Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from June 7, 2022 to August 5, 2022

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief ~~June 7~~August 5, 2022 , 2022
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment and U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment and~~—as of mid-2022—~~
with Turkey in economic distress. Existing U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed with Turkey in economic distress. Existing U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed
2016 coup in Jim Zanotti
~~2016 coup in~~ Turkey—including Turkey—including ~~via~~ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019
procurement of Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
~~procurement of~~ a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the
future of Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
~~future of~~ bilateral relations. Nevertheless, bilateral relations. Nevertheless, ~~both countries’~~U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of officials emphasize the importance of

continued continued ~~U.S.-Turkey~~ cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Clayton Thomas
~~Organization~~ (NATO). The following are major factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. (NATO). The following are major factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Erdogan’s rule and Turkey’s economic challenges. Many observers voice worries about Many observers voice worries about

President Erdogan’s largely authoritarian rule. In late 2021, an ongoing currency crisis President Erdogan’s largely authoritarian rule. In late 2021, an ongoing currency crisis
accelerated after he installed a central bank governor who lowered interest rates, generating accelerated after he installed a central bank governor who lowered interest rates, generating

major domestic concern about inflation major domestic concern about inflation (the official annual figure was nearly 80% in July 2022) and the country’s future financial stability. Presidential and the country’s future financial stability. Presidential
and parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 2023, and public opinion polls suggest that Erdogan may be vulnerable to and parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 2023, and public opinion polls suggest that Erdogan may be vulnerable to
defeat. Some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place, (2) opposition parties can attract support defeat. Some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place, (2) opposition parties can attract support
across ideological lines, and (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral loss. across ideological lines, and (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral loss.
Turkey’s strategic orientation. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkey’s ongoing cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkey’s ongoing
economic struggles highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s economic struggles highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s
surrounding region affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent surrounding region affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent
foreign policy. These include Russia’s 2022 foreign policy. These include Russia’s 2022 ~~renewed~~ invasion of Ukraine, Syria’s civil war (during which more than 3.6 invasion of Ukraine, Syria’s civil war (during which more than 3.6
million refugees have come to Turkey), and other challenges involving Greece, Cyprus, and Libya. Since 2021, Turkey has million refugees have come to Turkey), and other challenges involving Greece, Cyprus, and Libya. Since 2021, Turkey has
made some headway in easing tensions and boosting trade with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. made some headway in easing tensions and boosting trade with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.
~~Key NATO Issues:~~ Russia’s war on Ukraine ~~and Swedish/Finnish accession~~. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened
challenges Turkey faces in balancing relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey has not challenges Turkey faces in balancing relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey has not
joined sanctions against Russia, with which it has close trade and energy ties, likely because it hopes to minimize spillover joined sanctions against Russia, with which it has close trade and energy ties, likely because it hopes to minimize spillover
effects to its national security and economy. effects to its national security and economy. The movement of some Russian assets and business operations to Turkey has caused some Western concern about possible Russian sanctions evasion. However, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims may However, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims may
have converged, as Turkey has have converged, as Turkey has ~~joined~~worked in parallel with other NATO countries in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. other NATO countries in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense cooperation, and the drones appear to have had some success against Russian military targets. These reported successes have bolstered the TB2’s already strong reputation from conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, increasing the demand for Turkish defense exports, as well as opportunities for Turkey to build broader ties with a number of countries. Under Turkey’s Under Turkey’s
authority to regulate access to the Black Sea under the 1936 Montreux Convention, it has generally barred Russian and authority to regulate access to the Black Sea under the 1936 Montreux Convention, it has generally barred Russian and
Ukrainian warships from transiting the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, drawing statements of support from U.S. officials. Ukrainian warships from transiting the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, drawing statements of support from U.S. officials.
Turkey also has advised other countries’ naval vessels to avoid the Straits, leading some observers to raise questions about Turkey also has advised other countries’ naval vessels to avoid the Straits, leading some observers to raise questions about
security and freedom of security and freedom of navigation for other Black Sea countries, and about NATO’s role in the region. Swedish/Finnish NATO accession and Syria. In June 2022, Turkey reached agreement with Sweden and Finland to end Turkey’s delay of their formal NATO accession process. Sweden and Finland agreed to address Turkish objections to external support for ~~navigation for other Black Sea countries, and about NATO’s role in the region.~~
~~Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense cooperation,~~
~~and the drones appear to have successfully played a role in targeting Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries,~~
~~helicopters, and ships. These reported successes have bolstered the TB2’s already strong reputation from conflicts in Syria,~~
~~Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, increasing the demand for Turkish defense exports from other countries, as well as~~
~~opportunities for Turkey to build broader ties with those countries.~~
~~As Sweden and Finland formally applied for NATO membership in May 2022, Turkish officials demanded that the two~~
~~countries address certain Turkish concerns before agreeing to their accession. These demands center on having Sweden,~~
~~Finland, and other NATO allies (including the United States) end support for Kurdish~~ individuals or groups that Turkey individuals or groups that Turkey
considers to be connected to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), considers to be connected to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization),
including a Syrian Kurdish group helping the anti-Islamic State including a Syrian Kurdish group helping the anti-Islamic State coalition. However, President Erdogan has warned that Turkey’s final approval of Swedish and Finnish NATO membership could depend on whether the two countries extradite certain individuals to Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey has publicly discussed a new military operation in Syria aimed at displacing PKK-linked Syrian Kurds from areas near its border, but U.S. and Russian concerns may affect whether and how such an operation occurs~~coalition. Given the other NATO allies’ support for Sweden~~
~~and Finland’s access, continued Turkish objections might increase U.S.-Turkey tensions and Turkish isolation within NATO~~. .
U.S.-Turkey arms sales issues (including F-16s). Turkey’s Turkey’s ~~acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system in~~
~~July 2019~~S-400 acquisition from Russia has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter program and U.S. sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency. The continuing U.S.-Turkey impasse over the Fighter program and U.S. sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency. The continuing U.S.-Turkey impasse over the
~~S-400~~ S-400 or other issues could prevent or complicate major Western arms sales to Turkey. In April 2022, the Biden Administration reportedly could prevent or complicate major Western arms sales to Turkey. In April 2022, the Biden Administration reportedly
notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, ~~with Members of Congress expressing mixed~~
~~views about the transaction. The potential sale could affect the military balance between Turkey and Greece.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

link to page link to page 2021 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and defense relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and defense
matters. matters.
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. He has limited his cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. He has limited his
meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the sidelines of multilateral meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the sidelines of multilateral
conferences. This approach may reflect a U.S. and European inclination to keep Turkey at arms’ conferences. This approach may reflect a U.S. and European inclination to keep Turkey at arms’
length until after the 2023 elections.1 Nevertheless, Turkey’s length until after the 2023 elections.1 Nevertheless, Turkey’s ~~geostrategic significance,~~ cautious cautious
support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s 2022 invasionsupport for Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s 2022 invasion, and openness to rapprochement and openness to rapprochement
with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved U.S.-Turkey relations.2 with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved U.S.-Turkey relations.2
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by , by
Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and figures about for a map and key facts and figures about
Turkey. Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily
deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became
president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a
mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he
cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some
allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.3 allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.3
Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-
leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic
domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of their reliance on parliamentary support domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of their reliance on parliamentary support
from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP).from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.4 The AKP won the largest share of equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.4 The AKP won the largest share of
votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates
from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP). from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).

1 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” 1 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” SWP Comment (German Institute for International (German Institute for International
and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 6, 2022. and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 6, 2022.
2 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for 2 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, May 19, 2022. Relations, May 19, 2022.
3 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final 3 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). 2018 (published June 25, 2018).
4 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two 4 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.5 In response to the 2016 coup governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.5 In response to the 2016 coup
attempt, the government detained tens of thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to attempt, the government detained tens of thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to
military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media
outlets.6 Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen outlets.6 Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen
movement orchestrated the coup attempt, in which more than 250 people were killed and movement orchestrated the coup attempt, in which more than 250 people were killed and
thousands were injured.7 Forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted thousands were injured.7 Forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted
the apparent efforts of some renegade military personnel (which included airstrikes targeting the apparent efforts of some renegade military personnel (which included airstrikes targeting
Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament building) to seize state control. Some leading Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament building) to seize state control. Some leading
opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the
failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.8 failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.8
In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced civil society figure Osman Kavala to life imprisonment In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced civil society figure Osman Kavala to life imprisonment
after convicting him of conspiring against the government. The European Court of Human after convicting him of conspiring against the government. The European Court of Human
RightsRights (ECHR), whose rulings are supposed to be binding for Turkey due to its Council of Europe , whose rulings are supposed to be binding for Turkey due to its Council of Europe
membership, had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said membership, had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said
that Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental that Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law,” while also criticizing “continued judicial harassment of civil freedoms, and the rule of law,” while also criticizing “continued judicial harassment of civil
society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial
detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases.”9detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases.”9
In July, the ECHR ordered Turkey to release Kavala and pay him damages. If Turkey does not comply, it could have its voting rights and membership in the Council of Europe suspended.10 With national elections scheduled for 2023 (discussed below), the Erdogan government has With national elections scheduled for 2023 (discussed below), the Erdogan government has
pursued a Constitutional Court ruling to close down the Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic pursued a Constitutional Court ruling to close down the Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic
Party (Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in Turkey’s parliament. The government Party (Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in Turkey’s parliament. The government
claims that the HDP has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-claims that the HDP has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization).designated terrorist organization).1011 The State Department has said that banning the HDP “would The State Department has said that banning the HDP “would
unduly subvert the will of Turkish voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny unduly subvert the will of Turkish voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny
millions of Turkish citizens their chosen representation.”millions of Turkish citizens their chosen representation.”1112 How Kurds who feel politically How Kurds who feel politically
marginalized might respond to the HDP’s ban is unclear. Major violence between Turkish marginalized might respond to the HDP’s ban is unclear. Major violence between Turkish
authorities and PKK militants—which has taken place on and off since the 1980s—wracked authorities and PKK militants—which has taken place on and off since the 1980s—wracked
~~Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015 and 2016, and the Turkish military has continued~~
~~targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.12~~

5 State Department, 5 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, , Turkey; European Commission, Turkey
2021 Report, October 19, 2021. , October 19, 2021.
6 Ibid. 6 Ibid.
7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” 7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” , July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America, July 15, 2019. , July 15, 2019.
Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about
possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” For more on Gulen, see CRS In Focus IF10444, possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” For more on Gulen, see CRS In Focus IF10444,
Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
8 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” 8 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, , April 7,
2021. 2021.
9 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022. 9 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022.
10 10 Nazlan Ertan, “Europe’s top court reprimands Turkey for jailing philanthropist,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2022. 11 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye, ,
March 20, 2021. March 20, 2021.
1112 State Department, “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021. State Department, “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021.
~~12 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February~~
~~18, 2022.~~
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Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015 and 2016, and the Turkish military has continued targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.13 Major Economic Challenges
Ongoing economic problems in Turkey have considerably worsened in the past year as its Ongoing economic problems in Turkey have considerably worsened in the past year as its
currency, the currency, the lira, depreciated in value nearly 45% against the U.S. dollar in 2021 and has , depreciated in value nearly 45% against the U.S. dollar in 2021 and has
continued its slide during 2022. continued its slide during 2022. ~~In May 2022, official annual inflation in Turkey swelled to 73.5%~~
~~(see Figure A-2), the highest since 1998.13~~ Official annual inflation climbed to nearly 80% for July—a level not seen in Turkey since the 1990s—with annual inflation for producers estimated at 145% in that same month.14 One unofficial estimate earlier in the summer put consumer inflation at 160%.15 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish
central bank’s reduction of its key interest rate from 19% to 14% between September and central bank’s reduction of its key interest rate from 19% to 14% between September and
December 2021, with additional inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such December 2021, with additional inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such
as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major
economies.economies.1416 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with its decline driven The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with its decline driven
by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.1517
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.1618 Erdogan also Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.between rich and poor.1719
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies.sector companies.1820 The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts
and subsidies for basic expenses and borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.and subsidies for basic expenses and borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.1921 According According
to one source, by December 2021 almost 65% of Turkish bank deposits were in foreign to one source, by December 2021 almost 65% of Turkish bank deposits were in foreign
~~currencies20~~currencies22—up from around 41% at the time of the 2016 coup attempt.—up from around 41% at the time of the 2016 coup attempt.2123 In that month, the In that month, the
government announced a plan to insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency government announced a plan to insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency
~~depreciation, in apparent coordination with a significant state-backed market intervention.22 It is~~
~~unclear whether the government’s credit and domestic savers’ confidence will be sufficient to~~
~~prevent future financial panic.23~~

~~13 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish consumer inflation soars to 73.5%,” Al-Monitor, June 3, 2022.~~
14 13 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 18, 2022. 14 “Turkey’s inflation jumped to 24-year high of 79.6 percent in July,” Al Jazeera, August 3, 2022. 15 “The price is wrong,” Economist, July 14, 2022. 16 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April , April
28, 2022. 28, 2022.
1517 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. , April 25, 2022.
1618 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta , December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. , December 11, 2021.
1719 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3,
~~2021; Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy.”~~
182021. 20 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press. .
1921 “Turkey’s inflation surges to 70%, putting Erdogan in bind,” “Turkey’s inflation surges to 70%, putting Erdogan in bind,” Reuters, May 5, 2022; Balci and Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All ; Balci and Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All
Inflation Forecasts.” Inflation Forecasts.”
2022 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut,” Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2021. , December 16, 2021.
2123 Capital Economics graphic, from Caitlin Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall,” Capital Economics graphic, from Caitlin Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall,” Wall Street
Journal, December 7, 2021. , December 7, 2021.
~~22 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021.~~
~~23 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish taxpayers outraged at cost of lira protection scheme,” Al-Monitor, March 25, 2022.~~
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~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~
Congressional Research Service 3 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief depreciation, in apparent coordination with a significant state-backed market intervention.24 It is unclear whether the government’s credit and domestic savers’ confidence will be sufficient to prevent future financial panic.25
Future Elections
Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place by June 2023. Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place by June 2023.
Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems, public opinion polls suggest that support Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems, public opinion polls suggest that support
for Erdogan and the AKP is at a historic low.for Erdogan and the AKP is at a historic low.2426 Observers speculate about whether Erdogan and Observers speculate about whether Erdogan and
the existing AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition can remain in power.the existing AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition can remain in power.2527 How Kurdish citizens of How Kurdish citizens of
Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote—with or without the HDP’s Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote—with or without the HDP’s
participation—could impact the outcome.participation—could impact the outcome.2628 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free
and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,2729 (2) opposition parties can convince potential (2) opposition parties can convince potential
swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,2830 or (3) or (3)
Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.2931
The CHP and some other opposition parties have agreed on some steps toward a joint platform The CHP and some other opposition parties have agreed on some steps toward a joint platform
focused on strengthening legislative and judicial checks on executive power.focused on strengthening legislative and judicial checks on executive power.3032 However, it However, it
remains unclear which opposition candidate will challenge Erdogan for president: CHP party remains unclear which opposition candidate will challenge Erdogan for president: CHP party
leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the Alevi religious minority), or either of the two mayors who leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the Alevi religious minority), or either of the two mayors who
won control of Istanbul and Ankara for the party in 2019 (Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas, won control of Istanbul and Ankara for the party in 2019 (Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas,
respectively) and generally poll higher than Kilicdaroglu.respectively) and generally poll higher than Kilicdaroglu.3133 In a sign to some of government In a sign to some of government
attempts to sideline opponents, Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity attempts to sideline opponents, Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity
because of criminal charges accusing him of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral because of criminal charges accusing him of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral
Council in 2019.Council in 2019.3234
Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his
unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead
Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.3335
How closely U.S. and other international actors engage Erdogan’s government ahead of elections How closely U.S. and other international actors engage Erdogan’s government ahead of elections
could depend on perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to could depend on perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to
which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical and domestic considerations. which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical and domestic considerations.

24 24 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021. 25 “Inflation nation,” Economist, July 21, 2022. 26 Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022. , May 5, 2022.
2527 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 10, 2022. the United States, January 10, 2022.
2628 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment (German (German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 2022. Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 2022.
2729 Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey”; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey”; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the
Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?”
2830 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, ,
November 1, 2021. November 1, 2021.
2931 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.”
3032 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February , February
15, 2022. 15, 2022.
3133 Ibid.; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” Ibid.; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.”
3234 Andrew Wilks, “Cases against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Andrew Wilks, “Cases against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022. , June 2, 2022.
3335 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14, , December 14,
2021. 2021.
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Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and
Defense
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s
relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey
has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global
system. Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and system. Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and
discouraging Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness discouraging Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness
to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian
S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with
Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises
involving Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan). involving Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan).
In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and
South Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key South Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key
actors. U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to actors. U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to
counter Turkish actions.counter Turkish actions.3436 In the past year, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions In the past year, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions
with major U.S. partners in the Middle East—namely Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi with major U.S. partners in the Middle East—namely Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia (seeArabia (see Appendix B). U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on . U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on
regional security matters remains mutually important.regional security matters remains mutually important.3537
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.actors and maintain its leverage with them.3638 Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense cooperation, United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense cooperation,
European countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the EU since the European countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the EU since the
late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection
or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to
remain largely dependent on these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles remain largely dependent on these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles
(discussed above) highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties.(discussed above) highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties.3739
Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to
maintain power domestically. Because Erdogan’s control over parliament depends on the AKP’s maintain power domestically. Because Erdogan’s control over parliament depends on the AKP’s
coalition with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to preserve support from core coalition with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to preserve support from core
constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign
policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment with the West.policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment with the West.3840 Turkey’s Turkey’s
history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression contributes to wide history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression contributes to wide

3436 Ahmed Qandil, “East Med Gas Forum turns into regional organisation, in blow to Turkey,” Ahmed Qandil, “East Med Gas Forum turns into regional organisation, in blow to Turkey,” Arab Weekly, September , September
23, 2020. 23, 2020.
3537 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,”
May 18, 2022. May 18, 2022.
3638 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; , June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. , RAND Corporation, 2020.
3739 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy
Analysis, February 17, 2022. Analysis, February 17, 2022.
3840 William Hale, William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, New York: Routledge, 2013 (3rd edition). , New York: Routledge, 2013 (3rd edition).
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domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse, as well as sympathy for domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse, as well as sympathy for
Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish regional prestige. Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish regional prestige.
Turkish Hard Power and “Drone Diplomacy”
During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region
(with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern (with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern
Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military
deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however, deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however,
Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especial y the case after Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especial y the case after
Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating
power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt. power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt.
Under this modified approach, Turkey has relied more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically, Under this modified approach, Turkey has relied more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically,
Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces
(particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in (particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in
theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.3941 Partly because the Partly because the
drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less restraint in drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less restraint in
deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less
mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-origin equipment in Syria, Libya, and mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-origin equipment in Syria, Libya, and
Nagorno-Karabakh).Nagorno-Karabakh).4042
Turkey’s demonstrated battlefield successes with its drones have significantly increased demand for exports to Turkey’s demonstrated battlefield successes with its drones have significantly increased demand for exports to
other countries.other countries.4143 The growing global popularity of the Bayraktar TB2 drone in particular (see The growing global popularity of the Bayraktar TB2 drone in particular (see Figure A-32) has has
prompted one Western arms industry figure to call it the “Kalashnikov [rifle] of the 21st century.”prompted one Western arms industry figure to call it the “Kalashnikov [rifle] of the 21st century.”4244 One analyst One analyst
explained the TB2’s appeal by saying that it “strikes a favorable balance between price and capability, being more explained the TB2’s appeal by saying that it “strikes a favorable balance between price and capability, being more
affordable and accessible compared to US drones while being far more reliable and effective than Chinese affordable and accessible compared to US drones while being far more reliable and effective than Chinese
models.”models.”4345 At the same time Turkey markets drones to other countries with fewer constraints than Western At the same time Turkey markets drones to other countries with fewer constraints than Western
countries, it generally seeks to broaden military, political, and economic linkages with them.countries, it generally seeks to broaden military, political, and economic linkages with them.4446
While this “drone diplomacy” appears to be helping Turkey build important regional and global connections, some While this “drone diplomacy” appears to be helping Turkey build important regional and global connections, some
observers have raised concerns. One worry is that Turkey may enable human rights violations; an example is the observers have raised concerns. One worry is that Turkey may enable human rights violations; an example is the
Ethiopian government’s use of TB2s (alongside drones originally from Iran and China) against Tigrayan rebels.Ethiopian government’s use of TB2s (alongside drones originally from Iran and China) against Tigrayan rebels.4547
Another concern is that without greater oversight and transparency, exporting drones broadly could result in Another concern is that without greater oversight and transparency, exporting drones broadly could result in
unintended, adverse consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.unintended, adverse consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.4648
U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about

3941 See, e.g., Rich Outzen, See, e.g., Rich Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection, Washington , Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021. Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021.
4042 James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” Wall Street Journal, ,
June 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year—here’s how he did it,” June 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year—here’s how he did it,” Business
Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
4143 Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish drone success in Ukraine sets stage for Asia roadshow,” Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish drone success in Ukraine sets stage for Asia roadshow,” Nikkei Asia, March 16, 2022. , March 16, 2022.
4244 Ibid. For background information on the initial development of Turkey’s drone aircraft industry, see CRS Report Ibid. For background information on the initial development of Turkey’s drone aircraft industry, see CRS Report
R41368, R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
4345 Gabriel Honrada, “The Turkish drones winning the Ukraine war,” Gabriel Honrada, “The Turkish drones winning the Ukraine war,” Asia Times, May 12, 2022. , May 12, 2022.
4446 Rich Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey,” Rich Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey,” New/Lines Magazine, April 26, 2022. , April 26, 2022.
4547 Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,” Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,” Voice of
America, February 2, 2022. , February 2, 2022.
4648 Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January
31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment for International 31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 18, 2022. Peace, January 18, 2022.
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encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria,
Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military
operations and arms exports.operations and arms exports.4749
Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key
U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO
ground forces command in Izmir (seground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-43). .
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
~~Overview~~
Political, Military, and Economic Implications Russia’s 2022 Russia’s 2022 ~~renewed~~ invasion of Ukraineinvasion of Ukraine~~—a country Russia first invaded and partly occupied~~
~~in 2014—~~ has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries
and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. In recent years, Turkey’s and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. In recent years, Turkey’s
links with Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense links with Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense
system—have fueled major U.S.-Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported informal system—have fueled major U.S.-Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported informal
congressional holds on arms sales (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian congressional holds on arms sales (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian
invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including
along the Black Sea coast—may have converged as Turkey has participated along the Black Sea coast—may have converged as Turkey has participated ~~alongside~~in parallel with other other
NATO countries to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.NATO countries to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.4850
While Turkey has denounced Russia’s invasion and supplied Ukraine with armed drone aircraft While Turkey has denounced Russia’s invasion and supplied Ukraine with armed drone aircraft
(see text box below) and humanitarian assistance, Turkey likely hopes to minimize spillover (see text box below) and humanitarian assistance, Turkey likely hopes to minimize spillover
effects to its national security and economy. The Turkish government has not joined economic effects to its national security and economy. The Turkish government has not joined economic
sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. As mentioned above, sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. As mentioned above, global and regional supply problems stemming from the ~~the~~
conflict conflict ~~appears~~appear to have worsened Turkey’s ongoing inflation crisis. Additionally, decreases in to have worsened Turkey’s ongoing inflation crisis. Additionally, decreases in
Russian and Ukrainian tourism are Russian and Ukrainian tourism are ~~likely to hurt~~affecting Turkey’s economy, and Turkey is wary of potential Russian actions that could harm its economy even more, such as cutoffs of natural gas and wheat exports or military operations that might increase refugee flows to Turkey.51 ~~Turkey’s economy, as could cutoffs of imported~~
~~Russian natural gas and wheat, or Russian military actions in Syria that create new refugee~~
~~flows.49 Turkey has engaged in mediation between Russia and Ukraine, including some~~
~~involvement in broader international efforts seeking a corridor through Russian-blockaded waters~~
~~for Ukrainian grain exports that could alleviate global supply concerns.50~~
With Turkish officials arguably motivated to improve the country’s economic profile while With Turkish officials arguably motivated to improve the country’s economic profile while
anticipating closely contested national elections in 2023, they have welcomed sanctioned Russian anticipating closely contested national elections in 2023, they have welcomed sanctioned Russian
oligarchs as tourists and investors. Turkey’s actions raise questions about whether it can and will oligarchs as tourists and investors. Turkey’s actions raise questions about whether it can and will
prevent Russian investors from evading Western sanctions.prevent Russian investors from evading Western sanctions.51
52 In June 2022, Deputy Secretary of
4749 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.” 2022; Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.”
4850 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
4951 Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine.” Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine.”
~~50 William Mauldin et al., “The Ukraine Crisis: Talks Press Plan to Free Shipments of Grain,” Wall Street Journal, June~~
~~2, 2022.~~
5152 Giacomo Tognini, “Why Turkey Could Become the Next Haven for Russian Oligarchs Fleeing Sanctions,” Giacomo Tognini, “Why Turkey Could Become the Next Haven for Russian Oligarchs Fleeing Sanctions,”
forbes.com, May 3, 2022; Karen Gilchrist, “Turkey may become the new playground for Russian oligarchs – but it’s a forbes.com, May 3, 2022; Karen Gilchrist, “Turkey may become the new playground for Russian oligarchs – but it’s a
risky strategy,” CNBC, March 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~link to page 24~~ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief the Treasury Wally Adeyemo reportedly visited Turkey to raise concerns over the movement of some Russian assets and business operations to Turkey.53 In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly alleviate global supply concerns.54 In a statement marking the departure of the first shipment in early August, the State Department commended Turkey and the U.N. for their roles in mediating the agreement, while maintaining a wait-and-see approach toward its impact on global food security.55 If successful implementation continues, Turkey may portray the agreements to Ukraine and the West as a justification for keeping lines of communication open with Russia for problem-solving diplomacy.56 Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.57 ~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

Ukraine’s Use of Bayraktar TB2 Drones and Broader Implications
Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense
cooperation since 2019,cooperation since 2019,5258 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has periodically delivered and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has periodically delivered
additional TB2s to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion.additional TB2s to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion.5359 Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s successful use of Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s successful use of
TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships—often in TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships—often in
coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have destroyed coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have destroyed
Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.5460
Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer
combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing
capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.5561 Ukraine became an important alternative Ukraine became an important alternative
source for Turkey in procuring engines after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to concerns about source for Turkey in procuring engines after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to concerns about
Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.5662
Expanding Turkish defense cooperation—including drone exports—with countries near Russia may present Expanding Turkish defense cooperation—including drone exports—with countries near Russia may present
opportunities to renew common cause between the West and Turkey in countering Russia.opportunities to renew common cause between the West and Turkey in countering Russia.5763 Alternatively, Alternatively,
Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions,Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions,5864 or or
increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.59
~~Black Sea Access~~
~~Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (see~~
Figure A-5) under the 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux
~~Convention”) is important to U.S. interests.60 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of~~
~~war between Russia and Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which~~
~~generally bars belligerent countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are~~
~~returning to their base of origin).61 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony~~
~~Blinken expressed appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for~~
~~Ukraine.62 (The United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms~~
~~since it went into effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.)~~
~~Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may limit Russia from~~
~~replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some~~

~~risky strategy,” CNBC, March 30, 2022.~~
5265 53 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor, June 22, 2022. 54 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” Associated Press, July 22, 2022. 55 State Department, “First Grain Ship Departs the Black Sea,” August 3, 2022. 56 Menekse Tokyay, “What to expect following grain corridor deal?” Arab News, July 24, 2022. 57 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain.” 58 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, , February 4,
2022. 2022.
5359 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022. David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022.
5460 Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” New Yorker, May 16, 2022. , May 16, 2022.
5561 Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022. , March 28, 2022.
5662 Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation for Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation for
Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022. Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022.
5763 Suat Kiniklioglu, “Necessary friends: Turkey’s improving relationship with the West,” European Council on Foreign Suat Kiniklioglu, “Necessary friends: Turkey’s improving relationship with the West,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, April 7, 2022. Relations, April 7, 2022.
5864 Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey.” Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey.”
5965 Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,” Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,” War on the Rocks, ,
December 15, 2021. December 15, 2021.
~~60 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” foreignpolicy.com, April 25, 2022. Text of the~~
~~Convention is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-~~
~~Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf.~~
~~61 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022.~~
~~62 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~link to page 17~~ ~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 24 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Black Sea Access Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (see Figure A-4) under the 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux Convention”) is important to U.S. interests.66 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of war between Russia and Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which generally bars belligerent countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are returning to their base of origin).67 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for Ukraine.68 (The United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms since it went into effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.) Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may limit Russia from replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some Russian ships, Russia’s existing Black Sea fleet remains powerful, now controls the key Russian ships, Russia’s existing Black Sea fleet remains powerful, now controls the key
Ukrainian port of Mariupol, and has essentially disabled Ukraine’s navy.Ukrainian port of Mariupol, and has essentially disabled Ukraine’s navy.6369
In March 10 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that (under the Montreux In March 10 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that (under the Montreux
Convention) Turkey has only formally closed the Straits to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent Convention) Turkey has only formally closed the Straits to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent
countries, while advising all other countries to refrain from sending warships through the Straits. countries, while advising all other countries to refrain from sending warships through the Straits.
Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other countries from transit could Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other countries from transit could
put NATO at a disadvantage.put NATO at a disadvantage.6470 One has asserted that Black Sea access is “essential for the One has asserted that Black Sea access is “essential for the
alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania and Bulgaria.alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania and Bulgaria.6571 It is It is
unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside from Russia) to take unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside from Russia) to take
direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom of navigation, and direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom of navigation, and
how that could affect regional security. how that could affect regional security.
~~Conditions on~~ NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
When Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022 (sparked by growing When Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022 (sparked by growing
security concerns in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), security concerns in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), ~~President Erdogan indicated that~~
~~Turkey has objections that he wants the two countries to overcome before Turkey will agree to~~
~~their accession~~Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies can . Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies can
only happen with the unanimous agreement of existing members. Addressing Turkey’s parliament only happen with the unanimous agreement of existing members. Addressing Turkey’s parliament
on May 18, Erdogan said, “The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the on May 18, Erdogan said, “The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the
respect that is shown to our sensitivities.”respect that is shown to our sensitivities.”66
~~Erdogan and other Turkish officials have complained that Sweden and Finland support or harbor~~
~~sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK and the~~
~~Fethullah Gulen movement.67 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist~~
~~group.) Turkey is demanding that both countries lift the arms embargoes they have maintained~~
~~against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against a PKK-linked Kurdish group (the~~
~~People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-~~
~~Islamic State coalition (see “Syria”).68 Turkish officials also have requested the extradition of~~
~~alleged PKK members from Sweden and Finland, and reportedly seek to have both countries~~
~~curtail PKK- and Gulen movement-related activities on their territory.69~~
~~After meeting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in New York on May 18,~~72 The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK 66 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” foreignpolicy.com, April 25, 2022. Text of the Convention is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf. 67 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022. 68 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Turkish Foreign
~~Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Turkey expected more support from all NATO allies related~~
~~to its concerns about the PKK and YPG. He called for U.S. officials to remove the sanctions~~

63Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022. 69 Jon Jackson, “Russia Risks Losing Its Power in the Black Sea,” Jon Jackson, “Russia Risks Losing Its Power in the Black Sea,” Newsweek, May 2, 2022. , May 2, 2022.
6470 Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog, Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog,
March 5, 2022. March 5, 2022.
6571 James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com, James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com,
March 1, 2022. March 1, 2022.
6672 Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” Washington Post, May 19, 2022. See , May 19, 2022. See
also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” Economist, May 30, 2022. , May 30, 2022.
~~67 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17,~~
~~2022.~~
~~68 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department,~~ ~~Country~~
~~Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak~~
~~Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.~~
~~69 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey demands extradition of PKK members from Sweden, Finland for Nato bid,” Middle East Eye,~~
~~May 16, 2022; Richard Milne and Laura Pitel, “Erdoğan blocks Nato accession talks with Sweden and Finland,”~~
Financial Times, May 18, 2022.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~link to page 17~~ Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 18 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

~~placed on Turkey for its acquisition of an S-400 system from Russia and suspend their support for~~
~~the YPG in Syria.70 Such calls, which Cavusoglu did not explicitly say were conditions of~~
~~Swedish and Finnish accession, may be connected with Turkey’s proposed plans to expand its~~
~~areas of control in northern Syria at the YPG’s expense (see “Syria”).~~
~~Many U.S. and NATO officials, including President Biden, strongly support Swedish and Finnish~~
~~accession and have voiced confidence that Turkey will not block it.71 In 2009, Turkey ultimately~~
~~withdrew objections it had to former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen serving as~~
~~NATO Secretary General, and in 2019 NATO countries resolved a Turkish delay to defense~~
~~planning—with both cases at least partly related to Kurdish issues.72 Erdogan might be adopting a~~
~~nationalistic tone on a globally prominent issue for domestic political gain.73~~
~~Some observers express concern that Turkish actions to delay accession could increase its~~
~~isolation within NATO at a time when the Russia-Ukraine war has presented opportunities to~~
~~highlight Turkey’s value to NATO and bolster the alliance’s strength.74 Senate Foreign Relations~~
~~Committee Chairman Bob Menendez has called on the Administration to tell Erdogan “you’ve~~
~~got to act in a different way if you want consideration for anything,” such as the upgrade to its~~
~~fleet of F-16 aircraft that Turkey is seeking from the United States (discussed below). Senator~~
~~Thom Tillis, Co-Chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, has said that the United States could~~
~~act to compel Turkey’s cooperation, but expressed a preference for not escalating tensions.75~~
and the Fethullah Gulen movement.73 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist group.) Turkey demanded that both countries lift the suspension of arms sales they have maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against a PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition (see “Syria”).74 Turkey removed its objections to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June 2022 agreement between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the agreement, the three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work against the PKK.75 While Turkey’s decision generally drew plaudits after some Western officials had raised questions about its commitment to strengthening NATO, President Erdogan has said that Turkey could still delay its parliamentary ratification of the accession process.76 Turkey has called for Sweden and Finland to extradite some people it accuses of terrorist links or actions. U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,
Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.other munitions to maintain military strength.7677 Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to- Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-
air defense system (discussed below) has raised questions about whether Turkey can remain air defense system (discussed below) has raised questions about whether Turkey can remain
closely integrated with the United States and NATO on defense matters. However, after Russia’s closely integrated with the United States and NATO on defense matters. However, after Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, Turkey appears less inclined to consider purchases of additional Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey appears less inclined to consider purchases of additional Russian
arms. One source quoted a senior Turkish diplomat as saying, “The war has practically killed all arms. One source quoted a senior Turkish diplomat as saying, “The war has practically killed all
potential Turkish-Russian deals in strategic weapons systems.”potential Turkish-Russian deals in strategic weapons systems.”77

~~70 Jared Szuba, “US assures Sweden, Finland of military support as Turkey delays NATO entry,” Al-Monitor, May 19,~~
~~2022.~~
~~71 Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden”; State Department, “Secretary Antony J.~~
~~Blinken and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at a Joint Press Availability,” June 1, 2022.~~
~~72 Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”; Zaman, “Turkey continues to~~
~~play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership.”~~
~~73 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey continues to play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership,~~78 Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program and U.S. Sanctions Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,79 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on 73 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, 2022. 74 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. 75 Agreement text available at Twitter, Ragip Soylu, June 28, 2022 – 2:48 PM, https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1541856195257966592. 76 Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan says Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO memberships not done deal,” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2022. 77~~” Al-Monitor, May~~
~~16, 2022.~~
~~74 Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”; Zaman, “Turkey continues to~~
~~play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership.”~~
~~75 Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden.”~~
76 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
7778 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, , March 9,
2022. 2022.
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10

~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program and U.S. Sanctions~~
~~Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia~~
~~delivered in 2019,78 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United~~
~~States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration~~
~~removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions~~
~~under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on~~
79 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a second system to come later. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.7980 In explaining the U.S. decision to In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 programremove Turkey from the F-35 program~~, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and~~
~~Sustainment Ellen Lord~~ in 2019, one official said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform
[within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 program makes, repairs and houses the [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 program makes, repairs and houses the
F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those
capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of the F-35 program.”capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of the F-35 program.”8081
Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least
100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and 100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and
industrial production of the aircraft.industrial production of the aircraft.8182 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless
the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish
officials continue to publicly express hope that they can acquire the F-35 at some future time. officials continue to publicly express hope that they can acquire the F-35 at some future time.
Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby
bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision. bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision.
Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms
embargo over Cyprus.embargo over Cyprus.8283 Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of
Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval
vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly did not feature technology vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly did not feature technology
sharing,sharing,8384 one reason Turkish officials favored the S-400 was a hope that it could open the door one reason Turkish officials favored the S-400 was a hope that it could open the door
for future technology sharing on air defense with Russia.for future technology sharing on air defense with Russia.8485 Lack of agreement between the United Lack of agreement between the United
States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to
Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt
from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.85

~~78 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,~~
~~Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a~~
~~second system to come later.~~
7986 Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400. One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.87 Another is Turkish President Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used by some Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.88 80 CRS Insight IN11557, CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
8081 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
8182 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/ A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. , by Jeremiah Gertler.
8283 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019. , November 7, 2019.
8384 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, July 29, 2019. Institute, July 29, 2019.
8485 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News, ,
January 10, 2020. January 10, 2020.
8586 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course. 87 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018. 88 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019. Congressional Research Service 11 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief ~~Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.~~
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11

~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400. One is Turkey’s~~
~~apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.86 Another is Turkish President Erdogan’s~~
~~possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used by some Turkish~~
~~military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.87~~
Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally
operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expected to purchase a operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expected to purchase a
second S-400 system.second S-400 system.8889 Secretary of State Blinken warned Turkey that acquiring an additional Secretary of State Blinken warned Turkey that acquiring an additional
system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.8990 Turkey may need to forgo possession Turkey may need to forgo possession
or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
Possible F-16 ~~Upgrades~~Sales and Congressional Views
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet. fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.
President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.and notification process with Congress.9091
Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a new crisis implicating European security—Russia’s war Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a new crisis implicating European security—Russia’s war
on Ukraine—may have boosted the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 on Ukraine—may have boosted the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16
transaction with Turkey. Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of transaction with Turkey. Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of
Congress in a February 2022 letter,Congress in a February 2022 letter,9192 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s
support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”9293 While While
acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The
Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and
capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are
supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”9394
In April 2022, the Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade In April 2022, the Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade
some of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet and provide short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles some of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet and provide short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles
(Sidewinder AIM-9X and AMRAAM AIM-120D) at a total cost to Turkey of around $500 (Sidewinder AIM-9X and AMRAAM AIM-120D) at a total cost to Turkey of around $500
million.million.9495 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described what upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described what upgrades of Turkey’s F-16

~~86 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018.~~
~~87 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United~~
~~States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So~~
~~Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019.~~
88aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail, including a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.96 Other countries that may receive new or upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.97 89 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021. , September 27, 2021.
8990 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021. , April 28, 2021.
9091 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego , October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For , November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
9192 Text of letter available at Text of letter available at
https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-
16%20Request.pdf. 16%20Request.pdf.
9293 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022. , April 6, 2022.
9394 Ibid. Ibid.
9495 Jared Malsin, “Biden Administration Asks Congress to Approve New Weapons Deal with Turkey,” Jared Malsin, “Biden Administration Asks Congress to Approve New Weapons Deal with Turkey,” Wall Street
Journal, May 11, 2022; Daniel Flatley and Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Wins Biden Backing for Its F-16 Fighter Jets , May 11, 2022; Daniel Flatley and Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Wins Biden Backing for Its F-16 Fighter Jets
Upgrades,” Upgrades,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2022. For information on informal and formal congressional notifications, see CRS , May 12, 2022. For information on informal and formal congressional notifications, see CRS
~~Congressional Research Service~~

12

~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail, including a new radar, other software~~
~~and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s~~
~~service life.95 Other countries that may receive new or upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include~~
~~Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and~~
~~Slovakia.96~~Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 96 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021. 97 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 12 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide
Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the
TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to
partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to
develop technology for the TF-X.develop technology for the TF-X.9798 If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the
Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials had previously Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials had previously
hinted that they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft.hinted that they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft.9899 After the outbreak of After the outbreak of
the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey’s calculus reportedly changed. According to a Turkish defense the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey’s calculus reportedly changed. According to a Turkish defense
analyst, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its analyst, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its
fighter jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter] fighter jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter]
Typhoon, Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”Typhoon, Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”99100
Turkey’s support for Ukraine may Turkey’s support for Ukraine may ~~be inclining~~have inclined some key Members of Congress toward accepting some key Members of Congress toward accepting
a possible U.S. upgrade or sale of F-16s for Turkey. After the S-400 transaction, some Members a possible U.S. upgrade or sale of F-16s for Turkey. After the S-400 transaction, some Members
reportedly placed informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey, in the biggest reportedly placed informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey, in the biggest
disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.~~100~~ 101 However, in However, in
the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a May 2022 article interviewed some congressional the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a May 2022 article interviewed some congressional
committee leaders with oversight responsibilities for arms sales.committee leaders with oversight responsibilities for arms sales.~~101~~102 Most signaled openness to Most signaled openness to
considering F-16 transactions. Chairman Menendez remained skeptical, saying, “[Turkey] acts in considering F-16 transactions. Chairman Menendez remained skeptical, saying, “[Turkey] acts in
ways that are contrary to our interests in a whole host of things. I think the administration has to ways that are contrary to our interests in a whole host of things. I think the administration has to
stop seeing … the aspirational part of what we would like Turkey to be and realize that Turkey is stop seeing … the aspirational part of what we would like Turkey to be and realize that Turkey is
~~under Erdogan.”102 In a later interview after Turkey announced conditions on its support for~~
~~Swedish and Finnish NATO accession, House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Mike~~
~~McCaul indicated that this Turkish stance could present problems for upgrading Turkey’s F-~~
~~16s.103~~
~~With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in~~
~~2021,104 U.S. willingness to upgrade Turkish F-16s could have significant implications for the~~

~~Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~95 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021.~~
~~96 Ibid.~~
~~97 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”~~
98under Erdogan.”103 At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-Finland accession process to move forward and President Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.104 However, Chairman Menendez has continued expressing disapproval. Additionally, the House Armed Services Committee version of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 7900) contains a provision that would condition the transfer of new F-16s or upgrade technology to Turkey on a presidential certification (1) that the transfer is in the U.S. national interest, and (2) that includes a “detailed description of concrete steps taken to ensure that such F-16s are not used by Turkey for repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.” Turkey and Greece have actively disputed various Aegean Sea airspace boundary and overflight issues (some of which are referenced below) at least since the 1974 military clash over Cyprus.105 98 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.” 99 Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com, Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com,
March 15, 2021. March 15, 2021.
99100 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.” Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”
~~100~~101 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, ,
August 12, 2020. August 12, 2020.
~~101~~102 Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4, , May 4,
2022. 2022.
~~102 Ibid.~~
~~103 Bryant Harris, “Greece seeks to join F-35 program as it lobbies against Turkey F-16 sale,” Defense News, May 17,~~
~~2022.~~
~~104 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,”~~
~~August 3, 2021~~103 Ibid. 104 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022. 105 Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation, Alexis Heraclides and Gizen Alioglu Cakmak, ed., London: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022. .
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With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in 2021,106 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.~~105~~
107 Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal with Greek Prime Minister Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal with Greek Prime Minister
Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms
transactions while addressing a May 17 joint session of Congress.transactions while addressing a May 17 joint session of Congress.~~106~~108 Turkey and Greece have Turkey and Greece have
long-standing disputes over maritime and airspace boundaries, energy exploration, and the status long-standing disputes over maritime and airspace boundaries, energy exploration, and the status
of Cyprus (see text box). of Cyprus (see text box). ~~A recent 2019-2020 spike in tensions has somewhat subsided, but during~~
~~that time Greece strengthened its~~Since a relative spike in Turkey-Greece tensions in 2019, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations with the United States and a number of regional relations with the United States and a number of regional
countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.~~107~~109
Turkish Disputes Regarding Greece and Cyprus: Historical ~~Background108~~Background110
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, and contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, and
continental shelves (continental shelves (see Figure A-65). These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the . These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the
region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the
1974 military clash in which Turkish forces invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership
from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, which has close ties to from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, which has close ties to
Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern
two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.~~109~~111 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot In 1983, Turkish Cypriot
leaders proclaimed this part of the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, although no country other leaders proclaimed this part of the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it. than Turkey recognizes it.
~~Syria110~~Syria112
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has
severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.~~111~~113 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during
the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has
engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on
some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United
~~States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates~~
~~River where U.S. forces have been based.~~
~~Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)~~
~~from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s~~

~~105~~ 106 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,” August 3, 2021. 107 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, , May 30,
2022. 2022.
~~106~~108 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022. Congress,” May 17, 2022.
~~107~~109 See CRS Report R41368, See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~108~~110 Ibid. Ibid.
~~109~~111 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between
50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February , February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
~~110~~112 See CRS Report RL33487, See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. , coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
~~111~~113 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. , August 4, 2017.
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States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River where U.S. forces have been based. Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD),
to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have
emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish
authorities.authorities.~~112~~114 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an
umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S.
ground force partner against the Islamic State ground force partner against the Islamic State (IS) in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October
2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have 2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have
U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action
against Turkey in Congress.against Turkey in Congress.~~113~~115
In May 2022, Erdogan said that Turkey was considering a military operation to expand areas of In May 2022, Erdogan said that Turkey was considering a military operation to expand areas of
Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence.Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence.~~114~~116 In response, the State In response, the State
Department spokesperson recognized Turkey’s “legitimate security concerns” but condemned any Department spokesperson recognized Turkey’s “legitimate security concerns” but condemned any
escalation and said that the United States supports maintenance of the current ceasefire lines to escalation and said that the United States supports maintenance of the current ceasefire lines to
avoid destabilization and putting U.S. forces at risk in the campaign against the Islamic State.avoid destabilization and putting U.S. forces at risk in the campaign against the Islamic State.~~115~~117
In early June, Turkey announced plans that involve areas west of the Euphrates River away from In early June, Turkey announced plans that involve areas west of the Euphrates River away from
U.S. forces, which are concentrated on the river’s east side (seeU.S. forces, which are concentrated on the river’s east side (see Figure A-76)..~~116~~118 Russian officials Russian officials
also have raised some concerns about how a new Turkish offensive might escalate tensions and also have raised some concerns about how a new Turkish offensive might escalate tensions and
may seek to encourage greater Turkish coordination with Syrian government forces.may seek to encourage greater Turkish coordination with Syrian government forces.~~117~~
~~In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils.~~
~~These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these areas with funding,~~
~~oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future governance and~~
~~Turkey’s overarching role.~~
~~The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future~~
~~of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups~~
~~(including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian~~
~~government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict~~
~~in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and caused several Turkish and~~
~~Syrian casualties. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part~~
~~from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing~~
~~heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.118 Questions related to the~~
~~Russia-Ukraine war about the effect of Turkish measures to limit Russian military access to Syria~~

~~112~~119 Even if a new offensive does not target areas near U.S. forces, U.S. officials have expressed concern that it could draw SDF forces away from tasks that include guarding IS-affiliated prisoners. In June testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy Dana Stroul said that any Turkish escalation in northern Syria “risks disrupting [Defeat]-ISIS operations,” including the security of SDF-managed detention facilities.120 In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils. These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future governance and Turkey’s overarching role. 114 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates
in Syria), see footnoin Syria), see footnote 6874.
~~113~~115 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019. Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019.
~~114~~116 Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2022. , May 30, 2022.
~~115~~117 State Department Press Briefing, May 24, 2022. The United States and Russia established separate arrangements State Department Press Briefing, May 24, 2022. The United States and Russia established separate arrangements
with Turkey in October 2019 for managing certain areas of northeast Syria. White House, “The United States and with Turkey in October 2019 for managing certain areas of northeast Syria. White House, “The United States and
Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” October 17, 2019; State Department, “Special Representative for Syria Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” October 17, 2019; State Department, “Special Representative for Syria
Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the Traveling Press,” October 17, 2019; President of Russia, “Memorandum Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the Traveling Press,” October 17, 2019; President of Russia, “Memorandum
of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation,” October 22, 2019. of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation,” October 22, 2019.
~~116~~118 Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan announces military operations in Syria Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan announces military operations in Syria'’s Manbij, Tal Rifaat,” s Manbij, Tal Rifaat,” Al-Monitor, June 1, 2022. , June 1, 2022.
~~117~~119 Fehim Tastekin, “Ukraine, Syria top Lavrov’s agenda in Turkey,” Fehim Tastekin, “Ukraine, Syria top Lavrov’s agenda in Turkey,” Al-Monitor, June 6, 2022. , June 6, 2022.
~~118 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-~~
~~idlib-revealed-1.771953.~~
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~~by air and sea,119 and possible Russian moves to limit humanitarian access,~~ 120 Statement of Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Path Forward on U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy and Accountability,” June 8, 2022, available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060822_%20Stroul_Testimony.pdf. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups (including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and caused several Turkish and Syrian casualties. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.121 Questions related to the Russia-Ukraine war about the effect of Turkish measures to limit Russian military access to Syria by air and sea,122 and whether Russia might curtail humanitarian access to Syria in early 2023,123 could affect future could affect future
developments.developments.~~120~~
Refugees in Turkey
Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion Syrian refugees—more than any other country—along with hundreds of thousands Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion Syrian refugees—more than any other country—along with hundreds of thousands
from other countries.from other countries.~~121~~124 A few weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine began, Turkey estimated that 20,000 A few weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine began, Turkey estimated that 20,000
Ukrainians had come to Turkey.Ukrainians had come to Turkey.~~122~~125 Refugees’ and other migrants’ living situations, effect on Turkey’s population, Refugees’ and other migrants’ living situations, effect on Turkey’s population,
and access to employment, education, and public services vary based on the differing circumstances that they face. and access to employment, education, and public services vary based on the differing circumstances that they face.
Turkey closed off most access to migrants from Syria in Turkey closed off most access to migrants from Syria in ~~2015123~~2015126 and has sought to repatriate refugees who are and has sought to repatriate refugees who are
wil ing to return,wil ing to return,~~124~~127 with a few hundred thousand reportedly having done so to date. with a few hundred thousand reportedly having done so to date.~~125~~128 Reportedly, Turkish Reportedly, Turkish
authorities have forcibly returned some refugees to Syria.authorities have forcibly returned some refugees to Syria.~~126~~129
Per a 2016 Turkey-EU agreement to minimize the flow of migrants to the EU, Greece can return Syrian migrants Per a 2016 Turkey-EU agreement to minimize the flow of migrants to the EU, Greece can return Syrian migrants
to Turkey that come to its islands. As part of a structured process, the deal calls for the same number of people to Turkey that come to its islands. As part of a structured process, the deal calls for the same number of people
to be resettled from Turkey in EU countries.to be resettled from Turkey in EU countries.~~127~~130 The agreement also mandated EU economic assistance for The agreement also mandated EU economic assistance for
refugees in Turkey. During some times of crisis, President Erdogan has threatened to open Turkey’s borders to refugees in Turkey. During some times of crisis, President Erdogan has threatened to open Turkey’s borders to
allow migrants into Greece and Bulgaria. Those countries implement security measures—with the assistance of allow migrants into Greece and Bulgaria. Those countries implement security measures—with the assistance of
the EU’s border and coast guard agency—to minimize the number of crossings via land or sea, and some sources the EU’s border and coast guard agency—to minimize the number of crossings via land or sea, and some sources
have criticized them for alleged ethical or international legal violations related to the treatment of refugees or have criticized them for alleged ethical or international legal violations related to the treatment of refugees or
migrants.migrants.~~128~~
131
~~119~~121 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-idlib-revealed-1.771953. 122 Dorian Jones, “Ankara Tightens Russian Access to Syria,” Dorian Jones, “Ankara Tightens Russian Access to Syria,” Voice of America, May 10, 2022. , May 10, 2022.
~~120 Lara Jakes, “Fear That Russia Plans to Leverage Syrian Aid for an Edge in Ukraine~~123 Lara Jakes, “U.N. Yields to Russia’s Limits on Aid Mission in Syria,” ,” New York Times, , ~~June 1~~July 12, 2022. , 2022.
~~121~~124 See https://reporting.unhcr.org/turkey#toc-narratives. See https://reporting.unhcr.org/turkey#toc-narratives.
~~122~~125 Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan steps up pro-refugee rhetoric as 20,000 Ukrainians come to Turkey,” Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan steps up pro-refugee rhetoric as 20,000 Ukrainians come to Turkey,” Al-Monitor, March 17, , March 17,
2022. 2022.
~~123~~126 Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria,” Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria,” New York Times, ,
March 29, 2015. March 29, 2015.
~~124~~127 “Turkey talks with UN over returning Syrian refugees,” “Turkey talks with UN over returning Syrian refugees,” Associated Press, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
~~125~~128 Durrie Bouscaren, “Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey face a difficult decision to return home,” Durrie Bouscaren, “Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey face a difficult decision to return home,” The World, ,
September 23, 2021. September 23, 2021.
~~126~~129 Sultan al-Kanj, “Turkey forcibly deports dozens of Syrians,” Sultan al-Kanj, “Turkey forcibly deports dozens of Syrians,” Al Monitor, February 8, 2022. , February 8, 2022.
~~127~~130 Text of agreement available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey- Text of agreement available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-
statement/. statement/.
~~128~~131 “Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy,” Amnesty International, “Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy,” Amnesty International,
June 23, 2021; “Bulgaria: Pushbacks Escalate as Government Discusses Reinforcements at Borders,” European June 23, 2021; “Bulgaria: Pushbacks Escalate as Government Discusses Reinforcements at Borders,” European
Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 10, 2021. Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 10, 2021.
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Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,047,706 83,047,706
Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, s: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil,
Gaziantep 1.8 mil. Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% 23.4%
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $37,488 $37,488
Real GDP Growth: ~~2.7~~3.2% %
Inflation (end of year): 60.8: ~~60.5~~% %
Unemployment: ~~11.3~~12.0% %
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: ~~4.8~~3.9% %
Public Debt as % of GDP: ~~43.3~~42.5% %
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 53.7% .7%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022 Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022
estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. .

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Figure A-2. ~~Turkey: Annual Inflation Rate~~

Sources: Reuters (May 2022) using data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical
~~Institute.~~

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~~Figure A-3.~~ Bayraktar TB2 Drone

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Figure A-43. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011. outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate. All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-54. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

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Figure A-65. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS., with slight modifications by CRS.
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Figure A-76. Syria Conflict Map

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Appendix B. Relations with Israel and Arab States
Since the 2010s, Turkey’s relations with Israel and with Sunni Arab governments that support Since the 2010s, Turkey’s relations with Israel and with Sunni Arab governments that support
traditional authoritarian governance models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab traditional authoritarian governance models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—have been fraught with tension. Under President Erdogan, Turkey Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—have been fraught with tension. Under President Erdogan, Turkey
and Israel have clashed politically over Israel’s handling of Palestinian issues and Turkey’s and Israel have clashed politically over Israel’s handling of Palestinian issues and Turkey’s
support for the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), even support for the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), even
though the countries have continued to expand trade ties.though the countries have continued to expand trade ties.~~129~~132 The Sunni Arab governments have The Sunni Arab governments have
regarded Turkey with suspicion largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for regarded Turkey with suspicion largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for
Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.~~130~~133
Developments in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern Developments in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern
Mediterranean and its rivalries with the Sunni Arab governments because they supported Mediterranean and its rivalries with the Sunni Arab governments because they supported
opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. In late 2019, Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s then-opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. In late 2019, Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s then-
Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries, complicating the legal and Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries, complicating the legal and
economic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Tensions spiked further after Greece and Egypt economic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Tensions spiked further after Greece and Egypt
reached a maritime boundary agreement in August 2020 that ignores the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal. reached a maritime boundary agreement in August 2020 that ignores the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal.
In the past year, however, Turkey has sought rapprochement with some of its regional rivals. The In the past year, however, Turkey has sought rapprochement with some of its regional rivals. The
potential economic benefits could help alleviate Turkey’s financial crisis ahead of closely potential economic benefits could help alleviate Turkey’s financial crisis ahead of closely
contested presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023. For example, Erdogan and UAE contested presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023. For example, Erdogan and UAE
President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan have visited each otherPresident Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan have visited each other ~~in recent months,~~
, and the two countries have signed a currency swap deal along with many other agreements on and the two countries have signed a currency swap deal along with many other agreements on
economic cooperation and investment.economic cooperation and investment.~~131~~134 Additionally, figures indicate that Turkish trade with Additionally, figures indicate that Turkish trade with
Saudi Arabia increased year-on-year by 25% in the first quarter of 2022.Saudi Arabia increased year-on-year by 25% in the first quarter of 2022.~~132~~135 In April 2022, In April 2022,
Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia after Turkey transferred jurisdiction to the Saudis over the trial Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia after Turkey transferred jurisdiction to the Saudis over the trial
Turkey had previously convened for Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. Turkey had previously convened for Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. In June, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud visited Turkey. One media report anticipates One media report anticipates
UAE investment in Turkey’s defense industry and Turkish defense exports to the Gulf—UAE investment in Turkey’s defense industry and Turkish defense exports to the Gulf—
potentially including drones, air defense systems, and various air, sea, and land platforms.potentially including drones, air defense systems, and various air, sea, and land platforms.~~133~~136
Moreover, Israel and Turkey have shown signs of improving ties over the past year. The two Moreover, Israel and Turkey have shown signs of improving ties over the past year. The two
countries maintain diplomatic relations but have not had ambassadors stationed in each other’s countries maintain diplomatic relations but have not had ambassadors stationed in each other’s
country since 2018. country since 2018.
Israeli openness to rapprochement with Turkey may stem from a confluence of factors, including Israeli openness to rapprochement with Turkey may stem from a confluence of factors, including
 Potentially greater Turkish willingness to reduce its support for Hamas in hopes  Potentially greater Turkish willingness to reduce its support for Hamas in hopes
of better political and economic relations with Israel and other key U.S. partners of better political and economic relations with Israel and other key U.S. partners
in the region (Sunni Arab governments such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia)—in the region (Sunni Arab governments such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia)—
partly to improve Turkey’s image in Washington. Some reports partly to improve Turkey’s image in Washington. Some reports ~~from early 2022~~have hinted at

~~129~~132 Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell, “President Herzog’s visit to Ankara: A first step in normalizing Turkey-Israel Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell, “President Herzog’s visit to Ankara: A first step in normalizing Turkey-Israel
relations?” Brookings Institution, March 7, 2022. relations?” Brookings Institution, March 7, 2022.
~~130~~133 Flanagan et al., Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting ; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting
MBZ against Erdogan,” MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020. , October 26, 2020.
~~131~~134 “UAE and Turkey central banks seek further co-operation after currency swap deal,” “UAE and Turkey central banks seek further co-operation after currency swap deal,” The National, February 17, , February 17,
2022. 2022.
~~132~~135 Sinem Cengiz, “Echoes from President Erdoğan Sinem Cengiz, “Echoes from President Erdoğan'’s Saudi Arabia Visit: A Fresh Start?” s Saudi Arabia Visit: A Fresh Start?” Politics Today, May 5, 2022. , May 5, 2022.
~~133~~136 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals,” Defense News, March 1, , March 1,
2022. 2022.
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  ~~hinted at~~ Turkey’s willingness to expel Hamas members allegedly involved in Turkey’s willingness to expel Hamas members allegedly involved in
militant militant operations from its territory.operations from its territory.~~134~~137
 Increasing Israeli focus on how relations with Turkey and other regional  Increasing Israeli focus on how relations with Turkey and other regional
countries might help counter Iran. countries might help counter Iran.
 The 2021  The 2021 ~~leadership change from the Netanyahu government to the Bennett-~~
~~Lapid power-sharing government~~change in Israeli leadership from Benjamin Netanyahu to Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. .
In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey~~. In May, Turkish Foreign Minister~~
~~Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Israel (and the West Bank), and the two~~, and the two countries’ foreign ministers exchanged visits in May and June. The countries anticipate future countries anticipate future
bilateral meetings and steps to improve political and economic relations. President Erdogan and bilateral meetings and steps to improve political and economic relations. President Erdogan and
other top Turkish officials have made public statements expressing interest in energy cooperation other top Turkish officials have made public statements expressing interest in energy cooperation
with Israel. However, Israeli officials reportedly remain skeptical about prospects for a subsea with Israel. However, Israeli officials reportedly remain skeptical about prospects for a subsea
Israel-Turkey natural gas pipeline.Israel-Turkey natural gas pipeline.~~135~~138 While Israel has pursued greater high-level interaction with While Israel has pursued greater high-level interaction with
Turkey, it may be cautious about significant near-term improvements in bilateral relations, and Turkey, it may be cautious about significant near-term improvements in bilateral relations, and
appears to remain committed to close strategic ties with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.appears to remain committed to close strategic ties with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.~~136~~139

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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~~134~~137 Ariel Kahana, “Report: Israel, Turkey working to deport Hamas officials from Ankara,” Ariel Kahana, “Report: Israel, Turkey working to deport Hamas officials from Ankara,” Israel Hayom, February 15, , February 15,
2022; Ofer Bengio, “Turkey Finds Israel Useful Again,” 2022; Ofer Bengio, “Turkey Finds Israel Useful Again,” Tablet, March 13, 2022. , March 13, 2022.
~~135~~138 Lazar Berman, “FM’s visit shows Turkey eager to accelerate reconciliation, but Israel more cautious,” Lazar Berman, “FM’s visit shows Turkey eager to accelerate reconciliation, but Israel more cautious,” Times of
Israel, May 24, 2022. While such a pipeline may be the most feasible pipeline option for transporting Eastern , May 24, 2022. While such a pipeline may be the most feasible pipeline option for transporting Eastern
Mediterranean natural gas to Europe, political and economic obstacles may make liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports Mediterranean natural gas to Europe, political and economic obstacles may make liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports
from liquefaction terminals in Egypt a more practical option. “Turkey best option for East Med gas transit to Europe: from liquefaction terminals in Egypt a more practical option. “Turkey best option for East Med gas transit to Europe:
Experts,” Experts,” Daily Sabah, March 10, 2022; Sean Mathews, “Russia-Ukraine war: Conflict boosts hopes for East , March 10, 2022; Sean Mathews, “Russia-Ukraine war: Conflict boosts hopes for East
Mediterranean energy, experts say,” Mediterranean energy, experts say,” Middle East Eye, April 5, 2022. , April 5, 2022.
~~136~~Rina Bassist, “Israeli energy minister inks deal to export gas to Europe via Egypt,” Al-Monitor, June 15, 2022. 139 “Summit in Ankara: Turkey is wooing a reluctant Israel,” Americans for Peace Now, March 14, 2022. “Summit in Ankara: Turkey is wooing a reluctant Israel,” Americans for Peace Now, March 14, 2022.
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