Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Changes from February 13, 2023 to September 14, 2023

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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and
~~February 13~~September 14, 2023 , 2023
Intelligence Aspects
Andrew S. Bowen
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s
Analyst in Russian and Analyst in Russian and
deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s
European Affairs European Affairs
borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russian ground forces borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russian ground forces

attacking from multiple directions. attacking from multiple directions.

Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into
effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and
officials assess that, during this first stage of the war, the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by officials assess that, during this first stage of the war, the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by
specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian Armed specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian Armed
Forces (UAF), while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, have proven more Forces (UAF), while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, have proven more
resilient and adaptive than Russia expected. resilient and adaptive than Russia expected.
Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military had to adjust Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military had to adjust
to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many ~~of its~~Russian advances stalled, Russian defense officials advances stalled, Russian defense officials
announced in late March 2022 that announced in late March 2022 that ~~Russian~~ military operations would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of military operations would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and
that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north.that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north. ~~Russia subsequently gained additional~~
~~territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and held territory in other regions, including Kharkiv in the northeast and~~
~~Zaporizhia and Kherson in the south.~~
~~In September 2022, Ukrainian forces succeeded in retaking territory in Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Kherson regions. In this effort,~~
~~the UAF demonstrated an ability to deploy forces effectively to conduct offensive operations, and the Russian military~~
~~continued to suffer from systemic and structural failings. Fighting subsequently has focused on the Donbas, specifically the~~
~~town of Bakhmut and surrounding territory. Amid intense attritional fighting, both sides have been reforming and~~
~~reconstituting units for spring offensives after suffering heavy personnel and equipment losses.~~
~~Approaching one year since Russia’s 2022 invasion, debates continue over each side’s ability to establish and equip units~~
~~capable of conducting offensive operations, with many observers skeptical either Russia or Ukraine will be able to achieve a~~
~~decisive battlefield victory in the near future. At the same time, both sides anticipate intensive localized offensives.~~
~~Prior Congresses have considered~~ Through the winter of 2022-2023 and the war’s one-year mark, fighting gradually focused around the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut, as both sides began preparing and reconstituting forces for expected offensives in the spring. Russia’s armed forces had launched a new offensive early in the winter, likely due to Moscow’s continued and unrealistic demands for gains, and had expended crucial personnel, equipment, and ammunition. In early 2023, Ukraine established new units that were trained and equipped by the United States and allied partners to spearhead a counteroffensive to retake occupied territory. Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in southern and eastern Ukraine has run into heavier-than-expected resistance, forcing the UAF to adjust tactics and achieve incremental gains against fortified Russian lines. In contrast to previous periods of the war that saw rapid maneuver warfare, the war entering fall 2023 has become attritional, with each side seeking to wear down and outlast the other. Casualties, equipment losses, and the need for ammunition are acute as Russia and Ukraine seek to reconstitute units and rotate forces on the frontlines. For Russia, recruiting remains constrained due to political considerations and implications for domestic stability. Ukraine’s relatively smaller population has been almost entirely mobilized. Sustainment, rather than the introduction of new capabilities or units, likely will be the focus for both Russia and Ukraine. The ability to repair and replace equipment, recruit new personnel, and procure artillery ammunition will be among the key factors determining success in the coming months. Congress has taken numerous measures in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The 118th numerous measures in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The 118th
Congress is likely to continue tracking Congress is likely to continue tracking ~~these developments~~developments in Ukraine closely as it considers upcoming policy decisions on U.S. and closely as it considers upcoming policy decisions on U.S. and
international efforts to support Ukraine militarily, conducts oversight of security assistance, international efforts to support Ukraine militarily, conducts oversight of security assistance, ~~monitors allegations of war~~
~~crimes,~~ and examines U.S. and international policies to deter further Russian aggression. For other CRS products on Russia’s and examines U.S. and international policies to deter further Russian aggression. For other CRS products on Russia’s
war in Ukraine, see CRS Report R47054, war in Ukraine, see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s ~~2022 Invasion of~~War Against Ukraine: Related CRS Products. .
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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Introduction
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s
deadliest armed conflict in decadesdeadliest armed conflict in decades~~. It also~~ and prompted intensive international efforts to respond to prompted intensive international efforts to respond to
the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures, the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures,
including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering
support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the
ongoing war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to ongoing war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to
Congress. Congress.
This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which
are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and
conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to
the invasion, the the invasion, the ~~different~~various phases of the war to date, recent developments on the ground, and the phases of the war to date, recent developments on the ground, and the
conflict’s near-term outlook. The report includes brief discussions about potential Russian war conflict’s near-term outlook. The report includes brief discussions about potential Russian war
expectations and military command and personnel challenges. For other CRS products related to expectations and military command and personnel challenges. For other CRS products related to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054,
Russia’s ~~2022 Invasion of~~War Against Ukraine: Related CRS Products. .
Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture
In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by
Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and
within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region (which Russia claimed to annex in 2014). The buildup within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region (which Russia claimed to annex in 2014). The buildup
came after a sustained increase in Russia’s permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.came after a sustained increase in Russia’s permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.1
Since 2014, Russia has created two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Since 2014, Russia has created two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western
Military District (20th CAA, headquartered in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District Military District (20th CAA, headquartered in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District
(8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia
created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate, and manage command and control of units created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate, and manage command and control of units
transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands the separatist units in two transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands the separatist units in two
Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s
Republics, or DNR/LNR). Republics, or DNR/LNR).
Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the
February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120 February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120
Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,21 in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.3

~~1 Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West,” War on the Rocks, January 24, 2022.~~
22 1 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined
arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting air defense, artillery, and other units. arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting air defense, artillery, and other units.
BTGs comprise the higher readiness units of the Russian military and are staffed by professional (also known as BTGs comprise the higher readiness units of the Russian military and are staffed by professional (also known as
contract) personnel. Each Russian regiment or brigade is intended to generate two BTGs. In August 2021, Russian contract) personnel. Each Russian regiment or brigade is intended to generate two BTGs. In August 2021, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the Russian military had 168 BTGs. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the Russian military had 168 BTGs. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The
Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Leavenworth, KS: (Leavenworth, KS:
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), pp. 34-40; Tass, “Russian Army Operates Around 170 Battalion Tactical Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), pp. 34-40; Tass, “Russian Army Operates Around 170 Battalion Tactical
Groups—Defense Chief,” August 20, 2021. Groups—Defense Chief,” August 20, 2021.
32 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “U.S. Statement for the Vienna Document U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “U.S. Statement for the Vienna Document
Joint PC-FSC Chapter III Meeting,” February 12, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Joint PC-FSC Chapter III Meeting,” February 12, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a
Background Briefing,” press release, March 3, 2022. Background Briefing,” press release, March 3, 2022.
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Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the Russian military was a tiered readiness force, with Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the Russian military was a tiered readiness force, with
~~personnel levels ranging from 70% to 90% of their authorized strength.~~units varying in levels of staffing and readiness.3 Additionally, since 2012- Additionally, since 2012-
2014, Russia has expanded its ground forces structure by creating new units without increasing 2014, Russia has expanded its ground forces structure by creating new units without increasing
the available personnel. However, as new units were created, the actual staffing level was reduced the available personnel. However, as new units were created, the actual staffing level was reduced
further due to insufficient personnel. Each Russian brigade or regiment is intended to field and further due to insufficient personnel. Each Russian brigade or regiment is intended to field and
deploy two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of 700-900 contract soldiers (a third would consist deploy two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of 700-900 contract soldiers (a third would consist
of conscripts), but it became clear that the BTGs varied in staffing levels. Some BTGs deployed of conscripts), but it became clear that the BTGs varied in staffing levels. Some BTGs deployed
with 400-600 contract personnel. The result was that the Russian military had a relatively limited with 400-600 contract personnel. The result was that the Russian military had a relatively limited
core of deployable maneuver combat formations of contract personnel relative to the total size of core of deployable maneuver combat formations of contract personnel relative to the total size of
the military.4 the military.4
During this buildup, analysts During this buildup, analysts ~~and observers~~ documented the movement of Russian units from documented the movement of Russian units from
across Russia toward Ukraine.5 The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District across Russia toward Ukraine.5 The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District
into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th
CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th
and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s
southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs) southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs)
moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus.6 In addition, Russia deployed elite units—moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus.6 In addition, Russia deployed elite units—
such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and spetsnaz (elite light infantry units used for (elite light infantry units used for
reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.7 reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.7
The buildup reflected the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and The buildup reflected the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and
support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range
precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic
warfare, support, and logistics units.8 Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large warfare, support, and logistics units.8 Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large
numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which
~~some observers believed would~~could play a key role in play a key role in ~~the initial~~an invasion.9 invasion.9
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize
the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had
~~remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just~~
~~territory controlled by DNR/LNR.~~

3 Andrew S. Bowen, “Russia’s Deceptively Weak Military,” National Interest, June 7, 2015; Roger McDermott, “Shoigu Builds Mythical Russian Army,” Jamestown Foundation, May 24, 2016. For a nuanced view on Western estimates of the Russian military prior to the 2022 invasion, see Bettina Renz, “Western Estimates of Russian Military Capabilities and the Invasion of Ukraine,” Problems of Post-Communism (2023), pp. 1-13. 4 Dara Massicot, “The Russian Military’s People Problem,” 4 Dara Massicot, “The Russian Military’s People Problem,” Foreign Affairs, May 18, 2022; Michael Kofman and Rob , May 18, 2022; Michael Kofman and Rob
Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022. June 2, 2022.
5 For more on the Russian military buildup, see CRS Insight IN11806, 5 For more on the Russian military buildup, see CRS Insight IN11806, Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian
Border, by Andrew S. Bowen. , by Andrew S. Bowen.
6 Units from all 11 Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and one Tank Army (as well as the 14th and 22nd Army Corps) 6 Units from all 11 Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and one Tank Army (as well as the 14th and 22nd Army Corps)
were present on the borders of Ukraine in the run-up to the invasion. For more, see Konrad Muzyka, “Tracking Russian were present on the borders of Ukraine in the run-up to the invasion. For more, see Konrad Muzyka, “Tracking Russian
Deployments near Ukraine—Autumn-Winter 2021-22,” Deployments near Ukraine—Autumn-Winter 2021-22,” Rochan Consulting, November 15, 2021. , November 15, 2021.
7 VDV include elite paratrooper and air assault forces. VDV act as Russia’s elite rapid response forces. For more on 7 VDV include elite paratrooper and air assault forces. VDV act as Russia’s elite rapid response forces. For more on
Russian military capabilities and structure see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian military capabilities and structure see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew , by Andrew
S. BowenS. Bowen; Christian Haimet, “Russian Troop Buildup Continues on Ukrainian Borders,” Janes IHS~~, February 21, 2022~~. .
8 Michael R. Gordon and Max Rust, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine Features Potent Weapons Systems, Well-Trained 8 Michael R. Gordon and Max Rust, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine Features Potent Weapons Systems, Well-Trained
Troops,” Troops,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2022. , February 14, 2022.
9 Russia’s Aerospace Forces include the air force, air defense, and space defenses forces. Russia merged these 9 Russia’s Aerospace Forces include the air force, air defense, and space defenses forces. Russia merged these
organizations into the VKS in 2015. Julian E. Barnes, Michael Crowley, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Positioning organizations into the VKS in 2015. Julian E. Barnes, Michael Crowley, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Positioning
Helicopters, in Possible Sign of Ukraine Plans,” Helicopters, in Possible Sign of Ukraine Plans,” New York Times, January 10, 2021; Tass, “Russia’s Su-35S Fighter , January 10, 2021; Tass, “Russia’s Su-35S Fighter
Jets Deployed in Belarus for Upcoming Drills-Ministry,” January 26, 20212. Jets Deployed in Belarus for Upcoming Drills-Ministry,” January 26, 20212.
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remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just territory controlled by DNR/LNR. Shortly thereafter, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the DNR/LNR, Shortly thereafter, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the DNR/LNR,
claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage attempts. These claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage attempts. These
Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent
months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine.10 months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine.10
On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration, On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration,
European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia launched a full-scale invasion European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia launched a full-scale invasion
of Ukraine. Russia claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect of Ukraine. Russia claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect
the civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; the civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; ~~many observers~~observers generally
understood the latter term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected understood the latter term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected
Ukrainian government.11 Ukrainian government.11
Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: Created by Congressional Research Service using data from U.S. Department of State, Global Admin, and ESRI. ~~Congressional Research Service.~~
~~Initial Invasion~~
~~On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military~~
~~operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided~~
~~munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval~~

10 Tara Copp, “They Could Go at Any Hour Now;’ U.S. Official Warns of Larger Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” 10 Tara Copp, “They Could Go at Any Hour Now;’ U.S. Official Warns of Larger Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”
Defense One, February 23, 2022. , February 23, 2022.
11 Audrius Rickus, “Baseless Claims of ‘Denazification’ Have Underscored Russian Aggression Since World War II,” 11 Audrius Rickus, “Baseless Claims of ‘Denazification’ Have Underscored Russian Aggression Since World War II,”
Washington Post, March 9, 2022. , March 9, 2022.
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Initial Invasion On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.12 In the installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.12 In the
opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs, opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs,
including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.13 including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.13
~~Some observers believe Russia’s initial intent was to achieve~~Russia initially focused on achieving air superiority, air superiority, ~~degrade~~degrading Ukrainian Ukrainian
air defenses, and air defenses, and ~~undermine~~undermining the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate defenses and the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate defenses and
counterattacks. Russia’s initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale counterattacks. Russia’s initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale
than some expected. In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces (VKS) failed to than some expected. In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces (VKS) failed to
conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an unwillingness conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an unwillingness
to act or because of a lack of capability.14 The Russian military may have underestimated the level to act or because of a lack of capability.14 The Russian military may have underestimated the level
of Ukrainian resistance and been initially hesitant to inflict collateral damage on civilian targets of Ukrainian resistance and been initially hesitant to inflict collateral damage on civilian targets
that would be crucial for supporting a Russian occupation.15 Russia’s failure to degrade the that would be crucial for supporting a Russian occupation.15 Russia’s failure to degrade the
Ukrainian air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities, Ukrainian air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities,
allowed the Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than allowed the Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than ~~most~~
~~observers~~ expected, both at the outset and subsequently. expected, both at the outset and subsequently.
Initially, Russian forces committed to multiple lines of advance rather than concentrating on one Initially, Russian forces committed to multiple lines of advance rather than concentrating on one
single front. In the north, Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses around single front. In the north, Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses around
Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and
attacked toward Izyum. In the south, Russian forces conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in attacked toward Izyum. In the south, Russian forces conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in
the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast. Each advance appeared to compete against the the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast. Each advance appeared to compete against the
others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics, and air support.16 Russian forces others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics, and air support.16 Russian forces
advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2, 2022) and eventually turned advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2, 2022) and eventually turned
toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol. Analysts argue that Russian advances in the south toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol. Analysts argue that Russian advances in the south
were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s most modern and professional were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s most modern and professional
units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical support than other units, due to units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical support than other units, due to
rail access from Crimea. In other regions, Russia made slow but initially steady progress, seeking rail access from Crimea. In other regions, Russia made slow but initially steady progress, seeking
to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.17 to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.17
Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target. Led by elite, but comparatively lightly equipped, Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target. Led by elite, but comparatively lightly equipped,
VDV, VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western side of Kyiv , and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western side of Kyiv
~~and reached the outskirts of the city within days. In the early hours of the invasion, Russian VDV~~
~~units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in Hostomel, on the~~
~~outskirts of Kyiv. Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the airport was intended to~~
~~allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize the Ukrainian capital.~~

12 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,” 12 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,” Washington
Post, February 24, 2022. , February 24, 2022.
13 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of 13 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of
Targets,” February 24, 2022. Targets,” February 24, 2022.
14 Economist, “Curious Case of Russia’s Missing Air Force,” March 8, 2022. Some analysis subsequently has argued 14 Economist, “Curious Case of Russia’s Missing Air Force,” March 8, 2022. Some analysis subsequently has argued
that Russia’s initial air campaign was possibly larger and more effective than initially believed. See Justin Bronk, Nick that Russia’s initial air campaign was possibly larger and more effective than initially believed. See Justin Bronk, Nick
Reynolds, and Jack Watling, Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defense, RUSI, London, , RUSI, London,
November 7, 2022. November 7, 2022.
15 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian’s Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” 15 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian’s Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” New York Times, ,
February 25, 2022. February 25, 2022.
16 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones, and Daniel Dombey, “Why Russia Is Deploying More Troops to Ukraine,” 16 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones, and Daniel Dombey, “Why Russia Is Deploying More Troops to Ukraine,”
Financial Times, March 17, 2022;, March 17, 2022; ~~Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine’s Troops Begin a Counteroffensive That Alters Shape~~
~~of the Battle with Russia,” March 24, 2022;~~ Stephen Fidler and Thomas Grove, “Behind the Front Lines, Russia’s Stephen Fidler and Thomas Grove, “Behind the Front Lines, Russia’s
Military Struggles to Supply Its Forces,” Military Struggles to Supply Its Forces,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2022. , April 1, 2022.
17 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” 17 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” New York Times, March , March
10, 2022. 10, 2022.
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and reached the outskirts of the city within days. In the early hours of the invasion, Russian VDV units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in Hostomel, on the outskirts of Kyiv. Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the airport was intended to allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize the Ukrainian capital. Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly causing heavy Russian Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly causing heavy Russian
casualties and shooting down several helicopters.18 casualties and shooting down several helicopters.18
Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. Despite not Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. Despite not
announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian
military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and
equipment. The Ukrainian military exploited numerous tactical and operational deficiencies of equipment. The Ukrainian military exploited numerous tactical and operational deficiencies of
Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian military to Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian military to
conduct ambushes and counterattacks.19 conduct ambushes and counterattacks.19
Russian units operated with little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms formations, Russian units operated with little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms formations,
leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to observers and leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to observers and
analysts.20 As Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress in early March analysts.20 As Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress in early March
2022, “We assess Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of 2022, “We assess Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of
internal military challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues internal military challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues
and considerable logistical issues.”21 and considerable logistical issues.”21
Overall, training and professionalism of Russian units appeared much lower than expected, even Overall, training and professionalism of Russian units appeared much lower than expected, even
among supposedly “elite” units. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as among supposedly “elite” units. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as
VDV, VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or , and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or
equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy
casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.22 casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.22
Russian armored units advanced without infantry support in numerous instances. In one example, Russian armored units advanced without infantry support in numerous instances. In one example,
Russian National Guard (Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) units reportedly advanced alongside, and sometimes in ) units reportedly advanced alongside, and sometimes in
front of, Russian military forces, apparently with little coordination.23 Contributing to the front of, Russian military forces, apparently with little coordination.23 Contributing to the
confusion, confusion, ~~observers~~analysts documented Russian units operating without encrypted communications, documented Russian units operating without encrypted communications,
often using civilian equipment to communicate.24 often using civilian equipment to communicate.24
~~In addition, the Russian military struggled with command and control, both at the tactical and the~~
~~operational levels. First, reports indicated there was no overall Russian operational commander at~~
~~the time. As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating independently, with~~
~~questionable levels of coordination.25 Second, Russian commanders appeared unprepared for~~

~~18 Paul Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,”~~ ~~Washington~~
~~Post, August 24, 2022.~~
18 Paul Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,” Washington Post, August 24, 2022; Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, “The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv,” War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023. 19 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12150, 19 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen; , by Andrew S. Bowen;
Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine:
February–July 2022, RUSI, London, November 30, 2022. , RUSI, London, November 30, 2022.
20 Mark Galeotti, “Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” 20 Mark Galeotti, “Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, April 1, , April 1,
2022; Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in 2022; Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in
Light of the Ukraine War,” Light of the Ukraine War,” Survival vol. 64, no. 3 (2022), pp. 7-28. vol. 64, no. 3 (2022), pp. 7-28.
21 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 21 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022. , 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
22 22 ~~Observers noted~~Analysts note these units these units have suffered particularly high casualties, which undermined Russian military effectiveness suffered particularly high casualties, which undermined Russian military effectiveness
due to their perceived high professionalism and ratio of contract/professional servicemen. Mark Urban, “The Heavy due to their perceived high professionalism and ratio of contract/professional servicemen. Mark Urban, “The Heavy
Losses of an Elite Russian Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022; James Beardsworth and Irina Shcherbakova, Losses of an Elite Russian Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022; James Beardsworth and Irina Shcherbakova,
“Are There Even Any Left? 100 Days of War in Ukraine for an Elite Russian Unit,” “Are There Even Any Left? 100 Days of War in Ukraine for an Elite Russian Unit,” Moscow Times, June 4, 2022. , June 4, 2022.
23 23 Rosgvardiya units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely
sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS
In Focus IF11647, In Focus IF11647, Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen., by Andrew S. Bowen.
24 Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” 24 Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,”
Washington Post, March 27, 2022. , March 27, 2022.
~~25 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command~~
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In addition, the Russian military struggled with command and control, both at the tactical and the operational levels. First, reports indicated there was no overall Russian operational commander at the time. As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating independently, with questionable levels of coordination.25 Second, Russian commanders appeared unprepared for many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among branches (such as many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among branches (such as
VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units. Reporting indicates that communication problems VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units. Reporting indicates that communication problems
compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-ranking officers moving compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-ranking officers moving
closer to the frontlines and contributing to casualties among these officers.26 closer to the frontlines and contributing to casualties among these officers.26
Moreover, Russia’s cyber operations were largely ineffective during the initial invasion, Moreover, Russia’s cyber operations were largely ineffective during the initial invasion,
surprising surprising ~~many observers~~analysts. Some analysts suggest Russian cyber performance possibly indicates . Some analysts suggest Russian cyber performance possibly indicates
the limitations of cyber operations in a kinetic conflict as well as structural limitations of cyber the limitations of cyber operations in a kinetic conflict as well as structural limitations of cyber
operations in the Russian military.27 operations in the Russian military.27
Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations
~~Observers~~Analysts continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its offensive against continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its offensive against
Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty assumptions that undermined Russia’s Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty assumptions that undermined Russia’s
conduct of the invasion. If true, incorrect political assumptions possibly contributed to unrealistic objectives and conduct of the invasion. If true, incorrect political assumptions possibly contributed to unrealistic objectives and
timetables imposed onto the Russian military, providing a partial explanation for the Russian military’s timetables imposed onto the Russian military, providing a partial explanation for the Russian military’s
unpreparedness and poor performance. unpreparedness and poor performance.
U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to “decapitate” the Ukrainian government and U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to “decapitate” the Ukrainian government and
rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region
in 2014. Some analysts speculate that Russia may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian in 2014. Some analysts speculate that Russia may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian
military would be ineffective and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced. As Central Intelligence military would be ineffective and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced. As Central Intelligence
Agency Director Wil iam J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee in March 2022, Russian Agency Director Wil iam J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee in March 2022, Russian
President Vladimir Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable of a quick, President Vladimir Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable of a quick,
decisive victory at minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count.” decisive victory at minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count.”
Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty assumptions in part due Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty assumptions in part due
to poor intelligence and a wil ingness by subordinates to convey only positive information to Russian to poor intelligence and a wil ingness by subordinates to convey only positive information to Russian
decisionmakers. Recent media reporting indicates the FSB overstated its influence and agent networks inside decisionmakers. Recent media reporting indicates the FSB overstated its influence and agent networks inside
Ukraine, possibly contributing to a false expectation of a quick regime change. Additionally, many observers Ukraine, possibly contributing to a false expectation of a quick regime change. Additionally, many observers
speculate a relatively small circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed to speculate a relatively small circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed to
potentially unrealistic assumptions. potentially unrealistic assumptions. ~~Observers believe this circle~~This circle of advisers includes Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, who includes Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, who
may have overstated the Russian military’s capabilitiesmay have overstated the Russian military’s capabilities.
Sources: Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bul y in the Bubble,” : Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bul y in the Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; U.S. , February 4, 2022; U.S.
Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022; , 117th Cong., March 8, 2022;
Steve Hol and and Andrea Shalal, “Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White Steve Hol and and Andrea Shalal, “Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White
House and EU Officials Say,” House and EU Officials Say,” Reuters, March 31, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The Interfering Tsar: Why Putin Is Ukraine’s , March 31, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The Interfering Tsar: Why Putin Is Ukraine’s
Best Hope of Victory,” Best Hope of Victory,” The Times, April 23, 2022; Greg Mil er and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s Spies Misread , April 23, 2022; Greg Mil er and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s Spies Misread
Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022; Michael Schwirtz et al., “Putin’s , August 19, 2022; Michael Schwirtz et al., “Putin’s
War,” War,” New York Times, December 16, 2022. December 16, 2022.
~~March-May 2022~~
~~After early March 2022, Russian forces attempted to adapt to the reality of effective Ukrainian~~
~~resistance. Russia made some changes to its military operations, including more coordination~~
~~between units and a greater attempt to operate as combined arms formations, increased air~~

25 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts
Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Janes IHS, March 7, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s , March 7, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s
War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022. , March 31, 2022.
26 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are 26 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are
closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have
been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed. been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed.
27 Gavin Wilde, 27 Gavin Wilde, Cyber Operations: Russia’s Unmet Expectations, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., December , Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., December
12, 2022; Jon Bateman, 12, 2022; Jon Bateman, Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and
Implications, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., December 16, 2022. , Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., December 16, 2022.
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March-May 2022 After early March 2022, Russian forces attempted to adapt to the reality of effective Ukrainian resistance. Russia made some changes to its military operations, including more coordination between units and a greater attempt to operate as combined arms formations, increased air support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.28 By March 7, 2022, support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.28 By March 7, 2022,
U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100 percent” of its available forces into U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100 percent” of its available forces into
Ukraine.29 The Russian VKS increased its number of sorties and operations, although Ukraine.29 The Russian VKS increased its number of sorties and operations, although ~~most~~
~~missions appeared to employ unguided weaponry rather than PGMs.30 The~~ the increased sortie rate increased sortie rate
also meant heavier lossesalso meant heavier losses ~~for the VKS, including some of its most advanced helicopter, fighter,~~
~~and fighter-bombers.~~.30
Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. After failing to achieve a Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. After failing to achieve a
decisive victory quickly, Russia appeared to re-evaluate its objectives and strategy toward decisive victory quickly, Russia appeared to re-evaluate its objectives and strategy toward
achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine. On March 25, the Russian Ministry of achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine. On March 25, the Russian Ministry of
Defense held a press conference alleging that Russia had mostly met its initial objectives and Defense held a press conference alleging that Russia had mostly met its initial objectives and
would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern Ukraine, including the would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern Ukraine, including the
Donbas.31 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on April 4, 2022, that “Russia is Donbas.31 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on April 4, 2022, that “Russia is
repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern and parts of southern repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern and parts of southern
Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and overwhelm Ukrainian forces Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and overwhelm Ukrainian forces
in eastern Ukraine.”32 in eastern Ukraine.”32
On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Slava class missile cruiser On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Slava class missile cruiser
Moskva, reportedly was struck by two Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles.33 Russian , reportedly was struck by two Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles.33 Russian
forces attempted to tow the heavily damaged cruiser back to port in Sevastopol, but the damage forces attempted to tow the heavily damaged cruiser back to port in Sevastopol, but the damage
was catastrophic and the ship eventually sank.was catastrophic and the ship eventually sank. ~~Russia initially denied that the Moskva was hit by~~
~~missiles and claimed it sank in a storm after an accidental fire. Reports indicate the Moskva was~~
~~blockading Odesa and providing air defense support to Russian units in the southwest near~~
~~Kherson when it was struck.~~34 The sinking provided a morale boost to Ukrainian forces and 34 The sinking provided a morale boost to Ukrainian forces and
undermined Russian efforts to threaten an amphibious assault against Odessa, potentially freeing undermined Russian efforts to threaten an amphibious assault against Odessa, potentially freeing
up Ukrainian forces defending the city. Russia’s new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet is the Project up Ukrainian forces defending the city. Russia’s new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet is the Project
11356 frigate 11356 frigate Admiral Makarov. .
Subsequently, Russia redirected forces to support operations in the east to cut off Ukrainian Subsequently, Russia redirected forces to support operations in the east to cut off Ukrainian
military units in the Donbas. On April 12, President Putin stated that Russia’s “military operation military units in the Donbas. On April 12, President Putin stated that Russia’s “military operation
will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help the people in the Donbas, will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help the people in the Donbas,
who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.”35 The terrain in the Donbas favored Russian who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.”35 The terrain in the Donbas favored Russian
forces, with consolidated logistics and its advantages in artillery.36 forces, with consolidated logistics and its advantages in artillery.36

28 Dan Lamothe, “Russia’s Invasion Began with Precision Missiles, But Weapons Are Changing as Siege War Begins,” 28 Dan Lamothe, “Russia’s Invasion Began with Precision Missiles, But Weapons Are Changing as Siege War Begins,”
Washington Post, March 1, 2022. , March 1, 2022.
29 Quint Forgey, “Putin Sends ‘Nearly 100 Percent’ of Russian Forces at Border into Ukraine,” 29 Quint Forgey, “Putin Sends ‘Nearly 100 Percent’ of Russian Forces at Border into Ukraine,” Politico, March 7, , March 7,
2022. 2022.
30 30 ~~Alan Cullison and Alexander Osipovich, “Russian General Is Killed in Ukraine as Airstrikes Intensify,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, March 11, 2022;~~ Dan Lamothe, “Russian Air Force Action Increases Despite Flood of Antiaircraft Missiles Dan Lamothe, “Russian Air Force Action Increases Despite Flood of Antiaircraft Missiles
into Ukraine,” into Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022. , March 22, 2022.
31 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: March 25, 2022,” 31 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: March 25, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, March 26, 2022; Jim Sciutto, , March 26, 2022; Jim Sciutto,
“U.S. Intel Assess ‘Major’ Strategy Shift by Russia as It Moves Some Forces away from Kyiv,” “U.S. Intel Assess ‘Major’ Strategy Shift by Russia as It Moves Some Forces away from Kyiv,” ~~CNN~~CNN, March 31, 2022. , March 31, 2022.
32 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” press 32 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” press
briefing, April 4, 2022. briefing, April 4, 2022.
33 Adam Taylor and Claire Parker, “‘Neptune’ Missile Strike Shows Strength of Ukraine’s Homegrown Weapons,” 33 Adam Taylor and Claire Parker, “‘Neptune’ Missile Strike Shows Strength of Ukraine’s Homegrown Weapons,”
Washington Post, April 15, 2022. , April 15, 2022.
34 Brad Lendon, “Moskva Sinking: What Really Happened to the Pride of Russia’s Fleet?” 34 Brad Lendon, “Moskva Sinking: What Really Happened to the Pride of Russia’s Fleet?” ~~CNN~~CNN, April 15, 2022. , April 15, 2022.
35 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Says Peace Talks Are at a ‘Dead End’ and Calls Atrocities in Bucha ‘Fake,’” 35 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Says Peace Talks Are at a ‘Dead End’ and Calls Atrocities in Bucha ‘Fake,’” New York
Times, April 12, 2022. , April 12, 2022.
36 Jack Watling, “Why the Battle for Donbas Will Be Very Different from the Assault on Kyiv,” 36 Jack Watling, “Why the Battle for Donbas Will Be Very Different from the Assault on Kyiv,” Guardian, April 9, , April 9,
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~~Despite the focus on the Donbas, larger Russian objectives remained a concern. On April 22,~~
~~2022, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, the then deputy commander of the Central Military~~
~~District, said in an interview that Russia wanted to take full control of eastern and southern~~
~~Ukraine, including a possible land bridge to Transnistria, a Russia-supported breakaway territory~~
~~in Moldova.37 Instead of an immediate threat to broaden the conflict, many observers believed~~
~~this statement reflected potentially larger Russian political objectives over the medium to long~~
~~term, since Russian military force constraints have prevented a serious offensive to capture~~
~~Odessa and link up with Transnistria.~~
2022; Howard Altman, “Ukraine’s Ability to Withstand Russian Artillery Critical to Fight for Donbas,” The Drive, April 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 7 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects On April 18, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported a new Russian offensive in the On April 18, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported a new Russian offensive in the
Donbas after a barrage of Russian missile strikes across Ukraine.Donbas after a barrage of Russian missile strikes across Ukraine.3837 Russian forces initially Russian forces initially
conducted slow and gradual probing attacks against Ukrainian forces, including the use of heavy conducted slow and gradual probing attacks against Ukrainian forces, including the use of heavy
artillery and rocket artillery to support operations. Russia concentrated on pressing Ukrainian artillery and rocket artillery to support operations. Russia concentrated on pressing Ukrainian
forces south of Izyum, west from Severodonetsk toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, and from forces south of Izyum, west from Severodonetsk toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, and from
Donetsk to create a large encirclement of UAF.Donetsk to create a large encirclement of UAF.3938 Russian forces could not break through Russian forces could not break through
Ukrainian defenses around Izyum, partially resulting from too few units and a gradual Ukrainian defenses around Izyum, partially resulting from too few units and a gradual
deployment, even with reinforcements from the abandoned effort to take Kyiv.deployment, even with reinforcements from the abandoned effort to take Kyiv.4039
Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward eastern Ukraine indicated that the Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward eastern Ukraine indicated that the
Russian military needed to rest and resupply after using most of its combat-effective units. Russian military needed to rest and resupply after using most of its combat-effective units.
During this time, analysts noted the need for Russian personnel reinforcements, not only to During this time, analysts noted the need for Russian personnel reinforcements, not only to
replace losses but also to support further Russian offensives.replace losses but also to support further Russian offensives.4140 Conditions forced Russia to pull Conditions forced Russia to pull
units from foreign bases to help replace and rotate out units and deployed private military units from foreign bases to help replace and rotate out units and deployed private military
companies (including heavy use of the Wagner companies (including heavy use of the Wagner Group Private Military CompanyPrivate Military Company). [PMC]).41 Despite the slow pace Despite the slow pace
of Russian progress and need for reinforcements, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines of Russian progress and need for reinforcements, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines
testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20, 2022, that “we assess President testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20, 2022, that “we assess President
Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals
beyond the Donbas.”42 beyond the Donbas.”42
A key Russian military objective was the coastal city of Mariupol, in the Donetsk region. A key Russian military objective was the coastal city of Mariupol, in the Donetsk region. ~~The~~
~~effort to seize the city benefited from Russia shifting operations away from seizing further~~
~~territory in the Kherson region (which includes Mykolaiv). After~~ After weeks of bombardment and weeks of bombardment and
fighting, Ukrainian military forces and large numbers of civilians were isolated in the Azovstal fighting, Ukrainian military forces and large numbers of civilians were isolated in the Azovstal
iron and steel plant in Mariupol.43 On April 21, Putin announced iron and steel plant in Mariupol.43 On April 21, Putin announced that Russia had seized Mariupol and that Russian forces would not assault the Azovstal plant but would surround and seal it off, despite Ukrainian forces’ continued resistance.44 Ukraine announced on May 16 that it had instructed its remaining troops at Azovstal to cease combat missions.45 Shortly thereafter, Ukrainian troops began surrendering and were evacuated to Russian-controlled areas Russia also continued its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but the VKS did not seek further air superiority beyond eastern Ukraine. Russia conducted long-range 37~~that Russia had seized Mariupol~~

~~2022; Howard Altman, “Ukraine’s Ability to Withstand Russian Artillery Critical to Fight for Donbas,” The Drive,~~
~~April 19, 2022.~~
~~37 Mary Ilyushina et al., “Commander Hints at Russian Ambitions Beyond Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 22, 2022.~~
38 Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,” Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,”
Financial Times, April 24, 2022. April 24, 2022.
3938 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 16-18, 2022,” Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 16-18, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 19, 2022; Christopher , April 19, 2022; Christopher
Miller and Paul McLeary, “Heavy Weaponry Pours into Ukraine as Commanders Become More Desperate,” Miller and Paul McLeary, “Heavy Weaponry Pours into Ukraine as Commanders Become More Desperate,” Politico, ,
April 25, 2022; Author correspondence with Michael Kofman. April 25, 2022; Author correspondence with Michael Kofman.
4039 Mike Eckel, “Fizzled Faltering? ‘Anemic’? Why Russia’s Donbas Offensive Isn’t Going Exactly as Anticipated,” Mike Eckel, “Fizzled Faltering? ‘Anemic’? Why Russia’s Donbas Offensive Isn’t Going Exactly as Anticipated,”
RFE/RL, May 3, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 9-15 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 15, RFE/RL, May 3, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 9-15 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 15,
2022. 2022.
4140 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, April 8, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, April 8, 2022;
Economist, “Rob Lee on Why Attrition Will Be a Critical Factor in the Battle for the Donbas,” April 23, 2022. , “Rob Lee on Why Attrition Will Be a Critical Factor in the Battle for the Donbas,” April 23, 2022.
41 For more on the Wagner Group, see CRS In Focus IF12344, Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), by Andrew S. Bowen 42 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 42 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., , 117th Cong.,
May 10, 2022. May 10, 2022.
43 Amy Mackinnon, “What the Fall of Mariupol Would Mean for the War,” 43 Amy Mackinnon, “What the Fall of Mariupol Would Mean for the War,” Foreign Policy, April 20, 2022. , April 20, 2022.
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~and that Russian forces would not assault the Azovstal plant but would surround and seal it off,~~
~~despite Ukrainian forces’ continued resistance.44 Ukraine announced on May 16 that it had~~
~~instructed its remaining troops at Azovstal to cease combat missions.45 Shortly thereafter,~~
~~Ukrainian troops began surrendering and were evacuated to Russian-controlled areas. On July 29,~~
~~a massive explosion ripped through a prisoner-of-war camp housing many of the prisoners from~~
~~Mariupol, killing an estimated 50 prisoners. Russia alleged the explosion was the result of a~~
~~Ukrainian missile strike, but many observers believe it was some other cause.46~~
~~Russia also continued its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but the~~
~~VKS did not seek further air superiority beyond eastern Ukraine. Russia conducted long-range~~
44 Michael Schwirtz, “Ukrainians in Mariupol’s Steel Mill Are Holding On, Despite Intensifying Attacks, a Commander Tells the Times,” New York Times, April 24, 2022. 45 Michael Schwirtz, “Last Stand at Azovstal: Inside the Siege That Shaped the Ukraine War,” New York Times, July 27, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects PGM strikes against what Russian officials said were Ukrainian defense industry and PGM strikes against what Russian officials said were Ukrainian defense industry and
infrastructure targets in an attempt to cripple and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term infrastructure targets in an attempt to cripple and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term
capability. However, capability. However, ~~observers began to~~analysts note the questionable precision, capability, and quantity note the questionable precision, capability, and quantity
of PGMs still available to Russian forces.of PGMs still available to Russian forces.4746 U.S. officials have stated that most PGMs appear to U.S. officials have stated that most PGMs appear to
be air-launched cruise missiles from bombers inside Russia.be air-launched cruise missiles from bombers inside Russia.4847
May-September 2022
After the capture of Mariupol, Russia refocused efforts on seizing key urban and infrastructure After the capture of Mariupol, Russia refocused efforts on seizing key urban and infrastructure
areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. Due to losses, Russia was unable to concentrate sufficient combat areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. Due to losses, Russia was unable to concentrate sufficient combat
power on multiple advances, forcing it to refocus efforts on a single objective while consolidating power on multiple advances, forcing it to refocus efforts on a single objective while consolidating
its hold on captured territory (such as in Kharkiv, Kherson, and its hold on captured territory (such as in Kharkiv, Kherson, and ~~Zaporizhzhia~~Zaporizhia). By mid-May 2022, ). By mid-May 2022,
Russia appeared unable to capture the key cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, a likely target of Russia appeared unable to capture the key cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, a likely target of
Russia’s refocused offensives. Instead, Russia focused on seizing the towns of Severodonetsk and Russia’s refocused offensives. Instead, Russia focused on seizing the towns of Severodonetsk and
Lysychansk, which would give Russia almost total control over Luhansk region.Lysychansk, which would give Russia almost total control over Luhansk region.49

~~44 Michael Schwirtz, “Ukrainians in Mariupol’s Steel Mill Are Holding On, Despite Intensifying Attacks, a~~
~~Commander Tells the Times,” New York Times, April 24, 2022.~~
~~45 Michael Schwirtz, “Last Stand at Azovstal: Inside the Siege That Shaped the Ukraine War,” New York Times, July~~
~~27, 2022.~~
~~46 Joyce Sohyun Lee et al., “What We Know About the Blast That Killed Ukrainian POWs in Olenivka,”~~ ~~Washington~~
~~Post, August 6, 2022.~~
~~47 John Ismay, “Russian Guided Weapons Miss the Mark, U.S. Defense Officials Say,” New York Times, May 9, 2022;~~
~~Thomas Newdick, “We May Have Our First Sight of a Russian Bomber Launching Missiles at Ukraine,” The Drive,~~
~~May 11, 2022.~~
~~48 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022.~~
~~49 Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May~~
~~28,” Institute for the Study of War, May 28, 2022.~~
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

48 In contrast to the early days of the invasion, In contrast to the early days of the invasion,
Figure 2. Donbas Region of Ukraine
the fighting in the Donbas resembled a more the fighting in the Donbas resembled a more
traditional conventional conflict of slow but traditional conventional conflict of slow but
intense fighting, and Russia reverted to its intense fighting, and Russia reverted to its
traditional reliance on the massed used of traditional reliance on the massed used of
artillery and rocket artillery. Russian forces artillery and rocket artillery. Russian forces
appeared to conduct a pincer movement to cut appeared to conduct a pincer movement to cut
off Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk and off Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk and
Lysychansk.Lysychansk.5049 In the north, Russian forces In the north, Russian forces
pushed southeast from Izyum, capturing pushed southeast from Izyum, capturing
Lyman and attempting to make several Lyman and attempting to make several
crossings of the Siverskyi Donets river near crossings of the Siverskyi Donets river near
Bilohorivka, but came under Ukrainian Bilohorivka, but came under Ukrainian
artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties. In artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties. In
the Donbas, Russia relied heavily on Wagner the Donbas, Russia relied heavily on Wagner
Group PMC and DNR/LNR units, many of whom PMC and DNR/LNR units, many of whom
were forcibly conscripted. were forcibly conscripted.

The UAF continued to staunchly defend The UAF continued to staunchly defend
Source: Created by Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
territory instead of conducting an organized territory instead of conducting an organized
using data from U.S. Department of State, Global withdrawal, leading some analysts to withdrawal, leading some analysts to
Admin, and ESRI. speculate that Ukraine’s strategy was to speculate that Ukraine’s strategy was to impose as much attrition on Russian forces as possible. impose as much attrition on Russian forces as possible.
Nevertheless, Russian forces, including Chechen Rosgvardiya and DNR/LNR troops, continued Nevertheless, Russian forces, including Chechen Rosgvardiya and DNR/LNR troops, continued
their offensive into Severodonetsk and gradually seized control of the city after Ukraine ordered their offensive into Severodonetsk and gradually seized control of the city after Ukraine ordered
its forces to retreat to Lysychansk. Russian forces continued to advance north from Popasna its forces to retreat to Lysychansk. Russian forces continued to advance north from Popasna
~~toward Bakhmut, threatening to cut off UAF units and envelope Lysychansk. Subsequently, the~~
~~UAF withdrew from Lysychansk to prepared defensive lines between Bakhmut and Siversk.51~~
~~Reported Russian and Ukrainian Casualties~~
~~Estimates of wartime casualties have varied widely and may not be considered reliable. Due to the continuing state~~
~~of war, verifying exact numbers of casualties is nearly impossible. Generally, ranges of possible casualties are given~~
~~as estimates due to the uncertain and changing nature of assessments. Below are some estimates mentioned in~~
~~various press reports through January 2023.~~
~~Russian Casualties~~
Russia: Officially, the Russian government stated in late March 2022 that 1,351 soldiers had died and another 3,850
~~had been wounded. On March 20, 2022, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared to publish~~
~~Russian Ministry of Defense figures that listed 9,861 deaths. This figure remains unconfirmed, and the newspaper~~
~~deleted the report and stated that it had been hacked. Russia has not provided a casualty update since.~~
~~United States: U.S estimates of Russian military losses are likely more than 100,000.~~ toward Bakhmut, threatening to cut off 46 John Ismay, “Russian Guided Weapons Miss the Mark, U.S. Defense Officials Say,” New York Times, May 9, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “We May Have Our First Sight of a Russian Bomber Launching Missiles at Ukraine,” The Drive, May 11, 2022. 47 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022. 48 Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28,” Institute for the Study of War, May 28, 2022. 49 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: May 21-23, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 24, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects UAF units and envelope Lysychansk. Subsequently, the UAF withdrew from Lysychansk to prepared defensive lines between Bakhmut and Siversk.50 Reported Russian and Ukrainian Casualties Reported numbers of wartime casualties have varied widely. Generally, sources provide ranges or estimates of possible casualties due to the uncertain and changing nature of assessments. Below are some estimates mentioned in various press reports through September 2023. • In January 2023, U.S. Chairman In January 2023, U.S. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Mil ey stated that Russia has suffered “significantly well over 100,000” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Mil ey stated that Russia has suffered “significantly well over 100,000”
~~Russian soldiers kil ed and wounded. Some estimates reported in the media place Russian casualties close to~~
~~200,000.~~
United Kingdom: UK estimates of Russian casualties have generally been comparable, if slightly higher, than those of
~~U.S. officials. UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace in December 2022 stated Russia has suffered over 100,000~~
~~casualties.~~
~~Ukrainian Casualties~~

~~50 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: May 21-23, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 24, 2022.~~
~~51 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Severodonetsk After Weeks of Brutal Battle,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, June 24, 2022; Jonathan Beale, “Ukraine Confirms Russia Captured Eastern City Lysychansk,” BBC, July 3,~~
~~2022.~~
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10

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~Until recently, Ukraine has been reluctant to share casualty figures. In June 2022, Ukrainian officials stated that~~
~~Ukraine was losing 100-200 soldiers per day during the height of fighting around Severodonetsk. On August 22,~~
~~2022, Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhny stated Ukraine had suffered almost~~
~~9,000 kil ed. In November 2022, General Mil ey stated that Ukraine has “probably” suffered similar casualties to~~
~~Russia.~~
~~Civilian Casualties~~
~~In February 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimated 7,155 kil ed and 11,662~~
~~injured civilians since the war began. Most observers consider this to be a significant undercount.~~
~~Sources: Helene Cooper, “Heavy Losses Leave Russia Short of Its Goal U.S. Officials Say~~soldiers kil ed and wounded • In February 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that “Russia suffered more combat deaths in Ukraine in the first year of the war than in all of its wars since World War II combined” • In April 2023, some media reporting estimated combined casualties suffered by Russian and Ukrainian forces were over 350,000 • In May 2023, U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby stated at least 100,000 Russian fighters had been kil ed or wounded in the previous five months, at least half of those from the Wagner Group Private Military Company • In July 2023, Mediazona and Meduza, using “records from the National Probate Registry and data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat),” estimated that as of “late May 2023, roughly 47,000 Russian men under the age of 50 have died in the war. To be absolutely precise, we can assert with a 95% probability that the true number of casualties falls between 40,000 and 55,000. This estimate does not take into account the losses of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR)” • In August 2023, Mediazona and the BBC confirmed 30,698 Russian combat deaths using publicly available data • In August 2023, the New York Times reported that U.S. officials estimate Ukraine and Russia have suffered a combined total of nearly 500,000 kil ed or wounded Sources: Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Soaring Death Tol Gives Grim Insight into Russian Tactics,” New York Times, February 2, 2023; Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer, Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 27, 2023; Guy Faulconbridge, “Ukraine War, Already with up to 354,000 Casualties, Likely to Last Past 2023,” Reuters, April 12, 2023; Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “U.S. Says 100,000 Russian Casualties in Ukraine in Past 5 Months,” New York Times, May 1, 2023; Mediazona, “At Least 47,000 Russian Soldiers Kil ed in Ukraine. A Data Investigation by Mediazona and Meduza,” July 10, 2023; Mediazona, “Russian Casualties in Ukraine,” August 24~~,” New York Times,~~
~~August 11, 2022; Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, “Almost 9,000 Ukrainian Defenders Died in the War with the~~
~~Russian Federation-Zaluzhny,” August 22, 2022; Euromaidan Press, “87,000 Kil ed Civilians Documented in~~
~~Occupied Mariupol—Volunteer,” August 30, 2022; Dan Lamothe, Liz Sly and Annabelle Timsit, “Well Over~~
~~100,000 Russian Troops Kil ed or Wounded in Ukraine, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, November 10, 2022; Ann M.~~
~~Simmons and Nancy A. Youssef, “Russia’s Casualties in Ukraine Near 200,000,” Wall Street Journal, February 4,~~
~~2023; OHCHR, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update,” February 6~~, 2023. , 2023.
The UAF suffered heavy casualties during the fighting for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, The UAF suffered heavy casualties during the fighting for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk,
including among experienced veterans who volunteered for the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) including among experienced veterans who volunteered for the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)
and reserve units.and reserve units.5251 The UAF broke up the core of its maneuver formations into smaller units to The UAF broke up the core of its maneuver formations into smaller units to
spearhead localized counterattacks and to shore up TDF and Reserve units staffing defensive spearhead localized counterattacks and to shore up TDF and Reserve units staffing defensive
positions.positions.5352 Many UAF counteroffensives, such as outside of Kharkiv, slowed as Russian units Many UAF counteroffensives, such as outside of Kharkiv, slowed as Russian units
regrouped and UAF forces concentrated on defending the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the regrouped and UAF forces concentrated on defending the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the
Donbas, leaving TDF units to defend the frontline but unable to launch further offensive action. Donbas, leaving TDF units to defend the frontline but unable to launch further offensive action.
50 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Severodonetsk After Weeks of Brutal Battle,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2022; Jonathan Beale, “Ukraine Confirms Russia Captured Eastern City Lysychansk,” BBC, July 3, 2022. 51 Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine’s War of Attrition Exacts Heavy Toll on Both Sides,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022. 52 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road From Survival to Victory,” RUSI, July 4, 2022, p. 17. Congressional Research Service 10 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects The UAF also struggled with secure communications and coordination ~~The UAF also struggled with secure communications and instances of command and control~~
issues between the TDF and regular military, as well as a dire need for artillery and heavy weapon issues between the TDF and regular military, as well as a dire need for artillery and heavy weapon
support.support.5453
Beginning in mid-May 2022, the UAF began receiving significant shipments of U.S. and Western Beginning in mid-May 2022, the UAF began receiving significant shipments of U.S. and Western
artillery systems, specifically the U.S. M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition. Security artillery systems, specifically the U.S. M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition. Security
assistance has been critical to sustaining UAF operations and countering the Russian advantage in assistance has been critical to sustaining UAF operations and countering the Russian advantage in
artillery and rocket artillery, since the UAF was running low on ammunition and parts for its artillery and rocket artillery, since the UAF was running low on ammunition and parts for its
Soviet/Russian artillery systems. Nevertheless, training time and overall shortages have resulted Soviet/Russian artillery systems. Nevertheless, training time and overall shortages have resulted
in most UAF units still relying on older Soviet/Russian systems while waiting for new Western in most UAF units still relying on older Soviet/Russian systems while waiting for new Western
weaponry.weaponry.5554 By July, Ukraine began receiving U.S.-supplied M270 Multiple Launch Rocket By July, Ukraine began receiving U.S.-supplied M270 Multiple Launch Rocket
Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), providing the Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), providing the
UAF with significantly improved targeting ability, including increased range and precision UAF with significantly improved targeting ability, including increased range and precision
accuracy.accuracy.5655 Early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers indicated that the UAF were Early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers indicated that the UAF were
using these systems effectively, including to target key Russian command and control, logistics, using these systems effectively, including to target key Russian command and control, logistics,
and transport infrastructure.and transport infrastructure.5756 One significant challenge, however, has been maintaining and ~~One significant challenge, however, has been maintaining and~~

~~52 Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine’s War of Attrition Exacts Heavy Toll on Both Sides,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022.~~
~~53 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road From Survival to Victory,” RUSI, July 4, 2022,~~
~~p. 17.~~
~~54 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “On Front Lines, Communication Breakdowns Prove Costly for~~
~~Ukraine,” New York Times, June 28, 2022; Viviana Salama, “Ukraine Faces Shortfall in Weapons as It Gears Up for~~
~~First Major Counteroffensive,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2022.~~
~~55 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory~~
~~Welt; Serhiy Morgunov, “As They Wait for Weapons, Ukrainians Hold the Line with Soviet Artillery,”~~ ~~Washington~~
~~Post, July 27, 2022.~~
~~56 Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Is Bringing a Big Gun to a Knife Fight,” Foreign Policy, July 13, 2022.~~
~~57 Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kostiantyn Khudov, “U.S. Supplied HIMARS Changing the Calculus on Ukraine’s~~
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11

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

repairing the vast number of Western systems the UAF has received, all with different standards repairing the vast number of Western systems the UAF has received, all with different standards
and requirements for operating. and requirements for operating.
Over the rest of July, Russian forces attempted to regroup and take an “operational pause” after Over the rest of July, Russian forces attempted to regroup and take an “operational pause” after
suffering heavy casualties capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. suffering heavy casualties capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. ~~Most observers believed~~
~~Russia~~Russia likely had exhausted most of its forces and required time to refit, resupply, and reorganize. had exhausted most of its forces and required time to refit, resupply, and reorganize.
Russian forces did not achieve any significant territorial progress over the next weeks, other than Russian forces did not achieve any significant territorial progress over the next weeks, other than
small gains between Siversk and Bakhmut, and appeared to focus on solidifying their control over small gains between Siversk and Bakhmut, and appeared to focus on solidifying their control over
existing territory.existing territory.58 57 Russia increasingly relied on Wagner Russia increasingly relied on Wagner Group PMC and DNR/LNR forces to probe PMC and DNR/LNR forces to probe
UAF lines and then direct artillery and rocket artillery upon making contact. OpenUAF lines and then direct artillery and rocket artillery upon making contact. Open -source source
reporting continued to document instances of low Russian morale and reports of Russian soldiers reporting continued to document instances of low Russian morale and reports of Russian soldiers
refusing to fight, resigning from their contracts before deployment, or refusing orders from their refusing to fight, resigning from their contracts before deployment, or refusing orders from their
superiors.superiors.5958 By early August 2022, as Russian advances stalled, a gradual stalemate and war of attrition began to set in. Russia continued some offensive operations toward Bakhmut and Avdiivkain the Donetsk region.59 The UAF appeared to prepare a shift from defensive to offensive operations. Ukraine began carrying out a series of partisan attacks (including assassinations) against officials in Russia-occupied regions, Russian government infrastructure, and key air bases and supply positions in Crimea. These attacks, conducted by Ukrainian Special Forces and local supporters, 53 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “On Front Lines, Communication Breakdowns Prove Costly for Ukraine,” New York Times, June 28, 2022; Viviana Salama, “Ukraine Faces Shortfall in Weapons as It Gears Up for First Major Counteroffensive,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2022. 54 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt; Serhiy Morgunov, “As They Wait for Weapons, Ukrainians Hold the Line with Soviet Artillery,” Washington Post, July 27, 2022. 55 Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Is Bringing a Big Gun to a Knife Fight,” Foreign Policy, July 13, 2022. 56
~~Russian Command and Control Challenges~~
~~Since the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, reports indicate that Russia has made different attempts to~~
~~address its command and control issues, including the lack of an overall operational commander. It is difficult for~~
~~most observers to definitively identify and state the nature of Russian command and control issues due to the~~
~~changing circumstances and lack of transparency. Recent events and reports, however, have provided greater~~
~~visibility into the general structure and picture of Russian command.~~
~~In April 2022, reports emerged that General Alexander Dvornikov, head of the Southern Military District, was~~
~~given operational command of Russia’s war to help streamline command and control. However, the extent of his~~
~~direct control and whether he supervised all Russian forces remained unclear. By June, reports emerged that~~
~~General Dvornikov had been removed from command and replaced by General Gennady Zhidko, the then-head~~
~~of the Main Military Political Directorate.~~
~~In October 2022, General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Aerospace Forces, reportedly took overall~~
~~command of Russian forces in Ukraine. As of December 2022, all five Military District commanders, the head of~~
~~the Airborne forces (VDV), the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and multiple junior commanders had been~~
~~replaced. The National Defense Management Center in Moscow has continued to coordinate and manage forces,~~
~~and appears to have greater oversight and management of Russian forces than in the early stages of the invasion.~~
~~After three months, Surovikin was replaced by Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov, despite a~~
~~widespread assessment that Surovikin was among Russia’s most capable commanders and largely credited with~~
~~stabilizing Russian lines in the wake of successful Ukrainian offensives. Analysts continue to speculate about the~~
~~reason for the latest shuffle, from improving coordination among military branches (MoD, PMC Wagner,~~
~~Rosgvardiya), continued unrealistic battlefield expectations of political leaders, to infighting among elites~~
~~(particularly within the Ministry of Defense) as they seek to deflect blame for Russian battlefield failures.~~
Sources: Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” ~~New~~
~~York Times, March 31, 2022; Karolina Hird et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2022,”~~ ~~Institute~~
~~for the Study of War, July 28, 2022; Russia Experiments with Command and Control in Ukraine,” Janes IHS, August~~
~~2, 2022; Andrew Roth, “Russia Appoints Notorious General To Lead Ukraine Offensive,” Guardian, October 8,~~
~~2022; Mary Ilyushina and Natalia Abbakumova, “Kremlin, Shifting Blame for War Failures, Axes military~~
~~Commanders,” Washington Post, October 8, 2022; Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd, “Militaries,~~
~~Mercenaries, Militias, and Morale and the Ukraine War” Marshall Center, November 15, 2022; Francesca Ebel,~~
~~“Russia’s New Commander Reflects Putin’s Plan to Push for Victory in Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 12,~~
~~2022; Mark Galeotti,” Enter Gerasimov,” In Moscow’s Shadows, January 12, 2023.~~

Frontlines,” Washington Post~~, July 1, 2022;~~ Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine Targets Russia’s Ammunition Depots, Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine Targets Russia’s Ammunition Depots,
Undermining Its Artillery Advantage,” Undermining Its Artillery Advantage,” Kyiv Independent, July 8, 2022. , July 8, 2022.
58 57 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 18-24 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 25, 2022; Dara Massicot, Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 18-24 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 25, 2022; Dara Massicot,
“Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One,” “Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One,” Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2022; Erika Solomon, , August 15, 2022; Erika Solomon,
“Behind Russia’s ‘Pause’ Are Signs of a Troubled Effort to Regroup,” “Behind Russia’s ‘Pause’ Are Signs of a Troubled Effort to Regroup,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. , September 10, 2022.
5958 Timofei Rozhanskiy, “Why Russian Soldiers Are Refusing to Fight in the War on Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 20, 2022; Timofei Rozhanskiy, “Why Russian Soldiers Are Refusing to Fight in the War on Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 20, 2022;
Pjotr Sauer, “Russian Soldiers Accuse Superiors of Jailing Them for Refusing to Fight,” Pjotr Sauer, “Russian Soldiers Accuse Superiors of Jailing Them for Refusing to Fight,” Guardian, August 2, 2022. , August 2, 2022.
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~By early August 2022, as Russian advances stalled, a gradual stalemate and war of attrition began~~
~~to set in. Russia continued some offensive operations (relying on Russian PMC and LNR/DNR~~
~~forces) toward Bakhmut and Avdiivka, as well as the town of Pisky, just outside Avdiivka in the~~
~~Donetsk region.60 The UAF appeared to prepare a shift from defensive to offensive operations.~~
~~Ukraine began carrying out a series of partisan attacks (including assassinations) against officials~~
~~in Russia-occupied regions, Russian government infrastructure, and key air bases and supply~~
~~positions in Crimea. These attacks, conducted by Ukrainian Special Forces and local supporters,~~
59 Kateryna Stepanenko et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2,” Institute for the Study of War, August 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects drones, and missile strikes, have destabilized the Russian military’s control over the region and drones, and missile strikes, have destabilized the Russian military’s control over the region and
forced Russia to devote more forces to counterinsurgency and internal security missions.forced Russia to devote more forces to counterinsurgency and internal security missions.61
~~International observers remain concerned by the Russian military’s occupation and management~~
~~of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear plant in Europe.62 Some~~
~~analysts argue that attacks on nuclear power plants could be considered a “war crime”~~
~~under international law.63 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiated with~~
~~Russia and Ukraine to send an expert mission to ZNPP to “assess the physical damage to the~~
~~ZNPP’s facilities, determine whether the main and back-up safety and security systems were~~
~~functional and evaluate the staff's working conditions,” according to the IAEA. An IAEA~~
~~inspection team visited the plant on September 1; six IAEA inspectors remained on-site for a few~~
~~days.64~~60
The UAF began preparations for a counteroffensive by conducting strikes across Kherson and The UAF began preparations for a counteroffensive by conducting strikes across Kherson and
Crimea to degrade Russian capabilities and hinder the resupply of its forces in Kherson, including Crimea to degrade Russian capabilities and hinder the resupply of its forces in Kherson, including
attacks against key logistics targets and the bridges connecting occupied Kherson with the rest of attacks against key logistics targets and the bridges connecting occupied Kherson with the rest of
occupied southern Ukraine. According to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General occupied southern Ukraine. According to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark A. Milley, Ukraine conducted over 400 HIMARS strikes by September 8.Mark A. Milley, Ukraine conducted over 400 HIMARS strikes by September 8.6561 These strikes These strikes
likely seriously strained Russian logistics and artillery ammunition supply by targeting previously likely seriously strained Russian logistics and artillery ammunition supply by targeting previously
unreachable depots.unreachable depots.6662
The UAF also deployed high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), used to target radar or The UAF also deployed high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), used to target radar or
electronic warfare systems, on its Russian-made MiG-29 fighters. Russian forces appeared to electronic warfare systems, on its Russian-made MiG-29 fighters. Russian forces appeared to
redeploy from Donetsk and Luhansk to southern Ukraine in preparation for a UAF offensive.redeploy from Donetsk and Luhansk to southern Ukraine in preparation for a UAF offensive.67

~~60 Kateryna Stepanenko et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2,” Institute for the Study of War,~~
~~August 2, 2022.~~
~~61 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Liz Sly, and Adela Suliman, “Crimea Airfield Blast War Work of Ukrainian Special Forces,~~
~~Official Says,” Washington Post, August 10, 2022; and Oren Liebermann, “How Ukraine Is Using Resistance Warfare~~
~~Developed by the U.S. to Fight Back Against Russia,” CNN, August 27, 2022; Anastasia Tenisheva, “Assassinations of~~
~~Russia-Installed Officials on the Rise in Occupied Ukraine,” Moscow Times, September 1, 2022.~~
~~62 For more, see CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt and~~
~~Mary Beth D. Nikitin; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Director General Grossi Alarmed by Shelling at~~
~~Ukraine NPP, Says IAEA Mission Vital for Nuclear Safety and Security,” press release, August 6, 2022.~~
~~63 George M. Moore, “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine,”~~
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022.
~~64 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, press conference, September 2, 2022.~~
~~65 Reuters, “Ukraine Has Struck More Than 400 Russian Targets with HIMARS - U.S. Top General,” September 8,~~
~~2022.~~
6663 Observers had noted reports of Ukrainian preparation for an offensive for months but speculated whether the UAF had enough trained personnel and sufficient equipment (such as tanks and armored vehicles to rapidly transport infantry) to sustain offensive operations, as well as possible risks of exposing other fronts to counterattack from Russian forces by drawing away resources.64 Kherson Region Offensive On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a long-awaited offensive into the Kherson region in the south. U.S. officials initially believed the offensive was part of a “shaping” strategy to improve the UAF position for future counteroffensives.65 Some reports indicated that Ukrainian forces, advised by U.S. officials, determined a smaller offensive would give the UAF flexibility to deploy resources to other fronts and conduct multiple counteroffensives against exposed Russian lines.66 By early September 2022, UAF offensives had made small but sustained progress across three fronts in Kherson, pushing back some Russian forces. UAF forces ran into significant and 60 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Liz Sly, and Adela Suliman, “Crimea Airfield Blast War Work of Ukrainian Special Forces, Official Says,” Washington Post, August 10, 2022; and Oren Liebermann, “How Ukraine Is Using Resistance Warfare Developed by the U.S. to Fight Back Against Russia,” CNN, August 27, 2022; Anastasia Tenisheva, “Assassinations of Russia-Installed Officials on the Rise in Occupied Ukraine,” Moscow Times, September 1, 2022. 61 Reuters, “Ukraine Has Struck More Than 400 Russian Targets with HIMARS - U.S. Top General,” September 8, 2022. 62 The Russian military must keep large supplies of ammunition close to the frontlines for resupply due to its reliance The Russian military must keep large supplies of ammunition close to the frontlines for resupply due to its reliance
on artillery. These supplies present a particularly vulnerable and significant target, especially for long-range systems on artillery. These supplies present a particularly vulnerable and significant target, especially for long-range systems
such as HIMARS. Liz Sly, John Hudson, and David L. Stern, “Crimea Attacks Point to Ukraine’s Newest Strategy, such as HIMARS. Liz Sly, John Hudson, and David L. Stern, “Crimea Attacks Point to Ukraine’s Newest Strategy,
Official Says,” Official Says,” Washington Post, August 18, 2022. , August 18, 2022.
6763 Russia constructed multiple lines of defense in preparation for a UAF offensive. Including DNR troops, Russia Russia constructed multiple lines of defense in preparation for a UAF offensive. Including DNR troops, Russia
concentrated a large portion of its remaining VDV and concentrated a large portion of its remaining VDV and Spetsnaz units (however, as demonstrated in the early stages of units (however, as demonstrated in the early stages of
the invasion, they are often insufficiently equipped to defend against a large conventional force), as well as various the invasion, they are often insufficiently equipped to defend against a large conventional force), as well as various
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~~Observers had noted reports of Ukrainian preparation for an offensive for months but speculated~~
~~whether the UAF had enough trained personnel and sufficient equipment (such as tanks and~~
~~armored vehicles to rapidly transport infantry) to sustain offensive operations, as well as possible~~
~~risks of exposing other fronts to counterattack from Russian forces by drawing away resources.68~~
~~Kherson Region Offensive~~
~~On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a long-awaited offensive into the Kherson region in the~~
~~south. Some observers and U.S. officials initially believed the offensive was part of a “shaping”~~
~~strategy to improve the UAF position for future counteroffensives.69 Some reports indicated that~~
~~Ukrainian forces, advised by U.S. officials, determined a smaller offensive would give the UAF~~
~~flexibility to deploy resources to other fronts and conduct multiple counteroffensives against~~
~~exposed Russian lines.70~~
~~By early September 2022, UAF offensives had made small but sustained progress across three~~
~~fronts in Kherson, pushing back some Russian forces. UAF forces ran into significant and~~
~~determined opposition, including the heavy use of artillery and air support.71~~other conventional Russian forces. Matthew Luxmoore, “Russia Moves to Reinforce Its Stalled Assault on Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2022. 64 Loveday Morris et al., “On the Kherson Front Lines, Little Sign of a Ukrainian Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, August 12, 2022. 65 Jim Sciutto, “Ukrainian Forces Begin ‘Shaping’ Battlefield for Counteroffensive, Senior U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, August 29, 2022. 66 E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects determined opposition, including the heavy use of artillery and air support.67 At the same time, At the same time,
the UAF began an offensive on another front, in the northeastern region of Kharkiv. the UAF began an offensive on another front, in the northeastern region of Kharkiv.
Kharkiv Offensive
In the Kharkiv region, the UAF appeared to exploit a weak point in Russian defenses and In the Kharkiv region, the UAF appeared to exploit a weak point in Russian defenses and
captured several towns (such as Balakliya) in early September 2022, potentially opening the captured several towns (such as Balakliya) in early September 2022, potentially opening the
possibility of targeting a key resupply city of Kupyansk. Reports document that Rosgvardiya possibility of targeting a key resupply city of Kupyansk. Reports document that Rosgvardiya
troops, not trained or equipped for frontline combat, and lower-quality LNR troops staffed troops, not trained or equipped for frontline combat, and lower-quality LNR troops staffed
Russian positions.Russian positions.7268 The UAF appeared to consolidate an estimated core of five to six brigades to The UAF appeared to consolidate an estimated core of five to six brigades to
launch a counteroffensive.launch a counteroffensive.7369 The UAF benefited from Russia pulling its most combat-effective The UAF benefited from Russia pulling its most combat-effective
troops south toward Kherson and from apparent Russian intelligence and command failures, as troops south toward Kherson and from apparent Russian intelligence and command failures, as
Russia failed to detect the UAF buildup and organize a coordinated response. Spearheaded by Russia failed to detect the UAF buildup and organize a coordinated response. Spearheaded by
tanks and armored vehicles, the UAF quickly exploited its breakthrough with high mobile units tanks and armored vehicles, the UAF quickly exploited its breakthrough with high mobile units
that advanced behind Russian forces, conducting ambushes and cutting off Russian that advanced behind Russian forces, conducting ambushes and cutting off Russian
reinforcements.reinforcements. ~~By September 8, the UAF had broken through Russian lines and liberated almost~~
~~400 square miles, with Russia appearing unable to coordinate effective resistance or reestablish~~

~~other conventional Russian forces. Matthew Luxmoore, “Russia Moves to Reinforce Its Stalled Assault on Ukraine,”~~
Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2022.
68 Loveday Morris et al., “On the Kherson Front Lines, Little Sign of a Ukrainian Counteroffensive,” Washington Post,
~~August 12, 2022.~~
~~69 Jim Sciutto, “Ukrainian Forces Begin ‘Shaping’ Battlefield for Counteroffensive, Senior U.S. Officials Say,” CNN,~~
~~August 29, 2022.~~
~~70 Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. War Gamed with Ukraine Ahead of Counteroffensive and Encouraged~~
~~More Limited Mission,” CNN, September 1, 2022; Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on~~
~~U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.~~
~~71 John Hudson, “Wounded Soldiers Reveal Steep Toll of Kherson Offensive,” Washington Post, September 7, 2022;~~
~~Andrew E. Kramer, “For Ukraine, the Fight Is Often a Game of Bridges,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.~~
~~72 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, September 6, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 7, 2022.~~
~~73 President Zelensky praised the 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade, and 92nd Mechanized Brigade in a~~
~~televised speech, but observers noted other units present in the initial offensive. BBC, “Zelensky Hails ‘Good News’ as~~
~~Settlements Recaptured from Russia,” September 7, 2022; Marc Santora, “How Ukraine Gained Momentum Against~~
~~Russia and Took a Critical Hub,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.~~
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~~defensive lines despite rushing in reinforcements.74~~70 The UAF also launched offensives south of The UAF also launched offensives south of
Izyum and Lyman to put pressure on Russian forces, threatening to cut off Russian forces in the Izyum and Lyman to put pressure on Russian forces, threatening to cut off Russian forces in the
area. area.
By September 10, Russian forces had announced a withdrawal from Izyum, a symbolic statement By September 10, Russian forces had announced a withdrawal from Izyum, a symbolic statement
after a near-total rout of Russian forces in the area. The collapse of Russian forces led to the UAF after a near-total rout of Russian forces in the area. The collapse of Russian forces led to the UAF
advancing so quickly that UAF command had trouble keeping track of its units.advancing so quickly that UAF command had trouble keeping track of its units.7571 Ukrainian Ukrainian
Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated the offensive had gone “better than expected” and that Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated the offensive had gone “better than expected” and that
Ukraine’s focus was on consolidating and defending the recaptured territory.Ukraine’s focus was on consolidating and defending the recaptured territory.7672 By September 11, By September 11,
Russia announced it had withdrawn all forces west of the Oskil River, with Ukraine retaking Russia announced it had withdrawn all forces west of the Oskil River, with Ukraine retaking
more than 1,000 square miles of territory and almost all previously occupied territory in Kharkiv more than 1,000 square miles of territory and almost all previously occupied territory in Kharkiv
region.region.7773
During this period, Russian forces continued to disintegrate, including reinforcements such as the During this period, Russian forces continued to disintegrate, including reinforcements such as the
90th Tank Division and the newly created 3rd Army Corps, which were rushed in to stabilize 90th Tank Division and the newly created 3rd Army Corps, which were rushed in to stabilize
Russian lines.Russian lines.7874 After recapturing Izyum, the UAF pushed past the Oskil River into Luhansk After recapturing Izyum, the UAF pushed past the Oskil River into Luhansk~~. The~~
~~UAF’s new objective was~~ toward the key hub of Lyman, critical for Russia’s efforts to push further into the key hub of Lyman, critical for Russia’s efforts to push further into
~~Donetsk. By this time, it was becoming clear that Lyman, and the Donetsk city of Bakhmut, were~~
~~turning into key objectives that would influence the trajectory of the conflict over the coming~~
~~months.79~~
~~Russia’s Claimed Annexation of Ukrainian Territories~~
~~On September 30, Putin announced that Russia would annex the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk,~~
~~Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. The announcement came in the midst of multiple~~
~~successful Ukrainian military offensives and was declared illegal by most of the international~~
~~community.80 Putin’s announcement of the annexation may have been intended to re-affirm~~
~~Russia’s commitment to the war, despite the setbacks, and corresponding to increasing rhetoric by~~
~~Putin linking the Ukraine conflict to a larger conflict between Russia and the West.81 In illegally~~
~~claiming to annex these regions, Putin ended any immediate prospect of negotiations or a~~
~~diplomatic solution to the war. Putin also created a pretext for further steps to shore up Russia’s~~
~~failing military operations (such as mobilization and various economic measures to support the~~
~~war), and for presenting Russia as defending itself to a Russian domestic audience. By declaring~~

74Donetsk.75 67 John Hudson, “Wounded Soldiers Reveal Steep Toll of Kherson Offensive,” Washington Post, September 7, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “For Ukraine, the Fight Is Often a Game of Bridges,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. 68 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, September 6, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 7, 2022. 69 President Zelensky praised the 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade, and 92nd Mechanized Brigade in a televised speech, but observers noted other units present in the initial offensive. BBC, “Zelensky Hails ‘Good News’ as Settlements Recaptured from Russia,” September 7, 2022. 70 Jack Detsch, “They Are Pushing Everywhere:’ Kyiv Goes on the Offensive,” Jack Detsch, “They Are Pushing Everywhere:’ Kyiv Goes on the Offensive,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 2022; , September 8, 2022;
Economist, “Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the East,” September 9, 2022. , “Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the East,” September 9, 2022.
7571 Economist, “Is Russia on the Run?” September 11, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Turning the Tide? Ukraine Stuns Russia with , “Is Russia on the Run?” September 11, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Turning the Tide? Ukraine Stuns Russia with
Counteroffensive but Can’t Claim Victory Yet,” RFE/RL, September 11, 2022. Counteroffensive but Can’t Claim Victory Yet,” RFE/RL, September 11, 2022.
7672 Jack Watling, “Ukraine Can Now Exploit Russia’s Confusion, But Must Plan Carefully,” Jack Watling, “Ukraine Can Now Exploit Russia’s Confusion, But Must Plan Carefully,” Guardian, September 10, , September 10,
2022. 2022.
7773 Illia Ponomarenko, “With Successful Kharkiv Operation, Ukraine Turns the War in Its Favor,” Illia Ponomarenko, “With Successful Kharkiv Operation, Ukraine Turns the War in Its Favor,” Kyiv Independent, ,
September 13, 2022.September 13, 2022.
7874 Siobhán O'Grady and Anastacia Galouchka, “The Letters Left Behind by Demoralized Russian Soldiers as They Siobhán O'Grady and Anastacia Galouchka, “The Letters Left Behind by Demoralized Russian Soldiers as They
Fled,” Fled,” Washington Post, September 15, 2022, September 15, 2022~~; David Axe, “Pity the Russians Who Get Assigned to the Ill-Fated 90th~~
~~Tank Division in Ukraine,” Forbes, September 15, 2022.~~
79. 75 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “Two Cities, Two Armies: Pivot Points in the Fight in Ukraine’s East,” Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “Two Cities, Two Armies: Pivot Points in the Fight in Ukraine’s East,”
New York Times, September 26, 2022, September 26, 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Russia’s Claimed Annexation of Ukrainian Territories On September 30, Putin announced that Russia would annex the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia. The announcement came in the midst of multiple successful Ukrainian military offensives and was declared illegal by most of the international community.76 Putin’s announcement of the annexation may have been intended to re-affirm Russia’s commitment to the war, despite the setbacks, and corresponding to increasing rhetoric by Putin linking the Ukraine conflict to a larger conflict between Russia and the West.77 In illegally claiming to annex these regions, Putin ended any immediate prospect of negotiations or a diplomatic solution to the war. By declaring
~~80 White House, “Statement from President Biden on Russia’s Attempts to Annex Ukrainian Territory,” press release,~~
~~September 20, 2022.~~
~~81 Anton Troianovski and Valerie Hopkins, “With Bluster and Threats, Putin Casts the West as the Enemy,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, September 30, 2022.~~
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these territories part of Russia, Putin also opened the possibility of deploying conscripts, which these territories part of Russia, Putin also opened the possibility of deploying conscripts, which
are prevented from being forcibly deployed abroad unless a state of war is declared. are prevented from being forcibly deployed abroad unless a state of war is declared.
Russian Personnel ~~and Manpower Challenges~~
Challenges In response to heavy casualties and insufficient recruitment In response to heavy casualties and insufficient recruitment ~~from its shadow mobilization strategies~~, and to defer the official deployment of conscripts to combat, Russian , Russian
President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilization” President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilization” ~~on September 21 with the initial call-up mobilizing~~
in September 2022 of 300,000 personnel. The initial mobilization was marked by confusion and a blanket call-up by local and regional 300,000 personnel. The initial mobilization was marked by confusion and a blanket call-up by local and regional
officials to meet quotas, instead of a more targeted mobilization of those with recent military experience or officials to meet quotas, instead of a more targeted mobilization of those with recent military experience or
technical skil s. Putin announced an end to mobilization by late October, but never officially signed a decree ending technical skil s. Putin announced an end to mobilization by late October, but never officially signed a decree ending
mobilization. In early Decembermobilization. In early December 2022, Putin announced that around 80,000 mobilized personnel were to be deployed in , Putin announced that around 80,000 mobilized personnel were to be deployed in
combat units, 70,000 to fulfil support and defensive roles, and 150,000 to conduct training in Russia or Belarus. combat units, 70,000 to fulfil support and defensive roles, and 150,000 to conduct training in Russia or Belarus. InAlso in
DecemberDecember ~~2022~~, Russia , Russia ~~also~~ announced several major structural changes to the armed forces, including an announced several major structural changes to the armed forces, including an
increase in the size of the military to 1.5 mil ion personnel (including 695,000 contract personnel) and the creation increase in the size of the military to 1.5 mil ion personnel (including 695,000 contract personnel) and the creation
of new units.of new units. Most analysts agree the only way to achieve this staffing level is through mobilizationMost analysts agree the only way to achieve this staffing level is through mobilization or an increase in conscription. On September 12, 2022, President Putin stated that 270,000 people voluntarily signed up to join the military over the last six months (in addition to those mobilized) and added that up to 1,500 people join “every day.” This is likely a heavily inflated number, and it likely reflects the total number of new personnel rather than those who voluntarily signed contracts, including some mobilized personnel as well as conscripts who were pressured or coerced into signing contracts to serve as professional soldiers. The Russian military also began recruiting prisoners from Russian prisons, copying the practice of the Wagner Group Private Military Company. .
Heavy casualties to senior contract soldiers and junior officers continue to hamper the Russian military’s ability to Heavy casualties to senior contract soldiers and junior officers continue to hamper the Russian military’s ability to
train new personnel, since most training is conducted at the unit level by these personnel. Due to the immediate train new personnel, since most training is conducted at the unit level by these personnel. Due to the immediate
need for reinforcements to stabilize Russian lines, the Russian military sent many mobilized personnel into the need for reinforcements to stabilize Russian lines, the Russian military sent many mobilized personnel into the
frontlines with minimal training and limited equipment. frontlines with minimal training and limited equipment. ~~Despite this, it appears at~~At least a portion of the mobilized least a portion of the mobilized
personnel personnel ~~are undergoing~~ underwent further training to either form new units or serve as more capable replacements in further training to either form new units or serve as more capable replacements in
~~reconstituted units.~~
~~Most analysts expect Russia to announce further mobilizations (or the use of conscripts) as it seeks to~~
~~reconstitute its forces. As noted, however, the military’s ability to integrate and train new personnel is limited, and~~
~~must be coordinated with the annual conscription intake.~~ reconstituted units. Training of mobilized personnel also has to be coordinated with the spring and fall conscription cycles, further straining Russia’s limited capacity to train new recruits. Despite the hurdles and chaotic nature of the first round Despite the hurdles and chaotic nature of the first round
of mobilization, of mobilization, ~~Russia likely has begun~~Russian authorities began a process of creating more orderly structures and processes for future call- a process of creating more orderly structures and processes for future call-
ups and ups and isare aware of the potential domestic aware of the potential domestic political implications of new round of mobilization. In order to gain new personnel and defer further mobilization, Russian authorities have turned to a variety of “shadow mobilization” strategies. These strategies combine incentives, such as high salaries and increased benefits, with measures aimed at making evasion or deferment more difficult. Russia has passed a series of legislative changes to increase the pool of available personnel, including electronic conscription summons and the creation of a digital registry, as well as increases in the maximum conscription age to 30 (from 27) and officers to 70 (from 65). Sources: Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Sends Il -Trained Draftees Into Combat Amid Losses, Analysts Say,” New York Times, November 4, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Don’t Call It Mobilization: Across Russia, Military Recruiters Send Out New Orders,” RFE/RL, March 16, 2023; Matthew Luxmoore and Yuliya Chernova, “Russia to Curb Draft-Dodging as It Denies Fresh Mobilization Plans,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2023; Thomas Gibbons-Nedd and Natalia Yermak, “‘Dig, Dig, Dig’: A Russian Soldier’s Story,” New York Times, July 5, 2023; Ivan Nechepurenko, 76 White House, “Statement from President Biden on Russia’s Attempts to Annex Ukrainian Territory,” press release, September 20, 2022. 77 Anton Troianovski and Valerie Hopkins, “With Bluster and Threats, Putin Casts the West as the Enemy~~political implications.~~
~~Observers and Ukrainian officials acknowledge that, despite the losses, the sheer quantity of these reinforcements~~
~~has been helpful in blunting further Ukrainian offensives. Wagner PMC has also become a largely independent~~
~~Russian force, conducting offensives and operations under its leader Yevgeny Prighozin, including ongoing efforts~~
~~to seize the town of Bakhmut and the massed recruitment of prisoners from prisons across Russia.~~
Sources: Department of Defense, “Russian Efforts to Raise Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ U.S.
~~Official Says,” press release, August 29, 2022; President of Russia, “Address by the President of the Russian~~
~~Federation,” press release, September 21, 2022; Brad Lendon, “Putin Can Call Up All The Troops He Wants, But~~
~~Russia Can’t Train or Support Them,” CNN, September 22, 2022; Max Seddon and Christopher Mil er, “Vladimir~~
~~Putin Signal End of Russia’s Popular Mobilization Drive,” FT, October 14, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Sends~~
~~Il -Trained Draftees Into Combat Amid Losses, Analysts Say~~,” ,” New York Times, September 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects “Russia, Seeking a Bigger Army, Moves to Raise Top Age for Military Service,” New York Times, July 25, 2023; Johan Norberg, Ismail Khan, and Jonas Kjellen, “Attrition and Regeneration: Russia's Armed Forces at War,” in Russia’s War Against Ukraine and the West: The First Year, ed. Maria Engqvist and Emil Wannheden (FOI, 2023), pp. 65-76; Conflict Intelligence Team, “Mobilization Update, August 3-4,” August 4, 2023. October 2022-March~~Times, November 4, 2022; Greg Mil er et~~
~~al., “Wiped Out’: War in Ukraine Has Decimated a Once Feared Russian Brigade,” Washington Post, December 16,~~
~~2022; Mike Eckel, “Russia Proposes Major Military Reorganization, Conscription Changes, Increase In Troop~~
~~Numbers,” RFE/RL, December 23, 2022; Pavel Luzin, “The Russian Army in 2023,” Riddle, January 18, 2023.~~
~~October 2022-Early~~ 2023
By early October 2022, the UAF had continued to capitalize on its success and push Russian By early October 2022, the UAF had continued to capitalize on its success and push Russian
forces back into Luhansk. The UAF captured the key hub of Lyman, the earlier scene of heavy forces back into Luhansk. The UAF captured the key hub of Lyman, the earlier scene of heavy
fighting in May 2022. Russian forces continued to withdraw, leaving significant amounts of fighting in May 2022. Russian forces continued to withdraw, leaving significant amounts of
military equipment (including tanks and artillery ammunition) that helped propel further UAF military equipment (including tanks and artillery ammunition) that helped propel further UAF
offensives.offensives.82

~~82 Since the first arrivals of M777 howitzers in April, the UAF increasingly relied on Western artillery and ammunition~~
~~as its stockpiles of ammunition for its Soviet and Russian era artillery dwindled to critically low levels. The provision~~
~~of Western artillery systems, and its precision targeting capability, proved decisive in the UAF’s ability to support~~
~~offensive operations. For more, see Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukraine’s New Offensive Is Fueled by Captured Russian~~
~~Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2022; Marcin Piotrowski,~~ ~~Military-Technical Assistance to Ukraine: An~~
~~Assessment of Its Short and Medium-Term Needs, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, December 2022;~~
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78 In contrast to the collapse of Russian forces in Kharkiv, the UAF faced stiff and determined In contrast to the collapse of Russian forces in Kharkiv, the UAF faced stiff and determined
resistance in Kherson. As noted above, Russia had moved some of its most capable remaining resistance in Kherson. As noted above, Russia had moved some of its most capable remaining
forces in preparation for an expected UAF offensive in the south. As Ukrainian forces retook forces in preparation for an expected UAF offensive in the south. As Ukrainian forces retook
some territory in Kherson region, Russian forces withdrew to prepared defensive lines and some territory in Kherson region, Russian forces withdrew to prepared defensive lines and
imposed heavy UAF casualties.imposed heavy UAF casualties.83 Western security assistance (such as M777 and HIMARS) again Western security assistance (such as M777 and HIMARS) again
proved crucial by giving the UAF long-range strike capabilities to isolate Russian forces by proved crucial by giving the UAF long-range strike capabilities to isolate Russian forces by
targeting command and control, logistics, and bridges.targeting command and control, logistics, and bridges.8479
At the same time, the UAF continued to demonstrate flexibility and innovation by conducting At the same time, the UAF continued to demonstrate flexibility and innovation by conducting
multiple strikes deep in Russia.multiple strikes deep in Russia.~~85 First, apparently modified Ukrainian drones attacked a Russian~~
~~airbase 170 miles southwest of Moscow, home to Tu-22M bombers used to launch strikes in~~
~~Ukraine.86 Second, on~~80 On October 8, Ukraine blew up parts of the Kerch Bridge connecting occupied October 8, Ukraine blew up parts of the Kerch Bridge connecting occupied
Crimea and Russia. In response, Russia launched more than 80 missiles and two dozen drones to Crimea and Russia. In response, Russia launched more than 80 missiles and two dozen drones to
attack more than 20 Ukrainian cities.attack more than 20 Ukrainian cities.87 Ukraine also attacked Russia’s Engels airbase, home to Ukraine also attacked Russia’s Engels airbase, home to
part of its strategic bomber force, twice in December 2022, again demonstrating Ukraine’s ability part of its strategic bomber force, twice in December 2022, again demonstrating Ukraine’s ability
to strike deep inside Russia.to strike deep inside Russia.8881
By autumn 2022, some battlefield momentum had shifted to Ukraine, and Russia faced the By autumn 2022, some battlefield momentum had shifted to Ukraine, and Russia faced the
prospect of defeat on multiple fronts. Russian forces suffered from a lack of personnel, dwindling prospect of defeat on multiple fronts. Russian forces suffered from a lack of personnel, dwindling
equipment and ammunition stockpiles, and low morale.equipment and ammunition stockpiles, and low morale. ~~Criticism of the regime and domestic~~
~~pressure began to build in response to continued battlefield losses.89~~ In the wake of these Russian In the wake of these Russian
failures, it is possible that Putin began to receive a more accurate understanding of the state of failures, it is possible that Putin began to receive a more accurate understanding of the state of
Russian forces and that Russia’s current strategy and conventional forces in Ukraine were Russian forces and that Russia’s current strategy and conventional forces in Ukraine were
insufficient.insufficient.9082
In response, Putin appointed a new commander of the Russian Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine, In response, Putin appointed a new commander of the Russian Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine,
General Sergei SurovikinGeneral Sergei Surovikin, in early October 2022. With a reputation for being a competent, if 78 Since the first arrivals of M777 howitzers in April, the UAF increasingly relied on Western artillery and ammunition as its stockpiles of ammunition for its Soviet and Russian era artillery dwindled to critically low levels. The provision of Western artillery systems, and its precision targeting capability, proved decisive in the UAF’s ability to support offensive operations. For more, see Marcin Piotrowski, Military-Technical Assistance to Ukraine: An Assessment of Its Short and Medium-Term Needs, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, December 2022; Egle E. ~~in early October 2022 (see “Russian Command and Control~~
~~Challenges” text box above). With a reputation for being a competent, if brutal, general,~~
~~Surovikin’s goal was to stem Russian losses and stabilize the frontline.91 To do so, Surovikin~~
~~adopted a more defensive strategy. Thousands of mobilized personnel were immediately sent to~~

~~Egle E.~~ Murauskaite, Murauskaite, U.S. Arms Transfers to Ukraine: An Impact Assessment, Asymmetric Threat Analysis Center: , Asymmetric Threat Analysis Center:
University of Maryland, January 2023. University of Maryland, January 2023.
~~83 Franco Ordonez, “In the Battle for Kherson, Ukrainian Infantry Officers Say Don’t Underestimate Russia,” NPR,~~
~~October 28, 2022.~~
8479 Jack Detsch, “Russian Army Keeps Collapsing After Falling Back in Kherson,” Jack Detsch, “Russian Army Keeps Collapsing After Falling Back in Kherson,” Foreign Policy, October 4, 2022. , October 4, 2022.
8580 There were previously unexplained explosions and reported attacks on military installations but Ukrainian officials There were previously unexplained explosions and reported attacks on military installations but Ukrainian officials
refused to comment. refused to comment.
~~86 Howard Altman and Tyler Rogoway, “Ukrainian Kamikaze Drone Attacks Bomber Base Deep In Russia,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Drive, October 7, 2022.~~
~~87 Meduza, “Putin and Russian Defense Ministry Satisfied with ‘High-Precision’ Missile Strikes on Ukraine’s~~
~~Civilians,” October 10, 2022; BBC, “Russian Attack on City Claimed by Moscow Kills 13,” October 10, 2022; James~~
~~Glanz and Marco Hernandez, “How Ukraine Blew Up a Key Russian Bridge,” New York Times, November 17, 2022.~~
~~88 Veronika Melkozerova, “Drone Attack Hits Russia’s Engels Airbase for Second Time in a Month,” Politico.eu,~~
~~December 26, 2022.~~
~~89 Economist, “As Ukraine Smashes Through More Russian Lines, Russians Wonder Whom to Blame,” October 3,~~
~~2022; Max Seddon, “Kremlin Backers Openly Target Russia’s Generals for Battlefield Setbacks,” FT, October 7, 2022.~~
~~90Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “As Russian Losses Mount in Ukraine, Putin~~
Gets More Involved in War Strategy,” New York Times~~, September 23, 2022;~~81 Veronika Melkozerova, “Drone Attack Hits Russia’s Engels Airbase for Second Time in a Month,” Politico.eu, December 26, 2022. 82 Paul Sonne, “Putin Faces Limits of His Paul Sonne, “Putin Faces Limits of His
Military Power as Ukraine Recaptures Land,” Military Power as Ukraine Recaptures Land,” Washington Post, October 5, , October 5, ~~2022.~~
91 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Attack Dog Brings a Terrible Type of Warfare to Ukraine,” Spectator~~, October 10,~~ 2022. 2022.
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brutal, general, Surovikin’s goal was to stem Russian losses and stabilize the frontline.83 To do so, Surovikin adopted a more defensive strategy, including the building of extensive, interlocking defensive lines across southern Ukraine.84 Thousands of mobilized personnel were immediately sent to the frontlines, often with limited training and equipment.the frontlines, often with limited training and equipment.9285 Despite their poor quality, these fresh Despite their poor quality, these fresh
troops allowed Russia to reinforce its lines, and in some cases even rotate and rest units. The troops allowed Russia to reinforce its lines, and in some cases even rotate and rest units. The
commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, stated bluntly, “Russian commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, stated bluntly, “Russian
mobilization has worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not mobilization has worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not
fight. They will.”fight. They will.”9386
Figure 3. Ukraine Airfields and Key Infrastructure

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Janes IHSCreated by Congressional Research Service using data from Janes IHS as of February 2022. .
At the same time, and possibly as a result of growing domestic dissent over the conduct of the At the same time, and possibly as a result of growing domestic dissent over the conduct of the
war, Russia launched a renewed strike campaign targeting key energy infrastructure across war, Russia launched a renewed strike campaign targeting key energy infrastructure across
Ukraine (seeUkraine (see Figure 3). Despite a widespread assessment that Russia’s stockpile of long-range . Despite a widespread assessment that Russia’s stockpile of long-range
precision munitions is running low, Russia continued to launch such attacks (including heavy precision munitions is running low, Russia continued to launch such attacks (including heavy
missile barrages in November and December 2022).missile barrages in November and December 2022).~~94 Evidence indicates that Russia has been~~
~~producing new munitions, albeit at a rate likely insufficient to replace lost stockpiles and sustain~~
~~large-scale attacks. In response~~87 To compensate for its dwindling stockpile and limitations on producing new PGMs, Russia has imported Iranian drones to supplement its precision , Russia has imported Iranian drones to supplement its precision
munition stockpile. The use of cheap, but effective, Iranian drones force Ukrainian air munition stockpile. The use of cheap, but effective, Iranian drones force Ukrainian air ~~defenses to~~
~~expend their limited munitions, potentially presenting a choice to Ukraine in the near future of~~
~~whether to prioritize air defense of critical infrastructure or its frontline forces.95 Additionally,~~

92 83 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Attack Dog Brings a Terrible Type of Warfare to Ukraine,” Spectator, October 10, 2022. 84 Marco Hernandez and Josh Holder, “Defenses Carves into the Earth,” New York Times, December 14, 2022. 85 Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd, “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, and Morale and the Ukraine War,” Marshall Center, November 15, 2022; Robyn Dixon and Natalia Abbakumova, “Angry Families Say Russian Conscripts Thrown to Front Line Robyn Dixon and Natalia Abbakumova, “Angry Families Say Russian Conscripts Thrown to Front Line
Unprepared,” Unprepared,” Washington Post, November 20, 2022. , November 20, 2022.
9386 Economist, “An Interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, Head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces,” December 15, 2022. Economist, “An Interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, Head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces,” December 15, 2022.
9487 Andrew E. Kramer and Megan Specia, “Death Toll of Russian Strike in Dnipro Rises to 40, Ukraine Says Andrew E. Kramer and Megan Specia, “Death Toll of Russian Strike in Dnipro Rises to 40, Ukraine Says,”,” New York Times, January 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 16 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects defenses to expend their limited munitions, potentially presenting a choice to Ukraine of prioritizing air defense of critical infrastructure or its frontline forces.88 Additionally, wearing ~~New~~
~~York Times, January 16, 2023.~~
~~95 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Russia Trying to Exhaut Ukraine’s Air Defenses, Pentagon Official Says,” Reuters,~~
~~November 19, 2022; CRS Insight IN12042, Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use in Ukraine, by Andrew S.~~
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~~wearing~~ down Ukraine’s air defenses would also allow the VKS to operate more freely, in down Ukraine’s air defenses would also allow the VKS to operate more freely, in
contrast to its current risk averse operations over Ukraine. contrast to its current risk averse operations over Ukraine.
In November 2022, Russia announced its withdrawal from the city of Kherson to more defensible In November 2022, Russia announced its withdrawal from the city of Kherson to more defensible
lines east of the Dnipro. lines east of the Dnipro. ~~It appears Putin finally relented to withdrawing from Kherson after~~
~~reportedly refusing the Russian military’s requests for months to retreat from its exposed~~
~~positions there.96 Russia appeared to be adjusting its military strategy and adapting to UAF~~
~~tactics, including attempting to disperse logistics and command and control in response to~~
~~HIMARS and precision artillery fire.97 However, a New Year’s Day strike by the UAF on Russian~~
~~mobilized troops housed next to ammunition indicates that the Russian military continues to have~~
~~issues with lower level command and control and professionalization.98~~
~~Figure 4. Ukraine Territorial Control~~

~~Notes:~~ ~~Created by CRS.~~Russia was able to withdraw some of its most capable units in good order, preserving them for expected offensives in the winter and spring. It appears Putin relented to withdrawing from Kherson after reportedly refusing the Russian military’s requests for months to retreat from its exposed positions there.89 Figure 4. Ukraine Territorial Control, Winter 2022-2023 Source: Created by Congressional Research Service using data from U.S. Department of State, Global Admin, and ESRI. Note: Lines of territorial control are approximate. Lines of territorial control are approximate.
With the establishment of more defensible lines and the introduction of new mobilized personnel, With the establishment of more defensible lines and the introduction of new mobilized personnel,
Russia was able to stabilize its lines, including blunting further UAF offenses to seize the key Russia was able to stabilize its lines, including blunting further UAF offenses to seize the key
cities of Kreminna and Svatove in Luhansk.cities of Kreminna and Svatove in Luhansk.9990 Most fighting Most fighting ~~has become~~soon became attritional, with a relatively warm winter limiting the ability of either side to conduct rapid offensive maneuvers due 88 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Russia Trying to Exhaust Ukraine’s Air Defenses, Pentagon Official Says,” Reuters, November 19, 2022; CRS Insight IN12042, Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use in Ukraine, by Andrew S. Bowen, Carla E. Humud, and Clayton Thomas. 89 Mike Eckel, “Bad News Politically, Shrewd Move Militarily? What Russia’s Kherson Retreat Means—And What It Doesn't.” RFE/RL, November 10, 2022. 90 ~~attritional, with a~~

~~Bowen, Carla E. Humud, and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~96 Mike Eckel, “Bad News Politically, Shrewd Move Militarily? What Russia’s Kherson Retreat Means—And What It~~
~~Doesn't.” RFE/RL, November 10, 2022.~~
~~97 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne, Liz Sly and Kamila Hrabchuk, “Ukraine Confronts Tougher Fight in Push to~~
~~Extend Battlefield Wins,” Washington Post, November 19, 2022.~~
~~98 Victoria Kim, “Russia Says Soldiers’ Cellphone Use Led to the Deadly Makiivka Strike,” New York Times, January~~
~~4, 2023.~~
99 Borys Sachalko, “'We Fight With Our Brains. They Fight With Numbers’: Ukrainian Paratroopers On The Battle For Borys Sachalko, “'We Fight With Our Brains. They Fight With Numbers’: Ukrainian Paratroopers On The Battle For
The Donbas City of Kreminna,” RFE/RL, December 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~relatively warm winter limiting the ability of either side to conduct rapid offensive maneuvers due~~
to wet and muddy terrain.to wet and muddy terrain.~~100~~91 Russian tactics Russian tactics ~~also have adapted and continue to evolve~~adapted, with , with
Russian forces conducting probing attacks to identify and fix UAF positions, which are then Russian forces conducting probing attacks to identify and fix UAF positions, which are then
~~attacked by smaller, professional units.~~
~~The Russian military does not appear to be operating BTGs; what professional units remain~~
~~appear to operate as Company Tactical Groups and are deployed as mobile reserves or strike~~
~~groups.101 These tactics contrast with Russia’s reliance on massed artillery during its offensives in~~
~~the Donbas during the summer. Analysts continue to speculate whether the lower level of artillery~~
~~fire is due to low stockpiles, more focused fighting areas, conservation of ammunition for~~
~~upcoming offensives, or logistical challenges.102~~
~~Battle for Bakhmut~~
~~The Donetsk city of Bakhmut and its surrounding cities have been the scene of intense fighting since the summer~~
~~of 2022, and continues to be a focus for Russian forces, specifically the Wagner PMC. Most observers agree that~~
~~while there is some tactical utility in capturing Bakhmut, its strategic value is questionable. Both sides appear to be~~
~~focusing on the symbolic importance of the city, with Russia seeking to present its capture as part of its pledge to~~
~~capture the Donetsk region, and Ukraine seeking to demonstrate its determination to defend all of its territory.~~
~~Some analysts speculate Russian forces were allowed to withdraw from Kherson in expectation of gains in the~~
~~Donbas, possibly explaining the focus on Bakhmut.~~
~~In the struggle for Bakhmut, Wagner and its leader Yevgeny Prighozin have sought to increase their stature by~~
~~presenting Wagner as a more capable and competent fighting force than the Russian military. Reports indicate that~~
~~Prighozin views the capture of Bakhmut as a way to increase his standing with the Russian leadership and establish~~
~~Wagner’s standing as an independent institution within Russia. Wagner has heavily recruited from prisons and~~
~~these recruits are viewed as expendable. As of early 2023, U.S. officials estimate Wagner commands up to 50,000~~
~~personnel, including 40,000 convicts and 10,000 professional mercenaries. Wagner uses these prisoners in massed~~
~~human wave attacks to identify and wear down UAF positions, despite suffering heavy casualties in the process.~~
~~While most Russian casualties are prisoners or low quality fighters, the UAF has devoted considerable resources,~~
~~including some of its most capable units, to defending Bakhmut. Wagner has been able to make small, incremental~~
~~gains, including seizing most of the town of Soledar (with the support of VDV units and not solely Wagner PMC~~
~~personnel), and increasingly threatening UAF control of Bakhmut. Observers continue to debate the extent to~~
~~which fighting in Bakhmut has drained both Russian and UAF resources and potentially affect each sides’ ability to~~
~~launch offensives in the spring.~~
Sources: Andrew Osborn and Mark Trevelyan, “Russia’s ‘General Armageddon’ Under Pressure to Deliver on
~~Battlefield After Retreat,” Reuters, November 21, 2022; Andrew Osborn and Felix Light, “Russia’s Grim Battle for~~
~~Bakhmut May Yield Pyrrhic Victory at Best,” Reuters, December 20, 2022; Tim Lister, “As Russia’s Military Stalls,~~
~~‘Putin’s Chef’ Serves Up His Wagner Shock Troops to Rescue Ukraine Campaign,” CNN, January 11, 2023; Paul~~
~~Soone and Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Bloody Bakhmut Siege Poses Risks for Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 15,~~
~~2023; Il ia Ponomarenko, “With the Loss of Soledar, Ukrainian Positions in Bakhmut Jeopardized,”~~ ~~Kyiv~~
~~Independent, January 22, 2023; Felix Light, Filipp Lebedev, and Reade Levinson, “A Russian Graveyard Reveals~~
~~Wagner’s Prisoner Army,” Reuters, January 26, 2023.~~
~~After only three months, Surovikin was replaced by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov~~
~~in early January 2023. The replacement comes despite a widespread assessment that Surovikin~~

~~The Donbas City of Kreminna,” RFE/RL, December 28, 2022.~~
~~100 Konrad Muzyka, “Issue 245, 16 January – 22 January 2023 (Weekly update),” Rochan Consulting, January 23,~~
~~2023.~~
~~101 Specifically, remaining VDV units appear to be the Russian military’s primary strike group element. Additionally,~~
~~Russia appears to be relying on dismounted infantry, without tank or armored fighting vehicle support, in contrast to~~
~~the early phases of the war, possibly as a result from heavy equipment losses, as well as conserving equipment for~~
~~possible future offensives.~~
~~102 Natasha Bertrand, Oren Liebermann, and Alex Marquardt, “Russian Artillery Fire Down Nearly 75%, U.S. Officials~~
~~Say, In Latest Sign of Struggles for Moscow,” CNN, January 10, 2022.~~
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~~was amongst Russia’s most capable commander and was largely credited with stabilizing Russian~~
~~lines in the wake of successful Ukrainian offensives. While the rationale is unclear, some~~
~~observers speculate that the replacement of Surovikin demonstrates the continued unrealistic~~
~~battlefield expectations of Russian political decisionmakers, partially due to an apparent~~
~~disconnect between Russian officers on the ground and the ability to convey accurate and realistic~~
~~information on the conflict.103 While it is possible Putin is getting more accurate information on~~
~~the state of the Russian military, Russia’s rhetoric and stated goals indicate there may still be a~~
~~mismatch between expectations and available resources.104 Director of National Intelligence Avril~~
~~Haines noted in December 2022, “I do think he [Putin] is becoming more informed of the~~
~~challenges that the military faces in Russia, but it’s still not clear to us that he has a full picture at~~
~~this stage of just how challenged they are.”105~~
~~Russia also has launched a number of local offensives in the South (around Vuhledar), continued~~
~~offensives to seize Bakhmut, and a counterattack in the North around Kreminna. Thus far the~~
~~attacks have failed to push back UAF forces and reports indicate Russian forces continue to suffer~~
~~heavy casualties.106 It is unclear whether these offensives are in fact part of the expected round of~~
~~offensives this spring, and could be an indication of Russia launching its offensives early without~~
~~sufficient training and resources.~~
~~Additional Key Issues~~
~~Among other issues, observers continue to monitor three issue areas for insight into the war.~~
~~These topics are the state of Russia’s defense industrial base, the role of Belarus, and war crimes.~~
~~These issues are important variables in the conflict and will continue to influence the trajectory of~~
~~the war.~~
~~Russian Defense Industrial Base~~
~~Since the beginning of the war, Russia has lost or expended a significant amount of equipment,~~
~~weapons, and ammunition. Not only does Russia need to replace equipment lost in battle, or~~
~~during retreats such as the route from Kharkiv, it must equip the newly mobilized soldiers and~~
~~units. As a result, Russia has mobilized its defense industry to a war footing and around the clock~~
~~production to meet its war needs.107 Putin has made visits to various defense factories, publicly~~
~~chastised defense industry officials, and appointed former President and Prime Minister Dmitry~~
~~Medvedev to a new position of first Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission that~~

~~103 Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd, “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, and Morale and the Ukraine~~
~~War” Marshall Center, November 15, 2022; Francesca Ebel, “Russia’s New Commander Reflects Putin’s Plan to Push~~
~~for Victory in Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022; Mark Galeotti,” Enter Gerasimov,”~~ ~~In Moscow’s~~
~~Shadows, January 12, 2023.~~
~~104 Evan Gershkovich, Thomas Grove, Drew Hinshaw, and Joe Parkinson, “Putin, Isolated and Distrustful, Leans on~~
~~Handful of Hard-Line Advisers,” Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2022.~~
~~105 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Fireside Chat with DNI Haines at the Reagan National Defense~~
~~Forum,” transcript, December 12, 2022.~~
~~106 Steve Hendrix and Serhii Korolchuk, “Attacking Vuhledar, Russia Previews New Push to Seize Southeast Ukraine,”~~
Washington Post, February 4, 2023; Marc Santora, Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Shashank Bengali, “Russia Pays a
~~Bloody Price for Small Gains on Eastern Front,” New York Times, February 7, 2023.~~
~~107 Yuliya Chernova and Stephen Fidler, “Putin Grips Economy Tighter to Supply Russian War Machine,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, December 6, 2022; Anton Troianovski, “Putin Admits Shortcomings But Vows ‘No Limits’ to Russia’s War~~
~~Spending,” New York Times, December 21, 2022.~~
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~~oversees the defense industry. Russia also enacted legislation to give the government “special~~
~~economic measures” to command the defense industry, but recent data indicates Russia is running~~
~~a large budget deficit to fund the war and defense industry.108~~
~~Russia’s defense industry faces issues of production capacity. While its defense industry attempts~~
~~to maximize output of newer systems, a portion of the defense industry’s capacity is directed to~~
~~updating, repairing, and modernizing equipment pulled from storage (such as installing reactive~~
~~armor on older tanks), especially to replace losses and equip newly mobilized personnel.109~~
~~Additionally, Russia’s heavy reliance on artillery in the war (often compensating for a lack of~~
~~personnel prior to mobilization) has likely reduced Russian munitions stockpiles.110 Reporting~~
~~indicates Russia has been forced to purchase munitions from alternative sources, such as North~~
~~Korea. Increasing ammunition production capacity is a key focus of Russia’s defense industry,~~
~~but constraints are likely to continue for the immediate future.111~~
~~Due to sanctions and export controls, Russia faces a shortage of critical components for its~~
~~advanced or modern systems (including helicopters, aircraft, PGMs, guided munitions, and~~
~~communication equipment).112 Despite limitations, Russia has been able to partially mitigate~~
~~shortages by turning to a number of strategies, including sanctions evasion, stockpiling critical~~
~~components prior to the war, and using civilian or lower-quality instead of military-grade~~
~~components. These strategies allow Russia to continue production, but rates of production are~~
~~likely insufficient to meet the military’s needs going forward.113~~
~~Additionally, the demands for mobilized personnel with technical skills are increasingly at odds~~
~~with the defense industry’s needs for those same personnel. While technical workers in the~~
~~defense industry are exempted from mobilization, the competition for skilled recruits could~~
~~complicate the defense industry’s ability to meet production demands if Russia conducts further~~
~~rounds of mobilization.114~~
~~Belarus~~
~~Since November 2022, Russian activity in Belarus has increased. Russia reportedly has increased~~
~~the number of troops in Belarus, with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu making several~~
~~trips to Belarus and Putin visiting in December 2022, raising concerns over the introduction of~~

~~108 Official Russian figures state that its military spending is expected to jump by $71 billion dollars in 2023, even as~~
~~Russia recorded a budget deficit of $47.3 billion in 2022. Pavel Luzin, “The Skyrocketing Costs for Russia’s War~~
~~Effort,” Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2023; Samantha Lock, “Putin Scolds Defense Industry Minister in~~
~~Televised Meeting for ‘Fooling Around,’” Guardian, January 12, 2023; Reuters, “Russia Rainy Day Fund Shrinks by~~
~~$38 Billion as Government Plugs Deficit,” January 18, 2023.~~
~~109 Georgy Aleksandrov, “The Barren Barrels,” Novaya Gazeta.eu, November 2, 2022.~~
~~110 Stephen Fidler and Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Munitions Shortages Raise Questions Over How Long It Can~~
~~Continue Ukraine War,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2022; Hlib Parfonov, “Russia Struggles to Maintain~~
~~Munition Stocks, “Jamestown Foundation, December 5, 2022.~~
~~111 James Beardsworth, “Is Russia Receiving Weapons From North Korea?” Moscow Times, December 18, 2022.~~
~~112 Igor Kossov, “How Many Missiles Does Russia Have Left?” Kyiv Independent, January 13, 2023.~~
~~113 Steve Stecklow, David Gauthier-Villars, and Maurice Tamman, “The Supply Chain that Keeps Tech Flowing to~~
~~Russia,” Reuters, December 13, 2022; Shashank Bengali, “Lacking Precision Missiles, Russia is Increasing Its Use of~~
~~Drones, Ukraine Says,” New York Times, January 4, 2022; Pavel Luzin, “Russia’s Nagging Arms Production~~
~~Problems,” Jamestown Foundation, January 23, 2023.~~
~~114 Polina Ivanova, Max Seddon, and Daria Mosolova, “They Grabbed Whoever They Could’: Putin’s Draft Puts More~~
~~Strain on Russian Businesses,” FT, November 29, 2022; Ian Talley and Anthony DeBarros, “China Aids Russia’s War~~
~~in Ukraine, Trade Data Shows,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023.~~
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~~Belarusian troops and a possible renewed offensive from Belarus.115 Most observers, however,~~
~~believe the likelihood of a renewed invasion from Belarus is low. Belarus has thus far resisted~~
~~Russian pressure to contribute troops, and Russian forces in Belarus are significantly fewer and~~
~~lower quality than those forces deployed for the initial Russian invasion.116 However, the~~
~~Belarusian military is training and equipping mobilized Russian personnel, including from~~
~~Belarusian ammunition stockpiles.~~
~~War Crimes~~
~~Numerous countries, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United Nations, the~~
~~Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), think tanks, and human rights~~
~~organizations have identified instances of potential Russian war crimes and human rights~~
~~violations in Ukraine.117 Calls from the international community for tribunals and structures to~~
~~investigate possible war crimes in Ukraine continue to grow, with both the EU and ICC proposing~~
~~tribunals.118 Among other crimes, Russian forces have been accused of indiscriminate and mass~~
~~killings, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence, intentionally targeting civilians, and~~
~~the forced “filtration” (interrogation and separation) of civilians and noncombatants from~~
~~occupied territories.119 Evidence continues to mount that at least some of the atrocities are~~
~~committed under the direction, or knowledge, of Russian commanders and authorities.120~~
~~Credible reports also continue to emerge over Russian “filtration camps,” where Ukrainian~~
~~civilians are interrogated and forcibly removed from their homes.121 On September 7, the U.S.~~
~~State Department accused Russia of orchestrating filtration operations, stating that “The United~~
~~States has information that (individuals) from Russia’s presidential administration are overseeing~~
~~and coordinating filtration operations. We are further aware that the Russian presidential~~
~~administration officials are providing lists of Ukrainians to be targeted for filtration.”122~~
~~Russia continues to launch cruise missiles and other precision guided munitions to strike targets~~
~~across Ukraine. Russia’s use of these and other missiles has demonstrated a trend of strikes on~~

~~115 Anatoly Kurmanaev, Andrew E. Kramer and Michael Levenson, “Putin Visits Belarus, Stirring New Concern on~~
~~Future of Ukraine War,” New York Times, December 19, 2022.~~
~~116 The Belarusian military is generally understood to have minimal offensive capability and suffers from low~~
~~readiness, with only a few units considered deployable. Ukrainian officials estimate 10,000 Russian troops are currently~~
~~stationed in Belarus. For more see, Wilk, Russia’s Belarussian Army, 2021; Konrad Muzyka, “The Belarusian Armed~~
~~Forces: Structures, Capabilities, and Defense Relations with Russia,” ICDS, August 2021; Yevhen Kizilov, “Ukrainian~~
~~Border Guards Report How Many Russian Troops are Deployed in Belarus,” Ukrainian Pravda, December 28, 2022.~~
~~117 See, for example, Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. experts find that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, September 23, 2022; BBC, “What War Crimes is Russia Accused Of?” November 14, 2022; Patrick~~
~~Wintour, “Russian War Crimes Draft Resolution Being Circulated at the UN,” Guardian, December 4, 2022.~~
~~118 Reuters, “EU Seeks Tribunal To Probe Possible Russian War Crimes in Ukraine,” November 20, 2022.~~
~~119 Justin Spike, “Bodies Exhumed From Mass Grave in Ukraine’s Liberated Lyman,” Washington Post, October 11,~~
~~2022; Erika Kinetz, “Kill Everyone’: Russian Violence in Ukraine Was Strategic,” AP, October 27, 2022.~~
~~120 Yousur Al-Hlou et al., “Caught on Camera, Traced by Phone: The Russian Military Unit That Killed dozens in~~
~~Bucha,” New York Times, December 23, 2022.~~
~~121 National Intelligence Council, “Russian Forces Conducting Detentions and Forced Deportations Through~~
~~Systematic Filtration Operations,” unclassified press release, June 15, 2022; Marc Santora, “A U.S. Intelligence Report~~
~~Finds that Russia’s Use of ‘Filtration Centers’ to Detain and Deport Ukrainians Has Intensified,” New York Times, July~~
~~25, 2022.~~
~~122 U.S. State Department, “Accountability for War Crimes and Other Atrocities in Ukraine: Recent Reporting and the~~
~~Commitment of Additional Funding,” press release, August 25, 2022; Reuters, “U.S. Demands Russia Halt ‘Filtration’~~
~~Operations in Ukraine,” September 7, 2022.~~
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~~civilian targets and populations and has increased in the wake of Russian battlefield failures.123~~
~~Observers also remain concerned by the Russian military’s occupation and supervision of the~~
~~Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest nuclear plant in Europe.124~~
~~To increase their control over occupied territories, Russian forces allegedly have conducted~~
~~arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, interrogations, and reprisals against the civilian~~
~~population. In particular, Russian forces reportedly have conducted intensive operations to repress~~
~~and eliminate opposition to Russian rule in the areas they occupy.125 Russian officials deny these~~
~~accusations, alleging that they only target legitimate military targets and that other accusations are~~
~~“lies.”126 Nevertheless, across recaptured territories in Kharkiv and Kherson, Ukrainian forces~~
~~have uncovered widespread evidence of torture, abuse, and mass graves.127 Ukrainian officials~~
~~state they are investigating over 58,000 potential war crimes.128~~
~~Observers highlight the potential for further war crimes in the context of denials by Russian~~
~~officials and an unwillingness to address accusations or alter behavior on the ground. One~~
~~Russian unit alleged to have participated in war crimes in Bucha was honored by Russian~~
~~President Vladimir Putin for its actions in Ukraine.129~~
~~Outlook~~
~~As the war in Ukraine reaches the one-year mark in February 2023, analysts and officials believe~~
~~attrition is the most likely trajectory for the immediate future, albeit with localized offensives and~~
~~some changes in territorial control by both sides.130 President Putin and Russian officials have~~
~~increasingly made statements to prepare the Russian population for a long conflict and are~~
~~mobilizing the Russian economy and society to support the war.131 Ukrainian officials,~~

~~123 Human Rights Watch, “Russian Attacks on Energy Grid Threaten Civilians,” December 6, 2022; Isabel Coles and~~
~~Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Targets Infrastructure Across Ukraine in Latest Barrage,” Wall Street Journal, December 16,~~
~~2022; Hanna Arhirova, “Russian Strike Toll: 45 Dead Civilians, Including Six Children,” AP, January 17, 2023.~~
~~124 For more, see CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt~~
~~and Mary Beth D. Nikitin; IAEA, “Director General Grossi Alarmed by Shelling at Ukraine NPP, says IAEA Mission~~
~~Vital for Nuclear Safety and Security,” press release, August 6, 2022.~~
~~125 Erika Kinetz, “We Will Find You’: Russian Hunt Down Ukrainians on Lists,” AP, December 21, 2022; Anthony~~
~~Deutsche, Anna Voitenko, and Olena Harmash, “Scale of Alleged Torture, Detentions by Russian Forces in Kherson~~
~~Emerges,” Reuters, January 12, 2023.~~
~~126 Reuters, “Kremlin Says Ukraine War Crimes Claims Are a Lie,” September 19, 2022.~~
~~127 Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine Exhumes Mass Burial Site in City Retaken From Russians,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~September 16, 2022; Lori Hinnant, Evgeniy Maloletka, and Vasilisa Stepanenko, “10 Torture Sites in One Town:~~
~~Russia Sowed Pain, Fear in Izium,” AP, October 2, 2022; Carlotta Gall, “‘It Was Horror’: Ukrainians Share Grim Tales~~
~~of Russian Occupation,” New York Times, October 20, 2022.~~
~~128 Michael Biesecker and Erika Kinetz, “Evidence of Russian Crimes Mounts as War in Ukraine Drags On,” AP,~~
~~December 20, 2022.~~
~~129 The U.S. State Department has identified Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division, its subordinate 234th Guards~~
~~Air Assault Regiment, and the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade as involved in possible war crimes in Bucha. U.S.~~
~~State Department, “Targeting Russia’s War Machine, Sanctions Evaders, Military Units Credibly Implicated in Human~~
~~Rights Abuses, and Russian Federation Officials Involved in Suppression of Dissent,” fact sheet, June 28, 2022.~~
~~130 John Hudson, “CIA Director Holds Secret Meeting With Zelensky on Russia’s Next Steps,” Washington Post,~~
~~January 19, 2023; Department of Defense, “Senior Military Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release,~~
~~January 23, 2023; Jen Kirby, “One Year In, Both Ukraine and Russia Still Think They Can Win,” Vox, January 25,~~
~~2023; Mike Eckel, “Russia’s New Offensive Grinds Into Action As Ukraine Punches Back Hard,” RFE/RL, February~~
~~11, 2023.~~
~~131 Ivo H. Daadler and James Goldgeier, “The Long War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, January 9, 2023; Michael~~
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~~meanwhile, remain committed to recapturing all territory occupied by Russian forces.~~
~~Nevertheless, observers debate the likelihood of a complete military victory for either side.~~
~~During a January 2023 press conference, Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General Milley stated,~~
~~“So from a military standpoint, I still maintain that for this year it would be very, very difficult to~~
~~militarily eject the Russian forces.... That doesn't mean it can’t happen; doesn’t mean it won’t~~
~~happen, but it’d be very, very difficult.”132~~
~~As of early 2023, both sides have been attempting to reconstitute their forces for expected~~
~~upcoming offensives in the spring.133 Russian casualties have exacerbated previously existing~~
~~personnel issues. A significant portion of Russia’s casualties have been the core of its professional~~
~~military, including its contract soldiers, elite units (VDV, Naval Infantry, Spetsnaz), and junior~~
~~officers. Additionally, Russia lost a significant portion of its remaining professional units in~~
~~offensives in the Donbas during summer and early fall.134 As a result, Russia has struggled to~~
~~replace losses, reconstitute, and rotate units, leading to a significant reduction in force quality.135~~
~~While observers note that mobilization has ameliorated Russia’s lack of personnel, speculation~~
~~persists about the quality of troops Russia will be able to reconstitute to conduct offensives.~~
~~Ukrainian officials also state they expect Russia to conduct further rounds of mobilization.136~~
~~Despite the poor performance of the Russian military, it continues to learn and adapt to~~
~~conditions, although constrained by the political environment, and is preparing for a long conflict.~~
~~Ukraine also is focusing on creating, equipping, and training new units for offensive operations~~
~~after suffering heavy casualties last summer and in the ongoing battle for Bakhmut. This effort~~
~~includes units, such as the new 47th Separate Assault Brigade, which likely will be used as strike~~
~~formations to break Russian defenses.137 The UAF continues to implement reforms to overcome~~
~~its Soviet-era legacy, but officials stress the UAF likely needs to adapt away from attritional~~
~~tactics and toward greater maneuverability in its operations.138 The U.S. supports UAF~~
~~development through training on systems (such as Bradley and Stryker infantry and armored~~

~~Kimmage and Maria Lipman, “Wartime Putinism,” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2023.~~
~~132 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and General Mark A. Milley Press Conference~~
~~Following Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting, Ramstein Air Base, Germany,” press release, January 20, 2023.~~
~~133 Karen DeYoung, Dan Lamothe, and Loveday Morris, “Inside the Urgent Push to Arm Ukraine for a Spring~~
~~Offensive,” Washington Post, January 19, 2023; James Waterhouse, “Bakhmut, Kyiv, and the Other Key Ukrainian~~
~~Cities and Towns in Russia’s Sights,” BBC, February 6, 2023.~~
~~134 Robe Lee and Michael Kofman, “How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success,” FPRI, December 23,~~
~~2022.~~
~~135 Emblematic of this was the reported heavy losses sustained by the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade during an offensive~~
~~to seize Pavlivka. Not only did the Brigade suffer catastrophic losses, many of the replacements and reinforcements~~
~~were mobilized soldiers without the level of training or equipment standard for the elite Naval Infantry. The 155th also~~
~~has reportedly suffered significant casualties in Russia’s latest offensive in the same areas. Neil MacFarquhar,~~
~~“Counting Russia’s War Dead, with Tips, Clips, and a Giant Spreadsheet,” New York Times, December 18, 2022; Ian~~
~~Lovett and Georgi Kantchev, “Russia Claims Advances, Strengthens Southern Front,” Wall Street Journal, February~~
~~13, 2023.~~
~~136 Matthew Luxmoore and Evan Gershkovich, “Ukraine Says Russia Is Delaying New Mobilization Amid Stepped-Up~~
~~Offensive,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2023.~~
~~137 As well as new units under the Ministry of the Interior (including National Guard, Border Guard, and National~~
~~Police) of all volunteer brigades called the “Offensive Guard.” Ukrinform, “New Units Created in Armed Forces of~~
~~Ukraine to Be Equipped with New Western Equipment,” January 23, 2023; Tim Lister, Fred Pleitgen, and Matthias~~
~~Somm, “As a Russian Offensive Looms, Ukraine Races to Train Military on New Western Weapons,” CNN, January~~
~~23, 2023.~~
~~138 Natasha Bertrand, Alex Marquardt, and Katie Bo Lillis, “The U.S. and Its Allies Want Ukraine to Change Its~~
~~Battlefield Tactics in the Spring,” CNN, January 24, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

25

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~fighting vehicles) and collective training of UAF units. The U.S. conducts collective training of~~
~~the UAF at the battalion level on Western style tactics, emphasizing maneuver and combined~~
~~arms operations. Additionally, the U.S. trains UAF brigade level leadership to coordinate,~~
~~integrate, and sustain combined arms operations.~~
~~This outlook underpins the recent heavy emphasis by Kyiv to secure additional Western~~
~~equipment such as tanks and armored personnel carriers to support offensive operations. The new~~
~~supplies of U.S. and Western tanks and armored fighting vehicles are intended to provide~~
~~improved fire capability and protection, including from all but the latest Russian anti-tank guided~~
~~missiles. Instead of dispersing systems, the United States is training individual UAF units on the~~
~~operation and sustainment of specific systems, reflecting their demanding requirements for~~
~~operation and maintenance. Observers remain concerned over the ability of the UAF to maintain~~
~~and support the various equipment variants it is receiving, each with different maintenance,~~
~~ammunition, and training requirements.139~~
~~Another crucial factor that will likely influence the outcome of any future offensives is the~~
~~availability of artillery ammunition. Both sides appear to be using less artillery compared to last~~
~~summer, possibly indicating either low stockpiles or the conservation of ammunition. Without~~
~~sufficient artillery support, it may be unlikely either side can conduct successful operations~~
~~outside of limited tactical offensives (for Russian ammunition issues see “Russian Defense~~
~~Industry Production” above).140 Western artillery and its increase in precision targeting were~~
~~crucial for the UAF’s earlier battlefield successes, especially due to increased precision.141~~
~~However, as many as a third of the UAF’s Western supplied howitzers are out of action at any one~~
~~time due to losses or repairs from heavy use.142 With limited ammunition available for its Soviet-~~
~~era artillery, the UAF is largely reliant on continued supplies of Western artillery and~~
~~ammunition.143 In addition, air defense systems and ammunition remains a key ongoing need for~~
~~the UAF, both at the frontlines and for protecting critical infrastructure.~~
~~Some have speculated about the potential for Russia to use nuclear, chemical, or biological~~
~~weapons if Russian policymakers perceive inadequate military advances or to demonstrate~~
~~capability. Most analysts, however, believe the likelihood of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons~~
~~remains low. Nevertheless, in November 2022 CIA Director Burns reportedly conveyed warnings~~
~~to senior Russian officials over the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.144~~

~~139 Loveday Morris et al., “Ukraine Faces Logistics Hurdles Ahead of Tank Deliveries,” Washington Post, January 26,~~
~~2023; CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and~~
~~Cory Welt.~~
~~140 Illia Ponomarenko, “As Battle of Bakhmut Nears Culmination, Ukraine’s Artillery Gasps For More Ammo,”~~ ~~Kyiv~~
~~Independent, January 5, 2023; Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff,~~
~~“Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023.~~
~~141 Andrew E. Kramer, “With Western Weapons, Ukraine Is Turning the Tables in an Artillery War,” New York Times,~~
~~November 1, 2022.~~
~~142 John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Artillery Is Breaking in Ukraine. It’s Becoming a Problem for the~~
~~Pentagon,” New York Times, November 25, 2022.~~
~~143 Due to the vast quantities of shells used by the UAF, the Pentagon recently announced it will dramatically increase~~
~~its production of 155mm artillery shells. John Ismay and Eric Lipton, “Pentagon Will Increase Artillery Production~~
~~Sixfold for Ukraine,” New York Times, January 24, 2023.~~
~~144 Felicia Schwartz and Max Seddon, “CIA Director Warns Russia Against Use of Nuclear Weapons,” FT, November~~
~~14, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

26

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~Issues for Congress~~
~~Congress continues to track developments in the war in Ukraine closely, especially as it considers~~
~~U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground.~~
~~Intensive interest and activity in the 117th Congress may be expected to carry over into the 118th~~
~~Congress, especially with no end in sight to the war.~~
~~Since 2014, Congress has supported Ukraine’s efforts to protect its territorial integrity, and since~~
~~FY2016 to include “lethal weapons of a defensive nature” and (since FY2019) “lethal assistance.”~~
~~For~~ attacked by smaller, professional units. Russian forces also adapted to the introduction of HIMARS and other precision strike weapons by dispersing logistics and command and control centers, as well as by making more effective use of electronic warfare.92 After only three months, Surovikin was replaced by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov in early January 2023. The replacement came despite a widespread assessment that Surovikin was one of Russia’s most capable commanders; he was largely credited with stabilizing Russian lines in the wake of successful Ukrainian offensives. There was some debate that the replacement of Surovikin may have demonstrated continued unrealistic battlefield expectations of Russian political decisionmakers.93 While it is possible Putin began getting more accurate information on the state of the Russian military, Russian rhetoric and stated goals suggest there continued to be a mismatch between expectations and available resources.94 Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines noted in December 2022, “I do think he [Putin] is becoming more informed of the challenges that the military faces in Russia, but it’s still not clear to us that he has a full picture at this stage of just how challenged they are.”95 After Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson city, both sides focused on reconstituting forces and stockpiling equipment and ammunition in preparation for expected spring offensives.96 In December 2022, Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhny stated, “It’s more important to focus on the accumulation of resources right now for the more protracted and heavier battles that may begin next year.”97 Also in December, the United States announced it would begin conducting combined arms training of UAF units, including the training of battalion and brigade level staff to manage operations (for more information see “New Ukrainian Units for Counteroffensive” text box below). The United States and Western allies also committed to supply Ukraine with a variety of armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and a large number of Western tanks (primarily Leopard-variant main battle tanks).98 Officials hoped that by combining advanced training with new Western tanks and armored vehicles, the UAF would gain the ability to conduct more effective offensive operations with fewer casualties.99 91 Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Survival, vol. 65, no. 2 (2023), pp. 7-22. 92 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI, May 19, 2023. 93; Francesca Ebel, “Russia’s New Commander Reflects Putin’s Plan to Push for Victory in Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022. 94 Evan Gershkovich et al., “Putin, Isolated and Distrustful, Leans on Handful of Hard-Line Advisers,” Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2022. 95 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Fireside Chat with DNI Haines at the Reagan National Defense Forum,” transcript, December 12, 2022. 96 Marita Maloney, “Kyiv Says Russia Planning Major Ground Offensive in New Year,” BBC, December 16, 2022. 97 Economist, “An Interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, Head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces,” December 15, 2022. 98 Department of Defense, “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” press release, January 25, 2023; Todd Prince, “Western Tanks a ‘Vital Part of Recipe’ as Ukraine Seeks to Drive Out Russian Forces,” RFE/RL, January 26, 2023. 99 Eric Schmitt and Andrew E. Kramer, “U.S. Will Train More Ukrainian Troops, Adding Advanced Battle Tactics,” New York Times, December 15, 2022; Department of Defense, “More Than $3 Billion in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” press release, January 6, 2023; Steven Erlanger et al. “Ukraine’s Allies Pledge to Send Major Infusion of Military Aid,” New York Times, January 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 18 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects New Ukrainian Units for Counteroffensive Along with providing Ukraine with weapons, the United States and allied partners committed in December 2022 to training new Ukrainian units to be used as the spearhead of the counteroffensive that was launched in summer 2023. Nine UAF brigades (of roughly 3,500-4,000 troops each) were trained and equipped by Western partners, with another three equipped by Ukraine. In addition to these 12 brigades, Ukraine organized 9 brigades in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; these units are under the command of the military and act in support of the UAF. Seven of the Internal Affairs brigades are from the National Guard, and one each is from the National Police and Border Guards. Although more lightly equipped than regular UAF brigades, many of these brigades have extensive combat experience. Western training has consisted of two primary components. The first component has been training Ukrainian units on Western equipment, such as infantry or armored fighting vehicles (IFV/AFV) like the Bradley IFV. Rather than spreading the new equipment across the UAF, particular systems were deployed to selected units to increase familiarity and competency. The second component has focused on transitioning the UAF toward NATO-style combined arms operations and away from its Soviet military legacy. Combined arms operations are the joint employment of capabilities from each combat branch (artil ery, armored, infantry, etc.) to operate simultaneously instead of individually and sequentially. Western officials maintained that training in combined arms operations would enable the UAF to maximize the capabilities provided by new security assistance and help breach entrenched Russian forces. Western training efforts have faced several hurdles. First, almost al the personnel of the new UAF units are new recruits rather than experienced personnel. As such, they must first be taught basic infantry skil s. Second, combined arms operations are complex and difficult. In general, Western militaries train units for several months on combined arms operations, whereas new Ukrainian armed forces units were given only several weeks of training. Finally, despite the initial steps to transition toward NATO-style doctrine, the UAF is stil primarily reliant on Soviet-style command and control, especial y when organizing higher-level operations. Sources: Ukrinform, “New Units Created in Armed Forces of Ukraine to Be Equipped with New Western Equipment,” January 23, 2023; Natasha Bertrand, Alex Marquardt, and Katie Bo Lil is, “The U.S. and Its Allies Want Ukraine to Change Its Battlefield Tactics in the Spring,” CNN, January 24, 2023; Daniel Michaels and Nancy A. Yousef, “Ukraine’s Troops Wil Need Fewer Bul ets and Shells After Training, U.S. Hopes,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2023; Ukrinform, “Year Behind the Scenes: Interview with Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny,” May 12, 2023; Erik Kramer and Paul Schneider, “What the Ukrainian Armed Forces Need to Do to Win,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2023; and Isobel Koshiw, “NATO Training Leaves Ukrainian Troops ‘Underprepared’ for War,” openDemocracy, August 8, 2023. Beginning in January 2023, Russia launched a number of local offensives in the south (around Vuhledar), continued offensives to seize Bakhmut, and conducted a counterattack in Luhansk around Kreminna rather than continuing the defensive strategy that General Surovikin had established.100 Initially, it was unclear whether these offensives were probing attacks or the early part of an expected spring offensive.101 It soon became apparent, however, that these were Russia’s main offensives and not preparatory attacks, with Russia committing many of its remaining professional units (such as the VDV and Naval Infantry), equipment, and ammunition. Russia’s mobilization helped remedy its urgent need for personnel and stabilized its lines, but it only provided enough personnel to replenish losses, not create new units. Additionally, most of these personnel were rushed to the frontlines with little training or preparation for offensive operations and with limited leadership due to heavy casualties among junior officers.102 Russia 100 Marc Santora, Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Shashank Bengali, “Russia Pays a Bloody Price for Small Gains on Eastern Front,” New York Times, February 7, 2023; Isabel Coles and Evan Gershkovich, “Russia Pushes on Several Fronts in Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2023; Mike Eckel, “Russia’s New Offensive Grinds Into Action As Ukraine Punches Back Hard,” RFE/RL, February 11, 2023. 101 Marc Santora, “Russia’s Losses Around Vuhledar Renew Questions About Its Ability to Sustain a Fresh Offensive,” New York Times, February 15, 2023. 102 Isabel Coles and Thomas Grove, “Russia’s New Offensive in Ukraine Exposes Blunders, Poor Training,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2023. Congressional Research Service 19 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects failed to overcome UAF resistance and suffered heavy casualties, partly due to relying on frontal attacks and other previously unsuccessful strategies.103 The timing of Russia’s offensive was questionable and possibly a result of impatience on the part of the Russian leadership.104 The appointment of Gerasimov likely indicated his willingness to launch offensive operations regardless of the state of the military. The Russian leadership also likely sought to achieve some territorial gains before promised Western security assistance (such as new Western tanks) were deployed on the battlefield.105 By launching its main offensive early, Russia expended valuable personnel, equipment, and ammunition it may need in the spring to defend against Ukraine’s expected counteroffensive.106 Despite the failure of Russia’s winter offensive, some Western officials remained skeptical of the UAF’s ability to decisively defeat the Russian military in the near future.107 During a January 2023 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff General Milley stated, “So from a military standpoint, I still maintain that for this year it would be very, very difficult to militarily eject the Russian forces.... That doesn’t mean it can’t happen; doesn’t mean it won’t happen, but it’d be very, very difficult.”108 April 2023-Fall 2023 In spring 2023, momentum continued to swing in Ukraine’s favor, as the UAF demonstrated significant flexibility and resilience defending against Russian offensives. After Russia expended most of what offensive potential remained during its winter offensive, both sides concentrated on Bakhmut, where the Wagner Group PMC led a brutal fight to capture the symbolically important town from Ukraine (see text box below).109 Battle for Bakhmut Bakhmut and its surrounding settlements have been the scene of intense fighting since summer 2022, much of it led on the Russian side by the Wagner Group Private Military Company (PMC). Analysts continue to debate the value of Bakhmut, generally agreeing it has tactical utility but little strategic importance. Both sides appeared to focus on the symbolic importance of the city, with Russia seeking to present its capture as part of its pledge to capture the entire Donetsk region and Ukraine seeking to demonstrate its determination to defend all of its territory. 103 For example, Russia’s elite 155th and 40th Marine Infantry Brigades suffered heavy casualties and lost “dozens” of tanks and armored personnel carriers in repeated frontal assaults against well entrenched UAF positions. Colonel General Rustam Muradov, then head of the Eastern Military District and in command of the Vuhledar assault, was reportedly dismissed in response. Mike Eckel, “What Happened In Vuhledar? A Battle Points to Major Russian Military Problems,” RFE/RL, February 17, 2023; Andrew E. Kramer, “In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes,” New York Times, March 1, 2023. 104 Josh Holder and Marco Hernandez, “How Russia’s Offensive Ran Aground,” New York Times, April 6, 2023. 105 Thomas Grove and Benoit Faucon, “Russia Aims to Regain Offensive in Ukraine War With New Commander,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2023. 106 Marc Santora, Matthew Mpoke Bigg and Richard Pérez-Peña, “Russian Attacks Along a Wide Arc of Ukraine Yield Little but Casualties,” New York Times, March 13, 2023; Riley Bailey et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1,” Institute for the Study of War, April 1, 2023. 107 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukraine, Russia Gird for a Decisive Spring Campaign After a Bloody Winter,” Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2023. 108 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and General Mark A. Milley Press Conference Following Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting, Ramstein Air Base, Germany,” press release, January 20, 2023. 109 Josh Holder and Marco Hernandez, “How Russia’s Offensive Ran Aground,” New York Times, April 6, 2023. Congressional Research Service 20 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects In the struggle for Bakhmut, the Wagner Group PMC and its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin sought to increase their stature by presenting the Wagner Group PMC as a more capable and competent fighting force than the Russian military. Reports indicated that Prigozhin viewed the capture of Bakhmut as a way to increase his standing with the Russian leadership and establish Wagner’s standing as an independent institution within Russia. To compensate for reduced artil ery support, Wagner relied on overwhelming manpower to wear down the UAF. Wagner recruited heavily from prisons and used those prisoners in massed human wave attacks, suffering heavy casualties in the process. Instead of withdrawing, the UAF devoted considerable resources—including some of its best and most experienced units, along with Territorial Defense Forces units—to defending Bakhmut. The UAF and Ukrainian leadership believed that defending Bakhmut could impose attrition on Russian forces and create a favorable balance of forces for when the UAF launched its counteroffensive. Although the attrition ratio was likely in Ukraine’s favor, Russian casualties largely consisted of convicts recruited from prisons, whereas UAF losses consisted of some of its most experienced troops. Over the course of nine months, the intensity and focus of each side converged on Bakhmut, as Russia’s offensives in other parts of Ukraine failed to achieve much success through early 2023. Wagner forces received logistic and other support from Russian forces (including some VDV units fighting alongside Wagner), but tension between Prigozhin and the Russian military leadership continued to grow as Prigozhin claimed credit for any success. By May 2023, Wagner forces gained ground on the heights surrounding Bakhmut and steadily forced the UAF to withdraw to the city’s outskirts. Prigozhin announced the capture of Bakhmut at the end of May and stated that the Wagner Group would hand over control of the city to regular Russian forces. Sources: Andrew E. Kramer, “‘Our Losses Were Gigantic’: Life in a Sacrificial Russian Assault Wave,” New York Times, February 12, 2023; Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne and Karen DeYoung, “Ukraine Short of Skil ed Troops and Munitions as Losses, Pessimism Grows,” Washington Post, March 13, 2023; Matthew Luxmoore and Ievgeni a Sivorka, “Ukraine’s Leadership Doubles Down on Bakhmut Defense as Russians Get Closer,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2023; Marcus Walker, “Ukraine Sees Russian Losses in Bakhmut as Paving Way for Spring Offensive,” Wall Street Journal, March 23, 2023; Siobhán O'Grady, Kamila Hrabchuk and Kostiantyn Khudov, “How Ukrainian Forces Denied Russia Victory in Bakhmut by Victory Day,” Washington Post, May 12, 2023; Rochan Consulting, “Issue 312: 15 May-21 May Weekly Update,” May 22, 2023; Jen Kirby, “The Longest Battle of the Ukraine War Might Finally Be Over,” Vox, May 22, 2023; Kateryna Stepanenko, “The Kremlin’s Pyrrhic Victory in Bakhmut: A Retrospective on the Battle for Bakhmut,” Institute for the Study of War, May 24, 2023. While fighting continued in and around Bakhmut, both sides continued to reconstitute their forces and Russia continued to reinforce its defenses in southern Ukraine, specifically Ukraine’s occupied Zaporizhia region.110 Russia also continued a sustained missile and drone strike campaign, mainly targeting key urban and civilian infrastructure centers. These strikes forced the UAF to divert and expend critical air defense assets away from the frontline to protect urban centers, a possible goal of the Russian strikes.111 If Ukraine’s air defenses were exhausted, it could allow the VKS to operate freely over Ukraine.112 Ukrainian defenses were bolstered by the deployment of advanced Western air defense systems, including U.S.-supplied Patriot systems.113 Ukrainian forces also began a series of attacks and operations meant to destabilize Russian forces ahead of Ukraine’s expected offensive. The UAF and Ukrainian intelligence units began 110 Anastasia Stognei, Polina Ivanova, and Christopher Miller, “Russia and Ukraine Tighten Conscription Rules Ahead of Spring Hostilities,” Financial Times, April 11, 2023. 111 Adam Durbin and James Landale, “Russia Launches Ninth Wave of Missile Attacks on Kyiv This Month,” BBC, May 18, 2023; Aleksander Palikot, “Ukraine Parries as Russia Seeks to Slow Counteroffensive with New Surge of Attacks,” RFE/RL, May 25, 2023. 112 According to one analyst, “the threat that the VKS can pose to Ukraine in the ongoing war is almost entirely dependent on whether Ukraine can sustain its [ground-based air defense] coverage near the frontlines,” Justin Bronk, Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations: Lessons from Ukraine, Center for Naval Analyses, April 2023, p. 16. 113 Alex Horton, “These are the Western Air Defense Systems Protecting Ukraine,” Washington Post, May 19, 2023; CRS In Focus IF12297, PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense System for Ukraine, by Andrew Feickert. For more on Russia’s strike campaign, see Ian Williams, Putin’s Missile War: Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 2023. Congressional Research Service 21 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects conducting strikes deep inside occupied Ukraine and Russia. The United Kingdom provided Ukraine with a long-range precision missile, Storm Shadow, which the Ukrainian Air Force began using to attack key targets.114 Storm Shadow—and eventually the French version SCALP-EG—allowed Ukraine to target Russian command and logistics centers which had been dispersed after the introduction of HIMARS during summer 2022.115 In May 2023, two volunteer units of Russian citizens backed and supported by Ukraine conducted a series of raids into Russia’s southern Belgorod region, briefly capturing several villages. Ukraine also began what would become a series of drone attacks against Moscow, including the Kremlin.116 The UAF began probing Russian defensive lines, searching for weak points, and attempting to keep Russian forces guessing about Ukrainian intentions ahead of the looming counteroffensive.117 The UAF’s new Western-trained and equipped units would form the spearhead of its counteroffensive, hoping to breach Russian defenses which could then be exploited by reserve units. While the UAF has demonstrated that it can be an effective defending force, it was unclear whether it could manage large-scale offensive operations against an entrenched Russian military. As noted above (see “New Ukrainian Units for Counteroffensive” box above), the training and cohesion of these new units was uncertain, as most recruits had little to no combat experience.118 Additionally, the UAF would rely heavily on artillery to support advances, and it was unclear whether the new units had enough minefield breaching equipment or sufficient training to break through Russian defensive lines.119 Russian forces began regrouping after their disastrous winter offensive, a task made easier with the Wagner Group PMC leading the battle for Bakhmut. The Russian military no longer appears to be operating BTGs; what professional units remain appear to operate as Company Tactical Groups and are deployed as mobile reserves or strike groups. To conduct offensive operations, Russia reorganized many of its units as “assault detachments,” which are smaller subunits created to attack and capture Ukrainian positions.120 Due to casualties, however, almost every Russian unit is likely either fully or partially composed of mobilized personnel with varying degrees of competency and training.121 114 Jim Sciutto, “Britain Has Delivered Long-Range ‘Storm Shadow’ Cruise Missiles to Ukraine Ahead of Expected Counteroffensive, Sources Say,” CNN, May 12, 2023; Isabel Coles, “Ukraine Launches Airstrikes on Russian-Held Targets,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2023. 115 In addition to operational adaptations such as dispersing command and control and logistics, Russia also adjusted its use of electronic warfare to mitigate HIMARS. Alex Marquardt, Natasha Bertrand, and Zachary Cohen, “Russia’s Jamming of U.S. Provided Rocket Systems Complicates Ukraine’s War Effort,” CNN, May 6, 2023. 116 Matthew Luxmoore and Georgi Kantchev, “Ukrainian-Backed Troops Stage Cross-Border Incursion Into Russia,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2023; Elsa Court, From Moscow to Novorossiysk: The List of Attacks on Russian Soil,” Kyiv Independent, August 5, 2023. 117 Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Begins Pre-Offensive Probe of Russian Lines,” Foreign Policy, May 18, 2023. 118 Ian Lovette and Nikita Nikolaienko, “Ukraine Races to Forge New Army Ahead of Offensive,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2023; Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk, “NATO-Trained Units Will Serve as Tip of Spear in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, June 4, 2023. 119 Ukrainian officials also criticized the slow delivery of promised security assistance, stating slow deliveries were postponing the counteroffensive. Hugo Bachega, “Zelensky Says Ukraine Needs More Time for Counteroffensive,” BBC, May 11, 2023. 120 Lester W Grau and Charles K Bartles, “The Russian Breakthrough Tactical Group,” Infantry, vol. 111, no. 3 (Fall 2022), pp. 14–17; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI, May 19, 2023, pp. 5-8. 121 Specifically, remaining VDV units appear to be the Russian military’s primary strike group element. Additionally, Russia increasingly relies on dismounted infantry, without tank or armored fighting vehicle support, in contrast to the early phases of the war, possibly due to heavy equipment losses as well as the need to conserve equipment for possible (continued...) Congressional Research Service 22 link to page 26 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects The Russian military continued to suffer from command-and-control issues, with an apparent disconnect between commanders on the ground and senior leaders in Moscow, which has likely contributed to the continued turnover of Russian commanders in Ukraine (see Figure 5). Russia continued to replace senior officers.122 Additionally, complaints from Russian soldiers continued to surface on social media sites, criticizing a lack of equipment and poor leadership.123 This turmoil highlighted the lack of communication and coordination among the senior leadership and local commanders. Instability in Russian command and control threatened to hamper Russian military effectiveness and allow the UAF to exploit the lack of communication.124 Expectations for a UAF counteroffensive grew throughout May. Some argued these Figure 5. Russian Command and Control expectations ignored the likely reality of a in Ukraine difficult fight ahead. Ukrainian and Western officials recognized the difficulties posed by Russia’s defensive fortifications.125 Ukraine’s leadership appeared to be under pressure to demonstrate it could use Western security assistance to defeat Russian forces. Some Western and Ukrainian officials feared that without success, support for Ukraine could wane and pressure for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia could increase.126 Ukraine’s Summer 2023 Counteroffensive Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive Source: Economist, “Why Have Russia’s Armed to retake Russian-occupied territory in Forces Been So Ineffective in Ukraine,” May 15, 2023. southern and eastern Ukraine began in early June 2023 but has run into heavier-than-expected resistance, forcing the UAF to adjust tactics and achieve incremental gains against fortified Russian lines. Both Russia and Ukraine continue to experience heavy casualties, equipment losses, and the depletion of artillery ammunition. The ability to rotate, replenish, and reconstitute forces will likely influence each side’s ability to sustain operations.127 For the UAF, the ability to future offensives. Mark Urban, “The Cost of the Ukraine War for One Russian Regiment,” BBC, April 6, 2023; Alex Horton, Russia’s Commando Units Gutted by Ukraine War,” Washington Post, April 14, 2023; Mary Ilyushina, “Russia Needs More Troops But is Wary of Public Anger, Leaked Documents Say,” Washington Post, April 27, 2023. 122 Reportedly, this includes Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, Commander of the VDV, who was relieved of command in January but reinstated in April due to his reputation as an effective and capable commander. Karolina Hird et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2023,” Institute for the Study of War, April 16, 2023. 123 Meduza, “Sent There to Be Meat:’ Why Russian Draftees Are Suddenly Publishing so Many Video Please to Putin,” March 9, 2023. 124 Paul Sonne and Anton Troianovski, “As Ukrainian Attack Looms, Putin Faces Setbacks and Disunity in Russian Forces,” New York Times, May 16, 2023. 125 Adam Taylor, Anastacia Galouchka and Serhiy Morguno, “To Liberate Territory, Ukraine Must Smash Fortified Russian Defenses,” Washington Post, June 2, 2023. 126 Julian E. Barnes et al., “Ukraine’s Spring Offensive Comes With Immense Stakes for Future of the War,” New York Times, April 24, 2023; Jonathan Lemire and Alexander Ward, “Biden’s Team Fears the Aftermath of a Failed Ukrainian Counteroffensive,” Politico, April 24, 2023. 127 For more on the initial phases of the counteroffensive, see Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months,” War on the Rocks, September 4, 2023; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defenses in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, RUSI, September 2023. Congressional Research Service 23 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects concentrate enough forces with sufficient support will likely affect future success of its offensive, especially as Russia continues attempting to draw UAF forces away from the south by launching attacks in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv and Luhansk regions.128 Toward the end of May 2023, the UAF made some gains around the flanks of Bakhmut, pushing back Russian forces. Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade broke through a series of Russian lines, exploiting gaps and an apparent lack of coordination between withdrawing Wagner Group PMC and Russian army units.129 Ukraine continued probing and harassing Russian forces, including via incursions into the Russian city of Belgorod, near the Ukrainian border, and increased artillery and long-range strikes to destabilize Russian forces and mask the focus of the counteroffensive.130 In early June, the UAF began a series of attacks across southern Ukraine. These operations were part of Ukraine’s main counteroffensive, with the UAF committing some of its new Western-trained and -equipped units.131 To date, the counteroffensive has targeted three axes of advance: south (Orikhiv-Tokmak), southeast (Velyka-Novosilka), and east (Bakhmut).132 The UAF also probed Russian lines further west on the Dnipro River in the Kherson region, threatening a potential attack across the river that could force Russia to withdraw forces elsewhere on the frontlines. Subsequently, Russia allegedly blew up Ukraine’s Kakhovka dam, flooding vast swathes of the lower Kherson region and making it nearly impossible for the UAF to conduct a bridging operation for the immediate future.133 Ukraine’s counteroffensive ran into immediate Russian resistance and reportedly suffered heavy casualties, including losses of newly-supplied Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.134 U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated at the outset of the offensive, “There will be stops and starts. There will be things that happen that [the] Ukrainians didn’t anticipate. There will be opportunities for the Ukrainians to exploit.”135 Most initial assaults consisted of battalion-level or smaller units as the UAF struggled to implement larger combined arms strategies and coordination. Especially challenging for Ukrainian forces has been the need to breach Russia’s extensive minefields. Ukraine’s minefield breaching equipment has become a key target for Russian forces.136 128 Rochan Consulting, “Issue 323, August 5-August 11, 2023,” August 11, 2023. 129 Marc Santora, “Gains Near Bakhmut Raise Ukraine’s Hopes of a Turning Tide,” New York Times, May 17, 2023; John Paul Rathbone et al., “Ukraine’s Daring ‘Shaping Operations’ Stretch Russian Defenses,” Financial Times, May 30, 2023. 130 Julian Borger, “The Intensity is Increasing: Ukraine Says First Steps in Counteroffensive Have Begun,” Guardian, May 27, 2023. 131 The UAF established the 9th and 10th corps to oversee these new units, as well as the TDF, Offensive Guard, and other units involved in the counteroffensive. The UAF also committed other, more experienced units pulled from other fronts to support the offensive. 132 Economist, “Ukraine’s Counteroffensive is Gathering Pace,” June 7, 2023; Rochan Consulting, “The Operational-Strategic Situation in Southern Ukraine,” June 14, 2023. 133 Andrew E. Kramer, “Dam’s Destruction Reshapes Ukraine, but Not Arc of the War,” New York Times, June 9, 2023; James Glanz et al., “Why the Evidence Suggests Russia Blew Up the Kakhovka Dam,” New York Times, June 16, 2023. 134 Ian Lovett, Marcus Walker, and Matthew Luxmoore, “Ukraine’s Offensive Begins With Ground Gained, Tanks Lost,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2023. 135 U.S. Department of Defense, “Austin Talks Uncertainties of War as Ukraine Prepares Counteroffensive,” DoD News, June 5, 2023. 136 Jack Watling, “Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Begins: Shall the Leopards Break Free,” RUSI, June 14, 2023. Congressional Research Service 24 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Figure 6. Southern Ukraine Territorial Control As of August 17, 2023 Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State, Global Admin, and ESRI. Lines of territorial control are approximate using data from the Institute for the Study of War. Russian forces have demonstrated a high level of tactical flexibility and the ability to learn and adapt.137 Despite reported low morale, Russian forces continue to put up resistance and conduct effective operations to counter UAF assaults. Many of the Russian units in and around the Orikhiv-Tokmak axis are from Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), which has remained effective and capable and has not experienced the same levels of attrition as other Russian forces. Russian forces appear to leverage the extensive fortifications and minefields prepared before the offensive and seek to draw in and ambush UAF forces, only then withdrawing to other prepared defensive positions, supported by artillery, anti-tank teams, and helicopters to attack UAF mechanized formations.138 The UAF has gradually made incremental gains, seizing small towns and pushing Russian forces past their initial defensive lines in southern Ukraine. Some of Ukraine’s biggest gains have come around Bakhmut, where the UAF has continued to press Russian forces on the outskirts of the town. Ukraine also has sought to exploit the confusion and chaos of Russia’s Wagner Group 137 This adaptation is generally reactive rather than proactive and most often comes after costly setbacks to Russian forces. Adaptation also is not uniform across the Russian military, with some branches such as the VDV demonstrating a higher propensity to adjust operations to battlefield conditions. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Julian E. Barnes and Natalia Yermak, “Russia, Learning From Costly Mistakes, Shifts Battlefield Tactics,” New York Times, June 17, 2023. 138 Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway, “Ukraine’s Armor Appears To Have A Russian Attack Helicopter Problem,” The Drive, June 15, 2023; Marcus Walker, “Mines Everywhere’: Ukraine’s Offensive Is Proving a Hard Slog,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 25 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects mutiny in late June 2023 (see Wagner Group Mutiny text box below), which has further exposed chaos and confusion in Russian command and control.139 Wagner Group Mutiny On June 23, 2023, Russia’s Wagner Group and its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, launched the most serious challenge yet to Russian President Vladimir Putin's rule. The mutiny fol owed worsening tensions between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense (MoD), specifically Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Prigozhin accused the military leadership in a video of fabricating the pretext for Russia's invasion of Ukraine and kil ing troops unnecessarily—including attacking Wagner units. Some observers speculate Prigozhin’s video and the subsequent escalation was initially an attempt to preempt the demand that all “volunteer" formations sign contracts with the Russian MoD, effectively ending the Wagner Group's autonomy. Russian authorities issued an arrest warrant for "incitement to armed rebellion" for Prigozhin shortly after midnight on June 24. Initially, it appeared Prigozhin and the remnants of the Wagner Group would oversee, and possibly expand, its foreign operations—specifically in Africa. However, Prigozhin, along with several key Wagner Group commanders, was kil ed when a private plane exploded in Russia on August 23, 2023. Russian officials soon visited several countries with Wagner Group deployments, demonstrating continued Russian support for private military company (PMC) operations—albeit under new command structures. Russian security services appear to be competing for control of Wagner’s foreign operations, but the exact structure and oversight of these operations remains unclear. Several other Russian PMCs appear to be positioning themselves to take control of Wagner’s foreign operations, but they are less independent than the Wagner Group and likely would operate under closer Russian intelligence control. The mutiny also highlighted the fractious and divided nature of Russian command and control, with Russia reportedly arresting or dismissing various key military officers for actual or tacit support of the mutiny. Russian authorities have been quick to dismiss such accusations, but key commanders—including General Surovikin—appear to have been removed from command. The mutiny has likely increased the demand for loyalty to the Russian political leadership, rather than effectiveness among its military commanders. Sources: Dara Massicot, “All Is Not Well on Russian Front Lines,” New York Times, July 19, 2023; Simon Sebag Montefiore, “Putin’s Fear of Strong Generals Is as Old as Russia Itself,” Foreign Policy, July 19, 2023; Jack Margolin, “The New Russian Mercenary Marketplace,” Riddle, August 21, 2023; Max Seddon and Courtney Weaver, “A Signal for the Whole Elite:’ The Demise of Yevgeny Prigozhin,” Financial Times, August 23, 2023; Matthew Luzmoore and Benoit Faucon, “Russian Private Military Companies Move to Take Over Wagner Fighters,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2023; Anton Troianovski et. al, “After Prigozhin’s Death, a High-Stakes Scramble for His Empire,” New York Times, September 8, 2023; CRS Insight IN12186, Wagner Group Mutiny in Russia, by Andrew S. Bowen; CRS In Focus IF12344, Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), by Andrew S. Bowen; CRS In Focus IF12389, Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Alexis Arieff. Ukraine’s strategy for rapidly breaching and exploiting Russia’s defensive lines did not succeed.140 Rather than ceding ground and gradually imposing attrition on the UAF, the Russian military decided to deploy its forces to defend its initial fortified lines.141 While this strategy forced the UAF to allocate more units and resources than anticipated, it also committed Russian forces to the initial defense rather than preserving units in reserve to counterattack against a possible breakthrough. Additionally, despite the confusion and distraction caused by the Wagner Group mutiny, Russian forces were able to launch a series of attacks in Ukraine’s northern Luhansk and Kharkiv regions. These attacks made minimal gains but succeeded in diverting some 139 Russia removed Major General Ivan Popov, head of the 58th CAA, for criticizing the conduct of the war and senior Russian leaders. Matthew Luxmoore, “Ukraine Gains Territory as Russia Grapples with Wagner’s Aborted Mutiny,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2023; Paul Sonne and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Russian General Denounces His Bosses as Officers Are Fired or Questioned,” New York Times, July 13, 2023; and Laura Seligman, “Russian Command Structure ‘Confusing at Best’ after Wagner Mutiny, Says Top U.S. General,” Politico, July 18, 2023. 140 Barry R. Posen, “Ukraine Has a Breakthrough Problem,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2023; and Jen Kirby, “What Went Wrong in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive,” Vox, August 8, 2023. 141 Kofman and Lee, “Perseverance and Adaptation.” Congressional Research Service 26 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects focus and units away from Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the south.142 By late June, the UAF announced an operational pause to re-group and adjust tactics in the face of stiff Russian resistance.143 According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, Right now, [the Ukrainians] are preserving their combat power and they are slowly and deliberately and steadily working their way through all these minefields … It is far from a failure, in my view … And I'll stay with what we’ve said before, this is going to be long, it’s going to be hard, it’s going to be bloody. And at the end of the day, we’ll see where the Ukrainians end up, vis-à-vis the Russians.144 Much of the fighting also focused on artillery duels, with each side attempting to target and destroy opposing artillery and rocket artillery. Artillery is also a central part of the UAF’s new, adjusted counteroffensive strategy. The UAF is leveraging some advantages in range and precision as it gradually seeks to destroy supply lines and isolate Russian forces.145 Due to the heavy volume of artillery use, ensuring the UAF has sufficient artillery ammunition has been a focus of Western assistance. To continue providing Ukraine immediate supplies of artillery ammunition, the Biden Administration decided in July to provide cluster munitions, or Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM).146 In addition to employing longer-range artillery and precision munitions to isolate Russian forces, Ukraine has increased its use of asymmetric attacks, including inside Russia. Ukraine continues to launch drone attacks against Moscow—targeting airfields, military infrastructure, and central Moscow itself—and naval drones that have attacked ships in Russian ports.147 The UAF also has continued targeting the bridges connecting Crimea with Russia and conducted special forces raids across the Dnipro River into the Kherson region.148 Ukraine’s counteroffensive soon bogged down in an attritional fight, forcing the UAF to adjust its approach as progress stalled and casualties increased. Ukrainian President Zelensky admitted progress was “probably slower than anyone wants.”149 Rather than continuing to conduct rapid maneuver operations, the UAF has returned to familiar strategies, such as small unit attacks and 142 Francesca Ebel and Kamila Hrabchuk, “On This Part of the Eastern Front, Russia Is Still on the Attack,” Washington Post, June 28, 2023; and Rochan Consulting, “Issue 318, June 24-June 30, 2023,” July 1, 2023. 143 Grace Mappes et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2023,” Institute for the Study of War, June 18, 2023; and Yaroslav Trofimov and Isabel Coles, “Ukraine’s Offensive Slows Down, Zelensky Says, as Kyiv Rethinks Approach,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2023. 144 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark A. Milley Hold Press Conference Following Virtual Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting,” press release, July 18, 2023. 145 Christopher Miller, “Ukraine Switches to Artillery Power for Eastern Push,” Financial Times, July 27, 2023; Sam Cranny-Evans, “Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations,” RUSI, August 9, 2023; and Stephen Biddle, “Back in the Trenches,” Foreign Affairs, August 10, 2023. 146 Felicia Schwartz and Christopher Miller, “U.S. Faces Hurdles in Ramping Up Munitions Supplies for Ukraine War Effort,” Financial Times, August 1, 2023; and U.S. Department of Defense, “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” press release, July 7, 2023. 147 Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “Ukraine Claims its Forces Staged a Brief Raid in Occupied Crimea,” New York Times, August 24, 2023; Marcel Plichta, “The Reason Ukraine’s Drone Attacks are More Effective Than Russia’s,” Telegraph, August 31, 2023; Jake Horton, Olga Robinson & Daniele Palumbo, “What Do We Know About Drone Attacks in Russia?” BBC, September 2, 2023; 148 Tim Lister, Victoria Butenko, and Kostan Nechyporenko, “Ukraine Hits Russian Oil Tanker With Sea Drone Hours After Attacking Naval Base,” CNN, August 5, 2023; Todd Prince, “Ukrainian Drone Attacks Against Russia Increase As Zelenskiy Hints At Change In Tactics,” RFE/RL, August 5, 2023; Roman Olearchyk and Isobel Koshiw, “Ukraine Forces Probe Russian Defenses Across Dnipro River,” Financial Times, August 11, 2023; and Anastasiia Malenko and Isabel Coles, “Ukraine Steps Up Campaign to Isolate Russian-Occupied Crimea,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2023 149 Interfax-Ukraine, “The Counteroffensive is Complex, but the Initiative Is on the Side of Ukraine,” August 8, 2023. Congressional Research Service 27 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects the sequenced use of artillery ahead of infantry assaults.150 The UAF also began combining Western-trained and -equipped units with more experienced—but generally less well equipped—units. By the end of July, the UAF reportedly committed a majority of its reserves in an ongoing attempt to breach Russian lines.151 The UAF has made small but tactically Black Sea Grain Initiative significant breaches in Russian lines.152 By In July 2023, Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain August 2023, the UAF had seized the town of Initiative (BSGI), a United Nations-sponsored plan Robotyne—on the south (Orikhiv-Tokmak) which allowed for the exports of grain, related front in the Zaporizhia region—and appeared foodstuffs, and fertilizers from three Ukrainian ports (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny/Pivdennyi), and are to pierce the first of several Russian defensive important to easing food shortages in the developing lines.153 Russia appeared to commit some of world. After withdrawing from the BSGI, Russia its last strategic reserves and redeployed launched missile strikes against these port and grain forces from its counteroffensive in northeast facilities. Ukraine to blunt the UAF breakthrough.154 Russia has continued to target Ukrainian port facilities The UAF attempted to exploit its success and for missile strikes, and threatened to treat commercial push past Russian defensive lines, targeting ships violating Russia’s blockade as military targets. Russian President Putin denied rejoining the BSGI after the town of Verbove, southeast of Robotyne.155 talks with Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if the UAF is unable to continue its Sources: Emily Olson and Joe Hernandez, “Russia breakthrough, it can increasingly target Suspends Ukraine Grain Deal. Here’s What It Means for the Rest of the World,” NPR, July 17, 2023; Pavel Russian rear areas (including logistics and Polityuk, “Russia Strikes Ukraine’s Danube Port, command and control targets) with artillery Driving Up Global Grain Prices,” Reuters, August 2, and precision missile strikes as the UAF 2023; United Nations, Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint recaptures territory.156 While it is unclear Coordination Center. whether Russia has sufficient forces to continue defending against UAF attacks, including enough capable units to push back UAF breakthroughs near Robotyne and Verbove, its forces continue to impose costs on the UAF and 150 Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Lack of Weaponry and Training Risks Stalemate in Fight with Russia,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2023; Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Troops Trained by the West Stumble in Battle,” New York Times, August 2, 2023. 151 Economist, “The Ukrainian Army Commits New Forces in a Big Southward Push,” July 27, 2023. 152 Several media outlets reported that U.S. and Ukrainian officials were at odds over the UAF’s strategy, including Ukraine’s focus on several fronts and an unwillingness to concentrate forces. Eric Schmitt et. al, “Ukraine’s Forces and Firepower Are Misallocated, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 22, 2023; Michael R. Gordon et. al, “U.S., Ukraine Clash Over Counteroffensive Strategy,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2023. 153 Constant Meheut, “Ukraine Says It Retook a Village, a Win That Highlights the Rough Going,” New York Times, August 28, 2023 154 Igor Kossov, “New Brigade Bears Heavy Brunt of Russia’s Onslaught in Kharkiv Oblast,” Kyiv Independent, September 1, 2023; David Axe, “Russia Has Deployed Its Last Reserve Division To Southern Ukraine. Did A Ukrainian Screw-Up Make That Possible?” Forbes, September 1, 2023. 155 Mike Eckel, “Breakthrough. Bridgehead. Salient. Glimmers Of Progress, And Hope, In Ukraine’s Advances,” RFE/RL, September 6, 2023; Howard Altman, “Breakthrough At Russia’s Second Defensive Line,” The Drive, September 7, 2023. 156 This includes a recent strike on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet shipyards in Sevastopol, Crimea. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Russian Navy Shipyard Targeted by Missile Strikes in Sevastopol; Two Vessels Hit,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2023. Congressional Research Service 28 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects hold its defensive lines.157 The trajectory of the counteroffensive will likely be influenced by whichever side can sustain combat power and better manage rates of attrition.158 Russia’s Defense Industrial Base Since the beginning of the war, Russia has lost or expended a significant amount of equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Not only does Russia need to replace equipment lost in battle, or during retreats such as the route from Kharkiv, it must equip the newly mobilized soldiers and units. According to testimony from Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, “if Russia does not initiate a mandatory mobilization and secure substantial third-party ammunition supplies beyond existing deliveries from Iran and others, it will be increasingly challenging for them to sustain even modest offensive operations.”159 As a result, Russia has mobilized its defense industry to a war footing and around the clock production to meet its war needs.160 Putin has made visits to various defense factories, publicly chastised defense industry officials, and appointed former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to a new position of first Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission that oversees the defense industry. Russia also enacted legislation to give the government “special economic measures” to command the defense industry, but recent data indicates Russia is running a large budget deficit to fund the war and defense industry.161 Russia’s defense industry faces issues of production capacity. While its defense industry attempts to maximize output of newer systems, a portion of the defense industry’s capacity is directed to updating, repairing, and modernizing equipment pulled from storage (such as installing reactive armor on older tanks), especially to replace losses and equip newly mobilized personnel.162 Additionally, Russia’s heavy reliance on artillery in the war (often compensating for a lack of personnel prior to mobilization) has likely reduced Russian munitions stockpiles.163 Reporting indicates Russia has been forced to purchase munitions from alternative sources, such as North 157 Adam Taylor, “How Russia Learned From Mistakes to Slow Ukraine’s Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, September 8, 2023. 158 Economist, “Are Ukraine’s Tactics Working,” September 12, 2023. 159 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on World Wide Threats, 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 4, 2023. 160 Yuliya Chernova and Stephen Fidler, “Putin Grips Economy Tighter to Supply Russian War Machine,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2022; Anton Troianovski, “Putin Admits Shortcomings But Vows ‘No Limits’ to Russia’s War Spending,” New York Times, December 21, 2022. 161 Official Russian figures state that its military spending is expected to jump by $71 billion dollars in 2023, even as Russia recorded a budget deficit of $47.3 billion in 2022. Pavel Luzin, “The Skyrocketing Costs for Russia’s War Effort,” Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2023; Samantha Lock, “Putin Scolds Defense Industry Minister in Televised Meeting for ‘Fooling Around,’” Guardian, January 12, 2023; Reuters, “Russia Rainy Day Fund Shrinks by $38 Billion as Government Plugs Deficit,” January 18, 2023. 162 Georgy Aleksandrov, “The Barren Barrels,” Novaya Gazeta.eu, November 2, 2022. 163 Stephen Fidler and Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Munitions Shortages Raise Questions Over How Long It Can Continue Ukraine War,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2022; Hlib Parfonov, “Russia Struggles to Maintain Munition Stocks, “Jamestown Foundation, December 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 29 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Korea and Iran.164 Increasing ammunition production capacity is a key focus of Russia’s defense industry, but constraints are likely to continue for the immediate future.165 Due to sanctions and export controls, Russia faces a shortage of critical components for its advanced or modern systems (including helicopters, aircraft, PGMs, guided munitions, and communication equipment).166 Despite limitations, Russia has been able to mitigate shortages by turning to a number of strategies, including sanctions evasion, stockpiling critical components prior to the war, import-substitution efforts (including thermal sights for tanks), and using civilian or lower-quality instead of military-grade components. These strategies allow Russia to continue production and upgrades to legacy systems taken out of storage, but sustaining rates of production are a likely continuing issue.167 Additionally, the demands for mobilized personnel with technical skills are increasingly at odds with the defense industry’s needs for those same personnel. While technical workers in the defense industry are exempted from mobilization, the competition for skilled recruits could complicate the defense industry’s ability to meet production demands if Russia conducts further rounds of mobilization.168 Outlook As the war in Ukraine has extended for more than 18 months, analysts and officials believe attrition is the most likely trajectory for the immediate future, albeit with localized offensives and some changes in territorial control by both sides. The UAF and Russia continue to suffer substantial losses in personnel and equipment, and fighting is dominated by the heavy use of artillery. Russian authorities appear committed to continuing the war, despite failing to achieve its goals; as Secretary of State Blinken has said, “The objective was to erase Ukraine from the map, to eliminate its independence, its sovereignty, to subsume it into Russia. That failed a long time ago.”169 President Putin and Russian officials have increasingly called on the Russian population to prepare for a long conflict and are mobilizing the Russian economy and society to support the war.170 Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, remain committed to recapturing all territory occupied by Russian forces. In terms of personnel, the UAF continues to benefit from strong motivation and recruitment, although casualties and Ukraine’s smaller population have made recruitment increasingly difficult 164 Media reports indicate Russia is building factories to mass produce Iranian drones inside Russia. Russian President Putin and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un also met in Russia on September 13, 2023 to discuss arms supplies. Dalton Bennet and Mary Ilyushina, “Inside the Russian Effort to Build 6,000 Attack Drones with Iran’s Help,” Washington Post, August 17, 2023; Guy Faulconbridge and Soo-Hyang Choi, “Kim Jong Un Meets Putin in Russia as Missiles Launch from North Korea,” Reuters, September 13, 2023. 165 James Beardsworth, “Is Russia Receiving Weapons From North Korea?” Moscow Times, December 18, 2022. 166 Max Bergmann et al., Out of Stock? Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry, CSIS, April 2023. 167 Andrew David et al., Russia Shifting Import Sources Amid U.S. And Allied Export Restrictions, Silverado Policy Accelerator, January 2023; Paul Schwartz, A War of Attrition: Assessing the Impact of Equipment Shortages on Russian Military Operations in Ukraine, CSIS, July 2023. 168 Polina Ivanova, Max Seddon, and Daria Mosolova, “They Grabbed Whoever They Could’: Putin’s Draft Puts More Strain on Russian Businesses,” Financial Times, November 29, 2022; Ian Talley and Anthony DeBarros, “China Aids Russia’s War in Ukraine, Trade Data Shows,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023. 169 Kaanita Iyer, “Blinken Says U.S. ‘Working to Put Some Stability’ Into Relationship with China,” CNN, July 23, 2023. 170 Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman, “Wartime Putinism,” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2023; Alexander Gabuev, “Putin is Looking for a Bigger War, Not an Off-Ramp, In Ukraine,” Financial Times, July 30, 2023. Congressional Research Service 30 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects and reliant on more coercive measures.171 The UAF continues to face challenges in training personnel, including training for new recruits on basic infantry skills and unit-level training to improve cohesion and coordination. Additionally, the UAF faces hurdles training junior officers to operate independently, as well as command staff to manage and coordinate complex operations.172 While Russia’s fall 2022 mobilization resolved its immediate personnel issues and was sufficient for defensive operations, its “shadow mobilization” strategies are not recruiting sufficient personnel to train and reconstitute forces for offensive operations.173 Each side’s ability to recruit and train new personnel, as well as to rotate and reconstitute units after losses, likely will influence the war’s trajectory. The UAF’s equipment focus likely will shift toward sustainment, as U.S. and Western partners have largely exhausted supplies of new capabilities and systems. Increasingly, the UAF’s focus will likely transition into repairing and maintaining its current stockpile of equipment and sustaining reliable supplies of artillery ammunition.174 Some Western countries and defense firms appear to be negotiating joint production agreements with Ukraine’s defense industry, a potentially key development to boost the UAF’s autonomy and ability to sustain operations over the long term.175 For Russia, several factors that have contributed to the Russian military’s poor performance remain. Many of the Russian military’s problems stem from leadership decisions and command and control challenges, highlighted by the Wagner Group mutiny in June 2023. The full effects of the mutiny remain unclear, as many Russian officers likely face ouster and removal for actual or perceived disloyalty toward the political leadership.176 Additionally, it is unclear whether Russia will announce another round of mobilization due to the potential domestic political implications. Without a mobilization, it is unlikely the Russian military will have sufficient personnel to launch further large-scale offensive operations in the near term.177 Despite its limitations and catastrophic losses in personnel and equipment, the Russian military remains an adaptive and resilient force.178 Russian units continue to vigorously defend against UAF offensives and, in some areas, conduct smaller scale counteroffensives.179 The Russian military continues to learn and adapt, but it is primarily a top-down process and it is unclear if 171 Hlib Parfonov, “Ukraine’s Manpower Requirements Reaching a Critical Threshold,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 26, 2023; David L. Stern, “Zelensky Fires Military Recruitment Center Chiefs After Corruption Probe,” Washington Post, August 11, 2023. 172 Watling and Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defenses in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, pp. 21-23. 173 Anastasia Tenisheva, “Russia’s Massive Army Recruitment Drive Appears to Deliver Few Soldiers,” Moscow Times, June 8, 2023. 174 Paul McLeary, “Allies’ ‘Main Effort’ for Ukraine Shifting From Donating Weapons to Fixing Them,” Politico, July 19, 2023; Isabel Coles, “Ukraine’s Ammunition Chief Battles to Boost Production,” Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2023; Missy Ryan, Alex Horton, and Karen DeYoung, “As Ukraine Flies Through Artillery Rounds, U.S. Races to Keep Up,” Washington Post, August 21, 2023. 175 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Ukraine Defense Firms Seek Ties to Europe’s Industry,” Defense News, June 15, 2023; Isabel Coles, “Ukraine’s Ammunition Chief Battles to Boost Production,” Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2023. 176 Mike Eckel, “All the Kremlin’s Men: Russian Officials Drop Out of Sight, Suggesting Post-Mutiny Purges,” RFE/RL, June 30, 2023. 177 Economist, “Russia Is Resorting to Desperate Measures to Recruit Soldiers,” August 1, 2023. 178 Margarita Konaev and Owen J. Daniels, “The Russian Are Getting Better,” Foreign Affairs, September 6, 2023. 179 Alex Horton and Serhii Korolchuk, “In Northeast Ukraine, the Russians Are Coming—Or Maybe Setting a Diversion,” Washington Post, September 7, 2023. Congressional Research Service 31 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects these lessons and adaptations are temporary or more permanent and widespread across its forces.180 In the absence of a decisive military victory for either side in the immediate future, discussions are increasingly turning toward available options for the United States and allies to support Ukraine over the long term.181 These discussions include possible security guarantees for Ukraine, ranging from immediate NATO membership to other options outside of institutional NATO membership, such as the so-called Israel Model.182 However, these discussions are contingent upon negotiations and the territorial control of Ukraine, with the Biden Administration’s position remaining that only Ukraine can begin negotiations: “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”183 Issues for Congress Congress continues to closely track developments in the war in Ukraine, especially as it considers U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground. Intensive interest and activity begun in the 117th Congress has carried over into the 118th Congress, especially with no end to the war in sight. Since 2014, Congress has supported Ukraine’s efforts to protect its territorial integrity, to include “lethal weapons of a defensive nature” since FY2016 and “lethal assistance” since FY2019. For FY2022 and FY2023, Congress provided $48.7 billion in supplemental appropriations in FY2022 and FY2023, Congress provided $48.7 billion in supplemental appropriations in
security assistance, of which the Biden Administration has committed more than $security assistance, of which the Biden Administration has committed more than $~~29.3~~43 billion billion
since the start of the 2022 war.since the start of the 2022 war.~~145~~ 184 On August 10, 2023, the Biden Administration submitted to Congress a request for nearly $24 billion in FY2024 supplemental funding for Ukraine and other international needs, including $10.5 billion in security assistance.185 In addition to providing further funds to support the UAF and In addition to providing further funds to support the UAF and
Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity, Congress remains interested in ensuring proper Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity, Congress remains interested in ensuring proper
oversight and accountability of security oversight and accountability of security ~~and~~ assistance. Section 1247 of the FY2023 National assistance. Section 1247 of the FY2023 National
Defense Authorization Act Defense Authorization Act ~~supports the interagency~~ established the Ukraine Oversight Working GroupUkraine Oversight Working Group ~~and a~~
~~whole of government approach to “~~, an interagency working group of inspectors general to formulate a “whole-of-government effort to advance accountability and end-use monitoring of weapons advance accountability and end-use monitoring of weapons
~~provided in response to the Ukraine crisis” as well as regular briefings and reports to Congress on~~
~~such efforts (Section 1247, H.R. 7776).~~
~~Congress also remains interested in supporting the investigation, documentation, and prosecution~~
~~of Russian war crimes. Congress passed the~~ ~~Ukraine Invasion War Crimes Deterrence and~~
~~Accountability Act~~ ~~(Section 5948, H.R. 7776) which highlights Russia’s deliberate war crimes~~
~~and supports efforts to document and identify those crimes and perpetrators~~provided in response to the Ukraine crisis, and continued attention and regular briefings 180 For more, see Watling and Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defenses in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, pp. 15-19. 181 Margaret MacMillan, “How Wars Don’t End,” Foreign Affairs, June 12, 2023; Liana Fix, “The Future is Now: Security Guarantees for Ukraine,” Survival, vol. 65, no. 3 (2023), pp. 67-72; Samuel Charap, “An Unwinnable War,” Foreign Affairs, June 5, 2023; Mick Ryan, “How Ukraine Can Win a Long War,” Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2023. 182 For an argument in support of NATO membership for Ukraine, see Andriy Zagorodnyuk, “To Protect Europe, Let Ukraine Join NATO—Right Now,” Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2023. While definitions vary on what constitutes the “Israel Model,” it is generally recognized that it consists of supporting the development of a modern and capable military, as well as a robust and independent economy, so that the costs to any future aggressor would be unacceptably high and therefore dissuade any further aggression. For more, see Franz-Stefan Gady, “Turn Ukraine Into a Bristling Porcupine,” Foreign Policy, May 22, 2023; Eric Ciaramella, “Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine,” Carnegie Endowment, June 8, 2023. 183 Reuters, “Biden Administration Did Not Sanction Unofficial Talks With Russians, State Department Says,” July 6, 2023. 184 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt and CRS Report R47275, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief, by Emily M. McCabe. 185 CRS Insight IN12107, Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary, by Brendan W. McGarry. Congressional Research Service 32 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects to relevant congressional oversight committees on such efforts is imperative” (Section 1247, H.R. 7776, 117th Congress). Some Members of Congress continue to be concerned regarding oversight of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. In the 118th Congress, several bills have been introduced to create an independent Special Inspector General for Ukraine Assistance to supervise audits and investigations of U.S. assistance to Ukraine (H.R. 855; H.R. 2445; S. 651). .
Congress remains concerned regarding malign Russian actors, specifically Russian PMCs such as Congress remains concerned regarding malign Russian actors, specifically Russian PMCs such as
the Wagner Group. Section 1243 of the FY2023 NDAA requires the Administration to report on the Wagner Group. Section 1243 of the FY2023 NDAA requires the Administration to report on
the activities and dangers posed by Russian private military companies as well as the sanctions the activities and dangers posed by Russian private military companies as well as the sanctions
that exist to impede their activities (Section 1243, H.R. 7776that exist to impede their activities (Section 1243, H.R. 7776, 117th Congress). In December 2022, the Holding ). In December 2022, the Holding
Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act (HARM Act) was introduced in the House and Senate to Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act (HARM Act) was introduced in the House and Senate to
designate the Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (H.R. 9381, S. 5164designate the Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (H.R. 9381, S. 5164, 117th Congress). The Biden ). The Biden
Administration designated the Wagner Group a Transnational Criminal Organization in January Administration designated the Wagner Group a Transnational Criminal Organization in January
2023.2023.~~146~~186 Subsequently, the HARM Act was reintroduced in both the House and Senate in 2023. Subsequently, the HARM Act was reintroduced in both the House and Senate in 2023.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

~~145 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory~~
~~Welt and CRS Report R47275,~~ ~~Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)~~
~~Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief, by Emily M. McCabe.~~
~~146 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal~~
~~Organization,” press release, January 26, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

27

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

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186 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” press release, January 26, 2023. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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