Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

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Emerging Military Technologies:
~~April 6~~November 1, 2022 , 2022
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
Technology and Global Technology and Global
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
Security Security
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly

evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the

United States’ traditional sources of military advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has United States’ traditional sources of military advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an
effort to exploit emerging technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and effort to exploit emerging technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation. In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, concepts of operation. In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation,
including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group. including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting that U.S.
national security will likely be national security will likely be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies
include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars
of the future. of the future.
Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting. The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key strategic The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key strategic
competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these technologies are integrated competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these technologies are integrated
into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant implications for the future of international into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant implications for the future of international
security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for Congress, both in terms of funding and program oversight. security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for Congress, both in terms of funding and program oversight.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and Russia: This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and Russia:
 artificial intelligence,  artificial intelligence,
 lethal autonomous weapons,  lethal autonomous weapons,
 hypersonic weapons,  hypersonic weapons,
 directed energy weapons,  directed energy weapons,
 biotechnology, and  biotechnology, and
 quantum technology.  quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the
potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated issues for Congress. These potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated issues for Congress. These
issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging
technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly
evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the
governance and regulation of emerging technologies. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, governance and regulation of emerging technologies. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization,
appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly
evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode
the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD)
has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging
technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations
focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense
Wargaming Alignment Group. Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third
Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New
technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence,
autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very
technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3 technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3
Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting.4 Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military
technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these
technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future
of international security writ large. of international security writ large.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States,
China, and Russia: China, and Russia:
 artificial intelligence,  artificial intelligence,
 lethal autonomous weapons,  lethal autonomous weapons,
 hypersonic weapons,  hypersonic weapons,
 directed energy weapons,  directed energy weapons,
~~ biotechnology,~~
~~ and quantum technology.~~
~~It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these~~
~~technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines~~

1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days 1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days
Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/. Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/.
2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second 2 The Third Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second
Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p. 3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” 2018, p.
3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
4 Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, October 2022, p. 19, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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 biotechnology,  and quantum technology. It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional
authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)45
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial intelligence, policymakers
generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is
further divided into further divided into ~~two~~three categories: narrow AI categories: narrow AI ~~and general AI.~~ , general AI, and artificial superintelligence. Narrow AI systems can perform Narrow AI systems can perform
only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be
capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not specifically capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not specifically
~~trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5~~trained. Artificial superintelligence refers to a system “that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest.”6 General AI systems and artificial superintelligence do not yet—and may never—exist.7
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the
United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence, United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance;surveillance, and reconnaissance;68 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi- logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or
replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding
work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on
operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis; operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis;
and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting
advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems. advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems.
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of challenges. For example, such systems may be
subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have
repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of
diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language
processing programs have developed gender bias.processing programs have developed gender bias.79 Such biases could hold significant Such biases could hold significant
implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected
~~biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended~~
~~killing of civilians or noncombatants.~~
~~Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could~~
~~lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited~~
~~demonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated in Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that~~
~~an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled~~
~~“nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it~~
~~resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such~~
~~vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted~~
~~target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or,~~

4 5 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National
Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
56 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). 7 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as a range of expert opinions about the future
of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).
68 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Competition, by Nishawn S. Smagh. , by Nishawn S. Smagh.
79 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “How to
Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at Fix Silicon Valley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/.
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link to page 7 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended killing of civilians or noncombatants. Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited demonstration of this phenomenon (illustrated in Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled “nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such vulnerabilities could be exploited intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or, ~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting
and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator. and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition

Source: AndrewAndrew Ilachinski, Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analyses, January 2017, p. 61. Analyses, January 2017, p. 61.
Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly
realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries
could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.810
Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its allies to generate false news
reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government
officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to
deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and
authenticating content.authenticating content.911 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which
the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have
expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social
media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.1012
These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of
~~deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes~~
~~and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes.~~
~~United States~~
~~DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to~~
~~approximately $874 million in FY2022, with the department maintaining over 685 active AI~~
~~projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232),~~

8 10 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formally declared war. For more information about
information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Information Operations, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A.
Theohary. Theohary.
911 Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of Some social media platforms such as Twitter have established rules for labeling and removing certain types of
synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to synthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Building rules in public: Our approach to
synthetic & manipulated media,” synthetic & manipulated media,” Twitter, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html. new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.
1012 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2019, , 2019,
at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12. at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12.
~~11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,~~ ~~Defense Budget Overview: United~~
~~States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/~~
~~Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and Government~~
~~Accountability Office, Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for Weapon Systems,~~
~~February 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 3 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes and minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes. United States DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 million in FY2016 to approximately $1.1 billion in FY2023, with the department maintaining over 685 active AI projects.13 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232), DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate
DOD projects of over $15 million; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of DOD projects of over $15 million; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).1214 The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission
Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,1315 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, humanitarian aid and disaster relief,
warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint
Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment” Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment”
intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.1416 In December In December
2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks directed the establishment of the Chief Digital 2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks directed the establishment of the Chief Digital
and Artificial Intelligence Office, which is to “serve as the successor organization to the JAIC, and Artificial Intelligence Office, which is to “serve as the successor organization to the JAIC,
reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”1517
The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and
fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the fielding, as well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the
Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled systems and Department governing the development and use of artificial intelligence enabled systems and
technologies in operational situations.”technologies in operational situations.”1618 In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation
Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted
recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence.1719 Based on these recommendations, Based on these recommendations,
DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations: DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations:
responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.1820 On May 26, 2021, Deputy On May 26, 2021, Deputy
~~Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the~~
~~implementation of Responsible Artificial Intelligence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical~~
~~principles.19 The JAIC has been charged with developing and implementing RAI strategy,~~
~~guidance, and policy.20~~

12 13 The amount listed as the FY2023 investment reflects DOD’s FY2023 unclassified budget request for AI. DOD’s actual investments in AI in FY2023 may be higher; based on historical precedent, they are unlikely to be lower. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and Government Accountability Office, Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for Weapon Systems, February 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf. 14 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title VIII, §808. P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title VIII, §808.
1315 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance
based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense
Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/
1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. 1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.
1416 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html. Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html.
1517 Department of Defense, “Establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer,” December 8, 2021, Department of Defense, “Establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer,” December 8, 2021,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/08/2002906075/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ON-ESTABLISHMENT-OF-THE-at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/08/2002906075/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ON-ESTABLISHMENT-OF-THE-
CHIEF-DIGITAL-AND-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-OFFICER.PDF. CHIEF-DIGITAL-AND-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-OFFICER.PDF.
1618 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238. P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238.
1719 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical
commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/
2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF. 2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF.
1820 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-
adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
~~19 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI product and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation,~~
~~responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks,~~
~~“Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at~~
~~https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-~~
~~INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF.~~
~~20 Kathleen H. Hicks, “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021,~~
~~at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-~~
~~INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) has additionally~~
~~issued Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio to operationalize DOD’s~~
~~Ethical Principles for AI within DIU’s commercial prototyping and acquisitions programs. Jared Dunnmon et al.,~~
Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio, November 14, 2021, at
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Congressional Research Service 4 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the implementation of Responsible Artificial Intelligence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical principles.21 DOD then released an RAI strategy and implementation pathway in June 2022.22 Finally, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on Finally, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI
technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The
commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and generally offers commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and generally offers
recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2) recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2)
applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and
building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) marshalling global AI cooperation.building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) marshalling global AI cooperation.2123 A A
number of NSCAI’s recommendations have been passed into law.number of NSCAI’s recommendations have been passed into law.2224 In addition, Section 247 of In addition, Section 247 of
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional
defense committees annual status reports on the department’s intent to implement NSCAI defense committees annual status reports on the department’s intent to implement NSCAI
recommendations, as well as any associated timelines for implementation.recommendations, as well as any associated timelines for implementation.2325
China
China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.2426
China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology” China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology”
that has become a “focus of international competition.”that has become a “focus of international competition.”2527 Recent Chinese achievements in the Recent Chinese achievements in the
field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China
has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into
the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter the country’s domestic surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter
~~espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and~~
~~undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which~~
~~could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source~~
~~publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.26~~
~~China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.27 In~~
~~general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research~~
~~laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for~~
~~example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national~~

21 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI product and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation, responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks, “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. 22 Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway, June 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.PDF. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) has additionally issued Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio to operationalize DOD’s Ethical Principles for AI within DIU’s commercial prototyping and acquisitions programs. Jared Dunnmon et al., Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice: Lessons Learned from the DIU Portfolio, November 14, 2021, at https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/2021_RAI_https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/2021_RAI_
Report-v3.pdf. Report-v3.pdf.
2123 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND
Corporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture Corporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture
for AI. See Danielle C. Tarraf et al., for AI. See Danielle C. Tarraf et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and
Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html. , RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.
2224 See, for example, Section 216 (“Improvements relating to Steering Committee on Emerging Technology and See, for example, Section 216 (“Improvements relating to Steering Committee on Emerging Technology and
National Security Threats”), Section 228 (“Executive Education on Emerging Technologies for Senior Civilian and National Security Threats”), Section 228 (“Executive Education on Emerging Technologies for Senior Civilian and
Military Leaders”), Section 903 (“Enhanced role for the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on Military Leaders”), Section 903 (“Enhanced role for the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council”), Section 909 (“Digital Talent Recruiting Officer”), and Section 1118 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council”), Section 909 (“Digital Talent Recruiting Officer”), and Section 1118
(“Occupational series for digital career fields”) of the FY2022 NDAA. (“Occupational series for digital career fields”) of the FY2022 NDAA.
2325 This requirement is to expire on December 27, 2023. This requirement is to expire on December 27, 2023.
2426 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston, MA: (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018). Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018).
2527 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2. China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2.
~~26 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,~~
~~Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27.~~
~~27 Ibid., p. 6.~~
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~~intelligence work.”28~~ Congressional Research Service 5 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.28 China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.29 In general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National Intelligence Law, for example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work.”30 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military
AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes. AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes.
Russia
Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will Russian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] will
become the ruler of the world.”become the ruler of the world.”2931 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has
released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s
AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.3032 Russia Russia
has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for has indicated it will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which called for
robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.3133
The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on
semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat
module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—
and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous and, potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous
systems.systems.3234 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval, In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval,
and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.3335 These technologies These technologies
could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, potentially enabling Russia to field more
systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing
and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively
~~communicate and navigate on the battlefield.34 Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI~~
~~technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations~~
~~directed against the United States and U.S. allies.35~~

28 28 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27. 29 Ibid., p. 6. 30 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a
choice,” choice,” CNBC, March 5, 2019. , March 5, 2019.
2931 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” RT.com, September 1, , September 1,
2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.
3032 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the
Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology,
Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-
the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/. the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/.
3133 Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, August 8, 2017. , August 8, 2017.
3234 Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” Tristan Greene, “Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race,” The Next Web, July 27, 2017, , July 27, 2017,
at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-
arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19,
2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-
machine-guns/. machine-guns/.
3335 Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,” Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems,” The
Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017. , December 12, 2017.
~~34 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; The Wilson Quarterly,~~
~~Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,”~~
War on the Rocks, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-
~~near-you/.~~
~~35 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution,~~
~~November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-~~
~~warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at~~
~~https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/.~~
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Congressional Research Service 6 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress communicate and navigate on the battlefield.36 Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI technologies for domestic propaganda and surveillance, as well as for information operations directed against the United States and U.S. allies.37 Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant
progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have
produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications ~~globally36~~globally38—and that —and that
the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by
the United States and China.the United States and China.3739 Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing
that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a
notably disruptive force in cyberspace.notably disruptive force in cyberspace.3840 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing
technological cooperation with China.technological cooperation with China.3941
International Institutions
A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group
of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental
set of principles for AI.set of principles for AI.4042 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and
trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”4143 The United States is one of The United States is one of
42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the
foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-
centered AI.centered AI.4244 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop
~~policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible~~
~~development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.”~~
~~Similarly, in October 2021, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released its first AI~~
~~strategy.43 According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the strategy is to “set~~
~~standards for responsible use of artificial intelligence, in accordance with international law,~~
~~outline how [NATO] will accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence in what [it does], set out~~
~~how [NATO] will protect this technology, and address the threats posed by the use of artificial~~

36 36 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,” War on the Rocks, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat-coming-to-a-city-near-you/. 37 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Disinformation Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/. 38 Margarita Konaev et al., Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for , Center for
Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9. Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9.
3739 Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” Leon Bershidsky, “Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at , September 5, 2017, at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina
Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15,
2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.
3840 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN, September 5, 2017. , September 5, 2017.
3941 Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, , Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have
cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both
Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Chinese and Russian sources as well as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating
Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9. , Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, p. 9.
4042 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “to guide the responsible adoption
of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt of AI based on shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.’” Matt
O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020. O’Brien, “US joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020.
4143 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/. https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
4244 “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ “G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/
000486596.pdf. 000486596.pdf.
~~43 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” October 22, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm?mc_cid=8f2b5c99db&mc_eid=5a3e8d2b43.~~
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~~intelligence by adversaries.”44~~Congressional Research Service 7 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress policy options that will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.” Similarly, in October 2021, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released its first AI strategy.45 According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the strategy is to “set standards for responsible use of artificial intelligence, in accordance with international law, outline how [NATO] will accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence in what [it does], set out how [NATO] will protect this technology, and address the threats posed by the use of artificial intelligence by adversaries.”46 NATO is to additionally establish AI test centers and a data and AI NATO is to additionally establish AI test centers and a data and AI
review board to “ensure the ‘operationalization’ of the AI strategy.”review board to “ensure the ‘operationalization’ of the AI strategy.”4547
Finally, in September 2021, the United States announced that it had formed a trilateral security Finally, in September 2021, the United States announced that it had formed a trilateral security
partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom.partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom.4648 This partnership, known as AUKUS, This partnership, known as AUKUS,
includes defense cooperation on artificial intelligence and autonomy, as well as hypersonic includes defense cooperation on artificial intelligence and autonomy, as well as hypersonic
weapons, quantum technologies, and other advanced capabilities.weapons, quantum technologies, and other advanced capabilities.4749
Potential Questions for Congress
 What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial  What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial
intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the
principles? principles?
  How is DOD testing and evaluating AI systems to ensure that they have not been exploited by adversaries?  Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the Do DOD and the intelligence community have adequate information about the
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications
may be used to harm U.S. national security? may be used to harm U.S. national security?
 How  How has the establishment of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office affected DOD’s ability to adopt AI applications?  How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of
the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government
undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes? undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes?
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)4850
Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems, Although there is no internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems,
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems
~~capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage~~
~~and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as~~
~~“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-~~
~~supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the~~
~~ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous,~~
~~or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target~~
~~groups that have been selected by a human operator.”49~~
~~LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make~~
~~an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in~~

44 45 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” October 22, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm?mc_cid=8f2b5c99db&mc_eid=5a3e8d2b43. 46 Vivienne Machi, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” Vivienne Machi, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” C4ISRNET, November 3, 2021, at , November 3, 2021, at
https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-
intelligence/. intelligence/.
4547 Ibid. Ibid.
4648 The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” September 15, 2021, at The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” September 15, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.
4749 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership The White House, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership
(AUKUS),” April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-(AUKUS),” April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-
implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/. implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
4850 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, For additional information about LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for
~~Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas.~~
~~49 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
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~~widespread development,50~~ Congressional Research Service 8 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.”51 LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development,52 it is believed they would enable military operations in it is believed they would enable military operations in
communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to
operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally “allow weapons to strike operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could additionally “allow weapons to strike
military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian
casualties.casualties.5153
Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have
called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of
accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction accountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction
requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the
potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.5254 These risks could arise from These risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or “hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or
simple malfunctions or software errors.”simple malfunctions or software errors.”5355 Although such risks could be present in automated Although such risks could be present in automated
systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be
unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or unable to physically intervene to terminate engagements—potentially resulting in wider-scale or
more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.54
~~United States~~
~~The United States is not known to be developing LAWS, nor does it currently have LAWS in its~~
~~inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of~~
~~LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of~~
~~LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety~~
~~rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”55 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be~~
~~designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment~~
~~over the use of force.”56 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human~~
~~“control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human~~
~~involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed.~~

5056 Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas. 51 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 52 Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’ Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’
definition of LAWS. See, for example, definition of LAWS. See, for example, Defense Innovation Board, AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use
of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense - Supporting Document, October 2019, p. 12, at , October 2019, p. 12, at
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/
DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that
Turkey’s deployment of the STM Turkey’s deployment of the STM Kargu-2 constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat, constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat,
the U.N. described the the U.N. described the Kargu-2 as being “ as being “programmed to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is
unlikely that the unlikely that the Kargu-2 meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March
2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of
the Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229. the Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229.
5153 U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,” U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,”
March 28, 2018, at https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/March 28, 2018, at https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf. (httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf.
5254 See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security,
February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf. risk.pdf.
5355 Ibid. Ibid.
~~54 Ibid.~~
~~55 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150,~~ ~~Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on~~
~~Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~56 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
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56 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 9 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress United States The United States is not known to be developing LAWS, nor does it currently have LAWS in its inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”57 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”58 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed.
In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including
lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; [f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries;
complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions
and,and, if if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seekunable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional humanadditional human operator input operator input
before continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that before continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that
could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized
parties. parties.
Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would
require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features
and ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS and ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS
must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both
development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide
senior leaders through this reviewsenior leaders through this review. and is additionally updating DODD 3000.09.59
China
According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons
manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and
engage targets autonomously.engage targets autonomously.5760 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China
has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that
exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes: exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes:
The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [ The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [sic] to be ] to be
lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control
during the entire process of executing a task. Thirdly, impossibility for termination, during the entire process of executing a task. Thirdly, impossibility for termination,
meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate
57 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler. 58 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 59 Valerie Insinna and Aaron Mehta, “Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details,” Breaking Defense, May 26, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/updated-autonomous-weapons-rules-coming-for-the-pentagon-exclusive-details/. 60 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019. Congressional Research Service 10 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of
conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with
the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities
in a way exceeding human expectations.in a way exceeding human expectations.5861
Russia
Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than
ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement
of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.5962 Russia has noted Russia has noted
that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while
contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”6063
Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons

~~57 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019.~~
~~58 UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/~~
~~(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf.~~
~~59 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous~~
~~weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/~~
~~(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf.~~
~~60 Ibid.~~
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manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles
capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.capable of autonomous target identification and, potentially, target engagement.6164
International Institutions
Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the
auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The
UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS,
as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have as well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not
development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate
and thus in violation of the law of war.and thus in violation of the law of war.6265
Potential Questions for Congress
 To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all,  To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at all,
should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development? should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?
 What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?  What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?
Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration, Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration,
or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS? or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?
 If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review  If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review
processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient? processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient?
61 UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf. 62 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf. 63 Ibid. 64 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017. 65 For additional information about UN CCW discussions on LAWS, see CRS In Focus IF11294, International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler. Congressional Research Service 11 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Hypersonic Weapons66 ~~Hypersonic Weapons63~~
A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic
weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. In contrast weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. In contrast
to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do not follow a to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do not follow a
parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making defense parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making defense
against them difficult. against them difficult.
There are two categories of hypersonic weapons: There are two categories of hypersonic weapons:
  Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target. target.6467
  Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the are powered by high-speed engines throughout the
duration of their flight. duration of their flight.
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short
time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable

~~61 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017.~~
~~62 For additional information about UN CCW discussions on LAWS, see CRS In Focus IF11294,~~ ~~International~~
~~Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~63 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811,~~ ~~Hypersonic Weapons: Background~~
~~and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459,~~ ~~Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide~~
~~Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~64 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to~~
~~as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon.~~
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flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.6568
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United
States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm
U.S. missile defenses.U.S. missile defenses.6669 Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons, Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons,
traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the
world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to
actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end well.”6770
United States
The Pentagon has requested $The Pentagon has requested $~~3.8~~4.7 billion in billion in ~~FY2022~~FY2023 for hypersonic weapons and $ for hypersonic weapons and $~~248~~225.5 million for million for
hypersonic defense programs.hypersonic defense programs.6871 DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the
Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with
~~the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as~~
~~through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.69 Analysts who support these~~
~~development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide~~
~~the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and~~
~~advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-~~
~~access/area denial strategies.70 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no~~
~~additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S. military has yet to identify any mission~~
~~requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.71~~
~~The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in~~
~~contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for~~
~~potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop~~

65 66 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf. 67 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon. 68 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of
Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. , RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
6669 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,
at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B.
Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
6770 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
6871 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year ~~2022~~2023 Budget Request, t, ~~May 2021, p. 3-2~~April 2022, p. 4-6, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.~~FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For additional information pdf. For additional information
about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by , by
~~Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall.~~
~~69 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle~~
~~for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors~~
~~with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,”~~
~~Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-~~
~~shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464,~~
Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
~~70 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at~~
~~the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army~~
~~Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.~~
~~71 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,”~~
Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-
~~changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/.~~
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Kelley M. Sayler. Congressional Research Service 12 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.72 Analysts who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.73 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S. military has yet to identify any mission requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.74 The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more
technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese
systems. systems.
China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.7275 China’s pursuit of hypersonic China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.retaliatory strike against the United States.7376
China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a
2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear 2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear
hypersonic glide vehicle.hypersonic glide vehicle.7477 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern
Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is
~~testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed~~
~~to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”75~~
~~Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable HGV76—launched by a Long~~
~~March rocket—in August 2021.77 In contrast to the ballistic missiles that China has previously~~
~~used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS),~~
~~launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with~~
~~a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior~~
~~to a strike.78~~
~~China has additionally tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014.~~
~~U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200~~
~~miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during~~

72 72 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle for use across the services. The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. 73 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. 74 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/. 75 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/
07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-
dilemma-pub-76894. dilemma-pub-76894.
7376 Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
7477 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2014 Annual Report, p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/ p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF.
~~75 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020,~~
~~at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf.~~
~~76 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.~~
~~77 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,~~
~~2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson~~
~~Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.~~
~~Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,~~
~~October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.~~
~~78 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,~~
~~at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~flight.79~~Congressional Research Service 13 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”78 Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable HGV79—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.80 In contrast to the ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.81 China has additionally tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200 miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during flight.82 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could
have become operational as early as 2020.have become operational as early as 2020.8083 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested
Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.8184 Some reports indicate that the Some reports indicate that the
Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.8285 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the U.S. officials have declined to comment on the
program.program.8386
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2002.2002.8487 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting 78 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf. 79 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy. 80 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16, 2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV. Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml. 81 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/. 82 ~~Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting~~
~~constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality,~~
~~and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in~~
~~the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could~~
~~simply be intercepted.”85 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they~~
~~approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its~~
~~sense of strategic stability.86~~
~~Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon~~
~~(or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively~~
~~‘unlimited’ range.”87 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December~~
~~2019.88 Tsirkon has a range of between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from~~
~~the vertical launch systems mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project~~

79 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at , April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/. missile-defense-systems/.
8083 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
8184 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft,” CNN, August 7, 2018, at , August 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html. See also U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
8285 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. p. 20.
8386 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at , August 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
8487 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
~~85 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/~~
~~president/news/56957.~~
~~86 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong~~
~~Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security~~
~~Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/~~
~~conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-~~
~~pub-76894.~~
~~87 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.~~
~~88 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,~~
~~at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other~~
~~platforms.89~~Congressional Research Service 14 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.”88 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of strategic stability.89 Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”90 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December 2019.91 Tsirkon has a range of between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350 frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.92 Russian news sources assert that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project Russian news sources assert that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project
22350 frigate in January, October, and December 2020 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class 22350 frigate in January, October, and December 2020 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class
submarine in October 2021.submarine in October 2021.~~90 The missile will reportedly become operational in 2023.91~~93 Russian news sources additionally indicate that, following a successful May 2022 test, the missile will become operational by the end of 2022 and is likely to be fielded on Project 22350 frigates.94
International Institutions
No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic
weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United
States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which States and Russia—does not specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which
could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.9295 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard Because Russia has deployed its Avangard
hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard
count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes
that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the
~~question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative~~
~~Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate~~
~~provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START~~
~~limits.93 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term~~
~~solution.94 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries~~
~~other than the United States and Russia.~~
~~Finally, some analysts have noted that if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a~~
~~nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in~~
~~violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying~~
~~nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.95~~
~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons~~
~~the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?~~

89 88 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. 89 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-pub-76894. 90 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. 91 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019, at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. 92 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at , December 21, 2018, at
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf. military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
9093 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at , February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Samuel Cranny-https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Samuel Cranny-
Evans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Evans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required), (subscription required),
October 4, 2021. October 4, 2021.
~~91“Russian Navy to accept latest Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service in 2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019, at~~
~~http://tass.com/defense/1049572.~~
9294 Isabel van Brugen, “Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race,” Newsweek, July 18, 2022, at https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426. 95 For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic
missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” missile. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?,” Air Force Magazine, May 7, , May 7,
2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/. 2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/.
~~93 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a~~
~~new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how~~
~~they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton,~~ ~~Silver Bullet?:~~
~~Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,~~
~~2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.~~
~~94 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~95 Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—but Not a Breakthrough,” Foreign Policy,~~
~~October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 15 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START limits.96 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term solution.97 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries other than the United States and Russia. Finally, some analysts have noted that if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.98 Potential Questions for Congress  What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how
should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or
the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling
technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?
 How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is  How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is
there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START,
negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking
transparency and confidence-building activities? transparency and confidence-building activities?
Directed Energy (DE) ~~Weapons96~~Weapons99
DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy,
rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment,
facilities, and/or personnel.”facilities, and/or personnel.”97100 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air
defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery, defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, artillery,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.and mortar (C-RAM) missions.98101 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming
access to a sufficient power access to a sufficient power ~~supply99~~supply102—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing 96 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?: Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 97 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. 98 Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—but Not a Breakthrough,” Foreign Policy, October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/. 99 For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. 100 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3-85, May 22, 2020, GL-6. 101 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. 102 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Congressional Research Service 16 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress ~~—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing~~
conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile
salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options
for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of
hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and
utility of this application.utility of this application.~~100~~103
High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic
means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as
a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control. a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.
United States
Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts
have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fallen short of have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fallen short of
expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately
cancelled.cancelled.~~101~~104 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for military applications.105 Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size requirements for integration into current platforms.106 The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging helicopters.”107 In addition, the Navy installed its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS Preble in FY2022 and plans to continue at-sea testing in FY2023.108 Similarly, the Army plans to field its first “combat relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2023 (previously planned for FY2022).109 The Air ~~Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for~~

~~96 For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925,~~ ~~Department of Defense~~
~~Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~97 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3-85, May 22, 2020, GL-6.~~
~~98 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426,~~ ~~Department of~~
~~Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~99 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuing solid state~~
~~lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical~~
~~power required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,”~~ ~~National~~
Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-
weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready.
~~100~~103 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense, ,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling. toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
~~101~~104 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security, Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security,
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~~military applications.102 Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions~~
~~about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality~~
~~and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size~~
~~requirements for integration into current platforms.103~~
~~The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS),~~
~~in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable~~
~~of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging~~
~~helicopters.”104 The Navy is testing and plans to install its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS~~
Preble “in line with its deployment schedule,” while the Army plans to field its first “combat
~~relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on~~
~~Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.105 Similarly, the Air~~ April 2015, p. 4. 105 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. 106 Ibid. 107 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Popular Mechanics, August 7, 2019. Kilowatts are units of power. For example, 1 kilowatt is equal to 1,000 watts. 108 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1011, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; and Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Shipboard Laser Being Tested at Wallops Island,” Seapower Magazine, August 1, 2021, at https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-helios-shipboard-laser-being-tested-at-wallops-island/. 109 See also Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 6-6, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book. Congressional Research Service 17 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Force is currently conducting field Force is currently conducting field
assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including both laser and high-powered assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including both laser and high-powered
microwave systems.microwave systems.~~106~~110
Overall, DOD requested at least $ Overall, DOD requested at least $~~578~~699 million in million in ~~FY2022~~FY2023 for unclassified DE research, for unclassified DE research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $~~331~~345 million for unclassified DE million for unclassified DE
weapons procurement.weapons procurement.~~107~~111 Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed
Energy Roadmap, which seeks to scale up DE weapon power levels from around 150 kW, as is Energy Roadmap, which seeks to scale up DE weapon power levels from around 150 kW, as is
currently feasible, to around 300 kW in currently feasible, to around 300 kW in ~~FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.108~~
FY2023 “with goal milestones to achieve 500 kW class with reduced size and weight by FY2025 and to further reduce size and weight and increase power to MW [megawatt] levels by FY2026.”112 China
According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been
developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing
HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.~~109~~113 China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided weapons.114 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.115 According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and pdf. See also ~~China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-~~

~~April 2015, p. 4.~~
~~102 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at~~
~~https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-~~
~~ready.~~
~~103 Ibid.~~
~~104 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Popular Mechanics,~~
~~August 7, 2019.~~
~~105 “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Shipboard Laser Being Tested at Wallops Island,” Seapower Magazine, August 1,~~
~~2021, at https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-helios-shipboard-laser-being-tested-at-wallops-island/; and~~
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 10-8, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/, May 2021, p. 10-8, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
~~106 Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April~~
~~9, 2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/.~~
~~107~~110 For a more in-depth discussion of U.S. DE programs, see CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. 111 These figures include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and These figures include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and
Navy. CRS analysis of Navy. CRS analysis of ~~FY2022~~FY2023 budget documents; for additional information, see Appendix B in CRS Report R46925, budget documents; for additional information, see Appendix B in CRS Report R46925,
Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. , coordinated by Kelley M.
Sayler. Sayler.
~~108 Although there is no consensus~~ 112 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 8, 2022. For reference, although no consensus exists regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target
~~sets, it is generally believed~~sets, DOD briefing documents suggest that a laser of that a laser of ~~around~~approximately 100 kW could engage 100 kW could engage ~~UAVs, small boats,~~ UASs, rockets, artillery, and rockets, artillery, and
~~mortar~~mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage , whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage small boats and cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e.,
flying across—rather than at—the laser). flying across—rather than at—the laser). Lasers of 1 MW could potentially neutralize ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is
OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” ~~Presentation~~presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with then-Principal Director for Principal Director for
Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels could be affected by Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels could be affected by
additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects. additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.
~~109~~113 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), USCC 2017 Annual Report, November 2017, p. , November 2017, p.
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~~mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided~~
~~weapons.110 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has~~
~~used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to~~
~~disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.111~~
~~According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons~~
~~to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited~~
~~capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a~~
~~ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and~~
563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 114 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 9, 2018. 115 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020; and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. Congressional Research Service 18 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the
structures of non-optical satellites.structures of non-optical satellites.~~112~~116
Russia
Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on
HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several
mobile intercontinental ballistic missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet,
including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle satellites and provide point defense including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle satellites and provide point defense
against unmanned aircraft systems.against unmanned aircraft systems.~~113~~117 Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has
stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military
aircraft.aircraft.~~114~~118 Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as well as additional HELs Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as well as additional HELs
capable of performing antisatellite missions. capable of performing antisatellite missions.
International Institutions
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”~~115~~119 However, certain applications of DE weapons However, certain applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the
employment of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of employment of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”~~116~~120 Some analysts have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.121 Other analysts have argued that DE weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy could potentially reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.122 116 ~~Some analysts~~

~~563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf.~~
~~110 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,”~~ ~~Jane’s Defence~~
~~Weekly, November 9, 2018.~~
~~111 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020;~~
~~and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at~~
~~https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.~~
~~112~~ Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf. 27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.
~~113~~117 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new 27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “Putin hails new
Russian laser weapons,” Russian laser weapons,” Associated Press, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a. , May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a.
~~114~~118 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” The Space Review, June 5, , June 5,
2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1. 2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1.
~~115~~119 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017. Article 36, November 2017.
~~116~~120 The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the
employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” Additional Protocol to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series, , Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf. vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.
For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS
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~~have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may~~
~~consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or~~
~~lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE~~
~~weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.117 Other analysts have argued that DE~~
~~weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy~~
~~could potentially reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-~~
~~personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.118~~Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 121 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. 122 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf. Congressional Research Service 19 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress
Potential Questions for Congress
 Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?  Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?
To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for
military applications? military applications?
 How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to  How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use
of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military
operations? operations?
 In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of  In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of
DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures
should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both
war and peacetime? war and peacetime?
Biotechnology
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments
in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security
writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,~~119~~123 have the potential have the potential
to to
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies
could be used to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military personnel. The could be used to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military personnel. The
proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in
nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological
weapons.weapons.~~120~~

~~Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by~~
~~Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~117 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at~~
~~https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.~~
~~118 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty,~~ ~~Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy~~
~~Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/~~
~~documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.~~
~~119~~124 Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.125 In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.126 Concerns have been raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or more invasive forms of human performance modification.127 123 For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E.
Gallo et al. Gallo et al.
~~120~~124 Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. 125 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016. 126 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “Army scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential. 127 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine, Congressional Research Service 20 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress United States Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing technologies.”128 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories, which completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology “intended to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”129 In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more endurance than other humans.”130 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between 1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.131 Finally, DOD is exploring “advanced development and operational testing of biomanufacturing capabilities to provide alternative sources for critical supply chain materials” and other “products needed for non-medical supply chain resiliency.”132 DOD requested $1.3 billion for biotechnology efforts in FY2023.133 Although there does not appear to be a DOD-specific biotechnology research strategy, the Biden Administration released the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security—as well as an associated National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security (NSM-15)—in October 2022.134 These documents outline “how the U.S. Government will manage its modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish, Human Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1. 128 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1. 129 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017. 130 Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top-Secret Military Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/. 131 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html. 132 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 4-7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 133 Ibid. 134 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 2022, at Congressional Research Service 21 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress activities to more effectively assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of [state, local, tribal, and territorial] entities, international partners, industry, academia, nongovernmental entities, and the private sector.”135 The Administration notes that, while it is currently “implementing key actions in the Strategy with existing funding,” full implementation “will require the support of Congress to provide additional resources, including the President’s $88 billion request over five years for pandemic preparedness and biodefense.”136 ~~Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as~~
~~Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf.~~
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~~Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome~~
~~editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.121~~
~~In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or~~
~~lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.122 Concerns have been~~
~~raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and~~
~~application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or~~
~~more invasive forms of human performance modification.123~~
~~United States~~
~~Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),124 the Trump Administration~~
~~released the National Biodefense Strategy, which outlines “how the United States Government~~
~~will manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and~~
~~recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international~~
~~partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”125 As some~~
~~analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and,~~
~~thus, was “largely unimplemented.”126 Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology~~
~~research strategy.127~~
~~Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on~~
~~improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of~~
~~biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also~~
~~exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric~~
~~illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases~~
~~and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program~~
~~seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing~~
~~technologies.”128 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories,~~

~~121 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”~~
~~delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016.~~
~~122 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “Army~~
~~scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/~~
~~army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.~~
~~123 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”~~
~~delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for~~
~~the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate~~
~~Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugs such as caffeine,~~
~~modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance-~~
~~enhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. See Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish,~~ ~~Human~~
~~Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/~~
~~publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.~~
~~124 P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1086.~~
~~125 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/~~
~~National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf.~~
~~126 See, for example, Tara O’Toole, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks and Opportunities,’”~~
~~Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020.~~
~~127 Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018.~~
~~There is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See “Modernizing the Regulatory System~~
~~for Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of~~
~~Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/~~
~~2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf.~~
~~128 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at~~
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~~which completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology “intended~~
~~to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”129~~
~~In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously~~
~~researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including~~
~~applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more~~
~~endurance than other humans.”130 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this~~
~~research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between~~
~~1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.131~~
Congress has expressed an interest in conducting oversight of the military applications of Congress has expressed an interest in conducting oversight of the military applications of
emerging biotechnologies. For example, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), emerging biotechnologies. For example, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92),
DOD is to conduct “a review of the military understanding and relevancy of applications of DOD is to conduct “a review of the military understanding and relevancy of applications of
emerging biotechnologies to national security requirements of the Department of Defense” and emerging biotechnologies to national security requirements of the Department of Defense” and
provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.”provide recommendations for future legislative and administrative activities.”~~132~~137 Section 278 of Section 278 of
the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison
of capabilities in emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ... between the of capabilities in emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ... between the
capabilities of the United States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”capabilities of the United States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”~~133~~138
Finally, Section 1091 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) establishes the National Security Finally, Section 1091 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) establishes the National Security
Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, which is to “consider the methods, means, and Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, which is to “consider the methods, means, and
investments necessary to advance and secure the development of biotechnology, investments necessary to advance and secure the development of biotechnology,
biomanufacturing, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address biomanufacturing, and associated technologies by the United States to comprehensively address
the national security and defense needs of the United States.” The commission is to deliver its the national security and defense needs of the United States.” The commission is to deliver its
interim findings and recommendations to the congressional defense committees and the President interim findings and recommendations to the congressional defense committees and the President
no later than January 26, 2023, and its final report no later than January 26, 2024.no later than January 26, 2023, and its final report no later than January 26, 2024.~~134~~139
China
Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly
interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority
~~within China’s Made in China 2025 initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s~~
~~current five-year development plan.135 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing~~

~~https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1.~~
~~129 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter~~
~~needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017.~~
~~130 Annie Jacobsen,~~ ~~The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top-Secret Military~~
~~Research Agency~~ ~~(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, “The Pentagon’s~~
~~Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/~~
~~2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/.~~
~~131 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “History of~~
~~Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.~~
~~132 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §263.~~
~~133 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §278.~~
~~134~~ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf; and The White House, National Security Memorandum on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 18, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/10/18/national-security-memorandum-on-countering-biological-threats-enhancing-pandemic-preparedness-and-achieving-global-health-security/. See also Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018. 135 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf. 136 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Releases Strategy to Strengthen Health Security and Prepare for Biothreats,” October 18, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/18/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-strategy-to-strengthen-health-security-and-prepare-for-biothreats/. This $88 billion request includes funds for the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development; it does not include funds for DOD. 137 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §263. 138 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §278. 139 A list of the eight commissioners appointed by the Armed Services Committees is available at A list of the eight commissioners appointed by the Armed Services Committees is available at
https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=5806E52B-95BB-4921-9F92-D1A5BC2DA8C4. One additional https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=5806E52B-95BB-4921-9F92-D1A5BC2DA8C4. One additional
commissioner is to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, Senate Majority Leader, and commissioner is to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, Senate Majority Leader, and
Senate Minority Leader, respectively. Senate Minority Leader, respectively.
~~135 “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and~~
~~Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, Translated by Etcetera Language Group,~~
~~Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf.~~
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Congressional Research Service 22 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress within China’s Made in China 2025 initiative and is additionally highlighted within China’s current five-year development plan.140 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became
the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist
produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited
babies.”babies.”~~136~~141 In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic
information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be
used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.~~137~~142
Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of
biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the
Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.~~138~~143 Furthermore, Furthermore,
reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain
science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance
enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical
institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.~~139~~144
Russia
Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing
of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag
behind that of the United States and China.behind that of the United States and China.~~140~~145 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for
biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and
bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental
protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.~~141~~146
Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies
within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted
to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in
violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly
unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.unrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.~~142~~
~~Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological~~
~~weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.143~~

~~136~~147 140 “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, Translated by Etcetera Language Group, Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf. 141 Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely
abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” Al
Jazeera, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a , November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a
‘New Domain of Warfare,’” ‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019. , August 14, 2019.
~~137~~142 David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also , July 31, 2017. See also
Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New
Revolution in Military Affairs,” Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/
chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
~~138~~143 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of
Warfare,’” Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-
biotech/159167/. biotech/159167/.
~~139~~144 Ibid. Ibid.
~~140~~145 Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology
in the Russian Federation,” 2012. in the Russian Federation,” 2012.
~~141~~146 Ibid. Ibid.
~~142~~147 Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,” Mark Urban, “Salisbury attack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,” BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment , March 4, 2019. For a full assessment
of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying
~~and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report:~~ ~~Biodefense in the~~
~~Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890.~~
~~143 Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018,~~
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Congressional Research Service 23 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.148 Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of
representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where
appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research
institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.~~144~~149
International Institutions
Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.~~145~~150 Some Some
international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of
biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on
biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since
1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that 1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that
monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors
involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment, involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment,
industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with
governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.governing the development and use of genetically modified organisms.~~146~~151 These entities are not, These entities are not,
however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology. however, focused specifically on military applications of biotechnology.
In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review
conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing
developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to
informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts informally consider relevant topics, as well as to address national bilateral and multilateral efforts
to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be
established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or
limits on certain applications.limits on certain applications.~~147~~152
Potential Questions for Congress
 Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research  Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research
priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or
organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national organizational changes would be required to fully implement a national
biodefense strategy? biodefense strategy?
~~ What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?~~
~~Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of~~
~~biotechnologies with ethical considerations?~~
~~ What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the~~
~~ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies~~
~~such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance~~
~~modification?~~

and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology Consensus Report: Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890. 148 Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/. at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.
~~144~~149 The ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national The ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity
List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/
27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list. 27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list.
~~145~~150 The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally
binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons. binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons.
~~146~~151 The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols. The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols.
~~147~~152 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/. , August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.
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 What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing? Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of biotechnologies with ethical considerations?  What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance modification? Quantum Technology153~~Quantum Technology148~~
Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological
applications.applications.~~149~~154 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could
hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications. hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications.
GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications
could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able
to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified,
classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and
military operations.”military operations.”~~150~~155
Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which
could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans
“transparent.”“transparent.”~~151~~156 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear
deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing
options that could in theory allow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS-options that could in theory allow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS-
degraded or GPS-denied environments. degraded or GPS-denied environments.
Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of
quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other
environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use
quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this will make
~~them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption will likely require~~
~~significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.~~
~~United States~~
~~According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies~~
~~assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the~~
~~U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.152 The task~~

~~148~~ 153 See also CRS In Focus IF11836, See also CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
~~149~~154 These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and
entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement
of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily
Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences,
2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS 2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS
Report R45409, Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy
Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola. , by Patricia Moloney Figliola.
~~150~~155 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances
in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a in quantum computing will likely be required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a
quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the
principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today principle of superposition—would be required to break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today
have around 256 qubits. See Siobhan Roberts, “This new startup has built a record-breaking 256-qubit quantum have around 256 qubits. See Siobhan Roberts, “This new startup has built a record-breaking 256-qubit quantum
computer,” computer,” MIT Technology Review, November 17, 2021, at , November 17, 2021, at
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/17/1040243/quantum-computer-256-bit-startup/. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/17/1040243/quantum-computer-256-bit-startup/.
~~151~~156 Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “The Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security
Professionals,” Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-
technology-primer-national-security-professionals/. technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.
~~152 Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at~~
~~https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm.~~
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Congressional Research Service 25 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.”157 As a result, widespread adoption will likely require significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques. United States According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.158 The task force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain
missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is
degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial
computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum
communications could improve networking technologies.communications could improve networking technologies.~~153~~159 The task force concludes that The task force concludes that
“quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing “quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing
and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide
upgraded capability to DOD.”upgraded capability to DOD.”~~154~~160 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum technology programs across these and other research areas. In addition, some analysts believe that an initial quantum computer prototype capable of breaking current encryption methods could be developed in the 2030 to 2040 timeframe.161 For this reason, the United States is investing in post-quantum cryptography (also known as quantum-resistant cryptography). In May 2022, the Biden administration released National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems (NSM-10), which “directs specific actions for agencies to take as the United States begins the multi-year process of migrating vulnerable computer systems to quantum-resistant cryptography.”162 NSM-10 notes that the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) are developing and expected to publicly release by 2024 technical standards for quantum-resistant cryptography. In September 2022, NSA issued a cybersecurity advisory stating that it “expects the transition to [quantum-resistant] algorithms for [national security systems] to be complete by 2035 in line with NSM-10.”163 157 U.S. Army Research Lab Public Affairs, “Army researchers see path to quantum computing at room temperature,” April 30, 2020, at https://www.army.mil/article/235127/army_researchers_see_path_to_quantum_computing_at_room_temperature#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIf%20future%20devices%20that%20use,power%20hungry%2C%E2%80%9D%20Heuck%20said. 158 Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 See, for example, “Quantum computers will break the encryption that protects the internet,” The Economist, October 10, 2018, at https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2018/10/20/quantum-computers-will-break-the-encryption-that-protects-the-internet. 162 The White House, National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems, May 4, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/. 163 National Security Agency, “Cybersecurity Advisory: Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0,” September 7, 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF. Congressional Research Service 26 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress ~~Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum~~
~~technology programs across these and other research areas.~~
Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating ~~these~~quantum technology programs programs
and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science
and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other
departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”~~155~~164 In In
addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary of each addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary of each
military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers that may military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers that may
“engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum “engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum
research.research.~~156~~165 To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research
Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research
Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army ~~says it~~ does not plan to establish a QIS does not plan to establish a QIS
Research Center at this time.Research Center at this time.166
Finally, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and Finally, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and
annually update a list of technical challenges that quantum computers could potentially address annually update a list of technical challenges that quantum computers could potentially address
within the next one to three years.within the next one to three years.~~157~~167 It also directs the services to establish programs with small It also directs the services to establish programs with small
and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and
academic researchers working on these challenges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an academic researchers working on these challenges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an
assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as well as current standards for post-assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as well as current standards for post-
quantum cryptography. In addition, Section 229 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the quantum cryptography. In addition, Section 229 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the
Secretary of Defense to establish activities to “to accelerate the development and deployment of Secretary of Defense to establish activities to “to accelerate the development and deployment of
dual-use quantum capabilities,” while Section 511 expands the grant program for science, dual-use quantum capabilities,” while Section 511 expands the grant program for science,
technology, engineering, and math education in the Junior Research Officers’ Training Corps to technology, engineering, and math education in the Junior Research Officers’ Training Corps to
include quantum information sciences. include quantum information sciences.
China
China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.~~158~~168
Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research

~~153 Ibid.~~
~~154 Ibid.~~
~~155 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234.~~
~~156 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §220.~~
~~157~~initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.169 China is already a world leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite (Micius) to provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.”170 In 2017, China 164 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234. 165 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §220. 166 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, April 5, 2021. 167 On behalf of the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified On behalf of the services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified
these challenges as quantum chemistry, optimization, and machine learning. CRS correspondence with the Office of the these challenges as quantum chemistry, optimization, and machine learning. CRS correspondence with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 25, 2022. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 25, 2022.
~~158~~168 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John
Costello, Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, Center for a New , Center for a New
American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-
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~~initiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the~~
~~country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.159 China is already a world~~
~~leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite to~~
~~provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China~~ Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406. 169 Ibid., p. 6. 170 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 146, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. This satellite—as well as the other communications networks discussed in this section—employ quantum key distribution (QKD), a subset of quantum communications. QKD Congressional Research Service 27 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress hosted the first hosted the first
quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.~~160~~171 Furthermore, China is investing heavily in Furthermore, China is investing heavily in
terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer
(approximately (approximately ~~1250~~1,250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that
network nationwide in the years to come.network nationwide in the years to come.~~161~~172 While such advances in quantum technology have While such advances in quantum technology have
been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military
applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects
Plan. Plan.
Russia
Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial intelligence, lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to
10 years behind” in quantum computing.10 years behind” in quantum computing.~~162~~173 In an effort to spur development, Russia announced In an effort to spur development, Russia announced
plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and plans in December 2019 to invest $790 million in quantum research over the next five years and
adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.~~163~~174 These initiatives are not These initiatives are not
military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia military-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia
might apply them to its military. might apply them to its military.
International Institutions
No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating
military or other applications of quantum technology. military or other applications of quantum technology.
Potential Questions for Congress
 Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current  Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current
funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum funding levels? To what extent, if at all, can advances in commercial quantum
technology be leveraged for military applications? technology be leveraged for military applications?
 Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and  Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and
to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods? to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods?
 How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of  How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of
quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten quantum technologies? To what extent, if at all, could such efforts threaten
advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation
stealth aircraft? stealth aircraft?

~~Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406.~~
~~159 Ibid., p. 6.~~
~~160~~enables secure communications that cannot be covertly intercepted during transmission. QKD communications can, however, be intercepted at the relay stations currently required for long-distance transmissions. 171 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
~~161~~172 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation
Leadership, p. 14., p. 14.
~~162~~ This terrestrial network is reportedly connected to Micius, which provides a satellite link “spanning 2,600 km [1,600 miles] between two observatories—one east of Beijing and the other just a few hundred kilometers from China’s border with Kazakhstan.” See Hamish Johnston, “Quantum cryptography network spans 4600 km in China,” Physics World, January 7, 2021, at https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-cryptography-network-spans-4600-km-in-china/. 173 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at , December 17, 2019, at
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z.
~~163~~174 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018, For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018,
commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years. commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years.
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Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies
for Warfighting
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if
not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of
technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which
emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the
interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and
international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use. international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the
future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics, future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics,
and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This
could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with
destabilizing consequences. destabilizing consequences.
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon
which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and which U.S. military forces have traditionally relied—and quantity, as well as between offense and
defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive
systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that
provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging
technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades. technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades.
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or
enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability.
For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce
more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image
recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons.
Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training
environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition
or control prosthetics or robotic systems.or control prosthetics or robotic systems.~~164~~175 Such developments could, in turn, require new Such developments could, in turn, require new
strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.~~165~~176
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could
additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These
consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As
analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue
engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area.”~~166~~177 This This
could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some
analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS. analysts to call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.

~~164~~175 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251, For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security
Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
~~165~~176 For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis For a discussion of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis
stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for
War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31-35, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age. publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.
~~166~~177 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, February 2016,
at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf.
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Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For
example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—
regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not
make specific target selection and engagement decisions.make specific target selection and engagement decisions.~~167~~178 Others have countered that human Others have countered that human
operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of
force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the
requirements of the laws of armed conflict.requirements of the laws of armed conflict.~~168~~179 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have
additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention
preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience.”dictates of the public conscience.”~~169~~180 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that
requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to
ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is
questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”~~170~~181
Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that
involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which
could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.~~171~~182
Issues for Congress
Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military
technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L.
115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison 115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison
between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of
adversaries of the United States.”adversaries of the United States.”~~172~~183 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum
technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the
Secretary of Defense. Similarly, Section 1251 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, Section 1251 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) directs the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Director of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Director of
the Office of Net Assessment, to “conduct a comparative analysis assessment of the efforts of the the Office of Net Assessment, to “conduct a comparative analysis assessment of the efforts of the
United States Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to develop and United States Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to develop and
deploy” emerging technologies such as directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons, deploy” emerging technologies such as directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons,

~~167~~178 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots.
~~168~~179 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at
https://www.esd.whs. https://www.esd.whs.
~~169~~180 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human , Human
Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-
killer-robots. killer-robots.
~~170~~181 Paul Scharre, Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2018), pp. 263-266. 2018), pp. 263-266.
~~171~~182 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824, For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824,
Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s , by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s
Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The
Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-
military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
~~172~~183 Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries
on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (3) an evaluation of
the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the
United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such United States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such
technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.” technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.”
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biotechnology, and quantum technology. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked biotechnology, and quantum technology. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA additionally tasked
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for
developing “technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an developing “technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an
adversary of the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that adversary of the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that
are] not receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.” are] not receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”
Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense
with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to
emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed
by the Department,”by the Department,”~~173~~184 while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the
Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of
and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats. and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats.
As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during
the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding
considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and
regulation, and oversight. regulation, and oversight.
Funding Considerations
A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy
weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S. weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S.
government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations challenge the
viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a
skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”~~174~~185
Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between
technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or
maturity.maturity.~~175~~186
Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for
overall research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert overall research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert
Martijn Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in order to enable “big bets” Martijn Rasser notes that reducing overall research and development in order to enable “big bets”
or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because
“we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”“we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs will come from.”~~176~~187

~~173~~184 Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by
the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data
(commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy, (commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.” hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.”
~~174~~ 185 Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at , September 2018, p. 21, at
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-
MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.
~~175~~186 See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July , July
1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-
ever-be-ready. ever-be-ready.
~~176~~187 See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,” See, for example, Will Knight, “Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, but a Boost for AI,” Wired, February , February
11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about 11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost-ai/. For more information about
federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341, federal R&D funding, including a discussion of DOD R&D funding, see CRS Report R46341, Federal Research and
Development (R&D) Funding: FY2021, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.
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link to page 37 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Management
In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately
due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E])Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E])/Chief Technology Officer (CTO), there are , there are separate principal~~separate technical directors or~~
~~assistant~~ directors for artificial intelligence directors for artificial intelligence, and autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy, autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy,
biotechnology, and quantum biotechnology, and quantum ~~science~~technology—among other technology areas—among other technology areas~~—which report through the~~
~~Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).177~~. Development of each of these technologies is Development of each of these technologies is
guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although
~~the Director for Modernization~~the USD(R&E)/CTO has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts
have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that
better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.~~178~~
~~Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military~~
~~technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This~~
~~fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set~~
~~spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”179~~
~~Personnel~~
~~Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining~~
~~personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries~~
~~significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.180 Other reports suggest that such~~
~~challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology~~
~~workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than~~
~~within it.”181 DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce.~~
~~Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology~~
~~education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research~~
~~universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology~~
~~workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.182~~

~~177 CRS In Focus IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, by Marcy E.~~
~~Gallo.~~
~~178 See, for example, Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve~~
~~the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and~~
~~Pete Modigliani,~~ ~~After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new~~
~~era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-~~
~~the-divorce-white-paper.pdf.~~
~~179 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One,~~
~~April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/.~~
~~180 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at~~
~~https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-~~
~~warfare-cummings-final.pdf.~~
~~181 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,”~~
The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-
~~valley-and-washington/577963/.~~
~~182~~188 Furthermore, prior to May 2022, these principal directors reported to the USD(R&E)/CTO through a singular Director for Modernization, who was “responsible for managing the capability analysis and investments for the modernization priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy,” including the technologies discussed in this report.189 In May 2022, DOD reorganized the office of the USD(R&E)/CTO and created separate reporting structures for “enabling technology”—including the Principal Director for AI and autonomy—and “applied technology”—including the Principal Directors for directed energy and hypersonic weapons (see Figure 2). The Directors for Enabling Technology and Applied Technology report to the Deputy CTO for Critical Technologies. In contrast, the Principal Directors for biotechnology and quantum science report through the Director of Science and Technology Futures to a different Deputy CTO—the Deputy CTO for Science and Technology.190 Congress may consider the ways in which this organizational change affects the oversight and integration of emerging technologies. Finally, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”191 188 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-the-divorce-white-paper.pdf. 189 CRS In Focus IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, by Marcy E. Gallo. 190 See Department of Defense, “Organizational Improvements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,” May 10, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3026367/organizational-improvements-to-the-office-of-the-under-secretary-of-defense-for/. 191 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One, April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/. Congressional Research Service 32 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Figure 2. Selected Reporting Structure of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) Source: CRS image, adapted from https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf. Notes: Chart depicts only the reporting structure for the OUSD(R&E) principal directors associated with the technologies discussed in this report. For a full OUSD(R&E) organizational chart, see “Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Organization,” May 9, 2022, at https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/usdre_org_chart_09may2022_distro_a.pdf. Personnel Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.192 Other reports suggest that such challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as well as from a belief among many technology workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than within it.”193 DOD faces additional challenges in training and educating its standing workforce. Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of challenges include increasing technology education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research universities, creating government fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.194 192 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf. 193 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat,” The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-valley-and-washington/577963/. 194 See Defense Science Board, See Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security ; National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at , March 2020, pp. 21-43, at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs,
“The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for
hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year hypersonic research and workforce development, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year
assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create
models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Acquisition
DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-
use technologies such as AI.use technologies such as AI.~~183~~195 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it
takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial
Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational
Capability.Capability.~~184~~196 In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development
process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial
product in six to nine months.product in six to nine months.~~185~~197 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software
acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration
and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”~~186~~198 Similar Similar
efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies. efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies.
Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging
technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense
acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of
12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the 12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, all 12 cited the
complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.~~187~~199 DOD has created DOD has created
a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the
Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome
processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.~~188~~200 Project Maven, for example, was established Project Maven, for example, was established
in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system in April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a commercially acquired prototype AI system
in combat.in combat.~~189~~201 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point
out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive
acquisitions reform.acquisitions reform.~~190~~202

~~models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.~~
~~183~~195 Andrew Ilachinski, Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068, Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068,
Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters. , by Heidi M. Peters.
~~184~~196 Andrew Ilachinski, Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189. , p. 189.
~~185~~197 Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, Software is Never Done:
Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/
2002124828/-1/-1/0/2002124828/-1/-1/0/
SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FINSOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FIN
AL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF. AL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF.
~~186~~198 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim
Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-
19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf. 19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.
~~187~~199 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, , GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment,
lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting
workforce. workforce.
~~188~~200 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research, In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (OTAs) to accelerate research,
prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, prototyping, and production. For additional information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense
Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters. , by Heidi M. Peters.
~~189~~201 Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,” Marcus Weisgerber, “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists,” Defense One, ,
December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-
hunting-terrorists/144742/. hunting-terrorists/144742/.
~~190~~202 Andrew Ilachinski, Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, p. 190. Analysis, January 2017, p. 190.
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Intellectual Property
Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about
intellectual property and data rights.intellectual property and data rights.~~191~~203 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on
broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of
commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant
unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or
restricted rights.”restricted rights.”~~192~~204 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that
“establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition, “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition,
licensing, and management of IP.”licensing, and management of IP.”~~193~~205 The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to
advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development
of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each
acquisition program.acquisition program.~~194~~206
Supply Chain Security
A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for
emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have
opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage, opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage,
transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-
level U.S. suppliers.level U.S. suppliers.~~195~~207 Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating, found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating,
assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on
foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”~~196~~208
Technology Protection
Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars [each year] to
theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies
and related intellectual property.and related intellectual property.~~197~~209 The United States has a number of programs devoted to The United States has a number of programs devoted to
addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging
and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a
covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared
strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect

~~191~~203 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain Companies.
~~192~~204 Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 20.
~~193~~205 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual
Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070. issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070.
~~194~~206 Ibid., pp. 8-11. Ibid., pp. 8-11.
~~195~~207 Govini, Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf. uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf.
~~196~~208 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46. , p. 46.
~~197~~209 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task
Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/
cs2018_0459.pdf. cs2018_0459.pdf.
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United States leadership in areas related to national security.” United States leadership in areas related to national security.”~~198~~210 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting Similarly, DOD’s Protecting
Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial
base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key
data.”data.”~~199~~211 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs
for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop
a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section
1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.~~200~~212 Some analysts have recommended Some analysts have recommended
expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.~~201~~213
Governance and Regulation
According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments … According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments …
are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US
interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”~~202~~214 To address this concern, some To address this concern, some
analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic
engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”~~203~~215
Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards
setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and
strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations. strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations.
~~Oversight204~~Oversight216
As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be challenged in its
ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972, ability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972,
Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert
“assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop “assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop

~~198~~210 The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an
interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more
information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and , by James K. Jackson and
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have
argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier
scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence, Intelligence, Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. 153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view.
~~199~~211 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task
Force.” Force.”
~~200~~212 C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26, C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26,
2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-
joint-force-strong/. joint-force-strong/.
~~201~~213 See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, Forging an Alliance Innovation
Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909.
~~202~~214 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018.
~~203~~215 Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Twin Pillars: Upholding National
Security and National Innovation in Emerging Technologies Governance, Center for Strategic and International , Center for Strategic and International
Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF. 200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.
~~204~~216 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, The
Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. , by John F. Sargent Jr..
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities. proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.~~205~~217
Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of
government.government.~~206~~218 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar
technology assessment organization.technology assessment organization.~~207~~219

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler Kelley M. Sayler

Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security Security

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
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~~205~~217 Ibid. Ibid.
~~206~~218 Ibid. Ibid.
~~207~~219 For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in
CRS Report R46327, CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. , by John F.
Sargent Jr.. Sargent Jr..
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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