Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

Changes from March 21, 2022 to May 10, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
~~March 21, 2022~~May 10, 2023
Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 15th largest economy in the world, is bound to the Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 15th largest economy in the world, is bound to the
United States by geography and strong economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to United States by geography and strong economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to
Clare Ribando Seelke
sharing a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, Mexico is among the top U.S. trade sharing a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, Mexico is among the top U.S. trade
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
partners and a major U.S. energy supplier. partners and a major U.S. energy supplier. ~~These ties frequently manifest themselves in~~
~~American Affairs~~
Criminal violence in Mexico has imperiled U.S. American Affairs citizen security in parts of Mexico, and fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico has contributed to surging drug overdoses in the United States. U.S.-Mexico ties, both positive and negative, manifest in legislative activity and interest across a wide legislative activity and interest across a wide ~~spectrum~~range of issues in Congress. of issues in Congress.

~~Joshua Klein~~
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement
~~Presidential Management~~
(MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018. (MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018.
~~Fellow~~
~~President~~ López Obrador has remained popular (López Obrador has remained popular (5463% approval % approval rating in February in February ~~2022~~2023), likely because of his social programs, minimum wage increases, and ability to connect with voters. Critics have expressed concerns about López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions, and judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform civilian functions. ~~), likely as a~~

~~result of his delivery on social programs and ability to connect with voters, even as his~~
~~government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence, corruption, and the~~

~~Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.~~ According to the International Monetary FundAccording to the International Monetary Fund
~~(IMF), Mexico’s economy contracted by 8.2% in 2020. The economy expanded 5.3% in 2021, but the IMF predicts 2.8%~~
~~growth this year.~~
~~U.S. Policy~~
~~U.S.-Mexico relations have remained generally cordial, with Mexico playing a key role in helping control U.S.-bound~~
~~irregular migration. Tensions have emerged, however, over trade policy and tariffs, border security issues, and U.S. arrests of~~
~~high-level former officials on drug trafficking and related charges. President Joe Biden and President López Obrador held~~
~~bilateral and trilateral (with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) meetings during the North American Leaders summit~~
~~in November 2021. U.S. policymakers remain concerned about synthetic drug flows from Mexico, implementation of the~~
~~U.S-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), and a range of human rights issues, including recent killings of~~
~~Mexican journalists and enforced disappearances~~, Mexico’s economy expanded 3.1% in 2022 and may expand 1.8% in 2023. Observers expect MORENA to dominate the July 2024 presidential elections even though President López Obrador is constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection. U.S. Policy U.S.-Mexico relations have grown turbulent during the López Obrador administration. Mexico has accommodated changing U.S. immigration and border security policies, negotiated a U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA), worked with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched security cooperation under a new Bicentennial Framework. Nevertheless, ongoing insecurity in Mexico and illicit drug trafficking from Mexico, trade disputes, and U.S. concerns over democracy and human rights issues have caused tension. The Mexican government has pressed for increased U.S. efforts to address drug demand and gun trafficking. Key issues of congressional interest discussed in this report include the . Key issues of congressional interest discussed in this report include the
following: following:
  ~~Security Cooperation:~~ ~~Members of~~ Transnational Crime and Drug Control: Congress may continue to fund and oversee bilateral efforts to Congress may continue to fund and oversee bilateral efforts to ~~combat~~
~~cross-border crime, improve law enforcement cooperation, and strengthen the rule of law in Mexico under~~
~~the new Bicentennial Framework security partnership signed in October 2021~~ combat cross-border crime a under the Bicentennial Framework signed in October 2021, particularly as “phase two” of the framework, adopted in March 2023, focuses on combating U.S.-bound fentanyl trafficking and Mexico-bound arms trafficking. .
  Irregular Immigration: Congress may continue to monitor Congress may continue to monitor ~~efforts to reduce~~Mexico’s role in reducing irregular U.S.- irregular U.S.-~~bound~~
~~migration, including policies that require bilateral cooperation, such as the Migrant Protection Protocols~~
~~(MPP) initiative~~ bound migration, including migration control and humanitarian protection efforts. .
  Human Rights: Members of Congress may continue to support Mexico’s Members of Congress may continue to support Mexico’s ~~effort~~efforts to address human rights to address human rights
challenges, including violence against journalists and human rights defenders challenges, including violence against journalists and human rights defenders ~~for whom homicide rates in~~
~~Mexico are extremely elevated.~~
 ~~USMCA~~, enforced disappearances, and femicide.  Free Trade: Congress may closely monitor both countries’ adherence to the USMCA, with particular Congress may closely monitor both countries’ adherence to the USMCA, with particular ~~interest~~
interest in labor conditions in Mexico and energy policies in Mexico that may violate the agreement.  Border Environmental Concerns. Congress may oversee~~in labor conditions in Mexico and a proposed reform of Mexico’s electricity sector that may violate key~~
~~provisions of the agreement.~~
~~ Border Environmental Concerns: Members of Congress may continue to conduct oversight on attempts~~
attempts to resolve long-standing transboundary to resolve long-standing transboundary pollution issues and water sharing on the pollution issues and water sharing on the ~~southwest~~Southwest border and may border and may
consider funding for infrastructure improvements to address such problems.consider funding for infrastructure improvements to address such problems.
Legislative Action
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has overseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has overseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound
unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, ~~the COVID-19 pandemic, and USMCA implementation. Congress appropriated~~
~~$158.9 million for Mexico in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 2471/P.L. 117-103), 27% above the Biden~~
~~Administration’s $116.5 million request. Other legislation that would affect U.S. relations with Mexico includes H.R. 3524~~
~~reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021. The bill would require a report on how the United States,~~
~~Mexico, and Canada could work together to reduce methane and other emissions and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA,~~
~~which prohibits importation of goods produced by forced labor. S. 1201, introduced in the Senate in April 2021, contains~~
~~similar provisions.~~
and USMCA implementation. The 118th Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 enacted level of $127.1 million and 30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million. Members of Congress have introduced a wide range of proposals to address fentanyl trafficking from Mexico, including bills that would authorize the use of U.S. military force in Mexico (H.J.Res 18) and that would designate Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (e.g., H.Res. 216, S. 698), some of which have prompted strong negative reactions from the Mexican government. On migration, legislative proposals have ranged from addressing irregular migration flows through humanitarian pathways and increased access to asylum to codifying policies and procedures to limit access to asylum put in place during the Trump Administration (H.R. 1690, H.R. 2, Title III). Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Introduction
Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading partner with Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading partner with
which the United States has a close but complex relationship (seewhich the United States has a close but complex relationship (see Figure 1). In recent decades, . In recent decades,
bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the
countries worked together to address crime, migration, and other issues of shared concern. countries worked together to address crime, migration, and other issues of shared concern.
Disagreements on these issues have emerged on occasionDisagreements on these issues have emerged on occasion~~. In addition, the~~, however, as exemplified by U.S. concerns about fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico and Mexican government concerns about U.S. counterdrug actions inside Mexico and arms trafficking.1 The history of U.S. military history of U.S. military
and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has ~~periodically provoked tension.1~~arguably exacerbated such tension.2
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized crime-related violence in Mexico on Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized crime-related violence in Mexico on
U.S. security interests and about U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. It has increased oversight of U.S. security interests and about U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. It has increased oversight of
U.S.-U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico security cooperation and may continue to do so as the two nations implement the security cooperation and may continue to do so as the two nations implement the
USU.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework agreement.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework agreement.23 Congress has continued to appropriate foreign Congress has continued to appropriate foreign
assistance for Mexico and oversee bilateral efforts to address illegal drug flows, unauthorized assistance for Mexico and oversee bilateral efforts to address illegal drug flows, unauthorized
migration, environmental issues, and migration, environmental issues, and lessons learned on health and supply chain management from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Implementation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) and its Implementation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) and its
labor commitments, Mexico’s treatment of U.S. energy firms, and border environmentallabor commitments, Mexico’s treatment of U.S. energy firms, and border environmental ~~and~~
~~water~~ issues may issues may also receive oversight attention. receive oversight attention.
This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico, followed by This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico, followed by
overviews of selected issues of congressional interest in Mexico—security overviews of selected issues of congressional interest in Mexico—security cooperation and foreign aid; and foreign aid;
fentanyl trafficking, extraditions; human rights, trade; migration; energy; and border environmental, water, and health extraditions; human rights, trade; migration; energy; and border environmental, water, and health
concerns. concerns.
Background
Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929-2000, by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929-2000,
to a true multiparty democracy.to a true multiparty democracy.34 Since the 1990s, presidential power has become more balanced Since the 1990s, presidential power has become more balanced
with that of Mexico’s Congress and Supreme Court. Partially as a result of these new constraints with that of Mexico’s Congress and Supreme Court. Partially as a result of these new constraints
on executive power, the country’s first two presidents from the conservative National Action on executive power, the country’s first two presidents from the conservative National Action
Party (PAN)—Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)—struggled to enact Party (PAN)—Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)—struggled to enact
some of the reforms designed to address Mexico’s economic and security challenges. some of the reforms designed to address Mexico’s economic and security challenges.
The Calderón government pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security The Calderón government pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security
cooperation with the United States. Mexico extradited many drug kingpins, but some 60,000 cooperation with the United States. Mexico extradited many drug kingpins, but some 60,000
people died due to organized crime-related violence. Security challenges overshadowed the people died due to organized crime-related violence. Security challenges overshadowed the
government’s achievements, including its economic stewardship during the global financial crisis, government’s achievements, including its economic stewardship during the global financial crisis,
health care expansion and management of the H1N1 pandemic, and efforts on climate change. health care expansion and management of the H1N1 pandemic, and efforts on climate change.
In 2012, the PRI regained control of the presidency after 12 years in the opposition with a victory In 2012, the PRI regained control of the presidency after 12 years in the opposition with a victory
by Enrique Peña Nieto over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, then standing for the leftist by Enrique Peña Nieto over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, then standing for the leftist
~~Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In 2013, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms addressing~~
~~energy, education, access to finance, and politics through the legislature by forming an agreement~~
~~among the PRI, PAN, and PRD. The energy reform opened Mexico’s energy sector to private~~

1 1 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray Over Fentanyl,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2023. 2 Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., Mexico and the United States: the Politics of Partnership (Boulder, CO: (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013). Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013).
23 White House, “ White House, “~~FACT SHEET~~Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2022: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2022~~; CRS Insight IN11859,~~
New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration.
3. 4 Emily Edmonds Poli and David A. Shirk, Emily Edmonds Poli and David A. Shirk, Contemporary Mexican Politics., 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2020). Littlefield, 2020).
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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In 2013, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms on energy, education, access to finance, and politics through the legislature by forming an agreement among the PRI, PAN, and PRD. The energy reform opened Mexico’s energy sector to private investment, prompting foreign companies to pledge hundreds of billions of dollars of new investment, prompting foreign companies to pledge hundreds of billions of dollars of new
investment in the country. During Peña Nieto’s term, Mexico continued to contend with high investment in the country. During Peña Nieto’s term, Mexico continued to contend with high
levels of homicides, moderate economic growth (averaging 2% annually), and pervasive levels of homicides, moderate economic growth (averaging 2% annually), and pervasive
corruption and impunity. corruption and impunity.
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance

Sources: Created by CRS using data from CIA World Factbook (CIA), Mexico’s National Council for the Created by CRS using data from CIA World Factbook (CIA), Mexico’s National Council for the
Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico’s National Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico’s National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the Trade Data Monitor (TDM). Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 8 link to page 8 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Notes: Mexico’s 2020 census did not include ethnicity; two questions asked people whether they self-identify as Mexico’s 2020 census did not include ethnicity; two questions asked people whether they self-identify as
Indigenous language speakers (6.1% of the population) or as Afro-Mexican or Afro-descendant (2% of the Indigenous language speakers (6.1% of the population) or as Afro-Mexican or Afro-descendant (2% of the
population). See the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, population). See the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Así Se Contó México, 2021. , 2021.
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Political and Economic Environment~~
~~On July 1, 2018, Mexican voters gave Andrés Manuel López Obrador and MORENA a mandate~~
~~to change the course of Mexico’s domestic policies. After campaigning on a platform pledging to~~
~~root out corruption while lifting up the poor, López Obrador and his MORENA coalition~~
~~dominated Mexico’s presidential and legislative elections. Originally from the southern state of~~
~~Tabasco, López Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005), had run for president in~~
~~the past two elections. After his 2012 loss, he left the center-left PRD and founded MORENA.~~
~~MORENA, a leftist party, ran in coalition with the socially conservative Social Encounter Party~~
~~(PES) and the leftist Labor Party (PT). López Obrador won 53.2% of the presidential vote, more~~
~~than 30 percentage points ahead of his nearest rival. López Obrador won in 31 of 32 states,~~
~~demonstrating that he had broadened his support from his base in southern Mexico.~~
~~Four years into his term, President López Obrador has proven adept at connecting with his~~
~~constituents but has struggled to adjust his priorities, even as Mexico has yet to reduce organized~~
~~crime-related violence and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. López Obrador has shaped~~
~~daily news coverage by convening early morning press conferences and traveling throughout the~~
~~country to attend large, campaign-style rallies. He also has attempted to take advantage of~~
~~electoral processes to increase his political capital; his MORENA party pushed to hold a costly~~
~~presidential recall election in April 2022 to demonstrate his broad popularity.4 Mexico’s~~
~~independent electoral body has maintained it lacks adequate funding for the referendum.5 Until a~~
~~recent corruption scandal involving his son, President López Obrador had an approval rating of~~
~~64% (January 2022), likely due to his delivery on social programs.6~~
~~President López Obrador has criticized media outlets that question his policies and reduced~~
~~funding for independent government entities and regulators that could check his presidential~~
~~power, alarming democracy experts.7~~Political and Economic Environment Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, leader of the leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took office for a six-year term in December 2018.5 President López Obrador, who created MORENA in 2014, is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both legislative chambers, although the size of those majorities decreased following the June 2021 midterm elections (See Figure 2 below). President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained high (63% in February 2023) even as he struggled to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and continues to be challenged by entrenched poverty and corruption.6 Supporters of the government have generally praised its social programs and minimum wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with his constituents through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Critics of the government point to López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions, and judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform roles previously carried out by civilian agencies in public security, health, infrastructure, customs, and other sectors. López Obrador has spared his priority, military-built, infrastructure projects from budget cuts while reducing certain other public spending. López Obrador’s administration has cut public sector López Obrador’s administration has cut public sector
salaries and ministry budgets, especially those of autonomous institutions that he proposes to salaries and ministry budgets, especially those of autonomous institutions that he proposes to
~~eliminate or merge into existing bureaucracies. Leadership for some independent institutions has~~
~~been replaced in favor of those with ties to the president.8~~
~~On June 6, 2021, Mexico held local, state, and midterm legislative elections that many analysts~~
~~framed as a referendum on President López Obrador and his policies halfway through his six-year~~
~~presidential term. The PRI, PAN, and PRD formed an opposition coalition to challenge López~~
~~Orbrador and MORENA. MORENA candidates dominated the gubernatorial elections, winning~~
~~11 of 15 governorships. In legislative elections, López Obrador’s party lost its simple majority~~
~~and the absolute majority it held with allied parties. López Obrador received less support from the~~
~~middle class than he did when he won the presidency but more support from poorer voters who~~

~~4 A recall election is a procedure by which voters can remove an elected official from office (in this case the president)~~
~~through a referendum before that official’s term of office has ended.~~
~~5 “Mexico: SCJN Rejects INE’s Suspension of Recall Vote,” Latin News Daily, December 23, 2021. Budget cuts to the~~
~~National Electoral Institute (INE), Mexico’s independent electoral management body, prompted its leadership to~~
~~suspend a presidential recall election scheduled for April 2022 until the Mexican Supreme Court overturned INE’s~~
~~decision, leading some to question the court’s independence from the administration.~~
~~6 Carin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” March 3, 2022.~~
~~7 See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021: Mexico, 2021; “Órganos Autónomos, AMLO no los ha Olvidado:~~
~~‘Apura’ Reforma para que Sean Eliminados,” El Financiero, November 4, 2021.~~
~~8 Francesco Manetto, “Del INE al Banco de México: la Tensión con los Órganos Autónomos Marca un año Clave para~~
~~López Obrador,” El País, January 9, 2022~~
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~have benefitted from his administration’s social welfare policies.9 Despite violence throughout~~
~~the electoral process, the elections themselves reportedly ran smoothly, with no protests, evidence~~
~~of fraud, or challenges to the results.10~~
~~Figure 2. Composition of the Mexican Congress by Party, as of March 2022~~

~~Source:~~ ~~Created by CRS using data from the Mexican chamber of deputies and Mexican senate~~eliminate or merge into existing bureaucracies. As of May 2023, MORENA controlled 201 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60 of 128 seats in the Mexican Senate (See Figure 2). MORENA relies on ad hoc support from other parties, including the PT, PES, and Green Party, to pass legislation. With these parties, the MORENA-led coalition controls 275 seats in the lower chamber and 76 seats in the senate, short of the two-thirds majority needed to make constitutional amendments. In 2022, the congress blocked a proposed constitutional reform that would have severely limited private sector involvement in the electricity sector.7 In contrast, the congress approved MORENA-backed legislation to place the National Guard, a military-led federal law enforcement body created by the López Obrador government, under the authority of the defense ministry in September 2022. Mexico’s Supreme Court declared that reform unconstitutional in April 2023.8 Domestic and international observers have criticized legislative reforms enacted in 2023 that, if ruled constitutional by Mexico’s Supreme Court, could severely weaken the independence and capacity of the country’s independent electoral commission ahead of the 2024 elections.9 5 Originally from the southern state of Tabasco, López Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005), had run for president in the past two elections. After his 2012 loss, he left the center-left PRD and founded MORENA. 6 Carin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, March 6, 2023; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Mexico, March 2023. Hereinafter: EIU, March 2023. On corruption, see “MEXICO: Scandal at Flagship Governmental Body Deepens,” Latin News Security & Strategic Review, May 2023. 7 Drazen Jorgic and Dave Graham, “Mexican President’s Contentious Electricity Overhaul Defeated in Congress,” Reuters, April 18, 2022. 8 Associated Press (AP), “Mexico Court: National Guard Shift to Army Unconstitutional,” April 18, 2023. 9 David Frum, “The Autocrat Next Door,” The Atlantic, February 21, 2023. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 9 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 2. Composition of Mexican Congress by Party: May 2023 Source: Created by CRS using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and Mexican Senate. .
Notes: MORENA = National Regeneration Movement; PVEM = Green Party; PT = Worker’s Party; PAN = MORENA = National Regeneration Movement; PVEM = Green Party; PT = Worker’s Party; PAN =
National Action Party; PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; MC = Citizen’s Movement; PRD = Democratic National Action Party; PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; MC = Citizen’s Movement; PRD = Democratic
Revolutionary Party; and PES = Social Encounter Party. Revolutionary Party; and PES = Social Encounter Party.
~~As of March 2022, MORENA controlled 60 of 128 seats in the senate and 202 of 500 seats in the~~
~~chamber (See Figure 2). The MORENA-led coalition, which is ad hoc but often includes the PT,~~
~~PES, and Green Party (PVEM), controls 277 seats in the chamber and 74 seats in the senate, short~~
~~of the two thirds majority needed to make constitutional amendments. This may pose challenges~~
~~for López Obrador’s plans to make constitutional reforms during the second half of his term.~~
~~Those reforms include a proposed energy reform that would severely limit private sector~~
~~involvement in the electricity sector. The government also plans to place the National Guard, a~~
~~military-led federal law enforcement body it created, under the authority of the defense ministry~~
~~and restructure the electoral authority.11~~
~~Security Conditions~~
Political attention in Mexico is focused on who will stand for MORENA in the 2024 elections, as López Obrador is constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection, and whether the opposition, which remains relatively weak and divided, will be able to select a unified candidate. As of May 2023, no leading candidates for the opposition parties have emerged. Mexico City Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard are among the leading contenders vying to stand for MORENA. Security Conditions and Policy Responses From 2015 to 2018, the homicide rate in Mexico surged some 71%, reaching a record 29 From 2015 to 2018, the homicide rate in Mexico surged some 71%, reaching a record 29
homicides per 100,000 people.homicides per 100,000 people.1210 Homicides in Mexico Homicides in Mexico ~~have~~ remained near those record-setting remained near those record-setting
~~levels, even during the COVID-19 pandemic.13 For over a decade, high~~levels leading up to and during the COVID-19 pandemic but have since declined.11 High levels of levels of homicides have largely mirrored trends in organized crime-related violence, as criminal groups have fought for control over illicit smuggling routes into the United States (see Figure 3).12 On March 3, 2023, cartel gunmen kidnapped four U.S. citizens (two of whom were subsequently killed) who reportedly had traveled to the city of Matamoros for medical services, prompting significant U.S. concern.13 By 2021, femicides (targeted killing of women) increased 10~~homicides have~~
~~been driven, in part, by increasing organized crime-related violence (see Figure 3).14~~

~~9 Maria Verza, “Head of Mexico’s Governing Party Cites Middle Class Failings,” AP, June 11, 2021.~~
~~10 Etellekt: Séptimo Informe de Violencia Política en México Proceso Electoral 2020-2021, June 2021.~~
~~11 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “AMLO Outlines Three Constitutional Reforms,” June 22, 2021~~
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Homicide database, at https://dataunodc.un.org/ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Homicide database, at https://dataunodc.un.org/
content/Country-profile?country=Mexico. content/Country-profile?country=Mexico.
1311 Laura Y. Calderón et al., Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico: 2021 Special Report,, Justice in Mexico, Justice in Mexico,
University of San Diego, October 2021. Hereinafter Calderón et al., University of San Diego, October 2021. Hereinafter Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021. , 2021.
1412 Infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation Infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation~~, or CJNG,~~ cartel. See cartel. See
CRS Report R41576, CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel. , by June S. Beittel.
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~
13 Kevin Sieff et al. “Two of the Americans Kidnapped in Mexico Are Found Dead,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023. Congressional Research Service 4 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations approximately 137% from 2015 levels.14 Enforced disappearances,15 kidnappings, and other violent crimes also have surged periodically.
Figure 3. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Homicides in Mexico
(2008- (2008-~~2021)~~
2022)
Source: Created by CRS. Information from Lantia Created by CRS. Information from Lantia ~~Consultores~~Intelligencia, a Mexican security firm. Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have fought to satisfy U.S. drug demand while also engaging in other illicit activities such as alien smuggling, fuel theft, arms trafficking, and money laundering. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that some 70% of firearms recovered in Mexico originated in the United States.16 Bulk cash smuggling continues, but TCOs also launder drug profits through complex schemes, some of which involve Chinese businesses and money traders, as well as through schemes to hide illicit profits in remittance flows sent from the United States.17 President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on transnational criminal organizations, as such an approached failed under his two predecessors. ~~, a Mexican security firm.~~
~~Femicides (targeted killing of women) and disappearances have increased in recent years. Mexico~~
~~recorded over 940 femicides each year in 2019 and 2020, an increase of approximately 129%~~
~~from 2015 levels.15 In November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances~~
~~conducted a fact-finding mission in Mexico and announced that more than 95,000 people had~~
~~been reported missing.16 Many people have been missing since former president Calderón~~
~~launched a “drug war” in 2006.17~~
~~U.S. drug demand, as well as bulk cash smuggling and weapons smuggling into Mexico from the~~
~~United States, have fueled drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico for over a decade. Recent~~
~~violence may be attributable to competition for the production and trafficking of synthetic~~
~~opioids.18 In November 2019, drug traffickers killed nine women and children from an extended~~
~~family of dual U.S.-Mexican citizens in Sonora, prompting significant U.S. concern.19~~
~~President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on transnational criminal organizations.~~
Instead, his administration’s security strategy includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic Instead, his administration’s security strategy includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic
drivers of violent crimedrivers of violent crime ~~and other novel policies.20~~. The administration launched a program that The administration launched a program that
provides scholarships to youth to attend university or complete internships. No one has evaluated provides scholarships to youth to attend university or complete internships. No one has evaluated
the program’s effects on youth employability or crime prevention,the program’s effects on youth employability or crime prevention,2118 and auditors have uncovered and auditors have uncovered
~~irregularities in the program’s implementation.22 Mexico’s senate passed legislation to~~

~~15 Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021.~~
~~16 “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021.~~
~~See CRS In Focus IF11669, Human Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances.~~
~~17 Maritza Pérez, “Segob Reporta 77,171 Personas Desaparecidas en México al Corte de Septiembre de 2020,”~~ El
~~Economista, October 7, 2020.~~
~~18 Steve Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t be Another El Chapo,” Foreign Affairs, February 27,~~
~~2019; Eimhin O’Reilly, “Fentanyl Trade Fuels Cartel Battle in Central Mexico,” InSight Crime, March 2, 2020.~~
~~19 Lizbeth Diaz, “Nine Americans Killed in Mexican Ambush, Trump Urges Joint war on Drug Cartels,” Reuters,~~
~~November 5, 2019.~~
~~20 Vanda Felbab-Brown, AMLO’s Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality, Brookings Institution, March 2019.~~
~~21 Alán Lopez, “Jovenes Perdiendo su Futúro,” Nexos, February 17, 2020.~~
~~22 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las Irregularidades que la ASF Encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,”~~ El
~~Financiero, February 21, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~decriminalize marijuana production and distribution to comply with a Mexican Supreme Court~~
~~ruling; it is before the chamber.23~~
~~At the same time, President López Obrador abandoned a key campaign promise by expanding,~~
~~rather than limiting, the military’s role in public security and in a broad~~irregularities in the program’s implementation.19 14 Woodrow Wilson Center, “Engendering Safety: Addressing Femicide in Mexico,” press release, July 15, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/engendering-safety-addressing-femicide-mexico. 15 According to the United Nations, enforced disappearances occur when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government.” See http://www.un.org/en/events/disappearancesday/background.shtml. 16 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis, GAO 21-322, February 2021. 17 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat Assessment, March 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Announces 2022 National Illicit Finance Strategy,” May 13, 2022; Signos Vitales, Euforia de las Remesas: Ėxodo, Lavado de Dinero, y Auge Económico, March 2023. 18 Alán Lopez, “Jovenes Perdiendo su Futúro,” Nexos, February 17, 2020. 19 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las Irregularidades que la ASF Encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 37 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Neither López Obrador nor Mexico’s prosecutor general have devoted resources to strengthening the accusatorial justice system that took effect in 2016 or the independence of the National Prosecutor’s Office.20 The administration has sought to increase the types of crimes subject to mandatory pretrial detention, contravening a goal of the reforms. Impunity for homicide remains above 90%, and Mexico ranks 135 out of 140 countries ranked by the World Justice Project in 2022 based on the performance of its criminal justice system.21 In contrast to his campaign pledges, President López Obrador has expanded, not limited, the military’s role in public security and an array of other public array of other public
sector tasks.sector tasks.2422 In 2019, López Obrador backed constitutional reforms that created a National In 2019, López Obrador backed constitutional reforms that created a National
~~Guard, and in May 2020 he~~ Guard to replace the Federal Police (a force that had received significant U.S. equipment and training). In May 2020, López Obrador signed a decree to allow military involvement in public security to signed a decree to allow military involvement in public security to
~~continue for five more years, under civilian supervision.25~~continue through 2025, a policy that Mexico’s congress extended through 2028.23 Although Mexico’s National Guard (composed Mexico’s National Guard (composed
mostly of military police units of the army and navymostly of military police units of the army and navy~~, as well as former federal police) has been~~
~~tasked with reasserting~~) is involved in territorial control in high-crime areas, border and immigration territorial control in high-crime areas, border and immigration
~~enforcement, and communications interception.26 However, military and law enforcement forces~~
~~reportedly have been prohibited from undertaking operations that involve a visible show of force~~
~~in an effort to reduce civilian deaths caused by firefights between security forces and organized~~
~~crime.27 Reports suggest that as federal operations have declined, criminal organizations have~~
~~begun to use increasingly lethal technology, such as drone-mounted bombs, to expand their~~
~~territory.28~~enforcement, and communications interception, it has limited capacity to investigate crimes.24 State and local police forces charged with investigating most crimes, including State and local police forces charged with investigating most crimes, including
homicides, have received less federal support from the López Obrador government than they homicides, have received less federal support from the López Obrador government than they
received under prior administrations.received under prior administrations.2925
Addressing Corruption ~~and Impunity~~
Corruption is an issue at all levels of government and among all political parties in Mexico. Corruption is an issue at all levels of government and among all political parties in Mexico. At
~~least 20 former governors (many from former president Peña Nieto’s PRI party) are under~~
~~investigation for corruption. In December 2019, Genaro García Luna, who served as public~~
While most evident at the municipal and state level, corruption and collusion between public servants and crime groups occurs at the federal level, as well. In February 2023, a U.S. federal jury convicted Genaro García Luna, public security minister during the PAN administration of President Calderón, security minister during the PAN administration of President Calderón, ~~was arrested in the United~~
~~States~~ on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa ~~Cartel; he is pending~~
~~trial in New York.30~~Cartel.26 In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister
Salvador Cienfuegos (2012-2018) on drug and money-laundering charges surprised and angered Salvador Cienfuegos (2012-2018) on drug and money-laundering charges surprised and angered
the Mexican government. Responding to Mexican pressure, the United States agreed to drop the the Mexican government. Responding to Mexican pressure, the United States agreed to drop the
case and allow Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, where he was exoneratedcase and allow Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, where he was exonerated ~~of all charges.31~~.
President López Obrador has taken steps to combat corruption, but the key institutions to detect President López Obrador has taken steps to combat corruption, but the key institutions to detect
and address corrupt offenses—such as the new criminal justice system, the Prosecutor General’s and address corrupt offenses—such as the new criminal justice system, the Prosecutor General’s
Office, and the National Anti-corruption System—remain Office, and the National Anti-corruption System—remain ~~underfunded~~weak (see Appendix A). President . President López Obrador has been unwilling to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations involving his family and allies.27 His administration’s focus on reducing government expenditures and efforts Financiero, February 21, 2021. 20 See, for example, Justice in Mexico, Prosecutorial Reform in Mexico: Assessing the Progress of the National Prosecutor’s Office, March 16, 2021. 21 Impunidad Cero, Impunidad en Homicidio Doloso y Femicidio 2022, December 2022; WJP Rule of Law Index, 2022. 22~~López Obrador~~

~~23 Juan Montes, “Mexico Set to Become World’s Largest Legal Cannabis Market,” Wall Street Journal, December 29,~~
~~2020.~~
24 Craig Deare, Craig Deare, Militarization a la AMLO: How Bad Can It Get?, Wilson Center, September 2021. , Wilson Center, September 2021.
2523 Those reforms contradict a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in public Those reforms contradict a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in public
security violated the Mexican Constitution. security violated the Mexican Constitution.
2624 Iñigo Guevara, Iñigo Guevara, Mexico’s National Guard: When Police ~~are not~~Are Not Enough, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, , Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute,
January 2020January 2020.; “Vigila Guardia Nacional 84 Hospitales de IMSS,” “Vigila Guardia Nacional 84 Hospitales de IMSS,” Reforma, April 15, 2020. , April 15, 2020.
~~27 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution,~~
~~January 2022.~~
~~28 Felbab-Brown, op. cit.~~
29 25 Maureen Meyer, Maureen Meyer, Police Reform and Security Strategies in Mexico in the Context of the war on Drugs and U.S.
Support of These Efforts, , ~~WOLA~~Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), July 2020. , July 2020.
3026 U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Department of Justice ~~(DOJ), “Former~~ , “Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna ~~Charged with~~
Convicted of Engaging Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Taking Millions in Cash Bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel,” February 21, 2023. 27 See, for example, Andrés Bello, “Why Allegations About His Son Could Hurt Mexico’s President,” Economist, Congressional Research Service 6 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations to punish tax evaders have won praise from some citizens. Nevertheless, observers worry that cuts in public sector salaries have made officials more susceptible to bribes and that tax-related “anti-corruption” probes have sometimes been used to intimidate government opponents.28 Human Rights Criminal groups, sometimes in collusion with state actors, have continued to commit serious human rights violations against civilians in Mexico.29 The vast majority of those abuses have gone unpunished, whether they were prosecuted in the military or civilian justice systems. Under Mexico’s new justice system, judges have had to let many defendants go free, even if they may have been guilty, due to police misconduct in gathering evidence.30 The government continues to receive criticism for not protecting journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and other vulnerable groups from abuses, as well as for its expansion of military involvement in public security despite abuses committed by security forces.31 Reports have documented the López Obrador government’s improper use of military-purchased spyware to surveil public officials, civil society leaders, and others.32 For years, human rights groups and the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have chronicled cases of Mexican security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial killings, torture, and “enforced disappearances.”33~~in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise,” July 30, 2020.~~
~~31 Oscar Lopez, “Mexico Exonerates Ex-Defense Chief Who Was Freed by the U.S.,” New York Times, January 14,~~
~~2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~has been unwilling to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations involving his family and~~
~~allies.32 His focus on reducing government expenditures and his administration’s efforts to punish~~
~~tax evaders have won praise from some citizens, while others have dismissed them as symbolic~~
~~actions. Many observers worry cuts in public sector salaries have made officials more susceptible~~
~~to bribes.~~
~~Key Institutions for Strengthening the Rule of Law~~
New Criminal Justice System. By the mid-2000s, most Mexican legal experts had concluded that reforming
~~Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system was crucial for combating criminality and strengthening the~~
~~rule of law. In June 2008, Mexico implemented constitutional reforms mandating that by 2016, trial procedures at~~
~~the federal and state levels had to move from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a~~
~~judge to an adversarial public trial system, with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. These changes~~
~~aimed to create a new, more transparent, impartial, and efficient criminal justice system.~~
~~Under then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico technically met the June 2016 deadline for adopting the new~~
~~system, with states that received technical assistance from the United States showing, on average, better results~~
~~than others. Nevertheless, problems in implementation occurred and public opinion turned against the system, as~~
~~judges released criminals due to flawed police investigations or weak cases presented by prosecutors. According~~
~~to the World Justice Project, the new system has produced better courtroom infrastructure, more capable judges,~~
~~and faster case resolution than the old system, but more training for police and prosecutors is needed.~~
~~President López Obrador has not dedicated significant resources to strengthening the justice system. His~~
~~administration attempted to implement some reforms, including mandatory pre-trial detention for more crimes,~~
~~which would have contradicted the new system’s goals. Mexico’s Supreme Court struck down those reforms.~~
Building an Independent Prosecutor General’s Office. Analysts who study Mexico’s legal system have long
~~highlighted the inefficiency of the attorney general’s office (known as the PGR). The PGR struggled with limited~~
~~resources, corruption, and a lack of political wil to resolve high-profile cases, including those involving corruption~~
~~or human rights abuses. Many civil society groups that pushed for the new criminal justice system also lobbied the~~
~~Mexican Congress to create an independent prosecutor’s office. Amid petitions from civil society organizations,~~
~~Mexico’s senate was to appoint an independent individual to lead the new prosecutor general’s office for a nine-~~
~~year term under 2014 constitutional reforms.~~
~~President López Obrador downplayed the importance of the new office during his campaign, but Mexico’s~~
~~Congress established the office, now known as the Prosecutor General’s Office (FGR), after López Obrador’s~~
~~inauguration. In January 2019, Mexico’s senate named Dr. Alejandro Gertz Manero, a close associate and former~~
~~security adviser to López Obrador, as prosecutor general. Gertz Manero directed prosecutors to focus on~~
~~emblematic cases, but few have progressed. Critics maintain Gertz Manergo has been slow to implement the~~
~~reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress to strengthen the FGR.~~
National Anti-corruption System. In July 2016, Mexico’s Congress approved legislation that contained several
~~proposals put forth by civil society to ful y implement the National Anti-corruption System (NAS) created by a~~
~~2015 constitutional reform. The legislation gave the NAS investigative and prosecutorial powers and a civilian~~
~~board of directors; increased administrative and criminal penalties for corruption; and required three declarations~~
~~(taxes, assets, and conflicts of interest) from public officials and contractors. Under the Peña Nieto government,~~
~~federal implementation of the NAS lagged and state-level implementation varied.~~
~~In February 2019, Prosecutor General Gertz Manero named a special anti-corruption prosecutor, who received a~~
~~significant budget for 2020 and 2021 amid generalized budget cuts for the institution. Cases involving corruption in~~
~~the social development ministry and corrupt payments from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to the~~
~~head of Petróleos de México (Pemex) during the Peña Nieto administration are moving forward. However, some 500~~
~~reports of corruption referred to the FGR by the Ministry of Public Administration in the current administration~~
~~have yet to be presented before a judge. In January 2022, the López Obrador administration proposed to~~
~~eliminate NAS’s technical support arm charged with evaluating the country’s anti-corruption activities as part of a~~
~~larger consolidation strategy to reduce public spending.~~
Sources: Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk, ~~Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final~~
~~Countdown to Implementation, Justice in Mexico, October 2015; World Justice Project México,~~ ~~Mexico’s New~~
~~Criminal Justice System: Substantial Progress and Persistent Challenges, June 2018; “AMLO Asegura que Respetará~~
~~Decisión de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa por Defraudación Fiscal,” El Economista, October 26, 2021; Arturo Angel,~~

~~32 See, for example, Andrés Bello, “Why Allegations About His Son Could Hurt Mexico’s President,” The Economist,~~
~~February 19, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~“Gertz en Tres Años con FGR: Despidos, Opacidad e Incumpliendo Plazos de su Propia Ley,”~~ ~~Animal Político,~~
~~January 27, 2022; and Jorge Monroy, Pedro Vil a y Caña y Alberto Morales, “Va AMLO por Fusionar 16 órganos~~
~~en Dependencias,” El Universal, January 28, 2022.~~
~~In December 2020, the Mexican Congress passed and President López Obrador signed a law to~~
~~limit foreign law enforcement activity in Mexico, including the work of the U.S. Drug~~
~~Enforcement Administration (DEA). Drafted in response to the U.S. investigation of General~~
~~Cienfuegos, the law originally required foreign law enforcement officials to share with Mexican~~
~~officials any information obtained on Mexican soil and local officials to report any interactions~~
~~with foreign agents. U.S. concerns that the new law would impede U.S.-Mexico security~~
~~cooperation led the Mexican government to soften the rule with respect to some sensitive~~
~~information; reportedly, cooperation still suffered.33~~
~~Human Rights~~
~~Criminal groups, sometimes in collusion with state actors, have continued to commit serious~~
~~human rights violations against civilians in Mexico.34 The vast majority of those abuses have~~
~~gone unpunished, whether they were prosecuted in the military or civilian justice systems. Under~~
~~Mexico’s new justice system, judges have had to let many defendants go free, even if they may~~
~~have been guilty, due to police misconduct in gathering evidence.35 The government continues to~~
~~receive criticism for not protecting journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and others.36~~
~~Critics of President López Obrador have accused him of promoting an environment of~~
~~intimidation and media self-censorship by continuing to attack journalists verbally.37~~
~~For years, human rights groups and the U.S. State Department’s~~ ~~Country Reports on Human~~
~~Rights Practices~~ ~~have chronicled cases of Mexican security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial~~
~~killings, torture, and “enforced disappearances.”38~~ The unresolved case of 43 missing students The unresolved case of 43 missing students
who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, in September 2014—which allegedly involved the local who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, in September 2014—which allegedly involved the local
police and federal authorities—galvanized global protests. Experts from the Inter-American police and federal authorities—galvanized global protests. Experts from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights disproved much of the attorney general’s investigation, and in Commission on Human Rights disproved much of the attorney general’s investigation, and in
2018, a federal judge dismissed that investigation as biased. President López Obrador established 2018, a federal judge dismissed that investigation as biased. President López Obrador established
a truth commission, and Prosecutor General Gertz Manero created a special prosecutor’s office to a truth commission, and Prosecutor General Gertz Manero created a special prosecutor’s office to
focus on the case. focus on the case. ~~By January 2021, trials had begun for two former federal security officials~~

~~33 “Mexico Softens Rules for Controversial New Foreign Agents Law,” Reuters, January 14, 2021; “US Envoy: US~~
~~Asking Mexico to let in DEA and Other Agents,” AP, October 9, 2021.~~
~~34 See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, March 2021. Hereinafter~~
~~U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report, March 2021.~~
~~35 World Justice Project,~~ ~~Almanac: Achievements and challenges~~As of May 2023, authorities have arrested more than 80 suspects for crimes related to the case but prosecutors have yet to secure any convictions.34 Among the human rights challenges facing Mexico, President López Obrador has prioritized addressing enforced disappearances.35 His administration has met regularly with families of the missing, launched an online portal for reporting missing persons, registered thousands of clandestine graves, and increased the budget for Mexico’s national search commission. The government has sought international assistance to identify tens of thousands of bodies that have been exhumed. Still, in November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances February 19, 2022. 28 Economist, “AMLO Uses His Anti-Corruption Drive to Gain Power and Scare Critics,” November 30, 2019. 29 See U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, March 2023. Hereinafter U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report, March 2023. 30 World Justice Project, Almanac: Achievements and Challenges of the New Criminal Justice System, October 25, , October 25,
2019, at https://worldjusticeproject.mx/almanaque-enpol16/. 2019, at https://worldjusticeproject.mx/almanaque-enpol16/.
3631 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, World Report ~~2022~~2023: Mexico, ~~available~~ at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/ at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/~~2022~~2023/country-/country-
~~chapters/mexico.~~
~~37 “IAPA asks López Obrador to ‘Immediately Suspend’ his attacks on Journalists,” Voz de América, February 17,~~
~~2022.~~
~~38 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report, March 2021. According to the United Nations, enforced~~
~~disappearances occur when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their~~
~~liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting~~
~~on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government.” See~~
~~http://www.un.org/en/events/disappearancesday/background.shtml.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~accused of involvement in the disappearances.39 As of February 2022, prosecutors have yet to~~
~~secure any convictions.~~
~~Among the human rights challenges facing Mexico, President López Obrador has prioritized~~
~~enforced disappearances.40 His administration has met regularly with families of the missing,~~
~~launched an online portal for reporting missing persons, registered thousands of clandestine~~
~~graves, and increased the budget for Mexico’s national search commission. The government has~~
~~sought international assistance to identify tens of thousands of bodies that have been exhumed.~~
~~Still, in November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances~~ chapters/mexico; Maria Abi-Habib and Galia García Palafox, “Deadly Attack Exposes Growing Threat in Mexico: The Military,” New York Times, April 7, 2023. 32 Natalie Kitroeff and Ronen Bergman, “How Mexico Became the Biggest User of the World’s Most Notorious Spy Tool,” New York Times, April 18, 2023. 33 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report, March 2023. 34 For recent updates, see National Security Archive, “Ayotzinapa Investigations,” at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/special-exhibit/ayotzinapa-investigations. 35 CRS In Focus IF11669, Mexico: Addressing Missing and Disappeared Persons. Congressional Research Service 7 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations criticized the criticized the
“structural impunity” that continues for perpetrators of disappearances and the involvement of “structural impunity” that continues for perpetrators of disappearances and the involvement of
public officials from all levels of government in such crimes.public officials from all levels of government in such crimes.4136
Human rights organizations have urged the López Obrador administration to fully enact the Human rights organizations have urged the López Obrador administration to fully enact the
country’s 2017 law against torture, investigate and punish cases of torture, and take steps to country’s 2017 law against torture, investigate and punish cases of torture, and take steps to
ensure that state agents do not commit acts of torture. After an April 2019 review of Mexico, the ensure that state agents do not commit acts of torture. After an April 2019 review of Mexico, the
U.N. Committee U.N. Committee ~~against~~Against Torture welcomed the passage of the 2017 law Torture welcomed the passage of the 2017 law, but stated that torture by but stated that torture by
state agents occurred in a “generalized manner” and found torture to be “endemic” in detention state agents occurred in a “generalized manner” and found torture to be “endemic” in detention
centers.centers.4237 López Obrador has spoken out against torture, but his government has yet to develop a López Obrador has spoken out against torture, but his government has yet to develop a
system to track statistics on torture cases as required by the 2017 law. system to track statistics on torture cases as required by the 2017 law.
Analysts maintain that efforts to protect journalists, human rights defenders, and migrants remain Analysts maintain that efforts to protect journalists, human rights defenders, and migrants remain
insufficient and, in some cases, have worsened under López Obrador.insufficient and, in some cases, have worsened under López Obrador.4338 Some Some ~~150~~157 journalists and journalists and
media workers have been killed in Mexico since 2000, including media workers have been killed in Mexico since 2000, including ~~seven~~7 in 2021 and in 2021 and ~~eight through~~
~~mid-March 2022.44~~at least 12 in 2022.39 Mexico ranks among the top 10 countries globally with the highest rates of Mexico ranks among the top 10 countries globally with the highest rates of
unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of population, according to the nongovernmental unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of population, according to the nongovernmental
Committee to Protect Journalists’ Committee to Protect Journalists’ ~~2021~~2022 Global Impunity Index. .
Mexico is also a dangerous country for human rights defenders. In Mexico is also a dangerous country for human rights defenders. In ~~2021~~2022, an estimated , an estimated 4245 human human
rights defenders were killed.rights defenders were killed.4540 As politicians discredited some human rights groups and As politicians discredited some human rights groups and
questioned their sources of funding, police periodically used excessive force against human rights questioned their sources of funding, police periodically used excessive force against human rights
defenders protesting against femicide and other issues.defenders protesting against femicide and other issues.4641 The López Obrador government has The López Obrador government has ~~not~~
neither strengthened the mechanism intended to protect human rights defenders and journalists nor strengthened the mechanism intended to protect human rights defenders and journalists nor
ensured an adequate budget for prosecutors charged with investigating those crimes. ensured an adequate budget for prosecutors charged with investigating those crimes.
Migrants in Mexico are vulnerable to abuse by criminal groups and corrupt officials, including Migrants in Mexico are vulnerable to abuse by criminal groups and corrupt officials, including
human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. In January 2021, U.S.-trained state police human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. In January 2021, U.S.-trained state police
reportedly killed 18 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.reportedly killed 18 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.~~47 Between January 2019 and January 2021,~~
~~the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program, an initiative started during the Trump~~

~~39 Moses Ngong and Stephanie Brewer, “Seventh Anniversary of the Ayotzinapa Disappearances in Mexico: Advances~~
~~and Challenges in the Search for Truth and Justice,” WOLA, September 23, 2021.~~
~~40 CRS In Focus IF11669, Human Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances, by Clare~~
~~Ribando Seelke and Rachel L. Martin.~~
4142 Economic and Social Conditions Beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open market economy that has entered into free trade agreements with 50 countries.43 The transition accelerated after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994. Since NAFTA, Mexico has increasingly become an export-oriented economy, with the value of exports equaling 41% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, up from 12% of GDP 36 “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021. , November 29, 2021.
4237 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee Against Torture Reviews the Report of U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee Against Torture Reviews the Report of
Mexico,” April 26, 2019. Mexico,” April 26, 2019.
4338 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Mexico.
4439 Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinados en México,” accessed on Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinados en México,” accessed on ~~February 17, 2022~~May 3, 2023, available at https://articulo19.org/, available at https://articulo19.org/
periodistasasesinados/periodistasasesinados/~~; Fabiola Sánchez, “Journalist Killed in Mexico, Eighth so far this Year,” AP, March 16, 2022.~~
45. 40 Frontline Defenders, Frontline Defenders, Global Analysis ~~2021~~~~, February 2022.~~
~~46 Ibid.~~
472022, April 2023. 41 Ibid. 42 Parker Asmann, “US-Trained Police Implicated in Mexico Migrant Massacre,” Parker Asmann, “US-Trained Police Implicated in Mexico Migrant Massacre,” InSight Crime, February 3, 2021. , February 3, 2021.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Administration, required many asylum-seekers to wait in Mexico while U.S. immigration courts~~
~~processed their cases; migrants’ rights advocates documented 1,500 cases of migrants returned to~~
~~northern Mexico under this program who had been raped, kidnapped, or attacked as of January~~
~~2021.48~~
~~Economic and Social Conditions~~
~~Beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open~~
~~market economy that has entered into free trade agreements with 50 countries.49 The transition~~
~~accelerated after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994.~~
~~Since NAFTA, Mexico has increasingly become an export-oriented economy, with the value of~~
~~exports equaling 40% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, up from 12% of GDP~~
~~in 1993.50~~43 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/mexico/. Congressional Research Service 8 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations in 1993.44 Mexico remains a U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States are Mexico remains a U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States are
vehicles and auto parts, vehicles and auto parts, ~~electrical machinery and equipment, and machinery and mechanical~~
~~appliances.51~~automatic data processing machines, and electrical machinery.45
From 2010 to 2019, Mexico recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 2.7%, but its From 2010 to 2019, Mexico recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 2.7%, but its
economy contracted 8.economy contracted 8.20% in 2020.% in 2020.5246 Although the global pandemic was the principle cause for Although the global pandemic was the principle cause for
the 2020 contraction, Mexico’s economy also shrank by 0.2% in 2019.the 2020 contraction, Mexico’s economy also shrank by 0.2% in 2019.53 Increased U.S. demand Increased U.S. demand
for goods and servicesfor goods and services, higher vaccination rates, and the ~~and~~ reopening of businesses reopening of businesses ~~after the pandemic powered a strong~~powered an
economic economic ~~recovery of 5.3~~rebound of 4.7% in 2021.% in 2021.5447 Nevertheless, concerns about tightening monetary policy Nevertheless, concerns about tightening monetary policy, inflation
and a reduction in U.S. growth projections led and a reduction in U.S. growth projections led ~~the IMF to lower its 2022 growth forecast for~~
~~Mexico to 2.8%.55~~to 3.1% growth in 2022 and a 2023 growth forecast of 1.8%.48
Mexico’s future growth projections are mixed. According to the Organisation for Economic Mexico’s future growth projections are mixed. According to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial exclusion, a lack of competitiveness, Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial exclusion, a lack of competitiveness,
employment in the informal sector, corruption, and low female participation in the workplace are employment in the informal sector, corruption, and low female participation in the workplace are
impediments to Mexico’s medium-term economic performance.impediments to Mexico’s medium-term economic performance.5649 Lingering pandemic-related Lingering pandemic-related
effects, energy sector reforms that discourage foreign investment, and new challenges related to effects, energy sector reforms that discourage foreign investment, and new challenges related to
technological innovation and climate change also could hinder long-term growth.technological innovation and climate change also could hinder long-term growth.5750 Experts have Experts have
posited that Mexico’s traditional economic assets—plentiful natural resources, a relatively young posited that Mexico’s traditional economic assets—plentiful natural resources, a relatively young
labor force, and proximity and preferential access to markets in the United States—strategically labor force, and proximity and preferential access to markets in the United States—strategically

~~48 Human Rights First, “Delivered to Danger,” at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico.~~
~~49 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-~~
~~investment-climate-statements/mexico/.~~
~~50 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed February 14, 2022.~~
~~51 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the United States, All Commodities, November, 2019-2021,” accessed~~
~~February 14, 2022.~~
~~52 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF DataMapper: Real GDP Growth,” accessed February 22, 2022,~~
~~https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/MEX~~
~~53 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, p. 6, at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/~~
~~2022/01/25/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2022.~~
~~54 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, p. 6.~~
~~55IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, p. 6.~~
~~56 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico, February~~
~~2022.~~
~~57 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.~~
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position it to take advantage of potential nearshoring opportunities as policymakers from the position it to take advantage of potential nearshoring opportunities as policymakers from the
United States and other countries seek to United States and other countries seek to ~~diversify~~establish supply chains away from Chinese markets. supply chains away from Chinese markets.5851
Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico remains Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico remains
heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly 7876.8% of Mexico’s exports % of Mexico’s exports in 2022in
~~2021~~ were U.S.-bound) and as a source of remittances, tourism revenues, and investment. were U.S.-bound) and as a source of remittances, tourism revenues, and investment.5952
Remittances reached a record of nearly $Remittances reached a record of nearly $~~52 billion in 2021, defying experts’ predictions that they~~
~~would fall due to the pandemic.60 Total~~58.5 billion in 2022.53 U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico stood at $ U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico stood at $~~100.9~~
~~billion in 2019, a 12% decrease from 2018~~110.7 billion in 2021; the United States ; the United States ~~remained~~remains Mexico’s top source of Mexico’s top source of
foreign direct investmentforeign direct investment~~, accounting for 39.1% of all (stock) inflows.61~~.54
López Obrador Government’s Economic and Energy Policies
President López Obrador promised to govern austerely and bolster economic growth, but a lack President López Obrador promised to govern austerely and bolster economic growth, but a lack
of public investment hurt Mexico’s pre-pandemic growth rate and the government’s limited fiscal of public investment hurt Mexico’s pre-pandemic growth rate and the government’s limited fiscal
response to the pandemic worsened its economic impact on Mexico.response to the pandemic worsened its economic impact on Mexico.55 López Obrador worked 44 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed February 14, 2022. 45 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the United States, All Commodities, November, 2021,” accessed February 14, 2022. 46 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF DataMapper: Real GDP Growth,” accessed April 27, 2023. 47 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021. Hereinafter: IMF, 2021. 48 EIU, March 2023. 49 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico, February 2022. 50 IMF, 2021. 51 Daniel Zega, Alessandra Ortiz, “Mexico at the Cusp of Recovery,” Deloitte Insights, December 10, 2021. 52 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the World, All Commodities,” accessed May 3, 2023. 53 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed April 27, 2023. 54 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/dici0722.pdf; U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statement: Mexico. 55 IMF, 2021. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 29 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations with the Trump Administration to renegotiate the USMCA, which updated and modernized the NAFTA agreement, assuaging some investor concerns about López Obrador’s economic policies. However, his government’s energy policies have prompted international concerns, legal challenges, and USMCA consultations that could result in a dispute settlement panel if U.S. and Canadian concerns are not adequately resolved (See “Energy” section).56 Mexico’s congress also passed mining reforms to shorten concessions for foreign companies invested in the sector and to require a percentage of revenues be shared with local communities.57 Reduced spending on public administration and several tax settlements with large companies since October 2019 have allowed the López Obrador government to devote significant resources to social programs and major infrastructure projects without adding to public debt.58 Many of those infrastructure projects have proven costly for the country. Upon assuming the presidency, López Obrador paid $1.8 billion to cancel the construction of a new airport outside of Mexico City, opting to build in a different location at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.59 His government has continued to construct the Maya Train, a $9.7 billion railroad line to promote tourism in five southeastern states, despite criticism that it would damage the environment and opposition from indigenous groups in the area.60 The government devoted $8 billion to build the Dos Bocas coal-powered refinery in Tabasco, but cost overruns, worker strikes, and operational setbacks have derailed the project’s budget and timeline.61 Social Conditions Mexico has long had relatively high poverty rates for its level of economic development, a problem exacerbated by the pandemic. Experts estimate nearly 10 million Mexicans fell into poverty in 2020, widening the poverty rate to 43.9%.62 Traditionally, poverty has been most acute among those in southern Mexico’s rural regions, indigenous populations, and those employed in subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector.63 Despite predictions to the contrary, poor and working class households received continued remittances sent from family members abroad, even during the pandemic. Remittances to Mexico rose 27% from 2020 to 2021.64 Mexico also has experienced high levels of income inequality. According to the 2022 World Inequality Report, 57% of Mexico’s wealth was concentrated in 10% of the population, a figure 56 In April 2022, the Mexican congress rejected a constitutional reform that would have dismantled the 2013 reforms with respect to the electricity sector; however, Mexico’s Supreme Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of regulatory reforms enacted in 2021 that favor the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) over private companies. ECPA, “Lingering Uncertainty in Mexico’s Energy Sector,” May 3, 2022; Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder, “Exclusive: US Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023. 57 Associated Press, “Mexico Passes Mine Reform, 17 Other Bills in Frenzied Rush,” April 29, 2023. 58 Javier Martínez, Leonardo Núñez, “Análisis del Paquete Económico 2022: El Presupuesto de un Solo Hombre,” Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción, September 13, 2021; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, May 2021. 59 Sonia Corona, “El Nuevo Aeropuerto de México, a Punto del Despegue,” El País, February 12, 2022. 60 “El Tren Maya de López Obrador Arranca el Año Con Tropiezos y Dudas,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2022. 61 Amy Stillman, Lucia Kassai, Max de Haldevang, “Mexico’s Crown-Jewel Oil Refinery Is $3.6 Billion Over Budget,” Bloomberg News, January 21, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “Trabajadores de la Refinería de Dos Bocas Chocan Con la Policía en Su Segundo Día de Paro,” El País, October 13, 2021. 62 Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Informe de la Política de Desarrollo Social 2020, February 9, 2021. 63 This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and is available in Spanish at https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza-2018.aspx. 64 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations that has stayed between 55% and 60% over the past century. Inequality has historically been due, in part, to the country’s regressive tax system, oligopolies that dominate particular industries, a relatively low minimum wage, and a lack of targeting in some social programs.65 ~~López Obrador worked with~~
~~the Trump Administration to renegotiate the USMCA, which updated and modernized the~~
~~NAFTA agreement, assuaging some investor concerns about López Obrador’s economic policies.~~
~~However, his handling of other policy measures with significant economic implications,~~
~~particularly in the energy sector, have caused concerns. In the second year of the pandemic, the~~
~~government increased budget allocations for education and public investment but otherwise~~
~~maintained the fiscally conservative approach it had previously taken, refraining from providing~~
~~as much budgetary support to its population as some other nations.62~~
~~Reduced spending on public administration and several tax settlements with large companies~~
~~since October 2019 have allowed the López Obrador government to devote significant resources~~
~~to social programs and major infrastructure projects without adding to public debt.63 Many of~~
~~those infrastructure projects have proven costly for the country. Upon assuming the presidency,~~
~~López Obrador paid $1.8 billion to cancel the construction of a new airport outside of Mexico~~
~~City, opting to build in a different location at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.64 His government~~
~~has continued to construct the Maya Train, a $9.7 billion railroad line to promote tourism in five~~
~~southeastern states, despite criticism that it would damage the environment and opposition from~~
~~indigenous groups in the area.65 His government devoted $8 billion to build the Dos Bocas coal-~~
~~powered refinery in Tabasco, but cost overruns, worker strikes, and operational setbacks have~~
~~derailed the project’s budget and timeline.66~~

~~58 Daniel Zega, Alessandra Ortiz, “Mexico At the Cusp of Recovery,” Deloitte Insights, December 10, 2021~~
~~59 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the World, All Commodities, November, 2019-2021,” accessed February~~
~~14, 2022.~~
~~60 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022.~~
~~61 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-~~
~~investment-climate-statements/mexico/.~~
~~62 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.~~
~~63 Javier Martínez, Leonardo Núñez, “Análisis del Paquete Económico 2022: El Presupuesto de un Solo Hombre,”~~
~~Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción, September 13, 2021; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, May 2021.~~
~~64 Sonia Corona, “El Nuevo Aeropuerto de México, a Punto del Despegue,” El País, February 12, 2022.~~
~~65 “El Tren Maya de López Obrador Arranca el Año Con Tropiezos y Dudas,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2022.~~
~~66 Amy Stillman, Lucia Kassai, Max de Haldevang, “Mexico’s Crown-Jewel Oil Refinery Is $3.6 Billion Over~~
~~Budget,” Bloomberg News, January 21, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “Trabajadores de la Refinería de Dos Bocas Chocan~~
~~Con la Policía en Su Segundo Día de Paro,” El País, October 13, 2021.~~
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~~Proposed Energy Reform~~
~~In October 2021, President López Obrador submitted a proposal to amend the Mexican constitution to reduce~~
~~private sector participation in the power sector and eliminate some independent regulatory agencies. The reform~~
~~would affect the electricity market by cancelling existing contracts with private generators, awarding the Federal~~
~~Electricity Commission (CFE) 56% of power generation contracts, and cancelling long-term energy supply~~
~~contracts and clean energy preferential buying programs. As written, the reform also would eliminate several~~
~~independent regulatory agencies. Outside of the electricity market, the upstream oil and gas regulator National~~
~~Hydrocarbon Commission (CNH) would be absorbed into the Secretariat of Energy, causing uncertainty around~~
~~the permitting process for future private oil and gas projects. The reform also includes provisions to prevent~~
~~foreign companies from exploiting the country’s lithium deposits by labeling them a “strategic” mineral.~~
~~Observers have criticized the initiative on economic, environmental, and legal terms. While López Obrador has~~
~~been adamant that the reform wil lower energy prices for Mexicans, skeptics maintain that less private sector~~
~~participation in an industry that requires significant capital investment wil increase rates. Experts contend that the~~
~~reform wil inhibit Mexico from reaching its climate mitigation commitments by prioritizing CFE power~~
~~generation—64% of which is nonrenewable—and discouraging privately funded clean energy projects from~~
~~entering the market; a U.S. Department of Energy analysis estimates that annual CO2 emissions would increase~~
~~between 26% and 65%. International observers have questioned the reform’s compliance with the USMCA, as it~~
~~appears to give advantages to state companies and undermine existing investments.~~
Sources: “What Would AMLO’s Power Sector Plan Mean for Mexico?” Inter-American Dialogue, February 10,
~~2022; “Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s Energy Policy Wil Hurt Mexico,” The Economist, January 8th, 2022;~~
~~“Mexico’s Energy Reform Strains Ties with US,” Associated Press, January 22, 2022; “¿Cuáles son los Puntos Clave~~
~~de la Reforma Eléctrica de AMLO y por qué ha Causado Polémica?” El Siglo Torreón, February 4, 2022; “Why~~
~~Controversial Energy Reforms Could Be ‘Devastating’ For Mexico’s Economy,” BNAmericas, February 4, 2022;~~
~~Ricardo Bracho et al., Impact Analysis of Amendments to Mexico's Unit Commitment and Dispatch Rules, National~~
~~Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2022, p. 33.~~
~~COVID-19~~
~~Health experts have criticized the López Obrador government’s failure to coordinate “a coherent~~
~~and unified national response” to the COVID-19 pandemic.67 Mexico waited several weeks after~~
~~the U.S.-Mexico border had closed to nonessential travel before declaring a public health~~
~~emergency on March 30, 2020.68 While the government implemented some measures to~~
~~ameliorate the economic impacts caused by the virus, including sending advance payments of~~
~~pensions to senior citizens, observers have characterized Mexico’s fiscal response to the~~
~~pandemic as “modest.”69 Throughout the pandemic, President López Obrador has downplayed the~~
~~threat posed by COVID-19, flouting public health guidelines in his own behavior. His~~
~~administration’s budget cuts reduced public health system personnel, testing availability, and~~
~~hospital capacity. As of March 18, 2022, Mexico reported roughly 321,800 COVID-19 deaths; the~~
~~actual total is likely higher since there were an estimated 650,000 “excess deaths” from~~
~~unidentified causes in Mexico from 2020 through October 2021.70 Mexico had fully vaccinated~~
~~some 62% of its population as of March 18, 2022.71 Mexico has been both a recipient and~~

~~67 UCSF Institute for Global Health Sciences, Mexico’s Response to COVID-19: a Case Study, April 2021.~~
~~68 IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19 Policy Tracker, accessed March 7, 2022.~~
~~69 Swarnali Ahmed Hannan, Keiko Honjo, and Mehdi Raissi,~~ ~~IMF Working Paper: Mexico Needs a Fiscal Twist:~~
~~Response to COVID-19 and Beyond, IMF, October 2020.~~
~~70 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Research Center, “Mexico,” accessed March 7, 2021, at~~
~~https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/mexico; “Tracking covid-19 excess deaths across countries,” The Economist,~~
~~February 9, 2022, using data from EuroMOMO, a group of European epidemiologists tracking COVID-19 and~~
~~mortality.~~
~~71 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Research Center, “Mexico,” accessed March 7, 2022.~~
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~benefactor of vaccine diplomacy; the country has received vaccines from the United States,~~
~~Russia, and others, while more recently donating vaccines to smaller countries.~~
~~Social Conditions~~
~~Mexico has long had relatively high poverty rates for its level of economic development, a~~
~~problem exacerbated by the pandemic. Experts estimate nearly 10 million Mexicans fell into~~
~~poverty in 2020, widening the poverty rate to 43.9%.72 Traditionally, poverty has been most acute~~
~~among those in southern Mexico’s rural regions, indigenous populations, and those employed in~~
~~subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector.73 Despite predictions to the contrary, poor and~~
~~working class household incomes have been supported by continued remittances sent from family~~
~~members abroad. Even amid the pandemic, remittances sent to Mexico have reached record~~
~~levels, increasing by 11% from 2019 to 2020 and 27% from 2020 to 2021.74~~
~~Mexico also has experienced high levels of income inequality. According to the~~ ~~2022 World~~
~~Inequality Report, 57% of Mexico’s wealth was concentrated in 10% of the population, a figure~~
~~that has stayed between 55% and 60% over the past century. Inequality has historically been due,~~
~~in part, to the country’s regressive tax system, oligopolies that dominate particular industries, a~~
~~relatively low minimum wage, and a lack of targeting in some social programs.75~~
Economists have asserted that reducing the untaxed and unregulated informal sector, in which Economists have asserted that reducing the untaxed and unregulated informal sector, in which
workers lack job protections and benefits, is crucial for addressing poverty, while also expanding workers lack job protections and benefits, is crucial for addressing poverty, while also expanding
Mexico’s low tax base. Under the Peña Nieto administration, a financial sector reform aimed to Mexico’s low tax base. Under the Peña Nieto administration, a financial sector reform aimed to
increase access to credit for small and medium size businesses (SMEs), which employ a majority increase access to credit for small and medium size businesses (SMEs), which employ a majority
of Mexican workers. A fiscal reform also sought to incentivize SMEs’ participation in the formal of Mexican workers. A fiscal reform also sought to incentivize SMEs’ participation in the formal
economy. Barriers to formalization remain, however, including complex and sometimes costly economy. Barriers to formalization remain, however, including complex and sometimes costly
state and local regulations.state and local regulations.7666
López Obrador has improved many Mexicans’ socioeconomic conditions amid the deepest López Obrador has improved many Mexicans’ socioeconomic conditions amid the deepest
recession in decades by increasing pensions for the elderly and raising the minimum wage recession in decades by increasing pensions for the elderly and raising the minimum wage by
~~95%, in nominal terms, over the first three years of his administration.77~~several times. His program to provide His program to provide
monthly payments to youth aged 18-29 to attend school or complete internships has enrolled over monthly payments to youth aged 18-29 to attend school or complete internships has enrolled over
300,000 individuals, despite reported administrative and financial irregularities.300,000 individuals, despite reported administrative and financial irregularities.7867 However, he However, he
has ended has ended Prospera, Mexico’s largest social program, which had won international praise for , Mexico’s largest social program, which had won international praise for
~~targeting those most in need.79~~

~~72 Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL),~~ ~~Informe de la Política de~~
~~Desarrollo Social 2020, February 9, 2021.~~
~~73 This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and is~~
~~available in Spanish at https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza-2018.aspx.~~
~~74 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022.~~
~~75 Gerardo Esquivel Hernandez, Concentration of Economic and Political Power, Oxfam Mexico, 2015.~~
76targeting those most in need.68 The government also maintained a fiscally conservative approach during the pandemic, providing less budgetary support to its population than some other countries in the region.69 Health experts have criticized the López Obrador government’s failure to coordinate “a coherent and unified national response” to the COVID-19 pandemic, which killed roughly 333,188 Mexicans through April 2023.70 Throughout the pandemic, President López Obrador downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19 and flouted public health guidelines. His administration’s budget cuts reduced public health system personnel, testing availability, and hospital capacity; they likely contributed to excess deaths from other causes such as heart disease and diabetes left untreated as hospitals focused on pandemic response.71 Foreign Policy In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. He has rarely traveled outside the country since assuming office. He met in Washington, DC, with President Trump in July 2020 and with President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders Summit in November 2021. Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has represented Mexico in global fora. 65 Gerardo Esquivel Hernandez, Concentration of Economic and Political Power, Oxfam Mexico, 2015. 66 Jorge Alvarez and Cian Ruane, Jorge Alvarez and Cian Ruane, Informality and Aggregate Productivity: the Case of Mexico, IMF Country Report, , IMF Country Report,
November 2019; OECD, November 2019; OECD, Economic Surveys: Mexico, February 2022. , February 2022.
~~77 Sitio Oficial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, “Porcentaje de Aumento del Salario Mínimo Nominal y Real (1989-~~
~~2019),” December 19, 2018; Comision Nacional de los Salarios Minimos, “Incremento a los Salarios Minimos para~~
~~2022,” press release, December 1, 2021,~~
7867 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las irregularidades que la ASF encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las irregularidades que la ASF encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
Financiero, February 21, 2022. , February 21, 2022.
7968 Stephen Kidd, “The Demise of Mexico’s Prospera Programme: a Tragedy Foretold,” Stephen Kidd, “The Demise of Mexico’s Prospera Programme: a Tragedy Foretold,” Development Pathways, June 2, , June 2,
2019. 2019.
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Foreign Policy~~
~~In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best~~
~~foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. He has rarely traveled outside the country since~~
~~assuming office. He did meet in Washington, DC, with President Trump in July 2020 and with~~
~~President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders~~
~~Summit in November 2021.~~
~~Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has represented Mexico in~~
~~global fora and led a return to Mexico’s~~69 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021. 70 UCSF Institute for Global Health Sciences, Mexico’s Response to COVID-19: a Case Study, April 2021; Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center. 71 Lina Sofía Palacio-Mejía et. al., “Leading Causes of Excess Mortality in Mexico During the COVID-19 Pandemic 2020–2021: A Death Certificates Study in a Middle-Income Country,” The Lancet, Vol. 13, 100303, September 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Under López Obradror, Mexico has returned to its historic noninterventionist and independent approach to historic noninterventionist and independent approach to
foreign policyforeign policy ~~(the so-called “Estrada doctrine”).~~ . Mexico has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and proposed the creation of a high-level caucus for peace in Ukraine within the United Nations. The current administration reversed Mexico’s The current administration reversed Mexico’s
recognition of Juan Guaidó as Interim President of Venezuela but then hosted Norway-led recognition of Juan Guaidó as Interim President of Venezuela but then hosted Norway-led
negotiations between officials representing Nicolás Maduro and the political opposition innegotiations between officials representing Nicolás Maduro and the political opposition in
~~August-September~~ 2021. The López Obrador government 2021. The López Obrador government ~~also~~established closer relations with Cuba, granted temporary asylum to granted temporary asylum to
~~ousted Bolivian President Evo Morales and has established closer relations with Cuba. Some~~
~~observers have questioned the López Obrador government’s decision not to endorse Organization~~
~~of American States resolutions criticizing human rights abuses by the Daniel Ortega government~~
~~in Nicaragua.80~~
~~Despite these changes~~ousted Bolivian President Evo Morales, abstained from OAS resolutions condemning the Daniel Ortega regime in Nicaragua, and defended impeached Peruvian President Pedro Castillo. Despite these developments, Mexico continues to participate in multilateral institutions and support , Mexico continues to participate in multilateral institutions and support
development in Central America. development in Central America. ~~Mexico held a seat on the U.N. Security Council for 2021-2022.~~
In addition to working within trade fora, such as the Pacific Alliance, Mexico continues to In addition to working within trade fora, such as the Pacific Alliance, Mexico continues to
promote its exports and seek new trade partners.promote its exports and seek new trade partners.8172 The López Obrador administration shares the The López Obrador administration shares the
view of prior Mexican governments that the best way to stop illegal immigration from the view of prior Mexican governments that the best way to stop illegal immigration from the
Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) is to address the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) is to address the
lack of opportunity and insecurity in that region. In lack of opportunity and insecurity in that region. In ~~2019, Mexico proposed a $100 million~~
~~program focused on promoting sustainable development in the Northern Triangle.82 In~~ December December
2021, the United States and Mexico jointly announced 2021, the United States and Mexico jointly announced Sembrando Oportunidades, a new effort to , a new effort to
coordinate development projects in the Northern Triangle.coordinate development projects in the Northern Triangle.8373
U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico Relations and Issues for Congress
Mexican-U.S. relations generally have grown closer over the past two decades. A range of Mexican-U.S. relations generally have grown closer over the past two decades. A range of
bilateral mechanisms and institutions have helped the Mexican and U.S. federal governments—as bilateral mechanisms and institutions have helped the Mexican and U.S. federal governments—as
well as stakeholders in border states, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—find well as stakeholders in border states, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—find
common ground on difficult issuescommon ground on difficult issues~~, such as migration and water management. In 2021, the Biden~~
~~and López Obrador governments restarted the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue~~
~~(HLED), the High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD), and the North American Leaders Summit~~
~~(NALS) with Canada. Those meetings did not occur during the Trump Administration.~~
~~Congressional interest in Mexico has focused on encouraging economic linkages; cooperating on~~
~~managing migration flows to the United States; combating illicit flows of people, weapons, drugs,~~
~~and currency; targeting assistance to Mexico on addressing corruption and human rights abuses;~~
~~and managing environmental resources, particularly at the border. The U.S.-Mexico~~

~~80 “OAS Assembly Condemns Nicaragua’s Election as ‘Not Free,’” AP, November 12, 2021.~~
~~81 CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by M. Angeles~~
~~Villarreal.~~
~~82 “México Destina 100 mdd para Exportar el Plan Sembrando Vida a Centroamérica,” Forbes, June 21, 2019.~~
~~83 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S.-Mexico Joint Statement on Sembrando Oportunidades,”~~
~~December 1, 2021.~~
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~~link to page 39 link to page 23 link to page 21 link to page 40~~ ~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Interparliamentary Group (IPG), first convened in 1961, has provided a forum through which~~
~~legislators from both countries can address issues such as trade, migration, and security. The~~
~~House of Representatives met with their Mexican counterparts virtually in July 2020; the Senate~~
~~has not met with Mexican senators since 2013.~~
~~U.S.-Mexican relations under the López Obrador administration generally have remained cordial.~~
~~Nevertheless, periodic tensions have emerged over trade disputes and tariffs; immigration and~~
~~border security issues, including President Trump’s decision to construct a border wall; and U.S.~~
~~investigations of Mexican officials. Mexico has accommodated changing U.S. immigration and~~
~~border security policies, worked with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched~~
~~security cooperation under a new framework. Mexico’s proposed energy reform and U.S.~~
~~concerns about the killings of journalists in Mexico have prompted congressional offices to send~~
~~several letters to the Biden Administration that voice concerns and have caused some strain in~~
~~relations.84 (See “Outlook,” below.)~~
~~Counternarcotics, Security Cooperation, and U.S. Foreign Aid85~~. U.S.-Mexico relations have nevertheless grown turbulent during the López Obrador administration, reaching a low point in recent months over U.S. criticisms of López Obrador’s public statements and policy reversals, antidrug investigations and indictments, and proposals for addressing fentanyl trafficking from Mexico—a key congressional concern. President López Obrador has strongly objected to some U.S. antidrug operations in Mexico, U.S. support of democracy and human rights groups critical of his government, and legislative proposals introduced in the 118th Congress, particularly those that would authorize the use of U.S. military force in Mexico and designate Mexican TCOs as terrorist groups.74 Presidents Biden and López Obrador met in July 2022 and pledged to address inflation, promote renewable energy, modernize border infrastructure, bolster efforts against fentanyl and arms trafficking, and address the root causes of irregular migration.75 A High-Level Economic Dialogue occurred in September 2022, a High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD) convened in October 2022, and a second North American Leaders Summit (NALS) with Presidents Biden and López Obrador and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took place in January 2023 in Mexico City. While the NALS advanced priorities on inclusivity, the environment, 72 CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 73 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S.-Mexico Joint Statement on Sembrando Oportunidades,” December 1, 2021. 74 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray over Fentanyl,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2023; Associated Press, “Mexican President Complains U.S. Is Funding Opposition,” May 3, 2023. 75 White House, “President Biden and President López Obrador Joint Statement,” July 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 18 link to page 22 link to page 18 link to page 38 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations competitiveness, migration, health, and regional security, the summit did not address ongoing trade disputes or result in new initiatives to address irregular migration or fentanyl trafficking.76 Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Assistance77
Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Close cooperation resumed in sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Close cooperation resumed in
2007, when then-President George W. Bush requested, and Congress appropriated, increased 2007, when then-President George W. Bush requested, and Congress appropriated, increased
counterdrug assistance for Mexico. Although initial U.S. funding for what ultimately would be counterdrug assistance for Mexico. Although initial U.S. funding for what ultimately would be
known as the “Mérida Initiative” focused heavily on training and equipping Mexican security known as the “Mérida Initiative” focused heavily on training and equipping Mexican security
forces, Congress shifted the emphasis of bilateral efforts over time to strengthening Mexican forces, Congress shifted the emphasis of bilateral efforts over time to strengthening Mexican
institutions under four broad pillarsinstitutions under four broad pillars (See Figure 4). . Until FY2016, Congress withheld some U.S. security Until FY2016, Congress withheld some U.S. security
assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative until certain human rights withholding assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative until certain human rights withholding
requirements were met (see requirements were met (see “Human Rights,” below). In compliance with Leahy Law vetting below). In compliance with Leahy Law vetting
requirements (22 U.S.C. requirements (22 U.S.C. §2378d),2378d),8678 U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for
potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment. potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment.
Congress has funded and overseen the Mérida Initiative, which has accounted for the majority of Congress has funded and overseen the Mérida Initiative, which has accounted for the majority of
U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico since FY2008. Congress maintained level funding for the U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico since FY2008. Congress maintained level funding for the
Mérida Initiative even as the Trump Administration requested less support (SeMérida Initiative even as the Trump Administration requested less support (See Table 1 for recent for recent
U.S. assistance to Mexico aU.S. assistance to Mexico and Table AB-1 for Mérida Initiative funding). Nevertheless, elevated for Mérida Initiative funding). Nevertheless, elevated
organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States have organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States have
led many to question the Mérida Initiative’s efficacy.led many to question the Mérida Initiative’s efficacy.~~87 Mexican transnational criminal~~
~~organizations (chiefly, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, or CJNG) have~~
~~established Mexico as the primary source and transit point for illicit fentanyl into the United~~
~~States.88 In its February 2022 final report, the Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid~~
~~Trafficking established by Section 7221 of P.L. 116-92 assessed that “cooperation with foreign~~

~~84 AP, “U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry Visits Mexico amid Power Clash,” February 8, 2022; Latin News Daily,~~
~~“MEXICO: US-Mexico Tensions Rise over Killings of Journalists,” February 24, 2022.~~
~~85 See also CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022; CRS Insight IN11859,~~
New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration.
~~86 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Liana W. Rosen.~~
~~87 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission,~~
~~December 2020.~~
~~88 As the Chinese government has placed strict controls on fentanyl, Mexican drug trafficking organizations are~~
~~increasingly involved in supplying the U.S. market. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration,~~ ~~Fentanyl Flow to the~~
~~United States, March 6, 2020.~~
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~law enforcement officials in Mexico to eradicate the fentanyl threat has been insufficient to date.”~~
~~In oversight hearings, Members of Congress have repeatedly expressed concerns about the lack of~~
~~metrics for measuring the Mérida Initiative’s success; these concerns also prompted Members to~~
~~request several Government Accountability Office reports on similar topics.89~~
~~On January 31, 2022~~79 U.S. security cooperation with Mexico has diminished since López Obrador took office in 2018. López Obrador campaigned against Mexico’s military-led “war” on TCOs and his predecessors’ strategy of focusing on cartel leaders rather than broader cartel-related crime. He criticized the Mérida Initiative for failing to stem drug-related violence. Cooperation deteriorated further after the October 2020 U.S. arrest of retired defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos on drug trafficking-related charges. By November 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice had dropped all charges against Cienfuegos and released him to Mexico, where the López Obrador government published the U.S evidence against Cienfuegos, declined to prosecute him, and called the U.S. evidence “fabricated.”80 Meanwhile, the Mexican Congress enacted legislation to limit U.S. law enforcement operations and intelligence sharing. The López Obrador government also paused the issuance of visas for U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, slowed extraditions, and declared the Mérida Initiative “dead.”81 76 CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th Congress, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke. 77 See also CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 78 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber. 79 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, December 2020. 80 Emilia López Pérez, “AMLO Respalda Exoneración a Cienfuegos: ‘Le Fabricaron Cargos in EU’, dice,” El Financiero, January 15, 2021. 81 Mary Beth Sheridan and Nick Miroff, “They call him the Eagle: How the U.S. Lost a key Ally in Mexico as Fentanyl Took off,” Washington Post, December 12, 2022; Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Declares $3 Billion U.S. Security Deal ‘Dead,’ Seeks Revamp,” Washington Post, July 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 18 link to page 18 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations On January 31, 2022, after months of negotiations, the U.S. and Mexican governments published an action plan for , the U.S. and Mexican governments published an action plan for
implementing the U.Simplementing the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe -Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe
Communities. Launched at the October 2021 HLSD, the framework is a replacement for the Communities. Launched at the October 2021 HLSD, the framework is a replacement for the
Mérida Initiative. The framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (Mérida Initiative. The framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (seesee Figure 4) that that
Congress could influence, particularly through the appropriations process. Congress could influence, particularly through the appropriations process. ~~The extent to which~~
~~the framework helps disrupt the illicit production and trafficking of U.S.-bound synthetic opioids,~~
~~a key U.S. priority, may determine congressional perceptions of the framework’s success.~~
~~Figure 4. U.S.-Mexican~~At meetings in March and April 2023, U.S. and Mexican officials announced phase two of the Bicentennial Framework, an effort focused on addressing fentanyl and arms trafficking.82 Figure 4. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Frameworks

Source: U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State.
~~The Biden Administration requested $116.8 million for Mexico for FY2022~~Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 enacted level of $127.1 million and 30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million (see Table 1). The ~~(see Table 1).~~
~~According to the~~ explanatory statement accompanying the explanatory statement accompanying the ~~FY2022~~FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Consolidated Appropriations
~~Act (H.R. 2471/P.L. 117-103), Congress is providing $158.9 million in assistance to Mexico, the~~
~~same amount appropriated in FY2021. The explanatory statement includes a provision from~~
~~H.Rept. 117-84 that prohibits funding to support Mexican military participation in public security~~
~~efforts and urges support for criminal justice reform, human rights protection, and community-~~
~~level crime and violence prevention. Other reporting directives require a comprehensive review~~
~~of funds provided through the Mérida Initiative; a report on any funds appropriated to Mexican~~
~~agencies involved in migration management; plans to improve data collection on synthetic drug~~
~~trafficking; the adequacy of Mexico’s efforts to combat human rights abuses, such as torture and~~
~~enforced disappearances; crimes committed along Mexico’s northern highways; efforts to combat~~
~~fentanyl flows; and the efficacy of U.S. drug policy.90~~

~~89 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),~~ ~~U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State Department Could Improve Its~~
~~Monitoring of Mérida Initiative Projects, GAO-20-388, May 12, 2020.~~
~~90 There is also a reporting directive unrelated to security matters that is focused on efforts to strengthen North~~
~~American supply chains.~~
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~~Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2018-FY2022~~
~~(appropriations in millions of current dollars)~~
~~FY2021~~
~~FY2022~~
~~Foreign Assistance Account~~
~~FY2018 FY2019~~
~~FY2020~~
~~(enacted) (enacted)~~
~~Development Assistance (DA)~~
~~0.0~~
~~0.0~~
~~0.0~~
~~0.0~~
~~0.0~~
~~Economic Support Fund (ESF)~~
~~45.0~~
~~45.0~~
~~50.0~~
~~50.0~~
~~50.0~~
~~International Narcotics Control and Law~~
~~100.0~~
~~110.0~~
~~100.0~~
~~100.0~~
~~100.0~~
~~Enforcement (INCLE)~~
~~Foreign Military Financing (FMF)~~
~~5.0~~
~~5.0~~
~~5.0~~
~~6.0~~
~~6.0~~
~~International Military Education and Training~~
~~1.5~~
~~1.3~~
~~1.8~~
~~1.8~~
~~1.8~~
~~(IMET)~~
~~Non-proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,~~
~~1.2~~
~~1.2~~
~~1.2~~
~~1.2~~
~~1.2~~
~~and Related Programs (NADR)~~
~~Total~~
~~152.7~~
~~162.5~~
~~158.0~~
~~159.0~~
~~159.0~~
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2022;
~~Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; and~~
~~Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103.~~
~~The Department of Defense (DOD) is not providing assistance through Mérida accounts, nor is~~
~~the agency mentioned in the Bicentennial Framework. However, DOD has overseen the~~
~~procurement and delivery of equipment provided through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)~~
~~account. Some DOD equipment programs are funded by annual State Department appropriations~~
~~for FMF, which totaled $6.0 million in FY2021 and in FY2022.~~Act (P.L. 117-328) did not specify a total funding amount for Mexico, The explanatory statement did direct the State Department to continue focusing assistance on helping Mexico protect human rights, prosecute cases of human rights abuses, improve its forensics capabilities, train justice sector operators, and combat synthetic opioids. The explanatory statement includes reporting directives related to Western Hemisphere drug control efforts, migration and refugee assistance, and updating reports required in H.Rept. 117-84. Additional reporting requirements relate to the Bicentennial Framework, human rights progress by the Mexican government, U.S. training of Mexican migration units, and the resilience of North American supply chains, among other requirements. Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2020-FY2024 (appropriations in millions of current dollars) FY2023 FY2024 Foreign Assistance Account FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 (request) (request) Development Assistance (DA) 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 Economic Support Fund (ESF) 50.0 50.0 56.8 75.0 60.7 82 White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Launch of Phase II of the Bicentennial Framework for Security,” March 10, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations FY2023 FY2024 Foreign Assistance Account FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 (request) (request) International Narcotics Control and Law 100.0 100.0 64.0 64.0 48.0 Enforcement (INCLE) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 5.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 International Military Education and Training 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.7 (IMET) Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, 1.2 1,2 1.2 1.0 1.0 and Related Programs (NADR) Total 158.0 159.0 127.1 141.6 111.4 Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2024. The Department of Defense (DOD) is not providing assistance through Mérida accounts, nor is the agency mentioned in the Bicentennial Framework. However, DOD implements International Military Education International Military Education
and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.82 million in million in ~~FY2021 and in FY2022, support~~
FY2022, and support training programs for the Mexican military, including courses in the United States. DOD also training programs for the Mexican military, including courses in the United States. DOD also
provides additional training, equipping, and other logistical support to Mexico that complements provides additional training, equipping, and other logistical support to Mexico that complements
the Mérida Initiative through its own authorities including, but not limited to, Section 333 the Mérida Initiative through its own authorities including, but not limited to, Section 333
Building Partner Capacity and Section 284 Counter-drug and Activities to Counter Transnational Building Partner Capacity and Section 284 Counter-drug and Activities to Counter Transnational
Organized Crime (both authorized under Title 10 of the Organized Crime (both authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code).).9183 Through 22 U.S.C. Through 22 U.S.C. §2416, 2416,
Congress requires an annual report on Foreign Military Training by DOD and the State Congress requires an annual report on Foreign Military Training by DOD and the State
Department; the agencies submitted the most recent version of that report to relevant committees Department; the agencies submitted the most recent version of that report to relevant committees
~~in February 2022.~~
~~Bilateral military cooperation deepened along with Mérida-related law enforcement cooperation.~~
in March 2022. According Northern Command officials, current bilateral goals focus on “improving regional According Northern Command officials, current bilateral goals focus on “improving regional
security, strengthening military ties with regional partners, and expanding force interoperability security, strengthening military ties with regional partners, and expanding force interoperability
through the Defense Strategic Framework and the Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable.”through the Defense Strategic Framework and the Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable.”92
~~Mexico is scheduled to host the next bilateral roundtable in May 2022.~~84
Congress may seek to influence how the Biden Administration balances U.S. foreign assistance Congress may seek to influence how the Biden Administration balances U.S. foreign assistance
priorities in Mexico; monitor the efficacy of U.S.-funded efforts; and recommend ways to priorities in Mexico; monitor the efficacy of U.S.-funded efforts; and recommend ways to
respond to challenges posed by evolving criminal activities and changes in Mexico’s policies. respond to challenges posed by evolving criminal activities and changes in Mexico’s policies.
Antidrug Efforts: Focus on Fentanyl Trafficking Given the ongoing epidemic of fentanyl-related overdoses in the United States, fentanyl control has become a top U.S. priority in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Some observers have questioned the efficacy of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation since Mexico emerged as the leading source of U.S.-bound fentanyl.85 At present, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl is produced clandestinely in Mexico, using chemical inputs (i.e., precursors) from the People’s Republic of China.86 This represents a significant shift in fentanyl production and trafficking trends since 2019, prior to 83
91 See ForeignAssistance.gov, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” at https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/mexico/, See ForeignAssistance.gov, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” at https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/mexico/,
accessed February 23, 2022. accessed February 23, 2022.
9284 CRS electronic correspondence with U.S. Northern Command officials, February 22, 2022. CRS electronic correspondence with U.S. Northern Command officials, February 22, 2022.
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85 See for example, Earl Anthony Wayne, “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Doubling Down Against Fentanyl, Arms Trafficking, Exploitation of Migrants and Illicit Money,” Wilson Center, opinion, November 4, 2022. 86 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2023, According to the State Department, approximately 96% of all fentanyl seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency in FY2022 originated in Mexico (p. 73). Hereinafter: INCSR, 2023. Congressional Research Service 15 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations which China was the primary source of U.S.-bound illicit fentanyl. TCOs—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—appear to be largely responsible for the procurement of precursors from Asia (via maritime and air ports of entry).87 TCOs also manufacture wholesale volumes of low-purity illicit fentanyl in Mexico and control the cross-border trafficking of fentanyl into the United States. Domestically, U.S.-based TCO affiliates distribute illicit fentanyl at the retail level. As part of the Bicentennial Framework, the U.S. and Mexican governments committed to establishing working-level mechanisms to coordinate on synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals.88 In 2022, Mexico expanded its nascent “chemical watch list” for dual-use precursors—a move that may spur opportunities for enhanced regional information sharing and regulatory action targeting fentanyl precursors.89 Joint actions in 2022 included financial sanctions targeting Mexican fentanyl traffickers, the development of a joint action plan to combat synthetic opioids, and increased U.S. efforts to help Mexican military agencies create records of fentanyl and precursor seizures to submit to a central database.90 The Mexican military leads customs operations at all land, air, and sea ports of entry.91 At the Mexico City NALS in January 2023, President López Obrador appeared to recognize concerns about fentanyl production in Mexico and pledged to take increased actions to interdict precursor chemicals and destroy fentanyl labs.92 With the U.S. and Canadian leaders, President López Obrador pledged to share information on chemicals used in illicit fentanyl production as a key summit deliverable; some criticized the leaders for not announcing any other significant new actions.93 A notable development in the lead up to the NALS was Mexico’s capture of Ovidio Guzmán, son of imprisoned Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán (former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel), on January 4.94 Ovidio Guzmán is one of the most wanted criminals in the United States for his role in trafficking fentanyl and other drugs. Since the Mexico City NALS, President López Obrador appears to have reversed some antidrug commitments made at the summit.95 Tension between the U.S. DEA and the Mexican government, as well as ongoing corruption in Mexico, exemplified by the U.S. conviction of former Public Security Minister García Luna on drug trafficking charges, remain obstacles to cooperation.96 Proposed U.S. responses to the recent killings of U.S. citizens in Mexico and Mexico’s limited efforts against fentanyl, including using U.S. military force against the cartels or designating the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, 87 RAND Corporation, Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking: Final Report, February 2022, pp. 8-9. 88 White House, Joint Statement: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue, October 8, 2021. 89 See for example, “Mexico Launches Online Platform for Dual-Use Precursors,” Associated Press, November 23, 2022. 90 INCSR, 2023, pp. 15, 73-75. 91 See for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Fentanyl-Trafficking La Nueva Familia Michoacana and its Leaders,” November 17, 2022, See also U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2022, pp. 54-55. 92 White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Trudeau, and President López Obrador in Joint Press Conference,” January 10, 2023. Hereinafter: White House, January 2023. 93 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023. 94 Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Captures Son of El Chapo, Alleged Fentanyl Trafficker, Ahead of Biden Visit,” Washington Post, January 5, 2023. 95 “Mexico asks China for Help on Fentanyl, Slams US Critics,” Reuters, April 5, 2023. 96 Gavin Voss, “García Luna Convicted, But Corruption Concerns Endure in U.S.-Mexico Partnership,” February 22, 2023. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 22 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations have prompted new tension with the Mexican government.97 President López Obador also has criticized U.S. intelligence-gathering activities that likely led to the April 2023 U.S. indictments of 28 individuals, including several of El Chapo Guzmán’s sons, for fentanyl trafficking.98 These developments could hinder efforts that have accelerated thus far in 2023 as phase two of the Bicentennial Framework has focused bilateral efforts on combating fentanyl (and arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico).99 Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions ~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions~~
~~In hearings and in letters, the 117th~~ Congress has expressed concerns about friction in U.S.-Congress has expressed concerns about friction in U.S.-
~~Mexican~~Mexico security cooperation. security cooperation. ~~Congressional~~During the 118th Congress, oversight attention may focus on the Bicentennial oversight attention may focus on the Bicentennial
Framework’s progress in restarting bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The framework’s Framework’s progress in restarting bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The framework’s
action plan envisions a joint objective of building on past cooperation to investigate and prosecute action plan envisions a joint objective of building on past cooperation to investigate and prosecute
corrupt actors through the disruption of criminal financial networks, as well as increasing corrupt actors through the disruption of criminal financial networks, as well as increasing
cooperation in extradition matters.cooperation in extradition matters.93100 However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all
criminal matters, especially those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of criminal matters, especially those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of
~~friction between the countries.94 Should that cooperation not improve, Members have introduced~~
~~legislation (H.R. 2600) that would require the State Department to declare certain Mexican DTOs~~
~~as foreign terrorist organizations, a move that Mexico likely would oppose.95~~
friction between the countries.101 During the Calderón government (2006-2012), Mexico extradited an average of 98 people per During the Calderón government (2006-2012), Mexico extradited an average of 98 people per
year to the United States, a significant increase over the prior administration. When President year to the United States, a significant increase over the prior administration. When President
Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 but rose to an administration high of 76 in Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 but rose to an administration high of 76 in
2016 (se2016 (see Figure 5). In January 2017, Mexico’s decision to extradite Joaquín “El Chapo” . In January 2017, Mexico’s decision to extradite Joaquín “El Chapo”
Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the DEA’s top global targets, was a high point in Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the DEA’s top global targets, was a high point in
bilateral cooperation that was praised by many Members of Congress. Extraditions remained bilateral cooperation that was praised by many Members of Congress. Extraditions remained
relatively level during the first two years of the López Obrador government, before hitting a relatively level during the first two years of the López Obrador government, before hitting a 1520--
year low in year low in ~~2021.~~
~~Figure 5. Extraditions from Mexico to the United States: 1999-2021~~

Source: CRS based on data from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State.

932022. 97 Mary Beth Sheridan, “As Fentanyl Crisis Grows, U.S.-Mexico Divide Deepens,” Washington Post, April 29, 2023. 98 Associated Press, “Mexico President Slams U.S. ‘Spying’ After Traffickers Charged,” April 17, 2023. 99 White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Implementation of the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” April 13, 2023. 100 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Summary of the Action Plan for U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Summary of the Action Plan for U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for
Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” January 31, 2022. Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” January 31, 2022.
94101 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution,
January 24, 2022. January 24, 2022.
~~95 CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy Implications, coordinated by~~
~~Liana W. Rosen.~~
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~~Human Rights96~~Congressional Research Service 17 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 5. Extraditions: from Mexico by Administration: 2000-2022 Source: CRS based on data from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State. Human Rights102
The U.S. Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico The U.S. Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico
through conditions on appropriations, support for human rights programming, oversight hearings, through conditions on appropriations, support for human rights programming, oversight hearings,
and letters to, and visits with, successive U.S. and Mexican administrations. Recent attention has and letters to, and visits with, successive U.S. and Mexican administrations. Recent attention has
focused on violence against journalists in Mexico.focused on violence against journalists in Mexico.97103 Congress has continued to monitor adherence Congress has continued to monitor adherence
to the Leahy vetting requirements that must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of to the Leahy vetting requirements that must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of
1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2378d), which pertains to State Department aid, and 10 U.S.C. 2378d), which pertains to State Department aid, and 10 U.S.C.
§2249e, which guides DOD funding. DOD suspended assistance to a brigade based in Tlatlaya, 2249e, which guides DOD funding. DOD suspended assistance to a brigade based in Tlatlaya,
Mexico, due to concerns about the brigade’s potential involvement in extrajudicial killings but Mexico, due to concerns about the brigade’s potential involvement in extrajudicial killings but
has also worked with Mexico to rehabilitate units once suspended from receiving U.S. has also worked with Mexico to rehabilitate units once suspended from receiving U.S.
assistance.assistance.98104 Congressional concerns about labor conditions in Mexico and the government’s Congressional concerns about labor conditions in Mexico and the government’s
ability to implement USMCA commitments prompted the inclusion of $210 million in funds for ability to implement USMCA commitments prompted the inclusion of $210 million in funds for
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) technical assistance the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) technical assistance
programs in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113).programs in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113).99
105 102 See also: CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief; CRS In Focus IF11669, Mexico: Addressing Missing and Disappeared Persons. 103 Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine and Rubio Urge State Department to Address Ongoing Violence Against Journalists in Mexico,” February 8, 2022. 104 Michael Evans, US: Mexico Mass Graves Raise “Alarming Questions” About Government “Complicity” in September 2014 Cartel Killings, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 515, May 2015; Col. Andrew M. Leonard, “Leahy Law Diplomacy: Human Rights Vetting and Foreign Policy,” FAOA Journal of International Affairs, 2019. 105 The purpose of the funding is for ILAB to administer technical assistance grants to support worker-focused capacity building and efforts to reduce workplace discrimination, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, child exploitation and other efforts related to implementation of Mexico’s labor commitments. Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 18 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress made conditional 15% of U.S. assistance to the Mexican From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress made conditional 15% of U.S. assistance to the Mexican
military and police until the State Department sent a report to appropriators verifying that Mexico military and police until the State Department sent a report to appropriators verifying that Mexico
was taking steps to comply with certain human rights standards. In FY2014, Mexico lost $5.5 was taking steps to comply with certain human rights standards. In FY2014, Mexico lost $5.5
million in funding due to human rights concerns.million in funding due to human rights concerns.~~100~~106 For FY2016-FY2021, human rights reporting For FY2016-FY2021, human rights reporting
requirements applied to FMF rather than to Mérida Initiative accounts. In recent years, human requirements applied to FMF rather than to Mérida Initiative accounts. In recent years, human
rights reporting requirements have been in explanatory statements rather than the legislation. The rights reporting requirements have been in explanatory statements rather than the legislation. The
explanatory statement accompanying the explanatory statement accompanying the ~~FY2022~~FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( Consolidated Appropriations Act (~~H.R.~~
~~2471/~~P.L. 117-P.L. 117-~~103~~328) requires a report on human rights progress in Mexico, but the reporting ) requires a report on human rights progress in Mexico, but the reporting
directive is not tied to any conditions on assistance provided to Mexico.directive is not tied to any conditions on assistance provided to Mexico.107 The State Department The State Department
reportedly has not sent human rights reports to Congress since FY2017, as the agency maintains it reportedly has not sent human rights reports to Congress since FY2017, as the agency maintains it
is not legally obligated to do so.is not legally obligated to do so.~~101~~108
U.S. assistance to Mexico has supported the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its judicial U.S. assistance to Mexico has supported the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its judicial
system and improve human rights conditions in the country.system and improve human rights conditions in the country.~~102~~109 Congress has provided funding to Congress has provided funding to
support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and
accusatorial system that aims to strengthen due process and human rights protections for victims accusatorial system that aims to strengthen due process and human rights protections for victims

~~96 See also: CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief; CRS In Focus IF11669,~~ ~~Human~~
~~Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances~~.
~~97 Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine and Rubio Urge State Department to Address Ongoing Violence Against Journalists in~~
~~Mexico,” February 8, 2022.~~
~~98 Michael Evans,~~ ~~US: Mexico Mass Graves Raise “Alarming Questions” About Government “Complicity” in~~
~~September 2014 Cartel Killings, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 515, May 2015; Col.~~
~~Andrew M. Leonard, “Leahy Law Diplomacy: Human Rights Vetting and Foreign Policy,”~~ ~~FAOA Journal of~~
~~International Affairs, 2019.~~
~~99 The purpose of the funding is for ILAB to administer technical assistance grants to support worker-focused capacity~~
~~building and efforts to reduce workplace discrimination, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, child exploitation~~
~~and other efforts related to implementation of Mexico’s labor commitments.~~
~~100~~and the accused.110 U.S. officials have issued statements on specific human rights concerns, including a 2022 tweet by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing concern about violence against journalists and a 2023 State Department spokesperson statement supporting “respect for judicial independence” and an “independent electoral system.”111 Protecting human rights and “vulnerable populations” is included under the first pillar of the Bicentennial Framework (see Figure 4). The State Department engages with human rights and freedom of expression organizations in Mexico and ensures U.S. training programs for justice sector actors have units on human rights. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides technical assistance to the Mexican federal and state governments as well as complementary support to think tanks and civil society organizations on human rights issues.112 USAID’s human rights programming includes a new $24 million initiative to support national and state implementation of laws against torture and enforced disappearances and to provide forensic assistance to address unidentified remains. Other ongoing initiatives seek to better protect journalists and human rights defenders, as well as to address enforced disappearances, femicides, and torture in selected states. In December 2020, USAID published its five-year strategy for Mexico, which integrates these efforts into a broader 106 As a result of the State Department’s decision not to submit a report for Mexico, some $5 million in FY2014 As a result of the State Department’s decision not to submit a report for Mexico, some $5 million in FY2014
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was reprogrammed by the State Department International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was reprogrammed by the State Department
to Peru. Mexico lost close to $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well. to Peru. Mexico lost close to $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well.
~~101~~107 The explanatory statement can be found at https://www.congress.gov/117/cprt/HPRT50348/CPRT-117HPRT50348.pdf. 108 CRS interview with State Department official, March 20, 2020. CRS interview with State Department official, March 20, 2020.
~~102~~109 For an overview For an overview ~~of recent programs~~, see GAO, , see GAO, U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State and USAID Allocated over $700
Million to Support Criminal Justice, Border Security, and Related Efforts from Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018, GAO , GAO
19-647, September 19-647, September 10, 2019. 110 While DOJ has supported reform efforts at the federal level, USAID programs have been at the state level since 2016. See USAID, “Mexico: Rule of Law,” September 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/rule-of-law. 111 Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken), “The high number of journalists killed in Mexico this year and the ongoing threats they face are concerning. I join those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican journalists,” Twitter, February 22, 2022, 8:47 p.m. U.S. Department of State, “Protests Against Electoral Overhaul in Mexico,” press statement, February 23, 2023. 112 USAID, “Mexico: Human Rights,” December 2022. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 25 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations strategy to help state and local governments committed to addressing impunity and violence.113~~10, 2019.~~
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~~link to page 20~~ ~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~and the accused.103 The State Department established a high-level human rights dialogue with~~
~~Mexico, although the dialogue has not yet convened under the López Obrador government. Top~~
~~U.S. officials have issued statements on specific human rights concerns, including a recent tweet~~
~~by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing concern violence against journalists.104~~
~~Protecting human rights and “vulnerable populations” is included under the first pillar of the new~~
~~Bicentennial Framework (see Figure 4). The State Department engages with human rights and~~
~~freedom of expression organizations in Mexico and ensures U.S. training programs for police and~~
~~criminal justice sector actors have units on protecting human rights.~~
~~The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides technical assistance to the~~
~~Mexican federal and state governments as well as complementary support to think tanks and civil~~
~~society organizations on human rights issues.105 USAID’s human rights programming includes a~~
~~new $24 million initiative to support national and state implementation of laws against torture and~~
~~enforced disappearances and to provide forensic assistance to address unidentified remains. Other~~
~~ongoing initiatives seek to better protect journalists and human rights defenders, as well as to~~
~~address enforced disappearances, femicides, and torture in selected states. In December 2020,~~
~~USAID published its five-year strategy for Mexico, which integrates these efforts into a broader~~
~~strategy to help state and local governments committed to addressing impunity and violence.106~~
USAID continues to support organizations that have received criticism for their anti-corruption USAID continues to support organizations that have received criticism for their anti-corruption
and human rights advocacy from President López Obrador and his party.and human rights advocacy from President López Obrador and his party.~~107~~114
Congress is likely to continue monitoring human rights conditions in Mexico, including Congress is likely to continue monitoring human rights conditions in Mexico, including
compliance with reporting requirements included in the explanatory statement to the compliance with reporting requirements included in the explanatory statement to the ~~FY2022~~FY2023
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Consolidated Appropriations Act (~~H.R. 2471/~~P.L. 117-P.L. 117-~~103~~328) and commitments to improve labor ) and commitments to improve labor
conditions made under USMCA.conditions made under USMCA.~~108~~115 Some Members of Congress have written letters to U.S. and Some Members of Congress have written letters to U.S. and
Mexican officials regarding human rights concerns, including allegations of extrajudicial killings Mexican officials regarding human rights concerns, including allegations of extrajudicial killings
by security forces, violence against journalists, and abuses of migrants. by security forces, violence against journalists, and abuses of migrants.
Congress may monitor how the López Obrador administration moves to punish past human rights Congress may monitor how the López Obrador administration moves to punish past human rights
abusers; how Mexico’s National Guard, along with other security and judicial actors, is or is not abusers; how Mexico’s National Guard, along with other security and judicial actors, is or is not
respecting human rights; what mechanisms exist to address allegations of abuse and wrongdoing respecting human rights; what mechanisms exist to address allegations of abuse and wrongdoing
by such actors; and the adequacy of victims’ assistance. Congress also may question how the by such actors; and the adequacy of victims’ assistance. Congress also may question how the

~~103 While DOJ has supported reform efforts at the federal level, USAID programs have been at the state level since~~
~~2016. See USAID, “Mexico: Rule of Law,” September 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/rule-of-law.~~
~~104 Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken), “The high number of journalists killed in Mexico this year and the~~
~~ongoing threats they face are concerning. I join those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican~~
~~journalists,” Twitter, February 22, 2022, 8:47 p.m.~~
~~105 USAID, “Mexico: Human Rights,” April 2021.~~
~~106 USAID, Mexico: Country Development Cooperation Strategy, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/cdcs.~~
~~107~~State Department and USAID can provide support to emerging human rights priorities, as well as the effects of ILAB technical assistance programs on labor conditions in Mexico. Migration Management Migration issues continue to be a high priority for U.S. policy and Congress, particularly as U.S. Customs and Border Protection encounters record levels of irregular migrants on the Southwest border. Since a 2019 U.S.-Mexico migration agreement, and particularly since the March 2020 U.S. launch of so-called Title 42 expulsions, Mexico has accepted U.S. policies that have shifted some of the burden of handling migrants from the United States to Mexico.116 The López Obrador administration has worked jointly with U.S. officials to help arrest 7,000 human smugglers since mid-2022 and to invest in development projects aimed at addressing the root causes of migration from northern Central America.117 Asylum applications and apprehensions have risen significantly in Mexico; both Mexico’s cash-strapped Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) and overcrowded shelter system have struggled to respond, even with U.S. assistance (see Figure 6).118 In March 2023, 38 migrants perished because Mexican officials failed to unlock 113 USAID, Mexico: Country Development Cooperation Strategy, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/cdcs. 114 Rafael Bernal. “Mexican President Calls on U.S. to Stop Funding Groups Critical of his Administration,” Rafael Bernal. “Mexican President Calls on U.S. to Stop Funding Groups Critical of his Administration,” The Hill, ,
February 21, 2022. February 21, 2022.
~~108~~115 The explanatory statement asserts, The explanatory statement asserts,
Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the
Committees on Appropriations on the extent to which the Government of Mexico is: (1) credibly Committees on Appropriations on the extent to which the Government of Mexico is: (1) credibly
investigating and prosecuting violations of human rights in civilian courts; (2) enforcing investigating and prosecuting violations of human rights in civilian courts; (2) enforcing
prohibitions against torture and the use of testimony obtained through torture; and (3) searching for prohibitions against torture and the use of testimony obtained through torture; and (3) searching for
victims of forced disappearances and credibly investigating and prosecuting those responsible for victims of forced disappearances and credibly investigating and prosecuting those responsible for
such crimes. such crimes. ~~Additionally, the report shall discuss how assistance under the Merida program~~
~~contributed to the objectives above.~~
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~~link to page 26~~ ~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~State Department and USAID can provide support to emerging human rights priorities, as well as~~
~~the effects of ILAB technical assistance programs on labor conditions in Mexico.~~
~~Migration and Border Issues~~
~~Immigration and border security are perennial issues of interest to Congress, which has enacted~~
~~piecemeal stand-alone legislation but has failed to enact comprehensive immigration reform for~~
~~several decades.109 President Biden’s proposed comprehensive immigration reform bill,~~
~~introduced in 2021 as the U.S. Citizenship Act (S. 348/H.R. 1177, has yet to receive~~
~~congressional consideration. Whereas some Members of Congress favor strong border security~~
~~measures and restrictions on asylum, others oppose restrictive immigration policies. Amid record~~
~~encounters (apprehensions and expulsions) in FY2021, Members of Congress are also closely~~
~~following the role Mexico is playing in interdicting irregular migrants and in offering asylum to~~
~~those eligible.110~~
~~President Trump’s rhetoric and shifts in U.S. immigration policies tested U.S.-Mexican relations~~
~~during the Peña Nieto government. In Executive Order 13678 (2017), the Trump Administration~~
~~broadened the categories of unauthorized immigrants prioritized for removal (deportation). Since~~
~~Mexicans comprise the vast majority of individuals removed from the United States each year,~~
~~this disproportionately affected Mexicans. In September 2017, the Administration rescinded the~~
~~Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative through a process the U.S. Supreme~~
~~Court subsequently ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper procedures and had to be vacated.111~~
~~Rescinding DACA would have affected Mexicans more than other nationalities, as Mexicans~~
~~comprise a majority of those who have received relief from removal through the initiative.~~
~~Under President López Obrador, Mexico has accommodated U.S. policy changes that have~~
~~shifted more of the burden of sheltering and offering asylum to non-Mexican migrants from the~~
~~United States to Mexico. At the same time, Mexico’s apprehensions of migrants totaled a record~~
~~307,679 in 2021, including some 232,500 from Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador,~~
~~Guatemala, and Honduras).112 Asylum requests in Mexico reached a record 131,448 in 2021, with~~
~~Haitians comprising 39.4% of those requests (see Figure 6, below).113~~

~~109 See, for example, CRS Report R46419, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 116th Congress, coordinated by~~
~~Andorra Bruno.~~
~~110 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and~~
~~William A. Kandel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke.~~
~~111 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative that the Obama Administration~~
~~implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present~~
~~individuals who arrived in the United States as children. See CRS Report R45995,~~ ~~Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals,~~
~~DACA, and Related Legislation, by Andorra Bruno; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10497,~~ ~~Supreme Court: DACA~~
~~Rescission Violated the APA, by Ben Harrington.~~
~~112 Gobierno de México, Secretaría de Gobernación,~~ ~~Boletín Mensual de Estadisticas Migratorias 2021.~~
~~113 Maritza Pérez, “Solicitudes de Refugio Rompen Récord,” El Financiero, January 3, 2022.~~
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure 6. Mexico: Apprehensions and Asylum Applications Received~~

~~Source:~~ ~~CRS, based on information from Mexico’s~~ Prior to the submission of such report, the State Department shall consult with United States and Mexican human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting the elements detailed in this paragraph. 116 In response to the pandemic, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) largely suspended asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico border in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) public health order (referred to as Title 42) that restricted the entry of foreign nationals without proper travel documents to prevent the spread of disease. For additional background on Title 42, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related Restrictions on Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations, by Kelsey Y. Santamaria. 117 White House, January 2023. 118 CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Ramon Miro. Congressional Research Service 20 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations a migrant detention facility during a fire. Authorities charged Mexico’s National Migration Institute’s director for involvement in the crime; he remains in his position.119 Figure 6. Mexico: Reported Asylum Applications and Apprehensions (2013-2023) Source: CRS, based on data from Mexico’s Commission for Refugee Assistance and Secretary of the Interior. On October 12, 2022, Mexico agreed to accept an unspecified number of U.S.-bound Venezuelan migrants who do not apply to come to the United States legally through a new Venezuela parole program and are expelled at the U.S. border under Title 42.120 In exchange, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) made available additional H-2B visas for temporary nonagricultural workers. Historically, the majority of H-2B visas have been issued to Mexican nationals. On January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of the Venezuela parole program to Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans.121 As part of that agreement, Mexico agreed to receive up to 30,000 expelled migrants from those three countries per month who are encountered irregularly instead of through the parole process, a number that U.S. officials assert could increase.122 President Biden thanked Mexico for this cooperation during his remarks at NALS, but the summit did not address detailed migration policies.123 The summit did produce an expansion of U.S.- 119 Juan Montes, “Mexico’s Immigration Chief Indicted over Detention Center Fire,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2023. 120 The new parole program allows Venezuelans who have a U.S. sponsor to apply for immigration parole and fly directly into the United States. CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke. For Mexico’s approach, see Government of Mexico, Interior-Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Is Coordinating with the U.S. a New Approach to Orderly, Safe, Regular and Humane Migration in the Region,” October 12, 2022. 121 DHS, “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans and Eliminates Cap for Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022. 122 Government of Mexico, Interior-Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Welcomes the Announcement of new U.S. Actions to Achieve Orderly, Safe, Regular, and Humane Migration,” January 5, 2023; White House, “Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” January 9, 2023. 123 For more information, see CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th Congressional Research Service 21 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Mexico efforts to address the root causes of migration to a trilateral action plan, as well as the creation of a virtual platform to allow migrants to access legal pathways to migration. In preparation for the May 11, 2023, ending of Title 42, the United States, Mexico, and other regional partners have ramped up cooperation on migration management, countering alien smuggling and disinformation, and related efforts.124 The Biden Administration deployed 1,500 National Guard troops to the border in anticipation of a post-Title 42 migration surge in arrivals. Mexico has pledged to continue receiving rapid deportations of certain non-Mexican nationals who have to date been expelled under Title 42.125 ~~Secretary of the Interior.~~
~~Migrant Protection Protocols~~
~~In December 2018, the López Obrador government offered basic services and jobs to non-~~
~~Mexicans enrolled in a new U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program, the Migrant~~
~~Protection Protocols (MPP). The MPP program required more than 70,000 asylum-seekers to wait~~
~~in Mexico while U.S. immigration courts processed their cases between January 2019 and~~
~~January 2021, when the program was initially suspended. DHS first piloted MPP in the El Paso~~
~~sector but gradually expanded the program across the border as part of a June 2019 U.S.-Mexico~~
~~migration agreement. In June 2021, the Biden Administration terminated new MPP enrollments~~
~~but, after a lawsuit challenging the termination, a federal judge ordered DHS to reinstate the~~
~~program in August 2021. After losing a Supreme Court appeal, DHS announced the~~
~~reimplementation of MPP with new implementation guidance on December 2, 2021.114 The~~
~~Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Biden Administration’s appeal of the lower court decision~~
~~this term.115 In the meantime, Members of Congress have conducted oversight trips and have held~~
~~a hearing on the reinstated MPP policy.116~~
~~Title 42~~
~~In response to the pandemic, DHS largely suspended asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico~~
~~border in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) public health~~
~~order (referred to as Title 42).117 The Trump Administration then expelled most migrants without~~

~~114 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pledged to help Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) enrollees access~~
~~shelter, counsel, COVID-19 vaccines, and transport to their hearings. Mexico promised temporary legal status and~~
~~work authorizations for those in MPP. Any adult or family unit from any Western Hemisphere country other than~~
~~Mexico now may be subject to MPP.~~
~~115 Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court to Review Trump-Era ‘Remain in Mexico’ Asylum Policy,” New York Times,~~
~~February 18, 2022.~~
~~116 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and~~
~~Operations, Examining the Court-Ordered Reimplementation of the Remain in Mexico Policy, 117th Cong., 2nd sess.,~~
~~March 2, 2022.~~
~~117 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10439, Entry Restrictions at the Northern and Southern Borders in Response to COVID-19,~~
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~valid travel documents into Mexico or returned them to their home countries without asylum~~
~~hearings. Mexico has struggled to absorb those migrants.118 The Biden Administration ended the~~
~~use of Title 42 for unaccompanied children and curtailed the policy for family units but left the~~
~~policy in place for single adults. During FY2020 and FY2021, nearly 1.2 million migrants were~~
~~expelled, the majority to Mexico.119 On March 4, 2022, a circuit court ruled that Title 42 may still~~
~~be used, but only in cases where a migrant does not express a fear of persecution or torture.120~~
Mexican border cities, some of which have high rates of violent crime, have been sheltering tens Mexican border cities, some of which have high rates of violent crime, have been sheltering tens
~~of thousands of migrants since 2019 due to MPP, Title 42, and another policy known as~~
~~metering.121 Among the concerns raised by human rights organizations is that the rapid expulsions~~
~~reportedly have led to cursory medical screenings (few qualifying for existing humanitarian~~
~~exceptions from expulsion).122 With some shelters limiting new arrivals due to COVID-19, some~~
of thousands of migrants. Some migrants have experienced precarious living situations and migrants have experienced precarious living situations and ~~some have been attacked~~attacks by criminal by criminal
~~groups.123~~
~~Congress may continue to provide funding and oversight to address migration, border security,~~
~~and related humanitarian and health issues on the U.S.-Mexican border and within Mexico. U.S.~~
~~funds appropriated for~~groups.126 Human rights groups are concerned about how the end of Title 42 will affect conditions for migrants in Mexico.127 U.S. funds appropriated under the Mérida Initiative have supported Mexico’s immigration control efforts the Mérida Initiative have supported Mexico’s immigration control efforts
and global funds provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance program to improve and global funds provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance program to improve
asylum processing, shelters, and assistance to migrants in Mexico. asylum processing, shelters, and assistance to migrants in Mexico.
Congress is considering legislation, foreign assistance, and restrictions on U.S. assistance that could affect those efforts, as well as overseeing the adequacy of existing foreign policy efforts to manage regional migration. Economic and Trade Relations and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
~~Agreement124~~Agreement128
The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that ~~was bolstered~~
~~through NAFTA. From 1994 through the USMCA’s entry into force on July 1, 2020, NAFTA had~~
deepened significantly through the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. NAFTA removed virtually all tariff and nontariff trade and investment barriers among removed virtually all tariff and nontariff trade and investment barriers among ~~partner countries~~
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and provided a rules-based mechanism to govern North and provided a rules-based mechanism to govern North American trade. It also made permanent Mexico’s unilateral market opening measures of the late 1980s and early 1990s. ~~American trade.~~ Most economic studies Most economic studies
concluded the net economic effect of NAFTA on the United States and Mexico was small but concluded the net economic effect of NAFTA on the United States and Mexico was small but
positive, though there were adjustment costs to some positive, though there were adjustment costs to some sectors in both countries. In July 2020, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) replaced NAFTA. While maintaining most of the market opening measures of NAFTA, USMCA updated and modernized the agreement in some areas but scaled back certain provisions.129 Recent U.S. Administrations have worked with Mexico to coordinate economic issues. The Obama Administration worked with Mexico to balance border security while facilitating legitimate trade and travel, promoting competitiveness, and pursuing greater energy integration through a cabinet-level High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) chaired by then-Vice President Biden. The High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council helped align regulatory principles. Congress, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke; and White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023. 124 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Announces Sweeping New Actions to Manage Regional Migration,” April 27, 2023. 125 White House, “Mexico and United States Strengthen Joint Humanitarian Plan on Migration,” May 2, 2023. 126 Doctors Without Borders, “Pushed Back, Beaten and Exposed: Stories from the US-Mexico Border,” March 29, 2022. 127 WOLA, “U.S. And Mexico Must End Policies That Expose Migrants to Death and Danger,” March 29, 2023. 128~~sectors in both countries.~~
~~Recent U.S. Administrations have worked with Mexico to coordinate economic issues. The~~
~~Obama Administration worked with Mexico to balance border security while facilitating~~

~~by Kelsey Y. Santamaria and Ben Harrington.~~
~~118 Michelle Hackman, “Court Upholds Federal Government’s Title 42 Border Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 4,~~
~~2022.~~
~~119 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and~~
~~William A. Kandel.~~
~~120 Priscilla Alvarez, “Federal Appeals Court Limits Biden Administration’s Use of Trump-Era Border Policy,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Hill, March 4, 2022.~~
~~121 Even before the pandemic, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had been limiting the number of asylum~~
~~seekers processed each day at designated ports of entry along the U.S. southern border. Migrants affected by this policy~~
~~generally had not yet reached the U.S. border and were required to remain in Mexico until CBP decided it could~~
~~process them. This policy—known as metering—sought to address an “unprecedented rise in asylum requests,” as well~~
~~as safety and health concerns resulting from overcrowding at ports of entry. The policy has led to long wait times and~~
~~overcrowded conditions on the Mexican side of the border.~~
~~122 WOLA, “U.S. and Mexico Must Urgently Address Impact of Ongoing Deportations and Expulsions During~~
~~COVID-19,” May 29, 2020.~~
~~123 Human Rights First, Delivered to Danger, February 19, 2021.~~
~~124~~ This section is drawn from CRS Report RL32934, This section is drawn from CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal. , by M. Angeles Villarreal.
129 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~legitimate trade and travel, promoting competitiveness, and pursuing greater energy integration~~
~~through a cabinet-level High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) chaired by Vice President Biden.~~
~~The High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council helped align regulatory principles.~~ Trilateral Trilateral
(with Canada) cooperation occurred under the aegis of the North American Leadership Summits (with Canada) cooperation occurred under the aegis of the North American Leadership Summits
(NALS). (NALS).
Under the Trump Administration, neither the HLED nor the NALS took place. However, the Under the Trump Administration, neither the HLED nor the NALS took place. However, the
Executive Steering Committee (ESC)Executive Steering Committee (ESC)—, which guided efforts along the border during the Obama which guided efforts along the border during the Obama
AdministrationAdministration—, expanded to focus on boosting competitiveness. The U.S.-expanded to focus on boosting competitiveness. The U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico CEO CEO
Dialogue also continued to convene biannual meetings and issue recommendations for both Dialogue also continued to convene biannual meetings and issue recommendations for both
governments. As previously mentioned, the Biden Administration has restarted both the HLED governments. As previously mentioned, the Biden Administration has restarted both the HLED
and the NALS. and the NALS.
Modernizing the U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico Border
Congress has long expressed concerns about delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.- Congress has long expressed concerns about delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.-
Mexico border. The majority of U.S.-Mexico border. The majority of U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico trade passes through a port of entry along the trade passes through a port of entry along the
southwestern border, often more than once, due to the increasing integration of manufacturing southwestern border, often more than once, due to the increasing integration of manufacturing
processes in the United States and Mexico. Past bilateral efforts have contributed to reductions in processes in the United States and Mexico. Past bilateral efforts have contributed to reductions in
wait times at some points of entry, but infrastructure and staffing issues remain on both the U.S. wait times at some points of entry, but infrastructure and staffing issues remain on both the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border. While Congress has enacted (P.L. 114-279) legislation to allow and Mexican sides of the border. While Congress has enacted (P.L. 114-279) legislation to allow
public-private partnerships to address some border infrastructure issues, staffing issues remain public-private partnerships to address some border infrastructure issues, staffing issues remain
challenging. challenging.
In May 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing the In May 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing the
U.S.-U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico border. border.~~125~~130 A Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral ESC has met since then, most A Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral ESC has met since then, most
recently in December recently in December ~~2021~~2022, to develop binational action plans and oversee implementation of , to develop binational action plans and oversee implementation of
those plans.those plans.~~126 In 2021, the ESC reviewed the completion of a three-phased modernization of the~~
~~San Isidro port of entry, the one of the world’s busiest border crossings.~~131 The ESC sets goals The ESC sets goals
within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and
shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo preclearance, improving cross-border shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo preclearance, improving cross-border
commerce and ties, and bolstering information sharing among law enforcement agencies. commerce and ties, and bolstering information sharing among law enforcement agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic posed several challenge for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials that The COVID-19 pandemic posed several challenge for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials that
Congress has examined via Congress has examined via ~~several~~ oversight hearings. Officials initially struggled to maintain the oversight hearings. Officials initially struggled to maintain the
integrity of supply chains for industries deemed essential during the pandemic while protecting integrity of supply chains for industries deemed essential during the pandemic while protecting
the health of workers employed in those sectors. the health of workers employed in those sectors. ~~Officials have communicated on a weekly basis~~
~~to try to minimize the effects of border travel restrictions and to determine when current trade and~~
~~travel restrictions can be safely lifted.127~~More recently, concerns over the smuggling of fentanyl through U.S. ports of entry have led to enhanced screening of commercial and passenger vehicles entering from Mexico and have sped the deployment of advanced imaging technologies used for cargo inspections. Congress may monitor how the Biden Administration Congress may monitor how the Biden Administration
balances trade and infrastructure issues with other priorities along the balances trade and infrastructure issues with other priorities along the ~~southwestern border.~~

~~125~~U.S.-Mexico border. U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement132 Congress played a key role in modifying, considering, and approving implementing legislation for the USMCA, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. Congress is actively overseeing the USMCA’s implementation and USMCA-related trade disputes. In May 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion 130 White House, “Declaration by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United White House, “Declaration by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As mentioned, Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As mentioned,
U.S.-U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative. security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative.
~~126~~131 The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) coordinates efforts with Mexico in three areas: infrastructure, secure The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) coordinates efforts with Mexico in three areas: infrastructure, secure
flows, and law enforcement/security. See U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering flows, and law enforcement/security. See U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering
Committee of the 21st Century Border Management Process, December Committee of the 21st Century Border Management Process, December ~~10, 2021.~~
~~127 U.S. Department of State, “North American Cooperation on COVID-19,” May 12, 2020~~1, 2022. 132 This section is drawn from the summary of CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal. .
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2423 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement128~~
~~Congress played a key role in modifying, considering, and approving implementing legislation~~
~~for the USMCA, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. Congress is actively overseeing the~~
~~USMCA’s implementation and USMCA-related trade disputes. In May 2017, the Trump~~
~~Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and~~
~~Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion~~
Authority (TPA). Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and were concluded on September 30, Authority (TPA). Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and were concluded on September 30,
2018. USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The House Democratic leadership 2018. USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The House Democratic leadership
recommended modifications to USMCA (on labor, the environment, and dispute settlement, recommended modifications to USMCA (on labor, the environment, and dispute settlement,
among other topics) that led to changes to the agreement and a subsequent negotiation with among other topics) that led to changes to the agreement and a subsequent negotiation with
Mexico and Canada on a USMCA protocol of amendment on December 10, 2019. The House Mexico and Canada on a USMCA protocol of amendment on December 10, 2019. The House
approved USMCA implementing legislation in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in approved USMCA implementing legislation in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in
January 2020 (P.L. 116-113). January 2020 (P.L. 116-113).
On April 24, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative notified Congress that Canada and Mexico had On April 24, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative notified Congress that Canada and Mexico had
taken the legal and regulatory steps necessary to implement the USCMA and that the agreement taken the legal and regulatory steps necessary to implement the USCMA and that the agreement
would enter into force on July 1, 2020.would enter into force on July 1, 2020. ~~On July 8, 2020, President Trump hosted President López~~
~~Obrador at the White House to commemorate the USMCA’s entry into force.129 Canadian Prime~~
~~Minister Justin Trudeau did not to attend due to the COVID-19 pandemic.~~
USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s free-trade USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s free-trade
provisions and other measures, but it makes notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute provisions and other measures, but it makes notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute
settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property right (IPR) settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property right (IPR)
protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment and addresses protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment and addresses
new trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption, and currency new trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption, and currency
misalignment. Key issues for Congress in the debate surrounding USMCA included workers’ misalignment. Key issues for Congress in the debate surrounding USMCA included workers’
rights protection in Mexico, IPR provisions and access to medicine, the enforceability of labor rights protection in Mexico, IPR provisions and access to medicine, the enforceability of labor
and environmental provisions, and the constitutional authority of Congress over international and environmental provisions, and the constitutional authority of Congress over international
trade and its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement. trade and its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement.
Congress included $180 million over four years in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. Congress included $180 million over four years in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L.
116-113) for technical assistance projects related to the agreement and $30 million to pay for 116-113) for technical assistance projects related to the agreement and $30 million to pay for
labor attachés and other staff to monitor Mexico’s USMCA compliance.labor attachés and other staff to monitor Mexico’s USMCA compliance.~~130~~133 The goals of recent The goals of recent
assistance have been to ensure enforcement of Mexican labor laws and legitimate collective assistance have been to ensure enforcement of Mexican labor laws and legitimate collective
bargaining rights; increase measures to mitigate COVID-19 among workers; and address child bargaining rights; increase measures to mitigate COVID-19 among workers; and address child
labor and forced labor in Mexico’s supply chains, including in agriculture.labor and forced labor in Mexico’s supply chains, including in agriculture.~~131~~134 Some Members of Some Members of
Congress have praised two recent votes by Mexican workers in favor of establishing independent Congress have praised two recent votes by Mexican workers in favor of establishing independent
unions at their automotive plants as steps toward improving workers’ rights and representation.unions at their automotive plants as steps toward improving workers’ rights and representation.~~132~~135
Now that USMCA is in the implementation phase, Congress may wish to consider various issues Now that USMCA is in the implementation phase, Congress may wish to consider various issues
regarding the agreement. These issues include how the new importing requirements under regarding the agreement. These issues include how the new importing requirements under
USMCA are being phased in; whether the new rules of origin for the motor vehicle industry are USMCA are being phased in; whether the new rules of origin for the motor vehicle industry are

~~128 This section is drawn from the summary of CRS Report R44981,~~ ~~The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement~~
~~(USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal.~~
~~129 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump and President López Obrador of the United Mexican States in~~
~~Signing of a Joint Declaration,” July 8, 2020.~~
~~130 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Labor Rights and the United States-Mexico-~~
~~Canada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca.~~
~~131 U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Announces $20 Million in New Grants to Support USMCA~~
~~Implementation, Bringing the 2020 Total to Nearly $50 Million,” News Release, December 16, 2020.~~
~~132 AP, “Mexico Sees 2nd Major Win for Independent Unions,” March 1, 2022.~~
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

being implemented as planned; how the more stringent requirements are affecting the North being implemented as planned; how the more stringent requirements are affecting the North
American motor vehicle industry; how well Mexico is implementing labor law reforms to provide American motor vehicle industry; how well Mexico is implementing labor law reforms to provide
more workers’ rights protection; how wellmore workers’ rights protection; how well ~~the funding provided by USMCA legislation is~~
~~ensuring effective implementation of Mexico’s labor reforms; how well~~ the new labor the new labor
enforcement measuresenforcement measures~~, including the rapid response mechanism,~~ are working; and the extent to are working; and the extent to
which USMCA’s updated dispute resolution procedures are improving the enforcement of the which USMCA’s updated dispute resolution procedures are improving the enforcement of the
agreement’s provisions, among other issues. agreement’s provisions, among other issues.
Selected CRS Products on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
CRS Report R44981, CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Vil arreal , by M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS In Focus IF10997, CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal , by M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS CRS ~~Legal Sidebar LSB10399, USMCA: Implementation and Considerations for Congress, by Nina M. Hart~~
~~CRS~~ In Focus IF11308, In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs , by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs
CRS In Focus IF11167, CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Vil arreal , by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Vil arreal
~~CRS In Focus IF11399,~~ ~~Enforcing International Trade Obligations in USMCA: The State-State Dispute Settlement~~
~~Mechanism, by Nina M. Hart~~
133 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Labor Rights and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca. 134 U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Announces $20 Million in New Grants to Support USMCA Implementation, Bringing the 2020 Total to Nearly $50 Million,” News Release, December 16, 2020. 135 Associated Press, “Mexico Sees 2nd Major Win for Independent Unions,” March 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations CRS In Focus IF12082, USMCA: Motor Vehicle Rules of Origin, by Liana Wong and M. Angeles Vil arreal Energy
Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the future of energy production in Mexico, as it is Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the future of energy production in Mexico, as it is
important for Mexico’s economic growth and for the U.S. energy sector. Mexico has considerable important for Mexico’s economic growth and for the U.S. energy sector. Mexico has considerable
oil and gas resources, but its state oil company (Pemex), has struggled to counter declining oil and gas resources, but its state oil company (Pemex), has struggled to counter declining
production and postponed needed investments due to fiscal challenges. Many Members of production and postponed needed investments due to fiscal challenges. Many Members of
Congress praised Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms on energy that opened up oil, electricity, Congress praised Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms on energy that opened up oil, electricity,
gas, transmission, production, and sales to private and foreign investment while keeping gas, transmission, production, and sales to private and foreign investment while keeping
ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state control. Members of Congress have expressed ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state control. Members of Congress have expressed
serious concerns about the López Obrador administration’s treatment of U.S. energy companiesserious concerns about the López Obrador administration’s treatment of U.S. energy companies,
~~as well as its proposed electricity reform.133~~ and measures it has taken to favor the state-owned electrical utility and Pemex. Members of Congress demonstrated bipartisan support for the 2022 U.S. request for consultations with Mexico over potential violations of the USMCA.136 Should those consultations not lead to an agreement, the U.S. and Canada could request a dispute settlement panel; the panel could result in retaliatory tariffs on Mexico.137
The 2013 reforms created opportunities for U.S. businesses in exploration, pipeline construction The 2013 reforms created opportunities for U.S. businesses in exploration, pipeline construction
and ownership, natural gas production, and commercial gasoline sales. Although the reforms did and ownership, natural gas production, and commercial gasoline sales. Although the reforms did
not privatize Pemex, they did expose the company to competition and hastened its entrance into not privatize Pemex, they did expose the company to competition and hastened its entrance into
joint ventures. Because of the reforms, Mexico received more than $160 billion in promised joint ventures. Because of the reforms, Mexico received more than $160 billion in promised
investment.investment.~~134 However, the reforms ended subsidies that kept gasoline prices low for Mexican~~
~~consumers and~~138 Many experts argued at that time that deepened energy cooperation with Mexico could give North America an industrial advantage.139 Despite their promise, the energy sector reforms failed to reverse production declines failed to reverse production declines ~~and~~or to address structural problems within Pemex. While problems within Pemex. While ~~analysts~~
proponents still predict still predict ~~that~~ the reforms will bring the reforms will bring long-term benefits to Mexico, opponents~~long-term benefits to the country, the Peña Nieto~~
~~administration oversold their short-term impacts, which has emboldened those~~ within the López within the López
Obrador government Obrador government ~~who~~ have sought to curtail private involvement in the sector.have sought to curtail private involvement in the sector.~~135~~
~~The~~140 In light of concerns about the López Obrador government’s counterreform policies, the United States sought to cement Mexico’s energy reforms through the NAFTA renegotiations. United States sought to cement Mexico’s energy reforms through the NAFTA renegotiations.
NAFTA included some reservations for investment in Mexico’s energy sector. USMCA reinforces NAFTA included some reservations for investment in Mexico’s energy sector. USMCA reinforces
Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms and the current legal framework for private energy projects Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms and the current legal framework for private energy projects

~~133 Sheky Espejo, “Lawmakers Urge Biden to Address Concerns of U.S. Energy Companies in Mexico,”~~ ~~S & P Global~~
~~Commodity Insights,~~ ~~July 12, 2021; AP, “U.S. Congressmen Complain About Mexico Energy Changes,” October 20,~~
~~2021.~~
~~134~~in Mexico. It includes investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms similar to those that existed in NAFTA for the oil and gas, infrastructure, and other energy sectors, even as those mechanisms 136 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “What They Are Saying: United States Requests Consultations Under the USMCA over Mexico’s Energy Policies on Behalf of U.S. Stakeholders,” July 20, 2022. 137 Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder, “Exclusive: U.S. Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023. 138 Duncan Wood and John Padilla, Duncan Wood and John Padilla, Mexico’s new Hydrocarbons Model: a Critical Assessment Four Years Later,
Wilson Center & IPD Latin AmericaWilson Center & IPD Latin America.
~~135 Ibid.;~~, April 2018. 139 Earl Anthony Wayne and David Shedd, Assuring Energy Security with a Modern NAFTA, Wilson Center Mexico Institute, May 9, 2018. 140 Duncan Wood et al., Duncan Wood et al., Changing the Guard in Mexico: AMLO’s Opportunities and Challenges, July 2018. , July 2018.
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~~in Mexico. It includes investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms similar to those that existed~~
~~in NAFTA for the oil and gas, infrastructure, and other energy sectors, even as those mechanisms~~
~~were limited for other sectors.136~~were limited for other sectors.141 In addition, the free trade agreement maintains tariff-free exports In addition, the free trade agreement maintains tariff-free exports
of U.S. natural gas to Mexico, which have increased significantly since the 2013 reforms.of U.S. natural gas to Mexico, which have increased significantly since the 2013 reforms.~~137~~
~~Private sector trade, innovation, and investment have created a North American energy market~~
~~that is interdependent and multidirectional, with cross-border gas pipelines and liquefied natural~~
~~gas (LNG) shipments from the United States to Mexico surging. In 2019, the value of U.S.~~
~~petroleum products exports to Mexico totaled nearly $30 billion, more than double the value of~~
~~U.S. energy imports from Mexico ($13 billion).138 Many experts have argued that deepened~~
~~energy cooperation with Mexico could give North America an industrial advantage.139~~
142 Over time, López Obrador’s energy policies have concerned energy investors and U.S. companies with large López Obrador’s energy policies have concerned energy investors and U.S. companies with large
parts of their supply chains in Mexico. The government’s decisions to halt new auctions in the oil parts of their supply chains in Mexico. The government’s decisions to halt new auctions in the oil
and gas sector, as well as in wind and solar energy projects, stunned investors and put hundreds of and gas sector, as well as in wind and solar energy projects, stunned investors and put hundreds of
existing projects in limbo.existing projects in limbo.~~140~~143 Private sector actors Private sector actors ~~are lobbying~~lobbied for adjustments in the proposed for adjustments in the proposed
electricity reform that would enable Mexico to keep its Paris climate agreement pledges and electricity reform that would enable Mexico to keep its Paris climate agreement pledges and
respect private investment while still strengthening the CFE.respect private investment while still strengthening the CFE.~~141~~
144 They have filed numerous legal challenges to the 2021 enacted reforms. Opportunities exist for continued U.S.- Opportunities exist for continued U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico energy cooperation in the energy sector, but the energy cooperation in the energy sector, but the
future of those efforts may depend on the outcome of López Obrador’s future of those efforts may depend on the outcome of López Obrador’s ~~proposed~~ reforms. The reforms. The
Biden Administration has engaged Mexico in Biden Administration has engaged Mexico in ~~several~~ high-level meetings to express high-level meetings to express ~~concern~~concerns over the electricity reform and others ~~over~~
~~the proposal~~, citing concerns that , citing concerns that itthey could hinder U.S.-Mexico cooperation on clean energy could hinder U.S.-Mexico cooperation on clean energy
initiatives and violate the USMCA.initiatives and violate the USMCA.~~142~~145 Bilateral efforts to accelerate Mexican action on renewable Bilateral efforts to accelerate Mexican action on renewable
energy development and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could continue energy development and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could continue
through a newly created U.S.-Mexico Climate and Clean Energy Working Group.through a newly created U.S.-Mexico Climate and Clean Energy Working Group.~~143~~146
In addition to monitoring López Obrador’s proposed energy reform as it pertains to USMCA, In addition to monitoring López Obrador’s proposed energy reform as it pertains to USMCA,
congressional oversight may involve broader issues related to the fairness of policies adopted by congressional oversight may involve broader issues related to the fairness of policies adopted by
the López Obrador government toward foreign energy companies and investors. the López Obrador government toward foreign energy companies and investors.
~~Selected~~ Border Environmental ~~Issues144~~Issues147
The transboundary flow of raw sewage and industrial wastewater has been a focus of bilateral The transboundary flow of raw sewage and industrial wastewater has been a focus of bilateral
environmental dialogue since at least the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. environmental dialogue since at least the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. ~~Effluent~~Wastewater, trash, , trash, and sediment flowing into the United States from Mexico have caused health and environmental problems in the border region. Wastewater collection and treatment system capacity has not kept pace with the region’s rapid population growth. In addition, the aging of existing wastewater infrastructure has led to increased maintenance issues, such as pipeline ruptures. To address border sanitation, Congress has appropriated funds for the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North American Development Bank (NADB) to construct or finance wastewater infrastructure on both sides of the border. Transboundary flows have continued to require bilateral cooperation, despite the construction of several sanitation facilities on both sides of the border. 141 CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal. 142 “USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade,” S & P Global Market Intelligence, December 10, 2019. 143~~and~~

~~136 CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal.~~
~~137 “USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade,” S & P Global Market Intelligence, December~~
~~10, 2019.~~
~~138 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “In 2019, the U.S. Imported $13 Billion of Energy Goods from Mexico,~~
~~Exported $34 Billion,” November 4, 2020.~~
~~139 Earl Anthony Wayne and David Shedd, Assuring Energy Security with a Modern NAFTA, Wilson Center Mexico~~
~~Institute, May 9, 2018.~~
~~140~~ Kate Linthicum, “For Mexico’s President, the Future Isn’t Renewable Energy—It’s Coal,” Kate Linthicum, “For Mexico’s President, the Future Isn’t Renewable Energy—It’s Coal,” Los Angeles Times, April , April
12, 2021. 12, 2021.
~~141~~144 Dave Graham, “Analysis: Hints of Compromise Emerge over Mexico’s Contentious Power Bill,” Reuters, February Dave Graham, “Analysis: Hints of Compromise Emerge over Mexico’s Contentious Power Bill,” Reuters, February
15, 2022. 15, 2022.
~~142~~145 U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm on Travel to Mexico U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm on Travel to Mexico
City, Mexico,” press release, January 21, 2021, City, Mexico,” press release, January 21, 2021,
~~143~~146 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, “Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Visits Mexico City,” U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, “Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Visits Mexico City,”
press release, February 9, 2022. press release, February 9, 2022.
~~144 This section was authored by Elena~~147 Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy, authored this section. .
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2726 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations International Boundary and Water Commission The IBWC, consisting of U.S. and Mexico sections, implements boundary and water treaties between the United States and Mexico.148

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~sediment flowing into the United States from Mexico has caused health and environmental~~
~~problems in the border region that Members of Congress have consistently raised on behalf of~~
~~their constituents. Wastewater collection and treatment system capacity has not kept pace with~~
~~rapid population growth in the border region. Also, the aging of existing wastewater infrastructure~~
~~has led to increased maintenance issues, such as pipeline ruptures. To address border sanitation~~
~~issues, Congress has appropriated funds for the International Boundary and Water Commission~~
~~(IBWC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North American~~
~~Development Bank (NADB) to construct or finance wastewater infrastructure on both sides of the~~
~~border. Several sanitation facilities have been constructed, though continued transboundary flows~~
~~require bilateral cooperation.~~
~~International Boundary and Water Commission~~
~~The IBWC, consisting of U.S. and Mexico Sections, implements boundary and water treaties~~
~~between the United States and Mexico.145~~ IBWC’s activities are conducted through Minutes, IBWC’s activities are conducted through Minutes,
which have the force of law when both the U.S. and Mexican governments provide written which have the force of law when both the U.S. and Mexican governments provide written
approval through their respective sections of the IBWC. To address the issue of transboundary approval through their respective sections of the IBWC. To address the issue of transboundary
effluent flows, the IBWC has taken actions under numerous Minutes.effluent flows, the IBWC has taken actions under numerous Minutes.~~146~~149 Under this authority, Under this authority,
IBWC has constructed and IBWC has constructed and currently operates three wastewater treatment plants, two of which treat operates three wastewater treatment plants, two of which treat
Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. These two wastewater treatment Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. These two wastewater treatment ~~plant~~ plants are the are the
South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Ysidro, CA, and the Nogales South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Ysidro, CA, and the Nogales
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nogales, AZ. Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nogales, AZ. Further, IBWC ~~IBWC also~~ operates the Nuevo Laredo Wastewater operates the Nuevo Laredo Wastewater
Treatment Plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Treatment Plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.
Congress appropriates funds to the IBWC for construction activities through State Department Congress appropriates funds to the IBWC for construction activities through State Department
appropriations. The State Department’s appropriations. The State Department’s ~~FY2022~~FY2023 budget requested $ budget requested $4641.8 million in construction .8 million in construction
funds for funds for ~~strengthening the Amistad Dam;~~a range of projects, including rehabilitating IBWC wastewater infrastructure in rehabilitating IBWC wastewater infrastructure in
~~Nogales, AZ; and improving security for USIBWC facilities and critical infrastructure.147~~Nogales, AZ.150 The The
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, ~~2022~~2023 (P.L. 117- (P.L. 117-~~103)~~328), includes an appropriation of includes an appropriation of ~~$51~~$53.0 million .0 million
for IBWC construction, roughly $2 million above enacted for IBWC construction, roughly $2 million above enacted ~~FY2021~~FY2022 IBWC construction IBWC construction
appropriations.appropriations. ~~Congressional~~ In recent years, congressional appropriators have shown interest in appropriators have shown interest in ~~increasing~~ oversight regarding oversight regarding
transboundary sewage flows. The joint explanatory statement transboundary sewage flows. The joint explanatory statement ~~accompanying~~for the Consolidated the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Appropriations Act, ~~2022 (P.L. 117-103) expresses concern over the transboundary flow of~~
~~effluent from Mexico into the United States and includes a requirement for the Department of~~
~~State and the IBWC to submit a status report reviewing planned and completed actions to address~~
~~such flows. The~~ 2023 (P.L. 117-328), requires the IBWC to submit to the appropriations committees an operating plan for FY2023, including plans for new and ongoing construction projects. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) included a requirement FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) included a requirement
for the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant federal agencies, to for the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant federal agencies, to
submit a report to the appropriations committee on the implementation of the interagency plan submit a report to the appropriations committee on the implementation of the interagency plan
developed pursuant developed pursuant to the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), within 90 days of enactment. P.L. 116-94 directed the Secretary of State, as well as other relevant federal agencies, to develop a plan to address the impacts of toxic transboundary flows on U.S. communities. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Congress annually provides funding to EPA for high priority water and wastewater infrastructure projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. In 1997, EPA and NADB entered into an agreement, under which EPA contributes much of its annual border infrastructure appropriation to NADB for grants to construct water infrastructure on both sides of the border. For FY2023, Congress provided $36.4 million for the Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP) through an EPA account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328). EPA in turn provides these~~to the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), within 90~~

~~145~~148 In 1882, the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) as a temporary In 1882, the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) as a temporary
boundary-setting body. See 1882 Boundary Convention, Article 3. The United States and Mexico reestablished the IBC boundary-setting body. See 1882 Boundary Convention, Article 3. The United States and Mexico reestablished the IBC
in 1889 and made it permanent in 1900. See Convention Between the United States of America and the United States in 1889 and made it permanent in 1900. See Convention Between the United States of America and the United States
of Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the Two Governments, Known as of Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the Two Governments, Known as
the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. Treaty Between the United States of the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. Treaty Between the United States of
America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-
Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf. The 1944 Treaty, Article 3, Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf. The 1944 Treaty, Article 3,
states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems. states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems.
~~146~~149 These Minutes can be found at https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes_ByProject.html. These Minutes can be found at https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes_ByProject.html.
~~147~~150 Department of State, Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, Washington, DC, , Washington, DC, ~~May 28, 2021, p. 54, at~~March 28, 2023, p. 57, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/~~2021/05/FY-2022-~~
~~State_USAID-~~2022/06/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-Congressional-Budget-~~Justification~~Justification_Final_508comp.pdf. .pdf.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2827 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations funds to two programs: (1) the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAP) and (2) the Border Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF).151 The PDAP and BEIF programs are intended to identify and fund drinking water quality and/or wastewater management infrastructure projects. Project sponsors can apply jointly to the PDAP/BEIF program through NADB, which screens for initial eligibility and prioritizes projects using EPA’s ranking methodologies.152 The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) included a supplemental appropriation of $300 million for EPA to support high-priority wastewater facilities, after consultation with the appropriate border commission. The act directs EPA to carry out design, construction, operation, and maintenance activities of high-priority treatment works in the Tijuana River Valley to treat wastewater flows originating in Mexico. Section 7069 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, authorizes EPA to transfer funds provided by P.L. 116-113 to the IBWC to construct, own, and/or operate treatment works to (1) address transboundary pollution and inadequacies or breakdown of existing treatment works in Mexico, and (2) provide treatment of flows, including the operations and maintenance of new treatment works. USMCA Implementation Act, IBWC, and Minute 328 In July 2022, the U.S. and Mexican sections of the IBWC agreed to Minute 328, “Sanitation Infrastructure Projects in San Diego, California – Tijuana, Baja California for Immediate Implementation and for Future Development.”153 Minute 328 identifies specific projects to be constructed in San Diego and Tijuana, and the financial commitments of each country to these projects. These funds are dedicated to expanding the capacity of the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Diego County; rehabilitating pumping plants, pump stations, and pipelines in Mexico, as well as constructing a new wastewater treatment plant in Mexico. North American Development Bank In 1993, the United States and Mexico adopted an agreement to establish the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the NADB to provide financial assistance for a range of environmental infrastructure projects in the border region.154 The agreement noted the need for environmental infrastructure, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, and municipal solid waste. The BECC was authorized to help border states and communities coordinate, design, and mobilize financing for environmental infrastructure projects, and to certify projects for financing. The NADB evaluates the financial feasibility of BECC-certified projects and provides financing as appropriate. In 1993, Congress authorized U.S. participation in the BECC and NADB in legislation implementing the NAFTA (P.L. 103-182). In 2004, P.L. 108-215 authorized several operational reforms to the NADB. In 2017, BECC and NADB were integrated into a single institution.155 151 Project funds are divided between EPA

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~days of enactment. P.L. 116-94 directed the Secretary of State, as well as other relevant federal~~
~~agencies, to develop a plan to~~
~~address the impacts of toxic transboundary flows on U.S. communities, including: (1) an~~
~~explanation of the sources and impacts of such flows; (2) the delineation of responsibility~~
~~between each agency and a description of necessary actions and resources for each agency~~
~~to address such impacts; (3) steps that will be taken to raise the issue of transboundary~~
~~flows with the Government of Mexico, including by utilizing U.S. assistance for Mexico~~
~~to obtain improvements to prevent, divert, and/or treat toxic flows on the Mexican side of~~
~~the border; and (4) steps that will be taken to improve the timeliness of warnings to U.S.~~
~~communities regarding toxic conditions.~~
~~North American Development Bank~~
~~In October 1993, the United States and Mexico adopted an agreement to establish the Border~~
~~Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the NADB to provide financial assistance for~~
~~environmental infrastructure projects in the border region. The agreement noted the need for~~
~~environmental infrastructure, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, and~~
~~municipal solid waste. The BECC is authorized to help border states and communities coordinate,~~
~~design, and mobilize financing for environmental infrastructure projects, and to certify projects~~
~~for financing. The NADB evaluates the financial feasibility of BECC-certified projects and~~
~~provides financing as appropriate. Congress authorized U.S. participation in the BECC and~~
~~NADB in legislation implementing the North America Free Trade Agreement (P.L. 103-182).~~
~~Enacted in 2004, P.L. 108-215 authorized several operational reforms to the NADB. In 2017,~~
~~BECC and NADB were integrated into a single institution.148~~
~~The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), Title VIII, Subtitle C, called for U.S. NADB~~
~~board members to urge NADB to prioritize financing environmental infrastructure projects (over~~
~~road or commercial projects), streamline project certification and financing procedures, and~~
~~develop project performance measures. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-~~
~~260), Division O, Title VI, authorized the U.S. Treasury to contribute up to $1.02 billion for U.S.~~
~~shares of NADB capital stock. The 2020 NADB annual report states that, in 2020, the United~~
~~States provided $225 million in paid-in capital to the NADB and that Mexico intends to provide~~
~~matching payments.149 The report also indicated that $165 million of this amount depends on~~
~~payments from Mexico.150~~
~~U.S. Environmental Protection Agency~~
~~Congress annually provides funding to EPA for high priority water and wastewater infrastructure~~
~~projects in the U.S.-Mexican border region. In 1997, EPA and NADB entered into an agreement,~~
~~under which EPA contributes much of its annual border infrastructure appropriation to NADB for~~
~~grants to construct water infrastructure on both sides of the border. For FY2022, Congress~~
~~provided $32 million for the Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP) through an EPA~~
~~account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103). EPA in turn provides these~~

~~148 North American Development Bank (NADB), “NADB and BECC Merge,” press release, November 7, 2017,~~
~~https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-and-becc-merge.~~
~~149 Paid-in capital consists of funds contributed by the two governments to NADB. NADB,~~ ~~North American~~
~~Development Bank 2020 Annual Report, November 9, 2020, p. 4, at https://www.nadb.org/uploads/files/~~
~~2020_annual_report_eng_final.pdf.~~
~~150 Ibid., p. 33.~~
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~~funds151 to two programs: (1) the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAP) and (2) the~~
~~Border Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF). The PDAP and BEIF programs are intended to~~
~~identify and fund drinking water quality, wastewater management infrastructure projects, or both.~~
~~Project sponsors can apply jointly to the PDAP/BEIF program through NADB, which screens for~~
~~initial eligibility and prioritizes projects using EPA’s ranking methodologies.152 To be eligible for~~
~~BEIF grants, projects located in Mexico must have a U.S. benefit and are required to provide a~~
~~cost-share, as determined by the Mexican national water agency. EPA reports that BWIP has~~
~~provided funding for 136 projects, 101 of which have been completed.153~~
~~The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) includes a supplemental appropriation of $300~~
~~million for EPA to support high-priority wastewater facilities, after consultation with the~~
~~appropriate border commission.154 The act directs EPA to carry out design, construction,~~
~~operation, and maintenance activities of high-priority treatment works in the Tijuana River Valley~~
~~to treat wastewater flows originating in Mexico.155 EPA is directed to carry out such activities in~~
~~coordination with the U.S. Section of the IBWC; federal agencies, including the Department of~~
~~State and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and state and local partners. In July 2020, EPA~~
~~convened the USMCA Interagency Consultation Group, composed of the partners identified in~~
~~the act, and later announced the selection of two projects to be funded with the USMCA~~
~~supplemental appropriation.156 Under a new memorandum of understanding with IBWC, EPA will~~
~~design and construct a structure to divert 10 million gallons per day of flows to the South Bay~~
~~International Wastewater Treatment Plant. EPA, working with the City of San Diego, also will~~
~~develop a sediment and trash reduction strategy at the U.S.-Mexican border to mitigate such~~
~~waste from going into the Pacific Ocean.157~~
~~In May 2021, EPA completed a technical evaluation of potential projects to address~~
~~transboundary pollution in the Tijuana River Valley and identified three alternatives with “the~~
~~highest potential” to reduce transboundary pollution in the Tijuana River and the coastal areas.158~~
~~In November 2021, EPA stated that projects identified in one of the three alternatives are~~
~~undergoing environmental review.159 These projects range from constructing a new wastewater~~
~~treatment plant in Tijuana to installing a boom to control trash in the Tijuana River. EPA notes~~

~~151 Funds are divided between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)~~ Region 6 (for projects in New Mexico, Region 6 (for projects in New Mexico,
Texas, Chihuahua, Nueva Leon, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas) and EPA Region 9 (for projects in Arizona, California, Texas, Chihuahua, Nueva Leon, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas) and EPA Region 9 (for projects in Arizona, California,
Baja California, and Sonora). Baja California, and Sonora).
152 Project application documents can be found at https://www.nadb.org/infrastructure-financing/grants/border- 152 Project application documents can be found at https://www.nadb.org/infrastructure-financing/grants/border-
environment-infrastructure-fund-beif-pdap. environment-infrastructure-fund-beif-pdap.
153 153 ~~EPA, Fiscal Year 2022 Justification of Appropriation Estimates for the Committees on Appropriation, 190-R-21-~~
~~002, May 2021, pp. 686-688, at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-07/fy22-cj-10-stag.pdf.~~
~~154 The supplemental appropriation of $300 million for high priority wastewater facilities in P.L. 116-113 parallels the~~
~~FY2020 BWIP appropriation, which is for “the construction of high priority water and wastewater facilities.”~~
~~155 P.L. 116-113 §821.~~
~~156 EPA, “EPA Announces Two Near-Term, Clean Water Projects in the Tijuana River,” press release, October 2,~~
~~2020, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-two-near-term-clean-water-projects-tijuana-river.~~
~~157 EPA, “EPA Announces Two Near-Term, Clean Water Projects in the Tijuana River,” press release, October 2,~~
~~2020, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-two-near-term-clean-water-projects-tijuana-river.~~
~~158 For a discussion of these alternatives, see PG Environmental, LLC, for EPA,~~ ~~Water Infrastructure Alternatives~~
~~Analysis,~~ ~~November 9, 2021, at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-11/usmca-water-infrastructure-~~
~~alternatives-analysis-final-report.pdf.~~
~~159 EPA, “EPA Announces Holistic Approach to Address Water Pollution from the Tijuana River Watershed~~IBWC, “Minute 328,” https://ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min328.pdf. 154 The amended agreement can be found at North American Development Bank (NADB) website “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a North American Development Bank” at https://www.nadb.org/uploads/content/files/Policies/Charter_Eng.pdf. 155 NADB, “NADB and BECC Merge,” press ,” press
release, November release, November ~~8, 2021, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-holistic-approach-address-water-~~
~~pollution-tijuana-river-watershed.~~
7, 2017, https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-and-becc- Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3028 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), Title VIII, Subtitle C, called for U.S. NADB board members to urge NADB to prioritize financing environmental infrastructure projects (over road or commercial projects), streamline project certification and financing procedures, and develop project performance measures. The FY2021

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~that the cost to construct all projects included in this alternative would total $627 million,~~
~~exceeding the supplemental appropriation provided by P.L. 116-113.160 Accordingly, EPA intends~~
~~to use a phased approach in the design and construction of the projects.161~~
~~The EPA FY2022 request for BWIP maintained the funding level provided by the FY2021~~
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), Division O, Title VI, authorized the U.S. Treasury to contribute up to $1.02 billion for U.S. shares of NADB capital stock. The 2021 NADB annual report stated that, as of July 2022, the United States has provided $225 million in paid-in capital to the NADB and that Mexico intended to provide matching payments.156 Water Resource Issues157~~260) of $30 million.162 As stated above, the~~
~~Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103) increases the level of appropriations for~~
~~BWIP to $32 million.163~~
~~Water Resource Issues164~~
The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. These The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. These
shared rivers have long presented complex issues leading to cooperation and conflict in the U.S.-shared rivers have long presented complex issues leading to cooperation and conflict in the U.S.-
~~Mexican~~Mexico border region and between the United States and Mexico. border region and between the United States and Mexico.
The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944 and other binational agreements guide how the two The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944 and other binational agreements guide how the two
governments share the flows of these rivers.governments share the flows of these rivers.~~165~~158 The binational IBWC administers these The binational IBWC administers these
agreements and includes a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S. agreements and includes a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S.
Department of State. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing river-Department of State. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing river-
related disputes between the United States and Mexico. related disputes between the United States and Mexico.
Under the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, the United States is required to provide Mexico Under the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, the United States is required to provide Mexico
annually with 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.annually with 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.~~166~~159 U.S. deliveries to Mexico in the U.S. deliveries to Mexico in the
Rio Grande basin near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez occur annually under a 1906 binational convention, Rio Grande basin near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez occur annually under a 1906 binational convention,
whereas Mexico’s deliveries downstream of Fort Quitman, TX, are established in the U.S.-whereas Mexico’s deliveries downstream of Fort Quitman, TX, are established in the U.S.-
Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. The 1944 treaty typically requires Mexico to deliver to the United Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. The 1944 treaty typically requires Mexico to deliver to the United
States a minimum amount during a five-year cycle. States a minimum amount during a five-year cycle.
~~Recent~~ Developments in the Colorado River Basin. The United States continues to meet its The United States continues to meet its
Colorado River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the U.S.-Mexico Water Colorado River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty of 1944. Recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River have focused on how to manage the Treaty of 1944. Recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River have focused on how to manage the
Colorado River’s water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to Colorado River’s water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to
restore and protect riverine ecosystems. The most recent minute governingrestore and protect riverine ecosystems. The most recent minute governing Colorado River basin operations, Minute 323 (signed in September 2017), is a set of binational measures that provides for cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat. Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S. portion of the basin, including delivery reductions under drought contingency plans authorized by Congress in April 2019.160 In addition, Minute 323 designates a “Mexican Water Reserve” merge. 156 Paid-in capital consists of funds contributed by the two governments to NADB. NADB, North American Development Bank 2021 Annual Report, June 30, 2022, p. 41. 157 ~~basin operations,~~

~~160 EPA, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Investments, fact sheet, November 20, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-11/cis-factsheet-110221.pdf.~~
~~161 EPA, “EPA Announces Holistic Approach to Address Water Pollution from the Tijuana River Watershed,” press~~
~~release, November 8, 2021, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-holistic-approach-address-water-~~
~~pollution-tijuana-river-watershed.~~
~~162 EPA, Fiscal Year 2022 Justification of Appropriation Estimates for the Committees on Appropriation, 190-R-21-~~
~~002, Washington, DC, May 2021, pp. 686-688, at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-07/fy22-cj-10-~~
~~stag.pdf.~~
~~163 The Joint Explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, encourages EPA to~~
~~“advance predictive models to assess and evaluate potential infrastructure projects to reduce beach closure days and~~
~~other related impacts from transboundary untreated sewage pollution events” in the Tijuana River Valley.~~
~~164~~ This section is drawn from CRS Report R45430, This section is drawn from CRS Report R45430, Sharing the Colorado River and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and
Conflict with Mexico, by Nicole T. Carter, Stephen P. Mulligan, and Charles V. Stern., by Nicole T. Carter, Stephen P. Mulligan, and Charles V. Stern. ~~See also Alexandra Helfgott,~~
Bilateral Water Management: Water Sharing between the US and Mexico along the Border, Woodrow Wilson Center’s
~~Mexico Institute, January 4, 2021.~~
~~165~~ 158 Another example of a water resource related treaty provision is Article IV of the 1970 Treaty to Resolve Pending Another example of a water resource related treaty provision is Article IV of the 1970 Treaty to Resolve Pending
Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-~~Mex.~~
~~166~~Mexico, signed November 23, 1970. 159 Under the treaty, the United States must supply an additional 200,000 acre-feet when surplus is declared. During Under the treaty, the United States must supply an additional 200,000 acre-feet when surplus is declared. During
drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. uses. drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. uses.
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~~Minute 323 (signed in September 2017), is a set of binational measures that provides for~~
~~cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat.~~
~~Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S.~~
~~portion of the basin, including delivery reductions under drought contingency plans authorized by~~
~~Congress in April 2019.167 In addition, Minute 323 designates a “Mexican Water Reserve”~~
160 Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin were enacted in April 2019 in P.L. 116-14. For more information, see CRS Report R45546, Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought, Congressional Research Service 29 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed
deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake’s elevation.deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake’s elevation.~~168~~161 For the Colorado For the Colorado
River River ~~basin~~Basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 323 , issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 323
implementation and water management associated with potential shortage conditionsimplementation and water management associated with potential shortage conditions. and any additional proposed delivery reductions in response to ongoing drought.162 Congress Congress
also may be interested in the upcoming 2026 expiration of Minute 323 and the negotiation of any also may be interested in the upcoming 2026 expiration of Minute 323 and the negotiation of any
extensions or replacement agreements in the interim. extensions or replacement agreements in the interim.
~~Recent Development~~Developments in the Rio Grande Basin. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has
not met its Rio Grande delivery obligations of 1,750,000 acre-feet within the five-year cycle not met its Rio Grande delivery obligations of 1,750,000 acre-feet within the five-year cycle
established by the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, most recently during the five-year cycle established by the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, most recently during the five-year cycle
from 2010 to 2015.from 2010 to 2015.~~169~~163 Mexico avoided ending the October 2015 to October 2020 cycle with a Mexico avoided ending the October 2015 to October 2020 cycle with a
water delivery water delivery deficit by transferring~~deficit as the result of a transfer~~ to the United States to the United States of Mexican water stored at Mexican water stored at
binational IBWC dams. binational IBWC dams. ~~The~~A minute concluded in October 2020 October 2020, Minute 325 Minute 325, provided that a shortfall would be avoided provided that a shortfall would be avoided
through the transfer of water stored at two IBWC dams from Mexican to U.S. ownership. Minute through the transfer of water stored at two IBWC dams from Mexican to U.S. ownership. Minute
325 resulted in the transfer of ownership of 144,728 acre-feet of water.325 resulted in the transfer of ownership of 144,728 acre-feet of water.~~170~~ 164 Minute 325 also Minute 325 also
allowed for negotiation of an agreement for allowed for negotiation of an agreement for ~~the~~ potential temporary use of U.S. water for potential temporary use of U.S. water for
minimum municipal needs in Mexico below the Amistad Dam. In addition, Minute 325 indicated minimum municipal needs in Mexico below the Amistad Dam. In addition, Minute 325 indicated
that two Rio Grande working groups would be established as part of the efforts to reach a goal of that two Rio Grande working groups would be established as part of the efforts to reach a goal of
developing a minute on increased reliability and predictability of Rio Grande deliveries to water developing a minute on increased reliability and predictability of Rio Grande deliveries to water
users in the United States and Mexico by December 2023. To date, Congress has been primarily users in the United States and Mexico by December 2023. To date, Congress has been primarily
involved in conducting oversight through reporting requirements for the U.S. Department of involved in conducting oversight through reporting requirements for the U.S. Department of
State, such as those included in P.L. 116-6 (S.Rept. 115-282). Pursuant to the various reporting State, such as those included in P.L. 116-6 (S.Rept. 115-282). Pursuant to the various reporting
requirements, reports have been delivered to various committees of Congress. requirements, reports have been delivered to various committees of Congress. ~~As of early January~~
~~2022, Mexico’s deliveries for the first 14 months of the current five-year cycle (2020-2025) are~~
~~lower than the first 14 months of delivery cycles since 1992.~~
~~U.S.-Mexican~~During the current five-year cycle (October 2020-October 2025), Mexico’s deliveries were among the lowest observed for the first 22 months of a cycle. Deliveries increased in August and September 2022 and then flattened out through March 2023. Mexico has another 2½ years to meet the 5-year delivery obligation. U.S.-Mexico Health Cooperation
As with neighboring Canada, robust tradeAs with neighboring Canada, robust trade ~~and migration through~~, migration, and an extensive shared border have an extensive shared border have
~~made~~made public health cooperation a critical part of the U.S.- health cooperation a critical part of the U.S.-~~Mexican~~Mexico bilateral relationship. bilateral relationship.~~171~~165 Collaboration Collaboration
on health matters has been on health matters has been ~~particularly strong since 2001—when Anthrax attacks in the United~~
~~States prompted Mexico to join the Global Health Security Initiative—and was reinforced in~~

~~167 Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin were enacted in April 2019 in P.L. 116-~~
~~14. For more information, see CRS Report R45546,~~ ~~Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought,~~
strong for more than two decades, particularly since the Anthrax release in 2001 when Mexico became part of the Global Health Security Agenda and later on in and the Federal Role, by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh. , by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh.
~~168~~161 Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used by the United States for determining shortage conditions and associated Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used by the United States for determining shortage conditions and associated
water delivery cutbacks for the Lower Colorado River Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada. water delivery cutbacks for the Lower Colorado River Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada.
~~169~~162 For example, in January 2023 six of the seven Colorado River basin states submitted a proposal to the Department of the Interior that recommends conserving Colorado River waters by assessing evaporative losses on deliveries to Lower Colorado River basin states and Mexico. See Letter from Colorado River Basin State Representatives of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming to Tanya Trujillo, Assistant Secretary, Water & Science, U.S. Department of the Interior, January 31, 2023. 163 Mexico made up for those shortfalls in subsequent five-year cycles, as authorized under the U.S.-Mexico Water Mexico made up for those shortfalls in subsequent five-year cycles, as authorized under the U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty of 1944. Treaty of 1944.
~~170~~164 Amount of the transfer is described in Letter from Jayne Harkins, Commissioner, U.S. IBWC, to Greg Abbott, Amount of the transfer is described in Letter from Jayne Harkins, Commissioner, U.S. IBWC, to Greg Abbott,
Governor of Texas, November 3, 2020. Governor of Texas, November 3, 2020.
~~171~~165 This paragraph draws from Andrew I. Rudman and Duncan Wood, This paragraph draws from Andrew I. Rudman and Duncan Wood, Pandemics and Beyond: The Potential for U.S.-
Mexican Cooperation in Public Health, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, March 2020. , Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, March 2020.
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response to the outbreaks of SARS-CoV (2002-2004). response to the outbreaks of SARS-CoV (2002-2004). ~~As an example, the~~In response, both countries collaborated on the development of ~~countries jointly~~
~~developed~~ an electronic early warning surveillance system for infectious diseases. an electronic early warning surveillance system for infectious diseases.
~~Based~~Building on lessons learned from the H1N1 (2009) Influenza pandemic, Mexico, Canada, and the on lessons learned from the H1N1 (2009) Influenza pandemic, Mexico, Canada, and the
United States launched the 2012 North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza United States launched the 2012 North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza
(NAPAPI).(NAPAPI).~~172 The NAPAPI, led by the North American Health Security Working Group~~
~~(NAHSWG),~~ The 2012 NAPAPI created a flexible platform to created a flexible platform to ~~facilitate a coordinated response~~prevent, prepare, and respond to any potential or to any potential or
~~actual health security threat to North America. The NAHSWG has hosted multiple tabletop~~
~~exercises on emergency communications and deployments of medical countermeasures, medical~~
~~personnel, and laboratory samples.173~~
~~In January 2020, the NAHSWG convened at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and served as~~
~~the sole communication forum on public health preparedness and response actions in North~~
~~America. The group has enabled the sharing of best practices on issues such as epidemiological~~
~~surveillance, laboratory diagnostics regulation, testing policies, supply chains, workers’ safety,~~
~~virus variants, and vaccine confidence.~~actual health security threat to North America through the North American Health Security Working Group (NAHSWG). Since its creation, the NAHSWG has hosted multiple tabletop exercises on emergency communications and deployments of medical countermeasures, medical personnel, and laboratory samples.166 The NAHSWG is led by the U.S. Department of Health The NAHSWG is led by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and has U.S. government representation from several HHS offices, and Human Services (HHS) and has U.S. government representation from several HHS offices,
such as the CDC, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of such as the CDC, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of
Health (NIH)Health (NIH), and from other agencies ( and from other agencies (~~e.g.,~~such as DHS and the State Department). DHS and the State Department).
In addition to this trilateral collaborationIn addition to this trilateral collaboration ~~on health security~~, Mexico is one of five countries that , Mexico is one of five countries that
has a permanent HHS has a permanent HHS ~~Health Attaché~~health attaché representing the Office of the Secretary representing the Office of the Secretary ~~and~~, overseeing the overseeing the
work of HHS agencieswork of HHS agencies~~, such as CDC and FDA,~~ operating within the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and leading health diplomacy efforts. Response to COVID-19. In January 2020, the NAHSWG convened to respond to COVID-19. The group enabled the sharing of best practices on issues such as epidemiological surveillance, laboratory diagnostics regulation, testing policies, supply chains, workers’ safety, COVID-19 variants, and vaccine confidence. Through the HHS health attaché, Mexico ~~operating within the U.S. Embassy in Mexico~~
~~City. The Health Attaché leads health diplomacy efforts; fosters collaborative biomedical~~
~~research; supports capacity-building efforts on public health, health systems, and border health;~~
~~and serves as a key point of contact for the U.S. government in the event of an infectious disease~~
~~outbreak.~~
~~There is a U.S.-Mexican binational technical working group led by the CDC office in Mexico that~~
~~regularly meets to share information on laboratory capacity, epidemiological surveillance,~~
~~outbreak investigation, and training.174 Through the HHS Health Attaché and this office, Mexico~~
~~has~~ received funding support to strengthen the COVID-19 response in the areas of received funding support to strengthen the COVID-19 response in the areas of
epidemiological and laboratory surveillance, risk communication, epidemiological and laboratory surveillance, risk communication, ~~personnel training, and~~
~~studying the impact of border mobility and the virus.175~~and research. HHS also supported Mexico with HHS also supported Mexico with
diagnostics test kits, facilitated the acquisition of ventilators, hosted bilateral dialogues on vaccine diagnostics test kits, facilitated the acquisition of ventilators, hosted bilateral dialogues on vaccine
and therapeutics development, and provided expertise on vaccine deployment matters. Mexico and therapeutics development, and provided expertise on vaccine deployment matters. Mexico
received nearly 17 million received nearly 17 million vaccine doses~~doses of the COVID-19 vaccine~~ from the U.S. government. from the U.S. government.~~176~~
~~Another important binational collaboration body is the~~167 Border Health Coordination. The U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission
was created in July 2000 with the signing of an agreement by created in July 2000 with the signing of an agreement by ~~U.S.~~the Secretary of Secretary of ~~HHS and the~~
Health and Human Services of the United States and the Secretary of Health of México to provide international leadership to improve health and quality of Secretary of Health of México to provide international leadership to improve health and quality of
life along the U.S.-Mexico border.life along the U.S.-Mexico border.~~177 Since 2018~~168 Under the Biden Administration’s HHS leadership, the U.S. section of the commission is tasked with conducting health needs assessments and serving as a key advisory body on border health matters to the HHS Secretary in alignment with larger bilateral collaboration frameworks and with its public law mandate. Since 2018, the U.S. section~~, the U.S. section of the commission~~ has has
provided funding and technical advice through the provided funding and technical advice through the CDC’s Binational Border Infection Disease Surveillance (BIDS) program, which in turn funds the four U.S. states on the U.S.-Mexico border to improve the detection, reporting, and prevention of infectious diseases of binational importance. The NAHSWG and the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission reviewed lessons learned from COVID-19 at the federal and border level, as called for during the 2021 North American Leaders’ Summit.169 While some transborder communities (e.g., San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja 166 CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022. 167 Ibid. 168~~CDC’s Binational Border Infection Disease~~

~~172 Embassy of Mexico in the United States, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Framework on Health Issues,” May 4, 2020.~~
~~173 CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022.~~
~~174 DHS, “Joint Statement on U.S.-Mexico Joint Initiative to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic,” March 20, 2020.~~
~~175 CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022.~~
~~176 U.S. Mission to Mexico, “Almost 4 Million Vaccines Arrive from the United States to Mexico,” March 9, 2022.~~
~~177~~ HHS, “U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission,” at https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/oga/about-oga/what-we- HHS, “U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission,” at https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/oga/about-oga/what-we-
do/international-relations-division/americas/border-health-commission/index.htmldo/international-relations-division/americas/border-health-commission/index.html. 169 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2021 North American Leaders’ Summit,” November 18, 2021. That review reportedly examined emergency communications; joint outbreak investigation; laboratory capacity; development of and access to medical countermeasures; supply chains; health systems capacity and interoperability; and workers’ protections. Congressional Research Service 31.
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~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Surveillance (BIDS) program, which in turn funds the four U.S. states on the U.S.-Mexico border~~
~~to improve the detection, reporting, and prevention of infectious diseases of binational~~
~~importance.178 Under the Biden Administration, the U.S. section of the commission is tasked with~~
~~conducting health needs assessments on the U.S.-Mexico border. The U.S. section also serves as a~~
~~key advisory body on border health matters to the HHS Secretary in alignment with larger~~
~~bilateral collaboration frameworks and its public law mandate.179~~
~~Currently, the United States and Mexico have different travel requirements related to vaccination~~
~~and testing, which are affecting travel between the two countries. Based on these policy~~
~~discrepancies and other issues that have arisen during the pandemic, the NAHSWG and the U.S.-~~
~~Mexico Border Health Commission are in the process of launching a review of lessons learned~~
~~from COVID-19 at the federal and border level, as called for during the 2021 North American~~
~~Leaders’ Summit.180 Lessons learned from the pandemic may touch on the areas of emergency~~
~~communications, joint outbreak investigation, laboratory capacity, medical countermeasures~~
~~development and access, supply chains, health systems (hospital and personnel) capacity and~~
~~interoperability, and workers’ protections.~~
~~Legislation has been introduced—H.R. 1538, the Binational Health Strategies Act of 2021—that~~
~~would amend the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission Act and ask the commission to~~
~~undertake an assessment of COVID-19 impact and response along the border and mandate a~~
~~binational plan on how that response could be bolstered. Related legislation, S. 2570, would~~
~~require the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission and a similar entity with Canada to develop~~
~~strategic plans to address border health issues and authorize a total of $20 million annually for~~
~~those entities to award grants to eligible entities in border areas to carry out those plans.~~
~~Other Legislative Action~~
~~Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has overseen bilateral efforts to~~
~~address U.S.-bound unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, the COVID-19 pandemic,~~
~~USMCA implementation, and border environmental issues, among others. Although several~~
~~pieces of legislation have been introduced that would influence the issues in bilateral relations~~
~~discussed in this report, appropriations legislation has been the primary vehicle through which~~
~~laws and policies affecting Mexico have been enacted thus far.~~
~~Other legislation that would affect U.S. relations with Mexico includes H.R. 3524, reported by~~
~~the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021, which would require a report on how the~~
~~United States, Mexico, and Canada could work together to reduce methane and other emissions~~
~~and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA, which prohibits importation of goods produced by~~
~~forced labor. S. 1201, introduced in the Senate in April 2021, contains similar provisions.~~

~~178 The funding is used to enhance information systems; facilitate communicable disease case reporting; follow up on~~
~~outbreaks and notifications to Mexican health authorities; refine local, state, and international public health~~
~~communication protocols; and develop assessments to better describe mobile border populations as well as to enhance~~
~~COVID-19 vaccination activities targeting hard to reach populations.~~
~~179 CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022.~~
~~180 The White House, “FACT SHEET: Key Deliverables for the 2021 North American Leaders’ Summit,” November~~
~~18, 2021.~~
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34

~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Outlook~~
~~U.S.-Mexican relations are likely to be tested in 2022 by ongoing tension in security and energy~~
~~relations, lingering economic and health challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and~~
~~elevated levels of irregular migration. Most experts maintain the best way for both countries to~~
~~address these challenges is to continue working together and with Canada to ensure the best~~
~~possible outcomes for North America. A series of high-level meetings in autumn 2021 seemed to~~
~~smooth over initial tensions between the Biden and López Obrador administrations. Nevertheless,~~
~~recent U.S. criticism of Mexico’s inability to protect journalists and Mexican criticism of U.S.~~
~~support for nongovernmental organizations investigating corruption and abuses against journalists~~
~~in Mexico have caused some renewed tension. Congress is likely to maintain significant interest~~
~~in Mexico, with trade, security, drug policy, migration, health, and environmental issues as~~
~~probable areas of funding and oversight efforts.~~
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35

~~link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 40~~ ~~Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Appendix. Mérida Initiative Funding~~
~~Table A~~ Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations California) used existing mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic responses, others (e.g., El Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua) struggled to do so.170 Limited federal support from underfunded border health entities and disjointed national travel restrictions and vaccine policies added to the challenges faced by local officials in binational communities.171 At the 2023 NALS, a key deliverable included revising the 2021 NAPAPI to better respond to health threats.172 Outlook U.S.-Mexico relations are likely to be tested in 2023 by ongoing tension in security and energy relations and by U.S. concerns over human rights, the weakening of Mexico’s democratic institutions, and the military’s growing role in Mexico’s economy and society. Most experts maintain the best way for both countries to address these challenges is to continue working together and with Canada to ensure the best possible outcomes for North America. A series of high-level meetings in 2022 and thus far in 2023 have kept dialogue open between the Biden and López Obrador administrations. Nevertheless, tough U.S. congressional criticism of Mexico’s inability to address fentanyl trafficking and Mexican criticism of U.S. intervention and violations of Mexican sovereignty have caused renewed tension. In addition, bilateral cooperation may falter as both countries convene presidential elections in 2024. Congress is likely to maintain significant interest in Mexico, with trade, security, drug policy, migration, health, and environmental issues as probable areas of funding and oversight efforts. 170 Barbara Jiménez and Justine Kozo, “The Development of a Collaborative Binational Strategy to Support the San Diego-Tijuana Transborder Community During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Front Public Health, vol. 10, July 2022; Martha Pskowski and Lauren Villagran, “'Too Many People Died for Us to Walk Away’: Renewed U.S., Mexico Cooperation Vital to Saving Lives in Next Pandemic,” El Paso Times, March 24, 2022. 171 Ibid. 172 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023. Congressional Research Service 32 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Appendix A. Key Justice Institutions Key Institutions for Strengthening the Rule of Law New Criminal Justice System. By the mid-2000s, most Mexican legal experts had concluded that reforming Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system was crucial for combating criminality and strengthening the rule of law. In June 2008, Mexico implemented constitutional reforms mandating that by 2016, trial procedures at the federal and state levels had to move from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a judge to an adversarial public trial system, with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. These changes aimed to create a new, more transparent, impartial, and efficient criminal justice system. Under then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico technically met the June 2016 deadline for adopting the new system, with states that received technical assistance from the United States showing, on average, better results than others. Nevertheless, problems in implementation occurred and public opinion turned against the system, as judges released criminals due to flawed police investigations or weak cases presented by prosecutors. According to the World Justice Project, the new system has produced better courtroom infrastructure, more capable judges, and faster case resolution than the old system, but more training for police and prosecutors is needed. President López Obrador has not dedicated significant resources to strengthening the justice system. His administration attempted to implement some reforms, including mandatory pretrial detention for more crimes, which would have contradicted the new system’s goals. Mexico’s Supreme Court struck down those reforms. Building an Independent Prosecutor General’s Office. Analysts who study Mexico’s legal system have long highlighted the inefficiency of the attorney general’s office (known as the PGR). The PGR struggled with limited resources, corruption, and a lack of political wil to resolve high-profile cases, including those involving corruption or human rights abuses. Many civil society groups that pushed for the new criminal justice system also lobbied the Mexican Congress to create an independent prosecutor’s office. Amid petitions from civil society organizations, Mexico’s senate was to appoint an independent individual to lead the new prosecutor general’s office for a nine-year term under 2014 constitutional reforms. President López Obrador downplayed the importance of the new office during his campaign, but Mexico’s Congress established the office, now known as the Prosecutor General’s Office (FGR), after López Obrador’s inauguration. In January 2019, Mexico’s senate named Dr. Alejandro Gertz Manero, a close associate and former security adviser to López Obrador, as prosecutor general. Gertz Manero directed prosecutors to focus on emblematic cases, but few have progressed. Critics maintain Gertz Manergo has been slow to implement the reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress to strengthen the FGR. National Anti-corruption System. In July 2016, Mexico’s Congress approved legislation that contained several proposals put forth by civil society to ful y implement the National Anti-corruption System (NAS) created by a 2015 constitutional reform. The legislation gave the NAS investigative and prosecutorial powers and a civilian board of directors; increased administrative and criminal penalties for corruption; and required three declarations (taxes, assets, and conflicts of interest) from public officials and contractors. Under the Peña Nieto government, federal implementation of the NAS lagged and state-level implementation varied. In February 2019, Prosecutor General Gertz Manero named a special anti-corruption prosecutor, who received a significant budget for 2020 and 2021 amid generalized budget cuts for the institution. Cases involving corruption in the social development ministry and corrupt payments from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to the head of Petróleos de México (Pemex) during the Peña Nieto administration are moving forward. However, some 500 reports of corruption referred to the FGR by the Ministry of Public Administration in the current administration have yet to be presented before a judge. In January 2022, the López Obrador administration proposed to eliminate NAS’s technical support arm charged with evaluating the country’s anti-corruption activities as part of a larger consolidation strategy to reduce public spending. Sources: Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final Countdown to Implementation, Justice in Mexico, October 2015; World Justice Project México, Mexico’s New Criminal Justice System: Substantial Progress and Persistent Challenges, June 2018; “AMLO Asegura que Respetará Decisión de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa por Defraudación Fiscal,” El Economista, October 26, 2021; Arturo Angel, “Gertz en Tres Años con FGR: Despidos, Opacidad e Incumpliendo Plazos de su Propia Ley,” Animal Político, January 27, 2022; and Jorge Monroy, Pedro Vil a y Caña y Alberto Morales, “Va AMLO por Fusionar 16 órganos en Dependencias,” El Universal, January 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 33 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 38 Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations Appendix B. Mérida Initiative Funding Table B-1. Estimated Mérida/Bicentennial Framework Funding: FY2008-FY2022
(in millions of dollars) (in millions of dollars)
Account
ESF
INCLE
FMF
Total
FY2008 FY2008
20.0 20.0
263.5 263.5
116.5 116.5
400.0
FY2009 FY2009
15.0 15.0
406.0 406.0
39.0 39.0
460.0
FY2010 FY2010
9.0 9.0
365.0 365.0
265.2 265.2
639.2
FY2011 FY2011
18.0 18.0
117.0 117.0
8.0 8.0
143.0
FY2012 FY2012
33.3 33.3
248.5 248.5
Not app. Not app.
281.8
FY2013 FY2013
32.1 32.1
190.1 190.1
Not app. Not app.
222.2
FY2014 FY2014
35.0 35.0
143.1 143.1
Not app. Not app.
178.1
FY2015 FY2015
33.6 33.6
110.0 110.0
Not app. Not app.
143.6
FY2016 FY2016
39.0 39.0
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
139.0
FY2017 FY2017
40. 40.9a
90.0 90.0
Not app. Not app.
130.9
FY2018 FY2018
39. 39.0b
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
139.0
FY2019 FY2019
39. 39.0c
110.0 110.0
Not app. Not app.
149.0
FY2020 FY2020
33. 33.0d
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
133.0
FY2021 FY2021
50. 50.0e0
100.0 100.0
Not app. Not app.
150.0
FY2022 FY2022
50. 50.0f
~~100~~0e 64.0 .0
Not Not. app. app.
~~150~~114.0
Total
486.9
2,543.2
428.7
~~3,458.8~~
3,458.8 FY2023 req. 75.0 64.0 Not. app. 139.0 FY2024 req. 60.7 64.0 Not. app. 124.7 Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, November 3, 2016; U.S. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, November 3, 2016; U.S.
Department of State, November 18, 2016; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 117-103; U.S. Department of State, Department of State, November 18, 2016; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 117-103; U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2022; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94;
Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; and Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103. Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; and Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; FMF = ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; FMF =
Foreign Military Financing. FY2008-FY2010 included supplemental funding. Foreign Military Financing. FY2008-FY2010 included supplemental funding.
a. For FY2017, Mérida programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) a. For FY2017, Mérida programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
were funded through the Development Assistance account rather than ESF. were funded through the Development Assistance account rather than ESF.
b. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs. b. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
c. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs. c. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
d. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $13 mil ion wil be used to support non-d. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $13 mil ion wil be used to support non-
Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #71, December Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #71, December
16, 2020. 16, 2020.
e. e. ~~Congress appropriated $50 mil ion in ESF for Mexico in P.L. 116-6, but USAID has yet to notify Congress~~
~~on how much of those funds wil support Mérida Initiative programs.~~
f.
~~Congress appropriated $50 mil ion in ESF for Mexico in P.L. 117-103, but USAID has yet to notify Congress~~
~~on how much of those funds wil support Mérida Initiative programs.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

36Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $18 mil ion wil be used to support non- Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #193, July 18, 2022. f. A portion of the funds appropriated wil support programs related to clean energy and sustainable landscapes. Congressional Research Service 34

Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke Clare Ribando Seelke
~~Joshua Klein~~
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs
~~Presidential Management Fellow~~

Acknowledgments
This report contains significant contributions from Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; This report contains significant contributions from Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy;
Stephen P. Mulligan, Legislative Attorney; Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; and Stephen P. Mulligan, Legislative Attorney; Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; and
Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy. Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy.

Disclaimer
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