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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations

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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and September 29, 2022
U.S.-Baltic Relations
Derek E. Mix
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, often referred to as the Baltic states, are democracies and close
Specialist in European
U.S. allies. Strong U.S. relations with these three states are rooted in history. The United States
Affairs
never recognized the Soviet Union’s forcible incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940, and U.S.

officials applauded the restoration of their independence in 1991. Congress backed these policies
on a bipartisan basis. The United States supported the Baltic states’ accession to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 2004. Especially since
Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, potential threats posed to the Baltic states by Russia have been a primary driver
of increased U.S. and congressional interest in the region.
Regional Security Concerns
Russia’s February 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine has intensified U.S. and NATO concerns about the potential threat of
Russian military action against the Baltic states. The Baltic states have supported Ukraine, including by providing military
assistance and imposing sanctions against Russia that go beyond those adopted by the EU. Baltic states have been seeking to
build up their military capabilities, but their armed forces remain relatively small and their capabilities limited. Consequently,
the Baltic states’ defense planning relies heavily on their NATO membership. The Baltic states fulfill NATO’s target for
member states to spend at least 2% of gross domestic product on defense.
Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance
The United States and the Baltic states cooperate closely on defense and security issues for the purposes of building capacity
to deter and resist potential Russian aggression. In FY2021 and FY2022 combined, Congress appropriated nearly $349
million in U.S. Department of Defense security assistance funding to the Baltic states through the Baltic Security Initiative.
Under the U.S. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014, the United States has enhanced its military presence
in Central and Eastern Europe, with rotational U.S. forces conducting training and exercises in the Baltic states. The United
States has stationed additional personnel and capabilities in the Baltic states since February 2022. NATO also has helped to
bolster the Baltic states’ security. In 2016, the allies agreed to deploy multinational Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups
to the Baltic states. NATO allies have deployed additional personnel to these battlegroups since February 2022. Baltic leaders
have advocated for further enhancements to the U.S. and NATO deployments.
Potential Hybrid Threats
Some observers have expressed concerns that Russia could use the Baltic states’ ethnic Russian minorities as a pretext to
manufacture a crisis. Many ethnic Russians in the Baltic states traditionally receive their news from Russian media sources,
potentially making those communities a leading target for disinformation and propaganda. The Baltic states suspended many
Russia-based television channels following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Cyberattacks are another potential hybrid
threat; addressing potential vulnerabilities with regard to cybersecurity is a top priority of the Baltic states.
Energy Security
The Baltic states have taken steps to end energy reliance on Russia, including through a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal
in Lithuania and new pipeline interconnections with their European neighbors. Lithuania ended imports of Russian gas in
April 2022, and Estonia and Latvia plan to do the same by the end of 2022.
Relations with China
A variety of factors have contributed to the Baltic states developing a skeptical view of China over the past several years. In
2021 (Lithuania) and 2022 (Estonia and Latvia), the Baltic states quit the 17+1, a forum China launched to deepen
cooperation with countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Tensions between Lithuania and China are especially acute, with
China recently launching a de facto trade embargo against Lithuania due to Lithuania’s expanded relations with Taiwan.
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Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1
Domestic Politics ............................................................................................................................. 2
Estonia ....................................................................................................................................... 2
Latvia ........................................................................................................................................ 3
Lithuania ................................................................................................................................... 4
Economic Issues .............................................................................................................................. 5
Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine ...................................................................................... 6
Regional Relations with the United States ...................................................................................... 7
Security Partnership and Assistance .......................................................................................... 8
Economic Relations .................................................................................................................. 9
Regional Security Concerns and Responses .................................................................................... 9
Defense Spending and Capabilities .......................................................................................... 11
U.S. and NATO Military Presence .......................................................................................... 12
Hybrid Threats ........................................................................................................................ 13
Disinformation Campaigns and Ethnic Russians in Baltic States ..................................... 13
Cyberattacks ...................................................................................................................... 14
Energy Security ............................................................................................................................. 15
Relations with China ..................................................................................................................... 16
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Figures
Figure 1. Map of the Baltic Region ................................................................................................. 1
Figure 2. Allied Forces in the Baltic States ................................................................................... 13

Tables
Table 1. Baltic States Defense Information .................................................................................... 11

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 18


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Introduction and Issues for Congress
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress consider Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, often
referred to collectively as the Baltic states, to be valued U.S. allies and among the most pro-U.S.
countries in Europe. Strong ties between the United States and the Baltic states have deep
historical roots. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia gained independence in 1918, after the collapse of
the Russian Empire. In 1940, they were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, but the
United States never recognized their annexation.1 The United States strongly supported the
restoration of the countries’ independence in 1991 and was a leading advocate of their accession
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 2004.
Figure 1. Map of the Baltic Region

Source: Created by CRS using data from the Department of State and ESRI.
The United States and the Baltic states work closely together in their respective bilateral
relationships and within NATO, as well as in the context of U.S.-EU relations. The U.S.-Baltic
partnership encompasses diplomatic cooperation in pursuit of shared foreign policy objectives,
extensive cooperation on security and defense, and a mutually beneficial economic relationship.
The United States provides considerable security assistance intended to strengthen the military
capabilities of the Baltic states.
Since 2014, U.S. focus on the Baltic region has increased, driven by concerns about potential
threats posed by Russia. Such concerns have intensified in the context of Russia’s renewed

1 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 23,
1940,” at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v01/d412. Also see U.S. Department of State, “Message
on the 80th Anniversary of the Welles Declaration,” July 22, 2020, at https://2017-2021.state.gov/message-on-the-80th-
anniversary-of-the-welles-declaration/index.html.
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aggression against Ukraine in 2022, leading the United States and NATO to increase their
military deployments to the Baltic states.
Developments related to security concerns about Russia and the implications for U.S. policy and
NATO likely will have continuing relevance for Congress. The Baltic states are central
interlocutors and partners in assessing and responding to these challenges. As indicated by annual
security assistance appropriations and the Baltic Security Initiative created in 2021 (see Security
Partnership and Assistance below), as well as numerous congressional delegations to the region
and congressional resolutions adopted or introduced in recent years, Congress broadly supports
the maintenance of close relations and security cooperation with the Baltic states. Increased
attention to the Baltic states in the 117th Congress, especially since Russia’s renewed invasion of
Ukraine in 2022, has led to the introduction of bipartisan legislation that would expand and
increase the U.S. commitment to providing the Baltic states with security assistance.
The House Baltic Caucus, a bipartisan group of 71 Members of the House of Representatives, and
the Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus, a bipartisan group of 14 Senators, seek to maintain and
strengthen the U.S.-Baltic relationship and engage in issues of mutual interest.2
Domestic Politics
Given the three countries’ many similarities, observers typically view Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania as a group. The countries cooperate extensively with one another and hold comparable
views on foreign and security policy (particularly with regard to the threat posed by Russia).
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania stand out as the leaders of democracy among post-Soviet states and
are the only states formerly part of the Soviet Union that have joined NATO and the EU. Since
the restoration of their independence, the three countries’ governments have tended to consist of
multiparty coalitions, which have maintained pro-U.S., pro-NATO, and pro-EU orientations.
At the same time, citizens of the three countries tend to point out that alongside the similarities
are notable differences in national history, language, and culture. Each country has its own unique
domestic political dynamics, and the viewpoints and priorities of the three countries are not
always perfectly aligned.3
Estonia
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas of the center-right Reform Party leads the government of Estonia. The
Reform Party formed a new governing coalition with the conservative Isamaa (Fatherland) party
and the center-left Social Democratic Party in July 2022.4 The coalition is Estonia’s fourth
government since the country’s 2019 parliamentary election. The Reform Party came in first
place in the 2019 election with 28.9% of the vote (34 seats in Estonia’s 101-seat unicameral
parliament, the Riigikogu), but it was unable to secure enough support from potential coalition
partners to form a government.5 Instead, the populist center-left Center Party, which came in
second place with 23.1% of the vote (26 seats), formed a government after it reversed its
campaign pledge to not work with the far-right Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE),

2 In the 117th Congress, the cochairs of the House Baltic Caucus are Rep. Don Bacon and Rep. Ruben Gallego. The
cochairs of the Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus are Sen. Richard Durbin and Sen. Charles Grassley.
3 See, for example, Rein Taagepera, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia: 100 Years of Similarities and Disparities,
International Center for Defence and Security (Estonia), February 16, 2018, at https://icds.ee/lithuania-latvia-and-
estonia-100-years-of-similarities-and-disparities/.
4 Estonian Public Broadcasting, “Estonia’s New Government Takes Office,” July 18, 2022.
5 See full election results at https://rk2019.valimised.ee/en/election-result/election-result.html.
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which came in third place. The three-party coalition government of the Center Party, EKRE, and
Isamaa collapsed in January 2021, when Prime Minister Juri Ratas of the Center Party resigned
due to a corruption scandal involving members of his party.
The Reform Party subsequently took over
leadership of the government after reaching a
Estonia: Basic Facts
coalition agreement with the Center Party, with
Population: 1.33 million
Kaja Kallas becoming the country’s first female
Ethnicity: 68.7% Estonian, 24.8% Russian
prime minister. The coalition comprised two
Languages: Estonian is the official language and first
parties with a history of differing ideologies and
language of 68.5% of the population; Russian is the
opposing policies.6 The arrangement collapsed
first language of 29.6% of the population.
in June 2021 due to differences over education
Religion: 70.8% listed as none or unspecified, 16.2%
reform and social welfare spending.7 Prime
Orthodox, 9.9% Lutheran
Minister Kallas briefly led a minority
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2021
government before forming the new coalition
(Current Prices): $36.287 billion; per capita GDP
the following month.
approximately $27,282
Currency: euro (€)
The Reform Party previously led a series of
Political Leaders: President: Alar Karis; Prime
coalition governments from 2005 to 2016. The
Minister: Kaja Kallas; Foreign Minister: Urmas Reinsalu;
Center Party, whose support comes largely from
Defense Minister: Hanno Pevkur
Estonia’s Russian-speaking population, led the

government from 2016 to 2019. In 2016, a
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
change in the party’s leadership reoriented the
Economic Outlook Database, April 2022; Central
Center Party away from a pro-Russia outlook to
Intelligence Agency (CIA), World Factbook.
one more aligned with NATO and the EU.
The next election is due in March 2023.
In August 2021, Estonia’s parliament elected Alar Keris as President of Estonia. Keris formerly
served as Auditor General of Estonia and director of the Estonian National Museum.8 The
president is elected indirectly by the Riigikogu and regional electoral colleges and serves a five-
year term. The president has largely ceremonial duties but plays a role in defining Estonia’s
international image and expressing the country’s values.
Latvia
Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins of the center-right New Unity Party (JV) leads a four-party
coalition government in Latvia.9 Latvia’s 2018 general election produced a fragmented result,
with seven parties winning seats in the country’s 100-seat unicameral parliament (Saeima).10 JV
leveraged its experience as a member of the previous governing coalition to put together and lead
the new government despite being the smallest party in the Saeima, with eight seats.

6 See Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, Estonia: The Liberal Reform Party Returns to Power, Centre for Eastern Studies
(Warsaw), March 5, 2019.
7 Deutsche Welle, “Estonia: Governing Coalition Collapses,” June 3, 2022.
8 Euronews, “Estonian MPs Elect Alar Karis as President at Second Attempt,” August 31, 2021.
9 Gederts Gelzis, “Latvia’s Karins Confirmed as PM, Ending Lengthy Political Deadlock,” Reuters, January 22, 2019.
Karins was born and educated in the United States before moving to Latvia in 1997.
10 Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, Parliamentary Elections in Latvia: The Fragmentation of the Political Scene, Centre for
Eastern Studies (Warsaw), October 9, 2018.
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The other coalition members are the conservative, nationalist National Alliance (NA); the New
Conservative Party (JKP), which campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; and the liberal
Development/For! alliance. The anti-establishment Who Owns the State? (KPV LV) party
dropped out of the coalition in June 2021, making the coalition a minority government with a
combined 47 seats in parliament and reliant on ad hoc deals with opposition members to pass
legislation. The opposition center-left Harmony Social Democratic Party (SDPS), which draws its
support largely from the country’s ethnic Russian population, won 23 seats in the 2018 election
and is the largest party in parliament.
Strong showings in the 2018 election by KPV
LV and JKP (each won 16 seats) appeared to
Latvia: Basic Facts
reflect public dissatisfaction with corruption and
Population: 1.889 million
the political establishment following high-
Ethnicity: 62.7% Latvian, 24.5% Russian
profile bribery and money-laundering
Languages: Latvian is the official language and first
scandals.11 The three parties of the previous
language of 56.3% of the population; Russian is the
coalition government, the centrist Union of
first language of 33.8% of the population.
Greens and Farmers (ZZS), the Unity Party
Religion: 36.2% Lutheran, 19.5% Roman Catholic,
(rebranded New Unity in 2018), and the NA,
19.1% Orthodox, 23.5% listed as none or unspecified
lost nearly half their total seats, dropping from a
GDP, 2021 (Current Prices): $38.965 billion; per
combined 61 seats to 32 seats.12
capita GDP approximately $20,581
The next election is scheduled to take place on
Currency: euro (€)
October 1, 2022. Polls indicate the election is
Political Leaders: President: Egils Levits; Prime
Minister: Krisjanis Karins; Foreign Minister: Edgars
likely to result in a similar center-right
Rinkevics; Defense Minister: Artis Pabriks
coalition; as of September 2022, polls indicated

support for JV at 19% and support for NA at
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database,
11%.13 Support for SDPS had declined from
April 2022; CIA, World Factbook.
17% in September 2021 to 10%, likely owing to
the party’s past ties with the United Russia
party of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In 2019, the Saeima elected Egils Levits, a former judge at the European Court of Justice, to be
Latvia’s president. The president serves a four-year term and performs a mostly ceremonial role
as head of state but also acts as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and can propose and
block legislation.14
Lithuania
Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte of the center-right Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian
Democrats (TS-LKD) leads the government of Lithuania. TS-LKD came in first place in
Lithuania’s October 2020 election, winning 50 out of 141 seats in the unicameral Lithuanian
parliament (Seimas).15 Analysts observed that the main issues in the election included the
previous government’s handling of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and

11 John O’Donnell and Gederts Gelzis, “Corruption Scandal Casts Long Shadow over Latvia,” Reuters, April 12, 2019.
12 See Central Election Commission, https://sv2018.cvk.lv/pub/ElectionResults.
13 Politico Europe, “Latvia—National Parliament Voting Intention,” June 8, 2022.
14 Corinne Deloy, Egils Levits, Candidate Supported by the Government Coalition Parties, Should Become the Next
President of the Republic of Latvia, Robert Schumann Foundation, May 27, 2019.
15 Seimas, Results of the 2020-2024 Parliament Elections.
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competing plans on how to reduce economic disparities between urban and rural areas.16 The
government is a three-party coalition that also includes the center-right Liberal Movement and the
center-left Freedom Party; the coalition controls a narrow parliamentary majority with a
combined 74 seats.
The main opposition parties are the centrist
Lithuania: Basic Facts
Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVZS),
Population: 2.79 million
which led the government from 2016 to 2020,
Ethnicity: 84.1% Lithuanian, 6.6% Polish, 5.8%
the center-left Social Democratic Party of
Russian
Lithuania (LSDP), which led the government
Languages: Lithuanian is the official language and
from 2012 to 2016, and the new Union of
first language of 82% of the population; Russian is the
Democrats “For Lithuania.”
first language of 8% of the population; Polish is the
first language of 6% of the population.
The next parliamentary election is due in 2024.
Religion: 77.2% Roman Catholic, 4.1% Orthodox,
Lithuania’s president is Gitanas Nauseda, a pro-
10.1% listed as unspecified
European, politically independent centrist and
GDP, 2021 (Current Prices): $65.479 billion; per
former banker who was elected in 2019.
capita GDP approximately $23,473
17 The
president is elected directly for a five-year term.
Currency: euro(€)
The Lithuanian president plays an important
Political Leaders: President: Gitanas Nauseda; Prime
Minister: Ingrida Simonyte; Foreign Minister: Gabrielius
role in shaping foreign and national security
Landsbergis; Defense Minister: Arvydas Anusauskas
policy, is commander-in-chief of the armed

forces, appoints government officials, and has
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database,
the power to veto legislation.
April 2022; CIA, World Factbook.
Economic Issues
The COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected the Baltic states’ economies, but less so than it did
the economies of most other EU countries (the EU economy as a whole contracted by more than
6% in 2020).
 Estonia’s gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 3% in 2020 before
rebounding to 8.3% growth in 2021. Growth is forecast to be 0.2% in 2022.
Unemployment is 7.2%.18
 Latvia’s GDP contracted by 3.8% in 2020 before growing 4.7% in 2021. Growth
is forecast to be 1.0% in 2022. Unemployment is 8.1%.
 Lithuania’s GDP contracted by 0.1% in 2020 before growing 4.9% in 2021.
Growth is forecast to be 1.8% in 2022. Unemployment is 7.3%.
The Baltic states each use the euro as their currency (Estonia adopted the euro in 2011, Latvia in
2014, and Lithuania in 2015).
As in many other countries, high inflation and rising energy and commodity costs pose challenges
to the Baltic states’ economies. As of June 2022, the Baltic states had the three highest increases
in annual inflation among the 19 countries using the euro; year-on-year inflation was 22% in

16 Euronews, “Lithuania Votes: Centre-Right Opposition Wins Second Round of Legislative Elections,” October 26,
2020.
17 Andrius Sytas, “Lithuania’s Nauseda Wins Presidential Election,” Reuters, May 26, 2019.
18 Economic statistics from International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2022.
Figures rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent.
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Estonia, 20.5% in Lithuania, and 19% in Latvia, compared with the euro area average of 8.6%.19
Additionally, sectors reliant on trade with Russia, including importers of steel, wood, and
fertilizer, are affected negatively by EU sanctions on Russia.
With considerable investment in the financial services sector, Sweden is the largest foreign
investor in the region, followed by Finland and the Netherlands.20 Major regional trading partners
include Finland, Germany, Poland, Russia, and Sweden.21
Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
The Baltic states have been outspoken in condemning Russia’s 2022 war against Ukraine and
expressing their view that Russia’s aggressive ambitions may well go beyond Ukraine. The Baltic
states have committed substantial military and financial support to Ukraine. According to the
nongovernmental Kiel Institute, which tracks international aid to Ukraine, the Baltic states
provided an estimated €613 million (approximately $597 million) in bilateral military assistance
and €692 million (approximately $673 million) in total bilateral assistance (military plus financial
and humanitarian assistance) to Ukraine between January 24 and August 3, 2022.22 Over the same
time period, in terms of total bilateral assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of GDP, Estonia
ranked as the top country in the world (0.83%), Latvia ranked second (0.8%), and Lithuania
ranked fifth (0.32%), according to the Kiel Institute.23 Military assistance to Ukraine from the
Baltic states has included Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, other air
defense and anti-tank weapons, howitzers, armored vehicles, small arms, grenades,
communications equipment, night vision equipment, ammunition, helmets, medical equipment,
fuel, and food. As of August 30, 2022, more than 134,000 Ukrainian refugees had registered for
temporary protection in the Baltic states (approximately 63,300 in Lithuania, 38,400 in Latvia,
and 32,600 in Estonia), equivalent to nearly 2% of the three countries’ combined population.24
The Baltic states have advocated the strongest possible EU sanctions against Russia and have
implemented measures beyond those adopted by the EU. The three countries have stopped issuing
tourist visas to Russian citizens, for example, and have called for all EU countries to do the same.
The Baltic states also have barred entry to Russian tourists seeking to travel to other destinations
in Europe.25 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted the three countries to remove Soviet
monuments and World War II memorials as a “risk to public order” and an unwanted reminder of
Russia’s former occupation of their territories.26 The parliaments of the Baltic states have adopted
resolutions describing Russia’s actions in Ukraine as genocide, and the parliaments of Lithuania
and Latvia have declared Russia a “terrorist state” and a “state sponsor of terrorism,”

19 Eurostat, “Euro Area Annual Inflation up to 8.6%,” July 1, 2022.
20 Jorge Durán, FDI & Investment Uncertainty in the Baltics, European Commission, March 2019.
21 World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution Database.
22 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker, accessed June 19, 2022. Hereinafter, Kiel Institute.
23 Kiel Institute. Poland, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States rank third, fourth, sixth, and seventh,
respectively.
24 European Council and Council of the European Union, “Refugees from Ukraine in the EU,” infographic, September
5, 2022.
25 Andrew Higgins, “The Baltic States Agree to Bar Land Crossings by Russian Tourists,” New York Times, September
7, 2022.
26 Euronews, “Estonia to Remove Soviet-Era Monuments to ‘Ensure Public Order,’” August 17, 2022.
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respectively.27 Latvia suspended all Russia-based television channels in June 2022;28 Estonia and
Lithuania also have banned numerous Russian television channels from broadcasting or
retransmission. EU sanctions block access to state-owned Russian media (Sputnik and Russia
Today) in all member countries.29
Since the invasion, the Baltic states have made additional plans to increase their defense spending
and acquire new military capabilities. They also have advocated for a substantial increase in the
U.S. and NATO forces stationed on their territory (see Regional Security Concerns and
Responses below).
Regional Relations with the United States
The U.S. State Department describes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as strong, effective, and
reliable allies that have helped to promote security, democracy, and prosperity in Europe and
beyond.30 Many citizens of the Baltic states remain grateful to the United States for consistently
supporting their independence throughout the Cold War and playing a key role in promoting the
restoration of their independence in 1991. Most policymakers in the Baltic states tend to see their
countries’ relationship with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of their security against
pressure or possible threats from Russia. All three Baltic states joined NATO and the EU in 2004
with the full backing of the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained
strong bilateral partnerships with the Baltic states and have expressed a continued U.S.
commitment to ensuring the security of the Baltic region.31
In addition to maintaining a pro-NATO and pro-EU orientation, the Baltic states have sought to
support U.S. foreign policy and security goals. For example, they worked closely with the United
States in Afghanistan, where the three Baltic states contributed troops to NATO-led missions for
nearly two decades. The three countries also have been partner countries in the Global Coalition
to Defeat the Islamic State, providing personnel, training, weapons, and funding for efforts to
counter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria since 2014.32
During the 117th Congress, the Senate adopted a resolution (S.Res. 499) celebrating 100 years of
diplomatic relations between the United States and the Baltic states and committing to continued
economic and security cooperation. A similar resolution (H.Res. 1142) was introduced in the
House of Representatives.

27 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Lithuania Adopts Resolution Calling Russia ‘Terrorist State,’ Accuses Moscow
of ‘Genocide,’” May 10, 2022; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Latvian Parliament Designates Russia a State
Sponsor of Terrorism,” August 11, 2022.
28 Public Broadcasting of Latvia, “All Russia-Based TV Channels Banned in Latvia,” June 6, 2022.
29 Council of the European Union, EU Imposes Sanctions on State-Owned Outlets RT/Russia Today and Sputnik’s
Broadcasting in the EU, March 2, 2022.
30 See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Estonia, December 3, 2020; U.S. Relations with Latvia, December
3, 2020; and U.S. Relations with Lithuania, August 5, 2020.
31 See White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris, President Levits of Latvia, President Nausėda of Lithuania,
and Prime Minister Kallas of Estonia Before Multilateral Meeting,” February 18, 2022; and “Readout of President
Biden’s Meeting with Prime Minister Kaja Kallas of Estonia, President Egils Levits of Latvia, and President Gitanas
Nauseda of Lithuania,” June 14, 2021. Also see White House, A Declaration to Celebrate 100 Years of Independence
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Renewed Partnership, April 4, 2018.
32 See Global Coalition Against Daesh, https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/.
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Security Partnership and Assistance
The United States provides significant security assistance to the Baltic states. Recent highlights
include the following:
 The Baltic Security Initiative (BSI) directs U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
security cooperation funding to the Baltic states.33 Congress appropriated nearly
$169 million for the BSI in FY2021 and $180 million in FY2022.34 Developing
the Baltic states’ air defense systems has been a priority of DOD security
assistance.
 The Baltic Defense and Deterrence Act, introduced in the House of
Representatives (H.R. 7290) and the Senate (S. 3950) in March 2022, would
codify the BSI, authorize $250 million in DOD funding for the BSI annually
from FY2023 through FY2027, and establish a complementary Baltic Security
and Economic Enhancement Initiative at the State Department.
 From FY2018 to FY2021, the United States provided the Baltic states with $252
million in security assistance through the State Department’s Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program and approximately $18.3 million through the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.35 The
Administration’s FMF and IMET requests for the three countries total
approximately $162.3 million for FY2022 and $165.3 million for FY2023.
 Since FY2015, the State Department has notified Congress of approximately $2
billion in proposed sales of defense articles and services to the Baltic states under
the Foreign Military Sales program.36
 In 2019, the United States and the three Baltic states signed separate bilateral
defense cooperation strategic road maps focusing on specific areas of security
cooperation for the period 2019-2024. Areas of emphasis include training,
exercises, and multilateral operations; improving maritime domain awareness in
the Baltic Sea; improving regional intelligence-sharing, surveillance, and early
warning capabilities; and building cybersecurity capabilities.
 Since 1993, the Baltic states have participated in the U.S. National Guard State
Partnership Program. Under the program, Estonia’s armed forces partner with
units from the Maryland National Guard, Latvia’s armed forces partner with the
Michigan National Guard, and Lithuania’s armed forces partner with the
Pennsylvania National Guard.

33 See CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia.
34 Funding for the Baltic Security Initiative was included in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021,
passed in December 2020 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), and the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2022, passed in March 2022 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L.
117-103).
35 State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2020-FY2023. Data may not account for all recent
increases in appropriations for the Baltic states.
36 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Major Arms Sales,” at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales.
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Economic Relations
U.S. economic ties with the three Baltic states remain relatively limited, although the State
Department asserts that there are “growing commercial opportunities for U.S. businesses” and
“room for growth” in economic relations.37
 In 2021, U.S. goods exports to Estonia were valued at $449.8 million and goods
imports from Estonia were valued at more than $1.9 billion.38 Main U.S. exports
to Estonia are computer and electronic products, machinery, and transportation
equipment; Estonia’s top exports to the United States are computer and electronic
products, machinery, electrical equipment, and wood products. U.S. affiliates
employ about 3,000 people in Estonia, and U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI)
in Estonia was $74 million in 2020.39
 In 2021, U.S. goods exports to Latvia were valued at $413.2 million and goods
imports from Latvia were valued at $686.3 million.40 Main U.S. exports to Latvia
and top U.S. imports from Latvia both consist of transportation equipment,
beverage products, and computer and electronic products. U.S. affiliates employ
about 1,700 people in Latvia, and U.S. FDI in Latvia was $37 million in 2020.41
 In 2021, U.S. goods exports to Lithuania were valued at nearly $1.24 billion and
goods imports from Lithuania were valued at more than $2 billion.42 Main U.S.
exports to Lithuania are used machinery, liquefied natural gas (LNG),
transportation equipment, and chemicals; top U.S. imports from Lithuania are
petroleum and coal products, chemicals, and furniture. U.S. affiliates employ
about 5,100 people in Lithuania, and U.S. FDI in Lithuania was $182 million in
2020.43
Regional Security Concerns and Responses
Over the past two decades, officials in the Baltic region increasingly have viewed Russia as a
threat to their countries’ security. Baltic officials have expressed concern over a buildup of
Russian forces in the region, large-scale military exercises, and incursions by Russian military
aircraft into Baltic states’ airspace.44
Russia’s 2022 war against Ukraine has significantly intensified NATO concerns that the Baltic
states (as well as Moldova and Georgia, which are not NATO members) could be targets for
aggressive Russian ambitions beyond Ukraine. The presence of a large ethnic Russian population
in the Baltic states, particularly in Latvia and Estonia, also is a factor in these concerns, given that

37 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Latvia, December 3, 2020; and U.S. Relations with Lithuania, August
5, 2020.
38 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Estonia.”
39 Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, The
Transatlantic Economy 2022, p. 156. Hereinafter, Hamilton and Quinlan, Transatlantic Economy.
40 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Latvia.”
41 Hamilton and Quinlan, Transatlantic Economy, p. 164.
42 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Lithuania.”
43 Hamilton and Quinlan, Transatlantic Economy, p. 165.
44 Jaroslaw Adamowski and Martin Banks, “Without a NATO-Wide Effort, the Skies Along the Northeastern Flank
Could Be in Peril,” DefenseNews, June 16, 2019.
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Russian claims of persecution against Russian communities were a large part of Russia’s pretext
for its invasion of Ukraine. One of the central principles of Russian foreign policy is to act as the
defender and guarantor of the “rights” of Russian-speaking people wherever they live.45
Scenarios for Russian action against the Baltic states include a full invasion after a military
buildup, with the aim of capturing the region and closing it off from NATO reinforcements; an
attempted land grab following a quick mobilization; and a limited incursion or “ambiguous
invasion” similar to the tactics employed in Crimea in 2014.46 Some analysts view a full Russian
invasion of the Baltic states as unlikely due to the risk of escalation Russia would face in an open
confrontation with NATO; in a March 2022 visit to the region, U.S. Secretary of State Antony
Blinken declared that NATO would defend “every inch” of its territory.47 Despite the acute
concerns caused by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Baltic leaders maintain that they see no
“immediate threat” of a full-scale Russian invasion against their own countries.48
NATO has increased its deterrent presence in the Baltic states since 2016, with a further increase
in 2022, although Russia retains a large advantage in the number of forces in the region. The
likely accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO also would substantially enhance the
alliance’s ability to defend the Baltic states and prevent a scenario in which Russia might
effectively close off the region. Such factors may make Russian action in the region “less likely,
but that doesn’t mean it’s unlikely,” according to one Lithuanian analyst; in June 2022, a former
Russian prime minister predicted that if Ukraine falls, “the Baltic states will be next.”49
Kaliningrad: Russia’s Strategic Territory on the Baltic Sea
Kaliningrad, a 5,800-square-mile Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea located between Poland and Lithuania, is a key
strategic territory for Russia, allowing the country to project military power into NATO’s northern flank (see
Figure 1). The territory has a heavy Russian military presence, including the Baltic Fleet, a large naval airbase, a
mechanized division, Iskander ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, S-400 surface-to-air missile
systems, and coastal defense missile systems. In August 2022, Russia reportedly deployed three MiG-31 aircraft
equipped with hypersonic missiles to Kaliningrad.
According to NATO officials, Russia uses Kaliningrad to pursue an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy that
involves layering surface-to-air missiles to potentially block access to the Baltic states and much of Poland. Analysts
warn that Kaliningrad’s geographic isolation creates a scenario in which Russia could try to seize the Suwalki Gap,
the 100-kilometer border between Poland and Lithuania separating Kaliningrad from Russia’s ally Belarus.
In summer 2022, Lithuania encountered Russian diplomatic backlash when it enforced EU sanctions on the transit
of steel and other metals from Russia; Lithuania’s implementation of the sanctions affected freight shipments (but
not passengers) on trains transiting its territory to travel between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia.
Sources: U.S. Department of State, “EU Sanctions on Russia and Shipments to and from Kaliningrad,” July 13,
2022; Stefan Hedlund, Scenarios for Russia’s Strategic Kaliningrad Exclave, Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG, June
21, 2022; Sebastien Roblin, “Fortress Kaliningrad: Russia’s Baltic Fleet Now Has a Mechanized Division,” and
National Interest, “Why Russia’s Kaliningrad Naval Base Poses a Deadly Dilemma for NATO,” March 30, 2021.

45 Reuters, “Putin Approves New Foreign Policy Doctrine Based on ‘Russian World,’” September 5, 2022. See also
President of Russia, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” March 18, 2014, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/20603. For additional information, see CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations,
by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory Welt.
46 Lukas Milevski, “Scenarios for Baltic Defence: What to Prepare Against,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, vol.
17 (2019).
47 Missy Ryan, “‘Every Inch of NATO’: Blinken Seeks to Deter Any Russia Thought of Pushing Beyond Ukraine,”
Washington Post, March 8, 2022; Ben S. Wermeling, “Fighting Russia? Modeling the Baltic Scenarios,” US Army War
College Quarterly: Parameters, vol. 48, no. 2 (Summer 2018).
48 Richard Milne, “War in Ukraine: Will the Baltics Become the ‘New West Berlin?,’” Financial Times, March 9,
2022.
49 Matthew Karnitschnig, “The Most Dangerous Place on Earth,” Politico Europe, June 20, 2022.
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Defense Spending and Capabilities
The national militaries of the Baltic states are relatively small (see Table 1) and have limited
capabilities (no combat aircraft or main battle tanks, for example). The Baltic states’ defense
planning consequently relies heavily on NATO membership. The Baltic states have emphasized
active participation in the alliance through measures such as contributing troops to NATO’s
mission in Afghanistan. Prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014, the Baltic
states have increased their defense budgets and acquired new capabilities. All three countries
exceed NATO’s target for member states to allocate at least 2% of GDP for defense spending, and
all three plan for defense spending to reach 2.5% of GDP either in 2022 (Lithuania and Estonia)
or by 2025 (Latvia).
Lithuania has the largest military of the three Baltic states, with 23,000 total active duty personnel
and 7,100 reserves.50 According to NATO, Lithuania’s defense spending increased from $428
million in 2014 to $1.318 billion in 2021, equivalent to 2.03% of GDP.51 In the past several years,
the Lithuanian armed forces have acquired new self-propelled artillery, infantry fighting vehicles,
and short- to medium-range air defense systems. Lithuania is in the process of acquiring new anti-
tank weapons, including Javelin missiles.
Estonia’s defense spending was 2.16% of GDP ($771 million) in 2021.52 The country’s armed
forces total 7,200 active personnel and 17,500 reserves.53 Acquisitions by the Estonian armed
forces over the past several years include new self-propelled artillery, infantry fighting vehicles,
and Javelin anti-tank missiles. Estonia is in the process of acquiring new rocket artillery systems,
coastal defense systems, and short- to medium-range air defense systems.
Latvia’s armed forces total 8,750 active personnel and 11,200 reserves.54 According to NATO
figures, Latvia has more than doubled its defense spending as a percentage of GDP over the past
five years, from 0.94% of GDP in 2014 to 2.16% of GDP ($835 million) in 2021.55 Acquisition
projects underway for the Latvian armed forces include armored personnel carriers, self-propelled
artillery, and Black Hawk helicopters.
Table 1. Baltic States Defense Information
Active Armed
Armed Forces
2021 Defense
Defense Spending %

Forces Personnel
Reserves
Expenditure
of GDP
Estonia
7,200
17,500
$771 million
2.16
Latvia
8,750
11,200
$835 million
2.16
Lithuania
23,000
7,100
$1.318 billion
2.03
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2022 and NATO Public
Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014-2022), June 27, 2022.

50 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2022, p. 124-125. Hereinafter, IISS, Military
Balance.
51 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014-2022), June 27, 2022.
Hereinafter, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures.
52 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures.
53 IISS, Military Balance, pp. 100-101.
54 IISS, Military Balance, pp. 122-123.
55 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Defence Expenditures.
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U.S. and NATO Military Presence
In 2014, the United States launched the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI, originally called the
European Reassurance Initiative) in response to Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine. Under EDI,
the United States has rotated about 7,300 U.S.-based military personnel into Central and Eastern
Europe, typically under a nine-month deployment, while not increasing its permanent troop
presence in Europe.56 The Atlantic Resolve mission, as this rotation is called, includes an Armored
Brigade Combat Team and a Combat Aviation Brigade. The forces conduct training and exercises
in more than a dozen European countries, including the Baltic states, and the U.S. Army V Corps
forward headquarters located in Poznań, Poland is responsible for overseeing mission command
of rotational units supporting Atlantic Resolve. EDI funding was $3.8 billion in FY2022, with
$4.2 billion requested for FY2023.
Since February 2022, the United States has deployed more than 20,000 additional armed forces
personnel to Europe to bolster deterrence and increase alliance defense capabilities, bringing the
total number of U.S. military personnel in Europe to more than 100,000 by mid-year.57 Enhanced
U.S. rotational deployments in the Baltic states include armored, aviation, air defense, and special
operations forces.
At the 2016 NATO Summit, the alliance agreed to deploy battalion-sized (approximately 1,100-
1,500 personnel) multinational battlegroups to Poland and each of the three Baltic states. These
Enhanced Forward Presence units are intended to deter Russian aggression by acting as a
tripwire that ensures a response from the entire alliance in the event of a Russian attack. The
United Kingdom leads the battlegroup in Estonia, Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia, and
Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania. (The United States leads the NATO battlegroup in
Poland.)
Although several allies increased their deployments to the battlegroups (see Figure 2) following
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Baltic officials have expressed the view that NATO’s tripwire
forces are too small to deter Russian aggression.58 Baltic officials have called for NATO to shift
to a forward defense strategy with forces sufficient to deny Russia territorial gains in the first
place rather than maintaining what one leader called a strategy of “lose it and liberate
afterwards.”59 Many officials in the Baltic states advocate establishing permanent U.S. or NATO
bases on their territory and call for the alliance to deploy a permanent brigade-sized presence
(approximately 3,000-5,000 personnel) in each country.60 NATO countries have discussed plans
to form such combat-capable brigades in the Baltic states; initial efforts may include designating
units outside the Baltic states that could be deployed rapidly for their defense.61

56 See U.S. Army Europe and Africa, Operation Atlantic Resolve, at https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/
AtlanticResolve/.
57 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe,” fact sheet, June 29, 2022.
58 Jacqueline Feldscher, “‘Obsolete’ NATO Force Presence in Baltics Needs Upgrade, Estonian Defense Leader Says,”
DefenseOne, June 15, 2022.
59 Richard Milne, “Estonia’s PM Says Country Would Be ‘Wiped from Map’ Under Existing NATO Plans,” Financial
Times, June 22, 2022.
60 Andrea Dudik and Rosalind Mathieson, “Latvia’s President Wants a NATO Brigade to Deter Russia,” Bloomberg,
May 23, 2022; Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Baltic States Are Pushing NATO for More Than Just a Tripwire
Against Russia,” Foreign Policy, May 19, 2022; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty “Lithuania Seeks Permanent U.S.
Military Presence in Country,”, February 9, 2022; Estonian Public Broadcasting, “Congressman: Permanent U.S.
Baltics Base Being Discussed, Would Be Major Task,” February 22, 2022.
61 Reuters, “Canada to Lead Efforts to Form ‘Combat-Capable’ Brigade in Latvia,” June 29, 2022; Dan Sabbagh and
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Figure 2. Allied Forces in the Baltic States

Source: Created by CRS with information from NATO, NATO’s Eastern Flank: Stronger Defence and Deterrence,
June 2022.
Notes: Numbers do not include host countries’ national armed forces.
Lacking their own fighter aircraft, the Baltic countries rely on their NATO allies to police and
defend their airspace. NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission was launched in 2004 and is based at
Siauliai Airbase in Lithuania and Ämari Airbase in Estonia. The Baltic states contribute to the
costs of the mission, including by providing ground services for the aircraft and supplying
aviation fuel.
Hybrid Threats
In addition to conventional military threats, analysts have observed that Russia targets the Baltic
states with hybrid warfare tactics, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.
Disinformation Campaigns and Ethnic Russians in Baltic States
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left millions of ethnic Russians living outside Russia’s
borders. Ethnic Russians make up approximately 25% of the populations of Estonia and Latvia,
respectively; Lithuania has a smaller percentage of ethnic Russians, approximately 6%.62
A 2019 survey indicated that a large majority of the ethnic Russian community in the Baltic states
received news primarily from Russian state media channels.63 Analysts have documented how
Russia uses traditional media (e.g., radio, television) and social media to propagate
disinformation in the Baltic states and many other European countries.64 Russian disinformation
efforts against the Baltic states typically attempt to polarize society by portraying the Baltic states
as illegitimate and dysfunctional, the EU as ineffective and divided, NATO and the United States
as imperial powers, and Baltic governments as Russophobe fascist regimes that oppress their

Peter Walker, “Britain to Commit 1,000 Extra Troops to NATO’s Defence of Estonia,” Guardian, June 29, 2022;
Andreas Rinke and Andrius Sytas, “Germany to Boost Military Mission in Lithuania,” Reuters, June 8, 2022; William
Mauldin and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Blinken Says NATO Is Considering More Permanent Troops in Baltics,” Wall
Street Journal, March 7, 2022.
62 CIA, World Factbook.
63 Sarah Coolican, The Russian Diaspora in the Baltic States: The Trojan Horse That Never Was, LSE IDEAS,
December 2021, p. 14. Hereinafter, Coolican, Russian Diaspora.
64 See, for example, Rihards Kols, Hybrid Threats: The Baltic Experience with Russian Aggressive Behavior, European
Leadership Network, April 5, 2022; Jedrzej Duszynski, Russian Disinformation in Latvia, Warsaw Institute, December
11, 2020; Joseph Robbins, Countering Russian Disinformation, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
September 23, 2020.
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ethnic Russian populations. Russia’s government routinely accuses the Baltic states of violating
the human rights of Russian-speaking minorities, including by discriminating against the use of
the Russian language in the media and schools.65
Prior to adopting wider bans on Russia-based media in 2022, the Baltic states had imposed fines
and temporary bans on Russian media outlets for what authorities called dangerous and
unbalanced reporting. In 2015, the public broadcasting organizations of Estonia and Latvia jointly
launched a new Russian-language television channel in an attempt to present Russian-speaking
audiences with alternatives to the pro-Kremlin narratives typically featured on Russian state
channels. Volunteer organizations in the Baltic states also have sought to expose and counter
Russian disinformation online.
Researchers caution against implicit assumptions that the Baltic states’ Russian-speaking
communities support Russia or pro-Russian narratives monolithically; surveys indicate a diversity
of attitudes within these communities with regard to views of Russia, Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, and other Russia-related questions.66 There has been no movement among Russian-
speaking communities in the Baltic states advocating absorption by Russia. Members of these
communities may prefer to be residents of the Baltic states for reasons including visa-free travel
throughout the EU and average wages that are considerably higher than in Russia. Nevertheless,
the Baltic states’ Russian-speaking populations remain a significant factor in both Russian policy
toward the region and assessments of the potential security threat posed by Russia. Concerns
remain that Russia could attempt to foment tensions or civil unrest as a pretext for intervention or
in an attempt to seize territory where ethnic Russians reside.
Cyberattacks
Vulnerability to potential cyberattacks is a primary concern for the Baltic states. Following a
period of heightened tensions with Russia in 2007, Estonia’s internet infrastructure came under
heavy attack from hackers. Estonian officials said some assaults came from Russian government
web servers, although many others appeared to come from all over the world.67 According to
analysts, what appeared as a series of smaller, individual distributed denial-of-service attacks was
most likely a coordinated, large-scale effort.68 The attacks did little long-term damage, and they
gave Estonia experience in facing such incidents and prompted the country to strengthen its cyber
defenses.69 In August 2022, Estonia reported that it had repelled the largest cyberattack directed
against it since 2007; a Russian hacker group claimed credit for the attack.70
Estonia hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, which opened in
2008. The center fosters cooperation and information sharing on cybersecurity between NATO

65 Reuters, “Moscow Says Baltic States’ ‘Russophobia’ Will Further Damage Ties,” August 30, 2022.
66 Lenora Chu, “Who’s a Latvian and Why? A Complex Question Just Got Harder,” Christian Science Monitor, August
31, 2022; Phil McCausland, “Russian Speakers in Estonia Live in a Tug of War Between Russia and the West,” NBC
News, April 10, 2022; Gordon F. Sander, “They Speak Russian, But Do They Support Putin’s War?,” Politico Europe,
March 20, 2022; Coolican, Russian Diaspora, pp. 11-12.
67 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, “2007 Cyber Attacks on Estonia” in Hybrid Threats: A
Strategic Communications Perspective, Annex of Case Studies, 2019, pp. 51-69.
68 Rain Ottis, Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks Against Estonia from the Information Warfare Perspective, NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2008.
69 Damien McGuinness, “How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia,” BBC News, April 27, 2017.
70 Andrew Higgins, “Estonia Says It Repelled a Major Cyberattack Claimed by Russian Hackers,” New York Times,
August 18, 2022.
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countries, conducts cyberwarfare research and training, and organizes exercises and conferences
preparing NATO countries to detect and fight cyberattacks.71
In 2018, Lithuania adopted a national Cyber Security Strategy and integrated several government
agencies into the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) under the Ministry of Defense.
Lithuania’s NCSC registered nearly 4,100 cybersecurity incidents in 2021.72
The International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index 2020 ranked Estonia
third, Lithuania sixth, and Latvia fifteenth in the world based on measurements of legal, technical,
organizational, capacity building, and cooperation measures related to cybersecurity.73 (The
United States ranked first, the UK and Saudi Arabia tied for second.)
Energy Security
While continuing to import most of their oil and natural gas from Russia since regaining their
independence, the Baltic states have had increasing concerns about Russia using energy
dependence as political and economic leverage. Over the years, they accordingly have positioned
themselves to end their reliance on Russian energy through a series of steps that deepen their
integration with European natural gas and electricity networks and allow them to diversify their
supply sources and import routes. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania
announced in April 2022 that it had eliminated all imports of Russian gas; Latvia and Estonia
have announced plans to quit the use of Russian gas by the end of 2022.74
In 2014, a floating LNG terminal became operational at the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, and
Lithuania subsequently began importing LNG from Norway and the United States. The nearly
300-meter-long floating storage and regasification unit, the Independence, has the capacity to
supply 100% of Lithuania’s natural gas needs and 90% of the total natural gas needs of the three
Baltic countries combined.75 A pipeline linking the gas infrastructures of Estonia and Finland
became operational at the start of 2020, and a pipeline linking Lithuania to Poland became
operational in May 2022.76 In April 2022, Finland and Estonia announced a joint decision to lease
a floating LNG terminal.77 Latvia is proceeding with plans to construct its own LNG terminal.78
As a remnant of the Soviet era, the Baltic states’ power grids remain connected and synchronized
with those of Russia (including Kaliningrad) and Belarus.79 Two projects to integrate the region’s

71 See NATO Cyber Defence Center of Excellence at https://www.ccdcoe.org/. Lithuania hosts the NATO Energy
Security Center of Excellence, and Latvia hosts the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. See
NATO, Centres of Excellence, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm.
72 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, Key Trends and Statistics of the National Cyber Security Status of
Lithuania, 2021 – Q1 2022.
73 International Telecommunications Union, Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2020, pp 25.
74 Maris Andzans, The Baltic Road to Energy Independence from Russia Is Nearing Completion, Foreign Policy
Research Institute, May 25, 2022; Euractiv, “Baltic States Become First in Europe to Stop Russian Gas Imports,” April
4, 2022.
75 Lithuanian National Television and Radio, “Lithuanian LNG Terminal Turns Seven: ‘Weapon Against Russia’s
Aggressive Energy Policy,’” November 4, 2021.
76 European Commission, “Inauguration of Gas Interconnection Between Poland and Lithuania,” May 5, 2022;
European Commission, “Balticconnector Gas Pipeline Up and Running Since 1 January 2020,” January 8, 2020.
77 Estonian Public Broadcasting, “Estonia, Finland Sign LNG Terminal Cooperation Agreement,” April 29, 2022.
78 Estonian Public Broadcasting, “Latvian Minister: We Can Survive the Winter with LNG Terminals, Gas Storage,”
August 4, 2022.
79 Ott Tammik, “Estonian Premier Warns of Blackouts If Russia Cuts Grid Access,” Bloomberg, September 23, 2022;
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power grid into the wider European electricity market became operational in 2016: a link
connecting Lithuania with Poland and an undersea cable connecting Lithuania with Sweden.80
Previously, two connections between Estonia and Finland were the only infrastructure linking the
region’s electric grid to the rest of the EU. In 2018, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania reached an agreement with the European Commission on plans to synchronize their
electricity grids with the rest of Europe by 2025.81
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress regard European energy security as a U.S. national
interest. Successive U.S. Administrations have encouraged EU member states to reduce energy
dependence on Russia through diversification of supplies and supply routes. Some Members of
Congress have expressed support for the Three Seas Initiative as a way to reduce Central and
Eastern European countries’ dependence on Russian energy. (See CRS In Focus IF11547, The
Three Seas Initiative, by Sarah E. Garding and Derek E. Mix.)
Relations with China
Over the past several years, the governments of the Baltic states appear to have developed an
increasingly skeptical view of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and a growing
wariness of China’s influence and intentions in the region.82 In May 2021, Lithuania announced
that it was quitting the 17+1, calling the forum “divisive.”83 (The 17+1 originated in 2012 as a
means to intensify economic and cultural ties between China and the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.84) In August 2022, Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania’s example in quitting
the forum, leaving it with 14 European participants.
Of the three Baltic countries, Lithuania has adopted the most openly skeptical and assertive
approach toward relations with China and has made several policy moves that have triggered a
negative reaction from China.85 Lithuania angered Beijing in March 2021 when it announced its
intention to set up a trade representative office in Taiwan. Lithuania subsequently quit the 17+1,
called on others to do so, and pledged to send COVID-19 vaccine doses to Taiwan. In July 2021,
Taiwan announced it would establish a Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, the first
such trade office (widely considered de facto embassies) in Europe to use the name “Taiwan”
rather than “Chinese Taipei.”86 China subsequently imposed a de facto trade embargo on
Lithuania and European firms that source from Lithuania. In January 2022, Taiwan announced a
$200 million fund for investments in Lithuania and a $1 billion credit fund to finance cooperative
projects with Lithuania in strategic sectors including semiconductors, biotechnology, and
satellites.87

Giedrius Gaidamavičius, “Lithuania Could Make Do Without Russian Gas, But Not Without Russian Electricity – EU
Commissioner,” Lithuanian National Television and Radio, March 9, 2022.
80 ModernPowerSystems, “Completion of NordBalt and LitPol Closes the Baltic Ring,” March 23, 2016.
81 European Commission, “European Solidarity on Energy: Synchronisation of the Baltic States’ Electricity Network
with the European System Strengthens Security of Supply,” June 27, 2018.
82 See also CRS In Focus IF10252, The European Union and China, by Sarah E. Garding et al.
83 Euractiv, “Lithuania Quits ‘Divisive’ China 17+1 Group,” May 23, 2021.
84 See Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, http://www.china-
ceec.org/eng/.
85 Konstantin Eggert, “Lithuania’s Challenge to China is Risky, But Clever,” Deutsche Welle, April 4, 2021.
86 France24, “Taiwan to Use Its Own Name at New Lithuania Office,” July 20, 2021.
87 Mary Hui, “Taiwan’s $1 Billion Lithuania Fund Is a High-Stakes Game of Economic Diplomacy,” Quartz, January
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China’s trade restrictions against Lithuania led the EU to initiate a trade dispute case at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in January 2022.88 The EU additionally began developing a new
instrument designed to deter and counter the use of economic coercion against its member states
by third parties.89 In December 2021, Secretary of State Blinken affirmed U.S. support for
Lithuania in pushing back against China’s coercive behavior, and in March 2022 the United
States requested to join the EU’s WTO consultation.90 Many Members of Congress have
expressed interest in developing ways to work with U.S. allies to deter and respond to efforts at
economic coercion by China.91
Other issues besides Taiwan also have contributed to tensions between China and Lithuania; in
May 2021, the Lithuanian parliament passed a resolution condemning China’s treatment of its
Uyghur Muslim minority as an act of genocide, criticizing China’s National Security Law for
Hong Kong, and calling on China to allow international observers into Tibet.92
Common factors that affect the Baltic states’ views of China include the following:93
 Baltic governments’ close relationships with the United States, in the context of
U.S. efforts to limit or counter PRC influence in the region;
 the Baltic states’ relatively low levels of trade with China and investment from
China compared with many other EU countries, and the availability of
investment and assistance from European countries and the EU;
 disappointment in the Baltic states about a lack of deliverables from trade and
investment talks with China, such as significantly increased investment from
China or greater access to the PRC market for Baltic companies;
 increasing concerns in the Baltic states about the security implications of PRC
investments and potential cyber vulnerabilities from the use of PRC technology;
 resentment in the Baltic states over China’s close ties with Russia and its military
cooperation with Russia, including past naval exercises in the Baltic Sea;
 resentment in the Baltic states over China’s ambiguous stance on the war in
Ukraine;

26, 2022.
88 World Trade Organization, “EU Initiates WTO Dispute Complaint Regarding Chinese Restrictions on Trade with
Lithuania,” January 31, 2022.
89 European Commission, “EU Strengthens Protection Against Economic Coercion,” December 8, 2021.
90 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), “Statement from USTR Spokesperson Adam Hodge on
the EU’s Request for WTO Consultations with China,” January 27, 2022. U.S. Department of State, “Secretary
Blinken’s Call with Lithuanian Prime Minister Simonyte,” December 21, 2021.
91 In the 117th Congress, the House-passed version of H.R. 4521 (America COMPETES Act of 2022; passed by the
Senate as the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021) would establish an interagency task force to
develop a U.S. strategy to respond to China’s coercive economic measures. The task force also would consult with U.S.
partners and allies to develop a collective response and establish long-term deterrence to such measures.
92 The U.S. government and the parliaments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands also have
characterized China’s treatment of the Uyghurs as genocide.
93 See, for example, Priyanka Shankar, “Why Are the Baltics Becoming Skeptical of Relations with China?,” Deutsche
Welle, August 22, 2022; Maria Siow, “Why Europe’s Baltic States Can Brush Off China,” South China Morning Post,
July 17, 2021; Andris Banka, Baltic States Start to Turn Away from China, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 7,
2021; Jessica Larsen, Chinese Influence in the Baltic?, Danish Institute for International Studies, November 18, 2020.
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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations

 the Baltic states’ values-based foreign policies that emphasize democracy and
human rights, an outlook linked to their history of forcible annexation by the
Soviet Union;
 claims by some leaders in the Baltic states that China overreacts to perceived
slights and criticism on human rights issues; and
 decreased willingness on the part of the Baltic states to compartmentalize or
separate economic cooperation with China from issues such as human rights,
climate, and security concerns.
Outlook
The Baltic states are likely to remain strong U.S. allies and important U.S. partners in Europe that
will continue to look to the United States for leadership on foreign policy and security issues.
Bilateral security cooperation with the Baltic states and the regional presence and activities of
U.S. and NATO forces are topics that have been of long-standing interest to many Members of
Congress. Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, such cooperation has taken
on much greater urgency, leading some Members of Congress to travel to the region and conduct
renewed oversight of U.S. defense commitments to allies along NATO’s eastern flank.
Members of Congress may
 track efforts to bolster the capabilities of the Baltic states’ armed forces,
including through defense sales and the provision of U.S. security assistance.
Congressional actions in these areas may include continuing security assistance
appropriations and conducting oversight of related executive branch programs
and activities.
 remain informed about specific security threats to the Baltic states posed by
Russia, including conventional military concerns and hybrid threats, such as
disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. Related congressional action may
include continuing oversight of regional U.S. defense policy and commitments,
and engaging in oversight of U.S. policies toward countering hybrid threats.
 follow the Baltic states’ efforts to end their reliance on Russian energy supplies.
Related congressional action may include continued oversight of U.S. policies
toward European energy security, including funding for the Three Seas Initiative.
 monitor the Baltic states’ relations with China in the wider context of
congressional concerns about China’s influence and activities in Europe and
congressional oversight of U.S. policies toward China.

Author Information

Derek E. Mix

Specialist in European Affairs

Congressional Research Service

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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations


Acknowledgments
The author thanks CRS Visual Information Specialist Amber Wilhelm for her work in creating the graphics
for this report.

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Congressional Research Service
R46139 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
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