African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA):
August 1, 2022May 3, 2023
Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief
Nicolas Cook
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a framework agreement signed by 54 ofnascent goods and services free trade Specialist in African Affairs zone that African Union (AU) member states created to foster greater intracontinental trade and investment as means of spurring economic integration and growth in Africa. Fifty-four of 55 AU Liana Wong member states have signed a framework agreement establishing the AfCFTA, which covers a Analyst in International region with a joint gross domestic product of approximately $3.4 trillion and a population of Trade and Finance roughly 1.4 billion people. The agreement centers on the implementation and continuing phased negotiation of various commitments to reduce or eliminate tariffs, prospectively including up to 97% of all tariff lines, as well as nontariff barriers to trade. The agreement, which came into force in May 2019, is to be supplemented by additional protocols on particular trade issues. Some of these protocols have been provisionally agreed to, while others remain subject to negotiation. AfCFTA’s initial implementation phase, centering on trade in goods, began in January 2021. Little trading has occurred under the agreement to date, due to a need to finalize administrative processes and negotiations on certain issues, including rules of origin. Long-term AfCFTA goals are to create a single market for goods, services, and capital, including a single African customs union, and enable the intraregional free movement of persons. Many policymakers and economists view the AfCFTA as an ambitious trade policy initiative with considerable potential to stimulate economic development in Africa, if implemented as envisioned. The World Bank, for example, estimates that the AfCFTA could increase Africa-wide real income by 7% and potentially lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty by 2035. The ultimate success of the agreement may depend on the ability and political will of signatory countries to resolve the remaining issues under negotiation and effectively implement their AfCFTA commitments. Success will also be affected by private sector use of AfCFTA benefits. Congress has enacted a range of measures that seek to improve African countries’ ability to engage in international trade and align closely with the aims of the AfCFTA agreement, and has appropriated funds for such purposes
Specialist in African Affairs
the 55 members of the African Union (AU) that seeks to remove barriers to intra-African trade

and investment through the phased negotiation and implementation of various commitments. The
Brock R. Williams
agreement aims to foster greater African regional economic integration, which lags behind that of
Specialist in International
other world regions, and to promote economic growth. Commitments include the eventual
Trade and Finance
elimination of tariffs on 97% of tariff lines. Long-term goals are to create a single market for

goods, services, and capital, including a common African customs union, and enable the intra-
regional free movement of persons. Congress may have interest in the agreement and its
Rileigh K. Greutert
implementation due to the AfCFTA’s potential effects on U.S. economic relations with the
Research Assistant
region, and given congressional statements in support of efforts to improve African countries’

ability to engage in international trade and mandates to the executive branch to use U.S. funds to
help achieve this.

While the AfCFTA’s primary goal is to increase trade within Africa, the successful implementation of the agreement could
also benefit the United States and help attain longstanding and congressionally-supported U.S. policy goals in the region. It
aims, for instance, to promote trade liberalization and market-oriented reforms within Africa, stimulate economic growth, and
expand the size and diversity of African economies and markets. These objectives, if realized, could expand U.S. market
access to the region, potentially decrease the need for U.S. development assistance in the region, and, increase reciprocal
opportunities for U.S.-African trade and investment.
The United States, partly as directed by Congress, has provided assistance to expand Africa’s intra-regional and global trade
through various initiatives, and has supported the ongoing negotiation and implementation of the AfCFTA under both the
Trump and Biden Administrations. Through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended), . Through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended),
which which providessunsets in 2025, Congress has provided preferential U.S. tariff treatment to imports from eligible sub-Saharan African countries preferential U.S. tariff treatment to imports from eligible sub-Saharan African countries and is currently
authorized through September 2025. Under AGOA, Congress has , Congress has stated itsexpressed support for African regional support for African regional integration effortseconomic integration and directed the and directed the
President to provide trade capacityPresident to provide trade capacity building (TCB) assistance toward this aim. -building assistance to Africa. Congress also has supported and encouraged Congress also has supported and encouraged
African countries’ African countries’ participation inaccession and adherence to and adherence to trade agreements at the World Trade Organization World Trade Organization (WTO)-administered agreements(WTO), including the , including the
WTO Trade Facilitation AgreementTrade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which share many common objectives with, which generally complements the the AfCFTA. Selected U.S. executive branch agencies, under both the Trump and Biden Administrations, have expressed support for the AfCFTA and provided targeted technical assistance to directly aid ongoing AfCFTA negotiation and implementation activities. In the 117th Congress, some Members of Congress also backed efforts to support such goals (e.g., under H.R. 9364 and S. 5154), and several hearings examined the AfCFTA and related topics. In the 118th Congress, Representative Kamlager-Dove has introduced H.Res. 261, which would express “strong support” for AfCFTA. The AfCFTA is primarily designed to foster trade-centered growth within Africa, but its successful realization could benefit the U.S. private sector and advance long-standing congressionally supported U.S. policy goals for the region. For instance, AfCFTA aims to promote trade liberalization, market-oriented reforms, and economic growth in Africa and to increase the size, diversity, and integration of African economies and markets—all longtime U.S. goals. Such outcomes could expand U.S. market access to and trade with Africa, decrease the need for U.S. development assistance in the region, diversify U.S. supply chains, and increase reciprocal opportunities for U.S.-African trade and investment expansionAfCFTA.
In addition to the United States, other foreign governments and international organizations support the AfCFTA. The
European Union (EU) has been a prominent partner in the AfCFTA’s development and has funded such initiatives. China
also has stated its support for the AfCFTA and, given its increasingly prominent position as an economic partner to many
African countries, China may be particularly interested in the agreement’s ongoing negotiation and implementation. In 2021,
China’s trade with Africa ($254.0 billion) was nearly four times larger than U.S. trade with the region ($64.1 billion). These
governments and other African trading partners may seek to influence the nature of AfCFTA commitments in line with their
own trade and foreign policy objectives. Currently, there appears to be no comprehensive reporting . Currently, there appears to be no comprehensive reporting ofon U.S. foreign assistance U.S. foreign assistance
specifically specifically inallocated to support support of the AfCFTA, which may make it challenging for Congress to evaluate how such U.S. the AfCFTA, which may make it challenging for Congress to evaluate how such U.S. support
assistance compares to or complements that of other African trade partners compares to or complements that of other African trade partners and whether U.S. assistanceor other U.S. economic development programs in Africa or elsewhere—or whether it is sufficient to address is sufficient to address
congressional objectives in the region.
Many policymakers and economists view the AfCFTA as an ambitious trade policy initiative with considerable potential to
stimulate economic development in Africa, if implemented as envisioned. The World Bank, for example, estimates that the
AfCFTA could increase Africa-wide real income by 7% and potentially lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty by
2035. The first phase of the AfCFTA, which focuses primarily on goods and services trade liberalization, technically took
effect on January 1, 2021, but little trading has actually occurred under AfCFTA rules due to pending and related
negotiations on certain issues, notably on rules of origin. The ultimate success of the agreement may depend on the members’
ability and political will to resolve the remaining issues under negotiation and fully implement the agreement’s commitments.

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congressional objectives in the region. The United States is not alone in expressing support for AfCFTA; multilateral organizations and other external actors, including the People’s Republic of China, may seek to influence the nature of AfCFTA and aid its development in a manner that suits their own trade and foreign policy objectives, which may differ from U.S. ones. The European Union has provided substantial technical aid supporting the AfCFTA’s development. China also has stated its support for the AfCFTA, and may be particularly interested in the agreement’s ongoing negotiation and implementation given its prominent trade relations with Africa. (In 2021, China’s trade with Africa [$254 billion] was nearly four times larger than U.S. trade with the region [$64 billion]). Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 10 link to page 13 link to page 16 link to page 13 link to page 19 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background on U.S. Trade Initiatives in Africa ........................................................................ 12
AfCFTA: Overview and Implementation ........................................................................................ 34
U.S. Assistance for AfCFTA’s Development ................................................................................... 8 6
U.S.- AfCFTA Support andin Context of Broader U.S. TCB Efforts ............................................................. 7 9
International Support for the AfCFTA ............................................................................................. 8 11
China’s Engagement with the AfCFTA ................................................................................... 1012
Outlook and Selected Issues for Congress ..................................................................................... 11 13

Figures
Figure 1. AfCFTA Ratification Status and African Trade Overview ............................................... 57
Figure 2. United States TCB Funding by Region ............................................and for Africa by Agency ................................ 710
Figure 3. U.S. and Chinese Trade in Goods with Africa ............................................................... 1013

Tables
Table 1. U.S. TCB Funding to Africa, by Category ........................................................................ 8 10

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 1416

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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

Introduction
Since 2019, the U.S. government has sought to spur intra-African trade, including by supporting
the successful negotiation, implementation, and continuing development of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA is a framework agreement signed by 54 of
the 55 members of the African Union (AU), or all AU members except Eritrea, that seeks to
remove barriers to intra-African trade and investment through the phased negotiation and
implementation of various commitments. Forty-three signatories have ratified the agreement to
date. While the AfCFTA’s primary goal is to increase trade within Africa, the successful
implementation of the agreement also could benefit the United States and help attain longstanding
and congressionally-supported U.S. policy goals in the region. ItThe African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a trade zone established in the late 2010s by African Union (AU) member states to foster greater intracontinental trade- and investment-based economic integration and growth. The AfCFTA was established under a framework agreement that has been signed by 54 of the 55 AU member states—all AU members except Eritrea—and came into force in May 2019. The AfCFTA (a term used in this report to refer both to the agreement and the trade zone that it establishes) centers on the phased negotiation and implementation of a range of commitments to reduce or eliminate as many as 97% of all tariff lines and to reduce nontariff barriers to trade within Africa. As of April 2023, 46 signatories had ratified the agreement. Multiple U.S. administrations have sought to promote African economic development by helping countries expand intra-African and African-U.S. trade. Since 2019, the U.S. government also has supported the negotiation, implementation, and continuing development of the AfCFTA. Several U.S. agencies have provided ad hoc technical assistance and hosted dialogues seeking to advance such aims. In addition, the United States and the African Union’s AfCFTA Secretariat signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in late 2022 during the U.S.-Africa Business Forum, held as part of the Biden Administration’s U.S.-African Leaders Summit.1 The MOU provides for annual high-level dialogues between U.S. and AfCFTA Secretariat officials, quarterly working group meetings, information exchanges on best practices, and forums to receive stakeholder input, among other aims.2 Such ongoing or planned AfCFTA-specific support complements a range of other current and past U.S. trade capacity-building (TCB) efforts, which have been a focus of U.S. technical assistance activity for many years. While the AfCFTA’s core goal is to increase trade-centered growth in Africa, the agreement’s successful implementation could advance long-standing, congressionally backed U.S. policy goals for the region to enhance economic development and promote security, as well as directly benefit the U.S. economy. The AfCFTA aims, for instance, to promote aims, for instance, to promote
trade liberalization and market-oriented reforms within Africa; trade liberalization and market-oriented reforms within Africa; stimulateboost economic growth; and economic growth; and
expandincrease the size the size and diversity, diversity, and integration of African economies and markets. of African economies and markets. If fully implemented, the
AfCFTA could increaseThe AfCFTA, if substantially realized, could potentially contribute to U.S. economic growth by increasing opportunities for U.S.-African trade opportunities for U.S.-African trade and investment. It might, for instance, enable U.S. firms active in African markets to more easily leverage aggregate regional growth, value chain integration, and economies of scale, expanding or creatingand investment. U.S. firms active
within Africa, for example, may be able to leverage regional growth as a source of new markets new markets
for U.S. goods and servicesfor U.S. goods and services. Implementation of the agreement also could potentially, as well as U.S. imports. AfCFTA implementation also could eventually decrease the decrease the
need for U.S. development need for U.S. development assistanceaid in the region. in the region.
The reduction and The AfCFTA has the potential to benefit the United States in other ways as well, including with respect to supply chain diversification and in the context of global power competition. The reduction or elimination of regional trade barriers and other improvements in African elimination of regional trade barriers and other improvements in African
countries’ ability to engage in international trade countries’ ability to engage in international trade also could help diversifycould broaden U.S. and global supply chains, a prospect that aligns with the Biden Administration’s supply chain resilience initiatives. This may be 1 The signatories were U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and AfCFTA Secretary-General Wamkele Mene during the 2022 U.S.-Africa Business Forum. See USTR, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation for Trade and Investment Between the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat and the Government of the United States of America, December 14, 2022. 2 The USTR reports that the MOU “will establish annual high-level dialogues between U.S. and AfCFTA Secretariat officials, as well as quarterly working group meetings, to exchange information on best practices, receive stakeholder input, and have an open dialogue to enhance the relationship between the United States, the AfCFTA Secretariat, and AfCFTA member states.” USTR, “In Year 2, Ambassador Katherine Tai and USTR Continued to Execute President Biden’s Vision for Worker-Centered Trade Policy” (Fact Sheet), March 2022; and text of the MOU, op cit. Congressional Research Service 1 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress especially true with respect to a possible expansion of U.S.-African trade in U.S. and global supply
chains. In this sense, U.S. support for the AfCFTA could align with the Biden Administration’s
supply chain resilience initiatives, especially given the substantial African reserves of critical critical
minerals and other natural resources minerals and other natural resources that the Administration has identified as important to U.S. economic growth and security.important to U.S. economic growth and security.3 U.S. U.S.
support for the AfCFTA also has the potential to demonstrate the depth and scope of the U.S. support for the AfCFTA also has the potential to demonstrate the depth and scope of the U.S.
commitment to deepening U.S.-African economic and institutional collaboration relative to commitment to deepening U.S.-African economic and institutional collaboration relative to
similar activity by U.S. global economic competitorssimilar activity by U.S. global economic competitors, such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the longer term, the AfCFTA may help . In the longer term, the AfCFTA may help
Africa better withstand external shocks, making the region more resilientAfrica better withstand external shocks, making the region more resilient in the future to the types to the types
of challenges (e.g., food and fuel inflation and supply chain disruptions) it has faced as a result of of challenges (e.g., food and fuel inflation and supply chain disruptions) it has faced as a result of
Russia’s war against Ukraine or the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Russia’s war against Ukraine or the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Congress Congress may have interest in the agreement and its implementation due to the AfCFTA’s
potential effects on U.S. economic relations with the region, and given its statements in
legislation in support of efforts to improve African countries’ ability to engage in international
trade and legislative mandates to the executive branch to use U.S. funds to help achieve this. The
AfCFTA is widely supported among policy analysts, but the prospects for itshas enacted a range of measures that seek to improve African countries’ ability to engage in international trade and that align closely with the aims of the AfCFTA, and some Members of Congress have expressed interest in considering how to further integrate U.S. support for the AfCFTA into existing U.S. trade capacity-building programs in Africa.4 In the 117th Congress, the prospective success of AfCFTA implementation featured in several hearings. In addition, the then-chairpersons of the foreign affairs subcommittees with principal jurisdiction over Africa in the House and the Senate introduced bills that would have supported the implementation of AfCFTA; they were, respectively, H.R. 9364 (Bass) and S. 5154 (Van Hollen).5 In the 118th Congress, Representative Kamlager-Dove has introduced H.Res. 261, which would express “strong support for the successful successful
implementation face a number of challenges, which Congress may consider in possible debates
over U.S. support for the AfCFTA.
implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area,” among other aims. Whether the 118th Congress more broadly may pursue activity relating to the AfCFTA remains to be seen, but there is arguably substantial complementarity between the further development of the AfCFTA and themes of stated interest to some Members (e.g., U.S. strategic global power competition in Africa, the development of trade relations with the region, and mineral sector development in the region). Background on U.S. Trade Initiatives in Africa
For many years, the U.S. government has supported a wide range of programs to help For many years, the U.S. government has supported a wide range of programs to help spurstimulate
economic development and growth in Africa, economic development and growth in Africa, one of the world’s poorest regions, as well as to as well as to
expand U.S. economic and trade relations with the regionexpand U.S. economic and trade relations with the region. Prominent among these efforts have
been U.S. programs intended to expand trade and investment activity, which is one of the world’s poorest. Such programs, which . Such programs, which
align with goals established by Congress in legislation (e.g.align with goals established by Congress in legislation (e.g., the African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA, Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended, including under the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, P.L. 114-27], P.L. 114-27), have sought to expand ), have sought to expand
trade between Africa, the United States, and other global trade partnersAfrica’s overall ability to trade internationally, with a focus on U.S.-African trade; improve African ; improve African
countries’ global trade competitiveness; increase countries’ global trade competitiveness; increase intra-regionalintraregional African economic integration; and African economic integration; and
foster greater U.S. investment in Africa. Major foster greater U.S. investment in Africa. Major initiatives include 3 White House, Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-based Growth: 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017, June 2021, and “America’s Supply Chains,” Executive Order 14017, February 24, 2021. 4 See, e.g., Representative Bass, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Passes Bass, Smith Resolution Reaffirming the U.S.-African Union Relationship and Encouraging Greater Trade Partnership with Africa,” September 14, 2022. 5 Such hearings have included House Ways and Means Committee/Trade Subcommittee, “Strengthening the U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment Relationship,” November 17, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee/Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, “U.S. Trade and Investment in Africa,” July 28, 2021, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/us-trade-and-investment-in-africa-072821; and House Foreign Affairs Committee/Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights Subcommittee (HFAC/Africa), “Understanding the African Continental Free Trade Area and How the U.S. Can Promote Its Success,” April 27, 2022. Congressional Research Service 2 initiatives include:
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• U.S. trade preferences under the U.S. trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA,
Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended);1
AGOA, as amended;6 • trade capacity-building (TCB) assistance, as required under AGOA and as trade capacity-building (TCB) assistance, as required under AGOA and as
provided under provided under a series of presidential initiatives and WTO-related various U.S. presidential initiatives, other agency programs, and World Trade Organization (WTO)-related support activities over activities over
the past two decadesthe past two decades;
• trade and investment promotion programs trade and investment promotion programs that provideproviding finance, insurance, finance, insurance,
technical technical assistance, andassistance, and/or other support for specific transactions or projects; other support for specific transactions or projects;
and and
• efforts to establish various U.S. trade and investment agreements in the region. efforts to establish various U.S. trade and investment agreements in the region.
AGOA, enacted in 2000, provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for most U.S. imports from AGOA, enacted in 2000, provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for most U.S. imports from
eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, building on similar benefits provided eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, building on similar benefits provided underby the the
United States under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).27 The President annually reviews and determines each The President annually reviews and determines each
country’s AGOA eligibility based on statutory criteria (e.g., the beneficiary country’s trade and country’s AGOA eligibility based on statutory criteria (e.g., the beneficiary country’s trade and
investment policy, governance, and worker rights). In 2015, Congress extended AGOA’s investment policy, governance, and worker rights). In 2015, Congress extended AGOA’s
authorization for authorization for ten10 years years to, until September 2025 (P.L. 114-27). September 2025 (P.L. 114-27).8 AGOA also directs the President to AGOA also directs the President to
provide TCB assistance to African countries. provide TCB assistance to African countries. ThreeHistorically, for most of the 2000s and 2010s, three trade and investment “hubs” located in Africa trade and investment “hubs” located in Africa
and administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have hosted hosted
programs to increase use of AGOA, programs to increase use of AGOA, foster intraregionalfoster intra-regional economic integration, attract investment economic integration, attract investment
to Africa, and support U.S.-Africa to Africa, and support U.S.-Africa trade and investment. One of these hubs, covering East and Central Africa, was phased out several years ago, and another, for Southern Africa, ended its activities in late 2022. A third Nigeria-based West Africa hub continues to operate. A range of other U.S. agencies also carry out TCB activitiestrade and investment.
In addition to USAID, many U.S. agencies carry out TCB activities, (see “U.S.-AfCFTA Support
and Broader U.S. TCB Efforts”) and engage in broader trade and investment promotion efforts and engage in broader trade and investment promotion efforts
related to Africa.related to Africa.3 Since 2019, a presidential initiative known as Prosper Africa These include the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC); the departments of Agriculture, State, Labor, and the Treasury; the Trade and Development Agency; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR); the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; and the Export–Import Bank of the United States.9 Since 2019, Prosper Africa, a presidential initiative, has sought to has sought to
better coordinate better coordinate thesesuch efforts. The initiative, launched by the Trump Administration and efforts. The initiative, launched by the Trump Administration and
maintained by the Biden Administration, seeks to link U.S. firms with economic opportunities in maintained by the Biden Administration, seeks to link U.S. firms with economic opportunities in
Africa and African firms with U.S. Africa and African firms with U.S. opportunities;opportunities, facilitate access to U.S. trade promotion facilitate access to U.S. trade promotion
services;services, and foster market-oriented reforms. and foster market-oriented reforms.410 Prosper Africa also supports a range of trade and investment capacity-building efforts in Africa, including under the Africa Trade and Investment (ATI) program, a mechanism providing technical expertise which USAID country missions can tap to carry out Prosper Africa-related project work.
The United States also has completed or made efforts toward negotiating several types of trade The United States also has completed or made efforts toward negotiating several types of trade
and investment agreements with countries in the region, including 16 Trade and Investment and investment agreements with countries in the region, including 16 Trade and Investment
Framework Agreements (TIFAs) and nine bilateral investment treaties (BITs). TIFAs aim to Framework Agreements (TIFAs) and nine bilateral investment treaties (BITs). TIFAs aim to
provide a forum for high-level engagement on trade and investment issues with the goal of provide a forum for high-level engagement on trade and investment issues with the goal of
reducing barriers and expanding market opportunities, while BITs aim to protect U.S. foreign
direct investment and promote economic growth by advancing non-discriminatory rules and other
market-oriented policies.5 The United States has a free trade agreement (FTA) with Morocco, but
there are no U.S. FTAs with SSA countries—FTAs include commitments to eliminate barriers to
goods and services trade and establish enforceable trade rules on a range of issues (e.g., services,

1 6 See CRS In Focus IF10149, See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), by Brock R. Williams.
2. 7 GSP expired at the end of 2021 and Congress continues to debate its potential reauthorization. See CRS In Focus GSP expired at the end of 2021 and Congress continues to debate its potential reauthorization. See CRS In Focus
IF11232, IF11232, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), by Liana Wong.
3 These include the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC); the departments of Agriculture, State, Labor, and
Treasury; the Trade and Development Agency; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR); the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation; and the Export–Import Bank of the United States.. 8 For an overview of AGOA and other U.S. trade and investment programs and activities across Africa, see USTR, 2022 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, June 2022. 9 CRS In Focus CRS In Focus
IF11016, IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
4; see also, USAID, “What Is TCB?,” TCB database, https://tcb.usaid.gov/about.html. 10 See CRS In Focus IF11384, See CRS In Focus IF11384, The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative, , by Nicolas Cook and Brock R.
Williams, and the Prosper Africa website and the Prosper Africa website (https://www.prosperafrica.gov). Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 10 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress reducing barriers and expanding market opportunities. BITs aim to protect U.S. foreign direct investment and promote economic growth by advancing nondiscriminatory rules and other market-oriented policies.11 The United States has a free trade agreement (FTA) with Morocco, but there are no U.S. FTAs with SSA countries.12 In 2020, the Trump Administration launched FTA talks with Kenya. The Biden Administration did not continue these negotiations. Instead, in July 2022, the U.S. and Kenyan governments established a more limited trade initiative, the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP), which provides for bilateral cooperation on 11 targeted trade-related issues, including digital trade and regulatory practices.13 While AfCFTA is itself a region-wide FTA, it privileges preexisting subregional FTAs, as well as FTAs that provide countries with greater free trade benefits than those established under the AfCFTA; the AfCFTA agreement regards Regional Economic Community (REC) FTAs “as building blocks for the AfCFTA.”14 However, how the AfCFTA may interface with FTAs between individual African countries or country blocs and foreign governments or blocs—such as the formerly envisioned U.S.-Kenya FTA—is unclear.15(https://www.prosperafrica.gov).
5 See CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. International Investment Agreements (IIAs), by Martin A. Weiss and Shayerah I.
Akhtar. For a listing of U.S. BITS, see U.S. State Department website. For a listing of U.S. TIFAs, see USTR website.
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agriculture, intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, worker rights, and the environment).6
In 2020, the Trump Administration launched FTA talks with Kenya, but the Biden Administration
has not continued the negotiations, and instead is pursuing a more limited initiative with Kenya
on issues such as digital trade and regulatory practices.7
AfCFTA: Overview and Implementation
The AfCFTA is a framework agreement signed by 54 of the 55 members of the African Union The AfCFTA is a framework agreement signed by 54 of the 55 members of the African Union
(AU) that aims to remove barriers to intra-African trade and investment through the phased (AU) that aims to remove barriers to intra-African trade and investment through the phased
negotiation and implementation of various commitments negotiation and implementation of various commitments (Figure 1). As of . As of July 2022, 43April 2023, 46 of the of the
54 signatories had ratified the agreement.54 signatories had ratified the agreement.816 AfCFTA members seek to eventually create a single AfCFTA members seek to eventually create a single
market for goods, services, and capital, and to enable the market for goods, services, and capital, and to enable the intra-regionalintraregional free movement of free movement of
persons. Ultimately, the AfCFTA members seek to establish a singlepersons. A long-term goal of AfCFTA is to lay the foundations for the establishment of a unitary African customs union, African customs union,
which, like the European Union (EU), would require a common external tariff which, like the European Union (EU), would require a common external tariff structurestructure (i.e., the same customs duties and other import rules would apply to all goods entering the AfCFTA area). .
AfCFTA members have committed to eliminate tariffs on 90% of tariff lines over AfCFTA members have committed to eliminate tariffs on 90% of tariff lines over five5 years, or years, or
ten10 years for the least developed countries for the least developed countries., as of the nominal official start of trading under the 11 See CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. International Investment Agreements (IIAs). For a listing of U.S. BITS, see U.S. State Department website. For a listing of U.S. TIFAs, see USTR website. 12 FTAs include commitments to eliminate barriers to goods and services trade and establish enforceable trade rules on a range of issues (e.g., services, agriculture, intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, worker rights, and the environment). U.S. FTA negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU), held in the early 2000s, were unsuccessful. USTR, “Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA,” June 2, 2003. 13 Other areas of focus include agriculture; anti-corruption efforts; environment and climate action; micro, small, and medium size enterprises; workers’ rights protections; services domestic regulation; standards collaboration, trade facilitation and customs procedures; and the participation of women, youth, and others in trade. CRS In Focus IF11526, U.S.-Kenya FTA Negotiations; and USTR, “Launch of the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership,” July 14, 2022, and “United States and Kenya Conclude Opening Round Under the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership,” February 10, 2023. 14 Quote from AfCFTA. See also TRALAC, Gerhard Erasmus, “Making the AfCFTA and the RECs work,” June 3, 2021, and “How the AfCFTA fits into Africa’s existing regional integration scheme,” November 23, 2022, both in TRALAC Blog. 15 Witney Schneidman and Brionne Dawson, “The US and Kenya launch negotiations on a free trade agreement. Will they succeed?,” Brookings Africa in Focus, July 29, 2020. 16 These member states include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic or Western Sahara, which the U.S. government does not recognize as a state. For the ratification status and text of the agreement, see AfCFTA Secretariat “Creating One African Market,” November 2022 and other ratification data on the AfCFTA Secretariat’s website (https://au-afcfta.org); and Tralac, “Status of AfCFTA Ratification,” February 20, 2023. Congressional Research Service 4 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress AfCFTA in early 2021.17 Of the remaining 10% of tariff lines, 7% are for “sensitive” Of the remaining 10% of tariff lines, 7% are for “sensitive”
products, to be phased out over a longer period, while 3% of lines may be excluded. The products, to be phased out over a longer period, while 3% of lines may be excluded. The
agreement is agreement is designed to complement and build upon existing integration efforts pursued by Africa’s eight to complement and build upon existing integration efforts pursued by Africa’s eight
AU-recognized regional economic communities (RECs). AU-recognized regional economic communities (RECs). For example, RECs that have already RECs that have already
formed full customs unions with a common external tariff among their members, such as the East formed full customs unions with a common external tariff among their members, such as the East
African Community (EAC), African Community (EAC), are to provide joint tariff offers to the other AfCFTA parties.provide joint tariff offers to the other AfCFTA parties.9
The first stage of AfCFTA implementation, which technically took effect January 1, 2021, focuses
on lowering barriers to trade in goods and services and establishes a dispute settlement
mechanism. This phase also covers trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards,
non-tariff and technical barriers to trade, and trade remedies.10 AfCFTA Secretariat officials
reported in mid-2021 that some trade began under the preferential AfCFTA rules, but was limited
due to ongoing negotiations on certain Phase 1 issues.11 For example, services trade commitments
and rules of origin, which determine whether goods originate from within the AfCFTA and are
eligible for preferential treatment, remain under negotiation.12 The AfCFTA Secretary General,

6 U.S. FTA negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU) were held in the early 2000s but were
unsuccessful. USTR, “Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA,” June 2, 2003.
7 CRS In Focus IF11526, U.S.-Kenya FTA Negotiations, by Brock R. Williams and Lauren Ploch Blanchard. USTR,
“Launch of the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership,” July 14, 2022.
8 These member states include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic or Western Sahara, which the U.S. government
does not recognize as a state. For the ratification status and text of the agreement, see the AU webpage on the AfCFTA
(https://au-afcfta.org); and Tralac, “Status of AfCFTA Ratification,” May 3, 2022.
9 Four RECs submitted their members’ offers in this manner. For more on regional integration efforts, see African
Union (AU), Towards an Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa, 2019 African Regional Integration Report, 2019.
10 SPS measures relate to food, animal, and plant health, and safety. AfCFTA Secretariat, Compiled Annexes to the on
the Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area [sic], n.d.
11 Pepina Gappah, “African Free Trade Area: 8 Months In,” event comments, Peterson Institute for International
Economics, August 18, 2021.
12 As of early 2022, 46 countries had made services trade commitment offers and rules of origin were agreed for 88%
of tariff lines, with automobiles, textiles, and clothing still pending. Gerhard Erasmus and Trudi Hartzenberg, “Trade in
Services Negotiations Update, Tralac Blog, April 11, 2022; and AfCFTA AU Assembly, Decision on the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Assembly/AU/Dec. 831(XXXV), February 5-6, 2022.
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link to page 8 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

18 Boosting Intraregional Trade to Increase Value-Added Production An underlying goal of the AfCFTA is to increase intraregional trade in Africa, which lags behind that of most other world regions. In 2020, 17% of African exports were to other African countries, compared to intraregional trade shares of 30% in North America, 61% in Asia and Oceania, and 68% in Europe.19 The World Bank estimates that implementation of the AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade by 81%, elevate Africa-wide real income by 7% (worth a projected $450 bil ion), and potentially lift 30 mil ion people out of extreme poverty by 2035.20 However, the World Bank study and others suggest that the agreement’s tariff reduction effects wil be limited unless they are accompanied by significant reductions in various nontariff barriers (NTBs), including improved trade facilitation (e.g., more efficient and transparent customs procedures).21 Rules on NTBs are included in the agreement, but they may be more challenging to implement than tariff modifications. The World Bank study estimates that of the 7% potential increase in real income resulting from the agreement, 0.2% would be due to tariff reductions, whereas 6.8% would be due to removal of NTBs and improved trade facilitation. The AfCFTA Secretariat has established an online mechanism for monitoring, reporting, and elimination of NTBs.22 The first stage of AfCFTA implementation, which technically took effect on January 1, 2021, focuses on lowering barriers to trade in goods and services and establishes a dispute settlement mechanism, though little trade enjoying AfCFTA tariff reductions has taken place to date. This is because significant parts of the overall AfCFTA remain under design or have yet to be implemented, and as some countries have yet to enact their AfCFTA commitments into their national legal codes. In addition, regulatory forms or online compliance systems and other practical tools necessary to implement AfCFTA have yet to be rolled out. African trade ministers sought to speed implementation progress in October 2021 by adopting a provisional tariff schedule legally permitting preferential trade between countries that had already agreed to tariff concessions.23 This phase also covers trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, nontariff and technical barriers to trade, and trade remedies.24 AfCFTA Secretariat officials reported in mid-2021 that some trade began under the preferential AfCFTA 17 AfCFTA Secretariat Secretary-General, Briefing on the State of Play of the AFCFTA Negotiations and Steps Towards the Start of Commercially Meaningful Trade under the AFCFTA to Group of African Ambassadors/High Commissioners in the UK, March 28, 2022 18 At least four RECs submitted their members’ offers in this manner. For more on regional integration efforts, see AU, 2019 African Regional Integration Report: Towards an Integrated and Prosperous and Peaceful Africa, 2019. 19 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Merchandise: Intra-trade and extra-trade of country groups by product, annual,” at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en and CRS calculations. 20 World Bank, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, 2020, at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ef1aa41f-60de-5bd2-a63e-75f2c3ff0f43/content. 21 For example, a 2019 study by the IMF found that trade logistics/customs procedures and infrastructure are the most binding constraints on greater intra-African trade. IMF, Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook, p. 47. 22 AfCFTA Secretariat, “AfCFTA Non-Tariff Barriers Reporting Mechanism,” at https://tradebarriers.africa. 23 AfCFTA Secretariat, “The AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative,” October 7, 2022. 24 Trade facilitation refers to efforts to make cross-border transfers and customs procedures more efficient, faster, and less costly and administratively burdensome. SPS measures relate to food, animal, and plant health, and safety. AfCFTA Secretariat, Compiled Annexes to the on the Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area [sic], n.d. Congressional Research Service 5 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress rules, but was limited due to ongoing negotiations on certain Phase I protocol issues.25 Issues that remained under negotiation included services trade commitments and rules of origin, which determine whether goods originate from within the AfCFTA and are eligible for preferential treatment.26 The AfCFTA Secretary General, Wamkele Mene, noted that logistical difficulties caused by COVID-19 and varying institutional Wamkele Mene, noted that logistical difficulties caused by COVID-19 and varying institutional
capacities among members capacities among members havehad contributed to contributed to the delays.13delays in negotiating these outstanding issues.27 Negotiations have also begun on Phase II commitments covering investment, intellectual property rights (IPR), competition policy, and digital trade.28
In 2022, AfCFTA officials and signatory governments met to finalize an AfCFTA rules of origin In 2022, AfCFTA officials and signatory governments met to finalize an AfCFTA rules of origin
manual, and to discuss AfCFTA regulations and the creation of an online “e-tariff” tool.manual, and to discuss AfCFTA regulations and the creation of an online “e-tariff” tool.14
Negotiations have also begun on Phase II commitments, covering investment, IPR, competition
policy, and digital trade.15 29 In October 2022, the AfCFTA Secretariat also initiated the AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative, which aims to foster “commercially meaningful” levels of AfCFTA-mediated trade in a selection of goods among eight initial countries; test in practice various applied operational, institutional, legal, and trade policy components of the AfCFTA; and, along with other Secretariat efforts, promote private-sector awareness of the AfCFTA.30 To help facilitate AfCFTA trade, AfCFTA officials, in collaboration To help facilitate AfCFTA trade, AfCFTA officials, in collaboration
with Afreximbank—a public-private trade finance institution—launched the Pan African Payment with Afreximbank—a public-private trade finance institution—launched the Pan African Payment
and Settlement System (PAPSS), a regional platform for settling intra-African trade payments.and Settlement System (PAPSS), a regional platform for settling intra-African trade payments.16
31 The AU Assembly also The AU Assembly also recentlyhas mandated the negotiation of an AfCFTA Protocol on Women and mandated the negotiation of an AfCFTA Protocol on Women and
Youth in Trade and the establishment of an AfCFTA Adjustment Fund to address potential Youth in Trade and the establishment of an AfCFTA Adjustment Fund to address potential
disruptions (e.g., tariff revenue disruptions (e.g., tariff revenue reductions) from AfCFTA trade liberalization.32 The AfCFTA Secretariat, jointly with the World Bank, has also carried out an audit of barriers to trade in services among African states.33 25 Protocols are akin to investment agreement chapters in U.S. trade agreements. Pepina Gappah, “African Free Trade Area: 8 Months In,” event comments, Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 18, 2021. 26 As of early 2022, 46 countries had made services trade commitment offers and rules of origin were agreed for 88% of tariff lines, with automobiles, textiles, and clothing still pending. Gerhard Erasmus and Trudi Hartzenberg, “Trade in Services Negotiations Update, Tralac Blog, April 11, 2022; and AfCFTA AU Assembly, Decision on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Assembly/AU/Dec. 831(XXXV), February 5-6, 2022. 27 Kingsley Ighobor, “One Year of Free Trading in Africa Calls for Celebration Despite Teething Problems,” Africa Renewal, January 5, 2022. 28 AfCFTA Secretariat, press release, January 29, 2022, at https://twitter.com/AfCFTA/status/1487806904881582085. 29reductions) from AfCFTA trade liberalization.17
Some analysts have raised concerns over the difficulties in finalizing Phase I negotiations and the
lack of progress on implementation to date.18 To expedite implementation, some observers have
urged AfCFTA members to move forward with trading under AfCFTA rules and tariff concessions
for the products for which negotiations have concluded and to facilitate AfCFTA trade among the
largest African trading firms, which account for much of the region’s trade.19 Others also have
called for expanded public awareness campaigns, as well as the creation of AfCFTA-specific
customs forms and registries for trade logistics and supply chain firms.20
Boosting Intra-Regional Trade to Increase Value-Added Production
An underlying goal of the AfCFTA is to increase intra-regional trade in Africa, which lags behind that of most
other world regions. In 2020, 17% of African exports were to other African countries, compared to intra-regional
trade shares of 30% in North America, 61% in Asia and Oceania, and 68% in Europe (Figure 1).21 The World
Bank estimates that implementation of the AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade by 81%, elevate Africa-wide
real income by 7% (worth a projected $450 bil ion), and potentially lift 30 mil ion people out of extreme poverty
by 2035.22 However, the World Bank study and others suggest that the agreement’s tariff reduction effects wil be
limited unless they are accompanied by significant reductions in various non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including
improved trade facilitation (e.g., more efficient and transparent customs procedures).23 Rules on NTBs are
included in the agreement, but they may be more challenging to implement than tariff modifications. The World

13 Kingsley Ighobor, “One Year of Free Trading in Africa Calls for Celebration Despite Teething Problems,” Africa
Renewal, January 5, 2022.
14 WCO, “AfCFTA, EU and WCO Join Forces to Support Digital Transformation of Customs Work,” January 31, WCO, “AfCFTA, EU and WCO Join Forces to Support Digital Transformation of Customs Work,” January 31,
2022; and Desiderio Consultants, “AfCFTA e-tariff book, what’s the state of play?,” May 19, 2022. 2022; and Desiderio Consultants, “AfCFTA e-tariff book, what’s the state of play?,” May 19, 2022.
15 AfCFTA Secretariat, press release, January 29, 2022, at https://twitter.com/AfCFTA/status/1487806904881582085.
1630 AfCFTA Secretariat, “The AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative,” October 7, 2022, and “Launch of the AfCFTA Private Sector Mapping and Glossary,” November 27, 2022. 31 PAPSS is designed to enable cross-border payments in local currencies without requiring the use of intermediary PAPSS is designed to enable cross-border payments in local currencies without requiring the use of intermediary
exchanges of hard currency. AfCFTA Secretariat, “AfCFTA Press Briefing,”exchanges of hard currency. AfCFTA Secretariat, “AfCFTA Press Briefing,” press release, July 9, 2021; and Afreximbank, July 9, 2021; and Afreximbank,
“Afreximbank and AfCFTA Announce the Operational Roll-out of PAPSS,”“Afreximbank and AfCFTA Announce the Operational Roll-out of PAPSS,” press release, September 28, 2021. September 28, 2021.
17 32 AfCFTA Secretariat, AfCFTA Secretariat, The Futures Report: Making the AfCFTA Work for Women and Youth, 2020. AU Assembly, , 2020. AU Assembly,
February 5-6, 2022, op. cit. February 5-6, 2022, op. cit.
18 For example, see Jamie MacLeod and David Luke, Breathing Life into the AfCFTA: Why the Details Matter,
International Institute for Sustainable Development, March 2, 2022.
19 Gerhard Erasmus and Trudi Hartzenberg, “Expediting the Start of Trade under the AfCFTA,” Tralac, May 25, 2022.
20 Francis Mangeni and Andrew Mold Monday, “7 ways to accelerate implementation of the AfCFTA,” Africa in Focus
Brookings Institution blog, June 13, 2022.
21 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Merchandise: Intra-trade and extra-trade of
country groups by product, annual” and CRS calculations.
22 World Bank, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, 2020.
23 For example, a 2019 study by the IMF found that trade logistics/customs procedures and infrastructure are the most
binding constraints on greater intra-African trade. IMF, Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook, p. 4733 AfCFTA Secretariat, “AfCFTA Trade in Services Regulatory Audit Reports launched,” December 1, 2022. .
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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

Bank study estimates that of the 7% potential increase in real income resulting from the agreement, 0.2% would be
due to tariff reductions, whereas 6.8% would be due to removal of NTBs and improved trade facilitation. The
AfCFTA Secretariat has established an online mechanism for monitoring, reporting, and elimination of NTBs.24
Figure 1. AfCFTA Ratification Status and African Trade Overview

Source: CRS, based on World Bank Development Indicators, USAID Trade Capacity Building CRS, based on World Bank Development Indicators, USAID Trade Capacity Building (TCB) database, Trade database, Trade
Data Monitor, African Union, and U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Data Monitor, African Union, and U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

24 AfCFTA Secretariat, “AfCFTA Non-Tariff Barriers Reporting Mechanism,” at https://tradebarriers.africa.
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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

Notes: The AfCFTA member states include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic or Western Sahara, which The AfCFTA member states include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic or Western Sahara, which
the U.S. government does not recognize as a state (see CRS Report R45387, the U.S. government does not recognize as a state (see CRS Report R45387, Morocco: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Alexis Arieff). Trade capacity building (TCB)). TCB data shown for North Africa exclude regional funding data shown for North Africa exclude regional funding
allocated tofor the Middle East and North Africa region, totaling $64 mil ion between 2011 and 2020. GDP and the Middle East and North Africa region, totaling $64 mil ion between 2011 and 2020. GDP and
GDP per capita data were not available for South Sudan, Eritrea, and Western Sahara and are excluded from GDP per capita data were not available for South Sudan, Eritrea, and Western Sahara and are excluded from
calculations. Population data for Eritrea and Western calculations. Population data for Eritrea and Western Sahara were not available and are excluded from totals. Congressional Research Service 7 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress Some analysts have raised concerns over the difficulties in finalizing Phase I negotiations and the lack of progress on implementation to date.34 To expedite implementation, some observers have urged AfCFTA members to move forward with trading under AfCFTA rules and tariff concessions for the products for which negotiations have concluded and to facilitate AfCFTA trade among the largest African trading firms, which account for much of the region’s trade.35 Others also have called for expanded public awareness campaigns, as well as the creation of AfCFTA-specific customs forms and registries for trade logistics and supply chain firms.36 Sahara were not available and are excluded from totals.
U.S. Assistance for AfCFTA’s Development
The United States has provided technical support for the AfCFTA under both the Trump and The United States has provided technical support for the AfCFTA under both the Trump and
Biden AdministrationsBiden Administrations, but. Such activity generally has taken the form of ad hoc workshops, trainings, and dialogue-type events, and there appears to be no current comprehensive source of data on there appears to be no current comprehensive source of data on
funding for funding for or tracking of U.S. activities specifically in support of AfCFTA’s development and implementation. U.S. activities specifically in support of AfCFTA’s development and implementation.
In 2019, Trump Administration and AU representatives signed a joint statement describing the In 2019, Trump Administration and AU representatives signed a joint statement describing the
AfCFTA as a common U.S.-AU goal.AfCFTA as a common U.S.-AU goal.2537 The Office of the The Office of the United StatesU.S. Trade Representative Trade Representative
(USTR) and State Department officials hosted AU Commission (AUC) officials (USTR) and State Department officials hosted AU Commission (AUC) officials forwho were part of a 2019 a 2019
International Visitors Leadership Program on U.S. trade policy approaches and U.S.-AU International Visitors Leadership Program on U.S. trade policy approaches and U.S.-AU
cooperation on the AfCFTA. The USTR and delegation also held talks as part of the U.S.-AU cooperation on the AfCFTA. The USTR and delegation also held talks as part of the U.S.-AU
High-Level Dialogue, during which “both sides reaffirmed their support for AfCFTA as a High-Level Dialogue, during which “both sides reaffirmed their support for AfCFTA as a
strategic means to increase Africa’s competitiveness and attractiveness to U.S. business.”strategic means to increase Africa’s competitiveness and attractiveness to U.S. business.”2638
The 2019 AUC visit led to U.S.-sponsored workshops in 2020 on IPR, SPS rules, and digital The 2019 AUC visit led to U.S.-sponsored workshops in 2020 on IPR, SPS rules, and digital
trade pertaining to AfCFTA negotiations.trade pertaining to AfCFTA negotiations.2739 USAID, jointly with the nonprofit American National USAID, jointly with the nonprofit American National
Standards Institute, also supported the AUC by providing a technical advisor, on a virtual basis, to Standards Institute, also supported the AUC by providing a technical advisor, on a virtual basis, to
aid the negotiation and implementation of commitments on technical barriers to trade and aid the negotiation and implementation of commitments on technical barriers to trade and
e-commerce issues. In 2020, USTR, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the e-commerce issues. In 2020, USTR, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the
U.S. Copyright Office hosted a workshop for AfCFTA IPR negotiators and publicU.S. Copyright Office hosted a workshop for AfCFTA IPR negotiators and public- and private and private
-sector stakeholders. USAID also sponsored a 2020 digital trade workshop for AUC staff, and the sector stakeholders. USAID also sponsored a 2020 digital trade workshop for AUC staff, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) aided implementation of the AfCFTA SPS policy U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) aided implementation of the AfCFTA SPS policy
framework, including by facilitating an AfCFTA SPS Committee. This followed USDA support framework, including by facilitating an AfCFTA SPS Committee. This followed USDA support
for the development of a possible SPS-focused AU Food Safety Agency. for the development of a possible SPS-focused AU Food Safety Agency.
In October 2021, USTR Katherine Tai In October 2021, USTR Katherine Tai notedtook note of several U.S. programs being developed to support several U.S. programs being developed to support
the AfCFTA, including the AfCFTA, including IPR negotiation workshops for African officials workshops for African officials focused on assistance for IPR negotiations
andand efforts “to help prepare African entrepreneurs for the upcoming digital trade negotiations.” “to help prepare African entrepreneurs for the upcoming digital trade negotiations.”2840 U.S. U.S.
and AfCFTA officials have also expressed support for U.S.-AU collaboration in support of the and AfCFTA officials have also expressed support for U.S.-AU collaboration in support of the
planned AfCFTA protocol on the inclusion of women and youth in trade.planned AfCFTA protocol on the inclusion of women and youth in trade.2941 Other reported U.S. Other reported U.S.
assistance includes USDA support for a technical advisor embedded with the AUC to assist with assistance includes USDA support for a technical advisor embedded with the AUC to assist with
the SPS policy framework, and plans to develop cross-border trade infrastructure projects in the
region under the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC’s) regional compact initiative.30

25 34 For example, see Jamie MacLeod and David Luke, Breathing Life into the AfCFTA: Why the Details Matter, International Institute for Sustainable Development, March 2, 2022. 35 Gerhard Erasmus and Trudi Hartzenberg, “Expediting the Start of Trade under the AfCFTA,” Tralac, May 25, 2022. 36 Francis Mangeni and Andrew Mold Monday, “7 ways to accelerate implementation of the AfCFTA,” Africa in Focus Brookings Institution blog, June 13, 2022. 37 USTR, “Remarks of Ambassador Mahoney at the 2019 AGOA Forum in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire,” August 5, 2019. USTR, “Remarks of Ambassador Mahoney at the 2019 AGOA Forum in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire,” August 5, 2019.
2638 USTR, USTR, Congressional Budget Submission, FY2022, May 2021. , FY2022, May 2021.
2739 USTR, USTR, 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report,, March 2021. March 2021.
2840 USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Tai’s Participation in the Virtual AGOA Ministerial Meeting,” October 20, 2021. USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Tai’s Participation in the Virtual AGOA Ministerial Meeting,” October 20, 2021.
2941 USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Tai’s Meeting with AfCFTA Secretary General,” December 13, 2021. USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Tai’s Meeting with AfCFTA Secretary General,” December 13, 2021.
30 USTR, 2022 Trade Policy Agenda and 2021 Annual Report, March 2022.
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5 link to page 13 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress the SPS policy framework, and plans to develop cross-border trade infrastructure projects in the region under the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC’s) regional compact initiative.42 Further U.S. AfCFTA support activities are envisioned under the late 2022 U.S.-AfCFTA Secretariat memorandum of cooperation noted above. Such activities may include exchanges of “knowledge, experience, and training” relating to a range of efforts to foster AfCFTA implementation and broader U.S.-Africa trade and investment activity expansion. Foci include trade facilitation, digital trade promotion, an inclusive AfCFTA trading environment that promotes the participation in trade of women, youth, and underserved groups, and efforts to promote partnerships between U.S. and African firms in various sectors.43 U.S. AfCFTA Support in Context of in Brief

U.S.-AfCFTA Support and Broader U.S. TCB Efforts
U.S. support for the AfCFTA is an element of broader U.S. U.S. support for the AfCFTA is an element of broader U.S. TCB efforts, which referefforts to foster trade capacity-building (TCB), which refers to a range of to a range of
activities that support foreign countries’ ability to engage in international trade. The United States activities that support foreign countries’ ability to engage in international trade. The United States
uses TCB activities to encourage market-based economic development and reform and to increase uses TCB activities to encourage market-based economic development and reform and to increase
U.S. opportunities for trade and investment abroad. USAID is a lead administrator of U.S. TCB U.S. opportunities for trade and investment abroad. USAID is a lead administrator of U.S. TCB
assistance, though some 20 agencies also administer TCB funding or implement TCB programs. assistance, though some 20 agencies also administer TCB funding or implement TCB programs.
USTR manages interagency U.S. support for the AfCFTA through its coordinating role in the USTR manages interagency U.S. support for the AfCFTA through its coordinating role in the
interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee.interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee.31 44 Coordination of U.S. TCB efforts Coordination of U.S. TCB efforts is of ongoing
concern tohas been a focus of concern for Congress (see Division J, Title VII, Section 708 of P.L. 116-94). Congress (see Division J, Title VII, Section 708 of P.L. 116-94).
The original AGOA legislation directed the President to provide specific technical assistance to The original AGOA legislation directed the President to provide specific technical assistance to
enhance SSA countries’ ability to participate in international trade and noted congressional enhance SSA countries’ ability to participate in international trade and noted congressional
support for African regional integration efforts (see Sections 102 and 122 of P.L. 106-200). support for African regional integration efforts (see Sections 102 and 122 of P.L. 106-200).
Through reauthorizations of and amendments to AGOA, Congress renewed this directive (see Through reauthorizations of and amendments to AGOA, Congress renewed this directive (see
Section 10 of P.L. 108-274 and Section 104 of P.L. 115-167). U.S. assistance to the AfCFTA may Section 10 of P.L. 108-274 and Section 104 of P.L. 115-167). U.S. assistance to the AfCFTA may
address such mandates. address such mandates.
Historically, much of this mandated TCB support was provided through the three USAID-administered trade hubs noted above (see “Background on U.S. Trade Initiatives in Africa”). USAID maintains a database documenting U.S. government funding for TCB activities USAID maintains a database documenting U.S. government funding for TCB activities
(AfCFTA-related funding is not specifically identified).32, though it does not break out AfCFTA-specific funding.45 During 2011-2020, Africa accounted for During 2011-2020, Africa accounted for
the largest regional share (45%) of U.S. TCB the largest regional share (45%) of U.S. TCB activities, with an annual average of $486 million in
obligated assistance (Figure 2).33obligated assistance, which annually averaged $486 million (Figure 2).46 Agencies providing the largest shares of funding Agencies providing the largest shares of funding for the region included MCC included MCC
(43%) and USAID (34%)(43%) and USAID (34%). Of total TCB support, nearly two-thirds targeted, and nearly two-thirds of all such TCB aid supported trade-related trade-related
infrastructure and agriculture activities. TCB infrastructure and agriculture activities. TCB assistancesupport for trade integration, the category most for trade integration, the category most
akin to the types of U.S. assistance provided akin to the types of U.S. assistance provided into support support of the AfCFTA, accounted for $2.6 the AfCFTA, accounted for $2.6
million annually from 2011 to 2020million annually from 2011 to 2020, or (i.e., less than 1% of total TCB funding to Africa during that less than 1% of total TCB funding to Africa during that
period (Table 1).
Figure 2. United States TCB Funding by Region
(includes breakout by agency for Africa, in $ millions)

Source: CRS with data from USAID TCB database.

31period). 42 USTR, 2022 Trade Policy Agenda and 2021 Annual Report, March 2022. 43 USTR, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation for Trade and Investment Between the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat and the Government of the United States of America, December 14, 2022. 44 USAID response to CRS inquiry, December 2021. USAID response to CRS inquiry, December 2021.
3245 USAID, Trade Capacity Building Database, at https://tcb.usaid.gov/dashboard.html. USAID, Trade Capacity Building Database, at https://tcb.usaid.gov/dashboard.html.
3346 All data on TCB assistance are from USAID’s TCB database and values are in constant 2020 dollars. All data on TCB assistance are from USAID’s TCB database and values are in constant 2020 dollars.
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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief Figure 2. United States TCB Funding by Region and for Africa by Agency Source: CRS with data from USAID TCB database.

Notes: U.S. TCB obligations shown for North Africa exclude funding allocated to the overall Middle East and U.S. TCB obligations shown for North Africa exclude funding allocated to the overall Middle East and
North Africa North Africa (MENA) region, totaling $64 mil ion between 2011 and 2020. OPIC refers to the Overseas Private region, totaling $64 mil ion between 2011 and 2020. OPIC refers to the Overseas Private
Investment CorporationInvestment Corporation. In December 2019, OPIC’s functions were subsumed into the new Development
Finance Corporation (DFC), which the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation succeeded in 2019. Totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding. .
Table 1. U.S. TCB Funding to Africa, by Category
(millions of constant 2020 $ (millions of constant 2020 $’s, FY2011-FY2020) , FY2011-FY2020)
Category
Total
Annual Average
Trade- Trade-relatedRelated Infrastructure Infrastructure
$1,722.8 1,722.8
$172.3 172.3
Trade- Trade-relatedRelated Agriculture Agriculture
$1,288.8 1,288.8
$128.9 128.9
Competition Policy, Business Environment, and Governance Competition Policy, Business Environment, and Governance
$500.7 500.7
$50.1 50.1
Trade- Trade-relatedRelated Labor Labor
$295.7 295.7
$29.6 29.6
Trade Promotion Trade Promotion
$165.9 165.9
$16.6 16.6
Enterprise Development Enterprise Development
$162.2 162.2
$16.2 16.2
Financial Sector Financial Sector
$131.7 131.7
$13.2 13.2
Other Trade Capacity Building Other Trade Capacity Building
$130.2 130.2
$13.0 13.0
Sanitary and Sanitary and Phyto-sanitaryPhytosanitary Measures (SPS) Measures (SPS)
$100.0 100.0
$10.0 10.0
Environmental Standards and Trade Environmental Standards and Trade
$98.9 98.9
$9.9 9.9
Customs Operations Customs Operations
$87.3 87.3
$8.7 8.7
Trade- Trade-relatedRelated Tourism Tourism
$67.7 67.7
$6.8 6.8
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
$45.3 45.3
$4.5 4.5
FTAs and Trade Integration FTAs and Trade Integration
$25.8 25.8
$2.6 2.6
WTO Accession and Compliance WTO Accession and Compliance
$15.9 15.9
$1.6 1.6
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
$10.3 10.3
$1.0 1.0
Trade- Trade-relatedRelated Services (excluding Tourism) Services (excluding Tourism)
$9.0 9.0
$0.9 0.9
Trade- Trade-relatedRelated Procurement Procurement
$4.3 4.3
$0.4 Congressional Research Service 10 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress 0.4
Source: CRS with data from USAID TCB Database. CRS with data from USAID TCB Database.
Notes: Excludes funding Excludes funding to allocated to the overall MENA region, totaling $64 mil ion from 2011allocated to the overall MENA region, totaling $64 mil ion from 2011- to 2020. 2020.
International Support for the AfCFTA
Multiple donor governments and international organizations have provided support to the AU and Multiple donor governments and international organizations have provided support to the AU and
AfCFTA member countries to assist with AfCFTA negotiations and implementation. AfCFTA member countries to assist with AfCFTA negotiations and implementation. For example,
theThe U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), for instance, published a guide on AfCFTA national published a guide on AfCFTA national
utilization strategies, and has partnered with the AfCFTA Secretariat to promote trade as a utilization strategies, and has partnered with the AfCFTA Secretariat to promote trade as a
stimulus for post-COVID-19 economic recovery efforts.stimulus for post-COVID-19 economic recovery efforts.3447 The International Trade Centre (ITC), a The International Trade Centre (ITC), a
multilateral agency with a joint mandate with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the U.N., multilateral agency with a joint mandate with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the U.N.,
established SheTrades AfCFTA, a program to build the capacity of women-owned businesses to established SheTrades AfCFTA, a program to build the capacity of women-owned businesses to

34 AU, “African Trade Observatory,” n.d.; UNECA, et al., Guidelines for Developing African Continental Free Trade
Area National Strategies, 2021; and AfCFTA press release, March 29, 2021.
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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

use the AfCFTA.35use the AfCFTA.48 The AU also launched an African Trade Observatory, with EU assistance, to The AU also launched an African Trade Observatory, with EU assistance, to
help track AfCFTA implementation, regional integration, and tariff negotiations.help track AfCFTA implementation, regional integration, and tariff negotiations.3649
The EU, a major donor to AfCFTA support efforts, provided €74 million (approximately $79.9 The EU, a major donor to AfCFTA support efforts, provided €74 million (approximately $79.9
million) for such initiatives during 2014-2020, and further assistance remains ongoing.million) for such initiatives during 2014-2020, and further assistance remains ongoing.3750 This aid has supported This
includes support for facilitating the AfCFTA negotiation AfCFTA negotiation processfacilitation; AfCFTA advocacy and country ; AfCFTA advocacy and country
ratification; tariff classification harmonizationratification; tariff classification harmonization and strengthening IPR; IPR strengthening; development of AfCFTA ; development of AfCFTA
national implementation strategies; rules of origin implementation by African customs services; national implementation strategies; rules of origin implementation by African customs services;
SPS system capacity-building; and SPS system capacity-building; and establishingthe creation of regional geographical indications for products. regional geographical indications for products.3851
Other international support for the AfCFTA Other international support for the AfCFTA includeshas included the following the following.:
 The UK government signed a• The September 2021 signing of a UK-AfCFTA Secretariat Memorandum of Memorandum of Understanding (Understanding (MoU) with the
AfCFTA Secretariat in September 2021, to supportMOU) in support of AfCFTA implementation and AfCFTA implementation and
African African intra-regionalintraregional trade and investment. trade and investment.3952 Funding for this initiative totals Funding for this initiative totals
£35 million (~$45.5 million) between 2021 and 2026.£35 million (~$45.5 million) between 2021 and 2026.40
 The53 • Programs administered by the German-government-owned development German-government-owned development corporation, GIZ, corporation, GIZ, administers
programs to assist with AfCFTA negotiation preparation and implementation, to assist with AfCFTA negotiation preparation and implementation,
policy research and advice, and stakeholder outreach and training.41 Funding for
activities totals €34.5 million (~$37.3 million) between mid-2020 and mid-2024.
 Canada is funding a $15 million program for UNECA’s African Trade Policy
Centre to support AfCFTA development.42
 Denmark is funding a $3.8 million program for AU AfCFTA-implementing
institutions and UNECA.43
In addition to AfCFTA-specific assistance, other institutions provide estimates of African
countries’ broader trade facilitation progress and gaps. For example, the WTO maintains a
database on WTO member countries’ implementation of WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement
(TFA) commitments, which share AfCFTA’s goals of lowering trade costs and improving
customs operations.44 Forty-four of the 55 AU members are members of the WTO, and 40 have

35policy research and advice, and stakeholder outreach and 47 AU, “African Trade Observatory”; UNECA, et al., Guidelines for Developing African Continental Free Trade Area National Strategies, 2021, at https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43060; and AfCFTA press release, March 29, 2021. 48 This project is one of a wider array of ITC female trade participation promotion projects, including a number in This project is one of a wider array of ITC female trade participation promotion projects, including a number in
Africa. See ITC web resource “SheTrades AfCFTA,” at https://Africa. See ITC web resource “SheTrades AfCFTA,” at https://www.shetrades.com/en/projects/shetrades-afcfta.
36intracen.org/our-work/projects/shetrades-empowering-women-in-the-afcfta-phase-ii. 49 African Union, “African Trade Observatory,” at https://ato.africa/en. African Union, “African Trade Observatory,” at https://ato.africa/en.
3750 Africa-EU Partnership, Africa-EU Partnership, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Ongoing EU Support [Factsheet] [Factsheet], n.d.
. Exchange rate calculations based on exchange rates sourced through FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Exchange rate calculations based on exchange rates sourced through FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
3851 European Economic and Social Committee, European Economic and Social Committee, 7th EU-Africa Economic and Social Stakeholders' Network, March 2, , March 2,
20212021, at https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/madame_synowiec_.pdf; European Commission, ; European Commission, EU Aid for Trade Progress Report 2021, , 2021at https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/eu-aid-for-trade-progress-report-2021_en.pdf; and Pan-African Geographical ; and Pan-African Geographical
Indications Information Hub (Indications Information Hub (https://africa-gi.comafrica-gi.com/en). ).
3952 Business & Financial Times (Ghana), “AfCFTA Secretariat Signs Landmark Agreement with UK Government,” (Ghana), “AfCFTA Secretariat Signs Landmark Agreement with UK Government,”
September 13, 2021September 13, 2021, at https://thebftonline.com/2021/09/13/afcfta-secretariat-signs-landmark-agreement-with-uk-government/. 53.
40 UKAid Development Tracker, “African Continental Free Trade Area Support Programme,” September 20, 2021 UKAid Development Tracker, “African Continental Free Trade Area Support Programme,” September 20, 2021.
41 GIZ stands for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International
Cooperation). GIZ, “The , at https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-301220/summary. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 16 African Continental Free Trade AreaAfrican Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress training.54 Funding for such activities totals €34.5 million (~$37.3 million) between mid-2020 and mid-2024. • Canadian funding of a $15 million program for UNECA’s African Trade Policy Centre to support AfCFTA development.55 • Danish funding of a $3.8 million program for AU AfCFTA-implementing institutions and UNECA.56 In addition to AfCFTA-specific assistance, other institutions provide estimates of African countries’ broader trade facilitation progress and gaps. For example, the WTO maintains a database on WTO member countries’ implementation of WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) commitments, which share AfCFTA’s goals of lowering trade costs and improving customs operations.57 Forty-four of the 55 AU members are members of the WTO, and 40 have : Development and More Economic Resilience through a
Unified African Market,” [project summary] July 2021; see also country or sub-region-specific project summaries (e.g.,
for Ethiopia, Ghana, and the EAC) and GIZ AU Office, Annual Report 2020.
42 Canadian Government, “Prime Minister Trudeau Announces Additional Support for Hard-Hit African Economies,”
May 18, 2021.
43 Danish Foreign Affairs Ministry, Support to the African Continental Free Trade Area, December 6, 2019.
44 See CRS Report R44777, WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement; and WTO, “Trade Facilitation Agreement Database.”
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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

ratified the TFA.ratified the TFA.4558 The WTO also provides technical assistance and capacity building for The WTO also provides technical assistance and capacity building for
developing and least-developed country members to aid with TFA implementation. developing and least-developed country members to aid with TFA implementation.
China’s Engagement with the AfCFTA
Over the past two decades, increasing Africa-China trade and investment ties have drawn concern Over the past two decades, increasing Africa-China trade and investment ties have drawn concern
from U.S. from U.S. policy and lawmakerspolicymakers (Figure 3)..4659 At issue are concerns over lost U.S. export At issue are concerns over lost U.S. export
opportunities, potential effects on U.S. economic ties with the region, and U.S.-China global opportunities, potential effects on U.S. economic ties with the region, and U.S.-China global
strategic competition. U.S. officials have emphasized economic linkages and potential strategic competition. U.S. officials have emphasized economic linkages and potential
dependencies resulting from dependencies resulting from China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiativethe People’s Republic of China (PRC) Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its trade- and its trade-
centered infrastructure loans in the region.centered infrastructure loans in the region.4760 At $254.0 billion ($148.1 billion in exports and At $254.0 billion ($148.1 billion in exports and
$106.0 billion in imports), $106.0 billion in imports), ChinaPRC-Africa trade in 2021 was nearly four times as large as U.S.--Africa trade in 2021 was nearly four times as large as U.S.-
Africa trade, at $64.1 billion ($26.6 billion in exports and $37.5 billion in imports).Africa trade, at $64.1 billion ($26.6 billion in exports and $37.5 billion in imports).4861 Bills Bills
introduced in the 117th Congress introduced in the 117th Congress includeincluded measures to address concerns over U.S. strategic measures to address concerns over U.S. strategic
competition with competition with Chinathe PRC globally, including in Africa (e.g., H.R. 3524 and S. 1260, among others). globally, including in Africa (e.g., H.R. 3524 and S. 1260, among others).
While many non-African countries and businesses may benefit from the AfCFTA, some experts While many non-African countries and businesses may benefit from the AfCFTA, some experts
view China’s government and state-owned firms as particularly wellview China’s government and state-owned firms as particularly well- positioned to do so.positioned to do so.49
Figure 3. U.S. and Chinese Trade in Goods with Africa

Source: Data from U.S. Census Bureau and China Customs Statistics via Trade Data Monitor.
To date, China’s public statements on the AfCFTA have been limited, but supportive. In October
2021, the AfCFTA Secretariat and the Chinese government signed an MoU establishing an expert
group on cooperation. A statement on the MoU asserted that the group “is expected to collaborate
in areas that will include experience-sharing on intellectual property rights, customs procedures,
digital trade and competition policy.”50 In the same statement, AfCFTA Secretary-General Mene

45 WTO, Strengthening Africa’s Capacity to Trade, 202162 54 GIZ stands for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation). GIZ, “The African Continental Free Trade Area: Development and More Economic Resilience through a Unified African Market,” [project summary] July 2021; see also country or sub-region-specific project summaries (e.g., for Ethiopia, Ghana, and the EAC) and GIZ AU Office, Annual Report 2020, at https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2020_en_African_Union_Annual_Report_2020.pdf. 55 Canadian Government, “Prime Minister Trudeau Announces Additional Support for Hard-Hit African Economies,” press release, May 18, 2021, at https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2021/05/18/prime-minister-trudeau-announces-additional-support-hard-hit-african. 56 Danish Foreign Affairs Ministry, Support to the African Continental Free Trade Area, December 6, 2019. 57 See CRS Report R44777, WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement; and WTO, “Trade Facilitation Agreement Database,” at https://tfadatabase.org/members/. 58 WTO, Strengthening Africa’s Capacity to Trade, 2021, at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/strengthening_africas_capacity_to_trade_e.pdf; and WTO TFA Database, “Ratifications,” April 19, 2022. ; and WTO TFA Database, “Ratifications,” April 19, 2022.
4659 See for example, “China in Africa: Unequal Partnership,” See for example, “China in Africa: Unequal Partnership,” The Economist, special report, May 29, 2022. , special report, May 29, 2022.
4760 See CRS In Focus IF11735, See CRS In Focus IF11735, China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues, by Karen M. Sutter, Andres
B. Schwarzenberg, and Michael D. Sutherland.
48. 61 Data from U.S. Census Bureau and China Customs Statistics sourced via Trade Data Monitor. Data from U.S. Census Bureau and China Customs Statistics sourced via Trade Data Monitor.
4962 Linda Calabrese, “China-Africa Economic Relations: The BRI, the AfCFTA, and the Rest of the World,” Italian Linda Calabrese, “China-Africa Economic Relations: The BRI, the AfCFTA, and the Rest of the World,” Italian
Institute for International Political Studies, July 29, 2021, Institute for International Political Studies, July 29, 2021, among others.
50 Foreign Affairs Ministry of China, “AfCFTA to Gain from Chinese expertise,” October 29, 2021. The MoU wasat https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/china-africa-economic-relations-bri-afcfta-and-rest-world-31179, among others.
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To date, PRC public statements on the AfCFTA have been limited, but supportive. In October 2021, the AfCFTA Secretariat and the Chinese government signed an MOU establishing an expert group on cooperation. A statement on the MOU asserted that the group “is expected to collaborate in areas that will include experience-sharing on intellectual property rights, customs procedures, digital trade and competition policy.”63 In the same statement, AfCFTA Secretary-General Mene said that “China has been providing financial assistance to the AfCFTA Secretariat since its said that “China has been providing financial assistance to the AfCFTA Secretariat since its
establishment, and support on aspects touching on IPR, investment, competition policy, and establishment, and support on aspects touching on IPR, investment, competition policy, and
digital trade would be critical for the impending AfCFTA Phase II negotiations.” Mene also digital trade would be critical for the impending AfCFTA Phase II negotiations.” Mene also
asserted that the “AfCFTA will produce new trading and investment opportunities for China in asserted that the “AfCFTA will produce new trading and investment opportunities for China in
various economic sectors, including agro-processing, automobiles, and financial technology.” various economic sectors, including agro-processing, automobiles, and financial technology.”
Figure 3. U.S. and Chinese Trade in Goods with Africa Source: CRS with data from U.S. Census Bureau and China Customs Statistics via Trade Data Monitor. Outlook and Selected Issues for Congress
Many policymakers and economists view the AfCFTA as an ambitious trade policy initiative with Many policymakers and economists view the AfCFTA as an ambitious trade policy initiative with
considerable potential to stimulate economic development in Africa if fully realizedconsiderable potential to stimulate economic development in Africa if fully realized, in alignment in alignment
with U.S. trade and foreign policy goals in the region. In previous legislation, Congress has with U.S. trade and foreign policy goals in the region. In previous legislation, Congress has
endorsed efforts to spur Africa’s global and regional trade, including through Africa-specific trade endorsed efforts to spur Africa’s global and regional trade, including through Africa-specific trade
facilitation programs and preferential tariff treatment under AGOAfacilitation programs and preferential tariff treatment under AGOA. As Congress potentially
considers future, and efforts to efforts to support U.S.-African trade relations, it may examine how such
initiatives relate to the AfCFTA and the extent to which U.S. support for the AfCFTA may further
congressional goals in the region. Selected issues for Congress include the following.
Prospects for AfCFTAexpand U.S.-Africa trade and investment ties, as through Prosper Africa. Should Congress maintain and seek to build on such goals, Members may see utility in examining the roles that AfCFTA and U.S. support for its ongoing implementation and further development could play in advancing this policy agenda; the issues involved may include the following. Prospects for AfCFTA and Related U.S. Engagement. The ultimate success of the AfCFTA likely depends on The ultimate success of the AfCFTA likely depends on theits members’ members’
ability and political will to resolve ability and political will to resolve the remaining issues under negotiation and fully implement remaining issues under negotiation and fully implement
their commitments. The region faces commitments. The region faces numeroussignificant challenges in 63 Foreign Affairs Ministry of China, “AfCFTA to Gain from Chinese expertise,” press release, October 29, 2021, at http://www.focac.org/eng/zfzs_1/202110/t20211027_10282233.htm. The MOU was signed in the context of ongoing Chinese-African relations pursued through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which comprises China and all African countries except Eswatini. FOCAC via Foreign Affairs Ministry of China, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024),” November 30, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202112/t20211202_10461183.html. Congressional Research Service 13 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress challenges in this regard, including participants’ vastly this regard, including participants’ vastly
divergent institutional capabilities and economic interests, and ongoing regional tensions divergent institutional capabilities and economic interests, and ongoing regional tensions
unrelated to trade. African countries’ slow unrelated to trade. African countries’ slow past implementation of commitments under the WTO’s implementation of commitments under the WTO’s
TFA suggests the region TFA suggests the region may havecould face similar difficulty in implementing the AfCFTA. similar difficulty in implementing the AfCFTA.5164 Congress Congress
may consider the likelihood that AfCFTA members are ablemay seek to assess the relative capacity of AfCFTA members to fully realize its ambitious to fully realize its ambitious
objectives and objectives and howthe role that U.S. assistance U.S. assistance may affect these prospectsmight play in helping them do so. Congressional monitoring of U.S. engagement with the development and progress of AfCFTA could be achieved through periodic congressional consultations with U.S. agencies involved in the annual high-level U.S.-AfCFTA Secretariat forum and technical working groups planned under the late 2022 U.S.-AfCFTA Secretariat MOU.65 Some in Congress may also seek to participate in that high-level forum and may see a need for periodic reporting by the USTR to Congress on such activity, whether informally or through a legislative requirement. .
U.S. Funding for AfCFTA Support. There appears to be no current comprehensive source of There appears to be no current comprehensive source of
data on funding for U.S. activities specifically in support of AfCFTA’s development and data on funding for U.S. activities specifically in support of AfCFTA’s development and
implementation. This gap may present a challenge to congressional oversight. Based on the types implementation. This gap may present a challenge to congressional oversight. Based on the types
of assistance U.S. agencies report to have provided to the AfCFTA (e.g.,of assistance U.S. agencies report to have provided to the AfCFTA (e.g., ad hoc workshops and workshops and
advisors), U.S. funding in support of the AfCFTA is likely significantly lower than that provided advisors), U.S. funding in support of the AfCFTA is likely significantly lower than that provided
by some other donor governments (notably the EU). Congress may by some other donor governments (notably the EU). Congress may consider requiring additionalsee benefit in requiring
reporting from the executive branch on U.S. AfCFTA assistance, and reporting from the executive branch on U.S. AfCFTA assistance, and withusing such data such data, could
consider to determine whether current funding is sufficientwhether current funding is sufficient and appropriately targeted to meet U.S. objectives, which to meet U.S. objectives, which maycould potentially include include
promoting alignment between new AfCFTA rules and promoting alignment between new AfCFTA rules and WTO and U.S. trade agreement objectivesprocesses and those of the WTO, applicable WTO agreements, and U.S. trade policy priorities. .
International Assistance Coordination. Multiple foreign development partners Multiple foreign development partners —and competitors, like the PRC—support the support the
AfCFTA. To avoid duplication of efforts, AfCFTA. To avoid duplication of efforts, make effective use ofefficiently utilize scarce resources, elevate the scarce resources, elevate the
representation of U.S. views, and promote effective collaboration with like-minded donor representation of U.S. views, and promote effective collaboration with like-minded donor
governments, Congress may consider how to foster greater coordination among and with governments, Congress may consider how to foster greater coordination among and with such
U.S.-aligned partners. While such coordination reportedly exists on an ad hoc basis, an official cooperative partners. While such coordination reportedly exists on an ad hoc basis, an official cooperative
forum, formally involving AfCFTA and development partner (e.g., EU and U.S.) officials, could forum, formally involving AfCFTA and development partner (e.g., EU and U.S.) officials, could
act as a channel to clarify African needs and address act as a channel to clarify African needs and address capacity gaps. Such coordination may be important in areas in which the United States and other AfCFTA development partners may have differing trade regimes and policy priorities.66 Expertise and Education Needs. A deficit of expertise reportedly exists among many AfCFTA signatories regarding highly technical matters in the negotiations, which may affect these countries’ ability to implement AfCFTA commitments.67 In addition, extensive education may be needed if private-sector actors, including entrepreneurs in Africa’s large informal microenterprise sector, are to take advantage of the AfCFTA and comply with its new trade rules. Reportedly, 64capacity gaps. Such coordination may be

signed in the context of ongoing Chinese-African relations pursued through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), which comprises China and all African countries except Eswatini. FOCAC via Foreign Affairs Ministry of
China, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024),” November 30, 2021.
51 WTO members in Asia and Latin America have implemented roughly three-quarters of their TFA commitments to WTO members in Asia and Latin America have implemented roughly three-quarters of their TFA commitments to
date, in line with the global implementation rate, compared to half of commitments implemented among African WTO date, in line with the global implementation rate, compared to half of commitments implemented among African WTO
members. The TFA allowed developing countries to set their own implementation schedules. WTO, “Trade Facilitation members. The TFA allowed developing countries to set their own implementation schedules. WTO, “Trade Facilitation
Agreement Database,” at https://tfadatabase.org/implementation/comparisons, accessed July 13, 2022. Agreement Database,” at https://tfadatabase.org/implementation/comparisons, accessed July 13, 2022.
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important in areas in which the United States and other AfCFTA development partners may have
differing trade regimes and policy priorities.52
Expertise and Education Needs. A deficit of expertise reportedly exists among many AfCFTA
signatories regarding highly technical matters in the negotiations, which may affect countries’
ability to implement AfCFTA commitments.53 In addition, extensive education may be needed if
private sector actors, including entrepreneurs in Africa’s large informal micro-enterprise sector,
are to take advantage of the AfCFTA and comply with new trade rules. Technical65 The USTR reports that the MOU “will establish annual high-level dialogues between U.S. and AfCFTA Secretariat officials, as well as quarterly working group meetings, to exchange information on best practices, receive stakeholder input, and have an open dialogue to enhance the relationship between the United States, the AfCFTA Secretariat, and AfCFTA member states.” USTR, “In Year 2, Ambassador Katherine Tai and USTR Continued to Execute President Biden’s Vision for Worker-Centered Trade Policy” (Fact Sheet), March 2022; and text of the MOU, op cit. 66 For example, EU and U.S. trade policy approaches often differ with regard to geographical indications and certain digital trade issues. For more, see CRS Report R44556, Geographical Indications (GIs) in U.S. Food and Agricultural Trade and CRS Report R46732, EU Digital Policy and International Trade. 67 Kingsley Ighobor, “One Year of Free Trading in Africa Calls for Celebration Despite Teething Problems,” Africa Renewal, January 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress technical assistance to assistance to
date reportedly date has focused heavily on the AfCFTA Secretariat and various AUC departments, has focused heavily on the AfCFTA Secretariat and various AUC departments,
rather than rather than on efforts at the national and regional at the national and regional level.54levels.68 Congress might Congress might consider whether U.S. advisory
see benefit in assessing the roles that targeted U.S. advisory or other assistance or engagement at the national and regional levels engagement at the national and regional levels would assist U.S. agencies in monitoring and
helping to addressmight play in better addressing AfCFTA implementation challenges. AfCFTA implementation challenges.
Automation and Digital Infrastructure. Enhanced Enhanced automatedautomation and online processing of trade- and online processing of trade-
related tasks could reduce related tasks could reduce cross-border transaction costs, and potentially decrease the administrative discretion transaction costs, and potentially decrease the administrative discretion
of low-level officials, which of low-level officials, which maycould lower the risks of corruption lower the risks of corruption in such contexts. Efforts . Efforts atto achieve greater customs greater customs
automation also align with multilateral trade obligations automation also align with multilateral trade obligations and goals under the WTO TFA. U.S. digital under the WTO TFA. U.S. digital
resource resource companiesfirms may be well placed to help build the technological infrastructure needed for may be well placed to help build the technological infrastructure needed for
such improvements. Congress may consider the adequacy and focus of existing U.S. government such improvements. Congress may consider the adequacy and focus of existing U.S. government
tools to support U.S. businesses in accessing such opportunitiestools to support U.S. businesses in accessing such opportunities.55 in the region.69 Some Members Some Members also may see a need may see a need
for greater U.S. government support for such activities to act as a counterweight to Chinese firms’ for greater U.S. government support for such activities to act as a counterweight to Chinese firms’
roles in building African information technology networks and infrastructure.roles in building African information technology networks and infrastructure.5670
Relation to AGOA. The AGOA preference program has been a primary congressional The AGOA preference program has been a primary congressional initiative
aimed at vehicle for enhancing U.S.-African trade relations. enhancing U.S.-African trade relations. However, participation in AGOAParticipation in AGOA, however, is statutorily is statutorily
limited to SSA countries, while the AfCFTA also includes the countries of North Africa. This limited to SSA countries, while the AfCFTA also includes the countries of North Africa. This
divergence in regional focus between the AfCFTA and AGOA could divergence in regional focus between the AfCFTA and AGOA could be an impediment to the
developmentimpede AGOA’s potential to contribute to the growth of intra-African supply chains and greater intra-African trade. Congress of intra-African supply chains and greater intra-African trade. Congress may
consider whether various might see utility in considering whether reforms to AGOA’s regional focus reforms to AGOA’s regional focus could address such concerns, such as
broadening the program to include North African countries or changing AGOA’s rules of origin,
to allow for cumulation among all AfCFTA participantsmight better leverage AfCFTA’s continent-wide growth potential. Examples might include changes in AGOA’s rules of origin to allow certain qualifying inputs from North Africa to be used in AGOA-eligible goods production, or a broadening of the program to include eligible North African countries or industry sectors—though this might require changes in AGOA eligibility criteria, such as per capita income levels. .
U.S. Influence in Establishing Trade Rules and U.S. Trade Negotiations in Africa. The The
United States historically has led in establishing trade rules through the WTO and United States historically has led in establishing trade rules through the WTO and inthrough U.S. FTAs U.S. FTAs
with various global trade partners, including on issues such as services trade liberalization, IPR with various global trade partners, including on issues such as services trade liberalization, IPR
protection and enforcement, worker rights, environmental protections, and digital trade. protection and enforcement, worker rights, environmental protections, and digital trade. Given the
growing number and importance of regional trade negotiations that do not involve the United
States, such as the AfCFTA (or the CPTPP or RCEP agreements in Asia57), Congress may

52 For example, EU and U.S. trade policy approaches often differ with regard to geographical indications and certain
digital trade issues. For more, see CRS Report R44556, Geographical Indications (GIs) in U.S. Food and Agricultural
Trade, by Renée Johnson and CRS Report R46732, EU Digital Policy and International Trade, by Rachel F. Fefer.
53 Kingsley Ighobor, “One Year of Free Trading in Africa Calls for Celebration Despite Teething Problems,” Africa
Renewal, January 5, 2022.
54 CRS discussions with U.S. trade officials.
55 See CRS In Focus IF10673, U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA), by Shayerah I. AkhtarThe Biden Administration’s ongoing trade and economic negotiations with the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere aim to address those issues without including traditional market access provisions (e.g., lowering tariffs) typical in previous U.S. free trade agreements, raising questions about Congress’s role in the negotiation and consideration of final agreements that may result from those negotiations. Congress may see a need to assess its role in setting negotiating priorities for trade agreements and initiatives, including potential initiatives in Africa. Congress has directed the President to seek reciprocal trade liberalization agreements in SSA (e.g., P.L. 106-200, P.L. 114-27), but the United States has yet to successfully conclude such an agreement. Effectiveness of U.S. TCB. The United States obligated an annual aggregate average of $486 million in general TCB funding to African countries during 2011-2020. Congress may wish to consider whether sufficient tools and metrics exist to evaluate the effectiveness of this foreign assistance in achieving congressional goals. 68 CRS discussions with U.S. trade officials. 69 See CRS In Focus IF10673, U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) , and CRS In Focus , and CRS In Focus
IF11436, IF11436, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), by Shayerah I. Akhtar and Nick M. Brown.
56. 70 Aubrey Hruby, “Africa’s digital infrastructure is the next playing field for great-power competition,” Atlantic Aubrey Hruby, “Africa’s digital infrastructure is the next playing field for great-power competition,” Atlantic
Council Council AfricaSource blog, November 29, 2021 blog, November 29, 2021.
57 See CRS In Focus IF12078, CPTPP: Overview and Issues for Congress and CRS In Focus IF11891, Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/africas-digital-infrastructure-is-the-next-playing-field-for-great-power-competition/. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

consider how the United States can ensure U.S. trade policy priorities continue to influence the
development of new global trade rules, including in Africa. Options to address this concern might
Congressional Research Service

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African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

include greater U.S. prioritization of new U.S. trade agreement negotiations with countries or
regional blocs in Africa. Congress has directed the President to seek reciprocal trade liberalization
agreements in SSA (e.g., P.L. 106-200, P.L. 114-27), but the United States has yet to successfully
conclude such an agreement.
Effectiveness of U.S. TCB. The United States obligated an annual average of $486 million in
general TCB funding to African countries during 2011-2020. Congress may consider whether
sufficient tools and metrics exist to evaluate the effectiveness of this foreign assistance in
achieving congressional goals.

Author Information

Nicolas Cook
Rileigh K. Greutert
Specialist in African Affairs
Research Assistant


Brock R. Williams

Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Author Information Nicolas Cook Liana Wong Specialist in African Affairs Analyst in International Trade and Finance Acknowledgments Former CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance Brock R. Williams originally coauthored this report, to which former CRS Research Assistant Rileigh K. Greutert also contributed.

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