Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from January 19, 2023 to February 15, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
~~January 19~~February 15, 2023 , 2023
Relations In Brief
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
coup in Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 coup in Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019

procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the
Clayton Thomas
future of bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and future of bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and
holds Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
~~informal holds~~ on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the
importance of Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
~~importance of~~ continued cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty continued cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
~~Organization~~ (NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish (NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency have President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency have

led to led to speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP)
might be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections might be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections ~~planned for~~required by June 2023 June 2023, if competitive elections occur. The aftermath of the disastrous February 6, 2023 earthquakes in southern Turkey is affecting Turkey’s politics, society, and economy, and could influence the timing and nature of elections. if
~~competitive elections occur.~~ If a different Turkish president were to win 2023 elections and take power, If a different Turkish president were to win 2023 elections and take power, or if the president’s party coalition does not control parliament, some ~~some~~ domestic and domestic and
foreign policy changes could be possible.foreign policy changes could be possible.
U.S. relations and F-16s. Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation
on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S.
policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense; growing policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense; growing
relationships with other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power (including via the export of drone aircraft); and relationships with other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power (including via the export of drone aircraft); and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that
would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. According to media would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. According to media
accounts, the Administration reportedly provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of possible sales of F-16s accounts, the Administration reportedly provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of possible sales of F-16s
to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional deliberations include to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional deliberations include
Turkey’s Turkey’s ~~tense relations with Greece and its~~ stance on Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accessionstance on Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and . Congressional and
executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military
options in the region, options in the region, ~~and~~as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Turkey’s foreign policy approach. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperationcooperation~~, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports~~. Turkish leaders have . Turkish leaders have
indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain their willingness to coordinate indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and
Armenia-Azerbaijan.Armenia-Azerbaijan.
Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships. Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, and Greece. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey
faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-
Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and
energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these
dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important
mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. In June, Turkey agreed on a mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. In June, Turkey agreed on a
framework deal for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but Turkey has delayed framework deal for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but Turkey has delayed ~~ratifying their accession~~final approval while demanding while demanding
that the two countries help Turkey act against people it considers to be terrorists. that the two countries help Turkey act against people it considers to be terrorists. ~~Longstanding~~Long-standing disputes between Greece and disputes between Greece and
Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic
cooperation with Greece. cooperation with Greece.
Syria: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria has deepened further Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria has deepened further
during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the
Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq. ~~Turkey’s military~~
~~could undertake another ground operation against the PKK-linked Syrian Kurds, despite reported U.S. and Russian~~
~~expressions of concern.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

~~link to page 32~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 2827

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 2423 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and (Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security defense matters. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security
matters remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s purchase of an S-400 surface-to-air matters remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s purchase of an S-400 surface-to-air
defense system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and defense system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and
with Greece and Cyprus). with Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense
and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat
improved U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to improved U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to
Turkey, and in January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a Turkey, and in January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a
potential F-16 sale, plus associated equipment and munitions (see potential F-16 sale, plus associated equipment and munitions (see “Possible F-16 Sales and
Congressional Views” below). below).
Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952. Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey. Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being. policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and for a map and key facts and
figures about Turkey. figures about Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily
deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became
president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a
~~mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of governance, which he~~
~~cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some~~

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023. Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “ 2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their
Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Briefing, January 18, 2023. Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for 3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, August 24, 2022. Relations, August 24, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1 1

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of governance, which he cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.4 allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.4
Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-
leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic
domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly because of their reliance on parliamentary domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly because of their reliance on parliamentary
support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP). support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 The AKP won the largest share of equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 The AKP won the largest share of
votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates
from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP). from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 Some leading opposition governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.7 suppress dissent and consolidate power.7
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued their on-and-off efforts to counter militants from Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued their on-and-off efforts to counter militants from
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).
These efforts include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in These efforts include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in
Iraq and Syria.8 Iraq and Syria.8
~~Major Economic Challenges~~
~~Ongoing economic problems in Turkey considerably worsened in 2022 as its currency, the lira,~~
~~depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021.~~
~~Official annual inflation climbed to nearly 85% for October—a level not seen in Turkey since the~~
~~1990s—before dropping to 64% in December.9 Some unofficial estimates have suggested that~~
~~actual inflation may be well over 100%.10 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish~~
~~central bank’s repeated reductions of its key interest rate since September 2021, with additional~~
~~inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and~~
~~interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.11 The lira has been trending~~February Earthquakes and Their Implications Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake damage in areas of Turkey and Syria, and the after-effects in cold winter weather, have reportedly killed more than 35,000 people in Turkey and 5,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and have directly affected the living situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings,9 observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.10 U.S. officials have provided or announced various means of assistance to Turkey,

4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final 4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). 2018 (published June 25, 2018).
5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two 5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
6 State Department, 6 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission, , Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
~~Turkiye~~Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022. , October 6, 2022.
7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” 7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” , July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. , April 7, 2021.
8 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 8 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022. 18, 2022.
9 9 ~~Nektaria Stamouli, “Turkey’s inflation drops sharply in boost for Erdoğan,” Politico, January 3, 2023; Beril Akman,~~
~~“Turkey slashes interest rate in line with Erdogan’s demand,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2022; “Yearly inflation in~~
~~Turkey rises to new 24-year high of 85%,” Associated Press, November 3, 2022~~
~~10 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish inflation hits 85.5% as doubts linger over official data,” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022.~~
~~11 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April~~
~~28, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

2

~~link to page 13 link to page 25~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~downward for more than a decade, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns~~
~~about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.12~~Fulya Ozerkan and Omar Haj Kadour, “Miracle rescues as Turkey-Syria quake toll passes 25,000,” Agence France Presse, February 10, 2023. 10 See, for example, Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” New York Times, February 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 2 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief including $85 million in urgent humanitarian assistance and the deployment of transport helicopters to Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base.11 The crisis is affecting Turkey’s politics, society, and economy, particularly as the country prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections (discussed below). Parliament has approved a three-month state of emergency in the ten southern Turkish provinces most directly affected. These provinces account for about 10% of Turkey’s gross domestic product and 15% of its population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.12 Analysts speculate about how the crisis will affect support for President Erdogan and his government.13 A major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey killed approximately 18,000, prompting legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.14 However, some media accounts and opposition politicians allege that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of damage and fatalities.15 Erdogan has denounced criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,16 and Turkey’s justice ministry has ordered prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal violations for substandard work.17 Erdogan has acknowledged some problems with the government’s initial response,18 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.19 He has announced that the government will prepare a recovery program and complete housing reconstruction within a year.20 Major Economic Challenges Ongoing economic problems in Turkey considerably worsened in 2022 as its currency, the lira, depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021. Annual inflation was at 58% in January 2023,21 with an unofficial estimate suggesting that actual inflation may be well over 100%.22 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key interest rate since September 2021, with additional inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.23 The lira has been trending 11 White House, “FACT SHEET: The Biden-⁠Harris Administration’s Response to the Earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria,” February 10, 2023; U.S. Navy, “Unified DoD Efforts Supporting Türkiye,” February 11, 2023. 12 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Reuters, February 13, 2023; Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” New York Times, February 13, 2023. 13 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Financial Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023. 14 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Associated Press, February 10, 2023. 15 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.” 16 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.” 17 Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration.” 18 Ibid. 19 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” New York Times, February 12, 2023. 20 Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group.” 21 “Turkey inflation higher than expected at nearly 58%,” Reuters, February 3, 2023. 22 “Turkey’s independent academics announce annual inflation rate as 121 percent,” Duvar English, February 3, 2023. 23 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 23 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief downward for more than a decade, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.24
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.1325 Erdogan also Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.between rich and poor.1426
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts, sector companies. The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts,
minimum wage increases, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic expenses, along with borrowing incentives for and subsidies for basic expenses, along with borrowing incentives for
banks that hold liras.banks that hold liras.1527 Turkey also has sought currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and Turkey also has sought currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and
has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows that contribute to U.S. warnings about potential has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows that contribute to U.S. warnings about potential
sanctions evasion (see sanctions evasion (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation” below). below).~~16 He~~28 To date, Erdogan has has
publicly rejected calls to turn to the International Monetary Fund for a financial assistance publicly rejected calls to turn to the International Monetary Fund for a financial assistance
~~package.~~
~~2023 Elections~~
~~Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are planned to take place by June 2023,~~
~~but probably will happen in May. Erdogan or Turkey’s parliament can change the elections to an~~
~~earlier date.17 In January 2023, Erdogan signaled that elections would likely take place on May~~
~~14, 2023.18 If no presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a presidential run-off~~
~~election between the top two vote-getting candidates would take place two weeks later.~~
~~Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have~~
~~fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable~~
~~to a coalition of opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi (Good) Party, and the Democracy~~
~~and Progress Party (Turkish acronym DEVA) (see Figure A-2).19 Some observers have debated~~

~~12 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022.~~
13package. Costs of ongoing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from the earthquake crisis, along with disruptions to agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity (estimated to reduce Turkey’s 2023 economic growth forecasts by up to 2%), will likely strain Turkey’s economy further.29 An early estimate of rebuilding costs and damage is around $84 billion.30 With a modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 37.5% (see Figure A-1), Turkey may have some space to boost fiscal spending in response to the crisis. One analyst has said that financial assistance from international development banks will be necessary but limited because of the Turkish government’s poor relations with the West.31 The World Bank has said it will provide $1.78 billion in relief and recovery assistance, and assess priority areas for support.32 28, 2022. 24 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. 25 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta , December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. , December 11, 2021.
1426 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s , June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021. Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
~~15 Ben Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan,” New York Times, December 5,~~
~~2022; Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022.~~
1627 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle East Institute, February 13, 2023. 28 Laura Pitel “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Laura Pitel “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022; , October 25, 2022;
Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East
Institute, November 7, 2022. Institute, November 7, 2022.
~~17 Erdogan may seek to have Turkey’s parliament (by a three-fifths vote) schedule early elections, because Turkey’s~~
~~constitution requires that a president can only seek a third term if parliament (rather than the president) moves up the~~
~~election date. Some Erdogan supporters argue that Erdogan’s next term would be his second~~29 Mustafa Sonmez, “Massive earthquake cost to deepen Turkey’s economic woes,” Al-Monitor, February 11, 2023; Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.” 30 Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.” 31 Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs.” 32 World Bank, “World Bank Announces Initial $1.78 Billion for Türkiye’s Recovery & Reconstruction Efforts After Earthquake Disaster,” February 9, 2023. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 24 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief 2023 Elections Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are required under Turkey’s under Turkey’s
~~constitution because his first term (which was not a full five years) came before the current constitutional amendments~~
~~regarding the presidency became effective in 2018. “Can Recep Tayyip Erdoğan run for a third term as president?”~~
James in Turkey, last updated December 19, 2022.
~~18 “President Erdoğan hints at May 14 for general elections,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 18, 2023.~~
~~19 Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”; “Polls indicate close race between~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

3

~~link to page 10 link to page 10~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,20~~constitution to take place by June 18, 2023. In January, President Erdogan signaled that elections would likely occur on May 14, 2023,33 but the February 6 earthquakes have led some Erdogan allies to publicly consider a delay.34 A delay beyond June 18 could prompt debate over its legal basis.35 Measures taken under the state of emergency—especially if Erdogan moves to extend or geographically expand it—could influence the campaign’s trajectory.36 Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi (Good) Party, and the Democracy and Progress Party (Turkish acronym DEVA) (see Figure A-2).37 Some observers have debated whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,38 (2) opposition parties can (2) opposition parties can
convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for
Erdogan,Erdogan,2139 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.40 If no presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a presidential run-off election between the top two vote-getting candidates would take place two weeks later. If the president’s party coalition does not control parliament after the elections, parliament could check the president in various ways if a majority of members seeks to do so. The president has broad powers to act in the absence of parliamentary initiative, but relies on parliament’s approval in certain matters such as budgeting, international treaty ratification, and foreign military deployments.41 The opposition coalition has agreed on a joint platform focused on returning Turkey to the parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting 33 “President Erdoğan hints at May 14 for general elections,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 18, 2023. Turkey’s constitution requires that a president can only seek a third term if parliament (rather than the president) moves up the election date, which it can do via a three-fifths vote. Some Erdogan supporters argue that Erdogan’s next term would be his second under Turkey’s constitution because his first term (which was not a full five years) came before the current constitutional amendments regarding the presidency became effective in 2018. “Can Recep Tayyip Erdoğan run for a third term as president?” James in Turkey, last updated December 19, 2022. 34 “Explainer: How the earthquake threw Turkey's election plan into turmoil,” Reuters, February 14, 2023. 35 Ibid.; Soner Cagaptay, “How Will Turkey’s Earthquake Affect the Current Election Cycle?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 14, 2023. 36 Cagaptay, “How Will Turkey’s Earthquake Affect the Current Election Cycle?” 37 Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”; “Polls indicate close race between ~~or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.22~~
~~The CHP and some other opposition parties have agreed on some steps toward a joint platform~~
~~focused on returning Turkey to the parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election,~~
~~largely as a means of limiting executive power.23 However, it remains unclear which opposition~~
~~candidate will challenge Erdogan for president: CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the~~
~~Alevi religious minority), or either of the two mayors who won control of Istanbul and Ankara for~~
~~the party in 2019 (Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas, respectively) and generally poll higher~~
~~than Kilicdaroglu.24 Opposition figures have criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to a~~
~~range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see also~~ ~~“Foreign~~
~~Policy Changes Under a Different President?”).25 Imamoglu’s candidacy may be jeopardized by a~~
~~criminal conviction (see text box).26 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers~~
~~have questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects, citing obstacles posed by disunity,~~
~~Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over the media, economic~~
~~developments, and judicial rulings.27~~
~~Imamoglu’s Criminal Case and Potential Political Ban~~
~~Istanbul mayor and CHP member Ekrem Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity because of a December~~
~~2022 criminal conviction. The charge of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council stemmed from a~~
~~remark that Imamoglu said he made about the annul ed March 2019 election (discussed above) in response to an~~
~~insult against him from Turkey’s interior minister.28 The court sentenced Imamoglu to jail and banned him from~~
~~political activity for two years and seven months, but both penalties are subject to appeal, and the timing of the~~
~~appellate process is unclear.29 In the meantime, Imamoglu continues to serve as mayor and engage politically.~~
~~Imamoglu and other opposition figures denounced the verdict and judicial process as politicized and a sign of~~
~~government attempts to sideline Erdogan’s potential electoral opponents.30 The State Department issued a~~

rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,” rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,” BIA News, October 12, 2022; Berk Esen, “The opposition , October 12, 2022; Berk Esen, “The opposition
alliance in Turkey: A viable alternative to Erdogan?” alliance in Turkey: A viable alternative to Erdogan?” SWP Comment, August 2022. , August 2022.
2038 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to
Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?”
2139 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, ,
November 1, 2021. November 1, 2021.
2240 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022. 41 Unofficial English translation of Turkish constitution available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. See also Alan Makovsky, Erdoğan’s Proposal for an Empowered Presidency, Center for American Progress, March 22, 2017. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 10 link to page 10 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief executive power.42 However, it remains unclear which opposition candidate will challenge Erdogan for president: CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the Alevi religious minority), or either of the two mayors who won control of Istanbul and Ankara for the party in 2019 (Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas, respectively) and generally poll higher than Kilicdaroglu.43 Opposition figures have criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to a range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see also “Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?”).44 Imamoglu’s candidacy may be jeopardized by a criminal conviction that he and other opposition figures charge is politically motivated.45 As he awaits a final decision on appeal, Imamoglu continues to serve as mayor and engage politically.46 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers have questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects, citing obstacles posed by disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over the media, economic developments, and judicial rulings.47 It is unclear how voters will respond to the earthquake crisis. How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the outcome.48 The Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), which could face a legal ban,49 announced in January 2023 that it would run its own presidential candidate in the elections.50 Pending resolution of the potential legal ban, Turkey’s Constitutional Court has frozen the HDP bank accounts that hold the party’s state-provided funds.51 ~~Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a~~
~~champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022.~~
~~23 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February~~
~~15, 2022.~~
~~24 Ibid.; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.”~~
~~25 “Türkiye’s CHP forms technocratic committee to advise the govt,” Yetkin Report, December 4, 2022; Berk Esen,~~
~~“Post-2023 election scenarios in Turkey,” SWP Comment, September 2022; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political~~
~~Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2022.~~
26 Gonca Tokyol, “Wielding Istanbul’s clout, Kaftancioglu and the CHP take aim at 2023 elections,” Turkey recap
~~(Substack), November 16, 2022.~~
~~27 “The opposition should win, but it has obstacles in its way,” Economist, January 16, 2023; James Ryan, “The path~~
~~ahead in Turkey’s upcoming electoral campaign,” War on the Rocks, November 10, 2022.~~
~~28 “Turkish court orders jail, political ban for Erdogan rival,” Reuters, December 14, 2022; Andrew Wilks, “Cases~~
~~against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022.~~
~~29 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15,~~
~~2022.~~
30 Ibid.; Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Istanbul mayor given two-year jail sentence and ‘political ban,’” Middle East
~~Congressional Research Service~~

4

~~link to page 25 link to page 27~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~statement criticizing Imamoglu’s conviction, and urging the government to cease prosecutions under criminal insult~~
~~laws.31~~
~~In a separate case, Turkish prosecutors charged Imamoglu (and six co-workers) in January 2023 with improperly~~
~~awarding a public tender to a company during his time as mayor of an Istanbul district (before he was elected~~
~~mayor of the entire city).32 Imamoglu has called the charges “an attempt to fabricate a bogus criminal offence,”~~
~~saying that authorities had not detected anything problematic at the time of the tender.33~~
~~How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the~~
~~outcome.34 The Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), which could~~
~~face a legal ban,35 announced in January 2023 that it would run its own presidential candidate in~~
~~the elections.36 Pending resolution of the potential legal ban, Turkey’s Constitutional Court has~~
~~frozen the HDP bank accounts that hold the party’s state-provided funds.37~~
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought
greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system.
Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
~~Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate~~
~~some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400~~
~~surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—~~
~~with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving~~
~~Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan.~~
~~In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and~~
~~South Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key~~
~~actors (Figure A-2). Turkey appears to be building regional relationships partly due to its export~~
~~of the popular Bayraktar TB2 drone (see Figure A-4), but some observers have raised concerns~~
~~that “drone diplomacy” could possibly enable human rights violations or lead to other adverse~~
~~consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.38 U.S. officials have~~

Eye, December 14, 2022.
~~31 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction and Sentencing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu,” December 15, 2022.~~
~~32 Amberin Zaman, “Istanbul mayor charged with corruption as Turkish opposition weighs Erdogan challenger,”~~ ~~Al-~~
~~Monitor, January 11, 2023.~~
~~33 “Istanbul mayor, Erdogan critic faces fraud case – Haberturk,” Reuters, January 11, 2023.~~
~~34 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment, April 2022.~~
~~35 Diego Cupolo, “Top Turkish court accepts revised indictment to ban pro-Kurdish party,” Al-Monitor, June 21, 2021.~~
~~36 Amberin Zaman, “Will Kurds’ choice to field own candidate benefit Erdogan or Turkey’s opposition?” Al-Monitor,~~
~~January 9, 2023.~~
~~37 Andrew Wilks, “Turkey's historic election could move up as Erdogan calculates,” Al-Monitor, January 5, 2023.~~
~~38 Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,”~~ ~~Voice of~~
~~America, February 2, 2022; Fehim Tastekin, “Are Turkish drones complicating disputes in Central Asia?” Al-Monitor,~~
~~September 26, 2022; Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign~~
~~Relations, January 31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter Turkish actions.39~~
~~In the past year, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions with major U.S. partners~~
~~in the Middle East—namely Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.40 U.S. and~~
42 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).” 43 Ibid.; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” 44 “Türkiye’s CHP forms technocratic committee to advise the govt,” Yetkin Report, December 4, 2022; Berk Esen, “Post-2023 election scenarios in Turkey,” SWP Comment, September 2022; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2022. 45 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15, 2022. In a separate case, Turkish prosecutors charged Imamoglu (and six co-workers) in January 2023 with improperly awarding a public tender to a company during his time as mayor of an Istanbul district (before he was elected mayor of the entire city). Amberin Zaman, “Istanbul mayor charged with corruption as Turkish opposition weighs Erdogan challenger,” Al-Monitor, January 11, 2023. Imamoglu has called the charges “an attempt to fabricate a bogus criminal offence,” saying that authorities had not detected anything problematic at the time of the tender. “Istanbul mayor, Erdogan critic faces fraud case – Haberturk,” Reuters, January 11, 2023. 46 Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader.” 47 “The opposition should win, but it has obstacles in its way,” Economist, January 16, 2023; James Ryan, “The path ahead in Turkey’s upcoming electoral campaign,” War on the Rocks, November 10, 2022. 48 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment, April 2022. 49 Diego Cupolo, “Top Turkish court accepts revised indictment to ban pro-Kurdish party,” Al-Monitor, June 21, 2021. 50 Amberin Zaman, “Will Kurds’ choice to field own candidate benefit Erdogan or Turkey’s opposition?” Al-Monitor, January 9, 2023. 51 Andrew Wilks, “Turkey’s historic election could move up as Erdogan calculates,” Al-Monitor, January 5, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security matters remains mutually Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security matters remains mutually
important.important.4152
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.actors and maintain its leverage with them.~~42 For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United~~
~~States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense cooperation, European~~
~~countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the EU since the late 1990s),~~
~~and Russia and Iran for energy imports.~~
~~Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military~~
~~strength and economic well-being appear to remain largely dependent on these traditional~~
~~relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces~~
~~if it jeopardizes these ties.43~~53 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on the Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on the
degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and economic degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and economic
relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks in those relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks in those
relationships while building other global relationships. relationships while building other global relationships.
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?
In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign
policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from
Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.4454 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment
among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have
difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern: difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern:
Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence), Greece and Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence), Greece and
Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its
regional and global consequences). regional and global consequences).
However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be
more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such
changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on
monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems, (2) giving monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems, (2) giving
greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish

~~for International Peace, January 18, 2022.~~
~~39 See, for example, Richard Outzen, “What Is Turkey Thinking in the Eastern Med?” Hoover Institution, December 7,~~
~~2021.~~
~~40 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~41 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,”~~
~~May 18, 2022.~~
~~42 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;~~
~~Stephen J. Flanagan et al.,~~ ~~Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the~~
~~U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.~~
~~43 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy~~
~~Analysis, February 17, 2022.~~
~~44 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen,~~
~~“Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~link to page 28 link to page 29~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions.
Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president
might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the
United States and European countries.United States and European countries.4555 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing
some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less
inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western
states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in
northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish
government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate
multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s
52 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism,” January 18, 2023. 53 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. 54 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” 55 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 26 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition
might become more passive on foreign policy. might become more passive on foreign policy.
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria,
Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military
operations and arms exports.operations and arms exports.4656
Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key
U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO
ground forces command in Izmir (seeground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-53). Turkey also controls access to and from the . Turkey also controls access to and from the
Black Sea through the BosphorusBlack Sea through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits— and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—see Figure A-4~~A-6~~). .
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Someabout the continued use of Turkish bases. Some ~~observers have advocated exploring alternative~~
~~basing arrangements in the region.47 Some~~ reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded
U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be connected with U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be connected with
concerns about Turkey.concerns about Turkey.4857 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey expert and In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey expert and
former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the United States former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the United States
should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation in recent should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation in recent
years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania,
and Greece to “hedge its bets.”and Greece to “hedge its bets.”49

~~45 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”~~
4658 Russia Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense. Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.59 56 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” 2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
~~47 See, for example, Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures, April 19, 2019.~~
4857 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph , September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019. , January 14, 2019.
4958 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Russia~~
~~Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made~~
~~a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could~~
~~be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the~~
~~West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense.~~
~~Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine~~
~~and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.50~~
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/. 59 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported ~~informal~~ congressional holds on arms sales congressional holds on arms sales
(discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and
Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—
may have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense may have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense
capabilities in parallel with other NATO countries.capabilities in parallel with other NATO countries.5160 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion,
closing the Straits to belligerent warships, and opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory closing the Straits to belligerent warships, and opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory
(including Crimea),(including Crimea),5261 Turkey has supplied Ukraine with Turkey has supplied Ukraine with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant
ambush-resistant (MRAP) ambush-resistant (MRAP) ~~vehicles,~~ vehicles62—as well as humanitarian assistance.as well as humanitarian assistance.53 Nevertheless, Turkey’s Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate
the conflict (discussed below). the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.5463 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.denied that any such transfers have occurred.55

~~Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,~~
~~the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-~~
~~challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.~~
~~50 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,~~
~~2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.~~
5164 Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.65 In 2017, a Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their respective defense industries.66 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.67 In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.68 Turkish expertise with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing 60 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
5261 “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,” “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,” PBS Newshour, September , September
19, 2022; “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” 19, 2022; “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022. , February 27, 2022.
~~53 For information on the MRAPs, see~~62 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with
more expected,” more expected,” Defense News, August , August 22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx, November 2122, 2022. , 2022.
5463 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, ,
January 10, 2023. January 10, 2023.
5564 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January , January
14, 2023. 14, 2023.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation~~
~~Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.56 In 2017, a~~
~~Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in~~
~~the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their~~
~~respective defense industries.57 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer~~
~~cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.58~~
~~In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion~~
~~of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.59 Turkish expertise~~
~~with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing~~
~~aerospace engines and missiles.60~~65 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. 66 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. 67 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. 68 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” Congressional Research Service 9 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief aerospace engines and missiles.69 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,6170 and some reports have suggested that the and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.6271 Additionally, Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.6372
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly
alleviate global supply concerns.alleviate global supply concerns.6473 Under the deal, which currently runs until March 2023, Under the deal, which currently runs until March 2023,
Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in
Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.6574 President President
Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.66
75 Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia. These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving cooperation with Russia. These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving

~~56 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008,~~ ~~Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and~~
~~U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.~~
~~57 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.~~
~~58 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,~~
~~“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.~~
~~59 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”~~
~~60 Ibid.~~
61the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.76 The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia cooperation across economic sectors.77 Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish financial institutions: 69 Ibid. 70 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, , February 4,
2022. 2022.
6271 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s , May 10, 2022. The TB2’s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, , November 7,
2022. 2022.
6372 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022. , October 3, 2022.
6473 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” Associated Press, July 22, , July 22,
2022. 2022.
6574 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
6675 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November
15, 2022. 15, 2022.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.67 The Turkish government has not~~
~~joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.~~
~~In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia~~
~~cooperation across economic sectors.68 Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to~~
~~Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. In June~~
~~2022, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo reportedly visited Turkey to raise~~
~~concerns over the movement of some Russian assets and business operations to Turkey,69 and in~~
~~August Adeyemo sent a letter to Turkish business groups warning of penalties if they worked~~
~~with Russian individuals or entities facing sanctions.70~~
76 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December 10, 2022. 77 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 27 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic activities. However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow.... In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and correspondent relationships. Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian military-industrial complex.78 Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of transactions and services with Russian businesses.79 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing membersrequires the unanimous agreement of existing members (Figure A-5). .
The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or
harbored sympathies for groups that Turkeyharbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the
Fethullah Gulen Fethullah Gulen ~~movement71~~movement80 (which (which ~~Turkey’s~~the government has blamed for involvement in the government has blamed for involvement in the
2016 failed coup) and the PKK2016 failed coup) and the PKK ~~and the Fethullah Gulen movement.72~~.81 (The United States and EU (The United States and EU
also classify the PKK as a terrorist groupalso classify the PKK as a terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that .) Turkey demanded that ~~both countries~~Sweden and Finland lift the lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.7382 Turkey removed its objections Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 2022 ~~agreement~~memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral ~~agreement~~memorandum, the three , the three
countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, Sweden and countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, Sweden and
Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work against the Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work against the
PKK.PKK.74
~~While Turkey’s decision generally drew plaudits from other NATO members, during the delay~~
~~some Western officials had raised questions about Turkey’s commitment to strengthening NATO.~~

~~67 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December~~
~~10, 2022.~~
~~68 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5,~~
~~2022.~~
~~69 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor,~~
~~June 22, 2022.~~
~~70 Elif Ince et al., “Russian Superyachts, Subject to Sanctions, Find a Haven in Turkey,” New York Times, October 24,~~
~~2022.~~
7183 78 Treasury Department, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out Illicit Trade With Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023. 79 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023. 80 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
7281 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, , May 17,
2022. 2022.
7382 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak , Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. , Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
~~74 Agreement text available at Twitter, Ragip Soylu, June 28, 2022 – 2:48 PM, at https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/~~
~~1541856195257966592.~~
83 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat- Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1011

link to page 21 link to page link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 14 14 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Since then, President Erdogan has sought to have Sweden and Finland take additional steps Since then, President Erdogan has sought to have Sweden and Finland take additional steps
before Turkey’s parliament considers before Turkey’s parliament considers ~~ratifying~~approving the two countries’ accession. the two countries’ accession.7584 With Hungary With Hungary
~~likely to ratify Swedish and Finnish~~’s parliament likely to agree to accession by early 2023, Turkey could remain the only accession by early 2023, Turkey could remain the only
country delaying the process.country delaying the process.7685
For example, Turkey continues to press Sweden and Finland to extradite people that Turkey For example, Turkey continues to press Sweden and Finland to extradite people that Turkey
considers to be terrorists. Under the June 2022 trilateral considers to be terrorists. Under the June 2022 trilateral ~~agreement~~memorandum, Sweden and Finland agreed to , Sweden and Finland agreed to
address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit
to specific outcomes in those cases.to specific outcomes in those cases.7786 In December, Sweden reportedly deported a man who had In December, Sweden reportedly deported a man who had
been convicted in Turkey in 2015 of being a PKK member,been convicted in Turkey in 2015 of being a PKK member,7887 but Sweden’s supreme court but Sweden’s supreme court
blocked the extradition of a journalist with alleged links to the Gulen movement.blocked the extradition of a journalist with alleged links to the Gulen movement.79 88 Sweden’s Sweden’s
prime minister and other sources have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are inclined to prime minister and other sources have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are inclined to
make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted
~~under due process and the rule of law.80 An unnamed European diplomat was quoted in~~
~~November as saying, “It remains to be seen if Erdogan thinks he’s got enough signs of goodwill~~
~~from Sweden and it’s therefore in his political and military interest to declare victory, or if he~~
~~thinks sticking to the current line will serve his re-election campaign.”81~~
~~At a December press conference with Sweden’s and Finland’s foreign ministers, Secretary of~~
~~State Blinken reiterated strong U.S. support for the two countries’ NATO accession and said that~~
~~they have addressed Turkey’s security concerns in tangible ways. He stated that “it is not a~~
~~bilateral issue between the United States and Turkey and it’s not going to turn into one,” while~~
~~also expressing confidence that the process will come to a successful conclusion soon.82~~
~~When various media outlets began reporting in January 2023 that the Administration has provided~~
~~informal notification~~under due process and the rule of law.89 In January 2023, Turkish presidential adviser Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey would only be in a position to agree to Sweden’s accession after it passed new anti-terror laws, a process he estimated would take about six months.90 Erdogan then said publicly that he expects the extradition of “around 130” people before approving Turkish ratification.91 In January 2023, the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that congressional approval of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see “Congressional Notification Process” below) would be tied to Turkish approval~~Process”~~
~~below), the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that congressional~~
~~approval of the sale would be tied to Turkish ratification~~ of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO
~~accession.83 The same article cited the U.S. officials as saying that they are encouraging President~~
~~Erdogan to stop delaying the accession.84 Shortly thereafter, Turkish presidential adviser Ibrahim~~
~~Kalin said that Turkey would only be in a position to ratify Sweden’s accession after it passed~~
~~new anti-terror laws, a process he estimated would take about six months.85 Erdogan then said~~

75accession.92 Several Senators from both parties, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch and 29 others who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if Swedish and Finnish accession moves forward.93 A media source has suggested that Turkey’s parliament could agree to Finland’s accession as soon as March.94 Finland reportedly prefers to join NATO together with memo.pdf. 84 Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan says Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO memberships not done deal,” Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan says Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO memberships not done deal,” Al-Monitor, June 30, , June 30,
2022. 2022.
7685 William Mauldin and Michael R. Gordon, “Sweden and Finland on Track for NATO Membership,” William Mauldin and Michael R. Gordon, “Sweden and Finland on Track for NATO Membership,” Wall Street
Journal, December 9, 2022. , December 9, 2022.
7786 See footno See footnote ~~74.~~
7883. 87 “Sweden deports man with alleged ties to Kurdish militant group,” “Sweden deports man with alleged ties to Kurdish militant group,” Reuters, December 3, 2022. , December 3, 2022.
7988 “Swedish court blocks extradition of journalist sought by Turkey in Nato deal,” “Swedish court blocks extradition of journalist sought by Turkey in Nato deal,” Agence France Presse, December , December
19, 2022. 19, 2022.
8089 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben , January 10, 2023; Ben
Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022. , October 28, 2022.
~~81 Remi Banet, “Erdogan announces new meeting on Sweden’s NATO bid~~90 “Turkey ‘Not in a Position’ to Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,” ,” Agence France Presse, , ~~November 8, 2022.~~
~~82 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström and Finnish~~
~~Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto at a Joint Press Availability,” December 8, 2022.~~
83January 14, 2023. 91 “Sweden, Finland must send up to 130 ‘terrorists’ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,” Reuters, January 16, 2023. 92 Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Wall
Street Journal, January 13, 2023. , January 13, 2023.
~~84 Ibid.~~
~~85 “Turkey ‘Not In A Position’ To Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,” Agence France Presse, January 14, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~link to page 30~~93 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. In August 2022, Senate Treaty Document 117-3 approved ratification by a 95-1 vote. 94 Selcan Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, “Turkey Could Approve Finland’s NATO Bid Before May Elections,” Bloomberg, February 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 28 link to page 14 link to page 14 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

~~publicly that he expects the extradition of “around 130” people before approving Turkish~~
~~ratification.86~~
~~Syria87~~
~~Background~~
Sweden,95 but if Sweden’s status remains unresolved over the coming months, popular support in Finland for NATO membership could lead to pressure on Finnish officials to join before Sweden.96 Syria97 Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.8898 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved
during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based. U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.8999 The The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.90100 Turkey has set Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-76). .
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. As of early 2023, Russia is reportedly trying to which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. As of early 2023, Russia is reportedly trying to
broker better ties.broker better ties.91101 Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border
and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish
withdrawal in return.withdrawal in return.92102 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would
affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in
northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State

~~86 “Sweden, Finland must send up to 130 ‘terrorists’ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,” Reuters, January 16,~~
~~2023.~~
87Department spokesperson has said that U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to normalize or upgrade relations with the Asad regime.103 95 Essi Lehto, “Finland to stick with Sweden in NATO bid, hopes for green light by July,” Reuters, January 30, 2023. 96 “Finland Debates NATO Ratification That May Leave Sweden Behind,” Reuters, February 9, 2023. 97 See CRS Report RL33487, See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. , coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
8898 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. , August 4, 2017.
8999 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates
in Syria), see footnoin Syria), see footnote 7382.
90100 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. , October 15, 2019.
91101 Fehim Tastekin, “Fledgling Turkish-Syrian dialogue faces bumpy road ahead,” Fehim Tastekin, “Fledgling Turkish-Syrian dialogue faces bumpy road ahead,” Al-Monitor, January 14, 2023. , January 14, 2023.
92102 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
103 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1213 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.104 Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,105

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Department spokesperson has said that U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to~~
~~normalize or upgrade relations with the Asad regime.93~~
~~Further Turkish Military Operations?~~
~~In May 2022, Erdogan began making public statements about a possible new Turkish military~~
~~operation to expand areas of Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence and~~
~~providing areas for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey.94 The presence of~~
~~Syrian refugees has become politically charged in Turkey ahead of the scheduled 2023 elections,~~
~~partly because of Turkey’s ongoing economic turmoil. In June testimony before the Senate~~
~~Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy~~
~~Dana Stroul said that any Turkish escalation in northern Syria “risks disrupting [Defeat]-ISIS~~
~~operations,” including the security of SDF-managed detention facilities.95 As of August 2022, a~~
~~media report suggested that approximately 900 U.S. Special Forces personnel were deployed in~~
~~northeastern Syria to help the SDF counter the Islamic State and to discourage other countries’~~
~~forces from occupying the area.96~~
~~A November 13, 2022, bombing that killed six people in Istanbul and injured dozens more may~~
~~have boosted the Turkish government’s resolve to consider a military operation in Syria. Turkish~~
~~officials have publicized information alleging YPG responsibility for the attack, though the YPG~~
~~and PKK deny involvement.97 Turkey began air and artillery strikes against SDF-controlled areas~~
~~of northern Syria (including civilian infrastructure) and PKK targets in northern Iraq on~~
~~November 20, 2022, dubbing the strikes Operation Claw-Sword and invoking self-defense as~~
~~justification. Various U.S. official statements have acknowledged Turkey’s right to self-defense,~~
~~but have generally opposed cross-border strikes and voiced concerns that Turkey-SDF clashes~~
~~could reduce the SDF’s focus on countering the Islamic State.98 In a November 30 call between~~
~~Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, Secretary Austin~~
~~expressed the Defense Department’s “strong opposition to a new Turkish military operation.”99~~
~~U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues~~
~~How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects~~
~~Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,~~
~~Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and~~
~~other munitions to maintain military strength.100~~

~~93 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.~~
~~94 Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2022.~~
~~95 Statement of Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, Testimony Before the~~
~~Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Path Forward on U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy and Accountability,” June 8,~~
~~2022, available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060822_%20Stroul_Testimony.pdf.~~
~~96 Alexander Ward et al., “What are we still doing in Syria?” Politico, August 26, 2022.~~
~~97 “Turkey blames deadly bomb on Kurdish militants; PKK denies involvement,” Reuters, November 14, 2022.~~
~~98 Ibid.~~
~~99 Defense Department, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Phone Call With Turkish Minister of~~
~~National Defense Hulusi Akar,” November 30, 2022.~~
~~100 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany~~
~~(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,~~
~~U.S. Sanctions, and Informal Holds~~
~~Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia~~
~~delivered in 2019,101~~ has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.~~102~~106 In explaining the U.S. decision to In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.~~103~~107 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to
transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer
possesses the S-400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have possesses the S-400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have
made the system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 made the system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400
in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some An August 2020 article reported that some ~~Members of congressional committees~~congressional committee leaders placed holds on placed holds on
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. ~~Customary~~
~~practice allows some Members of Congress to place holds on major arms sales, though the holds~~
The executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.are not legally binding.~~104~~108 Such a disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not Such a disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not
occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.~~105~~
~~Possible F-16 Sales and Congressional Views~~
~~Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)~~
~~In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16~~
~~fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.~~
~~President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20~~
~~meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation~~
~~and notification process with Congress.106 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described~~
~~what upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail,~~
~~including a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements~~

~~101~~109 104 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 105 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later. second system to come later.
~~102~~106 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~103~~107 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
~~104~~108 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~105~~109 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, ,
August 12, 2020. August 12, 2020.
~~106 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego~~
~~Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For~~
~~background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.107 Other countries that may receive new or~~
Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 25 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Possible F-16 Sales and Congressional Views Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues) In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.110 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and notification process with Congress.111 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration would include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.112 Other countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco,
Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.~~108~~113
After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a crisis After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a crisis
implicating European security may have subsequently boosted the Administration’s interest in implicating European security may have subsequently boosted the Administration’s interest in
moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey in early 2022. moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey in early 2022. While Turkey has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, it has NATO’s second-largest military, hosts allied military assets and personnel (see Figure A-3), and partners in other ways with the United States and NATO114—including using F-16s in occasional policing missions in the Baltics, Poland, and elsewhere.115 Responding to criticism of a Responding to criticism of a
possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,~~109~~116 a State Department a State Department
official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign
influence in the region.”influence in the region.”~~110~~117 While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional
notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless
compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national
security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade
ties with Turkey.”ties with Turkey.”~~111~~
~~U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide~~
~~Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the~~
~~TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to~~
~~partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to~~
~~develop technology for the TF-X.112 If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the~~
~~Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials have hinted that~~
~~they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft or Western European~~
~~alternatives.113 According to some defense analysts, however, Turkey’s calculus has likely~~
~~changed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.114 One has written that if Turkey cannot procure F-~~
~~16s, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its fighter~~
~~jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter] Typhoon,~~
~~Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”115~~
~~At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-~~
~~Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President~~
~~Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as~~
~~well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.116 However,~~

~~107 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22,~~
~~2021.~~
~~108 Ibid.~~
~~109~~118 110 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html. 111 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 112 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf. 113 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021. 114 State Department, “U.S. Relations With Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye’s International Security Initiatives and Contributions to NATO and EU Operations.” 115 NATO, “Turkey, United States take up NATO air patrols,” July 7, 2021. 116 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/ Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf. 20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
~~110~~117 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022. , April 6, 2022.
~~111 Ibid.~~
~~112 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,~~
~~2022.~~
~~113 “Türkiye signals it may turn to Russia if US blocks F-16 jet sales,” Daily Sabah, September 9, 2022; Paul Iddon,~~
~~“Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” Forbes, March 15, 2021.~~
~~114 Paul Iddon, “Where can Turkey buy fighter jets if US F-16 deal falls through?” Middle East Eye, September 29,~~
~~2022.~~
~~115 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”~~
~~116 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Menendez has expressed~~ 118 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a more advanced fighter,119 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.120 If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider purchasing Western European alternatives. Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,121 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany would approve such a sale.122 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a non-F-16 platform.123 At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.124 However, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what disapproval due to what
he has termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”he has termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”~~117~~125
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria, In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other ~~longstanding~~long-standing Aegean Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional
attention.attention.~~118 Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal~~126 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime with Greek Prime
Minister Kyriakos MitsotakisMinister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms
transactions while addressing a May transactions while addressing a May 172022 joint session of Congress. joint session of Congress.~~119~~127 In December, the final In December, the final
version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to
Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However,
the joint explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We the joint explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We
believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized
territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”~~120~~
~~With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in~~
~~2021,121~~128 119 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. Turkey also plans to work with domestic contractors to upgrade the country’s 36 F-16 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot domestically upgrade its other F-16s because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022. 120 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense News, January 18, 2023. 121 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye, January 20, 2023. 122 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to ‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023. 123 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.” 124 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022. 125 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/status/1600519759493304321. 126 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022. 127 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts. 128 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 29 link to page 30 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in 2017,129 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.countries.~~122~~130 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations
with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.~~123~~131
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).below).~~124~~132
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing ~~Issues125~~Issues133
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see (including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-8
7 and and Figure A-9 8 for maps of some of the areas in dispute).for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The

~~117 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/~~
~~status/1600519759493304321.~~
~~118 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,”~~ ~~Greece and Turkey in Conflict and~~
~~Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek~~
~~Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022.~~
~~119 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.~~
~~Congress,” May 17, 2022.~~
~~120 Joint explanatory statement available at https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-~~
~~117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf.~~
~~121 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,”~~
~~August 3, 2021.~~
~~122 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30,~~
~~2022.~~
~~123 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~124 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.~~
~~125 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,~~
~~claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-~~
~~thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are~~
~~backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.126 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot~~
~~leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other~~
~~than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim~~
~~to be legally invalid.~~
~~Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of~~
~~Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.127 U.S. officials have~~
~~explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as~~
~~part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.128 In the March 2022 congressional hearing~~
~~testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass~~
~~logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.129 After Turkish~~
~~Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced~~
~~approach in the Aegean,130~~ internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.134 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim to be legally invalid. Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.135 U.S. officials have explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.136 In the March 2022 congressional hearing testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.137 After Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced 129 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017. 130 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022. 131 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 132 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. 133 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 134 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. 135 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022. 136 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense Minister,” July 18, 2022. 137 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.” Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 15 link to page 15 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief approach in the Aegean,138 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been
no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are
focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.~~131~~139
Congressional Notification Process
~~Various~~In January 2023, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported ~~in mid-January 2023~~ that the that the
Administration has provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Administration has provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for
Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these
reports, the January informal notification on Turkey is for 40 new F-16s and 79 F-16 upgrade reports, the January informal notification on Turkey is for 40 new F-16s and 79 F-16 upgrade
packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20
~~billion.132 Official confirmation may be unavailable because the~~billion.140 The State Department says it does not State Department says it does not
comment on possible arms sales until the executive branch formally notifies the sale to comment on possible arms sales until the executive branch formally notifies the sale to
Congress.Congress.~~133~~
~~Formal notification of a possible arms sale to Congress generally occurs~~ 141 In general, the State Department formally notifies SFRC and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of a possible arms sale 20 to 40 days after 20 to 40 days after
an informal notification, giving informal notification, giving ~~foreign affairs~~ the committees the opportunitycommittees the opportunity ~~during the interim~~ to to
address concerns with the Administration in a confidential process. address concerns with the Administration in a confidential process. ~~Formal notification generally~~
However, formal notification usually does not proceed if a does not proceed if a ~~Member (usually a~~ committee chair or ranking membercommittee chair or ranking member) places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the proposed transaction.142 Under provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the Administration can proceed with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece) after formal notification.143 As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may depend on Turkey’s approval of Swedish-Finnish NATO accession.144 Shortly after the reported informal notifications, the New York Times cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey, saying: President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.145 The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S. 138 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. 139~~places a hold on~~

~~126 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot~~
~~soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between~~
~~50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February~~
~~3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a~~
~~buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000~~
~~personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.~~
~~127 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American~~
~~Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022.~~
~~128 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense~~
~~Minister,” July 18, 2022.~~
~~129 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining~~
~~U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”~~
~~130 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.~~
~~131~~ Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/ Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928. 1582273449145212928.
~~132~~140 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden , January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden
Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to
Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023. , January 14, 2023.
~~133~~141 State Department Press Briefing, January 13, 2023. 142 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 143 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen. 144 See footnote 92 and footnote 93. 145 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al., “Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023. Congressional Research Service 18 Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief regional involvement (as mentioned above).146 By harmonizing ~~State Department Press Briefing, January 13, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~the proposed transaction.134 In the case of the proposed F-16 sale to Turkey, Al-Monitor wrote in~~
~~mid-January to expect a “drawn-out process of briefings and deliberations on Capitol Hill before~~
~~the sale moves forward.”135 Citing unnamed U.S. officials, the Wall Street Journal reported (as~~
~~also stated above) that congressional approval is contingent on Turkey’s ratification of Swedish-~~
~~Finnish NATO accession.136~~
~~The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece~~
~~come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.~~
~~regional involvement (as mentioned above).137 By timing~~ the informal notification on F-35s for the informal notification on F-35s for
~~Greece close to the notification for F-16s to~~Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to
reassure Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over reassure Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over
Greece.Greece.~~138~~ 147 One journalist has argued: One journalist has argued:
A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5- A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-
16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a 16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.~~139~~148
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.~~140~~
~~Shortly after the reported informal notifications, the New York Times cited Chairman Menendez~~
~~as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey, saying:~~
~~President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and~~
~~democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and~~
~~against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human~~
~~rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and~~
~~begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.141~~
~~As mentioned above, congressional holds on proposed arms sales are not legally binding, but the~~
~~executive branch generally gives broad deference to the chair and ranking member of the foreign~~
~~affairs committees on possible major foreign arms sales. After formal notification of a potential~~
~~sale, any Member of Congress can privilege a joint resolution of disapproval for floor action if~~
~~the Member introduces it within the time period prescribed under the Arms Export Control Act~~
~~(P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320).142 For NATO allies such as Turkey and Greece, the prescribed time~~

~~134 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~135 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale.”~~
~~136 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey.”~~
~~137~~149 146 CRS Report R41368, CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~138~~147 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong, Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,
“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”
~~139~~148 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,” Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023. , January 16, 2023.
~~140~~149 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January , January
17, 2023. 17, 2023.
~~141 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al.,~~
~~“Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023.~~
~~142 For historical background on how the congressional review process has affected some U.S. arms sales, see CRS~~
~~Report R44984, Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy, coordinated by~~
~~Clayton Thomas; and archived CRS Report R46580,~~ ~~Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales~~
~~to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

18

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~period is 15 days after formal notification.143 The President can veto a resolution of disapproval,~~
~~subject to congressional override.~~

~~143 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

19 19

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Appendix. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,047,706. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, 83,047,706. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% (2020) 23.4% (2020)
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017) Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017)
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $38,759 $38,759
Real GDP Growth: 5.0% 5.0%
Inflation: 73% 73%
Unemployment: 10.8% 10.8%
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 4.5% 4.5%
Public Debt as % of GDP: 37.5% 37.5%
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 5.7% 5.7%
International currency reserves: $67.1 bil ion $67.1 bil ion
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022 Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022
end-of-year estimates or projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World end-of-year estimates or projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World
Factbook. .

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

20 20

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-2. Turkish Public Opinion Polls

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

21 21

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-3. ~~Turkey’s Military Presence Abroad~~
~~(as of August 2022)~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

22

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Figure A-4. Countries Interested in Bayraktar TB2 Drone Aircraft~~
~~(as of July 2022)~~

Source: ProPublica, based on news reports and statements from government officials and Baykar Technology.
Notes: Since the publication of this map, the UAE has reportedly acquired TB2s and Saudi Arabia has expressed
~~interest as well. “Türkiye sells its famed battle-tested drones to UAE as ties mend,” Daily Sabah/Reuters,~~
~~September 21, 2022. Other potential buyers include the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,~~
~~Uruguay, and Togo. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates~~
~~geopolitical stage,” Defense News, August 8, 2022; “Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 drone: Why African states are buying~~
~~them,” BBC News, August 25, 2022. A few countries (including Tunisia, Algeria, and Malaysia) have reportedly~~
~~purchased or expressed interest in the TAI Anka-S drone, which has a significantly larger flight range than the~~
~~TB2.~~

Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets since 2011. Note: All locations are approximate. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2322

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-~~5. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey~~

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
~~outlets since 2011.~~
Note: All locations are approximate.
4. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2423

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-~~6. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits~~

5. NATO Countries and Aspirants Source: CRS Graphics. Map updated June 2022. Notes: As indicated, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine are also formal aspirants for NATO membership.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2524

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-76. Syria Conflict Map

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2625

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-87. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/. sovereignty-16-maps/.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2726

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure A-98. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. , with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid. claim to be legally invalid.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2827

Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R44000 R44000 · VERSION 8193 · UPDATED
2928