Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Changes from September 14, 2022 to February 13, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and
~~September 14, 2022~~February 13, 2023
Intelligence Aspects
Andrew S. Bowen
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s
Analyst in Russian and Analyst in Russian and
deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s
European Affairs European Affairs
borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russian ground forces borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russian ground forces

attacking from multiple directions. attacking from multiple directions.

Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into
effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and
officials assess thatofficials assess that, during this first stage of the war during this first stage of the war, the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by
specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian
~~military~~Armed Forces (UAF), while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, , while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, ~~has~~have proven more proven more
resilient and adaptive than Russia expected. resilient and adaptive than Russia expected.
Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military had to adjust Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military had to adjust
to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many of its advances stalled, to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many of its advances stalled, ~~in late March 2022,~~ Russian Russian
defense officials announced defense officials announced in late March 2022 that Russian military operations would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of that Russian military operations would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and
that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north.that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north.
~~Since refocusing on the Donbas region of Ukraine, Russia has gained~~ Russia subsequently gained additional territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and held territory in other regions, including Kharkiv in the northeast and Zaporizhia and Kherson in the south. In September 2022, Ukrainian forces succeeded in retaking territory in Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Kherson regions. In this effort, the UAF demonstrated an ability to deploy forces effectively to conduct offensive operations, and the Russian military continued to suffer from systemic and structural failings. Fighting subsequently has focused on the Donbas, specifically the town of Bakhmut and surrounding territory. Amid intense attritional fighting, both sides have been reforming and reconstituting units for spring offensives after suffering heavy personnel and equipment losses. Approaching one year since Russia’s 2022 invasion, debates continue over each side’s ability to establish and equip units capable of conducting offensive operations, with many observers skeptical either Russia or Ukraine will be able to achieve a decisive battlefield victory in the near future. At the same time, both sides anticipate intensive localized offensives. Prior Congresses have considered numerous measures in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The 118th Congress is likely to continue tracking these developments closely as it considers upcoming policy decisions on U.S. and ~~territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. President~~
~~Putin recalibrated his stated war aims to emphasize helping “the people in the Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with~~
~~Russia.” It is unclear whether Russia has the necessary forces to achieve its recalibrated objectives, considering losses of~~
~~personnel and equipment. However, short-term strategies to increase recruitment are unlikely to resolve personnel challenges~~
~~and likely will undermine Russian capability going forward.~~
~~As Russia suffers from a lack of personnel and supply challenges, momentum may be shifting to Ukrainian Armed Forces~~
~~(UAF) counterattacks. The UAF continues to train and deploy personnel to exploit Russian weaknesses, including the use of~~
~~advanced Western systems to target key Russian logistics, infrastructure, and command centers. How the UAF decides to~~
~~deploy limited resources and personnel likely will play a crucial role in the conflict’s evolution.~~
~~After unprecedented Ukrainian success retaking territory in Ukraine’s northeastern region of Kharkiv in September 2022,~~
~~many observers believe momentum has swung in Ukraine’s favor for the immediate future. The UAF has demonstrated an~~
~~ability to deploy forces effectively to conduct offensive operations, and the Russian military continues to suffer from endemic~~
~~and structural failings. Recent Russian losses in personnel, equipment, and morale likely will limit its operational capability~~
~~for the immediate future.~~
~~Congress is poised to continue to track these developments closely, especially as it considers U.S. and~~ international efforts to international efforts to
support Ukraine militarilysupport Ukraine militarily ~~and respond to events on the ground. For more~~, conducts oversight of security assistance, monitors allegations of war crimes, and examines U.S. and international policies to deter further Russian aggression. For other CRS products on Russia’s war in Ukraine, see CRS Report R47054, , see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s 2022 Invasion
of Ukraine: Related CRS Products. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Introduction
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s
deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to
the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures, the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures,
including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering
support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of thesupport to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the ongoing war war
are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress. are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress.
This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which
are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and
conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to
the invasion, the the invasion, the ~~performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible~~
~~Russian intentions, and recent developments on the ground~~different phases of the war to date, recent developments on the ground, and the conflict’s near-term outlook. The report includes brief discussions about potential Russian war expectations and military command and personnel challenges. For other CRS products related to . For other CRS products related to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054,
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Related CRS Products. .
Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture
In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by
Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and
within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea regionwithin Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region (which Russia claimed to annex in 2014). The buildup came after a sustained increase in Russia’s . The buildup came after a sustained increase in Russia’s
permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.1 Since 2014, Russia has created two new permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.1 Since 2014, Russia has created two new
Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Military District (20th CAA, headquartered Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Military District (20th CAA, headquartered
in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-
Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate, Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate,
and manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly and manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly
commands the separatist units in two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called commands the separatist units in two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR). Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR).
Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the
February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120 February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120
Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,2 in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,2 in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.3 occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.3

1 Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West,” 1 Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West,” War on the Rocks, January 24, 2022. , January 24, 2022.
2 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined 2 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined
arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting air defense, artillery, and other units. arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting air defense, artillery, and other units.
BTGs comprise the higher readiness units of the Russian military and are staffed by professional (also known as BTGs comprise the higher readiness units of the Russian military and are staffed by professional (also known as
contract) personnel. Each Russian regiment or brigade is intended to generate two BTGs. In August 2021, Russian contract) personnel. Each Russian regiment or brigade is intended to generate two BTGs. In August 2021, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the Russian military had 168 BTGs. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the Russian military had 168 BTGs. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The
Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Leavenworth, KS: (Leavenworth, KS:
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), pp. 34-40; Tass, “Russian Army Operates Around 170 Battalion Tactical Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), pp. 34-40; Tass, “Russian Army Operates Around 170 Battalion Tactical
Groups—Defense Chief,” August 20, 2021Groups—Defense Chief,” August 20, 2021~~; Sebastien Roblin, “Russian Battalion Groups Are Assembling Around~~
~~Ukraine. What Is Putin Up To?”19FortyFive, December 17, 2021; Conflict Intelligence Team, “‘Almost All Contract~~
~~Soldiers Are Going to the Border:’ Comments on Social Media Shed Light on Russian Troop Transfer,” January 19,~~
~~2022~~. .
3 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “U.S. Statement for the Vienna Document 3 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “U.S. Statement for the Vienna Document
Joint PC-FSC Chapter III Meeting,” February 12, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Joint PC-FSC Chapter III Meeting,” February 12, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a
Background Briefing,” Background Briefing,” press release, March 3, 2022. ~~March 3, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2954139/~~
~~senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.~~
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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the Russian military was a tiered readiness force, with personnel levels ranging from 70% to 90% of their authorized strength. Additionally, since 2012-2014, Russia has expanded its ground forces structure by creating new units without increasing the available personnel. However, as new units were created, the actual staffing level was reduced further due to insufficient personnel. Each Russian brigade or regiment is intended to field and deploy two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of 700-900 contract soldiers (a third would consist of conscripts), but it became clear that the BTGs varied in staffing levels. Some BTGs deployed with 400-600 contract personnel. The result was that the Russian military had a relatively limited core of deployable maneuver combat formations of contract personnel relative to the total size of the military.4 During this buildup, analysts and observers documented the movement of Russian units from During this buildup, analysts and observers documented the movement of Russian units from
across Russia toward Ukraine.across Russia toward Ukraine.45 The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District
into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th
CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th
and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s
southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs) southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs)
moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus.moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus.56 In addition, Russia deployed elite units— In addition, Russia deployed elite units—
such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and spetsnaz (elite light infantry units used for (elite light infantry units used for
reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.6
~~These forces included~~7 The buildup reflected the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and
support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range
precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic
warfare, support, and logistics units.warfare, support, and logistics units.78 Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large
numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which
some observers believed would play a key role in the initial invasion.some observers believed would play a key role in the initial invasion.89
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize
the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had
remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just
territory controlled by DNR/LNR. territory controlled by DNR/LNR.
~~Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the~~
~~DNR/LNR, claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage~~
~~attempts. These Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials,~~
~~Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around~~
~~Ukraine.9~~
~~On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration,~~
~~European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia invaded Ukraine.10 Russia~~
~~claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect the civilian~~

4 4 Dara Massicot, “The Russian Military’s People Problem,” Foreign Affairs, May 18, 2022; Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022. 5 For more on the Russian military buildup, see CRS Insight IN11806, For more on the Russian military buildup, see CRS Insight IN11806, Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian
Border, by Andrew S. Bowen. , by Andrew S. Bowen.
56 Units from all 11 Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and one Tank Army (as well as the 14th and 22nd Army Corps) Units from all 11 Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and one Tank Army (as well as the 14th and 22nd Army Corps)
were present on the borders of Ukraine in the run-up to the invasion. For more, see Konrad Muzyka, “Tracking Russian were present on the borders of Ukraine in the run-up to the invasion. For more, see Konrad Muzyka, “Tracking Russian
Deployments near Ukraine—Autumn-Winter 2021-22,” Rochan ConsultingDeployments near Ukraine—Autumn-Winter 2021-22,” Rochan Consulting, November 15, 2021. 7 VDV include elite paratrooper~~, November 15, 2021; Dmitry Gorenburg~~
~~and Michael Kofman, “Here’s What We Know About Russia’s Military Buildup near Ukraine,” Washington Post,~~
~~January 15, 2022.~~
~~6 VDV include elite paratroop~~ and air assault forces. VDV act as Russia’s elite rapid response forces. For more on and air assault forces. VDV act as Russia’s elite rapid response forces. For more on
Russian military capabilities and structure see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian military capabilities and structure see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew , by Andrew
S. Bowen; Christian Haimet, “Russian Troop Buildup Continues on Ukrainian Borders,” S. Bowen; Christian Haimet, “Russian Troop Buildup Continues on Ukrainian Borders,” Janes IHS, February 21, 2022. , February 21, 2022.
78 Michael R. Gordon and Max Rust, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine Features Potent Weapons Systems, Well-Trained Michael R. Gordon and Max Rust, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine Features Potent Weapons Systems, Well-Trained
Troops,” Troops,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2022. , February 14, 2022.
89 Russia’s Aerospace Forces include the air force, air defense, and space defenses forces. Russia merged these Russia’s Aerospace Forces include the air force, air defense, and space defenses forces. Russia merged these
organizations into the VKS in 2015. Julian E. Barnes, Michael Crowley, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Positioning organizations into the VKS in 2015. Julian E. Barnes, Michael Crowley, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Positioning
Helicopters, in Possible Sign of Ukraine Plans,” Helicopters, in Possible Sign of Ukraine Plans,” New York Times, January 10, 2021; Tass, “Russia’s Su-35S Fighter , January 10, 2021; Tass, “Russia’s Su-35S Fighter
Jets Deployed in Belarus for Upcoming Drills-Ministry,” January 26, 20212. Jets Deployed in Belarus for Upcoming Drills-Ministry,” January 26, 20212.
~~9 Tara Copp, “They Could Go at Any Hour Now;’ U.S. Official Warns of Larger Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”~~
Defense One, February 23, 2022.
~~10 Shane Harris et al., “Road to War: U.S. Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of Invasion,”~~
Washington Post, August 16, 2022.
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

Congressional Research Service 2 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Shortly thereafter, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the DNR/LNR, claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage attempts. These Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine.10 On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect the civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; many observers understood the latter population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; many observers understood the latter
term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government.11 term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government.11
Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: Congressional Research Service. Congressional Research Service.
Initial Invasion
On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military
operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval
10 Tara Copp, “They Could Go at Any Hour Now;’ U.S. Official Warns of Larger Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Defense One, February 23, 2022. 11 Audrius Rickus, “Baseless Claims of ‘Denazification’ Have Underscored Russian Aggression Since World War II,” Washington Post, March 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.12 In the installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.12 In the
opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs, opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs,
including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.13 including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.13
Some observers believe Russia’s initial Some observers believe Russia’s initial ~~strategy was (or was intended)~~ intent was to achieve air superiority, to achieve air superiority,
degrade Ukrainian air defenses, and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate degrade Ukrainian air defenses, and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate
defenses and counterattacks. defenses and counterattacks. ~~This~~Russia’s initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale than some expected. In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces (VKS) failed to conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an unwillingness to act or because of a lack of capability.14 The Russian military may have underestimated the level of Ukrainian resistance and been initially hesitant to inflict collateral damage on civilian targets that would be crucial for supporting a Russian occupation.15 Russia’s failure to degrade the Ukrainian air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities, allowed the Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than most observers expected, both at the outset and subsequently. Initially, Russian forces committed to multiple lines of advance rather than concentrating on one single front. In the north, Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses around Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and attacked toward Izyum. In the south, Russian forces conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast. Each advance appeared to compete against the others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics, and air support.16 Russian forces advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2, 2022) and eventually turned toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol. Analysts argue that Russian advances in the south were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s most modern and professional units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical support than other units, due to rail access from Crimea. In other regions, Russia made slow but initially steady progress, seeking to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.17 Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target. ~~initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration~~

~~11 Audrius Rickus, “Baseless Claims of ‘Denazification’ Have Underscored Russian Aggression Since World War II,”~~
Washington Post, March 9, 2022.
~~12 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,”~~ ~~Washington~~
~~Post, February 24, 2022; Alex Kokcharov and John Raines, “Russia Begins ‘Blitzkrieg’ Invasion of Ukraine with~~
~~Objective of Quick Victory; Intensive Fighting Likely Across Country,” Janes IHS, February 25, 2022.~~
~~13 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of~~
~~Targets,” February 24, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “These Are the Standoff Missiles Russia Used to Open Its War Against~~
~~Ukraine,” The Drive, February 24, 2022.~~
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~and scale than some analysts expected.14 In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces~~
~~(VKS) failed to conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an~~
~~unwillingness to act or because of a lack of capability. Russia’s failure to degrade the Ukrainian~~
~~air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities, allowed the~~
~~Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than most observers~~
~~expected, both at the outset and subsequently.15~~
~~After the air assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from~~
~~occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from~~
~~Russia’s Belgorod and Kursk toward Ukraine’s cities of Kharkiv and Sumy; and a strong two-~~
~~pronged thrust toward the capital of Kyiv from Belarus.16 The first phase of the war was~~
~~subsequently defined by rapid maneuver operations to outflank and seize key objectives.~~
~~Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target.17~~ Led by elite, but comparatively lightly Led by elite, but comparatively lightly
equipped, VDV, equipped, VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western , and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western
side of Kyiv and reached the outskirts of the city within days.side of Kyiv and reached the outskirts of the city within days.18 In the early hours of the invasion, In the early hours of the invasion,
Russian VDV units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in Russian VDV units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in
Hostomel, on the outskirts of Kyiv.Hostomel, on the outskirts of Kyiv.19 Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the
airport was intended to allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize airport was intended to allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize
~~the Ukrainian capital.20 Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly~~
~~causing heavy Russian casualties and shooting down several helicopters.21~~
~~Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance.22 Russia made the most progress in~~
~~the south from occupied Crimea, reportedly imposing significant casualties on Ukrainian forces~~
~~in the region. Russian forces advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2,~~
~~2022) and eventually turned toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol.23 Analysts argue that~~
~~Russian advances in the south were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s~~
~~most modern and professional units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical~~

~~14 Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow’s Use of Overwhelming Force Against~~
~~Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2022.~~
~~15 Some analysts speculate that this result was due to Ukraine’s decision, possibly influenced by U.S. and Western~~
~~intelligence, to activate and disperse most of its units from their permanent bases in preparation for a possible Russian~~
~~invasion. Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Biden Administration Altered Rules for Sharing Intelligence with~~
~~Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2022.~~
~~16 Nicholas Fiorenza, Huw Williams, and Thomas Bullock, “Ukraine Conflict: Russia Launches Multipronged Attack~~
~~on Ukraine,” Janes IHS, February 24, 2022.~~
~~17 Yuliya Talmazan et al., “Russian Troops Advance Within 20 Miles of Ukraine Capital, Pentagon Says,” NBC News,~~
~~February 24, 2022; Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Officials Fear the Worst Is Yet to Come~~
~~for Kyiv,” CNN, March 1, 2022.~~
~~18 Mark Galeotti, “Russian Airborne Forces Retool for an Expanded Role,” Janes IHS, October 25, 2021.~~
~~19 Haley Williams, Ainara Tiefenthaler, and Masha Froliak, “Russian Helicopters Attack an Airport Near Kyiv,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, February 24, 2022.~~
~~20 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” Institute for the~~
~~Study of War, February 25, 2022.~~
~~21 James Marson, “Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong~~the Ukrainian capital. 12 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,” Washington Post, February 24, 2022. 13 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of Targets,” February 24, 2022. 14 Economist, “Curious Case of Russia’s Missing Air Force,” March 8, 2022. Some analysis subsequently has argued that Russia’s initial air campaign was possibly larger and more effective than initially believed. See Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defense, RUSI, London, November 7, 2022. 15 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian’s Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” New York Times, February 25, 2022. 16 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones, and Daniel Dombey, “Why Russia Is Deploying More Troops to Ukraine,” Financial Times, March 17, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine’s Troops Begin a Counteroffensive That Alters Shape of the Battle with Russia,” March 24, 2022; Stephen Fidler and Thomas Grove, “Behind the Front Lines, Russia’s Military Struggles to Supply Its Forces,” ,” Wall Street
Journal, , ~~March 3, 2022.~~
~~22 CRS Insight IN11872, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects, by Andrew S.~~
~~Bowen.~~
~~23 Michael Schwirtz and Richard Perez-Pena, “First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets~~April 1, 2022. 17 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” ,” New
York Times, March , March 210, 2022. , 2022.
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~~support than other units, due to rail access from Crimea.24 In other regions, Russia made slow but~~
~~initially steady progress, seeking to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as~~
~~Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.25 Logistics issues and other factors soon stalled most Russian~~
~~advances.26~~
Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly causing heavy Russian casualties and shooting down several helicopters.18 Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset.27 Despite not Despite not
announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian
military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and
equipment. The Ukrainian military equipment. The Ukrainian military ~~appeared to exploit~~exploited numerous tactical and operational numerous tactical and operational
deficiencies of Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian deficiencies of Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian
military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks.military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks.19
Russian units operated with little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms formations, Russian units operated with little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms formations,
leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to observers and leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to observers and
analysts.analysts.28 20 As Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress in early March 2022, “We assess Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of internal military challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues and considerable logistical issues.”21 Overall, training and professionalism of Russian units appeared much lower than Overall, training and professionalism of Russian units appeared much lower than
expected, even among supposedly “elite” units. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped expected, even among supposedly “elite” units. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped
units (such as VDV, units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not , and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not
trainedtrained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer
heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.29
~~Additionally,~~22 Russian armored units advanced without infantry support in numerous instances. armored units advanced without infantry support in numerous instances.~~30 In~~
~~another~~ In one example, Russian National Guard ( example, Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) units reportedly advanced alongside, ) units reportedly advanced alongside,
and sometimes in front of, Russian military forces, apparently with little coordination.and sometimes in front of, Russian military forces, apparently with little coordination.31
23 Contributing to the confusion, observers documented Russian units operating without encrypted Contributing to the confusion, observers documented Russian units operating without encrypted
communications, often using civilian equipment to communicate.communications, often using civilian equipment to communicate.32

~~24 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Third Week: Will Russian Forces Need to Pause?,” War on the Rocks,~~
~~March 14, 2022.~~
~~25 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” New York Times, March~~
~~10, 2022.~~
~~26 Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur Galocha, “Why Russia’s Military Is Bogged Down by Logistics in Ukraine~~24 In addition, the Russian military struggled with command and control, both at the tactical and the operational levels. First, reports indicated there was no overall Russian operational commander at the time. As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating independently, with questionable levels of coordination.25 Second, Russian commanders appeared unprepared for 18 Paul Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,” ,”
Washington Post, , ~~March 30, 2022.~~
~~27 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Forces Repel Russian Attack on Kyiv, Prepare for Next Assault,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, February 26, 2022.~~
~~28 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “The War in Ukraine Isn’t Working Out the Way Russia Intended,” Washington Post,~~
~~February 27, 2022; Jack Watling, “Just How Tall Are Russian Soldiers?” RUSI, March 11, 2022; Mark Galeotti,~~
~~“Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, April 1, 2022.~~
29August 24, 2022. 19 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen; Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI, London, November 30, 2022. 20 Mark Galeotti, “Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, April 1, 2022; Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War,” Survival vol. 64, no. 3 (2022), pp. 7-28. 21 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022. 22 Observers noted these units suffered particularly high casualties, which undermined Russian military effectiveness Observers noted these units suffered particularly high casualties, which undermined Russian military effectiveness
due to their perceived high professionalism and ratio of contract/professional servicemen. due to their perceived high professionalism and ratio of contract/professional servicemen. ~~James Beardsworth and Irina~~
~~Shcherbakova, “Are There Even Any Left? 100 Days of War in Ukraine for an Elite Russian Unit,” Moscow Times,~~
~~June 4, 2022.~~
~~30 Serguy Bobok and Frankie Taggart, “Russian Airborne Troops Land in Ukraine’s Second City Kharkiv,”~~ ~~Moscow~~
~~Times, March 2, 2022; James Marson and Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Troops Fight War of Ambush and Skirmish~~
~~Against Russian Invaders,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2022; Mark Urban, “The Heavy Losses of an Elite Russian~~
~~Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022.~~
31Mark Urban, “The Heavy Losses of an Elite Russian Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022; James Beardsworth and Irina Shcherbakova, “Are There Even Any Left? 100 Days of War in Ukraine for an Elite Russian Unit,” Moscow Times, June 4, 2022. 23 Rosgvardiya units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely
sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS
In Focus IF11647, In Focus IF11647, Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen, by Andrew S. Bowen~~; Vladimir~~
~~Sevrinovsky, “Refusing to Kill People Isn’t a Crime:’ The Russian National Guard Is Firing Officers Who Refuse to~~
~~Join the War in Ukraine,” Meduza, March 29, 2022; Tim Ripley, “Russian National Guard Deployed Across Ukraine,”~~
~~Janes IHS, April 4~~. 24 Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022., 2022.
~~32 Sergei Dobrynin and Mark Krutov, “Communication Breakdown: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Bogged~~
~~Down,” RFE/RL, March 19, 2022; Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “‘The Ukrainians Are Listening’: Russia’s~~ 25 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command
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~~link to page 10~~ Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among branches (such as VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units. Reporting indicates that communication problems compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-ranking officers moving closer to the frontlines and contributing to casualties among these officers.26 Moreover, Russia’s cyber operations were largely ineffective during the initial invasion, surprising many observers. Some analysts suggest Russian cyber performance possibly indicates the limitations of cyber operations in a kinetic conflict as well as structural limitations of cyber operations in the Russian military.27 Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations Observers continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its offensive against Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty assumptions that undermined Russia’s conduct of the invasion. If true, incorrect political assumptions possibly contributed to unrealistic objectives and timetables imposed onto the Russian military, providing a partial explanation for the Russian military’s unpreparedness and poor performance. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to “decapitate” the Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014. Some analysts speculate that Russia may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian military would be ineffective and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced. As Central Intelligence Agency Director Wil iam J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee in March 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable of a quick, decisive victory at minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count.” Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty assumptions in part due to poor intelligence and a wil ingness by subordinates to convey only positive information to Russian decisionmakers. Recent media reporting indicates the FSB overstated its influence and agent networks inside Ukraine, possibly contributing to a false expectation of a quick regime change. Additionally, many observers speculate a relatively small circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed to potentially unrealistic assumptions. Observers believe this circle includes Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, who may have overstated the Russian military’s capabilities. Sources: Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bul y in the Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022; Steve Hol and and Andrea Shalal, “Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White House and EU Officials Say,” Reuters, March 31, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The Interfering Tsar: Why Putin Is Ukraine’s Best Hope of Victory,” The Times, April 23, 2022; Greg Mil er and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022; Michael Schwirtz et al., “Putin’s War,” New York Times, December 16, 2022. March-May 2022 After early March 2022, Russian forces attempted to adapt to the reality of effective Ukrainian resistance. Russia made some changes to its military operations, including more coordination between units and a greater attempt to operate as combined arms formations, increased air of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Janes IHS, March 7, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022. 26 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed. 27 Gavin Wilde, Cyber Operations: Russia’s Unmet Expectations, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., December 12, 2022; Jon Bateman, Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C., December 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.28 By March 7, 2022, U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100 percent” of its available forces into Ukraine.29 The Russian VKS increased its number of sorties and operations, although most missions appeared to employ unguided weaponry rather than PGMs.30 The increased sortie rate also meant heavier losses for the VKS, including some of its most advanced helicopter, fighter, and fighter-bombers. Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. After failing to achieve a decisive victory quickly, Russia appeared to re-evaluate its objectives and strategy toward achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine. On March 25, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a press conference alleging that Russia had mostly met its initial objectives and would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern Ukraine, including the Donbas.31 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on April 4, 2022, that “Russia is repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern and parts of southern Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and overwhelm Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine.”32 On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Slava class missile cruiser Moskva, reportedly was struck by two Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles.33 Russian forces attempted to tow the heavily damaged cruiser back to port in Sevastopol, but the damage was catastrophic and the ship eventually sank. Russia initially denied that the Moskva was hit by missiles and claimed it sank in a storm after an accidental fire. Reports indicate the Moskva was blockading Odesa and providing air defense support to Russian units in the southwest near Kherson when it was struck.34 The sinking provided a morale boost to Ukrainian forces and undermined Russian efforts to threaten an amphibious assault against Odessa, potentially freeing up Ukrainian forces defending the city. Russia’s new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet is the Project 11356 frigate Admiral Makarov. Subsequently, Russia redirected forces to support operations in the east to cut off Ukrainian military units in the Donbas. On April 12, President Putin stated that Russia’s “military operation will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help the people in the Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.”35 The terrain in the Donbas favored Russian forces, with consolidated logistics and its advantages in artillery.36 28 Dan Lamothe, “Russia’s Invasion Began with Precision Missiles, But Weapons Are Changing as Siege War Begins,” Washington Post, March 1, 2022. 29 Quint Forgey, “Putin Sends ‘Nearly 100 Percent’ of Russian Forces at Border into Ukraine,” Politico, March 7, 2022. 30 Alan Cullison and Alexander Osipovich, “Russian General Is Killed in Ukraine as Airstrikes Intensify,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russian Air Force Action Increases Despite Flood of Antiaircraft Missiles into Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022. 31 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: March 25, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, March 26, 2022; Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Intel Assess ‘Major’ Strategy Shift by Russia as It Moves Some Forces away from Kyiv,” CNN, March 31, 2022. 32 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” press briefing, April 4, 2022. 33 Adam Taylor and Claire Parker, “‘Neptune’ Missile Strike Shows Strength of Ukraine’s Homegrown Weapons,” Washington Post, April 15, 2022. 34 Brad Lendon, “Moskva Sinking: What Really Happened to the Pride of Russia’s Fleet?” CNN, April 15, 2022. 35 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Says Peace Talks Are at a ‘Dead End’ and Calls Atrocities in Bucha ‘Fake,’” New York Times, April 12, 2022. 36 Jack Watling, “Why the Battle for Donbas Will Be Very Different from the Assault on Kyiv,” Guardian, April 9, Congressional Research Service 7 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Despite the focus on the Donbas, larger Russian objectives remained a concern. On April 22, 2022, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, the then deputy commander of the Central Military District, said in an interview that Russia wanted to take full control of eastern and southern Ukraine, including a possible land bridge to Transnistria, a Russia-supported breakaway territory in Moldova.37 Instead of an immediate threat to broaden the conflict, many observers believed this statement reflected potentially larger Russian political objectives over the medium to long term, since Russian military force constraints have prevented a serious offensive to capture Odessa and link up with Transnistria. On April 18, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported a new Russian offensive in the Donbas after a barrage of Russian missile strikes across Ukraine.38 Russian forces initially conducted slow and gradual probing attacks against Ukrainian forces, including the use of heavy artillery and rocket artillery to support operations. Russia concentrated on pressing Ukrainian forces south of Izyum, west from Severodonetsk toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, and from Donetsk to create a large encirclement of UAF.39 Russian forces could not break through Ukrainian defenses around Izyum, partially resulting from too few units and a gradual deployment, even with reinforcements from the abandoned effort to take Kyiv.40 Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward eastern Ukraine indicated that the Russian military needed to rest and resupply after using most of its combat-effective units. During this time, analysts noted the need for Russian personnel reinforcements, not only to replace losses but also to support further Russian offensives.41 Conditions forced Russia to pull units from foreign bases to help replace and rotate out units and deployed private military companies (including heavy use of the Wagner Private Military Company). Despite the slow pace of Russian progress and need for reinforcements, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20, 2022, that “we assess President Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas.”42 A key Russian military objective was the coastal city of Mariupol, in the Donetsk region. The effort to seize the city benefited from Russia shifting operations away from seizing further territory in the Kherson region (which includes Mykolaiv). After weeks of bombardment and fighting, Ukrainian military forces and large numbers of civilians were isolated in the Azovstal iron and steel plant in Mariupol.43 On April 21, Putin announced that Russia had seized Mariupol 2022; Howard Altman, “Ukraine’s Ability to Withstand Russian Artillery Critical to Fight for Donbas,” The Drive, April 19, 2022. 37 Mary Ilyushina et al., “Commander Hints at Russian Ambitions Beyond Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 22, 2022. 38 Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,” Financial Times, April 24, 2022. 39 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 16-18, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 19, 2022; Christopher Miller and Paul McLeary, “Heavy Weaponry Pours into Ukraine as Commanders Become More Desperate,” Politico, April 25, 2022; Author correspondence with Michael Kofman. 40 Mike Eckel, “Fizzled Faltering? ‘Anemic’? Why Russia’s Donbas Offensive Isn’t Going Exactly as Anticipated,” RFE/RL, May 3, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 9-15 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 15, 2022. 41 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, April 8, 2022; Economist, “Rob Lee on Why Attrition Will Be a Critical Factor in the Battle for the Donbas,” April 23, 2022. 42 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., May 10, 2022. 43 Amy Mackinnon, “What the Fall of Mariupol Would Mean for the War,” Foreign Policy, April 20, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects and that Russian forces would not assault the Azovstal plant but would surround and seal it off, despite Ukrainian forces’ continued resistance.44 Ukraine announced on May 16 that it had instructed its remaining troops at Azovstal to cease combat missions.45 Shortly thereafter, Ukrainian troops began surrendering and were evacuated to Russian-controlled areas. On July 29, a massive explosion ripped through a prisoner-of-war camp housing many of the prisoners from Mariupol, killing an estimated 50 prisoners. Russia alleged the explosion was the result of a Ukrainian missile strike, but many observers believe it was some other cause.46 Russia also continued its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but the VKS did not seek further air superiority beyond eastern Ukraine. Russia conducted long-range PGM strikes against what Russian officials said were Ukrainian defense industry and infrastructure targets in an attempt to cripple and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term capability. However, observers began to note the questionable precision, capability, and quantity of PGMs still available to Russian forces.47 U.S. officials have stated that most PGMs appear to be air-launched cruise missiles from bombers inside Russia.48 May-September 2022 After the capture of Mariupol, Russia refocused efforts on seizing key urban and infrastructure areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. Due to losses, Russia was unable to concentrate sufficient combat power on multiple advances, forcing it to refocus efforts on a single objective while consolidating its hold on captured territory (such as in Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia). By mid-May 2022, Russia appeared unable to capture the key cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, a likely target of Russia’s refocused offensives. Instead, Russia focused on seizing the towns of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which would give Russia almost total control over Luhansk region.49 44 Michael Schwirtz, “Ukrainians in Mariupol’s Steel Mill Are Holding On, Despite Intensifying Attacks, a Commander Tells the Times,” New York Times, April 24, 2022. 45 Michael Schwirtz, “Last Stand at Azovstal: Inside the Siege That Shaped the Ukraine War,” New York Times, July 27, 2022. 46 Joyce Sohyun Lee et al., “What We Know About the Blast That Killed Ukrainian POWs in Olenivka,” Washington Post, August 6, 2022. 47 John Ismay, “Russian Guided Weapons Miss the Mark, U.S. Defense Officials Say,” New York Times, May 9, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “We May Have Our First Sight of a Russian Bomber Launching Missiles at Ukraine,” The Drive, May 11, 2022. 48 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022. 49 Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28,” Institute for the Study of War, May 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects In contrast to the early days of the invasion, Figure 2. Donbas Region of Ukraine the fighting in the Donbas resembled a more traditional conventional conflict of slow but intense fighting, and Russia reverted to its traditional reliance on the massed used of artillery and rocket artillery. Russian forces appeared to conduct a pincer movement to cut off Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.50 In the north, Russian forces pushed southeast from Izyum, capturing Lyman and attempting to make several crossings of the Siverskyi Donets river near Bilohorivka, but came under Ukrainian artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties. In the Donbas, Russia relied heavily on Wagner PMC and DNR/LNR units, many of whom were forcibly conscripted. The UAF continued to staunchly defend Source: Congressional Research Service territory instead of conducting an organized withdrawal, leading some analysts to speculate that Ukraine’s strategy was to impose as much attrition on Russian forces as possible. Nevertheless, Russian forces, including Chechen Rosgvardiya and DNR/LNR troops, continued their offensive into Severodonetsk and gradually seized control of the city after Ukraine ordered its forces to retreat to Lysychansk. Russian forces continued to advance north from Popasna toward Bakhmut, threatening to cut off UAF units and envelope Lysychansk. Subsequently, the UAF withdrew from Lysychansk to prepared defensive lines between Bakhmut and Siversk.51 Reported Russian and Ukrainian Casualties Estimates of wartime casualties have varied widely and may not be considered reliable. Due to the continuing state of war, verifying exact numbers of casualties is nearly impossible. Generally, ranges of possible casualties are given as estimates due to the uncertain and changing nature of assessments. Below are some estimates mentioned in various press reports through January 2023. Russian Casualties Russia: Officially, the Russian government stated in late March 2022 that 1,351 soldiers had died and another 3,850 had been wounded. On March 20, 2022, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared to publish Russian Ministry of Defense figures that listed 9,861 deaths. This figure remains unconfirmed, and the newspaper deleted the report and stated that it had been hacked. Russia has not provided a casualty update since. United States: U.S estimates of Russian military losses are likely more than 100,000. In January 2023, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Mil ey stated that Russia has suffered “significantly well over 100,000” Russian soldiers kil ed and wounded. Some estimates reported in the media place Russian casualties close to 200,000. United Kingdom: UK estimates of Russian casualties have generally been comparable, if slightly higher, than those of U.S. officials. UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace in December 2022 stated Russia has suffered over 100,000 casualties. Ukrainian Casualties 50 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: May 21-23, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 24, 2022. 51 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Severodonetsk After Weeks of Brutal Battle,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2022; Jonathan Beale, “Ukraine Confirms Russia Captured Eastern City Lysychansk,” BBC, July 3, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Until recently, Ukraine has been reluctant to share casualty figures. In June 2022, Ukrainian officials stated that Ukraine was losing 100-200 soldiers per day during the height of fighting around Severodonetsk. On August 22, 2022, Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhny stated Ukraine had suffered almost 9,000 kil ed. In November 2022, General Mil ey stated that Ukraine has “probably” suffered similar casualties to Russia. Civilian Casualties In February 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimated 7,155 kil ed and 11,662 injured civilians since the war began. Most observers consider this to be a significant undercount. Sources: Helene Cooper, “Heavy Losses Leave Russia Short of Its Goal U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 11, 2022; Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, “Almost 9,000 Ukrainian Defenders Died in the War with the Russian Federation-Zaluzhny,” August 22, 2022; Euromaidan Press, “87,000 Kil ed Civilians Documented in Occupied Mariupol—Volunteer,” August 30, 2022; Dan Lamothe, Liz Sly and Annabelle Timsit, “Well Over 100,000 Russian Troops Kil ed or Wounded in Ukraine, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, November 10, 2022; Ann M. Simmons and Nancy A. Youssef, “Russia’s Casualties in Ukraine Near 200,000,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; OHCHR, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update,” February 6, 2023. The UAF suffered heavy casualties during the fighting for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, including among experienced veterans who volunteered for the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and reserve units.52 The UAF broke up the core of its maneuver formations into smaller units to spearhead localized counterattacks and to shore up TDF and Reserve units staffing defensive positions.53 Many UAF counteroffensives, such as outside of Kharkiv, slowed as Russian units regrouped and UAF forces concentrated on defending the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas, leaving TDF units to defend the frontline but unable to launch further offensive action. The UAF also struggled with secure communications and instances of command and control issues between the TDF and regular military, as well as a dire need for artillery and heavy weapon support.54 Beginning in mid-May 2022, the UAF began receiving significant shipments of U.S. and Western artillery systems, specifically the U.S. M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition. Security assistance has been critical to sustaining UAF operations and countering the Russian advantage in artillery and rocket artillery, since the UAF was running low on ammunition and parts for its Soviet/Russian artillery systems. Nevertheless, training time and overall shortages have resulted in most UAF units still relying on older Soviet/Russian systems while waiting for new Western weaponry.55 By July, Ukraine began receiving U.S.-supplied M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), providing the UAF with significantly improved targeting ability, including increased range and precision accuracy.56 Early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers indicated that the UAF were using these systems effectively, including to target key Russian command and control, logistics, and transport infrastructure.57 One significant challenge, however, has been maintaining and 52 Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine’s War of Attrition Exacts Heavy Toll on Both Sides,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022. 53 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road From Survival to Victory,” RUSI, July 4, 2022, p. 17. 54 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “On Front Lines, Communication Breakdowns Prove Costly for Ukraine,” New York Times, June 28, 2022; Viviana Salama, “Ukraine Faces Shortfall in Weapons as It Gears Up for First Major Counteroffensive,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2022. 55 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt; Serhiy Morgunov, “As They Wait for Weapons, Ukrainians Hold the Line with Soviet Artillery,” Washington Post, July 27, 2022. 56 Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Is Bringing a Big Gun to a Knife Fight,” Foreign Policy, July 13, 2022. 57 Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kostiantyn Khudov, “U.S. Supplied HIMARS Changing the Calculus on Ukraine’s Congressional Research Service 11 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects repairing the vast number of Western systems the UAF has received, all with different standards and requirements for operating. Over the rest of July, Russian forces attempted to regroup and take an “operational pause” after suffering heavy casualties capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. Most observers believed Russia had exhausted most of its forces and required time to refit, resupply, and reorganize. Russian forces did not achieve any significant territorial progress over the next weeks, other than small gains between Siversk and Bakhmut, and appeared to focus on solidifying their control over existing territory.58 Russia increasingly relied on Wagner PMC and DNR/LNR forces to probe UAF lines and then direct artillery and rocket artillery upon making contact. Open source reporting continued to document instances of low Russian morale and reports of Russian soldiers refusing to fight, resigning from their contracts before deployment, or refusing orders from their superiors.59 Russian Command and Control Challenges Since the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, reports indicate that Russia has made different attempts to address its command and control issues, including the lack of an overall operational commander. It is difficult for most observers to definitively identify and state the nature of Russian command and control issues due to the changing circumstances and lack of transparency. Recent events and reports, however, have provided greater visibility into the general structure and picture of Russian command. In April 2022, reports emerged that General Alexander Dvornikov, head of the Southern Military District, was given operational command of Russia’s war to help streamline command and control. However, the extent of his direct control and whether he supervised all Russian forces remained unclear. By June, reports emerged that General Dvornikov had been removed from command and replaced by General Gennady Zhidko, the then-head of the Main Military Political Directorate. In October 2022, General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Aerospace Forces, reportedly took overall command of Russian forces in Ukraine. As of December 2022, all five Military District commanders, the head of the Airborne forces (VDV), the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and multiple junior commanders had been replaced. The National Defense Management Center in Moscow has continued to coordinate and manage forces, and appears to have greater oversight and management of Russian forces than in the early stages of the invasion. After three months, Surovikin was replaced by Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov, despite a widespread assessment that Surovikin was among Russia’s most capable commanders and largely credited with stabilizing Russian lines in the wake of successful Ukrainian offensives. Analysts continue to speculate about the reason for the latest shuffle, from improving coordination among military branches (MoD, PMC Wagner, Rosgvardiya), continued unrealistic battlefield expectations of political leaders, to infighting among elites (particularly within the Ministry of Defense) as they seek to deflect blame for Russian battlefield failures. Sources: Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022; Karolina Hird et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2022,” Institute for the Study of War, July 28, 2022; Russia Experiments with Command and Control in Ukraine,” Janes IHS, August 2, 2022; Andrew Roth, “Russia Appoints Notorious General To Lead Ukraine Offensive,” Guardian, October 8, 2022; Mary Ilyushina and Natalia Abbakumova, “Kremlin, Shifting Blame for War Failures, Axes military Commanders,” Washington Post, October 8, 2022; Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd, “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, and Morale and the Ukraine War” Marshall Center, November 15, 2022; Francesca Ebel, “Russia’s New Commander Reflects Putin’s Plan to Push for Victory in Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022; Mark Galeotti,” Enter Gerasimov,” In Moscow’s Shadows, January 12, 2023. Frontlines,” Washington Post, July 1, 2022; Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine Targets Russia’s Ammunition Depots, Undermining Its Artillery Advantage,” Kyiv Independent, July 8, 2022. 58 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 18-24 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 25, 2022; Dara Massicot, “Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One,” Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2022; Erika Solomon, “Behind Russia’s ‘Pause’ Are Signs of a Troubled Effort to Regroup,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. 59 Timofei Rozhanskiy, “Why Russian Soldiers Are Refusing to Fight in the War on Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 20, 2022; Pjotr Sauer, “Russian Soldiers Accuse Superiors of Jailing Them for Refusing to Fight,” Guardian, August 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects By early August 2022, as Russian advances stalled, a gradual stalemate and war of attrition began to set in. Russia continued some offensive operations (relying on Russian PMC and LNR/DNR forces) toward Bakhmut and Avdiivka, as well as the town of Pisky, just outside Avdiivka in the Donetsk region.60 The UAF appeared to prepare a shift from defensive to offensive operations. Ukraine began carrying out a series of partisan attacks (including assassinations) against officials in Russia-occupied regions, Russian government infrastructure, and key air bases and supply positions in Crimea. These attacks, conducted by Ukrainian Special Forces and local supporters, drones, and missile strikes, have destabilized the Russian military’s control over the region and forced Russia to devote more forces to counterinsurgency and internal security missions.61 International observers remain concerned by the Russian military’s occupation and management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear plant in Europe.62 Some analysts argue that attacks on nuclear power plants could be considered a “war crime” under international law.63 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiated with Russia and Ukraine to send an expert mission to ZNPP to “assess the physical damage to the ZNPP’s facilities, determine whether the main and back-up safety and security systems were functional and evaluate the staff's working conditions,” according to the IAEA. An IAEA inspection team visited the plant on September 1; six IAEA inspectors remained on-site for a few days.64 The UAF began preparations for a counteroffensive by conducting strikes across Kherson and Crimea to degrade Russian capabilities and hinder the resupply of its forces in Kherson, including attacks against key logistics targets and the bridges connecting occupied Kherson with the rest of occupied southern Ukraine. According to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley, Ukraine conducted over 400 HIMARS strikes by September 8.65 These strikes likely seriously strained Russian logistics and artillery ammunition supply by targeting previously unreachable depots.66 The UAF also deployed high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), used to target radar or electronic warfare systems, on its Russian-made MiG-29 fighters. Russian forces appeared to redeploy from Donetsk and Luhansk to southern Ukraine in preparation for a UAF offensive.67 60 Kateryna Stepanenko et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2,” Institute for the Study of War, August 2, 2022. 61 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Liz Sly, and Adela Suliman, “Crimea Airfield Blast War Work of Ukrainian Special Forces, Official Says,” Washington Post, August 10, 2022; and Oren Liebermann, “How Ukraine Is Using Resistance Warfare Developed by the U.S. to Fight Back Against Russia,” CNN, August 27, 2022; Anastasia Tenisheva, “Assassinations of Russia-Installed Officials on the Rise in Occupied Ukraine,” Moscow Times, September 1, 2022. 62 For more, see CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Director General Grossi Alarmed by Shelling at Ukraine NPP, Says IAEA Mission Vital for Nuclear Safety and Security,” press release, August 6, 2022. 63 George M. Moore, “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022. 64 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, press conference, September 2, 2022. 65 Reuters, “Ukraine Has Struck More Than 400 Russian Targets with HIMARS - U.S. Top General,” September 8, 2022. 66 The Russian military must keep large supplies of ammunition close to the frontlines for resupply due to its reliance on artillery. These supplies present a particularly vulnerable and significant target, especially for long-range systems such as HIMARS. Liz Sly, John Hudson, and David L. Stern, “Crimea Attacks Point to Ukraine’s Newest Strategy, Official Says,” Washington Post, August 18, 2022. 67 Russia constructed multiple lines of defense in preparation for a UAF offensive. Including DNR troops, Russia concentrated a large portion of its remaining VDV and Spetsnaz units (however, as demonstrated in the early stages of the invasion, they are often insufficiently equipped to defend against a large conventional force), as well as various Congressional Research Service 13 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Observers had noted reports of Ukrainian preparation for an offensive for months but speculated whether the UAF had enough trained personnel and sufficient equipment (such as tanks and armored vehicles to rapidly transport infantry) to sustain offensive operations, as well as possible risks of exposing other fronts to counterattack from Russian forces by drawing away resources.68 Kherson Region Offensive On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a long-awaited offensive into the Kherson region in the south. Some observers and U.S. officials initially believed the offensive was part of a “shaping” strategy to improve the UAF position for future counteroffensives.69 Some reports indicated that Ukrainian forces, advised by U.S. officials, determined a smaller offensive would give the UAF flexibility to deploy resources to other fronts and conduct multiple counteroffensives against exposed Russian lines.70 By early September 2022, UAF offensives had made small but sustained progress across three fronts in Kherson, pushing back some Russian forces. UAF forces ran into significant and determined opposition, including the heavy use of artillery and air support.71 At the same time, the UAF began an offensive on another front, in the northeastern region of Kharkiv. Kharkiv Offensive In the Kharkiv region, the UAF appeared to exploit a weak point in Russian defenses and captured several towns (such as Balakliya) in early September 2022, potentially opening the possibility of targeting a key resupply city of Kupyansk. Reports document that Rosgvardiya troops, not trained or equipped for frontline combat, and lower-quality LNR troops staffed Russian positions.72 The UAF appeared to consolidate an estimated core of five to six brigades to launch a counteroffensive.73 The UAF benefited from Russia pulling its most combat-effective troops south toward Kherson and from apparent Russian intelligence and command failures, as Russia failed to detect the UAF buildup and organize a coordinated response. Spearheaded by tanks and armored vehicles, the UAF quickly exploited its breakthrough with high mobile units that advanced behind Russian forces, conducting ambushes and cutting off Russian reinforcements. By September 8, the UAF had broken through Russian lines and liberated almost 400 square miles, with Russia appearing unable to coordinate effective resistance or reestablish other conventional Russian forces. Matthew Luxmoore, “Russia Moves to Reinforce Its Stalled Assault on Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2022. 68 Loveday Morris et al., “On the Kherson Front Lines, Little Sign of a Ukrainian Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, August 12, 2022. 69 Jim Sciutto, “Ukrainian Forces Begin ‘Shaping’ Battlefield for Counteroffensive, Senior U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, August 29, 2022. 70 Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. War Gamed with Ukraine Ahead of Counteroffensive and Encouraged More Limited Mission,” CNN, September 1, 2022; Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. 71 John Hudson, “Wounded Soldiers Reveal Steep Toll of Kherson Offensive,” Washington Post, September 7, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “For Ukraine, the Fight Is Often a Game of Bridges,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. 72 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, September 6, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 7, 2022. 73 President Zelensky praised the 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade, and 92nd Mechanized Brigade in a televised speech, but observers noted other units present in the initial offensive. BBC, “Zelensky Hails ‘Good News’ as Settlements Recaptured from Russia,” September 7, 2022; Marc Santora, “How Ukraine Gained Momentum Against Russia and Took a Critical Hub,” New York Times, September 10, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects defensive lines despite rushing in reinforcements.74 The UAF also launched offensives south of Izyum and Lyman to put pressure on Russian forces, threatening to cut off Russian forces in the area. By September 10, Russian forces had announced a withdrawal from Izyum, a symbolic statement after a near-total rout of Russian forces in the area. The collapse of Russian forces led to the UAF advancing so quickly that UAF command had trouble keeping track of its units.75 Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated the offensive had gone “better than expected” and that Ukraine’s focus was on consolidating and defending the recaptured territory.76 By September 11, Russia announced it had withdrawn all forces west of the Oskil River, with Ukraine retaking more than 1,000 square miles of territory and almost all previously occupied territory in Kharkiv region.77 During this period, Russian forces continued to disintegrate, including reinforcements such as the 90th Tank Division and the newly created 3rd Army Corps, which were rushed in to stabilize Russian lines.78 After recapturing Izyum, the UAF pushed past the Oskil River into Luhansk. The UAF’s new objective was the key hub of Lyman, critical for Russia’s efforts to push further into Donetsk. By this time, it was becoming clear that Lyman, and the Donetsk city of Bakhmut, were turning into key objectives that would influence the trajectory of the conflict over the coming months.79 Russia’s Claimed Annexation of Ukrainian Territories On September 30, Putin announced that Russia would annex the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. The announcement came in the midst of multiple successful Ukrainian military offensives and was declared illegal by most of the international community.80 Putin’s announcement of the annexation may have been intended to re-affirm Russia’s commitment to the war, despite the setbacks, and corresponding to increasing rhetoric by Putin linking the Ukraine conflict to a larger conflict between Russia and the West.81 In illegally claiming to annex these regions, Putin ended any immediate prospect of negotiations or a diplomatic solution to the war. Putin also created a pretext for further steps to shore up Russia’s failing military operations (such as mobilization and various economic measures to support the war), and for presenting Russia as defending itself to a Russian domestic audience. By declaring 74 Jack Detsch, “They Are Pushing Everywhere:’ Kyiv Goes on the Offensive,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the East,” September 9, 2022. 75 Economist, “Is Russia on the Run?” September 11, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Turning the Tide? Ukraine Stuns Russia with Counteroffensive but Can’t Claim Victory Yet,” RFE/RL, September 11, 2022. 76 Jack Watling, “Ukraine Can Now Exploit Russia’s Confusion, But Must Plan Carefully,” Guardian, September 10, 2022. 77 Illia Ponomarenko, “With Successful Kharkiv Operation, Ukraine Turns the War in Its Favor,” Kyiv Independent, September 13, 2022. 78 Siobhán O'Grady and Anastacia Galouchka, “The Letters Left Behind by Demoralized Russian Soldiers as They Fled,” Washington Post, September 15, 2022; David Axe, “Pity the Russians Who Get Assigned to the Ill-Fated 90th Tank Division in Ukraine,” Forbes, September 15, 2022. 79 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “Two Cities, Two Armies: Pivot Points in the Fight in Ukraine’s East,” New York Times, September 26, 2022 80 White House, “Statement from President Biden on Russia’s Attempts to Annex Ukrainian Territory,” press release, September 20, 2022. 81 Anton Troianovski and Valerie Hopkins, “With Bluster and Threats, Putin Casts the West as the Enemy,” New York Times, September 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~Despite having significant artillery, rocket artillery, and air capabilities, Russian forces appeared~~
~~restrained in their use of these systems and capabilities during the initial invasion.33 Some~~
~~analysts speculated this occurred because the Russian military underestimated the level of~~
~~Ukrainian resistance and that it may have indicated an initial hesitation to inflict collateral~~
~~damage on civilian targets that would be crucial for supporting a Russian occupation.34~~
~~Analysis of Russia and Ukraine’s Initial Military Performance~~
~~Russian Performance~~
~~Despite Russian forces launching heavy attacks and advancing across Ukraine, the Russian~~
~~military overall performed poorly during the initial phases of the invasion, surprising most~~
~~observers and analysts (including Ukrainian military and political officials).35 Reports indicated~~
~~that Russia’s military and political leadership appeared surprised by the military’s lack of~~
~~progress and the level of resistance from Ukrainian forces.36 Some Russian forces invaded with~~
~~apparently little preparation. Captured Russian soldiers and intercepted communications revealed~~
~~that many units were unaware they were to invade Ukraine until shortly beforehand.37 As Director~~
~~of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress in early March 2022, “We assess~~
~~Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of internal military~~
~~challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues and~~
~~considerable logistical issues.”38~~
~~In particular, many analysts were surprised at the apparently limited role the VKS played at the~~
~~outset of the invasion, beyond the initial bombardment.39 Russian ground forces appeared to have~~
~~limited air cover, with Russia primarily relying on Iskander-M SRBMs or air-launched cruise~~
~~missiles launched from VKS bombers inside Belarus and Russia, especially to target Ukrainian~~
~~infrastructure and other targets in western Ukraine (see Figure 2).40 The Ukrainian air force~~

~~Military Radios Are Getting Owned,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian~~
~~Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022; James Rands,~~
~~“Doctrine, Tactics, and Technical Issues Underpin Russian Forces’ Communication Woes,” Janes IHS, March 29,~~
~~2022.~~
~~33 Thomas Newdick, “A Rundown of Russia’s Arsenal of Artillery That Could Wreak Havoc on Ukraine’s Cities,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Drive, March 4, 2022.~~
~~34 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian’s Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” New York Times,~~
~~February 25, 2022.~~
~~35 Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of~~
~~the Ukraine War,” Survival 64, no. 3 (2022), pp. 7-28; Sam Jones, John Paul Rathbone, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “A~~
~~Serious Failure’: Scale of Russian Military Blunders Becomes Clear,” Financial Times, March 12, 2022; Paul Sonne et~~
~~al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,” Washington Post, August 24,~~
~~2022.~~
~~36 Department of Defense, “Ukrainian Resistance, Logistics Nightmares Plague Russian Invaders,” press release,~~
~~March 1, 2022; Michael Schwirtz, “Proud Band of Ukrainian Troops Holds Russian Assault at Bay—for Now,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, March 6, 2022.~~
~~37 Luke Harding, “Demoralized Russian Soldiers Tell of Anger at Being ‘Duped’ into War,” Guardian, March 4, 2022;~~
~~Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes, “As Russia’s Military Stumbles, Its Adversaries Take Note,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, March 7, 2022~~
~~38 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.~~
~~39 Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force,” RUSI, February 28, 2022; Phil Stewart and~~
~~Idrees Ali, “What Happened to Russia’s Air Force? U.S. Officials, Experts Stumped,” Reuters, March 1, 2022.~~
~~40 Reuters, “Ukrainian Official Says Missiles Launched from Belarus to Ukraine,” February 27, 2022; Reuters,~~
~~“Ukraine Says It Downed Missile Launched by Russian Bomber Flying over Belarus,” February 27, 2022; Kyrylo~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~continued to operate over western Ukraine, and its air defenses shot down Russian aircraft and~~
~~challenged Russian air superiority.41~~
~~Figure 2. Ukraine Airfields and Key Infrastructure~~

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Janes IHS.
~~The Russian military’s logistics issues limited its offensives in almost all sectors.42 Russian units~~
~~appeared poorly supplied (for example, some captured Russian food reportedly was expired and~~
~~inedible) and seemed to advance past available logistics support.43 Available logistics appeared~~
~~too limited to sustain multiple simultaneous offensives.44 Moreover, the Ukrainian military~~
~~appeared to prioritize ambushing Russian supply columns, exacerbating Russian logistics~~
~~issues.45~~
~~In addition, the Russian military appears to have challenges with command and control, both at~~
~~the tactical and the operational levels. First, reports indicate there was no overall Russian~~

~~Ovsyaniy, “A Source of Death:’ Air Bases in Russia, Belarus, and Crimea Used in Moscow’s Assault on Ukraine,”~~
~~RFE/RL, March 24, 2022.~~
~~41 Media reports have documented the loss of Su-25 (SM/SM3), Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighters and fighter-bombers, as~~
~~well as numerous Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-35, Mi-28N, and Ka-52 helicopters. Jack Siminski, “What the Air Campaign in~~
~~Ukraine Tells Us About the Current State of the Russian Air Force,” Aviationist, March 4, 2022.~~
~~42 Alex Vershinin, “Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli,”~~ ~~War on the~~
~~Rocks, November 23, 2021; Ryan Baker, “The Russian Invasion Has Some Logistical Problems. That Doesn’t Mean~~
~~It’s Doomed,” Washington Post, February 28, 2022.~~
~~43 Emily Ferris, “Russia’s Military Has a Railroad Problem,” Foreign Policy, April 21, 2022~~
~~44 Polina Beliakova, “Russian Military’s Corruption Quagmire,” Politico.eu, March 8, 2022; Bill Chappell, “Russia’s~~
~~40-Mile Convoy Has Stalled on Its Way to Kyiv, a U.S. Official Says,” NPR, March 1, 2022.~~
~~45 Julian Borger, “The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Convoy Headed for Kyiv,” Guardian, March 28, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~operational commander.46 As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating~~
~~independently, with questionable levels of coordination.47 Second, Russian commanders appeared~~
~~unprepared for many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among~~
~~branches (such as VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units.48 Reporting indicates that~~
~~communication problems compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-~~
~~ranking officers moving closer to the frontlines and contributing to casualties among these~~
~~officers.49~~
~~Ukrainian Performance~~
~~Many observers and analysts have been surprised and impressed by Ukraine’s military resistance.~~
~~Despite having a smaller military than Russia, and a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in~~
~~equipment and resources, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have proven resilient and~~
~~adaptive.50 The UAF has demonstrated greater flexibility than the Russian military and a~~
~~willingness to adapt to changing conditions to exploit Russian missteps and weaknesses.51 The~~
~~UAF also has benefited from high levels of motivation and recruitment, as well as significant~~
~~Western security assistance and training.52~~
~~Initially, the UAF traded space to draw Russian forces in, as Russian units advanced without~~
~~sufficient convoy protection and logistical support. As Russian units advanced, Ukraine~~
~~emphasized guerrilla strategies, such as hit and run or ambushes, to attack supply lines.53 Ukraine~~
~~also isolated Russian units in an effort to tire and deplete Russian forces. Ukraine leveraged key~~
~~capabilities (such as the TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle for strikes and targeting), security~~
~~assistance, and artillery to stymie Russian advances and undermine Russian advantages, such as~~

~~46 Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, “Who Is Russia’s Top Field Commander in Ukraine? The U.S. Isn’t Sure.”~~
~~CNN, March 22, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials~~
~~Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022.~~
~~47 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command~~
~~of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts~~
~~Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Janes IHS, March 7, 2022.~~
~~48 Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington, “Russian Comms in Ukraine: A World of Hertz,” RUSI, March 9,~~
~~2022.~~
~~49 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are~~
~~closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have~~
~~been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed. The high number likely indicates that problems forced~~
~~Russian commanders to accept greater levels of exposure. Jack Detsch, “‘Winging It’: Russia Is Getting Its Generals~~
~~Killed on the Front Lines,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’~~
~~Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022.~~
~~50 CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Andrew S. Bowen; CRS In Focus IF12150,~~ ~~Ukrainian Military~~
~~Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.~~
~~51 Nabih Bulos, “Ukraine’s Army, Vastly Outgunned, Inflicts Losses on More Powerful Russian Forces,”~~ ~~Los Angeles~~
~~Times, March 9, 2022; Tim Judah, “How Kyiv was Saved by Ukrainian Ingenuity as Well as Russian Blunders,”~~
Financial Times, April 10, 2022.
~~52 52 Brett Forrest and Alan Cullison, “How Ukraine Blunted the Russian Advance,” Wall Street Journal, March 6,~~
~~2022; CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and~~
~~Cory Welt. In addition to the significant levels of security assistance, Western training for the Ukrainian military,~~
~~specifically Ukrainian special operations forces, has played a key role in defending against Russia’s invasion. For~~
~~more, see Andrew White, “Ukraine Conflict: Ukrainian Special Operations Forces in Focus,” Janes IHS, March 4,~~
~~2022.~~
~~53 John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to~~
~~Russia,” Financial Times, April 1, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~airpower.54 Easily deployable weapons systems (including foreign and domestic anti-tank and~~
~~anti-air systems) were effective at imposing losses in Russian personnel and equipment.55 The~~
~~UAF also appears to have adopted a diffuse command structure, allowing each operational~~
~~command to coordinate and initiate operations according to local conditions.~~
~~Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations~~
~~Observers continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its~~
~~offensive against Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty~~
~~assumptions that undermined Russia’s conduct of the invasion.56 If this is the case, these incorrect~~
~~political assumptions possibly determined and imposed unrealistic objectives and timetables onto~~
~~the Russian military. This in turn may partially, but not entirely, explain the Russian military’s~~
~~unpreparedness and poor performance.57~~
~~On February 25, 2022, the Pentagon assessed that Russia had committed one-third of its available~~
~~troops into Ukraine. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to~~
~~“decapitate” the Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key~~
~~junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014.58 Some analysts~~
~~speculate that Russia may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian military~~
~~would be ineffective and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced.59 As Central~~
~~Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee~~
~~in March 2022, Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable~~
~~of a quick, decisive victory at minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count. Those~~
~~assumptions have proven to be profoundly flawed over the last 12 days of conflict.”60~~
~~Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty~~
~~assumptions in part due to poor intelligence and a willingness by subordinates to convey only~~
~~positive information to Russian decisionmakers.61 Recent media reporting indicates the FSB~~

~~54 Dave Phillips and Eric Schmitt, “Over Ukraine, Lumbering Turkish-Made Drones Are an Ominous Sign for Russia,”~~
New York Times, March 11, 2022.
~~55 Henry Foy and Ian Bott, “How Is Ukraine Using Western Weapons to Exploit Russian Weaknesses?”~~ ~~Financial~~
~~Times, March 16, 2022.~~
~~56 Zach Beauchamp, “Why the First Few Days of War in Ukraine Went Badly for Russia,” Vox, February 28, 2022;~~
~~Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “How Putin Bungled His Invasion of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2022;~~
~~Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion,” RUSI, April 22, 202;~~
~~Mark Galeotti, “The Interfering Tsar: Why Putin Is Ukraine’s Best Hope of Victory,” The Times, April 23, 2022.~~
~~57 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “11 Days In: Russia’s Invasion Stumbles Forward,” War on the Rocks, March 7,~~
~~2022; Isaac Chotiner, “The Russian Military’s Debacle in Ukraine,” New Yorker, March 11, 2022.~~
~~58 Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Gives a Grim Assessment of the First Stages of the Russian Invasion,” New York Times,~~
~~February 24, 2022.~~
~~59 Nick Reynolds and Jack Whatling, “The Plot to Destroy Ukraine,” RUSI, February 15, 2022; Economist, “Russia’s~~
~~Army Is In a Woeful State,” April 20, 2022.~~
~~60 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.~~
~~61 See Mark Galeotti, “The West Thinks Putin Is Russia’s Spymaster. But Are the Spies Controlling Him?” Guardian,~~
~~June 20, 2019; Todd Prince, “Eyeing Ukraine, Putin Huddles in a Tight, Hawkish Circle,” RFE/RL, February 15, 2022;~~
~~Henry Foy and John Paul Rathbone, “Intelligence Failures Hamper Russia’s Ukraine Mission,” Financial Times,~~
~~March 1, 2022; David V. Gioe and Huw Dylan, “Putin’s KGB Past Didn’t Help Him with Intelligence on Ukraine,”~~
Washington Post, March 17, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, Lara Jakes, and John Ismay, “U.S. Intelligence Suggests That
~~Putin’s Advisors Misinformed Him on Ukraine,” New York Times, March 30, 2022; Steve Holland and Andrea Shalal,~~
~~“Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White House and EU Officials Say,” Reuters,~~
~~March 31, 2022; Philip H. Davies and Toby Steward, “No War for Old Spies: Putin, the Kremlin and Intelligence,”~~
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~overstated its influence and agent networks inside Ukraine, possibly contributing to a false~~
~~expectation of a quick regime change.62 Additionally, many observers speculate a relatively small~~
~~circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed to potentially~~
~~unrealistic assumptions.63 Observers believe this circle includes Minister of Defense Sergei~~
~~Shoigu, who may have overstated the Russian military’s capabilities.64~~
~~March-May 2022~~
~~Since early March 2022, Russian forces attempted to adapt to the reality of effective Ukrainian~~
~~resistance. Russia made some changes to its military operations, including more coordination~~
~~between units and a greater attempt to operate as combined arms formations, increased air~~
~~support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.65 Russian forces made~~
~~slow incremental advances but continued to suffer heavy losses in both personnel and~~
~~equipment.66 By March 7, 2022, U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100~~
~~percent” of its available forces into Ukraine.67 The Russian VKS increased its number of sorties~~
~~and operations, although most missions appeared to employ unguided weaponry rather than~~
~~PGMs.68 The increased sortie rate also meant heavier losses for the VKS, including some of its~~
~~most advanced helicopter, fighter, and fighter-bombers.69~~
~~At this stage of the conflict, instead of concentrating on one area of operations, the Russian~~
~~military appeared to continue multiple lines of advance.70 In the north, Russian forces attempted~~
~~to break through Ukrainian defenses around Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the~~
~~east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and attacked toward Izyum. In the south, Russian forces~~
~~conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast.71 Each~~

RUSI, May 20, 2022.
~~62 Mari Saito and Maria Tsvetkova, “The Enemy Within,” Reuters, July 28, 2022; Greg Miller and Catherine Belton,~~
~~“Russia’s Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022.~~
~~63 Analysts have debated the balance between advisers providing false or misleading information to Putin and the~~
~~leadership itself imposing unrealistic objectives and limitations onto the Russian government and military. See Adam~~
~~E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bully in the Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The~~
~~Personal Politics of Putin’s Security Council Meeting,” Moscow Times, February 22, 2022; Amanda Taub, “Putin~~
~~Seems to Sideline Advisers on Ukraine, Taking a Political Risk,” New York Times, March 1, 2022.~~
~~64 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Man Behind Putin’s Military,” Foreign Affairs, February 26, 2022;~~
~~Thomas Grove, “Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, But Now Faces a Potential Quagmire,”~~
Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022; Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “The Intellectual Failures Behind
~~Russia’s Bungled Invasion,” RUSI, April 1, 2022.~~
~~65 Steven Erlanger, “After a Fumbled Start, Russian Forces Hit Harder in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28,~~
~~2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russia’s Invasion Began with Precision Missiles, But Weapons Are Changing as Siege War~~
~~Begins,” Washington Post, March 1, 2022.~~
~~66 Griff Witte et al., “After More Than Two Weeks of War, the Russian Military Grinds Forward at a Heavy Cost,”~~
Washington Post, March 11, 2022.
~~67 Quint Forgey, “Putin Sends ‘Nearly 100 Percent’ of Russian Forces at Border into Ukraine,” Politico, March 7,~~
~~2022.~~
~~68 Alan Cullison and Alexander Osipovich, “Russian General Is Killed in Ukraine as Airstrikes Intensify,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, March 11, 2022; Abraham Mahsie, “Air War Ramps Up in Russia-Ukraine Conflict as Russian PGMs Run~~
~~Out,” Air Force Magazine, March 21, 2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russian Air Force Action Increases Despite Flood of~~
~~Antiaircraft Missiles into Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022.~~
~~69 David Axe, “The Russian Air Force Is Losing Its Best Jets over Ukraine,” Forbes, March 29, 2022.~~
~~70 For specific tracking of the conflict, see Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor,” Rochan Consulting.~~
~~71 Financial Times, “How Russia’s Mistakes and Ukrainian Resistance Altered Putin’s War,” March 18, 2022.~~
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~~advance appeared to compete against the others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics,~~
~~and air support. Gradually, most Russian offensives began to stall due to a number of factors,~~
~~including continued logistics issues, mounting casualties and a lack of available reinforcements,~~
~~and increasing Ukrainian counterattacks.72~~
~~Throughout mid-March 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted effective counterattacks across~~
~~most axes of advance, defeating repeated Russian offensives outside of Kyiv, outside of Kharkiv~~
~~and Sumy, and in Mykolaiv.73 Ukraine also attacked captured infrastructure, such as an airbase in~~
~~Kherson and the port of Berdyansk, and destroyed key Russian assets.74~~
~~Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. Ukrainian forces~~
~~launched multiple sustained counteroffensives and pushed back Russian forces.75 Observers noted~~
~~that, after failing to achieve a decisive victory quickly, Russia was reevaluating its objectives and~~
~~strategy toward achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine.76 On March 25, the~~
~~Russian Ministry of Defense held a press conference alleging that Russia had mostly met its~~
~~initial objectives and would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern~~
~~Ukraine, including the Donbas.77 Russia soon announced it was withdrawing forces from around~~
~~Kyiv and Chernihiv; analysts speculated that this was aimed at allowing the redeployment of~~
~~units for further offensives in the east.78 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on~~
~~April 4, 2022, “Russia is repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern~~
~~and parts of southern Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and~~
~~overwhelm Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine.”79~~
~~Subsequently, Russia redirected forces to support operations in the east to cut off Ukrainian~~
~~military units in the Donbas.80 On April 12, President Putin stated that Russia’s “military~~

~~72 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones, and Daniel Dombey, “Why Russia Is Deploying More Troops to Ukraine,”~~
Financial Times, March 17, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine’s Troops Begin a Counteroffensive That Alters Shape
~~of the Battle with Russia,” March 24, 2022; Alex Horton, “Why Russian Troops Are Using Tree Branches for~~
~~Camouflage in Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022; Stephen Fidler and Thomas Grove, “Behind the Front~~
~~Lines, Russia’s Military Struggles to Supply Its Forces,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2022.~~
~~73 Yaroslav Trofimov, “A Ukrainian Town Deals Russia One of the War’s Most Decisive Routs,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~March 16, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Counteroffensive near Mykolaiv Relieves Strategic Port City,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, March 18, 2022; David Stern et al., “Ukraine Claims It Had Retaken Key Town Outside Kyiv, as~~
~~Defenses Hold Against Fierce Russian Onslaught,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022.~~
~~74 Most analysts believe Ukraine launched Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile systems during the attacks on~~
~~Kherson Airbase and the port of Berdyansk. Analysts cite this occurrence as another failure of the VKS to target and~~
~~destroy such key strategic weapon systems. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Barrage Leaves Russian-Occupied~~
~~Kherson Airbase in Flames,” The Drive, March 15, 2022; Andrew Carey et al., “Ukrainians Claim to Have Destroyed~~
~~Large Russian Warship in Berdyansk,” CNN, March 25, 2022.~~
~~75 Andrew E. Kramer, “In Kyiv Suburb, Ukrainian Military Claims a Big Prize,” New York Times, March 29, 2022;~~
~~John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to~~
~~Russia,” Financial Times, March 31, 2022.~~
~~76 Michael R. Gordon and Alex Leary, “Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to ‘Plan~~
~~B,’” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2022.~~
~~77 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: March 25, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, March 26, 2022.~~
~~78 Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Intel Assess ‘Major’ Strategy Shift by Russia as It Moves Some Forces away from Kyiv,” CNN,~~
~~March 31, 2022; David Axe, “Ukraine’s Best Tank Brigade Has Won the Battle for Chernihiv,” Forbes, March 31,~~
~~2022; Anjali Singhvi et al., “How Kyiv Has Withstood Russia’s Attacks,” New York Times, April 2, 2022.~~
~~79 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” press~~
~~briefing, April 4, 2022.~~
~~80 The Joint Forces Operation (JFO) is Ukraine’s term for its military operation against the Russian-controlled Donetsk~~
~~and Luhansk People’s Republics. Most analysts consider Ukrainian military forces in the JFO to be Ukraine’s best~~
~~units. Barbara Starr et al., “Russia Shifting Focus to Show a Victory by Early May in Eastern Ukraine, U.S. Officials~~
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~operation will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help the people in the~~
~~Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.”81 The terrain in the Donbas favored~~
~~Russian forces, with its advantages in artillery units, and made it more difficult for Ukrainian~~
~~forces to conduct guerrilla-style attacks.82~~
~~Despite the apparent focus on the Donbas, some observers remained concerned about larger~~
~~Russian objectives. On April 22, 2022, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, the deputy~~
~~commander of the Central Military District, said in an interview that Russia wanted to take full~~
~~control of eastern and southern Ukraine, including a possible land bridge to Transnistria, a~~
~~Russia-supported breakaway territory in Moldova.83 Many observers believe this statement~~
~~reflects larger Russian political objectives over the medium to long term, since Russian military~~
~~force constraints prevent a serious offensive to capture Odessa and link up with Transnistria.~~
~~Sinking of the Moskva and Snake Island~~
~~On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Slava class missile cruiser Moskva, reportedly was~~
~~struck by two Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles. Initially, Russia denied the Moskva was hit by missiles,~~
~~said it sunk in a storm after an accidental fire, and attempted to tow the heavily damaged cruiser back to port in~~
~~Sevastopol; the damage was catastrophic, however, and the ship eventually sank. Reports indicate the Moskva was~~
~~blockading Odessa and providing air defense support to Russian units in the southwest near Kherson when it was~~
~~struck. The sinking provided a morale boost to Ukrainian forces and undermined Russian efforts to threaten an~~
~~amphibious assault against Odessa, potentially freeing up Ukrainian forces defending the city to conduct~~
~~counteroffensives against Russian forces near Kherson. Russia’s new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet is the Project~~
~~11356 frigate Admiral Makarov.~~
~~The sinking of the Moskva also threatened Russia’s control over Snake Island, a small rock outcropping Russia~~
~~seized during the initial days of the invasion and used to support the Russian blockade of Odessa. Ukrainian forces~~
~~harassed Russian forces on the island throughout the conflict using TB2 UCAVs and fighters, sinking Russian ships~~
~~and destroying air defense systems. Eventually, long-range Ukrainian artil ery and the loss of the Moskva made the~~
~~island untenable, and Russian forces departed Snake Island by the end of June.~~
Sources: Brad Lendon, “Moskva Sinking: What Really Happened to the Pride of Russia’s Fleet?” CNN, April 15,
~~2022; Adam Taylor and Claire Parker, “’Neptune’ Missile Strike Shows Strength of Ukraine’s Homegrown~~
~~Weapons,” Washington Post, April 15, 2022; Economist, “How Did Ukraine Destroy the Moskva, a Large Russian~~
Warship,” April 20, 2022; B. J. Armstrong, “The Russo-Ukrainian War at Sea: Retrospect and Prospect,” War on
the Rocks, April 21, 2022; Marc Santora and Ivan Nechepurenko, “Ukraine Drives Russian Forces from Snake
~~Island, a Setback for Moscow,” New York Times, June 20, 2022.~~
~~On April 18, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia had begun its offensive in the~~
~~Donbas after a barrage of Russian missile strikes across Ukraine.84 Russian forces initially~~
~~conducted slow and gradual probing attacks against Ukrainian forces, including the use of heavy~~
~~artillery and rocket artillery to support operations.85 Russia concentrated on pressing Ukrainian~~

~~Say,” CNN, April 2, 2022.~~
~~81 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Says Peace Talks Are at a ‘Dead End’ and Calls Atrocities in Bucha ‘Fake,’”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, April 12, 2022.~~
~~82 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “Battles May Be Tougher for Ukrainians as War Shifts to Wide-Open Terrain in East,”~~
Washington Post, April 9, 2022; Jack Watling, “Why the Battle for Donbas Will Be Very Different from the Assault on
~~Kyiv,” Guardian, April 9, 2022; Howard Altman, “Ukraine’s Ability to Withstand Russian Artillery Critical to Fight~~
~~for Donbas,” The Drive, April 19, 2022; Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “Technical Reflections on Russia’s~~
~~Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” RUSI, April 27, 2022.~~
~~83 Mary Ilyushina et al., “Commander Hints at Russian Ambitions Beyond Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 22, 2022.~~
~~84 Hannah Allam et al., “Zelensky Says Russia Has Launched Offensive in Eastern Ukraine,” Washington Post, April~~
~~18, 2022; Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab~~
~~Strategy,” Financial Times, April 24, 2022.~~
~~85 Ivana Saric, “Russia Seizes Eastern Ukraine City of Kreminna, Official Says,” Axios, April 19, 2022; Christopher~~
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~~forces south of Izyum, west from Severodonetsk toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, and from~~
~~Donetsk to create a large encirclement of UAF.86~~
~~Russian forces ran into determined and effective UAF resistance and were unable to make~~
~~significant progress.87 Russian forces could not break through Ukrainian defenses around Izyum,~~
~~partially resulting from too few units and a gradual deployment, even with reinforcements from~~
~~the abandoned effort to take Kyiv.88 Additionally, UAF forces reinforced and conducted~~
~~counterattacks outside of Kharkiv, pushing Russian forces in some positions back toward the~~
~~border and potentially placing the Russian city of Belgorod within striking distance of long-range~~
~~Ukrainian rocket and missile artillery.89 Throughout the war, numerous unexplained explosions~~
~~have occurred at various industrial sites in Russia, some of which are likely the result of~~
~~Ukrainian air, missile, or sabotage attacks.90 UAF forces also conducted counterattacks toward~~
~~Izyum, reportedly advancing against Russian units (such as those from the Russian 1st Guards~~
~~Tank Army), which had suffered significant casualties.91~~
~~Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward eastern Ukraine indicated the~~
~~Russian military’s need to rest and resupply after using most of its combat-effective units. During~~
~~this time, analysts noted the need for Russian personnel reinforcements, not only to replace losses~~
~~but also to support further Russian offensives.92 Conditions forced Russia to pull units from~~
~~foreign bases to help replace and rotate out units.93 Russia reportedly also has deployed private~~
~~military companies (including heavy use of Wagner Private Military Company) to support~~
~~operations, primarily to oversee and support Russian-led forces from the DNR/LNR.94 Many~~
~~observers speculated that Putin would announce a state of war and national mobilization during~~
~~Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebration, allowing Russia to call up reserves and use conscripts in~~
~~combat.95 The celebration passed with no such announcement. Despite the slow pace of Russian~~

~~Miller and Paul McLeary, “Heavy Weaponry Pours into Ukraine as Commanders Become More Desperate,” Politico,~~
~~April 25, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 24, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 25, 2022.~~
~~86 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 16-18, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 19, 2022; Author~~
~~correspondence with Michael Kofman.~~
~~87 Zachary Cohenet et al., “Russia Making ‘Slow and Uneven’ Progress as Military Tries to Fix Problems That Plagued~~
~~Early Invasion, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, April 28, 2022; Sam Jones et al., “‘Anemic’ Russian Advance Heralds Long~~
~~War of Attrition,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022.~~
~~88 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 9-15 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 15, 2022. Some estimated~~
~~20-25 Russian BTGs in the Izyum area, but those forces were never fully deployed together and some were held in~~
~~reserve. Additionally, some units were reported to rotate back to Russia after suffering heavy losses and becoming~~
~~combat ineffective.~~
~~89 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 5 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 6, 2022.~~
~~90 Mike Eckel, “Blasts, Bombs, and Drones: Amid Carnage in Ukraine, A Shadow War on the Russian Side of the~~
~~Border,” RFE/RL, April 29, 2022.~~
~~91 Mike Eckel, “Fizzled Faltering? ‘Anemic’? Why Russia’s Donbas Offensive Isn’t Going Exactly as Anticipated,”~~
~~RFE/RL, May 3, 2022.~~
~~92 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, April 8, 2022;~~
Economist, “Rob Lee on Why Attrition Will Be a Critical Factor in the Battle for the Donbas,” April 23, 2022.
~~93 Reports indicate Russia was forced to deploy units from several foreign bases, including units from the 201st Military~~
~~Base in Tajikistan, 7th Military Base in Russia-occupied Abkhazia (Georgia), and 4th Military Base in Russia-occupied~~
~~South Ossetia (Georgia), to support operations in Ukraine. Digital Forensics Research Lab, “Additional Units from~~
~~Georgian Breakaway Regions Join Russian Offensive,” Atlantic Council, March 28, 2022.~~
~~94 Economist, “Russia’s Brutal Mercenaries Probably Won’t Matter Much in Ukraine,” April 9, 2022; Miriam Berger,~~
~~“What Is the Wagner Group, the Russian Mercenary Entity in Ukraine?,” Washington Post, April 9, 2022.~~
~~95 Robyn Dixon and Liz Sly, “On a Victory Day Without Victory, Putin Faces Choice over All-Out War,”~~ ~~Washington~~
~~Post, May 7, 2022; Dmitry Alperovitch and Michael Kofman, “War in Ukraine,” Silverado Policy Accelerator, May 8,~~
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~~progress and need for reinforcements, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified to~~
~~the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20, 2022, “We assess President Putin is preparing~~
~~for prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the~~
~~Donbas.”96~~
~~A key Russian military objective was the coastal city of Mariupol, in the Donetsk region.97~~
~~Russian forces gradually surrounded and advanced into Mariupol against stiff Ukrainian~~
~~resistance.98 The effort to seize the city benefited from Russia shifting operations away from~~
~~seizing further territory in the Kherson region (which includes Mykolaiv).99 After weeks of~~
~~bombardment and fighting, Ukrainian military forces and large numbers of civilians were isolated~~
~~in the Azovstal iron and steel plant.100 On April 21, Putin announced that Russia had seized~~
~~Mariupol and that Russian forces would not assault the Azovstal plant but would surround and~~
~~seal it off, despite Ukrainian forces’ continued resistance.101 Ukraine announced on May 16 that it~~
~~had instructed its remaining troops at Azovstal to cease combat missions.102 Shortly thereafter,~~
~~Ukrainian troops began surrendering and were evacuated to Russian-controlled areas.103 The~~
~~status of these prisoners remains unclear, with potential options ranging from “trials” for Russian~~
~~propaganda purposes to some form of prisoner exchange.104 On July 29, a massive explosion~~
~~ripped through a prisoner-of-war camp housing many of the prisoners from Mariupol, killing an~~
~~estimated 50 prisoners.105 Russia alleged the explosion was the result of a Ukrainian missile~~
~~strike, but many observers believe it was some other cause.106~~
~~Russia also continued its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but the~~
~~VKS did not seek further air superiority beyond eastern Ukraine. Russia conducted long-range~~
~~PGM strikes against what Russian officials say are the Ukrainian defense industry and~~
~~infrastructure targets in an attempt to cripple and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term~~
~~capability. However, observers began to note the questionable precision, capability, and quantity~~

~~2022.~~
~~96 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong.,~~
~~May 10, 2022.~~
~~97 Alan Cullison, Brett Forrest, and Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Ramps Up Ukraine Attacks in Effort to Seize~~
~~Strategically Key Port City,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2022.~~
~~98 Bermet Talant, “Why Is Mariupol So Important to Russian Forces?,” Guardian, March 22, 2022.~~
~~99 Nick Paton Walsh et al., “Russia Could Be Losing Ground in Battle for Mykolaiv, But It Still Seeks to Crush What It~~
~~Cannot Have,” CNN, March 21, 2022.~~
~~100 Ann M. Simmons and Daniel Michaels, “Mariupol, in Ruins, Still Looms Large for Russia and Ukraine,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, April 19, 2022; Amy Mackinnon, “What the Fall of Mariupol Would Mean for the War,”~~ ~~Foreign~~
~~Policy, April 20, 2022.~~
~~101 Michael Schwirtz, “Ukrainians in Mariupol’s Steel Mill Are Holding On, Despite Intensifying Attacks, a~~
~~Commander Tells the Times,” New York Times, April 24, 2022.~~
~~102 Valerie Hopkins, Ivan Nechepurenko, and Marc Santora, “The Ukrainian Authorities Declare an End to the Combat~~
~~Mission in Mariupol After Weeks of Russian Siege,” New York Times, May 16, 2022.~~
~~103 Todd Prince, “Russia’s Capture of Azovstal: Symbolic Success, ‘Pyrrhic’ Victory?,” RFE/RL, May 18, 2022;~~
~~Michael Schwirtz, “Last Stand at Azovstal: Inside the Siege That Shaped the Ukraine War,” New York Times, July 27,~~
~~2022.~~
~~104 Claire Parker et al., “Moscow Casts Doubt on Prisoner Swap; Soldier Pleads Guilty in Killing.” Washington Post,~~
~~May 18, 2022; Isabel Coles and Ann M. Simmons, “Russia Takes Captured Ukrainian Fighters from Mariupol to Its~~
~~Territory,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2022.~~
~~105 Matthew Mpoke Bigg and Maria Varenikova, “Here’s What We Know About the Deadly Blast at a Prisoner Camp~~
~~in Eastern Ukraine,” New York Times, August 1, 2022.~~
~~106 Joyce Sohyun Lee et al., “What We Know About the Blast That Killed Ukrainian POWs in Olenivka,”~~ ~~Washington~~
~~Post, August 6, 2022.~~
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~~of PGMs still available to Russian forces.107 U.S. officials have stated most PGMs appear to be~~
~~air-launched cruise missiles from bombers inside Russia.108~~
~~May-September 2022~~
~~After the capture of Mariupol, Russia refocused efforts on seizing key urban and infrastructure~~
~~areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.109 Due to losses, Russia appeared unable to focus and concentrate~~
~~combat power on multiple advances, forcing it to refocus efforts on a single objective while~~
~~consolidating its hold on captured territory (such as in Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia).110~~
~~By mid-May 2022, Russia appeared unable to capture the key cities of Slovyansk and~~
~~Kramatorsk, a likely target of Russia’s refocused offensives. Instead, Russia focused on on~~
~~seizing the towns of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which would give Russia almost total~~
~~control over Luhansk Oblast.111~~
~~In contrast to the early days of the invasion,~~
~~Figure 3. Donbas Region of Ukraine~~
~~the fighting in the Donbas resembled a more~~
~~traditional conventional conflict of slow but~~
~~intense fighting, and Russia reverted to its~~
~~traditional reliance on the massed used of~~
~~artillery and rocket artillery.112 Russian forces~~
~~appeared to conduct a pincer movement to cut~~
~~off Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk and~~
~~Lysychansk.113 In the north, Russian forces~~
~~pushed southeast from Izyum, capturing~~
~~Lyman and attempting to make several~~
~~crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River near~~
~~Bilohorivka, but came under Ukrainian~~
~~artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties.114~~
~~In the Donbas, Russia relied heavily on~~
~~Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)~~

Source: Congressional Research Service

~~107 John Ismay, “Russian Guided Weapons Miss the Mark, U.S. Defense Officials Say,” New York Times, May 9, 2022;~~
~~Thomas Newdick, “We May Have Our First Sight of a Russian Bomber Launching Missiles at Ukraine,” The Drive,~~
~~May 11, 2022; Stetson Payne and Tyler Rogoway, “Kyiv Claims Russia is Running Low on Missiles,” The Drive,~~
~~August 27, 2022.~~
~~108 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022.~~
~~109 Dan Lamothe, Ellen Nakashima, and Alex Horton, “Russia Tries to Rebound in Ukraine as Prospects for Victory~~
~~Fade,” Washington Post, May 21, 2022.~~
~~110 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022.~~
~~111 Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May~~
~~28,” Institute for the Study of War, May 28, 2022.~~
~~112 John Paul Rathbone and Max Seddon, “Battle for Severodonetsk Shows Russian Strategy in Donbas,”~~ ~~Financial~~
~~Times, May 25, 2022; John Paul Rathbone et al., “Russia’s Barrage Hits Ukrainian Morale in the Donbas,”~~ ~~Financial~~
~~Times, June 10, 2022.~~
~~113 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: May 21-23, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 24, 2022.~~
~~114 Howard Altman, “Debacle on the Donets: How Russian Forces Got Obliterated Trying to Cross a River,” The Drive,~~
May 12, 2022; Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Forces Sink Russian River Crossings, Inflicting Heavy Damage,” Wall
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~~and local DNR/LNR units.115 These forces sustained heavy casualties but gradually pushed the~~
~~UAF back and captured key towns such as Popasna.116~~
~~The UAF continued to staunchly defend territory instead of conducting an organized withdrawal,~~
~~leading some analysts to speculate that Ukraine’s strategy was to impose as much attrition on~~
~~Russian forces as possible.117 Nevertheless, Russian forces, including Chechen Rosgvardiya and~~
~~DNR/LNR troops, continued their offensive into Severodonetsk and gradually seized control of~~
~~the city after Ukraine ordered its forces to retreat to Lysychansk.118 Russian forces continued to~~
~~advance north from Popasna toward Bakhmut, threatening to cut off UAF units and envelope~~
~~Lysychansk.119 Subsequently, the UAF withdrew from Lysychansk to prepared defensive lines~~
~~between Bakhmut and Siversk.120~~
~~Reported Russian and Ukrainian Casualties~~
~~Estimates of wartime casualties vary widely and may not be considered reliable. Due to the continuing state of~~
~~war, verifying exact numbers of casualties is nearly impossible. Generally, ranges of possible casualties are given as~~
~~estimates due to the uncertain and changing nature of assessments. Below are some estimates mentioned in~~
~~various press reports through August 2022.~~
~~Russian Casualties~~
Russia: Officially, the Russian government stated in late March 2022 that 1,351 soldiers had died and another 3,850
~~had been wounded. On March 20, 2022, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared to publish~~
~~Russian Ministry of Defense figures that listed 9,861 deaths. This figure remains unconfirmed, and the newspaper~~
~~deleted the report and stated that it had been hacked. Russia has not provided a casualty update since.~~
United States: U.S estimates of Russian military losses range from 70,000 to 80,000 total (including killed and
~~wounded). In July, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Wil iam Burns estimated the Russians suffered~~
~~15,000 kil ed. In early August, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated, “I think it’s safe to suggest~~
~~that the Russians are probably taking 70 or 80,000 casualties in less than six months.”~~
United Kingdom: UK estimates of Russian casualties are slightly higher than those of U.S. officials. UK Defense
~~Secretary Ben Wallace in August stated Russia has suffered 80,000 casualties, while citing in June estimates that~~
~~Russia suffered 25,000 kil ed.~~
~~Ukrainian Casualties~~
~~Until recently, Ukraine has been reluctant to share casualty figures. In June 2022, Ukrainian officials stated that~~
~~Ukraine was losing 100-200 soldiers per day during the height of fighting around Severodonetsk. On August 22,~~
~~2022, Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeri Zaluzhny stated Ukraine had suffered almost~~
~~9,000 kil ed.~~

Street Journal, May 23, 2022.
~~115 Observers note Russian Private Military Company (PMC) and DNR/LNR forces are integrated into the Russian~~
~~military command structure. Reuters, “Conscripts Sent to Fight by Pro-Russia Donbas Get Little Training, Old Rifles,~~
~~Poor Supplies,” April 4, 2022; Ihor Burdyga and Regina Gimalova, “How Ukraine Separatists are Mass Conscripting~~
~~Anyone of Fighting Age,” DW, April 27, 2022; Lilia Yapparova, “A Mercenaries’ War,” Meduza, July 14, 2022;~~
~~Reuters, “Russian Firm Wagner Made Tactical Advances in Donbas-UK Intelligence,” July 27, 2022.~~
~~116 Reuters, “Ukraine Troops Retreat from Popasna, Luhansk Governor Confirms,” May 8, 2022; Karolina Hird,~~
~~Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20,”~~ ~~Institute for the Study~~
~~of War, May 20, 2022.~~
~~117 Ian Lovett, “Ukraine Counterattack Takes Back Parts of Strategic Donbas City,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 3033;~~
~~Tim Lister, “Two Months On, Russia Is Still Struggling to Capture This Small Ukrainian City,” CNN, June 21, 2022.~~
~~118 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Severodonetsk After Weeks of Brutal Battle,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, June 24, 2022; Tass, “Mopping Up of Village near Severodonetsk in LPR Being Completed — Chechen~~
~~Leader,” June 19, 2022.~~
~~119 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 27 June – 3 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 3, 2022.~~
~~120 Jonathan Beale, “Ukraine Confirms Russia Captured Eastern City Lysychansk,” BBC, July 3, 2022; Annabelle~~
~~Timsit et al., “Russia Claims Key City in Punishing Conquest of Eastern Ukraine,” Washington Post, July 3, 3033.~~
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~~Civilian Casualties~~
~~In August 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated 5,587 civilians had been kil ed and 7,890~~
~~wounded since the war began. The commissioner also noted that this was likely an undercount. For example, in~~
~~Mariupol, a city that suffered especial y severe civilian casualties, Ukrainian sources have stated that local morgues~~
~~have documented at least 87,000 deaths.~~

Sources: BBC, “Kyiv Losing Up to 200 Troops a Day-Zelensky Aide,” June 9, 2022; Economist, “How Heavy Are
~~Russian Casualties in Ukraine?” July 24, 2022; Niamh Cavanagh, “Russia Has Suffered an Estimated 75,000~~
~~Casualties in Ukraine Invasion, U.S. Officials Say,” Yahoo News, July 28, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Russia Is Readying the~~
~~Zinc Coffins Again,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2022; Helene Cooper, “Heavy Losses Leave Russia Short of Its Goal~~
~~U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 11, 2022; Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, “Almost 9,000 Ukrainian~~
~~Defenders Died in the War with the Russian Federation-Zaluzhny,” August 22, 2022; U.N. Office of the High~~
~~Commissioner for Human Rights, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update 22 August 2022,” press release, August 22,~~
~~2022; Kyiv Independent, “British Defense Minister: Combined Russian Casualties at 80,000 Troops in War Against~~
~~Ukraine,” August 24, 2022; Euromaidan Press, “87,000 Kil ed Civilians Documented in Occupied Mariupol—~~
~~Volunteer,” August 30, 2022.~~
~~The UAF suffered heavy casualties during the fighting for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk,~~
~~including among experienced veterans who volunteered for the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)~~
~~and reserve units.121 The UAF broke up the core of its maneuver formations into smaller units to~~
~~spearhead localized counterattacks and to shore up TDF and Reserve units manning defensive~~
~~positions. According to a RUSI study, “In the defense, this has led to reasonable combat~~
~~performance by these troops. For the attack, however, the Ukrainian armed forces have found it~~
~~necessary to bring their best units back together and have them spearhead attacks.”122 Many UAF~~
~~counteroffensives, such as outside of Kharkiv, slowed as Russian units regrouped and UAF forces~~
~~concentrated on defending the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas, leaving TDF units to~~
~~defend the frontline but unable to launch further offensive action.123 The UAF also struggled with~~
~~secure communications and instances of command and control issues between the TDF and~~
~~regular military, as well as a dire need for artillery and heavy weapon support.124~~
~~Beginning in mid-May 2022, the UAF began receiving significant shipments of U.S. and Western~~
~~artillery systems, specifically the U.S. M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition.125 Security~~
~~assistance has been critical to sustaining UAF operations and countering the Russian advantage in~~
~~artillery and rocket artillery, since the UAF reports it is running low on ammunition and parts for~~
~~its Soviet/Russian artillery systems.126 Nevertheless, training time and the high need for systems~~
~~have resulted in most UAF units still relying on older Soviet/Russian systems while waiting for~~

~~121 Dave Lawler, “Ukraine Suffering Up to 1,000 Casualties Per Day in Donbas, Official Says,” Axios, June 15, 2022;~~
~~Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine’s War of Attrition Exacts Heavy Toll on Both Sides,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022. See~~
~~also CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.~~
~~122 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road From Survival to Victory,” RUSI, July 4, 2022,~~
~~p. 17~~
~~123James M. Lindsay, “The Long War in Ukraine, With Michael Kofman,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 12,~~
~~2022.~~
~~124 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “On Front Lines, Communication Breakdowns Prove Costly for~~
~~Ukraine,” New York Times, June 28, 2022; Viviana Salama, “Ukraine Faces Shortfall in Weapons as It Gears Up for~~
~~First Major Counteroffensive,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2022.~~
~~125 David Vergun, “M777 Artillery Deliveries Should Help Ukraine in the Donbas, Says Official,” DoD News, April~~
~~29, 2022; and Andrew E. Kramer and Maria Varenikova, “Powerful American Artillery Enters the Fight in Ukraine,”~~
New York Times, May 23, 2022.
~~126 Lara Seligman, “Biden to Send New Precision-Guided Artillery Rounds to Ukraine,” Politico, July 8, 2022.~~
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~~new Western weaponry.127 By July, Ukraine began receiving U.S.-supplied M270 Multiple~~
~~Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS),~~
~~providing the UAF with significantly improved targeting ability, including increased range and~~
~~precision accuracy.128 Early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers indicate the UAF is~~
~~using these systems effectively, including to target key Russian command and control, logistics,~~
~~and transport infrastructure.129 One significant challenge, however, is maintaining and repairing~~
~~the vast number of Western systems the UAF has received, all with different standards and~~
~~requirements for operating.~~
~~Over the rest of July, Russian forces attempted to regroup and take an “operational pause” after~~
~~suffering heavy casualties capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.130 Most observers believed~~
~~Russia had exhausted most of its forces and required time to refit, resupply, and reorganize.~~
~~Russian forces did not achieve any significant territorial progress over the next weeks, other than~~
~~small gains between Siversk and Bakhmut, and appeared to focus on solidifying their control over~~
~~existing territory.131 Russia increasingly relied on Wagner PMC and DNR/LNR forces to probe~~
~~UAF lines and then direct artillery and rocket artillery upon making contact.132 Open-source~~
~~reporting continued to document instances of low Russian morale and increasing reports of~~
~~Russian soldiers refusing to fight, resigning from their contracts before deployment, or refusing~~
~~orders from their superiors.133~~
~~Russian Command and Control Challenges~~
~~Since the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, reports indicate Russia has attempted to address its command~~
~~and control issues, including the lack of an overall operational commander. It is difficult for most observers to~~
~~definitively identify and state the nature of Russian command and control due to the changing circumstances and~~

~~127 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory~~
~~Welt; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Natalia Yermak, and Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine Is Running Short of Soviet-Era~~
~~Ammunition for Its Artillery, Crippling Its Ability to Hold the Line in the East,” New York Times, June 10, 2022; and~~
~~Serhiy Morgunov, “As They Wait for Weapons, Ukrainians Hold the Line with Soviet Artillery,” Washington Post,~~
~~July 27, 2022.~~
~~128 Stephen Kalin and Georgi Kantchev, “Ukraine Loses Ground in Battle for Severodonetsk but Gains Firepower from~~
~~U.S.” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Is Bringing a Big Gun to a Knife Fight,”~~ ~~Foreign~~
~~Policy, July 13, 2022; and Isabel Coles and Evan Gershkovich, “Ukraine Strike on Russian Air-Defense Unit Shows~~
~~Impact of New Weapons from West,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2022.~~
~~129 Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kostiantyn Khudov, “U.S. Supplied HIMARS Changing the Calculus on Ukraine’s~~
~~Frontlines,” Washington Post, July 1, 2022; Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine Targets Russia’s Ammunition Depots,~~
~~Undermining Its Artillery Advantage,” Kyiv Independent, July 8, 2022; and C. Todd Lopez, “U.S. Provided HIMARS~~
~~Effective in Ukraine,” DoD News, July 15, 2022.~~
~~130 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Russia Advances Behind Brutal Barrage, But Will Its Strategy Keep Working?”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, July 4, 2022; Erika Solomon, “Behind Russia’s ‘Pause’ Are Signs of a Troubled Effort to Regroup,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, September 10, 2022.~~
~~131 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 18-24 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 25, 2022; Dara Massicot,~~
~~“Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One,” Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2022.~~
~~132 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 25-31 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, August 1, 2022.~~
~~133 It is unclear how widespread and pervasive low morale is in the Russian military, but the rise of such reports, along~~
~~with the reliance on PMC and DNR/LNR units (including public appeals from DNR/LNR units for support), likely~~
~~indicates it is not an isolated issue. Because Russia states it is not at war and its invasion is a “Special Military~~
~~Operation,” contract soldiers can refuse deployment and face only dismissal, not prosecution. This places added~~
~~pressure on the Russian military’s personnel issues. Timofei Rozhanskiy, “Why Russian Soldiers Are Refusing to Fight~~
~~in the War on Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 20, 2022; Pjotr Sauer, “Russian Soldiers Accuse Superiors of Jailing Them for~~
~~Refusing to Fight,” Guardian, August 2, 2022.~~
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~~lack of transparency. Recent events and reports, however, have provided greater visibility into the general~~
~~structure and picture of Russian command.~~
~~In April 2022, reports emerged that General Alexander Dvornikov, head of the Southern Military District, was~~
~~given operational command of Russia’s war to help streamline command and control. However, the extent of his~~
~~direct control and whether he supervised all Russian forces remained unclear. By June, reports emerged that~~
~~General Dvornikov had been removed from command and replaced by General Gennady Zhidko, the then-head~~
~~of the Main Military Political Directorate.~~
~~As of August, four of five Military District commanders, the head of the Airborne forces (VDV), the commander~~
~~of the Black Sea Fleet, and multiple junior commanders had been replaced. Russian forces appear to be organized~~
~~into two “groupings”: the Western and Southern Groupings of Forces. General Sergei Surovikin, commander of~~
~~the Aerospace Forces, reportedly has taken over command of Russia’s Southern Grouping of Forces from General~~
~~Zhidko. Colonel General Aleksander Lapin, head of the Central Military District, now commands the Western~~
~~Grouping of Forces. Overall operation of the war continues to be control ed through the National Defense~~
~~Management Center in Moscow, which appears to have greater oversight and management of the “groupings” of~~
~~Russian forces than in the early stages of the invasion.~~
Sources: Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” ~~New~~
~~York Times, March 31, 2022; Miriam Berger and Bryan Pietsch, “What to Know About Russia’s Top Commander in~~
~~Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 10, 2022; Kyiv Independent, “Conflict Intelligence Team: General Dvornikov~~
~~Dismissed from Leading Russian Troops in Ukraine,” June 3, 2022; Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George~~
~~Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25,” Institute for the Study of War, June 25, 2022; Karolina~~
~~Hird et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2022,” Institute for the Study of War, July 28, 2022;~~
~~Russia Experiments with Command and Control in Ukraine,” Janes IHS, August 2, 2022; UK Defense Intelligence,~~
~~“Intelligence Update, August 7, 2022,” press release, August 7, 2022.~~
~~By early August 2022, as Russian advances stalled, a gradual stalemate and war of attrition began~~
~~to set in. Russia continued some offensive operations (relying on Russian PMC and LNR/DNR~~
~~forces) toward Bakhmut and Avdiivka, as well as the town of Pisky, just outside Avdiivka in the~~
~~Donetsk region.134 The UAF appeared to prepare a shift from defensive to offensive operations.~~
~~Ukraine began carrying out a series of partisan attacks (including assassinations) against officials~~
~~in Russia-occupied regions, Russian government infrastructure, and key air bases and supply~~
~~positions in Crimea.135 These attacks, conducted by Ukrainian Special Forces and local~~
~~supporters, drones, and missile strikes, have destabilized the Russian military’s control over the~~
~~region and forced Russia to devote more forces to counterinsurgency and internal security~~
~~missions.136~~
~~International observers remain concerned by the Russian military’s occupation and management~~
~~of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear plant in Europe.137 Some~~

~~134 Kateryna Stepanenko et al, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2,” Institute for the Study of War,~~
~~August 2, 2022; Susie Blann, “Russian Forces Begin Assault on Two Eastern Ukraine Cities,” AP, August 6, 2022;~~
~~David Axe, “The Russians Want Pisky. The Ukrainians Want Pisky. Neither Army Has Enough Troops For a Quick~~
~~Victory.” Forbes, August 1, 2022.~~
~~135 Marc Santora, “Guerrilla Attacks Signal Rising Resistance to Russian Occupation,” New York Times, June 6, 2022;~~
Kyiv Independent, “Russian Puppet Official in Ukraine’s Kherson Assassinated,” August 7, 2022; Todd Prince, “Long
~~Range Missiles? Special Op? Regardless, Crimean Air Base Blasts Are a ‘Real Quandry’ for Russia,” RFE/RL, August~~
~~12, 2022; and Anastasia Tenisheva, “Assassinations of Russia-Installed Officials on the Rise in Occupied Ukraine,”~~
Moscow Times, September 1, 2022.
~~136 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Liz Sly, and Adela Suliman, “Crimea Airfield Blast War Work of Ukrainian Special Forces,~~
~~Official Says,” Washington Post, August 10, 2022; and Oren Liebermann, “How Ukraine Is Using Resistance Warfare~~
~~Developed by the U.S. to Fight Back Against Russia,” CNN, August 27, 2022; Al-Jazeera, “Ukraine’s Partisans Won’t~~
~~Win War but Can ‘Wreak Havoc,” September 6, 2022.~~
~~137 For more, see CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt~~
~~and Mary Beth D. Nikitin; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Director General Grossi Alarmed by~~
~~Shelling at Ukraine NPP, Says IAEA Mission Vital for Nuclear Safety and Security,” press release, August 6, 2022.~~
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~analysts argue that attacks on nuclear power plants could be considered a “war crime”~~
~~under international law.138 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiated with~~
~~Russia and Ukraine to send an expert mission to ZNPP to “assess the physical damage to the~~
~~ZNPP’s facilities, determine whether the main and back-up safety and security systems were~~
~~functional and evaluate the staff's working conditions,” according to the IAEA. An IAEA~~
~~inspection team visited the plant on September 1; six IAEA inspectors remained on-site for a few~~
~~days. Two of those inspectors reportedly will stay to continue monitoring the plant’s operation as~~
~~a permanent presence.139~~
~~The UAF began preparations for a counteroffensive by conducting strikes across Kherson and~~
~~Crimea to degrade Russian capabilities and hinder the resupply of its forces in Kherson, including~~
~~attacks against key logistics targets and the bridges connecting occupied Kherson with the rest of~~
~~occupied southern Ukraine.140 According to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General~~
~~Mark A. Milley, Ukraine conducted over 400 HIMARS strikes by September 8.141 These strikes~~
~~likely seriously strained Russian logistics and artillery ammunition supply by targeting previously~~
~~unreachable depots.142~~
~~The UAF also deployed high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), used to target radar or~~
~~electronic warfare systems, on its MiG-29 fighters. Russian forces appeared to redeploy from~~
~~Donetsk and Luhansk to southern Ukraine in preparation for a UAF offensive.143 Observers had~~
~~noted reports of Ukrainian preparation for an offensive for months but speculated whether the~~
~~UAF had enough trained personnel and sufficient equipment (such as tanks and armored vehicles~~
~~to rapidly transport infantry) to sustain offensive operations, as well as possible risks of exposing~~
~~other fronts to counterattack from Russian forces by drawing away resources.144 Ukraine likely~~
~~considered the benefits—including deterring a possible Russian referendum and annexation of~~
~~occupied territories, considering winter and potential complications due to European reliance on~~
~~Russian natural gas, and demonstrating to Western allies that continued assistance could shift the~~

~~138 George M. Moore, “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine,”~~
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022.
~~139 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, press conference, September 2, 2022.~~
~~140 Stephen Fidler and Daniel Michaels, “War with Russia Enters New Phase as Ukraine Readies Southern~~
~~Counterblow,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2022; and Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor 22-28 August~~
~~2022,” Rochan Consulting, August 29, 2022.~~
~~141 Reuters, “Ukraine Has Struck More Than 400 Russian Targets with HIMARS - U.S. Top General,” September 8,~~
~~2022.~~
~~142 The Russian military must keep large supplies of ammunition close to the frontlines for resupply due to its heavy~~
~~reliance on massed artillery fires. These supplies present a particularly vulnerable and significant target. Liz Sly, John~~
~~Hudson, and David L. Stern, “Crimea Attacks Point to Ukraine’s Newest Strategy, Official Says,” Washington Post,~~
~~August 18, 2022.~~
~~143 Russia has constructed multiple lines of defense in preparation for a UAF offensive. Including DNR troops, Russia~~
~~has a significant concentration of VDV and Spetsnaz units (however, as demonstrated in the early stages of the~~
~~invasion, they are often insufficiently equipped to defend against a large conventional force), as well as various other~~
~~conventional Russian forces. Isobel Koshiw, “Ukrainian Offensive Forces Russia to Bolster Troops in Occupied~~
~~South,” Guardian, July 31, 2022; Brett Forrest and Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Redeploys Troops in Ukraine as Focus of~~
~~Conflict Turns South,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2022; and Matthew Luxmoore, “Russia Moves to Reinforce Its~~
~~Stalled Assault on Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2022.~~
~~144 Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Shortfalls Create an Opportunity for Ukraine, Western Officials Say,”~~
New York Times, August 4, 2022; Loveday Morris et al., “On the Kherson Front Lines, Little Sign of a Ukrainian
~~Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, August 12, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, Anton Troianovski, and Helen Cooper,~~
~~“Ukraine Weighs a Risky Offensive to Break Out of a Stalemate,” New York Times, August 26, 2022.~~
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~~balance of momentum and allow Ukraine to retake territory and defeat Russia—to outweigh the~~
~~risks.145~~
~~Kherson Region Offensive~~
~~On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a long-awaited offensive into the Kherson region in the~~
~~south, reportedly making some initial advances.146 The extent of UAF success may depend on the~~
~~capability of Russian forces, which have increased in number in recent weeks; sufficient~~
~~equipment for UAF units; and sufficient reserves to replace casualties and exploit~~
~~breakthroughs.147 Some observers and U.S. officials believe the latest offensive may still be part~~
~~of a “shaping” strategy to improve the UAF position for future counteroffensives.148 Some reports~~
~~indicate Ukrainian forces, advised by U.S. officials, determined a smaller offensive would give~~
~~the UAF flexibility to deploy resources to other fronts and conduct multiple counteroffensives~~
~~against exposed Russian lines.149~~
~~By early September 2022, UAF offensives had made small but sustained progress across three~~
~~fronts in Kherson, pushing back some Russian forces.150 UAF forces ran into significant and~~
~~determined opposition, including the heavy use of artillery and air support.151 At the same time,~~
~~the UAF began an offensive on another front, in the northeastern region of Kharkiv. Some~~
~~observers thus speculated the Kherson offensive was intended as a distraction.152 While possible,~~
~~the level and scale of UAF resources suggested the Kherson offensive was not simply a feint.~~
~~Kharkiv Offensive~~
~~In the Kharkiv region, the UAF appeared to exploit a weak point in Russian defenses and~~
~~captured several towns (such as Balakliya) in early September 2022, potentially opening the~~
~~possibility of targeting a key resupply city of Kupyansk. Some initial reports indicated that~~
~~Russian defense was manned by Rosgvardiya troops not trained or equipped for frontline combat~~
~~as well as by lower-quality LNR troops.153 The UAF appeared to consolidate an estimated core of~~

~~145 Christopher Miller and Paul McLeary, “Ukraine Has Telegraphed Its Big Counteroffensive for Months. So Where Is~~
~~It?,” Politico, August 16, 2022; James Marson, Matthew Luxmoore, and Ian Lovett, “Ukraine Tried to Make Southern~~
~~Offensive a Turning Point in War,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2022.~~
~~146 James Marson, “Ukraine Launches Counteroffensive in South, Leading with Artillery Bombardment,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, August 29, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Starts a Push to Recapture Kherson, a Crucial Russian Occupied City,”~~
~~August 29, 2022; and Dan Parsons, “U.S. Says Some Russian Units Are ‘Falling Back’ In Kherson,” The Drive, August~~
~~31, 2022; Thomas Bullock, “Kyiv Begins Offensive in South of Country,” Janes IHS, September 2, 2022.~~
~~147 Matthew Luxmoore, “Ukrainian Soldiers Say They Are Advancing in the South, But at a Cost,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~August 31, 2022.~~
~~148 Jim Sciutto, “Ukrainian Forces Begin ‘Shaping’ Battlefield for Counteroffensive, Senior U.S. Officials Say,” CNN,~~
~~August 29, 2022.~~
~~149 Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. War Gamed with Ukraine Ahead of Counteroffensive and Encouraged~~
~~More Limited Mission,” CNN, September 1, 2022; Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on~~
~~U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.~~
~~150 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Against Fierce Resistance, Ukraine Makes Small Gains in the South,” New York Times,~~
~~September 2, 2022; John Hudson, “Wounded Soldiers Reveal Steep Toll of Kherson Offensive,” Washington Post,~~
~~September 7, 2022.~~
~~151 Andrew E. Kramer, “For Ukraine, the Fight Is Often a Game of Bridges,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.~~
~~152 Isobel Koshiw, Lorenzo Tondo and Artem Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive ‘Was Designed to Trick~~
~~Russia,” Guardian, September 10, 2022.~~
~~153 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, September 6, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 7, 2022.~~
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~~five brigades to launch a counteroffensive.154The UAF benefited from Russia pulling its most~~
~~combat-effective troops south toward Kherson and from apparent Russian intelligence and~~
~~command failures, as Russia failed to detect the UAF buildup and organize a coordinated~~
~~response.155 Spearheaded by tanks, the UAF quickly exploited its breakthrough with high mobile~~
~~units that advanced behind Russian forces, conducting ambushes and cutting off Russian~~
~~reinforcements. By September 8, the UAF had broken through Russian lines and liberated almost~~
~~400 square miles, with Russia appearing unable to coordinate effective resistance or reestablish~~
~~defensive lines despite rushing in reinforcements.156 The UAF also launched offensives south of~~
~~Izyum and Lyman to put pressure on Russian forces, threatening to cut off Russian forces in the~~
~~area.~~
~~By September 10, Russian forces had announced a withdrawal from Izyum, a symbolic statement~~
~~after a near-total rout of Russian forces in the area.157 The collapse of Russian forces meant the~~
~~UAF advanced so quickly that UAF command had trouble keeping track of its units.158 Many~~
~~observers believe the UAF will focus on defending its recaptured territory to prevent becoming~~
~~overextended. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated the offensive had gone “better~~
~~than expected” and that Ukraine’s focus was on consolidating and defending the recaptured~~
~~territory.159 By September 11, Russia announced it had withdrawn all forces west of the Oskil~~
~~River, with Ukraine retaking more than 1,000 square miles of territory and almost all previously~~
~~occupied territory in Kharkiv region.160~~
~~Russian Personnel and Manpower Challenges~~
~~Since the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, analysts have noted that one of the Russian military’s~~
~~greatest weaknesses is its lack of personnel. The Russian military includes two types of enlisted personnel:~~
~~conscripts drafted twice a year and contract (professional) soldiers who volunteer for a fixed term of service.~~
~~Since 2008, Russia has focused with limited success on recruiting contract soldiers, resulting in a mix of conscripts~~
~~and contract soldiers. Russian law prohibits conscripts from combat unless a national emergency and mobilization~~
~~is declared. As a result, contract soldiers are prioritized for combat units (and elite units such as VDV, Spetsnaz,~~
~~and reconnaissance) and to fulfil technical positions requiring higher levels of training and knowledge. Additionally,~~

~~154 President Zelensky praised the 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade, and 92nd Mechanized Brigade in a~~
~~televised speech, but observers noted other units present in the initial offensive. BBC, “Zelensky Hails ‘Good News’ as~~
~~Settlements Recaptured from Russia,” September 7, 2022; Marc Santora, “How Ukraine Gained Momentum Against~~
~~Russia and Took a Critical Hub,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.~~
~~155 John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Gains Momentum with Kharkiv Offensive,” Financial Times,~~
~~September 9, 2022.~~
~~156 Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8,” Institute for the Study of War,~~
~~September 8, 2022; Jack Detsch, “They Are Pushing Everywhere:’ Kyiv Goes on the Offensive,” Foreign Policy,~~
~~September 8, 2022; Isabel Coles, “Ukraine’s Rapid Advance in East Puts Russian Forces on Defensive,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, September 9, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the East,” September 9, 2022.~~
~~157 John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Lightning Ukraine Offensive Pushes Russia Back 70km in a Week,”~~
Financial Times, September 10, 2022; Thomas Grove and Evan Gershkovich, “In Major Advance, Ukraine Drives
~~Russians Out of Key Front-Line Cities,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2022.~~
~~158 Economist, “Is Russia on the Run?,” September 11, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Turning the Tide? Ukraine Stuns Russia~~
~~with Counteroffensive but Can’t Claim Victory Yet,” RFE/RL, September 11, 2022.~~
~~159 Jack Watling, “Ukraine Can Now Exploit Russia’s Confusion, But Must Plan Carefully,” Guardian, September 10,~~
~~2022; John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine’s Reznikov Warns on Russian Counter-attack,”~~ ~~Financial~~
~~Times, September 11, 2022.~~
~~160 James Marson, “Ukraine Claims Fresh Gains Against Russian Forces in Country’s East,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~September 11, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, 5-11 September 2022,” Rochan Consulting,~~
~~September 12, 2022; Illia Ponomarenko, “With Successful Kharkiv Operation, Ukraine Turns the War in Its Favor,”~~
Kyiv Independent, September 13, 2022.
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~~conscripts receive most training in their home units by contract personnel and officers, making contract personnel~~
~~crucial to the overall readiness of the Russian military.~~
~~The Russian military is a tiered readiness force, with personnel levels ranging from 70% to 90% of their authorized~~
~~strength. Additionally, since 2012-2014, Russia has expanded its ground forces structure by creating new units~~
~~without increasing the available personnel. Michael Kofman and Rob Lee note, “Russia regressed to a partial-~~
~~mobilization force, hoping to have the best of both worlds: more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and cost,~~
~~plus the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice.” However, as new units were created, the~~
~~actual staffing level was reduced further due to insufficient personnel. Each Russian brigade or regiment is intended~~
~~to field and deploy two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of 700-900 contract soldiers (a third would consist of~~
~~conscripts), but it became clear that the BTGs varied in staffing levels. Some BTGs deployed with 400-600~~
~~contract personnel. The result was that the Russian military had a relatively limited core of deployable maneuver~~
~~combat formations of contract personnel relative to the total size of the military.~~
~~Heavy Russian casualties have exacerbated the personnel situation. In the initial invasion, Russia mobilized an~~
~~estimated 80% of its deployable units. Since Russia states its war is a “Special Military Operation,” which prohibits~~
~~the use of conscripts, it has limited contract personnel and staffed units available to reinforce, rotate, and replace~~
~~Russian casualties. Force quality has continued to deteriorate as units (especial y elite forces) poach the best~~
~~available officers and men from the lower-tiered units, which in turn do the same to the units below them~~
~~(including pul ing officer cadets from training schools and into command positions). This cycle undermines the~~
~~quality of the unit, as those pul ed up are not of the same quality and do not have sufficient training. As a result,~~
~~Russia has turned to a variety of “shadow mobilization” strategies to recruit and mobilize forces to sustain~~
~~offensive operations. These strategies include the fol owing:~~

~~Pressuring conscripts to sign as contract soldiers~~

~~Offering high salary levels and signing bonuses for new contract soldiers (estimates range from 3-5 times~~
~~the average Russian salary) and on a short-term basis (six months)~~

~~Recruiting at least one volunteer battalion per Russian federal district, with most of these battalions~~
~~reportedly forming the core of the newly established 3rd Army Corps in Mulino, Russia~~

~~Forcing conscription of local residents in DNR/LNR (Since these territories are not Russian territory~~
~~and the inhabitants not Russian citizens, they do not have the protections afforded to Russian conscripts~~
~~and likely are viewed as more expendable by the Russian leadership.)~~

~~Increasing reliance on Private Military Companies (PMCs), including the Wagner Group, to conduct~~
~~offensive operations, especial y in the Donetsk and Luhansk region. (PMCs reportedly have been~~
~~recruiting from Russian prisons in return for a reduced sentence.)~~
~~Most observers believe these strategies are short-term solutions to avoid a politically costly decision to declare~~
~~national mobilization. However, it is unclear how long these solutions wil suffice and to what extent they can~~
~~compensate for casualties among Russia’s professional contract soldiers. Many of these recruitment strategies~~
~~compete over the same recruits, and analysts note these recruitment drives are likely coming up short of~~
~~proposed goals. The strategies are further complicated by retention issues, as many volunteers reach the end of~~
~~their short-term contracts. On August 29, 2022, a Pentagon official stated, “This effort is unlikely to succeed, as~~
~~Russia has historically not met personnel and strength targets.... In fact, if you look at the Russian armed forces,~~
~~prior to the invasion, they may have already been 150,000 personnel short of their mil ion personnel goal.”~~
~~Observers also note these recruitment drives have lifted previous age and health restrictions, likely resulting in~~
~~lower-quality candidates and recruits (in addition to large regional and ethnic disparities among new volunteers).~~
~~Additionally, the extent and level of training for many of these new units is unclear. Since contract soldiers and~~
~~junior officers conduct most training at the unit level, including for new conscripts, casualties to these troops likely~~
~~wil negatively affect the Russian military’s ability to train and prepare incoming conscript cycles and wil undermine~~
~~readiness in the future. However, in the event of a national mobilization, conscripts with the most recent service~~
~~and personnel who served in motor rifle or elite units (VDV, Naval Infantry, Spetsnaz) likely would be among the~~
~~first targeted and thereby have decreased the training requirements before deployment.~~
~~On August 25, 2022, Russian President Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the active military to 1.15~~
~~mil ion, an increase of 137,000. Although the decree by itself does not resolve Russia’s personnel issues and does~~
~~not meaningful y allow for greater recruitment, it likely reflects the Russian government planning for a protracted~~
~~conflict and could provide a legal instrument to coordinate the integration and consolidation of volunteer and~~
~~DNR/LNR units into the Russian military.~~
Sources: Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Planned a Major Military Overhaul. Ukraine Shows the Result,” ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 16, 2022; Dara Massicot, “The Russian Military’s People Problem,” Foreign Affairs, May 18, 2022;~~
Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Il -Fated Force Design,” War on the
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Rocks, June 2, 2022; Neil MacFarquhar, “Desperate for Recruits, Russia Launches a ‘Stealth Mobilization,’” ~~New~~
~~York Times, July 10, 2022; Mike Eckel, “The Orchestra Needs Musicians: Behind the Covert Mobilization to~~
~~Reinforce Russian Troops in Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 14, 2022; Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick~~
~~W. Kagan, “Russian Volunteer Units and Battalions,” Institute for the Study of War, July 16, 2022; Anastasia~~
~~Tenisheva, “Russia Sends Army Recruits to Fight in Ukraine After Just Days of Training,” Moscow Times, July 22,~~
~~2022; Moscow Times, “Russia Regions Form 40 Volunteer Battalions,” August 8, 2022; Economist, “Russia is~~
~~Forcing Ukrainian Conscripts into Battle,” August 11, 2022; Novaya Gazeta, “To War or to Prison?” August 12,~~
~~2022; Mary Ilyushina, “In Ukraine, a Russian Mercenary Group Steps Out of the Shadows,” Washington Post,~~
~~August 18, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Wagner Mercenaries Enter the Spotlight as Russian Troops Struggle in~~
~~Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2022; Olga Ivshina, “Lost Battalions: Calculating Russia’s Casualties in Six~~
~~Months of War in Ukraine,” BBC, August 22, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine and Russia Both Need More Soldiers,”~~
~~August 25, 2022; Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Dwindling Manpower in Ukraine Spurs Recruitment Drive,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, August 26, 2022; Yuliya Talmazan, “Putin Orders Russian Military to Increase Its Forces as Ukraine~~
~~War Passes the Six-Month Mark,” NBC News, August 25, 2022; Department of Defense, “Russian Efforts to Raise~~
~~Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ U.S. Official Says,” press release, August 29, 2022.~~
~~War Crimes~~
~~Numerous countries, the International Criminal Court, the Organization for Security and~~
~~Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), think tanks, and human rights organizations have identified~~
~~instances of potential Russian war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.161 On April 12,~~
~~2022, an OSCE report on possible human rights violations and war crimes in Ukraine found that,~~
~~“while in the circumstances a detailed assessment of most allegations of IHL (International~~
~~Humanitarian Law) violations and war crimes concerning particular incidents has not been~~
~~possible, the Mission found clear patterns of such violations by the Russian forces on most of the~~
~~issues investigated.”162~~
~~Russian forces have been accused of indiscriminate and mass killings, particularly after the~~
~~discovery of mass graves and murdered civilians following the Russian military’s withdrawal~~
~~from the Kyiv suburb of Bucha; rapes; and the forced “filtration” (interrogation and separation) of~~
~~civilians and noncombatants from occupied territories.163 On July 13, 2022, U.S. Secretary of~~
~~State Antony Blinken called on Russia to “halt its systematic filtration operations and forced~~
~~deportations in Russian-controlled and held areas of Ukraine.”164 Observers also have accused~~

~~161 See, for example, Amnesty International, “Russian Military Commits Indiscriminate Attacks During the Invasion of~~
~~Ukraine,” February 25, 2022; International Criminal Court,~~ ~~Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the~~
~~Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation, March 2, 2022;~~
~~Steve Holland, “U.S. Begins Collecting Material For Russia War Crimes Inquiry,” Reuters, March 7, 2022; Human~~
~~Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Russian Assault Kills Fleeing Civilians,” March 8, 2022; Jamie Dettmer, “Judgement Day:~~
~~European Nations Start Probing Alleged Russian War Crimes in Ukraine,” VOA, March 9, 2022; Eliot Higgins, “These~~
~~Are the Cluster Munitions Documented by Ukrainian Civilians,” Bellingcat, March 11, 2022; Valerie Hopkins,~~
~~“Investigators of War Crimes in Ukraine Face Formidable Challenges,” New York Times, July 3, 2022.~~
~~162 OSCE~~~~, Report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes, and Crimes~~
~~Against Humanity Committed in Ukraine Since 24 February 2022, April 12, 2022.~~
~~163 Malachy Browne, David Botti, and Haley Willis, “Satellite Images Show Bodies Lay in Bucha for Weeks, Despite~~
~~Russian Claims,” New York Times, April 4, 2022; Cara Anna, “War Crimes Watch: A Devastating Walk Through~~
~~Bucha’s Horror,” AP, April 10, 2022; Anthony Deutsch, “Ukraine Prepares War Crimes Charges Against Russian~~
~~Military Personnel, Including Pilots,” Reuters, April 26, 2022; Ivana Kottasova and Oleksandra Ochman, “Ukrainians~~
~~Must Endure a Brutal ‘Filtration’ Process to Escape Russian-Held Territory: Here’s What That Means,” CNN, May 23,~~
~~2022; National Intelligence Council, “Russian Forces Conducting Detentions and Forced Deportations Through~~
~~Systematic Filtration Operations,” unclassified press release, June 15, 2022.~~
~~164 U.S. State Department, “Russia’s ‘Filtration’ Operations, Forced Disappearances, and Mass Deportations of~~
~~Ukrainian Citizens,” press release, July 13, 2022.~~
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~~Russia of shelling humanitarian corridors established to allow civilians to flee urban and conflict~~
~~areas and targeting civilian areas.165 Russian authorities continue to deny accusations; Russian~~
~~President Putin honored one unit alleged to have conducted war crimes in Bucha for its actions in~~
~~Ukraine.166~~
~~Outlook~~
~~With the war past its six-month mark, most observers believe there is little likelihood for political~~
~~settlement or cessation of hostilities.167 Few observers expect Russia to agree to a political~~
~~settlement or cease-fire unless it believes it has realized enough territorial gains to achieve its~~
~~revised objectives and present a victorious narrative to domestic audiences.168 Observers continue~~
~~to speculate whether Russia has the military capabilities to achieve a decisive outcome or if the~~
~~UAF can sustain operations through the winter.169 For both sides, observers believe one of the~~
~~most critical issues will be raising, supporting, and deploying limited resources of personnel and~~
~~equipment most effectively.170~~
~~Russia likely believes it retains advantages heading into the winter that will allow it to regain the~~
~~initiative. On September 8, CIA Director William Burns stated, “Putin’s bet right now is that he is~~
~~going to be tougher than the Ukrainians, the Europeans, the Americans.”171 Russia also is betting~~
~~that its economy will weather international sanctions, and that international support for Ukraine~~
~~will dwindle as rising energy costs take hold in Europe.172 It is unclear whether Russia’s recent~~
~~battlefield failures have influenced these views.173~~

~~165 Tim Lister et al., “Civilians Killed as Russian Military Strike Hits Evacuation Route in Kyiv Suburb,” CNN, March~~
~~7, 2022; Amy Cheng, and Annabelle Timsit, “At Least Six Killed in Kharkiv Strikes; Chasiv Yar Death Toll Hits 34,”~~
New York Times, July 12, 2022.
~~166 The U.S. State Department has identified Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division, its subordinate 234th Guards~~
~~Air Assault Regiment, and the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade as involved in possible war crimes in Bucha. U.S.~~
~~State Department, “Targeting Russia’s War Machine, Sanctions Evaders, Military Units Credibly Implicated in Human~~
~~Rights Abuses, and Russian Federation Officials Involved in Suppression of Dissent,” fact sheet, June 28, 2022; See~~
~~also Bryan Pietsch, “Putin Honors Brigade Accused of War Crimes in Bucha,” Washington Post, April 19, 2022; and~~
~~Jade McGlynn, “Russia’s War Crime Denials Are Fuel for More Atrocities,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2022.~~
~~167 Anton Troianovski, Andrew E. Kramer and Steven Erlanger, “Six Months into War, Ukraine and Russia Are Both~~
~~Reshaped,” New York Times, August 24, 2022; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Six Months of War in Ukraine: ‘The Enemy~~
~~Learned Fast,’” Financial Times, August 24, 2022.~~
~~168 Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,”~~
Financial Times, April 24, 2022.
~~169 Lilia Yapparova, “The Fog of War: Military Analyst Rob Lee on Ukraine’s Push to Liberate Kherson and Russia’s~~
~~Manpower Problem,’ Meduza, September 1, 2022; Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Breach: Ukraine’s~~
~~Counter-Offensive Begins,” War on the Rocks, September 2, 2022.~~
~~170 Economist, “Ukraine and Russia Both Need More Soldiers: Who Can Train Them Faster?,” August 25, 2022; Jack~~
~~Watling, “The Ukrainian Offensive Must Come in Stages,” RUSI, September 2, 2022.~~
~~171 Julian E. Barnes, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Looks Like a ‘Failure,’ C.I.A Director Says,” New York Times,~~
~~September 8, 2022.~~
~~172 Liz Alderman, “As Russia Threatens Europe’s Energy, Ukraine Braces for a Hard Winter,” New York Times, August~~
~~2, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “Organized Labour in Neoliberal and Authoritarian Russia,” In Moscow’s Shadows, September~~
~~5, 2022.~~
~~173 The need to replace losses could force Putin to make a decision to declare national mobilization, which he has~~
~~previously resisted. Anton Troianovski, “As Russians Retreat, Putin Is Criticized by Hawks Who Trumpeted His War,”~~
New York Times, September 10, 2022; John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Polina Ivanova, “Russia to Press on
~~‘Until All the Goals’ Achieved in Ukraine, Says Kremlin,” Financial Times, September 12, 2022; Robyn Dixon,~~
~~“Putin, Tone Deaf and Isolated, Pursues War ‘Goals’ and Refuses to Lose,” Washington Post, September 13, 2022.~~
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~~Russia has suffered significant equipment losses, including tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and~~
~~artillery systems.174 These losses have forced Russia to pull older systems out of storage and~~
~~deploy them to the battlefield.175 Additionally, some reports indicate Russia is mobilizing its~~
~~defense industry to retool to produce and repair a variety of modern and older systems, including~~
~~new legislation giving the government “special economic measures” to control and compel the~~
~~work of the defense industry.176 However, even with these measures and considering the losses~~
~~suffered, it will take several months before production can be mobilized to full production~~
~~capacity. Even at full production, it is unclear how long and to what extent Russia can replace~~
~~equipment losses.~~
~~Observers are more skeptical regarding Russia’s ability to procure key components for advanced~~
~~weaponry (including microchips) and if countries (such as China or India) are willing to bear the~~
~~risks to assist Russia in avoiding export controls.177 Captured and destroyed Russian weaponry~~
~~have demonstrated the extent to which Russia has circumvented export controls and sanctions, as~~
~~well as the extent to which it has adapted civilian technology for military use.178 It is unclear if~~
~~Russia has sufficient stockpiles of critical components to continue producing advanced weaponry~~
~~or if its ability to replenish stockpiles is limited.179~~
~~Some have speculated about the potential for Russia to use nuclear, chemical, or biological~~
~~weapons if Russian policymakers perceive inadequate military advances or to demonstrate~~
~~capability. Most analysts, however, believe the likelihood of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons~~
~~remains low. CIA Director Burns said the United States has not “seen a lot of practical evidence~~
~~of the kind of deployments or military dispositions that would reinforce that concern.”180~~
~~For Ukraine, there is optimism, as some observers believe momentum has swung in its favor as~~
~~the UAF retakes territory across the country, and the Russian military continues to retreat.181~~
~~Ukraine’s Commander in Chief Valery Zaluhzny stated on September 7, “for the Armed Forces of~~
~~Ukraine, the situation will be a complex mix of the actual location of the line of contact, the~~
~~available resources, the pool of combat-ready forces, and, obviously, the strategic initiative that~~

~~174 Oryx (blog), “Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” February 24,~~
~~2022; James Beardsworth, “Tank Losses in Ukraine Raise Strategic Questions for Russia,” Moscow Times, July 18,~~
~~2022.~~
~~175 Alberto Nardelli, “Russia Turns to Old Tanks as It Burns Through Weapons in Ukraine,” Bloomberg, June 14, 2022.~~
~~176 Mark Trevelyan, “Russian Parliament Passes First Vote on War Economy Measures,” Reuters, July 5, 2022; Polina~~
~~Ivanova, “Russia Prepares to Mobilize Economy for Longer Way in Ukraine,” Financial Times, July 7, 2022; Mark~~
~~Galeotti, “Russia Is Militarizing Its Economy,” Spectator, July 9, 2022; Sebastien Roblin, “Russia Mulls Restarting~~
~~Production of Older Vehicles to Replace Ukraine Losses,” Forbes, August 31, 2022.~~
~~177 Sidharth Kaushal, “Can Russia Continue to Fight a Long War?,” RUSI, August 23, 2022; John Ismay, “How Russia~~
~~Uses Low Tech in Its High Tech Weapons,” New York Times, September 4, 2022.~~
~~178 James Byrne et al., “Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,” RUSI, August 8,~~
~~2022.~~
~~179 Maria Shagina, “Technology Controls Can Strangle Russia—Just Like the Soviet Union,” Foreign Policy, August~~
~~22, 2022; Zoya Sheftalovitch and Laurens Cerulus, “The Chips Are Down: Putin Scrambles for High-Tech Parts as His~~
~~Arsenal Goes Up in Smoke,” Politico.eu, September 5, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean~~
~~Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” New York Times, September 5, 2022.~~
~~180 Central Intelligence Agency, “Director Burns’ Remarks at Georgia Tech,” press release, April 14, 2022; Kate~~
~~O’Keeffe, “Zelensky Warns That Russia Could Use Nuclear, Chemical Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2022;~~
~~CRS Report R45861, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, by Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~181 Marcus Walker and Gordon Lubold, “After Six Months in Ukraine, Momentum Tilts Against Russia,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, August 23, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Ukraine’s Lightning Counteroffensive Approaches the Russian Border,”~~
Foreign Policy, September 12, 2022.
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~~Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects~~

~~will remain in the enemy’s hands.”182 Despite being underequipped, UAF forces continue to~~
~~demonstrate high levels of operational and tactical flexibility to sustain operations.183~~
~~As the conflict shifts away from the Donbas to southern Ukraine, the UAF likely needs continued~~
~~support to replace lost equipment and support transitioning toward NATO-style weaponry.184~~
~~Ukraine’s recent Kharkiv offensive saw the UAF capture large quantities of Russian weaponry~~
~~and ammunition that can be used to replenish UAF stocks.185 The conflict has consumed~~
~~significant amounts of ammunition, and the UAF likely needs replenishment of ammunition,~~
~~assistance and advice in equipment maintenance and repair, and continued training of personnel.~~
~~Additionally, Ukraine continues to benefit from high levels of volunteers, and foreign support for~~
~~training will likely give Ukraine a personnel advantage as Russia continues to exhibit recruitment~~
~~problems.186~~
~~Congress is poised to continue to track developments in the war in Ukraine closely, especially as~~
~~it considers U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on~~
~~the ground.~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Andrew S. Bowen~~

~~Analyst in Russian and European Affairs~~

~~Disclaimer~~
~~This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan~~
~~shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and~~
~~under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other~~
~~than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in~~
~~connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not~~
~~subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in~~
~~its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or~~
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~~copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.~~

~~182 General Valery Zaluhzny and Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodsky, “Prospects for Running a Military~~
~~Campaign in 2023: Ukraine’ Perspective,” Ukrinform.net, September 7, 2022.~~
~~183 John Hudson, “Ukraine Lures Russian Missiles with Decoys of U.S. Rocket System,” Washington Post, August 30,~~
~~2022; and Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “A Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks~~
~~and Artillery,” New York Times, August 30, 2022.~~
~~184 Such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, medium-range air defenses, and~~
~~mobile artillery. CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S.~~
~~Bowen, and Cory Welt.~~
~~185 Jack Detsch, “Russia Is Supplying Ukraine with Lightly Used Tanks,” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2022.~~
~~186 Jill Lawless, “Urban Combat and Beyond: Ukrainian Recruits Get UK Training,” AP, August 15, 2022; Vivienne~~
~~Machi, “Europeans Mull New Training Mission for Ukrainian Army,” Defense News, August 30, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~R47068 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED~~
27 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects these territories part of Russia, Putin also opened the possibility of deploying conscripts, which are prevented from being forcibly deployed abroad unless a state of war is declared. Russian Personnel and Manpower Challenges In response to heavy casualties and insufficient recruitment from its shadow mobilization strategies, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilization” on September 21 with the initial call-up mobilizing 300,000 personnel. The initial mobilization was marked by confusion and a blanket call-up by local and regional officials to meet quotas, instead of a more targeted mobilization of those with recent military experience or technical skil s. Putin announced an end to mobilization by late October, but never officially signed a decree ending mobilization. In early December, Putin announced that around 80,000 mobilized personnel were to be deployed in combat units, 70,000 to fulfil support and defensive roles, and 150,000 to conduct training in Russia or Belarus. In December 2022, Russia also announced several major structural changes to the armed forces, including an increase in the size of the military to 1.5 mil ion personnel (including 695,000 contract personnel) and the creation of new units. Most analysts agree the only way to achieve this staffing level is through mobilization. Heavy casualties to senior contract soldiers and junior officers continue to hamper the Russian military’s ability to train new personnel, since most training is conducted at the unit level by these personnel. Due to the immediate need for reinforcements to stabilize Russian lines, the Russian military sent many mobilized personnel into the frontlines with minimal training and limited equipment. Despite this, it appears at least a portion of the mobilized personnel are undergoing further training to either form new units or serve as more capable replacements in reconstituted units. Most analysts expect Russia to announce further mobilizations (or the use of conscripts) as it seeks to reconstitute its forces. As noted, however, the military’s ability to integrate and train new personnel is limited, and must be coordinated with the annual conscription intake. Despite the hurdles and chaotic nature of the first round of mobilization, Russia likely has begun a process of creating more orderly structures and processes for future call-ups and is aware of the potential domestic political implications. Observers and Ukrainian officials acknowledge that, despite the losses, the sheer quantity of these reinforcements has been helpful in blunting further Ukrainian offensives. Wagner PMC has also become a largely independent Russian force, conducting offensives and operations under its leader Yevgeny Prighozin, including ongoing efforts to seize the town of Bakhmut and the massed recruitment of prisoners from prisons across Russia. Sources: Department of Defense, “Russian Efforts to Raise Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ U.S. Official Says,” press release, August 29, 2022; President of Russia, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” press release, September 21, 2022; Brad Lendon, “Putin Can Call Up All The Troops He Wants, But Russia Can’t Train or Support Them,” CNN, September 22, 2022; Max Seddon and Christopher Mil er, “Vladimir Putin Signal End of Russia’s Popular Mobilization Drive,” FT, October 14, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Sends Il -Trained Draftees Into Combat Amid Losses, Analysts Say,” New York Times, November 4, 2022; Greg Mil er et al., “Wiped Out’: War in Ukraine Has Decimated a Once Feared Russian Brigade,” Washington Post, December 16, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Russia Proposes Major Military Reorganization, Conscription Changes, Increase In Troop Numbers,” RFE/RL, December 23, 2022; Pavel Luzin, “The Russian Army in 2023,” Riddle, January 18, 2023. October 2022-Early 2023 By early October 2022, the UAF had continued to capitalize on its success and push Russian forces back into Luhansk. The UAF captured the key hub of Lyman, the earlier scene of heavy fighting in May 2022. Russian forces continued to withdraw, leaving significant amounts of military equipment (including tanks and artillery ammunition) that helped propel further UAF offensives.82 82 Since the first arrivals of M777 howitzers in April, the UAF increasingly relied on Western artillery and ammunition as its stockpiles of ammunition for its Soviet and Russian era artillery dwindled to critically low levels. The provision of Western artillery systems, and its precision targeting capability, proved decisive in the UAF’s ability to support offensive operations. For more, see Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukraine’s New Offensive Is Fueled by Captured Russian Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2022; Marcin Piotrowski, Military-Technical Assistance to Ukraine: An Assessment of Its Short and Medium-Term Needs, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, December 2022; Congressional Research Service 16 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects In contrast to the collapse of Russian forces in Kharkiv, the UAF faced stiff and determined resistance in Kherson. As noted above, Russia had moved some of its most capable remaining forces in preparation for an expected UAF offensive in the south. As Ukrainian forces retook some territory in Kherson region, Russian forces withdrew to prepared defensive lines and imposed heavy UAF casualties.83 Western security assistance (such as M777 and HIMARS) again proved crucial by giving the UAF long-range strike capabilities to isolate Russian forces by targeting command and control, logistics, and bridges.84 At the same time, the UAF continued to demonstrate flexibility and innovation by conducting multiple strikes deep in Russia.85 First, apparently modified Ukrainian drones attacked a Russian airbase 170 miles southwest of Moscow, home to Tu-22M bombers used to launch strikes in Ukraine.86 Second, on October 8, Ukraine blew up parts of the Kerch Bridge connecting occupied Crimea and Russia. In response, Russia launched more than 80 missiles and two dozen drones to attack more than 20 Ukrainian cities.87 Ukraine also attacked Russia’s Engels airbase, home to part of its strategic bomber force, twice in December 2022, again demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deep inside Russia.88 By autumn 2022, some battlefield momentum had shifted to Ukraine, and Russia faced the prospect of defeat on multiple fronts. Russian forces suffered from a lack of personnel, dwindling equipment and ammunition stockpiles, and low morale. Criticism of the regime and domestic pressure began to build in response to continued battlefield losses.89 In the wake of these Russian failures, it is possible that Putin began to receive a more accurate understanding of the state of Russian forces and that Russia’s current strategy and conventional forces in Ukraine were insufficient.90 In response, Putin appointed a new commander of the Russian Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin in early October 2022 (see “Russian Command and Control Challenges” text box above). With a reputation for being a competent, if brutal, general, Surovikin’s goal was to stem Russian losses and stabilize the frontline.91 To do so, Surovikin adopted a more defensive strategy. Thousands of mobilized personnel were immediately sent to Egle E. Murauskaite, U.S. Arms Transfers to Ukraine: An Impact Assessment, Asymmetric Threat Analysis Center: University of Maryland, January 2023. 83 Franco Ordonez, “In the Battle for Kherson, Ukrainian Infantry Officers Say Don’t Underestimate Russia,” NPR, October 28, 2022. 84 Jack Detsch, “Russian Army Keeps Collapsing After Falling Back in Kherson,” Foreign Policy, October 4, 2022. 85 There were previously unexplained explosions and reported attacks on military installations but Ukrainian officials refused to comment. 86 Howard Altman and Tyler Rogoway, “Ukrainian Kamikaze Drone Attacks Bomber Base Deep In Russia,” The Drive, October 7, 2022. 87 Meduza, “Putin and Russian Defense Ministry Satisfied with ‘High-Precision’ Missile Strikes on Ukraine’s Civilians,” October 10, 2022; BBC, “Russian Attack on City Claimed by Moscow Kills 13,” October 10, 2022; James Glanz and Marco Hernandez, “How Ukraine Blew Up a Key Russian Bridge,” New York Times, November 17, 2022. 88 Veronika Melkozerova, “Drone Attack Hits Russia’s Engels Airbase for Second Time in a Month,” Politico.eu, December 26, 2022. 89 Economist, “As Ukraine Smashes Through More Russian Lines, Russians Wonder Whom to Blame,” October 3, 2022; Max Seddon, “Kremlin Backers Openly Target Russia’s Generals for Battlefield Setbacks,” FT, October 7, 2022. 90Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “As Russian Losses Mount in Ukraine, Putin Gets More Involved in War Strategy,” New York Times, September 23, 2022; Paul Sonne, “Putin Faces Limits of His Military Power as Ukraine Recaptures Land,” Washington Post, October 5, 2022. 91 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Attack Dog Brings a Terrible Type of Warfare to Ukraine,” Spectator, October 10, 2022. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 21 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects the frontlines, often with limited training and equipment.92 Despite their poor quality, these fresh troops allowed Russia to reinforce its lines, and in some cases even rotate and rest units. The commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, stated bluntly, “Russian mobilization has worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not fight. They will.”93 Figure 3. Ukraine Airfields and Key Infrastructure Sources: Congressional Research Service, Janes IHS. At the same time, and possibly as a result of growing domestic dissent over the conduct of the war, Russia launched a renewed strike campaign targeting key energy infrastructure across Ukraine (see Figure 3). Despite a widespread assessment that Russia’s stockpile of long-range precision munitions is running low, Russia continued to launch such attacks (including heavy missile barrages in November and December 2022).94 Evidence indicates that Russia has been producing new munitions, albeit at a rate likely insufficient to replace lost stockpiles and sustain large-scale attacks. In response, Russia has imported Iranian drones to supplement its precision munition stockpile. The use of cheap, but effective, Iranian drones force Ukrainian air defenses to expend their limited munitions, potentially presenting a choice to Ukraine in the near future of whether to prioritize air defense of critical infrastructure or its frontline forces.95 Additionally, 92 Robyn Dixon and Natalia Abbakumova, “Angry Families Say Russian Conscripts Thrown to Front Line Unprepared,” Washington Post, November 20, 2022. 93 Economist, “An Interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, Head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces,” December 15, 2022. 94 Andrew E. Kramer and Megan Specia, “Death Toll of Russian Strike in Dnipro Rises to 40, Ukraine Says,” New York Times, January 16, 2023. 95 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Russia Trying to Exhaut Ukraine’s Air Defenses, Pentagon Official Says,” Reuters, November 19, 2022; CRS Insight IN12042, Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use in Ukraine, by Andrew S. Congressional Research Service 18 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects wearing down Ukraine’s air defenses would also allow the VKS to operate more freely, in contrast to its current risk averse operations over Ukraine. In November 2022, Russia announced its withdrawal from the city of Kherson to more defensible lines east of the Dnipro. It appears Putin finally relented to withdrawing from Kherson after reportedly refusing the Russian military’s requests for months to retreat from its exposed positions there.96 Russia appeared to be adjusting its military strategy and adapting to UAF tactics, including attempting to disperse logistics and command and control in response to HIMARS and precision artillery fire.97 However, a New Year’s Day strike by the UAF on Russian mobilized troops housed next to ammunition indicates that the Russian military continues to have issues with lower level command and control and professionalization.98 Figure 4. Ukraine Territorial Control Notes: Created by CRS. Lines of territorial control are approximate. With the establishment of more defensible lines and the introduction of new mobilized personnel, Russia was able to stabilize its lines, including blunting further UAF offenses to seize the key cities of Kreminna and Svatove in Luhansk.99 Most fighting has become attritional, with a Bowen, Carla E. Humud, and Clayton Thomas. 96 Mike Eckel, “Bad News Politically, Shrewd Move Militarily? What Russia’s Kherson Retreat Means—And What It Doesn't.” RFE/RL, November 10, 2022. 97 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne, Liz Sly and Kamila Hrabchuk, “Ukraine Confronts Tougher Fight in Push to Extend Battlefield Wins,” Washington Post, November 19, 2022. 98 Victoria Kim, “Russia Says Soldiers’ Cellphone Use Led to the Deadly Makiivka Strike,” New York Times, January 4, 2023. 99 Borys Sachalko, “'We Fight With Our Brains. They Fight With Numbers’: Ukrainian Paratroopers On The Battle For Congressional Research Service 19 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects relatively warm winter limiting the ability of either side to conduct rapid offensive maneuvers due to wet and muddy terrain.100 Russian tactics also have adapted and continue to evolve, with Russian forces conducting probing attacks to identify and fix UAF positions, which are then attacked by smaller, professional units. The Russian military does not appear to be operating BTGs; what professional units remain appear to operate as Company Tactical Groups and are deployed as mobile reserves or strike groups.101 These tactics contrast with Russia’s reliance on massed artillery during its offensives in the Donbas during the summer. Analysts continue to speculate whether the lower level of artillery fire is due to low stockpiles, more focused fighting areas, conservation of ammunition for upcoming offensives, or logistical challenges.102 Battle for Bakhmut The Donetsk city of Bakhmut and its surrounding cities have been the scene of intense fighting since the summer of 2022, and continues to be a focus for Russian forces, specifically the Wagner PMC. Most observers agree that while there is some tactical utility in capturing Bakhmut, its strategic value is questionable. Both sides appear to be focusing on the symbolic importance of the city, with Russia seeking to present its capture as part of its pledge to capture the Donetsk region, and Ukraine seeking to demonstrate its determination to defend all of its territory. Some analysts speculate Russian forces were allowed to withdraw from Kherson in expectation of gains in the Donbas, possibly explaining the focus on Bakhmut. In the struggle for Bakhmut, Wagner and its leader Yevgeny Prighozin have sought to increase their stature by presenting Wagner as a more capable and competent fighting force than the Russian military. Reports indicate that Prighozin views the capture of Bakhmut as a way to increase his standing with the Russian leadership and establish Wagner’s standing as an independent institution within Russia. Wagner has heavily recruited from prisons and these recruits are viewed as expendable. As of early 2023, U.S. officials estimate Wagner commands up to 50,000 personnel, including 40,000 convicts and 10,000 professional mercenaries. Wagner uses these prisoners in massed human wave attacks to identify and wear down UAF positions, despite suffering heavy casualties in the process. While most Russian casualties are prisoners or low quality fighters, the UAF has devoted considerable resources, including some of its most capable units, to defending Bakhmut. Wagner has been able to make small, incremental gains, including seizing most of the town of Soledar (with the support of VDV units and not solely Wagner PMC personnel), and increasingly threatening UAF control of Bakhmut. Observers continue to debate the extent to which fighting in Bakhmut has drained both Russian and UAF resources and potentially affect each sides’ ability to launch offensives in the spring. Sources: Andrew Osborn and Mark Trevelyan, “Russia’s ‘General Armageddon’ Under Pressure to Deliver on Battlefield After Retreat,” Reuters, November 21, 2022; Andrew Osborn and Felix Light, “Russia’s Grim Battle for Bakhmut May Yield Pyrrhic Victory at Best,” Reuters, December 20, 2022; Tim Lister, “As Russia’s Military Stalls, ‘Putin’s Chef’ Serves Up His Wagner Shock Troops to Rescue Ukraine Campaign,” CNN, January 11, 2023; Paul Soone and Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Bloody Bakhmut Siege Poses Risks for Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 15, 2023; Il ia Ponomarenko, “With the Loss of Soledar, Ukrainian Positions in Bakhmut Jeopardized,” Kyiv Independent, January 22, 2023; Felix Light, Filipp Lebedev, and Reade Levinson, “A Russian Graveyard Reveals Wagner’s Prisoner Army,” Reuters, January 26, 2023. After only three months, Surovikin was replaced by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov in early January 2023. The replacement comes despite a widespread assessment that Surovikin The Donbas City of Kreminna,” RFE/RL, December 28, 2022. 100 Konrad Muzyka, “Issue 245, 16 January – 22 January 2023 (Weekly update),” Rochan Consulting, January 23, 2023. 101 Specifically, remaining VDV units appear to be the Russian military’s primary strike group element. Additionally, Russia appears to be relying on dismounted infantry, without tank or armored fighting vehicle support, in contrast to the early phases of the war, possibly as a result from heavy equipment losses, as well as conserving equipment for possible future offensives. 102 Natasha Bertrand, Oren Liebermann, and Alex Marquardt, “Russian Artillery Fire Down Nearly 75%, U.S. Officials Say, In Latest Sign of Struggles for Moscow,” CNN, January 10, 2022. Congressional Research Service 20 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects was amongst Russia’s most capable commander and was largely credited with stabilizing Russian lines in the wake of successful Ukrainian offensives. While the rationale is unclear, some observers speculate that the replacement of Surovikin demonstrates the continued unrealistic battlefield expectations of Russian political decisionmakers, partially due to an apparent disconnect between Russian officers on the ground and the ability to convey accurate and realistic information on the conflict.103 While it is possible Putin is getting more accurate information on the state of the Russian military, Russia’s rhetoric and stated goals indicate there may still be a mismatch between expectations and available resources.104 Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines noted in December 2022, “I do think he [Putin] is becoming more informed of the challenges that the military faces in Russia, but it’s still not clear to us that he has a full picture at this stage of just how challenged they are.”105 Russia also has launched a number of local offensives in the South (around Vuhledar), continued offensives to seize Bakhmut, and a counterattack in the North around Kreminna. Thus far the attacks have failed to push back UAF forces and reports indicate Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties.106 It is unclear whether these offensives are in fact part of the expected round of offensives this spring, and could be an indication of Russia launching its offensives early without sufficient training and resources. Additional Key Issues Among other issues, observers continue to monitor three issue areas for insight into the war. These topics are the state of Russia’s defense industrial base, the role of Belarus, and war crimes. These issues are important variables in the conflict and will continue to influence the trajectory of the war. Russian Defense Industrial Base Since the beginning of the war, Russia has lost or expended a significant amount of equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Not only does Russia need to replace equipment lost in battle, or during retreats such as the route from Kharkiv, it must equip the newly mobilized soldiers and units. As a result, Russia has mobilized its defense industry to a war footing and around the clock production to meet its war needs.107 Putin has made visits to various defense factories, publicly chastised defense industry officials, and appointed former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to a new position of first Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission that 103 Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd, “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, and Morale and the Ukraine War” Marshall Center, November 15, 2022; Francesca Ebel, “Russia’s New Commander Reflects Putin’s Plan to Push for Victory in Ukraine,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022; Mark Galeotti,” Enter Gerasimov,” In Moscow’s Shadows, January 12, 2023. 104 Evan Gershkovich, Thomas Grove, Drew Hinshaw, and Joe Parkinson, “Putin, Isolated and Distrustful, Leans on Handful of Hard-Line Advisers,” Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2022. 105 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Fireside Chat with DNI Haines at the Reagan National Defense Forum,” transcript, December 12, 2022. 106 Steve Hendrix and Serhii Korolchuk, “Attacking Vuhledar, Russia Previews New Push to Seize Southeast Ukraine,” Washington Post, February 4, 2023; Marc Santora, Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Shashank Bengali, “Russia Pays a Bloody Price for Small Gains on Eastern Front,” New York Times, February 7, 2023. 107 Yuliya Chernova and Stephen Fidler, “Putin Grips Economy Tighter to Supply Russian War Machine,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2022; Anton Troianovski, “Putin Admits Shortcomings But Vows ‘No Limits’ to Russia’s War Spending,” New York Times, December 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects oversees the defense industry. Russia also enacted legislation to give the government “special economic measures” to command the defense industry, but recent data indicates Russia is running a large budget deficit to fund the war and defense industry.108 Russia’s defense industry faces issues of production capacity. While its defense industry attempts to maximize output of newer systems, a portion of the defense industry’s capacity is directed to updating, repairing, and modernizing equipment pulled from storage (such as installing reactive armor on older tanks), especially to replace losses and equip newly mobilized personnel.109 Additionally, Russia’s heavy reliance on artillery in the war (often compensating for a lack of personnel prior to mobilization) has likely reduced Russian munitions stockpiles.110 Reporting indicates Russia has been forced to purchase munitions from alternative sources, such as North Korea. Increasing ammunition production capacity is a key focus of Russia’s defense industry, but constraints are likely to continue for the immediate future.111 Due to sanctions and export controls, Russia faces a shortage of critical components for its advanced or modern systems (including helicopters, aircraft, PGMs, guided munitions, and communication equipment).112 Despite limitations, Russia has been able to partially mitigate shortages by turning to a number of strategies, including sanctions evasion, stockpiling critical components prior to the war, and using civilian or lower-quality instead of military-grade components. These strategies allow Russia to continue production, but rates of production are likely insufficient to meet the military’s needs going forward.113 Additionally, the demands for mobilized personnel with technical skills are increasingly at odds with the defense industry’s needs for those same personnel. While technical workers in the defense industry are exempted from mobilization, the competition for skilled recruits could complicate the defense industry’s ability to meet production demands if Russia conducts further rounds of mobilization.114 Belarus Since November 2022, Russian activity in Belarus has increased. Russia reportedly has increased the number of troops in Belarus, with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu making several trips to Belarus and Putin visiting in December 2022, raising concerns over the introduction of 108 Official Russian figures state that its military spending is expected to jump by $71 billion dollars in 2023, even as Russia recorded a budget deficit of $47.3 billion in 2022. Pavel Luzin, “The Skyrocketing Costs for Russia’s War Effort,” Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2023; Samantha Lock, “Putin Scolds Defense Industry Minister in Televised Meeting for ‘Fooling Around,’” Guardian, January 12, 2023; Reuters, “Russia Rainy Day Fund Shrinks by $38 Billion as Government Plugs Deficit,” January 18, 2023. 109 Georgy Aleksandrov, “The Barren Barrels,” Novaya Gazeta.eu, November 2, 2022. 110 Stephen Fidler and Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Munitions Shortages Raise Questions Over How Long It Can Continue Ukraine War,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2022; Hlib Parfonov, “Russia Struggles to Maintain Munition Stocks, “Jamestown Foundation, December 5, 2022. 111 James Beardsworth, “Is Russia Receiving Weapons From North Korea?” Moscow Times, December 18, 2022. 112 Igor Kossov, “How Many Missiles Does Russia Have Left?” Kyiv Independent, January 13, 2023. 113 Steve Stecklow, David Gauthier-Villars, and Maurice Tamman, “The Supply Chain that Keeps Tech Flowing to Russia,” Reuters, December 13, 2022; Shashank Bengali, “Lacking Precision Missiles, Russia is Increasing Its Use of Drones, Ukraine Says,” New York Times, January 4, 2022; Pavel Luzin, “Russia’s Nagging Arms Production Problems,” Jamestown Foundation, January 23, 2023. 114 Polina Ivanova, Max Seddon, and Daria Mosolova, “They Grabbed Whoever They Could’: Putin’s Draft Puts More Strain on Russian Businesses,” FT, November 29, 2022; Ian Talley and Anthony DeBarros, “China Aids Russia’s War in Ukraine, Trade Data Shows,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023. Congressional Research Service 22 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Belarusian troops and a possible renewed offensive from Belarus.115 Most observers, however, believe the likelihood of a renewed invasion from Belarus is low. Belarus has thus far resisted Russian pressure to contribute troops, and Russian forces in Belarus are significantly fewer and lower quality than those forces deployed for the initial Russian invasion.116 However, the Belarusian military is training and equipping mobilized Russian personnel, including from Belarusian ammunition stockpiles. War Crimes Numerous countries, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), think tanks, and human rights organizations have identified instances of potential Russian war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.117 Calls from the international community for tribunals and structures to investigate possible war crimes in Ukraine continue to grow, with both the EU and ICC proposing tribunals.118 Among other crimes, Russian forces have been accused of indiscriminate and mass killings, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence, intentionally targeting civilians, and the forced “filtration” (interrogation and separation) of civilians and noncombatants from occupied territories.119 Evidence continues to mount that at least some of the atrocities are committed under the direction, or knowledge, of Russian commanders and authorities.120 Credible reports also continue to emerge over Russian “filtration camps,” where Ukrainian civilians are interrogated and forcibly removed from their homes.121 On September 7, the U.S. State Department accused Russia of orchestrating filtration operations, stating that “The United States has information that (individuals) from Russia’s presidential administration are overseeing and coordinating filtration operations. We are further aware that the Russian presidential administration officials are providing lists of Ukrainians to be targeted for filtration.”122 Russia continues to launch cruise missiles and other precision guided munitions to strike targets across Ukraine. Russia’s use of these and other missiles has demonstrated a trend of strikes on 115 Anatoly Kurmanaev, Andrew E. Kramer and Michael Levenson, “Putin Visits Belarus, Stirring New Concern on Future of Ukraine War,” New York Times, December 19, 2022. 116 The Belarusian military is generally understood to have minimal offensive capability and suffers from low readiness, with only a few units considered deployable. Ukrainian officials estimate 10,000 Russian troops are currently stationed in Belarus. For more see, Wilk, Russia’s Belarussian Army, 2021; Konrad Muzyka, “The Belarusian Armed Forces: Structures, Capabilities, and Defense Relations with Russia,” ICDS, August 2021; Yevhen Kizilov, “Ukrainian Border Guards Report How Many Russian Troops are Deployed in Belarus,” Ukrainian Pravda, December 28, 2022. 117 See, for example, Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. experts find that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine,” New York Times, September 23, 2022; BBC, “What War Crimes is Russia Accused Of?” November 14, 2022; Patrick Wintour, “Russian War Crimes Draft Resolution Being Circulated at the UN,” Guardian, December 4, 2022. 118 Reuters, “EU Seeks Tribunal To Probe Possible Russian War Crimes in Ukraine,” November 20, 2022. 119 Justin Spike, “Bodies Exhumed From Mass Grave in Ukraine’s Liberated Lyman,” Washington Post, October 11, 2022; Erika Kinetz, “Kill Everyone’: Russian Violence in Ukraine Was Strategic,” AP, October 27, 2022. 120 Yousur Al-Hlou et al., “Caught on Camera, Traced by Phone: The Russian Military Unit That Killed dozens in Bucha,” New York Times, December 23, 2022. 121 National Intelligence Council, “Russian Forces Conducting Detentions and Forced Deportations Through Systematic Filtration Operations,” unclassified press release, June 15, 2022; Marc Santora, “A U.S. Intelligence Report Finds that Russia’s Use of ‘Filtration Centers’ to Detain and Deport Ukrainians Has Intensified,” New York Times, July 25, 2022. 122 U.S. State Department, “Accountability for War Crimes and Other Atrocities in Ukraine: Recent Reporting and the Commitment of Additional Funding,” press release, August 25, 2022; Reuters, “U.S. Demands Russia Halt ‘Filtration’ Operations in Ukraine,” September 7, 2022. Congressional Research Service 23 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects civilian targets and populations and has increased in the wake of Russian battlefield failures.123 Observers also remain concerned by the Russian military’s occupation and supervision of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest nuclear plant in Europe.124 To increase their control over occupied territories, Russian forces allegedly have conducted arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, interrogations, and reprisals against the civilian population. In particular, Russian forces reportedly have conducted intensive operations to repress and eliminate opposition to Russian rule in the areas they occupy.125 Russian officials deny these accusations, alleging that they only target legitimate military targets and that other accusations are “lies.”126 Nevertheless, across recaptured territories in Kharkiv and Kherson, Ukrainian forces have uncovered widespread evidence of torture, abuse, and mass graves.127 Ukrainian officials state they are investigating over 58,000 potential war crimes.128 Observers highlight the potential for further war crimes in the context of denials by Russian officials and an unwillingness to address accusations or alter behavior on the ground. One Russian unit alleged to have participated in war crimes in Bucha was honored by Russian President Vladimir Putin for its actions in Ukraine.129 Outlook As the war in Ukraine reaches the one-year mark in February 2023, analysts and officials believe attrition is the most likely trajectory for the immediate future, albeit with localized offensives and some changes in territorial control by both sides.130 President Putin and Russian officials have increasingly made statements to prepare the Russian population for a long conflict and are mobilizing the Russian economy and society to support the war.131 Ukrainian officials, 123 Human Rights Watch, “Russian Attacks on Energy Grid Threaten Civilians,” December 6, 2022; Isabel Coles and Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Targets Infrastructure Across Ukraine in Latest Barrage,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2022; Hanna Arhirova, “Russian Strike Toll: 45 Dead Civilians, Including Six Children,” AP, January 17, 2023. 124 For more, see CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin; IAEA, “Director General Grossi Alarmed by Shelling at Ukraine NPP, says IAEA Mission Vital for Nuclear Safety and Security,” press release, August 6, 2022. 125 Erika Kinetz, “We Will Find You’: Russian Hunt Down Ukrainians on Lists,” AP, December 21, 2022; Anthony Deutsche, Anna Voitenko, and Olena Harmash, “Scale of Alleged Torture, Detentions by Russian Forces in Kherson Emerges,” Reuters, January 12, 2023. 126 Reuters, “Kremlin Says Ukraine War Crimes Claims Are a Lie,” September 19, 2022. 127 Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine Exhumes Mass Burial Site in City Retaken From Russians,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2022; Lori Hinnant, Evgeniy Maloletka, and Vasilisa Stepanenko, “10 Torture Sites in One Town: Russia Sowed Pain, Fear in Izium,” AP, October 2, 2022; Carlotta Gall, “‘It Was Horror’: Ukrainians Share Grim Tales of Russian Occupation,” New York Times, October 20, 2022. 128 Michael Biesecker and Erika Kinetz, “Evidence of Russian Crimes Mounts as War in Ukraine Drags On,” AP, December 20, 2022. 129 The U.S. State Department has identified Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division, its subordinate 234th Guards Air Assault Regiment, and the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade as involved in possible war crimes in Bucha. U.S. State Department, “Targeting Russia’s War Machine, Sanctions Evaders, Military Units Credibly Implicated in Human Rights Abuses, and Russian Federation Officials Involved in Suppression of Dissent,” fact sheet, June 28, 2022. 130 John Hudson, “CIA Director Holds Secret Meeting With Zelensky on Russia’s Next Steps,” Washington Post, January 19, 2023; Department of Defense, “Senior Military Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, January 23, 2023; Jen Kirby, “One Year In, Both Ukraine and Russia Still Think They Can Win,” Vox, January 25, 2023; Mike Eckel, “Russia’s New Offensive Grinds Into Action As Ukraine Punches Back Hard,” RFE/RL, February 11, 2023. 131 Ivo H. Daadler and James Goldgeier, “The Long War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, January 9, 2023; Michael Congressional Research Service 24 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects meanwhile, remain committed to recapturing all territory occupied by Russian forces. Nevertheless, observers debate the likelihood of a complete military victory for either side. During a January 2023 press conference, Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General Milley stated, “So from a military standpoint, I still maintain that for this year it would be very, very difficult to militarily eject the Russian forces.... That doesn't mean it can’t happen; doesn’t mean it won’t happen, but it’d be very, very difficult.”132 As of early 2023, both sides have been attempting to reconstitute their forces for expected upcoming offensives in the spring.133 Russian casualties have exacerbated previously existing personnel issues. A significant portion of Russia’s casualties have been the core of its professional military, including its contract soldiers, elite units (VDV, Naval Infantry, Spetsnaz), and junior officers. Additionally, Russia lost a significant portion of its remaining professional units in offensives in the Donbas during summer and early fall.134 As a result, Russia has struggled to replace losses, reconstitute, and rotate units, leading to a significant reduction in force quality.135 While observers note that mobilization has ameliorated Russia’s lack of personnel, speculation persists about the quality of troops Russia will be able to reconstitute to conduct offensives. Ukrainian officials also state they expect Russia to conduct further rounds of mobilization.136 Despite the poor performance of the Russian military, it continues to learn and adapt to conditions, although constrained by the political environment, and is preparing for a long conflict. Ukraine also is focusing on creating, equipping, and training new units for offensive operations after suffering heavy casualties last summer and in the ongoing battle for Bakhmut. This effort includes units, such as the new 47th Separate Assault Brigade, which likely will be used as strike formations to break Russian defenses.137 The UAF continues to implement reforms to overcome its Soviet-era legacy, but officials stress the UAF likely needs to adapt away from attritional tactics and toward greater maneuverability in its operations.138 The U.S. supports UAF development through training on systems (such as Bradley and Stryker infantry and armored Kimmage and Maria Lipman, “Wartime Putinism,” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2023. 132 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and General Mark A. Milley Press Conference Following Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting, Ramstein Air Base, Germany,” press release, January 20, 2023. 133 Karen DeYoung, Dan Lamothe, and Loveday Morris, “Inside the Urgent Push to Arm Ukraine for a Spring Offensive,” Washington Post, January 19, 2023; James Waterhouse, “Bakhmut, Kyiv, and the Other Key Ukrainian Cities and Towns in Russia’s Sights,” BBC, February 6, 2023. 134 Robe Lee and Michael Kofman, “How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success,” FPRI, December 23, 2022. 135 Emblematic of this was the reported heavy losses sustained by the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade during an offensive to seize Pavlivka. Not only did the Brigade suffer catastrophic losses, many of the replacements and reinforcements were mobilized soldiers without the level of training or equipment standard for the elite Naval Infantry. The 155th also has reportedly suffered significant casualties in Russia’s latest offensive in the same areas. Neil MacFarquhar, “Counting Russia’s War Dead, with Tips, Clips, and a Giant Spreadsheet,” New York Times, December 18, 2022; Ian Lovett and Georgi Kantchev, “Russia Claims Advances, Strengthens Southern Front,” Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2023. 136 Matthew Luxmoore and Evan Gershkovich, “Ukraine Says Russia Is Delaying New Mobilization Amid Stepped-Up Offensive,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2023. 137 As well as new units under the Ministry of the Interior (including National Guard, Border Guard, and National Police) of all volunteer brigades called the “Offensive Guard.” Ukrinform, “New Units Created in Armed Forces of Ukraine to Be Equipped with New Western Equipment,” January 23, 2023; Tim Lister, Fred Pleitgen, and Matthias Somm, “As a Russian Offensive Looms, Ukraine Races to Train Military on New Western Weapons,” CNN, January 23, 2023. 138 Natasha Bertrand, Alex Marquardt, and Katie Bo Lillis, “The U.S. and Its Allies Want Ukraine to Change Its Battlefield Tactics in the Spring,” CNN, January 24, 2023. Congressional Research Service 25 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects fighting vehicles) and collective training of UAF units. The U.S. conducts collective training of the UAF at the battalion level on Western style tactics, emphasizing maneuver and combined arms operations. Additionally, the U.S. trains UAF brigade level leadership to coordinate, integrate, and sustain combined arms operations. This outlook underpins the recent heavy emphasis by Kyiv to secure additional Western equipment such as tanks and armored personnel carriers to support offensive operations. The new supplies of U.S. and Western tanks and armored fighting vehicles are intended to provide improved fire capability and protection, including from all but the latest Russian anti-tank guided missiles. Instead of dispersing systems, the United States is training individual UAF units on the operation and sustainment of specific systems, reflecting their demanding requirements for operation and maintenance. Observers remain concerned over the ability of the UAF to maintain and support the various equipment variants it is receiving, each with different maintenance, ammunition, and training requirements.139 Another crucial factor that will likely influence the outcome of any future offensives is the availability of artillery ammunition. Both sides appear to be using less artillery compared to last summer, possibly indicating either low stockpiles or the conservation of ammunition. Without sufficient artillery support, it may be unlikely either side can conduct successful operations outside of limited tactical offensives (for Russian ammunition issues see “Russian Defense Industry Production” above).140 Western artillery and its increase in precision targeting were crucial for the UAF’s earlier battlefield successes, especially due to increased precision.141 However, as many as a third of the UAF’s Western supplied howitzers are out of action at any one time due to losses or repairs from heavy use.142 With limited ammunition available for its Soviet-era artillery, the UAF is largely reliant on continued supplies of Western artillery and ammunition.143 In addition, air defense systems and ammunition remains a key ongoing need for the UAF, both at the frontlines and for protecting critical infrastructure. Some have speculated about the potential for Russia to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons if Russian policymakers perceive inadequate military advances or to demonstrate capability. Most analysts, however, believe the likelihood of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons remains low. Nevertheless, in November 2022 CIA Director Burns reportedly conveyed warnings to senior Russian officials over the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.144 139 Loveday Morris et al., “Ukraine Faces Logistics Hurdles Ahead of Tank Deliveries,” Washington Post, January 26, 2023; CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt. 140 Illia Ponomarenko, “As Battle of Bakhmut Nears Culmination, Ukraine’s Artillery Gasps For More Ammo,” Kyiv Independent, January 5, 2023; Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023. 141 Andrew E. Kramer, “With Western Weapons, Ukraine Is Turning the Tables in an Artillery War,” New York Times, November 1, 2022. 142 John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Artillery Is Breaking in Ukraine. It’s Becoming a Problem for the Pentagon,” New York Times, November 25, 2022. 143 Due to the vast quantities of shells used by the UAF, the Pentagon recently announced it will dramatically increase its production of 155mm artillery shells. John Ismay and Eric Lipton, “Pentagon Will Increase Artillery Production Sixfold for Ukraine,” New York Times, January 24, 2023. 144 Felicia Schwartz and Max Seddon, “CIA Director Warns Russia Against Use of Nuclear Weapons,” FT, November 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 26 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Issues for Congress Congress continues to track developments in the war in Ukraine closely, especially as it considers U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground. Intensive interest and activity in the 117th Congress may be expected to carry over into the 118th Congress, especially with no end in sight to the war. Since 2014, Congress has supported Ukraine’s efforts to protect its territorial integrity, and since FY2016 to include “lethal weapons of a defensive nature” and (since FY2019) “lethal assistance.” For FY2022 and FY2023, Congress provided $48.7 billion in supplemental appropriations in security assistance, of which the Biden Administration has committed more than $29.3 billion since the start of the 2022 war.145 In addition to providing further funds to support the UAF and Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity, Congress remains interested in ensuring proper oversight and accountability of security and assistance. Section 1247 of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act supports the interagency Ukraine Oversight Working Group and a whole of government approach to “advance accountability and end-use monitoring of weapons provided in response to the Ukraine crisis” as well as regular briefings and reports to Congress on such efforts (Section 1247, H.R. 7776). Congress also remains interested in supporting the investigation, documentation, and prosecution of Russian war crimes. Congress passed the Ukraine Invasion War Crimes Deterrence and Accountability Act (Section 5948, H.R. 7776) which highlights Russia’s deliberate war crimes and supports efforts to document and identify those crimes and perpetrators. Congress remains concerned regarding malign Russian actors, specifically Russian PMCs such as the Wagner Group. Section 1243 of the FY2023 NDAA requires the Administration to report on the activities and dangers posed by Russian private military companies as well as the sanctions that exist to impede their activities (Section 1243, H.R. 7776). In December 2022, the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act (HARM Act) was introduced in the House and Senate to designate the Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (H.R. 9381, S. 5164). The Biden Administration designated the Wagner Group a Transnational Criminal Organization in January 2023.146 Subsequently, the HARM Act was reintroduced in both the House and Senate in 2023. Author Information Andrew S. Bowen Analyst in Russian and European Affairs 145 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt and CRS Report R47275, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief, by Emily M. McCabe. 146 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” press release, January 26, 2023. Congressional Research Service 27 Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Congressional Research Service R47068 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED 28