El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations

El Salvador: In Brief
April 29, 2022Background and U.S. Relations January 29, 2024
Congress maintains interest in El Salvador, a small Central American nation Congress maintains interest in El Salvador, a small Central American nation. A large percentage
, due to the history of U.S. involvement in the country and extensive cultural ties. A large percentage Clare Ribando Seelke of El Salvador’s population has lived in the United States since the Salvadoran civil of El Salvador’s population has lived in the United States since the Salvadoran civil conflict
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin conflict (1980-1992), and the country is a source of irregular migration to the United (1980-1992), and the country is a source of irregular migration to the United States. During the
Specialist in Latin
American Affairs States. As of 2021, some 2.5 million people born in El Salvador resided in the United States, an estimated 32% of them in the country without authorization. In the 1980s, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars to support the Salvadoran government’s 1980s, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars to support the Salvadoran government’s
American Affairs
counterinsurgency efforts against the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). counterinsurgency efforts against the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).

The United States later supported a 1992 peace accord that ended the conflict and transformed The United States later supported a 1992 peace accord that ended the conflict and transformed
Joshua Klein
the FMLN into a political party. Over the next few decadesthe FMLN into a political party. Over the next few decades—and despite periodic tensions—the
Presidential Management
, the United States worked with both leftist FMLN and conservative National Republican Alliance United States worked with both leftist FMLN and conservative National Republican Alliance
Fellow
(ARENA) administrations. However, popular disaffection with corruption and insecurity under (ARENA) administrations. However, popular disaffection with corruption and insecurity under

both parties led to the election of political outsider Nayib Bukele in 2019both parties led to the election of political outsider Nayib Bukele in 2019, and relations. Relations between between
the United States and the United States and Bukele’s El Salvador have been periodically strainedEl Salvador have deteriorated under Bukele’s increasingly authoritarian

rule. .
Bukele has governed as a populist, using social media to communicate with supporters, announce policies, purge officials, Bukele has governed as a populist, using social media to communicate with supporters, announce policies, purge officials,
and attack opponents. Through 2020, Bukeleand attack opponents. Through 2020, Bukele battled with the opposition-dominated legislature and the Salvadorian Supreme
Court over funds for his security plan and his aggressive enforcement of a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
quarantine. Although’s ability to implement his policy agenda was hampered by contentious relations with the opposition-dominated legislature and the Salvadoran Supreme Court. Bukele remained popular, Bukele remained popular, but critics warned about his critics warned about his increasingly authoritarian tendencies and possible ties to authoritarian tendencies and possible ties to
organized crime. In February 2021, Bukele’s New Ideas party and its allies won a supermajority in parliamentary elections. organized crime. In February 2021, Bukele’s New Ideas party and its allies won a supermajority in parliamentary elections.
Since May 2021, the New Ideas-dominated legislature has helped Bukele consolidate control over all branches of Since May 2021, the New Ideas-dominated legislature has helped Bukele consolidate control over all branches of
governmentgovernment and close civic space, raising concerns among U.S. and international observers. The legislature has . The legislature dismissed the dismissed the
attorney general and five magistrates from the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamberattorney general and five magistrates from the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and the attorney general, replacing , replacing
them with Bukele loyalists. In Septemberthem with Bukele loyalists. In September, the new Constitutional Chamber 2021, those magistrates ruled that Bukele could run for magistrates ruled that Bukele could run for
another term despite constitutional prohibitions on reelection. After gang-related homicides spiked in March 2022, Bukele another term despite constitutional prohibitions on reelection. After gang-related homicides spiked in March 2022, Bukele
successfully sought, and the legislature approved, a successfully sought, and the legislature approved, a “state of exceptionstate of exception,,” which suspended many civil rights, enabled mass which suspended many civil rights, enabled mass
arrests, and resulted in arrests, and resulted in other human rights abuses.
U.S. Policy
U.S. relations with the Bukele government in El Salvador appear to have started well but soured in the latter years of the
Trump Administration. The Trump Administration cut off some aid to El Salvador in mid-June 2019 until El Salvador “took
action” on immigration; shortly thereafter, Bukele embraced enhancedhuman rights abuses. The Salvadoran government has repeatedly extended the state of exception, while dramatic reductions in violent crime that have bolstered Bukele’s popularity. Many expect Bukele to garner a first-round victory in presidential elections and anticipate his party dominating legislative elections scheduled for February 4, 2024. U.S. Policy The Biden Administration’s policy toward El Salvador is guided by the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, which aims to promote economic prosperity, strengthen governance, and improve security in El Salvador; it is also influenced by geopolitical concerns, such as El Salvador’s relations relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Criticism from Secretary of State Antony Blinken and targeted sanctions related to democratic backsliding and corruption in El Salvador initially strained relations with the Bukele government. Relations have improved as U.S. officials have scaled back public criticism of the government while praising collaboration on migration control and other issues. Although some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about democratic backsliding in El Salvador, others have praised Bukele. As Congress oversees U.S. foreign assistance to El Salvador, it is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget request of $124.8 million for El Salvador. The House-passed (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) and Senate-reported (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) versions of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, would not specify funding levels for El Salvador. Both bills would maintain some restrictions on aid for the Salvadoran government, however, and S. 2438 would maintain a prohibition on Foreign Military Financing for El Salvador. Other legislative measures could affect U.S.-Salvadoran migration ties. For example, the Secure the Border Act of 2023 (H.R. 2), passed by the House in May 2023, would direct the Secretary of State to “seek to negotiate” an asylum cooperation agreement with the Salvadoran government. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 16 link to page 20 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relationswith China and traveled to China in
December 2019. U.S. policy interest in El Salvador has broadened under the Biden Administration to focus on issues beyond
migration control, and friction has grown due to U.S. concerns about democratic backsliding and corruption. In apparent
response, Bukele has aligned his government even more with China and Russia.
Many in Congress are monitoring events in El Salvador and U.S. policy responses. On May 19, 2021, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee reported H.Res. 408, urging the Salvadoran government to respect the country’s democratic institutions.
Congress prohibited Foreign Military Financing to El Salvador in the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-
103) and placed several restrictions on aid to the Salvadoran government. Increasing concerns about corruption and
authoritarianism in El Salvador among some Members of Congress could influence U.S. foreign assistance, sanctions, and
trade policies. Congress also may monitor how tension in relations affects irregular migration, pending gang extraditions, and
El Salvador’s ties to China.


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link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 4 link to page 13 link to page 16 El Salvador: In Brief

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 2
Democratic Backsliding Under Nayib Bukele and New Ideas ................................................. 2
1 Security Conditions ................................................................................................................... 34
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 46
Economic and Social Conditions ..................................................................................................... 5
Adoption of Bitcoin as Legal Tender 7 U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress ......................................................................................... 6
Socioeconomic Conditions.. 9 Migration ........................................................................................................ 7
U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress .......................... 11 Foreign Assistance ................................................................... 8
Migration ............................................... 12 Sanctions .................................................................................... 9
Foreign Assistance ............................................. 15 Counternarcotics and Anti-gang Cooperation ......................................................................... 9
Sanctions15 Commercial Ties ..................................................................................................................... 16 Outlook ................................ 11
Counternarcotics and Anti-Gang Cooperation ........................................................................ 12
Commercial Ties ................................................ 16 Figures Figure 1. El Salvador at a Glance ..................................................................... 12

Figures
Figure 1. El Salvador at a Glance ................................ 2 Figure 2. Homicide Rates in El Salvador: 2013-2023 ..................................................................... 14

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to El Salvador, FY2016-FY2023 Request: FY2021-FY2024 ............................................. 1013

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 1317

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El Salvador: In Brief link to page 5 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction1
El Salvador is a small, densely populated country El Salvador is a small, densely populated country located in the “Northern Triangle” of Central in the “Northern Triangle” of Central America,
a subregion that also includes Guatemala and Honduras. El Salvador hasAmerica (along with Guatemala and Honduras) with deep historical, familial, deep historical, familial,
and economic ties to the United Statesand economic ties to the United States. During the 1980s, the U.S. government spent billions of
dollars to support the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency efforts against the leftist
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The United States later supported a 1992
peace accord that ended the 12-year conflict and incorporated the FMLN into the political
system.2 The conservative National Republican Alliance (ARENA) maintained control of the
presidency from 1989 to 2009, when it was replaced by two consecutive FMLN administrations.
Despite periodic tensions, the United States worked productively with these ARENA and FMLN
administrations. In 2019, however, popular disaffection with corruption and insecurity under both
parties led to the election of outsider Nayib Bukele, and relations between the United States and
El Salvador have deteriorated considerably under Bukele’s increasingly authoritarian rule.3
Figure 1. El Salvador at a Glance

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank (WB); and U.S.
Department of Commerce as presented by Trade Data Monitor (TDM). Map created by CRS; imagery and
boundaries from Esri.

1 For historical background, see Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, El Salvador: A Country Study, ed.
Richard Haggerty (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990). For information on El Salvador and bilateral relations
through mid-2020, see archived CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations.
2 The Salvadoran civil conflict resulted in more than 70,000 deaths. See U.N. Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,
From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,
1993 and Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of
the Cold War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
3 Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, “Latin America Erupts: Millennial Authoritarianism in El Salvador,” Journal of
Democracy, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2021, pp. 19-32.
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El Salvador: In Brief

Political Situation
Nayib Bukele began his career as an FMLN politician, but party leaders expelled him in 2017 for
violating party rules.4 Bukele, a businessperson and former mayor of San Salvador (2015-2018),
took office in June 2019 for a five-year presidential term after winning a first-round victory
representing the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) party. Bukele founded a new
political (See Figure 1). Decades of post-conflict rule by the two traditional parties failed to address the country’s sluggish economic growth, persistent corruption, and high levels of gang-related crime. The 2019 election of political outsider Nayib Bukele, a millennial populist who has maintained high approval ratings largely as a result of his aggressive anticrime policies, has transformed El Salvador. President Bukele has consolidated control over all branches of government and moved to silence critics in civil society, particularly since his New Ideas party won a legislative supermajority in 2021.2 Bukele is widely predicted to win reelection, despite constitutional prohibitions on presidential reelection, in elections scheduled for February 4, 2024. Economic challenges, exacerbated by President Bukele’s adoption of bitcoin as a form of legal tender in 2021, could pose a major test to governance in a potential second Bukele term. U.S. policymakers have struggled to balance concerns about democratic backsliding and human rights abuses under the Bukele government with acknowledgment that its policies have proven popular among Salvadorans and have coincided with reduced irregular migration from the country.3 In FY2023, El Salvador did not rank among the top 10 nationalities of migrants encountered at the U.S. Southwest border (Honduras and Guatemala ranked in the top five).4 In addition, the Bukele government reportedly has decided to exclude Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and other China-based companies from its fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications infrastructure, a U.S. goal.5 Nevertheless, U.S. concerns about the police and the attorney general’s office have led to scaled-back U.S. foreign assistance for some units within those entities and greater U.S. support for civil society.6 Moving forward, some human rights advocates have urged the United States, other countries, and multilateral lenders to pressure the Bukele government to end the state of exception and allow more political pluralism.7 Political Situation Bukele, a businessperson and former mayor of San Salvador (2015-2018), took office in June 2019 for a five-year presidential term after winning a first-round victory representing the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) party. Bukele began his career as an FMLN politician, but party leaders expelled him in 2017 for violating party rules.8 Bukele founded a new political 1 For historical background, see Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, El Salvador: A Country Study, ed. Richard Haggerty (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990). For information on El Salvador and bilateral relations through mid-2020, see archived CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations. 2 Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, “Latin America Erupts: Millennial Authoritarianism in El Salvador,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 32, no. 3 (July 2021), pp. 19-32. 3 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as “movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.” IOM, “Key Migration Terms,” at https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms. 4 See CRS In Focus IF12538, U.S. Efforts to Manage Western Hemisphere Migration Flows. 5 Hector Silva, “El Asunto Chino: Nayib Bukele Negocia Red 5G con Estados Unidos y Obtiene Silencio por la Reelección (Primera parte),” Prensa Comunitaria, December 6, 2023. 6 See, for example, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), USAID, “USAID Redirects Assistance for Salvadoran Government Institutions to Civil Society Groups,” May 21, 2021. 7 See, for example, Tamara Taraciuk Broner and Noah Bullock, “Countering El Salvador’s Democratic Backsliding,” Americas Quarterly, March 21, 2023. 8 Sonja Wolf, “A Populist President Tests El Salvador’s Democracy,” Current History, vol. 120, no. 823 (July 2021). Congressional Research Service 1 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations party, New Ideas, in 2017, but the party was too new to field candidates in 2019. Born in party, New Ideas, in 2017, but the party was too new to field candidates in 2019. Born in
1981, Bukele is the first Salvadoran president to come of age politically after the country’s civil 1981, Bukele is the first Salvadoran president to come of age politically after the country’s civil
warwar (1979-1992) and the first president in 30 years to win without support from and the first president in 30 years to win without support from ARENA or FMLN.
Although Bukele has remained popular, many critics have warned about his authoritarian
tendencies.5 National Republican Alliance (ARENA) or the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Bukele promised to reduce crime and attract investment, but his lack of support in Bukele promised to reduce crime and attract investment, but his lack of support in
the National Assembly during the first two years of his term (GANA had 11 of 84 seats) led to the National Assembly during the first two years of his term (GANA had 11 of 84 seats) led to
executive-legislative clashes. He has governed as an authoritarian populist, using social media to executive-legislative clashes. He has governed as an authoritarian populist, using social media to
communicate with supporters, announce policies, purge officials, and attack opponents. communicate with supporters, announce policies, purge officials, and attack opponents.
Throughout 2020, Bukele battled with the legislature and the Throughout 2020, Bukele battled with the legislature and the SalvadorianSalvadoran Supreme Court over Supreme Court over
funding for his security plan and his aggressive enforcement of a Coronavirus Diseasefunding for his security plan and his aggressive enforcement of a Coronavirus Disease- 2019 2019
(COVID-19) quarantine. In February 2020, Bukele ordered the military to surround the National (COVID-19) quarantine. In February 2020, Bukele ordered the military to surround the National
AssemblyAssembly in an apparent effort to intimidate legislators into approving an anti-crime bill. to intimidate legislators into approving an anti-crime bill.6 He ignored Supreme Court
rulings to respect constitutional rights and legislative decisions during the pandemic.
Democratic Backsliding Under Nayib Bukele and New Ideas
Figure 1. El Salvador at a Glance Sources: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank (WB); and U.S. Department of Commerce, Trade Data Monitor (TDM). Map created by CRS; imagery and boundaries from Esri. In February 2021, New Ideas and its allies won a supermajority In February 2021, New Ideas and its allies won a supermajority (56 of 84 seats) in parliamentary
elections, paving the way for Bukele to increasein legislative elections amid the collapse of popular support for the two traditional parties.9 New Ideas’ resounding victory paved the way for Bukele to consolidate control over the legislature and the courts, quickly replicating the methods that other authoritarian leaders (such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Daniel 9 Laura Gamboa, “How Oppositions Fight Back,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 34, no. 3 (July 2023), pp. 98-99. Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 7 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Ortega in Nicaragua) developed over many years control over the legislature and the courts. On . On
May 1, 2021, the newly seated New Ideas deputies presented charges against and dismissed five May 1, 2021, the newly seated New Ideas deputies presented charges against and dismissed five
magistrates from the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber for inhibiting the government’s magistrates from the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber for inhibiting the government’s
pandemic response. Legislators then dismissed the attorney general for having ties to ARENA; pandemic response. Legislators then dismissed the attorney general for having ties to ARENA;
the attorney general had been investigating corruption in Bukele’s Cabinet and allegations that the attorney general had been investigating corruption in Bukele’s Cabinet and allegations that
the administration had negotiated with gangs to reduce violencethe administration had negotiated with gangs to reduce violence in the country.7.10 Both Both movesdismissals were were
broadly viewed as unconstitutional.broadly viewed as unconstitutional.811 The legislature subsequently enacted a judicial reform law The legislature subsequently enacted a judicial reform law
that mandated retirement for all judges over the age of 60, including the judge who had presided that mandated retirement for all judges over the age of 60, including the judge who had presided
over an emblematic trial of military officials involved in the civil war-era El Mozote massacre.over an emblematic trial of military officials involved in the civil war-era El Mozote massacre.9
12 In September 2021, the new Constitutional Chamber magistrates ruled that Bukele could run for In September 2021, the new Constitutional Chamber magistrates ruled that Bukele could run for
another term despite constitutional prohibitions on reelection. another term despite constitutional prohibitions on reelection.
Bukele, the legislature, and the new attorney general (who reportedly worked for a U.S.- Bukele, the legislature, and the new attorney general (who reportedly worked for a U.S.-
sanctioned subsidiary of Venezuela’s state oil company) sanctioned subsidiary of Venezuela’s state oil company) have shut down investigations into shut down investigations into
corruption corruption in the Bukele administration.13 In May 2021, the National Assembly passed a law granting immunity from prosecution to anyone involved in administering government pandemic relief funds. Since March 2022, the legislature has repeatedly extended a state of exception suspending constitutional rights to combat criminality (see “Security Conditions”). In 2023, the legislature backed constitutional reforms to reduce the size of the unicameral legislature and cut the number of municipalities. Bukele’s administration says the reforms aim to reduce costs; skeptics argue the reform will allow the ruling party to further centralize power. In January 2024, the legislature gave the attorney general authority to create a list of people and organizations to investigate as “terrorists” and more power over extraditions, including gang leaders the United States has asked El Salvador to extradite.14 Despite these efforts to erode checks and balances, Bukele has become one of Latin America’s most popular leaders,15 with a 2023 poll reporting that Salvadorans expressed more satisfaction with democracy than the citizens of any other country in the region.16 Satisfaction appears to be tied to the apparent reduction in crime achieved by the Bukele government. Bukele is widely expected to garner a first-round victory in presidential elections scheduled for February 4, 2024.17 If successful, Bukele would begin his second five-year term on June 1, 2024. Bukele’s party also is widely predicted to capture a large majority of seats in the new legislature to be elected on February 4.18 Mayoral elections are to be held on March 3, 2024. 10in the Bukele government while arresting government opponents on corruption

4 Sonja Wolf, “A Populist President Tests El Salvador’s Democracy,” Current History, vol. 120, issue 823, July 2021.
5 Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, “Latin America Erupts: Millennial Authoritarianism in El Salvador,” Journal of
Democracy, vol. 32, issue 3, July 2021.
6 Brian Winter, “Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different—and Worrying,” Americas Quarterly, February 13,
2020.
7 Carlos Martínez, Gabriela Cáceres, and Óscar Martínez, “Criminal Investigation Found the Bukele Administration Carlos Martínez, Gabriela Cáceres, and Óscar Martínez, “Criminal Investigation Found the Bukele Administration
Hid Evidence of Negotiations with Gangs,” Hid Evidence of Negotiations with Gangs,” El Faro, August 23, 2021. , August 23, 2021.
811 International Bar Association, “El Salvador: IBAHRI Condemns Removal of Attorney General and Top Judges by International Bar Association, “El Salvador: IBAHRI Condemns Removal of Attorney General and Top Judges by
Bukele Administration,” May 13, 2021. Bukele Administration,” May 13, 2021.
912 Human Rights Watch, “El Salvador: New Laws Threaten Judicial Independence,” September 2, 2021. Human Rights Watch, “El Salvador: New Laws Threaten Judicial Independence,” September 2, 2021.
13 Gabriel Campos and Daniel Valencia, “Investigación Revela que Fiscal Impuesto Trabajó para Alba Petróleos,” La Prensa Gráfica, August 1, 2021. 14 Gabriel Labrador, “Asamblea Aprueba más Poderes para el Fiscal General del Bukelismo,” El Faro, January 17, 2024. 15 Jonathan Blitzer, “The Rise of Nayib Bukele, El Salvador’s Authoritarian President,” The New Yorker, September 5, 2022. 16 Noam Lupu et al., eds., Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2023, p. 29. 17 Nelson Renteria, “El Salvador’s Bukele Looks Set to Cruise to Controversial Presidential Reelection—Poll,” January 16, 2024. 18 Ibid. Eric Olson, El Salvador’s February 4 Election: Eight Keys to Understanding the Political Context and Likely Results, Seattle International Foundation, January 2024. Congressional Research Service 3 Congressional Research Service

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link to page link to page 14 7 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Security Conditions Since the 1990s, gangs with origins in Southern California, principally the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the 18t Street gang, and the 18th Street Revolucionarios (Revolutionaries), have undermined citizen security in El Salvador. Gangs have been involved in local drug distribution, extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, among other crimes. With most of their power based on territorial control, gangs have battled each other and the Salvadoran police. After a 2012 government-backed truce collapsed in 2014, homicides rose, peaking in 2015 at a rate of 107 per 100,000 people, the highest in the world (see Figure 2). Extrajudicial killings of suspected gang members by paramilitary groups added to the violence. In 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department designated MS-13 as a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO). As a result, any individuals or entities that support the MS-13 can be subject to U.S. financial sanctions.19 Figure 2. Homicide Rates in El Salvador: 2013-2023 Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Government of El Salvador. Over the past 20 years, successive Salvadoran governments have sought to address gangs through “hard-handed” (mano dura) crackdowns by security forces and negotiations.20 Mano dura approaches typically have involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible gang-related tattoos) for illicit association and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. Though the provisions have been popular with voters, they have increased pretrial detention rates as police and prosecutors have been generally unable to efficiently gather sufficient evidence to turn arrests into successful convictions. Gang roundups also have exacerbated prison overcrowding and allowed gangs to use prisons to increase cohesion and recruit youth. Government-gang negotiations, including the 2012 truce and talks during the 19 The Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) gang is designated for sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13851, the Treasury Department’s designation for transnational criminal organizations. 20 Gema Kloppe-Santamaría and José Miguel Cruz, “The ‘New Wars’: Security and Cooperation in Mexico and Northern Central America,” Crime, Law and Social Change, November 30, 2023. Congressional Research Service 4 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations current government, have resulted in privileges for gang leaders not shared with lower-ranking gang members and often have involved corruption.21 Many analysts assert that initial homicide reductions under President Bukele occurred as a result of quid pro quo negotiations between the Bukele government and gangs.22 Bukele officials reportedly offered improved prison conditions and other incentives to some gang leaders in exchange for a reduction in homicides, gang support of pandemic-lockdowns,El Salvador: In Brief

charges.10 In May 2021, the National Assembly passed a law granting immunity from prosecution
to anyone involved in administering government pandemic relief funds.11 Bukele started and
ended cooperation with an Organization of American States-supported International Commission
Against Impunity in El Salvador after the commission launched investigations into the misuse of
funds intended to address the COVID-19 pandemic, including by the executive branch.
Security Conditions
Bukele appeared to fulfill a campaign promise to reduce violent crime as the country’s homicide
rate declined from 36 per 100,000 people in 2019 to 17.6 per 100,000 people in 2021, according
to police figures.12 Some analysts have voiced concerns that the reduction in homicides may mask
a trend of rising disappearances.13 The government attributed the dramatic reduction in the
homicide rate to its Territorial Control Plan security initiative, but some analysts maintained the
reduction was the result of quid pro quo negotiations between the Bukele government and
prominent street gangs.14 In August 2021, an investigative news outlet published what it alleged
to be portions of a report on an aborted investigation led by the ousted attorney general. The
report allegedly proved the Bukele government had negotiated with the country’s three principal
gangs.15 According to the report, authorities offered improved prison conditions and other
incentives for a reduction in homicides and electoral and electoral support.23 In December 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two support. The Biden Administration has
responded to these developments by imposing sanctions on Bukele Bukele officials for providing illicit favors during covert negotiations with the MS-13 gang. According to the sanction’s designation, those favors enabled the gang “to pay its members millions of dollars through government programs and payouts.”24 The government reportedly released at least one high-level gang leader facing a U.S. extradition request. Mexican authorities captured that individual and extradited him to the United States in November 2023.25 After government-gang negotiations ruptured in March 2022, 87 murders were registered within three days, among the most violent periods recorded since the end of the civil conflict in 1992.26 officials involved in
clandestine government-gang negotiations (see “Sanctions,” below).
In late March 2022, El Salvador registered 87 murders within three days; 62 of these occurred on
the single bloodiest day since the inception of daily homicide records.16 In response, Bukele In response, Bukele
called for, and the legislative assembly approved, a 30-day state of called for, and the legislative assembly approved, a 30-day state of emergency that curtailedexception on March 27, which curtailed certain constitutionally protected civil civil
liberties, including the right to free association and assembly, liberties, including the right to free association and assembly, among others.17 The legislative
assembly approved additional reforms that increased prison sentences for gang members and
approved $80 million in additional security spendingdue process, and access to legal counsel.27 The assembly also adopted new criminal reforms that removed some limits on pretrial detention periods and increased prison sentences for gang members, including for youth aged 12-16. The government deployed additional . The government deployed additional
soldiers to bolster its security plansoldiers to bolster its security plan, bringing the total number of soldiers involved in public
security efforts to over 17,000.18. Authorities have Authorities have leveragedused the special powers the special powers granted under the state of under the state of
exception, exception, which may be extendedextended most recently through January 2024, to carry out , to carry out mass arrests and lengthy detentions of suspects with little or no evidence.28 El Salvador’s state of exception has contributed to measurable reduction in homicides, increased weapons and drug seizures, and some gang leader arrests, but it also has resulted in an increase in reported human rights violations.29 21 Andrea Colombo, “Bukele’s Negotiations with Gangs are a False Solution to the Structural Problem of Violence in El Salvador,” The Dialogue, July 22, 2023. 22 See, for example, Carlos Martínez, Gabriela Cáceres, and Óscar Martínez, “Gobierno de Bukele Negoció con las Tres Pandillas e Intentó Esconder la Evidencia,” El Faro, August 23, 2021. 23 Carlos Garcia, “Transnational Escape of MS-13 Leader “Crook” Caught on Social Media,” El Faro, July 11, 2022. 24 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized Crime,” December 8, 2021. 25 Carlos Martínez, “U.S. Captures “Crook,” MS-13 Fugitive Released by Bukele Administration,” El Faro, November 9, 2023. 26mass arrests of suspected gang members.

10 Gabriel Campos and Daniel Valencia, “Investigación Revela que Fiscal Impuesto Trabajó para Alba Petróleos,” La
Prensa Gráfica, August 1, 2021; Sarah Kinosian, “Exclusive-Salvadoran Ex-Prosecutor Says Government Quashed
Probe into Pact with Gangs,” Reuters, December 28, 2021.
11 Alex Papadovassilakis, “Pandemic Spending Immunity Deepens El Salvador Corruption Concerns,” InSight Crime,
May 10, 2021.
12 Insight Crime, “2021 Homicide Round-Up,” February 1, 2022; and Insight Crime, “2019 Homicide Round-Up,”
January 28, 2020.
13 Kinosian, op. cit.; Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD), Desaparición de Personas en
El Salvador, April 2021, p. 17; Katie Jones, “Report: Soaring Disappearances Linked to Gang Pacts,” Insight Crime,
April 21, 2021.
14 Carlos Martínez et al., “Gobierno de Bukele Lleva un Año Negociando con la MS-13 Reducción de Homicidios y
Apoyo Electoral,” El Faro, September 3, 2020.
15 CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America; Carlos Martínez, Gabriela Cáceres, and Óscar Martínez,
“Gobierno de Bukele Negoció con las Tres Pandillas e Intentó Esconder la Evidencia,” El Faro, August 23, 2021.
16 Laura Jordán, “Sábado Cerró con el Mayor Número de Asesinatos Desde que Existe el Registro Diario en El Laura Jordán, “Sábado Cerró con el Mayor Número de Asesinatos Desde que Existe el Registro Diario en El
Salvador,” Salvador,” La Prensa Gráfica, March 27, 2022, March 27, 2022.
17 LatinNews, “El Salvador: State of Emergency Declared as Killings Soar,” March 28, 2022.
18 LatinNews, “El Salvador: Bukele Hardens Anti-Gang Stance,” April 5, 2022; BBC Mundo, “Bukele Contra las
Maras: 3 Polémicas Medidas Aprobadas por El Salvador para combatir a las pandillas,” April 6, 2022.
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El Salvador: In Brief

Authorities have detained more than 18,000 individuals since the state of emergency began; those
detained have often been subjected to harsh conditions and unable to contact their families.19
Human Rights
Violence and human rights abuses have been prevalent for much of El Salvador’s modern history.
After the ; and Maria Abi-Habib and Bryan Avelar, “Explosion of Gang Violence Grips El Salvador, Setting Record,” New York Times, March 27, 2022. 27 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). “IACHR Urges El Salvador to Ensure that Law Enforcement and any Exceptional Measures Comply with Human Rights,” April 30. 2022. 28 Amnesty International, “El Salvador: President Bukele Engulfs the Country in a Human Rights Crisis After Three Years in Government,” June 2, 2022. 29 Alessia Genoves, “50 mil detenidos. Régimen de Excepción se Prorroga,” ContraPunto,” August 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Human Rights Violence and human rights abuses have been prevalent for much of El Salvador’s modern history. In 1932, for example, the Salvadoran military killed tens of thousands of Indigenous people who participated in a communist party-led peasant revolt.30 After the Salvadoran Supreme Court overturned a 1993 amnesty law in July 2016, Salvadoran authorities Supreme Court overturned a 1993 amnesty law in July 2016, Salvadoran authorities
began to investigate mass atrocities committed began to investigate mass atrocities committed by government security forces during the civil war.during the civil war.2031 Progress on these Progress on these
investigations has stalled under the Bukele administration, however, as the government has, investigations has stalled under the Bukele administration, however, as the government has,
among other measures, blocked access to military archives.among other measures, blocked access to military archives.2132
Many of the most serious human rights abuses in El Salvador today relate to gangs and criminal Many of the most serious human rights abuses in El Salvador today relate to gangs and criminal
groups, excessive use of force by security forces, gender-based violence, and government attacks groups, excessive use of force by security forces, gender-based violence, and government attacks
on civil liberties. Resource constraints, corruption, and a lack of political will have hindered on civil liberties. Resource constraints, corruption, and a lack of political will have hindered
efforts to address these challenges. efforts to address these challenges.
The Office of the The Office of the United Nations (U.N.)U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and others have warned High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and others have warned
that recentthat Bukele government anti-gang measures Bukele government anti-gang measures are not in keeping withviolate international human international human
rights standards.rights standards.22 In late March 2022, over 70 local and international organizations issued a joint
statement about the country’s state of exception, asserting that it “poses a disproportionate threat
to the protection and fulfillment of fundamental freedoms.”23 The U.S. State Department’s
Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering 2021 cites Salvadoran security forces’
involvement in extrajudicial killings, unlawful disappearances, and torture.
El Salvador, along with neighboring Honduras and Guatemala, has some of the world’s highest
levels of femicide (targeting women or girls for murder based on their gender) and violence
against women.24 Amid declining homicides, femicides increased in El Salvador in 2020.25
According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, El Salvador
had the third-highest rate of femicide reported in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2020.26 This
violence has contributed to irregular emigration.27
Observers also have decried the erosion of civil liberties under Bukele. Salvadoran officials have
deported foreign journalists, harassed human rights activists and civil society organizations, and

19 Natalie Kitroeff, “In El Salvador, the President Cracks Down on Civil Liberties, and Is Beloved for It,” New York
Times, April 28, 2022; Saraí Alas, “Régimen de Excepción ha sido doble Impacto para las Mujeres,” La Prensa
Gráfica, April 20, 2022.
20 Jason Motlagh, “Inside El Salvador’s Battle with Violence, Poverty, and U.S. Policy,” National Geographic, March
2019.
2133 Authorities have used the special powers granted under the state of exception to arbitrarily arrest more than 72,000 individuals (including U.S. citizens), 7,000 of whom were released without explanation in August 2023 but remain under government surveillance.34 Increased human rights abuses have been reported in the country’s already overcrowded prisons and police holding cells. Human Rights Watch has documented hundreds of cases of torture, physical and verbal abuse, denial of food and/or medicine, and other abuses.35 Salvadoran youth have been subjected to verbal and physical abuse in detention, detained without police informing their families, and deprived of legal counsel or visits with their families. By May 2023, at least 150 detainees had reportedly died in custody.36 In July 2023, the legislature enacted a law allowing mass trials for groups of up to 900 detainees at once.37 It is unclear when the state of exception, once considered a temporary measure, will end. El Salvador, along with neighboring Honduras and Guatemala, has some of the world’s highest levels of femicide (targeting women or girls for murder based on their gender) and violence against women.38 According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the 30 This episode, known as la matanza (the massacre) weakened, but did not destroy, El Salvador’s small Indigenous communities. Erik Ching and Virginia Tilley, “Indians, the Military and the Rebellion of 1932 in El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1998). 31 Jason Motlagh, “Inside El Salvador’s Battle with Violence, Poverty, and U.S. Policy,” National Geographic, March 2019. 32 Peter Canby, “Is El Salvador’s President Trying to Shut Down a Hearing on the Infamous El Mozote Massacre?,” Peter Canby, “Is El Salvador’s President Trying to Shut Down a Hearing on the Infamous El Mozote Massacre?,”
New Yorker, September 10, 2021. , September 10, 2021.
2233 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, El Salvador: Concern at Measures in Response to Rising
Gang Violence, April 5, 2022. , April 5, 2022.
23 Washington Office on Latin America, El Salvador: State of Exception and Attacks Against Human Rights Defenders
and Organizations Facilitate State Abuses, Joint Statement, March 31, 2022.
2434 El País, “Detainees in El Salvador’s Gang Crackdown Cite Abuse During Months in Jail,” December 1, 2023. 35 Human Rights Watch, “El Salvador: Evidence of Serious Abuses in State of Emergency,” June 2022. 36 El País, “Detainees in El Salvador’s Gang Crackdown Cite Abuse During Months in Jail,” December 1, 2023. 37 Nelson Renteria, “El Salvador Backs Mass Trials for Thousand Held in Crime Crackdown,” Reuters, July 26, 2023. 38 María Bozmoski, “The Northern Triangle: The World’s Epicenter for Gender-Based Violence,” Atlantic Council, María Bozmoski, “The Northern Triangle: The World’s Epicenter for Gender-Based Violence,” Atlantic Council,
March 3, 2021. March 3, 2021.
25 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Violencia Contra las Mujeres, El Salvador 2020,” June 2021.
26 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, The Pandemic in the Shadows: Femicides or
Feminicides in 2020 in Latin America and the Caribbean, November 24, 2021.
27 New Humanitarian, “How Mexico and Central America’s Femicide Epidemic Drives and Complicates the Migrant
Crisis,” February 27, 2020.
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link to page 9 El Salvador: In Brief

proposed a law that would require foreign-funded individuals and organizations to register as
foreign agents.Congressional Research Service 6 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Caribbean, El Salvador had the third-highest rate of femicide reported in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2022.39 This violence has contributed to irregular emigration.40 Observers also have decried the erosion of civil liberties under Bukele. Officials have harassed journalists, human rights activists, opposition leaders, and civil society organizations online, threatened them with audits, and accused them of money laundering and other crimes.41 In 2021, the legislature proposed a law that would have required foreign-funded entities to register as foreign agents, but multilateral pressure led deputies to abandon the proposal.42 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, the OHCHR the OHCHR, and others have raised have raised
concerns about reports that the Bukele government used spyware to illegally surveil journalists concerns about reports that the Bukele government used spyware to illegally surveil journalists
and civil society groups.and civil society groups.2843 In February 2022, the legislature approved a reform to expand law In February 2022, the legislature approved a reform to expand law
enforcement’s ability to investigate cybercrimes; critics maintain the reform enforcement’s ability to investigate cybercrimes; critics maintain the reform seekssought to legalize to legalize
such surveillance.such surveillance.2944 In In April 2022, the legislature passed a law making it illegal for journalists to “transmit messages” from gangs in their articles; it rescinded the restrictions on press freedom in November 2023, but not before dozens of journalists had fled the country after facing harassment.45April 2022, the National Assembly amended the penal code to criminalize
the diffusion of any information that explicitly or implicitly alludes to criminal groups; two
Salvadoran nongovernmental organizations have filed a Supreme Court challenge to the
reforms.30
Economic and Social Conditions
El Salvador’s economy contracted by El Salvador’s economy contracted by roughly 7.9% and lost 20% of its formal jobs in 2020 due to 7.9% and lost 20% of its formal jobs in 2020 due to
pandemic-related economic shocks.31the COVID-19 pandemic.46 In response, the Bukele government implemented two fiscal In response, the Bukele government implemented two fiscal
packages worth $3 billion in total, financed by multilateral loans, to provide relief to local packages worth $3 billion in total, financed by multilateral loans, to provide relief to local
governments, support households and small firmsgovernments, support households and small firms, distribute vaccines, and combat food , and combat food
insecurity. The economy rebounded insecurity. The economy rebounded 10.3%with 11.2% growth in 2021 due to strong remittances in 2021 due to strong remittances from migrant workers abroad, a manufacturing , a manufacturing
sector recovery, and new investment.sector recovery, and new investment.3247 From 2015 From 2015- to 2020, remittances 2020, remittances have made upcomprised around 18% around 18%
of El Salvador’s gross domestic product (GDP); of El Salvador’s gross domestic product (GDP); increased remittance flows during the pandemic remittance flows during the pandemic
enlarged increased that share to over 25% in 2021.that share to over 25% in 2021.33 Looking ahead, the48 The International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund
(IMF) predicts an economic expansion of 3.0% in 2022. Nevertheless, low levels of investment
and rising public debt will likely weigh on El Salvador’s long-term growth, as they did prior to
the COVID-19 pandemic.
The pandemic has exacerbated El Salvador’s long-standing fiscal and debt problems. Since 2000,
the Salvadoran government has run budget deficits that have contributed to a rising debt-to-GDP
ratio.34 Although the Bukele administration’s pandemic response arguably helped mitigate
adverse social impacts, it also drove the government on a path to “unsustainable” levels of
indebtedness, estimated at 89% of GDP in 2021.35 For more than a year, the Bukele government
has sought a roughly $1.3 billion loan agreement with the IMF. Prospects for a deal remain
uncertain, especially as El Salvador rejected an IMF recommendation to remove Bitcoin as legal
tender (see “Adoption of Bitcoin as Legal Tender,” below).

28 Latin News(IMF) has credited tourism, remittances, and public investment for supporting economic growth of 2.6% in 2022 and an estimated 2.3% in 2023.49 39 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preventing Femicides:Obligation for States and a Persistent Challenge in the Region, November 2023. 40 New Humanitarian, “How Mexico and Central America’s Femicide Epidemic Drives and Complicates the Migrant Crisis,” February 27, 2020. 41 For a recent example, see Héctor Silva Ávalos, “Quién es Rubén Zamora, el Opositor Salvadoreño a Quien la Justicia de Bukele Mandó a Arrestar en la Víspera de Nochebuena,” Infobae, December 31, 2023. 42 Tamara Taraciuk Broner and Noah Bullock, “Countering El Salvador’s Democratic Backsliding,” Americas Quarterly, March 21, 2023. 43 Latin American Security & Strategic Review, “El Salvador: Spying Scandal Reignites Press Freedom Concerns,” March , “El Salvador: Spying Scandal Reignites Press Freedom Concerns,” March
2022.
292022; John Scott-Railton et al., “Project Torogoz: Extensive Hacking of Media & Civil Society in El Salvador with Pegasus Spyware,” Citizen Lab and Access Now, January 11, 2022. 44 Associated Press, “El Salvador Aprueba el Uso de Agentes Encubiertos Digitales,” February 1, 2022; Associated Press, “El Salvador Aprueba el Uso de Agentes Encubiertos Digitales,” February 1, 2022; LatinNews, “El , “El
Salvador: Reforms to Tackle Cyber Crime Spark Spying Concerns,” February 2, 2022. Salvador: Reforms to Tackle Cyber Crime Spark Spying Concerns,” February 2, 2022.
30 Inter American Press Association (IAPA), “IAPA Rejects the ‘Criminalization’ of Journalism in El Salvador,” press
release, April 6, 2022; AFP, “El Salvador NGOs File Suit Against Gag Order on Gang Statements,” April 20, 2022.
31 45 Gerardo Arbiaza, “El Salvador Lawmakers Repeal Media Crackdown, Declare ‘War on Gangs Won,’” Reuters, November 2, 2023; Luke Taylor, “El Salvador News Outlet Relocates to Costa Rica to Avoid Bukele’s Crackdown,” Guardian, April 19, 2023. 46 International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Monetary Fund (IMF), El Salvador: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement
by the Executive Director for El Salvador, Country Report 22/20, January 2022, January 2022, pp. 7-12. Hereinafter: IMF, El
Salvador, January 2022.
32 World Bank, Recovery: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens, Migration and Development Brief 35,
November 2021, pp. 8-16; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: El Salvador, generated March 14,
2022. Hereinafter: EIU, Recovery, March 2022.
33 EIU, Recovery, March 2022, p. 8;. Hereinafter: IMF, January 2022. 47 IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database, October 2023,” October 5, 2023. 48 IMF, IMF, El Salvador, January 2022, pp. 24-25; and IMF, “El Salvador’s Comeback January 2022, pp. 24-25; and IMF, “El Salvador’s Comeback
Constrained by Increased Risks, Country Focus,” February 16, 2022. Constrained by Increased Risks, Country Focus,” February 16, 2022.
3449 IMF, IMF, El Salvador, January 2022, pp. 3-9.
35 Ibid., p. 9: Staff Concluding Statement on the 2023 Article IV Mission, February 10, 2023. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

57 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations The pandemic exacerbated El Salvador’s long-standing fiscal and debt problems. Since 2000, the Salvadoran government has run budget deficits that have led to a rising debt-to-GDP ratio.50 While the Bukele administration’s pandemic response helped mitigate adverse social impacts, it also drove the government on a path to “unsustainable” levels of indebtedness, estimated at 89% of GDP in 2021.51 The Bukele government repaid one of two outstanding bonds in January 2023 but has continued to seek an agreement with the IMF to stabilize its finances. After the government rejected an IMF recommendation to remove bitcoin as legal tender in November 2021, prospects for a debt relief agreement stalled.52 Adoption of Bitcoin as Legal Tender

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El Salvador: In Brief

Economists have suggested that a lack of public and private investment contributes to low
productivity and high levels of economic informality, and is a principal barrier to higher levels of
economic growth in El Salvador.36 Prior to the pandemic, El Salvador registered some of the
lowest inflows of foreign direct investment in Central America. Insecurity and corruption have
impeded investment in the country.37 The IMF estimates that firms in El Salvador spend between
5% and 15% of revenue on security and surveillance. Violent crime had trended downward since
2015, but recent gang-related homicides have revived security concerns. About half of all firms in
El Salvador also identify corruption, in addition to weak property rights and institutions, as a
major constraint to investment, according to the World Bank.38
A lack of infrastructure, especially in the energy sector, further hampers economic growth in El
Salvador. Several new energy projects scheduled to begin operation in 2022, including a power
station facilitated by a $1 billion investment from the U.S. Development Finance Corporation,
could help reduce the country’s dependence on energy imports. In light of its strained public
finances, the Bukele government has pursued international investment to help finance additional
infrastructure projects. Bukele has supported public-private partnerships to bolster private sector
investment, but the country’s first such project, announced in October 2020 and aimed at
expanding the San Salvador airport’s cargo terminal, still awaits legislative approval.39 During a
2019 visit to China, Bukele secured $500 million in investment for various projects. The first
project, a $40 million national library, broke ground in February 2022.40
Adoption of Bitcoin as Legal Tender
In September 2021, El Salvador’s National Assembly enacted a Bukele-backed initiative to adopt
BitcoinIn September 2021, El Salvador’s National Assembly enacted a Bukele-backed initiative to adopt bitcoin cryptocurrency as a form of legal tender, a move the as a form of legal tender, a move the IMFInternational Monetary Fund had warned could expose the economy to had warned could expose the economy to
money laundering and high crypto-asset price volatility.money laundering and high crypto-asset price volatility.4153 To encourage its adoption, the To encourage its adoption, the
government established a $150 government established a $150 millionmil ion trust fund to allow any Salvadoran citizen or firm to trust fund to allow any Salvadoran citizen or firm to
exchange exchange Bitcoinbitcoin for U.S. for U.S. dollars dol ars without cost; the trust fund subsidized the transaction and without cost; the trust fund subsidized the transaction and
exchange rate costs.exchange rate costs.42 The Bukele government The Bukele government reportedly hopeshad hoped that designating designating Bitcoinbitcoin as a national as a national
currency currency willwould reduce transfer fees for remittances, foster financial inclusion, increase investment reduce transfer fees for remittances, foster financial inclusion, increase investment
from international crypto-asset investors, and decrease dependence on U.S. from international crypto-asset investors, and decrease dependence on U.S. monetary policy.54 Two years later, despite incentives that included a $30 bonus for anyone who signed up for the “Chivo” electronic cryptocurrency wallet to manage bitcoin, the usage of bitcoin and Chivo remains low among the general population but reportedly has increased among gangs and other criminal groups.55 Economists assert that a lack of public and private investment and a high proportion of the labor force working outside of the formal sector dampen productivity and economic growth in the country.56 El Salvador has registered some of the lowest inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central America; the country failed to attract increased FDI even after the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) took effect in 2006.57 Insecurity historically has impeded investment in the country.58 According to the State Department’s 2023 Investment Climate Report for El Salvador, violence reduction associated with the state of exception has led to increased domestic and diaspora investment but has not yet prompted increased FDI. About half of all firms in El Salvador also identify corruption, in addition to weak property rights and institutions, as a major constraint to investment, according to the World Bank.59 A lack of infrastructure, especially in the energy sector, further hampers 50 IMF, El Salvador, January 2022, pp. 3-9. 51 Ibid., p. 9. 52 Associated Press, “El Salvador Angrily Rejects IMF Call to Drop Bitcoin Use,” January 31, 2022. 53monetary policy.43
Bukele may seek to use the crypto-asset as an alternative avenue for investment, given El
Salvador’s increasingly strained relations with the United States and international financial
institutions. In November 2021, the IMF urged the government to stop using Bitcoin; Bukele
rejected that recommendation.44

36 IMF, January 2022, pp. 50, 59, 90.
37 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: El Salvador; IMF, El Salvador, January 2022, p. 14.
38 Hulya Ulku and Gabriel Zaourak, Unleashing Central America’s Growth Potential: El Salvador, World Bank, 2021,
p. 6. Hereinafter: World Bank, Unleashing Central America’s Growth Potential, 2021.
39 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: El Salvador.
40 Evan Ellis, China and El Salvador: An Update, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 22, 2021.
41 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2021 Article IV Consultation with El Salvador,” press release, no. 22/13, IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2021 Article IV Consultation with El Salvador,” press release, no. 22/13,
January 25, 2022. January 25, 2022.
42 Nelson Renteria, “El Salvador Congress Backs $150 Mln Fund for Bitcoin Ahead of Adoption,” Reuters, August 31,
2021.
43 Henri Arslanian et al., El Salvador’s Law: A Meaningful Test for Bitcoin, PricewaterhouseCoopers, October 2021, at
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/financial-services/pdf/el-salvadors-law-a-meaningful-test-for-bitcoin.pdf.
44 Associated Press, “El Salvador Angrily Rejects IMF Call to Drop Bitcoin use,” January 31, 2022.
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Socioeconomic Conditions
54 Henri Arslanian et al., El Salvador’s Law: A Meaningful Test for Bitcoin, PricewaterhouseCoopers, October 2021. 55 Douglas Farah and Marianne Richardson, “The Growing use of Cryptocurrencies by Transnational Organized Crime Groups in Latin America,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 20, 2023; Fernando F. Alvarez, David Argente, and Diana Van Patten, Are Cryptocurrencies Currencies?, National Bureau of Economic Research, Bitcoin as Legal Tender in El Salvador, Cambridge, MA, February 2023, pp. 17-19. 56 IMF, January 2022, pp. 50, 59, 90. 57 Pedro Argumedo, Antonio Zuleta, and Karla Luna, DR-CAFTA: 16 Years After its Signing, Lessons to Take Advantage of Nearshoring, FUSADES and CIPE, Economic Analysis 67, August 2023. 58 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: El Salvador; IMF, El Salvador, January 2022, p. 14. 59 Hulya Ulku and Gabriel Zaourak, Unleashing Central America’s Growth Potential: El Salvador, World Bank, 2021, p. 6. Hereinafter: World Bank, Unleashing Central America’s Growth Potential, 2021. Congressional Research Service 8 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations economic growth, although the Bukele government has pursued international investment to finance infrastructure projects.60 Prior to the pandemic, El Salvador outpaced Prior to the pandemic, El Salvador outpaced
its Northern Triangle neighbors in reducing its Northern Triangle neighbors in reducing
COVID-19 In El Salvador
poverty and inequality. Poverty declined from
El Salvador has recorded the lowest rate of
44.5poverty and inequality. Poverty declined from 44.6% in 2014 to 30.4% in 2019, and extreme % in 2014 to 30.4% in 2019, and extreme
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) infections and
deaths among Northern Triangle countries, registering
poverty declined from 11.poverty declined from 11.47% in 2014 to 5.6% % in 2014 to 5.6%
a mortality rate of 64 deaths per 100,000 individuals,
in 2019.45 In 2019, El Salvador the World
despite being the most densely populated country in
in 2019.61 In 2019, the World Bank considered El Salvador Bank considered El Salvador to be the country with the least income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, in part due to increased labor income in urban areas and strong remittances to rural communities.62 Despite such progress, the pandemic and a to be the country
Central America. Public health measures such as the
with the least income inequality in Latin
rapid implementation of strict mobility restrictions in
March 2020 and a robust vaccination campaign likely
America and the Caribbean, in part due to
contributed to reducing pandemic-related deaths. As of
increased labor income in urban areas and
April 18, 2022, approximately 66.5% of the population
strong remittances to rural communities.46
had been fully vaccinated, 19 and 30 percentage points
Despite such progress, the pandemic and a
greater than neighboring Honduras and Guatemala,
series of natural disasters increased poverty in
respectively.
series of natural disasters increased poverty in 2020, 2020, particularly in rural communities. As of 2022, the Salvadoran poverty rate was 29.8% (40.7% in rural areas) and the extreme poverty rate was 8.7% (14.8% in rural areas).63 According to the 2023particularly in rural areas.
Sources: Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus

Resource Center, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/; IMF,
According to the 2021 World Risk Index, El
“Policy Responses to COVID-19,” at
World Risk Index, El Salvador is among the Salvador is among the 2035 countries in the countries in the
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-
world most at risk from natural disastersworld most at risk from natural disasters, due
Responses-to-COVID-19; accessed April 18, 2022.
due to frequent exposure and weak response to frequent exposure and weak response
capacities.capacities.4764 The country is susceptible to a range of disasters including earthquakes, volcanoes, The country is susceptible to a range of disasters including earthquakes, volcanoes,
hurricanes, and droughts.hurricanes, and droughts.48 Fifty-eight percent of El Salvador is part of the Central American Dry Fifty-eight percent of El Salvador is part of the Central American Dry
Corridor, a noncontiguous strip of Central America that is highly susceptible to cyclical droughts Corridor, a noncontiguous strip of Central America that is highly susceptible to cyclical droughts
and flooding.and flooding.4965 According to the World Food Program, over 1 million Salvadorans surveyed in June 2023 faced moderate to severe food insecurity.66 According to the United Nations, these factors have combined with the COVID-
19 economic crisis to precipitate a spike in the number of Salvadorans facing food insecurity,
which is estimated to include over 1 million people and has become a driver of irregular
migration.50
Gang violence, a dearth of schools in rural areas, and low mandatory school requirements (only Gang violence, a dearth of schools in rural areas, and low mandatory school requirements (only
primary school is compulsory) contribute to an education system that often produces worse primary school is compulsory) contribute to an education system that often produces worse
outcomes in El Salvador compared outcomes in El Salvador compared towith education systems in other countries with similar income education systems in other countries with similar income
levels, according to the World Bank.levels, according to the World Bank.5167 An estimated An estimated 2725.5% of Salvadorans have not completed % of Salvadorans have not completed
primary school.primary school.52 The proportion68 Nearly a quarter (23.5%) of Salvadoran youth aged 15-24 of Salvadoran youth aged 15-24 who are not employed, in are not employed, in

45 Data are available at U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, at
https://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/estadisticasIndicadores.asp?idioma=i.
46 The World Bank, “El Salvador: Overview,” updated October 6, 2021.
47school, or in vocational training, demonstrating the lack of opportunity in the country.69 Those youth are widely considered to be at risk for gang recruitment. U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress El Salvador has traditionally been a partner of the United States.70 During the Salvadoran civil conflict in the 1980s, which coincided with U.S. Cold War concerns about communism in the region, the United States provided billions of dollars in economic aid, as well as military training 60 Several new energy projects, including a $1 billion liquefied natural gas power generation facility supported by a $350 million investment from the U.S. Development Finance Corporation and new renewable energy projects aim to make the country become self-sufficient in electricity production. 61 ECLAC, “CEPALSTAT” database, accessed January 2024. 62 The World Bank, “El Salvador: Overview,” updated October 6, 2021. 63 ECLAC, “CEPALSTAT” database, accessed January 2024. 64 Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, World Risk Index, ,
2021.
48 United Nations Development Program, Independent Country Program Evaluation: El Salvador, September 2020, p.
8.
492023. 65 Peter Laderach et al Peter Laderach et al., , Climate Security in the Central American Dry Corridor, Consultative Group for International , Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), position paper, 2021, p. 7. Agricultural Research (CGIAR), position paper, 2021, p. 7.
50 United Nations66 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Response Plan: El Salvador,
2021, p. 5; Grazia Pacillo et al., Is Climate a “Risk Multiplier” in the Central American Dry Corridor?, CGIAR and
World Food Program, 2021.
51El Salvador: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan Summary 2024, December 15, 2023. 67 World Bank, World Bank, Unleashing Central America’s Growth Potential, 2021, p. 10. 2021, p. 10.
5268 Data are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), Data are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT, accessed , accessed April 2022.January 2024. 69 Ibid. 70 This draws from U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, “U.S.-El Salvador Relations.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

79 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations and equipment to help successive governments combat the FMLN insurgency.71 Some 70,000 died during the conflict, a majority killed by security forces.72

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El Salvador: In Brief

school, or in vocational training (26.7%) is another consequence of a lack of opportunity in the
country.53 Those youth are widely considered to be at risk for gang recruitment.
U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress
El Salvador has traditionally been a partner of the United States.54 After the signing of the 1992 After the signing of the 1992
peace peace accordsaccords ending the civil war, U.S. relations with El Salvador were cordial under both , U.S. relations with El Salvador were cordial under both ARENA andright-leaning ARENA and left-leaning FMLN FMLN
governments. governments. Successive U.S. AdministrationsU.S. presidential administrations sought, with mixed success, to help El Salvador sought, with mixed success, to help El Salvador
build a multiparty democracy, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, and expand build a multiparty democracy, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, and expand
economic development. Bilateral trade increased after the 2006 implementation of economic development. Bilateral trade increased after the 2006 implementation of the Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)DR-CAFTA. The United States . The United States
and El Salvador and El Salvador have partnered on defense, counternarcotics, and anti-gang efforts, with El Salvador partnered on defense, counternarcotics, and anti-gang efforts, with El Salvador
hosting a Cooperative Security Location for U.S. air assets involved in detecting and monitoring hosting a Cooperative Security Location for U.S. air assets involved in detecting and monitoring
narcotics and an electronic monitoring center that supports regional efforts to combat narcotics and an electronic monitoring center that supports regional efforts to combat
transnational criminal organizations. transnational criminal organizations.
U.S. relations with the Bukele government U.S. relations with the Bukele government in El Salvador arguably started well but soured in the
latter years of the Trump Administration. In mid-have been volatile. In June 2019, the Trump Administration cut off June 2019, the Trump Administration cut off
some aid to El Salvador until El Salvador some aid to El Salvador until El Salvador “took action” on immigration.took additional steps to combat irregular migration; those steps included signing an “asylum cooperation agreement” with the United States.73 Shortly thereafter, Shortly thereafter,
Bukele embraced relationsBukele expressed interest in bolstering ties with China and traveled there in December 2019. with China and traveled there in December 2019.55
U.S. policy interest in El Salvador has74 Nevertheless, Bukele forged close relations with some Trump Administration officials, particularly former Ambassador Ron Johnson, which he has maintained since President Trump left office.75 U.S. policy interests in El Salvador have broadened under the Biden Administration to focus on broadened under the Biden Administration to focus on
issues beyond migration control, and friction has issues beyond migration control, and friction has grownoccurred due to U.S. concerns about democratic due to U.S. concerns about democratic
backsliding and corruption. backsliding and corruption. The Biden Administration has expressed concerns about the erosion
of democratic institutions in El Salvador. In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called
President Bukele to express concern about the dismissals of the country’s magistrates and President Bukele to express concern about the dismissals of the country’s magistrates and
attorney general.attorney general.56 In November 2021, then-U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Jean Manes announced a
“pause” in efforts to repair U.S.-Salvadoran relations and left her post.57 In addition. Secretary
Blinken has questioned the Bukele government’s tactics in responding to increased levels of
gang-related violence. In an April 2022 statement, Secretary Blinken expressed concern about an
amendment to El Salvador’s criminal code that criminalizes reporting on certain gang activities.58
In apparent response, Bukele has further aligned his government with China and Russia.59 In
March 2022, El Salvador was one of four Latin American countries to abstain from the U.N.
General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Many in Congress are monitoring events in El Salvador and U.S. policy responses, as well as how
tension in relations has affected issues of U.S. concern such as migration, anti-gang efforts, and
trade. On May 19, 2021, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.Res. 408, urging the
Salvadoran government to respect the country’s democratic institutions. Congress prohibited
Foreign Military Financing to El Salvador in the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.

53 Ibid.
54 This draws from U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, “U.S.-El Salvador Relations.”
55 U.S. 76 In 2022, Secretary Blinken questioned the Bukele government’s tactics in responding to increased levels of gang-related violence.77 In apparent response, El Salvador abstained from the U.N. General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Over the past year, U.S. officials have sought to repair relations with the Bukele government by avoiding public criticism of most of its policies and working together on issues of mutual interest.78 Secretary of State Blinken hosted El Salvador’s Foreign Minister at the State Department in August 2023, before which Blinken pledged to find ways to “deepen our 71 See National Security Archive, “El Salvador: War, Peace, and Human Rights, 1980-1994,” available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/publications/elsalvador2/. 72 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002); 73 Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the executive branch to enter into “bilateral or multilateral agreement[s] for the removal of asylum seekers to third countries.” Such agreements are typically known as “safe third country agreements” (STCAs). In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) started negotiating and/or implementing agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which would allow DHS to transfer some asylum seekers to those countries instead of evaluating their claims for asylum in the United States. DHS referred to these “Safe Third Country Agreements” (STCAs) as “Asylum Cooperative Agreements” (ACAs). The U.S.-El Salvador ACA was signed in September 2019, but never implemented. See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10402, Safe Third Country Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries: Background and Legal Issues. 74 El Salvador abandoned its long-standing ties with Taiwan to establish relations with China in August 2018. U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, June 17, 2019; EIU, “Bukele Visits China,” December 10, Department of State, Department Press Briefing, June 17, 2019; EIU, “Bukele Visits China,” December 10,
2019.
56 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Salvadoran President Bukele,” May 2, 2021.
57 Nelson Renteria, “U.S. Official Says El Salvador Relations ‘Paused’ for Lack of Interest,” Reuters, November 22,
2021.
582019. 75 “Fireside Chat with Ron Johnson, Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador,” FIU Gordon Institute, May 2, 2023. available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xU05zxohGZg; Héctor Silva, “La visita de Marco Rubio a Bukele: cómo el Partido Republicano ha Influido en la Política Exterior de Washington en El Salvador,” Prensa Comunitaria, December 10, 2023. 76 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Salvadoran President Bukele,” May 2, 2021. 77 U.S. Department of State, “Violence and Threats to Free Speech in El Salvador,” press release, April 10, 2022. U.S. Department of State, “Violence and Threats to Free Speech in El Salvador,” press release, April 10, 2022.
59 Kate Linthicum, “In Latin America’s New Cold War, Will China Lift Up Autocrats?,” Los Angeles Times, February
17, 202278 See, for example, “Ambassadors on U.S.-Central America Relations,” C-Span, June 16, 2023, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?528799-1/ambassadors-us-central-america-relations. .
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117-103)Background and U.S. Relations cooperation.”79 In October 2023, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols met with President Bukele during a trip to El Salvador. When asked about the legality of Bukele’s bid to seek reelection, Nichols said that Salvadoran voters “can decide whether they agree or disagree with this process.”80 This response contrasted markedly with the State Department’s September 2021 statement that the ruling enabling Bukele’s reelection undermined democracy in the country.81 Many in Congress are monitoring events in El Salvador and U.S. policy responses, as well as the extent to which periodic tension in relations has affected cooperation on issues such as irregular migration, gangs and drugs, and trade. Congress prohibited Foreign Military Financing to El Salvador in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328, Division K), and placed several restrictions on aid to the Salvadoran government. Increasing and placed several restrictions on aid to the Salvadoran government. Increasing
concerns about corruption and authoritarianism in El Salvador among some Members of concerns about corruption and authoritarianism in El Salvador among some Members of
Congress could influence Congress could influence U.S.future foreign assistance provided to the country foreign assistance provided to the country in FY2023. Congress
also may monitor how tension in relations affects irregular migration, pending gang extraditions,
and El Salvador’s commercial and political ties to China.
Migration
Migration from the Northern Triangle countries remains of acute interest to Congress. The Biden
Administration has developed two regional strategies that guide its approach to migration from
Central America, but tensions in broader relations have hindered cooperation in this area. The
and/or prompt new legislation to replace the targeted sanctions authority under the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F), which expired in December 2023.82 Migration Migration has been a major issue in U.S. relations with El Salvador. As of 2021, some 2.5 million people born in El Salvador resided in the United States, and an estimated 32% of them were in the country without authorization.83 An estimated 188,000 Salvadorans who arrived in the United States prior to 1999 currently benefit from a Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation that was issued in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and extended by consecutive U.S. presidential administrations.84 Salvadorans with TPS receive relief from removal (deportation) and work authorization. The Trump Administration sought to terminate the TPS designation for El Salvador as of January 2020, but that decision was put on hold due to a legal challenge and was rescinded by the Biden Administration. In June 2023, the Biden Administration extended TPS for existing Salvadoran beneficiaries through March 9, 2025.85 In addition to Salvadorans with TPS, an estimated 22,500 Salvadorans benefitted from protection from deportation and work authorization under the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) program as of March 31, 2023.86 79 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken and Salvadoran Foreign Minister Alexandra Hill Tinoco Before Their Meeting,” August 7, 2023. 80 “Brian Nichols Acknowledges Salvadorans Must Decide on Presidential Reelection,” El Salvador News, October 27, 2023. 81 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Press Statement, “Salvadoran Re-Election Ruling Undermines Democracy,” September 5, 2021. 82 CRS In Focus IF12486, Central America: Expiration of Targeted Sanctions Authority, by Peter J. Meyer. 83 Mohamad Moslimani, Luis Noe-Bustamante, and Sono Shah, “Facts on Hispanics of Salvadoran Origin in the United States, 2021,” Pew Research Center, August 16, 2023; Jeffrey S. Passel and Jens Manuel Krogstad, “What we Know About Unauthorized Immigrants Living in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, November 16, 2023. 84 CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson. 85 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “DHS Rescinds Prior Administration’s Termination of Temporary Protected Status Designations for El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, and Nicaragua,” press release, June 13, 2023. 86 For information on DACA, see CRS Report R46764, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): By the Numbers, by Andorra Bruno. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Count of Active DACA Recipients,” March 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 15 link to page 16 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Addressing irregular migration from and through El Salvador and other Central American countries remains of acute interest to Congress. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America focuses foreign assistance efforts on improving governance, security, and socioeconomic conditions (see “Foreign Assistance” below).87 In FY2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection encountered 61,515 migrants from El Salvador, down slightly from 97,000 in FY2022.88 This reduction in irregular migration may be attributable to improvements in security and economic conditions in El Salvador. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Collaborative Migration Management Strategy seeks to manage irregular migration U.S. Collaborative Migration Management Strategy seeks to manage irregular migration to the
United States by working with El Salvador and other regional partners to stabilize populations by working with El Salvador and other regional partners to stabilize populations
with acute needs, deter potential with acute needs, deter potential irregular migrants, strengthen border controls, and expand access to legal migrants, strengthen border controls, and expand access to legal
migration and protection pathways.migration and protection pathways.89 To implement that strategy, the U.S. government To implement that strategy, the U.S. government provided
provides humanitarian aid to El Salvadorhumanitarian aid to El Salvador; continued, supports public awareness campaigns public awareness campaigns; began new regional, and engages in anti- anti-
migrant smuggling law enforcement effortsmigrant smuggling law enforcement efforts; and. The Administration has restarted the Central American Minors Refugee restarted the Central American Minors Refugee
and Parole Program, which reunites eligible Salvadoran and Parole Program, which reunites eligible Salvadoran children with their parents in the United States, and is pushing to help more Salvadorans secure temporary H2 temporary agricultural and non-agricultural visas.90 The Bukele government has worked to recruit eligible H2A workers and committed to covering the transportation costs for those vetted to travel to the United States. In October 2023, the Salvadoran government instituted visa requirements and a $1,000 fee for migrants from African countries and India to help curb the use of El Salvador as a transit point for irregular migration toward the United States.91 Migration has been a subject of considerable debate in the 118th Congress, with Members introducing various legislative measures that could impact El Salvador or Salvadoran migrants. For example, the Secure the Border Act of 2023 (H.R. 2), passed by the House in May 2023, would direct the Secretary of State to “seek to negotiate” agreements with the Salvadoran government similar to the asylum cooperation agreement that the Trump Administration negotiated in 2020 and the Biden Administration terminated prior to implementation in 2021.92 Foreign Assistance Congress plays a key role in appropriating and shaping annual foreign assistance funds to help El Salvador address the security, economic, and social drivers of irregular migration and to strengthen democratic institutions. The Biden Administration allocated at least $121.7 million in foreign assistance to El Salvador in FY2021, $142.0 million in FY2022, and an estimated $87.1 million in FY2023 (See Table 1). This funding has allowed U.S. agencies to restart some programming in the aftermath of the Trump Administration’s 14-month suspension of most aid to El Salvador in response to continued irregular migration to the United States. According to the 87 CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. Meyer. 88 DHS, Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters. 89 The White House, “Collaborative Migration Management Strategy,” July 2021. 90 U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, “Ambassador’s Remarks to the NCAE Employer Labor Forum,” November 29, 2023. 91 Michael D. McDonald, “El Salvador Slaps a $1,000 Tax on Travelers from Africa and India,” Bloomberg, October 26, 2023. 92 For background information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10402, Safe Third Country Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries: Background and Legal Issues. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 16 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Government Accountability Office (GAO), that aid suspension had several “adverse effects” on State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded projects.93 Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to El Salvador: FY2021-FY2024 (allocations in millions of current dollars) FY2023 FY2024 Foreign Assistance Account FY2021 FY2022 (estimate) (request) Bilateral Aid, Subtotal 80.8 98.7 87.1 124.8 Economic Support Fund 2.0a 0.0 0.0 0.0children with their parents in the United
States. The Administration also is implementing a U.S. Strategy to Address the Root Causes of
Migration in Central America, which focuses foreign assistance efforts on improving governance,
security, and socioeconomic conditions in the region. To implement the strategy, the
Administration requested $520.9 million of foreign assistance for Central America in FY2023,
including $128.4 million for El Salvador.60
Foreign Assistance
Congress plays a key role in appropriating and shaping annual foreign assistance funds. From
FY2016 to FY2020 (the most recent year available), the U.S. government obligated roughly
$466.6 million in assistance to El Salvador to address the security, economic, and social drivers of
irregular migration and to strengthen democratic institutions.61 This assistance includes
contributions from U.S. agencies such as the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
and the Peace Corps. The Department of Defense provides security cooperation assistance to train
and equip the Salvadoran defense ministry in border and maritime interdiction capabilities. In
FY2021, Congress provided an estimated $70.0 million in development assistance and
$0.7 million in military training for El Salvador. As in years past, El Salvador also received
regional security assistance through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
In June 2021, in response to democratic backsliding in El Salvador and deteriorating relations, the
Biden Administration announced the reprogramming of USAID support from government entities
(such as the attorney general’s office) to civil society groups.62

60 U.S. Department of State, “United States Announces Actions Against Seven Central American Officials for
Undermining Democracy and Obstructing Investigations into Acts of Corruption,” September 20, 2021.
61 U.S. Department of State and USAID, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country: El Salvador,” at
https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/honduras/2020/obligations/0.
62 USAID, “USAID Redirects Assistance for Salvadoran Government Institutions to Civil Society Groups,” May 21,
2021.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to El Salvador, FY2016-FY2023 Request
(allocations in millions of current dollars)
Foreign Assistance
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
Account
FY16
FY17
FY18a
FY19
(est.)b
(est.)b
(requested)
(requested)
Bilateral Aid, Subtotal
67.9
72.8
5.9
39.5
80.9
80.8
95.8
124.8
Economic Support Fund
—
—
—
—
2.0
2.0
—
—
Global Health Programs
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
5
(USAID) Global Health Programs (USAID) 0.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 Global Health Programs (State) 8.1 10.3 10.6 — Development Assistance 70.0 84.0 71.2 119.0
Global Health Programs
—
—
—
—
6.2
8.1
—
—
(State)
Development Assistance
65
70
3.3
39.5
70
70
95
119
International Military
1
0.9
0.7
—
0.8
0.7
0.8
0.8
Education and International Military Education and 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.8 Training Training
(IMET)
Foreign Military Financing
1.9
1.9
1.9

1.9
—
—
—
(FMF)
CARSIc
73.4
70.2
16.8
68.8
58.6
25
NA
NA
Economic Support Fund
35.5
28.5
2.0
25.5
26
25
NA
NA
(ESF)
International Narcotics
37.9
41.7
14.8
43.3
32.6
NA
NA
NA
Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
Total
141.3
143.0
22.7a
108.3
139.5b
105.8 b
95.8
124.8
Sources(IMET) CARSI 40.9 43.4 NA NA Economic Support Fund (ESF) 25.0 26.0 NA NA International Narcotics Control and Law 15.9 17.3 NA NA Enforcement (INCLE) Total 121.7 142.0 87.1 124.8 Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2021FY2022-FY2024; U.S. Department of State, FY2023 Allocation Data, September 26, 2023; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Congressional Notification (CN) #8, November 16, 2021; CN #190, July 13, 2023; U.S. Department of State, CN 22-288, August 16, 2022; CN 23-323, August 24, 2023. Notes: ;
U.S. Department of State and USAID Congressional Notifications for FY2018-FY2021; Congressional Budget
Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2020-FY2023.
Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; NA = Not available; USAID = U.S. Agency for CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; NA = Not available; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development. International Development.
a. a. In FY2018, Congress appropriated $57.7 million of bilateral aid for El Salvador and the State Department
and USAID initially allocated an additional $33.6 million of CARSI assistance to El Salvador. In 2019,
however, the Trump Administration reprogrammed much of that aid to other countries.
b. Bilateral aid to El Salvador through the ESF includes appropriations made through supplemental COVID-19
relief measures including P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136 in FY2020 and FY2021 American Rescue Plan Act of
2021 (P.L. 117-2) mandatory funding.
c. Congress typically appropriates CARSI aid for the entire Central American region. Comprehensive
allocations for El Salvador are not yet available for FY2021, FY2022, or FY2023.
Although the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103) did not specify an overall
funding level for El Salvador, it provided funding for regional programs that include El Salvador.
For example, it provided at least $100 million for locally led development efforts, $70 million for
programs to reduce violence against women and girls, and $61.5 million for entities and activities
to combat corruption and impunity in Central America. The act prohibitedCongress typically appropriates CARSI aid for the entire Central American region. Comprehensive allocations for El Salvador are not yet available for FY2023. While many suspended projects eventually restarted, the Biden Administration has reshaped some assistance to El Salvador as a result of U.S. concerns about corruption, democratic backsliding, and human rights. In May 2021, in response to democratic backsliding, the Biden Administration announced the reprogramming of USAID support from government entities (such as the attorney general’s office) to civil society groups.94 According to the State Department, U.S. agencies have shifted security and rule of law assistance away from parts of the Salvadoran government where trusted partners are lacking (e.g., the judicial sector, prisons, part of the attorney general’s office) and have focused police assistance on “human rights, ethics, and appropriate use of force.”95 U.S. assistance supports global health security threat prevention and response; military education and training implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense, and a broad range of development activities. Those activities include good governance programs intended to encourage civil society 93 The Trump Administration reprogrammed $396.2 million of FY2018 assistance for the Northern Triangle, including $51.7 million of bilateral assistance for El Salvador. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Northern Triangle of Central America: The 2019 Suspension and Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects, GAO-21-104366, September 2021, p. 8, 14. 94 USAID, “USAID Redirects Assistance for Salvadoran Government Institutions to Civil Society Groups,” May 21, 2021. 95 E-mail from the Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, December 14, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations engagement and oversight, elections-related assistance, and support for municipal governments.96 Economic programs include job training and other support for small businesses, agriculture programs intended to increase food security and protect the environment, and education programs. Citizen security programs, which receive support from the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), support law enforcement training and technical assistance, operations against TCOs, border security and antidrug programs, services for victims, and crime and violence prevention initiatives. The United States also provides humanitarian assistance to help El Salvador recover from natural disasters and stabilize vulnerable populations with food assistance and income generation activities. USAID provides psychosocial and other support to women and children victims of gender-based violence, as well as support to returned migrants to help them reintegrate into Salvadoran society. U.S. humanitarian aid totaled $27.4 million in FY2021, $30 million in FY2022, and at least $14.4 million in FY2023 for basic needs such as food, water, shelter, and protection.97 Congress has placed restrictions on some U.S. assistance to El Salvador annually since FY2016. For example, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (, Division K), prohibits Foreign Military Foreign Military
Financing for El Salvador. It also Financing for El Salvador. It also requiredrequires the State Department to withhold 60% of Economic the State Department to withhold 60% of Economic
Support Support Funds and Fund and international security assistance security assistance for the Salvadoran government (e.g., International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement and International Military Education and Training aid) to support the central government of El Salvador until the Secretary of State until the Secretary of State
certifiescertifies that the Salvadoran government has met certain criteria. Those criteria include combatting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, protecting human rights, improving border security, and improving the foreign investment environment.98 The State Department has yet to certify that the Bukele administration has met the congressional criteria required to release funds appropriated in FY2021, FY2022 or FY2023. In August 2022, the State Department informed Congress that it would reprogram a total of $13.6 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance once allocated for El Salvador (and Guatemala) to other countries.99 The Biden Administration requested $124.8 million for El Salvador in FY2024. Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2024 appropriations but it has enacted continuing resolutions (P.L. 118-15, P.L. 118-22, and P.L. 118-35) that fund most foreign aid programs at the same level and under the same conditions as FY2023 from October 1, 2023 until March 8, 2024. The FY2024 foreign assistance appropriations measures approved by the House (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) and reported in the Senate (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) do not specify funding levels for El Salvador. Both bills would maintain withholding requirements on aid for the Salvadoran government, with some modifications compared with prior years. S. 2438 also would maintain the prior-year prohibition on Foreign Military Financing for El Salvador. 96 USAID, “El Salvador Fact Sheet,” September 2023, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/USAID%20El%20Salvador%20Fact%20Sheet%20.pdf. 97 USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year 2021, September 30, 2021; USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year 2022, September 30, 2022; and USAID, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, “Central America Assistance Overview,” October 2023. 98 The full criteria are listed in §7045(a)(2) of P.L. 117-328. 99 U.S. Department of State, CN 22-300, August 17, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations Sanctions Congress has shaped U.S. sanctions policy toward El Salvador, especially in relation to concerns about corruption, democracy, and human rights the Salvadoran government has met a series of conditions, including that it is working to
combat corruption and impunity, strengthen the independence of judicial institutions, and protect
the rights of journalists and civil society groups. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L.
117-103 directed the State Department to comply with instructions in H.Rept. 117-84, including
requirements to update a previous report on the El Mozote massacre in El Salvador and to submit
a new report on access to women’s reproductive health services in the country.
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In addition to that bilateral and regional assistance, the United States has extended aid to assist El
Salvador in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic through the donation of vaccines; personal
protective equipment; and medical equipment, such as subzero freezers for vaccine storage. Since
the start of the pandemic, the U.S. government has donated more than 3.2 million vaccines to El
Salvador, part of over $30 million in bilateral pandemic assistance to the country.63 In FY2021,
the United State provided El Salvador more than $27.3 million in humanitarian assistance to
mitigate the effects of food insecurity, the pandemic, and natural disasters.64
Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 request for El Salvador. The request
includes approximately $128.4 million dollars in bilateral assistance, the majority of which is
dedicated to Development Assistance. The Administration’s request also includes about $520.9
million for Central America; El Salvador may receive a part of those funds.
Sanctions
Congress has shaped U.S. sanctions policy toward El Salvador, especially in relation to concerns
about corruption. The Biden Administration has made combating corruption a key part of its . The Biden Administration has made combating corruption a key part of its
strategy to address the root causes of migration from Central America. In May 2021, the State strategy to address the root causes of migration from Central America. In May 2021, the State
Department declassified, pursuant to Section 7019(e) of P.L. 116-260, a report to Congress on Department declassified, pursuant to Section 7019(e) of P.L. 116-260, a report to Congress on
corrupt Northern Triangle officials that listed five current and former Salvadoran politicians.corrupt Northern Triangle officials that listed five current and former Salvadoran politicians.65 In
July 2021, the State Department released a list of officials subject to visa restrictions for
corruption or undemocratic actions pursuant to Section 353 of P.L. 116-260; the list included 14
Salvadoran officials, including Bukele’s Cabinet chief, legal adviser, and labor minister.66 In
September, the State Department added El Salvador’s five new Constitutional Chamber
magistrates to that sanctions list. 100 Between July 2021 and December 2023, the Administration designated 34 Salvadoran individuals for engaging in significant corruption or undermining democratic processes or institutions pursuant to Section 353 of the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F). Those individuals, who are generally ineligible for entry into the United States, included Bukele’s Cabinet chief, legal adviser, press secretary, and labor minister, as well as five Constitutional Chamber magistrates. Section 353 sanctions, as well as the authority to impose them, expired on December 27, 2023. In addition, the State Department has publicly revoked the visas of 14 individuals under Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Acts for involvement in a gross violation of human rights or corruption. In December 2021, the Department of the Treasury announced In December 2021, the Department of the Treasury announced
financial sanctions against Bukele’s chief of staff for corruption associated with a pandemic-related sanctions against Bukele’s chief of staff for corruption associated with a pandemic-related
procurement scandal.procurement scandal.67 101 Treasury also sanctioned two high-level officials, Osiris Luna and Carlos Treasury also sanctioned two high-level officials, Osiris Luna and Carlos
Marroquin, for Marroquin, for providing illicit favors to the Treasury-designated MS-13 gang during covert negotiations.102 Among other changes to sanctions policy, Congress may consider reauthorizing or modifying the sanctions authority in the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260). Counternarcotics and Anti-gang Cooperation The flow of illicit drugs into the United States is another ongoing issue of concern to Congress. Although El Salvador is not a producer of illicit drugs, it serves as a transit country for narcotics, mainly cocaine and heroin, cultivated in the Andes and destined for the United States. In September 2023, President Biden included El Salvador on the annual list of countries designated as “major drug transit” countries.103 According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report covering 2022, seizures by the Salvadoran Navy and a maritime unit of the police continued to increase, but corruption and inadequate budgets for the police and attorney general’s office challenged antidrug efforts. El Salvador extradited 13 MS-13 gang members to the United States between 2016 and 2020, but its willingness to extradite high-profile gang suspects to the United States has since waned, perhaps as a result of previously mentioned government negotiations with the gangs.104 In 100 Joshua Goodman, “U.S. Report: Allies of El Salvador’s President Deemed Corrupt,” AP, May 18, 2021. 101providing illicit favors to the Treasury-designated Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13)
gang during covert negotiations.68 In December 2021, media outlets reported the Department of
Justice was preparing criminal indictments against these two men related to their role in
negotiations with gangs; however, indictments have yet to be announced.69

63 U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, “United States Announces Second Batch of 1.5 million Vaccines for El Salvador,”
press release, July 20, 2021; U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, “United States Preparing to Ship an Additional 188,370
Doses of Pfizer’s COVID-19 Vaccine to El Salvador,” press release, August 26, 2021.
64 USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras-Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2022, February 2, 2022.
65 Joshua Goodman, “U.S. Report: Allies of El Salvador’s President Deemed Corrupt,” AP, May 18, 2021.
66 U.S. Department of State, Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors Report, at https://www.state.gov/reports/
section-353-corrupt-and-undemocratic-actors-report/. These 17 individuals are included on the FY2020 Report to
Congress on Anti-Kleptocracy and Human Rights Visa Restrictions required by Section 7031(c)(1)(A) of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-93). One Salvadoran
former official and three of his family members were included in the FY2021 Report to Congress on Anti-Kleptocracy
and Human Rights Visa Restrictions.
67 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized
Crime,” December 8, 2021. Crime,” December 8, 2021.
68102 The Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) gang is designated for sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13851, the Treasury The Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) gang is designated for sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13851, the Treasury
Department’s designation for transnational criminal organizations. Department’s designation for transnational criminal organizations.
69 Sarah Kinosian et al., “U.S. Preparing Indictments Against Salvadoran Officials over Alleged Pact with Gangs—
Sources,” Reuters, December 10, 2021.
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El Salvador: In Brief

Counternarcotics and Anti-Gang Cooperation
Another ongoing issue of concern to Congress is the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.
Although El Salvador is not a producer of illicit drugs, it serves as a transit country for narcotics,
mainly cocaine and heroin, cultivated in the Andes and destined for the United States. In
September 2021, President Biden included El Salvador on the annual list of countries designated
as “major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries” for the 11th consecutive year.70
According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report covering
2021, record seizures by the Salvadoran Navy occurred despite the pandemic, but corruption at all
levels of the government and inadequate budgets for the police and attorney general’s office
inhibited bilateral efforts.
Although the United States successfully extradited 13 MS-13 gang members between 2016 and
2020, more recent frictions in relations may have hindered El Salvador’s willingness to extradite
several high-profile gang suspects to the United States.71 In 103 White House, “A Memorandum for the Secretary of State on Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2024,” September 15, 2023. 104 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Full-Scale Response: A Report on the Department of Justice’s Efforts to Combat MS-13 from 2016-2020, 2020, at https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/page/file/1329776/download; and El Faro, “Is El (continued...) Congressional Research Service 15 El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations November 2021, the Salvadoran November 2021, the Salvadoran
attorney general requested that the Salvadoran Supreme Court deny attorney general requested that the Salvadoran Supreme Court deny a U.S. extradition U.S. extradition ofrequest for Armando Armando
Melgar Díaz, the first-ever MS-13 gang member to Melgar Díaz, the first-ever MS-13 gang member to be indictedbe brought up on U.S. terrorism charges; on U.S. terrorism charges; a decision regarding his his
extradition remains pending. In January 2021, the Department of Justice charged extradition remains pending. In January 2021, the Department of Justice charged another 14 high-ranking 14 high-ranking
gang members in El Salvador with terrorism offenses. Salvadoran authorities reportedly released gang members in El Salvador with terrorism offenses. Salvadoran authorities reportedly released
four of these suspects, who were already in prison in El Salvador, between July 2021 and four of these suspects, who were already in prison in El Salvador, between July 2021 and
February 2022.February 2022.72105 In November 2023, Mexican officials captured and extradited one of those MS-13 leaders to the United States, where he was arrested on terrorism charges.106
Commercial Ties
The U.S.-Salvadoran economic relationship includes extensive investment, trade, remittance, and The U.S.-Salvadoran economic relationship includes extensive investment, trade, remittance, and
tourism ties. U.S. foreign direct investment on a historical-cost basis in El Salvador was estimated tourism ties. U.S. foreign direct investment on a historical-cost basis in El Salvador was estimated
at $at $31.4 billion in .4 billion in 2020.732022.107 Total trade Total trade in goods increased from $3.8 billion in 2005 (pre-CAFTA-increased from $3.8 billion in 2005 (pre-CAFTA-DR) to $7.9 billion in 2022 (the most recent year available).DR) to
$6.6 billion in 2021.74 The United States had a $ The United States had a $1.62.2 billion trade surplus with El Salvador in billion trade surplus with El Salvador in
2021. In 20212022.108 In 2022, apparel and clothing accessories made up , apparel and clothing accessories made up 65% 61% of U.S. imports from El Salvador. of U.S. imports from El Salvador.
Conversely, petroleum made up 21Conversely, petroleum made up 21.5% of all U.S. exports to El Salvador.109 Congress may continue to monitor U.S.-Salvadoran commercial relations and the extent to which U.S. investment promotion policies help U.S. companies compete with those from China. U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Chinese investments in strategic sectors in Latin America, including ports, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure. In El Salvador and in other countries, U.S. officials have expressed concern that if governments allow PRC-based Huawei to provide its 5G technology, China could use that technology to spy. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation has increased its activities in El Salvador to help incentivize U.S. companies to invest in the country. Outlook Congress is likely to closely monitor conditions in El Salvador and U.S.-Salvadoran relations, particularly surrounding the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for February 4, 2024. The Bukele government has collaborated with the United States to address drug trafficking and irregular migration and has been responsive to U.S. concerns about certain Chinese investments but has denied MS-13 extradition requests. Bukele quickly consolidated control over all branches of government by 2021. To quash gang violence, he has used authoritarian means that have captured the attention of other Latin American leaders. Should Bukele win a second term, as many expect, Congress would likely face continued debate on how to best maintain the Salvadoran government’s cooperation on U.S. Salvador Protecting MS-13 from Extradition?” March 18, 2022; Steven Dudley, “Capture of MS13 Leader Exposes US-El Salvador Rift,” InSight Crime, November 9, 2023. 105% of all U.S. exports to El Salvador, with mechanical
appliances and electric machinery also comprising large trade volumes.


70 White House, “A Memorandum for the Secretary of State on Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or
Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 15, 2021.
71 U.S. Department of Justice, Full-Scale Response: A Report on the Department of Justice’s Efforts to Combat MS-13
from 2016-2020, 2020, at https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/page/file/1329776/download; and El Faro, “Is El
Salvador Protecting MS-13 from Extradition?” March 18, 2022.
72 Carlos García, “Are MS-13 Leaders Wanted for Extradition to U.S. Free in El Salvador?” Carlos García, “Are MS-13 Leaders Wanted for Extradition to U.S. Free in El Salvador?” Insight Crime, March 31, , March 31,
2022. 2022.
73106 Reuters, “Mexico Nabs, Swiftly Deports MS-13 Gang Leader to El Salvador, April 18, 2023; U.S. DOJ, “High-Ranking MS-13 Fugitive Arrested on Terrorism Charges,” November 15, 2023. 107 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), “Direct Investment by Country and Industry, , “Direct Investment by Country and Industry, 20202022,” ,”
July July 22, 2021.
7420, 2023. 108 BEA, “El Salvador: International Trade and Investment Country Facts,” accessed December 20, 2023. 109 U.S. Census data, as presented by Trade Data Monitor, accessed March 22, 2022. U.S. Census data, as presented by Trade Data Monitor, accessed March 22, 2022.
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El Salvador: In Brief

Background and U.S. Relations security and strategic concerns while seeking to stem democratic backsliding and human rights abuses in the country.
Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke Clare Ribando Seelke
Joshua Klein
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Presidential Management Fellow




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