< Back to Current Version

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Changes from March 6, 2023 to July 10, 2025

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with red strikethrough and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.


Poland: Background and U.S. Relations
March 6, 2023
Updated July 10, 2025 (R45784) Jump to Main Text of Report

Summary

Over the past three decades, the relationship between the United States and Poland has Over the past three decades, the relationship between the United States and Poland has
been close and cooperative. The United States strongly supported Polandbeen close and cooperative. The United States strongly supported Poland's accession to NATO in 1999 and s accession to
Derek E. Mix
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and backed its entry into the
Specialist in European
its entry into the European Union (EU) in 2004. European Union (EU) in 2004. Poland made strongCongress backed Poland's NATO and EU integration on a bipartisan basis. U.S. officials welcomed Poland's contributions to U.S.- and NATO- contributions to U.S.- and NATO-
Affairs
led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland and the United States continue to led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland and the United States continue to

work together closely on a range of foreign policy and international security issues, work together closely on a range of foreign policy and international security issues,

mostlymost notably in response to Russia notably in response to Russia’s 's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

U.S. policymakers widely regard Poland as a strategic frontline partner on NATO's eastern flank, and Trump Administration officials have characterized Poland as a model U.S. ally. Poland has been a focus of U.S. and NATO efforts to deter Russian aggression against NATO members. The United States has approximately 10,000 military personnel deployed in Poland. Arms purchases from the United States play a central role in Poland's armed forces modernization. In 2023 and 2024, the United States provided Poland with approximately $11 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) loans and loan guarantees to purchase U.S. defense articles and services.

Response to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In February 2023,
U.S. President Joe Biden visited Poland for the second time in 11 months.
Response to Russia’s War Against Ukraine
Poland has been a leader in Europe and NATO in supporting Ukraine following RussiaPoland has been a leader in Europe and NATO in supporting Ukraine following Russia’s February 2022 invasion.
's full-scale invasion in 2022. Poland is one of the leading providers of military assistance to Ukraine, and it Poland is one of the leading providers of military assistance to Ukraine, and it serveshas served as the main logistics and as the main logistics and
transit hub for international assistance to Ukraine. Poland also has taken in transit hub for international assistance to Ukraine. Poland also has taken in the most Ukrainian refugees of any
countryapproximately 1 million refugees from Ukraine. Polish leaders have urged the EU adopt the strongest possible sanctions against Russia. Poland. Polish leaders have urged the EU adopt the strongest possible sanctions against Russia. Poland’s support
for Ukraine has raised Poland’s profile in Europe and NATO and deepened the U.S.-Poland security and defense
relationship.
Domestic Political Situation
The conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) has led the government of Poland since 2015. Mateusz
Morawiecki (PiS) is Poland’s prime minister (head of government). The center-right Civic Platform (PO) is the
largest opposition party. Poland’ also has been a leading voice in calls for NATO members to increase their defense spending.

Political Situation

Prime Minister Donald Tusk of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party has led a coalition government in Poland since 2023. The conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party, which led the government of Poland from 2015 to 2023, is the largest opposition party. Poland's next parliamentary election is due to occur in autumn 2027.

Running as the candidate backed by PiS, Karol Nawrocki won Poland's 2025 presidential election. Nawrocki is scheduled to be inaugurated on August 6, 2025, succeeding Andrzej Duda, who won the 2015 and 2020 elections as the candidate backed by PiS. President Duda has blocked efforts by the Tusk government to undo a number of controversial changes to Poland's judicial system that PiS made during its time in government. Some of the measures adopted under the PiS-led government caused tensions between Poland and the EU. Analysts expect that Nawrocki will continue to block the Tusk government's judicial reform agenda.

Defense Spending and Security Concerns

As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Poland (at 4.1%) had the highest defense spending of any NATO member in 2024. Poland plans to spend 4.7% of GDP on defense in 2025. Poland has undertaken an ambitious initiative to expand the size of its armed forces and acquire a range of new military equipment. In addition to conventional military threats, Poland faces hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus such as cyberattacks, sabotage, and weaponized migration. Poland has taken steps to enhance the security of its borders with Russia and Belarus.

Energy Security

Over the past decade, and in particular since 2022, Poland has moved to end reliance on energy imports from Russia
s next parliamentary election is due to occur in autumn 2023.
Andrzej Duda is the president of Poland (head of state). Running as the candidate backed by PiS, Duda won a
second term in office in Poland’s 2020 presidential election.
Law and Justice has made changes to the country’s judicial system and enacted other reforms that have generated
concerns about democratic backsliding and caused tensions between Poland and the EU. As a result, the EU has
withheld approximately $38.9 billion in grants and loans that Poland applied for from the EU pandemic recovery
fund. The Polish government has initiated measures that attempt to address the EU’s concerns, but the dispute
remains unresolved.
Defense Modernization and U.S.–Poland Defense Cooperation
In 2022, Poland was one of nine NATO members to have met the alliance’s benchmark of spending at least 2% of
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Poland adopted
legislation that sets defense spending at a minimum of 3% of GDP and calls for doubling the size of the country’s
armed forces over the next five years.
Arms purchases from the United States play a central role in Poland’s armed forces modernization planning. Over
the past five years, U.S. defense sales to Poland have included F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, advanced Patriot air and
missile defense systems, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), and Abrams main battle tanks. In
addition, the United States has approximately 10,000 military personnel deployed in Poland. At the 2022 NATO
Summit, the United States announced that it would establish a permanent headquarters in Poland for the U.S.
Army’s V Corps to command U.S. rotational forces in Europe.
Energy Security
Poland has moved quickly to end reliance on Russia natural gas and oil imports, including by constructing a , including by constructing a
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal and a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal and a natural gas pipeline connecting Poland to Norway. The United States is Poland's largest supplier of LNG. A consortium of U.S. companies has signed an agreement with Polish authorities to build Poland's first nuclear power plant. Poland continues to rely heavily on coal for electricity generation.

Outlook and Issues for Congress

Given its role as a close U.S. ally
pipeline connecting Poland to Norwegian gas supplies. In 2022,
Poland announced a deal with the U.S. company Westinghouse to build six nuclear reactors in Poland by the mid-
2040s. Poland continues to rely on coal for more than two-thirds of its electricity generation.
Congressional Research Service


Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Outlook and Issues for Congress
Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, Poland and its relations with the United States are of continuing , Poland and its relations with the United States are of continuing
congressional interest. The main areas of interest include allied efforts to deter further Russian aggression and
support Ukraine, bilateral defense cooperation, the future of NATO, energy security, and concerns about
governance and democratic backsliding.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 5 link to page 8 link to page 18 Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1
Response to Russia’s War Against Ukraine ..................................................................................... 2
Military Assistance .................................................................................................................... 3
Refugee Support ........................................................................................................................ 3

Domestic Political Situation ............................................................................................................ 4
Controversial Reforms and Tensions with the EU .......................................................................... 7
The Economy .................................................................................................................................. 9
Defense Spending and Modernization ........................................................................................... 10
Energy Security .............................................................................................................................. 11
Relations with the United States .................................................................................................... 12
Defense Relations.................................................................................................................... 13
Economic Ties ......................................................................................................................... 13

Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 14

Figures
Figure 1. Poland: Map and Basic Facts ........................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Results of the 2019 Polish Parliamentary Election (Sejm) ............................................... 4

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 14


Congressional Research Service


Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction and Issues for Congress
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress consider Poland to be a strong ally of the United
States and one of the most pro-U.S. countries in Europecongressional interest. The main areas of interest have included bilateral defense cooperation, the future of NATO, Polish armed forces modernization, efforts to deter further Russian aggression, support for Ukraine, energy security, and economic relations.

Introduction and Issues for Congress

For decades, U.S. policymakers have considered Poland to be a strong ally of the United States and one of the most pro-U.S. countries in Europe. With strong backing from the United States (including the U.S. Congress), Poland was among the first group of post-communist countries to join NATO in 1999 and the European Union (EU) in 2004. Of the Central European and Baltic states that have joined NATO and the EU
. Of the Central European and Baltic
countries that have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union (EU) since the end of the Cold War, Poland is the most populous, has the largest economy, since the end of the Cold War, Poland is the most populous, has the largest economy,
and is the most significant actor in terms of security and defense issues. and is the most significant actor in terms of security and defense issues. In 1999, with strong
backing from the United States, Poland was among the first group of post-communist countries to
join NATO. In 2004, again with strong support from the United States, it was among a group of
post-communist countries to join the EU.
Figure 1. Poland: Map and Basic Facts

Figure 1. Poland: Map and Basic Facts
Area: Land area is about 120,728 sq. mi.; slightly smaller than New Mexico Land area is about 120,728 sq. mi.; slightly smaller than New Mexico.
Population: 37.654 mil ion.
approximately 38.75 million Ethnicity: 96.9% Polish 96.9% Polish.
Languages: Polish is the official language and first language of 98.2% of the population. Polish is the official language and first language of 98.2% of the population.
Religion: 85%84.6% Roman Catholic, Catholic, 12.913.0% listed as unspecified% listed as unspecified.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2024 (, 2022 (current prices): approximately $908.6 billion; per capita GDP approximately $24,800 ): $716.305 bil ion; per capita GDP $19,023.
Currency: złoty (PLN), $1=approx. PLN złoty (PLN), $1=approx. PLN 4.53.75, €1=approx. PLN 4.25 , €1=approx. PLN 4.75.
Political Leaders:
President: Andrzej Duda
Prime Minister: Mateusz Morawiecki
Foreign Minister: Zbigniew Rau
Defense Minister: Mariusz Błaszczak
Sources: Created by CRS using data from the U.S. Department of State and ESRI. Factual information from Created by CRS using data from the U.S. Department of State and ESRI. Factual information from
International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database ( (October 2022April 2025) and ) and CIA World Factbook. Especially since 2014, following Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine, Poland has become an increasingly important strategic partner for the United States. The United States and NATO have enhanced their defense posture on NATO's eastern flank, with Poland as a focal point for the U.S. military presence in the region. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022 has put security at the top of Poland's national agenda and further deepened U.S.-Poland security cooperation. Poland has been a leading provider of assistance to Ukraine and has played a central role in U.S. and international efforts to provide such assistance. As Poland prioritizes increasing its defense spending and expanding the size and capabilities of its armed forces, the United States provides significant security assistance to Poland, and the two countries maintain a multibillion-dollar arms sales relationship. Poland also has been a leading advocate for other NATO member countries to increase their defense spending. Members of the 119th Congress may be interested in developments in Poland and NATO's eastern neighborhood related to security concerns about Russia, as well as the implications of these developments for U.S. policy and NATO. Poland is among the principal U.S. partners in assessing and responding to these challenges. Numerous congressional delegations have visited Poland since 2022 to confer with Polish officials and conduct oversight of U.S. defense commitments and military activities in Central and Eastern Europe. CIA World Factbook.
Congressional Research Service

1

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the attendant effects on U.S. policy and NATO are likely
to remain priority issues of interest and relevance for the 118th Congress. Poland is a central
interlocutor and partner for the United States in responding to the war in Ukraine. Events in
Ukraine have deepened U.S.-Poland security cooperation and brought increased urgency to
security concerns along NATO’s eastern flank. Numerous congressional delegations have visited
Poland since early 2022 to confer with Polish officials and conduct oversight of U.S. defense
commitments and military activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Members of Congress
visiting Poland also have examined humanitarian efforts to address the refugee crisis caused by
the war in Ukraine.
Alongside the overall positive tone of U.S.-Poland relations and bilateral security cooperation,
some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about democratic backsliding and rule of
law issues in Poland since the country’s 2015 parliamentary election.
The Congressional Poland Caucus is a bipartisan group of Members of Congress who seek to The Congressional Poland Caucus is a bipartisan group of Members of Congress who seek to
maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Poland relationship and engage in issues of mutual interest to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Poland relationship and engage in issues of mutual interest to
both countries.1
Response to Russia’s War Against Ukraine
Poland is one of the international community’s biggest supporters of Ukraine and one of the
strongest critics of Russia. Historically, Poland has had a difficult relationship with Russia.
Poland’s view of Russia remains affected by the experience of Soviet invasion during World War
II and Soviet domination during the communist era. Over the past two decades, Polish leaders
have expressed warnings about the nature of Vladimir Putin’s government in Russia, tending to
view Russia as a potential threat to Poland and its neighbors. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in
2008 and its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 sharpened Polish concerns about Russia’s
intentions, and Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has put security at the top
of Poland’s national agenda.
Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated
that, “Russia wants to annihilate Ukraine as a sovereign state” and called the invasion an
existential threat to peace in Europe.2 Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau has described
Russia’s targeting of the civilian population and infrastructure in Ukraine as “state terrorism.”3
Polish President Andrzej Duda has called Russia’s war on Ukraine “totally unprovoked
aggression” and stated in January 2023 that it is “crucial to send additional support to Ukraine
specifically modern tanks and modern missiles.”4 Polish leaders have argued for harsh sanctions
against Russia, including the cancellation of energy imports and a total ban on trade, warned that
Russia will not stop its aggression with Ukraine, and advocated for the EU to offer Ukraine a path
to membership (the EU named Ukraine an official candidate country in June 2022).
Poland shares a 330-mile border with Ukraine. In November 2022, an errant Ukrainian air
defense missile landed on Polish territory, killing two people. Earlier, in March 2022, Russia
launched a missile attack against a military training base in Ukraine 15 miles from the Polish

1 For the 118th Congress, the co-chairs of the Congressional Poland Caucus are Representative Marcy Kaptur,
Representative Bill Keating, Representative Chris Smith, and Representative Mike Turner.
2 “Mateusz Morawiecki Calls for a Strong European Army,” Visegrad Post, March 1, 2022.
3 Margaret Besheer, “OSCE Chair: Russian Actions in Ukraine ‘State Terrorism’,” Voice of America, March 14, 2022.
4 John Irish, “Davos 2023-Polish President Says Crucial to Give Ukraine Modern Weapons,” Reuters, January 18,
2023. Judy Woodruff and Dan Sagalyn, “Poland President Andrzej Duda on Russia’s War in Ukraine, Putin’s Nuclear
Threats,” PBS News Hour, September 21, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

2

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

border, killings dozens of people. Such incidents have raised concerns about the conflict in
Ukraine potentially spreading to NATO member countries. (Poland also shares a 130-mile border
with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and a 260-mile border with Russia’s ally Belarus.)
Military Assistance
As of early 2023, Poland is the third largest donor of military aid to Ukraine, behind the United
States and the United Kingdom. Military assistance committed by Poland to Ukraine between
January 2022 and January 2023 was valued at approximately $2.64 billion and included 240 T-72
main battle tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, multiple rocket
launchers, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, mortars, small arms, and ammunition.5
In January 2023, Polish officials announced plans to transfer German-made Leopard main battle
tanks to Ukraine and urged other European countries to do likewise. Poland is training Ukrainian
personnel on operating Leopard tanks at a military base in Poland.6
Poland also functions as the main logistics center and transit hub for delivering international
military assistance to Ukraine. The city of Rzeszów, in southeastern Poland, has been a
particularly important focus of such activity.
Refugee Support
As of February 21, 2023, more than 1.56 million refugees from Ukraine had registered for
temporary protection in Poland since February 2022, the largest number of Ukrainian refugees
received by any country.7 In keeping with the EU Temporary Protection Mechanism adopted in
March 2022, registered Ukrainian refugees receive the same access to public services and social
benefits as Polish citizens.
Support thus far for assisting Ukrainian refugees has been widespread across Polish society and
political parties. In a February 2023 speech, President Duda noted that “there are no refugee
camps in Poland” due to the Polish people’s willingness to welcome Ukrainian refugees into their
homes.8 Poland shares many cultural and historical ties with Ukraine; in total, approximately 3.5
million Ukrainians live in Poland. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) estimates that the cost to Poland of hosting and supporting Ukrainian refugees totaled
€8.36 billion (approximately $9.2 billion) in 2022.9 Poland also is hosting a number of
international humanitarian relief efforts for the refugees. (For additional information, see CRS
Insight IN11882, Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis in Ukraine, by Rhoda Margesson and Derek
E. Mix.)

5 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker, February 21, 2023. According to the Kiel Institute’s
Ukraine Support Tracker, between January 24, 2022 and January 15, 2023, the United States committed military
assistance to Ukraine valued at €44.34 billion, the United Kingdom committed €4.89 billion, and Poland committed
€2.43 billion. Germany committed the fourth most military assistance to Ukraine, €2.36 billion, and Canada the fifth
most, €1.29 billion.
6 Lara Jakes, “Ukrainians Demonstrate Training on Leopard Tanks in Poland,” New York Times, February 13, 2023.
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Operational Data Portal, Ukraine Refugee Situation. As of
February 20, 2023, nearly 4.9 million refugees from Ukraine had registered for Temporary Protection or similar
national schemes in Europe.
8 Government of Poland, Message by the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda, February 24, 2023.
9 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Migration Outlook 2022, p. 105.
Congressional Research Service

3


Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Domestic Political Situation
Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS)
leads the government of Poland. United Right, an alliance of three political parties led by Law
and Justice, won the 2019 parliamentary election with 43.6% of the vote, giving the parties 235 of
the 460 seats in the Sejm, Poland’s lower house of parliament.10 (The coalition fractured in 2021,
depriving the government of a parliamentary majority; see below.) Law and Justice has led
Poland’s government since winning the 2015 election as the head of a similar electoral alliance
that received 37.6% of the vote and 235 seats in the Sejm.
Civic Coalition, a centrist electoral alliance of parties led by the center-right Civic Platform (PO)
party, came in second place in the 2019 election with 27.4% of the vote and 134 seats in the
Sejm.11 Civic Platform led the government of Poland from 2007 to 2015, and it has since been the
largest opposition party in the Sejm.
The Left (Lewica), an electoral alliance of left-wing parties, came in third place in the 2019
election with 49 seats; Polish Coalition, a center-right electoral alliance led by the Polish
Peasants’ Party (PSL), won 30 seats; Confederation Liberty and Independence (Konfederacja), an
electoral alliance of far-right parties, won 11 seats.
Figure 2. Results of the 2019 Polish Parliamentary Election (Sejm)

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Information from Poland National Electoral Commission, at https://pkw.gov.pl/
uploaded_files/1571084597_obwieszczenie_sejm.pdf.
In the 2019 election, the Law and Justice-led coalition lost the majority it had held in the 100-seat
Polish Senate, the country’s upper house of parliament, dropping from 61 seats to 48. Civic
Platform, other opposition parties, and independent candidates won 52 seats. Winning the Senate
allows opposition parties to propose amendments to legislation passed by the Sejm and to slow

10 The other parties in the 2019 United Right electoral alliance were the conservative-nationalist United Poland party,
led by Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro, and the socially conservative-economically liberal Agreement party. The
three parties subsequently formed a coalition government. Election results from the National Electoral Commission, at
https://pkw.gov.pl/uploaded_files/1571084597_obwieszczenie_sejm.pdf.
11 The other parties in the 2019 Civic Coalition electoral alliance were the liberal Modern (Nowoczesna) party, the
center-left Polish Initiative party, and the center-left Greens.
Congressional Research Service

4

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

down the legislative process. The two houses of parliament do not have equal status, however, as
the Polish Constitution “provides the Sejm with a dominant role in the legislative process.”12
Andrzej Duda, the president of Poland, won the 2015 and 2020 presidential elections as the
candidate backed by the Law and Justice party. He won re-election with 51.2% of the vote in the
second round of voting in 2020, defeating the Civic Platform candidate and mayor of Warsaw,
Rafał Trzaskowski, in Poland’s closest presidential election since the end of communism in 1989.
The president, who serves a five-year term, is Poland’s head of state and resigns party
membership upon election. The president exercises functions including making formal
appointments, overseeing the country’s executive authority, influencing legislation, representing
the state in international affairs, and acting as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.13
Jarosław Kaczyński is head of the Law and Justice party; many observers assert that Kaczyński
remains the most powerful politician in Poland who, as party chairman, exerts considerable
influence behind the scenes.14 Jarosław Kaczyński co-founded Law and Justice with his twin
brother Lech in 2001 and served as prime minister in 2006-2007. Lech Kaczyński was the
president of Poland from 2005 to 2010, when he died in an airplane crash in Russia that also
killed 95 other people, including many high-ranking Polish officials.
In winning the 2019 election, United Right received the largest share of the popular vote won by
any political party or electoral alliance in a Polish election since 1989, but was unable to increase
its number of seats in the Sejm.15 Voter support for Law and Justice increased despite strong
criticism of the party’s policies by domestic political opponents, European officials, and
international media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Particular targets of criticism
have included a series of reforms to the judicial system and public media, the government’s
contentious relationship with the EU, leaders’ anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
rhetoric and regional “LGBT-free zones,” and the tightening of restrictions on abortion. Critics
charge that the Law and Justice party’s policies and reforms since 2015 have undermined judicial
independence and damaged democracy in Poland (see Controversial Reforms and Tensions with
the EU
section below).
Analysts attribute the success of Law and Justice partially to a perception among its voters that
the party places strong emphasis on fulfilling election promises and reflecting the preferences of
its voters.16 Law and Justice has moved to reform national institutions, most notably the judiciary,
which it has argued were in need of rebalancing. The party, which has close ties with the Catholic
Church, has appealed to socially conservative voters by pushing back against perceived cultural

12 Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Sejm in the System of Power, at https://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/sejm/sejm.htm.
Only the Sejm decides on the final wording of legislation, and an absolute majority of the Sejm can vote to reject
amendments proposed by the Senate or to deny a Senate motion to reject proposed legislation. The Sejm alone decides
whether to accept or override a presidential veto, appoints the government and conducts oversight of its activities, and
appoints judges to the constitutional tribunal. The Senate has a role in making some official appointments, and the
consent of the Senate is required for constitutional amendments and ratifying international agreements. See Senate of
the Republic of Poland, How an Act Is Made? and The Role of the Senate in the Constitutional Structure of the Polish
State
, at https://www.senat.gov.pl/en/about-the-senate/senat-wspolczesny/.
13 See Official Website of the President of Poland, at https://www.president.pl/en/president/competences/.
14 Sarah Huemer, “Poland’s Kaczyński to Quit Government Role and Focus on Party Leadership,” Politico Europe,
October 13, 2021.
15 Members of the Sejm are elected to four-year terms through an open-list proportional representation system in which
there are 41 multi-member constituencies with between 7 and 20 members each. Members of the Polish Senate are
elected to four-year terms by plurality vote in 100 single-member constituencies.
16 Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, Poland’s 2019 Parliamentary Election, Warsaw Institute, November 5, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

5

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

liberalism and promoting itself as the defender of the “traditional family, Polish national identity,
and Christian values.”17
Civic Platform’s inability to make gains in the 2019 parliamentary election and its loss in the
2020 presidential election reflected analysts’ assertions that the party has struggled to find
effective leadership and promote a counter-narrative that broadens its support.18 Despite
arguments that Law and Justice policies endanger the country’s institutions and democracy,
observers note that Civic Platform and other opposition parties have had difficulties formulating a
persuasive campaign agenda other than a wish to defeat Law and Justice.19
Civic Platform received a boost in July 2021 when Donald Tusk, who was prime minister from
2007 to 2014 and president of the European Council (the leading political institution of the EU)
from 2014 to 2019, announced his return to national politics and intention to lead the party in the
next election.
In large part, Polish politics have become characterized by an entrenched social divide between
national-oriented social conservatives, represented by Law and Justice, and Western-oriented
liberals, represented by Civic Platform. In the 2019 election, Law and Justice and its allies
overwhelmingly won in the country’s more rural districts, while Civic Platform and other
opposition parties won mainly in Poland’s large cities. Many voters, including many younger
voters, shifted their support towards the ends of the political spectrum; parties comprising The
Left alliance and the Confederation of far-right parties re-entered the Sejm after being shut out in
the 2015 election.20
The United Right governing coalition has faced significant internal tensions. While there have
been disagreements about several policy issues, the in-fighting takes place in the context of a
power struggle between two rival wings of the coalition attempting to position themselves for the
future leadership of the political right in Poland. Prime Minister Morawiecki heads the relatively
moderate wing; Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro of the United Poland party leads a more
hardline faction.
In August 2021, Prime Minister Morawiecki fired the leader of the socially conservative-
economically liberal Agreement party from his post as a deputy prime minister amid tensions
over economic plans and a controversial media law. The departure of some Agreement members
from the government’s parliamentary caucus left the coalition with 228 members in the Sejm,
three short of a majority.21 The government has proceeded as a minority government, marshalling
the support of smaller parties and independent members to pass legislation.
The next parliamentary election is due in autumn 2023. As of February 2023, polling indicates
support for a Law and Justice-led coalition at 36%, versus 30% for Civic Coalition, 10% for the
new, centrist Poland 2050 party, 9% for the Left, and 7% for the far-right Confederation.22

17 Aleks Szczerbiak, “Why Is Poland’s Law and Justice Party Still So Popular?,” Polish Politics Blog, September 23,
2019.
18 Daniel Tilles, “Civic Platform Turns 20: Is Poland’s ‘Zombie Party’ Now Undermining Opposition to PiS?,” Notes
From Poland
, January 24, 2021.
19 Claudia Ciobanu, “Election Blues: Why Poland’s Opposition Keeps Losing,” Reporting Democracy - Balkan Insight,
July 22, 2020.
20 Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, Poland’s 2019 Parliamentary Election, Warsaw Institute, November 5, 2019.
21 See Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Current Members, at https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/poslowie.xsp.
22 “Poland - National Parliament Voting Intention,” Politico Europe, at https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/
poland/.
Congressional Research Service

6

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Controversial Reforms and Tensions with the EU
As noted above, the Law and Justice party-led government has been criticized by domestic
opponents and the EU for a range of controversial reforms related to social policies (including
those that affect women and LGBT rights), public media, and perhaps most prominently, the
judicial system. Critics charge that numerous moves enacted regarding the judicial system since
late 2015 subvert institutional checks and balances, undermine judicial independence and the rule
of law, and place the country’s courts under political control.23 Party leaders maintain that the
judicial system needed extensive reform because it was slow and inefficient, judges were not
properly vetted after the transition from communism to democracy, and procedures for selecting
new judges lacked fairness and accountability.24
Reforms to the judicial system have included the following:25
 Changes to the functioning of the country’s constitutional tribunal, a court
composed of 15 judges who decide whether legislation is constitutional. Critics
argue that the Law and Justice government has sought to diminish the
constitutional tribunal’s role as a systemic check on legislative power and to
mold it into a rubber stamp for the party’s policies.
 The replacement of the 15 judges on the National Council of the Judiciary with
new judges chosen by the Sejm; previously, other judges selected the members of
the council. The role of the National Council of the Judiciary is to select and
discipline the country’s judges and to safeguard the independence of the courts.
 New discretionary power for the justice minister (who is also the country’s
prosecutor general) to remove and replace district court judges.
 The establishment of a disciplinary chamber in the country’s Supreme Court with
the power to punish or dismiss judges based on their decisions or their criticism
of the government’s judicial reforms. (The government formally abolished the
chamber in June 2022; see below.)
Beyond the judicial system, a law adopted in 2016 granted the government the power to hire and
fire management of public broadcasting stations, a function previously performed by a non-
partisan National Broadcasting Council. The government subsequently established a new
National Media Council, controlled by Law and Justice members, to regulate broadcast media
and oversee public radio and television.26 The government maintained that the moves were
needed to correct political bias and restore balance in the public media. Critics argue that the
reforms have compromised the independence of public media and relegated it to publicizing the
government’s official narrative.27 The taxpayer-funded TVP, which encompasses a large network

23 See, for example, Brittany Benowitz, Threats to Judicial Independence – Not Discussion of the Holocaust – Are the
Real Threat to Polish Democracy
, American Bar Association, January 19, 2019 and Christian Davies, Hostile
Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts
, Freedom House, May 2018.
24 Rob Schmitz, “Poland’s Overhaul of Its Courts Leads To Confrontation With European Union,” NPR, February 13,
2020.
25 Alistair Walsh, “What Are Poland’s Controversial Judicial Reforms?,” Deutsche Welle, November 5, 2019.
26 Nathan Stormont, How Poland’s Government Set Out to Conquer a Free Press, Freedom House, June 28, 2017.
27 Dariusz Kalan, “Poland’s State of the Media,” Foreign Policy, November 25, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

7

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

of public television and radio stations, is Poland’s largest broadcaster and reaches by far the
largest audience in the country.28
Critics have raised additional concerns about media freedom in Poland after the energy company
PKN Orlen purchased regional newspaper publisher Polksa Press from a German publishing
company in 2020.29 PKN Orlen, which owns oil refineries, gas stations, and other energy assets in
multiple countries, is the largest company in Central Europe; the Polish state is the largest
shareholder in the company, and the Polish government controls the management. The acquisition
brought under Orlen’s control 20 of Poland’s 24 daily regional newspapers, 120 weekly
newspapers, and news websites with an estimated 17.4 million users.30
Multiple democracy indexes have registered declines in the quality of democracy in Poland. The
Nations in Transit 2022 report published by the non-governmental organization Freedom House,
measuring the quality of democratic governance in 29 countries in Europe and Eurasia,
downgraded Poland’s score for the eighth consecutive year due to concerns about democratic
backsliding.31 According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Poland was among the
10 most “autocratizing” countries globally between 2012 and 2022.32 Law and Justice leaders and
supporters dispute such portrayals, alleging that their political opponents have crafted an
exaggerated narrative in an attempt to undo the results of elections and block the government’s
ability to implement its agenda.
The European Union has undertaken a number of measures challenging the Law and Justice
party’s reforms. In 2016, the European Commission (the EU’s executive institution) launched an
inquiry into the effects of the judicial reforms and other controversial legislation in Poland. The
inquiry concluded that the measures “structurally undermine the independence of the judiciary”
and pose “a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland.”33 The Commission subsequently
proposed that the Council of the EU (the EU institution representing the national member state
governments) determine whether to initiate an “Article 7” procedure; Article 7 of the Treaty on
European Union allows for suspension of a member’s voting rights in the Council if it is found to
breach EU core values.34 The measure was never likely to be enacted, however, because Hungary
(which has similar tensions with the EU) vowed it would veto actions against Poland.
The Commission additionally launched a series of legal challenges asking the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) to suspend provisions of Poland’s judicial reforms and rule on their compatibility
with EU law. The Polish government has generally rejected the EU’s challenges, objecting that
the EU is interfering with the country’s sovereignty and does not understand its legal system, and
that the EU’s actions are politically motivated.35 In 2018, however, Poland complied with an EU

28 Rob Schmitz, “Poland’s Government Tightens its Control Over Media,” NPR, January 4, 2021.
29 “Court Looks Into Polska Press Takeover by Oil Giant PKN Orlen,” Reuters, June 7, 2022.
30 Jan Cienski and Paola Tamma, “Poland’s State-Run Refiner Becomes a Media Baron,” Politico Europe, December 7,
2020.
31 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2022, Poland, at https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/nations-transit/2022.
32 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization at
https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf.
33 European Commission, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 of 20 December 2017 Regarding the Rule of
Law in Poland Complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520
.
34 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach
by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law
, December 20, 2017.
35 Anna Wolska, “Polish Government Reacts To EU Court Ruling On Judicial Reform,” Euractiv, March 4, 2021.
Holly Ellyatt, “Controversial Judicial Reform Still ‘Needed,’ Polish Prime Minister Says After EU Battle,” CNBC,
January 22, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

8

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

court order suspending a law that allowed the president to decide whether to retire Supreme Court
judges over the age of 65. The episode marked the first time Law and Justice backtracked on any
major element of its controversial reform program. In 2021, the ECJ imposed a fine of €1 million
(approximately $1.1 million) per day until Poland complies with a ruling to dissolve the Supreme
Court disciplinary chamber.
The EU also developed a regulation linking regional funding from the EU budget to judicial
independence and rule of law standards (Poland is the largest beneficiary of such regional funds
from the EU budget) and included a provision in its pandemic recovery fund that links funding
access to rule of law criteria. Due to the ongoing dispute, the EU has continued to delay the
approval of €35.4 billion (approximately $38.9 billion) worth of grants and loans that Poland has
applied for from the EU pandemic recovery fund.36
President Duda prepared legislation that abolished the Supreme Court disciplinary chamber in
June 2022, but the EU asserted that the reforms and the structure replacing the chamber (the
Chamber of Professional Responsibility) did not satisfy its concerns about impartiality and
independence. In an effort to end the dispute and unlock the money from the pandemic recovery
fund, Prime Minister Morawiecki introduced new legislation in December 2022 that would move
judicial disciplinary matters to the country’s Supreme Court of Administration and make other
changes that had been negotiated with the European Commission.37 Some members of the
governing coalition oppose the changes, however, and President Duda has been cautious about
the bill, stating that he would study its compliance with the constitution “but also take into
account Poland’s sovereign right to shape the justice system in the way we, as Poles, want to.”38
In 2021, Poland’s constitutional tribunal ruled that sections of the Treaty on European Union that
grant the EU the power to set standards for the independence and impartiality of judges in all EU
member states are incompatible with Poland’s constitution. In challenging the principle of the
primacy of EU law, some observers suggested that Poland may be on a track to leave the EU,
although Law and Justice leaders have dismissed the notion.39 Surveys show that a large majority
of the Polish public views EU membership as beneficial.40
The Economy
Poland’s economy is among the most successful in Central and Eastern Europe. Starting with
post-communist reform programs in the 1990s and continuing beyond Poland’s accession to the
EU in 2004, pro-market policies and stable institutions have underpinned strong economic
growth, an expanding private sector, and a steady increase in per capita gross domestic product
(GDP).41

36 Piotr Buras, The Final Countdown: The EU, Poland, and the Rule of Law, European Council on Foreign Relations,
December 14, 2022.
37 Jan Cienski, “Poland’s Rule of Law Legislation Moves Forward—But Fights Remain,” Politico Europe, January 13,
2023.
38 “Poland’s New Judicial Reform in Limbo After President Voices Concerns,” Reuters, December 15, 2022.
39 “Poland: Ruling Party Chief Says ‘There Will Be No Polexit’,” Deutsche Welle, September 15, 2021.
40 Aleksandra Rebelińska, “Ponad 80 proc. Polaków za pozostaniem w Unii. Sondaż Kantar,” Bankier.pl, September
12, 2021.
41 For background on Poland’s economic development since communism, see World Bank, Lessons from Poland,
Insights for Poland: A Sustainable and Inclusive Transition to High-Income Status
, 2017, and Marcin Piatkowski, How
Poland Became Europe’s Growth Champion: Insights from the Successful Post-Socialist Transition
, Brookings
Congressional Research Service

9

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic negatively affected the economy, but less
so than in most other EU countries. The Polish economy contracted by 2.2% in 2020 (the EU as a
whole contracted by 5.7%), before rebounding with 5.9% growth in 2021 and 3.8% growth in
2022.42 Economic growth is projected to slow to 0.5% in 2023, as Poland’s economy faces
challenges from high inflation and encounters lower demand for exports due to a projected
economic slowdown in Poland’s main EU trading partners (Germany is Poland’s largest trading
partner). Economic growth is projected to reach 3.1% in 2024. Unemployment was low, at 3.2%
as of late 2022.
Although Poland joined the EU in 2004, it is not a member of the Eurozone.43 Poland continues to
use the złoty (PLN) as its national currency, and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008-2012
dampened Polish enthusiasm for adopting the euro. Under the terms of its EU accession treaty,
Poland is bound to adopt the euro as its currency eventually, but there is no fixed target date for
doing so.
Alongside the party’s right-wing ideology, Law and Justice has implemented a left-wing
socioeconomic policy focusing on redistribution and the reduction of income inequality. The
government’s flagship Family 500+ program, which provides a monthly PLN500 (approximately
$111) allowance per child, has proven especially popular with much of the electorate.44 The Law
and Justice-led government also has lowered the retirement age and increased the minimum
wage. With inflation driving a cost-of-living crisis ahead of the 2023 election, the government has
provided support packages that subsidize high energy costs for households and enterprises.
Since 2015, the Law and Justice-led government has sought to “repolonize” the economy by
using state-owned enterprises to acquire businesses in sectors such as banking, energy, and media.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, about half of Poland’s 20 largest companies are
state-controlled.45
Defense Spending and Modernization
According to NATO, Polish defense expenditures were an estimated 2.42% of GDP in 2022,
approximately $17.8 billion.46 (NATO member states have agreed to a target of spending at least
2% of GDP on defense.) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted Poland to adopt legislation in
2022 that increases defense spending to a minimum of 3% of GDP starting in 2023. The
legislation also calls for Poland to more than double the size of its armed forces over the next five
years, to 300,000 personnel.47 In January 2023, Prime Minister Morawiecki stated that he wants
to increase defense spending to 4% of GDP.48
Weapons and equipment purchases from the United States play a central role in Poland’s military
modernization program. Approximately $20 billion in U.S. Foreign Military Sales cases to

Institution, February 11, 2015.
42 Economic statistics from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022.
43 The twenty EU member countries that use the euro as their common currency are collectively referred to as the
Eurozone.
44 Anna Louie Sussman, “The Poland Model—Promoting ‘Family Values’ With Cash Handouts,” Atlantic, October 14,
2019.
45 Economist Intelligence Unit, Poland Country Report, February 2023.
46 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014-2022), June 27, 2022.
47 Matilde Stronell, “Poland Unveils Record 2023 Defence Budget,” Janes, September 1, 2022.
48 Alexandra Fouché, “Poland Boosts Defence Spending Over War in Ukraine,” BBC News, January 30, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

10

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Poland were active as of late 2022. Sales since 2016 have included 32 F-35 aircraft, 250 M1A2
Abrams main battle tanks and 116 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, Patriot-3+ integrated air and
missile defense systems, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), advanced air-to-air
and air-to-surface missiles, and Javelin anti-tank missiles. In September 2022, Poland requested
U.S. government approval for the purchase of 96 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, valued at
approximately $7 billion.49 Poland also is leasing MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States to
assist in conducting reconnaissance along Poland’s eastern border.
In 2022, Poland also concluded deals for arms purchases from South Korea valued at
approximately $12.3 billion. Purchases from South Korea include 189 K2 main battle tanks, 212
K9 self-propelled howitzers, 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft, and 288 K239 multiple rocket
launchers. Under the agreements, Poland intends to produce K2s and K9s domestically, and
eventually to have 1,000 K2s and nearly 700 K9s.50
Energy Security
Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Poland had taken steps to diversify its energy supplies
away from Russian oil and natural gas, including by expanding pipeline connections with its
European neighbors and constructing a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal that receives gas
from a U.S. supplier. Poland also was a leading opponent and critic of the halted Nord Stream 2
pipeline that would have increased direct Russian gas supplies to Germany via the Baltic Sea.
Before 2022, Poland had imported 53% of its gas from Russia. In April 2022, Russia halted
supplies of natural gas to Poland, ostensibly because of Poland’s refusal to comply with demands
to pay for gas deliveries in rubles. Polish officials described the cutoff as a breach of contract but
indicated they would be able to prevent shortages by importing gas (including LNG) from other
suppliers.51 Baltic Pipe, a new gas pipeline connecting Poland’s gas infrastructure to Norwegian
supplies via Denmark, became fully operational in November 2022.52 Also in November 2022,
Poland announced a $20 billion deal with the U.S. company Westinghouse to build six nuclear
reactors in Poland by the mid-2040s, with the first expected to come online in 2033.53 Overall,
Poland remains the most coal-dependent country in the EU, with coal accounting for
approximately 72% of Poland’s electricity generation in 2021.54 In February 2023, Russia halted
the delivery of oil via pipeline to Poland. The chief executive officer of Polish refining company
PKN Orlen stated that they had been prepared for the cutoff, had reduced Russian supplies to
10% of Poland’s oil imports, and would be able to compensate with other suppliers.55
Successive U.S. presidential administrations have encouraged EU member states to reduce energy
dependence on Russia through diversification of supplies and supply routes. Some Members of
Congress have expressed support for the Three Seas Initiative as a way to reduce Central and
Eastern European countries’ dependence on Russian energy. (See CRS In Focus IF11547, The
Three Seas Initiative
, by Sarah E. Garding and Derek E. Mix.) Since Russia’s war on Ukraine in

49 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Poland, October 31, 2022.
50 Daniel Tilles, “First Korean Tanks and Howitzers Arrive in Poland,” Notes From Poland, December 6, 2022.
51 “Ukraine War: Russia Halts Gas Exports to Poland and Bulgaria,” BBC News, April 27, 2022.
52 See Baltic Pipe Project, at https://www.baltic-pipe.eu/the-project/.
53 Wojciech Kość, “Poland Gives Details on $20B Nuclear Power Bid,” Politico Europe, November 2, 2022.
54 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Poland - Country Commercial Guide, Energy
Sector
, July 22, 2022.
55 “Russia Halts Pipeline Oil to Poland Says Refiner PKN Orlen,” Reuters, February 25, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

11

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

2022, the Biden Administration has strongly backed renewed efforts by the EU and its member
states to reduce dependence on Russian energy quickly.
Relations with the United States
Since the end of the Cold War, Poland and the United States have had close relations. The United
States strongly supported Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999, and Poland has become an
important U.S. security partner over the past two decades. Poland contributed large deployments
to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. The two countries
have considerable cultural ties, including nearly 10 million Americans of Polish heritage. The
United States granted Poland membership in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program in 2019, resolving a
long-standing irritant in bilateral relations.56
In February 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden travelled to Poland to commemorate the one-year
anniversary of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The trip—which included a surprise
visit to Kyiv, Ukraine, and a meeting with the leaders of NATO’s nine eastern flank countries—
was President Biden’s second trip to Poland in 11 months. During a speech in Warsaw on
February 21, 2023, President Biden opened by calling Poland “one of our great allies,” thanked
Poland for its support of Ukraine, and declared that, “Our support for Ukraine will not waver,
NATO will not be divided, and we will not tire.”57 In a subsequent speech on February 24, 2023,
President Duda stated that “the United States is the guarantee of security” in Europe.58 Poland is
among the strongest European voices in favor of retaining a leading U.S. role in European
security affairs.
While relations between Poland and the United States remain largely positive, there have been
concerns among some U.S. officials and Members of Congress since 2015 about the reforms
made by the Law and Justice party and their effect on the rule of law in Poland.59 In 2021, a
proposed media law (that President Duda eventually vetoed) and a new law affecting Holocaust-
era property restitution claims in Poland caused tensions with the Biden Administration and
additional concern from some Members of Congress.60 As a presidential candidate, Biden made
comments critical of the state of democracy in Poland; the tone of President Biden’s 2022 and
2023 visits to Poland, however, demonstrate that the war in Ukraine and Poland’s support for
Ukraine have shifted the priorities of the U.S.-Poland relationship toward a greater focus on
security issues.61

56 The Visa Waiver Program allows for visa-free travel to the United States for up to 90 days. See CRS Report
RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Abigail F. Kolker.
57 White House, Remarks by President Biden Ahead of the One-Year Anniversary of Russia’s Brutal and Unprovoked
Invasion of Ukraine
, February 21, 2023.
58 Government of Poland, Message by the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda, February 24, 2023.
59 See, for example,both countries.1 Political Situation Prime Minister Donald Tusk of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party leads the government of Poland. Tusk took office in December 2023 at the head of a coalition government consisting of the centrist Civic Coalition (KO, in which Civic Platform is the largest party), the conservative Polish People's Party (PSL), the centrist Poland 2050 party, and the left-wing Lewica (The Left) coalition.2 In the October 2023 parliamentary election, KO, PSL, Poland 2050, and Lewica won a combined 53.7% of the vote and 248 of the 460 seats in the Sejm (the lower house of parliament).3 The coalition government now holds 242 seats after one of the parties in Lewica switched to the opposition in October 2024. Tusk previously served as prime minister from 2007 to 2014 and as president of the European Council, the leading political institution of the EU, from 2014 to 2019.

Although the parties of the governing coalition have ideological differences, they united to deny a third consecutive term in government to the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party, which led the government of Poland from 2015 to 2023. In general, Polish politics are largely characterized by a divide between national-oriented social conservatives, represented by PiS, and Western-oriented liberals, represented by Civic Platform. PiS came in first place in the 2023 parliamentary election with 35.4% of the vote and 194 seats in the Sejm. However, it was unable to secure support from other parties to form a new government. The next parliamentary election is due to be held by October 2027.

In the 2023 election, the coalition parties won a combined 61 seats in the 100-seat Polish Senate (upper house of parliament), compared with 34 seats for PiS. The Senate may propose amendments to legislation passed by the Sejm, but the two houses do not have equal status; the Polish Constitution "provides the Sejm with a dominant role in the legislative process."4

Karol Nawrocki, a historian backed by PiS, won Poland's 2025 presidential election. Nawrocki defeated Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw and the candidate backed by Civic Coalition, by 50.9% to 49.1% in a second-round runoff vote held on June 1.5 The president, who serves a five-year term, is Poland's head of state and resigns party membership upon election. The president exercises functions including making formal appointments, representing the state in international affairs, and acting as commander in chief of the armed forces. The president also has the power to propose and veto legislation.6 Nawrocki is scheduled to be inaugurated on August 6, 2025. He succeeds Andrzej Duda, who won the 2015 and 2020 presidential elections as the candidate backed by PiS.

Some analysts observe that Nawrocki's victory is likely to extend political and legislative deadlock between Poland's prime minister and its president.7 During its eight years in government, PiS carried out numerous controversial reforms to the judiciary and public media that strained Poland's relations with the EU and raised strong objections from opposition parties.8 Critics charged that the some of the policies and reforms adopted by PiS undermined judicial independence and damaged democracy and rule of law in Poland. The Tusk government has sought to roll back many of these reforms, but President Duda vetoed some of the government's bills (requiring a 60% majority in the Sejm to override) and blocked others by referring them to the country's constitutional tribunal.9 The Tusk government contends that the tribunal lacks independence and that PiS unlawfully appointed several of the tribunal's judges and many of the country's other judges during its time in government.10 Some analysts assess that Nawrocki is likely to continue blocking the Tusk government's judicial reform agenda.11 Nawrocki's veto power also is likely to prevent the Tusk government from pursuing social reforms such as loosening abortion restrictions or legalizing same-sex marriage.

Some observers have criticized the Tusk government over rule-of-law issues, pointing to legal controversies about how it has undertaken its own public media and judicial reform efforts.12 The prosecution of some PiS officials over alleged offenses committed during their time in government also has generated controversy.13

The Tusk government's intentions to reform Poland's judicial system have improved relations between Poland and the EU. In February 2024, the EU released €137 billion (approximately $160 billion) in funding for Poland through 2027 that had been frozen due to the EU's rule-of-law concerns during the PiS-led government.14 In May 2024, the EU closed a procedure it had launched in 2017 to determine whether Poland was in breach of EU values relating to the rule of law.15

Economy Poland's economy is one of the most successful in Central and Eastern Europe. Starting with post-communist reform programs in the 1990s and continuing beyond Poland's 2004 EU accession, pro-market policies and stable institutions have underpinned strong economic growth and a steady increase in per capita gross domestic product (GDP).16

Poland's economic growth is among the strongest in the EU. The Polish economy grew by 2.9% in 2024 and is forecast to grow by 3.2% in 2025 and 3.1% in 2026.17 Unemployment is low, at 2.8% in 2024. Poland's economy continues to face challenges from relatively high inflation and weak demand from its main trading partners. In May 2025, year-on-year inflation in Poland was 3.5%, compared with the EU average of 2.2%.18 Germany is Poland's largest trading partner; in the first quarter of 2025, Germany was the destination for 27% of Poland's exports and the source of approximately 19% of Poland's imports.19

Although Poland joined the EU in 2004, it is not a member of the Eurozone, the group of 20 EU member states that use the euro as their common currency. Poland continues to use the złoty (PLN) as its national currency. Under the terms of its EU accession treaty, Poland is bound to adopt the euro as its currency eventually, but there is no fixed target date for doing so.

Response to Russia's War Against Ukraine Poland resolutely supports Ukraine and is one of the international community's strongest critics of Russia. Prime Minister Tusk has stated that "Poland's national interest requires unequivocal, lasting support for Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. This is non-negotiable."20 Historically, Poland has had a difficult relationship with Russia. Polish views of Russia remain affected by the experience of invasion by the Soviet Union during World War II and Soviet domination during the communist era. Over the past two decades, Polish leaders have warned about the nature of Russian President Vladimir Putin's government and tended to view Russia as a threat to Poland and its neighbors. Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 sharpened such concerns. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has put security at the top of Poland's national agenda. In a 2023 speech, President Duda asserted, "Russia sees Poland as a country that will either [be] subordinate to it and be dependent on it, or will be its enemy."21 Poland shares a 130-mile border with Russia's Kaliningrad exclave and a 260-mile border with Russia's ally Belarus; Poland also shares a 330-mile border with Ukraine.

According to the Kiel Institute, a nongovernmental organization that tracks aid to Ukraine, Poland committed approximately $4 billion in bilateral military assistance and $1.5 billion in financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine between January 2022 and April 2025.22 Military assistance has included hundreds of main battle tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, mortars, small arms, and ammunition. Poland also functions as the main logistics center and transit hub for delivering international military assistance to Ukraine. The city of Rzeszów, in southeastern Poland, has been a particularly important focus of such activity.

In addition to providing material assistance, Poland has hosted and conducted training for Ukrainian armed forces personnel.23 Prime Minister Tusk has stated that Poland does not plan to send armed forces personnel to Ukraine as part of a prospective future security guarantee but that Poland would provide logistical and political support should other countries decide to send their personnel to Ukraine.24

As of May 2025, approximately 1 million refugees from Ukraine were in Poland, making it the second-largest destination for Ukrainian refugees (behind Germany).25 The Kiel Institute estimates that the cost to Poland of hosting and supporting Ukrainian refugees from January 2022 through April 2025 was €29.3 billion (about $34.3 billion).26

In May 2025, Prime Minister Tusk joined other European leaders in calling on Russia to agree to an unconditional ceasefire and enter into peace negotiations.27 He subsequently stated, "The Russian side once again set conditions that were absolutely unacceptable, not only to Ukraine but to all of us."28 Polish leaders have supported strong EU sanctions against Russia and repeatedly argued for expanding the EU's sanctions further to increase pressure on Russia. Poland also has advocated for EU membership for Ukraine.29 The EU named Ukraine as an official candidate country in 2022 and opened accession negotiations with Ukraine in 2024.

Although Poland has been one of Ukraine's biggest supporters, there have been trade-related tensions between the two countries concerning imports of Ukrainian grain.30 Groups of Polish farmers periodically have blockaded crossing points at the Polish-Ukrainian border in protest over competing with cheaper imports from Ukraine. During the presidential election campaign, President-elect Nawrocki also adopted a critical tone toward Ukrainian refugees in Poland and other aspects of relations with Ukraine; in contrast to both Prime Minister Tusk and President Duda, Nawrocki has advocated against the idea of Ukraine joining NATO. Nevertheless, both the Tusk government and the opposition PiS back continued support for Ukraine and share the view that Russia is by far Poland's primary security threat.

Relations with the United States Since the end of the Cold War, Poland and the United States have had close relations. The United States strongly supported Poland's accession to NATO in 1999, and Poland has become a significant U.S. ally over the past 2½ decades. Poland contributed armed forces personnel to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. The two countries have considerable cultural ties, including more than 8 million Americans of Polish heritage.31 The United States granted Poland membership in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program in 2019, resolving a long-standing irritant in bilateral relations.32

Following Poland's 2025 presidential election, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement congratulating President-elect Nawrocki and asserting that

The United States and Poland share a strong and enduring partnership rooted in mutual commitment to security, prosperity, and the rule of law. The Polish people have spoken and support a stronger military and securing their borders. Poland is a model Ally and a key contributor to strengthening the NATO Alliance and its sovereign integrity against today's challenges and those ahead. Our cooperation in the energy sector—including nuclear energy—supports our expanding commercial ties and advances Poland's energy security.33

Defense cooperation between Poland and the United States is especially close and extensive. Poland has been a focus of U.S. and NATO efforts to deter Russian aggression in Europe and has played a central role in U.S. and NATO activities to aid Ukraine. In a February 2025 visit to Poland, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described Poland as a "strategic frontline partner on NATO's eastern flank" and stated that "we see Poland as the model ally on the continent, willing to invest not just in their defense, but in our shared defense and defense of the continent."34 The United States and Poland maintain a robust arms sales relationship (for more, see "Defense Spending and Modernization"). In 2023 and 2024, the United States provided Poland with more than $11 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) loans and loan guarantees to purchase U.S. defense articles and services.35

Poland also is among the strongest European voices in favor of retaining a leading U.S. role in European security affairs. In a 2023 speech, President Duda stated that "the United States is the guarantee of security" in Europe.36 Although they are political rivals who disagree on many domestic issues, both Civic Platform and PiS support a strong partnership with the United States. In 2024, Prime Minister Tusk and President Duda conducted a joint visit to the White House to mark the 25th anniversary of Poland's accession to NATO.37 At the same time, Prime Minister Tusk has advocated for Europe to build up its own defense capacity, arguing that Europe must simultaneously maintain close relations with the United States and become a stronger, more independent actor when it comes to defense. In March 2025, the prime minister stated, "The paradox is that 500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians. We must rely on ourselves, fully aware of our potential and with confidence that we are a global power."38

Although relations between Poland and the United States remain mostly positive, there have been some tensions between Tusk and the Trump Administration. During his time as president of the European Council, Tusk criticized President Trump on several occasions. In a February 2025 media interview, Prime Minister Tusk characterized President Trump as a "difficult partner" whose approach to the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia creates challenges for Poland and Europe, adding "but we must engage with him effectively, without illusions and without panic."39 At the February 2025 Munich Security Conference, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski described President Trump's direct outreach to Russian President Putin as a "mistake" and asserted, "the credibility of the United States depends on how this war ends."40

During Poland's 2025 presidential election campaign, the Trump Administration expressed support for Nawrocki (who ultimately won the election) over the candidate backed by Tusk. Prior to the election, Nawrocki visited with President Trump at the White House on May 1, 2025, and U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem endorsed Nawrocki during a speech in Poland later in the month.41 Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about rule-of-law issues in Poland under the Tusk government.42 Some U.S. officials during both the Biden Administration and the first Trump Administration, including some Members of Congress, previously expressed concerns about the rule of law in Poland during the PiS-led government.43 U.S. Military Presence in Poland

Approximately 10,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed in Poland. Many of the U.S. personnel in Poland are deployed under Operation Atlantic Resolve, a contingency operation launched in 2014 to deter potential Russian aggression against NATO by rotating U.S.-based military personnel into the countries of NATO's eastern flank. The United States and Poland signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2020 that supplements the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and streamlines cooperation on infrastructure construction and logistics.44

The U.S. military presence in Poland includes the following:45

  • the U.S. Army's V Corps forward headquarters at Camp Kosciuszko in Poznań, established as a permanent headquarters in 2022 to command U.S. rotational forces in Europe, support allies in the region, and improve allied interoperability;
  • a permanent U.S. Army Garrison Poland, based at Camp Kosciuszko to provide infrastructure support for U.S. forces in Poland;
  • the U.S. Army's 1st Infantry Division command, a staff battalion based at Bolesławiec;
  • a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team, deployed mainly in western Poland and conducting training and exercises throughout Poland and the region;
  • a rotational Combat Aviation Brigade task force, based at Powidz;
  • a rotational contingent of approximately 800 soldiers deployed near Orzysz in northeastern Poland as part of a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence multinational battlegroup;
  • a U.S. Air Force recurrent Aviation Detachment Rotation at Łask Air Base;
  • a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion based at Powidz to provide logistical support for Operation Atlantic Resolve;
  • a Long-Term Equipment Storage and Maintenance Complex at Powidz that hosts thousands of pieces of military equipment and vehicles; and
  • naval personnel assigned to an Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense base constructed by the United States in Redzikowo.
Economic Relations

In 2024, U.S. exports of goods and services to Poland were valued at $16.3 billion and U.S. imports of goods and services from Poland were valued at $18.0 billion. In 2023, U.S. direct investment in Poland was $15.8 billion and Poland's direct investment in the United States was $498 million. In 2022 (most recent data available), majority U.S.-owned affiliates employed approximately 232,600 people in Poland.46 U.S. companies with significant investment in Poland include Amazon, Citigroup, General Electric, IBM, Lear, Mars, Procter & Gamble, RTX, Whirlpool, and 3M.47 As Poland is a member of the EU, U.S. tariffs on products from the EU apply to Poland.

Defense Spending and Modernization Poland's national defense strategy has prioritized increasing defense spending, expanding the size of its armed forces, acquiring and developing new capabilities, and modernizing its military equipment.48 As a percentage of GDP, Poland had the highest defense spending of any NATO member in 2024; Poland's defense expenditures were equivalent to an estimated 4.1% of GDP, or approximately $35 billion.49 Poland plans to spend 4.7% of GDP on defense in 2025, and Polish officials have expressed support for President Trump's call for NATO members to spend 5% of GDP on defense.50 (In 2014, NATO member states agreed to a target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defense. At NATO's June 2025 summit, the allies committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035.)

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine prompted Poland to adopt a Homeland Defense Act calling for the Polish armed forces to double in size, from nearly 150,000 personnel at the time (111,500 active duty personnel and 32,000 territorial defense forces) to 300,000 personnel (250,000 active duty personnel and 50,000 territorial defense forces).51 The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 2025 lists the size of Poland's armed forces as 201,600 (164,100 active duty personnel and 37,500 territorial defense forces) as of February 2025.52 In a March 2025 speech to the Sejm, Prime Minister Tusk announced an initiative to provide military training to every adult male in Poland, with the goal of increasing the size of the Polish armed forces to 500,000 personnel, including reservists.53

Weapons and equipment purchases from the United States play a central role in Poland's military modernization program. According to the U.S. State Department, approximately $20 billion in U.S. Foreign Military Sales cases to Poland were active as of early 2025.54

Sales since 2016 have included the following:55

  • 32 F-35 aircraft;
  • 96 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters;
  • 250 M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and 116 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks;
  • Patriot-3+ integrated air and missile defense systems;
  • High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
  • advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles;
  • Javelin anti-tank missiles; and
  • F-16 aircraft upgrades and services.
Poland's equipment donations to Ukraine also have affected its own capabilities, adding urgency to the acquisition of replacement equipment to fill resulting gaps. In particular, since 2022, Poland has concluded deals for arms purchases from South Korea that reportedly are valued at more than $16 billion.56 Purchases from South Korea include 180 K2 main battle tanks (with a prospective deal for an additional 180), 212 K9 self-propelled howitzers, 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft, and 218 K239 multiple rocket launchers.57 Under the agreements, Poland intends to produce K2s and K9s domestically and eventually to have 1,000 K2s and nearly 700 K9s.

In addition to purchases from foreign suppliers, Poland has emphasized the development of its domestic defense industry. Polish defense companies supply the country's armed forces with equipment including Krab self-propelled howitzers, Borsuk infantry fighting vehicles, Rak self-propelled mortars, Piorun anti-aircraft missile systems, and Grot assault rifles.58

Poland also has been seeking to strengthen its capabilities in areas such as unmanned vehicles, the cyber and space domains, artificial intelligence, communications, and electronic warfare.

Under an initiative launched in 2024 called Shield East, Poland is constructing a defensive line along its borders with Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad exclave. Shield East, which has a planned completion date of 2028, is expected to detect and impede hostile forces or other threats through an array of advanced surveillance systems, physical barriers, anti-tank fortifications, bunkers, and minefields.59

Hybrid Threats

Analysts have observed that Russia frequently targets Poland and other NATO and EU member countries with a range of influence operations using hybrid warfare tactics such as cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage, and sabotage. The likely goals of such operations are to weaken, divide, or destabilize targeted societies without triggering direct military conflict.60 Many of Russia's hybrid activities since 2022 additionally appear intended to undermine support for Ukraine by pressuring or intimidating countries that have provided such support.

The main categories of operations employed by Russia against Poland include the following:

  • Cyberattacks and Disinformation Campaigns. Polish officials accused Russia of attempting to interfere in Poland's 2025 presidential election by spreading disinformation and conducting cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. In a May 2025 speech prior to the election, Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski stated, "We are currently witnessing unprecedented Russian interference in the electoral process. Not on the side of a specific party or force, but generally on the Polish political scene. Russia sees us as a target."61 Gawkowski asserted that Russia's military intelligence agency had doubled information and cyber activities targeting Poland compared with the previous year.62
  • Espionage and Sabotage. In April 2025, Poland's Internal Security Agency reported that since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the agency had detained 44 people in relation to spying or sabotage in Poland on behalf of Russia or Belarus.63 Those apprehended have included Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians, and Poles accused or convicted in connection with incidents including an arson attack against a Warsaw shopping center, surveillance of sensitive military locations, and plans to attack Polish railways carrying supplies for Ukraine.64 Since 2023, there also have been several incidents of suspected sabotage in the Baltic Sea involving vessels damaging underwater infrastructure by dragging their anchors across the seabed.65 In January 2025, NATO launched a new mission (Baltic Sentry) to increase its presence in the Baltic Sea and improve the allies' ability to protect critical infrastructure.66 In May 2025, Poland's armed forces intervened to divert a Russian tanker vessel reported to have performed suspicious maneuvers in the Baltic Sea near an underwater power cable connecting Poland and Sweden.67 Weaponized Migration. Some analysts and European officials assert that Russia and its ally Belarus have sought to use migration to destabilize the EU. Since 2021, tens of thousands of migrants, primarily from countries in the Middle East and Africa, have traveled to Russia and Belarus and subsequently have attempted to enter the EU illegally through Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.68 Prime Minister Tusk has described these migration flows as "state-led operations involving the regimes in Minsk and Moscow." 69 In response, Poland's government has made the security of its eastern border one of its top priorities. Poland has deployed armed forces personnel to reinforce border guards, constructed a barrier fence along its border with Belarus, invested in cameras and sensors, and adopted a law allowing the government to temporarily suspend the right to seek asylum.70Energy Security Since the 2000s, successive U.S. Administrations and some Members of Congress have encouraged EU member states to reduce energy dependence on Russia through diversification of supplies and supply routes.71 Prior to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Poland had taken steps to diversify its energy supplies away from Russian oil and natural gas, including projects to expand pipeline connections with its European neighbors and the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at Świnoujście. Poland also was a leading opponent of Russia's halted Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have increased direct Russian gas supplies to Germany via the Baltic Sea.

    As of 2020, Poland received about half of its natural gas imports and two-thirds of its oil imports from Russia.72 In April 2022, Russia halted supplies of natural gas to Poland, ostensibly because of Poland's refusal to comply with new Russian demands to pay for gas deliveries in rubles. Poland has been able to prevent shortages by importing gas from other suppliers.73 The United States is Poland's main LNG supplier, followed by Qatar.74 The Baltic Pipe, a new pipeline enabling import of Norwegian natural gas via Denmark, became fully operational in late 2022.

    Poland has not imported oil directly from Russian companies since February 2023, when Russia halted delivery to Poland via the northern branch of Druzhba oil pipeline, which runs from Russia, through Belarus, to Poland and Germany. In June 2023, the EU subsequently banned the import of Russian oil through the northern branch of the Druzhba pipeline (as part of broader EU sanctions measures targeting Russian energy exports).75 The main suppliers of oil to Poland include Saudi Arabia, Norway, the United States, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and the United Kingdom.76

    In April 2025, a consortium of U.S. companies Westinghouse and Bechtel signed an agreement with Polish authorities to proceed with the construction of Poland's first nuclear power plant.77 The Polish government has allocated approximately $15 billion for the project, covering about one-third of the total costs, and expects the plant to begin operations in 2036.78 Poland reportedly plans to finance the remainder of the costs through borrowing from international financial institutions, potentially including the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the U.S. International Development Financing Corporation.79

    Poland is a significant producer of coal and remains the most coal-dependent country in the EU, with coal accounting for approximately one-third of Poland's total energy supply and 60% of electricity generation in 2023.80

    Outlook

    Russia's war against Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security outlook along NATO's eastern flank and elevated Poland's role in European security.81 Poland is likely to continue acting as a leader in NATO and Europe in providing support to Ukraine and advocating for both a strong stance against Russia and increased defense spending among NATO members. Poland also is likely to remain a strong U.S. ally and an increasingly important U.S. partner in Europe, especially in terms of security and defense cooperation.

    In the 119th Congress, some Members of Congress may have an interest in

    • assessing and monitoring the deployment of U.S. military personnel and equipment to Poland. Related congressional action may include continuing oversight of regional U.S. defense policy and commitments.
    • assessing the development and capabilities of Poland's armed forces, including the role of U.S. Foreign Military Sales and the provision of U.S. security assistance. Congressional actions in these areas may include making decisions about security assistance appropriations and conducting oversight of related executive branch programs and activities.
    • assessing security threats to Poland posed by Russia and Belarus, including conventional military threats and hybrid threats such as sabotage, cyberattacks, and weaponized migration. Related congressional action may include continuing oversight of regional U.S. defense policy and commitments and engaging in oversight of U.S. policies toward countering hybrid threats against NATO countries.
    • conferring with their Polish counterparts and other Polish officials on wartime developments in Ukraine and Poland's role in efforts to support Ukraine. Related congressional action may include making decisions about potential security assistance to Ukraine, making decisions about potential additional sanctions against Russia and continued coordination with EU sanctions, and conducting oversight of U.S. policies toward Ukraine and Russia.
    • remaining informed about governance and rule of law issues in Poland. Members of Congress may have an interest in monitoring political developments in Poland in advance of the country's parliamentary election due to occur by autumn 2027.
    • assessing Poland's transition away from Russian oil and natural gas supplies, including purchases of LNG from the United States and cooperation with the United States in the development of a nuclear power plant. Related congressional action may include legislation and continuing oversight relating to U.S. policies toward European energy security.

    Footnotes

    1.

    For the 119th Congress, the cochairs of the Congressional Poland Caucus are Rep. Marcy Kaptur, Rep. Bill Keating, Rep. Chris Smith, and Rep. Mike Turner.

    2.

    The Polish People's Party and Poland 2050 ran in the 2023 parliamentary election as an electoral alliance called Third Way.

    3.

    Election results from National Electoral Commission, Polish Parliamentary Elections 2023, October 15, 2023.

    4. Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Sejm in the System of Power, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/sejm/sejm.htm. Also see Senate of the Republic of Poland, How an Act Is Made?, and The Role of the Senate in the Constitutional Structure of the Polish State, https://www.senat.gov.pl/en/about-the-senate/senat-wspolczesny/. 5.

    National Electoral Commission, Election of the President of the Republic of Poland 2025, June 2, 2025.

    6. See Official Website of the President of Poland, https://www.president.pl/en/president/competences/. 7.

    Maciej Bukowski, Gridlock Wins: What Next for Poland?, Center for European Policy Analysis, June 4, 2025.

    8.

    See, for example, Dariusz Kalan, "Poland's State of the Media," Foreign Policy, November 25, 2019; Alistair Walsh, "What Are Poland's Controversial Judicial Reforms?," Deutsche Welle, November 5, 2019.

    9.

    Jakub Jaraczewski, "Poland's Ongoing Rule-of-Law Crisis Explained," Notes From Poland, March 17, 2025.

    10.

    Ministry of Justice of Poland, A Package of Healing Solutions for the Constitutional Tribunal, March 4, 2024.

    11.

    Aleks Szczerbiak, "What Is at Stake in Poland's Presidential Election?," Notes from Poland, May 28, 2025.

    12.

    Daniel Tilles, "More Poles Believe Rule of Law Has Worsened Under Tusk Government Than Improved," Notes From Poland, January 5, 2025; Raphael Minder, "Inside Donald Tusk's Divisive Campaign to Restore Polish Democracy," Financial Times, February 18, 2024.

    13.

    Katarzyna-Maria Skiba and Dominika Cosic, "Former Polish PM Morawiecki Faces Prison over Alleged Abuse of Power," Euronews, February 28, 2025; "Polish Central Bank Chief's State Tribunal Case: What You Need to Know," TVP World, May 24, 2024.

    14.

    Jorge Liboreiro, "Breaking Down the €137 Billion in EU Funds That Brussels Has Unfrozen For Poland," Euronews, February 29, 2024.

    15.

    European Commission, Commission Intends to Close Article 7(1) TEU Procedure for Poland, May 5, 2024.

    16.

    Dominik Kopiński et al., The Big Bang Enlargement: 20 Years of Central Europe's Membership in the EU, Polish Economic Institute, April 2024.

    17.

    International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Figures rounded to the nearest tenth of a percentage.

    18.

    Eurostat, "Annual Inflation Down to 1.9% in the Euro Area," June 18, 2025.

    19.

    Statistics Poland, "Foreign Trade Turnover of Goods in Total and by Countries in January–April 2025," June 13, 2025.

    20.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Historic Summit in London – Western Leaders Stand Together for Security and Ukraine," March 2, 2025.

    21.

    President of the Republic of Poland, "Poland's Foreign Policy Seeks Russia's Strategic Defeat Andrzej Duda Says," June 19, 2023.

    22.

    Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker, June 16, 2025.

    23.

    NATO, "Ukrainian Troops Train in Poland to Master Allied Leopard 2 Tanks," December 10, 2024; NATO, "Ukrainian Soldiers Train in Combined Arms Warfare in Poland," December 18, 2023.

    24.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Prime Minister After Informal Paris Summit: Europe Must Strengthen Its Defense," February 17, 2025.

    25.

    United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Operational Data Portal, Ukraine Refugee Situation.

    26.

    Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker, June 16, 2025.

    27.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Prime Minister Tusk in Kyiv: We Call on Russia to Accept Unconditional Ceasefire," May 10, 2025.

    28.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "United for Peace: Europe Rallies to Increase Pressure on Russia," May 16, 2025.

    29.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Joint Statement by Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy," January 15, 2025.

    30.

    Emma Dodd and Caitlin Welsh, Fracturing Solidarity: The Grain Trade Dispute Between Ukraine and the European Union, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 20, 2024.

    31.

    United States Census Bureau, "Polish-American Heritage Month: October 2023," October 2023.

    32.

    See CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Abigail F. Kolker.

    33.

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, "On Poland's Presidential Election," U.S. Department of State, June 2, 2025. See also Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, "Poland's National Day," U.S. Department of State, May 3, 2025.

    34.

    U.S. Department of Defense, "Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Polish Deputy Prime Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz Hold Joint Media Availability," February 14, 2025.

    35.

    U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Bolsters Poland with $4 Billion FMF Loan Guarantee, Totaling Over $11 Billion in Loan Support," December 5, 2024.

    36.

    Government of Poland, "Message by the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda," February 24, 2023.

    37.

    White House, "Remarks by President Biden, President Andrzej Duda, and Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland Before Bilateral Meeting," March 13, 2024.

    38.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Historic Summit in London – Western Leaders Stand Together for Security and Ukraine," March 2, 2025.

    39.

    "Europe Must Adapt to Shifting U.S. Priorities: Polish PM," PolskieRadio, February 28, 2025.

    40.

    Munich Security Conference, Europole? The Old Continent's New Geopolitical Role, Panel Discussion, February 15, 2025, https://securityconference.org/en/msc-2025/agenda/event/europole-the-old-continents-new-geopolitical-role/.

    41.

    TVP World (@TVPWorld_com), "The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem Said That Karol Nawrocki Should Be the Next President of Poland," X post, May 28, 2025; White House (@WhiteHouse), "President Donald J. Trump Welcomes Polish Presidential Candidate Karol Nawrocki to the Oval Office," X post, May 1, 2025.

    42.

    House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Chairman Mast, Republicans Blast EU Inaction as Polish Globalists Undermine Free Election," May 27, 2025; "Vance Letter to Blinken on Poland Media Freedom," posted on Scribd, January 11, 2024.

    43. See, for example, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, "Poland's Troubling Legislation," U.S. Department of State, August 11, 2021;
    Office of Representative Jamie Raskin, Office of Representative Jamie Raskin, "House Democrats Urge Pence to Address Poland’s
    's Democratic Erosion
    ,," August 30, 2019, U.S. Department of State, August 30, 2019, U.S. Department of State, "Poland: Independence of the Judiciary,," July 21, 2017 July 21, 2017;
    and and "U.S. Senators Urge Poland to Respect Democracy, Rule of Law,U.S. Senators Urge Poland to Respect Democracy, Rule of Law," Reuters, February 14, 2016. 44.

    U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, August 15, 2020.

    45.

    Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland, "Increasing the U.S. Military Presence in Poland," accessed April 2, 2025.

    46.

    Statistics from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, PolandInternational Trade and Investment Country Facts.

    47.

    American Chamber of Commerce in Poland and SGH Warsaw School of Economics, American Companies in Poland, June 2023.

    48.

    Krystyna Marcinek and Scott Boston, Polish Armed Forces Modernization: A New Cornerstone of European Security?, RAND, May 29, 2025; Robert Czulda, "Poland's Future Armed Forces Take Shape," European Security & Defence, September 3, 2024.

    49.

    NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014-2024), June 17, 2024.

    50.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Prime Minister After Informal Paris Summit: Europe Must Strengthen Its Defense," February 17, 2025; Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, "The Speech of Polish Prime Minister at the European Parliament: 'Europe Is Not Yet Lost as Long as We Are Alive,'" January 22, 2025.

    51.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "More Troops and More Money for Defence—The Council of Ministers Adopted a Draft Homeland Defence Act," February 22, 2022.

    52.

    International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2025, p. 121.

    53.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Prime Minister in Parliament: Hope Cannot Replace Strategy," March 7, 2025. Also see Katarzyna-Maria Skiba, "Poland Says It Plans to Give Every Adult Male Military Training," Euronews, March 8, 2025.

    54.

    U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Poland, January 20, 2025.

    55.

    Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Poland, https://www.dsca.mil/tags/poland.

    56.

    Bartosz Głowacki, "Will S. Korea's Drama Cause Problems, Or Savings, For Poland's Large Weapon Buys?," Breaking Defense, January 27, 2025.

    57.

    Dylan Malyasov, "Poland to Buy More K2 Tanks in $6.2B Deal," Defence Blog, March 9, 2025.

    58.

    Mariusz Błaszczak, "Breakthrough for the Polish Armed Forces," Polska Zbrojna, May 30, 2023.

    59.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "'Shield East'—An Investment in Peace and Security," October 14, 2024.

    60.

    See CRS In Focus IF12865, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Services, by Andrew S. Bowen.

    61.

    Mariusz Marszałkowski, "Defence24 Days 2025: The Largest Defence and Security Conference in CEE Has Started," Defence24, May 6, 2025.

    62.

    PolskieRadio, "Poland Faces 'Unprecedented' Russian Election Interference: Deputy PM," May 6, 2025.

    63.

    Polska Agencja Prasowa, "Poland Detains Ukrainian Suspected of Spying For Russia," April 1, 2025.

    64.

    TVP World, "Poland to Close Russian Consulate After Evidence Kremlin Ordered 2024 Arson Attack," May 12, 2025; Anjou Kang-Stryker and Janusz Bugajski, Poland on the Frontlines Against Russia's Shadow War, Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 8, 2025.

    65.

    Juraj Majcin, Battle of the Baltic: Safeguarding Critical Undersea Infrastructure, European Policy Centre, April 22, 2025; Kinga Dudzińska, Security of Critical Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region, Polish Institute of International Affairs, January 16, 2025.

    66.

    NATO, "NATO Launches 'Baltic Sentry' to Increase Critical Infrastructure Security," January 14, 2025; Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "'Baltic Sentry—A New NATO Mission," January 14, 2025.

    67.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "The Baltic on High Alert: Poland Takes Action Against 'Shadow Fleet,'" May 22, 2025.

    68.

    Stanisław Żaryn, Government Plenipotentiary for the Security of Information Space of the Republic of Poland, "The Kremlin's Operation Against Poland," April 28, 2023; Anna Maria Dyner, The Border Crisis as an Example of Hybrid Warfare, Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022.

    69.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Poland Effectively Protects the EU Border," March 22, 2025.

    70.

    Adam Easton and Ian Aikman, "Poland Suspends Migrants' Right to Apply for Asylum," BBC News, March 27, 2025; Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Poland Effectively Protects the EU Border," March 22, 2025; Lorne Cook, "Poland Wants the EU Focused on Security. Its Border with Belarus Highlights the Challenges," Associated Press, January 20, 2025.

    71.

    The European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-94, Title XX, Div. P), for example, directs relevant U.S. agencies' heads to prioritize energy infrastructure project support in Europe and Eurasia. Some Members of Congress also have expressed support for the Three Seas Initiative as a way to reduce European countries' dependence on Russian energy. See CRS In Focus IF11547, The Three Seas Initiative, by Sarah E. Garding and Derek E. Mix.

    72.

    Joanna Maćkowiak-Pandera and Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, The End of Energy Resource Imports from Russia?, Forum Energii, February 28, 2022.

    73.

    BBC News, "Ukraine War: Russia Halts Gas Exports to Poland and Bulgaria," April 27, 2022.

    74.

    LNG Prime, "Polish LNG terminal receives 300th cargo," July 23, 2024; CEENERGYNEWS, "Another 'Record Year' For Poland's LNG Imports," January 8, 2024.

    75.

    Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 Amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View Of Russia's Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine.

    76.

    Magdalena Maj, Energy Without Russia: Country Report Poland, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, July 18, 2023.

    77.

    U.S. Department of Energy, "United States Signs Agreement to Advance American Civil Nuclear Deal in Poland," April 28, 2025; U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Poland, "FACT SHEET: United States and Poland Announce Deepening Collaboration on Energy Security and Nuclear Energy," November 2, 2022.

    78.

    Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, "Poland and U.S. Sign Bridge Agreement for First Nuclear Power Plant," April 28, 2025.

    79.

    David Dalton, "U.S. Development Finance Corporation Signs Letter of Intent for $979 Million Nuclear Loan," NucNet, November 13, 2024; Alan Charlish, "Poland Says It Receives U.S. Interest in Financing First Nuclear Power Plant," Reuters, November 13, 2024.

    80.

    International Energy Agency, Energy System of Poland, accessed July 7, 2025.

    81.

    See, for example, Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte, Power Moves East: Poland's Rise as a Strategic European Player, Danish Institute for International Studies, November 5, 2024.

    Reuters, February 14, 2016.
    60 See Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, Poland’s Troubling Legislation, U.S. Department of State, August 11,
    2021 and Office of Senator Marco Rubio, Rubio, Baldwin, Lankford, Rosen, Colleagues Urge Polish President to
    Clearly Oppose Bill that Would Prevent Holocaust Restitution Claims
    , July 19, 2021.
    61 Emily Rauhala, “Poland Was Once an Outcast in Europe. Then Russia Invaded Ukraine,” Washington Post, February
    21, 2023.
    Congressional Research Service

    12

    Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

    Defense Relations
    Defense cooperation between Poland and the United States is especially close and extensive.
    Poland has been a core focus of U.S. and NATO efforts to deter Russian aggression in the region.
    There were approximately 10,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in Poland as of early 2023.
    More than 4,000 U.S. personnel, including elements of an Armored Brigade Combat Team and a
    Combat Aviation Brigade, are deployed to Poland as part of the European Deterrence Initiative’s
    Operation Atlantic Resolve.62 The United States also is the lead nation in a multinational
    battlegroup stationed in Poland as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.63 The number of
    U.S. military personnel in the country increased to approximately 10,000 after the United States
    deployed approximately 4,700 additional personnel to Poland in February 2022 as a reassurance
    and deterrence measure in the context of Russia’s military build-up on its border with Ukraine.64
    The United States is building an Aegis Ashore facility in Poland as part of the NATO Ballistic
    Missile Defense program; U.S. officials expect the facility to become operational in 2023.65 The
    two countries signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2020 that supplements the
    NATO Status of Forces Agreement, streamlines cooperation on infrastructure construction and
    logistics, and enables the eventual presence of 1,000 additional U.S. soldiers in Poland. At the
    June 2022 NATO Summit, the United States announced that it would establish a permanent
    headquarters for the U.S. Army’s V Corps in Poznań, Poland to command U.S. rotational forces
    in Europe.66
    The United States provides significant security assistance to Poland. In September 2022, the
    United States obligated $288.6 million in FY2022 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds to
    Poland in order to help build the capacity of the Polish armed forces and deter against threats to
    Poland’s territorial sovereignty.67 As noted in the Defense Spending and Modernization section,
    the United States and Poland maintain a robust arms sales relationship.
    Economic Ties
    According to the U.S. Department of State, “Relatively strong economic growth, a large domestic
    market, tariff-free access to the European Union (EU), political stability, and a relatively low-cost
    well-educated workforce are prime reasons that U.S. companies do business in Poland.”68 As
    Poland is a member of the EU, the U.S.-Poland economic and trade relationship is set in the wider
    context of the U.S.-EU economic and trade relationship. In 2021, U.S. direct investment in
    Poland was $13.4 billion, U.S. exports of goods and services to Poland were valued at $7.6
    billion, and U.S. imports of goods and services from Poland were valued at $11.9 billion.69 In

    62 U.S. Army Europe and Africa, Operation Atlantic Resolve, at https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/AtlanticResolve/.
    63 NATO, Enhanced Forward Presence, Present Structure, at https://shape.nato.int/efp/efp/present-structure.
    64 U.S. Department of Defense, Posture Updates in Support of Allies in Europe, March 9, 2022 and February 22, 2022.
    65 Andrew Eversden, “Missile Defense Chief ‘Confident’ Poland’s Aegis Ashore Ready in 2023,” Breaking Defense,
    August 12, 2022.
    66 Ministry of National Defence (Poland), The Permanent HQ for US Army’s V Corps Will Be Established in Poland,
    June 30, 2022.
    67 U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Poland, United States Invests $288.6 Million in New Foreign Military Financing for
    Poland
    , September 29, 2022.
    68 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Poland, January 20, 2021.
    69 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Poland - International Trade and Investment Country
    Facts
    .
    Congressional Research Service

    13

    Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

    2020, majority U.S.-owned affiliates employed approximately 211,900 people in Poland.70 U.S.
    companies with significant investment in Poland include Amazon, Citigroup, Discovery
    Communications, General Electric, IBM, Lear, Mars, Procter & Gamble, United Technologies,
    and Whirlpool.71
    Outlook
    Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security outlook along NATO’s
    eastern flank and elevated Poland’s role in allied efforts related to European security. Poland is
    likely to continue acting as a leader in NATO and Europe in providing support to Ukraine and
    advocating for a strong stance against Russia. Russia’s war against Ukraine and Poland’s role in
    supporting Ukraine are likely to bring about a continued deepening of U.S.-Poland security and
    defense cooperation.
    Members of Congress may
     continue to confer with their Polish counterparts and the Biden Administration on
    wartime developments in Ukraine, Poland’s role in the transatlantic effort to
    support Ukraine, and the ongoing security threats posed by Russia.
     monitor the deployment of U.S. military personnel and equipment to Poland.
    Related congressional action may include continuing oversight of regional U.S.
    defense policy and commitments.
     track efforts to bolster the capabilities of Poland’s armed forces, including
    through defense sales and the provision of U.S. security assistance.
    Congressional actions in these areas may include continuing security assistance
    appropriations and conducting oversight of related executive branch programs
    and activities.
     remain informed about democracy, governance, and rule of law issues in Poland.
    Members of Congress may have an interest in monitoring political developments
    in relation to the Polish parliamentary election due to occur in autumn 2023.
     examine Poland’s transition away from Russian oil and natural gas supplies.
    Related congressional action may include continued oversight of U.S. policies
    toward European energy security, including funding for the Three Seas Initiative.



    Author Information

    Derek E. Mix

    Specialist in European Affairs


    70 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Poland - International Trade and Investment Country
    Facts
    .
    71 American Chamber of Commerce in Poland and KPMG, 30 Years of American Investments in Poland, April 2020.
    Congressional Research Service

    14

    Poland: Background and U.S. Relations


    Acknowledgments
    CRS Visual Information Specialist Amber Wilhelm and CRS Information Research Specialist Hannah
    Fischer created the graphics for this report.

    Disclaimer
    This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
    shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
    under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
    than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
    connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
    subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
    material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
    copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

    Congressional Research Service
    R45784 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED
    15