Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Changes from December 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
~~December 1, 2022~~
~~in Brief~~
~~Clayton Thomas~~
~~The aftershocks of Afghanistan’s watershed year of 2021 continue to reverberate within~~
~~Specialist in Middle~~
~~Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States. In 2021, U.S. and international~~
~~Eastern Affairs~~
~~forces departed after nearly two decades of operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed~~

~~Afghan government and its military forces collapsed;~~February 28, 2023 In 2021, U.S. and international forces withdrew from Afghanistan after nearly two decades of operations, and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist
group that formerly ruled the country group that formerly ruled the country Clayton Thomas from 1996 to 2001, retook power. from 1996 to 2001, retook power. ~~Afghans and Americans~~

~~alike, including Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers, continue to grapple with the~~
~~reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.~~
~~The Taliban government is dominated by former officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists, indicating that~~
~~the Taliban have prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures~~
~~advocated by the United States and other countries. Some signs~~The United States does not recognize the Taliban or any other Specialist in Middle entity as the government of Afghanistan and reports there are no U.S. diplomatic or military Eastern Affairs personnel in the country. The Taliban’s position appears secure, though its rule appears to have had negative effects for most Afghans, as well as a number of U.S. policy interests. The Taliban government is dominated by former officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. Signs of dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines have of dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines have
emerged, though the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes. Some Afghans have sought to advocate emerged, though the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes. Some Afghans have sought to advocate
for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban in nonviolent demonstrations, which the Taliban have for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban in nonviolent demonstrations, which the Taliban have ~~monitored and~~
~~sometimes violently dispersed. Other anti-Taliban~~sometimes violently dispersed, but the Taliban do not appear to face effective political opposition. Other Afghans have taken up arms against the Taliban, claiming guerilla-style Afghans have taken up arms against the Taliban, claiming guerilla-style
attacks against Taliban forces and calling for international assistanceattacks against Taliban forces and calling for international assistance~~, and the~~. The regional Islamic State affiliate has conducted regional Islamic State affiliate has conducted
attacks against attacks against ~~both~~ Taliban forcesTaliban forces ~~and~~, Afghan civilians Afghan civilians, and international targets alike. .
Some Members of Congress have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule on U.S. interests: Some Members of Congress have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule on U.S. interests:
  Counterterrorism. The Taliban takeover has had different impacts on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, The Taliban takeover has had different impacts on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda,
historic Taliban adversaries and partners, respectively. With no U.S. military forces based in Afghanistan historic Taliban adversaries and partners, respectively. With no U.S. military forces based in Afghanistan
or neighboring states, the United States is pursuing an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach. or neighboring states, the United States is pursuing an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach.
  Women and Girls. Taliban actions have been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, Taliban actions have been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan,
a longtime U.S. policy concern, with girls prohibited from attending school a longtime U.S. policy concern, with girls prohibited from attending school ~~at the secondary~~above the primary level and level and
women’s roles drastically curtailedwomen’s roles drastically curtailed, including a December 2022 decision to ban women from working for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). .
  Relocating U.S. Partners. Some Members of Congress have closely followed ongoing U.S. efforts to Some Members of Congress have closely followed ongoing U.S. efforts to
relocate remaining U.S. citizens, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts relocate remaining U.S. citizens, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts
and seek to leave the country. and seek to leave the country.
Some Members have also expressed concern about dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover, Some Members have also expressed concern about dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover,
Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both
preexisting (such as natural disasters and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international preexisting (such as natural disasters and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international
development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). In response, the development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). In response, the
Biden Administration has provided over $1 billion in humanitarian assistance, issued general licenses authorizing various Biden Administration has provided over $1 billion in humanitarian assistance, issued general licenses authorizing various
humanitarian and commercial transactions, and established a Switzerland-based “Afghan Fund” to disburse some of humanitarian and commercial transactions, and established a Switzerland-based “Afghan Fund” to disburse some of
Afghanistan’s central bank assets to support the Afghan economy. Afghanistan’s central bank assets to support the Afghan economy.
Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the
creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor
dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Going forward, Congress may consider further reporting dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Going forward, Congress may consider further reporting
requirements, resources, or investigative efforts related to various U.S. interests as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s requirements, resources, or investigative efforts related to various U.S. interests as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s
budget request and defense authorization measuresbudget request and defense authorization measures and examines lessons learned in Afghanistan. Future reports from the congressionally created Afghanistan War . Future reports from the congressionally created Afghanistan War
Commission and other bodies may offer lessons for legislatorsCommission and other bodies may offer lessons for legislators.
Congressional action Congressional action ~~is likely to be influenced, and likely~~could be influenced or constrained constrained, by a lack of reliable information about events in by a lack of reliable information about events in
Afghanistan and the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Perhaps more challengingly, the Biden Afghanistan and the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Perhaps more challengingly, the Biden
Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate humanitarian and economic conditions in Afghanistan, but without Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate humanitarian and economic conditions in Afghanistan, but without
taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem
may prove complicated given the Taliban’s evident aversion to make compromises in response to international pressure and may prove complicated given the Taliban’s evident aversion to make compromises in response to international pressure and
its apparent willingness to accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering as the price of that uncompromising its apparent willingness to accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering as the price of that uncompromising
stance. stance.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

~~Introduction~~
~~The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in~~
~~Afghanistan and the United States alike.~~ Introduction This report provides background information and This report provides background information and
analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including
 the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human  the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country; rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
 regional dynamics; and  regional dynamics; and
 the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.  the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has
influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central
bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the
Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule. Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.
Background: Taliban Takeover
The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United
States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against
Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored it. In the subsequent 20 years, the Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored it. In the subsequent 20 years, the
United States suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the United States suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the
rising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction and rising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction and
security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the
Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven
improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the
world’s poorest and most corrupt countries. world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.
At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a ~~close~~partner in U.S. counterterrorism U.S. counterterrorism ~~partner~~efforts, the , the
result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment
of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance. of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance.
President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level
since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the
February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 U.S. officials committed to continue to provide financial February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 U.S. officials committed to continue to provide financial
support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban, support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban,
while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.2 while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.2
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained
territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade
insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep
internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption.
1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29,
2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021,
and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the
United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement. 02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
2 See House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Pathway for Peace in 2 See House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Pathway for Peace in
Afghanistan, Afghanistan, CQ Congressional Transcripts,, February 19, 2021. February 19, 2021.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

~~internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed~~
~~certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and~~
~~financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.3~~
~~Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart~~
~~Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide~~
~~swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it~~
~~already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more significant:~~
~~some northern areas had successfully resisted the Taliban militarily when the group was in power~~
~~in the 1990s, making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant.4 The speed of the~~
~~Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with one commander saying~~
~~that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the scheduled~~
~~departure of U.S. forces.5~~
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the country. The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced
stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were
taken with minimal fighting.taken with minimal fighting.63 In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender
or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through
the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.7 4 The Taliban captured their first The Taliban captured their first
provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and its security provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and its security
forces accelerated. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by forces accelerated. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by
electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan military forces, fled the forces, fled the
country on August 15 and reportedly remains, as country on August 15 and reportedly remains, as of February 2023~~of November 2022~~, in the United Arab , in the United Arab
Emirates.Emirates.85 Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same day, taking effective control of the Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same day, taking effective control of the
country. country.
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The
Taliban refer to their government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Taliban refer to their government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan.Emirate of Afghanistan.96 The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996- The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-
2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (sharia) but) but ~~have not, per a~~

~~3 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, January~~
~~2021.~~
~~4 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second~~
~~Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021.~~
~~5 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing~~
~~in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.~~
~~6 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021.~~
7, according to one group of experts, “remain remarkably ambiguous when it comes to the type of Islamic state they want to form in Afghanistan.”7 Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available.8 Nearly all members of the government are former officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that conducted numerous attacks against U.S. and other international targets in Afghanistan. In the initial days of the transition, some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials or to others from outside the movement as part of the 3 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021. 4 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15, , August 15,
2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” 2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times, ,
August 18, 2021. August 18, 2021.
85 Charles Davis, “Afghanistan’s last president, Ashraf Ghani, rejects comparison to Ukraine’s Zelenskyy, says he’s Charles Davis, “Afghanistan’s last president, Ashraf Ghani, rejects comparison to Ukraine’s Zelenskyy, says he’s
‘lived an honorable life,’” ‘lived an honorable life,’” Yahoo News, August 23, 2022. , August 23, 2022.
96 It remains unclear as of It remains unclear as of ~~November 2022~~Februrary 2023 how or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent how or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent
positions. One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will positions. One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will
Run the Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021. Run the Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy in Brief~~

~~June 2022 U.S. State Department report, established “a clear and cohesive legal framework,~~
~~judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms.”10~~
~~Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone~~
~~strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances~~
~~and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available.11 Nearly all members of the~~
~~government are former officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male,~~
~~the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a~~
~~plurality of the population), and most are from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain,~~
~~designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior~~
~~Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up~~
~~to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani~~
~~Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is responsible for~~
~~numerous attacks against U.S. and other international targets in Afghanistan.~~
~~In the initial days of the transition, some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach~~
~~out to former Afghan government officials or to others from outside the movement as part of the~~
7 M. Bashir Mobasher et al., The Constitution and Laws of the Taliban, 1994-2001: Hints from the Past and Options for the Future, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, December 14, 2022. 8 “Taliban supreme leader addresses major gathering in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, July 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 2 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy Taliban’s promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The Taliban have not, however, Taliban’s promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The Taliban have not, however,
reached beyond their own ranks to fill government positions and are reportedly staffing ministries reached beyond their own ranks to fill government positions and are reportedly staffing ministries
with military and/or religious figures with little relevant experience, exacerbating the group’s with military and/or religious figures with little relevant experience, exacerbating the group’s
administrative challenges and some internal tensions.administrative challenges and some internal tensions.129
Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along
various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes, various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes,
governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based
decision-making.decision-making.1310 Points of tension reportedly exist between members of the group’s political Points of tension reportedly exist between members of the group’s political
wing (such as Baradar) and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the wing (such as Baradar) and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the
most credit for the group’s victory;most credit for the group’s victory;1411 between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file
fighters who are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;fighters who are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;1512 and between those with different and between those with different
ideological perspectives and ethnic identities.ideological perspectives and ethnic identities.1613 In a February 2023 speech, Haqqani criticized “power monopolization” within the Taliban, prompting other Taliban figures to state that criticisms should be voiced privately.14
Current and Potential Opposition
While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did
not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as a lack of support for the former not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as a lack of support for the former
government.government.1715 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the

~~10 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan, June 2, 2022.~~
~~11 “Taliban supreme leader addresses major gathering in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, July 1, 2022.~~
12Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.16 The Taliban have often violently dispersed these protests, and have stifled open non-violent dissent.17 According to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, “There is no significant visible political opposition to the Taliban inside Afghanistan,” and exiled officials associated with the former government “are fragmented and their statements have decreasing resonance for the population inside Afghanistan.”18 The Taliban face armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the National Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF leaders 9 Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,” Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,” New
York Times, January 13, 2022; , January 13, 2022; Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a
threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, May 26, 2022. , S/2022/419, May 26, 2022.
1310 Andrew Watkins, “The Taliban one year on,” Andrew Watkins, “The Taliban one year on,” CTC Sentinel, August 2022. , August 2022.
1411 “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” ANI,
February 15, 2022. February 15, 2022.
~~15 Abdul Basit, “How smoldering discontent affects the Taliban rule in Afghanistan,” TRT World, August 4, 2022.~~
1612 Sabawoon Samim, “New lives in the city: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 2, 2023. 13 Andrew Watkins, “One year later: Taliban reprise repressive rule, but struggle to build a state,” United States Andrew Watkins, “One year later: Taliban reprise repressive rule, but struggle to build a state,” United States
Institute of Peace, August 17, 2022. Institute of Peace, August 17, 2022.
1714 Ayaz Gul, “Top Taliban official’s public criticism reignite internal rift speculation,” Voice of America, February 13, 2023. 15 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid, “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,
“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021. “Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.
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~~Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated~~
~~nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.18 The Taliban~~
~~appear to have monitored most protests, and violently dispersed some.19~~
~~The Taliban face organized armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the~~
~~National Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF~~
~~leaders~~ 16 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022. 17 “Taliban disperses Afghan women’s march for ‘work and freedom,’” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2022. 18 UNAMA, “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva,” December 20, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based
representation.representation.2019 They have not won They have not won explicit public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps due to public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps due to
the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional powers, the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional powers,
including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran. including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran.
The NRF has claimed numerous attacks against Taliban fighters, mostly in and around the central The NRF has claimed numerous attacks against Taliban fighters, mostly in and around the central
province of Panjshir, but it is difficult to assess the veracity of such claims, which the Taliban province of Panjshir, but it is difficult to assess the veracity of such claims, which the Taliban
dismiss as “propaganda.”dismiss as “propaganda.”2120 Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military capabilities Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military capabilities
or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten the or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten the
Taliban’s position.Taliban’s position.2221
An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic
State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has
opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused
nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global
caliphate. Since the Taliban takeover, ISKP’s ranks have swelled to as many as caliphate. Since the Taliban takeover, ISKP’s ranks have swelled to as many as 46,000 fighters ,000 fighters
despite a concerted Taliban offensivedespite a concerted Taliban offensive~~, and ISKP has claimed responsibility for a number of major~~
~~attacks in 2022 (many targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the Hazaras).23 Experts disagree~~
~~about the potency of the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the group~~
~~without external assistance.~~.22 In addition to attacks against Afghan civilians (mostly targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the Hazaras) and Taliban fighters, ISKP has claimed a number of externally-oriented operations, including cross border rocket attacks against Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, attacks against the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul, and an assault on a Kabul hotel frequented by Chinese nationals.23 UN sanctions monitors assess the group’s attacks are intended “to portray the Taliban as incapable of providing security” and “to undermine the relationship between the Taliban and neighboring countries.”24 24
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors
Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has
throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers. throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers.
Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors. Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.
Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for
decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its
subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph

~~18 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022.~~
~~19 “Taliban disperses Afghan women’s march for ‘work and freedom,’” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2022.~~
20for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from 19 Ali Maisam Nazary, “What the Taliban really fear,” Ali Maisam Nazary, “What the Taliban really fear,” Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2022. , August 19, 2022.
2120 Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022. , June 13, 2022.
~~22 “Afghanistan’s security challenges under the Taliban,” International Crisis Group, August 12, 2022.~~
~~23 “Afghanistan: ISIS group targets religious minorities,” Human Rights Watch, September 6, 2022.~~21 Rubin, op. cit.; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan in 2023; Taliban internal power struggles and militancy,” Brookings, February 3, 2023. 22 Thirty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and entities, S/2023/95, December 30, 2022. 23 Hazaras comprise Hazaras comprise
10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more 10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more
accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule, particularly in urban areas, accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule, particularly in urban areas,
despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan in despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan in
fall 2021. While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not fall 2021. While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not
establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras. Nilly establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras. Nilly
Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, , May 27, 2022.Sudha Ramachandran, “ISKP attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 31, 2022. 24 Thirty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and entities, S/2023/95, December 30, 2022~~2022.~~
~~24 Fazal Muzhary, “Why the Islamic State in Afghanistan is too weak to overthrow the Taliban,” Baker Institute,~~
~~September 29, 2022; “Afghanistan’s security challenges,” op. cit~~. .
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

~~for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from~~
Pakistani leaders.25 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban Pakistani leaders.25 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban
government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021. government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.
However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for
Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-
based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i Taliban-i based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i Taliban-i
Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against Pakistani Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against Pakistani
security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to
seek the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefiresseek the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires~~, which appear to have broken down in~~
~~late 2022.26~~.26 The TTP has resumed attacks against Pakistani targets, including a January 2023 attack (claimed by a TTP faction) that targeted police officers and killed over 100. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over 1 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over 1
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over
their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government forces intermittently their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government forces intermittently
clashed in 2022.27 clashed in 2022.27
Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule
but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for
Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who
speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). ~~Official Taliban visits to~~
~~Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover and have continued since then, including with~~
~~the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022. Disputes in 2022~~Disputes over water over water
rights and refugees rights and refugees ~~could, however, portend future tensions~~persist, along with sporadic border clashes.28 .28
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central AsianAfghanistan’s Central Asian neighborsneighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
governments appear to be prioritizing governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had ~~numerous~~ official official
engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered
shelter to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front, a shelter to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front, a ~~result~~consequence both of Tajikistan’s own struggles both of Tajikistan’s own struggles
with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest ethnic with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest ethnic
group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.29 group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.29
China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some
congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.30 China, which played a relatively limited role congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.30 China, which played a relatively limited role
in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan
(particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban
takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and
other limitations.31 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has other limitations.31 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has
signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”32
25 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” 25 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, , August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani,
“Pakista’’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” “Pakista’’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021. , July 22, 2021.
26 26 ~~Abdul Basit, “The impact of Ayman Zawahiri’s killing on Pakistan-TTP reconciliation talks,” Jamestown~~
~~Foundation, October 21, 2022.~~
“Islamist militants present fresh challenge to Pakistan,” Reuters, January 31, 2023. 27 Rubin, op. cit. 27 Rubin, op. cit.
Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017. 28 Christian Hoj Hansen and Halimullah Kousary, “Can Iran get along with the Taliban?” 28 Christian Hoj Hansen and Halimullah Kousary, “Can Iran get along with the Taliban?” War on the Rocks, June 7, , June 7,
2022. 2022.
29 Abubakar Siddique, “Hostilities grow between Taliban and Tajikistan amid border closure, truck seizures,” 29 Abubakar Siddique, “Hostilities grow between Taliban and Tajikistan amid border closure, truck seizures,”
Gandhara, May 19, 2022; Rubin, op. cit. , May 19, 2022; Rubin, op. cit.
30 See, for example, 30 See, for example, ~~H.R. 5404, S. 2826, and Section 5404 of H.R. 7900~~. .
31 Jiayi Zhou et al., “Treading lightly: China’s footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan,” SIPRI, November 2022. 31 Jiayi Zhou et al., “Treading lightly: China’s footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan,” SIPRI, November 2022.
32 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

~~signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May~~
~~2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”32~~
U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power
Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has
created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in
Afghanistan, and has rendered obsolete former U.S. plans to partner with Afghan authorities to Afghanistan, and has rendered obsolete former U.S. plans to partner with Afghan authorities to
counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and other human counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and other human
rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken
numerous actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including numerous actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including
many Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S. many Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S.
citizens and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that citizens and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that
remains ongoing as of remains ongoing as of ~~November 2022~~February 2023. .
Counterterrorism
A number of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the A number of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the
Taliban have related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most Taliban have related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most
significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently. significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently.
Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has clashed with the Taliban, as Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has clashed with the Taliban, as
mentioned above. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched mentioned above. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched
airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban
cooperation.33 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10 cooperation.33 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10
million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible
for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people, for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people,
including over 30 U.S. service members.34 including over 30 U.S. service members.34
While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda, While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda,
the July 2022 killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable the July 2022 killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable
attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.35 Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.35 Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism
pressure, those ties have persisted for decades.36 The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in pressure, those ties have persisted for decades.36 The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in
Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties
remain unclearremain unclear~~. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has suggested that some elements of~~; neither the the
~~Taliban might not have supported or even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly~~
~~leading to tensions within the movement.37~~
~~In any case, per a July 2022 U.N. sanctions monitors report, Al Qaeda “is not viewed as posing an~~
~~immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan because it lacks an external~~
~~operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or~~

~~32 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022.~~
Taliban nor Al Qaeda officially acknowledged Zawahiri’s death.37 In any case, per a February 2023 Department of Defense Inspector General report, Al Qaeda and its regional affiliate “probably do not have the intent or capability to conduct directed attacks in the U.S. homeland during the next year, and al-Qaeda almost certainly does not have the capability to conduct attacks against U..S interests in the region.”38 33 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020. 33 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
34 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022. 34 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022.
35 CRS Insight IN11976, 35 CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. , by Clayton Thomas.
36 36 Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610
(2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. Document S/2022/547, U.N. Document S/2022/547,
released July 15, 2022. released July 15, 2022.
37 37 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested that some elements of the Taliban might not have supported or even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly leading to tensions within the Taliban. “The National Security Advisor’s very busy week,” “The National Security Advisor’s very busy week,” NPR, August 4, 2022. , August 4, 2022.
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy in Brief~~

~~embarrassment.” 38 The U.S. intelligence community assessed in March 2022 that AQ “will gauge~~
~~its ability to operate in Afghanistan under Taliban restrictions” as Al Qaeda and the Taliban~~
~~recalibrate their relationship and activities.39~~
38 Operation Enduring Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2022-December 31, 2022, February 14, 2023. In December 2022, the State Department designated three Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Congressional Research Service 6 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain
the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a
military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what
U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.4039 With the Taliban in control of With the Taliban in control of
Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the
continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. U.S. Central continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon
capabilities as “extremely difficult but not impossible” in February 2022 testimony.capabilities as “extremely difficult but not impossible” in February 2022 testimony.4140 The Biden The Biden
Administration has cited the Zawahiri strike as a demonstration of U.S. over-the-horizon Administration has cited the Zawahiri strike as a demonstration of U.S. over-the-horizon
capabilities.capabilities.4241
Afghan Women and ~~Girls~~Girls42
The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a
different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active
participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for themparticipants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them~~, and ethnic and religious~~
~~minorities,~~ were enshrined in the country’s were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution. Though the Taliban takeover has reduced high levels of violence that characterized the conflict, a development particularly welcomed by women in rural areas, the Taliban’s return to power has been said to have had a significantly negative impact on Afghan women and girls overall.43 In a September 2022 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan said “In no other country have women and girls so rapidly disappeared from all spheres of public life, nor are they as disadvantaged in every aspect of their lives.”44 Upon taking power, the Taliban ~~2004 constitution. While some early Taliban actions~~
~~suggested a possible measure of moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule, UN~~
~~High Commission for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said in June 2022 that “what we are~~
~~witnessing in Afghanistan today is the institutionalized, systematic oppression of women” and~~
~~that “Afghan women are rapidly facing the worst-case scenario many-feared.”43~~
~~The Taliban takeover appears to have reduced high levels of violence that characterized the~~
~~conflict, a development particularly welcomed by those in rural areas,44 but it has increased fears~~
~~of many Afghans about repression and women’s rights.45 Systems formerly in place to support~~
~~survivors of gender-based violence have been dismantled.46 The Taliban have~~ closed the Ministry closed the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and ~~have~~ reinstated reinstated
the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s
~~interpretation of Islam~~highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The ministry has issued guidance that seeks to impose new in the 1990s. The ministry has issued guidance that seeks to impose new
~~restrictions on Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel~~

~~38 Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, op cit.~~
~~39 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,~~
~~March 2022.~~
40restrictions on Afghan women. Those restrictions include a December 2021 prohibition on women driving long distances or flying without a male guardian, a May 2022 decree mandating punishments for the male relatives of women who do not wear a hijab that fully covers their bodies, and a November 2022 decision to ban women from public parks and bath houses.45 Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for Afghan girls. Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’ secondary schools, effectively shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022.46 However, on March 23, with some girls already present in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that secondary schools for girls 39 See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021. See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021.
4140 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx. See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx.
4241 The White House, The White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022. , October 2022.
~~43 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “High Commissioner updates the Human~~
~~Rights Council on Afghanistan,” June 15, 2022.~~
4442 See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas. 43 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021; Susannah George, “A year of September 6, 2021; Susannah George, “A year of
peace in one of Afghanistan’s deadliest provinces,” peace in one of Afghanistan’s deadliest provinces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2022. , August 12, 2022.
~~45 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, December 15, 2021.~~
46 Death in Slow Motion: Women and Girls under Taliban Rule~~, Amnesty International, July~~44 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Afghanistan,” June 15, 2022. 45 Belquis Ahmadi, “Taliban escalate new abuses against Afghan women, girls,” USIP, October 27, 2022. 46 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022. 2022.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

~~long distances without a male guardian and that male relatives of women who do not wear a~~ ~~hijab~~
~~that fully covers their bodies should be punished.47~~
~~Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for~~
~~Afghan girls. Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’ secondary schools, effectively~~
~~shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of~~
~~the new school year in late March 2022.48 However, on March 23, with some girls already present~~
~~in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that secondary schools for girls~~
would remain closed, shocking many observers.would remain closed, shocking many observers.4947 The United States and many other countries The United States and many other countries
condemned the decision, and in October 2022, the State Department announced visa restrictions condemned the decision, and in October 2022, the State Department announced visa restrictions
on several Taliban figures responsible for the repression of women and girls in Afghanistan.on several Taliban figures responsible for the repression of women and girls in Afghanistan.50
48 One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of hardline clerics within the group and One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of hardline clerics within the group and
Akhundzada.Akhundzada.5149 Other Taliban figures, including both Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly Other Taliban figures, including both Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly
support secondary education for girls (and some educate their own daughters abroad).support secondary education for girls (and some educate their own daughters abroad).5250 The The
evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative leaders, and the evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative leaders, and the
unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves, suggests that external unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves, suggests that external
actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions. Some Afghan women have reportedly continued to provide informal education to girls in private “secret schools,” and secondary schools for girls have remained open in some areas.51 In December 2022, the Taliban suspended women from attending university. That same month, the Taliban also banned women from working for national and international NGOs, threatening NGOs that do not comply with the suspension of their licenses. In response, an estimated 94% of Afghan NGOs fully or partially ceased operations, and 11 U.S. implementing partners (such as the International Rescue Committee and the Norwegian Refugee Council) suspended operations in Afghanistan.52 The ban, which drew unanimous condemnation from the U.N. Security Council and many other quarters, is likely to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan (see below), which disproportionately affects women and girls.53
Ongoing Relocations of U.S. Citizens and Certain Afghans
The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021, triggered the mass evacuation of tens of triggered the mass evacuation of tens of
thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and
Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S. Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S.
officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including
5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US
history.”history.”5354 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the State Department has said that it Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the State Department has said that it
has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 800 U.S. citizens has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 800 U.S. citizens
and 600 lawful permanent residents as of August 2022.and 600 lawful permanent residents as of August 2022.54
~~U.S. officials have characterized their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens~~
~~and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country as an “enduring mission.”55 According~~
~~to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has~~
~~fluctuated in the midst of continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S.~~

~~47 Belquis Ahmadi, “Taliban escalate new abuses against Afghan women, girls,” USIP, October 27, 2022.~~
~~48 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022.~~
4955 47 Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022. Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022.
5048 Announcement of Visa Restriction in Response to the Repression of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, U.S. Announcement of Visa Restriction in Response to the Repression of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, U.S.
Department of State, October 11, 2022. Department of State, October 11, 2022.
5149 Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,” Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 29, 2022. , March 29, 2022.
5250 Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership
divisions,” divisions,” Guardian, March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes , March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes
starting to change from within?” starting to change from within?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 7, 2022. , February 7, 2022.
5351 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Where learning is against the law: A secret school for Afghan girls,” Washington Post, November 9, 2022; “Afghanistan: Six provinces keep schools open for girls despite nationwide ban,” Amu TV, January 1, 2023. 52 “Gender alert no. 3: Out of jobs, into poverty – the impact of the ban on Afghan women working in NGOs,” UN Women, January 13, 2023; SIGAR January 30, 2023 Quarterly Report, pp. 60. 53 “Afghanistan Inter-Agency Rapid Gender Analysis, November 2022,” Gender in Humanitarian Action, December 22, 2022. 54 Statement available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Statement available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf. Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
5455 Some of those evacuated U.S. citizens reportedly traveled to Afghanistan after August 2021. Department Press Some of those evacuated U.S. citizens reportedly traveled to Afghanistan after August 2021. Department Press
BriefingBriefing – —August 15, 2022, U.S. Department of State; Andrew Desiderio et al., “800 Americans evacuated from August 15, 2022, U.S. Department of State; Andrew Desiderio et al., “800 Americans evacuated from
~~Afghanistan since Taliban takeover,” Politico, August 14, 2022.~~
~~55 Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press, U.S. Department of State, November 11, 2022.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy in Brief~~

~~citizens come forward to ask for assistance to leave.56~~ Congressional Research Service 8 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy U.S. officials have characterized their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country as an “enduring mission.”56 According to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has fluctuated in the midst of continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens come forward to ask for assistance to leave.57 On April 28, 2022, Secretary Antony On April 28, 2022, Secretary Antony
Blinken said, “There are at present 126, as of a few days ago, American citizens remaining of Blinken said, “There are at present 126, as of a few days ago, American citizens remaining of
whom 37 seek to leave and that we are assisting.”whom 37 seek to leave and that we are assisting.”5758 The number of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) The number of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
applicants, or those potentially eligible for an SIV or other forms of relief, who remain in applicants, or those potentially eligible for an SIV or other forms of relief, who remain in
Afghanistan is unclear. In a February 2022 report, an advocacy group for SIV-eligible persons Afghanistan is unclear. In a February 2022 report, an advocacy group for SIV-eligible persons
stated that 78,000 of the estimated 81,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan with visa applications stated that 78,000 of the estimated 81,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan with visa applications
pending as of August 15, 2021 remain in Afghanistan.pending as of August 15, 2021 remain in Afghanistan.5859 The State Department has disputed the The State Department has disputed the
accuracy of this report.accuracy of this report.5960 In May 2022, the State Department reportedly estimated that between In May 2022, the State Department reportedly estimated that between
70,000 and 160,000 Afghans were eligible for SIVs.70,000 and 160,000 Afghans were eligible for SIVs.6061
Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The
Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to various accounts, the Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to various accounts, the
Taliban have carried out reprisals against figures aligned with the former government, including Taliban have carried out reprisals against figures aligned with the former government, including
hundreds of killings.hundreds of killings.~~61 In April 2022, Secretary Blinken noted attacks by the Taliban against~~
~~“those who are part of the former government,” adding that most appeared to be happening “at a~~
~~local level” and were not “centrally directed.”62~~
62 The Taliban have reportedly interfered with departure flights, including by demanding seats for The Taliban have reportedly interfered with departure flights, including by demanding seats for
Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money.63 Secretary Blinken said in late Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money.63 Secretary Blinken said in late
April 2022 that the Taliban had allowed freedom of movement to some degree but cautioned that April 2022 that the Taliban had allowed freedom of movement to some degree but cautioned that
there were still limited means of transportation to enable individuals to leave Afghanistan.64 The there were still limited means of transportation to enable individuals to leave Afghanistan.64 The
United States has reportedly paid, through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to United States has reportedly paid, through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to
Qatar for individuals to leave Afghanistan.65 Other impediments to relocations from Afghanistan Qatar for individuals to leave Afghanistan.65 Other impediments to relocations from Afghanistan
~~includes~~include logistical issues at Kabul’s international airport (see textbox) and issues with Afghans logistical issues at Kabul’s international airport (see textbox) and issues with Afghans
obtaining travel documentationobtaining travel documentation~~.66~~
~~Status of Kabul Airport~~
~~Relocation efforts have been complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. After the final departure of~~
~~U.S. forces, Qatar and Turkey worked to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar system,~~
~~and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. As of November 2022,~~

~~56 Department Press Briefing – April 12, 2022, U.S. Department of State.~~
57; the Taliban reportedly suspended issuing passports in October 2022.66 Afghanistan since Taliban takeover,” Politico, August 14, 2022. 56 Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press, U.S. Department of State, November 11, 2022. 57 Department Press Briefing—April 12, 2022, U.S. Department of State. 58 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for the
Department of State, hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022. , hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022.
5859 Association of Wartime Allies, “On The Ground Report Association of Wartime Allies, “On The Ground Report - —Feb 2022.” Feb 2022.”
5960 Dan De Luce, “U.S. ‘left behind’ 78,000 Afghan allies in chaotic withdrawal: NGO report,” Dan De Luce, “U.S. ‘left behind’ 78,000 Afghan allies in chaotic withdrawal: NGO report,” NBC News, March 1, , March 1,
2022. 2022.
6061 Alex Thompson and Allie Bice, “Biden’s broken promise to SIV holders,” Alex Thompson and Allie Bice, “Biden’s broken promise to SIV holders,” Politico, May 16, 2022. , May 16, 2022.
6162 Barbara Marcolini et al., “The Taliban promised them amnesty. Then they executed them,” Barbara Marcolini et al., “The Taliban promised them amnesty. Then they executed them,” New York Times, April , April
12, 2022; Abubakar Siddique, “‘Afghanistan is hell’: Supporters of late Afghan general claim Taliban killings, 12, 2022; Abubakar Siddique, “‘Afghanistan is hell’: Supporters of late Afghan general claim Taliban killings,
persecution,” persecution,” Gandhara, November 2, 2022, November 2, 2022.
~~62 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, op. cit~~. .
63 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan 63 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan
for the past two weeks,” for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021. , December 23, 2021.
64 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, op. cit. 64 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, op. cit.
65 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee 65 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee
Afghanistan,” Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 8, 2022. , June 8, 2022.
66 66 ~~Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing~~
travel documents,” Washington Post, October 6, 2021; “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL“Kabul residents concerned over pause in issuance of passports,” TOLONews, January 2, 2023~~, January~~
~~16, 2022~~. .
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~ Status of Kabul Airport Relocation efforts have been complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. After the final departure of U.S. forces, Qatar and Turkey worked to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar system, and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. As of February 2023,

some domestic and regional airlines are carrying out flights from Kabul airport, but major foreign carriers have yet some domestic and regional airlines are carrying out flights from Kabul airport, but major foreign carriers have yet
to resume operations. Despite a preliminary December 2021 deal with Qatar and Turkey to operate several to resume operations. Despite a preliminary December 2021 deal with Qatar and Turkey to operate several
airports in Afghanistan, the Taliban in September 2022 announced that they had reached a seemingly similar deal airports in Afghanistan, the Taliban in September 2022 announced that they had reached a seemingly similar deal
with the United Arab Emirates to operate three airports, including Kabul’s.67 with the United Arab Emirates to operate three airports, including Kabul’s.67
Economic ~~Collapse~~Contraction and Humanitarian Crisis
The Taliban’s return to power has exacerbated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world The Taliban’s return to power has exacerbated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world
in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries. A number of in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries. A number of
U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. and U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. and
international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets,
appear relevant to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis. appear relevant to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis.
The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the
former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as
80% of total public expenditures.68 Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s 80% of total public expenditures.68 Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s
August 2021 takeover, leading the country’s economy to contract by August 2021 takeover, leading the country’s economy to contract by ~~over 20% in 2021.69~~
~~International assistance is “expected to mitigate some negative impacts of the contraction,”~~
~~according to the World Bank, but even that assistance “will not be sufficient to bring the economy~~
~~back on a sustainable recovery path,” given the ongoing financial crisis, persistently high~~
~~inflation, and Taliban policies.70~~
~~The economic collapse~~as much as 35% in 2021 and 2022.69 The United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan said in December 2022 that “the Taliban’s economic management has been more effective than expected,” citing lower levels of corruption, higher revenue collection, and the relative stability of Afghanistan’s currency over the past year. Still, the economy remains reliant on international donors to inject liquidity into the economy, including the United Nations, which has delivered $1.8 billion in cash between December 2021 and January 2023 for humanitarian operations and salary payments.70 The economic contraction has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19
pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions have worsened further since August 2021: the World pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions have worsened further since August 2021: the World
Food Programme asserted in Food Programme asserted in ~~November 2022~~January 2023 that “Afghanistan continues to face the highest that “Afghanistan continues to face the highest
prevalence of insufficient food consumption globally,” with 90% of Afghans reporting not having prevalence of insufficient food consumption globally,” with 90% of Afghans reporting not having
enough to eat.71 The enough to eat.71 The ~~U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan said in March 2022 that due to~~
~~emergency assistance from international donors, “we have perhaps averted our worst fears of~~
~~famine and widespread starvation” for the winter of 2021-2022.72 The winter of 2022-2023 may~~
~~be more difficult yet, given increased food prices.73 In November 2022, the U.N. Children’s Fund~~
~~(UNICEF) estimated that 1.1 million Afghan children are expected to need treatment for severe~~
~~acute malnutrition.74~~

~~67Charlotte Seet, “UAE civil aviation authority to operate Afghanistan air traffic control,” Simple Flying, September 8,~~
~~2022.~~
~~68 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that~~
~~undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021.~~
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that humanitarian partners provided 26.1 million Afghans with at least one form of assistance in 2022, and that “the outlook remains grim” given projected droughts and higher commodity prices.72 67 Charlotte Seet, “UAE civil aviation authority to operate Afghanistan air traffic control,” Simple Flying, September 8, 2022. 68 SIGAR January 2023 Quarterly Report, pp. 69-71. 69 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, October 7, 2022. 69 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, October 7, 2022.
70 Ibid. 70 Ibid.
71 “Afghanistan Situation Report, 71 “Afghanistan Situation Report, ~~October 31, 2022~~January 18, 2023” World Food Program, ” World Food Program, ~~November 2022.~~
~~72 “Briefing by Special Representative Deborah Lyons to the Security Council,” United Nations Assistance Mission in~~
~~Afghanistan, March 2, 2022.~~
~~73 Areou Rezvani, “Afghans are bracing for a winter many fear will be even worse than the last,” NPR, November 25,~~
~~2022.~~
~~74 “Afghanistan: Humanitarian Situation Report #11, 1-31 October 2022,” UNICEF, November 2022~~January 2023. 72 UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Response Plan 2022,” February 6, 2023. .
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

U.S. Policy Responses
The United States has provided over $1.1 billion The United States has provided over $1.1 billion ~~million~~ in humanitarian assistance in in humanitarian assistance in
Afghanistan and neighboring countries since the Taliban takeover.Afghanistan and neighboring countries since the Taliban takeover.7573 While such assistance plays a While such assistance plays a
crucial role in averting further humanitarian suffering, it is different in many ways from former crucial role in averting further humanitarian suffering, it is different in many ways from former
U.S. security, development, and stabilization assistance, which averaged over $5 billion annually U.S. security, development, and stabilization assistance, which averaged over $5 billion annually
between FY2019 and FY2021. In addition to providing some humanitarian assistance, those between FY2019 and FY2021. In addition to providing some humanitarian assistance, those
funds paid the salaries of Afghan soldiers and civil servants, supported key government services, funds paid the salaries of Afghan soldiers and civil servants, supported key government services,
and ultimately made up a large portion of Afghanistan’s economy. The Biden Administration’s and ultimately made up a large portion of Afghanistan’s economy. The Biden Administration’s
FY2023 budget request proposes $345 million for health, education, and other forms of assistance FY2023 budget request proposes $345 million for health, education, and other forms of assistance
in Afghanistan; the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan may complicate or in Afghanistan; the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan may complicate or
constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S. funding. constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S. funding.
Beyond assistance, the two U.S. policy areas that appear to have the greatest relevance to the Beyond assistance, the two U.S. policy areas that appear to have the greatest relevance to the
economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s
central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999)
remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in
Afghanistan.Afghanistan.7674 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued
several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of
assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions.assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions.7775
Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions or other actors to “de-Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions or other actors to “de-
risk” Afghanistan by refusing to engage in the country rather than risk violation of U.S. sanctions. risk” Afghanistan by refusing to engage in the country rather than risk violation of U.S. sanctions.
For more on U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, see CRS In Focus IF12039, For more on U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, see CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan:
Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions. .
The Biden Administration’s hold on The Biden Administration’s hold on the U.S.-based U.S.-based assets of the Afghan central bank Afghan central bank ~~assets~~(DAB) has also drawn has also drawn
scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from accessing the scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from accessing the
funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on
those assets, which total around $7 billion.those assets, which total around $7 billion.7876 On February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration On February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration
announced that it would “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for the benefit announced that it would “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for the benefit
of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.7977 In In
September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an “Afghan Fund” (based in September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an “Afghan Fund” (based in
Switzerland) to “make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to help provide greater stability Switzerland) to “make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to help provide greater stability
to the Afghan economy.”to the Afghan economy.”8078 The The ~~Fund’s board~~fund’s four member Board of Trustees met for the first time in November 2022.79 It has not, as of February 2023, made any disbursements. In December 2022, the DAB approved a USAID-funded third party assessment of the central bank’s anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism controls.80 73 See SIGAR January 2023 Quarterly Report 74 ~~met for the first time in November 2022.81~~
~~Congressional Action and Outlook~~
~~The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny. U.S. public attention~~
~~appears to have decreased in the subsequent months, but Afghanistan remains the subject of~~

~~75 United States Announces Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State, September 23, 2022.~~
76 “Economic causes of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis,” Human Rights Watch, August 4, 2022. “Economic causes of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis,” Human Rights Watch, August 4, 2022.
7775 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/
afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf. afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf.
7876 CRS In Focus IF12052, CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves. .
7977 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf. See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf.
8078 The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan, U.S. Department of The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan, U.S. Department of
State, September 14, 2022. See also SIGAR Quarterly Report, October 30, 2022, pp. 112-115. State, September 14, 2022. See also SIGAR Quarterly Report, October 30, 2022, pp. 112-115.
8179 Readout of Fund for the Afghan People Board Meeting, U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 21, 2022. Readout of Fund for the Afghan People Board Meeting, U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 21, 2022.
80 SIGAR January 2023 Quarterly Report. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~ Congressional Action and Outlook The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny. U.S. public attention appears to have since decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of

congressional engagement as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. congressional engagement as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S.
efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.8281
Congressional oversight of Afghanistan has been robust. Congressional committees held at least Congressional oversight of Afghanistan has been robust. Congressional committees held at least
ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.8382 Senate Senate
Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in
February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee then-ranking member produced an interim ranking member produced an interim
report on the withdrawal in August 2022.report on the withdrawal in August 2022.8483 In addition, Congress established the Afghanistan War In addition, Congress established the Afghanistan War
Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA,
P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series of lessons learned and P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series of lessons learned and
recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within three years. Per its website, the Commission “plans to formally convene in early 2023.”84 In the 118th Congress, two House committees have requested further information from the Administration related to the U.S.~~three years.~~
~~Congress has also increased reporting requirements related to Afghanistan. In the FY2022~~
~~NDAA, Congress directed the Administration to submit reports covering a number of topics,~~
~~including U.S. over-the horizon counterterrorism capabilities; the status of U.S.-supplied military~~
~~materiel in~~ military withdrawal from Afghanistan Afghanistan~~; and the lessons of Afghanistan for other U.S. security cooperation~~
~~programs. Reports required in the House-passed FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) include a strategy~~
~~for reimbursing U.S. personnel who expended personal funds in support of evacuation efforts and~~
~~an assessment of China’s activities in Afghanistan. The bill would also mandate an interagency~~
~~inspector general review of efforts to support and process evacuees from Afghanistan, including~~
~~screening procedures, and a full accounting of the number of individuals evacuated in 2021~~
~~disaggregated by age, SIV eligibility, and other categories.~~
and related contingency plans.85 One of them, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in its February 2023 Authorization and Oversight Plan that it will “comprehensively review policy, decision-making, planning, and execution related to the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan,” as well as “examine U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.”86 In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of ~~policy options,~~
~~including~~options.
 Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may affect  Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may affect
Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the
ability of Afghan girls to attend ability of Afghan girls to attend ~~secondary schools~~school in particular, to inform in particular, to inform
congressional consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on congressional consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on
FY2023 FY2023 appropriations; 81 Google Trends, “Afghanistan,” “8/31/2021–2/24/2023,” accessed February 24, 2023. 82 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by~~appropriations;~~
~~ Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration~~
~~about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in~~
~~Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation,~~
~~including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and~~
~~Administration plans to overcome those obstacles;~~

~~82 Google Trends, “Afghanistan,” “8/31/2021 – 11/22/2022,” accessed November 22, 2022.~~
~~83 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by:~~ House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with
Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed
Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House
Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie);
Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee
(October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5, (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5,
2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International
Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee
(October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former
U.S. officials). U.S. officials).
8483 Left Behind: A Brief Assessment of the Biden Administration’s Strategic Failures during the Afghanistan Evacuation, ,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Report, February 2022;United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Report, February 2022; House Republican Interim
Report: A “Strategic Failure:” Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal, Congressman Michael , Congressman Michael
McCaul, August 14, 2022. McCaul, August 14, 2022.
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy in Brief~~

~~ Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the targeted~~ 84 Afghanistan War Commission. 85 “Chairman McCaul fires back at Biden Admin, renews oversight request on Afghanistan withdrawal,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, January 12, 2023; February 17, 2023 letters from Chairman James Comer et al. to White House National Security Affairs Director Jake Sullivan, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas, USAID Administrator Power, Secretary of Defense Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley. 86 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Authorization and Oversight Plan, 118th Congress, adopted February 8, 2023. Congressional Research Service 12 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy  Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation, including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and Administration plans to overcome those obstacles;  Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the designated entities/individuals, ~~individuals,~~
the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, including by requiring the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, including by requiring
reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the Government Accountability reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the Government Accountability
Office, to assess whether they are achieving their intended objectives; and Office, to assess whether they are achieving their intended objectives; and
 Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S.  Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts ~~(e.g., H.R. 8560, 117th~~
~~Congress)~~, congressional authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight , congressional authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight
mechanisms (including those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign mechanisms (including those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign
partners, such as Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department partners, such as Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department
of Defense (and the federally funded research and development center with of Defense (and the federally funded research and development center with
whom the Department contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are whom the Department contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are
due to be submitted within approximately one and two years, respectively. due to be submitted within approximately one and two years, respectively.
Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, ~~will~~could be influenced be influenced ~~and likely~~
or constrained by a number of factors, including constrained by a number of factors, including
 a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.  a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.
diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on
journalists; and journalists; and
 the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make  the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make
cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically
difficult. difficult.
Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be
difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding
actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to
stave off mass casualties, it is unlikely to sustainably improve economic conditions. Financial stave off mass casualties, it is unlikely to sustainably improve economic conditions. Financial
assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but
comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering
Administration budget requests, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options, Administration budget requests, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options,
including conditions on U.S. assistance. including conditions on U.S. assistance.
The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since
returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues
to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to
form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling
for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In
response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright
these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not
be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.85
87
8587 See, for example, Daniella Cheslow, “Frozen Afghan funds have done little to sway Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2023; ~~See, for example,~~ Marvin Weinbaum, “America can’t change the Taliban,” Marvin Weinbaum, “America can’t change the Taliban,” National Interest, August 15, 2022; Kate , August 15, 2022; Kate
Bateman, “A year after the Taliban takeover: what’s next for the U.S. in Afghanistan?” U.S. Institute of Peace, August Bateman, “A year after the Taliban takeover: what’s next for the U.S. in Afghanistan?” U.S. Institute of Peace, August
1111~~, 2022; “Has U.S. policy toward Taliban-ruled Afghanistan failed Afghans?” Brookings, September 29~~, 2022. , 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy ~~in Brief~~

Author Information

Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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