Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Changes from March 31, 2022 to May 3, 2022

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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)
~~March 31~~May 3, 2022 , 2022
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Navy’s The Navy’s ~~new~~ Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program envisions procuring a class of Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program envisions procuring a class of 24up to to
35 Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
35 new amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new new amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new
Marine
~~Marine~~ Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). (A
~~June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document envisions procuring a total of 24 to 35~~

~~LAWs, while other Navy documents refer to a requirement for 35 LAWs.) The Navy envisions~~
~~the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requested $13~~The Navy had previously envisioned procuring the first LAW in FY2023, but the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission defers the procurement of the first LAW to FY2025. The Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget requests $12.2 million in research and .2 million in research and
development funding for the program. development funding for the program.
The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Under The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Under
the concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver the concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver
around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as
to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese
forces. The LAW ships would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, and forces. The LAW ships would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, and
subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units. subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units.
~~As conceived by the Navy and Marine Corps,~~ LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure
and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. ~~The Navy estimated in July 2021 that the first LAW would cost about~~
~~$156 million to procure, and that subsequent LAWs would cost about $130 million each to procure. In February 2022, a~~
~~Navy official, providing a somewhat different figure, reportedly stated that the Navy wants each LAW to cost $150 million~~
~~or less.~~
~~The LAW as outlined by the Navy is small enough that it~~ Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first LAW would be procured in FY2025 at a cost of $247.0 million, the second LAW would be procured in FY2026 at a cost of $203.0 million, and the third and fourth LAWs would be procured in FY2027 at a combined cost of $290.0 million (i.e., an average cost of $145.0 million each). The first LAW would cost substantially more than subsequent ships in the program because the procurement cost of the first LAW would include much or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to include much of all of the DD/NRE costs for a class of ship in the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.) The LAW as outlined by the Navy could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy’s could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy’s
baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships, but the Navy is open to having them built in multiple yards baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships, but the Navy is open to having them built in multiple yards
to the same design if doing so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively. The Navyto the same design if doing so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively. The Navy
~~plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract for the LAW~~
~~program in the second quarter of FY2022, and to award the contract in the first quester of FY2023.~~
~~The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including the merits of the EABO concept,~~
~~how LAWs would fit into the Navy’s future fleet architecture, the Navy’s preliminary unit procurement cost target for the~~
~~ship, and the industrial-base implications of the program.~~
’s FY2023 budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the first LAW would be awarded in December 2024, and that the ship would be delivered in July 2028. The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and envisioned The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and envisioned
acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program could affect Navy and Marine Corps acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program could affect Navy and Marine Corps
capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

~~link to page 11 link to page 26 link to page 30 link to page 33~~ ~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Tables~~
~~Table 1. Current and Potential New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goals ..................................... 7~~
~~Table 2~~17 Tables Table 1. Congressional Action on ~~FY2022~~FY2023 Procurement Funding Request .................................. 2219

~~Appendixes~~
~~Appendix. Proposed Change in Amphibious-Ship Force Architecture and EABO ....................... 26~~

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 2920

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s new Light This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s new Light
Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which envisions procuring a class of Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which envisions procuring a class of 24up to 35 new to 35 new
amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps
operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy
~~envisions the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget~~
~~requested $13~~had previously envisioned procuring the first LAW in FY2023, but the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission defers the procurement of the first LAW to FY2025. The Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget requests $12.2 million in research and development funding for the program. .2 million in research and development funding for the program.
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for
Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and
envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program
could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base. shipbuilding industrial base.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s programs for building much-larger LPD-17 Flight II A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s programs for building much-larger LPD-17 Flight II
and LHA-class amphibious ships.1 Other CRS reports provide an overview of and LHA-class amphibious ships.1 Other CRS reports provide an overview of ~~new Navy and~~
~~Marine Corps operational concepts, including EABO, the overall strategic and budgetary context~~
~~in which amphibious ship and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered,~~Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans and the and the
Marine Corps’ plans for redesigning Marine Corps units and their equipment.2 Marine Corps’ plans for redesigning Marine Corps units and their equipment.2
Background
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships ~~in General~~
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. The primary are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. The primary
function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and their function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and their
weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct
expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships can be used to support expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships can be used to support
Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive
or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and
their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from
ship to shore without need for port facilities,3 amphibious ships are potentially useful for a range ship to shore without need for port facilities,3 amphibious ships are potentially useful for a range
of combat and noncombat operations.4 of combat and noncombat operations.4

1 CRS Report R43543, 1 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 CRS Report RL32665, 2 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by , by
Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Insight IN11281, Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
3 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat 3 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and in many cases well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is (VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and in many cases well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is
a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return
to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.) to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.)
4 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian- 4 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian-
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such
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On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations called amphibious forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations called amphibious
groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis, groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis,
particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for
responding to smaller-scale or noncombat contingencies. responding to smaller-scale or noncombat contingencies.
Current Types of Amphibious Ships
The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force consists entirely of large amphibious ships, including The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force consists entirely of large amphibious ships, including
the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships, medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships,
designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.5 As designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.5 As
mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s current programs for procuring mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s current programs for procuring
new LHA- and LPD-type ships.6 The LAWs discussed in this CRS report would be much smaller new LHA- and LPD-type ships.6 The LAWs discussed in this CRS report would be much smaller
than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. than the Navy’s current amphibious ships.
Amphibious Ship Force ~~Level~~ at End of ~~FY2020~~
FY2021 The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of ~~FY2020~~FY2021 included included 3331 ships, including ships, including 109
amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and 87 LHDs), 11 LPD-17 Flight I ships, and LHDs), 11 LPD-17 Flight I ships, and 1211 older LSD- older LSD-
41/49 class ships. The LSD-41/49 class ships are to be replaced by new LPD-17 Flight II class 41/49 class ships. The LSD-41/49 class ships are to be replaced by new LPD-17 Flight II class
ships. ships.
~~One of the Navy’s LHDs—Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6)—was extensively damaged by a fire in~~
~~July 2020. It was decommissioned on April 15, 2021, and will be scrapped.7 Excluding LHD-6,~~Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal Under 355-Plan of 2016 The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and maintaining a 355-ship fleet that includes 38 amphibious ships—12 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (12+13+13).7 This 38-ship force-level goal predates the EABO concept and the initiation of the LAW program and consequently includes no LAWs.

as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime-security foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime-security
operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale
ground combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining ground combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining
forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability. forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
5 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious 5 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be . LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship, deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship,
well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. The exceptions are LHAs 6 well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. The exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of
well decks, see footnowell decks, see footnote 3. The terms “large-deck” and “small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck. The terms “large-deck” and “small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck.
6 CRS Report R43543, 6 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 7 ~~The four-day (some sources say five-day) fire on LHD-6 began on July 12, 2020, while the ship was at pier in San~~
~~Diego. At the time of the fire, the ship was 22 years old and had thus expended about 50% of its expected service life of~~
~~40 to 45 years. Following the fire, the Navy spent months assessing condition of the ship and examining options for~~
~~repairing it and returning it to service in some capacity. On November 30, 2020, the Navy announced that due to the~~
~~estimated cost and time to repair the ship and return it to service, the Navy had decided to decommission the ship and~~
~~scrap it. The Navy stated that about 60% of the ship was ruined and would need to be rebuilt or replaced. Repairing the~~
~~ship and returning it to service as an LHD, the Navy estimated, would cost between $2.5 billion and $3.2 billion and~~
~~take about five to seven years to complete. (By then, portions of the ship would be 27 to 29 years old.) By comparison,~~
~~the Navy said, a new replacement LHA-type ship would cost an estimated $4.1 billion to procure and take about six~~
~~years to build. (The Navy’s estimated repair cost for LHD-6 equates to about 61% to 78% of the Navy’s estimated~~
~~procurement cost for a replacement LHA. A new-built LHA would have a full 40- to 45-year expected service life.)~~
~~Repairing LHD-6 and reconfiguring it for use as either a hospital ship or a tender (i.e., a ship used to repair, maintain,~~
~~or otherwise support other Navy ships), the Navy estimated, would cost more than $1 billion, and also take five to~~
~~seven years to complete. The Navy stated that designing and building a new hospital ship or tender would cost less than~~
~~repairing LHD-6 and converting it into a hospital ship or tender. The Navy estimated that decommissioning the ship,~~
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~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~the Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2020 included 32 ships, including 9~~
~~LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships.~~
~~Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal~~
~~Current Force-Level Goal~~
~~The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and~~
~~maintaining a 355-ship fleet that includes 38 amphibious ships—12 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13~~
~~LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (12+13+13).8 This 38-ship force-~~
~~level goal predates the initiation of the LAW program and consequently includes no LAWs.~~
~~Potential New Force-Level Goal~~
~~Overview~~
~~The Navy and DOD since 2019 have been working to develop a new force-level goal to replace~~
~~the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. This new force-level goal is expected to introduce a~~
~~once-in-a-generation change in fleet architecture, meaning basic the types of ships that make up~~
~~the Navy and how these ships are used in combination with one another to perform Navy~~
~~missions. This new fleet architecture is expected to be more distributed than the fleet architecture~~
~~reflected in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy force-level goals. In particular, the new fleet~~
~~architecture is expected to feature~~
~~ a smaller proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers,~~
~~destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships);~~
~~ a larger proportion of smaller ships (such as frigates, corvettes, smaller~~
~~amphibious ships, smaller resupply ships, and perhaps smaller aircraft carriers);~~
~~and~~
~~ a new third tier of surface vessels about as large as corvettes or large patrol craft~~
~~that will be either lightly manned, optionally manned, or unmanned, as well as~~
~~large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).~~
~~Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is~~
~~ operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-~~
~~access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;9~~

~~salvaging usable parts of it for use on other Navy ships (which began in September 2020), towing the ship to its~~
~~scrapping site, and scrapping the ship would cost about $30 million. (See Megan Eckstein, “UPDATED: Navy Will~~
~~Scrap USS Bonhomme Richard,” USNI News, November 30, 2020; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Navy Will Scrap Fire-~~
~~Ravaged Bonhomme Richard,” Navy Times, November 20, 2020; Nancy A. Youssef, “Navy Will Decommission Ship~~
~~Damaged in Five-Day Blaze,” Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2020; Andrew Dyer, “Ravaged by Fire, USS~~
~~Bonhomme Richard Bound for Scrapyard, Navy Says,” San Diego Union-Tribune, November 30, 2020.)~~
~~8 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665,~~ ~~Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding~~
~~Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force~~
~~structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476,~~ ~~Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship~~
~~Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~9 See, for example, David B. Larter, “With China Gunning for Aircraft Carriers, US Navy Says It Must Change How It~~
~~Fights,” Defense News, December 6, 2019; Arthur H. Barber, “Redesign the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,~~
~~January 2019. Some observers have long urged the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds~~
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~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~ technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for~~
~~networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers~~
~~of UVs; and~~
~~ affordable—no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current~~
~~fleet architecture, so as to fit within expected future Navy budgets.10~~
~~Operational Rationale~~
~~To improve their ability to perform various missions in coming years, including a potential~~
~~mission of countering Chinese forces in a possible conflict in the Western Pacific, the Navy and~~
~~Marine Corps want to implement a new operational concept called Distributed Maritime~~
~~Operations (DMO).11 DMO calls for U.S. naval forces (meaning the Navy and Marine Corps)12 to~~
~~operate at sea in a less concentrated, more distributed manner, so as to complicate an adversary’s~~
~~task of detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting U.S. naval forces, while still being able to~~
~~bring lethal force to bear against adversary forces. To support the implementation of DMO, the~~
~~Navy wants to shift to the new and more distributed fleet architecture outlined above.~~
For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 2 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Emerging New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal The Navy and DOD since 2019 have been working to develop a new force-level goal to replace the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, released on April 20, 2022, includes a table summarizing the results of studies that have been conducted on the successor force-level goal. These studies outline potential future fleets with 6 to 10 LHAs/LHDs and 30 to 54 other amphibious ships, including but not necessarily limited to LPDs and LAWs.8 Marine Corps officials state that, from their perspective, a minimum of 66 amphibious ships will be required in coming years, including a minimum of 31 larger amphibious ships (10 LHAs/LHDs and 21 LPDs) plus 35 LAWs (aka “31+35”).9 At an April 26, 2022, hearing on Department of the Navy (DON) investment programs before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Department of the Navy testified that In order to ensure the future naval expeditionary force is maximized for effective combat power, while reflecting and supporting the force structure changes addressed in USMC’s Force Design, the Secretary of the Navy directed an amphibious requirement study that will inform refinement of amphibious ship procurement plans and shipbuilding profiles, as well as inform the ongoing overall Naval Force Structure Assessment.10 In January 2022, Navy officials reportedly anticipated that the above-mentioned study would be completed by the end of March 2022.11 At the end of March 2022, the study reportedly was expected to be completed shortly.12 At the beginning of April 2022, the study reportedly was in its final stages.13 The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, released on April 20 2022, states that “the Navy will begin assessment of a next-generation amphibious ship (i.e., LPD(X)) in FY2023.”14 8 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 9 See, for example, Todd South, “Back to Ship: Marines Need Ships to Fight. Will They Get Them?” Military Times, March 24, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Some Lawmakers Back Marines in Disagreement over Navy Amphib Force,” Defense News, April 5, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022. 10 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), Performing The Duties Of The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements And Capabilities (OPNAV N9), and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for Seapower, April 26, 2022, PDF page 12 of 37. 11 See Megan Eckstein, “Amphib Ship Requirements Study Could Spell Bad News for Marines, Industry,” Defense News, January 18, 2022. 12 Megan Eckstgein, “US Navy Seeks to End San Antonio-Class Ship Production, Reducing Fleet by 8 Amphibious Hulls,” Defense News, March 28, 2022. 13 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022. 14 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year Congressional Research Service 3 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program15 Overview As noted earlier, the LAW program may include up to 35 ships. A total of 35 would include nine operational LAWs for each of three envisioned Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), plus eight additional LAWs to account for factors such as a certain number of LAWs being in maintenance at any given moment. LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. Procurement Schedule As noted earlier, the Navy had previously envisioned procuring the first LAW in FY2023, but the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission defers the procurement of the first LAW to FY2025. The Navy’s FY2023 five-year (FY2023-FY2027) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the first LAW in FY2025, the second in FY2026, and the third and fourth in FY2027. The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the first LAW would be awarded in December 2024, and that the ship would be delivered in July 2028. Procurement Cost Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first LAW would be procured in FY2025 at a cost of $247.0 million, the second LAW would be procured in FY2026 at a cost of $203.0 million, and the third and fourth LAWs would be procured in FY2027 at a combined cost of $290.0 million (i.e., an average cost of $145.0 million each). The first LAW would cost substantially more than subsequent ships in the program because the procurement cost of the first LAW would include much or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to include much of all of the DD/NRE costs for a class of ship in the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.) By way of comparison, the Navy’s most recently procured LHA-type amphibious ship has an estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY20232 budget submission of about $3.5 billion, and LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships have unit procurement costs of about $1.9 billion. As additional comparisons, the Navy’s Ship-to-Shore Connectors (SSCs)—its new air-cushioned landing craft—are about 92 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of roughly $95 million, the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are 154 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of about $65 million, and the Navy’s new TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships are 263 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of about $96 million. 2023, April 2022, p. 14. 15 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section about the LAW is taken from Navy briefing slides and Navy answers to industry questions from LAW program industry days that were held on March 4 and April 9, 2020, and posted on March 20, May 5, and May 7, 2020, at “RFI: US Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW),” https://beta.sam.gov/opp/90a9ece86ade48089e9f6d57d2969d23/view, accessed by CRS on May 15, 2020. For press articles about the LAW, see Megan Eckstein, “Navy Researching New Class of Medium Amphibious Ship, New Logistics Ships,” USNI News, February 20, 2020. See also Rich Abott, “FY 2021 Request Starts Work on Future Amphibs and Logistics Ships,” Defense Daily, February 20, 2020; David Axe, “This Weird Little Ship Could Be the Future of Amphibious Warfare,” National Interest, February 24, 2020; Mallory Shellbourne, “Navy begins pursuit of Light Amphibious Warship,” Inside Defense, March 26, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Wants To Buy 30 New Light Amphibious Warships To Support Radical Shift In Marine Ops,” The Drive, May 5, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020. Congressional Research Service 4 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Operational Rationale, Including EABO To improve their ability to perform various missions in coming years, including a potential mission of countering Chinese forces in a possible conflict in the Western Pacific, the Navy and Marine Corps want to implement a new operational concept called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).16 DMO calls for U.S. naval forces (meaning the Navy and Marine Corps)17 to operate at sea in a less concentrated, more distributed manner, so as to complicate an adversary’s task of detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting U.S. naval forces, while still being able to bring lethal force to bear against adversary forces. In parallel with DMO, and with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios in the Western Pacific In parallel with DMO, and with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios in the Western Pacific
against Chinese forces, the Marine Corps has developed two supporting operational concepts, against Chinese forces, the Marine Corps has developed two supporting operational concepts,
called Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced called Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations (EABO). Under the EABO concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other Base Operations (EABO). Under the EABO concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other
things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver around the theater, moving things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver around the theater, moving
from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as

~~that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number~~
~~of individually larger and more expensive surface ships—is increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD~~
~~capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential~~
~~adversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributed architecture, these observers have argued, would~~
•
~~complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger number of Navy units~~
~~to detect, identify, and track;~~
•
~~reduce the loss in aggregate Navy capability that would result from the destruction of an individual Navy~~
~~platform;~~
•
~~give U.S. leaders the option of deploying USVs and UUVs in wartime to sea locations that would be~~
~~tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and~~
•
~~increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing mission needs.~~
~~For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153,~~ ~~China Naval Modernization:~~
~~Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~10 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665,~~ ~~Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and~~
~~Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
11to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese forces. More specifically, the Marine Corps states that the EABO concept includes, among other things, establishing and operating “multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning,”18 The use of Marine Corps units to contribute to U.S. sea-denial operations against an opposing navy by shooting ASCMs would represent a new mission for the Marine Corps.19 16 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, , by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
1217 Although the term Although the term naval is often used to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and is often used to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and
Marine Corps, because both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes Marine Corps, because both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes
operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and
Iraq), and is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law, a naval service. 10 U.S.C. Iraq), and is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law, a naval service. 10 U.S.C.
§8001(a)(3) states, “The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or §8001(a)(3) states, “The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or
conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy-conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy-
Marine Corps team. For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10484, Marine Corps team. For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10484, Defense Primer: Department of the Navy, ,
by Ronald O'Rourke. by Ronald O'Rourke.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
4

~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and~~
~~deny sea control to Chinese forces.~~
~~More specifically, the Marine Corps states that the EABO concept includes, among other things,~~
~~establishing and operating “multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that~~
~~can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and~~
~~refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and~~
~~air-defense and early warning,”13 The use of Marine Corps units to contribute to U.S. sea-denial~~
~~operations against an opposing navy by shooting ASCMs would represent a new mission for the~~
~~Marine Corps.14~~
~~Light Amphibious Warships (LAWs) would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs~~
~~embarking, transporting, landing, and subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units.~~
~~An August 27, 2020, press report states, “Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary~~
~~warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps~~
~~the most important investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary~~
~~advance base operations (EABO).”15 The December 9, 2020, shipbuilding document submitted by~~
~~the Trump Administration stated that the Marine Corps~~
~~is reducing a number of legacy systems to reinvest in development of more NDS [National~~
~~Defense Strategy]-relevant capabilities such as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), as~~
~~outlined in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and Force Design. The FNFS [Future~~
~~Naval Force Study] highlights the important contributions MLRs provide to Sea Denial~~
~~and Sea Control missions. This approach requires a new mix of amphibious warships~~
~~including the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which is critical to MLR mobility and~~
~~sustainability. The overall number of amphibious warships grows to support the more~~
~~distributed expeditionary force design, with an increased number of LAW complementing~~
~~fewer legacy amphibious warships.16~~
~~A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO states~~
~~Littoral maneuver will rely heavily on surface platforms such as the light amphibious~~
~~warship (LAW) and a range of surface connectors, as well as aviation assets. The LAW is~~
~~envisioned as the principal littoral maneuver vessel of the littoral force.…~~

1318 Emailed statement from Marine Corps as quoted in Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight Emailed statement from Marine Corps as quoted in Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight
in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,” in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,” Marine Times, May 14, 2020. See also David H. Berger, , May 14, 2020. See also David H. Berger,
“Preparing for the Future, Marine Corps Support to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals,” “Preparing for the Future, Marine Corps Support to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals,” Military Review, April , April
2021, 8 pp. 2021, 8 pp.
1419 For press articles discussing these envisioned operations, see, for example, Justin Katz, “Marines’ New Warfighting For press articles discussing these envisioned operations, see, for example, Justin Katz, “Marines’ New Warfighting
Concept Focuses on Small, Agile Forces with an Eye on China,” Concept Focuses on Small, Agile Forces with an Eye on China,” Breaking Defense, December 1, 2021; Bill Gertz, , December 1, 2021; Bill Gertz,
“Marine Commandant Reveals New Mission Preparing for China Conflict,” “Marine Commandant Reveals New Mission Preparing for China Conflict,” Washington Times, April 21, 2021; Megan , April 21, 2021; Megan
Eckstein, “CMC Berger Outlines How Marines Could Fight Submarines in the Future,” Eckstein, “CMC Berger Outlines How Marines Could Fight Submarines in the Future,” USNI News, December 8, , December 8,
2020; David Axe, “Meet Your New Island-Hopping, Missile-Slinging U.S. Marine Corps,” 2020; David Axe, “Meet Your New Island-Hopping, Missile-Slinging U.S. Marine Corps,” Forbes, May 14, 2020; , May 14, 2020;
Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to
Hawaii,” Hawaii,” Marine Times, May 14, 2020; William Cole (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), “The Marine Corps Is Forming a , May 14, 2020; William Cole (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), “The Marine Corps Is Forming a
First-of-its-Kind Regiment in Hawaii,” First-of-its-Kind Regiment in Hawaii,” Military.com, May 12, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Marines To Radically , May 12, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Marines To Radically
Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles,” Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles,” The Drive, March 23, 2020; Chris “Ox” , March 23, 2020; Chris “Ox”
Harmer, “Marine Boss’s Audacious Plan To Transform The Corps By Giving Up Big Amphibious Ships,” Harmer, “Marine Boss’s Audacious Plan To Transform The Corps By Giving Up Big Amphibious Ships,” The Drive, ,
September 5, 2019. September 5, 2019.
~~15 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them~~
~~ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “‘If It Floats, It Fights:’ Navy’s~~
~~New Small Ship Strategy,” Breaking Defense, August 28, 2020.~~
~~16 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, December 9,~~
~~2020, p. 11.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
5

~~link to page 30~~ ~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~
Congressional Research Service 5 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Light Amphibious Warships (LAWs) would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, and subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units. An August 27, 2020, press report states, “Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps the most important investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base operations (EABO).”20 A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO states Littoral maneuver will rely heavily on surface platforms such as the light amphibious warship (LAW) and a range of surface connectors, as well as aviation assets. The LAW is envisioned as the principal littoral maneuver vessel of the littoral force.…
The LAW supports the day-to-day maneuver of stand-in forces operating in the LOA The LAW supports the day-to-day maneuver of stand-in forces operating in the LOA
[littoral operations area]. It complements L-class amphibious [littoral operations area]. It complements L-class amphibious ~~ships17~~ships21 and other surface and other surface
connectors. Utilizing the LAW to transport forces of the surface reduces the impacts of connectors. Utilizing the LAW to transport forces of the surface reduces the impacts of
tactical vehicles on the road network, increases deception, and allows for the sustainment tactical vehicles on the road network, increases deception, and allows for the sustainment
of forces during embarkation. The range, endurance, and austere access of LAWs enable of forces during embarkation. The range, endurance, and austere access of LAWs enable
the littoral force to deliver personnel, equipment, and sustainment across a widely the littoral force to deliver personnel, equipment, and sustainment across a widely
distributed area. Shallow draft and beaching capability are keys to providing the volume distributed area. Shallow draft and beaching capability are keys to providing the volume
and agility to maneuver the required capabilities to key maritime terrain. and agility to maneuver the required capabilities to key maritime terrain.
LAW employment requires reconnaissance and prior planning relating to the bathymetry LAW employment requires reconnaissance and prior planning relating to the bathymetry
of the littoral environment. Effective LAW employment relies on knowledge of the beach of the littoral environment. Effective LAW employment relies on knowledge of the beach
makeup, slope, currents, tidal effects, and other environment factors. makeup, slope, currents, tidal effects, and other environment factors.
As envisioned and when properly postured, LAWs possess the range, endurance, speed, As envisioned and when properly postured, LAWs possess the range, endurance, speed,
sea-keeping, and C4ISR capabilities to support and conduct complementary operations sea-keeping, and C4ISR capabilities to support and conduct complementary operations
with, but not as part of, US Navy tactical groups, including an expeditionary strike group with, but not as part of, US Navy tactical groups, including an expeditionary strike group
(ESG) or amphibious ready group (ARG). Forward-positioned LAWs may augment the (ESG) or amphibious ready group (ARG). Forward-positioned LAWs may augment the
capabilities of deploying ARG/MEUs during regional engagement and response to crises capabilities of deploying ARG/MEUs during regional engagement and response to crises
or contingencies. or contingencies.
The LAW with embarked forces, generates and/or enables the following effects: The LAW with embarked forces, generates and/or enables the following effects:
 
Rapidly maneuver forces from shore-to-shore in a contested environment Rapidly maneuver forces from shore-to-shore in a contested environment
 
Sustain a combat-credible force ashore Sustain a combat-credible force ashore
 
Conduct enduring operations Conduct enduring operations
 
Enable persistent joint-force operations and power projection Enable persistent joint-force operations and power projection
 
Provide increased and capable forward Provide increased and capable forward ~~presence18~~presence22
The survivability of the LAW ships would come from their ability to hide among islands and The survivability of the LAW ships would come from their ability to hide among islands and
other sea traffic, from defensive support they would receive from other U.S. Navy forces, and other sea traffic, from defensive support they would receive from other U.S. Navy forces, and
from the ability of their associated Marine Corps units to fire missiles at Chinese ships and from the ability of their associated Marine Corps units to fire missiles at Chinese ships and
aircraft that could attack them with their own missiles (which can be viewed as an application of aircraft that could attack them with their own missiles (which can be viewed as an application of
the notion that the best defense is a good offense). the notion that the best defense is a good offense).
~~For additional background information on the proposed change in the amphibious-ship force~~
~~architecture and the EABO-related operational rationale behind it, see the Appendix.~~
~~December 9, 2020, Long-Range Navy Shipbuilding Document~~
~~On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding~~
~~document that called for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446~~
~~manned ships and 143 to 242 large unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (UVs). Within the~~
~~total of 382 to 446 manned ships, the document called for an amphibious fleet of 61 to 67~~
~~amphibious ships, including 9 to 10 LHA/LHD-type ships and a combined total of 52 to 57 LPD-~~
~~type ships and LAWs. The December 9, 2020, document did not break down the above figure of~~
~~52 to 57 amphibious ships into separate figures for LPD-type ships and LAWs.~~

17 20 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “‘If It Floats, It Fights:’ Navy’s New Small Ship Strategy,” Breaking Defense, August 28, 2020. 21 The term The term L-class amphibious ships refers to the Navy’s LHA/LHD- and LPD-type amphibious ships, whose refers to the Navy’s LHA/LHD- and LPD-type amphibious ships, whose
designation begins with the letter L in reference to amphibious designation begins with the letter L in reference to amphibious landing. .
1822 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, February 2021, pp. 7-9 to 7-10. Congressional Research Service 6 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ship Design The Navy wants LAWs to be a relatively simple and relatively inexpensive ships with the following features, among others:  a length of 200 feet to 400 feet;23  a maximum draft of 12 feet;  a displacement of up to 4,000 tons;24  a ship’s crew of no more than 40 Navy sailors;25  an ability to embark at least 75 Marines;  4,000 to 8,000 square feet of cargo area for the Marines’ weapons, equipment, and supplies;26  a stern or bow landing ramp for moving the Marines and their weapons, equipment, and supplies the ship to shore (and vice versa) across a beach;  a modest suite of C4I equipment;27  a 25mm or 30mm gun system and .50 caliber machine guns for self-defense;  a transit speed of at least 14 knots, and preferably 15 knots;28  a minimum unrefueled transit range of 3,500 nautical miles;29 23 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020. 24 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020. 25 A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that “The ship shall be capable of at least 11 day missions without replenishment for 40 crew and 50 embarked personnel.” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) 26 ~~Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,~~ ~~Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base~~
~~Operations, February 2021, pp. 7-9 to 7-10.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
6

~~link to page 11 link to page 11~~ ~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~June 17, 2021, Long-Range Navy Shipbuilding Document~~
~~On the evening of June 17, 2021, following conclusion of the hearing discussed above, the Biden~~
~~Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that calls for a Navy with a~~
~~more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large~~
~~unmanned surface and underwater UVs. Within the total of 321 to 372 manned ships, the~~
~~document calls for an amphibious fleet of 48 to 63 amphibious ships, including 8 to 9 LHA/LHD-~~
~~type ships, 16 to 19 LPD-type ships, and 24 to 35 LAWs.~~
~~Current and Potential New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goals~~
Table 1 compares the force-level goal for amphibious ships within the Navy’s 355-ship plan to
~~the emerging force-level goals for amphibious ships in the December 9, 2020, and June 17, 2021,~~
~~long-range Navy shipbuilding documents, and to figures included in remarks made by the Chief~~
~~of Naval Operations at a conference on February 18, 2022.~~
~~Table 1. Current and Potential New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goals~~
~~Emerging force-~~
~~Emerging force-~~
~~level goal in~~
~~level goal in~~
~~Trump~~
~~Biden~~
~~February, 18, 2022,~~
~~355-~~
~~Administration~~
~~Administration~~
~~remarks by Chief~~
~~ship~~
~~December 9,~~
~~June 17, 2021,~~
~~of Naval~~
~~Ship type~~
~~goal~~
~~2020, document~~
~~document~~
~~Operations~~
~~Large-deck (LHA/LHD)~~
12
~~9 to 10~~
~~8 to 9~~
9
~~LPD-type~~
26
~~n/a~~
~~16 to 19~~
~~19 or 20~~
~~Subtotal larger ships (LHA/LHD-~~
38
~~n/a~~
~~24 to 28~~
~~28 or 29~~
~~type and LPD-type)~~
~~Light Amphibious Warships (LAWs)~~
0
~~n/a~~
~~24 to 35~~
~~30 (or more)~~
~~LPD-type and LAWs combined~~
26
~~52 to 57~~
~~40 to 54~~
~~49 or 50 (or more)~~
~~TOTAL all types~~
38
~~61 to 67~~
~~48 to 63~~
~~58 or 59 (or more)~~
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data and (for final column) Sam LaGrone and Mallory
~~Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: ‘We Need a Naval Force of Over 500 Ships,’” USNI News, February 18, 2022; Justin~~
~~Katz, “CNO Lays Out Future Fleet He Wants: 500 ships, 12 Carriers, 150 Unmanned Vessels,” Breaking Defense,~~
~~February 18, 2022; Richard R. Burgess, “CNO Is ‘Sighted on a Bigger, More Capable Navy,’” Seapower, February~~
~~22, 2022. The Breaking Defense article of February 18, 2022, article reported the figure for LAW as 20 to 30.~~
Note: N/a means not available.
~~Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program19~~
~~Overview~~
~~As shown in Table 1, the June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document envisions~~
~~procuring a total of 24 to 35 LAWs. Other Navy documents refer to a requirement for 35 LAWs.~~

~~19 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section about the LAW is taken from Navy briefing slides and Navy~~
~~answers to industry questions from LAW program industry days that were held on March 4 and April 9, 2020, and~~
~~posted on March 20, May 5, and May 7, 2020, at “RFI: US Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW),”~~
~~https://beta.sam.gov/opp/90a9ece86ade48089e9f6d57d2969d23/view, accessed by CRS on May 15, 2020.~~
~~For press articles about the LAW, see Megan Eckstein, “Navy Researching New Class of Medium Amphibious Ship,~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
7

~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~The figure of 35 LAWs includes nine operational LAWs for each of three envisioned Marine~~
~~Littoral Regiments (MLRs), plus eight additional LAWs to account for factors such as a certain~~
~~number of LAWs being in maintenance at any given moment. LAWs would be much smaller and~~
~~individually much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious~~
~~ships. The Navy envisions the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed~~
~~FY2022 budget requested $13.2 million in research and development funding for the program.~~
~~Ship Design~~
~~The Navy wants LAWs to be a relatively simple and relatively inexpensive ships with the~~
~~following features, among others:~~
~~ a length of 200 feet to 400 feet;20~~
~~ a maximum draft of 12 feet;~~
~~ a displacement of up to 4,000 tons;21~~
~~ a ship’s crew of no more than 40 Navy sailors;22~~
~~ an ability to embark at least 75 Marines;~~
~~ 4,000 to 8,000 square feet of cargo area for the Marines’ weapons, equipment,~~
~~and supplies;23~~
~~ a stern or bow landing ramp for moving the Marines and their weapons,~~
~~equipment, and supplies the ship to shore (and vice versa) across a beach;~~
~~ a modest suite of C4I equipment;24~~
~~ a 25mm or 30mm gun system and .50 caliber machine guns for self-defense;~~
~~ a transit speed of at least 14 knots, and preferably 15 knots;25~~

~~New Logistics Ships,” USNI News, February 20, 2020. See also Rich Abott, “FY 2021 Request Starts Work on Future~~
~~Amphibs and Logistics Ships,” Defense Daily, February 20, 2020; David Axe, “This Weird Little Ship Could Be the~~
~~Future of Amphibious Warfare,” National Interest, February 24, 2020; Mallory Shellbourne, “Navy begins pursuit of~~
~~Light Amphibious Warship,” Inside Defense, March 26, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Wants To Buy 30 New Light~~
~~Amphibious Warships To Support Radical Shift In Marine Ops,” The Drive, May 5, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Navy~~
~~Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020.~~
~~20 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,~~
~~November 19, 2020.~~
~~21 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,~~
~~November 19, 2020.~~
22 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy
released on October 16, 2020, states that released on October 16, 2020, states that ~~“The ship shall be capable of at least 11 day missions without replenishment~~
~~for 40 crew and 50 embarked personnel.”~~the “ship shall have a cargo deck capable of carrying 648 ST [short tons] and a minimum deck area of 8000” square feet. (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Requirements (CoR), Draft (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Requirements (CoR), Draft
for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 65 of 19, attachment to “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light of 19, attachment to “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light
Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23,
2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
2327 C4I is command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence. 28 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “ship shall program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “ship shall ~~have a cargo deck capable of carrying 648~~
~~ST [short tons] and a minimum deck area of 8000” square feet.~~be capable of a minimum transit speed of 14 knots in Sea State three (SS3) at the ship’s full load condition….” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 56 of 19, attachment to “RFI: of 19, attachment to “RFI:
DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,
accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
~~24 C4I is command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence.~~
2529 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that The ship shall be capable of 3500 nautical miles endurance at 14 knots without refueling at the ship’s full load condition….” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, Congressional Research Service 7 ~~Congressional Research Service~~
8

link to page link to page 512 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 4 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

 a  a ~~minimum unrefueled transit range of 3,500 nautical miles;26~~
~~ a~~ “Tier 2+” plus level of survivability (i.e., ruggedness for withstanding battle “Tier 2+” plus level of survivability (i.e., ruggedness for withstanding battle
damage)—a level, broadly comparable to that of a smaller U.S. Navy surface damage)—a level, broadly comparable to that of a smaller U.S. Navy surface
combatant (i.e., a corvette or frigate), that would permit the ship to absorb a hit combatant (i.e., a corvette or frigate), that would permit the ship to absorb a hit
from an enemy weapon and keep the crew safe until they and their equipment from an enemy weapon and keep the crew safe until they and their equipment
and supplies can be transferred to another LAW;and supplies can be transferred to another LAW;2730
 an ability to operate within fleet groups or deploy independently; and  an ability to operate within fleet groups or deploy independently; and
 a 20-year expected service life. a 20-year expected service life.2831
In addition to the above points, the Navy states that the LAW’s design can be based on a In addition to the above points, the Navy states that the LAW’s design can be based on a
commercial-ship design. commercial-ship design.
A ship fitting the requirements listed above would be only a fraction as large as the Navy’s A ship fitting the requirements listed above would be only a fraction as large as the Navy’s
current amphibious ships. The Navy’s LHA/LHD-type ships are 844 to 855 feet long and have a current amphibious ships. The Navy’s LHA/LHD-type ships are 844 to 855 feet long and have a
full load displacements between 40,000 and 45,000 tons, while its and LPD-17 class ships are 684 full load displacements between 40,000 and 45,000 tons, while its and LPD-17 class ships are 684
feet long and have a full load displacement of 24,900 tons. As noted in the third bullet point feet long and have a full load displacement of 24,900 tons. As noted in the third bullet point
above, the LAW is to have a displacement of up to 4,000 tons—about 1/10th or 1/11th the above, the LAW is to have a displacement of up to 4,000 tons—about 1/10th or 1/11th the
displacement of an LHA/LHD-type ship, and about 1/6th the displacement of an LPD-17 class displacement of an LHA/LHD-type ship, and about 1/6th the displacement of an LPD-17 class
ships. ships.
The LAW’s maximum draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit shallow waters on The LAW’s maximum draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit shallow waters on
its way to and from landing beaches. The Navy prefers that the ship’s cargo space be in the form its way to and from landing beaches. The Navy prefers that the ship’s cargo space be in the form
of open deck storage. Unlike most of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, the LAW would not of open deck storage. Unlike most of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, the LAW would not
have a well deck.have a well deck.2932 A transit speed of about 15 knots would be less than the approximate 22-knot A transit speed of about 15 knots would be less than the approximate 22-knot
maximum sustained speed of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships, but it is a relatively fuel-maximum sustained speed of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships, but it is a relatively fuel-
efficient speed for moving ships through water,efficient speed for moving ships through water,3033 which would permit the ship to be equipped which would permit the ship to be equipped
with a less powerful and consequently less expensive propulsion plant. The 20-year expected with a less powerful and consequently less expensive propulsion plant. The 20-year expected
service life is less than the 30- to 45-year expected service lives of larger U.S. Navy amphibious service life is less than the 30- to 45-year expected service lives of larger U.S. Navy amphibious

~~November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law~~
~~program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “ship shall be capable of a minimum transit speed of~~
~~14 knots in Sea State three (SS3) at the ship’s full load condition….” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of~~
~~Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI:~~
~~DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,~~
~~accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)~~
~~26 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,~~
~~November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law~~
~~program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that The ship shall be capable of 3500 nautical miles endurance~~
~~at 14 knots without refueling at the ship’s full load condition….” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of~~
~~Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI:~~
~~DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,~~
ships—a difference that could reduce the LAW’s construction cost for a ship of its type and size—and closer to the 25-year expected service life of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).34 Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 show one firm’s LAW design. The design reportedly has a length of 120 meters (about 394 feet), a displacement of 4,500 tons, and 10,500 square feet of deck space for rolling stock or other cargoes.35 The Navy’s eventual preferred design for the LAW might or might not look like this design. accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
2730 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
2831 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. See also Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious November 19, 2020. See also Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious
Warship to Haul 75 Marines for $150M or Less,” Warship to Haul 75 Marines for $150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022. , February 10, 2022.
2932 As noted in footno As noted in footnote 3, a well deck is a large, covered, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded a well deck is a large, covered, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded
with water so that landing craft can leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate with water so that landing craft can leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate
that is somewhat like a garage door. that is somewhat like a garage door.
3033 Due to the density of water, fuel consumption for moving monohull ships through the water tends to increase steeply Due to the density of water, fuel consumption for moving monohull ships through the water tends to increase steeply
for speeds above 14 to 16 knots. for speeds above 14 to 16 knots.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16~~

~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~ships—a difference that could reduce the LAW’s construction cost for a ship of its type and~~
~~size—and closer to the 25-year expected service life of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships~~
~~(LCSs).31~~
Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 show one firm’s LAW design. The design reportedly has a
~~length of 120 meters (about 394 feet), a displacement of 4,500 tons, and 10,500 square feet of~~
~~deck space for rolling stock or other cargoes.32 The Navy’s eventual preferred design for the LAW~~
~~might or might not look like this design.~~
~~Figure 1. One Firm’s Design for LAW~~
~~Artist’s rendering~~

Source: Cropped version of il ustration of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin Manaranche,
~~“Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. A caption credits the~~
~~il ustration to Austal.~~
~~Procurement Schedule~~
~~Navy plans call for the first LAW to be procured in FY2023. The December 9, 2020, long-range~~
~~Navy shipbuilding document submitted by the Trump Administration showed the first LAW as~~
~~scheduled for procurement in FY2022 rather than FY2023, and the first 10 LAWs as being~~

3134 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
3235 Martin Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Martin Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. See , August 3, 2021. See
also Thomas Newdick, “Austal’s Light Amphibious Warship Design Is A Throwback To WWII’s Tank Landing also Thomas Newdick, “Austal’s Light Amphibious Warship Design Is A Throwback To WWII’s Tank Landing
Ships,” Ships,” The Drive, August 6, 2021. , August 6, 2021.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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link to page 7 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

~~scheduled for procurement in FY2022-FY2026 in annual quantities of 1-1-2-3-3. A June 21,~~
~~2021, press report stated~~
~~In its recent fiscal 2022 budget request, the Navy did not ask for money to begin~~
~~procurement in FY22, though. Navy spokesman Capt. Clay Doss told Defense News the~~
~~program would begin acquisition in FY23 if Congress funds the Navy’s request for just~~
~~research and development funds in FY22 to prepare for acquisition in FY23. He said the~~
~~decision to slow the program down was a fiscal one, not a sign of engineering or other~~
~~challenges.33~~
~~Figure 2~~Figure 1. One Firm’s Design for LAW
~~Photograph of model displayed at trade show~~

Artist’s rendering Source: Cropped version of Cropped version of ~~photograph of model~~il ustration of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin
Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. , August 3, 2021. ~~The model~~
~~was displayed at the Sea Air Space 2021 exposition.~~
~~Procurement Cost~~
~~The Navy estimated in July 2021 that the first LAW would cost about $156 million to procure,~~
~~and that subsequent LAWs would cost about $130 million each to procure.34 In February 2022, a~~
~~Navy official, providing a somewhat different figure, reportedly stated that the Navy wants each~~
~~LAW to cost $150 million or less.35~~
~~By way of comparison, the Navy’s most recently procured LHA-type amphibious ship, which~~
~~was procured in FY2017, has an estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY2022 budget~~
~~submission of about $3.8 billion, and LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships being procured by the~~
~~Navy have unit procurement costs of about $2.0 billion.~~

~~33 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21,~~
~~2021. See also Megan Eckstein, “US Navy’s Light Amphibious Warship No Longer on Track for 2022 Contract~~
~~Award,” Defense News, June 10, 2021.~~
~~34 Source: Navy briefing on LAW program for CRS and CBO, July 19, 2021.~~
~~35 Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious Warship to Haul 75 Marines for~~
~~$150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022.~~
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~~link to page 11~~

~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Figure 3. One Firm’s Design for LAW~~
~~Photograph of model displayed at trade show~~

A caption credits the il ustration to Austal. Potential Builders The LAW as outlined by the Navy could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. Acquisition Strategy Overview The Navy’s baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships in the LAW program, but the Navy is open to having LAWs built in multiple yards to the same design if doing so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.36 As noted 36 The Q&A document from the Navy’s April 9, 2020, industry day on the LAW program (see footnote 15) states Q [from industry]: Once [the industry] studies are done, what is the likelihood of [the Navy making] multiple [contract] awards [for the next stage]? A [from Navy]: When the [industry] studies are done, there will be multiple [contract] awards for preliminary design [work]. Then [the Navy will] down select for a [preferred] prototype. [There is] No plan for [building the ships at] multiple [ship]yards and [building them to multiple] designs like [the] LCS [Littoral Combat Ship program]. It’s too hard of a logistics tail [to provide lifecycle support for ships built to multiple designs]. But options are open if it is cheaper/faster. Congressional Research Service 9 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress earlier, the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the first LAW would be awarded in December 2024. Figure 2. One Firm’s Design for LAW Photograph of model displayed at trade show Source: Cropped version of photograph of model of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model was displayed at the Sea Air Space 2021 exposition. Reported July 2020 Contract Awards An October 6, 2020, press report stated that the Navy in July 2020 awarded contracts for LAW concept design studies to 15 firms, with the studies due in November 2020. According to the press report, the 15 companies awarded contracts included Austal USE, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St John Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Technology Associates, Thoma-Sea, and VT Halter Marine. The studies reportedly were intended to help inform concepts of operation, technical risk, and cost estimates for the LAW program, in support of a planned lead-ship contract award in FY2022. An August 27, 2020, press report states The Navy and Marine Corps’ new Light Amphibious Warship program is already in industry studies, with the service pushing ahead as quickly as possible in an acknowledgement that they’re already behind in their transformation of the force. Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps the most important Q [from industry]: Do you envision something similar to LCS variance [sic: variants]? Multiple yards and designs? A [from Navy]: No, it involves too much logistics and O&S [operation and support costs]. This drives overall costs initially [i.e., locks higher life-cycle support costs into the program from the outset of the program] and we’re not trying to go down that path. As we’ve said before, if studies tell us we are wrong, if it’s affordable and fields faster, then we won’t ignore it. The data and cost drivers will help us decide. The Government wants to field [the ships] as rapidly as possible, and we believe that using multiple yards is not the best and most affordable path. Congressional Research Service 10 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base operations (EABO). “Having these LAWs out there as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our Navy, engaging with our partners and allies, building partner capacity, is what I think we need to be doing right now. I think we’re late to need with building the Light Amphibious Warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly,” he said, saying that N95 was copying the surface warfare directorate’s playbook from the frigate program, which moved quickly from requirements-development to design to getting under contract thanks to the use of mature technology and designs from industry.37 Figure 3. One Firm’s Design for LAW Photograph of model displayed at trade show Source: Cropped version of photograph of model of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model was displayed at the Sea Air Space 2021 exposition. October 2020 Request for Information (RFI) On October 16, 2020, the Navy released a request for information (RFI) to solicit industry input on draft versions of documents relating to an eventual solicitation for conducting design work on the ship.38 Source: Cropped version of photograph of model of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin
~~Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model~~
~~was displayed at the Sea Air Space 2021 exposition.~~
~~As additional comparisons, the Navy’s Ship-to-Shore Connectors (SSCs)—its new air-cushioned~~
~~landing craft—are about 92 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of roughly $65 million,~~
~~the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are 154 feet long and have a unit~~
~~procurement cost of about $65 million, and the Navy’s new TATS towing, salvage, and rescue~~
~~ships are 263 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of about $80 million.~~
~~Potential Builders~~
~~The LAW as outlined by the Navy is small enough that it could be built by any of several U.S.~~
~~shipyards.~~
~~Acquisition Strategy~~
~~Overview~~
~~The Navy’s baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all 24 to 35 ships, but the Navy~~
~~is open to having them built in multiple yards to the same design if doing so could permit the~~
~~program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.36~~

~~36 The Q&A document from the Navy’s April 9, 2020, industry day on the LAW program (see footnote 19) states~~
~~Q [from industry]: Once [the industry] studies are done, what is the likelihood of [the Navy~~
~~making] multiple [contract] awards [for the next stage]?~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
12

~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~The Navy plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail design and construction~~
~~(DD&C) contract for the LAW program in the second quarter of FY2022, and to award the~~
~~contract in the first quester of FY2023.~~
~~Reported July 2020 Contract Awards~~
~~An October 6, 2020, press report stated that the Navy in July 2020 awarded contracts for LAW~~
~~concept design studies to 15 firms, with the studies due in November 2020. According to the~~
~~press report, the 15 companies awarded contracts included Austal USE, BMT Designers,~~
~~Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime~~
~~Assessment Associates, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St John~~
~~Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Technology Associates, Thoma-Sea, and VT Halter Marine. The studies~~
~~reportedly were intended to help inform concepts of operation, technical risk, and cost estimates~~
~~for the LAW program, in support of a planned lead-ship contract award in FY2022. An August~~
~~27, 2020, press report states~~
~~The Navy and Marine Corps’ new Light Amphibious Warship program is already in~~
~~industry studies, with the service pushing ahead as quickly as possible in an~~
~~acknowledgement that they’re already behind in their transformation of the force.~~
~~Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval~~
~~operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps the most important~~
~~investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base~~
~~operations (EABO).~~
~~“Having these LAWs out there as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our~~
~~Navy, engaging with our partners and allies, building partner capacity, is what I think we~~
~~need to be doing right now. I think we’re late to need with building the Light Amphibious~~
~~Warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly,” he said, saying that N95 was copying~~
~~the surface warfare directorate’s playbook from the frigate program, which moved quickly~~
~~from requirements-development to design to getting under contract thanks to the use of~~
~~mature technology and designs from industry.37~~

~~A [from Navy]: When the [industry] studies are done, there will be multiple [contract] awards for~~
~~preliminary design [work]. Then [the Navy will] down select for a [preferred] prototype. [There is]~~
~~No plan for [building the ships at] multiple [ship]yards and [building them to multiple] designs like~~
~~[the] LCS [Littoral Combat Ship program]. It’s too hard of a logistics tail [to provide lifecycle~~
~~support for ships built to multiple designs]. But options are open if it is cheaper/faster.~~
~~Q [from industry]: Do you envision something similar to LCS variance [sic: variants]? Multiple~~
~~yards and designs?~~
~~A [from Navy]: No, it involves too much logistics and O&S [operation and support costs]. This~~
~~drives overall costs initially [i.e., locks higher life-cycle support costs into the program from the~~
~~outset of the program] and we’re not trying to go down that path. As we’ve said before, if studies~~
~~tell us we are wrong, if it’s affordable and fields faster, then we won’t ignore it. The data and cost~~
~~drivers will help us decide. The Government wants to field [the ships] as rapidly as possible, and~~
~~we believe that using multiple yards is not the best and most affordable path.~~
37 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them 37 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them
ASAP,” ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Rich Abott, “Marine Corps In Industry Studies , August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Rich Abott, “Marine Corps In Industry Studies
For Light Amphibious Warship, Trying To Move Quickly,” For Light Amphibious Warship, Trying To Move Quickly,” Defense Daily, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~October 2020 Request for Information (RFI)~~
~~On October 16, 2020, the Navy released a request for information (RFI) to solicit industry input~~
~~on draft versions of documents relating to an eventual solicitation for conducting design work on~~
~~the ship.38~~38 See “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Issues RFI For Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design,” Defense Daily, October 19, 2020; Aidan Quigley, “Navy Solicits Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Designs,” Inside Defense, October 19, 2020. Congressional Research Service 11 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
November 2020 Press Report About Concept Designs
A November 9, 2020, press report stated that, as part of its LAW industry studies, the Navy had A November 9, 2020, press report stated that, as part of its LAW industry studies, the Navy had
received nine LAW concept designs from 16 design firms and shipyards, some of which have received nine LAW concept designs from 16 design firms and shipyards, some of which have
paired into teams. The report quoted a Navy official as stating that the following firms were paired into teams. The report quoted a Navy official as stating that the following firms were
participating in the industry studies: Austal USA, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere participating in the industry studies: Austal USA, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere
Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates, Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates,
Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St. John Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St. John Shipbuilding, Swiftships,
Technology Associates Inc., Thoma-Sea, VT Halter Marine and Fincantieri.39 A November 19, Technology Associates Inc., Thoma-Sea, VT Halter Marine and Fincantieri.39 A November 19,
2020, press report stated that “about six industry teams are working with the sea services [i.e., the 2020, press report stated that “about six industry teams are working with the sea services [i.e., the
Navy and Marine Corps] after two industry days and industry studies over the summer.40 Navy and Marine Corps] after two industry days and industry studies over the summer.40
A January 11, 2021, press report stated A January 11, 2021, press report stated
The Navy and Marine Corps are quickly seeking new ideas that allow Marines to support The Navy and Marine Corps are quickly seeking new ideas that allow Marines to support
the Navy in sea control and other maritime missions, including the rapid acquisition of a the Navy in sea control and other maritime missions, including the rapid acquisition of a
light amphibious ship and a movement toward using Marine weapons while at sea. light amphibious ship and a movement toward using Marine weapons while at sea.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), told USNI News during a Jan. 8 media call that the operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), told USNI News during a Jan. 8 media call that the
services are moving quickly to buy their first light amphibious warship (LAW) in Fiscal services are moving quickly to buy their first light amphibious warship (LAW) in Fiscal
Year 2022, as outlined in the recent long-range shipbuilding plan. Year 2022, as outlined in the recent long-range shipbuilding plan.
“We’re moving out at flank speed; I got a chance to brief the CNO and the commandant “We’re moving out at flank speed; I got a chance to brief the CNO and the commandant
recently, and they told me to maintain course and heading,” he said during the media call recently, and they told me to maintain course and heading,” he said during the media call
ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium. ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium.
“We’re going through the formal JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development “We’re going through the formal JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System) process right now. [Naval Sea Systems Command] has completed its second System) process right now. [Naval Sea Systems Command] has completed its second
industry studies, and we’re working on all those documents.” industry studies, and we’re working on all those documents.”
For now, 10 or 11 industry teams remain involved in the NAVSEA competition, which For now, 10 or 11 industry teams remain involved in the NAVSEA competition, which
recently held a second round of industry studies. NAVSEA is working with those teams to recently held a second round of industry studies. NAVSEA is working with those teams to
help iterate what King called “novel” designs, to ensure they were the right size and could help iterate what King called “novel” designs, to ensure they were the right size and could
achieve cost and performance requirements. Mid next year, he said, NAVSEA would achieve cost and performance requirements. Mid next year, he said, NAVSEA would
downselect to three teams for full design, and then would downselect to just one to build downselect to three teams for full design, and then would downselect to just one to build
the first LAW in late FY2022. the first LAW in late FY2022.

~~38 See “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,”~~
~~Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?~~
~~index=opp. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Issues RFI For Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~Daily, October 19, 2020; Aidan Quigley, “Navy Solicits Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Designs,”~~ ~~Inside~~
~~Defense, October 19, 2020.~~
~~39 Aidan Quigley, “Nine Concept Designs Submitted for LAW Industry Studies,” Inside Defense, November 9, 2020.~~
~~40 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,~~
~~November 19, 2020.~~
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~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

“My suspicion is that we’ll begin [research, development, test and evaluation] next year, “My suspicion is that we’ll begin [research, development, test and evaluation] next year,
and then we are aiming at lead ship construction in FY ’22, it’s going to be late in FY ’22 and then we are aiming at lead ship construction in FY ’22, it’s going to be late in FY ’22
,but I still consider that pretty fast,” King said. ,but I still consider that pretty fast,” King said.
“We’re just going to build one, get that out and start playing with it. We’ll probably build “We’re just going to build one, get that out and start playing with it. We’ll probably build
one the next year because we’ve got to get the doctrine right. The [Marine Littoral one the next year because we’ve got to get the doctrine right. The [Marine Littoral
Regiments] are going to start coming online at about the same time – first one’s in Hawaii, Regiments] are going to start coming online at about the same time – first one’s in Hawaii,
we’ll get it out there and let them play with it. And then we’ll go into a build profile of, I we’ll get it out there and let them play with it. And then we’ll go into a build profile of, I
don’t know, probably four or five a year or something like that is what we’re going to aim don’t know, probably four or five a year or something like that is what we’re going to aim
for.”41 for.”41
39 Aidan Quigley, “Nine Concept Designs Submitted for LAW Industry Studies,” Inside Defense, November 9, 2020. 40 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020. 41 Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Moving Quickly on Light Amphib, Anti-Ship Missiles to Create More Warfighting Options,” USNI News, January 11, 2021. Material in brackets as in original. See also Rich Abott, “Kilby Outlines Factors Leading To Faster New Light Amphib Development,” Defense Daily, February 5, 2021. Congressional Research Service 12 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress June 2021 Contract Awards
A June 17, 2021, press report states A June 17, 2021, press report states
The Navy this week issued “concept design” contracts to five companies for the Light The Navy this week issued “concept design” contracts to five companies for the Light
Amphibious Warship ahead of the Fiscal Year 2023 design selection, a service spokesman Amphibious Warship ahead of the Fiscal Year 2023 design selection, a service spokesman
confirmed to USNI News. confirmed to USNI News.
Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers were selected Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers were selected
for the contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau said. for the contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau said.
“A Concept Studies (CS) contract has been awarded to five offerors with a follow-on “A Concept Studies (CS) contract has been awarded to five offerors with a follow-on
option for Preliminary Design (PD),” Baribeau said in a statement. “The CS/PD efforts option for Preliminary Design (PD),” Baribeau said in a statement. “The CS/PD efforts
include engineering analyses, tradeoff studies, and development of engineering and design include engineering analyses, tradeoff studies, and development of engineering and design
documentation defining concepts studies/preliminary designs.” documentation defining concepts studies/preliminary designs.”
The Navy did not disclose the amount of money each company received to perform the The Navy did not disclose the amount of money each company received to perform the
work, but Baribeau confirmed to USNI News that the total combined amount of the work, but Baribeau confirmed to USNI News that the total combined amount of the
contracts was less than $7.5 million.42 contracts was less than $7.5 million.42
A February 10, 2022, press report states A February 10, 2022, press report states
Moving ahead, the services [i.e., the Navy and Marine Corps] expect a “full and open Moving ahead, the services [i.e., the Navy and Marine Corps] expect a “full and open
competition” once they issue the request for proposals for the detail[ed] design and competition” once they issue the request for proposals for the detail[ed] design and
construction phase, according to Tom Rivers, the executive director of the amphibious, construction phase, according to Tom Rivers, the executive director of the amphibious,
auxiliary and sealift office within the Program Executive Office for Ships. auxiliary and sealift office within the Program Executive Office for Ships.
After issuing five companies “concept design” contracts last year, those same five After issuing five companies “concept design” contracts last year, those same five
companies recently received options for the preliminary design phase, Rivers said. The companies recently received options for the preliminary design phase, Rivers said. The
companies working on the preliminary design are Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter companies working on the preliminary design are Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter
Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers. Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers.
“So LAW—the initial thought process is based upon parent designs [i.e., existing ship “So LAW—the initial thought process is based upon parent designs [i.e., existing ship
designs from which the design for LAW could be derived] that are already out there in the designs from which the design for LAW could be derived] that are already out there in the
world today to, again, to reduce our risks,” Rivers said at the conference. “As new world today to, again, to reduce our risks,” Rivers said at the conference. “As new
requirements are generated out of the Pentagon, we actually are sharing those with the requirements are generated out of the Pentagon, we actually are sharing those with the
shipyards so they can kind of see what we’re thinking about how it evolves over time and shipyards so they can kind of see what we’re thinking about how it evolves over time and
then they can kind of build that into the—and they come back to us and say, ‘hey here’s then they can kind of build that into the—and they come back to us and say, ‘hey here’s
the impact of that particular change on our configuration.’ Either it’s small or large and the impact of that particular change on our configuration.’ Either it’s small or large and
then we take that in consideration into the final requirements.” then we take that in consideration into the final requirements.”

~~41 Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Moving Quickly on Light Amphib, Anti-Ship Missiles to Create More Warfighting~~
~~Options,” USNI News, January 11, 2021. Material in brackets as in original. See also Rich Abott, “Kilby Outlines~~
~~Factors Leading To Faster New Light Amphib Development,” Defense Daily, February 5, 2021.~~
~~42 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Awards 5 Companies Light Amphibious Warship ‘Concept Design’ Contracts,”~~ ~~USNI~~
~~News, June 17, 2021.~~
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15

~~link to page 11~~ ~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~This type of process is helping the Navy determine what it can do with the various parent~~
~~designs, Rivers said.43~~
~~RFP and Award of Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) Contract~~
~~As mentioned earlier, the Navy plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail~~
~~design and construction (DD&C) contract for the LAW program in the second quarter of FY2022,~~
~~and to award the contract in the first quester of FY2023.~~
~~FY2022~~ This type of process is helping the Navy determine what it can do with the various parent designs, Rivers said.43 FY2023 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed The Navy’s proposed ~~FY2022~~FY2023 budget budget ~~requested $13~~requests $12.2 million in research and development .2 million in research and development
funding for the program. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium funding for the program. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium
Amphibious Ship) of PE (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which Amphibious Ship) of PE (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which
is line number 46 in the Navy’s is line number 46 in the Navy’s ~~FY2022~~FY2023 research and development account. 42 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Awards 5 Companies Light Amphibious Warship ‘Concept Design’ Contracts,” USNI News, June 17, 2021. 43 Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious Warship to Haul 75 Marines for $150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022. See also Aidan Quigley, “Five Shipbuilders Emerge as Leading Light Amphibious Warship Contenders,” Inside Defense, February 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Issues for Congress The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including those discussed briefly in the sections below. Deferral of Lead Ship Procurement to FY2025 As noted earlier, previous Navy plans envisioned starting procurement of LAWs in FY2023. Compared to the previously envisioned start of procurement in FY2023, the Navy’s FY2023 five-year shipbuilding plan in effect defers the start of LAW procurement two years, to FY2025. A March 30, 2022, press report stated: “The Marine Corps and the Department are getting the requirements tight on that ship before we choose to put it in our [shipbuilding appropriations account]. So there is funding in R&D for LAW,” Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Budget, told reporters during a roundtable ahead of the [FY2023] budget release Monday [March 28].44 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:  Why does the Navy need an additional two years of time to study requirements for the LAW? What has changed that would require that much additional time for the study of operational requirements?  What impact will the two-year deferral have in terms of reducing technical, schedule, and cost risk in the LAW program? What impact will it have on Navy-Marine Corps capabilities and operational risks over the next several years? Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal Another issue for Congress concerns the future amphibious ship force-level goal, which could affect future procurement quantities for LAWs. ~~research and development account.~~
~~Issues for Congress~~
~~The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including those~~
~~discussed briefly in the sections below.~~
~~Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal~~
~~One issue for Congress concerns the future amphibious ship force-level goal, which could affect~~
~~future procurement quantities for LHA-type ships, LPD-17 Flight II class ships, and LAWs. In~~
~~connection with this issue, one potential oversight question for Congress concerns the difference~~
~~between the emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships in the Biden Administration’s June~~
~~17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document and the emerging force-level goal for~~
~~amphibious ships in the Trump Administration’s December 9, 2020, long-range Navy~~
~~shipbuilding document. Using the figures shown in Table 1, the Trump Administration’s~~
~~emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships includes about 6%-27% more amphibious ships~~
~~in total than the Biden Administration’s emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships. A~~
~~potential oversight question is to what degree this difference between the two emerging force-~~
~~level goals is due to differences between the two Administrations regarding one or more of the~~
~~following factors:~~
~~ U.S. national security strategy and U.S. national defense strategy;~~
~~ projections of future capabilities of potential adversaries such as China and~~
~~Russia;~~
~~ consequent requirements, from the two factors above, for day-to-day forward-~~
~~deployed Navy capacity and capability and Navy warfighting capacity and~~
~~capability;~~
~~ assumptions about the capabilities of future U.S. Navy manned and unmanned~~
~~ships;~~
~~ Navy homeporting arrangements and operational cycles;~~

~~43 Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious Warship to Haul 75 Marines for~~
~~$150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022. See also Aidan Quigley, “Five Shipbuilders Emerge as Leading Light~~
~~Amphibious Warship Contenders,” Inside Defense, February 2, 2022.~~
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~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~ projections about future Navy budgets, including future Navy shipbuilding~~
~~budgets; and~~
~~ the degree of operational risk deemed acceptable regarding the ability of the~~
~~Navy to successfully perform its various day-to-day and warfighting missions.~~
A related potential oversight issue for Congress concerns how the LAW would fit into the Navy’s A related potential oversight issue for Congress concerns how the LAW would fit into the Navy’s
overall future fleet architecture. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: overall future fleet architecture. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
  Has the navy completed its study of amphibious ship force-level requirements? When does the Navy anticipate informing Congress of the results of the study?  What is the analytical basis for the envisioned procurement quantity of What is the analytical basis for the envisioned procurement quantity of 24up to 35 to 35
LAWs? LAWs?4445
 How well can the cost-effectiveness of a force of  How well can the cost-effectiveness of a force of 24up to 35 LAWs be assessed if to 35 LAWs be assessed if
the remainder of the Navy’s amphibious ship fleet architecture is not yet fully the remainder of the Navy’s amphibious ship fleet architecture is not yet fully
known? known?
EABO Operational Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of the EABO operational Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of the EABO operational
concept that the LAW is intended to help Marine Corps implement. Debate on the merits of the concept that the LAW is intended to help Marine Corps implement. Debate on the merits of the
EABO concept concerns issues such as EABO concept concerns issues such as
~~ whether the concept is focused too exclusively on potential conflict scenarios~~
~~with China at the expense of other kinds of potential Marine Corps missions;~~
~~ the ability of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would~~
~~operate;~~
~~ the ability to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;45~~
~~ the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;46~~
~~ how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would~~
~~make in contributing to overall U.S. sea-denial operations; and~~
~~ potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be~~
~~needed to implement EABO.47~~

~~44 For an article that raises questions concerning the analytical foundation for the LAW program, see Daniel Goure,~~
~~“Light Amphibious Warship: A Mistake For The U.S. Marine Corps And Navy?” 19FortyFive, July 27, 2021.~~
~~45 See, for example, John M. Doyle, “Berger Says Supporting a Widely Distributed Maritime Force Will Be a~~
~~Challenge,” Seapower, May 14, 2021.~~
~~46 See, for example, Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Light Amphibious Warships Face Survivability Questions,” National Defense,~~
~~April 23, 2021.~~
~~47 For a CRS report on the proposed redesign of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as EABO,~~
~~see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. See also John M.~~
~~Doyle, “Navy, Marine Corps Labs Exploring How to Keep Advanced Bases Supplied and Safe,” Seapower, February~~
~~10, 2022.~~
~~For Marine Corps statements about the redesign of the Marine Corps and EABO, see U.S. Marine Corps,~~
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated, released July 2019, 23 pp.; U.S.
~~Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, March 2020, 13 pp.; David H. Berger, “The Case for Change,”~~ ~~Marine Corps~~
~~Gazette, June 2020: 8-12. See also Megan Eckstein, “Marines Testing Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping~~
~~Future,” USNI News, June 4 (updated June 12), 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Marines Look to Two New Ship Classes to~~
~~Define Future of Amphibious Operations,” USNI News, June 4 (updated June 12), 202; David Berger, “Marines Will~~
~~Help Fight Submarines,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2020.~~
~~For press articles discussing the proposed redesign of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as~~
~~EABO, see Philip Athey, “Marines vs. China―the Corps Just Put These Tactics to the Test,” Marine Corps Times,~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
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~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~
44 Rich Abott, “First Light Amphibious Warship Purchase Pushed Back To 2025,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2022. 45 For an article that raises questions concerning the analytical foundation for the LAW program, see Daniel Goure, “Light Amphibious Warship: A Mistake For The U.S. Marine Corps And Navy?” 19FortyFive, July 27, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress  whether the concept is focused too exclusively on potential conflict scenarios with China at the expense of other kinds of potential Marine Corps missions;  the ability of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would operate;  the ability to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;46  the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;47  how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would make in contributing to overall U.S. sea-denial operations; and  potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be needed to implement EABO.48
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?  What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?
 What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and war  What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and war
games to develop and test the concept? games to develop and test the concept?
 Would EABO be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of  Would EABO be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of
the funding and personnel? the funding and personnel?
~~Preliminary Cost Target~~Accuracy of Estimated Procurement Cost
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the ~~Navy’s preliminary~~ accuracy of the navy’s estimated procurement cost procurement cost
target for the LAW. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: target for the LAW. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 Is the Navy’s  Is the Navy’s ~~estimated unit procurement cost~~estimate reasonable, given the features the reasonable, given the features the
Navy wants the ship to Navy wants the ship to have? have?
 As the LAW program proceeds, will the operational requirements (and thus  As the LAW program proceeds, will the operational requirements (and thus procurement cost) ~~cost)~~
~~of the LAW increase?~~
~~In connection questions such as these, a September 21, 2020, press report states~~
~~The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious~~
~~warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities~~
~~it will bring to the fight.~~
~~The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make~~
~~a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport~~
~~Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day~~
~~presentation.~~
~~While the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy requirements,~~
~~that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build,~~

~~October 19, 2020; Mark Perry, “The Marines Corps Is Rolling Out a ‘Subversive’ New Strategy to Take on China,”~~
~~Business Insider, October 15, 2020; David B. Larter, “Are the US Army and US Marine Corps Competing for Missions~~
~~in the Pacific?” Defense News, October 14, 2020; Michael Fabey, “Template For Change: Marine Corps’ New Vision~~
~~Sets A Headmark For U.S. Navy Transformation,” Jane’s Navy International, September 9, 2020; Chris “Junior”~~
~~Cannon, “The Commandant Needs Our Help: Accelerating Marine Corps Force Development,” Center for International~~
~~Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 25, 2020; Mallory Shelbourne, “Panel: New Focus on China Fight Could Rob~~
~~Marine Corps of Versatility,” USNI News, July 30, 2020; Tanner Greer, “The Tip of the American Military Spear Is~~
~~Being Blunted,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2020; Ben Wan Beng Ho, “Shortfalls in the Marine Corps’ EABO Concept,”~~
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2020; J. Noel Williams, “Force Design,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2020;
~~Dakota Wood, “The Marines: To Boldly Go Where the Corps Has Gone Before,” Washington Times, June 24, 2020;~~
~~Paul McLeary, “In War, Chinese Shipyards Could Outpace US in Replacing Losses; Marine Commandant,”~~ ~~Breaking~~
~~Defense, June 17, 2020; Dakota Wood, The U.S. Marine Corps: A Service in Transition, Heritage Foundation, June~~
~~216, 2020, 18 pp.; David B. Larter, “In His Fight to Change the Corps, America’s Top Marine Takes Friendly Fire,”~~
Defense News, June 11, 2020; Gina Harkins, “Marine 3-Star Hits Back at Claims that Corps’ Future Design Is Too
~~China-Focused,” Military.com, June 2, 2020; Frank G. Hoffman, “Still First to Fight?” Marine Corps Gazette, June~~
~~2020; Gary Anderson, “Addressing the Chinese Threat in the Indo-Pacific Area,” Washington Times, May 25, 2020;~~
~~Matthew Fay and Michael A. Hunzeker, “No Sure Victory: The Marines New Force Design Plan and the Politics of~~
~~Implementation,” War on the Rocks, May 14, 2020; Jim Webb, “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps,”~~ ~~National~~
~~Interest, May 8, 2020; Grant Newsham, “US Marines Revamp Amid China’s Growing Threat,” Asia Times, May 7,~~
~~2020; Jeff Cummings, Scott Cuomo, Olivia A. Garard, and Noah Spataro, “Getting the Context of Marine Corps~~
~~Reform Right,” War on the Rocks, May 1, 2020; Benjamin Jensen, “The Rest of the Story: Evaluating the U.S. Marine~~
~~Corps Force Design 2030,” War on the Rocks, April 27, 2020; T. X. Hammes, “Building a Marine Corps for Every~~
~~Contingency, Clime, and Place,” War on the Rocks, April 15, 2020; Mark F. Cancian, “The Marine Corps’ Radical~~
~~Shift toward China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 25, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
18

~~link to page 24~~ ~~Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress~~

of the LAW increase? 46 See, for example, John M. Doyle, “Berger Says Supporting a Widely Distributed Maritime Force Will Be a Challenge,” Seapower, May 14, 2021. 47 See, for example, Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Light Amphibious Warships Face Survivability Questions,” National Defense, April 23, 2021. See also John M. Doyle, “Navy, Marine Corps Labs Exploring How to Keep Advanced Bases Supplied and Safe,” Seapower, February 10, 2022. 48 For a CRS report on the proposed redesign of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as EABO, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. For press articles discussing the proposed redesign of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as EABO, see Gary Anderson, “The Marine Corps' Intellectual Civil War,” Military.com, April 28, 2022; Charles Krulak, Jack Sheehan, and Anthony Zinni, “War Is a Dirty Business. Will the Marine Corps Be Ready for the Next One?” Washington Post, April 22, 2022; Anthony Zinni, “What Is the Role of the Marine Corps in Today’s Global Security Environment?” Task and Purpose, April 19, 2022; Philip Athey, “First to Fight: Is This the End of the Corps as America’s 911 Force?” Marine Corps Times, April 12, 2022; Otto Kreisher, “Controversial EABO Concept Has Potential but Will Be Vetted, Speakers Say,” Seapower, April 5, 2022; Konstantin Toropin, “After a Barrage of Editorials and Critiques, Marine Leaders Defend Restructuring Plan,” Military.com, April 5, 2022; Craig Hooper, “Let The Marine Corps Build The New Light Amphibious Warship,” Forbes, April 3, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022; Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson, “How Two Dozen Retired Generals Are Trying to Stop an Overhaul of the Marines,” Politico, April 1, 2022; Noel Williams, “Insights for Marine (and Beyond) Force Design from the Russo-Ukrainian War,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2022; Jim Webb, “Momentous Changes in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Organization Deserve Debate,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022; Paul K. Van Riper, “Jeopardizing national security: What is happening to our Marine Corps?” Marine Corps Times, March 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress In connection questions such as these, a September 21, 2020, press report states The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities it will bring to the fight. The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day presentation. While the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy requirements, that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build, crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet [beyond its crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet [beyond its
currently envisioned role]? currently envisioned role]?
Analysts, experts and sources with knowledge of internal discussions who spoke to Analysts, experts and sources with knowledge of internal discussions who spoke to
Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon…. Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon….
When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to
align with the Navy’s desire to be more spreadalign with the Navy’s desire to be more spread out over a large area during a fight, [he out over a large area during a fight, [he
chief of naval operations’ director of expeditionary warfare, Maj. Gen. Tracy King] chief of naval operations’ director of expeditionary warfare, Maj. Gen. Tracy King]
answered in the affirmative. answered in the affirmative.
“[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build “[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build
an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.” an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.”
The unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors and The unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors and
requirements, it will slow down the process and increase the cost. Analysts who spoke to requirements, it will slow down the process and increase the cost. Analysts who spoke to
Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on
the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive…. the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive….
“The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,” “The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,”
said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation. said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation.
“This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship LCS:“This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship LCS:4849 It started out as a very light, near- It started out as a very light, near-
shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started adding on shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started adding on
requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you
get into all kinds of problems….” get into all kinds of problems….”
[Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group] acknowledged [Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group] acknowledged
that the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have more that the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have more
capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something
costly and elaborate. costly and elaborate.
“What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can “What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can
be purchased.”be purchased.”4950
Potential Alternative of Adapting Existing Army LSVs
Another potential issue for Congress is whether at least some portion of the operational Another potential issue for Congress is whether at least some portion of the operational
requirements for the LAW program could be met cost effectively met by adapting existing U.S. requirements for the LAW program could be met cost effectively met by adapting existing U.S.
military ships rather than building new LAWs. Some observers, for example, argue that at least military ships rather than building new LAWs. Some observers, for example, argue that at least
some portion of the operational requirements for the LAW program could be met more cost-some portion of the operational requirements for the LAW program could be met more cost-
~~effectively by transferring existing Army watercraft known as Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs)~~
~~(Figure 4) to the Navy and adapting these LSVs to the LAW mission.~~

4849 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
4950 David B. Larter, “US Marines Wants to Move Fast on a Light Amphibious Warship. But What is It?” David B. Larter, “US Marines Wants to Move Fast on a Light Amphibious Warship. But What is It?” Defense News, ,
September 21, 2020. September 21, 2020.
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effectively by transferring existing Army watercraft known as Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs) (Figure 4) to the Navy and adapting these LSVs to the LAW mission. Figure 4. Besson-Class Logistics Support Vessel (LSV)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Walker D. Mil s and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and Cropped version of photograph accompanying Walker D. Mil s and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and
Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Defense News, June 22, 2020. The caption to the photograph , June 22, 2020. The caption to the photograph
credits the photograph to the U.S. Navy and states, “U.S. Navy sailors conduct a simulated disaster relief supply credits the photograph to the U.S. Navy and states, “U.S. Navy sailors conduct a simulated disaster relief supply
offload from a General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessel at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on July offload from a General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessel at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on July
10, 2016.” 10, 2016.”
A June 22, 2020, opinion piece discussing this idea states A June 22, 2020, opinion piece discussing this idea states
The Navy intends to acquire up to 30 new light amphibious warships, or LAW, to support The Navy intends to acquire up to 30 new light amphibious warships, or LAW, to support
new Marine Corps requirements.… Rather than accepting a new amphibious design built new Marine Corps requirements.… Rather than accepting a new amphibious design built
from the ground up, however, decision-makers should take advantage of the fact that many from the ground up, however, decision-makers should take advantage of the fact that many
key requirements of the new vessels are very similar to the capabilities of vessels operated key requirements of the new vessels are very similar to the capabilities of vessels operated
by U.S. Army Transportation Command. by U.S. Army Transportation Command.
The Navy and Marine Corps should delay any new construction and immediately acquire The Navy and Marine Corps should delay any new construction and immediately acquire
some of these existing vessels to drive experimentation and better inform their some of these existing vessels to drive experimentation and better inform their
requirements for the LAW program…. requirements for the LAW program….
U.S. Army Transportation Command has over 100 vessels, and dozens have similar U.S. Army Transportation Command has over 100 vessels, and dozens have similar
capabilities to those required of the LAW. The Army’s LCU-2000s, also called the capabilities to those required of the LAW. The Army’s LCU-2000s, also called the
Runnymede-class large landing crafts, are smaller, with roughly half of the cargo space Runnymede-class large landing crafts, are smaller, with roughly half of the cargo space
designed for the LAW and slightly slower, but they boast nearly double the range. The designed for the LAW and slightly slower, but they boast nearly double the range. The
Runnymede-class vessels have nearly 4,000 square feet of cargo space and can travel 6,500 Runnymede-class vessels have nearly 4,000 square feet of cargo space and can travel 6,500
miles when loaded and at 12 knots; and they can unload at the beach with their bow ramp. miles when loaded and at 12 knots; and they can unload at the beach with their bow ramp.
The Army’s General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels are larger than the The Army’s General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels are larger than the
future LAW, at 273 feet in length but can claim 10,500 square feet of cargo space and a future LAW, at 273 feet in length but can claim 10,500 square feet of cargo space and a
6,500-mile range loaded to match the LCU-2000. These vessels also have both a bow and 6,500-mile range loaded to match the LCU-2000. These vessels also have both a bow and
stern ramp for roll-on/roll-off capability at the beach or ship-to-ship docking at sea. The stern ramp for roll-on/roll-off capability at the beach or ship-to-ship docking at sea. The
version built for the Phillipine military also has a helipad. version built for the Phillipine military also has a helipad.
Army Transportation Command has 32 Runnymede-class and eight General Frank S. Army Transportation Command has 32 Runnymede-class and eight General Frank S.
Besson-class vessels in service. Mostly built in the 1990s, both classes of vessel have many Besson-class vessels in service. Mostly built in the 1990s, both classes of vessel have many
~~years left in their life expectancy and more than meet the Navy’s 10-year life expectancy~~
~~for the LAW.~~
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years left in their life expectancy and more than meet the Navy’s 10-year life expectancy for the LAW. These vessels are operable today and could be transferred from the Army to the Navy or These vessels are operable today and could be transferred from the Army to the Navy or
Marine Corps tomorrow. In fact, the Army was attempting to divest itself of these Marine Corps tomorrow. In fact, the Army was attempting to divest itself of these
watercraft less than a year ago, which underscores the importance of this opportunity even watercraft less than a year ago, which underscores the importance of this opportunity even
further. Congress is firmly set against the Army getting rid of valuable, seaworthy vessels further. Congress is firmly set against the Army getting rid of valuable, seaworthy vessels
and has quashed all of the Army’s efforts to do so thus far, but transferring this equipment and has quashed all of the Army’s efforts to do so thus far, but transferring this equipment
to the Navy is a reasonable course of action that should satisfy all parties involved…. to the Navy is a reasonable course of action that should satisfy all parties involved….
By acquiring a watercraft that meets most of their requirements from the Army, the Navy By acquiring a watercraft that meets most of their requirements from the Army, the Navy
and Marine Corps simultaneously fill current capability gaps and obtain an invaluable and Marine Corps simultaneously fill current capability gaps and obtain an invaluable
series of assets they can use to support the evaluation and experimentation of new designs series of assets they can use to support the evaluation and experimentation of new designs
and concepts. This will allow Navy and Marine leaders to give their units the maximum and concepts. This will allow Navy and Marine leaders to give their units the maximum
amount of time to evaluate and experiment with new designs to get a betteramount of time to evaluate and experiment with new designs to get a better idea of what idea of what
they need both in future amphibious craft as well as operational and support equipment…. they need both in future amphibious craft as well as operational and support equipment….
Often overlooked, the availability of surplus vessels is absolutely critical to the process of Often overlooked, the availability of surplus vessels is absolutely critical to the process of
developing new technologies, developing the tactics to employ them, conducting training, developing new technologies, developing the tactics to employ them, conducting training,
and providing decision-makers the requisite capacity to remain flexible in the face of and providing decision-makers the requisite capacity to remain flexible in the face of
unexpected challenges…. unexpected challenges….
[The Navy and Marine Corps have] long been in need of a boost in their amphibious [The Navy and Marine Corps have] long been in need of a boost in their amphibious
capabilities so as to be better positioned to meet the demands of today and prepare for the capabilities so as to be better positioned to meet the demands of today and prepare for the
challenges of tomorrow, and taking possession of the Army’s Runnymede- and Frank S. challenges of tomorrow, and taking possession of the Army’s Runnymede- and Frank S.
Benson-class vessels is a solution on a silver platter.Benson-class vessels is a solution on a silver platter.5051
Potential questions for Congress include the following: Potential questions for Congress include the following:
 How many of these watercraft would be available for transfer to the Navy for use  How many of these watercraft would be available for transfer to the Navy for use
in meeting the operational requirements of the LAW program? in meeting the operational requirements of the LAW program?
 How do the capabilities of these watercraft compare with those required for the  How do the capabilities of these watercraft compare with those required for the
LAW? LAW?
 How much remaining service life do these watercraft have?  How much remaining service life do these watercraft have?
 Given the number of these watercraft that would be available for transfer to the  Given the number of these watercraft that would be available for transfer to the
Navy, their operational capabilities, and their remaining service life, what portion Navy, their operational capabilities, and their remaining service life, what portion
of the LAW program’s operational requirements could transferred watercraft of the LAW program’s operational requirements could transferred watercraft
meet? How many LAWs, if any, would still need to be built to fully or meet? How many LAWs, if any, would still need to be built to fully or
substantially meet the LAW program’s operational requirements? substantially meet the LAW program’s operational requirements?
 How do the acquisition and operation and support (O&S) costs of these  How do the acquisition and operation and support (O&S) costs of these
watercraft compare to the estimated acquisition and O&S costs of the LAWs they watercraft compare to the estimated acquisition and O&S costs of the LAWs they
would replace? would replace?
 Taking into account capabilities, acquisition costs, and O&S costs, how does the  Taking into account capabilities, acquisition costs, and O&S costs, how does the
cost effectiveness of an approach involving the transfer of these watercraft cost effectiveness of an approach involving the transfer of these watercraft
compare to that of the Navy’s baseline approach of meeting the LAW program’s compare to that of the Navy’s baseline approach of meeting the LAW program’s
requirements through the acquisition of 24 to 35 new LAWs? requirements through the acquisition of 24 to 35 new LAWs?
 What would be the potential industrial-base implications of using transferred  What would be the potential industrial-base implications of using transferred
watercraft to meet at least some portion of the LAW program’s operational watercraft to meet at least some portion of the LAW program’s operational
needs? needs?

5051 Walker D. Mills and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Walker D. Mills and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Defense
News, June 22, 2020. See also William Cole, “Army Vessels Could Be Transferred To Marines To Counter China , June 22, 2020. See also William Cole, “Army Vessels Could Be Transferred To Marines To Counter China
Threat,” Threat,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, February 7, 2022. , February 7, 2022.
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Industrial-Base Implications
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base implications Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base implications
of the LAW program. In recent years, all Navy amphibious ships have been built by the Ingalls of the LAW program. In recent years, all Navy amphibious ships have been built by the Ingalls
shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, a part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII/Ingalls). As noted shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, a part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII/Ingalls). As noted
earlier, LAWs could be built by multiple U.S. shipyards.earlier, LAWs could be built by multiple U.S. shipyards.5152 Potential oversight questions for Potential oversight questions for
Congress include, What implications might the LAW program have for the distribution of Navy Congress include, What implications might the LAW program have for the distribution of Navy
shipbuilding work among U.S. shipyards? How many jobs would the LAW program create at the shipbuilding work among U.S. shipyards? How many jobs would the LAW program create at the
shipyard that builds the ships, at associated supplier firms, and indirectly in surrounding shipyard that builds the ships, at associated supplier firms, and indirectly in surrounding
communities? In a situation of finite defense resources, what impact, if any, would funding the communities? In a situation of finite defense resources, what impact, if any, would funding the
procurement of LAWs have on funding available for procuring other types of amphibious ships, procurement of LAWs have on funding available for procuring other types of amphibious ships,
and thus on workloads and employment levels at HII/Ingalls, its associated supplier firms, and and thus on workloads and employment levels at HII/Ingalls, its associated supplier firms, and
their surrounding communities?their surrounding communities?5253
Legislative Activity for ~~FY2022~~FY2023
Summary of Congressional Action on ~~FY2022~~FY2023 Funding Request
Table 21 summarizes congressional action on the summarizes congressional action on the ~~FY2022~~FY2023 procurement funding request for the procurement funding request for the
LAW program. LAW program.
Table 21. Congressional Action on ~~FY2022~~FY2023 Procurement Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth

Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
Research and development Research and development
~~13.2~~
~~13.2~~
~~13.2~~
~~13.2~~
~~13.2~~
~~13.2~~
~~13.2~~
12.2 Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s ~~FY2022~~FY2023 budget submission, committee and conference budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on reports, and explanatory statements on ~~FY2022~~FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act and National Defense Authorization Act and ~~FY2022~~FY2023 DOD DOD
Appropriations Act. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium Amphibious Ship) of PE Appropriations Act. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium Amphibious Ship) of PE
(Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which is line 46 in the Navy‘s (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which is line 46 in the Navy‘s ~~FY2022~~FY2023 research research
and development account. and development account.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is is
House Appropriations Committee; House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee. is Senate Appropriations Committee.

5152 10 U.S.C. §8679 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be 10 U.S.C. §8679 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be
constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may
be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes
appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains
these provisos: “ … these provisos: “ … Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or , That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or
conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign facilities conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign facilities
for the construction of major components of such vessel: for the construction of major components of such vessel: Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this , That none of the funds provided under this
heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards….” heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards….”
5253 Two observers argue that shifting the Navy to a fleet architecture that includes a larger proportion of smaller ships would have beneficial impacts on U.S. shipbuilding industry’s ability to support Navy shipbuilding needs. See Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton, “Shipbuilding Suppliers Need More Than Market Forces to Stay Afloat,” Defense News, May 20, 2020. Congressional Research Service 19 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Author Information Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs ~~Two observers argue that shifting the Navy to a fleet architecture that includes a larger proportion of smaller ships~~
~~would have beneficial impacts on U.S. shipbuilding industry’s ability to support Navy shipbuilding needs. See Bryan~~
~~Clark and Timothy A. Walton, “Shipbuilding Suppliers Need More Than Market Forces to Stay Afloat,” Defense News,~~
~~May 20, 2020.~~
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~~FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792/S.~~
~~1605/P.L. 117-81)~~
~~House~~
~~The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on~~
~~H.R. 4350, recommended the funding level shown in the HASC column of Table 2.~~
Section 1049 of H.R. 4350 as reported by the committee states
~~SEC. 1049. REPORT ON ACQUISITION, DELIVERY, AND USE OF MOBILITY~~
~~ASSETS THAT ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED~~
~~BASE OPERATIONS.~~
~~(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this~~
~~Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report~~
~~that includes a detailed description of each of the following:~~
~~(1) The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and~~
~~facilities required to operate and maintain a force of 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships,~~
~~as well as the feasibility of accelerating the current Light Amphibius Warship procurement~~
~~plan and delivery schedule.~~
~~(2) The specific number, type, and mix of manned and unmanned strategic mobility wing-~~
~~in-ground effect platforms required to support distributed maritime operations and~~
~~expeditionary advanced base operations.~~
~~(3) The feasibility of the Navy and Marine Littoral Regiments using other joint and~~
~~interagency mobility platforms prior to the operational availability of Light Amphibious~~
~~Warships or wing-in-ground effect platforms, including—~~
~~(A) United States Army Transportation Command’s more than 100 LCU-2000,~~
~~Runnymede-class and the eight General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels;~~
~~(B) commercial vessel options, currently available, that meet Marine Littoral Regiment~~
~~requirements for movement, maneuver, sustainment, training, interoperability, and cargo~~
~~capacity and delivery;~~
~~(C) maritime prepositioning force vessels; and~~
~~(D) Coast Guard vessels.~~
~~(4) The specific number, type, and mix of long-range unmanned surface vessel platforms~~
~~required to support distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced base~~
~~operations, along with their operational interaction with the fleet’s warfighting capabilities;~~
~~(5) The feasibility of integrating Marine Littoral Regiments with—~~
~~(A) Special Operations activities;~~
~~(B) joint and interagency planning;~~
~~(C) information warfare operations; and~~
~~(D) command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and~~
~~reconnaissance, and security cooperation activities.~~
~~(6) The projected cost, and any additional resources required, to accelerate the operational~~
~~deployment of Marine Littoral Regiments and deliver the capabilities described in~~
~~paragraphs (1) through (5) by not later than three years after the date of the enactment of~~
~~this Act.~~
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~~(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a~~
~~publicly accessible, unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.~~
~~Senate~~
~~The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative~~
~~day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding level shown in the SASC~~
~~column of Table 2.~~
~~Enacted~~
~~The joint explanatory statement for the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1605/P.L.~~
~~117-81 of December 27, 2021) recommends the funding level shown in the authorization enacted~~
~~column of Table 2.~~
Section 1022 of S. 1605/P.L. 117-81 states
~~SEC. 1022. REPORT ON ACQUISITION, DELIVERY, AND USE OF MOBILITY~~
~~ASSETS THAT ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED~~
~~BASE OPERATIONS.~~
~~(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this~~
~~Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a~~
~~report that includes a detailed description of each of the following:~~
~~(1) The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and~~
~~facilities required to operate and maintain a force of 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships,~~
~~including—~~
~~(A) the estimated timeline for procuring and delivering such warships;~~
~~(B) the estimated cost to procure, man, train, operate, maintain, and modernize such~~
~~warships for each of the 10 years following the year in which the report is submitted,~~
~~together with the notional Department of Defense appropriations account associated with~~
~~each such cost; and~~
~~(C) the feasibility of accelerating the current Light Amphibius Warship procurement plan~~
~~and delivery schedule.~~
~~(2) The specific number, type, and mix of manned and unmanned platforms required to~~
~~support distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations.~~
~~(3) The feasibility of Marine Littoral Regiments using other joint and interagency mobility~~
~~platforms prior to, in addition to, or in lieu of the operational availability of Light~~
~~Amphibious Warships, including—~~
~~(A) Army LCU-2000, Runnymede-class and General Frank S. Besson-class logistics~~
~~support vessels;~~
~~(B) Navy LCU-1610 or LCU-1700, Landing Craft Air Cushioned, and Ship-to-Shore~~
~~Connector vessels;~~
~~(C) commercial vessel options that—~~
~~(i) are available as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and~~
~~(ii) meet Marine Littoral Regiment requirements for movement, maneuver, sustainment,~~
~~training, interoperability, and cargo capacity and delivery;~~
~~(D) maritime prepositioning force vessels; and~~
~~(E) Coast Guard vessels.~~
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~~(4) The specific number, type, and mix of long range unmanned surface vessel platforms~~
~~required to support distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced base~~
~~operations, along with their operational interaction with the warfighting capabilities of the~~
~~fleet, including—~~
~~(A) the estimated timeline for procuring and delivering such platforms; and~~
~~(B) the estimated cost to procure, man, train, operate, maintain, and modernize such~~
~~platforms for each of the 10 years following the year in which the report is submitted,~~
~~together with the notional Department of Defense appropriations account associated with~~
~~each such cost.~~
~~(5) The feasibility of integrating Marine Littoral Regiments with—~~
~~(A) special operations activities;~~
~~(B) joint and interagency planning;~~
~~(C) information warfare operations; and~~
~~(D) command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and~~
~~reconnaissance, and security cooperation activities.~~
~~(6) The projected cost and timeline for deploying Marine Littoral Regiments, including—~~
~~(A) the extent to which such regiments will deploy with the capabilities listed in paragraphs~~
~~(1) through (5) during each of the 10 years following the year in which the report is sub~~
~~mitted; and~~
~~(B) options to accelerate such deployments or increase the capabilities of such regiments~~
~~if additional resources are available, together with a description of such resources.~~
~~(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a~~
~~publicly accessible, unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.~~
~~FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432/S. XXXX/Division C of~~
~~H.R. 2471/P.L. 117-103)~~
~~House~~
~~The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R.~~
~~4432, recommended the funding level shown in the HAC column of Table 2.~~
~~Senate~~
~~The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18,~~
~~2021, for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommended the funding level~~
~~shown in the SAC column of Table 2.~~
~~Enacted~~
~~The joint explanatory statement for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R.~~
~~2471/P.L. 117-103 of March 15, 2022, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022) provides the~~
~~funding level shown in the appropriation enacted column of Table 2.~~
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~~Appendix. Proposed Change in Amphibious-Ship~~
~~Force Architecture and EABO~~
~~This appendix presents additional background information on the proposed change in the~~
~~amphibious-ship force architecture and the EABO-related operational rationale behind it.~~
~~Proposed Change in Amphibious Ship Force Architecture~~
~~Regarding the shift to a new amphibious-ship force architecture, the July 2019~~ ~~Commandant’s~~
~~Planning Guidance~~ ~~document states in part (emphasis as in the original):~~
~~Our Nation’s ability to project power and influence beyond its shores is increasingly~~
~~challenged by long-range precision fires; expanding air, surface, and subsurface threats;~~
~~and the continued degradation of our amphibious and auxiliary ship readiness. The ability~~
~~to project and maneuver from strategic distances will likely be detected and contested from~~
~~the point of embarkation during a major contingency. Our naval expeditionary forces must~~
~~possess a variety of deployment options, including L-class [amphibious ships] and E-class~~
~~[expeditionary ships] ships, but also increasingly look to other available options such as~~
~~unmanned platforms, stern landing vessels, other ocean-going connectors, and smaller~~
~~more lethal and more risk-worthy platforms.~~ ~~We must continue to seek the affordable~~
~~and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future~~
~~amphibious portion of the fleet.~~
~~We must also explore new options, such as inter-theater connectors and commercially~~
~~available ships and craft that are smaller and less expensive, thereby increasing the~~
~~affordability and allowing acquisition at a greater quantity. We recognize that we must~~
~~distribute our forces ashore given the growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so~~
~~it would be illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The~~
~~adversary will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the~~
~~preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design of smaller, more~~
~~lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms. We must be fully integrated with the Navy to~~
~~develop a vision and a new fleet architecture that can be successful against our peer~~
~~adversaries while also maintaining affordability. To achieve this difficult task, the Navy~~
~~and Marine Corps must ensure larger surface combatants possess mission agility across sea~~
~~control, littoral, and amphibious operations, while we concurrently expand the quantity of~~
~~more specialized manned and unmanned platforms….~~
~~We will no longer use a “2.0 MEB requirement” as the foundation for our arguments~~
~~regarding amphibious ship building, to determine the requisite capacity of vehicles~~
~~or other capabilities, or as pertains to the Maritime Prepositioning Force. We will no~~
~~longer reference the 38-ship requirement memo from 2009, or the 2016 Force~~
~~Structure Assessment, as the basis for our arguments and force structure~~
~~justifications.~~ ~~The ongoing 2019 Force Structure Assessment will inform the amphibious~~
~~requirements based upon this guidance. The global options for amphibs [types of~~
~~amphibious ships] include many more options than simply LHAs, LPDs, and LSDs. I will~~
~~work closely with the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to~~
~~ensure there are adequate numbers of the right types of ships, with the right capabilities, to~~
~~meet national requirements.~~
~~I do not believe joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) are irrelevant or an operational~~
~~anachronism; however, we must acknowledge that different approaches are required given~~
~~the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in mutually contested~~
~~spaces. Visions of a massed naval armada nine nautical miles off-shore in the South China~~
~~Sea preparing to launch the landing force in swarms of ACVs [amphibious combat~~
~~vehicles], LCUs [utility landing craft], and LCACs [air-cushioned landing craft] are~~
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~~impractical and unreasonable. We must accept the realities created by the proliferation of~~
~~precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart-weapons, and seek innovative ways to~~
~~overcome those threat capabilities. I encourage experimentation with lethal long-range~~
~~unmanned systems capable of traveling 200 nautical miles, penetrating into the adversary~~
~~enemy threat ring, and crossing the shoreline—causing the adversary to allocate resources~~
~~to eliminate the threat, create dilemmas, and further create opportunities for fleet maneuver.~~
~~We cannot wait to identify solutions to our mine countermeasure needs, and must make~~
~~this a priority for our future force development efforts….~~
~~Over the coming months, we will release a new concept in support of the Navy’s~~
~~Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept and the NDS called – Stand-in Forces.~~
~~The Stand-in Forces concept is designed to restore the strategic initiative to naval forces~~
~~and empower our allies and partners to successfully confront regional hegemons that~~
~~infringe on their territorial boundaries and interests.~~ ~~Stand-in Forces are designed to~~
~~generate technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements that confront aggressor~~
~~naval forces with an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms~~
~~and payloads.~~ ~~Stand-in forces take advantage of the relative strength of the contemporary~~
~~defense and rapidly-emerging new technologies to create an integrated maritime defense~~
~~that is optimized to operate in close and confined seas in defiance of adversary long-range~~
~~precision “stand-off capabilities.”~~
~~Creating new capabilities that intentionally initiate stand-in engagements is a disruptive~~
~~“button hook” in force development that runs counter to the action that our adversaries~~
~~anticipate. Rather than heavily investing in expensive and exquisite capabilities that~~
~~regional aggressors have optimized their forces to target, naval forces will persist forward~~
~~with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms that can economically host a dense~~
~~array of lethal and nonlethal payloads.~~
~~By exploiting the technical revolution in autonomy, advanced manufacturing, and artificial~~
~~intelligence, the naval forces can create many new risk-worthy unmanned and minimally-~~
~~manned platforms that can be employed in stand-in engagements to create tactical~~
~~dilemmas that adversaries will confront when attacking our allies and forces forward.53~~
~~EABO~~
~~Regarding EABO, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance states the following (emphasis as in the~~
~~original):~~
~~The 2016 Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) predates the current set of national~~
~~strategy and guidance documents, but it was prescient in many ways. It directed partnering~~
~~with the Navy to develop two concepts, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment~~
~~(LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) that nest exceptionally~~
~~well with the current strategic guidance. It is time to move beyond the MOC itself,~~
~~however, and partner with the Navy to complement LOCE and EABO with classified,~~
~~threat-specific operating concepts that describe how naval forces will conduct the range of~~
~~missions articulated in our strategic guidance….~~
~~EABO complement the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations Concept and will~~
~~inform how we approach missions against peer adversaries~~….
~~EABO are driven by the aforementioned adversary deployment of long-range precision~~
~~fires designed to support a strategy of “counter-intervention” directed against U.S. and~~
~~coalition forces. EABO, as an operational concept, enables the naval force to persist~~
~~forward within the arc of adversary long-range precision fires to support our treaty partners~~

~~53 U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated, released~~
~~July 2019, pp. 4-5, 10.~~
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~~with combat credible forces on a much more resilient and difficult to target forward basing~~
~~infrastructure. EABO are designed to restore force resiliency and enable the persistent~~
~~naval forward presence that has long been the hallmark of naval forces. Most significantly,~~
~~EABO reverse the cost imposition that determined adversaries seek to impose on the joint~~
~~force. EABO guide an apt and appropriate adjustment in future naval force development~~
~~to obviate the significant investment our adversaries have made in long-range precision~~
~~fires. Potential adversaries intend to target our forward fixed and vulnerable bases, as well~~
~~as deep water ports, long runways, large signature platforms, and ships. By developing a~~
~~new expeditionary naval force structure that is not dependent on concentrated, vulnerable,~~
~~and expensive forward infrastructure and platforms, we will frustrate enemy efforts to~~
~~separate U.S. Forces from our allies and interests. EABO enable naval forces to partner~~
~~and persist forward to control and deny contested areas where legacy naval forces cannot~~
~~be prudently employed without accepting disproportionate risk….~~
~~In February of 2019, the Commandant and Chief of Naval Operations co-signed the~~
~~concept for EABO. The ideas contained in this document are foundational to our future~~
~~force development efforts and are applicable in multiple scenarios.54~~
~~A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO defines EABO as follows:~~
~~EABO are a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of mobile, low-~~
~~signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain naval expeditionary forces~~
~~from a series of austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore within a contested or~~
~~potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or~~
~~enable fleet sustainment.~~
~~EABO support the projection of naval power by integrating with and supporting the larger~~
~~naval campaign. Expeditionary operations imply austere conditions, forward deployment,~~
~~and projection of power. EABO are distinct from other expeditionary operations in that~~
~~forces conducting them combine various forms of operations to persist within the reach of~~
~~adversary lethal and nonlethal effects. It is critical that the composition, distribution, and~~
~~disposition of forces executing EABO limit the adversary’s ability to target them, engage~~
~~them with fires and other effects, and otherwise influence their activities.~~
~~Missions of EABO include~~

~~Support sea control operations;~~

~~Conduct sea denial operations within the littorals;~~

~~Contribute to maritime domain awareness;~~

~~Provide forward command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence,~~
~~surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting (C5ISRT), and counter-C5ISRT capability;~~

~~Provide forward sustainment.~~
~~EABO tasks include~~

~~Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance;~~

~~Conduct operations in the information environment;~~

~~Conduct screen/guard/cover;~~

~~Deny or control key maritime terrain;~~

~~Conduct surface warfare operations;~~

~~Conduct air and missile defense;~~

~~54 U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated, released~~
~~July 2019, pp. 9, 11, 19. See also Jim Lacey, “The ‘Dumbest Concept Ever’ Just Might Win Wars,” War on the Rocks,~~
~~July 29, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “How to Seize Islands, Set Up a Forward Refueling Point: Marine Corps Recipes for~~
~~Expeditionary Operations,” USNI News, September 13, 2019.~~
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
~~Conduct strike operations;~~

~~Conduct antisubmarine warfare;~~

~~Conduct sustainment operations;~~

~~Conduct forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations.~~
~~FMF formations may execute these tasks across the competition continuum both above and~~
~~below the threshold of violence. In the former case, they are normally conducted to deny~~
~~an adversary access to adjacent battlespace or to support a more comprehensive effort to~~
~~establish sea control. In the latter, they are often conducted with the goal of deterring the~~
~~enemy while preparing for conflict if deterrence fails….~~
~~EABO provide engagement capabilities throughout the competition continuum. During~~
~~competition below the threshold of violence, EABO engage allies and partners, preserve~~
~~access, and shape the theater for future operations. EABO also enables stand-in~~
~~engagement capabilities by the persistent posturing of littoral forces within a potential~~
~~adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ). During armed conflict, the combination of~~
~~stand-in and stand-off engagement capabilities… places the adversary on the horns of a~~
~~dilemma: while the adversary seeks to discover and engage friendly stand-off forces, he~~
~~exposes himself to the sensing, nonlethal, and lethal capabilities of stand-in forces….~~
~~The assigned mission sets within EABO are conducted within a joint and coalition~~
~~framework, as part of not merely an interoperable, but an integrated naval force. Task-~~
~~organized Marine and Navy units project naval power through EABO by fusing their~~
~~landward and seaward roles….~~
~~A stand-in force executing EABO is strategically cost-effective by virtue of its ability to~~
~~undermine a potential adversary’s cost-imposition strategy. Potential adversaries are~~
~~investing in large numbers of comparatively inexpensive systems of adequate lethality,~~
~~extended range, and greater precision to hold at risk the US military’s expensive,~~
~~sophisticated, and relatively few multimission platforms. Forces executing EABO are~~
~~small, numerous, dispersed, and relatively inexpensive and difficult to target, thus inverting~~
~~an adversary’s cost-benefit calculation when deciding whether to engage and upsetting the~~
~~cost-imposition strategy.55~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Ronald O'Rourke~~

~~Specialist in Naval Affairs~~

~~55 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,~~ ~~Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base~~
~~Operations, February 2021, pp. 1-3 to 1-5. See also Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps,~~ ~~A Concept~~
~~for Stand-in Forces, December 2021, 23 pp.~~
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