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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
March March 10, 20229, 2023
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Kristin Archick
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Specialist in European Specialist in European
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Affairs Affairs
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has

reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK

( (unionists). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish, and many desire a ). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish, and many desire a
united Ireland (united Ireland (nationalists). ).
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In
recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, human rights, and addressing human rights, and addressing
Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past). Some Members also are concerned about how ). Some Members also are concerned about how
Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland. —the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement.
The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional
status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with
the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from
London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK
security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners. security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, full implementation ofimplementing the peace agreement proved challenging. In the peace agreement has been difficult. For
years, decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that generated instability in the devolved government. In
2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated 2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated
with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, howeverwith the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however. In
2017, the devolved government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed, prompting snap Assembly elections. It took nearly
three years to form a new devolved government in early 2020. In early February 2022, Northern Ireland First Minister Paul
Givan (of the DUP) resigned amid DUP unhappiness with the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations to resolve problems with
the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. Givan’s resignation froze the work of the Executive. Regularly scheduled
Assembly elections are to be held on May 5, 2022, but forming a new devolved government after the elections could be
difficult amid ongoing challenges related to Brexit or if Sinn Fein were to surpass the DUP to become the largest party in the
next Assembly (as some polls suggest). Northern Ireland also faces a number of issues, and Brexit and other contentious issues have hindered the functioning of Northern Ireland’s government in recent years. Assembly elections took place in May 2022, but the DUP has blocked the work of the Assembly and prevented the formation of a new Executive to protest the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. As the 25th anniversary of the peace accord approaches in April 2023, addressing Brexit-related concerns and restoring the devolved government are key priorities. Other issues facing Northern Ireland in its search for peace and reconciliation include in its search for peace and
reconciliation, including reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary
and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market
and customs union, the and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping promote land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping promote
peace and a dynamic cross-border economy. The UK and the EU ultimately agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs peace and a dynamic cross-border economy. The UK and the EU ultimately agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs
arrangements for Northern Ireland to retain this open border in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Implementation of the arrangements for Northern Ireland to retain this open border in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Implementation of the
protocol—which began in January 2021—protocol—which began in January 2021—has led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UKled to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK,
exacerbated a sense among unionists that their British identity is under threat, and contributed to heightened tensions in the
region. The UK government and the DUP have called for significant changes to the Northern Ireland protocol; the EU rejects
renegotiating the protocol but asserts it is committed to mitigating the trade disruptions and has offered several proposals to
address operational difficulties. UK-EU negotiations aimed at resolving the protocol’s implementation challenges remain
ongoing in 2022, but progress has been slow. and exacerbated tensions in the region. In late February 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—that seeks to resolve challenges posed by the protocol. The Windsor Framework still must be formally adopted. The DUP has not decided whether it will accept the new framework and agree to enter into a new power-sharing government with Sinn Fein. Brexit also has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status Brexit also has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status
and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others for a and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others for a border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain , or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain
part of the UK. Also see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mixpart of the UK or join Ireland. .
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
The 1998 Peace Agreement ............................................................................................................. 2
Key Elements ............................................................................................................................ 2
Implementation ......................................................................................................................... 3
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions .............................................................................. 3
Decommissioning ............................................................................................................... 4
Policing ............................................................................................................................... 4
Security Normalization ....................................................................................................... 5
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity ............................................................... 5

Initiatives to Further the Peace Process ........................................................................................... 6
Ongoing Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil ....................................................................... 7
2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government ........................................................................ 7
DUP Leadership Changes and the Current Political Crisis ....................................................... 9
Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in Spring 2021 .............................................................. 10The May 2022 Assembly Election: Outcome and Aftermath .................................................... 8
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process ...................................................................................... 11 10
Sectarian Divisions ................................................................................................................... 11 10
Dealing with the Past .............................................................................................................. 13. 11
Stormont House Agreement Provisions ............................................................................ 14
New UK Government Proposals 12 The May 2022 Troubles Bill .......................................................................................... 15... 13
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity ........................................................... 1615
Paramilitary Concerns ....................................................................................................... 1615
The Dissident Threat ......................................................................................................... 1815
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity .................................................................... 1816
Implications of Brexit .................................................................................................................... 2017
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement ................................................................... 2018
Post-Brexit Arrangements forin the Northern Ireland ..................Protocol .............................................. 20
Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions ........................ 19 The Protocol’s Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions ............................. 21
Ongoing Negotiations .....19 The Windsor Framework .................................................................................................. 2421
Economic Concerns ................................................................................................................ 2624
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects ..................................................................... 2725
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests ........................................................................................ 2926
Support for the Peace Process ................................................................................................. 2926
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland .................................................................................... 3028
International Fund for Ireland ................................................................................................. 3129

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland ............................................ 2

Tables
Table 1. Northern Ireland: Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) 2022 Election Results ........................................................... 8................. 9

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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 3230

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Overview
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the
Troubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map inTroubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map in Figure 1).1 At its 1 At its
core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities.
Protestants in Northern Ireland Protestants in Northern Ireland (48% of the population) largely define themselves as British and largely define themselves as British and
support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (unionists). Most Catholics in ). Most Catholics in
Northern Ireland Northern Ireland (45% of the population) consider themselves Irish, and many Catholics desire a consider themselves Irish, and many Catholics desire a
united Ireland (united Ireland (nationalists). In the past, more militant unionists (). In the past, more militant unionists (loyalists) and more militant ) and more militant
nationalists (nationalists (republicans) were willing to use force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2 ) were willing to use force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2
Results from the 2021 census, released in September 2022, indicate that for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, more people in Northern Ireland are from a Catholic background (45.7% of the population) than from a Protestant background (43.5% of the population).3 The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights, Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights,
housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists, housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists,
loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans. loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans.
Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on
the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between
1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government). 1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government).
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to
the conflict in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate the conflict in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s special Majority Leader George Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s special
adviser on Ireland. After many ups and downs, the UK and Irish governments and the Northern adviser on Ireland. After many ups and downs, the UK and Irish governments and the Northern
Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10, Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10,
1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was 1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was
concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.34
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement, Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
implementation of the peace accord has been challenging. Tensions implementation of the peace accord has been challenging. Tensions and distrust persist among Northern persist among Northern
Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more broadly. Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more broadly.
Northern Ireland Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society and continues to grapple with a number of continues to grapple with a number of
issues in its search for peace and reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and issues in its search for peace and reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and
addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past) is ) is
particularly controversial. Many analysts assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is
fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in January 2020—or Brexit—has
added to divisions within Northern Ireland, as highlighted by the riots and unrest that erupted in
parts of Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Brexit continues to pose challenges
for Northern Ireland’s peace process and economy, has renewed questions about Northern

particularly controversial. Many analysts 1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in 1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally
declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland, declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland,
with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of
Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the
remaining one-sixth of the island. remaining one-sixth of the island.
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as 2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as Ulster. Technically and . Technically and
historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland. historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
3 3 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, “Northern Ireland 2021 Census Results,” at https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/2021-census/results/main-statistics. 4 The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name
Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the
peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized
in the United States. in the United States.
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2020—or Brexit—has added to divisions within Northern Ireland, renewed questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK, and Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK, and is contributing to heightened contributed to political political
instability within Northern Ireland’s devolved governmentinstability in the power-sharing institutions. As the 25th anniversary of the peace accord approaches in April 2023, addressing concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland and restoring a functioning devolved government are key priorities. .
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the supported the
Northern Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday Northern Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, as well as subsequent accords and initiatives to further the peace processAgreement, as well as subsequent accords and initiatives to further the peace process and promote
long-term reconciliation. Some Members have been particularly interested in police reforms and . Some Members have been particularly interested in police reforms and
human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided development aid human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided development aid
through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development
and foster reconciliation. Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in and foster reconciliation. Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in how
Brexit will affect Northern Ireland in the years aheadBrexit’s implications for Northern Ireland. .
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland

Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017). Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).
The 1998 Peace Agreement
Key Elements
The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political
settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the
UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the consent principle——
that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority
Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 8 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests of Northern Ireland’s people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the of Northern Ireland’s people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the
agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a
majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in
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Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding
obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for
future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant. future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power (known as power (known as Strand One). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several ). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several
issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary
weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of
prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious. Experts assert prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious. Experts assert
that the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity” on such issues. that the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity” on such issues.
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
((Strand Two and and Strand Three, respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two , respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two
strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and
southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-
Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises
representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland,
Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Implementation
Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in
separate referendums on May 22, 1998separate referendums on May 22, 1998. Although considerable progress has been made in
implementing the agreement, the process has been arduous, but implementing the agreement was difficult. For years, decommissioning and . For years, decommissioning and
police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in Northern Ireland’s police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government. devolved government. SporadicOngoing sectarian strife and sporadic violence from dissident republican and loyalist violence from dissident republican and loyalist paramilitary
groups that refused to accept the peace process groups that refused to accept the peace process and sectarian strife also helped to feedalso fed mistrust mistrust
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties. between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement mandated power-sharing in the devolved government between unionists and nationalists and called for establishing a new Northern Ireland called for establishing a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive. To ensure Assembly and Executive. To ensure that neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the
108-member AssemblyAssembly (of 108 members at the time), the agreement , the agreement specifiedrequired that “key decisions” that “key decisions” must receive cross-receive cross-
community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly members). community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly members).
The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other ministers The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other ministers
with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be allocated to with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be allocated to
political parties according to party strength in the Assembly. political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.
The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The
devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, did not follow promptly because of
unionist concerns about decommissioning, or the paramilitaries’ surrender of their weapons.
was delayed by unionist concerns about the status of weapons decommissioning. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority over local affairs was transferred to the Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority over local affairs was transferred to the
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December 1999. Over the next few years, the issue Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December 1999. Over the next few years, the issue
of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—contributed to the of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—contributed to the
suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of direct rule from London several suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of direct rule from London several
times between 2000 and 2002. (See times between 2000 and 2002. (See “Decommissioning,” below.) ” below.)
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In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was
restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which
strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the
staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA.staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA.4 The DUP and Sinn
Fein have been the largest unionist and nationalist parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland since
2003. The 2007 DUP-Sinn Fein deal paved the way for greater stability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government over the next decade.5 Regularly scheduled Assembly elections in 2011 and Regularly scheduled Assembly elections in 2011 and
2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led by the DUP and Sinn Fein. 2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led by the DUP and Sinn Fein.
At the same time, tensions persisted within the devolved government and between the unionist
and nationalist communities. VariousAt the same time, various incidents—including protests in 2012 and 2013 over the use incidents—including protests in 2012 and 2013 over the use
of flags and emblemsof flags and emblems, a 2014 dispute over welfare reform, and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein
leader in connection with the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the leader in connection with the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the
devolved government’s devolved government’s stability. Brexit and other contentious issues led to the collapse of the power-sharing institutions between 2017 and 2020, and again in February 2022 (as of early March 2023, thestability. Following the collapse of the devolved government and snap
Assembly elections in 2017, divisions over Brexit and other contentious issues largely stalled
negotiations on forming a new devolved devolved government has not yet been restored; see “Ongoing Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil”).government for almost three years. (See “2017-2020
Crisis in the Devolved Government,”
below.)
Decommissioning
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold
office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded
or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its
weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as
tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls. tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls.
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to
pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”56 In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had
put all of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable put all of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable
matched estimates provided by the security forces.matched estimates provided by the security forces.67 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning The IICD also confirmed decommissioning
by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011. by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.
Policing
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between
unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was
established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92% established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92%
Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and
human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in
fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent
commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers
(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.8 For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI 5
4 Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps Cherished Prize,” Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps Cherished Prize,” Irish Times, March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI , March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI
Politics Moves Away from Edge,” BBC News, May 8, 2007. Politics Moves Away from Edge,” BBC News, May 8, 2007.
56 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005. “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005.
67 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005. Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005.
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI
introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.7
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI
8 See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf. Congressional Research Service 4 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007, and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007,
however, however, as part of the process to restore the devolved government, Sinn Fein members voted to Sinn Fein members voted to
support the police and join the Policing Board. support the police and join the Policing Board. Experts viewed Sinn Fein’s decision Sinn Fein’s decision was seen as historic, as historic,
given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. In 2010, the DUP and Sinn given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. In 2010, the DUP and Sinn
Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve policing and justice powers Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve policing and justice powers
from London to Belfast (on which the parties had been unable to agree at the time of the Good
Friday Agreement’s signing)from London to Belfast. .
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded.
Officials asserted that the 50-50 process, with officials asserting that it had fulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commission fulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commission
(including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).(including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).89 Concerns persist, however, that Concerns persist, however, that
not enough Catholics are seeking to join the PSNI (due to both lingering suspicions about the not enough Catholics are seeking to join the PSNI (due to both lingering suspicions about the
police within the Catholic/nationalist community and fears that Catholic police recruits may be police within the Catholic/nationalist community and fears that Catholic police recruits may be
targeted by targeted by dissident republicans). As of late 2021, Catholic officers made up 32% of the PSNI’s roughly 7,000 officers. Budget constraints are expected to freeze recruitment in general and lead to a reduction in the overall size of the PSNI in 2023 (to about 6,700) and in the years ahead.10dissident republicans). In 2017, the PSNI introduced a number of procedural changes
to help attract more Catholics (and more women). Catholic officers currently make up 32% of the
PSNI’s roughly 7,000 officers.9
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement called for “as early a return as possible to normal security The Good Friday Agreement called for “as early a return as possible to normal security
arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security installations. In February arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security installations. In February
2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July 2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July
2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a 2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a
regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no
longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide. longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality, In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern
Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission
for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area
of human rights and equalityof human rights and equality. They and argue that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights argue that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights. Consideration for a Bill of Rights was
(consideration of which is provided for in the Good Friday Agreement provided for in the Good Friday Agreement) and a stand-alone Irish
Language Act to give the Irish language the same official status as English in Northern Ireland.
The Good Friday Agreement , but the issue has long been controversial and consensus on the way forward—between unionists and nationalists, as well as with the UK government—remains elusive. The Good Friday Agreement also calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and support for the Irish language (Gaelic). Giving Gaelic the same official status as English and calls for a stand-alone Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland, however, were sensitive issues for many unionists. The 2020 deal to restore the power-sharing institutions included a compromise to recognize Gaelic as an official language in Northern Ireland and promote its use while also protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English that many unionists consider important to their heritage). In October 2022, the UK Parliament approved legislation enacting the language and cultural measures agreed in 2020 into law.11 9 “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” BBC News, March 28, 2011. 10 Julian O’Neill, “Catholic Recruitment an Issue as PSNI Turns 20,” BBC News, November 2, 2021; “PSNI Cuts Number of Police to Lowest Level Ever,” BBC News, January 26, 2023. 11 The Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Act 2022 received royal assent in December 2022. Enda McClafferty, “Irish Language and Ulster Scots Bill Clears Final Hurdle in Parliament,” BBC News, October 26, 2022calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
support for the Irish language. The subsequent St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 provided for an
Irish Language Act, but this issue remains controversial (see text box, “Language and Cultural
Issues,” below).

7 See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern
Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
8 “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” BBC News, March 28, 2011.
9 Deborah McAleese, “Top Officer’s ‘Deep Concern’ at Lack of Catholics Signing Up for Police Career in Northern
Ireland,” Belfast Telegraph, October 23, 2015; Vincent Kearney, “PSNI Aims to Recruit 300 New Officers,” BBC
News, October 23, 2017; Julian O’Neill, “Catholic Recruitment an Issue as PSNI Turns 20,” BBC News, November 2,
2021. .
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Initiatives to Further the Peace Process
Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish
governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation. governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation.
Major endeavors include the following: Major endeavors include the following:
  The 2013 Haass Initiative. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most
divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.1012 In particular, Haass was tasked with In particular, Haass was tasked with
making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of
parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass
released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was
unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.1113
  The 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In 2014, financial pressures and In 2014, financial pressures and
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments
convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing
structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the
resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland
political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating
measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the
public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive
departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included
measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements
over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled
implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.1214
  The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. In November 2015, the UK and Irish In November 2015, the UK and Irish
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare
reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s
budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the
Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election
after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments, after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments,
and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start
Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the
parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to
deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing
concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein
official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.1315

1012 Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003 Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003; he is
currently president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations.
11. 13 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf. http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf.
1214 The Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house- The Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-
agreement. agreement.
1315 The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,” The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,”
November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland. November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland.
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link to page 12 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

Ongoing Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns
remain about the stability of Northern Ireland’s remain about the stability of Northern Ireland’s devolved governmentpower-sharing institutions and the fragility of and the fragility of
community relations. community relations. As notedIn January 2017, the devolved government collapsed , the devolved government collapsed in January 2017 amid
heightened tensions related to Brexit and other issuesamid a scandal over a renewable energy program, differences between the DUP and Sinn Fein on a potential Irish Language Act and the legalization of same-sex marriage (Sinn Fein supported both measures, whereas the DUP opposed them), and unease in Northern Ireland over Brexit in the wake of the June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Snap Assembly elections were held in . Snap Assembly elections were held in
March 2017. It took nearly three years—until January 2020—to reestablish the devolved March 2017. It took nearly three years—until January 2020—to reestablish the devolved
government,government, based on a new power-sharing agreement (known as “New Decade, New Approach”) and led by then-First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and Deputy First Minister led by then-First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and Deputy First Minister
Michelle O’Neill of Sinn Michelle O’Neill of Sinn Fein. The new power-sharing deal addressed a number of key issues, including health, education, language and cultural issues, and the sustainability of Northern Ireland’s political institutions.16Fein.
Since then, the devolved government has been tested by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID- Since then, the devolved government has been tested by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19) pandemic and by challenges due to the implementation of the post-Brexit trade and customs 19) pandemic and by challenges due to the implementation of the post-Brexit trade and customs
rules for Northern Ireland, which rules for Northern Ireland, which many unionists view as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest
of the UK (i.e., Great Britain). The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland also have
prompted political turmoil within the DUP. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader at
the end of May 2021 and as first minister in June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became the leader
of the DUP in late June (the DUP’s second new leader in a month). Paul Givan, a DUP member
of the Assembly, succeeded Foster as first minister but resigned from this position in early
February 2022, amid ongoing DUP opposition to the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern
Ireland. The next regularly scheduled Assembly elections are due to be held on May 5, 2022. (See
“DUP Leadership Changes and the Current Political Crisis,” below.)
2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government
In January 2017, several contentious regional issues—including a scandal over a renewable
energy program—and unease in Northern Ireland over Brexit in the wake of the June 2016 UK
referendum on EU membership prompted the collapse of the devolved government. Other points
of tension included the introduction of a potential Irish Language Act and the legalization of
same-sex marriage; Sinn Fein supported both measures, whereas the DUP opposed them. New
Assembly elections were called for March 2, 2017.
As seen in Table 1, the number of Assembly seats contested in 2017 was 90 rather than 108
(contested in the regularly scheduled 2016 elections), because of a previously agreed reduction in
the size of the Assembly. The DUP retained the largest number of seats in 2017, but Sinn Fein
was regarded as the biggest winner, given its success in reducing the previous gap between the
two parties from 10 seats to 1 seat. A high voter turnout of almost 65%—fueled by anger over the
energy scandal and a perceived lack of concern from London about Brexit’s impact on Northern
Ireland—appears to have favored Sinn Fein and the cross-community Alliance Party. For the first
time in the Assembly, the unionist parties did not win a collective majority (a largely symbolic
status because of the power-sharing rules but highly emblematic for the unionist community).14
Following the March 2017 elections, negotiations on forming a new devolved government
repeatedly stalled between the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the other main political parties (see text box,
“Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland,” below). A key sticking point was a potential Irish
Language Act. Divisions over Brexit exacerbated tensions. The DUP was the only major Northern
Ireland political party to back Brexit, which Sinn Fein and the other main Northern Ireland parties
strongly opposed.

14 Sinead O’Shea, “Northern Ireland, Forced by Sinn Fein, Sets Early Election in Shadow of Brexit,” New York Times,
January 16, 2017; Harry McGee, “DUP Smarting from Close Encounter with Sinn Fein Crocodile,” Irish Times, March
3, 2017; Enda McClafferty, “Assembly Election a Brutal Result for Unionism,” BBC News, March 4, 2017.
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seek to preserve an open border on the island of Ireland while also respecting the rules of the EU single market and customs union. Set out in a protocol to the UK’s withdrawal agreement with the EU, many unionists view the post-Brexit arrangements as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK (i.e., Great Britain) and endangering the UK’s constitutional integrity. Implementation of the protocol—which began in January 2021—has led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and has contributed to heightened tensions. (See “Implications of Brexit,” below.) Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit arrangements appear to have exacerbated unionist concerns that their British identity is under threat. These arrangements may have been a factor in the violence and rioting that erupted in several cities and towns across Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Much of this rioting was carried out by young people and was concentrated in economically disadvantaged communities where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence. Some analysts suggest that strong rhetoric against the protocol from unionist politicians may have contributed to instigating the unrest. At the same time, the violence followed a decision in late March 2021 against prosecuting violations of social distancing restrictions at a large funeral in 2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. For many unionists, this incident reinforced their long-standing views of a double standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists. Frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people, also may have factored into the rioting.17 Although the DUP backed Brexit (it was the only major Northern Ireland political party to do so), the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland prompted political turmoil within the DUP in 2021. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader at the end of May 2021 and as first minister in June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, a DUP member of the UK Parliament, became the leader of the DUP in late June 2021 (the DUP’s second new leader in a month). Paul Givan, a DUP member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, succeeded Foster as first minister. 16 Government of the UK, New Decade, New Approach, January 9, 2020, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf. 17 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,” Politico, April 7, 2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,” New York Times, April 8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 13 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests In early February 2022, First Minister Givan resigned to protest the Northern Ireland protocol and the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations on resolving difficulties with the protocol. Givan’s resignation also forced Deputy First Minister O’Neill to step down. The first minister and deputy first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns, the other also ceases to hold office. As a result, the Northern Ireland Executive was unable to meet or make decisions (although the Northern Ireland Assembly was able to continue working on legislation already in progress).18 Regularly scheduled Assembly elections were held on May 5, 2022; as of early March 2023, the DUP has prevented the formation of a new devolved government due to objections to the Northern Ireland protocol. The May 2022 Assembly Election: Outcome and Aftermath In the May 2022 Assembly election, for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, Sinn Fein won the largest number of seats in the 90-member Assembly and surpassed the DUP as the largest party in the Assembly (see Table 1). Decreased support for the DUP appeared to be driven by dissatisfaction with the party’s leadership on Brexit and internal party divisions. Sinn Fein strongly supports a united Ireland but centered its election campaign on everyday concerns, such as the rising costs of living and health care. The smaller, cross-community Alliance Party made significant gains, attributed to voter frustration with Northern Ireland’s identity politics and frequent instability in the power-sharing institutions.19 Voter turnout was 63%. (Also see text box, “Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland,” below.) Since the election, the DUP has blocked the work of the Assembly and the Executive to exert pressure on the UK government to address unionist objections to the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol. The DUP maintains it will not agree to establish a new power-sharing government until the problems with the Northern Ireland protocol are resolved. Sinn Fein and other nationalists generally support the protocol as necessary to maintain an open border on the island of Ireland in light of Brexit. The UK government has twice extended the deadline for forming a new devolved government to avoid calling a new Assembly election.20 On February 27, 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement—known as the Windsor Framework—that seeks to resolve challenges posed by the Northern Ireland protocol. The Windsor Framework still must be formally adopted; the DUP has not decided whether it will accept the new framework and enter into a new power-sharing government. (See “Implications of Brexit” and “The Windsor Framework,” below). A range of social and economic policy divisions between the DUP and Sinn Fein could further complicate restoring Northern Ireland’s devolved government. Another potential issue relates to the roles of first minister and deputy first minister. Having won the largest number of Assembly seats in the May 2022 election, Sinn Fein would be entitled to the position of first minister based on those results. Although the roles of first minister and deputy first minister are equal, a Sinn Fein first minister would be highly symbolic in light of the party’s history and its support for Irish unification. The position of first minister has always been held by a unionist party, and the DUP may face pressure (both from within the DUP and from other unionists) against filling the deputy 18 Jayne McCormack, “Givan Resignation Triggers Fresh Political Crisis in NI,” BBC News, February 3, 2022. 19 NPR.org, “Sinn Fein Celebrates an Historic Election Win in Northern Ireland,” May 7, 2022; Mark Landler, “As Britain Turned Away from EU, Northern Ireland Turned to Sinn Fein,” New York Times, May 7, 2022; Mark Devenport, “How Alliance Number Nerds Turned Single Digits into a Surge,” BBC News, May 9, 2022. 20 Jayne McCormack, “Stormont Assembly Election Delayed by up to a Year,” BBC News, February10, 2023; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Heartless: DUP Blocks Stormont from Passing Organ Donation Law to Aid 6-Year-Old,” Politico, February 14, 2023. Congressional Research Service 8 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests first minister post alongside a Sinn Fein first minister. Meanwhile, the Alliance Party argues for reforming the devolved government’s power-sharing rules to promote greater stability and reflect growing support for nonsectarian parties.21 Table 1. Northern Ireland 2022 Election Results Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) Political Party # of Seats +/- Seats Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing) 27 — Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative) 25 -3 Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal) 17 +9 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right) 9 -1 Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center- -4 left) 8 Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing) 1 — People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing) 1 — Independent (unionist) 2 +1 Source: BBC News, “Northern Ireland Assembly Election Results 2022,” at https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2022/northern-ireland/results. Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. In late June 2021, fol owing a period of political turmoil within the party, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became leader of the DUP. Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in Northern Ireland and Ireland (with members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein, replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neil has led Sinn Fein in the Northern Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. Doug Beattie has led the UUP since May 2021. Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015. Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political orientation. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016. 21 Gerry Moriarty, “Significantly and Symbolically Damaging Election for Unionism,” Irish Times, May 7, 2022; “Northern Ireland Election Results 2022: Who Are the Alliance Party and What Do They Stand For?,” BBC News, May 8, 2022; Paul Lawlor, “Brexit: Protocol Deal No Guarantee of Stormont Return, Says Irish PM,” BBC News, January 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 9 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process Nearly 25 years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the past remains ever-present in Northern Ireland and the search for peace and reconciliation remains challenging. Difficult issues include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems), dealing with Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence, addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity, and furthering economic development and equality. Sectarian Divisions Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and Catholic communities existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities. In March 2022, despite some opposition from the DUP and other stakeholders, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation to increase the number of integrated school places and establish targets for the number of children educated in integrated schools.22 In some areas in Northern Ireland, peace walls separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods. Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s Departments of Justice and Housing have responsibility for the majority of peace walls (currently around 60), Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

Table 1. Northern Ireland: Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
2016 and 2017 election results
Political Party
2016
2017
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
38
28
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
28
27
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-left)
12
12
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
16
10
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
8
8
Green Party (nonsectarian; left-wing)
2
2
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
2
1
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
1
1
Independent (unionist)
1
1
Total
108
90
Sources: BBC, “NI Election 2016: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/
results, and BBC, “NI Election 2017: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/ni2017/results.
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since
2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom. The party
initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists as a
net loss for unionists. Social y conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. In late June 2021,
fol owing a period of political turmoil within the party, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became leader of the DUP.
Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a
united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in Northern Ireland and Ireland (with
members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political
party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received
considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein,
replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neil has led Sinn Fein in the Northern
Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader.
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the
UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. In May 2021, the
UUP elected Doug Beattie as its leader.
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that
supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the
negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015.
Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political
orientation. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
In December 2019, the UK and Irish governments launched a new round of talks with the main
political parties aimed at reestablishing the devolved government. These negotiations followed a
UK snap general election, in which Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party won a
convincing parliamentary majority. The 2019 election results negated the DUP’s influence in the
UK Parliament and thus improved the prospects for restoring Northern Ireland’s government.15

15 Padraic Halpin, “UK Election Clears Way for Northern Ireland Devolution, Dublin Says,” Reuters, December 13,
2019; Annabelle Dickson, “Northern Ireland’s Post-election Refocus,” Politico, December 16, 2019.
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On January 10, 2020, the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the other parties agreed to a deal put forward by
the UK and Irish governments to reestablish the devolved government. The new power-sharing
agreement, known as New Decade, New Approach, is wide-ranging and addresses a number of
key issues, including health, education, and measures to improve the sustainability of Northern
Ireland’s political institutions. The deal did not include a stand-alone Irish Language Act, as
initially demanded by Sinn Fein, but essentially sought to strike a compromise to promote the use
of the Irish (Gaelic) language while protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language
similar to English). Most of the agreed language and culture provisions remain to be enacted in
legislation (see text box, “Language and Cultural Issues,” below).16
DUP Leadership Changes and the Current Political Crisis
In late April 2021, DUP dissatisfaction with then-First Minister Foster’s leadership over Brexit
and other controversies prompted her to announce that she would step down as DUP party leader
at the end of May and as First Minister in June. In May 2021, the DUP chose Northern Ireland
Agriculture Minister Edwin Poots as its new leader. Poots announced that he did not intend to
serve as first minister and chose a close ally, Paul Givan, to become first minister.
Foster officially resigned as first minister on June 14, 2021. Under the devolved government’s
power-sharing rules, Foster’s resignation also forced Deputy First Minister O’Neill to step down.
The first minister and deputy first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns,
the other also ceases to hold office. Following these resignations, the DUP and Sinn Fein had
seven days to nominate replacements for these positions under rules in effect at the time.
Sinn Fein indicated it would refuse to renominate O’Neill as deputy first minister following
Foster’s resignation without progress in enacting into law the measures on the Irish language and
cultural issues previously agreed to in the 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal. On June 17,
2021, to avoid the prospect that the devolved government might collapse, the UK government and
Sinn Fein agreed to a timetable for the introduction of the Irish language and culture legislation
(see text box, “Language and Cultural Issues,” below). Poots backed this UK-Sinn Fein deal and
nominated Givan as first minister, despite concerns within the DUP about the language legislation
agreement and resulting DUP opposition to proceeding with Givan’s nomination. Although Givan
and O’Neill were confirmed as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively, DUP
unhappiness with Poots’s leadership forced him to announce his resignation as party leader.17
Sir Jeffrey Donaldson—a DUP member of the UK Parliament—replaced Poots as DUP party
leader on June 30, 2021. Donaldson asserted that his priority as DUP leader would be to “right the
wrong” imposed by the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.18 Givan remained as first
minister, although Donaldson expressed his intention to assume the role in the future.
On February 3, 2022, First Minister Givan resigned to protest the slow progress in UK-EU
negotiations aimed at resolving difficulties with the post-Brexit trade and customs rules for
Northern Ireland. With Givan’s resignation, Deputy First Minister O’Neill lost her position, too,
and the Northern Ireland Executive was unable to meet or make decisions. Under new legislation

16 Government of the UK, New Decade, New Approach, January 9, 2020, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf.
17 Colm Kelpie and Ciara Colhoun, “DUP Revolt over First Minister Confirmation,” BBC News, June 17, 2021.
18 Freya McClements, “Jeffrey Donaldson Ratified as DUP’s New Leader After Meeting of Executive,” Irish Times,
June 30, 2021.
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passed by the UK Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly was able to continue working on
legislation already in progress.19
Regularly scheduled Assembly elections are due to be held on May 5, 2022. Sinn Fein called for
the elections to be moved up in light of Givan’s resignation and the resulting freeze on the work
of the Executive, but the UK government ruled out an early election. DUP officials contend that it
could be “difficult” to form a new devolved government after the May elections if issues with the
post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland are not resolved. Some polls suggest Sinn Fein
may surpass the DUP in the May elections to become the largest party in the next Northern
Ireland Assembly; such an outcome also could pose challenges to forming a new government.20
Language and Cultural Issues
Sinn Fein and other nationalists have long demanded measures to promote and protect the Irish (Gaelic) language
in Northern Ireland. Divisions with unionists on this issue have posed political challenges for the devolved
government for years. As part of the January 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal to restore the devolved
government, the Northern Ireland political parties agreed to provide for the official recognition in Northern
Ireland of both the Irish language and the Ulster-Scots language (which many unionists consider important to their
heritage) and to allow the wider use of both languages in government settings. The deal also called for establishing
two new “language commissioners”—one for Irish and one for Ulster-Scots—to enhance, protect, and develop
each language and associated cultural traditions. Most of these language and cultural measures, however, remain to
be enacted. In June 2021, the UK government and Sinn Fein agreed the UK Parliament would introduce the
language and culture legislation in October 2021 if the Northern Ireland Assembly failed to do so by then. This
timetable has slipped, and the legislation has not been introduced in the Northern Ireland Assembly or in the UK
Parliament to date. UK officials assert that legislation wil be introduced in the UK Parliament before the Northern
Ireland Assembly elections in May 2022.
Sources: Shawn Pogatchnik, “Midnight Breakthrough Saves Northern Ireland Power-Sharing,” Politico, June 17,
2021; Robbie Meredith, “Irish Language Groups Urge Westminster Move-On for Legislation,” BBC News,
November 16, 2021; itv.com, “Government ‘Firmly Intends’ to Bring NI Language Legislation Before Election,”
February 9, 2022.
Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in Spring 2021
In late March and early April 2021, sporadic violence and rioting erupted for roughly 12 days in
several cities and towns in Northern Ireland, including Belfast and Londonderry (or Derry). The
unrest began with gangs of youths in a predominantly unionist/loyalist area of Londonderry on
March 29; rioting in Belfast on April 7—including attacks on police officers and a bus—was
described as some of the worst violence in Northern Ireland in years. Almost 90 police officers
were injured over the course of the violence.21
Much of the unrest was concentrated in economically disadvantaged communities where criminal
gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence, but the violence also spread to
interface areas between unionist and nationalist neighborhoods. Initial assessments suggested
loyalist paramilitaries could be orchestrating the riots and violence in some areas, but Northern
Ireland police authorities subsequently concluded that although individuals with ties to such

19 Jayne McCormack, “Givan Resignation Triggers Fresh Political Crisis in NI,” BBC News, February 3, 2022.
20 itv.com, “Sinn Fein Still on Course to be Northern Ireland’s Largest Party, Poll Suggests,” January 22, 2022; BBC
News, “DUP’s Donaldson Says Executive Return ‘Difficult’ If NI Protocol Remains,” February 5, 2022; Irish Times,
“UK Secretary for Northern Ireland Rules Out Early Stormont Election,” February 8, 2022; Irish Times, “Sinn Fein on
Course to be Largest Stormont Party, Says New Opinion Poll,” February 14, 2022.
21 Jordan Kenny, “Timeline: How Northern Ireland’s Violence Unfolded,” BBC News, April 12, 2021; “Belfast:
Rioting ‘Was Worst Seen in Northern Ireland in Years,’” BBC News, April 14, 2021.
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loyalist groups may have been involved, the groups did not sanction or organize the unrest.22 (See
“Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity,” below.) The Northern Ireland Assembly
unanimously condemned the violence, as did the UK and Irish governments.23
A complex combination of factors lies behind the unrest. Considerable attention has focused on
unionist unhappiness with the post-Brexit border and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland.
Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit
provisions appear to have exacerbated unionist concerns that their British identity is under threat
and enhanced a sense of unionist disenfranchisement and abandonment. Some analysts suggest
that strong rhetoric against the Brexit arrangements from unionist politicians may have further
fueled tensions in unionist/loyalist communities and contributed to instigating the unrest. (See
“Implications of Brexit,” below.)
At the same time, observers note that the immediate spark for the violence followed a decision in
late March 2021 by Northern Ireland authorities not to prosecute violations of COVID-19 social
distancing restrictions and public health protocols at a 2,000-person funeral in June 2020 for a
former high-ranking IRA official. Sinn Fein leadership, including Deputy First Minister O’Neill,
attended the funeral. For many unionists, this incident—and what they regarded as a lack of
police enforcement of the COVID-19 restrictions on the funeral—reinforced their long-standing
views of a double standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists and, more broadly,
a sense that the 1998 peace accord has benefited nationalists and republicans more than the
unionist and loyalist communities. Additional factors behind the rioting also may include
frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people from
economically deprived areas.24
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process
The search for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland remains challenging. Difficult issues
include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading,
protests, and the use of flags and emblems); dealing with the past; addressing remaining
paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity; and furthering economic development and
equality. The 2013 Haass initiative, 2014 Stormont House Agreement, and 2015 Fresh Start
Agreement attempted to tackle some aspects of these long-standing challenges. Some measures
agreed to in these successive accords were delayed amid the absence of a devolved government
between 2017 and 2020.
Sectarian Divisions
Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and
Catholic communities existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern
Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities. In March 2022, despite some opposition from

22 Lisa O’Carroll, “Northern Ireland Police Say Paramilitaries Not Behind Recent Violence,” Guardian, April 9, 2021;
Laura Noonan, “Criminal Gangs Blamed for Stoking Northern Ireland Violence,” Financial Times, April 14, 2021.
23 Peter Foster and Jim Brunsden, “London and Dublin Call for Calm After Fresh Riots in Northern Ireland,” Financial
Times
, April 8, 2021; David Young, Rebecca Black, and James Ward, “Stormont Ministers Unite to Condemn Violence
and Rioting,” Belfast Telegraph, April 8, 2021.
24 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,” Politico, April 7,
2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,” New York Times, April
8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021.
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the DUP and other stakeholders, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation to increase the
number of integrated school places and establish targets for the number of children educated in
integrated schools.25
In some areas in Northern Ireland, peace walls separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods.
Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s
Department of Justice and Housing Executive have responsibility for the majority of peace walls,
but when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed roads—the but when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed roads—the
number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is estimated at over number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is estimated at over
100. Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls since 2013, but 100. Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls since 2013, but
surveys of public attitudes indicate continued support for the walls in many communities.surveys of public attitudes indicate continued support for the walls in many communities.23 One One
poll conducted in 2019 found that 42% of those interviewed wanted the walls to remain in place poll conducted in 2019 found that 42% of those interviewed wanted the walls to remain in place
for reasons of safety and security. The same survey also found that 37% of respondents had never for reasons of safety and security. The same survey also found that 37% of respondents had never
interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the nearest peace wall.interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the nearest peace wall.26
24 Another 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in support of removing the Another 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in support of removing the
peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.2725
Sectarian divisions are Sectarian divisions are particularlyoften apparent during the annual summer apparent during the annual summer marching season, when , when
many unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant many unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant
history. Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held history. Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held
through or close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist through or close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist
parades as triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often parades as triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often
provoked fierce violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission, provoked fierce violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission,
which arbitrates disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have which arbitrates disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have
repeatedly argued for abolishing the commission.repeatedly argued for abolishing the commission.2826 Efforts over the years to address the Efforts over the years to address the
contentious issue of parading and related protests have stalled repeatedly.contentious issue of parading and related protests have stalled repeatedly. Following the riots in
spring 2021 and in light of ongoing tensions over Brexit, many officials and analysts worried the
2021 marching season could see increased violence. Parades and related events during the 2021
marching season, however, passed without any significant incidents.29
Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland. Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland.
A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at
Belfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on suchBelfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on such
issues between the unionist and nationalist communities. The protests, mostly by unionists and
loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent.
Northern Ireland leaders on both sides of the sectarian divide received death threats, and some
political party offices were vandalized.30

2522 Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated , April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated
Education: Stormont Passes Bill Despite DUP Opposition,” BBC News, March 9, 2022. Education: Stormont Passes Bill Despite DUP Opposition,” BBC News, March 9, 2022.
26 Northern Ireland Department of Justice, Public Attitudes to Peace Walls 2019 Findings, June 2020, at
https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/justice/public-attitudes-to-peace-walls-2019-
findings.PDF.
27 23 Julian O’Neill, “NI Troubles: I Would Love to See That Wall Coming Down,” BBC News, January 29, 2023. 24 Northern Ireland Department of Justice, Public Attitudes to Peace Walls 2019 Findings, June 2020. 25 International Fund for Ireland, International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019, November 2019, at
https://www.internationalfundforireland.com/images/documents/2019_Community_Attitudes_to_Peace_Walls_Survey/
Final_IFI_Report_2019.pdf.
28. 26 The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades. The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades.
29 Julian O’Neill, “Twelfth Parades Across Northern Ireland Passed Without Incident,” BBC News, July 12, 2021;
Megan Specia, “Northern Ireland’s Marching Season Begins in a Fraught Year for Unionists,” New York Times, July
13, 2021.
30 “Q&A: Northern Ireland Flag Protests,” BBC News, December 8, 2012.
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In June Congressional Research Service 10 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests issues between the unionist and nationalist communities. The protests, mostly by unionists and loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent. In 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess
these contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. these contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. This
commission consisted of 15 members, with 7 appointed by Northern Ireland’s political parties
and 8 drawn from outside the government. The commission’s work was delayed by the size of its
task and the collapse of the devolved government between 2017 and 2020. The commission
delivered its report to the first minister and deputy first minister in July 2020; theAfter several delays, the commission’s report was report was
published in published in Decemberlate 2021. The report contains over 40 recommendations, but the commission 2021. The report contains over 40 recommendations, but the commission
was unable to reach agreement on some key issueswas unable to reach agreement on some key issues, including related to flags and memorials related to flags and memorials, among others.
. Critics question the report’s value given the delays, costs (£800,000, or about $1.1 million), and Critics question the report’s value given the delays, costs (£800,000, or about $1.1 million), and
lack of an accompanying implementation plan.lack of an accompanying implementation plan.3127
Dealing with the Past
Fully addressing Fully addressing theNorthern Ireland’s legacy of violence legacy of violence in Northern Ireland remains controversial. The Good
and pursuing justice for crimes committed during the Troubles has been exceedingly difficult and often contentious. Reaching consensus on the best way to deal with the past is challenging in large part because many unionists and nationalists continue to view the Troubles differently and retain competing narratives. Cases of suspected collusion between UK security institutions, Northern Ireland’s former police force, and paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles have been particularly difficult to resolve. The Good Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the
victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the Northern Ireland victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the Northern Ireland
Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors aimed at supporting victims and Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors aimed at supporting victims and
their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming from the Troubles also their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming from the Troubles also
exist. These include investigations into deaths related to the conflict by a dedicated unit within the exist. These include investigations into deaths related to the conflict by a dedicated unit within the
PSNI; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of historical cases PSNI; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of historical cases
involving allegations of police misconduct; and public inquiries, such as the Saville inquiry involving allegations of police misconduct; and public inquiries, such as the Saville inquiry
(concluded in 2010) into the January 1972 Bloody Sunday incident in which the British Army (concluded in 2010) into the January 1972 Bloody Sunday incident in which the British Army
shot 28 people, resulting in 14 deaths.shot 28 people, resulting in 14 deaths.3228 Since 2016, an independent police team—known as Operation Kenova—also has investigated several cases of suspected collusion during the Troubles.
Critics argue these various legal processes represent a piecemeal approach and give some deaths Critics argue these various legal processes represent a piecemeal approach and give some deaths
or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been
slowslow. Nearly 1,200 conflict-related cases are awaiting investigation by the PSNI, and about 400
by the PONI.33 and has resulted in few prosecutions. As of 2022, over 900 conflict-related cases (involving nearly 1,200 deaths) were awaiting investigation by the PSNI.29 According to the UK government, between 2015 and 2021, historical reviews and According to the UK government, between 2015 and 2021, historical reviews and
investigations resulted in investigations resulted in prosecutions of nine people for Troubles-related deaths.30 In addition, UK government data as of mid-2021 indicated that about 400 Troubles-related cases alleging police misconduct remained before PONI; around 1,000 civil claims were pending against the UK Ministry of Defense and other state agencies; and around 36 fact-finding inquests into Troubles-era deaths remained outstanding (some of these inquests relate to killings by the British Army or the Northern Ireland police).31 Others point out the expense and time involved with some of these processes; for 27prosecutions of nine people for Troubles-related deaths.34 Others point
out the expense and time involved with some of these processes; for example, the Bloody Sunday
inquiry cost £195 million (more than $300 million) and took 12 years to complete.35 Reaching
consensus on the best way to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence has been difficult, in
large part because many unionists and nationalists continue to view the conflict differently and
retain competing narratives.

31 Jayne McCormack, “Flags Report: Stormont Publishes £800k Report Without Action Plan,” BBC News, December Jayne McCormack, “Flags Report: Stormont Publishes £800k Report Without Action Plan,” BBC News, December
1, 20211, 2021. For the text of the report, see; Northern Ireland Executive Office, Northern Ireland Executive Office, Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and
Tradition – Final Report
, , December 1, 2021. 28December 1, 2021, at https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/publications/commission-flags-
identity-culture-and-tradition-final-report.
32 Thirteen deaths occurred on Bloody Sunday Thirteen deaths occurred on Bloody Sunday, and; another another individualperson wounded on Bloody Sunday died several months wounded on Bloody Sunday died several months
later.
33 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, “Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past,” oral
statement, UK House of Commons, July 14, 2021, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/secretary-of-state-for-
northern-ireland-brandon-lewis-mp-oral-statement-wednesday-14th-july-2021; Northern Ireland Assembly Plenary
Debate, Official Report, October 18, 2021, pp. 58-75, at http://data.niassembly.gov.uk/HansardXml/plenary-18-10-
2021.pdf.
34 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Officelater. 29 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill Explanatory Notes, May 17, 2022, p. 6, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0010/en/220010en.pdf. 30 Government of the UK, , Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021, , July 14, 2021, p. 20, at at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-pasthttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past, p. 20.
35 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010.
. 31 For PONI data, see Northern Ireland Assembly Plenary Debate, Official Report, October 18, 2021, pp. 58-75, at Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

example, the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday cost £195 million (more than $300 million) and took 12 years to complete.32 The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the
Troubles remains contentious. UK veterans groups and some Members of Parliament Troubles remains contentious. UK veterans groups and some Members of Parliament contendargue that that
Troubles-related investigations and prosecutions have disproportionately focused on the actions Troubles-related investigations and prosecutions have disproportionately focused on the actions
of the armed forces and former police officers. They note that PSNI investigations involving the of the armed forces and former police officers. They note that PSNI investigations involving the
security forces account for 30% of its legacy case workload but only 10% of the overall deaths security forces account for 30% of its legacy case workload but only 10% of the overall deaths
during the conflict. during the conflict. During the 2019 UK general election, Prime Minister Johnson pledged to
protect veterans from prosecutions related to their past service in Northern Ireland, but in April
2021, the then-UK minister for veterans alleged that the government was failing to do so. Others
Others reject arguments that legacy investigations and prosecutions are predominantly targeting veterans. reject arguments that legacy investigations and prosecutions are predominantly targeting veterans.
Between 2011 and 2019, Northern Ireland’s Public Prosecution Service (PPS) undertook Between 2011 and 2019, Northern Ireland’s Public Prosecution Service (PPS) undertook
prosecutions in eight legacy cases involving republican paramilitaries, four prosecutions in eight legacy cases involving republican paramilitaries, four legacy cases cases
involving loyalist paramilitaries, and five cases involving former military personnel.involving loyalist paramilitaries, and five cases involving former military personnel.36
At the same time, such prosecutions often face legal hurdles. In 2021, due to inadmissible
evidence, prosecutions of several former British soldiers related to shooting incidents in 1972
collapsed (including the prosecution of “Soldier F,” charged with two of the Bloody Sunday
killings). Families of Bloody Sunday victims are pursuing legal challenges against the decision to
drop charges against Soldier F, as well as the 2019 decision not to bring charges against other
soldiers involved in Bloody Sunday. To date, one prosecution against33 Troubles-era criminal prosecutions also may face legal hurdles given that the passage of time may make it more difficult to meet the high evidentiary bar. Numerous prosecutions of former British soldiers have collapsed in recent years. In November 2022, a Northern Ireland court convicted a British Army veteran of manslaughter for killing a civilian in 1988 (the first conviction of a former member of the armed forces for a historical offense since the 1998 peace agreement). The only prosecution of a former British soldier for Troubles-related offenses currently underway is that against “Soldier F” for two of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings.34 a former British soldier for
offenses related to the Troubles remains active. Prosecutors are expected to decide in 2022 on
whether to bring charges in 11 Troubles-era cases, 3 of which involve former soldiers.37
Stormont House Agreement Provisions
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy
issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative)issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative):
Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). This body would. These bodies were to include a new Historical Investigation Unit (HIU) to take forward the work take forward the work
of the PSNI and of the PSNI and the PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the
Troubles. The UK government pledged full disclosure to the HIU.
Troubles and a new Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR). The ICIR would
to enable victims and survivors to seek and privately receive information about enable victims and survivors to seek and privately receive information about
conflict-related violenceconflict-related violence. It would be established by the UK and Irish
governments but would be separate from the justice systems in each jurisdiction.
Any information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible in criminal and
civil proceedings, but individuals who provided information would not be
immune to prosecution should evidentiary requirements be met by other means.
Oral History Archive. This archive would provide a central place for people
from all backgrounds to share experiences and narratives related to the Troubles.
Implementation and Reconciliation Group. This body would oversee work on
themes, archives, and information recovery in an effort to promote reconciliation
and reduce sectarianism.

36 Dan Sabbagh, “Defence Minister Johnny Mercer Dismissed from Government,” The Guardian, April 20, 2021;
Edward Burke, “The Trouble with Northern Ireland Legacy Cases,” RUSI, April 22, 2021; Claire Mills (separate from the judicial process). The Stormont House Agreement also provided for establishing an oral history archive and an Implementation and Reconciliation Group to promote reconciliation and reduce sectarianism.35 Efforts to enact these legacy mechanisms in UK law, however, stalled for years amid differences between the UK government and various stakeholders on certain aspects of how these bodies would function. In particular, some nationalists and many human rights advocates objected to the UK government’s insistence on proposed “national security caveats” pertaining to the disclosure of sensitive or classified information. Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that such caveats could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police http://data.niassembly.gov.uk/HansardXml/plenary-18-10- 2021.pdf; for civil claims and inquest data, see Government of the UK, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past. 32 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010. 33 Claire Mills and David Torrance, , Investigation
of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland
, UK House of Commons Library, , UK House of Commons Library, July 27, 2021.
37May 18, 2022. 34 David Young, “Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” David Young, “Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, ,
May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, “Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021; May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, “Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021; Julian
O’Neill, “Troubles Legacy Cases Set to Dominate Headlines Again in 2022,” BBC News, January 2, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
14“Bloody Sunday: Soldier F Prosecution Resumes in Court,” BBC News, September 28, 2022; Rory Carroll, “Ex-Soldier Who Shot Dead Civilian During Troubles Convicted of Manslaughter,” Guardian, November 25, 2022. 35 The Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement. Congressional Research Service 12

Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

Efforts to establish these four new legacy institutions in UK law, however, largely stalled due to
divisions between the UK government, on the one hand, and some nationalists and human rights
advocates, on the other, over proposed “national security caveats” related to the disclosure of
certain information. Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that “national security”
could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists
voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police officers.
Successive government crises and the stalemate in reestablishing the devolved government
between 2017 and early 2020 also impeded work on implementing these mechanisms to address
Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.38
New UK Government Proposals
In the January 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal to reestablish the devolved government,
the UK government pledged to introduce legislation in the UK Parliament to set up the legacy
bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020, the UK government
outlined its intentions for the new legacy mechanisms. Instead of the two separate HIU and ICIR
bodies agreed to in the Stormont House Agreement, the UK government said it would propose a
single “independent body” to “oversee and manage both the information recovery and
investigative aspects of the legacy system” in order to ensure the investigations were “effective
and thorough, but quick.”39
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis asserted that the UK government
would “remain true to the principles of the Stormont House Agreement” but that the proposed
changes would seek to put “greater emphasis on gathering information for families” and “moving
at a faster pace to retrieve knowledge before it is lost” to the passage of time.40 The UK’s March
2020 plan was widely rejected by Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and many human rights
organizations as short-changing victims and families, as it would essentially curtail investigations
and thus impede due process and the delivery of justice. The Irish government and some members
of the UK Parliament also expressed concerns about the proposed changes to the Stormont House
Agreement’s legacy mechanisms.41
In July 2021, the UK government announced its intent to bring forward legislation that essentially
would end all Troubles-related prosecutions, inquests, and civil actions against former soldiers,
security forces, and paramilitaries.42 The UK government asserted it would introduce a statute of
limitations “to apply equally to all Troubles-related incidents, bringing an immediate end to the
divisive cycle of criminal investigations and prosecutions, which is not working for anyone and
has kept Northern Ireland hamstrung by its past.” Similar to its initial March 2020 proposal, the

38officers. Successive government crises also impeded work on implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.36 The May 2022 Troubles Bill As part of the January 2020 agreement to reestablish Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, the UK government of then-Prime Minister Johnson pledged to introduce legislation to set up the legacy bodies proposed in the Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020 and subsequently in July 2021, however, the UK government outlined new proposals to address Northern Ireland’s past, including changes to the legacy mechanisms called for in the Stormont House Agreement. These proposals informed the government’s decision to introduce the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill in the UK Parliament in May 2022.37 In this new legislation, known as the Troubles Bill, the UK government sought to emphasize information recovery for victims and families (especially before such information is lost to the passage of time), while also protecting military veterans from prosecution and promoting wider societal reconciliation. The Troubles Bill essentially would draw to a close most investigations and prosecutions into incidents during the Troubles. Among other measures, the bill would establish a new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR) charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The bill also would establish a conditional immunity scheme that would provide immunity from prosecution for Troubles-related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIR. (For more information on these and other key provisions in the Troubles Bill, see the text box below.) Many stakeholders have responded negatively to the Troubles Bill. Although UK veterans groups and campaigners have largely welcomed the bill, victims groups and human rights advocates have been critical. All Northern Ireland political parties have expressed opposition. Nationalists contend that ending investigations and prosecutions would circumvent justice for victims and families and allow the UK government to cover up the truth about the state’s actions during the Troubles. Unionists object to what they view as establishing “moral equivalency” between the actions of soldiers and paramilitaries. The Irish government also has expressed serious concerns about various aspects of the legacy legislation, including “regret” that the bill departs from the approach envisioned in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement.38 Legal experts question whether provisions in the bill, especially those related to investigations and the immunity scheme, are compatible with UK commitments in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an international treaty of the Council of Europe.39 The UK House of Commons passed the Troubles Bill in July 2022, by a vote of 282 to 217. The bill was supported mostly by the majority Conservative Party. The opposition Labour Party and 36 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets , December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets
U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth , February 17, 2016; Gareth
Gordon, “Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018. Gordon, “Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018.
39 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Statement to the UK Parliament, “Addressing 37 Government of the UK, “Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Outline Way Forward to Address the Legacy of the Troubles,” press release, May 17, 2022; UK Parliament, Northern Northern
Ireland Legacy Issues,” March 18, 2020, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-
03-18/HCWS168.
40 Ibid. Also see Government of the UK, “UK Government Sets Out Way Forward on the Legacy of the Past in
Northern Ireland,” press release March 18, 2020.
41 Julian O’Neill, “New Plan for NI Troubles Cases to ‘Limit’ Investigations,” BBC News, March 18, 2020;
Government of Ireland, “Statement by Tanaiste on UK Government Legacy Announcement,” press release, March 18,
2020; Rory Carroll, “Troubles Legacy: MPs Condemn Government Plan to Close Cases,” Guardian, October 26, 2020.
42 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
Congressional Research Service
15

Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

UK government confirmed it would establish a single “Information Recovery Body” (rather than
the HIU and ICIR called for in the Stormont House Agreement). This body would be tasked with
investigating deaths or serious injuries for the purpose of “genuine and robust information
recovery, rather than to create a file for prosecution.” The 2021 proposal also included plans to
establish a “major oral history initiative” and asserted that the government would maintain “many
of the vital aspects proposed for the Implementation and Reconciliation Group.”43
In announcing these new legacy plans, including the statute of limitations, Prime Minister
Johnson asserted that the government’s proposals would allow Northern Ireland to “draw a line
under the Troubles.”44 Secretary of State Lewis acknowledged that, “We know that the prospect
of the end of criminal prosecutions will be difficult for some to accept, and this is not a position
that we take lightly,” but argued that the focus on information recovery—for as many families
and victims as possible—would be more effective than current litigation processes and “the best
way to help Northern Ireland move further along the road to reconciliation.”45 Secretary of State
Lewis also asserted that this approach would “deliver on our commitment to veterans who served
in Northern Ireland,” providing “certainty” for former soldiers and police officers, “many of
whom remain fearful of the prospect of being the subject of investigations ... even though the vast
majority acted in accordance with the law, and often at great personal risk.”46
The UK’s 2021 proposals have been heavily criticized by all main political parties in Northern
Ireland. Nationalists contend that ending prosecutions and inquests would allow the UK
government to cover up the truth about the state’s actions during the Troubles, and unionists
object to what they view as establishing “moral equivalency” between the actions of soldiers and
paramilitaries with a blanket statute of limitations. The Irish government, some Members of the
UK Parliament, and many human rights and victims groups have expressed serious concerns as
well, including with respect to the planned changes to the legacy bodies envisioned by the
Stormont House Agreement. On July 20, 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a motion
(without dissent) opposing the UK government’s new legacy plans.47 The UK government has not
yet formally introduced legislation in Parliament to enact its legacy proposals.
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the
Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. However, the
apparent continued existence of some groups and their engagement in criminality worries many
in both the unionist and the nationalist communities. In response to heightened concerns about
paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland in 2015, the UK government commissioned a study on

43 Ibid.
44 As quoted in, “Plan to End All NI Troubles Prosecutions Confirmed,” BBC News, July 14, 2021.
45 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, “Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past,” oral
statement, UK House of Commons, July 14, 2021, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/secretary-of-state-for-
northern-ireland-brandon-lewis-mp-oral-statement-wednesday-14th-july-2021.
46 Ibid.
47 BBC News, “Troubles: Political Reaction to PM’s Plan to End Prosecutions,” July 14, 2021; Irish Department of
Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs on UK Government Legacy Proposals,” press release, July
14, 2021; Eimear McGovern, “NI Assembly Rejects UK Government Troubles Amnesty Proposals,” Belfast
Telegraph
, July 20, 2021; BBC News, “Victims’ Groups Voice Opposition to Troubles Plans,” August 30, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
16

Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3160. 38 Molly Killeen, “Irish PM Urges UK Not to Act Alone as Troubles Legacy Bill Introduced,” EurActiv, May 18, 2022; Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, “Ireland Welcomes Decision by Council of Europe on Northern Ireland Legacy Issues,” press release, June 10, 2022. 39 The UK is a party to the ECHR as a member of the Council of Europe, a leading European human rights body that the UK helped found in 1949. The Council of Europe is an entirely separate organization from the EU. Lisa O’Carroll, “Troubles Legacy Bill Risks Breaching Human Rights Law, UK Warned,” Guardian, October 26, 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests others voted against the bill; no Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland supported it. The Troubles Bill is currently under consideration in the House of Lords, where it faces some resistance and potential delay. In January 2023, the UK government of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (who became Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in October 2022) introduced several amendments to the Troubles Bill, largely in response to concerns raised by victims and survivors. The amendments primarily seek to strengthen the conditions related to immunity from prosecution. Victims’ advocates and Northern Ireland political parties remain unsatisfied with the proposed amendments, however, and continue to urge the UK government to withdraw the bill.40 The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill: Key Provisions For the purposes of the legislation, the period of the Troubles is defined as being from January 1966 to April 10, 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Key provisions include the fol owing. A New Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR). The ICRIR would be charged with reviewing Troubles-related deaths and cases of serious injury. The ICRIR would be “demand led”—it would not review every death or serious injury but rather would do so at the request of family members, survivors, or certain government authorities. For each review undertaken, findings would be provided to the person who requested the review and would be made publicly available (in most cases). The ICRIR also would be required to produce and publish a historical record of all Troubles-related deaths not subject to a request for a review. Any review requests must be made within the first five years of the ICRIR’s operation. The ICRIR is to be composed of three to five commissioners, supported by ICRIR officers, equipped with the necessary expertise and police investigatory powers (for the primary purpose of information recovery). UK government authorities would be required to provide “ful disclosure” to the ICRIR. A New Conditional Immunity Scheme. The bil would provide immunity from prosecution for Troubles-related offenses for individuals that cooperate with the ICRIR. Individuals must apply for immunity, and an ICRIR judicial panel must be satisfied that a person requesting immunity has provided an account that is true to the best of that person’s knowledge or belief. Once granted by the ICRIR, immunity cannot be revoked. Immunity would not be granted to individuals for past Troubles-related convictions or to subjects of ongoing prosecutions. Ending Non-ICRIR Investigations and Limiting Prosecutions. Upon entering into force, the bil would ban criminal investigations into Troubles-related incidents by any UK authority other than the ICRIR. All ongoing investigations would cease, except those in support of prosecutions already underway (which would be allowed to continue to conclusion). The ICRIR could refer individuals not granted immunity for prosecution. Ending Inquests and Civil Claims. The bil would end inquests (a fact-finding investigation) that have not reached an advanced stage and would prohibit future inquests into Troubles-related deaths. The bil also would prevent future civil claims for Troubles-related conduct. Memorialization Initiatives. The bil would provide for efforts to memorialize the Troubles. Among other measures, the bil outlines and would fund an oral history initiative to encourage people from all backgrounds to share their experiences of the Troubles and listen to those of others. The bil also provides for the establishment of an independent academic initiative to study themes and patterns related to the Troubles and would mandate the preparation and publication of a “memorialization strategy” with concrete recommendations (including whether a Troubles museum or similar project would be beneficial). Sources: Joanna Dawson et al., Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill 2022-2023, UK House of Commons Library, May 20, 2022; and Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office, Explainers Relating to the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill, May 25, 2022. 40 Government of the UK, “Government Tables Amendments to NI Troubles Legacy Legislation,” press release, January 17, 2023; Stephen Walker, “Troubles Legacy Bill: Victims Take Protest to Westminster,” BBC News, January 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 21 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity Paramilitary Concerns Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. In 2015, the UK government commissioned a study on Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.48 This review found that all the main This review found that all the main
paramilitary groups paramilitary groups operatingthat operated during the Troubles still exist, but they are on cease-fire and the during the Troubles still exist, but they are on cease-fire and the
leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is “committed to peaceful means to achieve their leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is “committed to peaceful means to achieve their
political objectives.” At the same time, the review concluded that individual members of political objectives.” At the same time, the review concluded that individual members of
paramilitary groups still represent a threat to national security, including through their paramilitary groups still represent a threat to national security, including through their
involvement in organized crime, and “there is regular unsanctioned activity including behavior in
direct contravention of leadership instruction.”49
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement sought to address concerns about the main paramilitary groups
in Northern Ireland. Among other measures, it enumerated a set of principles that call upon
members of the Assembly and the Executive to work toward disbanding all paramilitary
organizations and to take no instructions from such groups. The agreement also called for
establishing a new, four-member international body to involvement in organized crime.41 In 2017, a new four-member Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) was established to monitor paramilitary activity and to report monitor paramilitary activity and to report
annually on progress toward ending such activity. The annually on progress toward ending such activity. The resulting Independent Reporting
Commission (IRC) began work in 2017; the UK and Irish governments each named one UK and Irish governments each named one
representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland Executive named two.representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland Executive named two.50
42 In its In its fourthfifth annual report, released in December annual report, released in December 20212022, the IRC states that paramilitary groups and structures continue to pose “a clear and present danger in and for Northern Ireland, the IRC states that it remains concerned
about the risks posed to Northern Ireland society by “the continuing existence of paramilitary
structures which can be harnessed for the purposes of violence or the threat of violence.” The IRC
remains supportive of.” The IRC supports a “twin track” approach that combines policing and criminal justice a “twin track” approach that combines policing and criminal justice
responses with measures to address the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing communities responses with measures to address the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing communities
in which paramilitaries operate.in which paramilitaries operate. In addition, the IRC emphasized the need for a “group transition
process” to encourage paramilitary groups to take voluntary action toward disbanding.5143
Concerns also exist about the degree to which divisions over Brexit could further enhance Concerns also exist about the degree to which divisions over Brexit could further enhance
paramilitary influence, prompt a resurgence in paramilitary activity, and paramilitary influence, prompt a resurgence in paramilitary activity, and otherwise affect the peace process. affect the peace process.
In March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing support for the In March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing support for the
Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about the implementation of Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about the implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocolthe post-Brexit
trade arrangements for Northern Ireland, which they view as dividing Northern Ireland from the
rest of the UK and threatening the union. Although these loyalist groups remain on cease-fire, . Although these loyalist groups remain on cease-fire,
they also warn that they also warn that the current Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to the Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to the
“permanent destruction” of the peace accord (see “Implications of Brexit“permanent destruction” of the peace accord (see “Implications of Brexit,”” below).44 The Dissident Threat Security assessments indicate that dissident groups not on cease-fire and opposed to the 1998 peace accord continue to present significant threats. Dissident republican groups are regarded as posing the greatest terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, although concerns persist about the public order challenges posed by smaller dissident loyalist groups.45 At the same time, experts note that 41 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20, 2015. This report below).52

48 The 2015 assessment focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand
Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks during the Troubles under the name of the Ulster under the name of the Ulster
Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish
Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA).
49 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20,
2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assessment-on-paramilitary-groups-in-northern-ireland.
50Liberation Army (INLA). 42 The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on
the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007. the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007.
5143 Independent Reporting Commission FourthFifth Report, December 7, , December 7, 20212022, at https://www.ircommission.org/news-, at https://www.ircommission.org/news-
centre/centre/irc-fifthirc-fourth-report. -report.
5244 As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support
for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists
Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,” Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,” Politico, March 5, 2021. , March 5, 2021.
45 MI5, “MI5 in Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/mi5-in-northern-ireland. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

The Dissident Threat
Security assessments indicate that dissident republican and loyalist groups not on cease-fire and
opposed to the 1998 peace accord continue to present serious threats. The aforementioned 2015
review of paramilitary groups maintained that the most significant terrorist threat in Northern
Ireland was posed not by the groups evaluated in that report but rather by dissident republicans.
The review described dissident loyalist groups as posing another, albeit “smaller,” threat.
At the same time, experts note that dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a
sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident
republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.53
According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the
Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblacht (ANP), and the New IRA Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblacht (ANP), and the New IRA
(which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers, prison (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers, prison
officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017, officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017,
dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers, dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers,
and two prison officers.and two prison officers.54
In January 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a small splinter group formed in
opposition to the cease-fire. The other groups remain active, and authorities warn the threat posed
by the New IRA in particular is severe. Police suspect the New IRA was responsible for a January
2019 car bomb that exploded in Londonderry. The New IRA also claimed responsibility46 Authorities are especially alarmed by the threat posed by the New IRA, which has carried out a string of high-profile attacks in recent years. Police suspect the New IRA of shooting and critically wounding a senior and prominent PSNI detective, John Caldwell, in Omagh in February 2023 (the New IRA has claimed responsibility). The New IRA also was responsible for the for the
April 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in LondonderryApril 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry.55
Security services report a “growing sophistication” in dissident republican explosive devices and
that the New IRA has attempted to obtain weapons overseas.56 (or Derry).47 Following the McKee murder, the PSNI and UK security services ramped up efforts to degrade the New IRA, including targeting its leadership in a series of operations. Some analysts suggest the Caldwell attack could signal that the New IRA has reorganized and regained strength, a source of concern for authorities as the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement approaches in April 2023. Although less active than the New IRA, in early March 2023, ANP warned that it would consider the families of PSNI officers to be targets as well.48
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity
Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny
dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal
opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable
advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average
of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from
over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.5749 The 2008-2009 global recession The 2008-2009 global recession affected the region,
however, and economic recovery was slow and uneven over much of the last decade.
Theled to a prolonged downturn in the region and economic recovery was slow and uneven for many years but gradually improved between 2013 and 2019. Like elsewhere in the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting restrictions on social and business activity affected COVID-19 pandemic and resulting restrictions on social and business activity affected
Northern Ireland’s economy, but the speed of economic recovery Northern Ireland’s economy, but the speed of economic recovery has beenin Northern Ireland was faster than expected faster than expected. Since mid-2022, high energy costs and inflation have been a drag on Northern Ireland’s economy. Northern Ireland’s economic output fell slightly (by 0.3%) in both the second and third quarters of 2022. At the same time, Northern Ireland’s output was 4.1% above pre-pandemic levels seen in 2019. Some analysts suggest that Northern Ireland has weathered the economic difficulties of the 46 In 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a small splinter group formed in opposition to the cease-fire.
initially. During the height of the first COVID-19 lockdown in the second quarter of 2020,

53 David McKittrick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process and the Dissident Menace,” The Independent, February 18,
2014; Richard English, “Why Republican Dissidents Have Not—And Will Not—Go Away,” Irish Times, July 19,
2017.
54 MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland. MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland.
5547 The New IRA The New IRA issued an apologyclaimed responsibility for McKee’s death for McKee’s death, asserting but reportedly issued an apology; the group asserted that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the
riots, butriots but had hit McKee by accident. hit McKee by accident.
56 Naomi O’Leary, “Northern Ireland Bomb Is a Warning We Can’t Ignore,” Politico, January 22, 2019; Julian O’Neill,
“Q&A: Why Is Dissident Republican Activity on the Rise?,” BBC News, September 15, 2019; “Security Report Warns
of Dissidents’ Growing Sophistication,” BBC News, April 30, 2020; Julian O’Neill, “New IRA ‘Still Dangerous’ After
MI5 and PSNI’s Operation Arbacia,” BBC News, September 30, 2020.
57See, Ed O’Loughlin, “New IRA Apologizes for Killing of Journalist in Northern Ireland,” New York Times, April 23, 2019. 48 Julian O’Neill, “Omagh Police Shooting: John Caldwell Attack Causes Shockwaves in PSNI,” BBC News, February 25, 2023; Allison Morris, “New IRA Still Main Suspect in DCI Caldwell Shooting, Chief Constable Tells Policing Board,” Belfast Telegraph, March 2, 2023; Seanin Graham, “PSNI Officers Warned of Republican Dissident Threat to their Families,” Irish Times, March 7, 2023. 49 Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic
Strategy, Strategy, Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011. , January 2011.
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Northern Ireland’s economic output fell by 13.3%. It rebounded in the third quarter of 2020 to
15.1% growth and increased by 4.6% in real terms over the year to September 2021. last few years better overall than the UK. As of the third quarter of 2022, for example, UK gross domestic product (GDP) was 0.8% below pre-pandemic levels (Northern Ireland economic output and UK GDP are considered similar measures but are not produced on a fully equivalent basis). Northern Northern
Ireland’s unemployment rate for October-December Ireland’s unemployment rate for October-December 20212022 was 2. was 2.75%, lower than the UK average %, lower than the UK average
unemployment rate of 4.1%.58 Both the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive
implemented a range of measures to mitigate COVID-19’s adverse economic effects. These
measures included financial support to enable businesses to retain workers, assistance for the self-
employed, government-backed loans for businesses, and additional funding for public services.59unemployment rate of 3.7%.50
Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities persist in Northern Ireland. Income Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities persist in Northern Ireland. Income
levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12 levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12
economic regions, Northern Ireland had the third-lowest gross domestic product per capita in economic regions, Northern Ireland had the third-lowest gross domestic product per capita in
20192020 (£25, (£25,656575, or about $, or about $35,03530,790), below the UK’s average (£), below the UK’s average (£33,15132,141, or about $, or about $45,270).6038,700).51
Northern Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (Northern Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (27roughly 26%) and a high proportion of %) and a high proportion of
working-age individuals with no formal qualifications. Studies indicate the historically poorest working-age individuals with no formal qualifications. Studies indicate the historically poorest
areas in Northern Ireland remain so and note that many of these bore the brunt of the Troubles. areas in Northern Ireland remain so and note that many of these bore the brunt of the Troubles.
Although many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, others are Although many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, others are
predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged areas in predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged areas in
Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called peace dividend..6152
At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The
gap in economic activity rates between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since gap in economic activity rates between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since
1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference) and has largely converged in the last few 1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference) and has largely converged in the last few
years. The most recent data available indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70% years. The most recent data available indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70%
for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment
rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.62
Over the past decade, efforts to improve Northern Ireland’s long-term economic performance
have sought to promote export-led growth, attract more foreign investment, and decrease
Northern Ireland’s economic dependency on the public sector by growing the private sector. The
public sector accounts for about 28% of total employment in the region.63 In February 2021, the
Northern Ireland Executive proposed a £290 million (about $402 million) COVID-19 economic
recovery action plan centered on developing a higher skilled and more agile workforce;
stimulating research and innovation; building a greener economy; and promoting investment,
trade, and exports.64

58 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 15, 2022;
53 Implications of Brexit54 In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The UK began negotiations with the EU on the terms of its withdrawal in 2017 and concluded these negotiations in late 2019. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020. The UK continued to apply EU rules and to participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of an 11-month transition period that concluded on December 31, 2020.55 Brexit has added to divisions within Northern Ireland and poses considerable challenges, with potential implications for Northern Ireland’s peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status. 50 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 3 20212022, ,
January January 14, 2022.
59 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service, Overview of COVID-19 Funding in NI and the
Economic Implications: An Update
, December 16, 2020; UK Treasury, “Extra £800 Million to Support Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland through Covid-19 This Year,” press release, December 24, 2020.
60 UK House of Commons Library, Regional and National Economic Indicators, December 17, 2021.
6112, 2023; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 14, 2023. 51 Matthew Ward and Daniel Harari, Regional and National Economic Indicators, UK House of Commons Library, February 23, 2023. 52 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November , November
2017; Duncan Morrow, 2017; Duncan Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony , University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony
of Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the of Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the
Environment and Cyber, Environment and Cyber, The United States Role in Reaffirming the Good Friday Agreement, , hearings, 117th Cong., 1st 117th Cong., 1st
sess., May 5, 2021. sess., May 5, 2021.
6253 Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019. 54 For more background on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mix. 55 In December 2020, UK and EU negotiators also concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which sets out terms for post-Brexit trade and economic relations, as well as cooperation on a range of other issues. Congressional Research Service 17 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019.
63 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Quarterly Employment Survey, December 14,
2021.
64 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Economic Recovery Action Plan, February 25, 2021.
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Implications of Brexit65
In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored
remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The
UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020, but continued to apply EU rules and to
participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of an 11-month transition
period that concluded on December 31, 2020. Brexit has added to divisions within Northern
Ireland and poses considerable challenges, with potential implications for Northern Ireland’s
peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status.
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the
Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by
providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law
also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and
nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland
belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an
important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped
produce a dynamic cross-border economy. produce a dynamic cross-border economy.
Preventing a Preventing a hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland
was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with
the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-
Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent
dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets, dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets,
endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would
threaten the region’s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.threaten the region’s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.6656
Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
“frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People “frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People
in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across
the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300 the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300
public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a
fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and
bureaucratic hurdles were common.bureaucratic hurdles were common.6757 In early 2019, the UK Parliament rejected an initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in large part because of concerns that arrangements for the Irish border would have kept the UK tied too closely to the EU single market and customs union. Some Brexit advocates contended that Ireland and the EU were exaggerating the security concerns about the border. Those of this view noted that, although the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security arrangements—including the removal of security installations “consistent with the level of threat”—it does not explicitly require an open border. The Irish government and many in Northern Ireland—as well as most UK officials—argued that an open border had become intrinsic to peace on the island of Ireland and to ensuring the fulfillment of provisions in the Good Friday Agreement on north-south cooperation on cross-border issues (including transport, agriculture, and the environment).58 56
Post-Brexit Arrangements for Northern Ireland
Devising a mechanism to maintain an open border was complicated by the UK government’s
decision to keep the UK outside of the EU’s single market and customs union. In early 2019, the
UK Parliament rejected the initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in large part

65 For more information on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland,
coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
66 Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,” Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,” Guardian, ,
February 7, 2018. February 7, 2018.
6757 Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” New York Times, August 5, , August 5,
2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,” 2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,” Belfast Telegraph, December 17, 2018. , December 17, 2018.
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because of concerns about the backstop for the Irish border, which would have kept the UK inside
the EU customs union until the UK and EU determined their future trade relationship. Some
Brexit advocates contended that Ireland and the EU were exaggerating and exploiting the security
concerns about the border to keep the UK close to the EU. Those of this view noted that, although
the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security arrangements—including
the removal of security installations “consistent with the level of threat”—it does not explicitly
require an open border. The Irish government and many in Northern Ireland—as well as most UK
officials—argued that an open border had become intrinsic to peace on the island of Ireland.68
In October 2019, EU and UK negotiators58 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” Politico, June 12, 2019. Congressional Research Service 18 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests Post-Brexit Arrangements in the Northern Ireland Protocol In October 2019, the EU and the government of then-UK Prime Minister Johnson reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a
renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of
Ireland while safeguarding the rules of the EU single market.69 Under the terms of the protocol,
Ireland.59 Under the terms of the protocol, which also sought to safeguard the rules of the EU single market, Northern Ireland remains legally in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment Northern Ireland remains legally in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment
with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for all practical purposes in the with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for all practical purposes in the
EU single market and customs unionEU single market and customs union, thus eliminating for goods. This eliminates the need for the need for regulatory checks on trade in checks on trade in
goods goods at the land border between Northern Ireland between Northern Ireland and Ireland,and the Republic of Ireland but essentially but essentially creating a creates a regulatory and customs customs
border in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (often termed the border in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (often termed the Irish Sea
border
). Any physical checks necessary to ensure ). Any physical checks necessary to ensure customs complianceregulatory and customs compliance for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland would be conducted at would be conducted at
ports or points of entry away from the ports or points of entry away from the Northern Ireland-Ireland land border, with no checks or
infrastructure at this border.
The DUP politically sensitive land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. The DUP and other unionists strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements, contending strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements, contending that they
would dividethe provisions in the protocol would treat Northern Ireland Northern Ireland differently from the rest of from the rest of the UK and would jeopardize Northern Ireland’s economy, its participation in the UK’s internal market, and the region’s position as part of the UK. The DUP and other unionists also objected to what they viewed as a lack of sufficient democratic consent in the development or amendment of EU rules that would apply in Northern Ireland. In an effort to address such concerns, negotiators included a provision in the revised protocol making its renewal after four years subject to the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In light of the large majority won by then-Prime Minister Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, the DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal agreement in the UK Parliament. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020. The Protocol’s Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit, demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which Catholics now outnumber Protestants) and the UK and threaten the UK’s constitutional
integrity. In light of the large majority won by Prime Minister Johnson’s Conservative Party in
the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, however, the DUP lost political influence and
was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal agreement. Both the UK and the EU
subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus enabling the UK to end its 47-year
membership in the EU in January 2020.
Concerns about a hard border developing on the island of Ireland mostly receded following the
UK Parliament’s approval of the withdrawal agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol. In
December 2020, the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials reached an agreement on
implementing the protocol after the end of the transition period. Among other issues, the Joint
Committee agreed on a process for checks on animals and plants and rules for the supply of
medicines and food products entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain; the EU presence in
Northern Ireland; export declaration requirements; and criteria for goods to be considered “not at
risk” of entering the EU (and thus not subject to tariffs).70
Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit,
demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which the population gap between Protestants and

68 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom
McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” Politico, June 12, 2019.
69 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19,
2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration.
70 The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement concluded in December 2020 was expected to further reduce
concerns about “at risk” goods as the deal provides for tariff-free and quota-free merchandise trade between the UK
and the EU (if rules of origin requirements are met). “Brexit: UK and EU Reach Deal on Northern Ireland Border
Checks,” BBC News, December 8, 2020; European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Joint Committee Formally
Adopts a Set of Implementation Measures Related to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement,” December 17, 2020.
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Catholics is narrowing) and changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who
may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the
unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The new post-Brexit post-Brexit
trade arrangements trade arrangements for Northern Ireland appear to be enhancing thisin the Northern Ireland protocol appear to have enhanced the sense of unionist sense of unionist
disenfranchisement, partly by raising fears that Northern Ireland disenfranchisement, partly by raising fears that Northern Ireland willwould be drawn closer to the be drawn closer to the
Republic of Ireland’s economic Republic of Ireland’s economic orbitorbit post-Brexit and that this could be a precursor to a united and that this could be a precursor to a united
Ireland.71 Meanwhile, Brexit also hasIreland. As noted previously, unionist and loyalist concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements in the Northern Ireland protocol may have contributed to the riots and violence that erupted in spring 2021. Brexit also heightened long-standing nationalist doubts about the heightened long-standing nationalist doubts about the
trustworthiness of the UK government and eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments. trustworthiness of the UK government and eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments.
As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is
deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.72
Significant challenges have arisen in implementing the 60 59 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, 2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration. 60 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” Irish Times, January 30, 2020; Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Guardian, April 5, 2021; Pat Congressional Research Service 19 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests Significant challenges have arisen in implementing the Northern Ireland protocol, which took effect on January 1, protocol, which took effect on January 1,
2021.2021.61 The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from
Great Britain Great Britain have posed trade and administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers posed trade and administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers
in Northern Ireland, despite initial grace periods ranging from three months to a year for full in Northern Ireland, despite initial grace periods ranging from three months to a year for full
implementation of the new rules for agri-food products, medicines, and other items. implementation of the new rules for agri-food products, medicines, and other items. Problems
haveInitial problems included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for Northern Ireland included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for Northern Ireland
supermarkets dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK.supermarkets dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK.73
In late January 2021, the Northern Ireland protocol became entangled in EU efforts to control the
export of COVID-19 vaccines outside the bloc. The EU initially planned to trigger Article 16 of
the protocol—an emergency override mechanism available to either the UK or the EU to suspend
parts of the protocol—to prevent vaccines being exported from Northern Ireland to the rest of the
UK. Amid a diplomatic outcry from UK, Irish, and Northern Ireland officials, the EU almost
immediately reversed itself on invoking Article 16, claiming it was a mistake made in haste.
Nevertheless, the incident is widely viewed as helping to bolster the DUP’s claim that the
protocol is “unworkable.”74 The DUP and other unionists subsequently began urging the UK
government to invoke Article 16 itself, given the economic and social problems with the
protocol’s implementation. Then-First Minister Foster asserted that the EU’s willingness to
invoke Article 16 had “lowered the bar” for the UK to do the same.75
By March 2021, as the end of the first grace periods approached, UK-EU talks to resolve
challenges arising from the protocol’s implementation had stalled. As such, the UK government
unilaterally extended grace periods that limited checks on parcels, certain agri-food products,

71 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon
Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” Irish Times, January 30, 2020;
Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Guardian, April 5, 2021.
72 Matthew O’Toole, “Of Course the Internal Market Bill Threatens Northern Ireland,” Politico, September 23, 2020;
Etain Tannam and Mary C. Murphy, “The Internal Market Bill May Further Erode Trust and Security in
Ireland/Northern Ireland,” London School of Economics, September 24, 2020; Pat 62 Tensions within Northern Ireland and between the UK and the EU were aggravated further in 2021 by several other issues related to implementation of the protocol. These issues included a dispute in late January 2021 over EU export controls on COVID-19 vaccines that could have impacted Northern Ireland, as well as the UK’s unilateral decisions in March 2021 to extend a number of grace periods that limited regulatory checks on certain goods. The EU subsequently initiated several legal infringement processes against the UK for breaching the terms of the protocol, which ultimately could have led to the UK’s referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, often commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ), potential fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.63 The UK government and the DUP increasingly argued that the protocol was not sustainable, called for substantial changes to the protocol, and repeatedly threatened to suspend parts of it.64 As noted previously, the DUP has blocked the work of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive since 2022 in protest against the protocol. Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish government maintained that the protocol was the only viable option to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. The EU rejected UK and DUP calls to fundamentally renegotiate the protocol, asserting that it represented a joint, already-agreed UK-EU solution and that any measures to resolve implementation problems must be found “within the framework” of the protocol.65 The EU offered several proposals to mitigate trade disruptions, reduce administrative burdens, and ease tensions in Northern Ireland.66 UK-EU talks to address issues with the protocol were contentious and progress was slow. UK-EU positions diverged on a number of key issues, including customs checks, agri-food safety rules, medicines, UK subsidies to Northern Ireland businesses, and value added tax (VAT) and excise rules. The role of the EU institutions—especially the Court of Justice of the EU—in enforcing EU rules and settling disputes related to the protocol was particularly controversial. UK officials and the DUP contended that such EU oversight infringed on UK sovereignty, while the EU firmly Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions
Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Irish Times, June 11, 2021. , June 11, 2021.
73 Physical61 Since the protocol took effect, physical checks necessary to ensure checks necessary to ensure regulatory and customs compliance are customs compliance are now being conducted at ports or points of entry on the being conducted at ports or points of entry on the
northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain.northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain. 62 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as
Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January , January 13, 2021; “British Supermarkets May Shift Supply Chains to EU if Northern Ireland Trade Not Addressed,” Reuters, July 17, 2021. 6313, 2021; Arthur Sullivan, “Northern Ireland: The
Brexit Problem That Will Not Go Away,” Deutsche Welle (dw.com), February 10, 2021.
74 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; David M.
Herszenhorn and Jakob Hanke Vela, “EU Drops Irish Border Move in Plan to Curb Vaccine Exports,” Politico, January
30, 2021.
75 As quoted in Shawn Pogatchnik, “Brexit Protocol Row Adds Pressure to Northern Ireland Unionists,” Politico,
February 4, 2021.
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plants, and used agricultural machinery.76 In response, the EU launched a legal infringement
process against the UK for breaching the terms of the protocol. This legal action ultimately could
have led to the UK’s referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, which is often
referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ), potential fines, and/or the imposition of
tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.77
In late June 2021, however, the EU put forward proposals to address several issues in the protocol
in the interest of finding “creative solutions … with the core purpose of benefitting people in
Northern Ireland.”78 Among other measures, the EU agreed to the UK’s request for a delay in
implementing a ban on shipping chilled meat products from the rest of the UK to Northern
Ireland (EU rules generally do not permit the import of items such as fresh sausages from non-
member states). At the end of July 2021, the EU decided to pause its legal infringement action
against the UK. Irish officials reportedly regarded this step as “a genuine goodwill gesture” by the
EU to de-escalate tensions with the UK.79
Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish government maintain that the protocol is the only
viable option to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland in light of Brexit and the UK’s
decision to leave the EU single market and customs union. The EU contends that 80% of the
regulatory and customs checks required by the protocol would be eliminated if the UK agreed to
align with EU food and veterinary standards. The UK government rejects this approach, given
that a key rationale for Brexit was to free the UK from EU regulations and due to concerns that
such alignment could impede new UK free-trade deals with other countries, such as the United
States.80
In September 2021, DUP leader Donaldson called for significant changes to the protocol,
including ensuring there is “no border in the Irish Sea.”81 Donaldson warned that the DUP might
withdraw its ministers from Northern Ireland’s Executive if concerns over the protocol were not
resolved. Donaldson also asserted that the DUP would stop engaging with the North-South bodies
(except for cooperation on health matters) established under Strand Two of the Good Friday
Agreement, would seek to block additional protocol-required customs checks at Northern Ireland
ports, would examine the legality of the current customs checks, and would “seek to frustrate and
prevent” the Northern Ireland Assembly from aligning legislation with EU laws.82 As noted
above, First Minister Givan resigned in February 2022 in protest against the protocol and amid
concerns about the slow progress in UK-EU negotiations.

76 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Written Ministerial Statement to the UK House of Commons,
March 3, 2021, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-03-03/hcws819.
77 European Commission, Withdrawal Agreement: Commission Sends Letter of Formal Notice to the United Kingdom
for Breach of its Obligations Under the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland
, March 15, 2021.
78 European Commission, “EU-UK Relations: Solutions Found to Help Implementation of the Protocol on Ireland and
Northern Ireland,” press release, June 30, 2021.
79 John Campbell, “Brexit: EU Pauses Legal Action Against UK over NI Protocol Breaches,” BBC News, July 27,
2021; Hans von der Burchard, “EU Pauses Both Brexit Lawsuits Against the UK,” Politico, July 28, 2021.
80 Chris Morris, “Brexit: Can the UK and the EU Reach a Deal on Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, June 16, 2021;
Mark Landler, “Britain and the EU Defer Action on Northern Ireland,” New York Times, June 30, 2021; Irish Times,
“Donaldson and McDonald Hold ‘Constructive and Frank’ First In-Person Meeting,” July 5, 2021.
81 Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021, at
https://mydup.com/news/sir-jeffrey-donaldson-now-is-the-time-to-act.
82 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
23Elizabeth Piper and John Chalmers, “EU Vows Legal Response as UK Moves Unilaterally on N.Ireland,” Reuters, March 3, 2021; Steven Erlanger, “Europe Says Britain Is Violating International Law Over Northern Ireland,” New York Times, March 15, 2021. 64 See, for example, Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, and Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021. 65 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021. 66 See, in particular, European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Proposes Bespoke Arrangements to Benefit Northern Ireland,” press release, October 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 20 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests opposed any changes to the role of the EU institutions, including the CJEU. EU officials also consistently raised concerns that the UK was not implementing certain aspects of the protocol (including building and properly staffing custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data, and properly declaring goods entering Northern Ireland).67 In June 2022, with UK-EU discussions largely stalled and, in an effort to meet DUP demands, the UK government led by then-Prime Minister Johnson introduced legislation in the UK Parliament to give the government authority to unilaterally disregard parts of the protocol and make changes to its operation.68 Among other measures, the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill would establish “green and red lanes” for goods, removing checks and paperwork for “green lane” goods going from Great Britain to Northern Ireland while leaving such checks in place for “red lane” goods meant for the EU market. The Protocol Bill also called for ending the role of EU institutions in overseeing the protocol’s implementation. The EU viewed the proposed UK legislation as violating the terms of the protocol and international law, and launched additional infringement proceedings against the UK.69 The Protocol Bill passed the UK House of Commons in July 2022 (but still required approval by the House of Lords to be enacted into UK law). Shortly after assuming office in late October 2022, new UK Prime Minister Sunak indicated that he would prefer that the UK and EU reach a “negotiated outcome” to the challenges posed by the protocol.70 UK-EU talks on the protocol resumed and gained momentum in late 2022 and early 2023. In January 2023, the UK and the EU reached a trade data-sharing agreement, giving the EU access to UK technology systems and detailed, real-time information on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain and those possibly at risk of entering Ireland. EU officials had been seeking greater visibility and access on the flow of goods into Northern Ireland since the protocol took effect in early 2021. The new data-sharing agreement was widely viewed as a key step toward restoring trust and facilitating progress on a wider deal on the protocol.71 The Windsor Framework72 On February 27, 2023, the UK and the EU announced a new agreement in principle—the Windsor Framework—to address implementation challenges and other concerns with the Northern Ireland protocol. The Windsor Framework consists of a command paper from the UK government presenting the solutions agreed to by the UK and the EU, a joint UK-EU political declaration, and several draft legal instruments that must be formally adopted for the Windsor Framework to take effect. Both the UK and the EU stressed that the Windsor Framework sought 67 Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to Exert Brexit Pressure,” Financial Times, June 8, 2021; Institute for Government, “Northern Ireland Protocol: Ongoing UK-EU Disagreements,” January 26, 2022. 68 Government of the UK, “Government Introduces Bill to Fix the Northern Ireland Protocol,” press release, June 13, 2022; UK Parliament, Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3182. 69 Christina Gallardo and Shawn Pogatchnik, “EU Launches Legal Action Over UK’s Northern Ireland Brexit Bill,” Politico, June 15, 2022; European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Launches Four New Infringement Procedures Against the UK,” press release, July 22, 2022. 70 “New British PM Rishi Sunak Tells Taoiseach He Wants ‘Negotiated Outcome’ to NI Protocol,” thejournal.ie, October 26, 2022; “Rishi Sunak: Where Does the New PM Stand on the NI Protocol?,” BBC News, October 27, 2022. 71 Annabelle Dickson et al., “EU and UK Agree ‘Way Forward’ on Post-Brexit Goods Data in Fresh Sign of Progress,” Politico, January 9, 2023. 72 Information in this section is based on the package of documents that comprise the Windsor Framework, released February 27, 2023, and available from the Government of the UK, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-windsor-framework. This section also draws from various news sources and the European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework, a New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” February 27, 2023. Congressional Research Service 21 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests to provide solutions to protocol-related issues affecting everyday life for people and businesses in Northern Ireland. Key areas addressed in the Windsor Framework include the following:  Trade and Customs. Similar to measures put forward by the UK government in the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill introduced in 2022, the Windsor Framework would establish a new system of “green and red lanes” for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Checks and customs paperwork would be significantly reduced for “green lane” goods remaining in Northern Ireland but would stay in place for “red lane” goods destined for (or at risk of entering) Ireland and the EU market. The UK and the EU also agreed to simpler rules and procedures for certain agri-food products entering Northern Ireland. UK health and safety standards (rather than EU standards) would apply to all retail food and drink intended for end consumption in Northern Ireland (removing the prospect of a ban in Northern Ireland on certain iconic British products, such as fresh sausages). An expanded and strengthened UK trusted trader scheme and new data-sharing and labeling arrangements would be used to oversee the trade and customs provisions and safeguard the EU single market.  EU Rules and Governance. According to the UK government, the Windsor Framework would remove 1,700 pages of EU law from applying

Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

Ongoing Negotiations
Since early 2021, the UK and the EU have engaged in negotiations to resolve the operational
challenges related to the Northern Ireland protocol. Talks have been contentious, and progress has
been slow. UK and DUP officials argue that the protocol is not sustainable and that significant
changes are necessary to decrease tensions in Northern Ireland, protect peace, and end market
disruptions for businesses and consumers. EU officials consistently have raised concerns that the
UK is not implementing certain aspects of the protocol, including building and properly staffing
border and custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data, and properly declaring goods
entering Northern Ireland.83
In July 2021, the UK government essentially called for the protocol to be renegotiated, asserting
that a “new balance” must be found so the protocol “can operate pragmatically” in accordance
“with the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland.”84 UK officials asserted that the government
would be justified in invoking Article 16 but would not do so for the time being in favor of
finding a consensual solution through negotiations. Among other changes, the UK government
called for largely removing customs checks on goods from Great Britain intended to remain in
Northern Ireland, removing medicines from the scope of the protocol, and eliminating the role of
the EU institutions in overseeing the protocol’s operation (especially the EU’s ability to take
disputes related to the application of EU law in Northern in Northern Ireland (including more than 60 EU food and drink rules covering over 1,000 pages) and thus also would eliminate the EU Court of Justice’s “interpretation and oversight in those areas.” In doing so, the Windsor Framework would narrow the range of EU laws applicable in Northern Ireland to less than 3% overall, which “are there solely, and only as strictly necessary” to maintain Northern Ireland’s access to the EU single market.73 The EU, however, stresses that the CJEU remains the “sole and ultimate arbiter of EU law” and has the “final say on EU law and single market issues.”74 In other words, the Windsor Framework would not change the role of the CJEU in interpreting EU law in disputes over EU rules that continue to apply in Northern Ireland. Both the EU and the UK, however, have pledged to work together to resolve any future disagreements before resorting to formal dispute-settlement proceedings.  The Stormont Brake. A new mechanism known as the Stormont brake would allow the UK government—at the request of 30 Members of Northern Ireland’s Assembly (from at least two parties)—to stop the application of amended or replacement EU goods rules that may have a “significant and lasting impact” on “everyday” life in Northern Ireland. UK officials assert that this brake gives the UK the power to “veto” changes to EU goods rules applicable in Northern Ireland.75 The EU emphasizes that the new mechanism would be triggered “under the most exceptional circumstances” and as a “last resort,” in accordance with a detailed process in the Assembly.76 Once the brake is triggered by the UK, the 73 See Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 3, 13, and 21, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1138989/The_Windsor_Framework_a_new_way_forward.pdf. 74 See, for example, European Commission, “A New Way Forward for the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Political Agreement in Principle on the Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; and Comments by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during press conference with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, February 27, 2023, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtxuqaFwsk0. 75 Government of the UK, Command Paper on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023, pp. 5, 7, 23, and 24. 76 The Stormont brake process is set out in a Unilateral Declaration by the UK in Annex 1 of the Draft Decision of the Congressional Research Service 22 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests EU rule change cannot be implemented; the UK and EU would engage in dialogue to try to resolve concerns and find a solution. If the EU disagreed with the UK’s decision to trigger the Stormont Brake, the matter would be referred to an independent arbitration panel (rather than the CJEU).  Taxes and State Aid. The Windsor Framework would allow certain UK VAT rules to apply in Northern Ireland (rather than EU rules), and the UK may diverge from EU rules on the structure of excise duties (enabling a recent UK cut in excise duty rates on alcoholic beverages to apply in Northern Ireland). The framework also clarifies the circumstances in which EU state aid rules apply in Northern Ireland.  Other Issues. The Windsor Framework also would ease rules in several other areas, including the movement of pets between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and on all types of parcels from people or businesses in Great Britain to friends, family, and consumers in Northern Ireland. Medicines approved for use by the UK’s medicines regulator would be available in Northern Ireland at the same time and under the same conditions as in the rest of the UK; new labeling and other safeguards were agreed to ensure medicines from Great Britain remain in Northern Ireland. As part of the Windsor Framework, the UK government agreed to halt the passage of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill in the UK Parliament and the EU agreed it would no longer proceed with the seven legal infringement challenges pending against the UK in relation to the protocol. Both the UK and the EU have sought to portray the Windsor Framework as opening a new era of UK-EU relations based on cooperation and dialogue. Observers suggest the successful implementation of the Windsor Framework—especially the “green and red lanes” system—will depend largely on the ability of the UK and the EU to maintain trust, goodwill, and effective communication and data-sharing.77 The Windsor Framework must be formally adopted to take effect. The first step is for the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials that oversees implementation of the UK-EU withdrawal agreement to approve the documents and decisions that make up the Windsor Framework (expected to occur in March 2023). The UK and the EU also must take the necessary steps—including some legislative measures—to translate the solutions identified in the Windsor Framework into legal instruments. Prime Minister Sunak has pledged to hold a vote on the framework in the House of Commons and has said the outcome of this vote would be respected. Concerns exist about whether the strongly pro-Brexit wing of Sunak’s Conservative Party would support the framework. Former Prime Minister Johnson has criticized the new deal, but some staunch Brexit supporters have welcomed it and some news reports suggest the prospects for a Conservative parliamentary rebellion to the Windsor Framework have receded.78 Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee Laying Down Arrangements Relating to the Windsor Framework, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1139421/Draft_Decision_of_the_Withdrawal_Agreement_Joint_Committee_on_laying_down_arrangements_relating_to_the_Windsor_Framework.pdf. 77 Andy Bounds, “Freedoms Versus Safeguards—The Northern Ireland Deal Viewed from Brussels,” Financial Times, March 2, 2023; Christina Gallardo, “Devil in the Details: 5 Potential Snags in the UK’s Big EU Deal,” Politico, March 5, 2023. 78 Esther Webber and Eleni Courea, “Rishi Sunak Holds His Breath as He Awaits MPs’ Verdict on Brexit Deal,” Politico, February 28, 2023; Robert White and Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe, “Sunak’s Windsor Agreement Splits Tory Eurosceptics,” Financial Times, March 2, 2023. Congressional Research Service 23 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests The UK government hopes the DUP will accept the new Windsor Framework and agree to reestablish a functioning Assembly and Executive in time for the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement in April 2023. UK government officials note that a key part of the new framework—the Stormont brake—can be triggered only if the Assembly is functioning. The DUP is reviewing the new framework; DUP leader Donaldson reportedly has remarked that the framework represents “significant progress” but that the DUP remains concerned about whether the solutions in the framework are sufficient. Critics point out that some EU laws would still apply in Northern Ireland. They also note that the Irish sea border may have been diluted but has not disappeared and that there appear to be some differences in interpretation between the UK government and the EU on certain elements of the new framework (especially with regard to the role of the CJEU). Questions also exist about how the Stormont brake would work, with some in the DUP arguing that a high bar has been set for triggering the mechanism and expressing unease that the ultimate decision to trigger it would rest with the UK government (not the Assembly).79 Economic Concerns Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible economic consequences for Northern Ireland. Studies indicate that Northern Ireland depends Ireland to the CJEU). Some analysts
suggest the UK’s proposals for a revamped protocol would rely mostly on the EU trusting the UK
to protect the EU’s single market rather than on abiding by EU rules.85
The EU rejects renegotiating the Northern Ireland protocol, reiterating that it represents a joint,
already-agreed UK-EU solution to the challenges Brexit poses to the island of Ireland. The EU
maintains that any measures to resolve implementation problems with the post-Brexit
arrangements for Northern Ireland must be found “within the framework” of the protocol.86 In
October 2021, the EU issued proposals to address some of the operational difficulties related to
customs paperwork, agri-food rules, and the supply of medicines; the EU also proposed ways to
enhance engagement and dialogue with Northern Ireland authorities and stakeholders on the
application of the protocol and EU rules.87
UK-EU negotiations continued through the rest of 2021 but remained largely stalled. UK-EU
positions diverge on numerous key issues, including customs checks, agri-food safety rules, and
the role of the EU institutions (see text box, “Northern Ireland Protocol Negotiations: Key
Issues,” below). In December 2021, as the end of another grace period approached, the EU
unilaterally took steps to ease restrictions on British medicine and drug manufacturers that supply

83 Lisa O’Carroll, Heather Stewart, and Daniel Boffey, “UK in ‘Constructive’ Talks with EU over Northern Ireland
Protocol,” Guardian, February 3, 2021; BBC News, “Brexit: Preserving NI Protocol Is ‘The Only Way Forward,’
Warns EU,” February 10, 2021; Reuters, “EU Not Interested in Protecting Belfast Peace Agreement – Northern Ireland
First Minister,” March 5, 2021; Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to Exert
Brexit Pressure,” Financial Times, June 8, 2021.
84 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/northern-ireland-protocol-next-steps.
85 See, for example, the analysis by John Campbell in “Brexit: Stormont Parties Divided on UK Call to Amend NI
Protocol,” BBC News, July 21, 2021; and Jennifer Rankin, “UK’s Northern Ireland Protocol Demands Sap Brussels’
Goodwill,” Guardian, July 21, 2021.
86 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK
Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021.
87 European Commission, “Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Proposes Bespoke Arrangements to
Benefit Northern Ireland,” press release, October 13, 2021.
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Northern Ireland following a failure to reach a joint UK-EU solution on this issue. The EU steps
include amending EU legislation to “ensure the continued supply of medicines to Northern
Ireland,” especially in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic; the EU also asserted that these
measures demonstrated that the protocol “has the flexibility to work on the ground” and
expressed hope for resolving other challenges posed by the protocol.88
Northern Ireland Protocol Negotiations: Key Issues
The UK and the EU are engaged in negotiations to ease operational difficulties with the Northern Ireland
protocol, decrease tensions, and facilitate trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Key issues and
points of contention related to the protocol include the fol owing.
Customs Checks. Both the UK and EU have made proposals to reduce the need for customs declarations and
paperwork on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. The EU has proposed expanding the
definition of goods “not at risk” of entering the EU to cover more goods and easing administrative requirements.
The EU asserts that these measures wil decrease the documentation currently needed for goods by 50%. The UK
has proposed that customs documentation requirements should only apply to those goods moving from Great
Britain to Northern Ireland that are destined for the EU, with traders responsible for declaring the destination of
their goods; those goods staying in Northern Ireland would not be subject to tariffs or customs declarations.
Agri-food Rules. Animal and plant products entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain must comply with EU
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules, including physical inspection requirements for products of animal origin and
prohibitions on certain categories of plant and animal products, such as chil ed meats. The EU has proposed
simplifying paperwork and reducing SPS checks for a wide range of retail goods from Great Britain that wil be
remain in Northern Ireland and an exemption for “iconic” British products, such as sausages, subject to special
certifications. The EU contends that these “bespoke” solutions wil decrease SPS checks by roughly 80%. Similar to
its position on customs checks, the UK maintains that only goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland
that are destined for the EU should require SPS checks and paperwork, and those remaining in Northern Ireland
should only need to meet UK SPS standards.
Role of EU Institutions. Under the protocol, the application of EU law in Northern Ireland is subject to
oversight by the EU institutions. The European Commission (the EU’s executive) can take action against the UK
government for not complying with EU rules, including referring the UK to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU, also commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice, or ECJ). In its July 2021 proposals on
the protocol, the UK government called for eliminating the EU institutions’ oversight role and argued that disputes
related to the protocol should be managed jointly by the UK and the EU. UK officials argue that the EU’s oversight
of the protocol infringes on UK sovereignty. Since July 2021, however, there have been some signs that the UK
may be softening its position and wil ing to accept an arbitration system to manage disputes, including a mechanism
to consult the CJEU on matters of EU law. The EU, however, firmly opposes any changes to the role of the EU
institutions, including the CJEU, in overseeing the protocol.
Other Issues. Other negotiation issues include the movement of pets and live animals between Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, UK subsidies to Northern Ireland businesses, and value added tax (VAT) and excise rules. The
EU also has proposed deepening ties to Northern Ireland civic groups, businesses, and other stakeholders to
increase transparency and help ensure that EU policymakers take Northern Ireland views into account in
developing or amending EU rules that wil apply in Northern Ireland.
Sources: Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021; European Commission,
“Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Commission Proposes Bespoke Arrangements to Benefit Northern
Ireland,” press release, October 13, 2021; Institute for Government, “Northern Ireland Protocol: Ongoing UK-EU
Disagreements,” October 14, 2021; Jennifer Rankin, “Northern Ireland: What Are the EU and UK Proposing and
Wil Deal Be Done?,” Guardian, December 17, 2021.
UK-EU negotiations on the protocol resumed in January 2022. UK officials reportedly would like
to reach a deal ahead of Northern Ireland’s scheduled Assembly elections in May 2022, in an
attempt to prevent Brexit and the protocol from becoming dominant campaign issues. Irish

88 The EU legislation also seeks to resolve outstanding supply issues in EU member states Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta.
European Commission, “EU-UK Relations: Commission Delivers on Promise to Ensure Continued Supply of
Medicines to Northern Ireland, as well as to Cyprus, Ireland and Malta,” press release, December 17, 2021.
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officials contend that the EU has made or suggested several compromises to resolve difficulties
posed by the protocol and that the UK government must be willing to make concessions
also.89The DUP continues to demand an end to the Irish Sea border and to most customs and
regulatory checks on trade in goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein
maintains that the focus of the UK-EU negotiations should be on making the protocol work better
for people and businesses in Northern Ireland.90
Economic Concerns
Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible
economic consequences for Northern Ireland. According to a UK parliamentary report, Northern
Ireland depends more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does
the rest of the the rest of the UK.80 In 2021UK.91 In 2019, approximately , approximately 5964% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU, % of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU,
including including 38about 43% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.92
Significant fears existed in particular that a no-deal Brexit (i.e., without a withdrawal agreement
in place) would have jeopardized81 Maintaining an open border after Brexit was viewed as important to protecting the island’s cross-border economy and labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis. labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis.
Many manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north Many manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north
and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and
alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for
processing and packaging.processing and packaging.9382 The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro and The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro and
small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.9483
UK and DUP leaders asserted that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to UK and DUP leaders asserted that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to
Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In 20192021, sales to other parts of the UK , sales to other parts of the UK
(£(£11.312.8 billion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£ billion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£4.55.2 billion) and billion) and more than
four nearly five times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.46 billion). billion).9584 Among the DUP’s initial Among the DUP’s initial
objections objections to the post-Brexit arrangements agreed in 2019, the DUP argued that they in 2019 to the Northern Ireland protocol were arguments that its trade arrangements would be would be
detrimental to the region’s economydetrimental to the region’s economy and would increase costs for businesses and consumers. The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct . The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct
given the supply problemsgiven the supply problems and shipping delays, shipping delays, administrative burdens, and other issues affecting Northern Ireland since the affecting Northern Ireland since the new post-post-
Brexit customs and regulatory requirements took effect. Major UK supermarket chains warn that
full implementation of the protocol could lead to increased costs for Northern Ireland consumers.
Brexit arrangements in the protocol began taking effect. One study from the University of 79 Shawn Pogatchnik, “DUP Won’t Be Pushed Into Accepting UK-EU Deal on Northern Ireland—But Sees an Attractive VetoOne study from the University of Ulster estimates that the costs of the protocol to Northern
Ireland’s public and private sectors could be around £850 million (around $1.2 billion) per year.96

89 Christina Gallardo, “Brexit Talks Head into 2022 as UK Softens Northern Ireland Governance Demands,” Politico,
December 17, 2021; Jude Webber, “Protocol Negotiations Need to be Finished by End of February, Says Coveney,”
Irish Times, December 31, 2021.
90 Jayne McCormack, “Brexit: NI Protocol Talks Must End Soon, Says Donaldson,” BBC News, January 7, 2022; John
Campbell, “Brexit: UK and EU Still Determined to Find Solutions to Protocol,” BBC News, March 8, 2022.
91 Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016.
92 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, August 4, 2021.
93,” Politico, February 27, 2023; Enda McClafferty, “Brexit Deal: Both Yes and No Carry Risks for DUP,” BBC News, February 28, 2023. 80 Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016; Lisa O’Carroll, “Pro-Brexit UK Regions More Dependent on EU for Exports, Study Finds,” Guardian, July 17, 2022. 81 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics, December 14, 2022. 82 Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How , March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How
Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019. Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019.
9483 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, , August 4, 2021.
95 Ibid.
96 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019;
“Brexit: Supermarkets Warn of Rising Costs Due to NI Protocol,” BBC News, July 18, 2021; Esmond Birnie, “The
Irish Sea Border Is Costing Northern Ireland £850m a Year,” newsletter.co.uk, August 12, 2021May 18, 2022. 84 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Northern Ireland Economic Trade Statistics, December 14, 2022. .
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UK officials maintain that the government is determined to “make a success of Brexit” for
Northern Ireland.97 They insist that Brexit offers new economic opportunities for Northern Ireland
outside the EU. Supporters of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland argue that the
provisions in the protocol will help to improve the region’s economic prospects. Northern Ireland
remains part of the UK customs union and thus will be able to participate in future UK trade
deals, but it also retains privileged access to the EU single market. These measures may help
increaseUlster estimated that the costs of the protocol to Northern Ireland’s public and private sectors could be around £850 million (around $1.2 billion) per year.85 Supporters of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland argue that they offer the region unique economic opportunities, which would be boosted further by improvements to the protocol in the Windsor Framework. In seeking DUP and unionist support for the Windsor Framework, Prime Minister Sunak has touted the potential economic benefits of Northern Ireland’s privileged access to both the UK internal market and the EU single market. As part of the UK customs union, Northern Ireland also will be able to participate in future UK trade deals. Experts suggest the post-Brexit arrangements may help increase the competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region a more attractive competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region a more attractive
destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland business leaders report broad destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland business leaders report broad
satisfaction with the protocol and note that it has a number of benefits, including keeping cross-satisfaction with the protocol and note that it has a number of benefits, including keeping cross-
border trade open. A January 2022 study found that Northern Ireland manufacturers have made
“significant” strides in adjusting to the protocol’s rules, with less than 25% of those surveyed
reporting problems (down from more than 40% in mid-2021).98border trade open.86
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein argues that
has argued that “Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.“Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.9987 Since the Since the
2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a 2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a border poll (a referendum on (a referendum on
whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the
hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification.
As noted previously, the Good Friday Agreement provides for the possibility of a border pollAs noted previously, the Good Friday Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll in
Northern Ireland, in line with the consent principle. Any decision to hold a border poll in , in line with the consent principle. Any decision to hold a border poll in
Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the UK Secretary of State for Northern Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the UK Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland. In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, a border poll must be calledIreland, who must call one if it if it
“appears likely” that “a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland “appears likely” that “a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland
should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”100
At present, experts believe there is not sufficient evidence to convince the UK government to call
a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Most88 At present, most opinion polls indicate that a opinion polls indicate that a
majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to support the region’s position as part of the UK. majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to support the region’s position as part of the UK.
Although a JanuaryA December 2021 survey found that 2021 survey found that 51% of people in Northern Ireland would54% of those polled support Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK versus 46% in support of a united Ireland.89 A poll from August 2022 found 48% in favor of Northern Ireland’s position within the UK compared to 41% for a united Ireland.90 Another poll carried out by Ipsos and released in December 2022 found a wider difference in opinion, with 50% of respondents supporting Northern Ireland remaining in the UK and 27% favoring unification with Ireland.91 As such, experts believe there is not sufficient evidence to convince the current UK government to call a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and influence whether a border poll is called in the years ahead. As seen by Northern Ireland’s 2021 census results, demographics are 85 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019; Esmond Birnie, “The Irish Sea Border Is Costing Northern Ireland £850m a Year,” newsletter.co.uk, August 12, 2021. 86 support
holding a border poll in the next five years (with 44% opposed and 5% having no opinion), it also
found that 47% favored Northern Ireland remaining in the UK versus 42% in support of a united
Ireland.101 A December 2021 survey found similar results, with 54% of those polled in Northern
Ireland supporting the region’s continued position within the UK versus 46% against.102 At the
same time, several recent surveys indicate that a majority of respondents in Northern Ireland

97 UK Government Press Release, “Brokenshire Holds Inaugural Meeting of Northern Ireland Business Advisory
Group,” September 1, 2016; Stephen Walker, “Brexit: Northern Ireland Can Be Success Outside EU,” BBC News,
October 4, 2016.
98 Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, , February 26,
2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” Politico, July 9, 2021; , July 9, 2021; Peter
Foster, Jude Webber, and Andy Bounds, “Northern Ireland Manufacturers Make ‘Significant’ Post-Brexit Strides,”
Financial Times, January 12, 2022.
99Andrew McDonald, “Sunak Gives EU Windsor Framework the Hard Sell in Belfast,” Politico, February 28, 2023. 87 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016. , November 2016.
10088 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998. UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
101 Gerry Moriarty, “Poll Finds Majority Favours Holding a Border Poll in Next Five Years,” Irish Times, January 24,
2021.
102 Colm Keena, “Majority of People in North Would Vote to Remain in UK in Referendum89 Colm Keena, “Majority of People in North Would Vote to Remain in UK in Referendum,” Irish Times, December 12, 2021. 90 Anthony Neeson, “Poll Shows Growing Support for Irish Unity,” Irish Echo, August 26, 2022. 91 Pat Leahy, “Northern Ireland Rejects Irish Unity by Large Margin, Poll Shows,” Irish Times, December 3, 2022,” Irish Times, December
12, 2021. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2725 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests shifting in Northern Ireland, with those of a Catholic background now outnumbering those of a Protestant background. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with Ireland and greater economic integration (since the Northern Ireland protocol took effect in January 2021, data indicate a significant and consistent increase in cross-border trade).92 Sinn Fein’s recent electoral success in Northern Ireland (and its growing popularity and electoral gains in Ireland) also could increase momentum for a border poll. Societal attitudes in Northern Ireland are changing as well, especially among young people, who may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities. Analysts suggest that non-aligned

Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

believe a united Ireland is possible in the longer term, with predictions ranging from within 10 to
25 years.103 Prime Minister Johnson, however, reportedly has asserted that there will be no
referendum on Northern Ireland’s status for “a very, very long time to come.”104
Several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and influence whether a border poll is
called in the years ahead. As discussed, Northern Ireland’s demographics are changing; many
experts expect forthcoming census data will show that Catholics equal or outnumber Protestants
in Northern Ireland. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced
trade ties with the Republic of Ireland and greater economic integration (data as of late 2021
indicate a significant increase in cross-border trade since the Northern Ireland protocol took
effect). Analysts suggest that nonaligned voters who do not identify as unionist or nationalist may voters who do not identify as unionist or nationalist may
be the decisive swing bloc in any future border poll and that such voters are likely to be swayed be the decisive swing bloc in any future border poll and that such voters are likely to be swayed
on the question of Irish unification more by its implications for issues such as the economy, on the question of Irish unification more by its implications for issues such as the economy,
health care, and pensions than by identity politics. In health care, and pensions than by identity politics. In addition, should Sinn Fein win the largest
number of seats in the next Assembly elections in Northern Ireland, this could increase pressure
on the UK government to call a border poll.105
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval. In Ireland’s February
2020 parliamentary election, Sinn Fein secured the largest percentage of the vote for the first time
in Ireland’s history, and some commentators suggest the party’s electoral success has helped push
the question of unification higher on the political agenda in the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s
three-party coalition government, consisting of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Green Party, has
the aforementioned Ipsos poll from late 2022, 21% of the roughly 50% of respondents opposed to Irish unification were from a Catholic background, while 31% of those undecided did not identify as either Catholic or Protestant.93 Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval. The Irish government has launched a “Shared Island” initiative to promote cross-border dialogue and research on launched a “Shared Island” initiative to promote cross-border dialogue and research on common challengescommon
challenges and the future of the island but has adopted what many view as a “go slow” approach
to the question of Irish unification. The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and . The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and
south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would
be accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.be accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.10694
Some experts question the current extent of support in Ireland for unification, given concerns that Some experts question the current extent of support in Ireland for unification, given concerns that
unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland as well as the potential unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland as well as the potential
economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about
$14 billion) budget subsidy to make up the shortfall in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of $14 billion) budget subsidy to make up the shortfall in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of
this subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeable defense this subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeable defense
spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s
budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An
April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54% April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54%
reported they would be unwilling to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.reported they would be unwilling to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.107

103 Ibid. Also see “NI 100: Majority Believe NI Will Leave UK Within 25 Years,” BBC News, April 20, 2021.
104 As quoted in Brian Hutton, “Boris Johnson: No Border Poll for Very Long Time to Come,” Irish Times, April 20,
2021.
105 Tony Barber, “Brexit Raises the Spectre of the UK’s Break-Up,” Financial Times, October 22, 2019; Alex Kane,
“Unionists May Find Being Bounced into Border Poll Is Boris’s Preferred Option,” Irish Times, February 8, 2021;
95 U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests Support for the Peace Process Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full 92 John Campbell, “Northern Ireland Exports to Republic Set to Pass €3bn This Year,” BBC News, November 17, 2021; Morwenna Coniam, “Irish Trade with Britain, Northern Ireland Climbs Despite Brexit,” Bloomberg.com, August 15, 2022; Ireland Central Statistics Office, “Record Levels of Exports and Imports in 2022,” February 15, 2023. 93 Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Financial Times, April 6, 2021; , April 6, 2021;
John Campbell, “Northern Ireland Exports to Republic Set to Pass €3bn This Year,” BBC News, November 17, 2021.
106 Naomi O’Leary, “Sinn Fein Surge Makes Irish Political History,” Politico, February 9, 2020; Shawn Pogatchnik and
Giovanna Coi, “Can Northern Ireland Survive Brexit?,” Politico, April 13, 2021.
107 Henry Farrell, “After Britain’s Elections, People Are Talking About a United Ireland. Don’t Hold Your Breath,”
Washington Post, December 13, 2019;Rory Carroll, “It’s Closer Now Than It’s Ever Been: Could There Soon Be a United Ireland?,” Guardian, October 6, 2022; Leahy, op. cit. 94 “Leo Varadkar Says Border Poll Not Appropriate at This Time,” BBC News, July 3, 2022; Jude Webber, “Ireland’s Reunification Talk Grows Louder,” Financial Times, October 9, 2022. 95 Fionnan Sheahan, “Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay Fionnan Sheahan, “Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay
for It,” for It,” Irish Independent, May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a , May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a
United Ireland?,” United Ireland?,” Irish Times, May 7, 2021. , May 7, 2021.
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U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework
for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping
the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full
implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the
restoration of the devolved government in 2007. restoration of the devolved government in 2007.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S. The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged
Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In
February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. In June 2013,
President Obama visited Northern Ireland and noted that the United States would always “stand
by” Northern Ireland.108 The Obama AdministrationThe Obama Administration also welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014 welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014
Stormont House Agreement and the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. Stormont House Agreement and the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson expressed regret at the
impasse in discussions to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and asserted that asserted that
the United States remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good the United States remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good
Friday Agreement and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”Friday Agreement and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”10996 In March 2020, In March 2020,
President Trump appointed his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy President Trump appointed his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy
to Northern Ireland.to Northern Ireland.11097
President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
peace process. In March peace process. In March 20212022, President Biden reiterated , President Biden reiterated strong“unequivocal” U.S. support for the Good Friday U.S. support for the Good Friday
Agreement during Agreement during annuala St. Patrick’s Day St. Patrick’s Day meetings with officials from the Republic of Ireland
and Northern Ireland. A joint U.S.-Irish statement asserted that the two governments are
“unequivocally committed” to the 1998 accord, which has served as “the bedrock of peace,
stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.”111 President Biden also underlined the ongoing U.S.
commitment to the Northern Ireland peace process during his visit to the United Kingdom in June
2021. A joint U.S.-UK statement noted, “It took a deep partnership between the UK, Ireland, and
the U.S. to support the people of Northern Ireland in bringing the Troubles to an end, and it will
take a continued and ongoing partnership to advance and safeguard Northern Ireland’s stability
and prosperity into the future.”112
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
decades. Congressional hearings have focused on the implementation of the Good Friday

108 As quoted in BBC News, “G8 Summit: U.S. Will Stand by Northern Ireland, Says Obama,” June 17, 2013.
109 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,”
November 1, 2017.
110 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021.
111 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Vitual Bilateral Meeting,”
March 17, 2021; White House, “Joint Statement by President Joe Biden and Taoiseach Micheál Martin,” March 17,
2021.
112 White House, “Joint Statement on the Visit to the United Kingdom of the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President
of the United States of America at the Invitation of the Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson, MP, the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” June 10, 2021.
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Agreement, policing reforms, and human rights in Northern Ireland. Some Members have been
interested in the status of investigations and public inquiries into several past murders in Northern
Ireland in which collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected—
including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 killing of Raymond
McCord, Jr. In January 2022, H.Res. 888 was introduced, commemorating the 50th anniversary of
Bloody Sunday and calling for justice for the victims and their families; the resolution also asserts
opposition to “any attempt” by the UK government to “implement amnesty or statute of limitation
laws that would end or inhibit investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the
Troubles.” Some Members of Congress havemeeting with then-Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin.98 Following the May 2022 Assembly election, the U.S. State Department called on Northern Ireland political leaders to work together to reestablish a functioning power-sharing government and asserted that the United States “remains deeply committed to preserving the peace dividend of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and will always strive to protect these gains for all communities.”99 News reports suggest President Biden may visit Northern Ireland in connection with the peace accord’s 25th anniversary in April 2023.100 Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for decades. Over the years, congressional hearings and resolutions have considered various aspects of implementing the Good Friday Agreement. A hearing in July 2022 centered on young people in Northern Ireland and their role in maintaining peace and shaping Northern Ireland’s future.101 Some Members of Congress also have a long-standing interest in policing issues and human rights in Northern Ireland, and the status of Troubles-related investigations and incidents of suspected collusion between state security agencies and paramilitary groups (including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 killing of Raymond McCord, Jr.). Two hearings in 2022 discussed the continued need for accountability and justice for victims of the Troubles, sparked in part by congressional concerns about the UK government’s new legislation (the Troubles Bill, discussed above) that would establish a conditional immunity scheme and end most Troubles-era investigations and prosecutions.102 On March 17, 2022, the 96 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,” November 1, 2017. 97 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021. 98 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Virtual Bilateral Meeting,” March 17, 2022. 99 U.S. Department of State, “Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Results,” press release, May 7, 2022. 100 See, for example, “President Joe Biden Reportedly Set to Visit Ireland Next Month,” IrishCentral.com, March 3, 2023. 101 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The Role of Young People in Fostering Peace in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022. 102 Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Northern Ireland: Accountability at Risk, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2022; and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, Truth Congressional Research Service 27 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests House passed H.Res. 888 commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings; the resolution called for justice for the victims and their families, and noted opposition to “any proposal” by the UK government to “implement amnesty or statute of limitation laws that would end or inhibit investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the Troubles, including on Bloody Sunday.” In January 2023, 27 Members of Congress sent a letter to UK Prime Minister Sunak expressing “grave concern” about the UK government’s decision to continue advancing the Troubles Bill, which “denies justice, suppresses the will of the people of Northern Ireland, and conceals the truth of the past.”103 In the 117th Congress, some Members urged President Biden to appoint a new special urged President Biden to appoint a new special
envoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace processenvoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process, especially in light of heightened Brexit-related tensions and the current stalemate in reestablishing Northern Ireland’s devolved government.104 In December 2022, the U.S. State Department announced the appointment of former Representative Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic Affairs.105 The United States has long been a key trading partner and an important source of investment for Northern Ireland.106 The new U.S. Special Envoy position is to focus on supporting economic development and growth in Northern Ireland—including through attracting more U.S. investment to Northern Ireland—and strengthening people-to-people ties. Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland President Biden and other Administration officials have repeatedly stressed that Brexit must not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process or jeopardize the open border on the island of Ireland. The Biden Administration has expressed concerns about in light of recent tensions.113
On the economic front, the United States is a key trading partner and an important source of
investment for Northern Ireland. According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive, in
2017, exports to the United States accounted for 17% of total Northern Ireland exports, and
imports from the United States accounted for 10% of total Northern Ireland imports. Foreign
direct investment by U.S.-based companies totaled £1.8 billion (about $2.5 billion) between 2008
and 2018.114 Between 2009 and 2011, a special U.S. economic envoy to Northern Ireland worked
to further economic ties between the United States and Northern Ireland and to underpin the
peace process by promoting economic prosperity.
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland
In contrast to President Trump’s support for Brexit, President Biden has maintained a skeptical
view of Brexit since his time as Vice President in the Obama Administration. During the 2020
U.S. presidential election campaign, then-candidate Biden stressed that Brexit must not
undermine the Good Friday Agreement or jeopardize the open border between Northern Ireland
and Ireland. Biden Administration officials have noted concerns about rising Brexit-related Brexit-related
tensions in tensions in Northern Ireland and conveyed support for the Northern IrelandNorthern Ireland and reiterated the need to protect the gains from the peace process.115
The Biden Administration also has conveyed U.S. support for the Northern Ireland protocol.116
U.S. officials note that the Administration views the protocol as “a way to manage the practical protocol as “a way to manage the practical
challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island
of Ireland. At the same time, Administration officials assert that the current difficulties in
implementing the protocol are trade issues for the UK and the EU to resolve and that President
Biden “is interested in having strong relations with both the UK and the EU.”117 In May 2021,
during a visit to London, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged both the UK and the EU

113 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Irish Times, May 13, 2021.
114 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Trade in Goods Data Analysis Northern Ireland – USA (2015-2017),
June 2018; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Northern Ireland Trade and Investment Patterns, October 2,
2018.
115 Patrick Wintour, “Biden and Pelosi Warn UK Over Risking Good Friday Agreement,” Guardian, September 16,
2020; George Parker and Katrina Manson, “Joe Biden Warns Boris Johnson Not to Let Brexit Upend Northern Ireland
Peace Process,” Financial Times, November 9, 2020; BBC News, “G7 Summit: Don’t Imperil NI Peace, Biden to
Warn UK and EU,” June 9, 2021; Jules Darmamin, Shawn Pogatchnik, and Emilio Casalicchio, “US Reprimands UK
Over Northern Ireland Protocol Row,” Politico, June 10, 2021.
116 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of Vice President Kamala Harris Meeting with First Minister Arlene
Foster and Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Northern Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
117 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual
Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
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“to prioritize political and economic stability in Northern Ireland” in implementing the post-
Brexit arrangements for the region.118
During President Biden’s June 2021 visit to the UK, news reports indicate he offered support for
a possible way to ease some of the trade challenges posed by the Northern Ireland protocol.
President Biden reportedly sought to assure Prime Minister Johnson and UK officials that a
temporary UK-EU agreement on food standards—aimed at reducing protocol-related trade
difficulties between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK—would not be a barrier to a separate
U.S.-UK free trade deal in the future.119 Negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade
agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden Administration has not resumed
these talks to date and has not indicated whether it will do so. It would likely take several years to
conclude any future U.S.-UK trade deal.120 U.S. officials reportedly are monitoring the ongoing
UK-EU negotiations on the Northern Ireland protocol. In January 2022, U.S. Trade
Representative Katherine Tai asserted that the United States continues to encourage both the UK
and the EU “to work in good faith” to find “durable and peaceful” solutions.121
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for
Northern Ireland. Although many Members back, in principle, a future U.S.-UK free trade
agreement, some Members have tied their support to protecting the peace process. In April 2019,
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated there would be “no chance whatsoever” for a U.S.-UK trade
agreement if Brexit were to weaken the Northern Ireland peace process.122
In December 2019, the House passed H.Res. 585, reaffirmingof Ireland.107 President Biden and other Administration officials consistently urged the UK to reach a negotiated solution with the EU to resolve the challenges in implementing the protocol’s post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.108 President Biden welcomed the February 2023 announcement that the UK and the EU had concluded the Windsor Framework to address challenges posed by the protocol, asserting that the new framework was “an essential step and Accountability for Victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 2022. 103 The January 2023 letter is available at https://boyle.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/boyle.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/boyle-et-al-letter-to-pm-sunak.pdf. 104 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Irish Times, May 13, 2021; Kerry O’Shea, “Congressional Group Reiterates U.S. Commitment to Northern Ireland,” IrishCentral.com, August 5, 2022. 105 U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Joe Kennedy III as U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland for Economic Affairs,” press statement, December 19, 2022. 106 According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive, the United States accounted for 12% of Northern Ireland’s exports and 7% of its imports in 2021, and is Northern Ireland’s “largest source of high-value, technology rich” foreign direct investment—worth £1.5 billion (about $1.8 billion at current exchange rates) and responsible for generating nearly 13,000 jobs over the last decade. See, Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Trade in Goods Data Analysis Northern Ireland – USA, May 26, 2022; and Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, “US and NI Investment Stronger Than Ever,” June 23, 2022. 107 The White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021. 108 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom,” press release, October 25, 2022. Congressional Research Service 28 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests to ensuring that the hard-earned peace and progress of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is preserved and strengthened.”109 Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for Northern Ireland. A hearing in October 2019 focused on maintaining peace and stability in Northern Ireland in light of Brexit; many Members expressed support for ensuring an open border on the island of Ireland post-Brexit.110 Like the Biden Administration, some Members have welcomed the Windsor Framework as a way to resolve difficulties with the Northern Ireland protocol, protect the gains of the peace process, and facilitate the return of Northern Ireland’s devolved government.111 Amid heightened tensions in Northern Ireland, some in Congress tied their support for a possible future U.S.-UK free trade agreement to protecting the peace process (negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden Administration has not resumed these talks to date). Both H.Res. 585 (116th Congress, passed in December 2019) and S.Res. 117 (117th Congress, passed in May 2021) reaffirmed support for the Good Friday support for the Good Friday
Agreement in light of Brexit and Agreement in light of Brexit and assertingasserted that any future U.S.-UK trade that any future U.S.-UK trade agreement and other
U.S.-UK bilateral agreements must include conditions to uphold the peace accord. In May 2021,
the Senate passed S.Res. 117, expressing support for the Good Friday Agreement and the
Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade or other bilateral
agreements must “take into account” whether obligations in the Good Friday Agreement are
being met. Some Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about the UK possibly
invoking Article 16 of the Northern Ireland protocol, viewing it as potentially destabilizing—both
politically and economically—for Northern Ireland.123or other bilateral agreements must consider Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland. S.Res. 134 (117th Congress, passed in May 2022) expressed support for concluding U.S. trade agreements with both the UK and the EU; it noted that doing so should be “contingent” upon a UK-EU agreement that “fully protects and preserves the Good Friday Agreement.”112
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments
established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an
independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas

118 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab at a Joint Press
Availability,” May 3, 2021.
119 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Ireland: UK-EU Food Safety Deal Wouldn’t Stop UK-US Trade Pact,” Politico, June 11, 2021.
120 Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, U.S.-UK Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
121 As quoted in Laura Slattery, “NI Protocol ‘Always on the Radar’ of US, Says Ambassador,” Irish Times, January
12, 2022.
122 Simon Carswell, “Pelosi Warns No US-UK Trade Deal if Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit,” Irish Times,
April 15, 2019.
123 See, for example, House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Meeks, Keating, Blumenauer and Boyle Issue Statement on
UK’s Threat to Invoke Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol,” press release, November 9, 2021; and Office of
Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy in Belfast and London Stresses Importance of Protecting Good Friday Agreement,
Peace in the Region,” press release, November 23, 2021.
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most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of
Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States
has contributed more than $has contributed more than $544549 million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI
funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well. funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well.
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in
the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.124113
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities, located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities,
and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and
the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as
tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus
toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions. toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
109 The White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Windsor Framework, February 27, 2023. 110 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, Protecting the Good Friday Agreement from Brexit, 116th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2019. 111 See, for example, Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Statement on Windsor Framework,” press release, February 27, 2023; Ray O’Hanlon, “Biden, Reps. Welcome Framework Deal,” Irish Echo, March 1, 2023. 112 Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, U.S.-UK Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. 113 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland. Congressional Research Service 29 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support
for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in
communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers
have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the
conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process. conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process.
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have encouraged the IFI to place greater Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have encouraged the IFI to place greater
focus on reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the focus on reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the
same time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as same time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as
largely wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way. largely wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way.
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call
for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members
asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern
Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the
final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation
for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years). for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years).
Since FY2011, successive Administrations have allocated funds from Economic Support Fund Since FY2011, successive Administrations have allocated funds from Economic Support Fund
(ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and
reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year to the IFI from ESF reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year to the IFI from ESF
funding between FY2011 and FY2014, $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million funding between FY2011 and FY2014, $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million
for FY2020, and $2.5 million for FY2021. for FY2020, and $2.5 million for FY2021.

Author Information

Kristin Archick Kristin Archick

Specialist in European Affairs Specialist in European Affairs


124 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International
Fund for Ireland.
Congressional Research Service
32

Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests



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