Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance
~~September 23~~December 2, 2022 , 2022
with International Obligations
Paul K. Kerr
Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to
Specialist in Specialist in
cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation of its cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation of its
Nonproliferation Nonproliferation
nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy- nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-

water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards
agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has

implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about,
the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran
concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s
Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated.
The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July
20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to
reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so. reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear
program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions
concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of
Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s “final assessment on the resolution” of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s “final assessment on the resolution” of
the outstanding issues. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions adopted in June 2020the outstanding issues. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions adopted in June 2020, and June and June and November 2022 call on Iran to satisfy more 2022 call on Iran to satisfy more
recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. But these resolutions do not contain a formal recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. But these resolutions do not contain a formal
finding of noncompliance. finding of noncompliance.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the
IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant. IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Introduction
Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires
nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in
1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine 1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine
nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of
Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the
council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns
about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and
describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.
For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint , by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report
R43333, R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. , by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman.
Background
Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear
weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main
source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride
gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can
produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and
highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear
weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a
uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several compounds, uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several compounds,
including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and
future power reactors. future power reactors.
Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern. Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern.
Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the
production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel
would have contained plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in would have contained plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in
nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called
“reprocessing.” Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France, Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”), Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”),
Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to fulfill a Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to fulfill a
JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the
P5+1 so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to P5+1 so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to
export the spent fuel from this reactor and all other nuclear reactors. export the spent fuel from this reactor and all other nuclear reactors.

1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. the United States.
2 2 ~~INFCIRC/214.~~
The Text of the Agreement Between Iran and the Agency for The Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/214, December 13, 1974. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions
regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Iran and the agency subsequently resolved most of these regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Iran and the agency subsequently resolved most of these
questions, which had contributed to suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons questions, which had contributed to suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.4 Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEA board June program.4 Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEA board June
2, 2008, that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions 2, 2008, that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions
regarding “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”5 The IAEA agency did not regarding “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”5 The IAEA agency did not
make any substantive progress on these matters for some time. make any substantive progress on these matters for some time.
Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns
and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.6 Iran also expressed concern to and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.6 Iran also expressed concern to
the IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to the IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to
sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The
IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its willingness to discuss IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its willingness to discuss
with Iran with Iran
modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in
the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive
information related to its conventional military activities.7 information related to its conventional military activities.7
Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested
information.8 information.8
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is
essential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all essential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all
outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012 outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012
and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of all and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of all
outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”9 However, during an October 2013 outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”9 However, during an October 2013
meeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to meeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to
resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013,
describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA
agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not
already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information

3 The text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf. 3 The text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
4 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran President Ali Akbar Salehi explained in a 2009 interview that Tehran “decided to 4 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran President Ali Akbar Salehi explained in a 2009 interview that Tehran “decided to
solve these problems within the context of our [safeguards] commitments and not accept anything beyond our legal solve these problems within the context of our [safeguards] commitments and not accept anything beyond our legal
obligations,” adding that there had previously been “debates about the decreasing of the level of our cooperation” with obligations,” adding that there had previously been “debates about the decreasing of the level of our cooperation” with
the IAEA. (“Interview: Dr. Salehi on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” published in the IAEA. (“Interview: Dr. Salehi on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” published in Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 9, , Vol. 9,
Nos. 1-2, Fall 2009-Winter 2010, p. 1. Nos. 1-2, Fall 2009-Winter 2010, p. 1.
5 5 Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008. , IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008.
6 See, for example, 6 See, for example, Communication Dated 7 January 2016 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Final Assessment on Past and
Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016. , INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016.
7 7 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008. GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008.
8 See, for example, 8 See, for example, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012.
9 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations 9 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations
with Tehran, and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues with Tehran, and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues
is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme.” programme.”
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about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to
the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on
high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport
and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.” and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.”
Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.10 Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.10
Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran completed a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA “Roadmap for Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran completed a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA “Roadmap for
Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA Director General Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA Director General
Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of
Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Iran, to make Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Iran, to make
an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”11 an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”11
According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors, “[a]ll the According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors, “[a]ll the
activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule.”12 activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule.”12
The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the agency’s “final The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the agency’s “final
assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues. assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues.
In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran’s cooperation In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran’s cooperation
with the road map and “further notes that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the with the road map and “further notes that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the
“outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”13 Since the IAEA has verified that Iran “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”13 Since the IAEA has verified that Iran
has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused
on Iran’s compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran’s on Iran’s compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran’s
safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA
implementation “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the implementation “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the
Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to
undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the
full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.”
The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to
the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the
full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of
Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds
to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or
safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting
provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General
to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel
to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and
also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors andalso to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at in parallel to the Security Council at
any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of
concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments. concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments.
Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s
investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its

10 10 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015.
11 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, 11 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear
Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. , by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman.
12 12 Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, GOV/2015/68, , GOV/2015/68,
December 2, 2015. December 2, 2015.
13 13 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Implementation and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran
in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015. , GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015.
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construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its
IAEA safeguards agreement.14 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. IAEA safeguards agreement.14 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.
Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, required Iran to comply with these Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, required Iran to comply with these
provisions, as well as to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of provisions, as well as to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons.” Resolution 1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified delivering nuclear weapons.” Resolution 1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified
Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements. (See Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements. (See “Potential Noncompliance After September 2005.”) ”)
Iran did not take any of these steps prior to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some Iran did not take any of these steps prior to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some
aspects of its nuclear program since the government began implementing the November 2013 aspects of its nuclear program since the government began implementing the November 2013
Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013
agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some information to the agency required by the agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some information to the agency required by the
modified Code 3.1. modified Code 3.1.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran applied additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran applied additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program
and heavy-water reactor program, as well as began implementing its additional protocol and the and heavy-water reactor program, as well as began implementing its additional protocol and the
modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016,
all of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N. all of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, composes the current legal Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, composes the current legal
framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.15 The IAEA reports findings of its inspection and framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.15 The IAEA reports findings of its inspection and
monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties’ monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties’
implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations are national decisions. implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations are national decisions.
Until July 2019, all official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the Until July 2019, all official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the
IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Iran had fulfilled its JCPOA and IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Iran had fulfilled its JCPOA and
related Resolution 2231 requirements.16 17 related Resolution 2231 requirements.16 17
Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding
JCPOA-mandated limits; the government has since increased the number of such activities (see JCPOA-mandated limits; the government has since increased the number of such activities (see

14 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water. 14 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water.
15 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” January 15 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” January
16, 2016. 16, 2016.
16 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1 16 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1
began implementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue was resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts began implementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue was resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts
of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 (of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 (Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department ofDepartment of State, April State, April
2017). For more information, see CRS Report R43333, 2017). For more information, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit and CRS Report and CRS Report
RL34544, RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have noted , by Paul K. Kerr. Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have noted
that Iran has on several occasions exceeded the JCPOA-required limit. Tehran since February 23, 2021, has neither that Iran has on several occasions exceeded the JCPOA-required limit. Tehran since February 23, 2021, has neither
informed the IAEA about Iran’s inventory of heavy water nor allowed the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water informed the IAEA about Iran’s inventory of heavy water nor allowed the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water
production. production.
17 According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and 17 According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and
development using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceeded the number permitted by development using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceeded the number permitted by
the JCPOA (the JCPOA (Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; GOV/2019/32). In a June 11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott 2019; GOV/2019/32). In a June 11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott
stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued
a similar public finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17, 2019, press conference a similar public finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17, 2019, press conference
that “Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at that “Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at
the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019). the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019).
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Appendix D).18 According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, LEU .18 According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, LEU
stockpile, enriched uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed stockpile, enriched uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed
JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development
(R&D) activities, as well as centrifuge manufacturing.19 (R&D) activities, as well as centrifuge manufacturing.19
In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as
grounds for reducing the government’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to grounds for reducing the government’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to
the agreement.the agreement.~~20According~~20 According to that paragraph, to that paragraph,
Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions
specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part. to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known
as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and
announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute
resolution mechanism.21 The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for resolution mechanism.21 The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, who oversees the mechanism’s process.22 It Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, who oversees the mechanism’s process.22 It
does not appear that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With regard to does not appear that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With regard to
Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that those Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that those
governments “remain committed to working with all JCPOA participants to find a diplomatic way governments “remain committed to working with all JCPOA participants to find a diplomatic way

18 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on the following sources: GOV/2019/32; 18 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on the following sources: GOV/2019/32; Verification and
Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report Report
by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019; by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in
Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9, , Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9,
July 8, 2019; July 8, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019; Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019; Verification and
Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report , Report
by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019; by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020; GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020; , Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020; Verification
and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), ,
Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021; , Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021;
Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution
2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021; , Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021; GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/51, November 17, 2021; , Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/51, November 17, 2021;
Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution
2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/4, March 3, 2022; , Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/4, March 3, 2022; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2022/24, May 30, 2022; GOV/2022/24, May 30, 2022; ~~and~~ Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/39, September 7, Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/39, September 7, 2022; and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/62, November 10, 2022. , 2022.
19 See also “IAEA Chief Sounds Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” 19 See also “IAEA Chief Sounds Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Financial Times, May 26, 2021. , May 26, 2021.
20 See also 20 See also Communication Dated 29 January 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Agency, INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021. , INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021.
21 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020. 21 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020.
22 “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 22 “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020. of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020.
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forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the JCPOA. The E3 forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the JCPOA. The E3
did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.23 did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.23
The E3 November 2020 statement explains that those governments “do not accept the argument The E3 November 2020 statement explains that those governments “do not accept the argument
that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never
triggered” the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease triggered” the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease
implementing the provisions of the agreement.”24 Nevertheless, according to the U.S. implementing the provisions of the agreement.”24 Nevertheless, according to the U.S.
government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran may cease performing commitments in whole government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran may cease performing commitments in whole
or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions.”25 or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions.”25
A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA had A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA had
continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA, continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA,
which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.26 A which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.26 A ~~September 7~~November 10, 2022, report , 2022, report
from Grossi, however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake the verification and from Grossi, however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake the verification and
monitoring activities concerning Section T since his February 2021 report.27 monitoring activities concerning Section T since his February 2021 report.27
The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian
sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the
IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent
with” the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns. with” the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns.
The IAEA has not reported whether it has requested JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military The IAEA has not reported whether it has requested JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military
facilities, but the agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-facilities, but the agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-
source information and receiving intelligence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian source information and receiving intelligence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian
compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April 2018 State compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April 2018 State
Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and nonproliferation Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and nonproliferation
agreements, agreements,
[t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards- [t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-
relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding
weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,
Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained
in the JCPOA.28 in the JCPOA.28
The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s compliance with the government’s obligations pursuant to The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s compliance with the government’s obligations pursuant to
Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.
According to Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the According to Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the
level of cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the level of cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the

23 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020. 23 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020.
24 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,” January 14, 2020. 24 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,” January 14, 2020.
25 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January 25 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January
31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst. 31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst.
26 GOV/2021/10. 26 GOV/2021/10.
27 GOV/2022/27 GOV/2022/~~39.~~
62. 28 Department of State, April 2018. The August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015, 28 Department of State, April 2018. The August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015,
IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues” concerning the IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues” concerning the
possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program,
does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its
previous assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program, or where it has concerns regarding previous assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program, or where it has concerns regarding
the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 2019). , 2019).
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JCPOA.”29 JCPOA.”29 However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government,
as of February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency as of February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency
measures” described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.30 On February measures” described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.30 On February
21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding … whereby 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding … whereby
the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to
three months, as set out in a technical annex.”31 During a press conference that day, Grossi three months, as set out in a technical annex.”31 During a press conference that day, Grossi
explained that this arrangement “is not a replacement for what we used to have” under the explained that this arrangement “is not a replacement for what we used to have” under the
Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that allows us to continue to give the world Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that allows us to continue to give the world
assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”32 assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”32
According to a subsequent report from Grossi, this agreement is meant “to enable the Agency to According to a subsequent report from Grossi, this agreement is meant “to enable the Agency to
recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge.”33 recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge.”33
Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without
limitation.”34 According to a December 1, 2021, letter to the IAEA, Iran has not scaled back limitation.”34 According to a December 1, 2021, letter to the IAEA, Iran has not scaled back
monitoring and inspections related to Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement; IAEA monitoring and inspections related to Tehran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement; IAEA
reports do not contradict Iran’s claims.35 Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Permanent reports do not contradict Iran’s claims.35 Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Permanent
Representative to the U.N. in Vienna, stated on March 4, 2021, that Tehran will resume “full Representative to the U.N. in Vienna, stated on March 4, 2021, that Tehran will resume “full
implementation of the Additional Protocol” when the other JCPOA participants resume implementation of the Additional Protocol” when the other JCPOA participants resume
implementing their obligations pursuant to the agreement.36 Iran’s Ambassador to the United implementing their obligations pursuant to the agreement.36 Iran’s Ambassador to the United
Nations, Majid Takht Ravanchi, asserted in a June 30 statement to the UN Security Council that Nations, Majid Takht Ravanchi, asserted in a June 30 statement to the UN Security Council that
“as soon as other [JCPOA] parties fulfill all of their obligations in a complete, effective, and “as soon as other [JCPOA] parties fulfill all of their obligations in a complete, effective, and
verifiable manner, Iran will immediately reverse all of its steps” that violate the agreement.37 verifiable manner, Iran will immediately reverse all of its steps” that violate the agreement.37
The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24, 2021, that the parties agreed to extend the above- The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24, 2021, that the parties agreed to extend the above-
describeddescribed arrangement until June 24, 2021.38 Grossi’s May 30 report expresses the agency’s arrangement until June 24, 2021.38 Grossi’s May 30 report expresses the agency’s

29 GOV/2020/51. 29 GOV/2020/51.
30 GOV/2021/10. The letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code 3.1 30 GOV/2021/10. The letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code 3.1
of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA use of modern safeguards technologies in Iran; of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA use of modern safeguards technologies in Iran;
the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium enrichment, the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium enrichment,
uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access “pursuant to uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access “pursuant to
provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of Tehran’s implementation of JCPOA-provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of Tehran’s implementation of JCPOA-
mandated “voluntary measures.” mandated “voluntary measures.”
31 GOV/2021/10. 31 GOV/2021/10.
32 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021, 32 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU.
33 GOV/2021/28. 33 GOV/2021/28.
34 GOV/2021/10. 34 GOV/2021/10.
35 35 Communication Dated 1 December 2021 From the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, ,
INFCIRC/967, December 3, 2021. A March 2022 Iran statement to the IAEA Board of Governors reiterated this INFCIRC/967, December 3, 2021. A March 2022 Iran statement to the IAEA Board of Governors reiterated this
commitment (“IAEA Envoy: Iran to Continue Fulfillment of Undertakings Based on CSA,” Fars News Agency, March commitment (“IAEA Envoy: Iran to Continue Fulfillment of Undertakings Based on CSA,” Fars News Agency, March
10, 2022). 10, 2022).
36 “Iranian Envoy Hails IAEA Members’ Vigilance to Prevent Escalating Tensions,” 36 “Iranian Envoy Hails IAEA Members’ Vigilance to Prevent Escalating Tensions,” Fars News Agency, March 4, , March 4,
2021. 2021.
37 Statement by H.E. Mr. Majid Takht Ravanchi Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of 37 Statement by H.E. Mr. Majid Takht Ravanchi Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to the United Nations Before the United Nations Security Council on “non-proliferation: Implementation of Iran to the United Nations Before the United Nations Security Council on “non-proliferation: Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)” June 30, 2022. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)” June 30, 2022. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz
Kamalvandi made a similar statement on September 8, 2022. (“Iran Rejects IAEAKamalvandi made a similar statement on September 8, 2022. (“Iran Rejects IAEA'’s Politically-Motivated Report, Says s Politically-Motivated Report, Says
Peaceful N. Program Fully Transparent,” Peaceful N. Program Fully Transparent,” Fars News Agency, September 8, 2022.) , September 8, 2022.)
38 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran 38 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran
Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 24, 2021; “Envoy , May 24, 2021; “Envoy
Confirms Iran Nuclear Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” Confirms Iran Nuclear Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” Islamic Republic News Agency, June 1, 2021. , June 1, 2021.
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“understanding that surveillance data from all Agency cameras installed for activities in relation “understanding that surveillance data from all Agency cameras installed for activities in relation
to the JCPOA, as well as its on-line enrichment monitors, electronic seals or installed to the JCPOA, as well as its on-line enrichment monitors, electronic seals or installed
measurement devices, will continue to be stored and made available to the Agency if and when measurement devices, will continue to be stored and made available to the Agency if and when
Iran resumes implementation” of Tehran’s JCPOA commitments.39 However, Iran is no longer Iran resumes implementation” of Tehran’s JCPOA commitments.39 However, Iran is no longer
recording such data (see below). recording such data (see below).
In late August 2021, the agency requested that Iran provide access to “all relevant locations” in In late August 2021, the agency requested that Iran provide access to “all relevant locations” in
Iran “in order to service the equipment and replace the storage media.”40 The IAEA also requested Iran “in order to service the equipment and replace the storage media.”40 The IAEA also requested
that Tehran permit agency inspectors to “verify the status” of four surveillance cameras that Iran that Tehran permit agency inspectors to “verify the status” of four surveillance cameras that Iran
had removed from its TESA Karaj complex centrifuge component manufacturing workshop.41 had removed from its TESA Karaj complex centrifuge component manufacturing workshop.41
Iranian officials have explained that the government removed the cameras following a June 23 Iranian officials have explained that the government removed the cameras following a June 23
“terrorist attack in which ... the agency’s equipment was destroyed and damaged.”42 Director “terrorist attack in which ... the agency’s equipment was destroyed and damaged.”42 Director
General Grossi explained in an October press interview that, as a result of this incident, “some of General Grossi explained in an October press interview that, as a result of this incident, “some of
our equipment was affected,” adding that “we need to restore our monitoring capacities there.”43 our equipment was affected,” adding that “we need to restore our monitoring capacities there.”43
The IAEA and Iran reached an agreement on September 12, 2021, that, according to an IAEA-The IAEA and Iran reached an agreement on September 12, 2021, that, according to an IAEA-
Iran joint statement, permits agency inspectors to “service the identified equipment and replace Iran joint statement, permits agency inspectors to “service the identified equipment and replace
their storage media.”44 their storage media.”44
Iran did not fully comply with this agreement, according to the IAEA. Iran permitted agency Iran did not fully comply with this agreement, according to the IAEA. Iran permitted agency
inspectors from September 20-22 to “service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance inspectors from September 20-22 to “service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance
equipment and to replace storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran,” according to Grossi’s equipment and to replace storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran,” according to Grossi’s
November 17 report, which adds that Iran denied the inspectors access to the Karaj workshop.45 November 17 report, which adds that Iran denied the inspectors access to the Karaj workshop.45
Iranian Ambassador Gharibabadi asserted in a September 27, 2021, statement that Iranian Ambassador Gharibabadi asserted in a September 27, 2021, statement that
[d]uring the discussions in Tehran as well as in Vienna, it was clearly indicated that since [d]uring the discussions in Tehran as well as in Vienna, it was clearly indicated that since
that Tessa Karaj Complex is still under security and judicial investigations, the equipment that Tessa Karaj Complex is still under security and judicial investigations, the equipment
related to this Complex are not included for servicing.46 related to this Complex are not included for servicing.46
Grossi’s November 17, 2021, report contradicts Gharibabadi’s claim, explaining that the Grossi’s November 17, 2021, report contradicts Gharibabadi’s claim, explaining that the
September agreement “did not in any way exclude certain locations and equipment.”47 In any September agreement “did not in any way exclude certain locations and equipment.”47 In any
case, the IAEA had installed replacement cameras in the Karaj workshop by the “end of case, the IAEA had installed replacement cameras in the Karaj workshop by the “end of
December 2021,” pursuant to a bilateral agreement with Iran.48 The next month, the IAEA December 2021,” pursuant to a bilateral agreement with Iran.48 The next month, the IAEA
removed the cameras from this workshop and installed cameras in another facility that is removed the cameras from this workshop and installed cameras in another facility that is
performing the work previously conducted at the Karaj workshop.49 performing the work previously conducted at the Karaj workshop.49
The IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments The IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments
has diminished since February 23, 2021; a has diminished since February 23, 2021; a ~~September 7~~November 10, 2022, report from Grossi explains that , 2022, report from Grossi explains that

39 GOV/2022/24. 39 GOV/2022/24.
40 Ibid. 40 Ibid.
41 GOV/2021/39. 41 GOV/2021/39.
42 GOV/2021/39; “Iran Urges JCPOA Parties to Prove Their Genuine Intention to Full Implementation of 42 GOV/2021/39; “Iran Urges JCPOA Parties to Prove Their Genuine Intention to Full Implementation of
Commitments,” November 26, 2021. Available at https://irangov.ir/detail/374677. Commitments,” November 26, 2021. Available at https://irangov.ir/detail/374677.
43 Stephanie Cooke, “Interview: IAEA’s Grossi on Aukus, Iran and COP26,” 43 Stephanie Cooke, “Interview: IAEA’s Grossi on Aukus, Iran and COP26,” Energy Intelligence, October 8, 2021. , October 8, 2021.
44“Joint Statement by the Vice-President and the Head of Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran 44“Joint Statement by the Vice-President and the Head of Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” September 12, 2021. and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” September 12, 2021.
45 GOV/2021/51. 45 GOV/2021/51.
46 “Ambassador Gharibabadi’s Comments on the IAEA DG Sep 26 Report on Cameras,” September 27, 2021. 46 “Ambassador Gharibabadi’s Comments on the IAEA DG Sep 26 Report on Cameras,” September 27, 2021.
47 GOV/2021/51. 47 GOV/2021/51.
48 GOV/2022/448 GOV/2022/4 ; “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December ; “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December
15, 2021. 15, 2021.
49 GOV/2022/24. 49 GOV/2022/24.
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the agency’s JCPOA-related “verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected the agency’s JCPOA-related “verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected
as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under
the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.”50the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.”50 ~~Recent Iranian actions~~ Iranian actions taken in June 2022 have further impeded the have further impeded the
agency’s ability to regain this continuity of knowledge. In response to a June 8 Iranian request agency’s ability to regain this continuity of knowledge. In response to a June 8 Iranian request
following a June IAEA Board of Governors resolution concerning outstanding issues related to following a June IAEA Board of Governors resolution concerning outstanding issues related to
Tehran’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement, the agency removed “all of its equipment Tehran’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement, the agency removed “all of its equipment
previously installed in Iran for surveillance and monitoring under the JCPOA.”51 Since June 10, previously installed in Iran for surveillance and monitoring under the JCPOA.”51 Since June 10,
“no data has since been recorded for verification and monitoring.”52 Mohammad Eslami, Head of “no data has since been recorded for verification and monitoring.”52 Mohammad Eslami, Head of
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated on July 25 that Tehran will keep the cameras the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated on July 25 that Tehran will keep the cameras
“switched off until the nuclear deal is fully restored.”53 “switched off until the nuclear deal is fully restored.”53
The IAEA would face a complex verification task, should Iran and the P5+1 resume full JCPOA The IAEA would face a complex verification task, should Iran and the P5+1 resume full JCPOA
implementation. implementation. ~~According to IAEA Director General Grossi s September 7 report, the IAEA~~
~~in order to be able to re-establish its knowledge of Iran’s nuclear-related activities during~~
~~the period when the Agency’s surveillance and monitoring equipment was not in operation,~~
~~would need to take remedial action. The Agency would need to apply additional safeguards~~
~~measures...and Iran would need to provide all related records to the Agency, the~~
~~consistency of which the Agency would then need to confirm.54~~
~~The IAEA would also “need to determine the comprehensiveness and accuracy”~~The agency would need to “re-establish an understanding” of Iran’s JCPOA-related activities since February 21, 2021, Grossi’s November 2022 report explains, adding that the IAEA “would need to confirm the integrity, comprehensiveness and accuracy of the data recorded by its surveillance equipment” between February 21, 2021, and June 8, 2022, “by comparing it to the declarations provided by Iran.” Tehran would also “need to provide all related records” to the IAEA, which would then confirm the “consistency” of the records “through the application of additional safeguards measures.”54 ~~of the~~
~~surveillance data stored in Iran, according to Grossi’s report, which cautions that~~
~~even if all records were provided by Iran, additional safeguards measures were applied by~~
~~the Agency, and the recovered data proved to be comprehensive and accurate, considerable~~
~~challenges would remain to confirm the consistency of Iran’s declared inventory of~~
~~centrifuges and heavy water with the situation prior to [February 21, 2021].55~~
Iran and the IAEA
As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are
designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to
nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.5655 Safeguards Safeguards
include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although
comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such agreements, are limited” according to the agency.56 As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the
50 GOV/2022/50 GOV/2022/3962. 51 GOV/2022/39. 52 GOV/2022/62.
~~51 Ibid.~~
~~52 Ibid~~. .
53 “AEOI Chief: Iran Not to Turn on Beyond-Safeguards Cameras Before JCPOA Revival,” 53 “AEOI Chief: Iran Not to Turn on Beyond-Safeguards Cameras Before JCPOA Revival,” Fars News Agency, July , July
25, 2022.25, 2022.
54 GOV/2022/ 54 GOV/2022/~~39.~~
~~55 Ibid.~~
5662. 55 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-
Glossary-2001-Edition.) Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, Glossary-2001-Edition.) Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153,
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According a Amano’s May available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According a Amano’s May
2013 report from Amano, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 2013 report from Amano, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as
1992,” that this model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of 1992,” that this model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of
nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State
(i.e. completeness)” ((i.e. completeness)” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013). , Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013).
56 Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services Series 21, May 2016. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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~~undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such~~
~~agreements, are limited” according to the agency.57~~
~~As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as~~
~~obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive~~
~~safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the~~
~~government.58~~government.57 Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the
agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the
IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from
member states.member states.5958 Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the
agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.6059
The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director
General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an all-General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an all-
encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to
make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”6160 Similarly, a February 2006 Similarly, a February 2006
report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the
agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is
limited.”limited.”6261 There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the
IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states
regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect
the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA board is the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA board is
required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (seerequired to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (see Appendix
B). Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the . Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the
more likely the board would be to approve such an inspection. more likely the board would be to approve such an inspection.
The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the
National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information
during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built
nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware
of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.6362 Prior to the Prior to the
NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the
agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in
violation of its safeguards agreement. violation of its safeguards agreement.

~~57 Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services~~
~~Series 21, May 2016.~~
58 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary.
59 In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the matter in September 2003, the IAEA board called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.63 57 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. 58 Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol
(INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. (INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
6059 Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a
resolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N. resolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N.
Security Council. Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021. Security Council. Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021.
6160 “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005, “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei. available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei.
6261 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006. GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.
6362 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council, Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council,
personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s
WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/
tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.htmltenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html. 63 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. .
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In In ~~fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the~~
~~NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the~~
~~matter in September 2003, the IAEA board called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the~~
~~agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “unconditionally sign,~~
~~ratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.64~~
In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment
activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and
comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.6564 As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain
from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional
Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.6665
Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as well as information Iran provided after the October 2003 Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as well as information Iran provided after the October 2003
agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities,
some of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (sesome of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (see Appendix A). After October . After October
2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in
November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.6766 However, Iran resumed uranium However, Iran resumed uranium
conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who
had been elected two months earlier. had been elected two months earlier.
On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77) On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77)6867
that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
The board, however, did not report Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran The board, however, did not report Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran
additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran
 to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,  to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,
documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military
owned workshops, and research and development locations; owned workshops, and research and development locations;
 to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity;  to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity;
 to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;  to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;
 to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and  to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and
 to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.  to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.
No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September
2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the 2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the
IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran.” nuclear material and activities in Iran.”
Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges
at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N. at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N.
Security Council.Security Council.6968 Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional
Protocol. (For details, see Protocol. (For details, see “Iran and the U.N. Security Council” below.) below.)

~~64 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.~~
65 Potential Noncompliance After September 2005 Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its IAEA safeguards agreement.69 That provision (called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed 64 The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.
6665 Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021. Iran implemented the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA until February 2021.
6766 The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.
6867 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
6968 For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see “Iran and the U.N.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~link to page 19~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Potential Noncompliance After September 2005~~
~~Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told~~
~~the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its~~
~~IAEA safeguards agreement.70 That provision (called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed~~
~~in February 2003, requires Tehran~~Security Council.” 69 According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” Congressional Research Service 11 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations in February 2003, requires states to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as
soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken,
whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere
to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to
provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material
into it.into it.7170
This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide
the IAEA with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had the IAEA with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had
refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at
Arak.Arak.7271 As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the
IAEA on February 12, 2014.IAEA on February 12, 2014.7372 Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design
information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the
agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22, agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22,
2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information, 2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information,
according to a November 2009 report.according to a November 2009 report.7473 Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had
“provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.“provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.7574 IAEA reports since 2012 IAEA reports since 2012
do not appear to address this issue. do not appear to address this issue.
Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before
September 2009 that it had been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called September 2009 that it had been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called
the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government’s safeguards the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May
2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction 2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction

~~Security Council.”~~
~~70 According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and~~
~~administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.”~~
71 70 During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s
Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA
Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Tehran Times, ,
November 9, 2011.November 9, 2011.
72 “Until 1992, the standard language” for code 3.1 “called for the state to provide the IAEA with completed design information questionnaires for new nuclear facilities as soon as possible but no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material.” The IAEA subsequently adopted the current notification requirement (Michael D. Rosenthal, Lisa L. Saum-Manning, Frank Houck, and George Anzelon, Review of the Negotiation of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) Volume I/III Setting the Stage: 1991-1996, Nonproliferation and National Security Department, Nonproliferation and Safeguards Division, Brookhaven National Laboratory, January 2010). 71 This lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the This lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the
design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to Amano’s May 2013 report design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to Amano’s May 2013 report
(GOV/2013/27). A November 2013 report from Amano explains that the IAEA “needs updated design information as (GOV/2013/27). A November 2013 report from Amano explains that the IAEA “needs updated design information as
early as possible in order ... to ensure that all possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards early as possible in order ... to ensure that all possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards
measures and customized safeguards equipment are put in place.” (measures and customized safeguards equipment are put in place.” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director , Report by the Director
General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013.) Iran has concluded “a safeguards approach for the reactor” (General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013.) Iran has concluded “a safeguards approach for the reactor” (Status of
Iran’s Nuclear Programme in Relation to the Joint Plan of Action, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8, , Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8,
April 20, 2015). April 20, 2015).
7372 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014. Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014.
7473 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008. GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008.
7574 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s November 2015 report, has not yet provided all of decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s November 2015 report, has not yet provided all of
this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue. this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue.
Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to
provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary
arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the
agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those
arrangements.arrangements.7675 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 ~~statement77~~statement76 that that
Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s
obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to
conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance
with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from
ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin
constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely
fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s
delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. As noted, Iran notified the IAEA delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. As noted, Iran notified the IAEA
on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.7877
Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it has decided to construct other new Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it has decided to construct other new
nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has
made such decisions. For example, the IAEA asked the government for information about Iranian made such decisions. For example, the IAEA asked the government for information about Iranian
statements that Tehran is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is designing a statements that Tehran is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is designing a
nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for four new nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for four new
research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. Pursuant to its research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. Pursuant to its
November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this information to November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this information to
the agency. According to Director General Grossi’s September 7 report, “Iran has informed” the the agency. According to Director General Grossi’s September 7 report, “Iran has informed” the
IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in the near future” and IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in the near future” and
that the government “was ready to work with” the agency “to find a mutually acceptable solution that the government “was ready to work with” the agency “to find a mutually acceptable solution
to address the issue of modified Code 3.1.”to address the issue of modified Code 3.1.”7978
Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the
basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to allow agency inspectors to verify design basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to allow agency inspectors to verify design
information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to
facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a
“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.8079 Moreover, Moreover,
the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify the the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify the
Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its
safeguards agreement.safeguards agreement.8180 IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify

7675 See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf. See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.
Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.” Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.”
7776 “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009. “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009.
7877 In a February 16, 2021, letter to Tehran, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is a In a February 16, 2021, letter to Tehran, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is a
legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified
unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of
provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” See GOV/2021/10. provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” See GOV/2021/10.
7978 GOV/2022/39. GOV/2022/39.
8079 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement. GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement.
8180 Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Tehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Tehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary
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design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month. design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month.8281 Inspectors have Inspectors have
visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano. visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano.
In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to
produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency
inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from
Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.8382 Article 45 of that agreement requires Article 45 of that agreement requires
that Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for that Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for
safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when
necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly
relevant for safeguards purposes.” relevant for safeguards purposes.”
The IAEA board has neither formally found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in The IAEA board has neither formally found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in
noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N. noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N.
Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described
Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary
arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal
finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious
concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of
Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution did not contain a formal Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution did not contain a formal
finding of noncompliance.finding of noncompliance.8483
Post-2018
A March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board of Governors A March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board of Governors
states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear
material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three undeclared Iranian material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three undeclared Iranian
locations.locations.~~85 86~~84 85 Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have detailed what Director General Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have detailed what Director General
Grossi has described as “possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” in Grossi has described as “possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” in
Iran. Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected anthropogenic uranium particles at three Iran. Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected anthropogenic uranium particles at three
undeclared Iranian locations.undeclared Iranian locations.8786 Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and

arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified. arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified.
8281 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009. GOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009.
8382 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010. GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010.
8483 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012. , GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012.
8584NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March , Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March
3, 2020. 3, 2020.
8685 Iran has suggested that these agency investigations are based on “fabricated information” from foreign intelligence Iran has suggested that these agency investigations are based on “fabricated information” from foreign intelligence
services (services (Communication dated 8 June 2020 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
the Agency, INFCIRC/936, June 9, 2020; , INFCIRC/936, June 9, 2020; Communication dated 3 June 2022 received from the Permanent Mission of
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, INFCIRC/996, June 7, 2022). , INFCIRC/996, June 7, 2022).
~~87According~~86According to a February 2021 report from Director General Grossi, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no to a February 2021 report from Director General Grossi, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no
verification value in conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted verification value in conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted
undeclared nuclear activities. The agency instead decided to conduct “additional verification activities” at a different undeclared nuclear activities. The agency instead decided to conduct “additional verification activities” at a different
Iranian facility. (Iranian facility. (NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021). GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021).
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additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as well as access additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as well as access
to these locations.to these locations.8887
In a March 4, 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of In a March 4, 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of
uranium) is very important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material uranium) is very important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material
that are not under international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the that are not under international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the
intent.”intent.”8988 A June 2020 report from Director General Grossi explained that Tehran’s inadequate A June 2020 report from Director General Grossi explained that Tehran’s inadequate
cooperation with the IAEA was “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve cooperation with the IAEA was “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve
the questions” raised by the IAEA’s findings described above.the questions” raised by the IAEA’s findings described above.9089 The IAEA Board of Governors The IAEA Board of Governors
adopted a resolution later that month calling on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and adopted a resolution later that month calling on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and
satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay, including by providing prompt access to satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay, including by providing prompt access to
the locations specified by the Agency.”the locations specified by the Agency.”9190 This resolution does not contain a formal finding of This resolution does not contain a formal finding of
noncompliance. noncompliance.
Although Iran has provided the IAEA with access to the relevant locations and provided some Although Iran has provided the IAEA with access to the relevant locations and provided some
related information, these actions did not resolve the outstanding issues. A December 2021 related information, these actions did not resolve the outstanding issues. A December 2021
bilateral agreement stated that Iran and the IAEA would “continue to work on remaining bilateral agreement stated that Iran and the IAEA would “continue to work on remaining
outstanding safeguards issues with the aim of resolving them.”outstanding safeguards issues with the aim of resolving them.”92
91 According to Grossi’s March 5, 2022, report, the two sides in February 2022 conducted According to Grossi’s March 5, 2022, report, the two sides in February 2022 conducted
“technical discussions,” which “paved the way” for a March 5 joint statement detailing a mutual “technical discussions,” which “paved the way” for a March 5 joint statement detailing a mutual
agreement to “accelerate and strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of agreement to “accelerate and strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of
the [outstanding] issues” and specifying “a series of actions ... upon completion of which” Grossi the [outstanding] issues” and specifying “a series of actions ... upon completion of which” Grossi
intended to “report his conclusion” in time for the IAEA Board of Governors June 2022 intended to “report his conclusion” in time for the IAEA Board of Governors June 2022
meeting.meeting.9392 But according to a May 30 report from Director General Grossi, the relevant But according to a May 30 report from Director General Grossi, the relevant
safeguards issues safeguards issues ~~“remain~~remained outstanding. outstanding.~~” 94~~ 93
On June 8, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran “to act on an On June 8, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran “to act on an
urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up” Grossi’s “offer of further urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up” Grossi’s “offer of further
engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues.” This resolution does not engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues.” This resolution does not
contain a formal finding of noncompliance.contain a formal finding of noncompliance.9594 Iran “has fulfilled all its commitments in this Iran “has fulfilled all its commitments in this
respect and addressed all the Agency’s questions in a very substantive and cooperative manner,” respect and addressed all the Agency’s questions in a very substantive and cooperative manner,”
according to a June 9, 2022, statement from Tehran’s mission to the UN in Vienna.according to a June 9, 2022, statement from Tehran’s mission to the UN in Vienna.9695
Nevertheless, Nevertheless, ~~Grossi’s~~according to a September 7 report September 7 report ~~states that “Iran has~~from Grossi, Iran had not engaged with the Agency on not engaged with the Agency on
the outstanding safeguards issuesthe outstanding safeguards issues” since the May 30 report. since the May 30 report. ~~Consequently, “there has~~ 96 A November 10 report from Grossi notes that “there has still been no been no
~~progress towards resolving them.”97~~progress in clarifying and resolving the outstanding

8887 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2021/42, September 7, 2021. , GOV/2021/42, September 7, 2021.
8988 Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Agence
France Presse, March 4, 2020. , March 4, 2020.
9089 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/30, June 5, 2020. , GOV/2020/30, June 5, 2020.
9190 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020. , GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020.
9291 “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December 15, 2021. “IAEA and Iran Reach Agreement on Replacing Surveillance Cameras at Karaj Facility,” December 15, 2021.
9392 GOV/2022/5. GOV/2022/5.
9493 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/26, May , Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/26, May
30, 2022. 30, 2022.
9594 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/34, June 8, 2022. , GOV/2022/34, June 8, 2022.
9695 Mr. Mohammad Reza Ghaebi, Acting Head of Mission and Charge d’Affaires, Iran Permanent Mission to the United Mr. Mohammad Reza Ghaebi, Acting Head of Mission and Charge d’Affaires, Iran Permanent Mission to the United
Nations Office and Other International Organizations, Nations Office and Other International Organizations, Statement before the IAEA Board of Governors on NPT
Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2022/26), June 9, 2022. , June 9, 2022.
9796 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/42, , Report by the Director General, GOV/2022/42,
September 7, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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safeguards issues.”97 A November 17, 2022, IAEA Board of Governors resolution states that “it is essential and urgent” that Iran take “without delay” several actions to resolve the outstanding safeguards matters.98 This resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. Iran and the U.N. Security Council
As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its
centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)9899 on on
February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its call for Iran to February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its call for Iran to
take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it
would stop implementing its Additional Protocol. would stop implementing its Additional Protocol.
On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not
legally binding, that called on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board legally binding, that called on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board
resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program: resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program:
1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835
(September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed
a variety of restrictions on Iran. a variety of restrictions on Iran.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the U.N. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. That article empowers the council to “call upon” governments “to comply with such Charter. That article empowers the council to “call upon” governments “to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or
recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as well aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as well
as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to
adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its
decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”
Resolution 1696 was the first to place legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with Resolution 1696 was the first to place legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with
respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension
and called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures called for by the IAEA board’s and called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures called for by the IAEA board’s
February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the
suspension’s scope to include “work on all heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that suspension’s scope to include “work on all heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that
the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under
Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted, develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted,
Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its
subsidiary arrangement. subsidiary arrangement.
Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that all of the Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that all of the
previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from
the IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day, the IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day,
as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation
~~Day took place on January 16, 2016.~~ 97 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/63, November 10, 2022. 98 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/70, November 17, 2022. The resolution requires that Iran: provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at three undeclared locations in Iran; inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment; provide all information, documentation, and answers the Agency requires for that purpose; and provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency. 99 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006. Congressional Research Service 16 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Day took place on January 16, 2016. The resolution stipulates that the council, which has been seized of the “Iranian nuclear issue” since 2006, is to end its consideration of the matter in 2025. The resolution’s “snapback” mechanism described below will then cease to be operational. Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate
fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA
reports.” The IAEA Board of Governors’ December 2015 resolution noted that the board had reports.” The IAEA Board of Governors’ December 2015 resolution noted that the board had
closed its consideration of the “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.” closed its consideration of the “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”
The JCPOA spells out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over alleged breaches of The JCPOA spells out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over alleged breaches of
their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231
contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a
P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any

~~September 7, 2022.~~
~~98 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006.~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

permanent U.N. Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution permanent U.N. Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution
that would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA that would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA
specifies that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would specifies that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would
be re-imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.” be re-imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.”
Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state” may bring a noncompliance Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state” may bring a noncompliance
finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the United States is no longer finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the United States is no longer
participating in the agreement.participating in the agreement.99100 In an August 20 letter to Security Council President Indonesian In an August 20 letter to Security Council President Indonesian
Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo initiated the snapback Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo initiated the snapback
process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-performance” of its JCPOA process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-performance” of its JCPOA
commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the council that the “United commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the council that the “United
States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has withdrawn from” the JCPOA.States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has withdrawn from” the JCPOA.~~100~~101
Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal effect.” U.N. Secretary General Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal effect.” U.N. Secretary General
António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that the “majority” of Security Council members António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that the “majority” of Security Council members
have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the notification necessary for snapback. The have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the notification necessary for snapback. The
resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to refrain from proceeding on the matter. resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to refrain from proceeding on the matter.
On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Mills sent a letter to Security On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Mills sent a letter to Security
Council President UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s Council President UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s
position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on
February 18, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full February 18, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full
effect.”effect.”~~101~~102
Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security
Council Actions
The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security
Council is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss Council is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss
the relevant portions of those documents. the relevant portions of those documents.
100 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by Paul K. Kerr. 101 Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2020/824 102 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 25 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations IAEA Statute103 ~~IAEA Statute102~~
Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.~~103~~104 Article III B. 4. of the statute Article III B. 4. of the statute
states that the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when states that the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when
appropriate,” to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the appropriate,” to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the
competence of the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall notify the Security competence of the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall notify the Security
Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security.” and security.”

~~99 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by~~
~~Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~100~~ ~~Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to~~
~~the President of the Security Council, S/2020/824~~
~~101 Ibid.~~
~~102 The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual~~
~~governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model~~
~~described in INFCIRC 153.~~
~~103 The text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~link to page 25~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the
agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The
board is then to “call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance board is then to “call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance
which it finds to have occurred,” as well as “report the non-compliance to all members and to the which it finds to have occurred,” as well as “report the non-compliance to all members and to the
Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”
In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the
board board
found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-
Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute; the Agency’s Statute;
According to the resolution, the board also found According to the resolution, the board also found
that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director
General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in
the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002
and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the
Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. international peace and security.
ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003. ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.~~104~~105 It It
described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed idescribed a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed in Appendix A, that violated hat violated
Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective
measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution called on Iran measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution called on Iran
to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not legally required to implement. to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not legally required to implement.
U.N. Charter and the Security Council
Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to
impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.~~105~~106 Article 24 confers on the council “primary Article 24 confers on the council “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that
the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
103 The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153. 104 The text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute. 105 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. 106 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/. Congressional Research Service 18 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that
the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.” aggression.”
Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council
resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program
invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension
required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40 required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40
states that states that

~~104 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.~~
~~105 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.~~
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the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of
Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. severance of diplomatic relations.
As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the
previous resolutions and called on Iran to comply with them. previous resolutions and called on Iran to comply with them.
It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that
[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations [i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its
Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”~~106~~107 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231
requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of
Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the
JCPOA.” JCPOA.”
Has Iran Violated the NPT?~~107~~108
Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for
determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a
formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however, formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however,
be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination. be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.
The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the
council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations. council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.
107 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11. 108 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials. Congressional Research Service 19 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently
had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA
Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement. Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which
requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with
the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states- Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states-
parties shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive parties shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.” nuclear explosive devices.”

~~106 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11.~~
~~107 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials.~~
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~~link to page 28~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” ElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”
Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above. Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above.
Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “until fall 2003, Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “until fall 2003,
Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear
weapons.”weapons.”~~108~~109 This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not
provide any detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has provide any detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has
attempted to develop nuclear weapons. attempted to develop nuclear weapons.
Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states’ Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states’
compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had
violated Article II of the NPT: violated Article II of the NPT:
The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which
they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement
channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and
to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification
for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear
weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of
the NPT.the NPT.~~109~~110
The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared
nuclear activities, as well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist, nuclear activities, as well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist,
including those that may be run solely by the military.” including those that may be run solely by the military.”
The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT
which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The
2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of 2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of
the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities
in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such
noncompliance.noncompliance.~~110~~
~~The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament~~
~~Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.111~~
~~Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a~~
~~nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two~~
~~examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the~~
~~production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster~~
111
~~108~~109 Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S. official , National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S. official
statements have been consistent with the NIE. statements have been consistent with the NIE.
~~109~~110 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, Department of State, August 2005. , Department of State, August 2005.
~~110~~111 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement
patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use
~~of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what~~
~~would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations~~
~~suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts~~
~~aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for~~
~~peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes.~~
~~111 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July~~
~~10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appendix C.~~
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Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 28 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.112 Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United
States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.” States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.”
It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the
notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to
determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by all experts.determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by all experts.~~112~~113 The 2005 The 2005
report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the
State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the
report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through
December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding
Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”~~113~~114 Subsequent versions of the report reiterated Subsequent versions of the report reiterated
the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous
issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”~~114~~115 As noted, As noted,
the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S. the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S.
official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear
weapons.weapons.~~115~~116 The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary William Hague would not say The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary William Hague would not say
whether Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.whether Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.~~116~~117

~~112~~of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes. 112 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July 10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appendix C. 113 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Training and Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre. Information Centre.
~~113~~114 Quotations are from Quotations are from Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, July 2010. , Department of State, July 2010.
~~114~~115 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, Department of State, April 2016. , Department of State, April 2016.
~~115~~116 See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, U.S. Intelligence
Community Worldwide Threat Assessment, February 26, 2015. The State Department compliance report covering 2020 February 26, 2015. The State Department compliance report covering 2020
states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities
associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, April 2021.) The version of , Department of State, April 2021.) The version of
this report published in April 2022 contains similar language. this report published in April 2022 contains similar language. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, April 2022. , Department of State, April 2022.
~~116~~117 Developments in UK Foreign Policy, House of Commons: Oral Evidence Taken Before the Foreign Affairs , House of Commons: Oral Evidence Taken Before the Foreign Affairs
Committee, March 8, 2012. Committee, March 8, 2012.
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Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement
The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the
agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as
“Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.” “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.”
The report stated that The report stated that
Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such
material has been processed and stored. material has been processed and stored.
The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier
reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.~~117~~118
According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency: According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency:
 The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further  The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further
processing. processing.
 The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production  The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production
and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste. and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.
Additionally, Iran failed to Additionally, Iran failed to
 declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,  declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,
stored, and processed; stored, and processed;
 provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor  provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor
located in Tehran; as well as located in Tehran; as well as
 provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.  provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.
GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA. GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA.
According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA: According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA:
 The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,  The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,
as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium. as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium.
 The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in  The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in
laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the
loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer
of resulting waste. of resulting waste.
 The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different  The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different
imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes. imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes.
 The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research  The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research
Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of
plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of
unprocessed irradiated targets. unprocessed irradiated targets.

~~117~~118 Those reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and Those reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.
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Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related
facilities, according to the report. These included the following: facilities, according to the report. These included the following:
 A centrifuge testing facility.  A centrifuge testing facility.
 Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.  Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.
 Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.  Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.
 The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),  The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),
the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the
relevant waste handling facility. relevant waste handling facility.
In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the
implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities. implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.
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Appendix B. IAEA Special Inspections
As noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations As noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations
are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the
IAEA Director General could call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval IAEA Director General could call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval
from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be
special when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or “involves access to information or special when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or “involves access to information or
locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of
safeguards in that country.safeguards in that country.~~118~~119 Such inspections “are foreseen in all Agency safeguards agreements, Such inspections “are foreseen in all Agency safeguards agreements,
principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to
a 1991 IAEA document.a 1991 IAEA document.~~119~~120 Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153, Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153,
states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make
special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency
considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the
State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to
fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement. fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.
According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of
“plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by “plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by
other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of
IAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to IAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to
report to the agency. report to the agency.
The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the
carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.~~120~~121 In the event that In the event that
the IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold the IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold
immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection
request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153. request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153.
However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that
if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is
essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to
safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action
without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been
invoked. invoked.
If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to
paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.~~121~~122

~~118~~119 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used “to verify the . According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used “to verify the
information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to submit a information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to submit a
special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and
surveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” surveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.”
Subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid Subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid
down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” The IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” The IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if
alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes. alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes.
~~119~~120 GOV/INF/613, May 29, 1991. GOV/INF/613, May 29, 1991.
~~120~~121 GOV/2554, November 12, 1991. GOV/2554, November 12, 1991.
~~121~~122 Ibid. Ibid.
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Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster
Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations
On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question
regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the
following statement: following statement:
Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive
Devices Devices
The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties
undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be
interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of
this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives
were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as
follows: follows:
“While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as “While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as
those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is
not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There
are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any
general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily
deal with all such situations. deal with all such situations.
“Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a “Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a
specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For
example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a
nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of
an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term
‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance
to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under
safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in
compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-
compliance. compliance.
“It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United “It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United
States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither
uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a
peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded
under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of
plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic
plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder
reactors under safeguards.” reactors under safeguards.”

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Appendix D. Iranian Adherence to JCPOA
~~Commitments122~~Commitments123
Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, LEU uranium-235 Iran’s number of installed centrifuges, low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, LEU uranium-235
(u-235) concentration, and enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also (u-235) concentration, and enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also
conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D), as well as centrifuge conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D), as well as centrifuge
manufacturing and installation. In addition, Iran has produced uranium metal in violation of the manufacturing and installation. In addition, Iran has produced uranium metal in violation of the
JCPOA.JCPOA.~~123~~124
Operating Centrifuges
Under the JCPOA, Iran is to use only its commercial-scale facility at Natanz for enriching Under the JCPOA, Iran is to use only its commercial-scale facility at Natanz for enriching
uranium. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for this purpose. Iran has retained uranium. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for this purpose. Iran has retained
these centrifuges and installed additional IR-1 centrifuges. Tehran has also installed JCPOA-these centrifuges and installed additional IR-1 centrifuges. Tehran has also installed JCPOA-
prohibited IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges in the facility and is using all three types of prohibited IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges in the facility and is using all three types of
centrifuges for enriching uranium. In addition, Iran is using IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR2m, and IR-s centrifuges for enriching uranium. In addition, Iran is using IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR2m, and IR-s
centrifuges to produce enriched uranium at Tehran’s pilot-scale enrichment facility. In addition, centrifuges to produce enriched uranium at Tehran’s pilot-scale enrichment facility. In addition,
Iran is enriching uranium using IR-1 and IR-6 centrifuges in Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility. Iran is enriching uranium using IR-1 and IR-6 centrifuges in Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility.
Enriched Uranium ~~Limits124~~Limits125
The JCPOA requires that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile must not exceed 300 kilograms of The JCPOA requires that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile must not exceed 300 kilograms of
uranium hexafluoride containing 3.67% u-235 “or the equivalent in other chemical forms.” This uranium hexafluoride containing 3.67% u-235 “or the equivalent in other chemical forms.” This
quantity of uranium hexafluoride “corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”quantity of uranium hexafluoride “corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”~~125~~126 Iran has been Iran has been
producing uranium containing up to 2% u-235, up to 5% u-235, up to 20% u-235, and up to 60% producing uranium containing up to 2% u-235, up to 5% u-235, up to 20% u-235, and up to 60%
u-235. The IAEA estimates Tehran’s total u-235. The IAEA estimates Tehran’s total ~~LEU~~enriched uranium stockpile to be stockpile to be ~~3940.9~~3673.7 kilograms of uranium. kilograms of uranium.
Most of this uranium is in the form of uranium hexafluoride; the remainder is in other chemical Most of this uranium is in the form of uranium hexafluoride; the remainder is in other chemical
forms. forms.
Centrifuge Manufacturing
Iran has manufactured centrifuges for prohibited R&D activities and also manufactured Iran has manufactured centrifuges for prohibited R&D activities and also manufactured
centrifuge components using carbon fiber that has not received the required approval from the centrifuge components using carbon fiber that has not received the required approval from the
JCPOA-established Joint Commission. JCPOA-established Joint Commission.
Research and Development
The JCPOA permits R&D with uranium using only several specified types of centrifuges and The JCPOA permits R&D with uranium using only several specified types of centrifuges and
allows Iran to operate only one test cascade containing a maximum of 10 IR-4 centrifuges.allows Iran to operate only one test cascade containing a maximum of 10 IR-4 centrifuges.~~126~~127

~~122~~123 Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is based on IAEA reports and the JCPOA text. Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is based on IAEA reports and the JCPOA text.
~~123~~124 As noted, Iran’s February 2021 decision to stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency As noted, Iran’s February 2021 decision to stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency
measures” has impeded the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement. measures” has impeded the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement.
~~124~~125 The IAEA “has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile” since February 16, 2021 ( The IAEA “has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile” since February 16, 2021 (
GOV/2022/24). GOV/2022/24).
~~125~~126 GOV/2021/39. GOV/2021/39.
~~126~~127 IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched
uranium in quantity. uranium in quantity.
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Iran’s current enrichment R&D activities include JCPOA-prohibited centrifuge types, locations, Iran’s current enrichment R&D activities include JCPOA-prohibited centrifuge types, locations,
and configurations. and configurations.
Uranium Metal
The JCPOA prohibits Iran from “producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their The JCPOA prohibits Iran from “producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their
alloys” and “conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, alloys” and “conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting,
forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.” Producing uranium or plutonium metals is a forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.” Producing uranium or plutonium metals is a
key step in producing nuclear weapons. These prohibitions’ duration is 15 years. Iran has key step in producing nuclear weapons. These prohibitions’ duration is 15 years. Iran has
produced natural and enriched uranium metal, but produced natural and enriched uranium metal, but ~~a May 30, 2002, report from Grossi indicates~~
IAEA reports indicate that Tehran has halted these activities.that Tehran has halted these activities.~~127~~128
Heavy Water
As noted, Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on As noted, Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on
two occasions since the P5+1 began implementing the agreement. Beginning in November 2019, two occasions since the P5+1 began implementing the agreement. Beginning in November 2019,
IAEA reports have noted that Iran has on several additional occasions exceeded this limit. Since IAEA reports have noted that Iran has on several additional occasions exceeded this limit. Since
February 23, 2021, Iran has neither informed the IAEA about its heavy water inventory “nor February 23, 2021, Iran has neither informed the IAEA about its heavy water inventory “nor
allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of
heavy water produced.”heavy water produced.”~~128~~129

Author Information

Paul K. Kerr Paul K. Kerr

Specialist in Nonproliferation Specialist in Nonproliferation

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~~127~~128 GOV/2021/39; GOV/2022/24. Iran has not since resumed these activities, according to Grossi’s September 7 report GOV/2021/39; GOV/2022/24. Iran has not since resumed these activities, according to Grossi’s September 7 report
(GOV/2022/39). (GOV/2022/39).
~~128~~129 GOV/2022/39. GOV/2022/39.
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