Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:
June 22August 26, 2022 , 2022
In Brief
Clayton Thomas
Even by the standards of Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, 2021 marked a major watershed for
Even by the standards of Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, 2021 marked a major watershed for
AnalystSpecialist in Middle in Middle
Eastern
the country. In 2021, U.S. and international forces departed after nearly two decades of
the country. In 2021, U.S. and international forces departed after nearly two decades of
Eastern Affairs Affairs
operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed Afghan government and its military forces
operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed Afghan government and its military forces
collapsed; and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from
collapsed; and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from
1996 to 2001, retook power. The aftershocks of these events continue to reverberate within 1996 to 2001, retook power. The aftershocks of these events continue to reverberate within
Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States as Afghans and U.S. policymakers
Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States as Afghans and U.S. policymakers
alike grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule. alike grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.
The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist
The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored
and supported it. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including about 2,400 and supported it. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including about 2,400
fatalities) in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the fatalities) in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the
robust and growingrising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over
$140$146 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the billion for reconstruction and security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the
Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven improvements in most measures of Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven improvements in most measures of
human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries. human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.
After over a year of negotiations initiated in 2018In February 2020, Trump Administration officials signed , Trump Administration officials signed
a February 2020an agreement with agreement with
the Taliban in which the United States committed to the withdrawal of all international military forces the Taliban in which the United States committed to the withdrawal of all international military forces
and contractors by by May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to
take unspecified action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda)
from using Afghan soil to threaten the United Statesfrom using Afghan soil to threaten the United States
and its allies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, U.S. officials contended that the Taliban were not fulfilling their commitments, given. Amid increased violence between the Taliban and Afghan government and increased violence between the Taliban and Afghan government and
continuing Taliban links with Al Qaeda, continuing Taliban links with Al Qaeda,
even as the Trump Administration drew down U.S. forcesthe Trump Administration drew down U.S. forces
, which reached to a low of a low of
2,500 in January 2021. Afghan officials sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. military withdrawal on their own forces’ capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicated that the withdrawal could lead to gains by the Taliban, who already controlled or contested half of the country by 2020.
In 20212,500 in January 2021. Several months later, President Joseph Biden announced that the United , President Joseph Biden announced that the United
States would complete the troop withdrawal by September 2021States would withdraw its troops, though several months later than the date to which it agreed in the U.S.-Taliban accord. On August 15, 2021, two weeks before that withdrawal was to . On August 15, 2021, two weeks before that withdrawal was to
conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that shocked many in the United conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that shocked many in the United
States and Afghanistan. In the last two weeks of August, U.S. military forces oversaw the evacuation of over 120,000 States and Afghanistan. In the last two weeks of August, U.S. military forces oversaw the evacuation of over 120,000
individuals, including U.S. and international diplomatic personnel and Afghan partners, from Kabul’s international airport, individuals, including U.S. and international diplomatic personnel and Afghan partners, from Kabul’s international airport,
before departing on August 30, 2021. No U.S. military or diplomatic personnel are in Afghanistan as of before departing on August 30, 2021. No U.S. military or diplomatic personnel are in Afghanistan as of
JuneAugust 2022. 2022.
The Taliban announced the formation of a new government dominated by Taliban loyalists on September 7, 2021. The
The Taliban announced the formation of a new government dominated by Taliban loyalists on September 7, 2021. The
composition of that government and the Taliban’s suppression of peaceful protests against its rule indicate the group has composition of that government and the Taliban’s suppression of peaceful protests against its rule indicate the group has
prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures
that might have been welcomedadvocated by the United States and other countries. Some anti-Taliban by the United States and other countries. Some anti-Taliban
Afghan leadersAfghans have sought U.S. support and have have sought U.S. support and have
claimed guerilla-style attacks against Taliban forces. However, the regional Islamic State affiliate may pose a more potent claimed guerilla-style attacks against Taliban forces. However, the regional Islamic State affiliate may pose a more potent
threat to the Taliban. threat to the Taliban.
U.S. policymakersMembers of Congress have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule, including the status of the Islamic have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule, including the status of the Islamic
State, Al Qaeda, and U.S. efforts to counter these groups “over the horizon.” Taliban actions have been detrimental for the State, Al Qaeda, and U.S. efforts to counter these groups “over the horizon.” Taliban actions have been detrimental for the
status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a longtime U.S. policy concern, with girls prohibited from attending school status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a longtime U.S. policy concern, with girls prohibited from attending school
above at the secondary level and women’s roles curtailed. The status of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the tens of the secondary level and women’s roles curtailed. The status of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the tens of
thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to leave the country, also remain closely scrutinized by U.S. thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to leave the country, also remain closely scrutinized by U.S.
policymakers. policymakers. The Taliban’s return to power also has implications for Afghanistan’s neighbors and regional dynamics more broadly.
Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic
crises, a result of challenges both pre-existing (such as crises, a result of challenges both pre-existing (such as
droughts, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,natural disasters and and
Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on
the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). The Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). The Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to
ameliorate these crises, but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. ameliorate these crises, but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so.
Pursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicatedPursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicated given the Taliban’s evident aversion to make compromises in response to international pressure and its apparent willingness to accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering as the price of that uncompromising stance.
Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Congress may consider further reporting requirements as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request and defense authorization measures. .
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: Taliban Takeover ........................................................................................................ 1
Taliban Government ........................................................................................................................ 2
Current and Potential Opposition .............................................................................................. 3
U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power .............................................................. 4
Counterterrorism ................................................................................................................. 54
Human Rights: Focus on Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities ............................. 6
Ongoing Relocations of AmericanU.S. Citizens and Certain Afghans .............................................. 7
Economic Collapse, Humanitarian Crisis 8
Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Policy ............................................................. 9
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors ...................................................................... 11 10
Congressional Action and Outlook ................................................................................................ 12
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 14
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief
Introduction
The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in
Afghanistan and the United States alike. This report provides background information and Afghanistan and the United States alike. This report provides background information and
analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including
the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
regional dynamics; and
regional dynamics; and
the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country. the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has
influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central
bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the
Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule. Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.
Background: Taliban Takeover
At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner, the At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner, the
result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment
of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance. of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance.
President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level
since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the
February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1
Still, U.S. officials committed to continue to provide U.S. officials committed to continue to provide
financial support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the financial support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the
Taliban, emphasizing the Taliban’s failure to capture any of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals.Taliban, while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.2
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained
territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade
insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep
internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed
certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and
financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.
23
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart
Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide
swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it
already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising:
some northern areas had successfully resisted the Taliban militarily when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source
1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29,
2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021,
and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the
United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement. 02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
2
2
See House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Pathway for Peace in Afghanistan, CQ Congressional Transcripts, February 19, 2021.
3 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,”
CTC Sentinel, January , January
2021. 2021.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief
estimated that the Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.3some northern areas had successfully resisted the Taliban militarily when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant.4 The speed of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with The speed of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with
one commander saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals one commander saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals
before the scheduled departure of U.S. forces.before the scheduled departure of U.S. forces.
45
The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced
The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced
stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were
taken with minimal fighting.taken with minimal fighting.
56 In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender
or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through
the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.
67 The Taliban captured their first The Taliban captured their first
provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and its security provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and its security
forces accelerated. forces accelerated.
Within a week, the Taliban were nearing Kabul, which they entered on August 15, 2021. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral
crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country
that same day and on August 15 and reportedly remains, as of remains, as of
JuneAugust 2022, in the United Arab Emirates. 2022, in the United Arab Emirates.
8 Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same day, taking effective control of the country.
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The
Taliban refer to their government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Taliban refer to their government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan.Emirate of Afghanistan.
It is unclear by whom members of this government might be replaced going forward and why, or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions.79 The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-2001 rule, have The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-2001 rule, have
said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (
sharia) but have not established “a clear and ) but have not established “a clear and
cohesive legal framework, judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms.”cohesive legal framework, judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms.”
810
Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone
Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone
strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances
and only one and only one
verified photograph of him reportedly exists.9 Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as foreign minister in the 1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime Minister. One analyst has described Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure who more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban prefer to their rivals.10 Abdul Ghani Baradar,
3photograph of him is known to be publicly available.11 Nearly all members of the government are former officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior
4 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second
Resistance,’” Resistance,’”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021. , July 2, 2021.
45 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing
in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021. in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
5
6 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,”
BBC, August 1, 2021. , August 1, 2021.
67 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,”
Washington Post, August 15, , August 15,
2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” 2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,”
New York Times, ,
August 18, 2021. August 18, 2021.
78 Charles Davis, “Afghanistan’s last president, Ashraf Ghani, rejects comparison to Ukraine’s Zelenskyy, says he’s ‘lived an honorable life,’” Yahoo News, August 23, 2022. 9 It remains unclear as of August 2022 how or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions. One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the
Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021. Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
8
10 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan, June 2, 2022. , June 2, 2022.
911 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Mysterious Public Appearances of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader,” Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Mysterious Public Appearances of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader,”
Newlines, December , December
20, 2021; “Haibatullah Akhundzada: Shadowy Taliban supreme leader whose son was suicide bomber,” 20, 2021; “Haibatullah Akhundzada: Shadowy Taliban supreme leader whose son was suicide bomber,”
Reuters, ,
September 7, 2021. September 7, 2021.
10 Martine van Bijlert, “The Focus of the Taleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief
who led Taliban negotiations with the United States from 2018 to 2021, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister.
Nearly all members of the government are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Congressional Research Service
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief
Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up
to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani
Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
that is responsible for numerous attacks against U.S. and other international targets in Afghanistan. .
In the initial days of the transition, some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach
In the initial days of the transition, some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach
out to former Afghan government officials (such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held out to former Afghan government officials (such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held
some meetings with senior Taliban figures after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from some meetings with senior Taliban figures after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from
outside the movement as part of their promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The outside the movement as part of their promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The
Taliban have not, however, reached beyond their own ranks to fill Taliban have not, however, reached beyond their own ranks to fill
seniorgovernment positions and are positions and are
reportedly staffing reportedly staffing
government positionsministries with military and/or religious figures with little relevant with military and/or religious figures with little relevant
experience, exacerbating the group’s administrative challenges and some internal tensions.experience, exacerbating the group’s administrative challenges and some internal tensions.
1112
Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along
Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along
various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes, various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes,
governing Afghanistan in 2022 presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-governing Afghanistan in 2022 presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-
based decision-making.based decision-making.
13 Points of tension reportedly exist between members of the group’s Points of tension reportedly exist between members of the group’s
political wing (such as Baradar) and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves political wing (such as Baradar) and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves
the most credit for the group’s victory;the most credit for the group’s victory;
1214 between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and
file fighters who are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;file fighters who are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;
1315 and between those with different and between those with different
ideological perspectives and ethnic identities.ideological perspectives and ethnic identities.
1416
Current and Potential Opposition
While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did
not reflect massive popular support for the movement not reflect massive popular support for the movement
but ratherso much as a lack of support for the former a lack of support for the former
government.government.
1517 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the
Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostilityTaliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility
despite ascribing a lack of violence unseen in decades to the group’s takeover.16 Both armed opponents and sporadic peaceful protests against the Taliban’s rule point to a potential for future unrest as well as future repression.
11, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.18 The Taliban appear to have monitored most protests, and violently dispersed some.19
The Taliban face organized armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the National Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF leaders have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based 12 Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,” Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,”
New
York Times, January 13, 2022; , January 13, 2022;
Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a
threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, May 26, 2022. , S/2022/419, May 26, 2022.
1213 Andrew Watkins, “The Taliban one year on,” CTC Sentinel, August 2022. 14 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: Taliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: Taliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,”
BBC, September , September
15, 2021; “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” 15, 2021; “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,”
ANI, February 15, 2022. February 15, 2022.
1315 Stephanie Glinski, “Taliban struggle to maintain unity six months into their reign,” Stephanie Glinski, “Taliban struggle to maintain unity six months into their reign,”
Foreign Policy, February 28, , February 28,
2022. 2022.
1416 Sudarsan Raghavan, “A popular Uzbek commander fought for the Taliban for more than two decades. He was Sudarsan Raghavan, “A popular Uzbek commander fought for the Taliban for more than two decades. He was
arrested anyway,” arrested anyway,”
Washington Post, February 1, 2022. , February 1, 2022.
1517 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid, “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,
“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021. “Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.
1618 Loveday Morris and Ruby Mellen, “Portraits of fear and loss,” Loveday Morris and Ruby Mellen, “Portraits of fear and loss,”
Washington Post, January 12, 2022; “Afghans say , January 12, 2022; “Afghans say
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The most coherent effort to oppose the Taliban militarily is the National Resistance Front (NRF), formed by figures aligned with the former Afghan state after the Taliban takeover. An attempt by the NRF to resist the Taliban in the central province of Panjshir, which was never conquered by the Taliban during their prior rule, collapsed in September 2021 but the group has claimed responsibility for a rising number of guerilla-style attacks on Taliban forces, mostly in and around Panjshir.17 NRF leaders have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, D.C.-based representation.18 They have not won public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran. The Taliban dismiss NRF claims as “propaganda,” but continued NRF attacks undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and could galvanize further opposition to the group.19 they feel safer but less hopeful under Taliban rule,” Associated Press, February 15, 2022. 19 “Taliban disperses Afghan women’s march for ‘work and freedom,’” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2022.
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representation.20 They have not won public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran. It is difficult to assess the veracity of claimed NRF operations against Taliban fighters, which the Taliban dismiss as “propaganda,” but NRF operations appear to be increasing in frequency as the group carries out guerilla-style attacks against Taliban forces, mostly in and around the central province of Panjshir.21 Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military capabilities or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten the Taliban’s position.22
An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic
An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic
State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has
opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused
nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global
caliphate. Since the Taliban takeover, ISKP’s ranks have swelled to as many as 4,000 fighters caliphate. Since the Taliban takeover, ISKP’s ranks have swelled to as many as 4,000 fighters
despite a concerted Taliban offensive, and a series of major attacks claimed by or attributed to despite a concerted Taliban offensive, and a series of major attacks claimed by or attributed to
ISKP in spring 2022 (many targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the Hazaras) raises the ISKP in spring 2022 (many targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the Hazaras) raises the
prospect of greater violence.prospect of greater violence.
2023 Experts disagree about the potency of the ISKP threat and the Experts disagree about the potency of the ISKP threat and the
Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the group without external assistance.Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the group without external assistance.
21 Some Afghans, including former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), have reportedly taken up arms with ISKP, purportedly attracted in part by ISKP cash payments.22
Beyond armed resistance, some Afghans have demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban. The Taliban appear to have monitored most protests, and violently dispersed some. The Interior Ministry issued a September 2021 decree banning unapproved demonstrations, and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on September 13, 2021, that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against protesters and journalists.”23 Some sporadic, small-scale protests have nevertheless continued.24
U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power
The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may create opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in
they feel safer but less hopeful under Taliban rule,” Associated Press, February 15, 2022.
17 Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022. 18 Ahmad Massoud, “The mujahideen resistance to the Taliban begins now. But we need help,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Lachlan Markey, “Taliban resistance ramps up U.S. lobbying efforts,” Axios, October 27, 2021; 19 Zia Ur Rehman, op. cit. 20 Susannah George, “Taliban sends hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan to wage war against Islamic State,” Washington Post, November 22, 2021.
21 Abdul Sayed, “Why Islamic State Khurasan poses an indigenous threat to the Afghan Taliban,” Nexus, May 9, 2022. 22 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers Turn to Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2021. 23 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48th Session of the Human Rights Council, September 13, 2021.
24 “Afghan women call for rights, protest alleged Taliban killings,” Al Jazeera, December 28, 2021; Julian Busch, “Standing up to the Taliban’s burqa decree,” Spiegel International, June 9, 2022.
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Afghanistan, and renders obsolete former U.S. plans to partner with Afghan authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken numerous actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many Members of Congress, also remain focused on securing the relocation of Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains ongoing as of June 2022.
Counterterrorism
A number of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISKP are two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect them differently.
24
U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in Afghanistan, and has rendered obsolete former U.S. plans to partner with Afghan authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken numerous actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains ongoing as of August 2022.
Counterterrorism
A number of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently.
ISKP, which has clashed with the Taliban as mentioned above, has long been a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.25 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10
20 Ali Maisam Nazary, “What the Taliban really fear,” Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2022. 21 Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022. 22 “Afghanistan’s security challenges under the Taliban,” International Crisis Group, August 12, 2022. 23 Claire Parker, “How strong is the Islamic State in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan?” Washington Post, August 19, 2022. 24 Abdul Sayed, “Why Islamic State Khurasan poses an indigenous threat to the Afghan Taliban,” Nexus, May 9, 2022; Parker, op. cit.
25 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
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million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people, including over 30 U.S. service members.26
While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda, the July 2022 killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.27 Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure,
AQ ties with the Taliban, which go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong.25those ties have persisted for decades.28 In October 2020, Afghan government In October 2020, Afghan government
troops killed a high-ranking AQ operative who reportedly was living and working with Taliban troops killed a high-ranking AQ operative who reportedly was living and working with Taliban
forces, forces,
underscoring the close and interrelated connections between the groups.29 The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties are not yet clear. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has suggested that some elements of the Taliban might not have supported or even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly leading to tensions within the ground.30 Observers speculate about the impact (if any) of Zawahiri’s killing on AQ capabilities and AQ-Taliban ties.31
In any case, per U.N. sanctions monitors, Al Qaeda “is not viewed as posing an immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan because it lacks an external operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment.” 32 The U.S. intelligence community assessed in March 2022 that AQ “will gauge its ability to operate in Afghanistan under Taliban restrictions” as Al Qaeda and the Taliban underscoring the close and interrelated connections between the groups.26 U.N. sanctions monitors reported in February 2022 that Al Qaeda has “maintained a strategic silence, likely an effort not to compromise Taliban efforts to gain international recognition and legitimacy,” in light of counterterrorism commitments made by the Taliban to secure the withdrawal of U.S. forces.27
Estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect AQ capabilities differ. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Frank McKenzie said in a December 2021 interview that the AQ presence in Afghanistan had “probably slightly increased” since August 2021.28 On the other hand, some analysts have argued that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S. counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential Taliban constraints.29 The U.S. intelligence community assesses that AQ “will gauge its ability operate in Afghanistan under Taliban restrictions” as the two groups recalibrate their recalibrate their
relationship and activities.relationship and activities.
30
On the other hand, the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan has clashed with the Taliban, who have struggled to contain the group’s growth since the Taliban takeover (as mentioned above). ISKP has long been a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, and under the former U.S.-backed government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.31 At a September 1, 2021, press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General Milley said, “It’s possible.”32 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected the notion of
25 Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368
(2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. Document S/2022/83, released February 3, 2022.
26 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26, 2020.
27 Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, op cit. 28 Robert Burns and Lolita Baldor, “US commander: Al-Qaida numbers in Afghanistan up ‘slightly,’” Associated
Press, December 10, 2021.
29 Daniel Byman and Asfandyar Mir, “How strong is Al-Qaeda? A debate,” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2022. 30 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 2022.
31 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020. 32 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the
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such cooperation in October 2021.33 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10 million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people, including over 30 U.S. service members.34
From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as AQ and ISKP without a military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.35 With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. Cooperation with Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too diplomatically or politically fraught. Collaboration with non-Taliban-affiliated Afghans via clandestine or covert action authorities could yield counterterrorism gains, but would also carry risks. In practice, according to the Department of Defense’s Acting Inspector General, over-the-horizon “relies primarily on unmanned aerial vehicles operating from U.S. facilities in Doha, Qatar,” but the United States has not conducted any airstrikes in Afghanistan since August 2021, as of a May 2022 Office of the Inspector General report.36 CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as “extremely difficult but not impossible” in February 2022 testimony.3733
From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.34 With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as “extremely difficult but not impossible” in February 2022 testimony.35 President Biden has asserted that the Zawahiri strike vindicated his decision to complete the removal of U.S. ground forces from Afghanistan and pursue an over-the-horizon approach. With no U.S. military or diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, and the nearest U.S. military bases hundreds of
26 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022. 27 CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. 28 Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. Document S/2022/547, released July 15, 2022.
29 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26, 2020.
30 “The National Security Advisor’s very busy week,” NPR, August 4, 2022. 31 CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. 32 Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, op cit. 33 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 2022.
34 See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021. 35 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx.
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miles away, the United States is reportedly working to increase its intelligence-gathering capabilities elsewhere in the region.36
Human Rights: Focus on Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities
The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a
The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a
different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active
participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them, and ethnic and religious participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them, and ethnic and religious
minorities, were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution. While some early Taliban actions minorities, were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution. While some early Taliban actions
suggested a possible measure of moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule, UN suggested a possible measure of moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule, UN
Rapporteur Bachelet said in June 2022 that “what we are witnessing in Afghanistan today is the Rapporteur Bachelet said in June 2022 that “what we are witnessing in Afghanistan today is the
institutionalized, systematic oppression of women” and that “Afghan women are rapidly facing institutionalized, systematic oppression of women” and that “Afghan women are rapidly facing
the worst-case scenario many-feared.”the worst-case scenario many-feared.”
3837
The Taliban takeover appears to have reduced high levels of violence that characterized the
The Taliban takeover appears to have reduced high levels of violence that characterized the
conflict, conflict,
a development particularly welcomed by those in rural areas,particularly welcomed by those in rural areas,
3938 but it has increased fears of many but it has increased fears of many
Afghans about repression and women’s rights.Afghans about repression and women’s rights.
4039 The Taliban have closed the Ministry of The Taliban have closed the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and have reinstated Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and have reinstated
the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s
U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.
33 Kathy Gannon, “Taliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021. 34 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022. 35 See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021. 36 Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and Operation Enduring Sentinel, Quarterly Report to the
United States Congress, May 17, 2022.
37 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx. 38 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Afghanistan,” June 15, 2022. 39 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021; Salar Bazaar, “On former front line in long Afghan war, an appreciation for peace,” Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 2022. 40 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,” New York
Times, December 15, 2021.
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interpretation of Islam in the 1990s.41interpretation of Islam in the 1990s. The ministry has issued guidance that seeks to impose new The ministry has issued guidance that seeks to impose new
restrictions on Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel restrictions on Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel
long distances without a male guardian and that male relatives of women who do not wear a long distances without a male guardian and that male relatives of women who do not wear a
hijab
that fully covers their bodies should be punished.that fully covers their bodies should be punished.
42 40 Amnesty International reported in July 2022 that increasing numbers of women and girls have been arrested for violating these policies.41 Those restrictions, together with the overall Those restrictions, together with the overall
economic economic
declinecollapse, have led to a decline in women’s participation in the workforce., have led to a decline in women’s participation in the workforce.
4342
Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for
Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for
Afghan girls. Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’ Afghan girls. Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’
secondary schools, effectively shuttered in schools, effectively shuttered in
most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of the new most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of the new
school year in late March 2022.school year in late March 2022.
4443 However, on March 23, with some girls already present in However, on March 23, with some girls already present in
schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that
secondary schools for girls would remain schools for girls would remain
closed, shocking many observers.closed, shocking many observers.
4544 One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of hardline One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of hardline
clerics within the group and Akhundzada.clerics within the group and Akhundzada.
4645 Other Taliban figures, including
36 Karoun Demirjian, “U.S. works to scale up intelligence networks in Central Asia,” Washington Post, June 21, 2022. 37 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Afghanistan,” June 15, 2022. 38 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021; Susannah George, “A year of peace in one of Afghanistan’s deadliest provinces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2022. 39 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,” New York Times, December 15, 2021.
40 Other Taliban figures, including both Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate their own daughters abroad).47 The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative leaders (over that of pragmatists who urge greater engagement with the outside world) suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions. In response to the reversal, the United States canceled meetings on economic issues with the Taliban and the World Bank reportedly suspended $150 million in education programming in Afghanistan.
Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities have also received scrutiny from U.S. policymakers. Many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who comprise 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population and represent one of the country’s largest ethnoreligious minorities) previously expressed fear about the Taliban’s possible return.48 Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan in fall 2021.49 While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras in 2021 and 2022.50
41 Rachel Pannett, “Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the Taliban’s top officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021. 42 “No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,” “No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,”
Al Jazeera, December 26, 2021; David , December 26, 2021; David
Zucchino and Safiullah Padshah, “Taliban impose head-to-toe coverings for women,”Zucchino and Safiullah Padshah, “Taliban impose head-to-toe coverings for women,”
New York Times, May 7, 2022. , May 7, 2022.
4341 Death in Slow Motion: Women and Girls under Taliban Rule, Amnesty International, July 2022. 42 International Labor Organization, “Employment prospects in Afghanistan; A rapid impact assessment,” January International Labor Organization, “Employment prospects in Afghanistan; A rapid impact assessment,” January
2022; Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori, “‘We are worse off’: Afghanistan further impoverished as women vanish from 2022; Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori, “‘We are worse off’: Afghanistan further impoverished as women vanish from
workforce,” workforce,”
Guardian, May 16, 2022. , May 16, 2022.
4443 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022. Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022.
4544 Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022. Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022.
4645 Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,” Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 29, 2022.
47 Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership divisions,” Guardian, March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes starting to change from within?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 7, 2022. 48 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,” New
York Times, March 27, 2019.
49 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence under Taliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021. 50 Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, 2022.
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Ongoing Relocations of American
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both Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate their own daughters abroad).46 The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative leaders (over that of pragmatists who urge greater engagement with the outside world) suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.
Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities have also received scrutiny from U.S. policymakers. Many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who comprise 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population and represent one of the country’s largest ethnoreligious minorities) previously expressed fear about the Taliban’s possible return.47 Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan in fall 2021.48 While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras in 2021 and 2022.49
Ongoing Relocations of U.S. Citizens and Certain Afghans
The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021 triggered the mass evacuation of tens of
The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021 triggered the mass evacuation of tens of
thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and
Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S. Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S.
officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including
5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US
history.”history.”
5150 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the State Department Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the State Department
has said that it has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 800 U.S.said that as of December 13, 2021, it has assisted in the departure of 479 U.S. citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and over 2,200 Afghans.52 On April 28, 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the State Department had directly assisted in the departure of 636 American citizens citizens
and 600and “many” lawful permanent residents lawful permanent residents
.53 as of August 2022.51
U.S. officials have said that their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and
U.S. officials have said that their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and
eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country have “no deadline.”eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country have “no deadline.”
5452 According to the According to the
State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has fluctuated in State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has fluctuated in
the midst of continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens come the midst of continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens come
forward to forward to
make themselves known, and, in many instances, ask for assistance to leave.ask for assistance to leave.
5553 On On
April 28, 2022, Secretary April 28, 2022, Secretary
Antony Blinken said, “There are at present 126, as of a few days ago, American Blinken said, “There are at present 126, as of a few days ago, American
citizens remaining of whom 37 seek to leave and that we are assisting.”citizens remaining of whom 37 seek to leave and that we are assisting.”
56
One December 2021 press report, citing a State Department official, stated that around 62,000 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain in Afghanistan.57 This figure excludes the tens of thousands of Afghans who may be at risk and eligible for other forms of relief but have not applied or are not eligible for an SIV. In a February 2022 report, an advocacy group for SIV-eligible persons stated that 78,000 of the estimated 81,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan with visa applications pending as of August 15, 2021 remain in Afghanistan.58 The State Department has disputed the accuracy of this report.59 In May 2022, the State Department reportedly estimated that between 70,000 and 160,000 Afghans were eligible for SIVs.60
Status of Kabul Airport
Relocation efforts have been complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. After the final departure of U.S. forces, Qatar and Turkey worked to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar system, and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. Domestic flights restarted
51 Statement available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
52 U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” December 13, 2021. 53 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State
Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit.
54 “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” op. cit. 55 Department Press Briefing – April 12, 2022, U.S. Department of State, April 12, 2022. 56 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State
Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit.
57 Jessica Donati, “More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2021.
58 Association of Wartime Allies, “On The Ground Report - Feb 2022.” 59 Dan De Luce, “U.S. ‘left behind’ 78,000 Afghan allies in chaotic withdrawal: NGO report,” NBC News, March 1, 2022.
60 Alex Thompson and Allie Bice, “Biden’s broken promise to SIV holders,” Politico, May 16, 2022.
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in early September 2021, but flights by foreign carriers have been mostly limited to charter Qatar Airways flights as carriers cite high insurance charges as well as security and logistical concerns as impediments to regular commercial air travel.61 Despite a preliminary December 2021 deal with Qatar and Turkey to operate five airports in Afghanistan, the Taliban in May 2022 announced that they had reached a seemingly similar deal with the United Arab Emirates; the terms of that agreement remain unclear.62
Beyond logistical problems at Kabul airport and issues with Afghans obtaining travel documentation,63 some54
Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 29, 2022.
46 Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership divisions,” Guardian, March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes starting to change from within?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 7, 2022. 47 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,” New York Times, March 27, 2019.
48 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence under Taliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021. 49 Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, 2022. 50 Statement available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
51 Some of those evacuated U.S. citizens reportedly traveled to Afghanistan after August 2021. Department Press Briefing – August 15, 2022, U.S. Department of State; Andrew Desiderio et al., “800 Americans evacuated from Afghanistan since Taliban takeover,” Politico, August 14, 2022. 52 U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” December 13, 2021. 53 Department Press Briefing – April 12, 2022, U.S. Department of State. 54 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State
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One December 2021 press report, citing a State Department official, stated that around 62,000 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain in Afghanistan.55 This figure excludes the tens of thousands of Afghans who may be at risk and eligible for other forms of relief but have not applied or are not eligible for an SIV. In a February 2022 report, an advocacy group for SIV-eligible persons stated that 78,000 of the estimated 81,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan with visa applications pending as of August 15, 2021 remain in Afghanistan.56 The State Department has disputed the accuracy of this report.57 In May 2022, the State Department reportedly estimated that between 70,000 and 160,000 Afghans were eligible for SIVs.58
Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban
retribution. The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to a press retribution. The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to a press
account, a report from U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to the Security Council in account, a report from U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to the Security Council in
January 2022 stated that the United Nations has received “credible allegations” of Taliban January 2022 stated that the United Nations has received “credible allegations” of Taliban
reprisals against those individuals, including dozens of killings.reprisals against those individuals, including dozens of killings.
6459 In April 2022, Secretary In April 2022, Secretary
Blinken noted attacks by the Taliban against “those who are part of the former government,” Blinken noted attacks by the Taliban against “those who are part of the former government,”
adding that most appeared to be happening “at a local level” and were not “centrally directed.”adding that most appeared to be happening “at a local level” and were not “centrally directed.”
6560
The Taliban have reportedly interfered with flights at times, including by demanding seats for
The Taliban have reportedly interfered with flights at times, including by demanding seats for
Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money.Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money.
6661 Secretary Blinken said in late Secretary Blinken said in late
April 2022 that the Taliban had allowed freedom of movement to some degree but cautioned that April 2022 that the Taliban had allowed freedom of movement to some degree but cautioned that
there were still limited means of transportation to enable individuals to leave Afghanistan.there were still limited means of transportation to enable individuals to leave Afghanistan.
6762 The The
United States has reportedly paid, through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to United States has reportedly paid, through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to
Qatar for individuals to leave Afghanistan.Qatar for individuals to leave Afghanistan.
68
Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S.
Policy
The Taliban’s return to power has exacerbated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries. A number of interrelated factors, including the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, have all contributed to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis.
61 Susannah George, “Taliban signs deal to hand control of Afghan airports to UAE company,” Washington Post, May 24, 2022.
62 Rahim Faiez, “Taliban say deal signed with UAE firm to manage airports,” Diplomat, May 25, 2022. 63 Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing travel documents,” Washington Post, October 6, 2021; “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January 16, 2022.
6463 Other impediments to relocations from Afghanistan includes logistical issues at Kabul’s international airport (see textbox) and issues with Afghans obtaining travel documentation.64
Status of Kabul Airport
Relocation efforts have been complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. After the final departure of U.S. forces, Qatar and Turkey worked to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar system,
Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit.
55 Jessica Donati, “More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2021.
56 Association of Wartime Allies, “On The Ground Report - Feb 2022.” 57 Dan De Luce, “U.S. ‘left behind’ 78,000 Afghan allies in chaotic withdrawal: NGO report,” NBC News, March 1, 2022.
58 Alex Thompson and Allie Bice, “Biden’s broken promise to SIV holders,” Politico, May 16, 2022. 59 “UN chief accuses Taliban of scores of revenge killings since seizing control in Afghanistan,” “UN chief accuses Taliban of scores of revenge killings since seizing control in Afghanistan,”
RFE/RL, January 30, , January 30,
2022. 2022.
6560 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
The State
Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit. , op. cit.
6661 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan
for the past two weeks,” for the past two weeks,”
NBC News, December 23, 2021. , December 23, 2021.
6762 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,
Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for the
Department of State, hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022. , hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022.
6863 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee
Afghanistan,” Afghanistan,”
NBC News, June 8, 2022. , June 8, 2022.
64 Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing travel documents,” Washington Post, October 6, 2021; “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January 16, 2022.
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Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions have worsened significantly since August 2021: the World Food Program reported in June 2022 that 92% of Afghans reported not having enough to eat, a slight decrease from the previous month but an increase from the 80% of Afghans that had insufficient food before the Taliban takeover.69 WFP also reported that global food price increases and supply chain delays caused by the war in Ukraine are “having a direct impact on WFP’s Afghanistan operations.” The U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan said in March 2022 that due to emergency assistance from international donors, “we have perhaps averted our worst fears of famine and widespread starvation,” though the situation remains dire.70 Nonetheless, in May 2022, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 3.2 million Afghan children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022, with 1 million children potentially at risk of death.71
Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief
and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. As of August 2022, some domestic and regional airlines are reportedly carrying out flights from Kabul airport, but major foreign carriers have yet to resume operations.65 Despite a preliminary December 2021 deal with Qatar and Turkey to operate five airports in Afghanistan, the Taliban in May 2022 announced that they had reached a seemingly similar deal with the United Arab Emirates; the terms of that agreement remain unclear.66
Economic Collapse, Humanitarian Crisis, and U.S. Policy The Taliban’s return to power has exacerbated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries. A number of U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, appear relevant to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis.
The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the
The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the
former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as
80% of total public expenditures.80% of total public expenditures.
7267 Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s
August 2021 takeover, plunging the country into what U.N. officials describe as economic “free August 2021 takeover, plunging the country into what U.N. officials describe as economic “free
fall” as the country’s economy contracted by as much as a third in the last four months of 2021.fall” as the country’s economy contracted by as much as a third in the last four months of 2021.
7368 Humanitarian aid, including cash transfers, has “supported some economic stabilization,” Humanitarian aid, including cash transfers, has “supported some economic stabilization,”
according to the World Bank, but Afghanistan’s economic outlook remains “stark.”according to the World Bank, but Afghanistan’s economic outlook remains “stark.”
74 The Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request proposes $345 million for health, education, and other forms of assistance in Afghanistan; the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan may complicate or constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S. funding.
U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan; the head of the Norwegian Refugee Council said in January 2021 that sanctions have “held back” their operations.75 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.76 Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions or other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by refusing to engage in the country rather than risk violation of U.S. sanctions. For more on U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, see CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions.
In at least some parts of the country, food is available but many Afghans do not have money with which to pay for it, illustrating the impact of the country’s economic crisis on humanitarian conditions. Afghanistan is a highly cash-dependent society, but shipments of dollars halted with the U.S. freeze on Afghan central bank assets in August 2021 and Afghanistan does not have the ability to print its own currency. The result is a severe liquidity crisis that threatens to destroy the 69 “Afghanistan Situation Report,” World Food Program, June 10, 2022. 70 “Briefing by Special Representative Deborah Lyons to the Security Council,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, March 2, 2022.
71 “Afghanistan: Humanitarian Situation Report #5, 1-31 March 2022,” UNICEF, May 26, 2022. 72 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021. 73 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, April 13, 2022 74 Ibid. 75 See interview at https://twitter.com/nrc_norway/status/1486778209387565058. 76 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf.
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country’s banking system. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in December 2021 that the United States was “looking intensely at ways to put more liquidity into the Afghan economy, to get more money into people’s pockets ... in a way that doesn’t directly benefit the Taliban.”77
Both the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on Afghan central bank69
The economic collapse has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions have worsened significantly since August 2021: the World Food Program asserted in August 2022 that 92% of Afghans reported not having enough to eat, an increase from the 80% of Afghans that had insufficient food before the Taliban takeover.70 WFP also reported in June that global food price increases and supply chain delays caused by the war in Ukraine are “having a direct impact on WFP’s Afghanistan operations.” The U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan said in March 2022 that due to emergency assistance from international donors, “we have perhaps averted our worst fears of famine and widespread starvation,” though the situation remains dire.71 In August 2022, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 1.1 million Afghan children are expected to need treatment for severe acute malnutrition.72
In terms of U.S. policy, the United States has provided over $900 million in humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover.73 While such assistance plays a crucial role 65 Tamim Shahir, “Major airlines still not making flights to Kabul,” TOLONews, August 8, 2022. 66 Rahim Faiez, “Taliban say deal signed with UAE firm to manage airports,” Diplomat, May 25, 2022. 67 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021. 68 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, April 13, 2022. 69 Ibid. 70 “Afghanistan Situation Report,” World Food Program, August 15, 2022. 71 “Briefing by Special Representative Deborah Lyons to the Security Council,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, March 2, 2022.
72 “Afghanistan: Humanitarian Situation Report #8, 1-31 July 2022,” UNICEF, August 2022. 73 USAID press releases, August 12, 2022.
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in averting further humanitarian suffering, it is different in many ways from former U.S. security, development, and stabilization assistance, which averaged over $5 billion annually between FY2019 and FY2021. In addition to providing some humanitarian assistance, those funds paid the salaries of Afghan soldiers and civil servants, supported key government services, and ultimately made up a large portion of Afghanistan’s economy. The Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request proposes $345 million for health, education, and other forms of assistance in Afghanistan; the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan may complicate or constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S. funding.
Beyond assistance, the two U.S. policy areas that appear to have the greatest relevance to the economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan; the head of the Norwegian Refugee Council said in January 2022 that sanctions have “held back” their operations.74 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the provision of assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions.75 Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions or other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by refusing to engage in the country rather than risk violation of U.S. sanctions. For more on U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, see CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions.
The Biden Administration’s hold on U.S.-based Afghan central bank assets has also drawn scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from accessing the funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on those assets, which total around $7 billion. On February 11, 2022, the Biden assets, which total around $7 billion. On February 11, 2022, the Biden
Administration announced that it Administration announced that it
willwould “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for
the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001,
attacks.attacks.
78 76 The Administration has reportedly engaged with the Taliban on the issue, including a potential Switzerland-based trust fund.77The Administration has not detailed how it intends to dispose of the assets for the Afghan people; possible uses include funding for humanitarian relief through U.N. agencies or other organizations. Alternatively, the $3.5 billion could contribute to “the potential recapitalization of a future central bank...and the recapitalization of a financial system,” according to Tom West, the State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan. For more, see CRS For more, see CRS
In Focus IF12052, In Focus IF12052,
Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves. .
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors
Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has
throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers. throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers.
Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors. Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.
Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for
decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its
subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph
74 See interview at https://twitter.com/nrc_norway/status/1486778209387565058. 75 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf.
76 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf and briefing at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-on-u-s-support-for-the-people-of-afghanistan/.
77 Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: U.S. commits to Afghan asset talks despite frustration with Taliban,” Reuters, August 22, 2022.
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for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from
Pakistani Pakistani
Prime Minister Imran Khan and others.79leaders.78 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous
meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021. meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.
However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for
However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for
Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-
based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i Taliban-i based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i Taliban-i
Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against Pakistani Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against Pakistani
security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to
seek the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires, most recently in June 2022.seek the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires, most recently in June 2022.
8079 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over one million Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over one million
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over their Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over their
shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government forces have intermittently shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government forces have intermittently
clashed in clashed in
the past six months.81
77 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” December 21, 2021. 78 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf and briefing at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-on-u-s-support-for-the-people-of-afghanistan/.
79 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, “Pakista’’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021. 80 Umair Jamal, “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan declares unilateral ceasefire,” Diplomat, June 13, 2022. 81 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017; Asfandyar Mir et al., “Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Dispute Heats Up,” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 12, 2022.
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2022.80
Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule
but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for
Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who
speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Official Taliban visits to speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Official Taliban visits to
Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover, and have continued since then, including with Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover, and have continued since then, including with
the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022.the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022.
Disputes in 2022 over water rights and refugees could portend future tensions.81
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central AsianAfghanistan’s Central Asian
neighborsneighbors
(Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
governments appear to be prioritizing economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-governments appear to be prioritizing economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had numerous official Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had numerous official
engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has
rejectedopposed the Taliban the Taliban’s government and emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s , a result both of Tajikistan’s
own struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second own struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second
largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.
82 Anti-Taliban leaders initially fled to Tajikistan after the Taliban takeover.
China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some
congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.
8283 China, which played a relatively limited role China, which played a relatively limited role
in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan
(particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban
takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and
other limitations.other limitations.
8384 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has
78 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, “Pakista’’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021. 79 Rhea Sinha, “TTP-Pakistan peace talks: the pitfalls and their implications,” ORF, August 18, 2022. 80 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “Pushed over the edge: political and military dynamics at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,” Middle East Institute, May 9, 2022.
81 Christian Hoj Hansen and Halimullah Kousary, “Can Iran get along with the Taliban?” War on the Rocks, June 7, 2022.
82 Abubakar Siddique, “Hostilities grow between Taliban and Tajikistan amid border closure, truck seizures,” Gandhara, May 19, 2022.
83 See, for example, H.R. 5404, S. 2826, and Sec 5404 of H.R. 7900. 84 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has signaled acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”84
Congressional Action and Outlook
The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public attention. Many Members characterized the August 2021 U.S. military withdrawal as chaotic and damaging to U.S. interest and global standing; some said they supported the removal of U.S. troops but not the way in which it was carried out.85 In the months since the Taliban entered Kabul, U.S. public attention appears to have decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of significant congressional interest as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.
At least six congressional committees held hearings on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover,86 and Congress established an Afghanistan War Commission (Section 1094 of
82 See, for example, H.R. 5404 and S. 2826. 83 Matthew Funaiole and Brian Hart, “Afghanistan Is No Treasure Trove for China,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2021.
84 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022. 85 Barbara Sprunt, “There’s a bipartisan backlash to how Biden handled the withdrawal from Afghanistan,” NPR, August 17, 2021.
86 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by: House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5,
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Matthew Funaiole and Brian Hart, “Afghanistan Is No Treasure Trove for China,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2021.
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signaled acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”85
Congressional Action and Outlook The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public attention. U.S. public attention appears to have decreased in the subsequent months, but Afghanistan remains the subject of significant congressional interest as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.86
Congressional oversight of Afghanistan appears robust. Congressional committees held at least ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.87 Senate Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee ranking member said he would produce his own investigative report in August 2022. In addition, Congress established the Afghanistan War Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining
the war and developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in the war and developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in
a final report to be issued within three years. In the meantime, some Members express an intent to remain focused on developments in Afghanistan, arguing that a U.S. failure to remain engaged in Afghanistan may lead to the sort of broader societal collapse in which Al Qaeda thrived and planned the September 11, 2001, attacks after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.87
How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is one issue on which Members might engage, especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as competing U.S. policy priorities. The Biden Administration initially framed and has since defended the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as helping to make the United States more prepared to confront other, and ostensibly more strategically important, challenges, such as those posed by Russia and China.88 a final report to be issued within three years.
Congress has also increased reporting requirements related to Afghanistan. In the FY2022 NDAA, Congress directed the Administration to submit reports covering a number of topics, including U.S. over-the horizon counterterrorism capabilities; the status of U.S.-supplied military materiel in Afghanistan; and the lessons of Afghanistan for other U.S. security cooperation programs. Reports required in the House-passed FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) include a strategy for reimbursing U.S. personnel who expended personal funds in support of evacuation efforts and an assessment of China’s activities in Afghanistan. The bill would also mandate an interagency inspector general review of efforts to support and process evacuees from Afghanistan, including screening procedures, and a full accounting of the number of individuals evacuated in 2021 disaggregated by age, SIV eligibility, and other categories. An amendment to add an additional reporting requirement on the humanitarian impact of U.S. sanctions and the hold on central bank assets was made in order but did not come up for a vote. Members may consider directing the Administration to provide additional reports on other topics of interest, such as the impact of the U.S. diplomatic withdrawal and conditions for its reinstatement.
Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, will be influenced and likely
Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, will be influenced and likely
constrained by a number of factors, including constrained by a number of factors, including
a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.
a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.
diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on
diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on
journalists; and journalists; and
the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make
cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically difficult.
Beyond the challenges of how to formulate U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Members may seek to articulate and shape what U.S. goals in Afghanistan should be. Many Members express an interest in minimizing humanitarian suffering, containing regionally based terrorist groups, and continuing support for Afghan women and girls. At the same time, many Members (with the evident support of the Biden Administration) evidently seek to avoid any actions, including the provision of development assistance, that might have the effect of benefiting the Taliban or improving the group’s position in power.89 Some of these priorities may come into tension: providing purely
85 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022. 86 Google Trends, “Afghanistan,” “Past 12 months,” accessed August 26, 2022. 87 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by: House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former U.S. officials).
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the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make
cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically difficult.
Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to stave off mass casualties, humanitarian aid may be sufficient to stave off mass casualties,
butit is unlikely to is unlikely to
boost the Afghan economysustainably improve economic conditions. Financial assistance could improve the Afghan economy, . Financial assistance could improve the Afghan economy,
ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or
broader benefits to the Taliban. Going forward, Members may weigh the financial and social costs of providing humanitarian assistance indefinitely with the political and moral costs of boosting (or at least refraining from undermining) the Taliban’s rule.
In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of policy options, including:
2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former U.S. officials).
87 Letter available at https://crow.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-crow-malinowski-meijer-press-president-biden-release.
88 See for example “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” White House, April 14, 2021; “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” White House, August 31, 2021; Department Press Briefing—January 24, 2022, U.S. Department of State.
89 See S. 2863.
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Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration
about its “over-the-horizon” plans to counter terrorism in Afghanistan to assess the feasibility of those plans, and may consider adjustments to the resources and/or authorities it provides to the Executive Branch to carry them out;broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering the Administration’s FY2023 budget request, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options, including conditions on U.S. assistance.
The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since returning to power they have not shown willingness to make compromises on important issues to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not be as effective in Afghanistan as in other contexts.88
In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of policy options, including:
Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may impact
Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may impact
Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the
Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the
ability of Afghan girls to attendability of Afghan girls to attend
secondary schools in particular, to inform congressional schools in particular, to inform congressional
consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2023 consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2023
appropriations; appropriations;
Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration
Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration
about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in
about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in
Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocationAfghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation
, including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and Administration plans to overcome those obstacles; ;
Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the targeted individuals,
Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the targeted individuals,
the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, including by requiring
the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, including by requiring
reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the Government Accountability reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the Government Accountability
Office, to assess whether they are achieving their intended objectives; Office, to assess whether they are achieving their intended objectives;
and
Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts (e.g., H.R. 8560, 117th Congress), congressional authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight mechanisms, (including those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners, such as Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department of Defense (and the federally funded research and development center with whom the Department contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are due to be submitted within approximately one and two years, respectively.
88 See, for example, Marvin Weinbaum, “America can’t change the Taliban,” National Interest, August 15, 2022; Kate Bateman, “A year after the Taliban takeover: what’s next for the U.S. in Afghanistan?” U.S. Institute of Peace, August 11, 2022.
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Author Information
Clayton Thomas
Specialist
Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration
about its plans for Afghan central bank assets held in the United States (though opportunities for congressional action may be limited in light of ongoing litigation); and
Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan to shape future oversight mechanisms, including those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners (such as Ukraine).
Author Information
Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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