The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations March 28September 14, 2022 , 2022
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have a deep relationship that includes a The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have a deep relationship that includes a
bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, and many bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, and many
Thomas Lum
shared strategic and economic interests. The Philippines, situated east of the South China Sea and shared strategic and economic interests. The Philippines, situated east of the South China Sea and
Specialist in Asian Affairs Specialist in Asian Affairs
south of Taiwan, has long played an important role in U.S. Asia policy as a close security and south of Taiwan, has long played an important role in U.S. Asia policy as a close security and

counterterrorism partner. The Philippines is a democratic state where popular support for the counterterrorism partner. The Philippines is a democratic state where popular support for the
Ben Dolven
bilateral relationship and the alliance is strong. bilateral relationship and the alliance is strong.
Specialist in Asian Affairs Specialist in Asian Affairs

President Rodrigo Duterte, whose term ends June 2022, has received high approval ratings
despite some controversial actions and policies, including carrying out a violent anti-illegal drug
Christina L. Arabia
campaign, harassing journalists critical of his government, threatening to terminate the
Analyst in Security
Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) before reversing course and recommitting to
Assistance, Security
it, and seeking a rapprochement with China, a potentially large source of foreign investment. U.S.
Cooperation and the
policymakers have sought to preserve the longstanding bilateral relationship, despite some of
Global Arms Trade
Duterte’s policy stances that appeared to strain U.S.-Philippine bonds.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr. assumed the office of President on June 30, 2022, having won more than 31 million out of 55 million votes cast in national elections held in May. Marcos is the son of Christina L. Arabia Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who ruled the country from 1965 until he was ousted by the 1986 People Analyst in Security Power Revolution. Sara Duterte-Carpio, daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte, won the Assistance, Security Vice-Presidency. The Philippine constitution limits both the President and Vice-President, who Cooperation and the are elected on separate tickets, to one six-year term. Global Arms Trade The Philippines is the largest country recipient of U.S. military assistance in the East Asia-Pacific The Philippines is the largest country recipient of U.S. military assistance in the East Asia-Pacific

region, including Foreign Military Financing and assistance under the Department of Defense’s region, including Foreign Military Financing and assistance under the Department of Defense’s
Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative. U.S. military personnel and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) hold Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative. U.S. military personnel and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) hold
regular bilateral military exercises and maritime patrols, collaborate on counterterrorism efforts, and conduct joint regular bilateral military exercises and maritime patrols, collaborate on counterterrorism efforts, and conduct joint
humanitarian activities. The U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, allows for the humanitarian activities. The U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, allows for the
increased rotational presence of U.S. military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippinesincreased rotational presence of U.S. military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippines, although President Duterte had
expressed skepticism about expanding the U.S. presence in the Philippines. Duterte’s threat to terminate the VFA raised
doubts about bilateral military ties, as the agreement governs the legal status of U.S. military forces operating in the
Philippines and establishes rules by which U.S. troops, vessels, and aircraft may enter the country. On July 30, 2021,
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Loranzana announced the Philippines would recommit to the agreement and Defense
Secretary Lloyd Austin III reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty.
. Despite some policies and stances of former President Duterte that strained U.S.-Philippine relations, U.S. and Philippine diplomatic and military officials attempted to maintain most security and other forms of cooperation. During their August 2022 meeting in Manila, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and President Marcos both pledged to strengthen the military alliance. The Philippines has long battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist groups in the south of the country. ISIS–East Asia The Philippines has long battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist groups in the south of the country. ISIS–East Asia
(ISIS-EA), a loose collection of groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, has around 300-500 mostly Filipino (ISIS-EA), a loose collection of groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, has around 300-500 mostly Filipino
and some foreign fighters who have carried out sporadic attacks in Mindanao and Sulu. The U.S. military has provided and some foreign fighters who have carried out sporadic attacks in Mindanao and Sulu. The U.S. military has provided
advisory and intelligence gathering support to the AFP in counterterrorism operations. advisory and intelligence gathering support to the AFP in counterterrorism operations.
Since 2016,Former President Duterte’s “War on Drugs” Duterte’s “War on Drugs” has resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings. Estimates of resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings. Estimates of drug war-related
deathsdeaths from the anti-illegal drug campaign range from Philippine government figures of roughly 6,000 to counts by human rights organizations of range from Philippine government figures of roughly 6,000 to counts by human rights organizations of over 27up to 30,000. ,000.
According to human rights groups, virtually all of the killings, which According to human rights groups, virtually all of the killings, which have beenwere carried out by police and armed vigilantes, carried out by police and armed vigilantes,
occurred without due process, and the vast majority of victims occurred without due process, and the vast majority of victims have beenwere unarmed, poor, low-level offenders. In response, unarmed, poor, low-level offenders. In response,
the U.S. government has suspended counternarcotics assistance to the U.S. government has suspended counternarcotics assistance to the Philippine National Police Philippine National Police units since 2016.since 2016. Marcos administration officials have stated that the government will continue the drug war, though it will target large illegal drug operators rather than petty offenders and focus on drug rehabilitation.
The Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have long-standing disputes over waters and land features in the The Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have long-standing disputes over waters and land features in the
South China Sea. In 2016, a tribunal convened under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague concluded that South China Sea. In 2016, a tribunal convened under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague concluded that
China’s “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims have no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea China’s “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims have no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Since 2019, flotillas of PRC vessels have regularly massed around Philippine-occupied land features, and in (UNCLOS). Since 2019, flotillas of PRC vessels have regularly massed around Philippine-occupied land features, and in
2019, a PRC vessel sank a Philippine fishing boat in disputed waters. The Duterte government 2019, a PRC vessel sank a Philippine fishing boat in disputed waters. The Duterte government has not focuseddid not focus on the tribunal on the tribunal
ruling in its diplomatic efforts with China to address the territorial disputes. ruling in its diplomatic efforts with China to address the territorial disputes. However, the Philippines recently has intensified
its efforts to protest Chinese incursions into disputed areas of the South China Sea that Manila considers to be part of its
Exclusive Economic Zone.
The Philippine Constitution limits the President to one six-year term. Preparations for the next Presidential election,
scheduled for May 2022, have begun. A wide range of presidential candidates have filed for the election, including Ferdinand
“Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the longtime Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos, and current Vice-President Leni
Robredo, a vocal Duterte critic. President Duterte announced plans to run for the Senate before reversing course and
withdrawing.

The Marcos administration has suggested that it will use the UNCLOS ruling to assert Philippine rights, while also seeking better relations with China. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Congressional Interests .................................................................................................................... 2
Strategic Interests ................................................................................................................ 2
Regional Counterterrorism Efforts ...................................................................................... 3
South China Sea Disputes ................................................................................................... 3
Human Rights Concerns ..................................................................................................... 43
Philippine Politics ............................................................................................................................ 4
Duterte’s Legacy and the 2022 Elections 2022 National Elections ............................................................................................................ 5
U.S.-PhilippinesPhilippine Relations ................................................................................................................ 56
U.S. Foreign Assistance ............................................................................................................ 7
U.S.-Philippines Defense Ties ......................................................................................................... 9
Security Cooperation ................................................................................................................. 9
Counterterrorism Efforts .......................................................................................................... 11
U.S. Defense Equipment Transfers .......................................................................................... 11
Mutual Defense Treaty ............................................................................................................ 12
Visiting Forces Agreement ...................................................................................................... 1312
U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement ................................................ 1413
Philippines-China Relations .......................................................................................................... 14
The Philippines’ Maritime Disputes with China ..................................................................... 15
Violent Extremism in the Philippines ............................................................................................ 1716
The Marawi Seige ................................................................................................................... 17
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-East Asia ..................................................................... 1817
Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................................... 19
The Drug War .......................................................................................................................... 19
Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 20
Economics and Trade .................................................................................................................... 21
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 22
Selected Legislation ................................in the 117th Congress ...................................................................................... 23

Figures
Figure 1. Philippines at a Glance ..................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Contested Boundaries in the South China Sea ............................................................... 16

Tables
Table 1. Department of State Assistance to the Philippines, FY2017-FY2021 ............................... 7

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 24
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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations


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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have maintained a deep relationship that The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have maintained a deep relationship that
includes a bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, includes a bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties,
and many shared strategic and economic interests.1 U.S. past administration of the Philippines as and many shared strategic and economic interests.1 U.S. past administration of the Philippines as
a colonial territory (1898-1946) also has shaped the relationship, by both forging bonds, on the a colonial territory (1898-1946) also has shaped the relationship, by both forging bonds, on the
one hand, and, among some Filipinos,2 creating a wariness of drawing too close to the United one hand, and, among some Filipinos,2 creating a wariness of drawing too close to the United
States, on the other. Filipino-Americans constitute the third-largest Asian-American group in the States, on the other. Filipino-Americans constitute the third-largest Asian-American group in the
United States, numbering over 4.2 million people, and comprise the most numerous foreign-born United States, numbering over 4.2 million people, and comprise the most numerous foreign-born
group in the U.S. Armed Forces.3 group in the U.S. Armed Forces.3
During Rodrigo Duterte’s term as President of the
Philippines, which began in 2016, U.S. policymakers have
Colonial History
sought to preserve the longstanding bilateral relationship,
The Philippines was unified and
despite some of Duterte’s policy stances that have appeared
colonized by Spain in 1542. Filipinos
to strain U.S.-Philippine bonds. Many Philippine diplomatic
waged a rebellion against Spain in
1896, but their independence
and military officials have been eager to maintain or
movement was not recognized by the
strengthen cooperation with the United States; however,
United States, which acquired the
Duterte’s documented distrust of the United States,4
territory from Spain in 1898 fol owing
eagerness for greater cooperation with the People’s Republic
the Spanish-American War. U.S.
of China (PRC), and antipathy toward U.S. criticism of
forces then battled Filipino resistance
fighters until they were largely
human rights issues in the Philippines have complicated
subdued in 1902. The Philippines
those efforts.5
became independent in 1946.
The Philippines has long played an important role in U.S.
Asia policy, and it figures prominently in the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy as one
of five regional treaty allies with which the United States has a deepening relationship.6 The
Philippines has been a treaty ally since 1951 and a major non-NATO ally since 2003. It is the
largest recipient of U.S. military assistance, equipment, and training in the region. The country
holds strategic importance as a part of what some experts refer to as the “first island chain” in the
Pacific,7 and its maritime territorial disputes with China are a potential flashpoint in the South
The Philippines has long played an important role in U.S. Asia policy, and it figures prominently in the Biden Colonial History Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy as one of five The Philippines was unified and regional treaty allies.4 The Philippines has been a treaty ally colonized by Spain in 1542. Filipinos since 1951 and a major non-NATO ally since 2003. It is the waged a rebellion against Spain in 1896, but their independence largest recipient of U.S. military assistance, equipment, and movement was not recognized by the training in the region. The country holds strategic United States, which acquired the importance as a part of what some experts refer to as the territory from Spain in 1898 fol owing “first island chain” in the Pacific,5 and its maritime territorial the Spanish-American War. U.S. disputes with People’s Republic of China (PRC) are a forces then battled Filipino resistance fighters until they were largely potential flashpoint in the South China Sea. The Philippines subdued in 1902. The Philippines also serves as an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in became independent in 1946. Southeast Asia. Since the 1986 “People Power” movement that deposed former authoritarian President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the country has also been one of the region’s most vibrant democracies, although corruption and serious human rights problems continue to fester.6 Despite some policies and stances of former President Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022) that strained U.S.-Philippine relations, U.S. and Philippine diplomatic and military officials attempted to maintain most security and other forms of cooperation.7
1 This report does not cover congressional issues related to WWII Filipino veterans who fought under U.S. military 1 This report does not cover congressional issues related to WWII Filipino veterans who fought under U.S. military
command during World War II. command during World War II.
2 “Filipino” (male), “Filipina” (female), and “Filipinos” (plural, all genders) refer to citizens of the Philippines. 2 “Filipino” (male), “Filipina” (female), and “Filipinos” (plural, all genders) refer to citizens of the Philippines.
3 Abby Budiman, “Filipinos in the U.S. Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, April 29, 2021. 3 Abby Budiman, “Filipinos in the U.S. Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, April 29, 2021.
4 4 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte Hates America,” The Diplomat, November 1, 2016;
Trefor Moss, “Behind Duterte’s Break with the U.S., a Lifetime of Resentment,” Wall Street Journal, October 21,
2016.
5 Steve Mollman, “Rodrigo Duterte Preceded Hosting Trump with Tirades Against His Human Rights Critics,” Quartz,
November 13, 2017.
6 The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022; Antony Blinken, “A Free and Open The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022; Antony Blinken, “A Free and Open
Indo-Pacific,” Jakarta, Indonesia, December 14, 2021; Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing Indo-Pacific,” Jakarta, Indonesia, December 14, 2021; Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing
a Shared Vision,” November 4, 2019. a Shared Vision,” November 4, 2019.
75 The so-called first island chain includes southern Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, enclosing the sea areas closest The so-called first island chain includes southern Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, enclosing the sea areas closest
to China. The second island chain also starts in Japan, but extends further out into the Pacific, enclosing the Philippine to China. The second island chain also starts in Japan, but extends further out into the Pacific, enclosing the Philippine
Sea that separates the Philippines from Guam. In discussions of China’s military capabilities and foreign policy goals Sea that separates the Philippines from Guam. In discussions of China’s military capabilities and foreign policy goals
for the Western Pacific, some security and foreign policy experts refer to the first and second island chains as areas that for the Western Pacific, some security and foreign policy experts refer to the first and second island chains as areas that
China is perceived as wanting to influence or eventually dominate, and conversely as geographic features that the China is perceived as wanting to influence or eventually dominate, and conversely as geographic features that the
United States and its allies and partners potentially can use to counter or contain Chinese military actions. See, for United States and its allies and partners potentially can use to counter or contain Chinese military actions. See, for
example, Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the example, Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the
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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

China Sea. The Philippines also serves as an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in Southeast
Asia. Since the 1986 “People Power” movement that deposed former authoritarian President
Ferdinand Marcos, the country has also been one of the region’s most vibrant democracies,
although corruption and serious human rights problems continue to fester.8Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” The National Interest, February 6, 2016. 6 Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, April 12, 2022 7 Richard Javad Heydarian, “US Outlasts Duterte’s Failing Dalliance with China,” Asia Times, May 19, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Figure 1. Philippines at a Glance
Geography
Archipelago. Land area—298,000 square kilometers Archipelago. Land area—298,000 square kilometers
(Slightly larger than Arizona). (Slightly larger than Arizona).

People
Population: 110114 mil ion mil ion (2021)
Ethnic Groups: Predominantly Malay (95%); other ethnic Predominantly Malay (95%); other ethnic
groups include Chinese and mixed race (Filipino-Spanish, groups include Chinese and mixed race (Filipino-Spanish,
Filipino-Chinese, and Filipino-American). Filipino-Chinese, and Filipino-American).
Religious Affiliations: Roman Catholic (81%); other Roman Catholic (81%); other
Christian (9%); Muslim (5%); other (5%). Christian (9%); Muslim (5%); other (5%).

Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $ $963871 bil ion (purchasing bil ion (purchasing
power parity, power parity, 20192020). Global ranking: 28. ). Global ranking: 28.
Per Capita GDP: $8, $8,900000 (purchasing power parity, (purchasing power parity, 2019).
2020). Global ranking: 151. GDP Composition by Sector: Agriculture (9%); Industry Agriculture (9%); Industry
(31%); Services (60%)(31%); Services (60%) (2019). .

Source: Map created by CRS using data from the U.S. State Department, Global Admin, and ESRI. Fact Map created by CRS using data from the U.S. State Department, Global Admin, and ESRI. Fact
information from Central Intelligence Agency, information from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, , 20212022. .
Congressional Interests
Congress has shown interest in the Philippines in several key policy areas over which it has Congress has shown interest in the Philippines in several key policy areas over which it has
provided oversight, policy direction, and funding. It has also occasionally placed restrictions on provided oversight, policy direction, and funding. It has also occasionally placed restrictions on
foreign assistance in order to pressure the Philippine government to improve human rights foreign assistance in order to pressure the Philippine government to improve human rights
conditions. conditions.
Strategic Interests
The Philippines holds strategic importance for the United States as part of what some experts The Philippines holds strategic importance for the United States as part of what some experts
refer to as the “first island chain” in the Pacific, as it is located less than 800 miles south of refer to as the “first island chain” in the Pacific, as it is located less than 800 miles south of
Taiwan and 900 miles southeast of China’s Hainan province, an island with a major naval base.Taiwan and 900 miles southeast of China’s Hainan province, an island with a major naval base.98
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) reportedly aims to broaden the U.S. force posture U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) reportedly aims to broaden the U.S. force posture
in East Asia, deploying and rotating military assets to Southeast Asia and the southern Pacific. in East Asia, deploying and rotating military assets to Southeast Asia and the southern Pacific.
Experts contend that the Philippines could play a key role in a contingency with China in the Experts contend that the Philippines could play a key role in a contingency with China in the

Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” The National Interest, February 6, 2016.
8 Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, March 30, 2021.
9 Damen Cook, “China’s Most Important South China Sea Military Base,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2017.
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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

region.10 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2022 calls on the Secretary of
Defense to strengthen U.S. ties with security partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
region.9 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2022 calls on the Secretary of Defense to strengthen U.S. ties with security partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 8 Damen Cook, “China’s Most Important South China Sea Military Base,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2017. 9 Todd Lopez, “For Contingencies in Indo-Pacom, Army Will Serve as ‘Linchpin’ for Joint Force,” DOD News, December 1, 2021; Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,” December 3, 2020. Congressional Research Service 2 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations U.S. allies the Philippines and Thailand, and increases funding for the Pacific Deterrence U.S. allies the Philippines and Thailand, and increases funding for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, which involves the Philippines, Japan, and other allies.Initiative, which involves the Philippines, Japan, and other allies.1110
Regional Counterterrorism Efforts
The Philippines, which is home to not only indigenous extremist groups but also at times to The Philippines, which is home to not only indigenous extremist groups but also at times to
foreign terrorist fighters,foreign terrorist fighters,1211 has “enjoyed close counterterrorism cooperation with the United has “enjoyed close counterterrorism cooperation with the United
States,” according to the State Department.States,” according to the State Department.1312 The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO
ally in 2003 as part of the George W. Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror.ally in 2003 as part of the George W. Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror.1413 U.S.- U.S.-
Philippine counterterrorism efforts have included the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippine counterterrorism efforts have included the Joint Special Operations Task Force–
Philippines (2002-2014) and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (2017-2020). In 2019, the two Philippines (2002-2014) and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (2017-2020). In 2019, the two
countries signed an agreement to establish a new regional counterterrorism facility in the countries signed an agreement to establish a new regional counterterrorism facility in the
Philippines.Philippines.1514
South China Sea Disputes
The United States has aimed to partner with the Philippines in carrying out strategies to counter The United States has aimed to partner with the Philippines in carrying out strategies to counter
Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and to build “support for rules-based Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and to build “support for rules-based
approaches to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.”approaches to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.”1615
The Philippines is the only country with territorial disputes with China that has challenged The Philippines is the only country with territorial disputes with China that has challenged
China’s maritime territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea China’s maritime territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).(UNCLOS).1716 Through the Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative Through the Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative
(MSI),(MSI),1817 which Congress extended in 2021, which Congress extended in 2021,1918 the United States has sought to improve the ability the United States has sought to improve the ability
of the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Southeast and South Asian countries to maintain maritime of the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Southeast and South Asian countries to maintain maritime
domain awareness and patrol their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). domain awareness and patrol their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

10 Todd Lopez, “For Contingencies in Indo-Pacom, Army Will Serve as ‘Linchpin’ for Joint Force,” DOD News,
December 1, 2021; Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies,” December 3, 2020.
11 Human Rights Concerns The Philippines long has attracted congressional concern related to its human rights violations, particularly extra-judicial killings. At various times during the past decade and a half, Congress 10 The National Defense Authorization Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-81, Sections 1242 and 1252). Benjamin Rimland and The National Defense Authorization Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-81, Sections 1242 and 1252). Benjamin Rimland and
Patrick Buchan, “Getting the Pacific Deterrence Initiative Right,” Patrick Buchan, “Getting the Pacific Deterrence Initiative Right,” The Diplomat, May 2, 2020. , May 2, 2020.
1211 Foreign fighters mostly have come from other countries in Southeast Asia. Thomas M. Sanderson and Maxwell B. Foreign fighters mostly have come from other countries in Southeast Asia. Thomas M. Sanderson and Maxwell B.
Markusen, “A Call to Battle in the Philippines: Investigating Foreign Fighters in Marawi,” Center for Strategic and Markusen, “A Call to Battle in the Philippines: Investigating Foreign Fighters in Marawi,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, October 31, 2017. International Studies, October 31, 2017.
1312 Department of State, Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines, December 16, 2021. See also Ashley L. , December 16, 2021. See also Ashley L.
Rhoades and Todd C. Helmus, “Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines,” RAND, 2020. Rhoades and Todd C. Helmus, “Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines,” RAND, 2020.
1413 Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6, Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6,
2003, 68 2003, 68 Federal Register 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,” 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,”
fact sheet, January 20, 2021. fact sheet, January 20, 2021.
1514 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “New Regional Counterterrorism Training Center to Boost U.S.-Philippine and U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “New Regional Counterterrorism Training Center to Boost U.S.-Philippine and
Regional Cooperation,” October 11, 2019. Regional Cooperation,” October 11, 2019.
1615 The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.” The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.”
1716 Some Members of Congress have sponsored legislation calling on the U.S. Senate to ratify UNLCOS. See H.Res. Some Members of Congress have sponsored legislation calling on the U.S. Senate to ratify UNLCOS. See H.Res.
361 and S.Res. 220. There is debate about the effectiveness of signing onto the agreement in furthering U.S. interests in 361 and S.Res. 220. There is debate about the effectiveness of signing onto the agreement in furthering U.S. interests in
the South China Sea. William Gallo, “Why Hasn’t the US Signed the Law of the Sea Treaty,” the South China Sea. William Gallo, “Why Hasn’t the US Signed the Law of the Sea Treaty,” Voice of America, June , June
6, 2016. 6, 2016.
1817 Formerly the South China Sea Initiative. See the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92, Formerly the South China Sea Initiative. See the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92,
Section 1263). Section 1263).
1918 The NDAA, 2022 (P.L. 117-81, Section 1241) extended the MSI through 2027. The NDAA, 2022 (P.L. 117-81, Section 1241) extended the MSI through 2027.
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Human Rights Concerns
The Philippines long has attracted congressional concern related to its human rights violations,
particularly extra-judicial killings. At various times during the past decade and a half, Congress
has restricted military and other security assistance to the Philippines in order to encourage has restricted military and other security assistance to the Philippines in order to encourage
improvements in human rights practices of the Philippine military, police, and government. The improvements in human rights practices of the Philippine military, police, and government. The
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409) supports a multipronged U.S. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409) supports a multipronged U.S.
strategy for advancing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” including the promotion of human rights strategy for advancing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” including the promotion of human rights
in the Indo-Pacific region. ARIA and in the Indo-Pacific region. ARIA and otherforeign assistance appropriations legislation restrict counternarcotics assistance to the legislation restrict counternarcotics assistance to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) due to human rights violations related to Philippine National Police (PNP) due to human rights violations related to the drug war.20former President Duterte’s antidrug campaign.19
Philippine Politics
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks the Philippines 54th out of 167 countries in terms of The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks the Philippines 54th out of 167 countries in terms of
its level of democracy, placing it in the “flawed democracy” categoryits level of democracy, placing it in the “flawed democracy” category and ranking it the second-
most democratic country in Southeast Asia after Malaysia. Although the EIU gives the . Although the EIU gives the
Philippines relatively high scores on electoral process and pluralism, political participation, and Philippines relatively high scores on electoral process and pluralism, political participation, and
civil liberties, the country receives relatively low scores on the functioning of government and civil liberties, the country receives relatively low scores on the functioning of government and
political culture.political culture.21
Many aspects of institutional democracy are practiced to the fullest in the Philippines. 20 The Department of State reported that the 2013 and 2019 midterm elections and the 2016 national elections were “generally free and fair,” although there were reports of vote-buying and some incidents of violence.21 An international group of election monitors found that the 2022 national elections were marred by instances of vote-buying, intimidation, disinformation, and violence.22 Philippine Philippine
citizens generally can exercise political and civil rights with few restrictions, openly criticize citizens generally can exercise political and civil rights with few restrictions, openly criticize
national leaders, and enjoy academic freedom and religious liberties. The country has a robust national leaders, and enjoy academic freedom and religious liberties. The country has a robust
civil society and a lively press. civil society and a lively press. International and national observers considered national midterm
elections held in 2019 “generally free and fair.”22 Some aspects of Philippine politics, however, Some aspects of Philippine politics, however,
long have undermined democratic institutions and government effectiveness and led to human long have undermined democratic institutions and government effectiveness and led to human
rights abuses. These include the existence of corruption; concentrations of power among rights abuses. These include the existence of corruption; concentrations of power among
socioeconomic elites and local clans; the lack of democratic control over the security forces; and socioeconomic elites and local clans; the lack of democratic control over the security forces; and
a weak judicial system and culture of impunity.23a weak judicial system and culture of impunity.23
Some analysts point to the Philippines as an example of growing authoritarian or illiberal tendencies in countries that still practice electoral democracy. Such trends include the increasing use of police and military in all levels of governance; suppression of opposition figures, the judiciary, and media; and disinformation campaigns that have lessened the public’s ability to influence decisionmaking.24 During the democratic era that began in 1986, the legislative branch and Supreme Court have not During the democratic era that began in 1986, the legislative branch and Supreme Court have not
served as strong checks on presidential power. Political parties and groupings tend to be fluid and served as strong checks on presidential power. Political parties and groupings tend to be fluid and
shifting, driven more by individual personalities, interests, and loyalties than by unifying shifting, driven more by individual personalities, interests, and loyalties than by unifying
ideologies, policy platforms, and goals.24 Some experts argue that the Supreme Court has become
less independent over the course of the past three administrations.25 The court generally has not

2019 See See also the Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021FY2022 (P.L. (P.L. 116-260117-103, Section 7043(g)). , Section 7043(g)).
2120 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2021,” February 10, 2022. By comparison, the United States ranks Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2021,” February 10, 2022. By comparison, the United States ranks
26th, also in the “flawed democracy” category26th, also in the “flawed democracy” category, and Indonesia ranks 52nd. 21.
22 Department of State, Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, March 30, 2021; Department of State, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, May 3, 2017. 22 Sebastian Strangio, “Philippine Election Marred by Violence, Vote-Buying: Monitoring Mission,” The Diplomat, May 20, 2022; International Observers Mission, “Interim Report of the Philippine Elections 2022,” May 19, 2022. .
23 Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s 23 Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s
Philippines,” Brookings, January 22, 2021; David G. Timberman, “Philippines Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Philippines,” Brookings, January 22, 2021; David G. Timberman, “Philippines Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm
Assessment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” January 10, 2019; Christia Marie Ramos, “‘Culture of Assessment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” January 10, 2019; Christia Marie Ramos, “‘Culture of
Impunity’ Made Filipinos Afraid of Voicing Criticism vs. Admin—Pangilinan,” Impunity’ Made Filipinos Afraid of Voicing Criticism vs. Admin—Pangilinan,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 19, , March 19,
2021. 2021.
24 24 Paul D. Kenny, “Why Is There No Political Polarization in the Philippines?” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, August 18, 2020.
25 Edcel John A. Ibarra, “The Philippine Supreme Court Under Duterte: Reshaped, Unwilling to Annul, and Unable to
Restrain,” Social Science Research Council. November 10, 2020.
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attempted to restrain the actions of President Duterte, who has appointed 12 of the Supreme
Court’s 15 Justices.26
Duterte’s Legacy and the 2022 Elections
The Philippines is scheduled to hold presidential, congressional, and local elections on May 9,
2022, with a new president and legislature slated to take office on July 1, 2022. President Duterte
is not seeking reelection, as the Philippine Constitution limits the President to one six-year term
without the possibility of reelection. Some observers view the polls as a referendum on President
Duterte’s policies and actions, including what some refer to as an erosion of democracy under his
rule.27
Duterte remains popular domestically, according to opinion polls, despite an economic downturn
caused by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, his violent antidrug campaign,
and his controversial foreign policy stances. In one poll conducted in March 2021, Duterte had an
approval rating of 65%.28
Prominent candidates for the presidency include Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the
longtime Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos; Vice-President Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo,
a prominent Duterte critic; and Senator Emmanuel “Manny” Pacquaio, a prominent boxing
champion. Duterte’s daughter, Sara Duterte-Carpio, formerly Mayor of Davao, is running for
Vice President, allied with Marcos. (The Philippines President and Vice-President are elected
separately, and frequently come from competing political factions, as is true of President Duterte
and Vice-President Robredo.)
Many political observers see the 2022 polls as an important test of the Philippines’ democratic
institutions, which some experts argue have weakened under Duterte. Analysts point to the
Philippines as an example of growing authoritarian tendencies in countries that still practice
electoral democracy. Such trends include the increasing use of police and military in all levels of
governance; attacks against the political opposition, judiciary, and media; and disinformation
campaigns that have lessened the public’s ability to influence decisionmaking.29
U.S.-Philippines Relations
In contrast to his predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who steered the Philippines strategically
towards the United States, President Duterte sought to strengthen ties with China, which he
viewed as a potentially large source of foreign investment.30 According to some analysts, Duterte
attempted to institute a policy of “equi-balancing” between the United States, its principal

26 Philippine Supreme Court Justices are required to retire at 70 years of age. “Duterte Appoints New Supreme Court
Justice,” BusinessWorld, November 16, 2021; David G. Timberman, “Philippines Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm
Assessment.”
27 David Hutt, “Next Philippine Election Looms as an Institutional Stress Test,” The Diplomat, November 12, 2020.
28 Azer Parrocha, “PRRD Maintains High Approval, Trust Ratings Amid COVID-19 Surge,” Philippine News Agency,
April 8, 2021; “September 17-20, 2020 National Mobile Phone Survey—Report No. 15: Filipinos Have Mixed
Expectations on Personal Quality-of-Life in the Next 12 Months,” Social Weather Stations, November 6, 2020.
29 Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s
Philippines,” Brookings Institution. January 22, 2021; Sheila Coronel, “This Is How Philippine Democracy Dies,” The
Atlantic, June 16, 2020.
30 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog, November 2, 2021.
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diplomatic and security partner, and China, its largest trading partner.31 The Philippines under
Duterte also expanded its sources of military assistance, including from U.S. allies and strategic
partners Australia, Japan, South Korea, and India, as well as from China and Russia.32 Between
2016 and 2019, Duterte made annual trips to China, including two in 2019, as well as two trips to
Russia and three to Japan, the Philippines’ largest foreign aid donor, as part of his policy of
reducing the Philippines’ reliance on the United States.33 President Duterte met with then-U.S.
President Donald Trump at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in
Manila in November 2017, but he has not visited the United States as President.
Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s Philippines,” Brookings Institution. January 22, 2021; Sheila Coronel, “This Is How Philippine Democracy Dies,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 4 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations ideologies, policy platforms, and goals.25 Some experts argue that the Supreme Court has become less independent over the course of the past three administrations.26 The court generally did not attempt to restrain the actions of former President Duterte, who appointed 12 of the Supreme Court’s 15 Justices.27 2022 National Elections Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. assumed the presidency on June 30, 2022, having won more than 31 million out of 55 million votes cast (59%) in nationwide elections held in May. Marcos is the son of Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who ruled the country from 1965 until he was ousted by the 1986 People Power Revolution, and who formally imposed martial law on the Philippines between 1972 and 1981.28 Sara Duterte-Carpio, daughter of Rodrigo Duterte, won the Vice-Presidency. The Philippine constitution limits both the president and vice-president, who are elected on separate tickets, to one six-year term. For many democracy advocates, Marcos Jr.’s election, after six years of democratic backsliding and human rights abuses under Duterte, raised questions about the state of human rights and democracy in the Philippines.29 Although Marcos earned a clear electoral victory, some analysts expressed concern about the use of social media and other information outlets to misrepresent or downplay his family’s role in human rights abuses and corruption during his father’s 21 years as president.30 Other observers perceived Marcos’s win as a continuation of populist and illiberal politics that began with Duterte, who remained popular throughout his term despite his violent antidrug campaign and some controversial foreign policy stances.31 Former Vice-President Leni Robredo, who had criticized Duterte’s human rights record and cooperative approach towards China, was the second place finisher in the 2022 presidential race, garnering 28% of the vote.32 Although Marcos has not yet introduced specific policy proposals or suggested major shifts in policy from his predecessor, he may focus initially on reviving the country’s economy, which is recovering from a downturn largely related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 25 Paul D. Kenny, “Why Is There No Political Polarization in the Philippines?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 18, 2020. 26 Edcel John A. Ibarra, “The Philippine Supreme Court Under Duterte: Reshaped, Unwilling to Annul, and Unable to Restrain,” Social Science Research Council. November 10, 2020. 27 Philippine Supreme Court Justices are required to retire at 70 years of age. “Duterte Appoints New Supreme Court Justice,” BusinessWorld, November 16, 2021; David G. Timberman, “Philippines Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment.” 28 Mark John Sanchez, “The People Power Revolution, Philippines 1986,” at https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/people-power-revolution-philippines-1986?language_content_entity=en. 29 Jim Gomez, “Activists Ask Top Court to Void Marcos Jr’s Presidential Win,” ABC News, May 17, 2022; Andrea Chloe Wong, “The Philippines’ Democratic ‘Backsliding’ in the Time of Duterte,” International Policy Digest, September 12, 2020. 30 Sheila Coronel, “The Triumph of Marcos Dynasty: Disinformation Is a Warning to the U.S.,” The New Yorker, May 17, 2022. 31 Zacarian Sarao, “Duterte Has Drawn High Ratings from 2016 to 2022—Pulse Asia,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2022; Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Philippines Election Result Is a Win for Dynasty Politics,” The Guardian, May 26, 2022. 32 Howard Johnson and Jonathan Head, “Leni Robredo: The Woman Leading the Philippines’ ‘Pink Revolution,’” BBC News, May 7, 2022; Mara Cepeda, “Robredo Blasts Duterte for ‘Favoring’ China, Throwing Away Sovereignty,” Rappler, May 9, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 16 link to page 16 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations pandemic.33 Some analysts expect Marcos to be a more reliable supporter of the U.S.-Philippines alliance than Duterte, while also seeking better relations with China.34 U.S.-Philippine Relations In contrast to his predecessor, President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), who steered the Philippines strategically towards the United States, former President Duterte sought to strengthen ties with China, which he viewed as a potentially large source of foreign investment.35 Duterte’s goal of garnering major infrastructure investment from Beijing, however, was largely unsuccessful, and the two countries made no significant progress toward resolving territorial disputes or engaging in joint oil exploration in the South China Sea.36 In some respects, the U.S.-Philippines relationship hit a low point in February 2020, when the In some respects, the U.S.-Philippines relationship hit a low point in February 2020, when the
Duterte government notified the United States of its intent to terminate the Philippines-U.S. Duterte government notified the United States of its intent to terminate the Philippines-U.S.
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which serves as the legal foundation for bilateral military Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which serves as the legal foundation for bilateral military
cooperation in the Philippines’ territory. As tensions between the Philippines and China over cooperation in the Philippines’ territory. As tensions between the Philippines and China over
disputed territory in the South China Sea continued to fester, however, the disputed territory in the South China Sea continued to fester, however, the PhilippinesDuterte government sought sought
closer security cooperation with the United States.closer security cooperation with the United States.3437 In July 2021, the In July 2021, the Philippine government
Philippines renewed its adherence to the VFA. (See renewed its adherence to the VFA. (See “Visiting Forces Agreement,” below.)below.)
Among Filipinos, popular support for the U.S.-Philippines relationship is strong. According to a
July 2020 survey conducted by Philippines-based Social Weather Stations, net trust in the United
States was +42 (60% much trust, 18% little trust), compared to +67 in December 2019. By
contrast, net trust in China fell from -27 in December 2019 to -36 in July 2020 (22% much trust,
58% little trust).35 A January 2020 Pew poll found that Filipinos had the highest favorable opinion
of the United States (80%) of 31 countries surveyed.36 In a June 2021 survey, 47% of respondents
indicated that the “the government is not doing enough to assert the country’s rights in the West
PH [South China] Sea” while 24% disagreed and 29% were undecided.37 Some analysts argue,
however, that South China Sea issues are not a primary factor determining the way Filipinos vote
in national elections.38

31 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s
Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China,” Journal of Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2016).
32 Andreo Calonzo, “Philippines Buys Two Warships as South China Sea Tensions Fester,” Bloomberg, December 28,
2021; Michael Punongbayan, “Philippines, Australia Affirm Defense Cooperation,” Philippine Star, February 27,
2021; Marc Calumba, “PHL Military Receives Offer from Japan for Official Development Assistance,” Alpha News
Philippines, May 5, 2021; Derek Grossman, “China Has Lost the Philippines Despite Duterte’s Best Efforts,” Foreign
Policy, May 3, 2021; Frances Mangosing, “China to Give Philippines Military Additional P1-Billion Aid,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 28, 2019; Manuel Mogato, “Philippines, Russia Sign Two Military Deals,” Reuters, October 25,
2017.
33 Pia Ranada, “Duterte Arrives in Russia for Second Visit,” Rappler, Oct 2, 2019; Nestor Corrales, “Breaking: Duterte
to Visit China in August for 5th Time,” Philippine Daly Inquirer, August 4, 2019; Arianne Merez, “Duterte Arrives in
Japan for 3rd Visit,” ABS-CBN News, May 28 2019.
34 “US-Philippines Alliance Back on Track as Duterte’s China Charm Offensive Crumbles,” South China Morning
Post, October 23, 2021.
35 Most recent survey on this topic available. “SWS July 3-6, 2020 National Mobile Phone Survey—Report No. 4: Net
trust of Filipinos is ‘Good’ +42 for the United States, ‘Moderate’ +27 for Australia, and ‘Bad’ -36 for China,” Social
Weather Stations, July 19, 2020.
36 Among 31 countries, Filipinos had the highest confidence in U.S. President Trump (77%); they also had the highest
confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin (61%) and third highest in Chinese leader Xi Jinping (58%) “to do the
right thing regarding world affairs.” “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly
Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 19, 2020.
37 “Second Quarter 2021 Social Weather Survey on the West PH Sea,” Social Weather Stations, July 28, 2021.
38 “Looking South, Looking West: Manila Views Security Threats to the Philippines,” Zoom webinar, US-Philippines
Society, June 30, 2021.
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In November 2021, during a period of renewed commitment to the relationship, the United States
and the Philippines held the ninth Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. The two sides pledged to engage
in cooperative efforts in various areas including responding to the COVID-19 pandemic,
upholding the “rules-based maritime order” in the South China Sea, strengthening interoperability
of the U.S. and Philippine armed forces, and fostering respect for human rights.39 Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin III and Philippines Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana spoke
on the phone on November 19, 2021, to discuss recent events in the South China Sea and
“welcomed recent bilateral efforts to continue strengthening the U.S.-Philippines
alliance.” Secretary Austin reaffirmed the “strong U.S. commitment” to the Philippines under the
Mutual Defense Treaty.40
U.S. Foreign Assistance
U.S. assistance to the Philippines, totaling an estimated $154.9 million in FY2021, includes U.S.
In November 2021, the United States and the Philippines held the ninth Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. The two sides pledged to engage in cooperative efforts in various areas including responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, upholding the “rules-based maritime order” in the South China Sea, strengthening interoperability of the U.S. and Philippine armed forces, and fostering respect for human rights.38 In July 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a call with newly appointed Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo, emphasized “the increasing significance of the U.S.-Philippine bilateral alliance to security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world.”39 During Blinken’s August 2022 visit to Manila, President Marcos emphasized the importance of the bilateral alliance given recent international developments such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and tensions between China and Taiwan.40 Among Filipinos, popular support for the U.S.-Philippines relationship is strong. According to a July 2022 survey conducted by Pulse Asia, 89% of Filipinos had a “great deal” or “fair amount” 33 Ambassador Jose Romualdez, US-Philippines Society, September 7, 2022; Japhet Quitzon and William Alan Reinsch, “What Does the Incoming Marcos Administration Mean for the Philippines Economy and International Trade?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 24, 2022. 34 “What Does the Incoming Marcos Administration Mean for the Philippines Economy and International Trade?” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 35 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog, November 2, 2021. 36 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog; Myrna M. Velasco, “No ‘Legal Deal’ Yet with China on Joint Oil Exploration at WPS—DOE,” Manila Bulletin, September 6, 2021. 37 “US-Philippines Alliance Back on Track as Duterte’s China Charm Offensive Crumbles,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2021. 38 Department of State, “9th U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue,” media note, November 16, 2021. 39 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manalo,” readout, July 9, 2022. 40 Sofia Tomacruz, “Marcos Meets Blinken, Says PH-US Ties Crucial Amid Taiwan Tension,” Rappler, August 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 11 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations of trust in the United States compared to Japan (78%) and China (33%). Filipinos placed the least amount of trust in China out of 10 countries (67% had “not too much trust” or “no trust”).41 U.S. Foreign Assistance U.S. assistance to the Philippines totaled an estimated $155.2 million in FY2022.42 U.S. aid includes U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State-funded development Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State-funded development
and security assistance. (and security assistance. (SeeSee Table 1.)) Development assistance includes programs aimed at Development assistance includes programs aimed at
promoting inclusive socio-economic development, the rule of law, and human rights, and promoting inclusive socio-economic development, the rule of law, and human rights, and
improving family health, basic education, and environmental management.improving family health, basic education, and environmental management.4143 In addition, USAID In addition, USAID
committed $63.6 million for humanitarian and recovery efforts in Marawi, a city destroyed during committed $63.6 million for humanitarian and recovery efforts in Marawi, a city destroyed during
a battle between a battle between government forces and Filipino and foreign Islamist insurgents Filipino and foreign Islamist insurgents and government forces in 2017.in 2017.4244
Table 1. Department of State Assistance to the Philippines, FY2017-FY2021
Current $ in thousands Current $ in thousands
Account
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021 FY2022
Development Assistance Development Assistance
51,889 51,889
70,000 70,000
70,000 70,000
70,000 70,000
70,000 70,000 70,350
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
40,000 40,000
40,000 40,000
40,000 40,000
40,000 40,000
40 40,000 20,000 ,000
Global Health Programs–USAID Global Health Programs–USAID
33,000 33,000
28,500 28,500
26,000 26,000
27,500 27,500
30,000 30,000
43,000 Global Health Programs–State Global Health Programs–State
— —
— —
— —
5,305 5,305
— —
7,442 International Military Education and International Military Education and
1.981 1.981
2,000 2,000
1,900 1,900
2,147 2,147
2,000 2,000 1,922
Training (IMET) Training (IMET)
International Narcotics Control and International Narcotics Control and
7,000 7,000
6,500 6,500
7,000 7,000
7,000 7,000
7,000 7,000
7,000 Law Enforcement (INCLE) Law Enforcement (INCLE)
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
6,090 6,090
5,800 5,800
5,800 5,800
5,940 5,940
5,940 5,940
5,500 De-mining and Related Programs De-mining and Related Programs
TOTAL
139,960
152,906
150,700
157,892
154,940
155,214 Source: State and USAID Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign OperationsState and USAID Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
Note: and other budget documents. Note: FY2022 numbers are estimated. FMF and IMET are implemented by the Defense Department through the Defense Security Cooperation FMF and IMET are implemented by the Defense Department through the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA). The U.S. government has suspended INCLE assistance to the PNP for counternarcotics Agency (DSCA). The U.S. government has suspended INCLE assistance to the PNP for counternarcotics
activities, while assistance for other activities continues. activities, while assistance for other activities continues.

39 Department of State, “9th U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue,” media note, November 16, 2021.
40 Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III Phone Call with Philippines Secretary of
National Defense Delfin Lorenzana,” November 19, 2021.
41 As of May 2022, USAID had provided $29.2 million in humanitarian assistance to help communities affected by Typhoon Odette.45 Also known as Rai, the cyclone struck the Visayas region in central Philippines and parts of Mindanao island beginning on December 16, 2021. 41 “Pulse Survey: Filipinos Trust US the Most; China, Russia the Least,” Philippines Star, July 29, 2022. 42 Department of State budget documents. 43 Department of State, Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY2022.
4244 USAID, “Marawi Assistance,” July 8, 2021. 45 USAID, “U.S. Provides Additional PHP400 Million in Aid to Support Typhoon Odette Recovery Efforts,” May 23, 2022; USAID, “U.S. Assistance for Typhoon Odette Tops PHP1 Billion with New Major Announcement,” January 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 7 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations USAID, “Marawi Assistance,” July 8, 2021.
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As of February 2, 2022, USAID had provided $21 million in humanitarian assistance to help
communities affected by Typhoon Odette.43 Also known as Rai, the cyclone struck the Visayas
region in central Philippines and parts of Mindanao island beginning on December 16, 2021.
Odette’s destruction affected nearly 5 million people, and the Philippine government reported Odette’s destruction affected nearly 5 million people, and the Philippine government reported
over 400 deaths and 580,000 people displaced due to the super typhoon.over 400 deaths and 580,000 people displaced due to the super typhoon.4446
The Philippines is a “priority recipient” in East Asia for security assistance and the largest The Philippines is a “priority recipient” in East Asia for security assistance and the largest
recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in the region. FMF primarily has supported recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in the region. FMF primarily has supported
maritime security, disaster response, military professionalization, and the procurement of maritime security, disaster response, military professionalization, and the procurement of
equipment for counterterrorism operations.equipment for counterterrorism operations.45 Anti-terrorism47 Antiterrorism programs provide training and programs provide training and
equipment grants for the Philippine National Police.equipment grants for the Philippine National Police.4648 The Philippines also receives The Philippines also receives
counterterrorism support through the Department of State East Asia and Pacific Regional program counterterrorism support through the Department of State East Asia and Pacific Regional program
and the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund.and the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund.47
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (49 COVID-19) in the Philippines
The Philippines, with the second-highest numbers of both COVID-19 infections and deaths in Southeast Asia, after
Indonesia, was among the last in the region to provide mass vaccinations.48 As of February 2022, the in the Philippines The World World
Health Organization reported approximately 3.Health Organization reported approximately 3.686 mil ion mil ion confirmed COVID-19 cases COVID-19 cases and over 61,500 deaths in in the Philippinesthe Philippines, and roughly
54,200 deaths.49 About 60 as of August 2022.50 Over 70% of the population % of the population wasis ful y vaccinated ful y vaccinated as of February 2022.50, according to the Philippine government and other sources.51 The U.S. government The U.S. government has
provided $39 mil ion in pandemic response assistance to the Philippines to facilitate testing, crucial care,
communication campaigns, protection and training of health workers, vaccine deployment, and essential equipment
and supplies.51 China and the United States have been the largest suppliers of vaccines, including those both
purchased and donated.52 The United States, the largest contributor to the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
(COVAX) program, has facilitated the delivery of over 65 mil ion vaccine doses to the Philippines as of January 10,
2022, including nearly 25 mil ion doses provided by the United States.53
Since 2016, the U.S. government has suspended International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to PNP units for counternarcotics activities, although it has

43 USAID, “USAID Announces $1 Million in Additional Funding for People Affected by Super Typhoon Rai in the
Philippines,” February 2, 2022; USAID, “U.S. Assistance for Typhoon Odette Tops PHP1 Billion with New Major
Announcement,” January 5, 2022.
44provided approximately $38 mil ion in pandemic-related assistance and 32 mil ion vaccines through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) program as of March 2022.52 Since 2016, due to human rights concerns, the U.S. government has suspended International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to PNP units for counternarcotics activities, although it has increased assistance for maritime law enforcement, drug demand reduction programs, and transnational interdiction efforts.53 Other legislative measures mandate reporting on Philippine security forces related to human rights violations.54 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) rewards countries that have demonstrated good governance, investment in health and education, and sound economic policies. In 2010, the MCC approved a five-year, $507 million compact with the Philippine government. The agreement aimed to help modernize the Bureau of Internal Revenue to increase revenue collection and reduce tax evasion; expand a community-driven, poverty-reduction program; and promote 46 Jeannette I. Andrade, “Odette Leaves P 24.5-Billion Damage; Death Toll Hits 407,” Jeannette I. Andrade, “Odette Leaves P 24.5-Billion Damage; Death Toll Hits 407,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, ,
January 3, 2022; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Philippines: Super Typhoon Rai January 3, 2022; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Philippines: Super Typhoon Rai
(Odette): Situation Report No. 1,” December 30, 2021. (Odette): Situation Report No. 1,” December 30, 2021.
4547 FMF equipment includes communications items, night vision devices, unmanned aerial systems, vehicles, precision FMF equipment includes communications items, night vision devices, unmanned aerial systems, vehicles, precision
guided munitions, and related integration work. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific guided munitions, and related integration work. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific
Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020,” Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020,”
November 10, 2020. November 10, 2020.
4648 The Department of State provides The Department of State provides anti-terrorismantiterrorism assistance through the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining assistance through the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining
and Related Programs (NADR) account. and Related Programs (NADR) account.
4749 Department of State, Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY2022.
48 Jim Gomez, “Philippines Launches Virus Vaccinations amid Supply Problems,” ABC News, March 1, 2021; Center
for Strategic and International Studies, “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker,” at https://www.csis.org/programs/
southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0.
49 World Health Organization, “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard,” at https://covid19.who.int/.
50 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker.”
51 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Provides 2.7 Million More Pfizer COVID-19 Vaccines to the Philippines,”
January 10, 2022.
52 “Philippines’ Duterte Thanks China for More COVID-19 Vaccines amid Surging Infections,” CGTN, August 20,
2021; “Tracker: The Philippines’ COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” Rappler, April 1, 2021.
53 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Provides 2.7 Million More Pfizer COVID-19 Vaccines to the Philippines.”
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increased assistance for maritime law enforcement, drug demand reduction programs, and
transnational interdiction efforts.54 Other legislative measures mandate reporting on Philippine
security forces related to human rights violations.55 (See “Selected Legislation,” below.)
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) rewards countries that have demonstrated good
governance, investment in health and education, and sound economic policies. In 2010, the MCC
approved a five-year, $507 million compact with the Philippine government. The agreement
aimed to help modernize the Bureau of Internal Revenue to increase revenue collection and
reduce tax evasion; expand a community-driven, poverty-reduction program; and promote
economic growth through investment in infrastructure.56 In December 2015, the50 Zacarian Sarao, “Low Vaccination, Booster Turnout May Lead to Over 19,000 Daily COVID Cases by August—DOH,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 26, 2022; World Health Organization, “Philippines Situation,” at https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/ph. 51 Reuters, “COVID-19 Tracker,” July15, 2022; Ma. Teresa Montemayor, “Over 70% of Target Population Vaccinated vs. Covid-19,” Philippine News Agency, March 7, 2022. 52 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with the Philippines,” fact sheet, March 3, 2022. 53 INCLE assistance is provided through the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Strengthens Drug Demand Reduction Programs in the Philippines Through Support for Outreach and Drop-In Centers,” November 27, 2020. See P.L. 115-409 (ARIA) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2022 (P.L. 117-103). 54 Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2022 (P.L. 117-103). Congressional Research Service 8 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations economic growth through investment in infrastructure.55 The MCC awarded MCC awarded
the Philippines a second compactthe Philippines a second compact. In 2016, the MCC indicated in 2015, but indicated in 2016 that it would reevaluate its that it would reevaluate its
decision in light of human rights concerns. In December 2017, the Philippine government decision in light of human rights concerns. In December 2017, the Philippine government
withdrew from the process, stating that it wanted to focus resources on rebuilding Marawi rather withdrew from the process, stating that it wanted to focus resources on rebuilding Marawi rather
than committing money than committing money tofor the counterpart funding required with MCC projects. The the counterpart funding required with MCC projects. The Duterte government government
denied that the decision to withdraw from the program was made in response to human rights denied that the decision to withdraw from the program was made in response to human rights
criticism.criticism.5756
U.S.-Philippines Defense Ties
The U.S.-Philippines defense relationship is deeply rooted in a history of shared security interests The U.S.-Philippines defense relationship is deeply rooted in a history of shared security interests
and priorities that dates back to the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and has continuously evolved to and priorities that dates back to the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and has continuously evolved to
address new and developing threats. Since 2015, the Philippines has received over $1 billion in address new and developing threats. Since 2015, the Philippines has received over $1 billion in
U.S. military assistance, making it the largest recipient of U.S. military equipment and training in U.S. military assistance, making it the largest recipient of U.S. military equipment and training in
the Indo-Pacific.the Indo-Pacific.5857 U.S. security cooperation activities in the Philippines have included U.S. security cooperation activities in the Philippines have included
counterterrorism assistance, maritime domain awareness, joint military exercises, and transfers of counterterrorism assistance, maritime domain awareness, joint military exercises, and transfers of
U.S. military equipment. Security cooperation programs also have enhanced the capacity of the U.S. military equipment. Security cooperation programs also have enhanced the capacity of the
Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) to provide humanitarian assistance and to engage in disaster Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) to provide humanitarian assistance and to engage in disaster
response operations. The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO ally in 2003, which response operations. The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO ally in 2003, which
allows the country certain defense trade and security cooperation privileges.allows the country certain defense trade and security cooperation privileges.5958
Security Cooperation
As a security partner in the Pacific, the Philippines has received military assistance through the As a security partner in the Pacific, the Philippines has received military assistance through the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Section 333 Building Partner Capacity program Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Section 333 Building Partner Capacity program

54 INCLE assistance is provided through the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL). U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Strengthens Drug Demand Reduction Programs in
the Philippines Through Support for Outreach and Drop-In Centers,” November 27, 2020.
55 See P.L. 115-409 and P.L. 116-260.
56and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.59 Section 333 activities have focused on the development and enhancement of critical AFP capabilities including intelligence, maritime and border security operations, counterterrorism, and counter-improvised explosive device.60 Equipment deliveries under Section 333 have included precision guided munitions and tactical equipment. MSI activities in the Philippines have aimed to improve the AFP’s maritime ISR 55 Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Philippines Compact: Closed Compact Report,” April 2018. Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Philippines Compact: Closed Compact Report,” April 2018.
5756 Jenny Lei Ravelo, “Philippines Withdraws from MCC, Citing Marawi Crisis as a Priority,” Jenny Lei Ravelo, “Philippines Withdraws from MCC, Citing Marawi Crisis as a Priority,” Devex, December 19, , December 19,
2017; Jenny Lei Ravelo, “Second MCC Philippine Compact Under Review Due to Rule of Law, Human Rights 2017; Jenny Lei Ravelo, “Second MCC Philippine Compact Under Review Due to Rule of Law, Human Rights
Concerns,” Concerns,” Devex, December 16, 2016; Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Philippines Selected for Second , December 16, 2016; Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Philippines Selected for Second
Compact,” at https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/video/video-052516-philippines-second-compact. Compact,” at https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/video/video-052516-philippines-second-compact.
5857 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned Aerial System to Philippine Air U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned Aerial System to Philippine Air
Force,” press release, October 14, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons Force,” press release, October 14, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons
and Munitions to AFP,” press release, July 8, 2021. and Munitions to AFP,” press release, July 8, 2021.
59 58 Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6, Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6,
2003, 68 2003, 68 Federal Register 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,” 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,”
fact sheet, January 20, 2021. fact sheet, January 20, 2021.
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and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.60 Section 333 activities have focused on the
development and enhancement of critical AFP capabilities including intelligence, maritime and
border security operations, counterterrorism, and counter-improvised explosive device.61
Equipment deliveries under Section 333 have included precision guided munitions and tactical
equipment. MSI activities in the Philippines have aimed to improve the AFP’s maritime ISR
59 Section 333 Building Partner Capacity is authorized under Title 10, U.S.C. §333. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) was authorized by Section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92, as amended by P.L. 114-328 and P.L. 115-232 and P.L. 116-92). 60 Data from ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines,” press release, at U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines REV29 (usembassy.gov). Note: DOD security cooperation program details are not made publicly available in a consistent or comprehensive manner; such activities provided in this report are not meant to be an exhaustive list. Congressional Research Service 9 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations capabilities and support the Philippines’ participation in multilateral engagements and other capabilities and support the Philippines’ participation in multilateral engagements and other
trainings, such as visit, board, search and seizure.trainings, such as visit, board, search and seizure.6261
The Philippines participates in U.S. defense institution capacity-building programs that have The Philippines participates in U.S. defense institution capacity-building programs that have
included defense strategy courses and policy workshops that aim to improve security sector included defense strategy courses and policy workshops that aim to improve security sector
governance, resource management, and legal capacity building.governance, resource management, and legal capacity building.6362 In addition, the Philippines is In addition, the Philippines is
partnered with the Guam and Hawaii National Guards through the State Partnership Program, partnered with the Guam and Hawaii National Guards through the State Partnership Program,
which is a unique civil-military program that the National Guard says aims to cultivate personal which is a unique civil-military program that the National Guard says aims to cultivate personal
relationships through a series of tailored engagements.relationships through a series of tailored engagements.6463
U.S.-Philippines bilateral exercises aim to strengthen interoperability through subject matter U.S.-Philippines bilateral exercises aim to strengthen interoperability through subject matter
exchanges and training events. In 2015-2020, the United States and the Philippines engaged in exchanges and training events. In 2015-2020, the United States and the Philippines engaged in
1,321 bilateral military exercises.1,321 bilateral military exercises.6564 Both sides curtailed security cooperation in 2020 Both sides curtailed security cooperation in 2020-2021 due to the due to the
uncertainty over possible termination of the VFA and to the COVID-19 pandemic. In uncertainty over possible termination of the VFA and to the COVID-19 pandemic. In October
2021, the two governments announced plans to return to full-scale military drills in 2022, and
stated that they would likely invite military observers from Australian, Japan, and the United
Kingdom.66 In 2022, 2022, approximately 3,800 AFP and 5,100 U.S. soldiers participated in Balikatan approximately 3,800 AFP and 5,100 U.S. soldiers participated in Balikatan
(“Shoulder-to-Shoulder”), the premier annual bilateral exercise, across Luzon, the largest (“Shoulder-to-Shoulder”), the premier annual bilateral exercise, across Luzon, the largest
Philippine island. The 2022 exercise, described as the “largest ever” by military officials, focused Philippine island. The 2022 exercise, described as the “largest ever” by military officials, focused
on improving interoperability and joint defense capabilities and engaged in humanitarian and on improving interoperability and joint defense capabilities and engaged in humanitarian and
civic assistance projects.civic assistance projects.6765
Other notable exercises include Maritime Training Activity “Sama Sama” (“Together”), which Other notable exercises include Maritime Training Activity “Sama Sama” (“Together”), which
was held in October 2021, and Kamandag (“Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea”), which was was held in October 2021, and Kamandag (“Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea”), which was

60 Section 333 Building Partner Capacity is authorized under Title 10, U.S.C. §333. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
Initiative (MSI) was authorized by Section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92,
as amended by P.L. 114-328 and P.L. 115-232 and P.L. 116-92).
61 Data from ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security
Assistance in the Philippines,” press release, at U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines REV29
(usembassy.gov). Note: DOD security cooperation program details are not made publicly available in a consistent or
comprehensive manner; such activities provided in this report are not meant to be an exhaustive list.
62conducted in September 2021.66 Exercises also have included the Philippine Navy, which participated in the first joint sail through the South China Sea in 2019 with the United States, Japan, and India.67 In addition, between April and June of 2021, the U.S. 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade conducted their first bilateral training events with various Philippine Army units.68 61 Data from ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Data from ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security
Assistance in the Philippines.” Assistance in the Philippines.”
6362 Institutional capacity-building activities are conducted through the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Institutional capacity-building activities are conducted through the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the DSCA’s Institute for Security Governance. Data from Studies, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the DSCA’s Institute for Security Governance. Data from
ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the
Philippines.” See also, DSCA, Institutional Capacity Building, accessed November 15, 2021, at https://www.dsca.mil/Philippines.” See also, DSCA, Institutional Capacity Building, accessed November 15, 2021, at https://www.dsca.mil/
institutional-capacity-building. institutional-capacity-building.
6463 For more information, see State Partnership Program, U.S. National Guard, at https://www.nationalguard.mil/ For more information, see State Partnership Program, U.S. National Guard, at https://www.nationalguard.mil/
Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/. See also, U.S. National Guard, Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/. See also, U.S. National Guard,
“Guam, Hawaii Share COVID Best Practices with the Philippines,” press release, December 10, 2020; Hawaii Air “Guam, Hawaii Share COVID Best Practices with the Philippines,” press release, December 10, 2020; Hawaii Air
National Guard, “HIANG Brings High Level Air Defense Expertise to Philippine Engagement,” press release, August National Guard, “HIANG Brings High Level Air Defense Expertise to Philippine Engagement,” press release, August
29, 2018. 29, 2018.
6564 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines.” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines.”
66 Andreo Calonzo, “U.S., Philippines Seek to Return to Full Military Drills in 2022,” Bloomberg, October 14, 2021.
67 “Largest-Ever PH-US Balikatan Exercise to Being Next Week,” CNN Philippines, March 22, 2022.
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conducted in September 2021.68 Exercises also have included the Philippine Navy, which
participated in the first joint sail through the South China Sea in 2019 with the United States,
Japan, and India.69 In addition, between April and June of 2021, the U.S.65 “Largest-Ever PH-US Balikatan Exercise to Being Next Week,” CNN Philippines, March 22, 2022. 66 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippine-U.S. Exercise MTA Sama Sama Kicks-off with Japan, France,” press release, October 12, 2021; Seth Robson, “Kamandag Drills Kick Off in the Philippines with a Focus on Shore-Based Weapons,” Stars and Stripes, September 30, 2021. 67 Ankit Panda, “US, India, Japan, Philippine Navies Demonstrate Joint Presence in South China Sea,” The Diplomat, May 11, 2019. 68 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Army 5th Security Force 5th Security Force
Assistance Brigade conducted their first bilateral training events with various Philippine Army
units.70Assistance Brigade and Philippine Army Conduct Bilateral Training in Nueva Ecija,” press release, April 28, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 21 link to page 21 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Counterterrorism Efforts
The U.S. military and the AFP have conducted bilateral counterterrorism operations since at least The U.S. military and the AFP have conducted bilateral counterterrorism operations since at least
2001. In 2017, following the reassertion of control over Marawi by Philippine military forces—2001. In 2017, following the reassertion of control over Marawi by Philippine military forces—
with assistance from U.S. special operations forces (SOF) advisors—the Department of Defense with assistance from U.S. special operations forces (SOF) advisors—the Department of Defense
(DOD) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) initiated Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (DOD) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) initiated Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines
(OPE-P) to help the AFP overcome counterterrorism capability gaps identified by U.S. advisors (OPE-P) to help the AFP overcome counterterrorism capability gaps identified by U.S. advisors
during operations in Marawi.during operations in Marawi.7169 U.S. SOF also provided logistical support, intelligence sharing, U.S. SOF also provided logistical support, intelligence sharing,
and operational planning, including the integration of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and and operational planning, including the integration of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) for intelligence gathering.reconnaissance (ISR) for intelligence gathering.7270 In 2020, the last year of OPE-P efforts, DOD In 2020, the last year of OPE-P efforts, DOD
committed $85.4 million for OPE-P, in which approximately 200 U.S. military personnel served committed $85.4 million for OPE-P, in which approximately 200 U.S. military personnel served
in advisory roles.in advisory roles.7371
Although the OPE-P overseas contingency operation designation has been removed, Although the OPE-P overseas contingency operation designation has been removed,
INDOPACOM continues both security cooperation under DOD authorities as well as “advise and INDOPACOM continues both security cooperation under DOD authorities as well as “advise and
assist” operations with Philippine security forces. Whereas OPE-P primarily focused on assist” operations with Philippine security forces. Whereas OPE-P primarily focused on
counterterrorism operations, “by, with, and through” Philippine partners, the scope of continued counterterrorism operations, “by, with, and through” Philippine partners, the scope of continued
bilateral security cooperation programs in the Philippines is to be “significantly larger than the bilateral security cooperation programs in the Philippines is to be “significantly larger than the
relatively narrow counterterrorism effort.”relatively narrow counterterrorism effort.”7472 (See “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-East Asia,” below.)
U.S. Defense Equipment Transfers
In addition to receiving military equipment through the U.S. FMF program, the Philippines is In addition to receiving military equipment through the U.S. FMF program, the Philippines is
eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles at discounted rates through the Excess Defense Articles eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles at discounted rates through the Excess Defense Articles
grant program.grant program.7573 In some cases, the Philippines supplements U.S. grant assistance with its In some cases, the Philippines supplements U.S. grant assistance with its

68 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippine-U.S. Exercise MTA Sama Sama Kicks-off with Japan, France,” press
release, October 12, 2021; Seth Robson, “Kamandag Drills Kick Off in the Philippines with a Focus on Shore-Based
Weapons,” Stars and Stripes, September 30, 2021.
69 Ankit Panda, “US, India, Japan, Philippine Navies Demonstrate Joint Presence in South China Sea,” The Diplomat,
May 11, 2019.
70 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Army 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade and Philippine Army Conduct
Bilateral Training in Nueva Ecija,” press release, April 28, 2021.
71national funds. In 2020 and 2021, the State Department notified Congress of six potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for the Philippines with a combined total over $4.5 billion. These items included missiles, F-16 aircraft, missiles, light military boats and attack helicopters.74 Some Members of Congress opposed the proposed FMS cases and other military assistance for human 69 DOD Inspector General, DOD Inspector General, DoD Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Armed Forces of the Republic of the
Philippines, DODIG-2019-048, January 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/04/2002085730/-1/-1/1/, DODIG-2019-048, January 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/04/2002085730/-1/-1/1/
DODIG-2019-048.PDF; Roy Ramos, “Duterte Thanks Nations for Helping to Liberate Marawi,” DODIG-2019-048.PDF; Roy Ramos, “Duterte Thanks Nations for Helping to Liberate Marawi,” Anadolu Agency, ,
October 25, 2017.October 25, 2017.
7270 Ibid. Ibid.
7371 By comparison, funding for OPE-P was $108 million in 2019 and $100 million in 2018. Lead Inspector General (IG) By comparison, funding for OPE-P was $108 million in 2019 and $100 million in 2018. Lead Inspector General (IG)
reporting responsibilities terminated at the end of FY2020 since none of the appropriated funding for OPE-P was reporting responsibilities terminated at the end of FY2020 since none of the appropriated funding for OPE-P was
associated with an Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO). See the 12th and final quarterly IG report for OPE-P: associated with an Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO). See the 12th and final quarterly IG report for OPE-P:
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.” Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.”
7472 Ibid. Ibid.
7573 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Military Delivers Php183 Million in New Weapons and Equipment to AFP,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Military Delivers Php183 Million in New Weapons and Equipment to AFP,”
press release, June 22, 2021. See also, U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned press release, June 22, 2021. See also, U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned
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national funds. In 2020 and 2021, the State Department notified Congress of six potential Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) cases for the Philippines with a combined total over $4.5 billion. These
items include missiles, F-16 aircraft, missiles, light military boats and attack helicopters.76 Some
Members of Congress opposed the proposed FMS cases and other military assistance for human
Aerial System to Philippine Air Force”; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons and Munitions to AFP.” 74 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Major Arms Sales: “Philippines—AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Air Launched Block II Missiles,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—F-16 Block 70/72 Aircraft,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—Scout, Assault, and Light Support Boats with Armaments and Accessories,” July 30, 2020; “Philippines—AH-1Z Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and Support,” April 30, 2020; “Philippines—AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and Support,” April 30, 2020. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 27 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations rights reasons, and sponsored legislation that would suspend security assistance to the rights reasons, and sponsored legislation that would suspend security assistance to the
Philippines.Philippines.7775 (See (See “Selected Legislation,” below.) The Philippines also purchases U.S. defense below.) The Philippines also purchases U.S. defense
articles and services through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program.articles and services through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program.7876
Mutual Defense Treaty
Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the United States and the Philippines Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the United States and the Philippines committed
are committed to help defend each other against external armed attack. Some analysts note that the MDT does to help defend each other against external armed attack. Some analysts note that the MDT does
not explicitly obligate the United States to defend maritime areas that are disputed by the not explicitly obligate the United States to defend maritime areas that are disputed by the
Philippines and other nations, and U.S. officials have not confirmed whether the Treaty applies to Philippines and other nations, and U.S. officials have not confirmed whether the Treaty applies to
disputed features in the South China Sea.disputed features in the South China Sea.7977 Article IV of the Treaty states: “Each Party recognizes Article IV of the Treaty states: “Each Party recognizes
an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutional processes.” Article V refers to an armed attack on the “metropolitan territory of constitutional processes.” Article V refers to an armed attack on the “metropolitan territory of
either of the Parties,” the “island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean,” or its either of the Parties,” the “island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean,” or its
“armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.”“armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.”8078
Some analysts contend that U.S. assurances have been getting stronger, particularly regarding the Some analysts contend that U.S. assurances have been getting stronger, particularly regarding the
defense of Philippine forces and military equipment in disputed areas. In March 2019, then-defense of Philippine forces and military equipment in disputed areas. In March 2019, then-
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed
attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual
defense obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”defense obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”81 In a January 27, 2021,
phone conversation between Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Philippine Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin, Jr., Blinken stressed the importance of the MDT and “its clear

Aerial System to Philippine Air Force”; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons
and Munitions to AFP.”
76 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Major Arms Sales: “Philippines—AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical
Missiles,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Air Launched Block II Missiles,” June 24, 2021;
“Philippines—F-16 Block 70/72 Aircraft,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—Scout, Assault, and Light Support Boats with
Armaments and Accessories,” July 30, 2020; “Philippines—AH-1Z Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and
Support,” April 30, 2020; “Philippines—AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and Support,”
April 30, 2020.
7779 Similarly, Biden Administration officials have affirmed that the MDT applies to “any armed attack on the Philippine military.”80 During their August 2022 meeting in Manila, Blinken and Marcos both pledged to strengthen the military alliance.81 Visiting Forces Agreement The Visiting Forces Agreement governs the legal status of U.S. military forces operating in the Philippines. It creates rules by which U.S. troops, vessels, and aircraft may enter the country and establishes criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.82 The VFA has been in effect since 1999, eight years after the Philippines rejected a treaty that would have extended the U.S. lease of 75 Ed Adamczyk, “Philippines’ Human Rights Record an Issue in Pending $2.6B Military Sale,” UPI, June 25, 2021. Ed Adamczyk, “Philippines’ Human Rights Record an Issue in Pending $2.6B Military Sale,” UPI, June 25, 2021.
7876 Details about proposed DCS are confidential; however, executive communications to the appropriate congressional Details about proposed DCS are confidential; however, executive communications to the appropriate congressional
committees are periodically published in the committees are periodically published in the Federal Register. For example, see, Department of State, “Bureau of . For example, see, Department of State, “Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: Notifications to the Congress of Proposed
Commercial Export Licenses,” 84 Commercial Export Licenses,” 84 Federal Register, November 27, 2019, at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2019-, November 27, 2019, at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2019-
25491/p-427. 25491/p-427.
7977 “Will the US Defend ‘A Few Rocks’ in Our Sea?” “Will the US Defend ‘A Few Rocks’ in Our Sea?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 2014; Ricardo Saludo, “Big , May 6, 2014; Ricardo Saludo, “Big
Holes in the Philippines-US Defense Treaty,” Holes in the Philippines-US Defense Treaty,” The Manila Times, March 20, 2014; Julie M. Aurelio, “PH-US Defense Manila Times, March 20, 2014; Julie M. Aurelio, “PH-US Defense
Pact Doesn’t Apply in Spratlys Dispute, Says Ex-UP Law Dean,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2011. Pact Doesn’t Apply in Spratlys Dispute, Says Ex-UP Law Dean,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2011.
8078 The MDT can be found at http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm. The MDT can be found at http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm.
8179 Mark Nevitt, “The US-Philippines Defense Treaty and the Pompeo Doctrine on South China Sea,” Mark Nevitt, “The US-Philippines Defense Treaty and the Pompeo Doctrine on South China Sea,” Just Security, ,
March 11, 2019. March 11, 2019.
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application to armed attacks against the Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the
Pacific, which includes the South China Sea.”82
Visiting Forces Agreement
The Visiting Forces Agreement governs the legal status of U.S. military forces operating in the
Philippines. It creates rules by which U.S. troops, vessels, and aircraft may enter the country and
establishes criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.83 The VFA has been in effect since
1999, eight years after the Philippines rejected a treaty that would have extended the U.S. lease of
80 Edward Wong, “In the Philippines, Blinken Vows to Strengthen Military Ties,” New York Times, August 6, 2022; Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” readout, January 27, 2021. 81 Edward Wong, “In the Philippines, Blinken Vows to Strengthen Military Ties.” 82 John Schaus, “What Is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and Why Does It Matter?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 12, 2020. Congressional Research Service 12 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, and ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, and ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the
Philippines. Philippines.
On February 10, 2020, the Government of the Philippines submitted to the U.S. Embassy in On February 10, 2020, the Government of the Philippines submitted to the U.S. Embassy in
Manila a “notice of termination” of the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement.Manila a “notice of termination” of the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement.84 On
February 11, 2020, Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo quoted President Duterte as saying
“It’s about time we rely on ourselves. We will strengthen our own defenses and not rely on any
other country.”85 Some analysts believe that83 Some analysts contended that former President Duterte may have initiated the termination as a Duterte may have initiated the termination as a
response to U.S. actions barring entry into the United States of a response to U.S. actions barring entry into the United States of a Duterte political ally involved in political ally involved in
human rights abuses; others human rights abuses; others saybelieved that he intended to leverage the VFA to negotiate better terms in that he intended to leverage the VFA to negotiate better terms in
the bilateral security relationship or that the action was part of an effort to orient the Philippines the bilateral security relationship or that the action was part of an effort to orient the Philippines
strategically away from the United States.strategically away from the United States.8684 Many in the Philippines, particularly in the defense Many in the Philippines, particularly in the defense
and foreign policy establishments, however, opposed the move.and foreign policy establishments, however, opposed the move.8785 The Philippine government The Philippine government
suspended the termination three times (for six months each), in June 2020, November 2020, and suspended the termination three times (for six months each), in June 2020, November 2020, and
June 2021.June 2021.8886 On July 30, 2021, On July 30, 2021, former Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana
announced that the Philippines had agreed to recommit to the VFA.announced that the Philippines had agreed to recommit to the VFA.89

82 Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” readout,
January 27, 2021.
83 John Schaus, “What Is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and Why Does It Matter?” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, February 12, 2020.
8487 U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement In 2014, the U.S. and Philippine governments signed the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The agreement allows for the increased rotational presence of U.S. military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippines and greater U.S. access to Philippine military bases, including the ability to store U.S. defense materials and equipment.88 Under EDCA, U.S. military personnel in the Philippines are deployed on a rotational or non-permanent basis. Philippine bases, including U.S.-built facilities and improvements, are to be utilized rent-free by the Americans but owned by the Philippines.89 In addition, EDCA “facilitate[s] humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and the region; improve[s] opportunities for bilateral training; and support[s] the long-term modernization of the [AFP] as it works to establish a minimum credible defense.”90 83 See Arellano Law Foundation, Philippines Law and Jurisprudence Databank, See Arellano Law Foundation, Philippines Law and Jurisprudence Databank, Visiting Forces Agreement, at , at
https://www.lawphil.net/international/treaties/vfa_1998.html. https://www.lawphil.net/international/treaties/vfa_1998.html.
85 Scott Neuman and Julie McCarthy, “Philippines Says It Will End U.S. Security Agreement,” NPR, February 11,
2020.
8684 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Duterte Finally Admits to the Importance of the U.S. Alliance,” Asia Maritime Renato Cruz De Castro, “Duterte Finally Admits to the Importance of the U.S. Alliance,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, February 24, 2021; Christopher Woody, “A Major Ally’s Decision to Scrap an Important Transparency Initiative, February 24, 2021; Christopher Woody, “A Major Ally’s Decision to Scrap an Important
Military Deal with the US Raises the Stakes in Competition with China,” Military Deal with the US Raises the Stakes in Competition with China,” Insider, February 23, 2020. , February 23, 2020.
8785 Richard Javad Heydarian, “US Outlasts Duterte’s Failing Dalliance with China Richard Javad Heydarian, “US Outlasts Duterte’s Failing Dalliance with China,” Asia Times, May 19, 2021.
88.” 86 Sofia Tomacruz, “US Welcomes Philippines’ Decision to Suspend VFA Termination Again,” Sofia Tomacruz, “US Welcomes Philippines’ Decision to Suspend VFA Termination Again,” Rappler, June 15, , June 15,
2021; “Philippines Again Suspends Scrapping of VFA Troop Pact with US, Amid South China Sea Tensions, Covid-19 2021; “Philippines Again Suspends Scrapping of VFA Troop Pact with US, Amid South China Sea Tensions, Covid-19
Vaccine Donations,” Vaccine Donations,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2021. , June 14, 2021.
8987 Rene Acosta, “Philippines Reverses Course and Commits to U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement,” Rene Acosta, “Philippines Reverses Course and Commits to U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement,” USNI News, July 30, , July 30,
2021. Some Filipino groups and policymakers long have objected to what they perceive as favorable treatment that the 2021. Some Filipino groups and policymakers long have objected to what they perceive as favorable treatment that the
VFA may allow for U.S. military personnel accused of committing crimes in the Philippines, compared to Philippine VFA may allow for U.S. military personnel accused of committing crimes in the Philippines, compared to Philippine
personnel arrested in the United States. See Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement, Article V, Section 6. In personnel arrested in the United States. See Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement, Article V, Section 6. In
August 2021, U.S. and Philippine officials reportedly agreed to a “technical side agreement” to the VFA that clarified August 2021, U.S. and Philippine officials reportedly agreed to a “technical side agreement” to the VFA that clarified
procedures related to criminal jurisdiction, although details were not made available. Andrea Chloe Wong “Unresolved procedures related to criminal jurisdiction, although details were not made available. Andrea Chloe Wong “Unresolved
Issues with the VFA’s Return,” Issues with the VFA’s Return,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 12, 2021; Sofia Tomacruz, “VFA Side , September 12, 2021; Sofia Tomacruz, “VFA Side
Agreement on Custody of Troops Now in Effect, Locsin Says,” Agreement on Custody of Troops Now in Effect, Locsin Says,” Rappler, August 31, 2021; Andrea Chloe Wong, , August 31, 2021; Andrea Chloe Wong,
“Duterte’s Back-Down on US Forces in Philippines,” “Duterte’s Back-Down on US Forces in Philippines,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 24, 2021. , Lowy Institute, August 24, 2021.
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U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
In 2014, the U.S. and Philippine governments signed the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The agreement allows for the increased rotational presence of
U.S. military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippines and greater U.S. access to Philippine
military bases, including the ability to store U.S. defense materials and equipment.90 Under
EDCA, U.S. military personnel in the Philippines are deployed on a rotational or non-permanent
basis. Philippine bases, including U.S.-built facilities and improvements, are to be utilized rent-
free by the Americans but owned by the Philippines.91 In addition, EDCA “facilitate[s]
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and the region; improve[s]
opportunities for bilateral training; and support[s] the long-term modernization of the [AFP] as it
works to establish a minimum credible defense.”92
In 2016, 88 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines Signed at Quezon City, April 28, 2014, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/14-625-Philippines-Defense-Cooperation.pdf. 89 Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” The Diplomat, May 2, 2014. 90 The White House, “United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations,” fact sheet, April 28, 2014. Congressional Research Service 13 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations In 2016, former President Duterte called for reassessing EDCA and reducing the number of U.S. troops President Duterte called for reassessing EDCA and reducing the number of U.S. troops
and joint military exercises in the Philippines. The Philippines eventually allowed EDCA to and joint military exercises in the Philippines. The Philippines eventually allowed EDCA to
proceed, but limited its mission and delayed facilities construction until 2018, when a proceed, but limited its mission and delayed facilities construction until 2018, when a
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief storage facility was built at Basa Air Base.humanitarian assistance and disaster relief storage facility was built at Basa Air Base.9391 Other Other
projects were delayed in 2019, and the uncertainties over the VFA and COVID-19 restrictions projects were delayed in 2019, and the uncertainties over the VFA and COVID-19 restrictions
further delayed EDCA’s progress.further delayed EDCA’s progress.9492 In October 2021, following the Philippines’ recommitment to In October 2021, following the Philippines’ recommitment to
the VFA and other improvements in the bilateral relationship, the AFP announced that the VFA and other improvements in the bilateral relationship, the AFP announced that
construction work related to EDCA would “intensify.”construction work related to EDCA would “intensify.”95
93 Philippines-China Relations
The Duterte government initially focused on finding ways to cooperate with China in the South The Duterte government initially focused on finding ways to cooperate with China in the South
China Sea, including through joint energy exploration that would shelve questions of sovereignty, China Sea, including through joint energy exploration that would shelve questions of sovereignty,
and sought PRC development loans, investment, and assistance with large infrastructure projects and sought PRC development loans, investment, and assistance with large infrastructure projects
in the Philippines. The two sides, however, did not come to agreement on how to resolve their in the Philippines. The two sides, however, did not come to agreement on how to resolve their
territorial disputes or on joint resource exploration, and relations between the Philippines and territorial disputes or on joint resource exploration, and relations between the Philippines and
China worsened during the second half of Duterte’s term.China worsened during the second half of Duterte’s term.96
94 President Marcos has stated he wants to improve ties with China despite ongoing territorial disputes.95 Former President Duterte eagerly sought PRC financing for infrastructure projects throughout the country as part of Duterte eagerly sought PRC financing for infrastructure projects throughout the country as part of
his “Build, Build, Build” program.his “Build, Build, Build” program.9796 In 2016, China pledged $6 billion in official development In 2016, China pledged $6 billion in official development
assistance andassistance, $3 billion in loans, and $24 billion in investments to the Philippines.97 However, only a small fraction of that financing and investment reportedly materialized.98 The Marcos government and China reportedly have resumed negotiations that began in 2018 on PRC financing and construction assistance for three major railway projects.99 Other proposed infrastructure projects with Chinese assistance include the Kaliwa Dam and Samal-Davao Bridge.100 PRC military assistance remains limited in terms of funding and scope, especially compared to U.S. and Australian military assistance.101 Cooperation in sensitive areas, such as intelligence 91 $3 billion in loans to the Philippines. China also pledged $24 billion in
investments.98 However, local observers report that only a small fraction of that financing and

90 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines Signed at Quezon City, April 28, 2014, at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/14-625-Philippines-Defense-Cooperation.pdf.
91 Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” The Diplomat, May 2,
2014.
92 The White House, “United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations,” fact sheet, April 28, 2014.
93 “US, PH Officials Lead Groundbreaking of First Major EDCA Project,” “US, PH Officials Lead Groundbreaking of First Major EDCA Project,” Asian Journal, April 19, 2018. , April 19, 2018.
9492 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Death of EDCA and Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Death of EDCA and Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” Perspective, ISEAS Yusof , ISEAS Yusof
Ishak Institute, May 11, 2020. Ishak Institute, May 11, 2020.
9593 William Cheng, “Philippine-US EDCA Activities to ‘Intensify’: AFP Chief,” William Cheng, “Philippine-US EDCA Activities to ‘Intensify’: AFP Chief,” ABS-CBN News, October 14, 2021. , October 14, 2021.
9694 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog; Myrna M. Velasco, “No ‘Legal Deal’ Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog; Myrna M. Velasco, “No ‘Legal Deal’
Yet with China on Joint Oil Exploration at WPS—DOE,” Yet with China on Joint Oil Exploration at WPS—DOE,” Manila Bulletin, September 6, 2021. , September 6, 2021.
9795 Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos, “Pres. Marcos Wants to Elevate PH-China Bilateral Ties to ‘Higher Level,’” Palawan News, July 1, 2022. 96 “China’s Infrastructure Investments in the Philippines,” US-Philippines Society, August 2, 2018. “China’s Infrastructure Investments in the Philippines,” US-Philippines Society, August 2, 2018.
9897 China Pledges $9B in Aid, Loans to Philippines: Finance Chief,” China Pledges $9B in Aid, Loans to Philippines: Finance Chief,” ABS-CBN, November 2, 2016. , November 2, 2016.
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investment materialized.99 Major proposed projects with Chinese funding, technical, and
construction assistance include the $940 million Subic-Clark freight railway and the $241 million
Kaliwa dam project.100 In June 2021, the Philippines House of Representatives halted
construction of the dam pending an investigation into alleged corruption in securing government
permits.101 Plans reportedly are underway for a bridge to be funded by China and built by a
Chinese company that would connect Samal Island to Davao in Mindanao, where Duterte once
served as mayor.102
PRC military assistance remains limited in terms of funding and scope, especially compared to
U.S. and Australian military assistance.103 Cooperation in sensitive areas, such as intelligence
sharing and joint drills, are in their early stages.10498 Catalina Ricci S. Madarang, “China’s Unmet Pledges to Philippines Seen as Reason for Duterte’s Shift in Tone,” Interaksyon, September 28, 2020. 99 Prime Sarmiento, “China, the Philippines Reaffirm Ties,” China Daily, August 22, 2022; Catherine S. Valente, “Renegotiate China Loan Deals—Marcos,” Manila Times, July 17, 2022. 100 “July Groundbreaking Targeted for Samal-Davao Bridge Project,” Business World, June 21, 2022; Mayvelin U. Caraballo, “PH Secures P17-B Loan from China,” Manila Times, June 15, 2022. 101 Maria Siow, “Philippines’ Move to Keep US Military Pact Reveals Shift in South China Sea Calculations,” South China Morning Post, June 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 20 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations sharing and joint drills, are in their early stages.102 Territorial disputes and the lack of trust and Territorial disputes and the lack of trust and
familiarity between the two sides creates further obstacles to greater military cooperation.familiarity between the two sides creates further obstacles to greater military cooperation.105103
The Philippines’ Maritime Disputes with China
The Philippines and China have long-standing disputes over waters and land features in the South The Philippines and China have long-standing disputes over waters and land features in the South
China Sea, which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea.China Sea, which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea.106104 Tensions have risen since 2012, Tensions have risen since 2012,
as China has enlarged and placed new military assets on several disputed features in the Spratly as China has enlarged and placed new military assets on several disputed features in the Spratly
archipelago, and increasingly interfered with Philippine commercial and military activities in archipelago, and increasingly interfered with Philippine commercial and military activities in
what the Philippines, citing UNCLOS, considers its Exclusive Economic Zone. DOD’s what the Philippines, citing UNCLOS, considers its Exclusive Economic Zone. DOD’s 20202021
report on PRC military and security developments stated that the PRC’s Spratly Island outposts report on PRC military and security developments stated that the PRC’s Spratly Island outposts
“allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the “allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the
area,” which “improves China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or area,” which “improves China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or
third parties and widens the range of response options available to China.”third parties and widens the range of response options available to China.”107105
The previous Aquino government sought arbitration under UNCLOS against aspects of China’s The previous Aquino government sought arbitration under UNCLOS against aspects of China’s
maritime claims and behavior in the South China Sea. In 2016, an UNCLOS tribunal concluded maritime claims and behavior in the South China Sea. In 2016, an UNCLOS tribunal concluded
that China’s “Nine Dash Line” claims to areas overlapping the Philippines EEZ have no legal that China’s “Nine Dash Line” claims to areas overlapping the Philippines EEZ have no legal

99 Catalina Ricci S. Madarang, “China’s Unmet Pledges to Philippines Seen as Reason for Duterte’s Shift in Tone,”
Interaksyon, September 28, 2020.
100 “China to Fund $940m Philippine Railway Linking Former US Bases,” Nikkei Asia, January 17, 2021; Pia Ranada,
“China-Funded Kaliwa Dam to Benefit from Duterte Order Fast-Tracking Water Projects,” Rappler, September 3,
2020.
101 Barbara Fraser, “Philippine Bishops Welcome Halt to Mega-Dam Construction Project,” Catholic News Service,
June 14, 2021.
102 Antonia Colina IV, “Fate of Davao-Samal Bridge Now in the Hands of DOF,” Manila Bulletin, June 16, 2021;
“Chinese Envoy Still Optimistic China-Funded Samal-Davao Bridge to Break This Year,” BusinessWorld, January 4,
2021.
103 Maria Siow, “Philippines’ Move to Keep US Military Pact Reveals Shift in South China Sea Calculations,” South
China Morning Post, June 6, 2020.
104basis.106 The tribunal also found that China violated its UNCLOS obligations by blocking Philippine access to Scarborough Shoal, interfering with Philippine oil and gas exploration at Reed Bank, and damaging the marine environment by reclaiming land. The United States has urged China, which declared the verdict “null and void,” to abide by the ruling, and the Philippines to try to enforce it.107 (See Figure 2.) Former President Duterte downplayed the UNCLOS ruling while engaging in bilateral discussions with China on resolving maritime disputes, without success.108 By contrast, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Manalo stated in July 2022 that the ruling and UNCLOS “are the twin anchors of the Philippines’ policy and actions” on the South China Sea.109 102 “Chinese, Philippine Coast Guards Hold Joint Exercises to Achieve Interoperability at Sea,” “Chinese, Philippine Coast Guards Hold Joint Exercises to Achieve Interoperability at Sea,” China Military Online, ,
January 16, 2020; Philip Tubeza, “Lorenzana: Intelligence Sharing with China Can Be Done Immediately,” January 16, 2020; Philip Tubeza, “Lorenzana: Intelligence Sharing with China Can Be Done Immediately,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 3, 2017. , July 3, 2017.
105103 Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth About China’s New Military Aid to the Philippines,” Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth About China’s New Military Aid to the Philippines,” The Diplomat, June 30, , June 30,
2017. 2017.
106104 For further information, see CRS Report R42784, For further information, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS In Focus IF10607, , by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS In Focus IF10607, China Primer: South China
Sea Disputes, by Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, and Ronald O’Rourke. , by Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, and Ronald O’Rourke.
107105 Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for 2000,” November 3, 2021. 106 Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,
November 3, 2020.”
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basis.108 The tribunal also found that China violated its UNCLOS obligations by blocking
Philippine access to Scarborough Shoal, interfering with Philippine oil and gas exploration at
Reed Bank, and damaging the marine environment by reclaiming land. The United States has
urged China, which declared the verdict “null and void,” to abide by the ruling, and the
Philippines to try to enforce it.109 (See Figure 2.)
Figure 2. Contested Boundaries in the South China Sea

Source: Created by CRS. Exclusive Economic Zones from Flanders Marine Institute (2020).
Duterte has downplayed the UNCLOS ruling while engaging in bilateral discussions with China
on maritime disputes.110 The Philippines suspended U.S.-Philippines joint maritime patrols in
2016, a move many analysts said was aimed at stabilizing relations with China, although the joint
patrols were resumed two years later. More recently, however, in the wake of multiple instances

108 The full text of the ruling can be accessed at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN- The full text of the ruling can be accessed at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-
20160712-Award.pdf. 20160712-Award.pdf.
109107 “Full Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by “Full Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by
Philippines,” Xinhua, July 12, 2016; Robert D. Williams, “What Did the U.S. Accomplish with Its South China Sea Philippines,” Xinhua, July 12, 2016; Robert D. Williams, “What Did the U.S. Accomplish with Its South China Sea
Legal Statement?” Legal Statement?” Brookings Institution, July 22, 2020; Renato Cruz de Castro, “After Four Years, the Philippines , July 22, 2020; Renato Cruz de Castro, “After Four Years, the Philippines
Acknowledges the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, July 27, 2020. See also Acknowledges the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, July 27, 2020. See also
Department of State, “Limits in the Seas, No. 150. People’s Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Department of State, “Limits in the Seas, No. 150. People’s Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China
Sea,” January 2022. Sea,” January 2022.
110 108 “Duterte Wants to Liberate Philippines from U.S. Shackles: Foreign Minister,” Reuters, October 6, 2016; Ernesto “Duterte Wants to Liberate Philippines from U.S. Shackles: Foreign Minister,” Reuters, October 6, 2016; Ernesto
M. Hilario, “Bilateral Talks on South China Sea Dispute,” M. Hilario, “Bilateral Talks on South China Sea Dispute,” Manila Standard, August 21, 2021. , August 21, 2021.
109 Richard Heydarian, “Marcos Flexing Muscles in the South China Sea,” Asia Times, July 13, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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15 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 2. Contested Boundaries in the South China Sea Source: Created by CRS. Exclusive Economic Zones from Flanders Marine Institute (2020).

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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

of PRC vessels interfering with Philippine commercial and coast guard vessels and massing near
Philippine-occupied landmasses, the Duterte government has objected more vocally to Chinese
actions. For example, in November 2021, Philippine Foreign Secretary Locsin condemned “in the
strongest terms” actions by PRC vessels to block Philippine Coast Guard vessels attempting to
resupply a Philippine military garrison at Second Thomas Shoal.111
Violent Extremism in the Philippines
The Philippines has battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist movements on the southern The Philippines has battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist movements on the southern
islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago for over 30 years. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago for over 30 years. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),
which the United States designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, has carried out which the United States designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, has carried out
hostage-takings for ransom, killings, and bombings since the early 1990s. In 2002, DOD hostage-takings for ransom, killings, and bombings since the early 1990s. In 2002, DOD
established the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) as part of Operation established the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom to support “the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Enduring Freedom to support “the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in their fight against terrorism,”Philippines in their fight against terrorism,”112110 including a large humanitarian component. including a large humanitarian component.
Philippine military efforts, supported by U.S. assistance, reduced the size of the ASG from 1,000-Philippine military efforts, supported by U.S. assistance, reduced the size of the ASG from 1,000-
2,000 militants in the mid-1990s to an estimated 400 members in the mid-2010s.2,000 militants in the mid-1990s to an estimated 400 members in the mid-2010s.113111 The U.S. The U.S.
government deactivated JSOTF-P in 2015, citing the diminishing strength of the ASG, but government deactivated JSOTF-P in 2015, citing the diminishing strength of the ASG, but
110 Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Fact Sheet, July 1, 2011, at http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com/2011/. 111 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018: Philippines, November 1, 2019; Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines,” 2001-2014, RAND, 2016. Congressional Research Service 16 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations launched OPE-P in 2017 in response to the rise of Islamic State (IS) affiliates in the launched OPE-P in 2017 in response to the rise of Islamic State (IS) affiliates in the
Philippines.Philippines.114112
The Marawi Seige
In May 2017, a coalition of Filipino Islamist extremist groups that had pledged allegiance to the In May 2017, a coalition of Filipino Islamist extremist groups that had pledged allegiance to the
Islamic State, along with dozens of foreign fighters, laid siege to Marawi, a provincial capital in Islamic State, along with dozens of foreign fighters, laid siege to Marawi, a provincial capital in
Mindanao.Mindanao.115113 With U.S. and other foreign assistance, the AFP retook the city in October 2017. With U.S. and other foreign assistance, the AFP retook the city in October 2017.
U.S. military personnel provided technical support, including ISR training, aerial surveillance, U.S. military personnel provided technical support, including ISR training, aerial surveillance,
and communications assistance.and communications assistance.116114 The conflict reportedly resulted in the deaths of over 900 The conflict reportedly resulted in the deaths of over 900
militants, over 165 Philippine troops, and roughly 50 civilians, as well as the destruction of much militants, over 165 Philippine troops, and roughly 50 civilians, as well as the destruction of much
of the city.of the city.117

111 “Philippines Tells China to ‘Back Off’ After South China Sea Standoff,” Reuters, November 18, 2022.
112 Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Fact Sheet, July 1, 2011, at http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com/2011/.
113 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018: Philippines, November 1, 2019; Linda Robinson, Patrick
B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines,” 2001-2014, RAND, 2016.
114 Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Officially Ends Special Operations Task Force in the Philippines, Some Advisers Remain,”
USNI News, February 27, 2015.
115 Joseph Hincks, “What the Siege of a Philippine City Reveals About ISIS’ Deadly New Front in Asia,” Time, May
25, 2017.
116 Neil Jerome Morales and Simon Lewis, “U.S. Forces Give Technical Assistance as PH Takes Losses in Marawi,”
ABS-CBN, June 11, 2017.
117 “Philippines: ‘Battle of Marawi’ Leaves Trail of Death and Destruction,” Amnesty International, November 17,
2017.
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115
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
For two decades, Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an armed separatist group, engaged in on-again, For two decades, Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an armed separatist group, engaged in on-again,
off-again negotiations on a settlement and political arrangement that would provide substantial autonomy to off-again negotiations on a settlement and political arrangement that would provide substantial autonomy to
Muslims in Mindanao and put an end to the decades-old military conflict. In 2018, the Duterte government and the Muslims in Mindanao and put an end to the decades-old military conflict. In 2018, the Duterte government and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front reached an agreement that formed a new, Muslim-majority administrative area in Moro Islamic Liberation Front reached an agreement that formed a new, Muslim-majority administrative area in
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, called the Bangsamoro Automomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, called the Bangsamoro Automomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
The BARMM, which encompasses five provinces and 4 mil ion people in Western Mindanao and Sulu, was The BARMM, which encompasses five provinces and 4 mil ion people in Western Mindanao and Sulu, was
approved by voters in the region and established in 2019. approved by voters in the region and established in 2019.
Previous peace agreements have successful y reduced the number of separatists engaged in armed conflict with the Previous peace agreements have successful y reduced the number of separatists engaged in armed conflict with the
central government, and some observers expect the new political arrangement similarly to result in the central government, and some observers expect the new political arrangement similarly to result in the
disarmament of militants, fewer attacks, and the growth of investment in the historically poor region.disarmament of militants, fewer attacks, and the growth of investment in the historically poor region.118116 However, However,
the COVID-19 pandemic has led to delays in the creation of new government institutions, demobilization and the COVID-19 pandemic has led to delays in the creation of new government institutions, demobilization and
disarmament of Moro fighters, and provision of socioeconomic benefits to former militants.disarmament of Moro fighters, and provision of socioeconomic benefits to former militants.119117 According to According to
experts, the slow transition could strengthen armed extremist groups, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom experts, the slow transition could strengthen armed extremist groups, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters, and undermine the upcoming BARMM electionsFighters, and undermine the upcoming BARMM elections, scheduled to be held in to be held in 2022.1202025.118
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-East Asia
In 2018, the Department of State added ISIS–Philippines (ISIS-P), a loose collection of groups In 2018, the Department of State added ISIS–Philippines (ISIS-P), a loose collection of groups
who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.121119
The network, now renamed ISIS–East Asia (ISIS-EA), has around 300-500 fighters.The network, now renamed ISIS–East Asia (ISIS-EA), has around 300-500 fighters.122 Although
weakened in the AFP counteroffensive in Marawi, the Abu Sayyaf Group and other IS-affiliated
groups have continued to carry out sporadic attacks in Mindanao and Sulu.123 In April 2020, ISIS-
EA ambushed AFP forces on the island of Jolo, killing 12 soldiers.124 Some U.S. officials and
analysts argue that “efforts to reduce extremism in the Philippines do not appear to have made a
substantial difference since the launch of OPE-P.”125 Force rotations, uncertainty over the VFA,
and COVID-19 restrictions appear to have also have hindered U.S. assistance.126 According to
U.S. Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC), despite progress in executing large-scale
counterterrorism operations in difficult terrains since 2017, the AFP as of 2020 had not
demonstrated the capacity to sustain gains by further degrading terrorist groups or preventing
them from reconstituting.127

118120 Although 112 Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Officially Ends Special Operations Task Force in the Philippines, Some Advisers Remain,” USNI News, February 27, 2015. 113 Joseph Hincks, “What the Siege of a Philippine City Reveals About ISIS’ Deadly New Front in Asia,” Time, May 25, 2017. 114 Neil Jerome Morales and Simon Lewis, “U.S. Forces Give Technical Assistance as PH Takes Losses in Marawi,” ABS-CBN, June 11, 2017. 115 “Philippines: ‘Battle of Marawi’ Leaves Trail of Death and Destruction,” Amnesty International, November 17, 2017. 116 Economist Intelligence Unit, Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines, June 11, 2021. , June 11, 2021.
119117 Georgi Engelbrecht, “The Normalization Process in the Bangsamoro Faces Rising Uncertainty,” Georgi Engelbrecht, “The Normalization Process in the Bangsamoro Faces Rising Uncertainty,” The Diplomat, ,
April 26, 2021. April 26, 2021.
120118 Nick Aspinwall, “Thousands of Families Are Being Displaced by Violent Clashes in Mindanao,” Nick Aspinwall, “Thousands of Families Are Being Displaced by Violent Clashes in Mindanao,” The Diplomat, ,
April 2, 2021. April 2, 2021.
121119 Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” at https://www.state.gov/ Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” at https://www.state.gov/
foreign-terrorist-organizations/. foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
122120 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.”
123 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines; Bong Sarmiento, “ISIS Thrives in Covid-19
Shadows in Philippines,” Asia Times, May 22, 2020.
124 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020-June 30, 2020,” August 11, 2020.
125 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020-June 30, 2020,” August 11, 2020.
126 Ibid.; Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State Holding on in Philippines, Despite Millions in US Spending,” VOA, August 12,
2020.
127 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service 17 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations weakened in the AFP counteroffensive in Marawi, the Abu Sayyaf Group and other IS-affiliated groups have continued to carry out sporadic attacks in Mindanao and Sulu.121 Some U.S. officials and analysts argue that “efforts to reduce extremism in the Philippines do not appear to have made a substantial difference since the launch of OPE-P.”122 Force rotations, uncertainty over the VFA, and COVID-19 restrictions appear to have also have hindered U.S. assistance.123 According to U.S. Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC), despite progress in executing large-scale counterterrorism operations in difficult terrains since 2017, the AFP as of 2020 had not demonstrated the capacity to sustain gains by further degrading terrorist groups or preventing them from reconstituting.124
Other Security Threats: Communist Party of the Philippines
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which the government long has viewed as its principal security The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which the government long has viewed as its principal security
threat, has waged an insurgency since the late 1960s. Over 100,000 combatants and civilians have died in fighting threat, has waged an insurgency since the late 1960s. Over 100,000 combatants and civilians have died in fighting
related to the insurgency since 1969. The CPP’s military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), reached over 25,000 related to the insurgency since 1969. The CPP’s military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), reached over 25,000
fighters in the early 1980s, but declined after President Ferdinand Marcos fighters in the early 1980s, but declined after President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. fell from power and democracy was fell from power and democracy was
restored in 1986. It now has an estimated restored in 1986. It now has an estimated 42,000 fighters ,000 fighters according to the government, and remains active throughout the Philippines.and remains active throughout the Philippines.128125
The U.S. government placed the CPP and the NPA on its list of terrorist organizations in 2002 under Executive The U.S. government placed the CPP and the NPA on its list of terrorist organizations in 2002 under Executive
Order 13224 (to block terrorist financing), but does not provide direct military support to the Philippine military Order 13224 (to block terrorist financing), but does not provide direct military support to the Philippine military
in its war against the NPA. The AFP has continued to battle communist insurgents, and the NPA has continued in its war against the NPA. The AFP has continued to battle communist insurgents, and the NPA has continued
attacks on security forces, property, and civilians.attacks on security forces, property, and civilians.129126 In 2017, peace talks held in Norway between the Philippine In 2017, peace talks held in Norway between the Philippine
government and the National Democratic Front, which represents the CPP, broke down, and government and the National Democratic Front, which represents the CPP, broke down, and former President Duterte President Duterte
signed a proclamation declaring the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.signed a proclamation declaring the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.130
Human Rights Issues
The Drug War
Since President Rodrigo Duterte’s election in 2016, human rights groups have criticized the
Philippine government for extrajudicial killings related to its “War on Drugs,” as well as for other
human rights violations.131 Drug war-related deaths range from Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency numbers of approximately 6,000 to estimates by human rights organizations of nearly
30,000.132 At the height of the drug war in 2016-2017, human rights groups reported that virtually
all of the killings were carried out by police or by armed vigilantes and occurred without due
process, and that the vast majority of victims were unarmed, poor, low-level offenders. They
further alleged that police collaborated with vigilantes, planted evidence at the scenes of killings,
fabricated reports, and held suspected drug offenders for ransom.133 Impunity from prosecution
that generally protects government and government-backed perpetrators of violence has long
been a problem in the Philippines. Of police officers involved in killings in the anti-drug war
since 2016, only three have been convicted of murder.134

Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.”
128127 Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.” 121 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines; Bong Sarmiento, “ISIS Thrives in Covid-19 Shadows in Philippines,” Asia Times, May 22, 2020. 122 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020-June 30, 2020,” August 11, 2020. 123 Ibid.; Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State Holding on in Philippines, Despite Millions in US Spending,” VOA, August 12, 2020. 124 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.” 125 John Eric Mendoza, “AFP: NPA Down to 2,000 Fighters, Guerilla Fronts Slashed by 74%,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 7, 2022; Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Next for the Philippines Communist Insurgency Under Duterte?” Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Next for the Philippines Communist Insurgency Under Duterte?” The Diplomat, ,
March 31, 2020. March 31, 2020.
129126 According to AFP sources, between 2016 and 2020, 443 Philippine soldiers were killed by CPP insurgents. According to AFP sources, between 2016 and 2020, 443 Philippine soldiers were killed by CPP insurgents.
Rigoberto D. Tiglao, “Not an Enemy? CPP-NPA Killed 50,000 Filipinos—and Continues to Kill,” Rigoberto D. Tiglao, “Not an Enemy? CPP-NPA Killed 50,000 Filipinos—and Continues to Kill,” Manila Times, ,
November 27, 2020; Frances Mangosing, “AFP, Citing Its Data, Says Civilian Property Destroyed in 532 NPA Attacks November 27, 2020; Frances Mangosing, “AFP, Citing Its Data, Says Civilian Property Destroyed in 532 NPA Attacks
Since 2010,” Since 2010,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 8, 2021; Department of State, , January 8, 2021; Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020:
Philippines; Jack Broome, “An End in Sight for the Philippines’ Maoist Insurgency?” ; Jack Broome, “An End in Sight for the Philippines’ Maoist Insurgency?” The Diplomat, February 19, , February 19,
2021. 2021.
130127 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 10168, the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012. “Duterte Pursuant to Republic Act No. 10168, the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012. “Duterte
Declares Philippine Communist Rebels ‘Terrorists,’”Declares Philippine Communist Rebels ‘Terrorists,’” Agence France Presse, December 5, 2017. Formal and informal Agence France Presse, December 5, 2017. Formal and informal
peace talks between the government and the communists also had been attempted under five prior administrations. peace talks between the government and the communists also had been attempted under five prior administrations.
131 See, for example, Human Right Watch, “Philippines: Events of 2021.”
132Congressional Research Service 18 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations Human Rights Issues The Drug War Human rights groups had been highly critical of the Duterte government for the extrajudicial killings tied to the “War on Drugs,” as well as for other human rights violations.128 Drug war-related deaths range from Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency numbers of approximately 6,000 to estimates by human rights organizations of nearly 30,000.129 At the height of the drug war in 2016-2017, human rights groups reported that virtually all of the killings were carried out by police or by armed vigilantes and occurred without due process, and that the vast majority of victims were unarmed, poor, low-level offenders. They further alleged that police collaborated with vigilantes, planted evidence at the scenes of killings, fabricated reports, and held suspected drug offenders for ransom.130 Impunity from prosecution that generally protects government and government-backed perpetrators of violence has long been a problem in the Philippines. Of police officers involved in killings in the antidrug war since 2016, only three have been convicted of murder.131 In March 2018, President Duterte announced that the Philippines would withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) after the tribunal launched a preliminary investigation into possible “crimes against humanity” related to the antidrug campaign.132 The ICC suspended its investigation in 2021 following a Philippine government pledge to conduct its own probe, but in June 2022 indicated it may seek to reopen it.133 In July 2022, Philippine Justice Secretary Jesus Remulla stated that the Philippines cannot be subjected to an ICC investigation since it withdrew from the body in 2018.134 President Marcos and Philippine officials have stated that the government will continue the drug war “within the framework of the law and with respect for human rights,” and will target large illegal drug operations and bolster drug rehabilitation.135 128 See, for example, Human Right Watch, “Philippines: Events of 2021.” 129 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2022: Philippines, Events of 2021,” December 16, 2021; Stefano Vechhia, “Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ Enters Its Final Phase,” Stefano Vechhia, “Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ Enters Its Final Phase,” Asia News, March 16, 2022; “How Many , March 16, 2022; “How Many
People Have Been Killed in Rodrigo Duterte’s War on Drugs?” People Have Been Killed in Rodrigo Duterte’s War on Drugs?” The Economist, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
133130 Human Rights Watch, “’License to Kill’: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,’” March 1, 2017; Human Rights Watch, “’License to Kill’: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,’” March 1, 2017;
Amnesty International, “If You Are Poor, You Are Killed: Extrajudicial Executions in the Philippines’ ‘War on Amnesty International, “If You Are Poor, You Are Killed: Extrajudicial Executions in the Philippines’ ‘War on
Drugs,’” January 2017. Drugs,’” January 2017.
134131 Karen Lema, “Relatives of Philippine Drug War Victims Alarmed by Duterte’s Talk of Staying On,” Reuters, Karen Lema, “Relatives of Philippine Drug War Victims Alarmed by Duterte’s Talk of Staying On,” Reuters,
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In March 2018, President Duterte announced that the Philippines would withdraw from the
International Criminal Court (ICC) after the tribunal launched a preliminary investigation into
possible “crimes against humanity” related to the antidrug campaign.135 In June 2020, the United
Nations Human Rights Council released a report on the human rights situation in the Philippines,
with a focus on the drug war. The report stated, “Persistent impunity for human rights violations
is stark and the practical obstacles to accessing justice are almost insurmountable.”136 In
December 2020, the ICC found a “reasonable basis to believe” that crimes against humanity were
committed under the anti-drug campaign.137August 25, 2021. 132 The Philippines officially withdrew from the ICC in March 2019. Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines Officially Leaves the International Criminal Court,” New York Times, March 17, 2019. 133 Andrea Chloe Wong, “ICC Pushes Probe on the Philippines’ Drug War,” The Interpreter, August 9, 2022; “ICC Prosecutor to Reopen Philippines ‘Drug War’ Investigation,” Al Jazeera, June 24, 2022. 134 Kristine Joy Patag, “Remulla: ICC to Get Info on ‘Drug War’ Cases as a Courtesy, Not Compliance,” Philippine Star, August 24, 2022. 135 Vince Lopez, “Mr. Marcos to ‘Refocus’ Drug War,” Manila Standard, September 14, 2022; Ambassador Jose Romualdez, US-Philippines Society, September 7, 2022; Sundy Locus, “Remulla on ICC Case: How Can They Probe if We’re Not a Member?” GMA News, July 16, 2022; Michelle R. Guillang, “Marcos Committed to Drug War—Swedish Envoy,” Daily Tribune, June 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 19 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Other Human Rights Issues
Some experts argue that the space for voices critical of the government narrowed under Duterte. Some experts argue that the space for voices critical of the government narrowed under Duterte.
In 2017, Philippine authorities arrested Senator Leila De Lima, a critic of Duterte’s drug war, on In 2017, Philippine authorities arrested Senator Leila De Lima, a critic of Duterte’s drug war, on
charges that she had accepted money from drug lords while she was Justice Secretary.charges that she had accepted money from drug lords while she was Justice Secretary.138136 In June In June
2020, journalist Maria Ressa, founder of the online news site Rappler, which 2020, journalist Maria Ressa, founder of the online news site Rappler, which hashad reported reported
critically on the critically on the anti-drugantidrug campaign, was found guilty of “cyber libel.” campaign, was found guilty of “cyber libel.”139137 Some observers view Some observers view
both cases as politically motivated.both cases as politically motivated.140138 Ressa, who is free on bail as she appeals her verdict, was Ressa, who is free on bail as she appeals her verdict, was
awarded the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to safeguard freedom of expression.awarded the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to safeguard freedom of expression.141
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 cited “serious
restrictions on free expression and the press139 In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the Philippines revoked the operating license of Rappler due to an issue related to alleged foreign control, which Rappler disputed; the media company was allowed to continue operations pending a final decision by the SEC and the Court of Appeals.140 Critics decried the license revocation as a violation of press freedom.141 In July 2020, the Philippines House of Representatives voted to reject the renewal of the broadcast license of ABS-CBN, the country’s largest broadcasting network, which had aired an opposition political advertisement in 2016 that reportedly offended former President Duterte. The network also was a major source of critical reporting on the drug war.142 The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 cited “serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence, threats of violence, and , including violence, threats of violence, and
unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the use of criminal libel laws to unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the use of criminal libel laws to
punish journalists.”punish journalists.”142143 The Philippines The Philippines wasis the seventh most dangerous country for journalists the seventh most dangerous country for journalists in
2020, according to the Committee to Project Journalists, and according to the Committee to Project Journalists, and it ranks ranks 138147th out of 180 countries on out of 180 countries on
Reporters Without Borders’ Reporters Without Borders’ “World Press Freedom Index.World Press Freedom Index.143”144 The Philippines enacted a new Anti- The Philippines enacted a new Anti-
Terrorism Law in 2020 that analysts say contains broad and vague provisions that the government Terrorism Law in 2020 that analysts say contains broad and vague provisions that the government
and security forces can use arbitrarily to target political opponents and silence dissent, and that and security forces can use arbitrarily to target political opponents and silence dissent, and that
weakens legal weakens legal protections for the accused.145 Human rights groups reported that Marcos’s presidential campaign and supporters harassed independent journalists, and expressed concern this practice may 136protections for the accused.144

August 25, 2021.
135 The Philippines officially withdrew from the ICC in March 2019. Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines Officially Leaves
the International Criminal Court,” New York Times, March 17, 2019.
136 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Philippines: UN Report Details Widespread Human Rights Violations and
Persistent Impunity,” at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25924&LangID=
E.
137 International Criminal Court, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020,” December 14, 2020.
138 Vince Ferreras, “TIMELINE: De Lima’s Four-Year Struggle in Prison,” Vince Ferreras, “TIMELINE: De Lima’s Four-Year Struggle in Prison,” CNN Philippines, March 16, 2021; , March 16, 2021;
“Muntinlupa Court Junks 1 of 3 Charges vs. De Lima,” “Muntinlupa Court Junks 1 of 3 Charges vs. De Lima,” CNN Philippines, February 17, 2021; “List of De Lima’s , February 17, 2021; “List of De Lima’s
‘Persecutors’ Sent to US Gov’t,” ‘Persecutors’ Sent to US Gov’t,” CNN Philippines, February 25, 2020. , February 25, 2020.
139137 “Philippine American Journalist Maria Ressa Convicted in Cybercrime Case,” “Philippine American Journalist Maria Ressa Convicted in Cybercrime Case,” MSN, June 15, 2020. , June 15, 2020.
140138 Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Drop Charges Against Rappler, Editor,” November 30, 2018. Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Drop Charges Against Rappler, Editor,” November 30, 2018.
141139 Ressa won the prize along with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov. “Maria Ressa: Facts,” The Nobel Prize, at Ressa won the prize along with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov. “Maria Ressa: Facts,” The Nobel Prize, at
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/ressa/facts/; Robyn Dixon et al., “Journalists Known for Taking on https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/ressa/facts/; Robyn Dixon et al., “Journalists Known for Taking on
Governments of Philippines and Russia Win Nobel Peace Prize,” Governments of Philippines and Russia Win Nobel Peace Prize,” Washington Post, October 8, 2021; Rebecca Ratcliffe , October 8, 2021; Rebecca Ratcliffe
and Jon Henley, “‘War Reporting Was Easier’: Maria Ressa’s Journey to Nobel Prize Winner,” and Jon Henley, “‘War Reporting Was Easier’: Maria Ressa’s Journey to Nobel Prize Winner,” The Guardian, October , October
8, 2021. 8, 2021.
142 Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines.
143 Committee to Protect Journalists, Global Impunity Index 2020, October 28, 2020140 The Philippines SEC upheld its 2018 decision in June 2022. Rappler plans to appeal the decision. “SEC Affirms Revocation of Rappler’s Certificate of Incorporation,” GMA News, June 29, 2022. Kyle Aristophere T. Atienza, “News Company Rappler to Appeal Shutdown Order,” BusinessWorld, June 29, 2022. 141 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, “State of Media Freedom in the Philippines,” May 5, 2021. 142 “ABS-CBN Says Sorry to Duterte for Airing Controversial Political Ad in 2016 Polls,” CNN Philippines, February 4, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Seeks to Shut Network, Case Against ABS-CBN Attacks Media Freedom,” February 10, 2020. 143 Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines. 144 Committee to Protect Journalists, Global Impunity Index 2021; Reporters Without Borders, ; Reporters Without Borders, World
Press Freedom Index 20212022.
144145 Nick Aspinwall, “After Signing Anti-Terrorism Law, Duterte Names His Targets,” Nick Aspinwall, “After Signing Anti-Terrorism Law, Duterte Names His Targets,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2020, July 10, 2020;.
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In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippines revoked the license of
online news site Rappler due to an issue related to alleged foreign control, which Rappler has
disputed; the media company was allowed to continue operations pending a final decision by the
SEC and the Court of Appeals.145 Critics decried the license revocation as a violation of press
freedom, particularly since Rappler had published reports on the drug war.146 In July 2020, the
Philippines House of Representatives voted to reject the renewal of the broadcast license of ABS-
CBN, the country’s largest broadcasting network, which had aired an opposition political
advertisement in 2016 that reportedly offended Duterte. The network also was a major source of
critical reporting on the drug war.147
In 2019 and 2020, extrajudicial killings of leftist and human rights activists increased, reportedly
often carried out by unidentified assailants linked to security forces and government-backed
militias.148 Many of the victims were targeted as alleged members of, or linkedcontinue.146 In July 2022, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression Irene Khan called on President Marcos to decriminalize libel, withdraw charges against journalist Maria Ressa, reverse government decisions against media outlets, and investigate attacks on journalists.147 In addition to the thousands of drug-related killings, roughly 200 extrajudicial killings of leftist and human rights activists reportedly occurred while Duterte was president. Many of these were carried out by unidentified assailants allegedly linked to security forces and government-backed militias, according to human rights groups.148 Some of the victims were accused by the government of being members of, or as having ties to, communist or to, communist or
terrorist organizations. Between 2015 and 2020, there were over 200 such killings, according to
the U.S.-based NGO Human Rights Watch.terrorist organizations.149 149
Economics and Trade
The Philippines, one of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia prior to the COVID-19 The Philippines, one of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, recorded annual economic expansion averaging 6.6% annually between 2016 and pandemic, recorded annual economic expansion averaging 6.6% annually between 2016 and
2019.150 2019.150 The country is home to the largest business process outsourcing sector in the world, generating over $26 billion annually.151 Filipino workers continue to emigrate for jobs abroad despite economic growth at home. Remittances from over 10 million overseas Filipino workers totaled $34.8 billion in 2021, a record high.152 GDP contracted by 9.4GDP contracted by 9% in 2020, largely due to the economic effects of the pandemic, but % in 2020, largely due to the economic effects of the pandemic, but
rebounded to rebounded to 45.5% in 2021..5% in 2021.151
153 Philippines trade with the United States, its third-largest trading partner and Philippines trade with the United States, its third-largest trading partner and second largest export largest export
market, totaled $market, totaled $16.319.5 billion in billion in 20202021, including $, including $9.711.8 billion in exports and $ billion in exports and $6.67.7 billion in imports. billion in imports.154
Major Philippine export items to the United States include electrical machinery, equipment, and Major Philippine export items to the United States include electrical machinery, equipment, and
parts; other machinery and appliances; leather goods and handbags; agricultural goods; medical parts; other machinery and appliances; leather goods and handbags; agricultural goods; medical
devices; and apparel. The largest U.S. exports to the Philippines are electrical machinery, devices; and apparel. The largest U.S. exports to the Philippines are electrical machinery,
equipment, and parts and agricultural goods.equipment, and parts and agricultural goods.152 155 Under the Aquino Under the Aquino administrationgovernment, the Philippines , the Philippines
had expressed strong interest in joining the (then) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in order to gain had expressed strong interest in joining the (then) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in order to gain
greater access to U.S. markets and investment opportunities. The Philippines recently has greater access to U.S. markets and investment opportunities. The Philippines recently has
expressed interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which evolved from the TPP without U.S. participation.153

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines.
145 “SEC Stands by Decision to Revoke Rappler’s License,” CNN Philippines, November 22, 2021.
146 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, “State of Media Freedom in the Philippines,” May 5, 2021.
147 “ABS-CBN Says Sorry to Duterte for Airing Controversial Political Ad in 2016 Polls,” CNN Philippines, February
24, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Seeks to Shut Network, Case Against ABS-CBN Attacks Media
Freedom,” February 10, 2020.
expressed interest in joining the Comprehensive and 146 Regina Cabato, “Philippines Dispatch: Pigs Presstitutes and How Journalists are Harassed,” Washington Post, June 13, 2022; Basti Evangelista, “Journalists Covering Marcos: Trolling, Disinformation to Worsen,” Yahoo Philippines, May 22, 2022. 147 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Philippines: UN Expert Slams Court Decision Upholding Criminal Conviction of Maria Ressa and Shutdown of Media Outlets,” press release, July 14, 2022. 148 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Philippines: UN Report Details Widespread Human Rights Violations and 148 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Philippines: UN Report Details Widespread Human Rights Violations and
Persistent Impunity,” June 29, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Spate of Killings of Leftist Activists,” June Persistent Impunity,” June 29, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Spate of Killings of Leftist Activists,” June
18, 2019. 18, 2019.
149 149 “UN Experts Call Out Duterte’s Silence on Bloody Sunday Killings,” People’s Dispatch, January 13, 2022; Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2021, Philippines: Events of 2020.” Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2021, Philippines: Events of 2020.”
150 World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %)—Philippines.” 151 Jessica Fenol, “BPO Industry Eyes $29-Billion Revenue, More Jobs by 2022,” ABS-CBN, June 25, 2021. 152 Lawrence Agcaoili, “OFW Remittances Hit All-Time High in 2021,” Philippine Star, February 16, 2022. 153 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines, August 26, 2022; Asian Development Bank, “ADB Maintains 2021 Forecast for Philippine Economy; COVID-19 Vaccination Key to Growth,” news release, September 22, 2021. 154 Trade Data Monitor. 155 Trade Data Monitor. Congressional Research Service 21 The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which evolved from the TPP without U.S. participation.156 The Philippines is one of 14 members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework initiative, which the Biden Administration launched in May 2022 to boost economic growth, fairness, competitiveness, and related objectives among allies and partners in the region.157150 World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %)—Philippines.”
151 Asian Development Bank, “ADB Maintains 2021 Forecast for Philippine Economy; COVID-19 Vaccination Key to
Growth,” news release, September 22, 2021; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines.
152 Trade Data Monitor.
153 The United States withdrew from the TPP in 2017. Shannon Hayden and Javiera Heine, “CPTPP: Can We Expect
Additional Southeast Asian Members Soon?” The Diplomat, March 10, 2022.
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The Philippines is home to the largest business process outsourcing sector in the world,
generating over $26 billion annually.154 Filipino workers continue to emigrate for jobs abroad
despite economic growth at home. Remittances from over 10 million overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) rose to a high of nearly $33.5 billion in 2019, the biggest share coming from the United
States at 40.9%.155 Over 600,000 OFWs returned to the Philippines in 2020-2021 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.156
Considerations for Congress
 Given the significance of the Philippines to U.S. strategic interests in the region,  Given the significance of the Philippines to U.S. strategic interests in the region,
Congress may consider how best to support the defense relationship, including Congress may consider how best to support the defense relationship, including
how to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines address its most critical how to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines address its most critical
capability gaps and capacity shortfalls. Congress may consider how to apportion capability gaps and capacity shortfalls. Congress may consider how to apportion
U.S. security assistance among the areas of responding to external threats and U.S. security assistance among the areas of responding to external threats and
counterterrorism. Congress may consider what combination of military and counterterrorism. Congress may consider what combination of military and
development or humanitarian assistance might best counter extremist movements development or humanitarian assistance might best counter extremist movements
in the southern Philippines. in the southern Philippines.
 As the United States and the Philippines have common interests in maintaining a  As the United States and the Philippines have common interests in maintaining a
“free and open Indo-Pacific,” Congress may consider how the United States “free and open Indo-Pacific,” Congress may consider how the United States
might provide support to the Philippines in its efforts to protect its sovereignty might provide support to the Philippines in its efforts to protect its sovereignty
and interests in its maritime domain. Policy tools include U.S. official statements and interests in its maritime domain. Policy tools include U.S. official statements
of support for the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal decision declaring China’s territorial of support for the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal decision declaring China’s territorial
claims to have no legal basis; cultivating multilateral support, including from claims to have no legal basis; cultivating multilateral support, including from
ASEAN, for countering PRC assertiveness in the South China Sea; and providing ASEAN, for countering PRC assertiveness in the South China Sea; and providing
greater security assistance to the Philippines. Congress may also consider the greater security assistance to the Philippines. Congress may also consider the
possible consequences for U.S. interests of ratifying UNCLOS.possible consequences for U.S. interests of ratifying UNCLOS.157158
 As the problems of extrajudicial killings and a culture of impunity have  As the problems of extrajudicial killings and a culture of impunity have
continued in the Philippines, Congress may consider how the United States might continued in the Philippines, Congress may consider how the United States might
assist the Philippine government in strengthening its oversight of its police and assist the Philippine government in strengthening its oversight of its police and
military forces and enhancing the efficacy of its judicial system. Previous U.S. military forces and enhancing the efficacy of its judicial system. Previous U.S.
assistance efforts, for example, have included strengthening the rule of law and assistance efforts, for example, have included strengthening the rule of law and
improving judicial processes.improving judicial processes.158159 Given past, present, and proposed congressional Given past, present, and proposed congressional
restrictions on U.S. security assistance to the Philippines due to human rights restrictions on U.S. security assistance to the Philippines due to human rights
concerns, Congress may consider their impact, if any, on human rights conditions concerns, Congress may consider their impact, if any, on human rights conditions
in the Philippines and on U.S.-in the Philippines and on U.S.-PhilippinesPhilippine relations, and adjust accordingly. relations, and adjust accordingly.160 
Given China’s economic engagement and influence in the region and Philippine Given China’s economic engagement and influence in the region and Philippine interest in interest in
strengthening economic ties with the United States, Congress may consider how best to promote strengthening economic ties with the United States, Congress may consider how best to promote
closer U.S.-Philippines economic ties and provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure closer U.S.-Philippines economic ties and provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure
financing, whether through bilateral trade arrangements, the U.S. International Development

154 Jessica Fenol, “BPO Industry Eyes $29-Billion Revenue, More Jobs by 2022,” ABS-CBN, June 25, 2021.
155 Remittances fell to $33.2 billion in 2020. Lawrence Agcaoili, “OFW Remittances Decline 1.7% to $2.89 Billion in
January,” Philippine Star, March 16, 2021.
156 Ferdinand Patinio, “600K Pandemic-Affected OFWs Repatriated in 12 Months,” Philippine News Agency, July 12,
2021.
157financing, whether through bilateral trade 156 The United States withdrew from the TPP in 2017. Shannon Hayden and Javiera Heine, “CPTPP: Can We Expect Additional Southeast Asian Members Soon?” The Diplomat, March 10, 2022. 157 The White House, “FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity,” May 23, 2022. 158 In the 117th Congress, H.Res. 361 and S.Res. 220 would call on the United States Senate to give its advice and In the 117th Congress, H.Res. 361 and S.Res. 220 would call on the United States Senate to give its advice and
consent to the ratification of UNCLOS. consent to the ratification of UNCLOS.
158159 See, for example, USAID’s Judicial Strengthening to Improve Court Effectiveness (JUSTICE) Project, at See, for example, USAID’s Judicial Strengthening to Improve Court Effectiveness (JUSTICE) Project, at
https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/philippines/partnership-growth-pfg/justice. https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/philippines/partnership-growth-pfg/justice.
160 Between 2008 and 2013, the U.S. Congress placed conditions upon a portion of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Philippines (withholding $2 million-$3 million annually) in order to encourage human rights improvements related to extra-judicial killings by members of the AFP. These restrictions applied only to the Army. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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arrangements, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation or other financial entities, a second Millennium Challenge Corporation Finance Corporation or other financial entities, a second Millennium Challenge Corporation
compact, or the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s proposed Indo-Pacific economic framework. compact, or the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s proposed Indo-Pacific economic framework.
Selected Legislation in the 117th Congress  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (H.R. 7900, passed in the House 7/14/22) would require a report on human rights in the Philippines (Section 5818) and prohibit Department of State funding to the Philippine National Police until certain human rights conditions by the government of the Philippines are met (Section 5863).
 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021FY2022 (P.L. (P.L. 116-260117-103, Section 7043(g)) , Section 7043(g))
states:states, “None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for “None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for
counternarcotics assistance for the Philippines, except for drug demand counternarcotics assistance for the Philippines, except for drug demand
reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational interdiction.” The law also requires an update to the report required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2020 (P.L. 116-94) on steps taken by the Philippine government to hold Philippine armed forces personnel accountable for human rights violations, and on how the report’s findings are reflected in U.S. assistance to the armed forces of the Philippines.161 interdiction.” In addition,
P.L. 116-260 mandated that the Administration submit a report describing steps
taken by the Government of the Philippines to prosecute armed forces personnel
who have been involved in extrajudicial killings, strengthen judicial institutions,
and ensure that the armed forces and paramilitary groups are not engaging in acts
of intimidation or violence against journalists, human rights and other social
activists. The act also barred entry “to foreign government officials involved in
threatening, wrongfully imprisoning, or otherwise depriving of liberty
independent journalists who speak out or publish about official corruption or
other abuses, including Maria Ressa in the Philippines.”159
 The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409) restricts  The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409) restricts
counternarcotics assistance to the PNP, with the exception of drug demand counternarcotics assistance to the PNP, with the exception of drug demand
reduction, maritime, and interdiction programs, unless the Philippines has reduction, maritime, and interdiction programs, unless the Philippines has
adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with
international human rights standards. international human rights standards.
  H.R. 3884 (introduced 6/14/21, 117th Congress), the Philippine Human Right Act,
would suspend U.S. security assistance to the Philippines until the Government
the Philippines has met certain conditions related to the protection of human
rights and prosecution of members of the police and military who have violated
human rights, among other provisions.160
 S. 1657 (introduced 5/17/21, 117th Congress), the South China Sea and East
China Sea Sanctions Act of 2021,The South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2021 (S. 1657, introduced 5/17/21) would impose sanctions on Chinese persons would impose sanctions on Chinese persons
and entities that participate in certain activities related to China’s territorial and entities that participate in certain activities related to China’s territorial
disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and addresses other disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and addresses other
related issues. related issues.
 H.Res. 724 (introduced 10/19/21, 117th Congress) and S.Res. 432 (introduced
10/28/21, 117th Congress) would recognize the month of October 2021 as
Filipino American History Month and celebrate the history and culture of
Filipino Americans and their immense contributions to the United States.


159 See Joint Explanatory Statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021, Division K (Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act, 2021) and S.Rept. 116-126. Between 2008 and 2013, the U.S. Congress
placed conditions upon a portion of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Philippines (withholding $2 million-$3
million annually) in order to encourage human rights improvements related to extra-judicial killings by members of the
AFP. These restrictions applied only to the Army.
160 The main provisions of this bill have been incorporated into H.R. 4521, the America COMPETES Act of 2022 (Sec.
30229A). 161 See S.Rept. 116-126. The report shall describe “steps taken during the previous calendar year by the Government of the Philippines to: (1) prosecute armed forces personnel, including commanding officers, who are credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or aided or abetted extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, and other gross violations of human rights, and to strengthen judicial institutions responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing those responsible for such crimes; (2) promote only armed forces personnel who demonstrate professionalism and respect for human rights; and (3) ensure that the Philippine armed forces and paramilitary groups under its control are not engaging in acts of intimidation or violence against journalists, human rights and environmental defenders, and other social activists.”
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Author Information

Thomas Lum Thomas Lum
Christina L. Arabia Christina L. Arabia
Specialist in Asian Affairs Specialist in Asian Affairs
Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Analyst in Security Assistance, Security

Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade

Ben Dolven Ben Dolven

Specialist in Asian Affairs Specialist in Asian Affairs



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