The American Innovation and Choice Online
August 30December 2, 2022 , 2022
Act
Jay B. Sykes
The competitive practices of large technology companies have attracted considerable
The competitive practices of large technology companies have attracted considerable
Legislative Attorney
Legislative Attorney
congressional attention in recent years. In October 2020, a House subcommittee concluded a
congressional attention in recent years. In October 2020, a House subcommittee concluded a
16-month investigation into the market power of four of the largest platform operators:
16-month investigation into the market power of four of the largest platform operators:
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple. The inquiry culminated in a 450-page report Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple. The inquiry culminated in a 450-page report
recommending a range of measures to address the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of these
recommending a range of measures to address the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of these
“Big Tech” firms. “Big Tech” firms.
While the subcommittee’s report prompted a range of proposals, attention has turned to bills targeting discriminatory conduct
While the subcommittee’s report prompted a range of proposals, attention has turned to bills targeting discriminatory conduct
by the tech giants. The relevant legislation—the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA)—would prohibit Big by the tech giants. The relevant legislation—the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA)—would prohibit Big
Tech platforms from favoring their own products and services in various ways.Tech platforms from favoring their own products and services in various ways.
There are different versions of the legislation. During the first session of the 117th Congress, the House Judiciary Committee
There are different versions of the legislation. During the first session of the 117th Congress, the House Judiciary Committee
ordered a version of the AICOA to be reported to the full House. Bills embodying the legislation are also under active Senate ordered a version of the AICOA to be reported to the full House. Bills embodying the legislation are also under active Senate
consideration in the second session. In January 2022, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 2992, which it reported to consideration in the second session. In January 2022, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 2992, which it reported to
the full Senate in March. Senator Amy Klobuchar—S. 2992’s sponsor—later released a different version of the AICOA on the full Senate in March. Senator Amy Klobuchar—S. 2992’s sponsor—later released a different version of the AICOA on
May 25, 2022. The May 25 draft indicates that Senator Klobuchar intends to introduce it as an amendment in the nature of a May 25, 2022. The May 25 draft indicates that Senator Klobuchar intends to introduce it as an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, if the Senate takes up the bill. This report provides an overview of the versions of the AICOAsubstitute, if the Senate takes up the bill. This report provides an overview of the versions of the AICOA
pending in the pending in the
Senate, while noting certain key differences between versions of the bill pending in the House and Senate. Senate, while noting certain key differences between versions of the bill pending in the House and Senate.
S. 2992 would apply special rules to “covered platforms.” Under the May 25 draft, covered platforms would include online
S. 2992 would apply special rules to “covered platforms.” Under the May 25 draft, covered platforms would include online
platforms that exceed certain thresholds for U.S.-based active users; exceed certain thresholds for annual sales, market platforms that exceed certain thresholds for U.S.-based active users; exceed certain thresholds for annual sales, market
capitalization, or worldwide active users; and occupy positions as “critical trading partners.” capitalization, or worldwide active users; and occupy positions as “critical trading partners.”
The legislation would prohibit operators of covered platforms from engaging in 10 categories of conduct. Three of the
The legislation would prohibit operators of covered platforms from engaging in 10 categories of conduct. Three of the
offenses would require regulators to establish that a platform operator’s conduct resulted in material harm to competition. Inoffenses would require regulators to establish that a platform operator’s conduct resulted in material harm to competition. In
particular, the legislation would bar operators of covered platforms from: particular, the legislation would bar operators of covered platforms from:
Preferencing their own products or services over those of other business users of their platforms in a
Preferencing their own products or services over those of other business users of their platforms in a
manner that would “materially harm competition”;
manner that would “materially harm competition”;
Limiting the ability of business users to compete with the operators’ own offerings in a manner that would
Limiting the ability of business users to compete with the operators’ own offerings in a manner that would
“materially harm competition”; and
“materially harm competition”; and
Discriminating in the application of their terms of service among similarly situated business users in a
Discriminating in the application of their terms of service among similarly situated business users in a
manner that would “materially harm competition.”
manner that would “materially harm competition.”
The remaining seven offenses involve a variety of other issues, including platform interoperability, use of user data, and
The remaining seven offenses involve a variety of other issues, including platform interoperability, use of user data, and
restrictions on the uninstallation of software applications. These offenses would not require regulators to prove competitive restrictions on the uninstallation of software applications. These offenses would not require regulators to prove competitive
harm, but defendants would be allowed to rebut a harm, but defendants would be allowed to rebut a
prima facie case by establishing an case by establishing an
absence of such harm. of such harm.
The legislation would also offer defendants several other affirmative defenses involving user privacy, data security, and
The legislation would also offer defendants several other affirmative defenses involving user privacy, data security, and
platform functionality. Enforcement authority would rest with the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and platform functionality. Enforcement authority would rest with the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and
state attorneys general. state attorneys general.
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2126 The American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2992)
Contents
Covered Platforms ........................................................................................................................... 2
Unlawful Conduct ............ 2 Unlawful Conduct ............................................................................................................... 6
Sections 3(a)(1)-(3): Self-Preferencing, Limitations on Business Users, and
Discrimination That Would “MateriallyMaterial y Harm Competition” ................................................ 6 7
Self-Preferencing ................................................................................................................ 7 8
Material Harm to Competition ............................................................................................ 8
Content Moderation ............. 9 Content Moderation ............................................................................................... 9 13
Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(7): Interoperability and Access to Data .......................................... 10 14
Section 3(a)(5): Tying .............................................................................................................. 11 16
Section 3(a)(6): Use of Data ................................................................................................... 13 17
Section 3(a)(8): App PreinstallationPreinstal ation and Steering ................................................................... 14 19
Section 3(a)(9): Self-Preferencing (Again) .................................Involving Platform Interfaces............................................ 14
19
Section 3(a)(10): Retaliation for Reports to Law Enforcement .............................................. 15 19
Affirmative Defenses ..................................................................................................................... 15
Enforcement .. 20 Enforcement................................................................................................................................ 17
Conclusion .. 21 Conclusion................................................................................................................................... 18 22
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 18 23
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The American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2992)
he competitive practices of large technology platforms have attracted considerable
he competitive practices of large technology platforms have attracted considerable
congressional attention in recent years. In October 2020, a House subcommittee concluded congressional attention in recent years. In October 2020, a House subcommittee concluded
T a 16-month investigation into the market power of four of the largest platform operators:
T a 16-month investigation into the market power of four of the largest platform operators:
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple. The inquiry culminated in a 450-page report
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple. The inquiry culminated in a 450-page report
recommending a range of measures to address the recommending a range of measures to address the
allegedlyal egedly anticompetitive conduct of these anticompetitive conduct of these
“Big Tech” firms.1“Big Tech” firms.1
The subcommittee’s report prompted a flurry of legislative activity.2 The 117th Congress has
The subcommittee’s report prompted a flurry of legislative activity.2 The 117th Congress has
featured featured
billsbil s that would impose vertical separation requirements,3 acquisition restrictions,4 that would impose vertical separation requirements,3 acquisition restrictions,4
interoperability and data-portability mandates,5 and a specialist regulator6 on Big Tech. interoperability and data-portability mandates,5 and a specialist regulator6 on Big Tech.
While these proposals cover a diverse range of topics, attention has turned to
While these proposals cover a diverse range of topics, attention has turned to
billsbil s targeting targeting
discriminatory conduct by the tech giants.7 The relevant legislation—the American Innovation discriminatory conduct by the tech giants.7 The relevant legislation—the American Innovation
and Choice Online Act (AICOA)—would prohibit Big Tech platforms from favoring their own and Choice Online Act (AICOA)—would prohibit Big Tech platforms from favoring their own
products and services in various ways.8 The prohibitions would move significantly beyond products and services in various ways.8 The prohibitions would move significantly beyond
existing antitrust doctrine and could have important ramifications for the shape of the digital existing antitrust doctrine and could have important ramifications for the shape of the digital
economy.9 economy.9
There are different versions of the legislation. During the first session of the 117th Congress, the
There are different versions of the legislation. During the first session of the 117th Congress, the
House Judiciary Committee ordered a version of the AICOA—H.R. 3816—to be reported to the House Judiciary Committee ordered a version of the AICOA—H.R. 3816—to be reported to the
full House.10 full House.10
Bills Bil s embodying the legislation are also under active consideration in the Senate in embodying the legislation are also under active consideration in the Senate in
the second session. In January 2022, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 2992, which it the second session. In January 2022, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 2992, which it
reported to the full Senate in March.11 Senator Amy Klobuchar—S. 2992’s sponsor—later reported to the full Senate in March.11 Senator Amy Klobuchar—S. 2992’s sponsor—later
1 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, SUBCOMM. 1 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, SUBCOMM.
ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG. (2020). This report ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG. (2020). This report
lists the Big Techlist s t he Big T ech firms in the same order as firms in the same order as
the subcommittee’s report. Since the publication of the subcommittee’s report, the subcommittee’s report. Since the publication of the subcommittee’s report,
Facebook has changedFacebook has changed
its name to Meta Platforms, Inc. its name to Meta Platforms, Inc.
2
2
See CRS CRS
Report R46875, Report R46875,
The Big Tech Antitrust Bills, by Jay B. Sykes. , by Jay B. Sykes.
3 H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. (2021). 3 H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. (2021).
4 S.4 S.
3197, 117th Cong. (2021); H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021). 3197, 117th Cong. (2021); H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021).
5 H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. (2021). 5 H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. (2021).
6 S.6 S.
4201, 117th Cong. (2022); H.R. 7858, 117th Cong. (2022). 4201, 117th Cong. (2022); H.R. 7858, 117th Cong. (2022).
7 7
See, e.g., Lauren Feiner, , Lauren Feiner,
Lawmakers Are Racing to Pass Tech Antitrust Reforms Before Midterms, CNBC, CNBC
(June 4, (June 4,
2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/04/lawmakers-racing-to-pass-tech-antitrust-tech-reforms-before-midterms.html. 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/04/lawmakers-racing-to-pass-tech-antitrust-tech-reforms-before-midterms.html.
While “discrimination” can be a value-laden term, this report uses that language in a purely descriptive senseWhile “discrimination” can be a value-laden term, this report uses that language in a purely descriptive sense
to refer to to refer to
conduct by a vertically integrated firm that preferences the firm’s own offerings over those of its rivals. conduct by a vertically integrated firm that preferences the firm’s own offerings over those of its rivals.
ThatT hat conduct is conduct is
“discriminatory” in this sense does“discriminatory” in this sense does
not necessarily entail any conclusions about its competitive effects. not necessarily entail any conclusions about its competitive effects.
See Erik Erik
Hovenkamp, Hovenkamp,
The Antitrust Duty to Deal in the Age of Big Tech , 131 YALE L.J. 1483, 1544 n.290 (2022) (collecting , 131 YALE L.J. 1483, 1544 n.290 (2022) (collecting
academic literature debating the circumstances in which platform academic literature debating the circumstances in which platform
discriminationdiscrimin ation is anticompetitive); is anticompetitive);
cf. HERBERT . HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 621-28 (2011) (discussing the HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 621-28 (2011) (discussing the
varied output effects of different types of price discrimination). varied output effects of different types of price discrimination).
8
8
See Brendan Bordelon & Josh Sisco,Brendan Bordelon & Josh Sisco,
Schumer’s Office Says He Plans to Hold Vote on Tech Antitrust Bill, POLITICO , POLITICO
(Aug.(Aug.
4, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/04/schumer-tech-antitrust4, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/04/schumer-tech-antitrust
-bill-00049890. -bill-00049890.
9
9
See, e.g., Letter from Fiona M. Scott Morton, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar & Sen., Letter from Fiona M. Scott Morton, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar & Sen.
Charles GrassleyCharles Grassley
5 (July 7, 2022),5 (July 7, 2022),
https://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2022-07/AICOA-Final-revised.pdf (supporting the AICOA on the grounds that it https://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2022-07/AICOA-Final-revised.pdf (supporting the AICOA on the grounds that it
“significantly strengthens” the antitrust laws vis-à-vis Big“significantly strengthens” the antitrust laws vis-à-vis Big
Tech T ech platforms); Ryan Bourne & Brad Subramaniam, platforms); Ryan Bourne & Brad Subramaniam,
The
“Big Tech” Self-Preferencing Delusion, CATO INST. 2 (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-, CATO INST. 2 (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-
02/briefing-paper-136.pdf (opposing the AICOA and arguing02/briefing-paper-136.pdf (opposing the AICOA and arguing
that it wouldthat it would
“ “fundamentally alter business conduct on fundamentally alter business conduct on
covered platforms”).covered platforms”).
10 H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021). 10 H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021).
11 S.11 S.
2992, 117th Cong. (2022) (reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute) [hereinafter “Reported 2992, 117th Cong. (2022) (reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute) [hereinafter “Reported
Version”]. Version”].
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2024 The American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2992)
released a different version of the AICOA
released a different version of the AICOA
on May 25, 2022.12 The May 25 draft indicates that on May 25, 2022.12 The May 25 draft indicates that
Senator Klobuchar intends to introduce it as an amendment in the nature of a substitute if the Senator Klobuchar intends to introduce it as an amendment in the nature of a substitute if the
Senate takes up the Senate takes up the
billbil . .
This report provides an overview of versions of the AICOA pending in the Senate. The report’s
This report provides an overview of versions of the AICOA pending in the Senate. The report’s
discussion applies to both the reported version of S. 2992 and Senator Klobuchar’s draft discussion applies to both the reported version of S. 2992 and Senator Klobuchar’s draft
amendment, unless amendment, unless
specificallyspecifical y noted. While the report focuses on versions of the legislation noted. While the report focuses on versions of the legislation
pending in the Senate, it contains several textboxes highlighting key differences between S. 2992 pending in the Senate, it contains several textboxes highlighting key differences between S. 2992
and H.R. 3816. and H.R. 3816.
Covered Platforms
The AICOA would apply special rules to “covered platforms.” The May 25 draft defines that term The AICOA would apply special rules to “covered platforms.” The May 25 draft defines that term
to mean “online platforms”13 that exceed certain thresholds for U.S.-based active users; exceed to mean “online platforms”13 that exceed certain thresholds for U.S.-based active users; exceed
certain thresholds for annual sales, market capitalization, or worldwide active users; and occupy certain thresholds for annual sales, market capitalization, or worldwide active users; and occupy
positions as “critical trading partners.”14positions as “critical trading partners.”14
The
The
bill bil would authorize the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would authorize the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
to jointly designate firms that meet these criteria as covered platforms.15 However, the legislation to jointly designate firms that meet these criteria as covered platforms.15 However, the legislation
does not limit its prohibitions to entities that have been does not limit its prohibitions to entities that have been
formallyformal y designated. Rather, the designated. Rather, the
bill bil appears to contemplate the possibility that regulators appears to contemplate the possibility that regulators
will wil enforce its prohibitions against enforce its prohibitions against
non-designated entities that nevertheless qualify as covered platforms.16 non-designated entities that nevertheless qualify as covered platforms.16
Under the May 25 draft, the term “covered platform” would mean an online platform that:Under the May 25 draft, the term “covered platform” would mean an online platform that:
12 The
12 T he May 25 version of the legislation is available May 25 version of the legislation is available
at at
https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/b/9/b90b9806-cecf-4796-89fb-561e5322531c/https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/b/9/b90b9806-cecf-4796-89fb-561e5322531c/
B1F51354E81BEFF3EB96956A7A5E1D6A.sil22713.pdfB1F51354E81BEFF3EB96956A7A5E1D6A.sil22713.pdf
[hereinafter “May 25 Draft”].[hereinafter “May 25 Draft”].
13 The 13 T he May 25 version of the bill contains a definition of the term “online platform” that appears intended to exclude May 25 version of the bill contains a definition of the term “online platform” that appears intended to exclude
financial-services and telecommunications companies from the legislation’s scope. financial-services and telecommunications companies from the legislation’s scope.
See May 25 Draft May 25 Draft
§ 2(a)(9) (2022). § 2(a)(9) (2022).
TheT he bill defines the term “online platform” to mean a website, online or mobile application, operating system, digital bill defines the term “online platform” to mean a website, online or mobile application, operating system, digital
assistant, or online service that “enables”: assistant, or online service that “enables”:
A user to generate or share content that can be viewed
A user to generate or share content that can be viewed
by by other users or to interact with other content on the other users or to interact with other content on the
platform; platform;
TheT he offering, advertising, sale, purchase, or shipping of products or services between offering, advertising, sale, purchase, or shipping of products or services between
and among consumers and among consumers
or businessesor businesses
not controlled by the platform operator; or not controlled by the platform operator; or
User searches or queries
User searches or queries
that access or display a volume of information. that access or display a volume of information.
Id. § 2(a)(9)(A). . § 2(a)(9)(A).
TheT he definition explicitly excludes services that provide the capability to transmit data to and receive definition explicitly excludes services that provide the capability to transmit data to and receive
data from “all or substantially all internet endpoints” by wire or radio. data from “all or substantially all internet endpoints” by wire or radio.
Id. § 2(a)(9)(B). In contrast, the reported version . § 2(a)(9)(B). In contrast, the reported version
of the billof the bill
would would define the term “define the term “
online platform” to include websites,online platform” to include websites,
online or mobile applications, operating online or mobile applications, operating
systems, digitalsystems, digital
assistants, or online services that “assistants, or online services that “
facilitate[] the offering, advertising, sale, purchase, [] the offering, advertising, sale, purchase,
payment, or , or
shipping of products or services, includingshipping of products or services, including
software applications, between andsoftware applications, between and
among consumers or businessesamong consumers or businesses
not not
controlled by the platform operator.” S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(9)(B) (Reported Version) (emphasis added).controlled by the platform operator.” S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(9)(B) (Reported Version) (emphasis added).
Unlike Unlike
the May 25 draft, the reported version of the bill wouldthe May 25 draft, the reported version of the bill would
not specifically excludenot specifically exclude
telecommunications companies. telecommunications companies.
14 May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B). 14 May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B).
15 S.15 S.
2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d). For additional discussion2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d). For additional discussion
of the designation of the designation
process and other issues related to the bill’s enforcement, seeprocess and other issues related to the bill’s enforcement, see
“Enforcement “ Enforcement” infra. .
16 16
See, e.g., S., S.
2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I) (Reported Version) (defining a “covered platform” to include 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I) (Reported Version) (defining a “covered platform” to include
certain firms with large numberscertain firms with large numbers
of U.S.-basedof U.S.-based
active usersactive users
“ “during the 12 months preceding a designation . . . during the 12 months preceding a designation . . .
or the the
12 months preceding the filing of a complaint for an alleged violation of this Act”) (emphasis added).12 months preceding the filing of a complaint for an alleged violation of this Act”) (emphasis added).
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Has at least 50
Has at least 50
million mil ion U.S.-based monthly active users or 100,000 U.S.-based U.S.-based monthly active users or 100,000 U.S.-based
monthly active business users at any point during the 12 months preceding a
monthly active business users at any point during the 12 months preceding a
designation decision or the filing of a complaint for a violationdesignation decision or the filing of a complaint for a violation
of the of the
billbil ; ;
Is owned or
Is owned or
controlledcontrol ed by an entity with: by an entity with:
Annual sales exceeding $550
Annual sales exceeding $550
billion bil ion at any point during the two years at any point during the two years
preceding a designation decision or the filing
preceding a designation decision or the filing
of a complaint; of a complaint;
An average market capitalization
An average market capitalization
exceeding $550 exceeding $550
billion bil ion over any 180-day over any 180-day
period during the two years preceding a designation decision or the filing of a
period during the two years preceding a designation decision or the filing of a
complaint; or complaint; or
At least one
At least one
billion bil ion worldwide monthly active users during the 12 months worldwide monthly active users during the 12 months
preceding a designation decision or the filing
preceding a designation decision or the filing
of a complaint; and of a complaint; and
Is a “critical trading partner” for the sale or provision of any product or service
Is a “critical trading partner” for the sale or provision of any product or service
offered on or directly related to the platform.17
offered on or directly related to the platform.17
The AICOA defines the term “critical trading partner” to mean a person that has the ability to
The AICOA defines the term “critical trading partner” to mean a person that has the ability to
“restrict or “restrict or
materiallymaterial y impede” a business user’s access to its users, customers, or a tool or service impede” a business user’s access to its users, customers, or a tool or service
needed to effectively serve its users or customers.18 needed to effectively serve its users or customers.18
Depending on the interpretation of the “critical trading partner” requirement, the legislation may
Depending on the interpretation of the “critical trading partner” requirement, the legislation may
encompass a range of popular platforms, including:encompass a range of popular platforms, including:
Facebook (a social network), Instagram (a photo-sharing service), and WhatsApp
Facebook (a social network), Instagram (a photo-sharing service), and WhatsApp
(a messaging application)—
(a messaging application)—
all al of which are controlled by Meta Platforms; of which are controlled by Meta Platforms;
Google Search (a search engine), YouTube (a video-sharing platform), Google
Google Search (a search engine), YouTube (a video-sharing platform), Google
Ads (an online advertising platform), Android OS (a mobile operating system),
Ads (an online advertising platform), Android OS (a mobile operating system),
and the Google Play Store (a software application store)—and the Google Play Store (a software application store)—
all al of which are of which are
controlled by Alphabet; controlled by Alphabet;
Amazon Marketplace (an e-commerce marketplace) and Amazon Web Services
Amazon Marketplace (an e-commerce marketplace) and Amazon Web Services
Marketplace (an online software store);
Marketplace (an online software store);
Apple’s App Store (a software application store) and iOS (a mobile operating
Apple’s App Store (a software application store) and iOS (a mobile operating
system);
system);
Azure Marketplace (an online software store), LinkedIn (an employment-
Azure Marketplace (an online software store), LinkedIn (an employment-
oriented social network), Microsoft Store on Xbox (an online video-game store),
oriented social network), Microsoft Store on Xbox (an online video-game store),
and Microsoft Windows (a group of operating systems)—and Microsoft Windows (a group of operating systems)—
all al of which are of which are
controlled by Microsoft; and controlled by Microsoft; and
TikTok (a video-sharing service), which is controlled by the Chinese firm
TikTok (a video-sharing service), which is controlled by the Chinese firm
ByteDance.19
ByteDance.19
The
The
billbil ’s supporters have argued that the criteria governing a firm’s status as a covered platform ’s supporters have argued that the criteria governing a firm’s status as a covered platform
are reasonable proxies for the type of “gatekeeping” power that often raises competition are reasonable proxies for the type of “gatekeeping” power that often raises competition
17 May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B). 17 May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B).
TheT he reported version of the bill would reported version of the bill would
apply the same criteria as the May 25 version to apply the same criteria as the May 25 version to
platforms controlled by publicly traded companies. platforms controlled by publicly traded companies.
See S.S.
2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B) (Reported Version). 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B) (Reported Version).
However, instead of the relevant sales and marketHowever, instead of the relevant sales and market
-capitalization thresholds, the reported version would apply an -capitalization thresholds, the reported version would apply an
earnings threshold of $30 billion to platforms controlled by nonearnings threshold of $30 billion to platforms controlled by non
-publicly traded companies. -publicly traded companies.
Id. § 2(a)(5)(C) (Reported . § 2(a)(5)(C) (Reported
Version). Version).
18 S.
18 S.
2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(6). 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(6).
19 Leah Nylen, 19 Leah Nylen,
Tech Antitrust Bill Threatens to Break Apple, Google’s Grip on the Internet, BLOOMBERG (July 26, , BLOOMBERG (July 26,
2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-tech-antitrust2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-tech-antitrust
-bill/. -bill/.
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concerns.20 Critics have contended that the thresholds are arbitrary and that a firm’s market
concerns.20 Critics have contended that the thresholds are arbitrary and that a firm’s market
capitalization, annual sales, and user base have little relevance for its abilitycapitalization, annual sales, and user base have little relevance for its ability
to harm to harm
competition.21 competition.21
The legislation’s “critical trading partner” requirement arguably addresses some of this concern
The legislation’s “critical trading partner” requirement arguably addresses some of this concern
about arbitrariness.22 However, that requirement would need to be interpreted by the DOJ, the about arbitrariness.22 However, that requirement would need to be interpreted by the DOJ, the
FTC, and the courts. As noted, S. 2992 defines the term “critical trading partner” to mean an FTC, and the courts. As noted, S. 2992 defines the term “critical trading partner” to mean an
entity with the ability to “restrict or entity with the ability to “restrict or
materiallymaterial y impede” a business user’s access to its customers impede” a business user’s access to its customers
or necessary inputs.23 The or necessary inputs.23 The
bill bil does not contain further clarification of this language, which is not does not contain further clarification of this language, which is not
drawn from antitrust case law. Existing antitrust doctrine instead emphasizes drawn from antitrust case law. Existing antitrust doctrine instead emphasizes
market power, ,
which is a requirement for most forms of antitrust liability.24 Plaintiffs which is a requirement for most forms of antitrust liability.24 Plaintiffs
typicallytypical y establish market establish market
power by showing that a defendant occupies a large share of a properly defined antitrust market.25 power by showing that a defendant occupies a large share of a properly defined antitrust market.25
In brief, defining an antitrust market involves an evaluation of the range of reasonable substitutes In brief, defining an antitrust market involves an evaluation of the range of reasonable substitutes
for a given product or service.26for a given product or service.26
The relationship between S. 2992’s “critical trading partner” requirement and these standards
The relationship between S. 2992’s “critical trading partner” requirement and these standards
from existing doctrine is not entirely clear. The core concern of market-power analysis—the from existing doctrine is not entirely clear. The core concern of market-power analysis—the
availabilityavailability
of reasonable substitutes—seems relevant to whether a platform has the ability to of reasonable substitutes—seems relevant to whether a platform has the ability to
“restrict or “restrict or
materiallymaterial y impede” a business user’s access to customers or inputs. It is notable, impede” a business user’s access to customers or inputs. It is notable,
however, that the AICOA does not employ the familiar language of market power.however, that the AICOA does not employ the familiar language of market power.
The choice to use new language that lacks an accepted meaning may reflect an intent to adopt less
The choice to use new language that lacks an accepted meaning may reflect an intent to adopt less
demanding standards than those in the market-power case law. Some commentators have demanding standards than those in the market-power case law. Some commentators have
expressed dissatisfaction with aspects of the relevant doctrine. For example, critics have argued expressed dissatisfaction with aspects of the relevant doctrine. For example, critics have argued
that the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in that the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in
Ohio v. American Express27—which adopted special 27—which adopted special
market-definition rules for “two-sided” markets—may hamper antitrust enforcement against tech market-definition rules for “two-sided” markets—may hamper antitrust enforcement against tech
20 20
See, e.g., Adam Conner & Erin Simpson, , Adam Conner & Erin Simpson,
Evaluating 2 Tech Antitrust Bills to Restore Competition Online, CTR. FOR , CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (June 2, 2022), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/evaluating-2-tech-antitrust-bills-to-restore-AM. PROGRESS (June 2, 2022), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/evaluating-2-tech-antitrust-bills-to-restore-
competition-online/. competition-online/.
21 21
See, e.g., Aurelien Portuese, , Aurelien Portuese,
The Revised (But Uncorrected) Version of the Klobuchar Bill, INFO. , INFO.
TECHT ECH. & . &
INNOVATION FDN. (June 21, 2022), https://itif.org/publications/2022/06/21/the-revised-but-uncorrected-version-of-the-INNOVATION FDN. (June 21, 2022), https://itif.org/publications/2022/06/21/the-revised-but-uncorrected-version-of-the-
klobuchar-bill/. klobuchar-bill/.
22
22
See Scott Morton, et al., Scott Morton, et al.,
supra note note
footnote 9, 9, at 1 (arguing that the AICOA is “carefully targeted in that its at 1 (arguing that the AICOA is “carefully targeted in that its
prohibitions apply only to platforms deemed ‘critical trading partners’”). prohibitions apply only to platforms deemed ‘critical trading partners’”).
23 S.23 S.
2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(6). 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(6).
24 24
See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, , John B. Kirkwood,
Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2018) , 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2018)
(explaining that market power “is central to antitrust because it distinguishes(explaining that market power “is central to antitrust because it distinguishes
firms that can harm competition and firms that can harm competition and
consumers from those that cannot”). A firm possesses market power when it has the ability to profitably charge prices consumers from those that cannot”). A firm possesses market power when it has the ability to profitably charge prices
above competitive levels for a sustained period of time. MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION LAW AND above competitive levels for a sustained period of time. MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (2d ed. 2012). Many economists contend that proper assessments of ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (2d ed. 2012). Many economists contend that proper assessments of
market power involve quality considerations. market power involve quality considerations.
See id. at 1 n.3. . at 1 n.3.
ThusT hus, market, market
-power analysis may require-power analysis may require
inquiries inquiries into a into a
firm’s ability to degradefirm’s ability to degrade
the quality of its offerings without facing a meaningful risk of consumer substitution. the quality of its offerings without facing a meaningful risk of consumer substitution.
See
generally John M. Newman, John M. Newman,
Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49 (2016); John M. , 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49 (2016); John M.
Newman, Newman,
Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015). , 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015).
25 MARKET POWER HANDBOOK, 25 MARKET POWER HANDBOOK,
supra note note
footnote 24,24, at 18. Plaintiffs can also establish market power with direct at 18. Plaintiffs can also establish market power with direct
evidence of supra-competitive prices, but this can beevidence of supra-competitive prices, but this can be
a difficult task. a difficult task.
See id. at 20. . at 20.
26
26
See id. at 61-63. More technically, market definition typically involves analysis of the cross-elasticity of demand . at 61-63. More technically, market definition typically involves analysis of the cross-elasticity of demand
between different products—that is, the extent to which the quantity demanded of one product willbetween different products—that is, the extent to which the quantity demanded of one product will
change in response change in response
to a change in the price of another product. to a change in the price of another product.
Id. at 64. . at 64.
27 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
27 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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platforms.28 Other scholars have criticized the market-definition paradigm more
platforms.28 Other scholars have criticized the market-definition paradigm more
generallygeneral y.29 .29
Senator Klobuchar—S. 2992’s sponsor—has introduced Senator Klobuchar—S. 2992’s sponsor—has introduced
othera different antitrust antitrust
legislation bil that appears to that appears to
reflect bothreflect both
points of view of those concerns.30 .30
This
This
all al suggests that the AICOA’s “critical trading partner” requirement is not intended to suggests that the AICOA’s “critical trading partner” requirement is not intended to
incorporate current market-power doctrine wholesale. Nevertheless, the extent to which incorporate current market-power doctrine wholesale. Nevertheless, the extent to which
preexisting antitrust principles would influence the interpretation of the “critical trading partner” preexisting antitrust principles would influence the interpretation of the “critical trading partner”
language remains an open question. One observer has characterized the language remains an open question. One observer has characterized the
bill bil as repudiating as repudiating
any analysis of market power and criticized it on that basis.31 However, the legislation might instead analysis of market power and criticized it on that basis.31 However, the legislation might instead
prompt courts to dispense with some of the more demanding elements of current doctrine without prompt courts to dispense with some of the more demanding elements of current doctrine without
completely abandoning certain general principles that inform it. completely abandoning certain general principles that inform it.
These types of interpretive issues recur throughout the
These types of interpretive issues recur throughout the
bill bil and could present regulators and courts and could present regulators and courts
with difficult questions if the legislationwith difficult questions if the legislation
becomes law.becomes law.
28 Lina M. Khan, The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More Power, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the-supreme-court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html. 29 See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010); see also INVESTIGATION OF COMP ETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 399 (recommending that Congress enact legislation providing that market definition is not required to prove an antitrust violation).
30 See S. 225, 117th Cong. §§ 9, 13 (2021). 31 Erik Hovenkamp, Proposed Antitrust Reforms in Big Tech: What Do They Imply for Competition and Innovation?, COMP ETITION POLICY INT’L ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 15, 22 (July 2022).
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Comparing Different Versions of the AICOA: S. 2992 and H.R. 3816
In June 2021, the House Judiciary Committee
In June 2021, the House Judiciary Committee
ordered the committeeordered the committee
version version of the AICOA—H.R.of the AICOA—H.R.
3816—to be 3816—to be
reported with amendments to the ful House. Whilereported with amendments to the ful House. While
parts of H.R. 3816 overlap with S. 2992, the bil s also differ in parts of H.R. 3816 overlap with S. 2992, the bil s also differ in
severalseveral
respects.respects.
LikeLike
S. 2992, H.R. 3816 would apply special rulesS. 2992, H.R. 3816 would apply special rules
to “covered platforms.” H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021). to “covered platforms.” H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
There is some similarityThere is some similarity
in the criteriain the criteria
used to determineused to determine
a firm’sa firm’s
status as a covered platform: the bil sstatus as a covered platform: the bil s
contain contain
the same thresholds for monthly active U.S. users and the samethe same thresholds for monthly active U.S. users and the same
“critical trading partner” standard. “critical trading partner” standard.
See S. 2992, S. 2992,
117th Cong. §§ 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(I), 2(a)(6) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft §§ 2(a)(5)(B)(i), 2(a)(6) (2022); 117th Cong. §§ 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(I), 2(a)(6) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft §§ 2(a)(5)(B)(i), 2(a)(6) (2022);
H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. §§ 2(g)(4)(B)(i), 2(g)(5).H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. §§ 2(g)(4)(B)(i), 2(g)(5).
There are differences with respect to the other criteria.There are differences with respect to the other criteria.
Under H.R. 3816, the relevant salesUnder H.R. 3816, the relevant sales
and and
market-capitalization thresholds would be $600 bil ion, as opposed to $550 bil ionmarket-capitalization thresholds would be $600 bil ion, as opposed to $550 bil ion
under u nder S. 2992. S. 2992.
See S. 2992, S. 2992,
117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(II)(aa) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B)(117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(II)(aa) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B)(
i ii)(I); H.R. 3816, 117th )(I); H.R. 3816, 117th
Cong. § 2(g)(4)(B)(i ).Cong. § 2(g)(4)(B)(i ).
Likewise,Likewise,
while S. 2992 could apply to entities that while S. 2992 could apply to entities that
fall fal below the relevant sales and market-capitalization below the relevant sales and market-capitalization
thresholds if they have morethresholds if they have more
than one bil ionthan one bil ion
worldwide monthly active users,worldwide monthly active users,
H.R. 3816 would not. H.R. 3816 would not.
See S. 2992, S. 2992,
117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(II)(bb) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(II); H.R. 3816, 117th 117th Cong. § 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(II)(bb) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 2(a)(5)(B)(i )(II); H.R. 3816, 117th
Cong. § 2(g)(4)(B)(i ). Cong. § 2(g)(4)(B)(i ).
There are also two differences related to designation decisions.There are also two differences related to designation decisions.
First,First,
S. 2992 would S. 2992 would
allowal ow the DOJ and FTC to the DOJ and FTC to
jointly designate firmsjointly designate firms
that meetthat meet
the specified criteriathe specified criteria
as covered platforms,as covered platforms,
while H.R. 3816 appears to permit while H.R. 3816 appears to permit
either agency to do so independently. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d); H.R. either agency to do so independently. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d); H.R.
3816, 117th Cong. § 2(d). Second, designation decisions under S. 2992 would be valid for seven years, as opposed 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(d). Second, designation decisions under S. 2992 would be valid for seven years, as opposed
to 10 years under the House committee-reportedto 10 years under the House committee-reported
bil .bil .
S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(1)(C) (Reported Version); May S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(1)(C) (Reported Version); May
25 Draft § 3(d)(1)(C); H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(d)(3).25 Draft § 3(d)(1)(C); H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(d)(3).
28 Lina M. Khan, The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the-supreme-court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html.
29 See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010). 30 See S. 225, 117th Cong. §§ 9, 13 (2021). 31 Erik Hovenkamp, Proposed Antitrust Reforms in Big Tech: What Do They Imply for Competition and Innovation?, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (forthcoming 2022).
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Unlawful Conduct
The AICOA would prohibit covered platforms from engaging in 10 categories of conduct.32 The AICOA would prohibit covered platforms from engaging in 10 categories of conduct.32
Under the May 25 version of the legislation, firms that violate the Under the May 25 version of the legislation, firms that violate the
billbil ’s prohibitions would be ’s prohibitions would be
liable
liable for up to 10% of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred.33for up to 10% of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred.33
The
The
bill bil makes “material harm” to competition an element of three of the offenses.34 For the makes “material harm” to competition an element of three of the offenses.34 For the
remaining seven categories, defendants would be remaining seven categories, defendants would be
allowedal owed to rebut a to rebut a
prima facie case by showing case by showing
that their conduct would that their conduct would
not result in “material harm” to competition.35 The legislation would also result in “material harm” to competition.35 The legislation would also
offer several other affirmative defenses for offer several other affirmative defenses for
all al 10 offenses.36 10 offenses.36
This section provides an overview of the
This section provides an overview of the
billbil ’s prohibitions, their relationship to current antitrust ’s prohibitions, their relationship to current antitrust
doctrine, and related interpretive issues. The doctrine, and related interpretive issues. The
billbil ’s affirmative defenses are discussed later in the ’s affirmative defenses are discussed later in the
report.37
32 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022). 33 May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(B). Under the reported version of S. 2992, violators would be liable for up to 15 percent of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(B) (Reported Version).
34 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(3). 35 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2). 36 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(1)-(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(1). 37 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra.
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report.37
Sections 3(a)(1)-(3): Self-Preferencing, Limitations on Business
Users, and Discrimination That Would “Materially Harm
Competition”
Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) of the AICOA would prohibit covered platforms from engaging in certain Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) of the AICOA would prohibit covered platforms from engaging in certain
forms of conduct in a manner that would “forms of conduct in a manner that would “
materiallymaterial y harm competition.”38 harm competition.”38
Section 3(a)(1) would prohibit operators of covered platforms from preferencing
Section 3(a)(1) would prohibit operators of covered platforms from preferencing
their own products, services, or lines of business over those of other business
their own products, services, or lines of business over those of other business
users of their platforms in a manner that would “users of their platforms in a manner that would “
materiallymaterial y harm competition.”39 harm competition.”39
Section 3(a)(2) would prohibit operators of covered platforms from limiting the
Section 3(a)(2) would prohibit operators of covered platforms from limiting the
ability
ability
of business users to compete with the operators’ own offerings in a of business users to compete with the operators’ own offerings in a
manner that would “manner that would “
materiallymaterial y harm competition.”40 harm competition.”40
Section 3(a)(3) would prohibit operators of covered platforms from
Section 3(a)(3) would prohibit operators of covered platforms from
discriminating in the application of their terms of service among similarly
discriminating in the application of their terms of service among similarly
situated business users in a manner that would “situated business users in a manner that would “
materiallymaterial y harm competition.”41 harm competition.”41
Much of the commentary surrounding the
Much of the commentary surrounding the
bill bil has focused on the types of conduct that may has focused on the types of conduct that may
trigger liabilitytrigger liability
under these provisions. Some of the practices that commentators have flagged as under these provisions. Some of the practices that commentators have flagged as
potentially
potential y prohibited include:
Google Search’s display of Google Maps content with search results, in addition
to its favorable placement of other Google verticals;42
Amazon advantaging its own products in search results on its Marketplace or
favoring itself over third-party merchants in managing its “Buy Box”;43
Apple’s preinstal ation of certain software applications (apps) on its mobile
devices;44 and
Microsoft’s prioritization of its own video games in Microsoft Store on Xbox.45
38 S. prohibited include:
32 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022). 33 May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(B). Under the reported version of S. 2992, violators would be liable for up to 15% of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(B) (Reported Version).
34 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(3). 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(3).
35 S. 39 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(2992, 117th Cong. § 3(
b)(2)(Aa)(1) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3() (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(
b)(2). 36 S. a)(1). 40 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(2992, 117th Cong. § 3(
b)(1)-a)(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3((2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(
b)(1). 37 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra. 38 S. a)(2). 41 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(
1)-(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(
1)-(3). 39 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1). 40 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(2). 41 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(3).
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Google Search’s display of Google Maps content with search results, in addition
to its favorable placement of other Google verticals;42
Amazon advantaging its own products in search results on its Marketplace or
favoring itself over third-party merchants in managing its “Buy Box”;43
Apple’s preinstallation of certain software applications (apps) on its mobile
devices;44 and
Microsoft’s prioritization of its own video games in Microsoft Store on Xbox.45
3). 42 Neil Bradley, Congressional Price Hike? How the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Raises Prices on Consum ers, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (June 21, 2022), https://www.uschamber.com/finance/antitrust/congressional-price-hike-how-the-american-innovation-and-choice-online-act-raises-prices-on-consumers.
43 Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 1546-47; Nylen, supra note 19. Amazon’s “Buy Box” is an icon that allows consumers to either place items in their carts or buy them with a single click. T hird-party merchants compete with one another and with Amazon to “win” the Buy Box for a given product at any point in time. Winners are chosen based on factors that include price and reliability in fulfillment. See Brian Connolly, How to Win the Am azon Buy Box in 2021 , JUNGLE SCOUT (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.junglescout.com/blog/how-to-win-the-buy-box/. 44 Randy Picker, How Would the Big Tech Self-Preferencing Bill Affect Users?, PROMARKET (June 16, 2022), https://www.promarket.org/2022/06/16/how-would-the-big-tech-self-preferencing-bill-affect -users/; but see Hal Singer, Rep. Cicilline’s Nondiscrim ination Bill Would Offer a Lifeline to Independent App Developers, PROMARKET (July 2, 2021), https://www.promarket.org/2021/07/02/antitrust -self-preferencing-preinstallation-app-developers-apple/ (arguing that similar language in the House version of the AICOA would not prohibit app preinstallation).
45 Nylen, supra note 19.
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The House subcommittee’s October 2020 report on digital competition identified several of these practices as examples of al egedly anticompetitive conduct by tech platforms.46 Whether S. 2992 would in fact proscribe this conduct would depend on the application of key Whether S. 2992 would in fact proscribe this conduct would depend on the application of key
terms like terms like
“preference,” “limit,” and “materially“preference,” “limit,” and “materially
harm competition.”harm competition.”
In addition to these behaviors—which
In addition to these behaviors—which
principallyprincipal y advantage a platform operator over its rivals— advantage a platform operator over its rivals—
the legislationthe legislation
may bar certain forms of “secondary line” discrimination.may bar certain forms of “secondary line” discrimination.
4647 In particular, some In particular, some
commentators have argued that Section 3(a)(3)’s prohibition of discriminatory terms-of-service commentators have argued that Section 3(a)(3)’s prohibition of discriminatory terms-of-service
enforcement may limit firms’ ability to remove unwanted content from their platforms.enforcement may limit firms’ ability to remove unwanted content from their platforms.
47
48 The following subsections review these issues.The following subsections review these issues.
Self-Preferencing
The
The
billbil ’s prohibition of self-preferencing may raise particularly complex questions. Many forms ’s prohibition of self-preferencing may raise particularly complex questions. Many forms
of conduct by a of conduct by a
verticallyvertical y integrated firm arguably “preference” the firm’s own offerings over integrated firm arguably “preference” the firm’s own offerings over
those of its rivals. Interpreted those of its rivals. Interpreted
literallyliteral y, that language could encompass any actions that treat a , that language could encompass any actions that treat a
platform’s own products more favorably than those of competitors.platform’s own products more favorably than those of competitors.
4849 If the term “preference” is If the term “preference” is
given this type of expansive meaning, Section 3(a)(1)’s “given this type of expansive meaning, Section 3(a)(1)’s “
materiallymaterial y harm competition” harm competition”
requirement would likely do much of the work defining the provision’s boundaries. requirement would likely do much of the work defining the provision’s boundaries.
At the same time, the concept of self-preferencing may also have internal limits that could
At the same time, the concept of self-preferencing may also have internal limits that could
complicate the complicate the
billbil ’s enforcement. Several commentators have argued that proving “preferential” ’s enforcement. Several commentators have argued that proving “preferential”
conduct would require regulators to establish some baseline level of neutral treatment from which conduct would require regulators to establish some baseline level of neutral treatment from which
a defendant has deviated.a defendant has deviated.
4950 In this view, self-preferencing would not encompass a platform operator’s favorable treatment of its own offerings when they deserve such treatment (i.e., when a
platform operator’s offerings are better than the alternatives).51
Section 3(a)(1) may thus require regulators and courts to grapple with chal enging conceptual questions.52 While cases in which a firm overrides its ordinary algorithmic protocols to disadvantage rivals may be fairly straightforward instances of self-preferencing, other fact
patterns could raise thornier interpretive and evidentiary issues.53
46 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 14 (concluding that Google has “used its
search monopoly . . . to boost Google’s own inferior vertical offerings, while imposing search penalties to demote third-party vertical providers”); id. at 282 (concluding that Amazon has given itself “ favorable treatment relative to competing sellers” through its control of the Buy Box); id. at 352-54 (discussing Apple’s preinstallation of its own apps on iPhones).
47 In this view, self-preferencing would not encompass a platform
42 Neil Bradley, Congressional Price Hike? How the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Raises Prices on
Consumers, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (June 21, 2022), https://www.uschamber.com/finance/antitrust/congressional-price-hike-how-the-american-innovation-and-choice-online-act-raises-prices-on-consumers.
43 Hovenkamp, supra note footnote 7, at 1546-47; Nylen, supra note footnote 19. Amazon’s “Buy Box” is an icon that allows consumers to either place items in their carts or buy them with a single click. Third-party merchants compete with one another and with Amazon to “win” the Buy Box for a given product at any point in time. Winners are chosen based on factors that include price and reliability in fulfillment. See Brian Connolly, How to Win the Amazon Buy Box
in 2021, JUNGLE SCOUT (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.junglescout.com/blog/how-to-win-the-buy-box/.
44 Randy Picker, How Would the Big Tech Self-Preferencing Bill Affect Users?, PROMARKET (June 16, 2022), https://www.promarket.org/2022/06/16/how-would-the-big-tech-self-preferencing-bill-affect-users/; but see Hal Singer, Rep. Cicilline’s Nondiscrimination Bill Would Offer a Lifeline to Independent App Developers, PROMARKET (July 2, 2021), https://www.promarket.org/2021/07/02/antitrust-self-preferencing-preinstallation-app-developers-apple/ (arguing that similar language in the House version of the AICOA would not prohibit app preinstallation).
45 Nylen, supra note footnote 19. 46 “Secondary line” competitive injury occurs when a company’s discriminatory conduct disadvantages some of its “Secondary line” competitive injury occurs when a company’s discriminatory conduct disadvantages some of its
customers relative to others in a manner that harms competition. customers relative to others in a manner that harms competition.
See HOVENKAMP, HOVENKAMP,
supra note note
footnote 7,7, at 632. at 632.
4748 See note note
footnote 6282 infra. .
4849 See Hovenkamp, Hovenkamp,
supra note note
footnote 31. 4931. 50 For versions of this argument, see For versions of this argument, see
ThomasT homas A. Lambert, A. Lambert,
Addressing Big Tech’s Market Power: A Comparative
Institutional Approach, 75 SMU L. REV. 73, 98-99 (2022); Daniel A. Crane, , 75 SMU L. REV. 73, 98-99 (2022); Daniel A. Crane,
Search Neutrality as an Antitrust
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operator’s favorable treatment of its own offerings when they deserve such treatment (i.e., when a platform operator’s offerings are better than the alternatives).50
Section 3(a)(1) may thus require regulators and courts to grapple with challenging conceptual questions.51 While cases in which a firm overrides its ordinary algorithmic protocols to disadvantage rivals may be fairly straightforward instances of self-preferencing, other fact patterns could raise thornier interpretive and evidentiary issues.52
Material Harm to Competition
The “materially harm competition” requirement in Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) has also generated discussion. The AICOA’s supporters have identified that requirement as a key limiting principle in response to allegations of overbreadth.53 The bill’s opponents have countered that this terminology—whichPrinciple, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1199 (2012); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What’s the Question?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 151 (2012). 51 Lambert, supra note 50, at 98-99. A product could conceivably be “better” than the alternatives in th e sense that it is generally superior, or in the narrower sense that it works better with a platform operator’s other offerings. For example, Apple might argue that its App Store is “better” than rival stores in the sense that the App Store is categorically superior, or in the sense that it works better on the iOS operating system.
52 See generally Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Baselines, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Mar. 2, 2009), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/03/legal-theory-lexicon-baselines.html.
53 See Crane, supra note 50, at 1207-08.
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Material Harm to Competition
The “material y harm competition” requirement in Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) has also generated
discussion.
The AICOA’s supporters have identified that requirement as a key limiting principle in response
to al egations of overbreadth.54
The bil ’s opponents have argued that there are two senses in which the meaning of the “material y harm competition” standard is unclear. First, the term “material y” does not have an established meaning in antitrust does not have an established meaning in antitrust
doctrine54—is likely to create significant uncertainties about the bill’s application.55 In turn,doctrine. While Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may “substantial y” lessen competition,55 neither the antitrust statutes nor the case law employ S. 2992’s language of materiality. The legislation’s critics have argued that this novelty is likely to create significant uncertainties about the bil ’s application.56 S. 2992’s
S. 2992’s proponents have proponents have
answered that the answered that the
bill’s novel languagenew terminology is intended to strengthen existing law, which is intended to strengthen existing law, which
they argue they argue
has proven inadequate to grapple with anticompetitive conduct by tech platforms.has proven inadequate to grapple with anticompetitive conduct by tech platforms.
56
Like other parts of the bill, the “materially57
Second, some commentators have argued that the “material y harm competition” standard may be
interpreted in ways that depart from current understandings of competitive harm.58
One source of this concern involves differences between S. 2992 and H.R. 3816. The “material y
harm competition” standard in S. 2992 differs from language in H.R. 3816 that offers defendants an affirmative defense for conduct that does not harm “the competitive process by restricting or impeding legitimate activity by business users.”59 Critics have contended that this contrast suggests “a shift away from protecting competitive processes towards protecting individual
competitors.”60
Another observer has argued that the AICOA’s omission of certain traditional antitrust concepts like market power may prompt courts to conclude that the bil seeks to move beyond preexisting
notions of harm to competition.61
54 See, e.g., Aaron Schur, The Critiques Against the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Miss harm competition” standard would have to be fleshed out in practice. The AICOA would direct the DOJ and FTC to issue guidelines outlining their interpretation of that language.57 Those guidelines could give regulated entities some clarity as to
Principle, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1199 (2012); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality is the
Answer, What’s the Question?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 151 (2012).
50 Lambert, supra note footnote 49, at 98-99. A product could conceivably be “better” than the alternatives in the sense that it is generally superior, or in the narrower sense that it works better with a platform operator’s other offerings. For example, Apple might argue that its App Store is “better” than rival stores in the sense that the App Store is categorically superior, or in the sense that it works better on the iOS operating system.
51 See generally Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Baselines, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Mar. 2, 2009), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/03/legal-theory-lexicon-baselines.html.
52 See Crane, supra note footnote 49, at 1207-08. 53 See, e.g., Aaron Schur, The Critiques Against the American Innovation and Choice Online Act Miss the Mark, ,
PROMARKET (July 18, 2022), https://www.promarket.org/2022/07/18/the-critiques-against-the-american-innovation-PROMARKET (July 18, 2022), https://www.promarket.org/2022/07/18/the-critiques-against-the-american-innovation-
and-choice-online-act-miss-the-mark/; Scott Morton, et al., and-choice-online-act-miss-the-mark/; Scott Morton, et al.,
supra note note
footnote 9, 9, at 6; Bill Baer, at 6; Bill Baer,
Why AmazonAm azon is
Wrong About the Am ericanthe American Innovation and Choice Online Act, BROOKINGS INST. (June 14, 2022), , BROOKINGS INST. (June 14, 2022),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/06/14/why-amazon-is-wrong-abouthttps://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/06/14/why-amazon-is-wrong-about
-the-american-innovation-and--the-american-innovation-and-
online-choice-act/; Conner & Simpson, online-choice-act/; Conner & Simpson,
supra note note
footnote 20.
54 While20.
55 15 U.S.C. § 18. Senator Klobuchar has introduced other legislation that would amend Section 7 of the Clayton Section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act prohibitsAct to prohibit mergers and mergers and
acquisitions that “create an appreciable risk of materially lessening competition.” S. 225, 117th Cong. § 4(b) (2021). T hat legislation defines the term “materially” to mean “more than a de minimis amount.” Id. S. 2992 leaves the term “ materially” undefined.
56 See, e.g., Comments of the Am. Bar Ass’n Antitrust L. Section Regarding the Am. Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2992) Before the 117th Congress at 9 (Apr. 27acquisitions that threaten “substantially” to lessen competition, 15 U.S.C. § 18, neither the antitrust statutes nor the case law employ the concept of “material” harm to competition.
55 See, e.g., Alden Abbott, AICOA: An Affront to the Rule of Law, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (June 29, 2022), , 2022),
https://truthonthemarket.com/2022/06/29/aicoa-an-affront-to-the-rule-of-law/; A. Douglas Melamed, Why I Think
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/comments/at -comments/2022/comments-aico-act.pdf [hereinafter “ ABA Comments”].
57 Scott Morton, et al., supra note 9, at 2 (characterizing the novelty of the “materially harm competition” standard as a “feature, not a bug” of the AICOA); Conner & Simpson, supra note 20. 58 A. Douglas Melamed, Why I Think Congress Should Not Enact the American Innovation and Choice Online Act, ,
COMPETITIONCOMP ETITION POLICY INT’L (June 19, POLICY INT’L (June 19,
2022), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/why2022), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/why
-i-think-congress-should-not-enact-i-think-congress-should-not-enact
-the-american--the-american-
innovation-and-choice-online-act/; COMMENTS OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N ANTITRUST L. SECTION REGARDING THE AM. INNOVATION AND CHOICE ONLINE ACT (S. 2992) BEFORE THE 117TH CONGRESS 6 (Apr. 27, 2022), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at-comments/2022/comments-aico-act.pdf [hereinafter “ABA COMMENTS”]; Bourne & Subramaniam, supra note footnote 9, at 7. 56 Scott Morton, et al., supra note footnote 9, at 2 (characterizing the novelty of the “materiallyinnovation-and-choice-online-act/; Portuese, supra note 21; ABA COMMENTS, supra note 56, at 5-6, 9, 20. 59 H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(1)(A) (2021). 60 ABA COMMENTS, supra note 56, at 5. 61 Melamed, supra note 58.
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Some of the AICOA’s supporters disagree. Representative David Cicil ine—H.R. 3816’s sponsor—has contended that S. 2992’s reference to harm to “competition” incorporates that concept’s established meaning in the case law, which encompasses harm to the “competitive process” but not harm to individual competitors standing alone.62 In this view, the difference between H.R. 3816’s reference to harm to the “competitive process” and S. 2992’s notion of harm
to “competition” is stylistic rather than substantive.
While harm to “competition” is a central concept in antitrust jurisprudence, its precise meaning is contested in multiple ways. There is a long-standing debate over whether various goals—like
protecting “consumer welfare,” the “competitive process,” or “trading partner welfare”—accurately reflect the meaning of “competition” that has developed in the antitrust case law.63 Some if not al of those goals themselves have several possible meanings.64 Final y, in addition to these doctrinal debates, there are differences of opinion over the types of harm to “competition”
that antitrust should preclude.65
It is unclear whether these debates would play a role in the interpretation of S. 2992’s “material y harm competition” standard. If the bil became law, courts may conclude that the standard ratifies prevailing notions of competitive harm, whatever the courts determine those to be. To similar
effect, judges steeped in the reigning approach to antitrust may be hesitant to embrace innovative
theories of harm without more explicit legislative direction.66
There are possible counterarguments, however. Recent efforts to reorient antitrust’s focus might
support the conclusion that the meaning of harm to “competition” in S. 2992 is not identical to preexisting understandings of that concept in the case law. For example, the October 2020 House subcommittee report on digital competition that laid the groundwork for the AICOA concluded that the Supreme Court “has limited the analysis of competitive harm to focus primarily on price and output rather than the competitive process.”67 In place of the current approach, the report
endorsed a broader standard that protects “not just consumers, but also workers, entrepreneurs, independent businesses, open markets, a fair economy, and democratic ideals.”68 This diagnosis and prescription could suggest an intent to reform and not merely ratify existing concepts of
competitive harm.
Several Members of Congress have noted these theoretical debates and expressed uncertainty about the role that “consumer welfare” would play in the AICOA’s application.69 These concerns 62 Letter from Rep. David N. Cicilline to Hon. Brian Schatz, et al., at 2 (June 15, 2022), https://cicilline.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cicilline.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2022-0615-cicilline-letter-to-senators-re-content-moderation.pdf [hereinafter “ Cicilline Letter”] (“ The antitrust concept of ‘harm to competition’ exists under current law and means ‘harm, not just to a single competitor, but to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself.’”) (quoting NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998)).
63 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Slogans and Goals of Antitrust Law, U. Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 22-33 (Oct. 2, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4121866# . 64 See id. at 49-89. 65 See, e.g., Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012). T here is also a dispute over whether antitrust needs a more specific normative benchmark than general n otions like “ competition.” See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013). 66 See Scott Morton, et al., supra note 9, at 3 (“[A] judiciary weighted with years of experience and jurisprudence will have significant inertia, and it is therefore unduly optimistic to imagine outcomes under the [AICOA] would veer drastically away from past understandings of core concepts like harm to competition.”). 67 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 391. 68 Id. at 392. 69 See, e.g., T ranscript of Markup of S. 2992 at 53 (Jan. 20, 2022) (on file with author) [hereinafter “S. 2992 Markup
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led the House Judiciary Committee to adopt an amendment to H.R. 3816 that provides an affirmative defense for conduct that “increases consumer welfare.”70 S. 2992, in contrast, does not contain a paral el affirmative defense. The role that consumer benefits would play in the application of the “material y harm competition” standard thus remains unclear. If consumer benefits and other efficiencies would not register in the application of that standard, then the meaning of the term “competition” in S. 2992 would diverge from the meaning that many courts
ascribe to that concept under current law.71
Efforts to equate harm to “competition” with harm to the “competitive process” do not
necessarily resolve such ambiguities.72 The “competitive process” has been invoked for a variety of purposes, some of which are in tension with one another. For example, that phrase has been
used:
To distinguish harm to “competition” (which qualifies as a cognizable harm
under current antitrust law) from harm to individual competitors (which does not);73
To refer to a general standard under which antitrust is or should be concerned
with the protection of competition as a process rather than with the achievement of specific economic outcomes;74 and
T ranscript”] (Sen. T hom T illis) (“It’s not clear how existing competitor or competition jurisprudence would support or be changed by [S. 2992]. T he purpose of competition law is to eliminate harm to consumers not to pick winners and losers. I’m also aware of the spirited debate [over] whether decades of antitrust law based on [the] consumer-welfare
standard should be put in the burn pit. I’m open to having [a] separate discussion about potential changes to that standard and I hope that we will. But as it stands in relation to this bill, what standard will enforcers look to [?] What about amendments [that] would insert [the] consumer welfare standard back into the definition of material harm to competition?”); T ranscript of Markup of H.R. 3843, the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act, et al., at 16,866 -16,869 (June 23, 2021), https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/112818/documents/HMKP -117-JU00-Transcript-20210623.pdf [hereinafter “ H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript”] (Rep. Cliff Bentz) (“ [W]e should also take into [account] consumers, since that is the proper focus and long-time focus, over the past 40 years at least, of our antitrust law.”); id. at 16,887-16,888 (Rep. Zoe Lofgren) (“ [I]n this bill there’s no consideration whatsoever for consumer benefit.”).
70 H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c) (2021); H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript at 17,309-17,310. 71 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that if a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of anticompetitive harm under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the defendant may proffer a procompetitive justification for its conduct —that is, “ a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal”); see also NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2151 (2021) (explaining that in Rule-of-Reason cases under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the goal is “[a]lways” to “distinguish between restraints [of trade] with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
72 See Hovenkamp, supra note 63, at 51 (“The ‘competitive process’ can mean pretty much what anyone thinks it means. As a result it embraces mutually inconsistent antitrust ideologies.”); John M. Newman, Procom petitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 514 (2019) (“[T]he actual content of the competitive-process approach remains mercurial, a cipher . . . . More than a half-century has passed since the [Supreme] Court first clearly invoked the competitive process approach to condemn a restraint of trade, yet terms like ‘competition’ and ‘competitive process’ are still ‘wonderfully ill-defined.’”) (citation omitted); Stucke, supra note 65, at 569 (arguing that the “competitive process” standard fails to provide meaningful guidance because “it simply shifts the debate [over antitrust’s goals] to a larger, unresolved issue, namely defining an ‘effective competitive process,’” and “[n]o consensus exists in the United States or elsewhere on an effective competition process or a unifying theory of competition.”). 73 E.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007). 74 E.g., T im Wu, The “Protection of the Competitive Process” Standard, Colum. Pub. L. Research Paper No. 14-612 (2018), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3293&context=faculty_scholarship ; Lina M. Khan, Am azon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 745 (2017); Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason:
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In ways that are difficult to distinguish from canonical statements of the
“consumer welfare” standard.75
Accordingly, courts would likely face a range of plausible meanings in interpreting and applying
S. 2992’s “material y harm competition” standard, even if that standard is equivalent to H.R.
3816’s reference to harm to the “competitive process.”76
In sum, then, the “material y harm competition” standard would have to be fleshed out in
practice. The AICOA would direct the DOJ and FTC to issue guidelines outlining their interpretation of that language.77 Those guidelines could give regulated entities some clarity as to the standard’s scope,78 but would not be legal y binding.79 harm competition” standard as a “feature, not a bug” of the AICOA); Conner & Simpson, supra note footnote 20. 57 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 4 (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 4 (2022).
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the standard’s scope,58 but would not be legally binding.59 As a result, the judiciary would likely As a result, the judiciary would likely
unpack the legislation’s meaning over time, presumably operating under the assumption that the unpack the legislation’s meaning over time, presumably operating under the assumption that the
““
materiallymaterial y harm competition” standard is intended to be more restrictive than certain aspects of harm competition” standard is intended to be more restrictive than certain aspects of
general antitrust doctrine.general antitrust doctrine.
60
Content Moderation
Commentators have also debated Section 3(a)(1)(3)’s possible effects on content moderation by covered platforms. As discussed, that provision would prohibit operators of covered platforms from discriminating in the enforcement of their terms of service among similarly situated business users in a manner that would “materially harm competition.”61
Some observers have concluded that this language may restrict firms’ ability to remove unwanted content from their platforms.62 To those concerned about alleged discrimination against conservative viewpoints, this is a virtue.63 To those worried about discouraging tech platforms from policing hate speech and disinformation, it is a cause for unease.64
Whether Section 3(a)(1)(3) would in fact prohibit certain forms of content moderation is unclear. As discussed, the “materially harm competition” standard is novel, making it difficult to confidently predict whether it would reach discriminatory content moderation.
Several commentators have argued that it is unlikely that courts would find that content-moderation decisions have the requisite anticompetitive effects.65 Others view such an outcome as plausible and have raised concerns that the bill may chill content moderation regardless.66
The provision’s interaction with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the First Amendment—both of which insulate firms from liability for certain forms of content 58 Scott Morton, et al., supra note footnote 9, at 2 (arguing that the agencies’ guidelines will help resolve any uncertainties about the meaning of the “materially harm competition” standard).
59 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 4(d) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 4(d). 60 In particular, Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) seem intended to repudiate the permissive rules that currently govern unilateral refusals to deal. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). Those rules would likely apply to much of the conduct targeted by Sections 3(a)(1)-(3), if such conduct was challenged under existing law. For an overview of this case law, see Hovenkamp, supra note footnote 7, at 1495-1502.
61 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)(3). 62 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Brian Schatz, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar (June 14, 2022), https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2022-06/senate-letter-asking-klobuchar-for-content-moderation-fix-on-s2992.pdf; Jane Bambauer & Anupam Chander, Bills Meant to Check Big Tech’s Power Could Lead to More Disinformation, WASH. POST (June 6, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/06/06/antitrust-bills-big-tech-hate-speech-disinformation/; Maria Curi, Tech Antitrust Bill Stokes Content-Moderation Worries, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 12, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/tech-antitrust-bill-stokes-lawmaker-content-moderation-worries.
63 See, e.g., Michael R. Davis, Conservatives Must Use Antitrust to Rein In Big Tech Monopolies, FOX NEWS (July 12, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/conservatives-must-use-antitrust-rein-big-tech-monopolies.
64 See, e.g., Bambauer & Chander, supra note footnote 62; Mark MacCarthy, Two Ways to Improve Senator
Klobuchar’s Needed Antitrust Legislation, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/08/two-ways-to-improve-senator-klobuchars-needed-antitrust-legislation/.
65 See, e.g., Schur, supra note footnote 53; Gilad Edelman, The Weak 80
Only Com petition Matters, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 732 (2014); Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium , 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1152-54 (1981). 75 E.g., T own of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 -22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.) (stating that a practice harms the “competitive process” if it “obstructs the achievement of competition’s basic goals—lower prices, better products, and more efficient production methods”); see also Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem , YALE L.J. F. 960, 971 n.48 (2018) (“ Even when courts claim to be analyzing the competitive process, they tend to use consumer welfare as a proxy to assess it.”) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Like the “competitive process,” “consumer welfare” has several possible meanin gs. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 65, at 571-73; Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consum er Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 133 (2011). One scholar
has explained that “under the consumer welfare . . . principle as most people understand it today,” antitrust “encourages markets to produce output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition, and prices that are accordin gly as low.” Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consum er Welfare Principle Im periled? , 45 J. CORP . L. 101, 102 (2019). Some commentators have argued that —properly understood—the “ consumer welfare” standard incorporates non -price benefits to consumers, such as product quality and innovation. See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson, Welfare Standards Underlying Antitrust Enforcem ent: What You Measure is What You Get, Luncheon Keynote Address at Geo. Mason L. Rev. 22nd Annual Antitrust Symposium at 5-7 (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455663/welfare_standard_speech_-_cmr-wilson.pdf.
76 Disputes over whether the “competitive process” standard is already the law may further complicate the interpretive task. Some commentators have argued that the “competitive process” approach represents an accurate statement of current antitrust doctrine. E.g., Werden, supra note 74, at 732. Others have been explicit that they regard the “competitive process” standard as a desirable replacement for prevailing understandings of competitive harm in the case law. E.g., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 391-92; Wu, supra note 74; Khan, supra note 74, at 745; see also Einer Elhauge, Should the Com petitive Process Test Replace the Consum er Welfare Standard?, PROMARKET (May 24, 2022), https://www.promarket.org/2022/05/24/should-the-competitive-process-test-replace-the-consumer-welfare-standard/ (criticizing efforts to replace the “ consumer welfare” standard with the “competitive process” standard). 77 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 4 (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 4 (2022). 78 Scott Morton, et al., supra note 9, at 2 (“Any uncertainty about the meaning of words like ‘competition’ will be resolved in [the agencies’] . . . guidelines and over time with the development of caselaw.”). 79 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 4(d) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 4(d). 80 In particular, Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) seem intended to repudiate the permissive rules that currently govern unilateral refusals to deal. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. T rinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). T hose rules would likely apply to much of the conduct targeted by Sections 3(a)(1) -(3), if such conduct was challenged under existing law. For an overview of this case law, see Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 1495-1502. By subjecting the specified forms of conduct to a general standard of competitive harm, the AICOA appears to dispense with such conduct -specific tests.
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Content Moderation
Commentators have also debated Section 3(a)(1)(3)’s possible effects on content moderation by covered platforms. As discussed, that provision would prohibit operators of covered platforms from discriminating in the enforcement of their terms of service among similarly situated
business users in a manner that would “material y harm competition.”81
Some observers have concluded that this language may restrict firms’ ability to remove unwanted content from their platforms.82 To those concerned about al eged discrimination against conservative viewpoints, this would be a virtue.83 To some of those worried about discouraging
tech platforms from policing hate speech and disinformation, it is a cause of unease.84
Whether Section 3(a)(1)(3) would in fact prohibit certain forms of content moderation is unclear. As discussed, the “material y harm competition” standard is subject to differing interpretations,
making it difficult to confidently predict whether it would reach discriminatory content
moderation.
Several commentators have argued that it is unlikely that courts would find that content-moderation decisions have the requisite anticompetitive effects.85 During H.R. 3816’s markup, Representative Cicil ine also repeatedly stated that the bil is not intended to affect
content moderation.86
Others have argued that it is plausible that courts would read the AICOA to apply to discriminatory content moderation and have raised concerns that the bil may chil content moderation regardless.87 Additional y, during H.R. 3816’s markup, multiple Members stated or
81 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)(3). 82 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Brian Schatz, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar (June 14, 2022), https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2022-06/senate-letter-asking-klobuchar-for-content-moderation-fix-on-s2992.pdf; Jane Bambauer & Anupam Chander, Bills Meant to Check Big Tech’s Power Could Lead to More Disinform ation, WASH. POST (June 6, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/06/06/antitrust -bills-big-tech-hate-speech-disinformation/; Maria Curi, Tech Antitrust Bill Stokes Content-Moderation Worries, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 12, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/tech-antitrust-bill-stokes-lawmaker-content-moderation-worries. 83 See, e.g., Michael R. Davis, Conservatives Must Use Antitrust to Rein In Big Tech Monopolies, FOX NEWS (July 12, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/conservatives-must-use-antitrust -rein-big-tech-monopolies.
84 See, e.g., Bambauer & Chander, supra note 82; Mark MacCarthy, Two Ways to Improve Senator Klobuchar’s Needed Antitrust Legislation, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/02/08/two-ways-to-improve-senator-klobuchars-needed-antitrust -legislation/. 85 See, e.g., Schur, supra note 54; Gilad Edelman, The Weak Argument Jeopardizing Tech Antitrust
Legislation , WIRED (June 16, 2022), https://www.wired.com/story/american-innovation-choice-online-act-democrats-, WIRED (June 16, 2022), https://www.wired.com/story/american-innovation-choice-online-act-democrats-
argument/; Conner & Simpson, supra note footnote 20.
66 See, e.g., Letter from Samir Jain, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar and Sen. Charles Grassley (Mar. 9, 2022), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/S2292-CDT-letter-3-9-22-FINAL.pdf.
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moderation—may also raise complicated legal questions that are beyond argument/; Cicilline Letter, supra note 62, at 2; Conner & Simpson, supra note 20.
86 H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript at 15,687-15,689, 16,077-16,079.
During that markup, the House Judiciary Committee rejected a proposed amendment that would have explicitly insulated platforms from liability for certain types of content moderation. See id. at 16,813-16,814; Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3816 Offered by Ms. Lofgren of California (June 23, 2021), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20210623/112818/BILLS-117-HR3816-L000397-Amdt-4.pdf.
Some Members who voted against the amendment explained that they believed it was unnecessary because the bill does not involve content moderation. See H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript at 16,071-16,072 (Rep. David Cicilline). Others voted against the amendment because of concerns that platforms would use the amendment’s protections to discriminate against conservative viewpoints. See H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript at 16,592-16,601 (Rep. Matt Gaetz).
87 See, e.g., Letter from Samir Jain, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar and Sen. Charles Grassley (Mar. 9, 2022), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/S2292-CDT -letter-3-9-22-FINAL.pdf.
During S. 2992’s markup, Senator Alex Padilla raised concerns that the bill may be const rued to prohibit certain types
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suggested that they interpreted the bil to prohibit discriminatory content moderation involving
business users.88
The legislation’s interaction with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the First
Amendment—both of which insulate firms from liability for certain forms of content moderation—may also raise complicated legal questions.89 For example, Representative Cicil ine has argued that Section 5(2) of S. 2992—which provides that the legislation shal not be construed to limit the application of “any law”90—would preserve Section 230’s protections for content-moderation decisions.91 Other commentators have responded that Section 5(2) does not
resolve concerns about the AICOA’s effect on content moderation because the bil may prompt courts to adopt narrow interpretations of Section 230.92 A full discussion of this debate is beyond
the scope of this the scope of this
report.report.
67
Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(7): Interoperability and Access to Data
Section 3(a)(4) of the Section 3(a)(4) of the
bill bil would impose interoperability requirements on covered platforms. The would impose interoperability requirements on covered platforms. The
provision would make it unlawful for operators of such platforms to “provision would make it unlawful for operators of such platforms to “
materiallymaterial y restrict, impede, restrict, impede,
or unreasonably delay” a business user’s ability to access or interoperate with features that are or unreasonably delay” a business user’s ability to access or interoperate with features that are
available
available to the operators’ own competing products or services.to the operators’ own competing products or services.
68 93
Section 3(a)(7) would address the related issue of access to data generated by business users on
Section 3(a)(7) would address the related issue of access to data generated by business users on
covered platforms. The provision would make it unlawful for operators of covered platforms to covered platforms. The provision would make it unlawful for operators of covered platforms to
“materially restrict or impede” a business user from accessing data it generates on such platforms or data that platform users generate by interacting with a business user’s products or services.69
Like the remaining prohibitions discussed below, these provisions would not require regulators to
of content moderation. See S. 2992 Markup T ranscript at 61-62 (“ [T]his bill may hamper the efforts of platforms to address the spread of hate speech and misinformation and disinformation efforts online that have caused so many recent problems for our democracy.”). Senator T ed Cruz also expressed support for the legislation based on his belief that it would limit discriminatory content moderation. Id. at 65 (“ I believe the bill would make some positive improvement as it concerns the problem of censorship . . . . [T he bill] would provide protections to content providers [and] to businesses that are discriminated against because of the content of what they pr oduce.”). 88 During H.R. 3816’s markup, the House Judiciary Committee considered a proposed amendment that would have granted a private right of action to persons whose content is subject to “politically biased content moderation” by a covered platform operator. H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript at 15,598-15,982; Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3816 Offered by [Mr. Jordan of Ohio] (June 23, 2021), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20210623/112818/BILLS-117-HR3816-J000289-Amdt -3.pdf.
Representative Zoe Lofgren contended that this amendment was unnecessary because the bill already prohibited covered platform operators from discriminating among similarly situated business users. H.R. 3816 Markup T ranscript at 15,651-15,655, 15,657-15,663. Representative Jim Jordan—the amendment’s sponsor—responded that the amendment was intended to extend the legislation’s prohibition of discriminatory content moderation to encompass discrimination involving individuals as well as business users. Id. at 15,664-15,665, 15,674, 15,790-15,794. T he proposed amendment was not adopted. Id. at 15,981-15,982. 89 For an overview of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, see CRS Report R46751, Section 230: An Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon and Eric N. Holmes. For a discussion of the First Amendment issues involved in regulating content moderation by social-media companies, see CRS Report R45650, Free Speech and the Regulation of Social Media Content, by Valerie C. Brannon; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10618, Trial Court Rules State Social Media Law Likely Unconstitutional, by Valerie C. Brannon.
90 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 5(2) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 5(2) (2022). 91 Cicilline Letter, supra note 62, at 2. 92 Letter from T echFreedom, et al., to Hon. Brian Schatz, et al. (June 27, 2022), https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2992-Response-to-Cicilline-letter.pdf.
93 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(4) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(4). Unlike the repo rted version of the bill, the May 25 draft contains an exemption for cases in which such access would lead to a “significant cybersecurity risk.” May 25 Draft § 3(a)(4).
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“material y restrict or impede” a business user from accessing data it generates on such platforms
or data that platform users generate by interacting with a business user’s products or services.94
Like the remaining prohibitions discussed below, these provisions would not require regulators to
establish that a platform’s conduct harmed competition. Rather, establish that a platform’s conduct harmed competition. Rather,
absence of competitive harm of competitive harm
would be an affirmative defense. Defendants could rebut a would be an affirmative defense. Defendants could rebut a
prima facie case under case under
Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(7) by establishing that their conduct had not and would not result in Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(7) by establishing that their conduct had not and would not result in
“material harm to competition.”“material harm to competition.”
7095 The legislation would also offer several other affirmative The legislation would also offer several other affirmative
defenses involving user privacy, data security, and preservation of platform functionality that are defenses involving user privacy, data security, and preservation of platform functionality that are
discussed below.discussed below.
7196
Interoperability requirements like Section 3(a)(4) are a response to the network effects that give
Interoperability requirements like Section 3(a)(4) are a response to the network effects that give
large tech platforms powerful incumbency advantages.large tech platforms powerful incumbency advantages.
7297 In markets characterized by strong In markets characterized by strong
network effects, a platform’s services become more valuable as more people use the platform.network effects, a platform’s services become more valuable as more people use the platform.
7398 Network effects can thus operate as entry barriers that make it difficult for newcomers to compete Network effects can thus operate as entry barriers that make it difficult for newcomers to compete
with an established firm. Such effects create a dilemma: upstart tech platforms may not be as with an established firm. Such effects create a dilemma: upstart tech platforms may not be as
attractive to consumers as an incumbent because upstarts lack similarly large user bases, which attractive to consumers as an incumbent because upstarts lack similarly large user bases, which
they cannot attain without being attractive to consumers.they cannot attain without being attractive to consumers.
7499 This phenomenon makes many digital This phenomenon makes many digital
markets susceptible to “tipping”—once one platform reaches a certain scale, its network markets susceptible to “tipping”—once one platform reaches a certain scale, its network
advantages reinforce themselves and cement its dominance.advantages reinforce themselves and cement its dominance.
75
67 It is unclear, for example, whether courts would be hesitant to apply the AICOA to content-moderation decisions in light of these protections. For an overview of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, see CRS Report R46751, Section 230: An Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon and Eric N. Holmes. For a discussion of the First Amendment issues involved in regulating content moderation by social-media companies, see CRS Report R45650, Free Speech and the Regulation of Social Media Content, by Valerie C. Brannon; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10618, Trial
Court Rules State Social Media Law Likely Unconstitutional, by Valerie C. Brannon.
68 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(4) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(4) (2022). Unlike the reported version of the bill, the May 25 draft contains an exemption for cases in which such access would lead to a “significant cybersecurity risk.” May 25 Draft § 3(a)(4). 69 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(7) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(7). 70 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2). 71 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra. 72 See Michael Kades & Fiona Scott Morton, Interoperability as a Competition Remedy for Digital Networks, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 1-2 (Sept. 23, 2020).
73 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 392-93 (4th ed. 2005). 74100
In theory, interoperability mandates may be able to mitigate these effects.101 For example, such
requirements could prevent a covered platform from cutting off rival app developers from the tools needed to access their platforms—a strategy that a powerful firm could use to preserve its
dominant position or leverage that position into adjacent markets.102
Broader interoperability duties could also facilitate competition by al owing consumers who do not directly use a dominant network to indirectly benefit from its scale. For example, if interoperability requires Facebook to al ow users of other social networks to communicate with its users, then upstart social networks may find it easier to attract customers.103 Whether 94 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(7) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(7). 95 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2). 96 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra. 97 See Michael Kades & Fiona Scott Morton, Interoperability as a Competition Remedy for Digital Networks, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 1-2 (Sept. 23, 2020).
98 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 392-93 (4th ed. 2005). 99 See REPORT, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., REPORT, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMM.,
GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS. 17 GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS. 17
(July 1, 2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market(July 1, 2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market
-structure-report.pdf. -structure-report.pdf.
75100 Kades Kades
& Scott Morton, & Scott Morton,
supra note note
footnote 72,97, at 7-9; UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE DIGITAL at 7-9; UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE DIGITAL
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In theory, interoperability mandates may be able to mitigate these effects.76 For example, such requirements could prevent a covered platform from cutting off rival app developers from the tools needed to access their platforms—a strategy that a powerful firm could use to preserve its dominant position or leverage that position into adjacent markets.77
Broader interoperability duties could also facilitate competition by allowing consumers who do not directly use a dominant network to indirectly benefit from its scale. For example, if interoperability requires Facebook to allow users of other social networks to communicate with its users, then upstart social networks may find it easier to attract customers.78 Whether Section 3(a)(4) would entail such duties would depend on the details surrounding its implementation.
Section 3(a)(7)’s data-access requirement would address related issues. By allowing business COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY 4 (Mar. 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf. In such cases, competitive pressures must come from outside the relevant market —for example, from firms that create new markets via disruptive technologies. In the jargon, competitive dynamics in tipped markets shift from “competition in the market” to “competition for the market,” which may not be forthcoming for extended periods of time. UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note 100, at 4, 38-41. 101 Kades & Scott Morton, supra note 97, at 12. 102 T he FT C has alleged that Facebook used this strategy when it withheld critical tools from certain rival app developers, including a rival social network called Path. See FT C v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2021). A House subcommittee also found that Apple has denied certain application programming interfaces and device functionalities to competing developers. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 354.
103 Kades & Scott Morton, supra note 97, at 11-12.
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Section 3(a)(4) would entail such duties would depend on the details surrounding its
implementation.
Section 3(a)(7)’s data-access requirement would address related issues. By al owing business
users to access data involving their activities and customers on covered platforms, the provision users to access data involving their activities and customers on covered platforms, the provision
could mitigate the switching costs that can diminish consumers’ could mitigate the switching costs that can diminish consumers’
willingnesswil ingness to abandon an to abandon an
incumbent platform in favor of a incumbent platform in favor of a
smallersmal er rival. rival.
79104
Interoperability requirements also have their skeptics, however. Depending upon their details,
Interoperability requirements also have their skeptics, however. Depending upon their details,
such requirements may prove costly to implement.such requirements may prove costly to implement.
80105 They may also dampen investment They may also dampen investment
incentives by forcing firms to share the fruits of their innovation with rivals.incentives by forcing firms to share the fruits of their innovation with rivals.
81 Additionally106 Additional y, ,
specific types of interoperability may create privacy concerns and data-security risks.specific types of interoperability may create privacy concerns and data-security risks.
82107 While the While the
AICOA’s affirmative defenses attempt to address these latter concerns, defendants would bear the AICOA’s affirmative defenses attempt to address these latter concerns, defendants would bear the
burden of establishing their applicability.burden of establishing their applicability.
83108
Section 3(a)(5): Tying
Section 3(a)(5) of the legislation would prohibit certain tying arrangements, whereby firms offer Section 3(a)(5) of the legislation would prohibit certain tying arrangements, whereby firms offer
one product on the condition that customers purchase a separate product as one product on the condition that customers purchase a separate product as
wellwel . The provision would make it unlawful for an operator of a covered platform to condition access to or preferred placement on the platform on the purchase or use of other products offered by the platform
operator that are not “part of or intrinsic to” the platform.109
Section 3(a)(5) resembles existing tying doctrine, with certain key differences. Under current law,
a plaintiff can prevail on a tying claim by showing that:
1. The defendant offered two distinct products;
2. The defendant conditioned the sale of one product (the tying product) on the
purchase of the other product (the tied product);
3. The defendant possessed sufficient economic power in the tying product market
to coerce purchasers into acceptance of the tied product; and
4. The defendant’s conduct affected a non-trivial amount of interstate commerce.110
Some courts have also required plaintiffs to demonstrate that a tying arrangement had
anticompetitive effects in the tied product market.111
104. The provision COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY 4 (Mar. 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf. In such cases, competitive pressures must come from outside the relevant market—for example, from firms that create new markets via disruptive technologies. In the jargon, competitive dynamics in tipped markets shift from “competition in the market” to “competition for the market,” which may not be forthcoming for extended periods of time. UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, supra note footnote 75, at 4, 38-41.
76 Kades & Scott Morton, supra note footnote 72, at 12. 77 The FTC has alleged that Facebook used this strategy when it withheld critical tools from certain rival app developers, including a rival social network called Path. See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2021). A House subcommittee also found that Apple has denied certain application programming interfaces and device functionalities to competing developers. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note footnote 1,
at 354.
78 Kades & Scott Morton, supra note footnote 72, at 11-12. 79 See Fiona M. Scott Morton, et al., Fiona M. Scott Morton, et al.,
Equitable Interoperability: The “Super Tool” of Digital Platform Governance, ,
YALE YALE
TOBINT OBIN CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY, Discussion Paper No. 4 at 26 (July 13, 2021). CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY, Discussion Paper No. 4 at 26 (July 13, 2021).
80105 ABA COMMENTS, ABA COMMENTS,
supra note note
footnote 55, 56, at 14. at 14.
81106 See, e.g., Howard, Howard
A. Shelanski, A. Shelanski,
Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual and Other Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. , 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
369, 380 (2009). 369, 380 (2009).
82107 See, e.g., Krisztian Katona, , Krisztian Katona,
AICOA’s Data Security, Privacy, and Content Moderation Issues Call for Risk
AssessmentAssessm ent, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (June 7, 2022), https://www.project, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (June 7, 2022), https://www.project
-disco.org/privacy/060722-aicoas--disco.org/privacy/060722-aicoas-
data-security-privacy-and-content-moderation-issues-call-for-risk-assessment/; Josh Withrow, data-security-privacy-and-content-moderation-issues-call-for-risk-assessment/; Josh Withrow,
The Revised AmericanAm erican
Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) is Still Fundamentally FlawedFundam entally Flawed , R ST. INST. (May 26, 2022), , R ST. INST. (May 26, 2022),
https://www.rstreet.org/2022/05/26/revised-antitrusthttps://www.rstreet.org/2022/05/26/revised-antitrust
-bill-remains-fundamentally-flawed/. -bill-remains-fundamentally-flawed/.
83108 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra. 109 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(5) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(5) (2022). 110 HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at 435 (summarizing the test employed by most federal circuit courts of appeals). 111 Id. at 435-36.
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Unlike ” infra.
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would make it unlawful for an operator of a covered platform to condition access to or preferred placement on the platform on the purchase or use of other products offered by the platform operator that are not “part of or intrinsic to” the platform.84
Section 3(a)(5) resembles existing tying doctrine, with certain key differences. Under current law, a plaintiff can prevail on a tying claim by showing that:
1. The defendant offered two distinct products;
2. The defendant conditioned the sale of one product (the tying product) on the
purchase of the other product (the tied product);
3. The defendant possessed sufficient economic power in the tying product market
to coerce purchasers into acceptance of the tied product; and
4. The defendant’s conduct affected a non-trivial amount of interstate commerce.85
Some courts have also required plaintiffs to demonstrate that a tying arrangement had anticompetitive effects in the tied product market.86
Unlike this test, Section 3(a)(5) does not contain an explicit market-power requirement. As this test, Section 3(a)(5) does not contain an explicit market-power requirement. As
discussed, the AICOA instead uses certain quantitative criteria and a “critical trading partner” discussed, the AICOA instead uses certain quantitative criteria and a “critical trading partner”
standard to identify the platforms that would be subject to its prohibitions.standard to identify the platforms that would be subject to its prohibitions.
87 112
Section 3(a)(5) would also depart from the tying test employed by some federal courts of appeals
Section 3(a)(5) would also depart from the tying test employed by some federal courts of appeals
that requires proof of anticompetitive effects.that requires proof of anticompetitive effects.
88113 Instead of requiring regulators to prove such Instead of requiring regulators to prove such
effects, S. 2992 would effects, S. 2992 would
allowal ow defendants to rebut a defendants to rebut a
prima facie case under Section 3(a)(5) by case under Section 3(a)(5) by
establishing an absence of competitive harm.establishing an absence of competitive harm.
89114
Section 3(a)(5) has attracted special attention because of its possible impact on Amazon Prime—a
Section 3(a)(5) has attracted special attention because of its possible impact on Amazon Prime—a
subscription service that offers Amazon customers fast shipping of eligible products, among other subscription service that offers Amazon customers fast shipping of eligible products, among other
benefits.benefits.
90115 An Amazon executive has argued that Section 3(a)(5) would prohibit the firm from An Amazon executive has argued that Section 3(a)(5) would prohibit the firm from
requiring third-party merchants to use Amazon’s requiring third-party merchants to use Amazon’s
fulfillmentfulfil ment services as a condition of services as a condition of
participating in Prime.participating in Prime.
91116 According to the company, such a rule would harm consumers because According to the company, such a rule would harm consumers because
it it
would prevent Amazon from being able to guarantee prompt delivery of Prime packages.would prevent Amazon from being able to guarantee prompt delivery of Prime packages.
92
84 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(5) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(5) (2022). 85 HOVENKAMP, supra note footnote 7, at 435 (summarizing the test employed by most federal circuit courts of appeals).
86 Id. at 435-36. 87117
The AICOA contains a provision that appears to be directed at this concern. The bil contains a
rule of construction that insulates firms from liability triggered “solely” by offering a
“fee-for-service subscription that provides benefits to covered platform users.”118
Section 3(a)(5)’s effect on Amazon Prime and other services likely to fal under the act’s coverage may ultimately depend on the meaning of the term “solely” in this rule of construction. For example, while the rule might insulate Amazon from certain types of claims involving Prime, this limiting language may preserve the possibility of liability for specific ways that Amazon structures the Prime program. In such cases, Amazon may need to rely on the general affirmative
defenses discussed below.119
Section 3(a)(6): Use of Data Section 3(a)(6) of S. 2992 would prohibit operators of covered platforms from using non-public data generated by business users or the customers of business users to support their own
competing products or services.120
112 See “Covered Platforms” supra. .
88113 See, e.g., Kaufman v. , Kaufman v.
TimeT ime Warner, 836 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2016); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Warner, 836 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2016); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf
Abstract & Abstract &
TitleT itle Inc., 758 Inc., 758
F.2d 1486, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985); Driskill v. Dallas CowboysF.2d 1486, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985); Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys
Football Club,Football Club,
Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974). Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974).
89 S. 114 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2). 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2).
90115 Compare Fact Sheet: How Compare Fact Sheet: How
the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S.the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S.
2992) Would Break Amazon Prime 2992) Would Break Amazon Prime
and Reduceand Reduce
Access to Amazon Basics,Access to Amazon Basics,
CHAMBER OF PROGRESS (Nov. 29, 2021), https://progresschamber.org/factCHAMBER OF PROGRESS (Nov. 29, 2021), https://progresschamber.org/fact
--
sheetsheet
-how-the-american-innovation-and-choice-online-act-s-2992-would-break-amazon-prime-and-block-amazon--how-the-american-innovation-and-choice-online-act-s-2992-would-break-amazon-prime-and-block-amazon-
basics/basics/
(arguing(arguing
that S. 2992’s tying prohibition would eliminate the logistics model that makes Amazon Prime that S. 2992’s tying prohibition would eliminate the logistics model that makes Amazon Prime
possible), with Sen.possible), with Sen.
Chuck Grassley,Chuck Grassley,
Q&A: Reining in UnbridledQ&A: Reining in Unbridled
Big Tech Big T ech (June 10, 2022), (June 10, 2022),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/qanda-reining-in-https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/qanda-reining-in-
unbridledunbridle d-big-tech-big-tech
(arguing(arguing
that S. 2992 that S. 2992
“explicitly does not impact subscription services, such as“explicitly does not impact subscription services, such as
Amazon Prime”). Amazon Prime”).
91116 Brian Huseman, Brian Huseman,
Antitrust Legislation and the Unintended Negative Consequences for American Consumers and
SmallSm all Businesses, AMAZON (June 1, 2022), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/antitrust, AMAZON (June 1, 2022), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/antitrust
--
legislation-and-the-unintended-negative-consequences-for-american-consumers-and-small-businesses. legislation-and-the-unintended-negative-consequences-for-american-consumers-and-small-businesses.
92117 See id. 118 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(7)(A)(vi)(II) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(8)(A)(vi)(II). 119 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra. 120 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(6) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(6).
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The AICOA contains a provision that appears to be directed at this concern. The bill contains a rule of construction that insulates firms from liability triggered “solely” by offering a “fee-for-service subscription that provides benefits to covered platform users.”93
Section 3(a)(5)’s effect on Amazon Prime and other services likely to fall under the act’s coverage may ultimately depend on the meaning of the term “solely” in this rule of construction. For example, while the rule might insulate Amazon from certain types of claims involving Prime, this limiting language may preserve the possibility of liability for specific ways that Amazon structures the Prime program. In such cases, Amazon may need to rely on the general affirmative defenses discussed below.94
Section 3(a)(6): Use of Data
Section 3(a)(6) of S. 2992 would prohibit operators of covered platforms from using non-public data generated by business users or the customers of business users to support their own competing products or services.95
The provision appears to respond to concerns that tech platforms have used their unique access to
The provision appears to respond to concerns that tech platforms have used their unique access to
user data to identify and imitate popular offerings. For example, in October 2020, a House user data to identify and imitate popular offerings. For example, in October 2020, a House
subcommittee concluded that Amazon had used third-party subcommittee concluded that Amazon had used third-party
sellersel er data to find profitable data to find profitable
opportunities to develop its own private-label products.opportunities to develop its own private-label products.
96121 Apple has also Apple has also
allegedly al egedly used used
information from app developers to build competing offerings and integrate certain functionalities information from app developers to build competing offerings and integrate certain functionalities
into its iOS operating system.into its iOS operating system.
97
Challenges122
Chal enges to such practices have to such practices have
traditionallytraditional y sounded in sounded in
intellectualintel ectual-property (IP) law rather -property (IP) law rather
than antitrust, to the extent that they involve possible patent infringement.than antitrust, to the extent that they involve possible patent infringement.
98123 The two bodies of The two bodies of
law stand in some tension: while antitrust safeguards competition, IP law offers temporary law stand in some tension: while antitrust safeguards competition, IP law offers temporary
monopolies over protected technology to incentivize innovation.monopolies over protected technology to incentivize innovation.
99 124
Some commentators have argued that the innovation concerns driving IP law may extend to
Some commentators have argued that the innovation concerns driving IP law may extend to
certain certain
non-patented technology that tech platforms stand accused of copying. technology that tech platforms stand accused of copying.
100125 For example, For example,
when a platform copies non-patented technology that nevertheless requires significant investment when a platform copies non-patented technology that nevertheless requires significant investment
93 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(7)(A)(vi)(II) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(8)(A)(vi)(II). 94 See “Affirmative Defenses” infra. 95 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(6) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(6). 96 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note footnote 1, at 274-82. 97 See, e.g., id. at 361-64; Reed Albergotti, How Apple Uses in innovation, the platform’s conduct arguably raises the same free-rider problems that motivate
IP law.126
In addition to these innovation issues, anti-copying measures like Section 3(a)(6) may be
motivated by fairness considerations.127
In practice, however, these animating principles would not necessarily play a direct role in Section 3(a)(6)’s application. S. 2992 would al ow a defendant to rebut a prima facie case under that provision by proving an absence of harm to competition—not innovation or fairness.128 As
noted, those goals can pull in different directions.
Depending on the interpretation of the relevant language, the burden to prove an absence of competitive harm may be fairly easy to satisfy. A platform’s entry into a new market—whether it involves copying a rival product or not—wil typical y increase the type of competition that
antitrust protects.129 To the extent that Section 3(a)(6) is motivated by concerns other than
121 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 274-82. 122 See, e.g., id. at 361-64; Reed Albergotti, How Apple Uses its App Store to Copy the Best Ideas, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, , WASH. POST (Sept. 5,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/05/how-apple-uses-its-app-store-copy-best-ideas/. 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/05/how-apple-uses-its-app-store-copy-best-ideas/.
98123 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp,
Monopolizing and the Sherman Act, Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 52 (Jan. 2022), , Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 52 (Jan. 2022),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3772&context=faculty_scholarshiphttps://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3772&context=faculty_scholarship
. .
99124 Herbert Hovenkamp, Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, ,
in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
1979, 1979 (2008). Many commentators and judicial1979, 1979 (2008). Many commentators and judicial
decisions decisions have discussedhave discussed
the different strategies of IP law and the different strategies of IP law and
antitrust for promoting economic welfare. antitrust for promoting economic welfare.
See, e.g., SCM, SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (
2d Cir. 1981) 2d Cir. 1981)
(“(“
TheT he conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed
to achieve to achieve
reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws rewardreciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward
the the
inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.”). inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.”).
100
125 See Sam Sam
Bowman, Bowman,
Amazon’s Tightrope: Balancing Innovation and Competition on Amazon’s Marketplace, ,
TRUTHT RUTH ON THE MARKET (Apr. 27, 2020), https://ON THE MARKET (Apr. 27, 2020), https://
truthonthemarkett ruthonthemarket.com/2020/04/27/amazons-.com/2020/04/27/amazons-
tightropetight rope-balancing-innovation--balancing-innovation-
and-competition-on-amazons-marketplace/. and-competition-on-amazons-marketplace/.
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in innovation, the platform’s conduct arguably raises the same free-rider problems that motivate IP law.101
In addition to these innovation issues, anti-copying measures like Section 3(a)(6) may be motivated by fairness considerations.102
In practice, however, these animating principles would not necessarily play a direct role in Section 3(a)(6)’s application. S. 2992 would allow a defendant to rebut a prima facie case under that provision by proving an absence of harm to competition—not innovation or fairness.103 As noted, those goals can pull in different directions.
Depending on the interpretation of the relevant language, the burden to prove an absence of competitive harm may be fairly easy to satisfy. A platform’s entry into a new market—whether it involves copying a rival product or not—will typically increase the type of competition that antitrust protects.104 To the extent that Section 3(a)(6) is motivated by concerns other than 126 See id. 127 See generally Francesco Ducci & Michael T rebilcock, The Revival of Fairness Discourse in Competition Policy, 64 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 79 (2019).
128 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2) (2022). 129 See Hovenkamp, supra note 124, at 1979 (“As a general proposition, the more firms that offer a product the more competitive will be its output and price.”).
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competition, then, the affirmative defense for an absence of competitive harm may narrow the competition, then, the affirmative defense for an absence of competitive harm may narrow the
provision’s scope in ways that are inconsistent with its theoretical underpinnings. provision’s scope in ways that are inconsistent with its theoretical underpinnings.
Section 3(a)(8): App Preinstallation and Steering
Section 3(a)(8) of the AICOA would make it unlawful for the operator of a covered platform to Section 3(a)(8) of the AICOA would make it unlawful for the operator of a covered platform to
““
materiallymaterial y restrict or impede” platform users from restrict or impede” platform users from
uninstalling preinstalleduninstal ing preinstal ed apps or changing apps or changing
default settings that steer users to the platform operator’s products or services.default settings that steer users to the platform operator’s products or services.
105130 Such restrictions Such restrictions
would be permissible, however, when necessary for the security or functioning of the platform or would be permissible, however, when necessary for the security or functioning of the platform or
to prevent data from being transferred to the government of the People’s Republic of China or a to prevent data from being transferred to the government of the People’s Republic of China or a
foreign adversary.foreign adversary.
106 131
The provision is a response to concerns that Apple and Google—which control the leading mobile
The provision is a response to concerns that Apple and Google—which control the leading mobile
operating systems, iOS and Android—have used app operating systems, iOS and Android—have used app
preinstallationpreinstal ation, default settings, and related , default settings, and related
contractual restrictions to favor their own apps over rivals.contractual restrictions to favor their own apps over rivals.
107132
Section 3(a)(9): Self-Preferencing (Again)
Involving Platform Interfaces Section 3(a)(9) of the May 25 draft would prohibit operators of covered platforms from using Section 3(a)(9) of the May 25 draft would prohibit operators of covered platforms from using
their platform interfaces (including search or ranking functionalities) to treat their own products their platform interfaces (including search or ranking functionalities) to treat their own products
or services more favorably than those of other business users “in a manner that is inconsistent or services more favorably than those of other business users “in a manner that is inconsistent
with the neutral, fair, and non-discriminatory treatment of with the neutral, fair, and non-discriminatory treatment of
all al business users.”business users.”
108
101 See id. 102 See generally Francesco Ducci & Michael Trebilcock, The Revival of Fairness Discourse in Competition Policy, 64 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 79 (2019).
103 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2) (2022). 104 See Hovenkamp, supra note footnote 99, at 1979 (“As a general proposition, the more firms that offer a product the more competitive will be its output and price.”). 105 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(8) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(8). 106 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(8)(A)-(B) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(8)(A)-(B). 107 See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note footnote 1, at 352-58, 379. 108 May 25 Draft § 3(a)(9). The reported version of the bill would prohibit operators of covered platforms from using their platform interfaces to favor their products or services “relative to those of another business user than under [sic] standards mandating the neutral, fair, and nondiscriminatory treatment of all business users.” S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(9) (Reported Version).
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The provision appears to overlap with Section 3(a)(1)’s self-preferencing prohibition, but there are three apparent differences.
First, unlike Section 3(a)(1), Section 3(a)(9) would not require regulators to
establish competitive harm.
Second, Section 3(a)(9)’s prohibition is limited to a platform operator’s use of its
platform interface, while Section 3(a)(1) is not.
Third, Section 3(a)(9) would require regulators to establish that a platform
operator’s conduct was “inconsistent with the neutral, fair, and non-discriminatory treatment of all business users,” while Section 3(a)(1) does not include such a requirement.109
Section 3(a)(10): Retaliation for Reports to Law Enforcement
Section 3(a)(10) of the AICOA would make it unlawful for the operator of a covered platform to retaliate against business users that raise good-faith concerns with law-enforcement authorities about actual or potential violations of law.110
Comparing Different Versions of the AICOA: S. 2992 and H.R. 3816
While S. 2992 would bar operators of covered platforms from engaging in 10 categories of conduct, H.R. 3816 contains 13 prohibitions. 133
The provision appears to overlap with Section 3(a)(1)’s self-preferencing prohibition, but there
are three apparent differences.
First, unlike Section 3(a)(1), Section 3(a)(9) would not require regulators to
establish competitive harm.
Second, Section 3(a)(9)’s prohibition is limited to a platform operator’s use of its
platform interface, while Section 3(a)(1) is not.
Third, Section 3(a)(9) would require regulators to establish that a platform
operator’s conduct was “inconsistent with the neutral, fair, and
non-discriminatory treatment of al business users,” while Section 3(a)(1) does not include such a requirement.134
Section 3(a)(10): Retaliation for Reports to Law Enforcement Section 3(a)(10) of the AICOA would make it unlawful for the operator of a covered platform to retaliate against business users that raise good-faith concerns with law-enforcement authorities
about actual or potential violations of law.135
130 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(8) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(8). 131 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(8)(A)-(B) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(8)(A)-(B). 132 See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 1, at 352-58, 379. 133 May 25 Draft § 3(a)(9). T he reported version of the bill would prohibit operators of covered platforms from using their platform interfaces to favor their products or services “ relative to those of another business user than under [sic] standards mandating the neutral, fair, and nondiscriminatory treatment of all business users.” S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(9) (Reported Version).
134 May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1), (a)(9). 135 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(10) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(10).
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Comparing Different Versions of the AICOA: S. 2992 and H.R. 3816
While S. 2992 would bar operators of covered platforms from engaging in 10 categories of conduct, H.R. 3816 contains 13 prohibitions. See S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25
Draft § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022); H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a)-(b) (2021). The additional offenses in the House Draft § 3(a)(1)-(10) (2022); H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a)-(b) (2021). The additional offenses in the House
committee-reportedcommittee-reported
bil involve restrictionsbil involve restrictions
on business users’on business users’
communications with platform users,communications with platform users,
interference interference
with business users’with business users’
pricing of their products and services,pricing of their products and services,
and specific types of interoperability.and specific types of interoperability.
See H.R. 3816, H.R. 3816,
117th Cong. § 2(b)(6), (b)(8)-(9).117th Cong. § 2(b)(6), (b)(8)-(9).
Although severalAlthough several
of the other prohibitions in S. 2992 and H.R. 3816 overlap, there are also key differences.of the other prohibitions in S. 2992 and H.R. 3816 overlap, there are also key differences.
Unlike Unlike
S. 2992—which would make harm to competition an element of three offenses—none of H.R. 3816’s prohibitions S. 2992—which would make harm to competition an element of three offenses—none of H.R. 3816’s prohibitions
would requirewould require
proof of competitiveproof of competitive
harm as part of a plaintiff’s case-in-chief. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(3) harm as part of a plaintiff’s case-in-chief. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(1)-(3)
(Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(3); H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a)-(b).(Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1)-(3); H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a)-(b).
Affirmative Defenses
Section 3(b) of the Section 3(b) of the
bill bil would provide operators of covered platforms with several affirmative would provide operators of covered platforms with several affirmative
defenses.defenses.
Section 3(b)(1) of the May 25 draft would offer an affirmative defense to
Section 3(b)(1) of the May 25 draft would offer an affirmative defense to
all al of the of the
billbil ’s ’s
prohibitions for conduct that is “reasonably tailored and reasonably necessary, such that the prohibitions for conduct that is “reasonably tailored and reasonably necessary, such that the
conduct could not be achieved through conduct could not be achieved through
materiallymaterial y less discriminatory means, to”: less discriminatory means, to”:
Prevent a violation of, or comply with, federal or state law;
Prevent a violation of, or comply with, federal or state law;
Protect safety, user privacy, the security of non-public data, or the security of a Protect safety, user privacy, the security of non-public data, or the security of a
covered platform; or
covered platform; or
Maintain or
Maintain or
substantiallysubstantial y enhance the “core functionality” of a covered enhance the “core functionality” of a covered
platform.
platform.
111
109 May 25 Draft § 3(a)(1), (a)(9). 110 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(10) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(a)(10). 111 May 25 Draft § 3(b)(1). The parallel defense in the reported version of the bill would allow defendants to rebut a prima facie case under Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) by showing that their conduct was “narrowly tailored, nonpretextual, and
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As discussed, Section 3(b)(2) would offer an affirmative defense to the prohibitions in Sections 3(a)(4)-(10) for conduct that “has not resulted in and would not result in material harm to competition.”112
Defendants would bear the burden of proving these defenses by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., by proving that the relevant propositions are more likely true than not true).113
The bill’s proponents have argued that the defenses appropriately place the burden to defend potentially anticompetitive conduct on platform operators, who have more information about their products than regulators.114 The May 25 version of the legislation also relaxed certain language in previous iterations of Section 3(b)(1) in response to criticism that the earlier defenses would have been overly difficult for defendants to establish.115
Critics have contended that even the less demanding language in the May 25 draft may chill 136
As discussed, Section 3(b)(2) would offer an affirmative defense to the prohibitions in Sections 3(a)(4)-(10) for conduct that “has not resulted in and would not result in material harm
to competition.”137
Defendants would bear the burden of proving these defenses by a preponderance of the evidence
(i.e., by proving that the relevant propositions are more likely true than not true).138
The bil ’s proponents have argued that the defenses appropriately place the burden to defend potential y anticompetitive conduct on platform operators, who have more information about their products than regulators.139 The May 25 version of the legislation also relaxed certain language in
136 May 25 Draft § 3(b)(1). T he parallel defense in the reported version of the bill would allow defendants to rebut a prim a facie case under Sections 3(a)(1)-(3) by showing that their conduct was “ narrowly tailored, nonpretextual, and reasonably necessary” to achieve any of the goals identified in the May 25 version. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (Reported Version). For the other seven offenses, the reported version of the bill would allow defendants to re but a prim a facie case by showing that their conduct “ was narrowly tailored, could not be achieved through less discriminatory means, was nonpretextual, and was reasonably necessary” to achieve any of those same goals. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (Reported Version). 137 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2). 138 See S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(1)-(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(4); United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2021).
139 Scott Morton, et al., supra note 9, at 3-4.
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previous iterations of Section 3(b)(1) in response to criticism that the earlier defenses would have
been overly difficult for defendants to establish.140
Critics have contended that even the less demanding language in the May 25 draft may chil
platforms’ efforts to promote privacy and data security. In particular, these commentators have platforms’ efforts to promote privacy and data security. In particular, these commentators have
argued that platforms often engage in duplicative efforts to protect customers, which may leave argued that platforms often engage in duplicative efforts to protect customers, which may leave
them vulnerable to claims that they could achieve their goals through “them vulnerable to claims that they could achieve their goals through “
materiallymaterial y less less
discriminatory means.”discriminatory means.”
116141
Comparing Different Versions of the AICOA: S. 2992 and H.R. 3816
The affirmative defenses
The affirmative defenses
in H.R. 3816 differ from those in S. 2992. As discussed, S. 2992 would in H.R. 3816 differ from those in S. 2992. As discussed, S. 2992 would
allowal ow defendants defendants
to rebut a to rebut a
prima facie case under Sections 3(a)(4)-(10) by proving an absence of “material case under Sections 3(a)(4)-(10) by proving an absence of “material
harm to competition” by harm to competition” by
a preponderance of the evidence.a preponderance of the evidence.
See S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2022) (Reported Version); May 25
Draft § 3(b)(2) (2022). In contrast, the corresponding defense in H.R. 3816 would require defendants to prove an Draft § 3(b)(2) (2022). In contrast, the corresponding defense in H.R. 3816 would require defendants to prove an
absence of harm to “the competitive process”absence of harm to “the competitive process”
by clearby clear
and convincing evidence. H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(1) and convincing evidence. H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(1)
(2021).(2021).
The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is moreThe clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is more
stringent than a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden. The stringent than a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden. The
latter requireslatter requires
evidence that makes it moreevidence that makes it more
likely likely than not that a proposition is true.than not that a proposition is true.
See, e.g., United States v. , United States v.
Watkins,Watkins,
10 F.4th 1179, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2021). By contrast, the clear-and-convincing-evidence test demands 10 F.4th 1179, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2021). By contrast, the clear-and-convincing-evidence test demands
that the evidence makesthat the evidence makes
a contention “highly probable.” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). a contention “highly probable.” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
According to a large empiricalAccording to a large empirical
study, many judges regard 75% probability as a reasonable approximation of the study, many judges regard 75% probability as a reasonable approximation of the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
See C.M.A. McCauliff, C.M.A. McCauliff,
Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence,
or Constitutional Guarantees?,,
35 VAND. L.35 VAND. L.
REV. 1293, 1328-29 (1982).REV. 1293, 1328-29 (1982).
The House committee-reportedThe House committee-reported
bil would also offer affirmative defensesbil would also offer affirmative defenses
related to privacy and data security. related to privacy and data security.
Defendants could rebut a Defendants could rebut a
prima facie case under H.R. 3816 by establishing by clear and convincing evidence that case under H.R. 3816 by establishing by clear and convincing evidence that
reasonably necessary” to achieve any of the goals identified in the May 25 version. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (Reported Version). For the other seven offenses, the reported version of the bill would allow defendants to rebut a prima facie case by showing that their conduct “was narrowly tailored, could not be achieved through less discriminatory means, was nonpretextual, and was reasonably necessary” to achieve any of those same goals. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (Reported Version).
112 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(2). 113 See S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(b)(1)-(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(b)(4); United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2021).
114 Scott Morton, et al., supra note footnote 9, at 3-4. 115their conduct was “narrowly tailored, could not be achieved through less discriminatory means, was nonpretextual, and was necessary” to prevent a violation of law, protect user privacy, or protect non-public data. H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(2). While the evidentiary standards differ, the substantive language in this defense is similar to—but not identical with—paral el affirmative defenses in the reported version of S. 2992. See note 136 supra. As discussed, Senator Klobuchar’s May 25 draft relaxed the relevant language in several respects. Unlike both bil s in the Senate, H.R. 3816 would not offer an affirmative defense related to the maintenance or enhancement of platform functionality. The House committee-reported bil would, however, offer a defense that does not appear in either version of S. 2992. Specifical y, defendants could rebut a prima facie case under H.R. 3816 by establishing by clear and convincing evidence that their conduct “increases consumer welfare.” H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(3).
Enforcement S. 2992 would grant enforcement authority to the DOJ, the FTC, and state attorneys general.142
The bil does not contain a private right of action.
140 See, e.g., Letter from Aurelian Portuese to Sen. Dick Durbin, et al., 3 (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www2.itif.org/2022-, Letter from Aurelian Portuese to Sen. Dick Durbin, et al., 3 (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www2.itif.org/2022-
ITIFIT IF-letter-S2992.pdf (criticizing an earlier iteration of Section 3(b) for establishing “-letter-S2992.pdf (criticizing an earlier iteration of Section 3(b) for establishing “
insurmountable thresholds” for insurmountable thresholds” for
the relevant affirmative defenses); Letter from the relevant affirmative defenses); Letter from
TimothyT imothy Powderly to Sen. Dick Durbin, Powderly to Sen. Dick Durbin,
et al., 2 (Jan. 18, 2022), et al., 2 (Jan. 18, 2022),
https://9to5mac.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2022/01/Apple-letter-full.pdf (criticizing an earlier iteration of https://9to5mac.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2022/01/Apple-letter-full.pdf (criticizing an earlier iteration of
Section 3(b) for establishingSection 3(b) for establishing
“ “a nearly insurmountable test”). For the relevant language in the reported version of the a nearly insurmountable test”). For the relevant language in the reported version of the
bill,bill,
see note see note
footnote 111136 supra. .
116141 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Spiwak,, Lawrence J. Spiwak,
The Third Time is Not the Charm: Significant Problems Remain With Senator
Klobuchar’s Antitrust Reform Bill, ,
THET HE FEDERALIST SOC’Y (June 7, 2022), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc- FEDERALIST SOC’Y (June 7, 2022), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-
blog/the-third-time-is-not-the-charm-significantblog/the-third-time-is-not-the-charm-significant
-problems-remain-with-senator-klobuchar-s-antitrust-problems-remain-with-senator-klobuchar-s-antitrust
-reform-bill.
142 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(1) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(1).
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-reform-bill.
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their conduct was “narrowly tailored, could not be achieved through less discriminatory means, was nonpretextual, and was necessary” to prevent a violation of law, protect user privacy, or protect non-public data. H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(2). While the evidentiary standards differ, the substantive language in this defense is similar to—but not identical with—parallel affirmative defenses in the reported version of S. 2992. See note footnote 111 supra. As discussed, Senator Klobuchar’s May 25 draft relaxed the relevant language in several respects. Unlike both bil s in the Senate, H.R. 3816 would not offer an affirmative defense related to the maintenance or enhancement of platform functionality. The House committee-reported bil would, however, offer a defense that does not appear in either version of S. 2992. Specifically, defendants could rebut a prima facie case under H.R. 3816 by establishing by clear and convincing evidence that their conduct “increases consumer welfare.” H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(3).
Enforcement
S. 2992 would grant enforcement authority to the DOJ, the FTC, and state attorneys general.117 The bill does not contain a private right of action.
As discussed, the legislation would empower the DOJ and FTC to jointly designate firms that
As discussed, the legislation would empower the DOJ and FTC to jointly designate firms that
meet the relevant criteria as covered platforms.meet the relevant criteria as covered platforms.
118143 Such designations would be valid for seven Such designations would be valid for seven
years, though the DOJ and FTC would be years, though the DOJ and FTC would be
allowedal owed to reevaluate designation decisions upon to reevaluate designation decisions upon
receiving a request showing that a platform no longer meets the relevant criteria.receiving a request showing that a platform no longer meets the relevant criteria.
119144 Designated Designated
platforms would also be permitted to seek judicialplatforms would also be permitted to seek judicial
review of their designations.review of their designations.
120145
Section 4 of the
Section 4 of the
bill bil would direct the DOJ and FTC to jointly issue guidelines outlining their would direct the DOJ and FTC to jointly issue guidelines outlining their
interpretation of the “interpretation of the “
materiallymaterial y harm competition” standard in Section 3(a) and the affirmative harm competition” standard in Section 3(a) and the affirmative
defenses in Section 3(b), in addition to their policies regarding civil penalties.defenses in Section 3(b), in addition to their policies regarding civil penalties.
121146
Under the May 25 version of the legislation, firms that violate the
Under the May 25 version of the legislation, firms that violate the
billbil ’s prohibitions would be ’s prohibitions would be
liableliable
for up to 10% of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred.for up to 10% of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred.
122147 In cases of recurring violations, the legislation would authorize courts to order a firm’s chief In cases of recurring violations, the legislation would authorize courts to order a firm’s chief
executive officer to forfeit any compensation received during the 12 months preceding the filing executive officer to forfeit any compensation received during the 12 months preceding the filing
of a complaint.148
Comparing Different Versions of the AICOA: S. 2992 and H.R. 3816
The versions of the AICOA pending in the Senate and the House would adopt different enforcement schemes. As discussed, the May 25 version of a complaint.123
117 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(1) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(1). 118 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(1) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d)(1). 119 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(1)(C), (d)(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d)(1)(C), (d)(2). 120 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d)(3). 121 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 4(a) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 4(a). 122 May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(B). Under the reported version of S. 2992, violators would be liable for up to 15% of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(B) (Reported Version).
123 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(D) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(D).
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Comparing Different Versions of the AICOA: S. 2992 and H.R. 3816
The versions of the AICOA pending in the Senate and the House would adopt different enforcement schemes. As discussed, the May 25 version of S. 2992 would authorize penalties of up to 10% of a defendant’s total U.S. of S. 2992 would authorize penalties of up to 10% of a defendant’s total U.S.
revenue over the course of a violation.revenue over the course of a violation.
May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(B) (2022). Under H.R. 3816, by contrast, violators May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(B) (2022). Under H.R. 3816, by contrast, violators
would face penalties of up to (1) 15% of their total U.S. revenue for the previous calendar year, or (2) 30% of the would face penalties of up to (1) 15% of their total U.S. revenue for the previous calendar year, or (2) 30% of the
U.S. revenue of entitiesU.S. revenue of entities
“affected or targeted” by the offending conduct, calculated over“affected or targeted” by the offending conduct, calculated over
the course of a violation. the course of a violation.
H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(f)(1) (2021).H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(f)(1) (2021).
H.R. 3816 also explicitly contemplates that divestiture ordersH.R. 3816 also explicitly contemplates that divestiture orders
may be appropriate remediesmay be appropriate remedies
for violations of the for violations of the
bil .bil .
The legislation providesThe legislation provides
that, if a court determinesthat, if a court determines
that a violation arisesthat a violation arises
from a “conflict of interest” related from a “conflict of interest” related
to a platform operator’sto a platform operator’s
control of multiple business lines,control of multiple business lines,
the court “the court “
shall shal consider” and “may order” divestiture consider” and “may order” divestiture
of the business lines giving riseof the business lines giving rise
to the conflict.to the conflict.
H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(f)(2)(D). S. 2992 does not contain an H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(f)(2)(D). S. 2992 does not contain an
analogous provision,analogous provision,
but instead makesbut instead makes
clear that it does not “prevent or limit”clear that it does not “prevent or limit”
regulators from seekingregulators from seeking
equitable equitable
relief.relief.
S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(C)(i )(V) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(C)(i )(V). S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(C)(i )(V) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(C)(i )(V).
One of the mostOne of the most
significant differences involvessignificant differences involves
the legislation’sthe legislation’s
would-be enforcers:would-be enforcers:
H.R. 3816 includes a private H.R. 3816 includes a private
right of action for treble damages, whileright of action for treble damages, while
S. 2992 does not. H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 6(a).S. 2992 does not. H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 6(a).
Conclusion
The AICOA reflects many of the concerns about digital competition that have occupied The AICOA reflects many of the concerns about digital competition that have occupied
congressional attention over the past several years. It also implicates difficult questions involving congressional attention over the past several years. It also implicates difficult questions involving
innovation, privacy, data security, and online speech. Regardless of whether S. 2992 or H.R. 3816 innovation, privacy, data security, and online speech. Regardless of whether S. 2992 or H.R. 3816
ultimately becomes law, the issues motivating the bills may continue to garner legislative interest. ultimately becomes law, the issues motivating the bills may continue to garner legislative interest.
143 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(1) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d)(1). 144 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(1)(C), (d)(2) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d)(1)(C), (d)(2). 145 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(d)(3) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(d)(3). 146 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 4(a) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 4(a). 147 May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(B). Under the reported version of S. 2992, violators would be liable for up to 15 percent of their total U.S. revenue for the period in which the violation occurred. S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(B) (Reported Version). 148 S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 3(c)(5)(D) (Reported Version); May 25 Draft § 3(c)(6)(D).
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Author Information
Jay B. Sykes Jay B. Sykes
Legislative Attorney
Legislative Attorney
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