Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

Changes from November 30, 2022 to March 23, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Iran: Background and U.S. Policy
~~November 30, 2022~~March 23, 2023
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S. Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales to partners threatened by Iran, seeking to sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales to partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
Carla E. Humud
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress
Analyst in Middle Eastern Analyst in Middle Eastern
to review related agreements. to review related agreements. ~~While indirect talks regarding~~In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, its government’s support for Affairs armed proxies and terrorist groups, its human rights violations, and its increasingly close relationships with Russia and China have all posed challenges for the United States. Clayton Thomas Specialist in Middle ~~Iran’s nuclear program were at the~~
~~Affairs~~
~~forefront of U.S. Iran policy for most of 2022, by the end of the year, U.S. and international~~

~~attention shifted following the outbreak of widespread protests in Iran, and the talks themselves~~
~~Clayton Thomas~~
~~appeared stalled.~~
~~Specialist in Middle~~
~~Eastern Affairs~~
2022 Political Protests. The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was . The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was

Eastern Affairs arrested by Iran’s Morality Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory arrested by Iran’s Morality Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head (or head
covering) law and died after reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide covering) law and died after reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide

~~unrest. While it is unclear whether the protests represent a “turning point,” as some analysts and~~
~~activists argue, they do appear to represent a significant challenge to the government’s authority~~unrest. The regime has cracked down violently against protesters, killing hundreds. The protests appear to have subsided in 2023 but could resurge as the grievances underlying them remain unresolved. The Biden Administration sanctioned a number of ~~. The Biden Administration~~
~~issued a number of new sanctions on~~ Iranian officials in response to the protestsIranian officials in response to the protests~~; it also issued new general licenses~~ and issued a general license aimed at aimed at
expanding secure internet access for expanding secure internet access for ~~Iranian citizens~~Iranians. .
Iran’s Military. U.S. officials have expressed . U.S. officials have expressed ~~longstanding~~long-standing concern with the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard concern with the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), which provides arms, training, and support to a network of regional proxies and armed groups. In addition to Corps (IRGC), which provides arms, training, and support to a network of regional proxies and armed groups. In addition to
IRGC support to U.S. adversaries in the Middle East, Iran maintains what U.S. officials describe as “the largest inventory of IRGC support to U.S. adversaries in the Middle East, Iran maintains what U.S. officials describe as “the largest inventory of
ballistic missiles in the region.” Iran also maintains an arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones). ballistic missiles in the region.” Iran also maintains an arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones).
Iran’s Foreign Policy. According to the . According to the ~~2022~~2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Iran, Iran’s government seeks to seeks to
erode U.S. influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states. Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq and erode U.S. influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states. Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq and
Syria have carried out rocket, drone, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and allied forces. Iran has Syria have carried out rocket, drone, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and allied forces. Iran has
provided thousands of rockets and short-range missiles to Lebanese Hezbollah, which the group has used in armed conflicts provided thousands of rockets and short-range missiles to Lebanese Hezbollah, which the group has used in armed conflicts
with Israel. Iran has provided Houthi militants in Yemen with ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as UAVs, that have with Israel. Iran has provided Houthi militants in Yemen with ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as UAVs, that have
enabled the Houthis to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran also has sought to strengthen its economic and enabled the Houthis to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran also has sought to strengthen its economic and
military ties with China and Russia—for example, by exporting drones to bolster Russian military operations in Ukraine.military ties with China and Russia—for example, by exporting drones to bolster Russian military operations in Ukraine.
Iran’s March 2023 agreement to reestablish ties with Saudi Arabia, which was brokered by China, also has implications for U.S. interests. Iran’s Nuclear Program. U.S. policymakers have long signaled concern that Tehran might seek to develop nuclear . U.S. policymakers have long signaled concern that Tehran might seek to develop nuclear
weapons, though Iranian leaders deny such ambitions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed weapons, though Iranian leaders deny such ambitions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed
restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. and UN Security Council economic sanctions. In restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. and UN Security Council economic sanctions. In
2018, the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in
2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. As of 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. As of
~~late 2022, the Biden Administration’s~~March 2023, indirect talks with Iran indirect talks with Iran’s government to revive the JCPOA appear to to revive the JCPOA appear to ~~have~~be stalled. stalled.
Issues for Congress. In recent years, congressional action on Iran has focused on sanctions. In recent years, congressional action on Iran has focused on sanctions~~, the JCPOA, and the use of U.S.~~
~~military force~~ and the JCPOA. .
  Sanctions. Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to . Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to
change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress. The United States has imposed sanctions on change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress. The United States has imposed sanctions on
Iran’s energy sector, arms and weapons-related technology transfers, financial sector, and various non-oil Iran’s energy sector, arms and weapons-related technology transfers, financial sector, and various non-oil
industries and sectors. Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on Iranian behavior. industries and sectors. Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on Iranian behavior.
  Oversight of Nuclear Talks. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, . In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA,
P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides for consideration of P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides for consideration of
legislation to potentially block their implementation. Some in Congress who have opposed Biden legislation to potentially block their implementation. Some in Congress who have opposed Biden
Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated that they might use INARA to block or at least Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated that they might use INARA to block or at least
complicate a potential future agreement. complicate a potential future agreement.
~~ Authorizing or Prohibiting the Use of Force. Congress has sometimes asserted its war powers when~~
~~U.S.-Iran tensions have raised the prospect of a wider military conflict. This has generally taken the form~~
~~of legislation stating that the use of force against Iran is not authorized, though Congress has not taken~~
~~action to restrain the President’s ability to deploy U.S. armed forces that have at times engaged in hostilities~~
~~with Iranian or Iran-backed forces outside of Iranian territory~~Outlook. Successive U.S. Administrations have used varying policy tools, including comprehensive sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic engagement with leaders in Iran and other countries to counter perceived Iranian threats to U.S. interests. As of 2023, the Iranian government retains considerable influence in the Middle East region, is developing new ties to Russia and China, and remains able to challenge U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In this context, Members of Congress may consider questions related to U.S. and Iranian policy goals, the stability of Iran’s government, and efforts to counter Iran’s regional influence and deter its nuclear development activities. .
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Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

Overview and Issues for Congress
The Islamic Republic of Iran, the second-largest country in the Middle East by size (after Saudi The Islamic Republic of Iran, the second-largest country in the Middle East by size (after Saudi
Arabia) and population (after Egypt), has for decades played an assertive, and by many accounts Arabia) and population (after Egypt), has for decades played an assertive, and by many accounts
destabilizing, role in the region and beyond. Iran’s influence stems from its oil reserves (the destabilizing, role in the region and beyond. Iran’s influence stems from its oil reserves (the
world’s fourth largest), its status as the world’s most populous Shia Muslim country, and its world’s fourth largest), its status as the world’s most populous Shia Muslim country, and its
active support for political and armed groups (including several U.S.-designated terrorist active support for political and armed groups (including several U.S.-designated terrorist
organizations) throughout the Middle East. organizations) throughout the Middle East.
Since the Iranian Revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has presented a Since the Iranian Revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has presented a
major foreign policy challenge for the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have major foreign policy challenge for the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have
identified Iran and its activities as a threat to the United States and its interests. Of particular identified Iran and its activities as a threat to the United States and its interests. Of particular
concern are concern are ~~Iran~~the Iranian government’s nuclear program, its military capabilities, its partnerships with Russia and China,~~’s nuclear program~~ and its support for and its support for ~~numerous~~ armed factions and terrorist armed factions and terrorist
~~groups throughout the region. The~~ groups. The United States has also condemned the Iranian government’s human rights violations and detention of U.S. citizens and others, though it has wrestled with how to support protest movements in Iran. The U.S. government has used a range of policy tools intended to U.S. government has used a range of policy tools intended to
reduce the threat posed by Iran, including sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic reduce the threat posed by Iran, including sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic
engagement; however, Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities remain considerable and engagement; however, Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities remain considerable and
have arguably increased. have arguably increased.
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S. Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales for partners threatened by Iran, seeking to sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales for partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress
to review related agreements. to review related agreements. AsIn 2021-2022, as the Biden Administration engaged in negotiations intended to the Biden Administration engaged in negotiations intended to
reestablish mutual compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reestablish mutual compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
numerous Members expressed a range of viewsMembers expressed a range of views, some in support of and others opposed to renewing the agreement. The prominence of the JCPOA in U.S. policy towards Iran . The prominence of the JCPOA in U.S. policy towards Iran
~~seems to have~~ waned in late 2022 because of waned in late 2022 because of ~~other developments, most importantly~~developments such as nationwide nationwide
~~unrest in Iran. In response to those developments, Members may consider legislative or other~~
~~action to influence aspects of U.S. policy toward Iran, including sanctions, the JCPOA, and the~~
~~use of U.S. military force.~~
unrest in Iran. Figure 1. Iran at a Glance

Geography
Total Area: 1,648,195 sq km (636,372 sq. 1,648,195 sq km (636,372 sq. ~~mile~~miles), 2.5 times the size of Texas), 2.5 times the size of Texas
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Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

People
Population: 86,758,304 (17th in the world) 86,758,304 (17th in the world)
% of Population 14 or Younger: 24.1% 24.1%
Religion: Muslim 99.6% (90-95% Shia, 5-10% Sunni), other (Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish) Muslim 99.6% (90-95% Shia, 5-10% Sunni), other (Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish)
0.3% (2016) 0.3% (2016)
Literacy: 85.5% (male 90.4%, female 80.8%) (2016) 85.5% (male 90.4%, female 80.8%) (2016)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $17,159 (2021) $17,159 (2021)
Real GDP Growth: 4.7% (2021); 3.2% (2022 projection) 4.7% (2021); 3.2% (2022 projection)
Year-on-year Inflation: 54% (July 2022) 54% (July 2022)
Unemployment: 8.9% (2021); 8.7% (2022 projection) 8.9% (2021); 8.7% (2022 projection)
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Fact information (2022 estimates unless otherwise specified) from Economist Graphic created by CRS. Fact information (2022 estimates unless otherwise specified) from Economist
Intelligence Unit and Central Intel igence Agency, Intelligence Unit and Central Intel igence Agency, The World Factbook. .
Iran’s Political System1
Iran’s Islamic Republic was established in 1979, ending the autocratic monarchy of the Shah, and Iran’s Islamic Republic was established in 1979, ending the autocratic monarchy of the Shah, and
is a hybrid political system that defies simple characterization. Iran has a parliament, regular is a hybrid political system that defies simple characterization. Iran has a parliament, regular
elections, and some other features of representative democracy. In practice, though, the elections, and some other features of representative democracy. In practice, though, the
government is authoritarian, ranking 154th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence government is authoritarian, ranking 154th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence
Unit’s Unit’s ~~2021~~2022 Democracy Index.2 Shia Islam is the state religion and the basis for all legislation and Democracy Index.2 Shia Islam is the state religion and the basis for all legislation and
jurisprudence, and political contestation is tightly controlled, with ultimate decisionmaking power jurisprudence, and political contestation is tightly controlled, with ultimate decisionmaking power
held by the Supreme Leader. That title has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since 1989, held by the Supreme Leader. That title has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since 1989,
when he succeeded the Islamic Republic’s founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In when he succeeded the Islamic Republic’s founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In
September 2022, Khamenei appeared to have suffered a bout of significant illness; prospects for September 2022, Khamenei appeared to have suffered a bout of significant illness; prospects for
leadership succession are unclear. leadership succession are unclear.
Iran’s top directly elected position is the presidency, which, like the directly elected unicameral Iran’s top directly elected position is the presidency, which, like the directly elected unicameral
parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the Majles) and every other organ ) and every other organ
of Iran’s government, is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Incumbent president Ebrahim Raisi, of Iran’s government, is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Incumbent president Ebrahim Raisi,
a hardliner close to Khamenei, won the June 2021 election to succeed Hassan Rouhani, who won a hardliner close to Khamenei, won the June 2021 election to succeed Hassan Rouhani, who won
elections in 2013 and 2017. Rouhani, who oversaw Iran’s negotiations with the United States and elections in 2013 and 2017. Rouhani, who oversaw Iran’s negotiations with the United States and
its entry into the JCPOA, was seen as relatively moderate. The 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA its entry into the JCPOA, was seen as relatively moderate. The 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA
and reimposition of sanctions, as well as the January 2020 U.S. killing of Islamic Revolutionary and reimposition of sanctions, as well as the January 2020 U.S. killing of Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, appeared to shift public support Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, appeared to shift public support
away from moderates like Rouhani.3 Hardliners prevailed in February 2020 away from moderates like Rouhani.3 Hardliners prevailed in February 2020 Majles elections. elections.
The June 2021 presidential election appears to have cemented this shift toward a more hardline approach to the United States. Rouhani was term-limited and ineligible to runRouhani was term-limited and ineligible to run ~~in the June 2021 presidential election~~; the ; the
government also banned several moderate candidates from running. These circumstances might government also banned several moderate candidates from running. These circumstances might
have contributed to this election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history; have contributed to this election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history;
slightly less than half (49%) of eligible Iranians voted. Raisi, who reportedly played a role in a slightly less than half (49%) of eligible Iranians voted. Raisi, who reportedly played a role in a
judicial decision to approve the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988, had lost the judicial decision to approve the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988, had lost the
2017
1 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32048, 1 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by , by
Kenneth Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report. Kenneth Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
2 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index ~~2021: The China challenge~~~~, February 10, 2022~~2022: Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine, February 2023. .
3 Garrett Nada, “Iran’s Parliamentary Polls: Hardliners on the Rise, Reformists Ruled Out,” United States Institute of 3 Garrett Nada, “Iran’s Parliamentary Polls: Hardliners on the Rise, Reformists Ruled Out,” United States Institute of
Peace, February 12, 2021. In Iran’s political system, hardliners are also known as “principlists,” moderates as Peace, February 12, 2021. In Iran’s political system, hardliners are also known as “principlists,” moderates as
“reformists.” “reformists.”
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~~2017~~ presidential election to Rouhani. In 2019 Khamenei appointed Raisi to head Iran’s judiciary. presidential election to Rouhani. In 2019 Khamenei appointed Raisi to head Iran’s judiciary.
Raisi’s presidential victory may boost his chances of succeeding Khamenei as Supreme Leader.4 Raisi’s presidential victory may boost his chances of succeeding Khamenei as Supreme Leader.4
Mass demonstrations shook Iran in 2009 and 2010, Mass demonstrations shook Iran in 2009 and 2010, ~~and~~ when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Iran’s urban centers to protest alleged fraud in the 2009 presidential election. Iran has experienced significant unrest Iran has experienced significant unrest
intermittently since then, including in December 2017, summer 2018, intermittently since then, including in December 2017, summer 2018, and late 2019, ~~late 2019, and September~~
~~and October 2022~~ based most frequently on economic conditions but also reflecting other based most frequently on economic conditions but also reflecting other
opposition to Iran’s leadership. The government has often used violence to disperse protests, in opposition to Iran’s leadership. The government has often used violence to disperse protests, in
which hundreds have been killed by security forces. U.S. and UN assessments have long cited which hundreds have been killed by security forces. U.S. and UN assessments have long cited
~~Iran~~Iran’s government for a wide range of human rights abuses in addition to its repression of political dissent and for a wide range of human rights abuses in addition to its repression of political dissent and
use of force against protesters, including severe violations of religious freedom and women’s use of force against protesters, including severe violations of religious freedom and women’s
rights, human trafficking, and corporal punishment. rights, human trafficking, and corporal punishment.
2022-2023 Political Protests
The September The September ~~16, 2022,~~2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by Iran’s Morality death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by Iran’s Morality
Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head covering) law and died after (or head covering) law and died after
reportedly having been beaten in custody, reportedly having been beaten in custody, ~~has~~ sparked nationwide unrestsparked nationwide unrest in late 2022. In protests throughout . In protests throughout
the country, demonstrators the country, demonstrators ~~have called~~voiced a broad range of grievances, with some calling for an end to the Islamic Republic for an end to the Islamic Republic, and chanting “death to the chanting “death to the
~~dictator,” and women and girls have burned their hijabs. In response, the government has~~
dictator.” Women played a particularly prominent role in the protests.5 In response, the Iranian government deployed security forces who deployed security forces who ~~have~~ killed killed ~~dozens~~hundreds of protesters of protesters~~, and has~~ and arrested thousands. Iranian officials, who blamed the United States and other foreign countries for fomenting what they called “riots,” also shut down internet shut down internet access. Throughout fall 2022, observers debated whether the protests, information about which remains opaque, fluid, and highly contested, represented the “turning point” that some activists claimed: one observer compared 2022 unrest to the circumstances that preceded the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while another discounted the revolutionary potential of the protests.6 The demonstrations of 2022 were smaller and more geographically dispersed than those of 2009, and reportedly included protestors from a diverse range of social groups. In December 2022, as the protests appeared to wane, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated, “this is not something that we see right now as being … an imminent threat to the regime.”7 As of March 2023, the protest movement seems to have receded. The fundamental grievances that motivated the outbreak of unrest in September 2022 (and in previous years) remain unresolved, so further rounds of popular protests appear possible in the short term. However, the continued absence to date of an organized opposition, a popular leader, or a shared alternative vision for Iran’s future may limit the existential risk protests pose to the Islamic Republic. The question of who might succeed 83-year old Supreme Leader Khamenei may be a more acutely destabilizing issue, though it is unclear how (if at all) Iranian foreign and domestic policy might change after Khamenei leaves office and whether such changes would be advantageous for the United States.8 4 Parisa Hafezi, “Winner of Iran presidency is hardline judge who is under U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 20, 2021. 5 Suzanne Kianpour, “The women of Iran are not backing down,” Politico, January 22, 2023. 6 Ray Takeyh, “A second Iranian revolution?” Commentary, November 2022; Sajjed Safael, “Iran’s protests are nowhere near revolutionary,” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2023. 7 “DNI Avril Haines: Protests in Iran not an ‘imminent threat to the regime’” MSNBC, December 5, 2022. 8 Murtaza Hussain, “The other giant crisis hanging over the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Intercept, December 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests New sanctions designations. Since September 2022, the Biden Administration has announced sanctions designations targeting Iran’s Morality Police and dozens of other government entities and officials for their role in the crackdown. Legislation introduced in the 118th Congress (H.R. 589) would direct the Administration to review whether additional specified Iranian officials meet the criteria for designation under certain existing sanctions authorities. General license and Internet service. In September 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control~~access.~~
~~While it is unclear whether the protests represent a “turning point,” as some activists claim, they~~
~~appear to represent a significant challenge to the government’s authority. One observer has~~
~~compared 2022 unrest to the circumstances that preceded the 1979 Islamic Revolution.5 The~~
~~protests have not, as of November 2022, taken the form of mass gatherings in major urban centers~~
~~of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators (as protests in 2009 did); instead, they have been~~
~~smaller and more geographically dispersed, and have reportedly included protestors from a~~
~~diverse range of social groups.~~
~~Observers have contrasted what they characterize as the Obama Administration’s relatively~~
~~restrained approach to the 2009 protest movement with the Biden Administration’s more assertive~~
~~support for protests in 2022.6 On September 22, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury~~
~~designated for sanctions Iran’s Morality Police (also known as Guidance Patrol), a component of~~
~~Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces. The Morality Police is designated pursuant to Executive Order~~
~~(E.O.) 13553, which imposes sanctions with respect to serious human rights abuses by the~~
~~government of Iran.7 On September 23, the U.S. Department of the Treasury~~ issued Iran General issued Iran General
License D-2, designed to License D-2, designed to ~~expand the range of internet services available to Iranians in response to~~
~~what~~ counter what officials described as officials described as ~~the Iranian government~~Tehran’s move to “cut off access to the Internet for ’s move to “cut off access to the Internet for
most of its 80 million citizens to prevent the world from watching its violent crackdown on most of its 80 million citizens to prevent the world from watching its violent crackdown on
peaceful protestors.”peaceful protestors.”8 9 Treasury officials stated that the new license expandsTreasury officials stated that the new license expands~~, among other things,~~
access to cloud-based servicesaccess to cloud-based services~~—allowing Iranians to access~~, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), and anti-surveillance tools critical to secure communication. In March 2023, a State Department spokesperson said “several U.S. companies have in turn taken advantage of the expanded authorization that we’ve provided.”10 Action at international bodies. In late November, the U.N. Human Rights Council authorized a fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Iranian government.11 The United States also led a successful effort to remove Iran from U.N. Commission on the Status of Women in December 2022. Nuclear negotiations. In the context of the protests, some Members of Congress have renewed calls on the Biden Administration to formally terminate stalled indirect talks with Iran over the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. As outlined below, Biden Administration officials are reportedly reluctant to do so, though they assert that negotiations are moribund and no longer a focus of U.S. efforts.12 Secretary Blinken in December 2022 stated that the regime’s actions in response to the protests “have only deepened our conviction that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. We continue to believe that the best way to ensure this is through diplomacy.”13 Congressional Action. In the 118th Congress, some Members have introduced several resolutions and bills related to the protests that have received consideration. In January 2023, the House voted 420-1 to agree to H.Con.Res. 7 which condemns Amini’s death and the violent suppression of protests and “encourages continued efforts” by the Biden Administration to respond to the protests via sanctions and the expansion of unrestricted internet access in Iran. Another introduced bill, H.R. 589, would direct the President to, within 90 days, review whether certain existing sanctions authorities apply to specified persons (including the Supreme Leader and associated persons and entities). 9 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury issues Iran General License D-2 to increase support for internet freedom,” September 23, 2022. 10 U.S. Department of State Press Briefing, March 1, 2023. 11 Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Council establishes fact-finding mission to investigate alleged human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022,” November 24, 2022. 12 Nahal Toosi, “‘Everyone thinks we have magic powers’: Biden seeks a balance on Iran,” Politico, October 25, 2022. 13 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities14 ~~and~~

~~4 Parisa Hafezi, “Winner of Iran presidency is hardline judge who is under U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 20, 2021.~~
~~5 Ray Takeyh, “A second Iranian revolution?” Commentary, November 2022;~~
~~6 Olivier Knox, “On Iran protests, Biden goes faster and farther than Obama,” Washington Post, September 23, 2022;~~
~~David Sanger, “Biden’s support for Iran protesters comes after bitter lessons of 2009,” New York Times, September 26,~~
~~2022.~~
~~7 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Iran’s Morality Police and Senior Security~~
~~Officials for Violence Against Protesters and the Death of Mahsa Amini,” September 22, 2022.~~
~~8 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “U.S. Treasury Issues Iran General License D-2 to Increase Support~~
~~for Internet Freedom,” September 23, 2022.~~
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~~anti-surveillance tools critical to secure communication.9 In Congress, several bills and~~
~~resolutions in the House (H.R. 9075, H.Con.Res. 110, H.Res. 1397) and the Senate (S.Con.Res.~~
~~47, S.Res. 803) would condemn the killing of Amini and the Iranian government’s use of violence~~
~~against protestors.~~
~~Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities10~~
Given the adversarial nature of U.S.-Iran relations and the centrality of various military-related Given the adversarial nature of U.S.-Iran relations and the centrality of various military-related
entities in Iranian domestic and foreign policy, Iran’s military has been a subject of sustained entities in Iranian domestic and foreign policy, Iran’s military has been a subject of sustained
engagement by Congress and other U.S. policymakers. engagement by Congress and other U.S. policymakers. In 2023 testimony, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Erik Kurilla said, “The advancement of Iranian military capabilities over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region.”15 The elements of Iran’s military that The elements of Iran’s military that
arguably threaten U.S. interests most directly are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps arguably threaten U.S. interests most directly are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) and the country’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone) programs. (IRGC) and the country’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone) programs.
Iran’s traditional military force, the Iran’s traditional military force, the Artesh, is a legacy of Iran’s Shah-era military force. The , is a legacy of Iran’s Shah-era military force. The
Artesh exists alongside the IRGC, which Khomeini established in 1979 as a force loyal to the new exists alongside the IRGC, which Khomeini established in 1979 as a force loyal to the new
regime. Rivalries between the two parallel forces (each have their own land, air, and naval force regime. Rivalries between the two parallel forces (each have their own land, air, and naval force
components) stem from their “uneven access to resources, varying levels of influence with the components) stem from their “uneven access to resources, varying levels of influence with the
regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.”regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.”1116 While both serve to defend Iran While both serve to defend Iran
against external threats, the against external threats, the ~~Artesh~~ ~~is deployed~~government deploys the Artesh primarily along Iran’s borders to counter any primarily along Iran’s borders to counter any
invading force, while the IRGC has a more ideological character and the more expansive mission invading force, while the IRGC has a more ideological character and the more expansive mission
of combating internal threats and expanding Iran’s influence abroad. Elements of the IRGC of combating internal threats and expanding Iran’s influence abroad. Elements of the IRGC
~~include:~~include
 The  The Basij, a “volunteer paramilitary reserve force,” which plays a key role in , a “volunteer paramilitary reserve force,” which plays a key role in
suppressing protests and other forms of internal dissent. suppressing protests and other forms of internal dissent.1217
 The IRGC  The IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which coordinates Iran’s regional activities, (IRGC-QF), which coordinates Iran’s regional activities,
providing arms, training, and other forms of support to the network of proxies providing arms, training, and other forms of support to the network of proxies
and armed groups that share Iran’s objectives (see “Regional Activities and and armed groups that share Iran’s objectives (see “Regional Activities and
Strategy” below). Strategy” below).
Ballistic Missiles
According to According to the U.S. intelligence community~~U.S. officials~~, Iran has “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region,” , Iran has “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region,”
and, as of 2022, has steadily improved the range and accuracy of its more than 3,000 ballistic and, as of 2022, has steadily improved the range and accuracy of its more than 3,000 ballistic
missiles over “the last five to seven years.”missiles over “the last five to seven years.”~~13 Those missiles, acquired through imports from~~
~~international suppliers like North Korea as well as domestic production and research, “constitute~~
~~an exigent threat to the security of every state in the region,” according to former CENTCOM~~
~~Commander General Frank McKenzie.14~~18 Per CENTCOM Commander Kurilla, Iran has aggressively developed its missile capabilities to achieve “an asymmetric advantage against regional militaries.”19 Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target U.S. regional Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target U.S. regional
assets directly, including a January 2020 attack (shortly following the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF assets directly, including a January 2020 attack (shortly following the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF

~~9 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on the Administration’s Efforts to Advance~~
~~the Free Flow of Information For the Iranian People,” September 23, 2022.~~
10Commander Soleimani) against Iraqi sites where U.S. military forces were stationed that left scores of U.S. service members injured, and missile and drone attacks against Iraq’s Kurdistan region in March and September 2022.20 14 For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman; , by Kenneth Katzman;
congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report. congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
1115 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, March 13, 2023. 16 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, ,
2019. 2019.
1217 Ibid. Ibid.
1318 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 8, , March 8, ~~2022~~2023; Senate Armed Services Committee ; Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358. Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358.
1419 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee Senate Armed Services Committee ~~Hearing, op. cit.~~, March 13, 2023. 20 “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, August
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~~Commander Soleimani) against Iraqi sites where U.S. military forces were stationed that left~~
~~scores of U.S. service members injured, and missile and drone attacks against Iraq’s Kurdistan~~
~~region in March and September 2022.15~~
Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles ~~are~~were assessed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2019 to to
have a maximum range of around 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders, reportedly capable of have a maximum range of around 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders, reportedly capable of
reaching targets as far as Israel or southeastern Europe.reaching targets as far as Israel or southeastern Europe.1621 U.S. officials and others U.S. officials and others ~~express~~
have expressed concern that Iranconcern that Iran’s government could use its nascent space program to develop longer-range missiles, including could use its nascent space program to develop longer-range missiles, including
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).1722 In March 2022, the Biden Administration designated In March 2022, the Biden Administration designated
for sanctions five Iranian individuals and entities for their involvement in ballistic missile for sanctions five Iranian individuals and entities for their involvement in ballistic missile
activities.activities.1823
UAVs
According to CENTCOM, Iran has also developed “the largest and most capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicle force in the region,”~~Iran has also developed a sophisticated arsenal of UAVs, its “most rapidly advancing air~~
~~capability” per the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2019,~~ with which it has attacked numerous with which it has attacked numerous
foreign targets.foreign targets.1924 While Iranian drones are not as technologically complex or advanced as the U.S. While Iranian drones are not as technologically complex or advanced as the U.S.
UAVs on which the Iranian versions are often modeled, they are a cost-effective way of UAVs on which the Iranian versions are often modeled, they are a cost-effective way of
projecting power, especially given Iran’s underdeveloped air force. Traditional air defense projecting power, especially given Iran’s underdeveloped air force. Traditional air defense
systems have difficulty intercepting UAVs, in part because such systems were designed to detect systems have difficulty intercepting UAVs, in part because such systems were designed to detect
manned aircraft with larger radar and/or heat signatures.manned aircraft with larger radar and/or heat signatures.2025 Iran’s drone operations include attacks Iran’s drone operations include attacks
in September 2019 against Saudi oil production facilities in Abqaiq, a complex assault that in September 2019 against Saudi oil production facilities in Abqaiq, a complex assault that
featured 18 drones and several land-attack cruise missiles; in July 2021 against an oil tanker off featured 18 drones and several land-attack cruise missiles; in July 2021 against an oil tanker off
the coast of Oman; and in October 2021 against a U.S. military base in At Tanf, Syria. The Biden the coast of Oman; and in October 2021 against a U.S. military base in At Tanf, Syria. The Biden
Administration has designated for sanctions individuals and entities that have “provided critical Administration has designated for sanctions individuals and entities that have “provided critical
support” to the IRGC’s UAV programs,support” to the IRGC’s UAV programs,2126 and in and in ~~April 2022~~the 117th Congress the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, ~~the House passed~~ a bill (H.R. 6089) a bill (H.R. 6089)
that would that would ~~require~~have required the President to impose sanctions on persons that engage in activities related to the President to impose sanctions on persons that engage in activities related to
Iranian UAVs.Iranian UAVs.2227 In August 2022, Iran In August 2022, Iran ~~reportedly~~ began transferring armed drones to Russia, began transferring armed drones to Russia,
which has used them against Ukrainian forces and civilian infrastructure.which has used them against Ukrainian forces and civilian infrastructure.2328

~~15 “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, August~~
8, 2021; “Iran attacks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,” 8, 2021; “Iran attacks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,” Reuters, March 13, 2022; White House , March 13, 2022; White House
press release, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Iran’s Missile and Drone Attacks in Northern press release, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Iran’s Missile and Drone Attacks in Northern
Iraq,” September 28, 2022. Iraq,” September 28, 2022.
1621 Iran Military Power, op. cit. 43. , op. cit. 43.
1722 Annual Threat Assessment, op. cit.; Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is still growing in size, reach, and , op. cit.; Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is still growing in size, reach, and
accuracy,” accuracy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2021. , December 13, 2021.
1823 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,”
March 30, 2022. March 30, 2022.
19 Iran Military Power24 Statement for the Record, op. cit. , op. cit.
2025 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran deploys drones to target internal threats, protect external interests,” Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran deploys drones to target internal threats, protect external interests,” RFE/RL, January 18, , January 18,
2022. 2022.
2126 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions network and individuals in connection with Iran’s unmanned U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions network and individuals in connection with Iran’s unmanned
aerial vehicle program,” October 29, 2021. aerial vehicle program,” October 29, 2021.
2227 The bill would amend Section 107 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA. P.L. The bill would amend Section 107 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA. P.L.
115-44) to include unmanned combat aerial vehicles. 115-44) to include unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
2328 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” Washington
Post, August 29, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian kamikaze drones creates , August 29, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian kamikaze drones creates
new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022. , September 17, 2022.
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Foreign Policy and Regional ~~Activities24~~Activities29
Iran’s foreign policy appears to reflect overlapping and at times contradictory motivations. These Iran’s foreign policy appears to reflect overlapping and at times contradictory motivations. These
includeinclude:
Threat Perception. Iran’s leaders argue that the United States and its allies seek to overturn . Iran’s leaders argue that the United States and its allies seek to overturn
Iran’s regime, claiming, for example, that the U.S. military presence in and around the Persian Iran’s regime, claiming, for example, that the U.S. military presence in and around the Persian
Gulf reflects an intent to intimidate or attack Iran. Gulf reflects an intent to intimidate or attack Iran. ~~Iran describes its~~Per the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, “The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the United States and its regional allies.”30 Iranian officials describes the country’s missile program and other missile program and other
military programs as “defensive,” arguing that they serve as a deterrent to attacks by hostile military programs as “defensive,” arguing that they serve as a deterrent to attacks by hostile
powers.powers.2531 Iranian leaders have witnessed U.S. military intervention in two of Iran’s neighboring Iranian leaders have witnessed U.S. military intervention in two of Iran’s neighboring
states (Iraq and Afghanistan), and continue to reference what former Secretary of State Albright states (Iraq and Afghanistan), and continue to reference what former Secretary of State Albright
described as the “significant role” played by the United States in “orchestrating the overthrow of described as the “significant role” played by the United States in “orchestrating the overthrow of
Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh” in 1953.Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh” in 1953.2632 Iranian leaders describe U.S. Iranian leaders describe U.S.
sanctions as economic warfare against Iran.sanctions as economic warfare against Iran.2733
Ideology. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution replaced a secular, U.S.-backed authoritarian leader . Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution replaced a secular, U.S.-backed authoritarian leader
with a Shia cleric-dominated regime, and that change infuses Iran’s foreign policy. Another with a Shia cleric-dominated regime, and that change infuses Iran’s foreign policy. Another
ideological element of the Islamic Revolution is the regime’s steadfast rhetorical opposition to the ideological element of the Islamic Revolution is the regime’s steadfast rhetorical opposition to the
existence of Israel. Since the revolution, that enmity has fed Iran-Israel tensions, with broad existence of Israel. Since the revolution, that enmity has fed Iran-Israel tensions, with broad
implications for the region and U.S. policy.implications for the region and U.S. policy.2834
Pragmatism. Iranian leaders have expressed a commitment to aiding other Shia Muslims, but at . Iranian leaders have expressed a commitment to aiding other Shia Muslims, but at
times have tempered that approach to preserve Iran’s geopolitical interests. For example, Iran has times have tempered that approach to preserve Iran’s geopolitical interests. For example, Iran has
supported Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shi’a-inhabited Azerbaijan, possibly in part to supported Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shi’a-inhabited Azerbaijan, possibly in part to
thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority.thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority.2935 President Raisi has President Raisi has
also tried to improve relations with neighboring Gulf states, an effort that appears to place also tried to improve relations with neighboring Gulf states, an effort that appears to place
domestic economic concerns ahead of traditional regional rivalries.domestic economic concerns ahead of traditional regional rivalries.3036 Iran’s March 2023 agreement to reestablish ties with rival Saudi Arabia (see textbox below) may also reflect this approach.
Factional Interests and Competition. Iran’s foreign policy has reflected differing approaches . Iran’s foreign policy has reflected differing approaches
among key internal actors and groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei sits at the apex of several among key internal actors and groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei sits at the apex of several
decisionmaking and advisory councils dominated by hardliners that seek to shield Iran from decisionmaking and advisory councils dominated by hardliners that seek to shield Iran from
~~Western political and cultural influence. More moderate Iranian leaders, such as former President~~
~~Hassan Rouhani, have at times sought to use engagement with the West as a way to attract greater~~
~~foreign investment and boost Iran’s economy.31~~

24 29 For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman; , by Kenneth Katzman;
congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report. congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
2530 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 6, 2023. 31 Omer Carmi, “Khamenei’s First Speech of 2021: Reemphasizing U.S. Weakness, Iranian Self-Reliance,” Omer Carmi, “Khamenei’s First Speech of 2021: Reemphasizing U.S. Weakness, Iranian Self-Reliance,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2021; “Iran’s defensive power must increase daily and it does: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2021; “Iran’s defensive power must increase daily and it does:
Imam Khamenei,” Imam Khamenei,” Khamenei.Ir, February 27, 2018. , February 27, 2018.
2632 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, March 17, 2000; “Conflicts Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, March 17, 2000; “Conflicts
between Iran and US goes back to 1953 coup,” between Iran and US goes back to 1953 coup,” Khamenei.Ir, November 2, 2022. , November 2, 2022.
2733 “Sanctions are ‘US way of war’, Iranian President at UN,” UN News, September 21, 2021. “Sanctions are ‘US way of war’, Iranian President at UN,” UN News, September 21, 2021.
2834 For more information on Israel’s approach to threats it perceives from Iran, as relevant to U.S. foreign policy, see For more information on Israel’s approach to threats it perceives from Iran, as relevant to U.S. foreign policy, see
CRS Report R44245, CRS Report R44245, Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
2935 Borzou Daraghi, “Nagorno-Karaback: An unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran,” Atlantic Council, Borzou Daraghi, “Nagorno-Karaback: An unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran,” Atlantic Council,
November 9, 2020; Vali Kaleji, “Iran increasingly uneasy about threats to common border with Armenia,” November 9, 2020; Vali Kaleji, “Iran increasingly uneasy about threats to common border with Armenia,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, October 14, 2022. , October 14, 2022.
3036 “Iran’s regional agenda and the call for détente with the Gulf states,” Middle East Institute, March 17, 2022 “Iran’s regional agenda and the call for détente with the Gulf states,” Middle East Institute, March 17, 2022.
31 “Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Paris to court investors,” Los Angeles Times~~, January 27, 2016~~. .
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Western political and cultural influence. More moderate Iranian leaders, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, have at times sought to use engagement with the West as a way to attract greater foreign investment and boost Iran’s economy.37 Regional Proxies and Allies
U.S. officials characterize U.S. officials characterize ~~Iran~~the Iranian government’s support for regional proxies and allies as a threat to U.S. ’s support for regional proxies and allies as a threat to U.S.
interests and forces in the region. The interests and forces in the region. The ~~2022 Worldwide Threat Assessment~~2023 intelligence community threat assessment predicted that, “Iran predicted that, “Iran
will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East, will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East,
entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states [...] Iranian-supported proxies will entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states [...] Iranian-supported proxies will
seek to launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and Syria, and perhaps launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and Syria, and perhaps onin other countries other countries
and regions.”and regions.”3238
Iraq. Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq continue to carry out intermittent rocket, drone, and . Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq continue to carry out intermittent rocket, drone, and
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and support systems. improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and support systems.
These groups seek to revise or rescind Iraq’s invitation to the U.S. military to retain an advisory These groups seek to revise or rescind Iraq’s invitation to the U.S. military to retain an advisory
presence in Iraq beyond the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the country in December presence in Iraq beyond the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the country in December
2021. They also seek to retaliate for the January 2020 U.S. strike in Baghdad that killed IRGC-2021. They also seek to retaliate for the January 2020 U.S. strike in Baghdad that killed IRGC-
Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the head of the Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the head of the Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib
Hezbollah.Hezbollah.3339 Iran also has carried out strikes in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, targeting what Iran Iran also has carried out strikes in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, targeting what Iran
alleges are support networks for Israel and Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. alleges are support networks for Israel and Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.
Syria. Iran-backed militias have used Syria as a base from which to target U.S. armed forces and . Iran-backed militias have used Syria as a base from which to target U.S. armed forces and
facilities in Iraq. They also have targeted U.S. forces in Syria in what U.S. officials have facilities in Iraq. They also have targeted U.S. forces in Syria in what U.S. officials have
sometimes described as retaliation for Israeli airstrikes on Iranian forces in Syria.sometimes described as retaliation for Israeli airstrikes on Iranian forces in Syria.3440 U.S. officials U.S. officials
assess that Iranassess that Iran’s government seeks a permanent military presence in Syria to bolster its regional influence, seeks a permanent military presence in Syria to bolster its regional influence,
support Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and threaten Israel.support Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and threaten Israel.3541
Lebanon. Iran’s support for Hezbollah, including providing thousands of rockets and short-range . Iran’s support for Hezbollah, including providing thousands of rockets and short-range
missiles, helps Iran acquire leverage against missiles, helps Iran acquire leverage against ~~key regional adversaries such as Israel and Saudi~~
~~Arabia.~~Israel, a key regional adversary.42 Israel has stated that Iran may be supplying Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems Israel has stated that Iran may be supplying Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems
and technologies, and assisting Hezbollah in creating an indigenous production capability for and technologies, and assisting Hezbollah in creating an indigenous production capability for
rockets, missiles, and drones that could threaten Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen.rockets, missiles, and drones that could threaten Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen.3643
Yemen. Iran’s support to the Houthi movement in Yemen—including supplying ballistic and . Iran’s support to the Houthi movement in Yemen—including supplying ballistic and
cruise missiles, as well as unmanned systems—has enabled the group to target U.S. partners, cruise missiles, as well as unmanned systems—has enabled the group to target U.S. partners,
including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.37
Gaza Strip. Iran continues to support the Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant groups Hamas and
~~Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), whose Gaza-based operations threaten parts of Israel with rockets,~~
~~missiles, and drones. Both groups also seek to make inroads into the West Bank to undermine~~
~~Israeli and Palestinian Authority control there.~~

3244 Iran reportedly agreed to halt arms 37 “Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Paris to court investors,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2016. 38 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, ,
February February ~~2022.~~
336, 2023. 39 For additional background see, CRS Report R46148, For additional background see, CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions, ,
coordinated by Clayton Thomas. coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
3440 “Strike on U.S. Base Was Iranian Response to Israeli Attack, Officials Say,” “Strike on U.S. Base Was Iranian Response to Israeli Attack, Officials Say,” New York Times, November 18, 2021. , November 18, 2021.
3541 See, for example, Posture statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie See, for example, Posture statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., before the Senate Armed Services Jr., before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 15, 2022. Committee, March 15, 2022.
3642 For more, see CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 43 Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, , International Institute for Strategic Studies,
April 2021; “Israeli minister says Iran using Syria facilities for weapons production,” April 2021; “Israeli minister says Iran using Syria facilities for weapons production,” Reuters, September 12, 2022. , September 12, 2022.
3744 Seth Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi war against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Seth Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi war against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 21, 2021; Bruce Reidel, “Yemen war spreads to the UAE,” Brookings, February 10, 2022. December 21, 2021; Bruce Reidel, “Yemen war spreads to the UAE,” Brookings, February 10, 2022.
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78 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy shipments to the Houthis as part of its March 2023 agreement with Saudi Arabia (see textbox below). Gaza Strip. Iran continues to support the Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant groups Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), whose Gaza-based operations threaten parts of Israel with rockets, missiles, and drones. Both groups also seek to make inroads into the West Bank to undermine Israeli and Palestinian Authority control there.

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

Iran’s Relations with China and Russia
Iran has sought to maintain and expand economic and military ties with Beijing and Moscow, Iran has sought to maintain and expand economic and military ties with Beijing and Moscow,
reflecting what analysts describe as a “lookreflecting what analysts describe as a “look ~~to the~~ East” strategy favored by hardline leaders East” strategy favored by hardline leaders
including President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei.including President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei.3845
~~China.~~ For the past several decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has taken For the past several decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has taken
steps to deepen its financial presence in numerous sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as to steps to deepen its financial presence in numerous sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as to
expand military cooperationexpand military cooperation ~~between the two states.39 The PRC~~. China is Iran’s largest trade partner and is Iran’s largest trade partner and
the largest importer of Iran’s crude oil and condensates.the largest importer of Iran’s crude oil and condensates.4046 Over the years, the PRC has become a Over the years, the PRC has become a
source of capital for Iran, in line with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a source of capital for Iran, in line with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a
series of energy and transportation corridors extending throughout Eurasia. On March 27, 2021, series of energy and transportation corridors extending throughout Eurasia. On March 27, 2021,
Iran and the PRC signed a 25-year China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan “to tap the Iran and the PRC signed a 25-year China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan “to tap the
potential for cooperation in areas such as economy and culture and map out prospects for potential for cooperation in areas such as economy and culture and map out prospects for
cooperation in the long run.”cooperation in the long run.”4147 Before doing so was banned by the UN Security Council, the PRC Before doing so was banned by the UN Security Council, the PRC
openly supplied Iran with advanced conventional arms, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol openly supplied Iran with advanced conventional arms, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol
boats that the IRGC Navy operates in the Persian Gulf; anti-ship missiles; ballistic missile boats that the IRGC Navy operates in the Persian Gulf; anti-ship missiles; ballistic missile
guidance systems; and other technology related to the proliferation of weapons of mass guidance systems; and other technology related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).destruction (WMD).4248 U.S. officials also report that PRC-based entities have supplied Iran- U.S. officials also report that PRC-based entities have supplied Iran-
backed armed groups with UAV technology.backed armed groups with UAV technology.4349 The United States has imposed sanctions on a The United States has imposed sanctions on a
number of PRC-based entities for allegedly supplying Iran’s missile, nuclear, and conventional number of PRC-based entities for allegedly supplying Iran’s missile, nuclear, and conventional
~~weapons programs.~~
Russia has traditionally been Iran’s main supplier of conventional weaponry and a significant
~~supplier of nuclear energy and missile-related technology (for~~ weapons programs. Tehran has reportedly viewed with apprehension closer Chinese relations with Saudi Arabia (Iran’s primary regional rival) and the UAE (with which Iran has strong economic ties but also some territorial disputes).50 March 2023 China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement In March 2023, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China announced that Iran and Saudi Arabia would reestablish diplomatic relations (suspended since 2016), reopen embassies in each other’s capitals, and reinitiate exchanges pursuant to bilateral accords signed during a previous period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (in 1998 and 2001).51 In the 45 Pierre Pahlavi, “The origins and foundations of Iran’s “Look East” policy,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 4, 2022. 46 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran,” November 17, 2022. 47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif,” March 28, 2021. 48 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, 2019. 49 Testimony of Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022. 50 Jacopo Scita, “When it comes to Iran, China is shifting the balance,” Bourse and Bazaar, December 13, 2022; Tala Taslimi, “China’s embrace of Saudi Arabia leaves Iran out in the cold,” Nikkei Asia, December 13, 2022. 51 See Joint Trilateral Statement at https://twitter.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1634180277764276227. For more on past agreements, see Faris Almaari, “Clarifying the status of previous Iran-Saudi agreements,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 9 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy China-brokered agreement, Iran and Saudi Arabia affirmed their respect for “non-interference in internal affairs of states.” One media source indicates that specific elements include a Saudi pledge to “tone down critical coverage of Iran” by a Saudi-linked media outlet and an Iranian pledge to halt arms shipments to the Houthis in Yemen.52 It is unclear what commitments, if any, China may have made as part of the agreement. The Biden Administration indicated that it conditionally welcomed the agreement, while highlighting uncertainty over “whether the Iranians are going to honor their side of the deal” given the legacy of Iran’s support to the Houthis in Yemen.53 CENTCOM Commander General Kuril a cautioned, “an agreement is not implementation” and “They have had diplomatic relations in the past while they were stil shooting at each other in the past.”54 Some Administration officials have characterized the agreement as “a good thing” that advances the U.S. goal of “de-escalation in the Middle East,” while downplaying the significance of the deal and of China’s role in brokering it.55 Observers have expressed a range of views. Some view the PRC initiative as a sea change in regional diplomacy and as an indication of China’s increased influence, while others see it as a modest win for China.56 The implications of the deal for U.S. policy also elicited a range of views. Some experts perceive the deal as a major blow to U.S. credibility, while others argue that, despite China’s foray into Middle Eastern diplomacy, the United States remains the essential partner to Gulf Arab states.57 Russia has traditionally been Iran’s main supplier of conventional weaponry and a significant supplier of nuclear- and missile-related technology (for their role in the latter, Russian companies have the latter, Russian companies have
been subject to U.S. sanctions). U.S. officials have expressed concern with Iran-Russia military been subject to U.S. sanctions). U.S. officials have expressed concern with Iran-Russia military
cooperation, particularly in Syria. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Russia cooperation, particularly in Syria. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Russia
~~and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have explored expanding bilateral and energy~~
~~cooperation.44 In June 2022, Iran and Argentina applied to join the emerging economies alliance~~
~~of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS); Russian officials sought to frame the~~
~~applications as an indicator that U.S. efforts to isolate Russia over its operations in Ukraine were~~
~~failing, and China has expressed support for Iran’s membership.45 As mentioned above, Iran has~~
~~reportedly transferred drones to Russia for use in Ukraine (which Iran denies), and in September~~
~~2022 reportedly agreed to supply Russia with additional drones as well as short-range ballistic~~
~~missiles.46~~

~~38 “Iran Turns East,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2021; “Will Iran look east if nuclear deal talks fail?” Al Monitor, May~~
~~14, 2022; “How Iran’s interpretation of the world order affects its foreign policy,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2022.~~
~~39 “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” New York Times, March 27, 2021.~~
~~40 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran,” July 16, 2021.~~
~~41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad~~
~~Zarif,” March 28, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zgyw/t1865100.htm.~~
~~42 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,~~
~~2019.~~
~~43 Testimony of Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the~~
~~Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022.~~
~~44 “Russia's Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022.~~
~~45 “Iran applies to join China and Russia in BRICS club,” Reuters, June 27, 2022; “Xi calls ties with Iran strategic,~~
~~backs Iran’s membership in BRICS,” Modern Diplomacy, September 17, 2022.~~
~~46 Joby Warrick et al., “Iran plans to send missiles, drones to Russia for Ukraine war, officials say,” Washington Post,~~
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~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program47~~
~~U.S. policymakers have signaled concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran, which began nuclear~~
~~activities in the 1950s, might develop~~ and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have deepened their relationship. Since August 2022, Iran has transferred armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) to Russia, which has used them against a range of targets in Ukraine. These transfers (and potential transfers of ballistic missiles) have implications for the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine as well as for U.S. efforts to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia's invasion. In late 2022, Administration officials warned that the relationship between Iran and Russia was advancing beyond the sale of drones; a National Security Council spokesperson stated, “Russia is offering Iran an unprecedented level of military and technical support that is transforming their relationship to a full-fledged defense partnership.”58 In February 2023, media reports suggested that Iran and Russia were advancing plans to construct a factory in Russia to produce Iranian-designed drones for Russia’s war in Ukraine.59 52 Summer Said et al., “China plans new Middle East summit as diplomatic role takes shape,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Iran agrees to stop arming Houthis in Yemen as part of pact with Saudi Arabia,” Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2023. 53 Patsy Widakuswara, “White House welcomes Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran deal,” VOA, March 10, 2023. 54 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Authorization Request for Central Command and Africa Command,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 16, 2023. 55 Nahal Toosi and Phelim Kine, “U.S. officials project calm as China stuns world with Iran-Saudi deal,” Politico, March 13, 2023. 56 “Experts react: Iran and Saudi Arabia just agreed to restore relations, with help from China. Here’s what that means for the Middle East and the world,” Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023. 57 Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, “How China’s Saudi-Iran deal can serve U.S. interests,” Foreign Policy, March 14, 2023; Adam Gallagher et al, “What you need to know about China’s Saudi-Iran deal,” United States Institute of Peace, March 16, 2023. 58 “Russia and Iran Military Ties Deepening Into Partnership, Biden Administration Warns,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2022. 59 “Moscow, Tehran Advance Plans for Iranian-Designed Drone Facility in Russia,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2023. Congressional Research Service 10 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Iran’s Nuclear Program60 U.S. policymakers have signaled concern for decades that Tehran might attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of ~~proliferation concern~~concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Gas . Gas
centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power
reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of
fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders claim that the countryfissile material used in nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders claim that the country ~~seeks enriched~~
~~uranium only for its~~ ’s LEU production is only for Tehran’s current and future civil nuclear reactorscurrent and future civil nuclear reactors~~, not for military purposes~~. .
U.S. policy has focused on using various means of coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran to agree to U.S. policy has focused on using various means of coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran to agree to
limits on its nuclear program. The Obama Administration pursued a “dual track” strategy of limits on its nuclear program. The Obama Administration pursued a “dual track” strategy of
stronger economic pressure through increased sanctions coupled with offers of sanctions relief if stronger economic pressure through increased sanctions coupled with offers of sanctions relief if
Iran accepted constraints on the nuclear program. Iran accepted constraints on the nuclear program. Many observers assess that U.S. and multilateral sanctions contributed to U.S. and multilateral sanctions contributed to
Iran’s 2013 decision to enter into negotiations that concluded in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Iran’s 2013 decision to enter into negotiations that concluded in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA).Plan of Action (JCPOA).
61 For more on Trump and Biden Administration approaches, see below. 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S.
and UN Security Council economic sanctions. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment and and UN Security Council economic sanctions. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment and
heavy water reactor programs and provided for enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency heavy water reactor programs and provided for enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) monitoring to detect Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weapons using either declared or (IAEA) monitoring to detect Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weapons using either declared or
covert facilities. The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement, according to U.S. officialscovert facilities. The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement, according to U.S. officials in
~~2015,~~ , extended the nuclear breakout time—the amount of time that Iran would need to produce extended the nuclear breakout time—the amount of time that Iran would need to produce
enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon—to a minimum of one year, for a duration enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon—to a minimum of one year, for a duration
of at least 10 years.of at least 10 years.4862 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material
production, the JCPOA indefinitely prohibited Iranian “activities which could contribute to the production, the JCPOA indefinitely prohibited Iranian “activities which could contribute to the
design and development of a nuclear explosive device,” including research and diagnostic design and development of a nuclear explosive device,” including research and diagnostic
activities. The IAEA continues to monitor Iranian compliance with the JCPOA provisions but activities. The IAEA continues to monitor Iranian compliance with the JCPOA provisions but
since 2019 has reported diminishing Iranian cooperation with since 2019 has reported diminishing Iranian cooperation with ~~its activities.49~~JCPOA-mandated monitoring.63
Sanctions ~~Relief~~~~.50~~relief.64 In accordance with the JCPOA, In accordance with the JCPOA, ~~U.S.~~the United States waived its secondary sanctions—restrictions on secondary sanctions—restrictions on
any third country engaging in some types of trade with Iran, primarily any third country engaging in some types of trade with Iran, primarily in the energy sector—in 2016~~in the energy sector—were~~
~~waived or terminated in 2016, but most sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade remained~~. The . The
secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation included (1) sanctions that limited secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation included (1) sanctions that limited
~~Iran’s exportation of oil and foreign sales to Iran of gasoline and energy sector equipment, and~~
~~which limited foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2) financial sector sanctions, including~~
~~trading in Iran’s currency, the rial; and (3) sanctions on Iran’s auto sector. The European Union~~

~~October 16, 2022.~~
~~47 Material in this section is drawn from CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit,” by Paul Kerr~~
~~and Kenneth Katzman, which contains additional information on Iran’s nuclear program and the JCPOA.~~
48Iran’s exportation of oil and foreign sales to Iran of gasoline 60 Material in this section is drawn from CRS Report R43333, by Paul K. Kerr, Clayton Thomas, and Carla E. Humud, which contains additional information on Iran’s nuclear program and the JCPOA. 61 Uri Berliner, “Crippled by sanctions, Iran’s economy key in nuclear deal,” NPR, November 25, 2013; Amir Toumaj, “Iran’s economy of resistance: implications for future sanctions,” AEI, November 17, 2014; “Inside the Iran nuclear deal,” Harvard Gazette, October 6, 2015. 62 “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iran,” July 14, 2015. U.S. Secretary of Energy “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iran,” July 14, 2015. U.S. Secretary of Energy
Ernest Moniz described this timeline as “very, very conservative” in an April 2015 interview (Michael Crowley, Ernest Moniz described this timeline as “very, very conservative” in an April 2015 interview (Michael Crowley,
“Ernest Moniz: Iran Deal Closes Enrichment Loophole,” “Ernest Moniz: Iran Deal Closes Enrichment Loophole,” Politico, April 7, 2015)., April 7, 2015).
49 See also CRS In Focus IF12106, Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production, by Paul K. Kerr. 63 CRS Report R40094, CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. , by Paul K.
Kerr. Kerr.
5064 For additional details on sanctions waived under the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, For additional details on sanctions waived under the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report. Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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and energy sector equipment, and which limited foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2) financial sector sanctions, including trading in Iran’s currency, the rial; and (3) sanctions on Iran’s auto sector. The European Union (EU) lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; and Iranian banks were readmitted to the (EU) lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; and Iranian banks were readmitted to the
SWIFT financial messaging services system.SWIFT financial messaging services system.5165 The UN Security Council revoked its resolutions The UN Security Council revoked its resolutions
that required member states to impose restrictions. The JCPOA did not require the lifting of U.S. that required member states to impose restrictions. The JCPOA did not require the lifting of U.S.
sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade or sanctions levied for Iran’s support for regional armed sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade or sanctions levied for Iran’s support for regional armed
factions and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses, or its efforts to acquire missile and factions and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses, or its efforts to acquire missile and
advanced conventional weapons technology. advanced conventional weapons technology. ~~U.S. sanctions lifted to implement the JCPOA were~~
~~reimposed in 2018 (see below).~~
The United States reimposed sanctions waived pursuant to JCPOA implementation in 2018 (see below). Post-JCPOA developments. The International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) has reported that some of Iran’s nuclear activities exceed JCPOA-mandated limits, including Iran’s LEU stockpile and number of enrichment locations. In March 2023, after the detection of uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent at Iran’s Fordow enrichment site sparked U.S. and international concern,66 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the agency and Iran “have initiated technical discussions to fully clarify this issue.”67 Following a January IAEA inspection of the Fordow facility, during which inspectors observed that Iran was operating centrifuges in a manner inconsistent with Tehran’s declaration to the agency, Iran agreed to “facilitate the further increase in the frequency and intensity of Agency verification activities” at the Fordow site, Grossi added.68 The U.S. Representative to the IAEA welcomed the announcement but stated, “too many times in the past, Iran has issued similarly vague promises for cooperation in order to avoid international censure, only to never follow through.”69 U.S.-Iran Relations: History and Recent Approaches
Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an authoritarian monarch who ruled from 1941 until 1979, Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an authoritarian monarch who ruled from 1941 until 1979,
Iran was a close U.S. security partner, receiving a total of nearly $15 billion in U.S. foreign Iran was a close U.S. security partner, receiving a total of nearly $15 billion in U.S. foreign
assistance to buttress its position against the neighboring Soviet Union.assistance to buttress its position against the neighboring Soviet Union.5270 Domestically, the Domestically, the
Shah’s social policies achieved some results but also alienated many Iranians; the government Shah’s social policies achieved some results but also alienated many Iranians; the government
jailed jailed ~~(and sometimes tortured)~~ tens of thousands as political prisonerstens of thousands as political prisoners and tortured many. Many other Iranians went . Many other Iranians went
into exile abroad, including prominent Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. Mass public protests into exile abroad, including prominent Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. Mass public protests
by both religious and secular Iranians against the Shah’s rule escalated throughout 1978, by both religious and secular Iranians against the Shah’s rule escalated throughout 1978,
culminating in the Shah’s January 1979 flight into exile, Khomeini’s return the following month, culminating in the Shah’s January 1979 flight into exile, Khomeini’s return the following month,
and the March 1979 replacement of the monarchy with a new Islamic Republic that quickly and the March 1979 replacement of the monarchy with a new Islamic Republic that quickly
moved to suppress domestic opposition. moved to suppress domestic opposition.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a turning point for U.S. policy toward Iran, and the two The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a turning point for U.S. policy toward Iran, and the two
countries have not had diplomatic relations since 1980, a result of the U.S. Embassy hostage countries have not had diplomatic relations since 1980, a result of the U.S. Embassy hostage
crisis.crisis.5371 U.S.-Iran tensions continued in the following decade, punctuated by armed confrontations 65 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), based in Belgium, provides a financial messaging service to facilitate cross-border transactions, including payments involving multiple currencies. International energy-sector trade heavily depends on SWIFT services. 66 Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran nuclear advance challenges U.S. as time to make potential bomb shortens,” Washington Post, March 2, 2023. 67 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, March 6, 2023. 68 Ibid. 69 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, U.S. Statement as Delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate, March 8, 2023. 70 Figure is in constant dollars (retrieved September 2022) from foreignassistance.gov. 71 For an account of the crisis, see Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006). Congressional Research Service 12 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy ~~U.S.-Iran tensions continued in the following decade, punctuated by armed confrontations~~
in the Gulf and Iran-backed terrorist attacks (including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. in the Gulf and Iran-backed terrorist attacks (including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. ~~embassy~~Embassy
and Marine barracks in Beirut). U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 1979, continued apace with the and Marine barracks in Beirut). U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 1979, continued apace with the
government of Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1984, the government of Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1984, the
imposition of an embargo on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran in 1995, and the first imposition of an embargo on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran in 1995, and the first
imposition of secondary sanctions (U.S. penalties against firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector) imposition of secondary sanctions (U.S. penalties against firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector)
in 1996. in 1996.
Approaches under the Trump and Biden Administrations
In comparing recent Administrations’ approaches to Iran, various points of continuity and change In comparing recent Administrations’ approaches to Iran, various points of continuity and change
emerge, with Biden Administration policy apparently continuing elements of both the Obama and emerge, with Biden Administration policy apparently continuing elements of both the Obama and
Trump Administrations. The Trump Administration reimposed sanctions that the Obama Trump Administrations. The Trump Administration reimposed sanctions that the Obama
Administration had imposed prior to the JCPOA but lifted as part of that deal, and sanctions Administration had imposed prior to the JCPOA but lifted as part of that deal, and sanctions
newly imposed by the Trump Administration remain in place under the Biden Administration. At newly imposed by the Trump Administration remain in place under the Biden Administration. At
the same time, the Biden Administration has sought to resuscitate the JCPOA, but the United the same time, the Biden Administration has sought to resuscitate the JCPOA, but the United
States and Iran have not engaged directly as happened under the Obama Administration. The States and Iran have not engaged directly as happened under the Obama Administration. The
September 2022 outbreak of nationwide unrest in Iran appears to have shifted the Biden September 2022 outbreak of nationwide unrest in Iran appears to have shifted the Biden
Administration’s focus away from reviving the JCPOA, prospects for the revival of which were Administration’s focus away from reviving the JCPOA, prospects for the revival of which were
~~dimming.~~

~~51 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), based in Belgium, provides a financial~~
~~messaging service to facilitate cross-border transactions, including payments involving multiple currencies.~~
~~International energy-sector trade heavily depends on SWIFT services.~~
~~52 Figure is in constant dollars (retrieved September 2022) from foreignassistance.gov.~~
~~53 For an account of the crisis, see Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).~~
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reportedly already dimming.
Trump Administration Policy
U.S. policy toward Iran shifted significantly under the Trump Administration. As a candidate, U.S. policy toward Iran shifted significantly under the Trump Administration. As a candidate,
Donald Trump Donald Trump ~~spoke against the JCPOA as “one of the worst deals ever made by any country in~~
~~history” and~~ said “my number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”said “my number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”5472
Though then-President Trump initially certified to Congress in April and July 2017 that Iran was Though then-President Trump initially certified to Congress in April and July 2017 that Iran was
in compliance with the agreement (under an INARA requirement to submit such a report every 90 in compliance with the agreement (under an INARA requirement to submit such a report every 90
days),days),5573 in October 2017 President Trump announced he would not submit another certification of in October 2017 President Trump announced he would not submit another certification of
Iranian compliance, saying, “Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.”Iranian compliance, saying, “Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.”5674 In January 2018, In January 2018,
President Trump announced that he would again waive the application of certain energy-sector President Trump announced that he would again waive the application of certain energy-sector
sanctions as a “last chance” to “secure our European allies’ agreement to fix” the JCPOA.sanctions as a “last chance” to “secure our European allies’ agreement to fix” the JCPOA.5775 No No
such deal was reached, and President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that the United States such deal was reached, and President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that the United States
would cease participating in the JCPOA, reinstating all sanctions that the United States had would cease participating in the JCPOA, reinstating all sanctions that the United States had
waived or terminated in meeting in meeting its JCPOA obligations. All sanctions went back into waived or terminated in meeting in meeting its JCPOA obligations. All sanctions went back into
effect as of November 2018. effect as of November 2018.
In articulating a new Iran strategy in May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that due to In articulating a new Iran strategy in May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that due to
“unprecedented financial pressure” through reimposed U.S. sanctions, U.S. military deterrence, “unprecedented financial pressure” through reimposed U.S. sanctions, U.S. military deterrence,
and U.S. advocacy, “we hope, and indeed we expect, that the Iranian regime will come to its and U.S. advocacy, “we hope, and indeed we expect, that the Iranian regime will come to its
senses.”senses.”5876 He also laid out 12 demands for any future agreement with Iran, including the He also laid out 12 demands for any future agreement with Iran, including the
withdrawal of Iranian support for armed groups and proxies throughout the region. Iran’s leaders withdrawal of Iranian support for armed groups and proxies throughout the region. Iran’s leaders
rejected U.S. demands and insisted the United States return to compliance with the JCPOA before rejected U.S. demands and insisted the United States return to compliance with the JCPOA before
72 “Full transcript: First 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, September 27, 2016; “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to AIPAC,” Time, March 21, 2016. 73 Sections 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as added by INARA (P.L. 114-17). 74 “Transcript: Trump’s Remarks on Iran nuclear deal,” NPR, October 13, 2017. The October 2017 decertification triggered a 60-day window for Congress to consider, under expedited procedures per INARA, legislation to re-impose sanctions lifted as part of the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. Congress did not do so. 75 Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, White House, January 12, 2018. 76 “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018. Congressional Research Service 13 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy engaging on a new or revised accord. The Trump Administration policy of applying “maximum engaging on a new or revised accord. The Trump Administration policy of applying “maximum
pressure” on Iran after late 2018 took two forms: additional sanctions and limited military action. pressure” on Iran after late 2018 took two forms: additional sanctions and limited military action.
After U.S. sanctions were reinstated in November 2018, the Administration designated for After U.S. sanctions were reinstated in November 2018, the Administration designated for
sanctions a number of additional entities under existing authorities (e.g., designating Iran’s sanctions a number of additional entities under existing authorities (e.g., designating Iran’s
Central Bank under Executive Order Central Bank under Executive Order ([E.O.E.O.)] 13224, adding to the Central Bank’s designation as a 13224, adding to the Central Bank’s designation as a
proliferation entity under E.O. 13382); issued new authorities (e.g., E.O. 13876, sanctioning the proliferation entity under E.O. 13382); issued new authorities (e.g., E.O. 13876, sanctioning the
office of the Supreme Leader); and designated the entirety of Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary office of the Supreme Leader); and designated the entirety of Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern.”money laundering concern.”5977
From mid-2019 on, Iran escalated its regional military activities, From mid-2019 on, Iran escalated its regional military activities, ~~periodically~~at times coming into direct coming into direct
military conflict with the United States (such when Iran shot down an unmanned U.S. military conflict with the United States (such when Iran shot down an unmanned U.S.
surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf in June 2019). Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf in June 2019). Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf and a complex September 2019 drone attack against Saudi Arabian oil production Persian Gulf and a complex September 2019 drone attack against Saudi Arabian oil production
facilities further increased tensions. Those tensions peaked in the Trump Administration’s January facilities further increased tensions. Those tensions peaked in the Trump Administration’s January
3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, and Iran’s 3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, and Iran’s
retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces in Iraq.retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces in Iraq.6078 Iran responded with ballistic missile attacks ~~Iran responded with ballistic missile attacks~~

~~54 “Full transcript: First 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, September 27, 2016; “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to~~
~~AIPAC,” Time, March 21, 2016.~~
~~55 Sections 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as added by INARA (P.L. 114-17).~~
~~56 “Transcript: Trump’s Remarks on Iran nuclear deal,” NPR, October 13, 2017. The October 2017 decertification~~
~~triggered a 60-day window for Congress to consider, under expedited procedures per INARA, legislation to re-impose~~
~~sanctions lifted as part of the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. Congress did not do so.~~
~~57 Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, White House, January 12, 2018.~~
~~58 “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018.~~
~~59 Department of the~~ ~~Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 31 Code Federal Regulations Part~~
~~1010, 84 Federal~~ ~~Register 59302.~~
~~60 For more, see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions.~~
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against U.S. forces based in Iraq that left over one hundred U.S. military personnel injured, and against U.S. forces based in Iraq that left over one hundred U.S. military personnel injured, and
attacks by Iran-backed forces in Iraq against U.S. targets continued over the following year. attacks by Iran-backed forces in Iraq against U.S. targets continued over the following year.
Iran also began exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear activities according to the IAEA. Biden Administration Policy
As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Trump Administration’s Iran policy as a As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Trump Administration’s Iran policy as a
“dangerous failure” that had isolated the United States from its international partners, allowed “dangerous failure” that had isolated the United States from its international partners, allowed
Iran to increase its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and raised tensions throughout the region.Iran to increase its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and raised tensions throughout the region.6179
He pledged to “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy” by promising to have the United He pledged to “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy” by promising to have the United
States rejoin the JCPOA as long as “Iran returns to strict compliance” with it. States rejoin the JCPOA as long as “Iran returns to strict compliance” with it.
Less than a month after taking office, the Biden Administration offered to restart talks with Iran to Less than a month after taking office, the Biden Administration offered to restart talks with Iran to
revive the JCPOA and appointed Robert Malley as Special Envoy for Iran. However, Iran refused revive the JCPOA and appointed Robert Malley as Special Envoy for Iran. However, Iran refused
to engage directly with the United States until the United States decreased sanctions pressure, to engage directly with the United States until the United States decreased sanctions pressure,
~~leading to a standstill: U.S. officials argued of Iran that “the ball is in [its] court” even as Iranian~~
~~President Rouhani argued, “America was first in breaking with the agreement and it should be the~~
~~first to return to it.”62 This difference over sequencing a potential mutual return to compliance~~
~~with the JCPOA presaged multiple challenges to reviving the accord. Other possible obstacles~~
~~discussed in connection with the talks include:~~
~~ Iranian concerns about future U.S. action. Iran has advocated that the United~~
~~States, as part of a possible return to JCPOA compliance, guarantee that it would~~
~~never again leave the accord, a condition U.S. officials describe as nonnegotiable~~
~~given the inability of one Administration to legally bind its successors without a~~
~~U.S.-Senate ratified treaty.63~~
~~ IRGC FTO designation. Iran has called on the United States to lift the Foreign~~
~~Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation on the IRGC as part of any new JCPOA~~
~~agreement. The IRGC was designated in 2019 under the Trump Administration,~~
~~becoming the first state military institution to be so designated. When asked in~~
~~July 2022 whether he would retain the IRGC’s FTO designation “even if that~~
~~means that it kills the deal,” President Biden answered “Yes.”64~~
necessitating indirect negotiations facilitated by the EU and other JCPOA partners. During multiple subsequent rounds of talks, negotiators reported slow and uneven progress, with talks sometimes paused for weeks or months at a time. In August 2022, reports indicated that all sides were close to achieving agreement before again In August 2022, reports indicated that all sides were close to achieving agreement before again
stalling over Iran’s reported revival of some demands that the other parties had considered closed stalling over Iran’s reported revival of some demands that the other parties had considered closed
issues.issues.6580 Since then, U.S. officials have Since then, U.S. officials have stated that JCPOA talks are not a U.S. policy priority.81 President Biden has said, “Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch,” and Administration officials have told Congress that a negotiated settlement akin to~~stated that they do not view progress toward reviving the~~
~~JCPOA as likely in the near term. In October 2022, a State Department spokesperson said of~~
~~nuclear talks, “That’s not our focus right now” in light of ongoing protests.66 Even as Biden~~
~~Administration officials have maintained that a return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA~~
~~represents~~ the JCPOA is the the best way to achieve that goal.82 Administration officials also argue that it is not possible to resolve 77 Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 31 Code Federal Regulations Part 1010, 84 Federal Register 59302. 78 For more, see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions. 79 Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020. 80~~best way to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the Administration has~~
~~pursued some other courses of action related to Iran.67 These include:~~

~~61 Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020.~~
~~62 Lara Jakes, “Impasse over Iran nuclear talks sets off international scramble to save accord,” New York Times, March~~
~~11, 2021.~~
~~63 Patrick Wintour, “US must guarantee it will not leave nuclear deal again, says Iran,” Guardian, June 30, 2021.~~
~~64 “US willing to kill Iran deal to keep IRGC on ‘terror’ list: Biden,” Al Jazeera, July 13, 2022.~~
65 Ishaan Tharoor, “Is the Iran deal worth salvaging?” Ishaan Tharoor, “Is the Iran deal worth salvaging?” Washington Post, August 26, 2022; “Iran nuclear talks in , August 26, 2022; “Iran nuclear talks in
‘stalemate,’ says EU foreign policy chief,” ‘stalemate,’ says EU foreign policy chief,” Arab News, September 15, 2022. , September 15, 2022.
6681 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on the Administration’s efforts to advance the free flow of information for the Iranian people, September 23, 2022. 82 White House, Remarks by President Biden and President Rivlin of the State of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting, Jun ~~U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, October 12, 2022.~~
~~67 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on the Administration’s efforts to advance~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1214 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program militarily, while maintaining that all U.S. options remain available.83 In March 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, “President Biden’s preference is to explore all diplomatic avenues to ensure that we constrain Iran’s progress in this field...And my job as secretary of defense...is to provide the president options if he so desires.”84 Other Biden Administration courses of action related to Iran include:

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

  New sanctions. The Biden Administration has not exerted any new sanctions The Biden Administration has not exerted any new sanctions
authorities but has continued to designate for sanctions Iranian and third-country- authorities but has continued to designate for sanctions Iranian and third-country-
based entities based entities ~~that violate~~pursuant to existing U.S. laws and executive orders. existing U.S. laws and executive orders. ~~According to a~~
~~State Department spokesperson, the Biden Administration had imposed “107~~
~~sanctions” on Iran as of May 2022.68 Numerous individuals and entities have~~
~~been designated since. Newly restricted designees~~Newly designated entities include individuals involved in include individuals involved in
oil smuggling networks; IRGC financial facilitators; individuals involved in oil smuggling networks; IRGC financial facilitators; individuals involved in
Iran’s UAV programs; an air transportation service provider for its role in Iran’s UAV programs; an air transportation service provider for its role in
shipping Iranian UAVs to Russia for use in Ukraine; and Iran’s Morality Police. shipping Iranian UAVs to Russia for use in Ukraine; and Iran’s Morality Police.
  Military activities. U.S. armed forces have reportedly struck Iran-related targets U.S. armed forces have reportedly struck Iran-related targets
in Iraq (June 2021) and Syria (February 2021, June 2021, January 2022, and in Iraq (June 2021) and Syria (February 2021, June 2021, January 2022, and
August 2022) in response to attacks by Iran-backed entities on U.S. forces.August 2022) in response to attacks by Iran-backed entities on U.S. forces.6985 U.S. U.S.
naval forces have interdicted or supported the interdiction of weapons shipments naval forces have interdicted or supported the interdiction of weapons shipments
originating from Iran, including in originating from Iran, including in ~~December 2021 and February 2022.70~~February 2023.86
  Security cooperation with other regional partners. The Biden Administration The Biden Administration
has continued the long-standing U.S. policy of bolstering the defense capabilities has continued the long-standing U.S. policy of bolstering the defense capabilities
of U.S. partners in the Gulf through arms sales, including an August 2022 of U.S. partners in the Gulf through arms sales, including an August 2022
proposed sale of 300 Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia ($3 billion) and 96 Terminal proposed sale of 300 Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia ($3 billion) and 96 Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to the United Arab Emirates High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to the United Arab Emirates
($2.2 billion).($2.2 billion).7187 The U.S. military and its partners have also continued to conduct The U.S. military and its partners have also continued to conduct
joint military exercises, including some seen as intended to counter Iranjoint military exercises, including some seen as intended to counter Iran~~, and U.S.~~
~~officials observed a May 2022 major Israeli military exercise.72~~.88
In its October 2022 National Security Strategy, the Administration laid out its policy toward Iran, In its October 2022 National Security Strategy, the Administration laid out its policy toward Iran,
stating the United States would “pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear stating the United States would “pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear
weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail,” and weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail,” and
that “we will respond when our people and interests are attacked.”that “we will respond when our people and interests are attacked.”7389 The Strategy also states, “we The Strategy also states, “we
will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied
them by the regime in Tehran.” them by the regime in Tehran.”
~~Issues for Congress~~
~~Sanctions~~
~~Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to~~
~~change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress.74 U.S. sanctions on Iran were first~~

~~the free flow of information for the Iranian people, September 23, 2022.~~
~~68 U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, May 10, 2022.~~
69 28, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25, 2022. 83 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25, 2022. 84 Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Holds a Joint Press Conference with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, U.S. Department of Defense, March 9, 2023. 85 See for example, U.S. Central Command, “Statement regarding precision strikes in Syria,” August 23, 2022. See for example, U.S. Central Command, “Statement regarding precision strikes in Syria,” August 23, 2022.
~~70 U.S. Department of State, “Illegal Iranian flow of weapons to Yemen,” December 23, 2021; NAVCENT~~86 U.S. Central Command Public Public
~~Affairs, “U.S. Navy destroyer supports UK seizure of Iranian missiles in Gulf of Oman,” July 7, 2022.~~
71Affairs, “U.S. Central Command supports partner forces in major Iranian weapons seizure,” February 2, 2023. 87 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 22-32 and 22-26, August 2, 2022. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 22-32 and 22-26, August 2, 2022.
~~72 Amos Harel, “Large U.S. army delegation in Israel reflects tighter ties, and sends a powerful message,” Haaretz,~~
~~June 24, 2022.~~
7388 Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.. Israel send message to Iran with biggest-ever military exercises,” Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2023. 89 White House, White House, National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022. , October 12, 2022.
~~74 For details on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report R43311,~~ ~~Iran: U.S. Economic~~
~~Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, in the form of executive orders issued~~
~~by President Jimmy Carter~~ Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 19 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Issues for Congress Sanctions Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress.90 U.S. sanctions on Iran are multifaceted and complex, a result of over four decades of legislative, administrative, and law enforcement actions by successive presidential administrations and Congresses. U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, when President Jimmy Carter issued executive orders blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the United States. In 1984, blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the United States. In 1984,
Secretary of State George Schultz designated the government of Iran a state sponsor of acts of Secretary of State George Schultz designated the government of Iran a state sponsor of acts of
international terrorism (SSOT) following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks international terrorism (SSOT) following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks
in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s status as an SSOT in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s status as an SSOT
triggers several sanctions including restrictions on licenses for U.S. dual-use exports; a ban on triggers several sanctions including restrictions on licenses for U.S. dual-use exports; a ban on
U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and support in the international financial institutions; and the U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and support in the international financial institutions; and the
withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell arms to the designeewithholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell arms to the designee
~~(secondary sanctions).75~~.91
Later in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, other U.S. sanctions sought to limit Iran’s Later in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, other U.S. sanctions sought to limit Iran’s
conventional arsenal and its ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In the 2000s, as conventional arsenal and its ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In the 2000s, as
Iran’s nuclear program progressed, U.S. sanctions focused largely on trying to pressure Iran to Iran’s nuclear program progressed, U.S. sanctions focused largely on trying to pressure Iran to
limit its nuclear activities (see limit its nuclear activities (see Table 1). Most of the U.S. sanctions enacted after 2010 were ). Most of the U.S. sanctions enacted after 2010 were
secondary sanctions—essentially denying U.S. market access to foreign firms that transact with secondary sanctions—essentially denying U.S. market access to foreign firms that transact with
major sectors of the Iranian economy, including banking, energy, and shipping. Successive major sectors of the Iranian economy, including banking, energy, and shipping. Successive
Administrations issued Executive Orders under which they designated specific individuals and Administrations issued Executive Orders under which they designated specific individuals and
entities to implement and supplement the provisions of these laws. United States has also, entities to implement and supplement the provisions of these laws. United States has also,
pursuant to various authorities, imposed sanctions on a number of individuals and entities held pursuant to various authorities, imposed sanctions on a number of individuals and entities held
responsible for human rights violations. responsible for human rights violations.
Table 1. Select Sanctions Legislation Pertaining to Iran
Public Law
Legislation Name
Number
Final Votes
Target of Sanctions
The Comprehensive The Comprehensive
P.L. 111-195, P.L. 111-195,
Conference Report Conference Report
Codifies the U.S. ban on trade with and Codifies the U.S. ban on trade with and
Iran Sanctions, Iran Sanctions,
22 U.S.C. 22 U.S.C.
agreed to in the agreed to in the
investment in Iran, first imposed by Executive investment in Iran, first imposed by Executive
Accountability, and Accountability, and
§§8501 et seq. §§8501 et seq.
House 408-8 and in House 408-8 and in
Order 12959 of May 1995; imposes sanctions Order 12959 of May 1995; imposes sanctions
Divestment Act of Divestment Act of
the Senate 99-0. the Senate 99-0.
on foreign banks that facilitate transactions on foreign banks that facilitate transactions
2010 (CISADA) 2010 (CISADA)
for Iranian entities. for Iranian entities.
FY2012 National FY2012 National
Section Section
Conference Report Conference Report
Imposes sanctions on banks of countries that Imposes sanctions on banks of countries that
Defense Authorization 1245(d), P.L. Defense Authorization 1245(d), P.L.
agreed to in the agreed to in the
do not reduce Iran oil imports. do not reduce Iran oil imports.
Act (NDAA) Act (NDAA)
112-81, 22 112-81, 22
House 283-136 and House 283-136 and
U.S.C. 8513a U.S.C. 8513a
in the Senate 86-13. in the Senate 86-13.
90 For details on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack. 91 CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack. Congressional Research Service 16 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Public Law Legislation Name Number Final Votes Target of Sanctions Iran Threat Reduction Iran Threat Reduction
P.L. 112-158, P.L. 112-158,
Passed in the House Passed in the House
Expands sanctions relating to Iran’s energy Expands sanctions relating to Iran’s energy
and Syria Human and Syria Human
22 U.S.C. 22 U.S.C.
410-11; passed in the sector; prohibits foreign banks from allowing 410-11; passed in the sector; prohibits foreign banks from allowing
Rights Act of 2012 Rights Act of 2012
§§8701 et seq. §§8701 et seq.
Senate with an Senate with an
Iran to withdraw its funds; imposes sanctions Iran to withdraw its funds; imposes sanctions
(ITRSHRA) (ITRSHRA)
amendment by voice amendment by voice
relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
vote. vote.
(IRGC) and to human rights violations. (IRGC) and to human rights violations.
Iran Freedom and Iran Freedom and
Sections 1244- Sections 1244-
Conference Report Conference Report
Imposes sanctions on transactions with Iran’s Imposes sanctions on transactions with Iran’s
Counter-Proliferation Counter-Proliferation
1247, P.L. 112- 1247, P.L. 112-
agreed to in the agreed to in the
energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and
Act (IFCA) Act (IFCA)
239, 22 U.S.C. 239, 22 U.S.C.
House 315-107 and House 315-107 and
banks that conduct transactions with banks that conduct transactions with
§§8801 et seq. §§8801 et seq.
in the Senate 81-14. in the Senate 81-14.
sanctioned Iranian entities. sanctioned Iranian entities.
Notes: Congress grants to the President the authority to terminate most of the sanctions imposed on Iran in Congress grants to the President the authority to terminate most of the sanctions imposed on Iran in
CISADA, ITRSHRA, and IFCA. Before terminating these sanctions, however, the President must certify that the CISADA, ITRSHRA, and IFCA. Before terminating these sanctions, however, the President must certify that the
government of Iran has ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in government of Iran has ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in
Section 401 of CISADA, as amended. Section 401 of CISADA, as amended.

~~75 CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne~~
~~E. Rennack.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

Impact of sanctions. U.S. sanctions imposed during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a . U.S. sanctions imposed during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a
substantial toll on Iran’s economy. A UN official, in a May 2022 visit to Iran, said that economic substantial toll on Iran’s economy. A UN official, in a May 2022 visit to Iran, said that economic
sanctions had increased inflation and poverty, exacerbating overall humanitarian conditions.sanctions had increased inflation and poverty, exacerbating overall humanitarian conditions.76
~~Another UN official said in a 2021 report that Iran’s ability to respond to the Coronavirus Disease~~
~~2019 (COVID-19) pandemic was in part affected by U.S. sanctions and their impact on the~~
~~Iranian economy, though humanitarian items including medicine and medical supplies are exempt~~
~~from U.S. sanctions.77~~ 92 Some analysts, while agreeing that sanctions have an impact, also have Some analysts, while agreeing that sanctions have an impact, also have
argued that Iran suffers from “decades of failed economic policies.”argued that Iran suffers from “decades of failed economic policies.”7893 The CIA World Factbook The CIA World Factbook
states, “Distortions—including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system states, “Distortions—including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system
holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans—weigh down the economy.”holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans—weigh down the economy.”7994
Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on the range of Iranian behaviors their imposition Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on the range of Iranian behaviors their imposition
has been intended to curb. As mentioned above, many experts attribute Iran’s decision to enter has been intended to curb. As mentioned above, many experts attribute Iran’s decision to enter
into multilateral negotiations and agree to limits on its nuclear program under the JCPOA at least into multilateral negotiations and agree to limits on its nuclear program under the JCPOA at least
in part to sanctions pressure. Many other aspects of Iranian policy seen as threatening to U.S. in part to sanctions pressure. Many other aspects of Iranian policy seen as threatening to U.S.
interests, including its regional influence and military capabilities, appear to remain considerable interests, including its regional influence and military capabilities, appear to remain considerable
and have arguably increased in the last decade.and have arguably increased in the last decade.8095
Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has
decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and conducted decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and conducted
provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. Those nuclear advances and regional provocations provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. Those nuclear advances and regional provocations
~~have~~ continued as Iran and the United States continued as Iran and the United States ~~have~~ engaged with other JCPOA signatories in engaged with other JCPOA signatories in
indirect negotiations around reviving the JCPOA. indirect negotiations around reviving the JCPOA. ~~Some analysts connect the~~The reimposition of U.S. reimposition of U.S.
sanctions after 2018 sanctions after 2018 may also have contributed to Iran’s growing closeness to China (with which Iran signed a March 2021 to Iran’s growing closeness to China (with which Iran signed a March 2021
agreement to deepen economic and security ties) agreement to deepen economic and security ties) 8196 and Russia. Following Russia’s invasion of 92 ~~and Russia. Following Russia’s invasion of~~
~~Ukraine in early 2022, Russia and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have explored expanding~~
~~bilateral and energy cooperation.82 Both China and Russia are signatories to the JCPOA.~~
~~As part of its oversight responsibilities and to better inform legislative action, Congress has~~
~~directed successive Administrations to provide numerous reports on a wide array of Iran-related~~
~~topics, including U.S. sanctions. In FY2022 legislation, they include reports on the “status of~~
~~United States bilateral sanctions on Iran” (Sec. 7041(b)(2)(B) of FY2022 Consolidated~~
~~Appropriations Act, P.L. 117-103) and the impact of sanctions on various Iranian entities and~~
~~Iran-backed groups (Sec. 1227 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-81).~~
~~Congress has also held numerous hearings focused primarily or in part on U.S. sanctions on Iran.~~

76 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Visit to Iran by controversial UN rapporteur provokes concerns,” Golnaz Esfandiari, “Visit to Iran by controversial UN rapporteur provokes concerns,” RFE/RL, May 13, 2022; Amir , May 13, 2022; Amir
Vahdat, “UN envoy: US sanctions on Iran worsen humanitarian situation,” ABC News, May 18, 2022Vahdat, “UN envoy: US sanctions on Iran worsen humanitarian situation,” ABC News, May 18, 2022;
~~77 United Nations General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, A/HRC/26/50, January~~
~~11, 2021; Office of Foreign Assets Control, Iran General License N-1, June 10, 2022.~~
78. 93 Anthony Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 11, Anthony Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 11,
2018. 2018.
7994 CIA World Factbook, “Iran,” updated September 28, 2022. CIA World Factbook, “Iran,” updated September 28, 2022.
8095 See, for example, “New report reveals extent of Iran’s growing Middle East influence,” See, for example, “New report reveals extent of Iran’s growing Middle East influence,” Al Jazeera, November 7, , November 7,
2019; Ariane Tabatabai et al., “Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts,” RAND Corporation, 2019; Ariane Tabatabai et al., “Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts,” RAND Corporation,
2021; David Gardner, “Curbing Iran’s regional ambitions remains a distant hope for the west,” 2021; David Gardner, “Curbing Iran’s regional ambitions remains a distant hope for the west,” Financial Times, June , June
10, 2021; Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), March 23, 10, 2021; Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), March 23,
2022. 2022.
8196 “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” New York Times, March 27, 2021. , March 27, 2021.
~~82 “Russia's Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~
Congressional Research Service 17 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy Ukraine in early 2022, Russia and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have explored expanding bilateral and energy cooperation.97 As part of its oversight responsibilities and to better inform legislative action, Congress has directed successive Administrations to provide numerous reports on a wide array of Iran-related topics, including U.S. sanctions. In FY2022 legislation, they include reports on the “status of United States bilateral sanctions on Iran” (§7041(b)(2)(B) of FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 117-103) and the impact of sanctions on various Iranian entities and Iran-backed groups (§1227 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-81). Congress has also held numerous hearings focused primarily or in part on U.S. sanctions on Iran.
Oversight of Nuclear Talks/Agreement
Congress has sought to influence the outcome and implementation of international negotiations Congress has sought to influence the outcome and implementation of international negotiations
over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides (INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides
for consideration of legislation to potentially block their implementation.for consideration of legislation to potentially block their implementation.8398
Among other provisions, INARA directs the President to submit to Congress within five calendar Among other provisions, INARA directs the President to submit to Congress within five calendar
days of reaching “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” that agreement days of reaching “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” that agreement
and a certification that it meets certain conditions, such as that the agreement ensures that Iran and a certification that it meets certain conditions, such as that the agreement ensures that Iran
will not be permitted to use its nuclear program for military purposes. It also provides Congress will not be permitted to use its nuclear program for military purposes. It also provides Congress
with a 30-day period following transmittal to review the agreement, during which the President with a 30-day period following transmittal to review the agreement, during which the President
may not waive or otherwise limit sanctions; if Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval during may not waive or otherwise limit sanctions; if Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval during
that period, the executive branch may not take any “action involving any measure of statutory that period, the executive branch may not take any “action involving any measure of statutory
sanctions relief.” sanctions relief.”
Indirect negotiations over potentially reviving the JCPOA (see above) have implications for Indirect negotiations over potentially reviving the JCPOA (see above) have implications for
INARA. The Biden Administration would likely be required to report any JCPOA amendments to INARA. The Biden Administration would likely be required to report any JCPOA amendments to
Congress, triggering the congressional review process described above, but it remains unclear Congress, triggering the congressional review process described above, but it remains unclear
whether reentering the JCPOA whether reentering the JCPOA ~~(which seems a diminished prospect in late 2022) would do so.84~~
would do so.99 For their part, Biden Administration officials have stated publicly that they are “committed to For their part, Biden Administration officials have stated publicly that they are “committed to
ensuring the requirements of INARA are fully satisfied” without engaging on the question of ensuring the requirements of INARA are fully satisfied” without engaging on the question of
whether they would submit a hypothetical agreement for congressional review.whether they would submit a hypothetical agreement for congressional review.85100 Many observers Many observers
consider it likely that deal opponents would be able to muster majorities against a potential consider it likely that deal opponents would be able to muster majorities against a potential
agreement but would again fall short of veto-proof majorities to block its implementation, as they agreement but would again fall short of veto-proof majorities to block its implementation, as they
did in 2015.did in 2015.86101
Some in Congress who oppose Biden Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated Some in Congress who oppose Biden Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated
that they might use INARA to block or at least complicate a potential future agreement. Several that they might use INARA to block or at least complicate a potential future agreement. Several
dozen senators wrote to President Biden in dozen senators wrote to President Biden in ~~February~~March 2022 urging him to submit any agreement 2022 urging him to submit any agreement
for for congressional review~~congressional review.87 Those same senators and several others wrote again to President Biden~~
~~in March 2022 reiterating that message and~~ expressing opposition to any agreement that does not expressing opposition to any agreement that does not
~~constrain Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile activities, and its support for international~~
~~terrorism.88 Some Members have also introduced legislation to condition potential U.S. entry into~~
~~an agreement on IAEA inspectors having full access to Iranian nuclear facilities (H.R. 1203); on~~
~~the Administration’s commitment to submit the agreement for approval by the Senate as a treaty~~
~~(S. 1205/H.R. 1479); or on the President’s submission of the agreement as a treaty (S. 2030).~~

83constrain Iran’s 97 “Russia's Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022. 98 For a legislative history of INARA, and the several votes taken in Congress that demonstrated opposition to the For a legislative history of INARA, and the several votes taken in Congress that demonstrated opposition to the
JCPOA but failed to block its implementation, see CRS Report R46796, JCPOA but failed to block its implementation, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020:
Selected Case Studies, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard. , coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
8499 CRS Report R46663, CRS Report R46663, Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman et al. Katzman et al.
85100 State Department Press Briefing, March 16, 2022. State Department Press Briefing, March 16, 2022.
86101 See, for example, Dan De Luce, “Biden is betting Republican senators lack votes to derail revival of Iran nuclear See, for example, Dan De Luce, “Biden is betting Republican senators lack votes to derail revival of Iran nuclear
deal,” deal,” NBC News, March 2, 2022; Patricia Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed, “Analysis: U.S. Congress may squawk , March 2, 2022; Patricia Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed, “Analysis: U.S. Congress may squawk
over a new Iran deal but is unlikely to block it,” Reuters, February 17, 2022. over a new Iran deal but is unlikely to block it,” Reuters, February 17, 2022.
~~87 “Sen. Cruz leads letter with 32 colleagues to President Biden, commits to blocking implementation of any Iran deal~~
~~not submitted to Congress for approval,” Senator Ted Cruz, February 8, 2022.~~
~~88 “49 Senate Republicans tell President Biden: An agreement without broad congressional support will not survive,”~~
~~Senator James M. Inhofe, March 14, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16 Congressional Research Service 18

Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

~~Other proposed measures would create congressional review and disapproval procedures similar~~
~~to those of INARA for the lifting of any sanctions on Iran (S. 488/H.R. 1699). Other Members~~
~~have~~nuclear program, its ballistic missile activities, and its support for international terrorism.102 In the 117th Congress, some Members also introduced legislation related to Iran’s nuclear program.103 Other Members issued public statements or introduced legislation in support of the Biden Administration’s issued public statements or introduced legislation in support of the Biden Administration’s
diplomatic efforts to revive the JCPOA.diplomatic efforts to revive the JCPOA.89
~~Authorizing or Prohibiting the Use of Force~~
~~Since 2019, Congress has several times asserted its constitutional war powers in relation to Iran.~~
~~During periods when armed confrontations have raised the prospect of a wider military conflict,~~
~~these efforts to constrain the executive have generally taken the form of legislation stating that the~~
~~use of force against Iran is not authorized. Congress has not, however, taken action to restrain the~~
~~President’s ability to deploy U.S. armed forces that have at times engaged in hostilities with~~
~~Iranian or Iran-backed forces outside of Iranian territory.~~
~~Congress has regularly included in Iran-related legislation language stating that “nothing in the~~
~~Act shall be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran” (e.g., Section 301 of the Iran~~
~~Freedom Support Act, P.L. 109-293, or Section 604 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria~~
~~Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158). Congress has also included similar language in several~~
~~defense authorization acts (going back to FY2013, P.L. 112-239, and most recently in FY2019,~~
~~P.L. 115-232). In the 117th Congress, similar language is included in Section 8128 of the~~
~~Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations~~
~~Act, 2022; P.L. 117-103).~~
~~The rise in U.S.-Iran tensions in summer 2019, and assertions from then-President Trump that he~~
~~possessed the authority to initiate military action against Iran without prior congressional~~
~~approval, prompted some congressional action.90 In Section 1229 of the draft FY2020 NDAA~~
~~(H.R. 2500, passed by the House in July 2019), the House approved legislation that would have~~
~~prohibited the use of funds for military force against Iran in the absence of a congressional~~
~~declaration of war or other statutory authorization. The Senate voted not to add similar language~~
~~(S.Amdt. 883) to its version of the bill, and the House-passed prohibition was not included in~~
~~conference text of the bill.~~
~~The January 2020 U.S. killing of IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani again prompted some~~
~~Members of Congress to introduce legislation to constrain the President’s ability to use force~~
~~against Iran, including H.Con.Res. 83 (pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution;~~
~~adopted by the House) and S.J.Res. 68 (pursuant to 50 USC sec 1546a; adopted by the Senate and~~
~~House and vetoed by President Trump).91~~
~~Debates over U.S. military action against Iranian and Iran-backed forces, notably those in Iraq,~~
~~also involve the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2002 AUMF, P.L. 107-243).~~
~~Biden Administration officials have voiced support for efforts by some Members to repeal that~~
~~legislation, citing the President’s Article II power to defend U.S. forces from attack as sufficient~~
~~to respond to threats from Iran. Some Members have voiced concern about the practical impacts~~

~~89 See, for example, S. 434 and Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy: After four years of failed maximum pressure in Iran,~~
~~we know we’re better off with a nuclear agreement,” September 22, 2022.~~
~~90 Saagar Enjeti and Jordan Fabian, “EXCLUSIVE: Trump: I do not need congressional approval to strike Iran,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Hill, June 24, 2019.~~
~~91 See “Congressional Responses” in CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by~~
~~Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~of repealing the 2002 AUMF without a revised authorization and argued that doing so would send~~
~~the wrong message to Iran and the region.92~~
~~Outlook and Congressional Options~~
~~Congress has long played an active role in overseeing U.S. policy toward Iran, whose actions~~
~~constitute one of the most persistent challenges to U.S. interests. While successive~~
~~Administrations have characterized Iran’s nuclear program as the most serious challenge posed~~
~~by Iran to U.S. interests, attention to efforts to revive the JCPOA appear to have dimmed in 2022~~
~~in light of nationwide unrest in Iran and other obstacles.~~
~~President Biden has said, “Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch,” and~~
~~Administration officials have told Congress that a negotiated settlement akin to the JCPOA is the~~
~~best way to achieve that goal.93 While they maintain that all U.S. options remain available,~~
~~Administration officials also argue that it is not possible to resolve the challenge of Iran’s nuclear~~
~~program militarily.94 During the Biden Administration, no Member of Congress appears to have~~
~~publicly supported military action to reduce Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Some Members have,~~
~~however, called for the United States to, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman~~
~~Robert Menendez advocated in May 2022, demonstrate that “we have the will, as well as military~~
~~capabilities if absolutely necessary, to defend our people and our interests” with regard to Iran.95~~
~~JCPOA opponents in Congress often advocate for increased U.S. military exercises with and arms~~
~~sales to regional partners as ways to increase deterrence.96~~
~~Members of Congress expressed a range of views in anticipation of an agreement. Some~~
~~congressional supporters of the JCPOA urged President Biden in 2021 to seek to restore the~~
~~accord.97 Many in Congress who opposed the JCPOA in 2015 maintain their opposition to the~~
~~accord, with some questioning the feasibility of negotiating with Iran at all.98 For their part, as of~~
~~fall 2022, Biden Administration officials assert that they are not focused on reviving the accord.99~~

~~92 Senate Foreign Relations Holds Hearing on Use of Force Authorizations, CQ Congressional Transcripts, August 3,~~
~~2021.~~
~~93 White House, Remarks by President Biden and President Rivlin of the State of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting, Jun~~
~~28, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May~~
~~25, 2022.~~
~~94 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25,~~
~~2022.~~
~~95 SFRC Chairman Menendez opening remarks at hearing on JCPOA negotiations and United States policy on Iran~~
~~moving forward,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman’s Press, May 25, 2022. See also Senate Foreign~~
~~Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25, 2022.~~
~~96 “Ranking Member Risch opening statement at hearing on the JCPOA negotiations and Iran policy,” U.S. Senate~~
~~Committee on Foreign Relations Ranking Member’s Press, May 25, 2022.~~
~~97 “Kaine, Murphy & colleagues urge President Biden to return to Iran nuclear agreement under a compliance for~~
~~compliance approach,” Senator Tim Kaine, April 13, 2021.~~
~~98 “Chairman Menendez: We cannot allow Iran to threaten us into a bad deal or an interim agreement that allows it to~~
~~continue building its nuclear capacity,” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman’s Press, February 1,~~
~~2022; “Ranking Member Risch opening statement at hearing on the JCPOA negotiations and Iran policy,” U.S. Senate~~
~~Committee on Foreign Relations Ranking Member’s Press, May 25, 2022; Omri Nahmias, “Rep. Gottheimer to ‘Post’:~~
~~‘We shouldn’t allow Iran to threaten the US,’” Jerusalem Post, March 16, 2021; “Risch: Mr. President, stop doing~~
~~business with the Russians, walk away from Iran deal,” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Ranking Member’s~~
~~Press, March 9, 2022.~~
~~99 See, for example, On-the-record press gaggle by NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,~~
~~October 20, 2022; Jennifer Hansler, “US Iran envoy says he is focused on ‘where we can be useful’ and not going to~~
~~‘waste our time’ on nuclear deal right now,” CNN, October 31, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

18

~~Iran: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~Iran’s provision of weaponry to Russia for use in Ukraine may be one factor related to this shift in~~
~~focus away from the JCPOA, but it appears that the government’s crackdown on protests in Iran~~
~~is the dominant factor. Members of Congress may oversee and seek to shape U.S. policy~~
~~responses to the protests, though there may be limits to Congress’s ability to shape events~~
~~themselves.100 Dozens of Members have cosponsored resolutions that would commend the~~
~~demonstrators, condemn the Iranian government’s violent repression, and urge the Biden~~
~~Administration to continue to designate for sanctions Iranian entities involved in the~~
~~crackdown.101 Some Members have also called on the Administration to “make needed changes to~~
~~enhance the free flow of information in Iran.”102 Finally, some activists and JCPOA opponents~~
~~have called on the Biden Administration to formally terminate negotiations around reviving the~~
~~accord, a step Biden Administration officials are reportedly resistant to take even as they~~
~~emphasize that those negotiations are moribund and no longer a focus of U.S. efforts.103~~
104 In the 118th Congress, legislation directly relating to Iran’s nuclear program has been relatively limited to date. Outlook A vigorous protest movement shook the Islamic Republic in fall 2022. Although visible unrest diminished in early 2023, protests could resurge in the near future, and Iran remains beset by economic challenges that are at least partly a result of wide-ranging U.S. sanctions. At the same time, Iran’s regional influence remains considerable, and its growing ties with China and Russia could benefit Iran’s economy, military capabilities, and regional relationships. Looming over all of these domestic and foreign policy developments are Iran’s nuclear activities, which have advanced in recent years. Together, these dynamics pose a complex challenge for U.S. policymakers and Congress, which has long played an active role in overseeing U.S. policy toward Iran. The Biden Administration and many in Congress express support for demonstrators, but the United States’ ability to support the right of Iranians to protest, or to aid the protesters in achieving their various objectives, appears limited. To counter Iran’s strategic clout, the United States has sought to marshal regional opposition to Iran and isolate Iran on the world stage. Despite some successes on both fronts, Iran remains diplomatically engaged with many of its neighbors, including some U.S. partners, and the lack of U.S. relations with Tehran precludes direct U.S. involvement in those diplomatic engagements. It is unclear how the 2023 agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia may affect the likelihood of a revival of JCPOA negotiations. On the one hand, Iranian leaders may calculate that, given deeper ties with countries like China and Russia, they may not need the U.S. sanctions relief that an agreement to limit their nuclear program would secure. On the other hand, the re-establishment of relations with Saudi Arabia could possibly signal the beginning of a shift towards a policy of greater re-engagement. Following the agreement, an IRGC-affiliated media outlet reportedly stated, “The agreement with Saudi Arabia might pave the way for resolving the deadlock over the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).”105 Beyond the limitations of existing U.S. policy tools, a number of other factors may influence congressional views of, and action toward, U.S. policies regarding Iran, including: 102 “49 Senate Republicans tell President Biden: An agreement without broad congressional support will not survive,” Senator James M. Inhofe, March 14, 2022. 103 Such measures include legislation to condition potential U.S. entry into an agreement on IAEA inspectors having full access to Iranian nuclear facilities (H.R. 1203); on the Administration’s commitment to submit the agreement for approval by the Senate as a treaty (S. 1205/H.R. 1479); or on the President’s submission of the agreement as a treaty (S. 2030). Other proposed measures would have created congressional review and disapproval procedures similar to those of INARA for the lifting of any sanctions on Iran (S. 488/H.R. 1699). 104 See, for example, S. 434 and Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy: After four years of failed maximum pressure in Iran, we know we’re better off with a nuclear agreement,” September 22, 2022. 105 “Deal With KSA May Facilitate Return To Nuclear Deal, Iran Media Say,” Iran International, March 14, 2023. Congressional Research Service 19 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy  A lack of detailed, current information about dynamics within Iran, at least partially a result of the absence of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations. No Members of Congress or congressional staff appear to have visited Iran since 1979.106  The historical legacy of animosity between the United States and Iran, particularly the U.S. embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and subsequent Iranian government support for terrorism and attacks on U.S. military personnel in the Middle East.  The large, diverse, and politically active Iranian diaspora community. In seeking to understand Iran and to shape U.S. policy, potential questions that Members of Congress may consider include:  What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Iran? What U.S. policy approaches have been most and least successful in moving toward those goals?  How secure is the position of Supreme Leader Khamenei? Who might succeed him? What other factions or power centers exist within the Iranian political system and how might they influence leadership succession and future regime policy?  To what extent did protests in fall 2022 and early 2023 represent a threat to regime stability? How did they compare with similar periods of unrest in Iranian history? What are the goals of the current protest movement and how likely are they to achieve those goals? What, if anything, can the United States do to support them?  What are Iran’s regional aims, and what do they need to achieve them? What additional assets/capabilities do U.S. partners need to counter Iran? What are the implications of diplomatic engagement and economic ties between Iran and U.S. regional partners for U.S. interests?  Why has Iran provided Russia with weaponry for use in Ukraine and how has their partnership impacted Iran and its other bilateral relationships? What drives the deepening Iran-Russia relationship and should the United States and its partners seek to impede it?  Why has Iran increased its nuclear activities and what is the ultimate purpose of the program? What additional steps would Iran need to obtain a nuclear weapon and how can the United States and partners prevent that? What might be the implications of Iran’s obtaining a nuclear weapon for Iran’s broader foreign policy, regional stability, and other U.S. interests?  What was the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities, domestic politics in Iran, and U.S.-Iran relations overall? What was the impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA?  What are the arguments for and against attempting to rejoin the JCPOA? Given changes on both sides since 2015, is reviving the accord feasible? What alternative arrangements, if any, might meet the U.S. goal of securing limits on Iran’s nuclear activities? 106 Some Members of Congress have visited other countries without a U.S. embassy such as Syria (in 2017), Cuba (in 2009), and North Korea (in 2003). Congressional Research Service 20 Iran: Background and U.S. Policy
Author Information

Carla E. Humud Carla E. Humud
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
Ken Katzman provided knowledge, advice, and wisdom in the production of this report—and has been Ken Katzman provided knowledge, advice, and wisdom in the production of this report—and has been
indispensable in the authors’ careers. indispensable in the authors’ careers.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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~~100 John Irish and Arshad Mohammed, “Analysis: Beyond cutting hair and rhetoric, little West can do to change Iran’s~~
~~trajectory,” Reuters, October 20, 2022.~~
~~101 S.Res. 803; H.Res. 1397; S.Con.Res. 47; and H.Con.Res. 110.~~
~~102 October 8, 2022, letter to Secretary Antony Blinken and Secretary Janet Yellen from 21 Representatives.~~
~~103 See, for example, Sen. Mike Lee, Rep. Chris Stewart, and Khosrow Semnani, “America should send a powerful~~
~~message to Iran by terminating nuclear negotiations,” The Hill, November 1, 2022; Nahal Toosi, “‘Everyone thinks we~~
~~have magic powers’: Biden seeks a balance on Iran,” Politico, October 25, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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