Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

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Emerging Military Technologies:
~~November 1, 2022~~February 22, 2024
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
Technology and Global Technology and Global
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
Security Security
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly

evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the

United States’ traditional sources of military advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has United States’ traditional sources of military advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an
effort to exploit emerging technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and effort to exploit emerging technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation. In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, concepts of operation. In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation,
including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group. including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting that U.S.
national security will likely be national security will likely be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies
include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars
of the future. of the future.
Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology,
and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting. The United States is the leader in developing many of these and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting. The United States is the leader in developing many of these
technologies. However, China and Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced technologies. However, China and Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced
military technologies. As these technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could military technologies. As these technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could
hold significant implications for the future of international security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for hold significant implications for the future of international security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for
Congress, both in terms of funding and program oversight. Congress, both in terms of funding and program oversight.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and Russia: This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and Russia:
• artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence,
• lethal autonomous weapons, lethal autonomous weapons,
• hypersonic weapons, hypersonic weapons,
• directed energy weapons, directed energy weapons,
• biotechnology, and biotechnology, and
• quantum technology. quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the
potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated issues for Congress. These potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated issues for Congress. These
issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging
technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly
evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the
governance and regulation of emerging technologies. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, governance and regulation of emerging technologies. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization,
appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly
evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode
the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD)
has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging
technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations
focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense
Wargaming Alignment Group. Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third
Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New
technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence,
autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very
technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3 technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3
Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science,
autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting.4 autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting.4
Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military
technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these
technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future
of international security writ large. of international security writ large.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States,
China, and Russia: China, and Russia:
• artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence,
• lethal autonomous weapons, lethal autonomous weapons,
• hypersonic weapons, hypersonic weapons,
• directed energy weapons, directed energy weapons,

• biotechnology, 1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days 1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days
Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/. Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/.
2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second 2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second
Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p. 3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p.
3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
4 Department of Defense, 4 Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, October 2022, p. 19, at , October 2022, p. 19, at
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-
MDR.PDF. MDR.PDF.
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

~~ biotechnology,~~
• and quantum technology. and quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these
technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines
associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional
authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)5
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers
generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is
further divided into three categories: narrow AI, general AI, and artificial superintelligence. further divided into three categories: narrow AI, general AI, and artificial superintelligence.
Narrow AI systems can perform only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while Narrow AI systems can perform only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while
general AI systems would be capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for general AI systems would be capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for
which they were not specifically trained. Artificial superintelligence refers to a system “that which they were not specifically trained. Artificial superintelligence refers to a system “that
greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest.”6 greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest.”6
General AI systems and artificial superintelligence do not yet—and may never—exist.7 General AI systems and artificial superintelligence do not yet—and may never—exist.7
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the
United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence, United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance;8 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-surveillance, and reconnaissance;8 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or
replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding
work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on
operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis; operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis;
and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting
advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems. advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems.
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be
subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have
repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of
diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language
processing programs have developed gender bias.9 Such biases could hold significant processing programs have developed gender bias.9 Such biases could hold significant
implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected

biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended killing of civilians or noncombatants. 5 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, 5 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National
Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
6 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 6 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press,
2014). 2014).
7 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future 7 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future
of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).
8 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, 8 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Competition, by Nishawn S. Smagh. , by Nishawn S. Smagh.
9 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at 9 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to
Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/.
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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

~~biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended~~
~~killing of civilians or noncombatants.~~
Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could
lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited
demonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated demonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated inin Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that , researchers combined a picture that
an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled
“nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it “nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it
resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such
vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted
target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or, target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or,
potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting
and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator. and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition

Source: AndrewAndrew Ilachinski, Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analyses, January 2017, p. 61. Analyses, January 2017, p. 61.
Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly
realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries
could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.10 could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.10
Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news
reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government
officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to
deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and
authenticating content.11 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which authenticating content.11 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which
the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have
expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social
media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.12 media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.12
These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of

deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes. 10 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about 10 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about
information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Operations in the Information ~~Operations~~Environment, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A.
Theohary. Theohary.
11 Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of 11 Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of
synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to
synthetic & manipulated media,” synthetic & manipulated media,” Twitter, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html. new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.
12 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” 12 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2019, , 2019,
at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12. at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12.
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~~deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes~~
~~and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes.~~
United States
DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to
approximately $1.approximately $1.18 billion in billion in ~~FY2023~~FY2024, with the department maintaining over 685 active AI , with the department maintaining over 685 active AI
projects.13 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232), projects.13 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232),
DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate
DOD projects of over $15 million; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of DOD projects of over $15 million; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).14 The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).14 The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission
Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,15 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,15 humanitarian aid and disaster relief,
warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint
Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment” Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment”
intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.16 In December intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.16 In December
2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks directed the establishment of the Chief Digital 2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks directed the establishment of the Chief Digital
and Artificial Intelligence Office, which is to “serve as the successor organization to the JAIC, and Artificial Intelligence Office, which is to “serve as the successor organization to the JAIC,
reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”17 reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”17
The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and
fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the
Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled systems and Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled systems and
technologies in operational situations.”18 In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation technologies in operational situations.”18 In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation
Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted
recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.19 Based on these recommendations, recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.19 Based on these recommendations,
DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations: DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations:
responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.20 On May 26, 2021, Deputy responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.20 On May 26, 2021, Deputy

~~13 The amount listed as the FY2023 investment reflects DOD’s FY2023~~Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the implementation of Responsible Artificial Intelligence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical 13 The amount listed as the FY2024 investment reflects DOD’s FY2024 unclassified budget request for AI. DOD’s unclassified budget request for AI. DOD’s
actual investments in AI in actual investments in AI in ~~FY2023~~FY2024 may be higher; based on historical precedent, they are unlikely to be lower. Office may be higher; based on historical precedent, they are unlikely to be lower. Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, ~~Defense Budget Overview:~~ United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year ~~2023~~2024 Budget Request, , ~~April 2022, p. 4-7, at~~
~~https~~March 2023, p. 15, at hhttps://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.~~
FY2024/FY2024_Budget_Request.pdf; and Government Accountability Office, pdf; and Government Accountability Office, Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities
for Weapon Systems, February 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf. , February 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf.
14 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title VIII, §808. 14 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title VIII, §808.
15 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance 15 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance
based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense
Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/
1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. 1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.
16 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html. 16 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html.
17 Department of Defense, “Establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer,” December 8, 2021, 17 Department of Defense, “Establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer,” December 8, 2021,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/08/2002906075/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ON-ESTABLISHMENT-OF-THE-at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/08/2002906075/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ON-ESTABLISHMENT-OF-THE-
CHIEF-DIGITAL-AND-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-OFFICER.PDF. CHIEF-DIGITAL-AND-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-OFFICER.PDF.
18 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238. 18 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238.
19 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical 19 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical
commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/
2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF. 2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF.
20 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial 20 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-
adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
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~~Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the~~
~~implementation of Responsible Artificial Intelligence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical~~
~~principles.21 DOD then released an RAI strategy and implementation pathway in June 2022.22~~
principles.21 DOD then released an RAI strategy and implementation pathway in June 2022.22 Section 1544 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs DOD to assess whether a given AI technology operationalizes the RAI principles, “to report and remediate any artificial intelligence technology that is determined not to be in compliance with the [RAI] framework,” and to discontinue the use of noncompliant technology “until effective remediation is achievable.” E.O. 14110, Executive Order (E.O.) on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, additionally provides guidance on standards for AI safety and security.23 Finally, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on Finally, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI
technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The
commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and generally offers commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and generally offers
recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2) recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2)
applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and
building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) marshalling global AI cooperation.building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) marshalling global AI cooperation.2324 A A
number of NSCAI’s recommendations have been passed into law.number of NSCAI’s recommendations have been passed into law.2425 In addition, Section 247 of In addition, Section 247 of
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional
defense committees annual status reports on the department’s intent to implement NSCAI defense committees annual status reports on the department’s intent to implement NSCAI
recommendations, as well as any associated timelines for implementation.recommendations, as well as any associated timelines for implementation.2526
China
China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.2627
China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology” China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology”
~~that has become a “focus of international competition.”27 Recent Chinese achievements in the~~
~~field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China~~
~~has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into~~
~~the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter~~

21 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI product and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation, 21 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI product and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation,
responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks, responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks,
“Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at
https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-
INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF.
22 Department of Defense, 22 Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
Pathway, June 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-, June 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-
Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.PDF. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.PDF. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
has additionally issued has additionally issued Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio to to
operationalize DOD’s Ethical Principles for AI within DIU’s commercial prototyping and acquisitions programs. Jared operationalize DOD’s Ethical Principles for AI within DIU’s commercial prototyping and acquisitions programs. Jared
Dunnmon et al., Dunnmon et al., Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio, November 14, 2021, , November 14, 2021,
at at
https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/~~2021_RAI_~~
~~Report~~2021_RAI_Report-v3.pdf. 23 For additional information, see CRS Report R47843, Highlights of the 2023 Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence for Congress, by Laurie Harris and Chris Jaikaran; and CRS Insight IN12286, The AI Executive Order and Its Potential Implications for DOD, by Alexandra G. Neenan and Kelley M. Sayler. 24~~-v3.pdf.~~
23 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND
Corporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture Corporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture
for AI. See Danielle C. Tarraf et al., for AI. See Danielle C. Tarraf et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and
Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html. , RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.
2425 See, for example, Section 216 (“Improvements relating to Steering Committee on Emerging Technology and See, for example, Section 216 (“Improvements relating to Steering Committee on Emerging Technology and
National Security Threats”), Section 228 (“Executive Education on Emerging Technologies for Senior Civilian and National Security Threats”), Section 228 (“Executive Education on Emerging Technologies for Senior Civilian and
Military Leaders”), Section 903 (“Enhanced role for the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on Military Leaders”), Section 903 (“Enhanced role for the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council”), Section 909 (“Digital Talent Recruiting Officer”), and Section 1118 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council”), Section 909 (“Digital Talent Recruiting Officer”), and Section 1118
(“Occupational series for digital career fields”) of the FY2022 NDAA. (“Occupational series for digital career fields”) of the FY2022 NDAA.
2526 This requirement is to expire on December 27, 2023. This requirement is to expire on December 27, 2023.
2627 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA: (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018). Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018).
~~27 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2.~~
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that has become a “focus of international competition.”28 Recent Chinese achievements in the field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and
undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which
could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source
publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.2829
China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States. China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.2930 In In
general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research
laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for
example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national
intelligence work.”intelligence work.”3031 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military
AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes. AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes.
Russia
Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will
become the ruler of the world.”become the ruler of the world.”3132 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has
released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s
AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.3233 Russia Russia
has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for
robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.3334
The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on
semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat
module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—
and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous
systems.systems.3435 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval, In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval,
and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.~~35 These technologies~~
~~could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more~~
~~systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing~~
~~and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively~~

2836 These technologies 28 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2. 29 Elsa Kania, Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, ,
Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27. Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27.
2930 Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 6.
3031 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a
choice,” choice,” CNBC, March 5, 2019. , March 5, 2019.
3132 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” RT.com, September 1, , September 1,
2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.
3233 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the
Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology,
Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-
the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/. the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/.
3334 Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017. , August 8, 2017.
3435 Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” The Next Web, July 27, 2017, , July 27, 2017,
at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-
arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19,
2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-
machine-guns/. machine-guns/.
3536 Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,” Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,” The
Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017. , December 12, 2017.
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could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively communicate and navigate on the battlefield.37~~communicate and navigate on the battlefield.36~~ Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI
technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations
directed against the United States and U.S. allies.directed against the United States and U.S. allies.3738
Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant
progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have
produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications ~~globally38~~globally39—and that —and that
the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by
the United States and China.the United States and China.3940 Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing
that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a
notably disruptive force in cyberspace.notably disruptive force in cyberspace.4041 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing
technological cooperation with China.technological cooperation with China.4142
International Institutions
A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group
of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental
set of principles for AI.set of principles for AI.4243 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and
trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”4344 The United States is one of The United States is one of
42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the
foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-
~~centered AI.44 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop~~

36 37 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; The Wilson Quarterly, ,
Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,” Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,”
War on the Rocks, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-
near-you/. near-you/.
3738 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution,
November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-
warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at , May 25, 2018, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/.
3839 Margarita Konaev et al., Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for , Center for
Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9. Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9.
3940 Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at , September 5, 2017, at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina
Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15,
2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.
4041 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017. , September 5, 2017.
4142 Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, , Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have
cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both
Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating
Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9. , Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9.
4243 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption
of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt
O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020. O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020.
4344 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/. https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
~~44 “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/~~
~~000486596.pdf.~~
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centered AI.45 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible
development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.” development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.”
Similarly, in October 2021, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released its first AI Similarly, in October 2021, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released its first AI
strategy.strategy.4546 According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the strategy is to “set According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the strategy is to “set
standards for responsible use of artificial intelligence, in accordance with international law, standards for responsible use of artificial intelligence, in accordance with international law,
outline how [NATO] will accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence in what [it does], set out outline how [NATO] will accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence in what [it does], set out
how [NATO] will protect this technology, and address the threats posed by the use of artificial how [NATO] will protect this technology, and address the threats posed by the use of artificial
intelligence by adversaries.”intelligence by adversaries.”4647 NATO NATO ~~is to~~has additionally additionally ~~establish~~established AI test centers and a data and AI AI test centers and a data and AI
review board to “ensure the ‘operationalization’ of the AI strategy.”review board to “ensure the ‘operationalization’ of the AI strategy.”4748
Finally, in September 2021, the United States announced that it had formed a trilateral security Finally, in September 2021, the United States announced that it had formed a trilateral security
partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom.partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom.4849 This partnership, known as AUKUS, This partnership, known as AUKUS,
includes defense cooperation on artificial intelligence and autonomy, as well as hypersonic includes defense cooperation on artificial intelligence and autonomy, as well as hypersonic
weapons, quantum technologies, and other advanced capabilities.weapons, quantum technologies, and other advanced capabilities.4950
Potential Questions for Congress
• What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial
intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the
principles? principles?
• How is DOD testing and evaluating AI systems to ensure that they have not been How is DOD testing and evaluating AI systems to ensure that they have not been
exploited by adversaries? exploited by adversaries?
• Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications
may be used to harm U.S. national security? may be used to harm U.S. national security?
• How has the establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office How has the establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office
affected DOD’s ability to adopt AI applications? affected DOD’s ability to adopt AI applications?
• How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of
the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government
undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes? undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes?
~~Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)50~~
~~Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems,~~
~~Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems~~

45 45 “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000486596.pdf. 46 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” October 22, 2021, at North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” October 22, 2021, at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm?mc_cid=8f2b5c99db&mc_eid=5a3e8d2b43. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm?mc_cid=8f2b5c99db&mc_eid=5a3e8d2b43.
4647 Vivienne Machi, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” Vivienne Machi, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” C4ISRNET, November 3, 2021, at , November 3, 2021, at
https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-
intelligence/. intelligence/.
4748 Ibid. Ibid.
48For additional information, see NATO, “NATO’s Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board,” October 17, 2022, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_208374.htm; and NATO, “DIANA Network: Test Centers,” July 20, 2023, at https://www.diana.nato.int/resources/site1/general/maps/diana-test-centres-en_v5.pdf. 49 The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” September 15, 2021, at The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” September 15, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.
4950 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership The White House, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership
(AUKUS),” April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-(AUKUS),” April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-
implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/. implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
50 For additional information about For additional information about ~~LAWS~~AUKUS and advanced capability development, see CRS Report , see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for
R47599, AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress, by Patrick Parrish and Luke A. Nicastro. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)51 Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage
and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as
“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-
supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the
ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous,
or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target
groups that have been selected by a human operator.”groups that have been selected by a human operator.”5152
LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make
an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in
widespread development,widespread development,5253 it is believed they would enable military operations in it is believed they would enable military operations in
communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to
operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally “allow weapons to strike operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally “allow weapons to strike
military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian
casualties.casualties.5354
Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have
called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of
accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction
requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the
potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.5455 These risks could arise from These risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or “hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or
simple malfunctions or software errors.”simple malfunctions or software errors.”5556 Although such risks could be present in automated Although such risks could be present in automated
systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be
~~unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or~~
~~more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.56~~

51 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas. , by Nathan J. Lucas.
5152 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated ~~May 8, 2017~~January 25, 2023, at , at
https://www.esd.whs.https://www.esd.whs.
52mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. 53 Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’ Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’
definition of LAWS. See, for example, definition of LAWS. See, for example, Defense Innovation Board, AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use
of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense - Supporting Document, October 2019, p. 12, at , October 2019, p. 12, at
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/
DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that
Turkey’s deployment of the STM Turkey’s deployment of the STM Kargu-2 constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat, constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat,
the U.N. described the the U.N. described the Kargu-2 as being “ as being “programmed to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is
unlikely that the unlikely that the Kargu-2 meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March
2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of
the Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229. the Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229.
5354 U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,” U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,”
March 28, 2018, at https://March 28, 2018, at https://~~www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/~~
~~(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf.~~
54ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/Law%20of%20War/Practice%20Documents/US%20Working%20Paper%20-%20Humanitarian%20benefits%20of%20emerging%20technologies%20in%20the%20area%20of%20LAWS%20-%20CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4_E.pdf?ver=O0lg6BIxsFt57nrOuz3xHA%3D%3D. 55 See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security,
February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf. risk.pdf.
~~55 Ibid.~~
56 Ibid. 56 Ibid.
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unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.57
United States
The United States is not known to The United States is not known to ~~be developing LAWS, nor does it~~ currently have LAWS in its currently have LAWS in its
inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of
LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of
LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety
rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”5758 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be
designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment
over the use of force.”over the use of force.”5859 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human
“control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human
involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed.
In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including
lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; [f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries;
complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions
and,and, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seekif unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional humanadditional human operator input operator input
before continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that before continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that
could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized
parties. parties.
Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would
require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features
and ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, and ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, ~~LAWS~~
~~must undergo a secondary senior-level review by~~a secondary senior-level review is required for covered autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This review requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the , the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and ~~, and either~~ the Under Secretary of Defense for the Under Secretary of Defense for ~~Acquisition~~
~~and Sustainment or~~Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) to approve the system before formal development. USD(P), VCJCS, and the Under Secretary of Defense for the Under Secretary of Defense for ~~Research and Engineering prior to both~~
~~development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide~~
~~senior leaders through this review and is additionally updating DODD 3000.09.59~~
~~China~~
~~According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons~~
~~manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and~~
~~engage targets autonomously.60 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China~~
~~has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that~~
~~exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes:~~
~~The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [sic] to be~~
~~lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control~~
~~during the entire process of executing a task. Thirdly, impossibility for termination,~~
~~meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate~~

~~57 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) must then approve the system before fielding. In the event of “urgent military need,” this senior-level review may be waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DODD 3000.09 additionally establishes the Autonomous Weapon System Working Group—composed of representatives of USD(P); USD(R&E); USD(A&S); DOD General Counsel; the Chief Digital and AI Officer; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to support and advise the senior-level review process.60 Per Section 251 of the FY2024 (P.L. 118-31), the Secretary of Defense is to notify the defense committees of any changes to DODD 3000.09 within 30 days. The Secretary is directed to provide a description of the modification and an explanation of the reasons for the modification. 57 Ibid. 58 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated January 25, 2023, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
~~58 Department~~59Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated ~~May 8, 2017~~January 25, 2023, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. 60 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 10 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress China According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and engage targets autonomously.61 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes: The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [sic] to be lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control during the entire process of executing a task. Thirdly, impossibility for termination, meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate ~~, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
~~59 Valerie Insinna and Aaron Mehta, “Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details,”~~
Breaking Defense, May 26, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/updated-autonomous-weapons-rules-coming-
~~for-the-pentagon-exclusive-details/.~~
~~60 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019.~~
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effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of
conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with
the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities
in a way exceeding human expectations.in a way exceeding human expectations.6162
Russia
Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than
ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement
of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.6263 Russia has noted Russia has noted
that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while
contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”6364
Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons
manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles
capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.6465
International Institutions
Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the
auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UNU.N. CCW). The CCW). The
UNU.N. CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS,
as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UNU.N. CCW, the United States and Russia have CCW, the United States and Russia have
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not
development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate
and thus in violation of the law of war.and thus in violation of the law of war.65
~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all,~~
~~should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?~~
~~ What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?~~
~~Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration,~~
~~or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?~~
~~ If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review~~
~~processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient?~~

~~61 UN~~66 The United States has instead proposed the development 61 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019. 62 U.N. CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf. (httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf.
~~62 UN~~63 U.N. CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous
weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf. (httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf.
6364 Ibid. Ibid.
6465 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017. , July 19, 2017.
6566 For additional information about For additional information about UNU.N. CCW discussions on LAWS, see CRS In Focus IF11294, CCW discussions on LAWS, see CRS In Focus IF11294, International
Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
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of a nonbinding Code of Conduct, which “would help States promote responsible behavior and compliance with international law.”67 The United States has additionally issued the “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” which notes that “military use of AI must be in compliance with applicable international law” and occur within a “responsible human chain of command and control.”68 To date, 50 states have endorsed the declaration.69 Potential Questions for Congress • To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all, should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development? • What role should the United States play in U.N. CCW discussions of LAWS? Should the United States support the status quo or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS? • If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient? Hypersonic Weapons70~~Hypersonic Weapons66~~
A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic
weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. In contrast weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. In contrast
to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do not follow a to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do not follow a
parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making defense parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making defense
against them difficult. against them difficult.
There are two categories of hypersonic weapons: There are two categories of hypersonic weapons:
• Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target. target.67
71 • Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the are powered by high-speed engines throughout the
duration of their flight. duration of their flight.
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short
time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable
67 U.S. Delegation to the U.N. CCW, “Opening Statement, as delivered by Joshua Dorosin,” December 2, 2021, at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2021/12/03/convention-on-ccw-group-of-governmental-experts-on-emerging-technologies-in-the-area-of-laws/. 68 Department of State, “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” November 9, 2023, at https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy-2/. 69 For a list of endorsing states, see https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy/. 70 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf. 71 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon. Congressional Research Service 12 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.6872
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United
States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm
U.S. missile defenses.U.S. missile defenses.6973 Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons, Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons,
traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the
world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to
actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”7074
United States
The Pentagon The Pentagon ~~has~~ requested $4.7 billion in FY2023 for hypersonic weapons and $225.5 million requested $4.7 billion in FY2023 for hypersonic weapons and $225.5 million
for for hypersonic defense programs.75 The Pentagon declined to provide a breakout of funding for hypersonic-related research in FY2024, but requested $11 billion for long-range fires—a category that includes hypersonic weapons.76 DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.77 Analysts who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.78 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S. military has yet to identify any mission requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.79 72~~hypersonic defense programs.71 DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the~~
~~Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with~~

~~66 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background~~
~~and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459,~~ ~~Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide~~
~~Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~67 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to~~
~~as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon.~~
68 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of
Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. , RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
6973 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,
at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B.
Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
7074 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
7175 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-6, at t, April 2022, p. 4-6, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.
pdf. For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, pdf. For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile
Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler., by Kelley M. Sayler.
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~~the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as~~
~~through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.72 Analysts who support these~~
~~development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide~~
~~the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and~~
~~advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-~~
~~access/area denial strategies.73 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no~~
~~additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S. military has yet to identify any mission~~
~~requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.74~~
~~The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in~~
~~contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not~~ 76 CRS correspondence with DOD Comptroller on October 12, 2023; November 27, 2023; and January 4, 2024. 77 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. 78 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. 79 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/. Congressional Research Service 13 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before FY2025; however, in contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not known to be developing hypersonic weapons for developing hypersonic weapons for
potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop
hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more
technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese
systems. systems.
Section 237 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of Defense to both assess DOD’s capacity to test and evaluate hypersonic capabilities and “[identify] test facilities outside the Department of Defense that have potential to be used to expand [DOD] capacity ... including test facilities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, academia, and commercial test facilities.” Section 218 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs the Secretary to update this assessment at least once every two years. It additionally directs the Secretary to conduct a study to evaluate at least two possible locations in the United States that “have potential to be used as additional corridors for long-distance hypersonic system testing” and to submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD funding and investments in hypersonic capabilities. China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.7580 China’s pursuit of hypersonic China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.retaliatory strike against the United States.7681
China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a
2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear 2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear
hypersonic glide vehicle.hypersonic glide vehicle.7782 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern
Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is

~~72 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle~~
~~for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors~~
~~with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,”~~
~~Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-~~
~~shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464,~~
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
~~73 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at~~
~~the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army~~
~~Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.~~
~~74 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,”~~
Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-
~~changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/.~~
75testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”83 Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable HGV84—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.85 In contrast to the ballistic missiles that China has previously 80 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/
07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-
dilemma-pub-76894. dilemma-pub-76894.
7681 Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
7782 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2014 Annual Report, p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/ p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed~~
~~to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”78~~
~~Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable HGV79—launched by a Long~~
~~March rocket—in August 2021.80 In contrast to the ballistic missiles that China has previously~~
83 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf. 84 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy. 85 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16, 2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (continued...) Congressional Research Service 14 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS),
launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with
a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior
to a strike.to a strike.8186
China has additionally tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014. China has additionally tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014.
U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200 U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200
miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during
flight.flight.8287 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could
have become operational as early as 2020.have become operational as early as 2020.8388 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested
Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.8489 Some reports indicate that the Some reports indicate that the
Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.8590 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the U.S. officials have declined to comment on the
program.program.8691
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2002.2002.8792 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting

~~78 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020,~~
~~at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf.~~
~~79 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.~~
~~80 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,~~
~~2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson~~
constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.”93 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV. Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.
Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml. October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.
8186 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021, , September 20, 2021,
at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/. at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.
8287 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at , April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/. missile-defense-systems/.
8388 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
8489 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” CNN, August 7, 2018, at , August 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
8590 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. p. 20.
8691 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at , August 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
8792 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
93 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality,~~
~~and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in~~
~~the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could~~
~~simply be intercepted.”88 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they~~
approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its
sense of strategic stability.sense of strategic stability.8994
Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon
(or Zircon).(or Zircon).95 Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively
~~‘unlimited’ range.”90 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December~~
~~2019.91~~‘unlimited’ range.”96 Reports indicate that Avangard is currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat reportedly entered combat duty in September 2023.97 Tsirkon has a range of between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from Tsirkon has a range of between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from
the vertical launch systems mounted on cruisers the vertical launch systems mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and and Pyotr Veliky, Project , Project
20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other
platforms.platforms.9298 Russian news sources assert that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project Russian news sources assert that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project
22350 frigate in January, October, and December 2020 and 22350 frigate in January, October, and December 2020 and May 2022, and from a Project 885 Yasen-class from a Project 885 Yasen-class
~~submarine in October 2021.93 Russian news sources additionally indicate that, following a~~
~~successful May 2022 test, the missile will become operational by the end of 2022 and is likely to~~
~~be fielded on Project 22350 frigates.94~~submarine in October 2021.99 Russia reportedly deployed Tsirkon on the Project 22350 frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov in January 2023.100
International Institutions
No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic
weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United
States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which
could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.95101 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard Because Russia has deployed its Avangard
hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard
count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes
that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the

~~88 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/~~
~~president/news/56957.~~
89 94 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894. pub-76894.
9095 Although it is frequently characterized as a “hypersonic weapon”—including by U.S. defense officials, a third weapon, the Kinzhal, is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile. See, for example, CSIS Missile Defense Project, “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” Updated March 19, 2022, at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/. 96 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. , January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
~~91 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,~~
~~at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.~~
9297 Al Jazeera, “Russia puts advanced Sarmat nuclear missile system on ‘combat duty,’” September 2, 2023, at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/2/russia-puts-advanced-sarmat-nuclear-missile-system-on-combat-duty#:~:text=Russia%20test%2Dfired%20the%20Sarmat,in%20Russia's%20far%20east%20region. Sarmat could reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR. 98 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at , December 21, 2018, at
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf. military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
9399 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at , February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Samuel Cranny-https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Samuel Cranny-
Evans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Evans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required), (subscription required),
October 4, 2021. October 4, 2021.
~~94 Isabel van Brugen, “Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race,” Newsweek, July~~
~~18, 2022, at https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426.~~
95100 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin deploys new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles to Atlantic,” Reuters, January 4, 2023, at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-sends-off-frigate-armed-with-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-2023-01-04/. 101 For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic
missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” Air Force Magazine, May 7, , May 7,
2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/. 2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/.
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question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate
provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START
limits.limits.96102 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term
solution.solution.97103 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries
other than the United States and Russia.other than the United States and Russia.104
Finally, some analysts have noted that if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a Finally, some analysts have noted that if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a
nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in
violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.98105
Potential Questions for Congress
• What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons
the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?
• Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how
should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or
the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling
technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?
• How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is
there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START,
negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking
transparency and confidence-building activities? transparency and confidence-building activities?
Directed Energy (DE) ~~Weapons99~~Weapons106
DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy,
rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment,
facilities, and/or personnel.”facilities, and/or personnel.”~~100~~107 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air
defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery, defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.and mortar (C-RAM) missions.~~101~~108 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming
~~access to a sufficient power supply102—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing~~

96 102 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
97103 CRS Report R41219, CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
98104 In addition to China, countries with hypersonic weapons development programs include Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan. For additional information, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler. 105 Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—but Not a Breakthrough,” Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—but Not a Breakthrough,” Foreign Policy, ,
October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/. October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/.
99106 For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925, For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense
Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. , coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler.
~~100~~107 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3-85, May 22, 2020, GL-6. , May 22, 2020, GL-6.
~~101~~108 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, Department of
Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
~~102 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state~~
~~lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical~~
power required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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access to a sufficient power supply109—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile
salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options
for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of
hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and
utility of this application.utility of this application.~~103~~110
High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic
means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as
a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control. a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.
United States
Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts
have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fallen short of have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fallen short of
expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately
cancelled.cancelled.~~104~~111 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for
military applications.military applications.~~105~~112 Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions
about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality
and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size
requirements for integration into current platforms.requirements for integration into current platforms.~~106~~113
The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS),
in 2014 aboard the USS in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable . LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable
of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging
helicopters.”helicopters.”~~107~~114 In addition, the Navy installed its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS In addition, the Navy installed its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS Preble in in
FY2022 and plans to continue at-sea testing FY2022 and plans to continue at-sea testing ~~in FY2023.108 Similarly, the Army plans to field its~~
~~first “combat relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense~~
~~System—on Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2023 (previously planned for FY2022).109 The Air~~

through at least the end of FY2028.115 Similarly, the Army delivered a platoon of 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System prototypes to the 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (Fort Sill, Oklahoma) in 109 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-
weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready.
~~103~~110 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense, ,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling. toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
~~104~~111 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security, Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security,
April 2015, p. 4. April 2015, p. 4.
~~105~~112 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at , July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready. ready.
~~106~~113 Ibid. Ibid.
~~107~~114 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Popular Mechanics, ,
August 7, 2019. Kilowatts are units of power. For example, 1 kilowatt is equal to 1,000 watts. August 7, 2019. Kilowatts are units of power. For example, 1 kilowatt is equal to 1,000 watts.
~~108~~115 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) ~~2023~~2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, ~~April 2022, p. 1011~~March 2023, p. 979, at , at
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/~~23pres~~24pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Congressional Research Service 18~~/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; and Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS~~
~~Shipboard Laser Being Tested at Wallops Island,” Seapower Magazine, August 1, 2021, at~~
~~https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-helios-shipboard-laser-being-tested-at-wallops-island/.~~
~~109 See also Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,~~ ~~Defense Budget Overview:~~
~~United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 6-6, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.~~
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2023.116 The Air Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including Force is currently conducting field assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including
both laser and high-powered microwave systems.both laser and high-powered microwave systems.~~110~~117 Overall, DOD requested approximately $1 billion for directed energy weapons programs in FY2024.118
~~Overall, DOD requested at least $699 million in FY2023 for unclassified DE research,~~
~~development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $345 million for unclassified DE~~
~~weapons procurement.111~~ Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed
~~Energy Roadmap, which seeks to scale up DE weapon power levels from around 150 kW~~Energy Roadmap. According to OUSD(R&E), DOD’s DE roadmap outlines DOD’s plans to increase power levels of HEL weapons from around 150 kilowatt (kW), as is , as is
currently feasible, tocurrently feasible, to ~~around 300 kW in FY2023 “with goal milestones to achieve 500 kW class~~
500 kW class—with reduced size and weightwith reduced size and weight —by FY2025by FY2025 ~~and~~ . DOD seeks “to further reduce size and weight and increase to further reduce size and weight and increase
power to MW [megawatt] levels by FY2026.”power to MW [megawatt] levels by FY2026.”~~112~~119
China
According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been
developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing
HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.~~113~~120 China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road- China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-
mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided
weapons.weapons.~~114~~121 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has
used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to
disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.~~115~~122
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons
to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited
capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a
ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and

~~pdf. See also Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,~~ ~~Defense Budget~~
~~Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 10-8, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/~~
~~FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.~~
~~110~~by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the structures of non-optical satellites.123 116 Venetia Gonzales, “Groundbreaking laser prototype systems delivered to 4-60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment,” U.S. Army, September 21, 2023, at https://www.army.mil/article/270134/groundbreaking_laser_prototype_systems_delivered_to_4_60th_air_defense_artillery_regiment. 117 For a more in-depth discussion of U.S. DE programs, see CRS Report R46925, For a more in-depth discussion of U.S. DE programs, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense Directed
Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. , coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler.
~~111 These figures include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and~~
~~Navy. CRS analysis of FY2023 budget documents; for additional information, see Appendix B in CRS Report R46925,~~
Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M.
~~Sayler.~~
~~112~~118 CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Dr. Frank Peterkin, May 17, 2023. See also Government Accountability Office, Directed Energy Weapons: DOD Should Focus Transition on Planning, April 2023, p. 1. 119 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 8, CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 8,
2022. For reference, although no consensus exists regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize 2022. For reference, although no consensus exists regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize
different target sets, DOD briefing documents suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage UASs, different target sets, DOD briefing documents suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage UASs,
rockets, artillery, and mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage small boats and cruise rockets, artillery, and mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage small boats and cruise
missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at—the laser). Lasers of 1 MW could potentially missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at—the laser). Lasers of 1 MW could potentially
neutralize ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon neutralize ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon
Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with
then-Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels then-Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels
could be affected by additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects. could be affected by additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.
~~113~~120 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), USCC 2017 Annual Report, November 2017, p. , November 2017, p.
563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
~~114~~121 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, November 9, 2018. , November 9, 2018.
~~115~~122 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020; , January 8, 2020;
and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
123 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the~~
~~structures of non-optical satellites.116~~
Russia
Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on
HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several
mobile intercontinental ballistic missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet,
including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle satellites and provide point defense including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle satellites and provide point defense
against unmanned aircraft systems.against unmanned aircraft systems.~~117~~124 Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has
stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military
aircraft.aircraft.~~118~~125 Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as well as additional HELs Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as well as additional HELs
capable of performing antisatellite missions. capable of performing antisatellite missions.
International Institutions
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”~~119~~126 However, certain applications of DE weapons However, certain applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the
employment of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of employment of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”~~120~~127 Some analysts Some analysts
have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may
consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or
lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE
weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.~~121~~128 Other analysts have argued that DE Other analysts have argued that DE
weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy
could potentially reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-could potentially reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-
personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.~~122~~

~~116 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/~~
~~27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.~~
~~117~~129 Potential Questions for Congress • Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for military applications? 124 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new 27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new
Russian laser weapons,” Russian laser weapons,” Associated Press, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a. , May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a.
~~118~~125 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” The Space Review, June 5, , June 5,
2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1.2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1.
~~119~~ 126 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017. Article 36, November 2017.
~~120~~127 The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the
employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” Additional Protocol to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series, , Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf. vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.
For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS
Report R41526, Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by , by
Ronald O'Rourke. Ronald O'Rourke.
~~121~~128 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
~~122~~129 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf. documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
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~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?~~
~~To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for~~
~~military applications?~~
• How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use
of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military
operations? operations?
• In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of
DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures
should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both
war and peacetime? war and peacetime?
Biotechnology
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments
in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security
writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,~~123~~130 have the potential have the potential
to to
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies
could be used to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military personnel. The could be used to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military personnel. The
proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in
nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological
weapons.weapons.~~124~~131
Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome
editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.~~125~~132
In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or
lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.~~126~~133 Concerns have been Concerns have been
raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and
application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or
more invasive forms of human performance modification.more invasive forms of human performance modification.~~127~~

~~123~~134 130 For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E.
Gallo et al. Gallo et al.
~~124~~131 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf.
~~125~~132 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016. delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016.
~~126~~133 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “Army , July 1, 2019; and “Army
scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/
army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential. army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.
~~127~~134 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for
the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine, Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine,
modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish, Human Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1. Congressional Research Service 21 ~~Congressional Research Service~~

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

United States
Overall, DOD requested $1.3 billion for biotechnology efforts in FY2023; the department did not provide a topline breakout of its request for biotechnology in FY2024.135 Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on
improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of
biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also
exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric
illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases
and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program
seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing
technologies.”technologies.”~~128 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories,~~
~~which completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology “intended~~
~~to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”129~~
~~In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously~~
~~researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including~~
~~applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more~~
~~endurance than other humans.”130 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this~~
~~research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between~~
~~1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.131~~
~~Finally,~~ 136 DOD is DOD is also exploring “advanced development and operational testing of biomanufacturing exploring “advanced development and operational testing of biomanufacturing
capabilities to provide alternative sources for critical supply chain materials” and other “products capabilities to provide alternative sources for critical supply chain materials” and other “products
needed for non-medical supply chain resiliencyneeded for non-medical supply chain resiliency~~.”132 DOD requested $1.3 billion for~~
~~biotechnology efforts in FY2023.133~~
~~Although there does not appear to be a DOD-specific biotechnology research strategy, the Biden~~
~~Administration released the~~ ~~National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for~~
~~Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health~~
~~Security—as well as an associated~~ ~~National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological~~
~~Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security (NSM-15)—~~
~~in October 2022.134 These documents outline “how the U.S. Government will manage its~~

~~modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-~~
~~enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish,~~ ~~Human~~
~~Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/~~
~~publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.~~
~~128~~,” and is to invest $1 billion in bioindustrial domestic manufacturing infrastructure over five years.137 Similarly, DOD has announced the establishment of a Tri-Service Biotechnology for a Resilient Supply Chain program, which is to include “more than $270 million investment over five years … to support the advanced development of bio-based materials for defense supply chains, such as fuels, fire-resistant composites, polymers and resins, and protective materials.”138 In addition, Section 215 of the FY2023 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense, subject to the availability of appropriations, to provide support for the development of a network of bioindustrial manufacturing facilities.139 In support of these efforts, DOD released its Biomanufacturing Strategy in March 2023.140 135 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 136 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at
https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1. https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1.
~~129 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter~~
~~needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017.~~
~~130 Annie Jacobsen,~~ ~~The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top-Secret Military~~
~~Research Agency~~ ~~(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s~~
~~Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/~~
~~2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/.~~
~~131 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of~~
~~Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.~~
~~132 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,~~ ~~Defense Budget Overview: United~~
~~States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.~~
~~pdf.~~
~~133 Ibid.~~
~~134 The White House,~~137 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and The White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States Announces New Investments and Resources to Advance President Biden’s National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative,” September 14, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/14/fact-sheet-the-united-states-announces-new-investments-and-resources-to-advance-president-bidens-national-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-initiative/. 138 The White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States Announces New Investments and Resources to Advance President Biden’s National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative,” September 14, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/14/fact-sheet-the-united-states-announces-new-investments-and-resources-to-advance-president-bidens-national-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-initiative/. 139 P.L. 117-263, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §215. DOD’s FY2024 budget request notes that, following a $300 million congressional add in support of Section 215, the BioMADE Manufacturing Innovation Institute—a DOD-sponsored public-private partnership headquartered at the University of Minnesota in St. Paul—is to initiate the development of the network. DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, March 2023, p. 296, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf. 140 Department of Defense, Biomanufacturing Strategy, March 21, 2023, at https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/22/2003184301/-1/-1/1/BIOMANUFACTURING-STRATEGY.PDF. Congressional Research Service 22 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Some reports suggest that the United States is also researching or has previously researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more endurance than other humans.”141 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between 1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.142 Although there does not appear to be a DOD-specific biotechnology research strategy, the Biden Administration released the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats,
Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health ~~Security, October 2022, at~~
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Security—as well as an associated National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security (NSM-15)—in October 2022.143 These documents outline “how the U.S. Government will manage its activities to more effectively assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological activities to more effectively assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological
threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of [state, local, tribal, and territorial] threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of [state, local, tribal, and territorial]
entities, international partners, industry, academia, nongovernmental entities, and the private entities, international partners, industry, academia, nongovernmental entities, and the private
sector.”sector.”~~135~~144 The Administration notes that, while it is currently “implementing key actions in the The Administration notes that, while it is currently “implementing key actions in the
Strategy with existing funding,” full implementation “will require the support of Congress to Strategy with existing funding,” full implementation “will require the support of Congress to
provide additional resources, including the President’s $88 billion request over five years for provide additional resources, including the President’s $88 billion request over five years for
pandemic preparedness and biodefense.”pandemic preparedness and biodefense.”~~136~~
145 Congress has expressed an interest in conducting oversight of the military applications of Congress has expressed an interest in conducting oversight of the military applications of
emerging biotechnologies. For example, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), emerging biotechnologies. For example, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92),
DOD is to conduct “a review of the military understanding and relevancy of applications of DOD is to conduct “a review of the military understanding and relevancy of applications of
emerging biotechnologies to national security requirements of the Department of Defense” and emerging biotechnologies to national security requirements of the Department of Defense” and
provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.”provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.”~~137~~146 Section 278 of Section 278 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison
~~of capabilities in emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ... between the~~
~~capabilities of the United States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”138~~
~~Finally, Section 1091 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) establishes the National Security~~
~~Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, which is to “consider the methods, means, and~~
~~investments necessary to advance and secure the development of biotechnology,~~
~~biomanufacturing, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address~~
~~the national security and defense needs of the United States.” The commission is to deliver its~~
~~interim findings and recommendations to the congressional defense committees and the President~~
~~no later than January 26, 2023, and its final report no later than January 26, 2024.139~~
~~China~~
~~Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly~~
~~interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority~~

141 Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top-Secret Military Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/. 142 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html. 143 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-
Final.pdf; and The White House, Final.pdf; and The White House, National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing
Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 18, 2022, at , October 18, 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/10/18/national-security-memorandum-on-https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/10/18/national-security-memorandum-on-
countering-biological-threats-enhancing-pandemic-preparedness-and-achieving-global-health-security/. See also Diane countering-biological-threats-enhancing-pandemic-preparedness-and-achieving-global-health-security/. See also Diane
Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018. , November 27, 2018.
~~135~~ 144 The White House, The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats,
Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 2022, at , October 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-
Final.pdf. Final.pdf.
~~136~~145 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Releases Strategy to Strengthen Health Security and The White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Releases Strategy to Strengthen Health Security and
Prepare for Biothreats,” October 18, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-Prepare for Biothreats,” October 18, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/10/18/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-strategy-to-strengthen-health-security-and-prepare-releases/2022/10/18/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-strategy-to-strengthen-health-security-and-prepare-
for-biothreats/. This $88 billion request includes funds for the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of for-biothreats/. This $88 billion request includes funds for the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National
Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development; it does not include funds for DOD. Development; it does not include funds for DOD.
~~137~~146 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §263. P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §263.
~~138 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §278.~~
~~139 A list of the eight commissioners appointed by the Armed Services Committees is available at~~
~~https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=5806E52B-95BB-4921-9F92-D1A5BC2DA8C4. One additional~~
~~commissioner is to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, Senate Majority Leader, and~~
~~Senate Minority Leader, respectively.~~
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Congressional Research Service 23 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress of capabilities in emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ... between the capabilities of the United States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”147 Similarly, Section 1312 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct “an analysis to determine if any biotechnology entity, or any subsidiary, parent, affiliate, or successor of such an entity, should be identified as a Chinese military company or a military-civil fusion contributor and included on [DOD’s 1260H] list.”148 Finally, Section 1091 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) establishes the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, which is to “consider the methods, means, and investments necessary to advance and secure the development of biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States.” The commission delivered an interim report to Congress in December 2023 and is to deliver its final report in December 2024.149 China Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority within China’s within China’s Made in China 2025 initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s
current five-year development plan.current five-year development plan.~~140~~150 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing In particular, China is aggressively pursuing
biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became
the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist
produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited
babies.”babies.”~~141~~151 In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic
information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be
used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.~~142~~152
Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of
biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the
Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.~~143~~153 Furthermore, Furthermore,
reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain
science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance
~~enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical~~
~~institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.144~~
~~Russia~~
~~Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing~~
~~of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag~~
~~behind that of the United States and China.145 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for~~
~~biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and~~
~~bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental~~
~~protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.146~~
~~Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies~~
~~within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted~~
~~to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in~~
~~violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly~~
~~unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.147~~

~~140~~ 147 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §278. 148 For additional information about DOD’s 1260H list, see Section 1260H of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283). 149 See National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, Interim Report, December 2023, at https://www.biotech.senate.gov/press-releases/interim-report/. 150 “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and
Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, Translated by Etcetera Language Group, , March 12, 2021, Translated by Etcetera Language Group,
Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf. Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf.
~~141~~151 Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely
abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” Al
Jazeera, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a , November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a
‘New Domain of Warfare,’” ‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019. , August 14, 2019.
~~142~~152 David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also , July 31, 2017. See also
Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New
Revolution in Military Affairs,” Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/
chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
~~143~~153 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of
Warfare,’” Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-
biotech/159167/. biotech/159167/.
~~144 Ibid.~~
~~145 Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology~~
~~in the Russian Federation,” 2012.~~
~~146 Ibid.~~
~~147 Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,” BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment~~
~~of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying~~
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Congressional Research Service 24 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.154 Russia Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag behind that of the United States and China.155 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.156 Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.157 Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological
weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.~~148~~158
Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of
representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where
appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research
institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.~~149~~159
International Institutions
Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.~~150~~160 Some Some
international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of
biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on
biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since
1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that 1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that
monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors
involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment, involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment,
industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with
~~governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.151 These entities are not,~~
~~however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology.~~
~~In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review~~
~~conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing~~
~~developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to~~
~~informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts~~
~~to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be~~
~~established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or~~
~~limits on certain applications.152~~
~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research~~
~~priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or~~
~~organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national~~
~~biodefense strategy?~~

154 Ibid. 155 Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation,” 2012. 156 Ibid. 157 Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,” BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report: and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report: Biodefense in the
Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890. , National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890.
~~148~~158 Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018, Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018,
at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/. at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.
~~149~~159 The ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national The ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity
List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/
27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list. 27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list.
~~150~~160 The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally
binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons. binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons.
~~151 The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols.~~
~~152 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,”~~ ~~Bulletin of the Atomic~~
~~Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.~~
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Congressional Research Service 25 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.161 These entities are not, however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology. In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or limits on certain applications.162 Potential Questions for Congress • Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national biodefense strategy? • What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing? What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?
Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of
biotechnologies with ethical considerations? biotechnologies with ethical considerations?
• What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the
ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies
such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance
modification? modification?
Quantum ~~Technology153~~Technology163
Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological
applications.applications.~~154~~164 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could
hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications. hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications.
GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications
could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able
to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified,
classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and
military operations.”military operations.”~~155~~
~~Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which~~
~~could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans~~
~~“transparent.”156 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear~~
~~deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing~~
~~options that could in theory allow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS-~~
~~degraded or GPS-denied environments.~~
~~Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of~~
~~quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other~~
~~environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use~~
~~quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make~~

~~153~~165 161 The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols. 162 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/. 163 See also CRS In Focus IF11836, See also CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
~~154~~164 These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and
entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement
of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily
Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences,
2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS 2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS
Report R45409, Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy
Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola. , by Patricia Moloney Figliola.
~~155~~165 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances
in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a
~~quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the~~
~~principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today~~
~~have around 256 qubits. See Siobhan Roberts, “This new startup has built a record-breaking 256-qubit quantum~~
~~computer,” MIT Technology Review, November 17, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/17/1040243/quantum-computer-256-bit-startup/.~~
~~156 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security~~
~~Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-~~
~~technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.”157~~(continued...) Congressional Research Service 26 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans “transparent.”166 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing options that could in theory allow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS-degraded or GPS-denied environments. Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.”167 As a result, widespread adoption will likely require As a result, widespread adoption will likely require
significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques. significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.
United States
According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies
assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the
U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.~~158~~168 The task The task
force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain
missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is
degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial
computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum
communications could improve networking technologies.communications could improve networking technologies.~~159~~169 The task force concludes that The task force concludes that
“quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing “quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing
and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide
upgraded capability to DOD.”upgraded capability to DOD.”~~160~~170 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum
technology programs across these and other research areas. technology programs across these and other research areas.
In addition, some analysts believe that an initial quantum computer prototype capable of breaking In addition, some analysts believe that an initial quantum computer prototype capable of breaking
current encryption methods could be developed in the 2030 to 2040 timeframe.current encryption methods could be developed in the 2030 to 2040 timeframe.~~161~~171 For this reason, For this reason,
the United States is investing in post-quantum cryptography (also known as quantum-resistant the United States is investing in post-quantum cryptography (also known as quantum-resistant
cryptography). In May 2022, the Biden administration released cryptography). In May 2022, the Biden administration released National Security Memorandum
~~on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to~~
~~Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems (NSM-10), which “directs specific actions for agencies to take~~
~~as the United States begins the multi-year process of migrating vulnerable computer systems to~~
~~quantum-resistant cryptography.”162 NSM-10 notes that the Director of the National Institute of~~
~~Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) are~~
~~developing and expected to publicly release by 2024 technical standards for quantum-resistant~~
~~cryptography. In September 2022, NSA issued a cybersecurity advisory stating that it “expects the~~
~~transition to [quantum-resistant] algorithms for [national security systems] to be complete by~~
~~2035 in line with NSM-10.”163~~

~~157~~ quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today have around 256 qubits. See Siobhan Roberts, “This new startup has built a record-breaking 256-qubit quantum computer,” MIT Technology Review, November 17, 2021, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/17/1040243/quantum-computer-256-bit-startup/. 166 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-technology-primer-national-security-professionals/. 167 U.S. Army Research Lab Public Affairs, “Army researchers see path to quantum computing at room temperature,” U.S. Army Research Lab Public Affairs, “Army researchers see path to quantum computing at room temperature,”
April 30, 2020, at April 30, 2020, at
https://www.army.mil/article/235127/army_researchers_see_path_to_quantum_computing_at_room_temperature#:~:https://www.army.mil/article/235127/army_researchers_see_path_to_quantum_computing_at_room_temperature#:~:te
~~xt=~~text=%E2%80%9CIf%20future%20devices%20that%20use,power%20hungry%2C%E2%80%9D%20Heuck%20said. %E2%80%9CIf%20future%20devices%20that%20use,power%20hungry%2C%E2%80%9D%20Heuck%20said.
~~158~~168 Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at , October 2019, at
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm. https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm.
~~159~~169 Ibid. Ibid.
~~160~~170 Ibid. Ibid.
~~161~~171 See, for example, “Quantum computers will break the encryption that protects the internet,” See, for example, “Quantum computers will break the encryption that protects the internet,” The Economist, October , October
10, 2018, at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2018/10/20/quantum-computers-will-break-the-10, 2018, at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2018/10/20/quantum-computers-will-break-the-
encryption-that-protects-the-internet. encryption-that-protects-the-internet.
~~162 The White House,~~ ~~National Security Memorandum~~ Congressional Research Service 27 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing
While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems (NSM-10), which “directs specific actions for agencies to take as the United States begins the multi-year process of migrating vulnerable computer systems to quantum-resistant cryptography.”172 NSM-10 notes that the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) are developing and expected to publicly release by 2024 technical standards for quantum-resistant cryptography. In September 2022, NSA issued a cybersecurity advisory stating that it “expects the transition to [quantum-resistant] algorithms for [national security systems] to be complete by 2035 in line with NSM-10.”173 Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232)~~Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems, May 4, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-~~
~~room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-~~
~~quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/.~~
~~163 National Security Agency, “Cybersecurity Advisory: Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm~~
~~Suite 2.0,” September 7, 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-~~
~~1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA~~, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under , the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating quantum Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating quantum
technology programs and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum technology programs and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum
information science and technology research and development between the Department of information science and technology research and development between the Department of
Defense and other departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector Defense and other departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector
entities.”entities.”~~164~~174 In addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary In addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary
of each military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers of each military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers
that may “engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum that may “engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum
research.research.~~165~~ To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research
Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research
Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army does not plan to establish a QIS Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army does not plan to establish a QIS
Research Center at this time.Research Center at this time.~~166~~175
Finally, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and Finally, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and
annually update a list of technical challenges that quantum computers could potentially address annually update a list of technical challenges that quantum computers could potentially address
within the next one to three years.within the next one to three years.~~167~~176 It also directs the services to establish programs with small It also directs the services to establish programs with small
and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and
academic researchers working on these challenges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an academic researchers working on these challenges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an
assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as well as current standards for post-assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as well as current standards for post-
quantum cryptography. In addition, Section 229 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the quantum cryptography. In addition, Section 229 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the
Secretary of Defense to establish activities to “to accelerate the development and deployment of Secretary of Defense to establish activities to “to accelerate the development and deployment of
dual-use quantum capabilities,” while Section 511 expands the grant program for science, dual-use quantum capabilities,” while Section 511 expands the grant program for science,
technology, engineering, and math education in the Junior Research Officers’ Training Corps to technology, engineering, and math education in the Junior Research Officers’ Training Corps to
include quantum information sciences. include quantum information sciences.
~~China~~
~~China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.168~~
~~Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research~~
~~initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the~~
~~country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.169 China is already a world~~
~~leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite~~
~~(Micius) to provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.”170 In 2017, China~~

~~164 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234.~~
~~165 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §220.~~
~~166~~ 172 The White House, National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems, May 4, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/. 173 National Security Agency, “Cybersecurity Advisory: Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0,” September 7, 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF. 174 Section 219 of the FY2024 NDAA amended this provision to authorize the Secretary of Defense to “carry out a program of fellowships in quantum information science and technology research and development for individuals who have a graduate or postgraduate degree.” Similarly, Section 220 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directs the Secretary of Defense to “to establish public-private talent exchange programs with private-sector entities working on quantum information sciences and technology research applications.” 175 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, April 5, CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, April 5,
2021. 2021.
~~167~~176 On behalf of the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified On behalf of the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified
these challenges as quantum chemistry, optimization, and machine learning. CRS correspondence with the Office of the these challenges as quantum chemistry, optimization, and machine learning. CRS correspondence with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 25, 2022. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 25, 2022.
~~168 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John~~
~~Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, Center for a New~~
~~American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-~~
~~Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406.~~
~~169 Ibid., p. 6.~~
~~170 Office of the Secretary of Defense,~~ ~~Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the~~
~~People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 146, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/~~
~~2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. This satellite—as well as the other communications networks~~
~~discussed in this section—employ quantum key distribution (QKD), a subset of quantum communications. QKD~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~hosted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.171~~Congressional Research Service 28 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Finally, Section 231 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program on near-term quantum computing applications. China China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.177 Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.178 China is already a world leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite (Micius) to provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.”179 In 2017, China hosted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.180 Furthermore, China is Furthermore, China is
investing heavily in terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a investing heavily in terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a
2,000 kilometer (approximately 1,250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and 2,000 kilometer (approximately 1,250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and
plans to expand that network nationwide in the years to come.plans to expand that network nationwide in the years to come.~~172~~181 While such advances in quantum While such advances in quantum
technology have been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage technology have been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage
them for military applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion them for military applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion
Special Projects Plan. Special Projects Plan.
Russia
Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to
10 years behind” in quantum computing.10 years behind” in quantum computing.~~173~~182 In an effort to spur development, Russia announced In an effort to spur development, Russia announced
plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and
adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.~~174~~183 These initiatives are not 177 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, Center for a New American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406. 178 Ibid., p. 6. 179 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 146, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. This satellite—as well as the other communications networks discussed in this section—employ quantum key distribution (QKD), a subset of quantum communications. QKD ~~These initiatives are not~~
~~military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia~~
~~might apply them to its military.~~
~~International Institutions~~
~~No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating~~
~~military or other applications of quantum technology.~~
~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current~~
~~funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum~~
~~technology be leveraged for military applications?~~
~~ Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and~~
~~to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods?~~
~~ How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of~~
~~quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten~~
~~advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation~~
~~stealth aircraft?~~

enables secure communications that cannot be covertly intercepted during transmission. QKD communications can, enables secure communications that cannot be covertly intercepted during transmission. QKD communications can,
however, be intercepted at the relay stations currently required for long-distance transmissions. however, be intercepted at the relay stations currently required for long-distance transmissions.
~~171~~180 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
~~172~~181 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation
Leadership, p. 14. This terrestrial network is reportedly connected to Micius, which provides a satellite link “spanning , p. 14. This terrestrial network is reportedly connected to Micius, which provides a satellite link “spanning
2,600 km [1,600 miles] between two observatories—one east of Beijing and the other just a few hundred kilometers 2,600 km [1,600 miles] between two observatories—one east of Beijing and the other just a few hundred kilometers
from China’s border with Kazakhstan.” See Hamish Johnston, “Quantum cryptography network spans 4600 km in from China’s border with Kazakhstan.” See Hamish Johnston, “Quantum cryptography network spans 4600 km in
China,” China,” Physics World, January 7, 2021, at https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-cryptography-network-spans-4600-, January 7, 2021, at https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-cryptography-network-spans-4600-
km-in-china/. km-in-china/.
~~173~~182 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at , December 17, 2019, at
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z.
~~174~~183 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018, For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018,
commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years. commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2829 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia might apply them to its military. International Institutions No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating military or other applications of quantum technology. Potential Questions for Congress • Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum technology be leveraged for military applications? • Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods? • How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation stealth aircraft?

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies
for Warfighting
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if
not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of
technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which
emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the
interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and
international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use. international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the
future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics, future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics,
and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This
could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with
destabilizing consequences. destabilizing consequences.
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon
which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and
defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive
systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that
provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging
technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades. technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades.
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or
enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability.
For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce
more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image
recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons.
Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training
environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition
Congressional Research Service 30 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress or control prosthetics or robotic systems.or control prosthetics or robotic systems.~~175~~184 Such developments could, in turn, require new Such developments could, in turn, require new
strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.~~176~~185
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could
additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These
consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As
analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue
engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”~~177~~186 This This
could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some
analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS. analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.

~~175 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251,~~ ~~National Security~~
~~Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~176 For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis~~
~~stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley,~~ ~~20YY: Preparing for~~
~~War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/~~
~~publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.~~
~~177 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016,~~
~~at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf.~~
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Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For
example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—
regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not
make specific target selection and engagement decisions.make specific target selection and engagement decisions.~~178~~187 Others have countered that human Others have countered that human
operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of
force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the
requirements of the laws of armed conflict.requirements of the laws of armed conflict.~~179~~188 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have
additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention
preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience.”dictates of the public conscience.”~~180~~189 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that
requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to
ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is
questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”~~181~~190
Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that
involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which
could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.~~182~~
~~Issues for Congress~~
~~Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military~~
~~technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L.~~
~~115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison~~
~~between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of~~
~~adversaries of the United States.”183 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum~~
~~technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the~~
~~Secretary of Defense. Similarly, Section 1251 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the~~
~~Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Director of~~
~~the Office of Net Assessment, to “conduct a comparative analysis assessment of the efforts of the~~
~~United States Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to develop and~~
~~deploy” emerging technologies such as directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons,~~

~~178~~191 184 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. 185 For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age. 186 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. 187 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots.
~~179~~188 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs. https://www.esd.whs.
~~180~~189 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots.
~~181~~190 Paul Scharre, Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2018), pp. 263-266. 2018), pp. 263-266.
~~182~~191 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824, For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824,
Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s , by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s
Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The
Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-
military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
~~183 Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries~~
~~on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of~~
~~the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the~~
~~United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such~~
~~technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.”~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 31 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Issues for Congress Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”192 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, Section 1251 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Net Assessment, to “conduct a comparative analysis assessment of the efforts of the United States Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to develop and deploy” emerging technologies such as directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked biotechnology, and quantum technology. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for
developing “technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an developing “technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an
adversary of the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that adversary of the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that
are] not receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.” are] not receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”
Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense
with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to
emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed
by the Department,”by the Department,”~~184~~193 while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the
Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of
and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats. and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats.
As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during
the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding
considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and
regulation, and oversight. regulation, and oversight.
Funding Considerations
A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy
weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S. weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S.
government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the
viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a
skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”~~185~~
~~Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between~~
~~technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or~~
~~maturity.186~~
~~Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for~~
~~overall research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert~~
~~Martijn Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in order to enable “big bets”~~
~~or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because~~
~~“we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”187~~

~~184~~194 192 Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.” 193 Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by
the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data
(commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy, (commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.” hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.”
~~185~~194 Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at , September 2018, p. 21, at
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-
MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.
~~186 See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July~~
~~1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-~~
~~ever-be-ready.~~
~~187 See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,” Wired, February~~
~~11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about~~
~~federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341,~~ ~~Federal Research and~~
~~Development (R&D) Funding: FY2021, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.~~
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~~link to page 37~~ ~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 32 link to page 38 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or maturity.195 Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for overall research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert Martijn Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in order to enable “big bets” or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because “we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”196 Management
In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately
due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E])/Chief Technology Officer (CTO), there are Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E])/Chief Technology Officer (CTO), there are
separate principal directors for artificial intelligence and autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed separate principal directors for artificial intelligence and autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed
energy, biotechnology, and quantum technology—among other technology areas. Development of energy, biotechnology, and quantum technology—among other technology areas. Development of
each of these technologies is guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a each of these technologies is guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a
classified strategy. Although the USD(R&E)/CTO has oversight over emerging military classified strategy. Although the USD(R&E)/CTO has oversight over emerging military
technologies, some analysts have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to technologies, some analysts have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to
portfolio management that better considers how such technologies might be combined and portfolio management that better considers how such technologies might be combined and
integrated.integrated.~~188~~197
Furthermore, prior to May 2022, these principal directors reported to the USD(R&E)/CTO Furthermore, prior to May 2022, these principal directors reported to the USD(R&E)/CTO
through a singular Director for Modernization, who was “responsible for managing the capability through a singular Director for Modernization, who was “responsible for managing the capability
analysis and investments for the modernization priorities outlined in the National Defense analysis and investments for the modernization priorities outlined in the National Defense
Strategy,” including the technologies discussed in this report.Strategy,” including the technologies discussed in this report.~~189~~198 In May 2022, DOD reorganized In May 2022, DOD reorganized
the office of the USD(R&E)/CTO and created separate reporting structures for “enabling the office of the USD(R&E)/CTO and created separate reporting structures for “enabling
technology”—including the Principal Director for AI and autonomy—and “applied technology”—including the Principal Director for AI and autonomy—and “applied
technology”—including the Principal Directors for directed energy and hypersonic weapons (see technology”—including the Principal Directors for directed energy and hypersonic weapons (see
Figure 2). The Directors for Enabling Technology and Applied Technology report to the Deputy . The Directors for Enabling Technology and Applied Technology report to the Deputy
CTO for Critical Technologies. In contrast, the Principal Directors for biotechnology and CTO for Critical Technologies. In contrast, the Principal Directors for biotechnology and
quantum science report through the Director of Science and Technology Futures to a different quantum science report through the Director of Science and Technology Futures to a different
Deputy CTO—the Deputy CTO for Science and Technology.Deputy CTO—the Deputy CTO for Science and Technology.~~190~~199 Congress may consider the ways 195 See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. 196 See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,” Wired, February 11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2021, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. 197 ~~Congress may consider the ways~~
~~in which this organizational change affects the oversight and integration of emerging~~
~~technologies.~~
~~Finally, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military~~
~~technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This~~
~~fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set~~
~~spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”191~~

~~188~~ See, for example, Government Accountability Office, See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve
the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and , August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and
Pete Modigliani, Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new
era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-
the-divorce-white-paper.pdf. the-divorce-white-paper.pdf.
~~189~~198 CRS In Focus IF10834, CRS In Focus IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E.
Gallo.Gallo.
~~190~~ 199 See Department of Defense, “Organizational Improvements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for See Department of Defense, “Organizational Improvements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering,” May 10, 2022, at Research and Engineering,” May 10, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3026367/organizational-improvements-to-the-office-of-the-https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3026367/organizational-improvements-to-the-office-of-the-
~~under-secretary-of-defense-for/.~~
~~191 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One,~~
~~April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

under-secretary-of-defense-for/. Congressional Research Service 33 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress in which this organizational change affects the oversight and integration of emerging technologies. Finally, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”200 Figure 2. Selected Reporting Structure of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E)

Source: CRS image, adapted from https://www.cto.mil/wp-CRS image, adapted from https://www.cto.mil/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf. content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf.
Notes: Chart depicts only the reporting structure for the OUSD(R&E) principal directors associated with the Chart depicts only the reporting structure for the OUSD(R&E) principal directors associated with the
technologies discussed in this report. For a technologies discussed in this report. For a ~~full~~ ful OUSD(R&E) organizational chart, see “Office of the Under OUSD(R&E) organizational chart, see “Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Organization,” May 9, 2022, at https://www.cto.mil/wp-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Organization,” May 9, 2022, at https://www.cto.mil/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf. content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf.
Personnel
Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining
personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries
significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.~~192~~201 Other reports suggest that such Other reports suggest that such
challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology
workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than
within it.”within it.”~~193~~202 DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce. DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce.
Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology
education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research
~~universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology~~
~~workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.194~~

~~192~~ 200 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One, April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/. 201 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at , January 2017, p. 11, at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-
warfare-cummings-final.pdf. warfare-cummings-final.pdf.
~~193~~202 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,” Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,”
The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-
valley-and-washington/577963/. valley-and-washington/577963/.
~~194 See Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security~~
~~Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at~~
~~https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs,~~
~~“The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for~~
~~hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year~~
~~assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create~~
~~models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.~~
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Congressional Research Service 34 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.203 Acquisition
DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-
use technologies such as AI.use technologies such as AI.~~195~~204 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it
takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial
Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational
Capability.Capability.~~196~~205 In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development
process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial
product in six to nine months.product in six to nine months.~~197~~206 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software
acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration
and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”~~198~~207 Similar Similar
efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies. efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies.
Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging
technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense
acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of
12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the 12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the
complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.~~199~~208 DOD has created DOD has created
a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the
Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome
processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.~~200~~209 Project Maven, for example, was established Project Maven, for example, was established
in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system
~~in combat.201 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point~~
~~out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive~~
~~acquisitions reform.202~~

~~195~~ 203 See Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government. 204 Andrew Ilachinski, Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068, Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068,
Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters. , by Heidi M. Peters.
~~196~~205 Andrew Ilachinski, Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189. , p. 189.
~~197~~206 Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, Software is Never Done:
Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/
2002124828/-1/-1/0/2002124828/-1/-1/0/
SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FINSOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FIN
AL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF. AL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF.
~~198~~207 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim
Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-
19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf. 19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.
~~199~~208 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, , GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment,
lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting
workforce. workforce.
~~200~~209 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research, In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research,
prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense
Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters. , by Heidi M. Peters.
~~201 Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,” Defense One,~~
~~December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-~~
~~hunting-terrorists/144742/.~~
~~202 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval~~
~~Analysis, January 2017, p. 190.~~
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34

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~
Congressional Research Service 35 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress in combat.210 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive acquisitions reform.211
Intellectual Property
Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about
intellectual property and data rights.intellectual property and data rights.~~203~~212 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on
broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of
commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant
unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or
restricted rights.”restricted rights.”~~204~~213 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that
“establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition, “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition,
licensing, and management of IP.”licensing, and management of IP.”~~205~~214 The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to
advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development
of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each
acquisition program.acquisition program.~~206~~215
Supply Chain Security
A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for
emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have
opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage, opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage,
transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-
level U.S. suppliers.level U.S. suppliers.~~207~~216 Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating, found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating,
assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on
foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”~~208~~
~~Technology Protection~~
~~Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to~~
~~theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies~~
~~and related intellectual property.209 The United States has a number of programs devoted to~~
~~addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review~~
~~Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United~~
~~States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging~~
~~and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a~~
~~covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared~~
~~strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect~~

~~203~~217 In response to such concerns, Title XCIX of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283), Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America, authorized an incentive program for building and equipping semiconductor fabrication facilities in the United States. Congress subsequently provided funding for the program in the Chips and Science Act (P.L. 117-167).218 210 Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,” Defense One, December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-hunting-terrorists/144742/. 211 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval Analysis, January 2017, p. 190. 212 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain Companies.
~~204~~213 Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 20.
~~205~~214 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual
Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070. issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070.
~~206~~215 Ibid., pp. 8-11. Ibid., pp. 8-11.
~~207~~216 Govini, Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf. uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf.
~~208~~217 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46. , p. 46.
~~209 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task~~
~~Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/~~
~~cs2018_0459.pdf.~~
218 For additional information about these provisions, see CRS Report R47558, Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act: The Global Context, by Karen M. Sutter, John F. Sargent Jr., and Manpreet Singh. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3536 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Technology Protection Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies and related intellectual property.219 The United States has a number of programs devoted to addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

United States leadership in areas related to national security.”United States leadership in areas related to national security.”~~210~~220 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting Similarly, DOD’s Protecting
Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial
base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key
data.”data.”~~211~~221 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs
for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop
a a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section
1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.~~212~~222 Some analysts have recommended Some analysts have recommended
expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.~~213~~223
Governance and Regulation
According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments … According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments …
are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US
interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”~~214~~224 To address this concern, some To address this concern, some
analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic
engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”~~215~~
~~Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of~~
~~Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards~~
~~setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and~~
~~strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations.~~
~~Oversight216~~
~~As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its~~
~~ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972,~~
~~Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert~~
~~“assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop~~

~~210~~225 219 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/cs2018_0459.pdf. 220 The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an
interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more
information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and , by James K. Jackson and
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have
argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier
scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence, Intelligence, Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. 153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view.
~~211~~221 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task
Force.” Force.”
~~212~~222 C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26, C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26,
2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-
joint-force-strong/. joint-force-strong/.
~~213~~223 See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, Forging an Alliance Innovation
Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909.
~~214~~224 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018.
~~215~~225 Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Twin Pillars: Upholding National
Security and National Innovation in Emerging Technologies Governance, Center for Strategic and International , Center for Strategic and International
~~Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/~~
~~200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.~~
~~216 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327,~~ ~~The~~
~~Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr..~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.217~~
~~Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of~~
~~government.218 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar~~
~~technology assessment organization.219~~(continued...) Congressional Research Service 37 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF. Congressional Research Service 38 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations. Oversight226 As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972, Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert “assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.227 Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of government.228 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar technology assessment organization.229

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security Security

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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~~217 Ibid.~~
~~218 Ibid.~~
~~219~~ 226 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in
CRS Report R46327, CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. , by John F.
Sargent Jr.. Sargent Jr..
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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