U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Changes from February 18, 2022 to March 1, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel
~~February 18, 2022~~March 1, 2023
This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past
aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues. aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues. ~~For general information~~
Jeremy M. Sharp
For general information on Israel, see on Israel, see Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, , Specialist in Middle by Jim Zanotti. by Jim Zanotti.
~~Specialist in Middle~~
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II.

Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with ~~significant~~
~~assistance in light~~ assistance reflective of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic

goals in the Middle East; a mutual goals in the Middle East; a mutual avowed commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating
from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To date, the United States has provided Israel $from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To date, the United States has provided Israel $~~150~~158 billion (current, or billion (current, or
~~noninflation-~~non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. At present, almost all U.S. bilateral aid to adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. At present, almost all U.S. bilateral aid to
Israel is in the form of military assistance; from 1971 to 2007, Israel also received significant economic assistance. Israel is in the form of military assistance; from 1971 to 2007, Israel also received significant economic assistance.
In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid,
covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional
appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants plus $5 billion in missile defense grants plus $5 billion in missile defense
appropriations) to Israel. appropriations) to Israel.
Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense’s fifth-generation stealth Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense’s fifth-generation stealth
aircraft, considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. To date, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in aircraft, considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. To date, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in
three separate contracts, funded with U.S. assistance, and has taken delivery three separate contracts, funded with U.S. assistance, and has taken delivery ~~on 30.~~of 36
For For ~~FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $3.3 billion in FMF for Israel and $500 million in missile defense aid to~~
~~mark the fourth year of the MOU. The Administration also requested $5 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance~~
~~humanitarian funding for migrants to Israel.~~
~~H.R. 4373, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 would, among~~
~~other things, provide $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Israel. The Senate version, S. 3075, the~~
~~Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, also would provide $3.3 billion in~~
~~FMF for Israel.~~
~~H.R. 4432 and S. 3023, the respective House and Senate defense appropriations bills for FY2022, would each provide $500~~
~~million in missile defense funding for Israel, including $108 million for the Iron Dome program, $157 million for David’s~~
~~Sling, $62 million for Arrow III, and $173 million for Arrow II.~~
~~Several bills under consideration by Congress would provide $1 billion in supplemental aid for Iron Dome over three years.~~
FY2023, Congress authorized $520 million for joint U.S.-Israel defense programs (including $500 million for missile defense) in the FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act. Per the terms of the MOU, Congress appropriated $3.8 billion for Israel (FMF and missile defense) in the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, and added $98.58 million in funding for other cooperative defense and non-defense programs. The foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including The foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including
USAID's U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the "Greenbook"), CRS communications with the State USAID's U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (also known as the "Greenbook"), CRS communications with the State
Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and annual State Department and USAID Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and annual State Department and USAID
Congressional Budget Justifications. For terminology and abbreviations used in this report, see Appendix A. Congressional Budget Justifications. For terminology and abbreviations used in this report, see Appendix A.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Background ~~and Recent Trends~~
The United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on a number of The United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on a number of
factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in
the Middle East; the Middle East; aan avowed mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating from U.S. mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating from U.S.
support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign aid has been a major component in support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign aid has been a major component in
cementing and reinforcing these ties. U.S. officials and many lawmakers have long considered cementing and reinforcing these ties. U.S. officials and many lawmakers have long considered
Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this
calculation. calculation. ~~While some~~Some U.S. citizens have worked to cultivate U.S. support for Israel since its U.S. citizens have worked to cultivate U.S. support for Israel since its
creation creation in 1948, and since~~in 1948, in the years following~~ the 1973 Yom Kippur War, advocates for Israel have the 1973 Yom Kippur War, advocates for Israel have
engaged in organized, broad-based domestic efforts to foster bipartisan support in Congress for engaged in organized, broad-based domestic efforts to foster bipartisan support in Congress for
the bilateral relationship, the bilateral relationship, including for U.S. aid to Israel. Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2023 current, or non-inflation-adjusted, U.S. dollars in millions Fiscal Year Military Economic Missile Defense Total 1946-2020 104,506.200 34,347.500 7,411.409 146,265.110 2021 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 2022 3,300.000 - 1,500.000 4,800.000 2023 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 Total 114,406.200 34,347.500 9,911.409 158,665.110 Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), the U.S. State Department, and the Missile Defense Agency. Notes: The Greenbook figures do not include missile defense funding provided by the Department of Defense. According to USAID Data Services as of January 2023, in constant 2021 U.S. dol ars (inflation-adjusted), total U.S. aid to Israel obligated from 1946-2023 is an estimated $260 bil ion. Some of the major advocacy organizations engaged on this issue, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Christians United for Israel (CUFI), express unequivocal support for U.S. security assistance to Israel.1 Another major advocacy organization, J Street, supports continued security assistance at current levels while arguing that U.S. funds should not be used to “trample on Palestinian rights” or “to implement or maintain annexation, the expansion of settlements, the demolition of Palestinian homes or other moves that entrench occupation” in the West Bank.2 Some political groups that are not focused exclusively on Israel matters have advocated for increased scrutiny of~~including for U.S. aid to Israel.~~
~~Although bipartisan support for U.S. assistance to Israel in Congress remains robust,~~
~~congressional debate over some aspects of this aid has become more frequent.1 While bipartisan~~
~~consensus on U.S. support for Israel appears to remain intact,2 formerly near congressional~~
~~unanimity in support of providing aid to Israel without conditions or use limitations faces~~
~~challenges (see, “Iron Dome” below).3 In particular, the debate over U.S. aid to Israel has~~
~~become more linked to controversial issues regarding Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.4 Both~~
~~changing developments in the Middle East itself and changing U.S. domestic public opinion may~~
~~be influencing emerging debates.5 These developments have had little or no apparent effect on the~~
~~“ironclad” U.S. commitment to Israel’s security,6 as evidenced by successive administrations’~~
~~opposition to conditioning aid to Israel,7 but they have opened political space for more of a debate~~
~~on aid conditionality.~~

~~1 Dennis Ross, “How Israel Should Navigate the New American Landscape,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November~~
~~2021.~~
~~2 On September 23, 2021, the House passed H.R. 5323, the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, on a 420 to 9~~
~~vote (with two voting “present”).~~
~~3 In 2021, as House appropriators began considering annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related~~
~~Programs (SFOPs) appropriations legislation, over 300 lawmakers signed onto a letter calling for U.S. military~~
~~assistance to Israel not to be reduced or conditioned. See,~~
~~https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf. While congressional~~
~~letters of support for continued U.S. aid to Israel are historically commonplace, it is rare for such letters to specify aid~~
~~conditionality as a possible outcome.~~
~~4 Michael J. Koplow, “The Aftermath of the Iron Dome Debate,” Israel Policy Forum, September 27, 2021.~~
~~5 See, Lisa Lerer and Jennifer Medina, “Tensions Among Democrats Grow Over Israel as the Left Defends~~
~~Palestinians,” New York Times, May 15, 2021. See also, “U.S. Public Has Favorable View of Israel’s People, but Is~~
~~Less Positive Toward Its Government,” Pew Research Center, April 24, 2019. The issue of what constitutes legitimate~~
~~criticism of U.S. policy toward Israel and what qualifies as the de-legitimization of Israel or even anti-Semitism (from~~
~~both the left and the right) has received extensive media coverage in recent years. See, “Ari Hoffman and Joel~~
~~Swanson, “Should Supporting Israel Be a Litmus Test for Participation in a Rally Against Antisemitism?” Forward,~~
~~July 13, 2021.~~
~~6 U.S. Department of Defense, April 11 Joint Press Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Israeli~~
~~Minister of Defense Benny Gantz, April 11, 2021.~~
~~7 During his Senate confirmation hearing, then U.S. Ambassador-designate to Israel, Thomas Nides, responded to a~~
~~question on conditioning security assistance to Israel by saying, “The reality is the administration does not support~~
~~conditionality on the assistance. And as you know, we're at a $38 billion 10-year MOU, and the position of the~~
~~administration is we do not support conditionality.” See, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Pending~~
~~Nominations, CQ Congressional Transcripts, Congressional Hearings, Sept. 22, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 8~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Some of the major advocacy organizations engaged on this issue, such as the American Israel~~
~~Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Christians United for Israel (CUFI), express unequivocal~~
~~support for U.S. security assistance to Israel.8 J Street supports continued security assistance~~
~~provided that U.S. funds do not infringe on Palestinian rights or sustain actions such as the~~
~~unilateral annexation of West Bank territory.9 Some political groups that are not focused~~
~~exclusively on Israel matters have advocated for increased scrutiny of U.S. military aid to Israel,~~
~~particularly during the May 2021 conflict in Israel and Gaza.10 These groups have stimulated~~
~~debates about possibly conditioning or cutting foreign aid to Israel,11 or supporting boycotts and~~
~~sanctions.12~~
~~Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2021~~
~~current, or non-inflation-adjusted, U.S. dollars in millions~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Military~~
~~Economic~~
~~Missile Defense~~
~~Total~~
~~1946-2019~~
~~101,206.200~~
~~34,336.000~~
~~6,911.409~~
~~142,453.609~~
~~2020~~
~~3,300.000~~
-
~~500.000~~
~~3,800.000~~
~~2021~~
~~3,300.000~~
-
~~500.000~~
~~3,800.000~~
~~Total~~
~~107,806.200~~
~~34,336.000~~
~~7,911.409~~
~~150,053.609~~
Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), the U.S. State Department, and the Missile Defense
~~Agency.~~
Notes: The Greenbook figures do not include missile defense funding provided by the Department of Defense.
~~According to USAID Data Services as of December 2021, in constant 2021 U.S. dol ars (inflation-adjusted), total~~
~~U.S. aid to Israel obligated from 1946-2021 is $247 bil ion.~~
~~U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology~~
~~Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of~~ U.S. military aid to Israel, particularly during the May 2021 conflict in Israel and Gaza.3 These groups have stimulated debates about possibly conditioning or cutting foreign aid to Israel,4 or supporting boycotts and sanctions.5 1 For example, see AIPAC’s and CUFI’s policy agendas respectively at https://www.aipac.org/s/policy-agenda and https://cufi.org/about/policy/policy-agenda/ 2 See, J Street’s position on aid at https://jstreet.org/policy/us-security-assistance-to-israel/#.YdR4gGjMKUk. 3 Laura Kelly, “Progressive Groups Call for Biden to Denounce Evictions of Palestinians as 'War Crimes,'” The Hill, May 13, 2021. 4 “America’s Democrats are increasingly divided over Israel,” The Economist, May 14, 2021. 5 Sean Sullivan, “Supporters of a Tougher Line on Israel Split over Tactics and Message,” Washington Post, May 30, 2021. See also, CRS Report R44281, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, coordinated Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 9 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Israel’s New Coalition Government: Implications for U.S. Aid to Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalist parties in the coalition government he formed in December 2022 may, according to some commentators, strain relations with the United States.6 Though Biden Administration officials call their commitment to Israel’s security “ironclad,”7 some former U.S. officials have advocated for the Biden Administration to communicate to Israel that while the United States wil continue to provide military aid, it wil restrict the provision of “offensive weapons” for “malign Israeli actions in Jerusalem or the occupied territories.”8 Some former Israeli officials have argued that regardless of Israel’s political orientation, U.S. aid to Israel should remain unconditional given the national security threats Israel faces and its value to U.S. interests in the Middle East.9 The Biden Administration has stated that it wil continue to “support the two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability,” and that it wil “gauge the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”10 In one December 2022 media article, two unnamed U.S. officials were reported as saying that President Joseph Biden has “ruled out cutting U.S. military aid to Israel.”11 In February 2023, after the Israeli government authorized West Bank settlement expansion in contravention of U.S. requests, a reporter asked State Department Spokesperson Ned Price whether the Biden Administration was considering taking any punitive measures against Israel. In response, Spokesperson Price remarked that a component of close U.S.-Israeli relations is the U.S. “rock-solid commitment to Israel’s security,” and that despite steps Israel may take to “undermine the prospect” for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States is going to “continue to stand by Israel’s side when it comes to the security threats that it faces.”12 U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is military assistance.13 U.S. military aid has military assistance.13 U.S. military aid has
helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated
militaries in the world (seemilitaries in the world (see, “Qualitative Military Edge (QME)”). U.S. military aid also has ). U.S. military aid also has
helped Israel build its domestic defense industry, which now ranks as one of the top global arms helped Israel build its domestic defense industry, which now ranks as one of the top global arms
exporters.14 Israeli defense companies, such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, and Elbit exporters.14 Israeli defense companies, such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, and Elbit

~~8 For example, see AIPAC’s and CUFI’s policy agendas respectively at https://www.aipac.org/s/policy-agenda and~~
~~https://cufi.org/about/policy/policy-agenda/~~
~~9 See, J Street’s position on aid at https://jstreet.org/policy/us-security-assistance-to-israel/#.YdR4gGjMKUk.~~
~~10 Laura Kelly, “Progressive Groups Call for Biden to Denounce Evictions of Palestinians as 'War Crimes,'” The Hill,~~
~~May 13, 2021.~~
~~11 “America’s Democrats are Increasingly Divided over Israel,” The Economist, May 14, 2021.~~
~~12 Sean Sullivan, “Supporters of a Tougher Line on Israel Split over Tactics and Message,” Washington Post, May 30,~~
~~2021. See also, CRS Report R44281, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, coordinated~~
~~by Jim Zanotti.~~
Systems, export nearly 70% of their products.15 Rather than producing large-scale hardware (combat aircraft, by Jim Zanotti. 6 See, for example, Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A Narrow Government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich Threatens US-Israel Ties,” Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. 7 U.S. Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the AIPAC Political Leadership Forum, January 10, 2023. 8 Aaron David Miller and Daniel C. Kurtzer, “Biden should respond boldly to a radical Netanyahu government,” Washington Post, November 29, 2022. 9 Chuck Freilich and Danny Ayalon, “Military aid to Israel must remain unconditional,” Jerusalem Post, December 14, 2022. 10 See, The White House, Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel, December 29, 2022 and U.S. State Department, Secretary Antony J. Blinken At the J Street National Conference, December 4, 2022. 11 Nahal Toosi, “Biden’s strategy for a far-right Israel: Lay it all on Bibi,” Politico, December 20, 2022. 12 U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, February 13, 2023. 13 For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since the rapid expansion of 13 For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since the rapid expansion of
Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation), Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation),
Israel has Israel has ~~been considered a fully industrialized nation (as of 2021~~become one of the world’s most dynamic economies (as of 2022, Israel’s Gross Domestic Product per capita ranks , Israel’s Gross Domestic Product per capita ranks
~~46th~~14th worldwide). worldwide). ~~Consequently~~, Israel and the United States agreed to gradually phase out economic grant aid to Israel. , Israel and the United States agreed to gradually phase out economic grant aid to Israel.
In FY2008, Israel stopped receiving bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) grants. In FY2008, Israel stopped receiving bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) grants. ItThe country had been a large-scale recipient had been a large-scale recipient
of grant ESF assistance since 1971. of grant ESF assistance since 1971.
14 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 14 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from ~~2016 to 2020~~2017 to 2021, Israel was the , Israel was the ~~8th~~10th
largest arms exporter worldwide, accounting for largest arms exporter worldwide, accounting for 32.4% of world deliveries. See, “Trends in International Arms % of world deliveries. See, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2022. 15 Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even (editors), “Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid,” INSS, ~~Transfers,~~
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

~~Systems, export nearly 70% of their products.15 Israel exports~~tanks), Israeli companies generally export advanced technological products (such as missile defense systems, unmanned missile defense systems, unmanned
aerial vehicles, cybersecurity products, radar, and electronic communications systemsaerial vehicles, cybersecurity products, radar, and electronic communications systems) to numerous customers globally. India, Azerbaijan, and Vietnam are Israel’s three largest export markets.16 Figure 1. Israel’s Annual Arms Exports: 2012-2021 Source: Created by CRS. Information from Israel Ministry of Defense, International Defense Cooperation Directorate (SIBAT), as reported by various media sources. Notes: SIBAT does not produce a specific list of Israeli customers by country. As Israel has become a global leader in certain niche defense technologies, Israeli defense exports to the U.S. market have grown substantially.17 ~~to, among~~
~~others: India,16Azerbaijan, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand,~~
~~Vietnam, Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Russia,~~
~~Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.17~~
~~Israeli Exports of Spyware~~
~~Revelations regarding the export of Israeli software have drawn attention to Israel’s defense export oversight~~
~~which, since 2006, has been overseen by Israel’s Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA). In 2021, after~~
~~investigative reports revealed the Israeli-owned cyber security firm NSO Group had sold mobile phone software~~
~~to foreign governments, which then used it to spy on other heads of state, dissidents, and human rights activists,~~
~~the Israeli media looked more closely at DECA’s export licensing process. According to one report, “The~~
~~limitations on such sales are exceedingly few. Israel’s current law on defense exports requires the Defense~~
~~Ministry to make ‘considerations regarding the end user or the end use,’ but does not expressly forbid arms sales~~
~~to human rights violators.. . the Defense Ministry’s Defense Export Controls Agency, which has a small staff and~~
~~responsibility for overseeing thousands of export licenses, lacks the necessary knowledge about the countries~~
~~purchasing Israeli firms’ technology to assess how the products wil be used.”18 The U.S. Commerce Department’s~~
~~Bureau of Industry and Security added NSO to its “Entity List” for engaging in activities that are contrary to the~~
~~national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.19 In December 2021, Israel altered its export~~
~~licensing policy for cybersecurity software, requiring purchasers to pledge they wil not use Israeli equipment to~~
~~commit “terrorist acts” or “serious crime,” as defined by DECA.20~~
~~As Israel has become a global leader in certain niche defense technologies, Israeli defense exports~~
~~to the U.S. market have grown substantially.~~ According to one report, the U.S. military purchased According to one report, the U.S. military purchased
$1.5 billion worth of Israeli equipment in 2019, representing a five-fold increase from two $1.5 billion worth of Israeli equipment in 2019, representing a five-fold increase from two
decades before.decades before.2118 In addition to the U.S. purchase of Iron Dome ( In addition to the U.S. purchase of Iron Dome (see below), the United States ), the United States
has purchased, among other items, the following Israeli defense articles: Trophy active protection has purchased, among other items, the following Israeli defense articles: Trophy active protection
systems for M1 Abrams tanks, enhanced nightsystems for M1 Abrams tanks, enhanced night -vision goggles, laser range finders for the U.S. vision goggles, laser range finders for the U.S.
Marines, helmets for F-35 fighter pilots, wings for the F-35, and a system of towers, electronic Marines, helmets for F-35 fighter pilots, wings for the F-35, and a system of towers, electronic
sensors, radars, and cameras for use along the U.S.-Mexican border.sensors, radars, and cameras for use along the U.S.-Mexican border.
~~The United States and Israel are in the process of gradually phasing out Israel’s ability to use a~~
~~portion of its U.S. military assistance for domestic purchases (also known as Off-Shore~~
~~Procurement – see Figure 1), and thus some Israeli companies have opened subsidiaries that are~~

~~2020,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2021.~~
~~15 Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even (editors), “Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid,” INSS,~~
The U.S. Army is currently evaluating whether to purchase Rafael’s SPIKE Non-Line of Sight missile to be mounted on AH-64E Apache Helicopters.19 Memorandum No. 202, July 2020. Memorandum No. 202, July 2020.
16 India is the largest buyer of Israeli defense equipment. See, Rina Bassist, “Israel, India Advance on Phalcon AWACS 16 India is the largest buyer of Israeli defense equipment. See, Rina Bassist, “Israel, India Advance on Phalcon AWACS
Megadeal,” Megadeal,” Al Monitor, September 3, 2020. , September 3, 2020.
17 17 ~~Israel Ministry of Defense, Defense Export and Defense Co‐Operation Agency (SIBAT), and Jane’s, Emerging~~
~~Markets Reports, Israel, January 19, 2022.~~ Per a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Per a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and
Israel as amendedIsrael as amended, (Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memorandum of Understanding), Israeli (Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memorandum of Understanding), Israeli
and U.S. defense contractors are able to and U.S. defense contractors are able to ~~compete~~compete for contracts in both countries in both countries ~~for contracts~~ on an equal basis. For the text of the on an equal basis. For the text of the
MOU, see https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/MOU, see https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-israel.pdf. 18 Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, “Asset Test 2021: How the U.S. Can Keep Benefiting from Its Alliance with Israel,” Transition 2021: Policy Notes for the Biden Administration, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2021. 19 Jen Judson, “Rafael pitches latest Spike variant for US Army’s long-range weapon for helos,” Defense News, June 17, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Israeli Exports of Spyware Revelations regarding the export of Israeli software have drawn attention to Israel’s defense export oversight, which has been overseen by Israel’s Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA) since 2006. In 2021, after investigative reports revealed the Israeli-owned cyber security firm NSO Group had sold mobile-phone software to foreign governments, which then used it to spy on other heads of state, dissidents, and human rights activists, the Israeli media looked more closely at DECA’s export licensing process. According to one report, “The limitations on such sales are exceedingly few. Israel’s current law on defense exports requires the Defense Ministry to make ‘considerations regarding the end user or the end use,’ but does not expressly forbid arms sales to human rights violators.. . the Defense Ministry’s Defense Export Controls Agency, which has a small staff and responsibility for overseeing thousands of export licenses, lacks the necessary knowledge about the countries purchasing Israeli firms’ technology to assess how the products wil be used.”20 Another report noted that since 2007, the Israeli Defense Ministry had approved all arms export licenses requiring government approval.21 The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security added NSO to its “Entity List” for engaging in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.22 In December 2021, Israel altered its export licensing policy for cybersecurity software, requiring purchasers to pledge they wil not use Israeli equipment to commit “terrorist acts” or “serious crime,” as defined by DECA.23 The United States and Israel are in the process of gradually phasing out Israel’s ability to use a portion of its U.S. military assistance for domestic purchases (also known as Off-Shore Procurement, see Figure 2); as a result, some Israeli companies have opened subsidiaries that are licensed to do business in the United States. Incorporating in the United States enables Israeli companies to both ~~Docs/mou-israel.pdf.~~
~~18 See, Judah Ari Gross, “NSO Group Affair is Latest in Israel’s Long History of Arming Shady Regimes~~~~,” Times of~~
~~Israel, July 28, 2021.~~
~~19 Available online at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/commerce-adds-nso-group-and-other-~~
~~foreign-companies-entity-list.~~
~~20 See, “Israel Issues Stricter Guidelines for use of its Cyber Tech Exports,” Reuters, December 6, 2021.~~
~~21 Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, “Asset Test 2021: How the U.S. Can Keep Benefiting from Its Alliance with~~
~~Israel,” Transition 2021: Policy Notes for the Biden Administration, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,~~
~~February 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~licensed to do business in the United States. Incorporating within the United States enables Israeli~~
~~companies both to~~ increase business with the U.S. military and, in some cases, conduct U.S. aid-increase business with the U.S. military and, in some cases, conduct U.S. aid-
financed military deals with the Israeli government. As more Israeli companies have obtained a financed military deals with the Israeli government. As more Israeli companies have obtained a
U.S. presence, it has led to increased defense partnerships between U.S. and Israeli firms, U.S. presence, it has led to increased defense partnerships between U.S. and Israeli firms,
whereby weapons development is done in Israel and production is completed in the United whereby weapons development is done in Israel and production is completed in the United
States.States.2224 Elbit Systems of America (Fort Worth, Texas), a wholly owned subsidiary of Israel’s Elbit Systems of America (Fort Worth, Texas), a wholly owned subsidiary of Israel’s
Elbit Systems, is one of the largest Israeli-owned firms operating in the United States. It acts as a Elbit Systems, is one of the largest Israeli-owned firms operating in the United States. It acts as a
purchasing agent for the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchasing agent for the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
programs.programs.23
25 As long as these subsidiaries follow U.S. guidelines (each must be a U.S.-based supplier, As long as these subsidiaries follow U.S. guidelines (each must be a U.S.-based supplier,
manufacturer, reseller, or distributor incorporated or licensed to do business in the United States manufacturer, reseller, or distributor incorporated or licensed to do business in the United States
and registered with the Israeli Ministry of Defense Mission in New York),and registered with the Israeli Ministry of Defense Mission in New York),2426 they are eligible they are eligible
(pending U.S. government approval) to enter into (pending U.S. government approval) to enter into FMF-financed Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) ~~contracts25~~
~~financed by FMF with the Israeli government.26~~ 20 See, Judah Ari Gross, “NSO Group Affair is Latest in Israel’s Long History of Arming Shady Regimes,” Times of Israel, July 28, 2021. 21 Oded Yaron, “Israeli Governments Approved Every Single Arms Deal Brought to Them Since 2007,” Haaretz, December 2, 2022. 22 Available online at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/commerce-adds-nso-group-and-other-foreign-companies-entity-list. 23 See, “Israel Issues Stricter Guidelines for use of its Cyber Tech Exports,” Reuters, December 6, 2021. 24 Ora Coren, “Israel's Arms Makers to Become more American under New Military-Aid Pact,” Ha’aretz, updated April 10, 2018. 25 Available online at https://elbitsystems.com/majior-subsidiaries/. 26 CRS conversation with U.S. State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), January 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel contracts27 with the Israeli government.28 Reoccurring language in annual Department of Reoccurring language in annual Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bills,State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bills,2729 as implemented as implemented
by Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, permit Israel (along with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, by Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, permit Israel (along with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Tunisia, Yemen, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Pakistan) to use FMF to finance DCS contracts, in Tunisia, Yemen, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Pakistan) to use FMF to finance DCS contracts, in
which the purchaser (Israel) enters into a contract directly with a vendor.which the purchaser (Israel) enters into a contract directly with a vendor.2830
Qualitative Military Edge (QME)
U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over
neighboring militaries.neighboring militaries.29 The rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and The rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and
training to compensate for being much smaller in land area and population than most of its training to compensate for being much smaller in land area and population than most of its

~~22 Ora Coren, “Israel's Arms Makers to Become more American under New Military-Aid Pact,” Ha’aretz, updated~~
~~April 10, 2018.~~
~~23 Available online at https://elbitsystems.com/majior-subsidiaries/.~~
~~24 CRS conversation with U.S. State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), January 6, 2022.~~
25potential adversaries. The Origins of QME The concept of QME (independent of its application to Israel) dates back to the Cold War. In assessing the balance of power in Europe, U.S. war planners would often stress to lawmakers that, because Warsaw Pact countries had a numerical advantage over U.S. and allied forces stationed in Europe, the United States must maintain a “qualitative edge” in defense systems.31 The concept was subsequently applied to Israel in relation to its Arab adversaries. In 1981, then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before Congress, saying, “A central aspect of US policy since the October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge.”32 For decades, successive Administrations, in conjunction with Congress, have taken measures to maintain Israel’s QME in a number of ways. For example,  U.S. arms sales policy has traditionally allowed Israel first regional access to U.S. defense technology. For example, Israel acquired the F-15 in 1976, six years 27 Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)/DCS allow a foreign entity to contract directly with a U.S.-based Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)/DCS allow a foreign entity to contract directly with a U.S.-based
company in order to obtain needed supplies or services (subject to U.S. Government review and approval). This process company in order to obtain needed supplies or services (subject to U.S. Government review and approval). This process
takes the U.S. Government out of the “middleman” role that it plays in facilitating FMS transactions. See, CRS InFocus takes the U.S. Government out of the “middleman” role that it plays in facilitating FMS transactions. See, CRS InFocus
CRS In Focus IF11441, CRS In Focus IF11441, Transfer of Defense Articles: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), by Nathan J. Lucas and Michael , by Nathan J. Lucas and Michael
J. Vassalotti. J. Vassalotti.
2628 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Guidelines for Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Guidelines for Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts,
March 2017. March 2017.
2729 See, for example, section headed “Foreign Military Financing Program” See, for example, section headed “Foreign Military Financing Program” ~~under Division K of the FY2021~~
of the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. ~~116-260).~~
28117-328). 30 P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, states that P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, states that
“Only those countries for which assistance was justified for the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program in the fiscal “Only those countries for which assistance was justified for the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program in the fiscal
year 1989 congressional presentation for security assistance programs may utilize funds made available under this year 1989 congressional presentation for security assistance programs may utilize funds made available under this
heading for procurement of defense articles, defense services or design and construction services that are not sold by heading for procurement of defense articles, defense services or design and construction services that are not sold by
the United States Government under the Arms Export Control Act.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s the United States Government under the Arms Export Control Act.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s
Security Assistance Manual further states that “DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA) Direct Commercial Security Assistance Manual further states that “DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA) Direct Commercial
Contracts Division (DCC)) approves DCCs to be financed with FMF on a case-by-case basis.” See Chapter 9.7.3, Contracts Division (DCC)) approves DCCs to be financed with FMF on a case-by-case basis.” See Chapter 9.7.3,
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M,
DSCA Policy 12-20. DSCA Policy 12-20.
~~29 For more coverage of this issue, see CRS Report R46580,~~ ~~Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms~~
~~Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
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~~potential adversaries.30 For decades, successive Administrations, in conjunction with Congress,~~
~~have taken measures to maintain Israel’s QME in a number of ways. For example,~~
 In practice, U.S. arms sales policy has traditionally allowed Israel first regional
~~access~~ ~~to U.S. defense technology.31~~31 For example, see, Written Statement of General William O. Gribble, Jr., Hearings on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1973, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, February 2, 3, 7, 9, 22, 23, 24, March 6, 7, and 8, 1972. 32 Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence Long, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981. Congressional Research Service 5 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel before Saudi Arabia. It received the delivery of the F-16 fighter in 1980, three years before Egypt.33
 In cases in which both Israel and an Arab state operate the same U.S. platform,  In cases in which both Israel and an Arab state operate the same U.S. platform,
Israel has first received either Israel has first received either a more advanced version of the platform or the of the platform or the
ability to ability to customize the U.S. system. the U.S. system.3234
 In cases in which Israel objected to a major defense article sale to an Arab  In cases in which Israel objected to a major defense article sale to an Arab
military (e.g., the 1981 sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System military (e.g., the 1981 sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System
aircraft or “AWACS” to Saudi Arabia), Congress has, at times, advocated for and aircraft or “AWACS” to Saudi Arabia), Congress has, at times, advocated for and
legislated legislated conditions on the usage and transfer of such weapons prior to or of such weapons prior to or
after a sale.after a sale.3335
 The United States has compensated Israel with “  The United States has compensated Israel with “offsetting” weapons packages or ” weapons packages or
military aid when selling other U.S. major defense articles to a Middle Eastern military aid when selling other U.S. major defense articles to a Middle Eastern
~~military rival~~state ( (see textbox below). ).
Over time, Congress codified informal QME-related practices in ways that encouraged a more Over time, Congress codified informal QME-related practices in ways that encouraged a more
deliberate interagency process for each major U.S. arms sale to Middle Eastern governments deliberate interagency process for each major U.S. arms sale to Middle Eastern governments
other than Israel.other than Israel.3436 In the 110th Congress, Representative Howard Berman sponsored legislation In the 110th Congress, Representative Howard Berman sponsored legislation
(H.R. 5916, Section 201) to “carry out an empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing (H.R. 5916, Section 201) to “carry out an empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing
basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats.” basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats.”
After becoming Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), then-Chairman After becoming Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), then-Chairman
Berman was able to incorporate this language into the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L. Berman was able to incorporate this language into the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L.
110-429). The relevant QME provisions of this law had three primary elements: (1) they defined 110-429). The relevant QME provisions of this law had three primary elements: (1) they defined

~~30 The concept of QME (independent of its application to Israel) dates back to the Cold War. In assessing the balance of~~
~~power in Europe, U.S. war planners would often stress to lawmakers that, because countries of the Warsaw Pact had a~~
~~numerical advantage over U.S. and allied forces stationed in Europe, the United States must maintain a “qualitative~~
~~edge” in defense systems. For example, see, Written Statement of General William O. Gribble, Jr., Hearings on~~
~~Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1973, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee~~
~~on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, February 2, 3, 7, 9, 22, 23,~~
~~24, March 6, 7, and 8, 1972. The concept was subsequently applied to Israel in relation to its Arab adversaries. In 1981,~~
~~then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before Congress, saying, “A central aspect of US policy since the~~
~~October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge.” Secretary of State Alexander~~
~~Haig, Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence Long, House Appropriations~~
~~Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981.~~
~~31 For example, Israel acquired the F-15 in 1976, six years before Saudi Arabia. It received the delivery of the F-16~~
~~fighter in 1980, three years before Egypt.~~QME;37 (2) they required an assessment of Israel’s QME every four years; and (3) they amended the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2776) to require a determination, for any export of a U.S. defense article to any country in the Middle East other than Israel, that such a sale would not adversely affect Israel’s QME. 33 In 1977, P.L. 95–92 provided that “In accordance with the historic special In 1977, P.L. 95–92 provided that “In accordance with the historic special
relationship between the United States and Israel and previous agreements and continuing understandings, the Congress relationship between the United States and Israel and previous agreements and continuing understandings, the Congress
joins with the President in reaffirming that a policy of restraint in United States arms transfers, including arms sales joins with the President in reaffirming that a policy of restraint in United States arms transfers, including arms sales
ceilings, shall not impair Israel’s deterrent strength or undermine the military balance in the Middle East.” ceilings, shall not impair Israel’s deterrent strength or undermine the military balance in the Middle East.”
3234 “The Double Edged Sword of the Qualitative Military Edge,” “The Double Edged Sword of the Qualitative Military Edge,” Israel Policy Forum, April 11, 2016. , April 11, 2016.
3335 See Section 131, Certification Concerning AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia, P.L. 99-83, the International Security and See Section 131, Certification Concerning AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia, P.L. 99-83, the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985. Development Cooperation Act of 1985.
3436 Prior to 2008, during congressional review of possible U.S. arms sales to the Middle East, QME concerns only were Prior to 2008, during congressional review of possible U.S. arms sales to the Middle East, QME concerns only were
addressed on an ad hoc basis, usually through consultations between the military and committee staff. Some addressed on an ad hoc basis, usually through consultations between the military and committee staff. Some
congressional staff congressional staff ~~felt~~argued that assessments for specific arms sales tended to be overly subjective that assessments for specific arms sales tended to be overly subjective~~. Because staff frequently~~
~~raised QME concerns, the attempt to codify QME as a statutory requirement stemmed from a desire to~~ and asserted that codifying the requirement would rationalize the rationalize the
process, make it more objective, and incorporate it as a regular component of the U.S. arms sales review process to process, make it more objective, and incorporate it as a regular component of the U.S. arms sales review process to
Middle Eastern governments. CRS conversation with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member, September Middle Eastern governments. CRS conversation with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member, September
~~24, 2020.~~
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~~QME;35 (2) they required an assessment of Israel’s QME every four years; and (3) they amended~~
~~the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2776) to require a determination, for any export~~
~~of a U.S. defense article to any country in the Middle East other than Israel, that such a sale~~
~~would not adversely affect Israel’s QME.~~
24, 2020. 37 Section 201(d)(2) defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.” Congressional Research Service 6 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Preserving QME: Offsetting Weapons Packages for Israel
The fol owing specific instances supplemented general U.S. efforts to strengthen Israel’s QME: The fol owing specific instances supplemented general U.S. efforts to strengthen Israel’s QME:3638
 
In 1992, after the United States announced a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 fighters, the George H.W. Bush In 1992, after the United States announced a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 fighters, the George H.W. Bush
Administration provided Israel with Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and pre-positioned U.S. defense Administration provided Israel with Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and pre-positioned U.S. defense
equipment in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. approval.equipment in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. approval.3739
 
In 2007, after the George W. Bush Administration agreed to sell Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack Munitions In 2007, after the George W. Bush Administration agreed to sell Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs), the Administration reportedly agreed to sell more advanced JDAMs to Israel.(JDAMs), the Administration reportedly agreed to sell more advanced JDAMs to Israel.3840
 
In 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to sell an additional 20 F-35 aircraft to Israel in response to a sale In 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to sell an additional 20 F-35 aircraft to Israel in response to a sale
to Saudi Arabia that included F-15s.to Saudi Arabia that included F-15s.3941
 
In 2013, after the Obama Administration agreed to sell the UAE advanced F-16 fighters, then In 2013, after the Obama Administration agreed to sell the UAE advanced F-16 fighters, then -Secretary of Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would provide Israel with KC-135 refueling aircraft, Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would provide Israel with KC-135 refueling aircraft,
anti-radiation missiles, advanced radar, and anti-radiation missiles, advanced radar, and ~~the sale of~~ six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.4042 At the time, the At the time, the
U.S. proposal marked the first time that the United States had offered to sell tilt-rotor Ospreys to another U.S. proposal marked the first time that the United States had offered to sell tilt-rotor Ospreys to another
country. Israel would eventually cancel its planned purchase of the V-22 due to budgetary constraints. country. Israel would eventually cancel its planned purchase of the V-22 due to budgetary constraints.
Since the passage of the QME law and its amending of the AECA, the interagency process to Since the passage of the QME law and its amending of the AECA, the interagency process to
assess Israel’s QME has taken place behind closed doors with little fanfare. According to the assess Israel’s QME has taken place behind closed doors with little fanfare. According to the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance Manual, QME Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance Manual, QME
determinations can be classified.determinations can be classified.4143 After a QME determination has been made regarding a specific After a QME determination has been made regarding a specific
proposed sale, DSCA includes a line in the applicable congressional notification reading, “The proposed sale, DSCA includes a line in the applicable congressional notification reading, “The
proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.” proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.”
~~At various times, the U.S. government reportedly has held regular consultations with Israeli~~
~~officials regarding the potential impact of regional arms sales on QME.42 More recently, some~~
~~former Obama Administration officials responded to news in 2020 of the possible sale of the F-35~~
(see below) to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with criticism of what they perceived as a lack of
~~time for U.S. officials and Congress to properly assess the transaction, noting that “the process of~~

~~35 Section 201(d)(2) defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from~~
~~any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and~~
~~casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command,~~
~~control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics~~
~~are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.”~~
~~36 See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military~~
~~Affairs, November 4, 2011; “U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: U.S. Provides Israel a Qualitative Military Advantage,”~~
Jewish Virtual Library.
~~37 See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 White House Statement on US Military Assistance to Israel, September~~
~~26, 1992, VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994.~~
~~38 Dan Williams, “Israel to get ‘Smarter’ U.S.-made Bombs than Saudis,” Reuters, January 13, 2020.~~
~~39 Eli Lake, “In Gates Book, Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining over Saudi Arms,” Daily Beast, January 10, 2014.~~
~~40 “U.S. Near $10 Billion Arms Deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE,” Reuters, April 19, 2013.~~
~~41 See https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5.~~
~~42 For an example, see Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israeli Brass Decry U.S. Arms Sales to Arab States,” Defense News,~~
~~January 23, 2012. At the time this article was published, the U.S. side of the working group was led by the Under~~
~~Secretary of Defense for Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, while the Israeli side was~~
~~led by the Defense Ministry’s policy chief and the Israel Defense Forces director of planning.~~
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~~military consultations with Israel on a given weapons system typically took several years of~~
~~extensive defense shuttle diplomacy, completed before formally notifying Congress of the arms~~
~~sale package.”43 One Member of Congress wrote that previous QME determinations encompassed~~
~~“classified negotiations that got to the heart of Israel’s defense capabilities.”44~~
Lawmakers have amended or attempted to amend aspects of the 2008 law. The U.S.-Israel Lawmakers have amended or attempted to amend aspects of the 2008 law. The U.S.-Israel
Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) amended Section 36 of the AECA to require that the Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) amended Section 36 of the AECA to require that the
Administration explain, in cases of sales or exports of major U.S. defense equipment to other Administration explain, in cases of sales or exports of major U.S. defense equipment to other
Middle Eastern states, Middle Eastern states, ~~what is~~ “Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by “Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by
~~such sale or export.”45 Most recently, in the 116th Congress, Representative Bradley Schneider~~
~~sponsored (H.R. 8494), the Guaranteeing Israel’s QME Act of 2020, which would have required~~
~~the President to consult with Israeli officials before making a QME determination.46~~
~~The Proposed F-35 Sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and~~
~~Israel’s QME~~
~~Prior to 2020, the UAE had no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, but the two small,~~
~~technologically advanced countries had been gradually and secretly increasing their bilateral~~
~~cooperation for decades.47 By 2020, the regional diplomatic environment presented a favorable~~
~~opportunity to formalize the relationship. At the time, the UAE had faced significant U.S. and~~
~~other foreign criticism for its military interventions in Yemen and Libya, its use of spyware~~
~~against domestic and foreign opponents,48 and its isolation of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council~~
~~(GCC) member Qatar. At the same time, then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had~~
~~secured a pledge from his new partners in a coalition government to support Israeli annexation of~~
~~parts of the West Bank, a move likely to be seen as inflammatory across the Arab world.49~~
~~Within this context, the Trump Administration, Israel, and the UAE jointly negotiated an Israel-~~
~~UAE diplomatic normalization agreement during the summer of 2020 in exchange for Israel~~
~~agreeing to suspend its annexation plans. In support of the set of bilateral agreements that came to~~
~~be known as the “Abraham Accords,” the Trump Administration also pledged to sell to the UAE~~

~~43 Barbara A. Leaf and Dana Stroul, “The F-35 Triangle: America, Israel, the United Arab Emirates,”~~ ~~War on the~~
~~Rocks, September 15, 2020. See also, Andrew Shapiro and Derek Chollet, “Selling F-35s to the Middle East Was~~
~~Never Going to Be Easy,” Defense One, September 14, 2020.~~
~~44 Representative Elissa Slotkin, “The Importance of Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” Medium.com,~~
~~September 14, 2020.~~
~~45 The Act also requires the Administration to evaluate “how such sale or export alters the strategic and tactical balance~~
~~in the region, including relative capabilities; and Israel’s capacity to respond to the improved regional capabilities~~
~~provided by such sale or export,” and include “an identification of any specific new capacity, capabilities, or training~~
~~that Israel may require to address the regional or country-specific capabilities provided by such sale or export; and a~~
~~description of any additional United States security assurances to Israel made, or requested to be made, in connection~~
~~with, or as a result of, such sale or export.”~~
~~46 In the 115th Congress, Representative Schneider sponsored H.R. 2833, Defending Israel’s QME Act of 2017.~~
~~47 Dion Nissenbaum, “Secret Ties Paved Way for U.A.E., Israel Deal,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2020.~~
~~48 Mark Mazzetti, Nicole Perlroth and Ronen Bergman, “It Seemed like a Popular Chat App. It’s Secretly a Spy Tool,”~~
New York Times, December 22, 2019.
~~49 Israel Democracy Institute, Coalition Agreement for the Establishment of an Emergency and National Unity~~
~~Government in Israel, April 20, 2020.~~
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~~the advanced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft50 and armed drones (see below).51 Previously, the~~
~~United States had repeatedly denied UAE requests to purchase the F-35, while allowing Israel to~~
~~become the first Middle East operator of the fifth generation platform in 2017 (see~~~~, “F-35”~~
~~below). UAE officials say the country has sought since 2014 to buy the F-35.~~
~~Israel has long held aerial superiority in the Middle East due to both the skill of its pilots and the~~
~~American-built planes in its fleet. Israel is the sole Middle Eastern country that operates the F-35,~~
~~and this possession of a fifth generation aircraft, along with its older, but still formidable,~~
~~squadrons of F-15Is and F-16Cs, provides it with a significant advantage over neighboring Arab~~
~~states. No other Middle Eastern air force currently possesses a stealth fighter akin to the F-35.~~
~~While other regional air forces possess advanced fourth generation fighters—such as Saudi~~
~~Arabia (Boeing F-15SA), Qatar (Boeing F-15QA), the UAE (Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 60~~
~~E/F Desert Falcon),52 and Egypt (Dassault Rafale)— the F-35’s advanced sensors and its ability~~
~~to share information with legacy aircraft give Israel’s older fighters a situational awareness of the~~
~~battlefield that no other regional state possesses.~~
~~During the last few months of the 116th Congress, many lawmakers largely welcomed the signing~~
~~of the Israel-UAE normalization agreement while asserting congressional prerogatives to~~
~~thoroughly review any potential related arms sales to the UAE, particularly as they relate to the~~
~~QME.53 Some lawmakers raised questions as to whether the sale of the F-35 to Middle Eastern~~
~~countries other than Israel would automatically erode Israel’s QME. In a September 2020 SFRC~~
~~hearing, then Ranking Member Robert Menendez asked then Under Secretary of State for~~
~~Political Affairs David Hale how the State Department was going to adhere to the 2008 law on~~
~~QME if the sale of the F-35 to the UAE went forward. In his response, Hale remarked that:~~
~~We have a large group of people at the Pentagon and at the State Department who evaluate~~
~~based on technical criteria and assessments of security and what it is that the Israelis have~~
~~and what it is that our partners need. And they will make recommendations to the Secretary~~
~~of State and then we have a consultative process with Israel. It occurs every year. There’s~~
~~an executive session in which it’s a closed session in which we talked about these things.54~~
~~On October 9, Senators Menendez and Reed sent a letter to then Secretary of State Michael~~
~~Pompeo posing a series of questions about the possible sale that they asserted “must be fully~~

~~50 See CRS Report R46580,~~ ~~Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab~~
~~Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
~~51 Amy Spiro, “Pompeo Says F-35 Sale to UAE was ‘Critical’ to the Abraham Accords,” Times of Israel, June 10,~~
~~2021.~~
~~52 The UAE’s Block 60 E/F Desert Falcon is considered a 4.5 generation fighter and the most advanced F-16 variant in~~
~~the world. See, Tyler Rogoway, “Here’s What the Ball on the Nose of UAE’s Block 60 F-16E/F Desert Falcon Does,”~~
The War Zone (online), September 19, 2019.
~~53 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell expressed his view that “We in Congress have an obligation to review any~~
~~U.S. arms sales package linked to the [Israel-UAE] deal. As we help our Arab partners defend against growing threats,~~
~~we must continue ensuring that Israel’s qualitative military edge remains unchallenged.” See, Congressional Record,~~
~~Senate Speeches and Inserts, Page S5563, September 14, 2020. Then Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)~~
~~Chairman Jim Risch stressed his view of the need for congressional consultations on preserving Israel’s QME and~~
~~upholding requirements in the AECA. See, Eric Shawn, “Trump Administration's Proposed F-35 Sale to UAE Hits~~
~~Snag,” Fox News, October 7, 2020. On September 15, 2020, then HFAC Chairman Eliot Engel sponsored a resolution~~
~~(H.Res. 1110) that, among other things, would have reaffirmed Congress’ commitment to maintaining Israel’s QME.~~
~~Prior to the resolution, several House lawmakers wrote a letter to President Trump warning that they would oppose any~~
~~arms sale that would threaten Israel’s QME. See, Rep. Schneider Leads Dem Call Defending Israel’s Qualitative~~
~~Military Edge, Press Release, September 11, 2020.~~
~~54 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing entitled, “U.S. Policy in a Changing Middle East,” September 24,~~
~~2020.~~
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~~answered before this sale is sent to Congress for review, as required by statute.”55 On October 20,~~
~~Senators Menendez and Feinstein introduced S. 4814, the Secure F-35 Exports Act of 2020. This~~
~~legislation would have, among other things, required a certification by the President before the~~
~~provision of F-35 aircraft to a Middle Eastern country other than Israel that such sale would not~~
~~undermine Israel’s QME.~~
~~A few Members expressed outright opposition to a proposed sale of the F-35 to the UAE.56~~
~~Representative Gregory Meeks stated that he was “absolutely opposed to that sale because we~~
~~don’t know what’s happening in the future. I’ve seen it happen before…. I think that it violates~~
~~Israel’s strategic interest and safety.”57~~
~~On November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion arms sale to~~
~~the UAE, to include F-35s, drones, and various munitions. As mentioned above, the sale was~~
~~proposed to support UAE-Israel diplomatic normalization. An effort to block the proposed sale in~~
~~the Senate failed to garner the required votes (S.J.Res. 77 and S.J.Res. 78).58 President Trump~~
~~issued a Statement of Administration Policy expressing his opposition to the resolutions of~~
~~disapproval, noting:~~
~~These sales are consistent with the longstanding commitment and statutory obligation of~~
~~the United States to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). The Department~~
~~of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, has included in its certification~~
~~to Congress a determination that these sales will not adversely affect Israel’s QME. In a~~
~~joint statement on October 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense~~
~~Minister Benny Gantz endorsed the delivery of advanced defense capabilities to the UAE,~~
~~noting the commitments by the United States to maintain Israel’s QME. Transfer of~~
~~enhanced capabilities to a partner after normalization of relations with Israel is consistent~~
~~with decades-long United States precedent. The United States provided enhanced security~~
~~capability to Egypt following its 1979 normalization of relations with Israel, and provided~~
~~enhanced security capability to Jordan following its 1994 normalization of relations with~~
~~Israel.59~~
~~In the last hours of the Trump presidency, the UAE signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance or~~
~~LOA (not a contract) to purchase up to 50 F-35s and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United~~
~~States.60 The Biden Administration temporarily paused the sale for review upon taking office, but~~

~~55 Available at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-09-~~
~~20%20RM%20Reed%20letter%20to%20Pompeo%20Esper%20re%20F-35%20UAE.pdf.~~
~~56 See, for example, Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz, “Trump Puts Israel’s Security in Danger with Deal to~~
~~Sell Fighter Jets to United Arab Emirates, Miami Herald, September 5, 2020.~~
~~57 Jacob Kornbluh, “Rep. Meeks Expresses ‘Absolute’ Opposition to Sale of F-35 Jets to UAE,” Jewish Insider,~~
~~September 24, 2020.~~
~~58 During floor consideration of the resolutions, then Senate Majority Leader McConnell stated that “Israel’s~~
~~Ambassador, Defense Minister, and Prime Minister have all made sure they are comfortable with this deal.” See,~~
~~Congressional Record, Senate Speeches And Inserts, Page S7247, Dec. 8, 2020. Senator Cornyn argued that the sales~~
~~would “allow greater military cooperation between the United States, the UAE, and Israel and strengthen a growing~~
~~coalition of aligned forces in the region.” See, Congressional Record, Senate Speeches And Inserts, Page S7268, Dec.~~
~~8, 2020. Other lawmakers, such as Senator Menendez, argued against the sales and raised the possibility that they~~
~~would exacerbate arms proliferation in the region and impact Israel's QME. See, Press Release, “Menendez Delivers~~
~~Floor Remarks on Joint Resolutions of Disapproval of Trump Administration's Proposed Arms Sale to UAE,”~~
~~December 9, 2020.~~
~~59 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, S.J.Res.~~
~~77, S.J.Res. 78, S.J.Res. 79, and S.J.Res. 80, Providing for Congressional Disapproval of the Proposed Export to the~~
~~United Arab Emirates of Certain Defense Articles and Services, December 9, 2020~~
~~60 Mike Stone, “UAE Signs Deal with U.S. to Buy 50 F-35 Jets and up to 18 Drones: Sources,” Reuters, January 20,~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~a State Department spokesperson told journalists in April 2021 that the Administration planned to~~
~~proceed with the sale.61 In April 2021, SFRC Chairman Menendez re-introduced the SECURE F–~~
~~35 Exports Act of 2021 (S. 1182).~~
~~As of January 2022, a contract between the UAE and Lockheed Martin for the F-35 had yet to be~~
~~reached or approved by the Biden Administration. In November 2021, Deputy Assistant Secretary~~
~~of State for Regional Security Mira Resnick said, “We’ve had quite a robust and sustained~~
~~dialogue with Emirati officials.... and I anticipate a continued, robust and sustained dialogue with~~
~~the UAE to ensure that any defense transfers meet our mutual national security strategic~~
~~objectives…. while protecting US technology.... It’s a real game-changing opportunity for the~~
~~UAE and for our partnership, and we look forward to implementing that sale.” 62 The UAE’s~~
~~ongoing relationship with China is one potential obstacle to concluding the F-35 sale. In~~
~~November 2021, the Biden Administration demanded an immediate halt to Chinese construction~~
~~of a reported military facility at Khalifa port, about 50 miles north of Abu Dhabi, where Chinese~~
~~company Cosco operates a commercial container terminal.63 Both the Trump and Biden~~
~~Administrations have pressed the UAE to remove Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei~~
~~Technologies Company from its network before the United States sells the Emiratis the F-35. The~~
~~UAE, which seeks to build a 5G system, has countered that it requires more time and an~~
~~alternative supplier before considering Huawei’s removal.64~~
such sale or export.” U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel
Since 1999, Since 1999, ~~overall~~ U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in 10-year government-to-U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in 10-year government-to-
government Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs are not legally binding agreements government Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs are not legally binding agreements
like treaties, like treaties, and ~~and thus~~ do not require Senate ratification. do not require Senate ratification. ~~Also~~Additionally, Congress may accept or change , Congress may accept or change
year-to-year assistance levels for Israel or provide supplemental appropriations. Nevertheless, year-to-year assistance levels for Israel or provide supplemental appropriations. Nevertheless,
past MOUs have significantly influenced past MOUs have significantly influenced ~~the terms of~~ U.S. aid to Israel; Congress has U.S. aid to Israel; Congress has
appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time. appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time.
P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal for Fiscal
~~Year 2021 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2021 NDAA”~~)Year 2021, contains Section 1273 of the United , contains Section 1273 of the United
States Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020, which authorizes “not less than” $3.3 States Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020, which authorizes “not less than” $3.3
~~billion in annual FMF to Israel through 2028 per the terms of the current MOU (see below).~~

~~2021.~~
~~61 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Remarks to the Press, January 27,~~
~~2021; “Joe Biden Is Proceeding with Donald Trump’s Biggest Arms Deal,” Huffington Post, April 13, 2021.~~
~~62 Jared Szuba, “Intel: US, UAE Talk F-35 as Russia Pitches Stealth Aircraft,” Al Monitor, November 17, 2021.~~
~~63 Gordon Lubold and Warren P. Strobel, “China Move in U.A.E. Thwarted --- U.S. Rang Alarm about Building of~~
~~Suspected Military Facility at Port on Mideast Ally's Turf,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2021.~~
~~64 Nick Wadhams and Sylvia Westall, “Biden Prods UAE to Dump Huawei, Sowing Doubts on Key F-35 Sale,”~~
Bloomberg, June 11, 2021.
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

billion in annual FMF to Israel through 2028 per the terms of the 38 See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, November 4, 2011; “U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: U.S. Provides Israel a Qualitative Military Advantage,” Jewish Virtual Library. 39 See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White House Statement on US Military Assistance to Israel, September 26, 1992, VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994. 40 Dan Williams, “Israel to get ‘Smarter’ U.S.-made Bombs than Saudis,” Reuters, January 13, 2020. 41 Eli Lake, “In Gates Book, Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining over Saudi Arms,” Daily Beast, January 10, 2014. 42 “U.S. Near $10 Billion Arms Deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE,” Reuters, April 19, 2013. 43 See https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 13 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel current MOU (see below). Appropriators have matched that authorization level each year since its passage. Brief History of MOUs on U.S. Aid to Israel
The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, was known as the “Glide The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, was known as the “Glide
Path Agreement” and represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 bil ion in total Path Agreement” and represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 bil ion in total
economic and military aideconomic and military aid ~~over its duration~~ (of which $21.3 bil ion was (of which $21.3 bil ion was in military aid)military aid)~~.65~~ during its duration.44 This MOU provided the This MOU provided the
template for the gradual phase-out of all economic assistance to Israel. template for the gradual phase-out of all economic assistance to Israel.
In 2007, the In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU consisting of a $30 bil ion Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU consisting of a $30 bil ion
military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. Under the terms of that agreement, Israel military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. Under the terms of that agreement, Israel
was explicitly permitted to continue spending up to 26.3% of U.S. assistance on Israeli-manufactured equipment was explicitly permitted to continue spending up to 26.3% of U.S. assistance on Israeli-manufactured equipment
(known as Off-Shore Procurement or OSP (known as Off-Shore Procurement or OSP -— discussed below). The agreement stated that “Both sides ). The agreement stated that “Both sides
acknowledge that these funding levels assume continuation of adequate levels for U.S. foreign assistance overall, acknowledge that these funding levels assume continuation of adequate levels for U.S. foreign assistance overall,
and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes.”and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes.”6645
The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)
At a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016, At a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016, ~~representatives of the~~
U.S. and Israeli U.S. and Israeli ~~governments~~government representatives signed another 10-year MOU on military aid covering FY2019 to signed another 10-year MOU on military aid covering FY2019 to
FY2028. Under the terms of this third MOU, the United States pledges, subject to congressional FY2028. Under the terms of this third MOU, the United States pledges, subject to congressional
appropriation, to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in FMF grants, plus $5 billion in appropriation, to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in FMF grants, plus $5 billion in
defense appropriations for missile defense programs) to Israel. According to the terms of the defense appropriations for missile defense programs) to Israel. According to the terms of the
MOU, “Both the United States and Israel jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in MOU, “Both the United States and Israel jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in
this MOU, and not to seek changes to the FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.”this MOU, and not to seek changes to the FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.”67

~~65 See, Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 19, 1999. According to the statement,~~
~~“The United States and Israel will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will express their joint~~
~~intention to restructure U.S. bilateral assistance to Israel. The MOU will state the United States’ intention to sustain its~~
~~annual military assistance to Israel, and incrementally increase its level by one-third over the next decade to a level of~~
~~$2.4 billion subject to Congressional consultations and approval. At the same time, the MOU will provide for a gradual~~
~~phase-out of U.S. economic aid to Israel, over a comparable period, as the Israeli economy grows more robust, less~~
~~dependent on foreign aid, and more integrated in world markets.”~~
~~66 United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, Signed by then U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas~~
~~Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron Abramovich, August 16, 2007.~~
~~67 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016.~~
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11

~~link to page 16~~

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Figure 1. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU~~

Source: CRS.
46 The terms of the FY2019-FY2028 MOU differ from previous agreements on issues such as, The terms of the FY2019-FY2028 MOU differ from previous agreements on issues such as,
  Phasing out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP).68 ~~Under the terms of the third~~
~~MOU, OSP will~~47 OSP is to decrease slowly until decrease slowly until FY2024, and then phase~~FY2024, but will then be phased~~ out more out more
dramatically over the MOU’s last five years, ending entirely in FY2028 (dramatically over the MOU’s last five years, ending entirely in FY2028 (see
Figure 12). The MOU calls on Israel to provide the United States with “detailed . The MOU calls on Israel to provide the United States with “detailed
programmatic information related to the use of all U.S. funding, including funds programmatic information related to the use of all U.S. funding, including funds
used for OSP.” In response to the planned phase-out of OSP, some Israeli defense used for OSP.” In response to the planned phase-out of OSP, some Israeli defense
contractors contractors ~~may be seeking to merge~~are merging with U.S. companies or with U.S. companies or ~~open~~opening U.S. U.S.
subsidiaries to continue their eligibility for defense contracts financed through subsidiaries to continue their eligibility for defense contracts financed through
FMF (seeFMF (see,, “U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology”).).6948
  Missile Defense. ~~Under the terms of the third MOU, the~~The Administration pledges Administration pledges
to request $500 million in annual to request $500 million in annual combined funding for missile defense programs combined funding for missile defense programs
~~with joint U.S.-Israeli elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and~~
~~David’s Sling. Previous MOUs did not include missile defense funding, which~~
~~has traditionally been appropriated via separate interactions between successive~~
~~Administrations and Congresses. While the MOU commits both the United~~

68with joint U.S.-Israeli 44 See, Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 19, 1999. 45 United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, Signed by then U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron Abramovich, August 16, 2007. 46 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016. 47 Section 42(c) (22 U.S.C. §2791(c)) of the AECA prohibits using funds made available under this Act for Section 42(c) (22 U.S.C. §2791(c)) of the AECA prohibits using funds made available under this Act for
procurement outside the United States unless the President determines that such procurement does not have an adverse procurement outside the United States unless the President determines that such procurement does not have an adverse
effect on the effect on the ~~economy of the United States~~U.S. economy or the industrial mobilization base. Executive Order 13637 designated this or the industrial mobilization base. Executive Order 13637 designated this
authority to the Secretary of Defense and the issuance of an OSP waiver requires concurrence by the Departments of authority to the Secretary of Defense and the issuance of an OSP waiver requires concurrence by the Departments of
State and Commerce. See, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance State and Commerce. See, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance
Manual, Chapter 9. Manual, Chapter 9.
6948 “Israeli UAV Firm agrees deal for Unnamed US Company,” “Israeli UAV Firm agrees deal for Unnamed US Company,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2017. , July 18, 2017.
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and David’s Sling. Previous MOUs did not include missile defense funding, which has traditionally been appropriated via separate interactions between successive Administrations and Congresses. While the MOU commits both the United ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

States and Israel to a $500 million annual U.S. missile defense contribution, it States and Israel to a $500 million annual U.S. missile defense contribution, it
also stipulates that under exceptional circumstances (e.g., major armed conflict also stipulates that under exceptional circumstances (e.g., major armed conflict
involving Israel), both sides may agree on U.S. support above the $500 million involving Israel), both sides may agree on U.S. support above the $500 million
~~annual cap (see~~~~, “The May 2021 War in Gaza and Proposed Supplemental~~
~~Iron Dome Funding”~~).
~~ No FMF for Fuel. According to the third MOU, Israel will no longer be~~
~~permitted to use a portion of its FMF to purchase fuel (or “other consumables”)~~
~~from the United States. Under the second MOU, Israel had budgeted an estimated~~
~~$400 million a year in FMF to purchase jet fuel from the United States.~~
~~Congressional appropriators have indicated in annual foreign assistance~~
~~legislation that they support FMF used to subsidize Israeli purchases of U.S. jet~~
~~fuel.70 In July 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a major defense sale to Israel of~~
~~990 million gallons of petroleum-based products, including jet fuel, for an~~
~~estimated cost of $3 billion.71~~
~~Figure 2. U.S. Military Aid to Israel over Decades~~

Source: CRS Graphics.
Notes: Figures included Foreign Military Financing only. Missile defense funds are not included. Figures are not
~~adjusted for inflation.~~

~~70 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel,~~
~~September 14, 2016. In the Committee report accompanying H.R. 2839, the Department of State, Foreign Operations,~~
~~and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020, appropriators wrote: “The Committee notes that Israel maintains the~~
~~flexibility under the MOU to purchase jet fuel from the United States.” See, H.Rept. 116-78 - State, Foreign~~
~~Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020. That same provision was reinserted into H.Rept. 116-444,~~
~~- State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2021. The explanatory statement accompanying~~
~~the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs federal agencies to comply with “the directives, reporting~~
~~requirements, and instructions” contained in H.Rept. 116-444 accompanying H.R. 7608.~~
~~71 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—Jp-8 Aviation Fuel, Diesel Fuel, and Unleaded Gasoline,”~~
~~Transmittal 20-44, July 6, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13annual cap). In FY2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in additional missile defense funding for Israel (see, Table 4). Figure 2. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU Source: CRS graphics. Figure 3. U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Israel over Decades Source: Created by CRS. Congressional Research Service 9

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales
Israel is the largest recipient of FMFIsrael is the largest recipient of FMF~~. For FY2022, the President’s request for Israel would~~
~~encompass approximately 53% of total requested FMF funding worldwide~~. Annual FMF grants to . Annual FMF grants to
Israel represent approximately 16Israel represent approximately 16~~.5%~~ % of the overall Israeli defense budget.of the overall Israeli defense budget.7249 Israel’s defense Israel’s defense
expenditure as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (5.expenditure as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (5.617% in % in ~~2020~~2021) is one of the highest in ) is one of the highest in
the world.the world.7350
Cash Flow Financing
Section 23 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement Section 23 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement
of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign
countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine
consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this
authority to permit Israel to utilize FMF funds to finance multiyear purchases in advance authority to permit Israel to utilize FMF funds to finance multiyear purchases in advance ~~of their~~
~~appropriations from Congress~~appropriations, rather than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up , rather than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up
~~front.74~~front (see text box below). Known as “cash flow financing,” this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms Known as “cash flow financing,” this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms
purchases with U.S. defense suppliers with payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.purchases with U.S. defense suppliers with payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.75
~~Cash flow financing and its derivatives also have allowed Israel to use U.S. government-approved~~
~~sources of external financing to support the procurement of major U.S. defense systems, such as~~
~~combat aircraft. Beginning with its purchase of F-16D aircraft from Lockheed Martin over 20~~
~~years ago and continuing presently with ongoing procurement of the F-35, the United States has~~
~~utilized what is known as the “Deferred Payments Program.” 76 This program allows Israel to~~

~~72 The Israeli Ministry of Defense provides funding figures for its domestic defense budget but excludes some~~
~~procurement spending and spending on civil defense. The estimate referenced above is based on figures published by~~
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, “Israel - Defence Budget Overview,” October 4, 2021.
~~Jane’s removes FMF from its Israeli defense budget calculations to reflect how much Israel independently spends on~~
~~defense.~~
~~73 Four other nations spend more on defense as a percentage of GDP: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Algeria, and Kuwait. See~~
~~Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross~~
~~domestic product, 1988-2020, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1949-2020.~~
74 51 Early History of Cash Flow Financing to Israel The United States initially began authorizing installment-style sales to Israel to help it rebuild its military capabilities The United States initially began authorizing installment-style sales to Israel to help it rebuild its military capabilities
after the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Congress appropriated $2.2 after the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Congress appropriated $2.2 ~~billion~~bil ion for Israel in P.L. 93-199, the Emergency for Israel in P.L. 93-199, the Emergency
Security Assistance Act of 1973. Section 3 of that act stated that “Foreign military sales credits [loans or grants] Security Assistance Act of 1973. Section 3 of that act stated that “Foreign military sales credits [loans or grants]
extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine and extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine and
without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended.” At the time, the Foreign Military Sales without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended.” At the time, the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968 (amended in 1971 and the precursor to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976), capped the annual amount Act of 1968 (amended in 1971 and the precursor to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976), capped the annual amount
of foreign military sales credit that could be extended to a recipient at no more than $250 of foreign military sales credit that could be extended to a recipient at no more than $250 ~~million~~mil ion per year. Under the per year. Under the
authorities contained in P.L. 93-199, President Nixon, in two separate determinations (April and July 1974), allocated authorities contained in P.L. 93-199, President Nixon, in two separate determinations (April and July 1974), allocated
the $2.2 the $2.2 ~~billion~~bil ion to Israel as $1.5 to Israel as $1.5 ~~billion~~bil ion in grant military aid, the largest U.S. grant aid package ever for Israel at the in grant military aid, the largest U.S. grant aid package ever for Israel at the
time. The remaining $700 time. The remaining $700 ~~million~~mil ion was designated as a military was designated as a military loan. According to the New York Times,~~loan. A year and a half later,~~ the Ford Administration the Ford Administration
reached a new arms sales agreement with Israel reached a new arms sales agreement with Israel providing that, according to the New York Timesa year and a half later, providing that, “the cost of the new , “the cost of the new
military equipment would be met through the large amount of aid approved by the just-completed session of Congress military equipment would be met through the large amount of aid approved by the just-completed session of Congress
as well as the aid that as well as the aid that ~~will~~ wil be approved by be approved by future Congresses.”52 Cash flow financing and its derivatives also have allowed Israel to use U.S. government-approved sources of external financing to support the procurement of major U.S. defense systems, such as combat aircraft. Beginning with its purchase of F-16D aircraft from Lockheed Martin over 20 years ago and continuing presently with ongoing procurement of the F-35, the United States has utilized what is known as the “Deferred Payments Program.”53 This program allows Israel to 49 The Israeli Ministry of Defense provides funding figures for its domestic defense budget but excludes some procurement spending and spending on civil defense. The estimate referenced above is based on figures published by Jane’s, “Israel Defence Budget,” June 20, 2022. Jane’s removes FMF from its Israeli defense budget calculations to reflect how much Israel independently spends on defense. 50 In 2021, five other nations spent more on defense as a percentage of GDP: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Algeria, Kuwait and Azerbaijan. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 2021, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 51~~future Congresses.” See, “U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel That It~~
~~Blocked in the Past,” New York Times, October 12, 1976.~~
75 Cash flow financing is defined in Section 25(d) of the AECA and Section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of Cash flow financing is defined in Section 25(d) of the AECA and Section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended. 1961, as amended.
7652 See, “U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel That It Blocked in the Past,” New York Times, October 12, 1976. 53 Under this arrangement, Lockheed Martin sells Citibank a legal claim on its defense contract with Israel. The U.S. Under this arrangement, Lockheed Martin sells Citibank a legal claim on its defense contract with Israel. The U.S.
Defense Department then repays Citibank using the available FMF allocation for Israel. The Israeli government uses its Defense Department then repays Citibank using the available FMF allocation for Israel. The Israeli government uses its
own national funds to pay interest on the Citibank loans. One organization in support of continued U.S. support for own national funds to pay interest on the Citibank loans. One organization in support of continued U.S. support for
Israel has advocated for Congress to authorize the use of FMF to cover Israeli interest payments on weapons deals to Israel has advocated for Congress to authorize the use of FMF to cover Israeli interest payments on weapons deals to
~~creditors. See, Jonathan Ruhe, Charles B. Perkins, and Ari Cicurel, “Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons~~
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defer payments owed under its defer payments owed under its ~~LOA~~Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for F-35 aircraft and use for F-35 aircraft and use ~~future~~ future-year FMF appropriations to year FMF appropriations to
make payments pursuant to a pre-determined payment schedule. Upon deferral of a given make payments pursuant to a pre-determined payment schedule. Upon deferral of a given
payment by Israel, a private bank (in the case of the F-35, a small consortium led by Citibank) payment by Israel, a private bank (in the case of the F-35, a small consortium led by Citibank)
pays Lockheed Martin in full and Lockheed Martin assigns its right to be paid by the U.S. pays Lockheed Martin in full and Lockheed Martin assigns its right to be paid by the U.S.
Government to the bank.Government to the bank.7754 In 2021, Israel’s “security cabinet” (formally known as the Ministerial In 2021, Israel’s “security cabinet” (formally known as the Ministerial
Committee on Defense) approved plans to allocate over $9 billion in future FMF appropriations Committee on Defense) approved plans to allocate over $9 billion in future FMF appropriations
to finance the purchases of various U.S. weapons systems, such as the Sikorsky CH-53K heavy to finance the purchases of various U.S. weapons systems, such as the Sikorsky CH-53K heavy
lift helicopter and additional F-35 aircraft (lift helicopter and additional F-35 aircraft (see below). ). ~~Various~~In 2021, various news reports news reports ~~indicate~~indicated that the that the
Israeli government Israeli government iswas pursuing a delay of the payments coming due under the Deferred pursuing a delay of the payments coming due under the Deferred ~~Payment~~
~~Program in order~~Payments Program to assist in financing these near-term foreign military sales acquisitions. to assist in financing these near-term foreign military sales acquisitions.7855
In Foreign Military Sales cases in which Israel and the United States seek to execute LOAs In Foreign Military Sales cases in which Israel and the United States seek to execute LOAs
beyond the scope of the current MOU (either beyond FY2028 or above the $33 billion pledged), beyond the scope of the current MOU (either beyond FY2028 or above the $33 billion pledged),
the U.S. government has established a “Special Billing Arrangement” or SBA with Israel. The the U.S. government has established a “Special Billing Arrangement” or SBA with Israel. The
purpose of SBAs, according to DSCA, is to “improve cash management for eligible FMS purpose of SBAs, according to DSCA, is to “improve cash management for eligible FMS
partners.”partners.”7956 Under an SBA, Israel may use national cash reserves for funding requirements Under an SBA, Israel may use national cash reserves for funding requirements
associated with an FMS case (e.g., funds to cover termination liability) that exceeds the amount associated with an FMS case (e.g., funds to cover termination liability) that exceeds the amount
of funds listed in or duration of the current MOU.of funds listed in or duration of the current MOU.8057
Early Transfer and Interest Bearing Account
Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump
sum during the first month of the fiscal year.sum during the first month of the fiscal year.~~81 P.L. 116-260~~58 P.L.117-328, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, , the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
~~FY2021 (herein after~~2023 (hereinafter referred to as “ referred to as “the ~~FY2021~~FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act”) states, ) states,
“That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than $3,300,000,000 shall be “That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than $3,300,000,000 shall be
available for grants only for Israel which shall be disbursed within 30 days of enactment of this available for grants only for Israel which shall be disbursed within 30 days of enactment of this
Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s military aid is transferred to an interest bearing account with the Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s military aid is transferred to an interest bearing account with the
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.8259 Israel has used interest collected on its military aid to pay down, Israel has used interest collected on its military aid to pay down,
~~among other things, its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S. government agencies, which,~~

among other creditors. See, Jonathan Ruhe, Charles B. Perkins, and Ari Cicurel, “Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations,Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations,” The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), , February February
2021. However, according to DSCA, it is unclear whether FMF is legally available for that purpose. 2021. However, according to DSCA, it is unclear whether FMF is legally available for that purpose.
7754 CRS Correspondence with DSCA, January 2022. CRS Correspondence with DSCA, January 2022.
7855 Avi Bar-Eli, “Analysis | 'Okay, but Never Again': How Israel Air Force Sealed $9 Billion U.S. Arms Deal,” Avi Bar-Eli, “Analysis | 'Okay, but Never Again': How Israel Air Force Sealed $9 Billion U.S. Arms Deal,”
Ha’aretz, February 9, 2021 and “Israel’s Military Skirts Budget Restrictions for $9 Billion Air Force Upgrade,” , February 9, 2021 and “Israel’s Military Skirts Budget Restrictions for $9 Billion Air Force Upgrade,” Al
Monitor, February 10, 2021. , February 10, 2021.
7956 See Chapter 9.10.2, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency See Chapter 9.10.2, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20. Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20.
8057 According to DSCA, “Since requirements and procedures are unique to each country, they are normally established According to DSCA, “Since requirements and procedures are unique to each country, they are normally established
in an agreement between the customer country, DSCA, and the appropriate banking institutions in the U.S. and the in an agreement between the customer country, DSCA, and the appropriate banking institutions in the U.S. and the
purchaser’s country.” See, Defense Security Cooperation University, Security Cooperation Management, Chapter 12, purchaser’s country.” See, Defense Security Cooperation University, Security Cooperation Management, Chapter 12,
Edition 41, May 2021. Edition 41, May 2021.
8158 On at least one occasion when government operations were funded by a continuing On at least one occasion when government operations were funded by a continuing ~~appropriations~~ resolution, resolution,
Congress has included provisions in the resolution preventing the early transfer of FMF to Israel until the final Congress has included provisions in the resolution preventing the early transfer of FMF to Israel until the final
appropriations bill for that fiscal year was passed. See Section 109 of P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act, appropriations bill for that fiscal year was passed. See Section 109 of P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act,
2014. 2014.
8259 According to DSCA, “Some countries may establish an account with the federal reserve bank (FRB), New York, for According to DSCA, “Some countries may establish an account with the federal reserve bank (FRB), New York, for
their FMS [Foreign Military Sales] deposits. An agreement between the FMS purchaser’s defense organization, the their FMS [Foreign Military Sales] deposits. An agreement between the FMS purchaser’s defense organization, the
purchaser’s central bank, FRB New York and DSCA identifies the terms, conditions, and mechanics of the account’s purchaser’s central bank, FRB New York and DSCA identifies the terms, conditions, and mechanics of the account’s
operation. Countries receiving FMFP funds must maintain their interest bearing account in the FRB.” See, Defense operation. Countries receiving FMFP funds must maintain their interest bearing account in the FRB.” See, Defense
Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),” Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),”
34th Edition, April 2015. 34th Edition, April 2015.
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things, its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S. government agencies, which, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, stood at $according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, stood at $~~11.8~~7.9 million as of million as of ~~March 2021.83~~
September 2021.60 Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel. Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel.
Shorter Congressional Review Period
Per provisions in the AECA, Israel, along with Per provisions in the AECA, Israel, along with ~~NATO~~ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, Japan, Australia, South member states, Japan, Australia, South
Korea, and New Zealand (commonly referred to as NATO+5) have shorter congressional review Korea, and New Zealand (commonly referred to as NATO+5) have shorter congressional review
periods (15 days instead of 30) and higher dollar notification thresholds than other countries for periods (15 days instead of 30) and higher dollar notification thresholds than other countries for
both government-to-government and commercially licensed arms sales.both government-to-government and commercially licensed arms sales.8461
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Israel was the first declared international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Israel was the first declared international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.8562 It has It has
purchased 50 F-35s purchased 50 F-35s ~~(called Adirs86)~~ in three separate contracts using FMF grants. As of in three separate contracts using FMF grants. As of
~~September 2021~~January 2023, Israel had received , Israel had received 3036 of 50 jets, which it has divided into of 50 jets, which it has divided into ~~two~~three squadrons (the squadrons (the
116th ‘Lions of the South116th ‘Lions of the South,’ the 140th ‘Golden Eagles,’ and the 117th Training Squadron~~’ and 105th ‘Golden Eagle’ squadrons~~) based at Nevatim Air Base in ) based at Nevatim Air Base in
southern Israel.southern Israel.8763 From there and without any aerial refueling, Israel’s F-35s could strike targets From there and without any aerial refueling, Israel’s F-35s could strike targets
in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and most of Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and most of Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.~~88 To date, Israel~~
~~reportedly has used its F-35 aircraft to conduct aerial strikes inside Syria.89~~
~~The Department of Defense’s F-35 program~~
~~Figure 3. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in~~
~~is an international cooperative program in~~
~~Formation~~
~~which Israel (and Singapore) are considered~~
~~Joint Exercise Enduring Lightning III (October 2020)~~
~~“security cooperation participants” outside of~~
~~the F-35 cooperative development~~
~~partnership.90 As a result, Israel is not eligible~~
~~to assign staff to the F-35 Joint Program~~
~~Office in Washington and does not receive~~

Source: U.S. Air Force.

8364 One open source has suggested that Israel may have extended the range of its F-35s in order to strike targets inside Iran without first requiring mid-air refueling.65 To date, according to media accounts, Israel has used its F-35s in several military operations, including:  Israel reportedly has used its F-35 aircraft to conduct aerial strikes inside Syria.66 60 Foreign Credit Reporting System (FCRS), Amounts Due the U.S. Government, United States Department of the Foreign Credit Reporting System (FCRS), Amounts Due the U.S. Government, United States Department of the
Treasury, Office of Global Economics and Debt. Treasury, Office of Global Economics and Debt.
8461 See CRS Report RL31675, See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
8562 In September 2008, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal In September 2008, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal
with a possible total value of $15.2 billion. See, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Transmittal No. 08-83, Israel - with a possible total value of $15.2 billion. See, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Transmittal No. 08-83, Israel -
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft, September 29, 2008. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft, September 29, 2008.
~~86 “After F-35 makes Aliyah, it will get new Israeli identity,” Israel Hayom, May 2, 2016. In Hebrew, “Aliyah” refers~~
~~to geographical relocation to Israel. “Adir” is a Hebrew word for “mighty” or “powerful.”~~
8763 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Air Force Favouring Additional F-35s,” Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Air Force Favouring Additional F-35s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2020. , September 10, 2020.
8864 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Declares F-35 to Be Operational,” Gareth Jennings, “Israel Declares F-35 to Be Operational,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 6, 2017. , December 6, 2017.
8965 Thomas Newdick, “Israel has Extended the Range of its F-35,” The War Zone, The Drive.com, June 9, 2022. 66 “F-35 Stealth Fighter Sees First Combat, in Israeli Operation,” “F-35 Stealth Fighter Sees First Combat, in Israeli Operation,” BBC News, May 22, 2018 and “Israel - Air Force,” , May 22, 2018 and “Israel - Air Force,”
Jane’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019. , July 5, 2019.
~~90 See CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.~~
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~~full F-35 technical briefings.91 The United States~~Congressional Research Service 12 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel  In March 2021, Israeli F-35 aircraft reportedly intercepted two Iranian drones (carrying a cargo of pistols presumably intended for Palestinian Figure 4. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in militants) while the drones were Formation outside of Israeli airspace.67 Joint Exercise Enduring Lightning III (October 2020) The Department of Defense’s F-35 program is an international cooperative program in which Israel (and Singapore) are considered “security cooperation participants” outside of the F-35 cooperative development partnership.68 Israel is not eligible to assign staff to the F-35 Joint Program Office in Virginia and does not receive full F-35 technical briefings.69 The U.S. government and Lockheed Martin retain government and Lockheed Martin retain
exclusive access exclusive access to the F-35’s software code, which Israel is not permitted to alter.to the F-35’s software code, which Israel is not permitted to alter.
~~However~~ Source: U.S. Air Force. Despite these limitations, Israel’s involvement in the F-35 , Israel’s involvement in the F-35
program is extensive, with Israeli program is extensive, with Israeli companies ~~companies~~
~~Figure 4. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display~~
making F-35 wing sets (IAI) and helmets making F-35 wing sets (IAI) and helmets
~~Made by Israeli Manufacturer Elbit Systems~~
(Elbit Systems). Israel (Elbit Systems). Israel ~~also~~ received received
significant development access to the F-35 significant development access to the F-35
and the ability to customize its planes with and the ability to customize its planes with
Israeli-made C4 (command, control, Israeli-made C4 (command, control,
communications, computers) systems, under communications, computers) systems, under
the condition that the software coding be done the condition that the software coding be done
by the United States. In 2018, the Navy by the United States. In 2018, the Navy
awarded Lockheed Martin a $148 million awarded Lockheed Martin a $148 million
contract for “the procurement of Israel-unique contract for “the procurement of Israel-unique
weapons certification, modification kits, and weapons certification, modification kits, and

electronic warfare analysis.”electronic warfare analysis.”9270 Software ~~Software~~
Source: Elbit Systems Ltd.
upgrades (called Block 3F+) added to the upgrades (called Block 3F+) added to the
Note: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display is a joint
main computer of Israel’s F-35s reportedly main computer of Israel’s F-35s reportedly
~~venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Col ins.~~
facilitate the “use of Israeli-designed facilitate the “use of Israeli-designed
electronic equipment and weaponry,” thereby permitting Israel to “employ its own external electronic equipment and weaponry,” thereby permitting Israel to “employ its own external
jamming pod and also allow internal carriage of indigenous air-to-air missiles and guided jamming pod and also allow internal carriage of indigenous air-to-air missiles and guided
munitions.”munitions.”9371 In December 2021, the Defense Department awarded a $49 million contract to In December 2021, the Defense Department awarded a $49 million contract to
Lockheed Martin to support work on “an F-35 variant ‘tailored’ for an undisclosed FMS Lockheed Martin to support work on “an F-35 variant ‘tailored’ for an undisclosed FMS
customer,” probably Israel.customer,” probably Israel.94
~~In October 2020, the United States and Israel conducted their third Enduring Lightning joint~~
~~aviation exercise using the F-35. American and Israeli pilots trained together to counter both~~
~~surface and air adversaries, while supporting units assisted with refueling, radar, and opponent~~
~~simulations.~~
~~KC-46A Pegasus~~
72 67 Yaakov Lappin and Jeremy Binnie, “IDF details Iranian UAV incursions,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 9, 2022. 68 See CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. 69 “Israel,” Jane’s World Air Forces, September 1, 2020. 70 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Contracts For February 2, 2018. 71 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Stands-Up Second F-35 Unit,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2020. 72 Gareth Jennings, “Lockheed Martin to Design and Develop F-35 Variant ‘Tailored’ for Foreign Customer,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Figure 5. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display Made by Israeli Manufacturer Elbit Systems KC-46A Pegasus To extend the range of its aerial attack capability and enhance personnel mobility, Israel has pursued procurement of Boeing’s KC-46A “Pegasus” multirole tanker. The Pegasus can refuel all types of U.S. and allied military aircraft and can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment. The Israel Air Force originally procured its current fleet of tankers (converted Boeing 707s) in the 1970s. According to one Source: Elbit Systems Ltd. account, the KC-46A can “refuel other aircraft Note: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display is a joint while being simultaneously refueled by venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Col ins. another KC-46, a capability the (Boeing 707 refueling plane) doesn't have. This theoretically stretches its range to infinity.”73 In March 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A Boeing In March 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A Boeing
“Pegasus” aircraft for an estimated $2.4 billion.“Pegasus” aircraft for an estimated $2.4 billion.~~95 According to Boeing, the KC-46A Pegasus is a~~
~~multirole tanker (can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment) that can refuel all U.S. and allied~~
~~military aircraft. After Japan, Israel is the second country approved by the United States to~~
~~receive the KC-46A. The Israel Air Force’s current fleet of tankers was originally procured in the~~
~~1970s; Israel is anticipated to~~74 Israel is the second foreign country approved by the United States to receive the KC-46A, after Japan. In February 2021, Israel signed an LOA to buy two KC-46As and, in January 2022, it reached a second LOA for two additional tankers. As actual contract negotiations ensued between the Israeli government and Boeing, some lawmakers sought expedited delivery of the tankers to Israel. In January 2022, five House Members wrote a letter to President Biden seeking an accelerated timetable for the delivery of the KC-46A.75 In April 2022, lawmakers again wrote to President Biden seeking expedited delivery.76 In late August 2022, Boeing and Israel signed a contract for four KC-46A plus associated maintenance, logistics, and training for $927 million. Then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz thanked the Department of Defense for approving the deal, which, according to him, included “the expedited implementation of U.S. FMF.”77 Israel may use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters, a key capability in use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters, a key capability in
projecting force toward Iran and elsewhere.projecting force toward Iran and elsewhere.9678

~~91 “Israel,” Jane’s World Air Forces, September 1, 2020.~~
~~92 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Contracts For February 2, 2018.~~
~~93 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Stands-Up Second F-35 Unit,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2020.~~
~~94 Gareth Jennings, “Lockheed Martin to Design and Develop F-35 Variant ‘Tailored' for Foreign Customer,”~~ ~~Jane’s~~
~~Defence Weekly, December 29, 2021.~~
~~95 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Israel—KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft, Transmittal No 20-12, March 3,~~
~~2020.~~
~~96 Seth J. Frantzman, “Israel Inks $3 Billion Deal for KC-46 Tankers, CH-53 Helos,” Defense News, January 4, 2022.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~In February 2021, Israel signed an LOA to~~
~~buy two KC-46As and, in January 2022, it~~
~~Figure 5. The KC46A Pegasus~~
~~reached a second LOA for two additional~~
~~tankers. Delivery of the Pegasus tankers is~~
~~anticipated at some point in 2024, though~~
~~Israel’s government has sought to expedite~~
~~this timetable.97 In January 2022, five House~~
~~lawmakers wrote a letter to President Biden~~
~~seeking justification for why the KC-46A~~
~~delivery timetable cannot be accelerated.98~~
~~CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters~~73 “Eye on Iran, Israel to buy four Boeing air force tankers for $927 million,” Reuters, September 1, 2022. 74 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Israel—KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft, Transmittal No 20-12, March 3, 2020. 75 Andrew Clevenger, “Biden Should Expedite Delivery of KC-46s to Israel, GOP Lawmakers Say,” CQ News, January 7, 2022. 76 See, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/israel_letter.pdf and https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000180-1e8b-d00d-a3c6-bfbbcef20000. 77 Seth Frantzman, “Israel, Boeing agree to $927M deal for four KC-46A tankers,” Defense News, September 1, 2022. 78 Seth Frantzman, “Israel inks $3 Billion deal for KC-46 Tankers, CH-53 helos,” Defense News, January 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Delivery of the Pegasus tankers may occur at Figure 6. The KC-46A Pegasus some point in 2026, though Israel’s government has sought to expedite this timetable.79 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters Since 1969, Israel’s Air Force has used its Sikorsky Yasur helicopters (CH-53D) to transport personnel and equipment. In upgrading its fleet of transport helicopters, Israel chose the Sikorsky “King Stallion” CH-53K Heavy Lift helicopters over competing systems. In 2021, DSCA notified Congress of Source: U.S. Air Force a planned sale to Israel of up to 18 CH-53Ks at an estimated cost of $3.4 billion.80 In late 2021, Israel signed an LOA with the
~~In late 2021, Israel signed an LOA with the~~

United States to purchase 12 United States to purchase 12 ~~Sikorsky “King~~
Source: U.S. Air Force
~~Stallion”~~ CH-53K Heavy Lift helicopters for CH-53K Heavy Lift helicopters for
~~$2 billion. The deal will enable Israel to replace its older model Sikorsky Yasur helicopters, which~~
~~have been in use for nearly half a century.99~~ $2 billion (with an option to procure an additional six helicopters).81 In February 2022, multiple sources reported that Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation had agreed to a contract with Israel to produce the first four CH-53Ks for $372 million. Delivery is anticipated sometime between 2025 and Delivery is anticipated sometime between 2025 and
~~2026.~~
~~Excess Defense Articles~~
2026. According to one report, Israel’s air force may face a “capability gap” if it retires most of its current Yasur helicopters before it can take delivery of the new CH-53Ks, a process which may take time given Israel’s need to customize the platform.82 Figure 7. The CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopter for Israel Excess Defense Articles (an artist rendering) The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides ~~a means by which~~an avenue for the United States the United States ~~can~~to
advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations—while also reducing its advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations—while also reducing its
inventory of outdated or excess equipment. This program, managed by DSCA, enables the United inventory of outdated or excess equipment. This program, managed by DSCA, enables the United
States to provide friendly countries with supplies in excess of States to provide friendly countries with supplies in excess of ~~the requirements of U.S~~U.S. requirements, at either , at either
reduced rates or no charge.reduced rates or no charge.~~100~~
83 Source: Lockheed Martin
9779 Joseph Trevithick, “Israel's Request Joseph Trevithick, “Israel's Request Toto Speed Delivery Of KC-46 Tankers Critical Speed Delivery Of KC-46 Tankers Critical ~~For~~for Striking Iran Denied - The Striking Iran Denied - The
War Zone,” War Zone,” The Drive, December 14, 2021. , December 14, 2021.
~~98 Andrew Clevenger, “Biden should Expedite Delivery of KC-46s to Israel, GOP Lawmakers Say,” CQ News, January~~
~~7, 2022.~~
9980 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Israel – CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters with Support, Transmittal No 21-52, July 30, 2021. 81 U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, “Israel to purchase CH-53K King Stallion,” U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, “Israel to purchase CH-53K King Stallion,” NAVAIR News, January 4, 2022. , January 4, 2022.
~~100~~82 Glenn Sands, “Israel wants its CH-53Ks as soon as possible,” Verticalmag.com, July 7, 2022. 83 To access DSCA’s Excess Defense Articles database, see http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda. To access DSCA’s Excess Defense Articles database, see http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda.
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As a designated “major non-NATO ally,” As a designated “major non-NATO ally,”~~101~~ Israel is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516(a) Israel is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516(a)
of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Section 23(a) of the AECA. According to DSCA, from of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Section 23(a) of the AECA. According to DSCA, from
2010 to 2010 to ~~2019~~2020, Israel received at least $385 million in EDA deliveries (current value).84 Origins of Israel’s Status as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” ~~, Israel received at least $385 million in EDA deliveries (current value).102~~
~~Table 2. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel103~~
~~Amount/Description~~
~~Cong. Notice~~
~~Primary Contractor(s)~~
~~Estimated Cost~~
~~75 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning~~
~~2008~~
~~Lockheed Martin~~
~~$15.2 bil ion~~
~~II) Aircraft~~
~~JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and~~
~~2013~~
~~N/A~~
~~$2 bil ion~~
~~unleaded gasoline~~
~~600 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Air-~~
~~2014~~
~~Raytheon~~
~~$544 mil ion~~
~~air missiles and associated equipment~~
~~14,500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions~~
~~2015~~
~~Various~~
~~$1.879 bil ion~~
~~(JDAM) and associated equipment~~
~~Equipment to support Excess Defense~~
~~2016~~
~~Science and Engineering~~
~~$300 mil ion~~
~~Articles sale of 8 SH-60F Sea Hawk~~
~~Services and General~~
~~Helicopters~~
~~Electric~~
~~13 76mm naval guns and technical~~
~~2017~~
~~DRS North America~~
~~$440 mil ion~~
~~support~~
~~240 Namer armored personal carrier~~
~~2019~~
~~MTU America~~
~~$238 mil ion~~
~~power packs and associated equipment~~
~~KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft~~
~~2020~~
~~Boeing Corporation~~
~~$2.4 bil ion~~
~~JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and~~
~~2020~~
~~N/A~~
~~$3 bil ion~~
~~unleaded gasoline~~
~~18 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters (with~~
~~2021~~
~~Lockheed Martin (parent~~
~~$3.4 bil ion~~
~~support equipment)~~
~~company of Sikorsky) and~~
~~General Electric Company~~
Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms
~~Transfer Database, IHS Jane’s.~~
Note: All figures are approximate.

~~101~~ On November 4, 1986, President Reagan signed into law P.L. 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for On November 4, 1986, President Reagan signed into law P.L. 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY1987. In Section 1105 of that act, Congress called for greater defense cooperation between the United States and FY1987. In Section 1105 of that act, Congress called for greater defense cooperation between the United States and
countries that the Secretary of Defense could designate as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). Such cooperation could countries that the Secretary of Defense could designate as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). Such cooperation could
entail U.S. funding for joint research and development and production of U.S. defense equipment. In February 1987, entail U.S. funding for joint research and development and production of U.S. defense equipment. In February 1987,
the United States granted Israel MNNA status along with several other countries (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and the United States granted Israel MNNA status along with several other countries (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and
Australia). According to press reports at the time, in the absence of a U.S.-Israeli mutual defense agreement, supporters Australia). According to press reports at the time, in the absence of a U.S.-Israeli mutual defense agreement, supporters
of Israel had been advocating for Israel to receive “equal treatment” with of Israel had been advocating for Israel to receive “equal treatment” with regard to certain special military benefits regard to certain special military benefits
(such as the ability to bid on U.S. defense contracts) that NATO allies received from the United States.(such as the ability to bid on U.S. defense contracts) that NATO allies received from the United States. ~~See, “Israel~~
~~seeks to obtain the kind of Financial Aid that NATO Members get from U.S. Government,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~February 3, 1987.~~85 Nearly a decade later, Congress passed additional legislation that further solidified Israel’s MNNA Nearly a decade later, Congress passed additional legislation that further solidified Israel’s MNNA
status. In 1996, Section 147 of P.L. 104-164 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by requiring the President to status. In 1996, Section 147 of P.L. 104-164 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by requiring the President to
notify Congress 30 days before designating a country as a MNNA. According to the act, Israel, along with several other notify Congress 30 days before designating a country as a MNNA. According to the act, Israel, along with several other
countries, “shall be deemed to have been so designated by the President as of the effective date of this section, and the countries, “shall be deemed to have been so designated by the President as of the effective date of this section, and the
President is not required to notify the Congress of such designation of President is not required to notify the Congress of such designation of those countries.”86 Table 2. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel Amount/Description Cong. Notice Primary Contractor(s) Estimated Cost 13 76mm naval guns and technical 2017 DRS North America $440 mil ion support 240 Namer armored personal carrier power packs and associated equipment 2019 MTU America $238 mil ion KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft 2020 Boeing Corporation $2.4 bil ion JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and unleaded gasoline 2020 N/A $3 bil ion Lockheed Martin (parent 18 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters (with 2021 company of Sikorsky) and $3.4 bil ion support equipment) General Electric Company Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database, IHS Jane’s. Note: All figures are approximate.~~those countries.” See, 22 U.S.C. §2321j.~~
~~102 Excess Defense Articles Database Tool, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.~~
~~103 For information on the status of Israeli procurement plans regarding key aircraft platforms such as F-15IA, V-22~~
~~Osprey, and KC-46A, see “Israel - Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019.~~
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Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli
Missile Defense Programs
Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli
missile defense projects designed to thwart a diverse range of threats. Due to Iranian weapons missile defense projects designed to thwart a diverse range of threats. Due to Iranian weapons
proliferation and the rapid spread of drone technology throughout the Middle East, Israel faces a proliferation and the rapid spread of drone technology throughout the Middle East, Israel faces a
bevy of state and non-state actors in possession of sophisticated precision-guided missiles, bevy of state and non-state actors in possession of sophisticated precision-guided missiles,
84 Excess Defense Articles Database Tool, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 85 See, “Israel seeks to obtain the kind of Financial Aid that NATO Members get from U.S. Government,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1987. 86 See, 22 U.S.C. §2321j. Congressional Research Service 16 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)~~unmanned aerial vehicles~~, and guided and unguided rockets. While the near-term threats of short-, and guided and unguided rockets. While the near-term threats of short-
range missiles and rockets launched by non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah remain, the range missiles and rockets launched by non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah remain, the
development of Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as Iran’s own advancement in development of Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as Iran’s own advancement in
precision guided munitions, have opened new fronts for Iran-backed groups to potentially precision guided munitions, have opened new fronts for Iran-backed groups to potentially
~~threaten Israel’s security.~~
threaten Israel’s security. In 2022 and 2023, Iran’s ongoing transfer of UAVs to Russia (and possibly short-range ballistic missiles) appear to have further heightened U.S. and Israeli concern over Iran’s capabilities. While Iranian UAVs suffer a high rate of interception, their low cost and ease of replacement have allowed Russia to use them in its invasion of Ukraine to swarm targets and overwhelm air defenses.87 Ukraine has repeatedly sought Israeli cooperation in bolstering its air defenses against both Russian attacks and Iranian-made drones (see below). Congress provides regular U.S. funding for Israeli and U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs in Congress provides regular U.S. funding for Israeli and U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs in
defense authorization and appropriations bills. Israel and the United States each contribute defense authorization and appropriations bills. Israel and the United States each contribute
financially to several weapons systems and engage in co-development, co-production, and/or financially to several weapons systems and engage in co-development, co-production, and/or
technology sharing in connection with them. Since 2001, Israel and the United States have technology sharing in connection with them. Since 2001, Israel and the United States have
conducted a joint biennial ballistic missile defense exercise, called Juniper Cobra,conducted a joint biennial ballistic missile defense exercise, called Juniper Cobra,~~104~~88 to work on to work on
integrating their weapons, radars, and other systems.integrating their weapons, radars, and other systems.~~105~~89
The following section provides background on Israel’s four-layered active defense network: Iron The following section provides background on Israel’s four-layered active defense network: Iron
Dome (short range), David’s Sling (low to mid-range), Arrow II (upper-atmospheric), and Arrow Dome (short range), David’s Sling (low to mid-range), Arrow II (upper-atmospheric), and Arrow
III (exo-atmospheric). In addition to these existing systems, Israel, the U.S. Missile Defense III (exo-atmospheric). In addition to these existing systems, Israel, the U.S. Missile Defense
Agency, and various private defense contractors are working on next generation defense systems, Agency, and various private defense contractors are working on next generation defense systems,
such as Arrow such as Arrow ~~IV106~~IV90 and various ground and air-based laser systems, including Iron Beam (see below).91 ~~and various ground and air-based laser systems.107 On February 1, 2022,~~
~~Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said, “In about a year, the IDF will launch a laser~~
~~interception system, at first experimentally and later it will become operational, first in the south~~
~~and then elsewhere....This will allow us in the medium to long term to surround Israel with a laser~~
~~wall that protects us from missiles, rockets, UAVs, and other threats.”108~~
Iron Dome
Iron Dome is a short-range anti-rocket, anti-mortar, and anti-artillery system (intercept range of Iron Dome is a short-range anti-rocket, anti-mortar, and anti-artillery system (intercept range of
2.5 to 43 miles) developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and originally produced 2.5 to 43 miles) developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and originally produced
in Israel. Iron Dome’s targeting system and radar are designed to fire its Tamir interceptors only in Israel. Iron Dome’s targeting system and radar are designed to fire its Tamir interceptors only
at incoming projectiles that pose threats to the area being protected (generally, strategically at incoming projectiles that pose threats to the area being protected (generally, strategically
important sites, including population centers); it is not configured to fire on rockets outside of that important sites, including population centers); it is not configured to fire on rockets outside of that
area. Israel can move Iron Dome batteries as threats change (there is a sea-variant of Iron Dome area. Israel can move Iron Dome batteries as threats change (there is a sea-variant of Iron Dome

~~104~~as well). Israel has at least ten Iron Dome batteries deployed throughout the country, each designed to defend a 60-square-mile populated area.92 Israel’s Defense Ministry claims that Iron Dome successfully intercepted 97% of all targets it engaged during a summer 2022 confrontation in which Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets into Israel.93 87 See, CRS Insight IN12042, Iran's Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use in Ukraine, November 4, 2022. 88 The IDF postponed the 2022 Juniper Cobra exercise. See, Anna Ahronheim, “IDF Delays Juniper Cobra Drill amid The IDF postponed the 2022 Juniper Cobra exercise. See, Anna Ahronheim, “IDF Delays Juniper Cobra Drill amid
Russian, Iranian Tensions,” Jerusalem Post, February 8, 2022. Russian, Iranian Tensions,” Jerusalem Post, February 8, 2022.
~~105~~89 The United States and Israel also jointly conduct a military exercise known as Juniper Falcon, The United States and Israel also jointly conduct a military exercise known as Juniper Falcon, ~~which is~~ designed to designed to
enhance interoperability between both nations’ militaries. enhance interoperability between both nations’ militaries.
~~106~~90 Udi Shaham, “Israel, US developing Arrow-4,” Udi Shaham, “Israel, US developing Arrow-4,” Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2021. , February 19, 2021.
~~107~~91 Anna Ahronheim, “Lockheed Martin, Rafael Join Forces to Build 'Ground-Based' Laser Weapon,” Anna Ahronheim, “Lockheed Martin, Rafael Join Forces to Build 'Ground-Based' Laser Weapon,” Jerusalem Post, ,
July 28, 2021. July 28, 2021.
~~108 “Bennett Reveals: IDF to use Laser Interception System in a Year,” 7Israel National News (Arutz Sheva), February~~
192 Each battery has three to four launchers loaded with up to 20 Tamir interceptors per launcher for a total of 60-80 interceptors per battery. Every Iron Dome Battery also comes equipped with vehicles to reload launchers. 93 “Israel says Iron Dome shoots down 97% of Gaza rockets,” Reuters, August 7, 2022. , 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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17 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

~~as well). Currently, Israel has ten Iron Dome batteries deployed throughout the country, and each~~
~~battery is designed to defend a 60-square-mile populated area.109~~
~~Co-production and U.S. Funding~~
~~Figure 6. Iron Dome Launcher~~Co-production and U.S. Funding
To date, the United States has provided To date, the United States has provided ~~$1.7~~
~~billion~~nearly $3 billion to Israel for Iron Dome batteries, to Israel for Iron Dome batteries,
interceptors, co-production costs, and general interceptors, co-production costs, and general
maintenance (maintenance (~~see~~see Table 5)4). Because Iron . Because Iron
Dome was developed by Israel alone, Israel Dome was developed by Israel alone, Israel
initially retained proprietary technology rights initially retained proprietary technology rights
to it. The United States and Israel have had a to it. The United States and Israel have had a
decades-long partnership in the development decades-long partnership in the development
and co-production of other missile defense and co-production of other missile defense

~~systems~~ systems Figure 8. Iron Dome Launcher (such as the Arrow). As the United (such as the Arrow). As the United
Source: Raytheon.
States began financially supporting Israel’s development of Iron Dome in FY2011, U.S. interest States began financially supporting Israel’s development of Iron Dome in FY2011, U.S. interest
in ultimately becoming a partner in its co-production grew. Congress then called for Iron Dome in ultimately becoming a partner in its co-production grew. Congress then called for Iron Dome
technology sharing and co-production with the United States.technology sharing and co-production with the United States.~~110~~94 In March 2014, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a co-production agreement to enable the manufacture of components of the Iron Dome system in the United States, while also providing the U.S. Source: Raytheon. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with full access to what had been proprietary Iron Dome technology.95 U.S.-based Raytheon is Rafael’s U.S. partner in the co-production of Iron Dome.96 In 2020, the two companies formed a joint venture incorporated in the United States known as “Raytheon Rafael Area Protection Systems (R2S).” Tamir interceptors (the U.S. version is called SkyHunter) are manufactured at Raytheon’s missiles and defense facility in Tucson, Arizona and elsewhere and then assembled in Israel. Israel also maintains the ability to manufacture Tamir interceptors within Israel. 94
~~U.S. Army Procurement of Iron Dome~~
~~U.S. efforts to acquire Iron Dome have come in the context of lawmakers’ expressed concern over a lack of~~
~~capability to protect American soldiers deployed overseas from possible sophisticated cruise missile attacks.111~~
~~Congress directed the Army to take interim steps to procure additional systems.112 Section 112 of P.L. 115-232,~~
~~The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, required the Secretary of Defense~~
~~to certify whether there is a need for the U.S. Army to deploy an interim missile defense capability (fixed-site,~~
~~cruise missile defense capability) and, if so, to deploy additional batteries. In response to this mandate, the U.S.~~
~~Army procured two Iron Dome batteries from Rafael at a cost of $373 mil ion. The Army justified the purchase by~~
~~referencing Iron Dome’s high interception rate as well as the Tamir interceptor’s low cost relative to existing U.S.~~
~~missile defense systems.113 After testing various systems, in September 2021, the U.S, Army selected Dynetics’~~
~~Enduring Shield system, rather than Iron Dome, to fulfil its “Indirect Fire Protection Capability”.114 Since then, the~~
~~Army temporarily deployed one Iron Dome battery to Guam for further testing. Section 111 of P.L. 117-81, the~~
~~National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, amends the 2019 NDAA to eliminate a mandate for two~~
~~additional U.S. Army purchases of Iron Dome. Currently, the U.S. Marine Corps is evaluating Iron Dome to fulfil~~
~~its “Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC).”~~

~~109 Each battery has three to four launchers loaded with up to 20 Tamir interceptors per launcher for a total of 60-80~~
~~interceptors per battery. Every Iron Dome Battery also comes equipped with vehicles to reload launchers.~~
~~110~~ In conference report language accompanying P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013, In conference report language accompanying P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013,
conferees agreed: “The Department of Defense needs to obtain appropriate data rights to Iron Dome technology to conferees agreed: “The Department of Defense needs to obtain appropriate data rights to Iron Dome technology to
ensure us the ability to use that data for U.S. defense purposes and to explore potential co-production opportunities. ensure us the ability to use that data for U.S. defense purposes and to explore potential co-production opportunities.
The conferees support this policy and expect the Department to keep the congressional defense committees informed of The conferees support this policy and expect the Department to keep the congressional defense committees informed of
developments and progress on this issue.” developments and progress on this issue.”
~~111 Jen Judson, “Congress Wants new Plans from Army on its Indirect Fire Protection Suite Development,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~News, September 18, 2018.~~
~~112 In 2018, some Members of Congress advocated for the selection of Iron Dome to protect U.S. troops deployed~~
~~abroad against threats emanating from Russia and North Korea. See, “Bipartisan House Letter requests Iron Dome Use~~
~~for US Army,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 24, 2018.~~
~~113 “US Army Buys Israel’s Iron Dome for Tactical Missile Defense,” Jewish Policy Center, January 22, 2019.~~
~~114 Andrew Eversden, “Dynetics Beats Out Iron Dome for $237M Army Missile Defense Contract,” Breaking Defense,~~
~~September 27, 2021.~~
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~~In March 2014, the United States and Israeli governments signed a co-production agreement to~~
~~enable the manufacture of components of the Iron Dome system in the United States, while also~~
~~providing the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with full access to what had been proprietary~~
~~Iron Dome technology.115 U.S.-based Raytheon is Rafael’s U.S. partner in the co-production of~~
~~Iron Dome.116 In 2020, the two companies formed a joint venture incorporated in the United~~
~~States known as “Raytheon Rafael Area Protection Systems (R2S).” Tamir interceptors (the U.S.~~
~~version is called SkyHunter) are manufactured at Raytheon’s missiles and defense facility in~~
~~Tucson, Arizona and elsewhere and then assembled in Israel. Israel also maintains the ability to~~
~~manufacture Tamir interceptors within Israel.~~
~~The May 2021 War in Gaza and Proposed Supplemental Iron Dome Funding~~
~~Overview~~
~~As previously mentioned, Congress and successive Administrations have demonstrated strong~~
~~support for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense. However, nearly nine months after Israel’s May~~
~~2021 conflict with Hamas in Gaza, an Israeli government request for supplemental U.S. military~~
~~aid to replenish its stocks of interceptor missiles for the Iron Dome short-range anti-rocket system~~
~~remains pending with Congress. See Table 3 below for some examples and timetables for the~~
~~congressional appropriation of emergency aid to Israel following the outbreak of regional~~
~~conflict.~~
~~Table 3. Select Examples of Emergency Aid to Israel~~
~~Conflict/Crisis~~
~~Congressional Action~~
~~Enactment~~
~~Israel’s Operation Protective Edge~~
~~$225 mil ion in supplemental aid for~~
~~August 4, 2014~~
~~in Gaza (July 8-August 26, 2014)~~
~~Iron Dome (P.L. 113-145)~~
~~U.S. Invasion of Iraq (March 20-May~~
~~$1 bil ion in military aid and $9~~
~~April 16, 2003~~
~~1, 2003)~~
~~bil ion in U.S.-backed loan~~
~~guarantees (P.L. 108-11)~~
~~Operation Desert Storm against~~
~~$650 mil ion in economic aid to pay~~
~~March 28, 1991~~
~~Iraq and Iraqi missile attacks against~~
~~for damages incurred during Persian~~
~~Israel (January 17 – February 28,~~
~~Gulf War (P.L. 102-21)~~
~~1991)~~
Source: Congress.gov.
~~Background~~
~~For eleven days in May 2021, Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), fought~~
~~their fourth major conflict since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. In Israel, 12~~
~~people were killed, while in Gaza, more than 250 people (including more than 60 children) were~~
~~killed. During the conflict, armed Palestinian groups (mostly Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad)~~
~~fired barrages of mortars and rockets (and sent explosive-laden drones) into Israel in an attempt to~~

~~115 The co-production agreement is formally titled, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United~~
~~States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System~~
~~Procurement.”~~
~~116 The FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, P.L. 113-145, exempted $225 million in Iron~~
~~Dome funding—requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict—from the co-~~
~~production requirements agreed upon in March 2014.~~
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~~overwhelm Iron Dome’s radar.117 These militants fired 4,369 rockets/mortars into Israel, of which~~
~~3,400 reached Israel. Of the 3,400, 1,428 were headed toward populated areas, and Iron Dome~~
~~intercepted and destroyed 1,357, a 95% success rate.118 While Hamas rockets are relatively cheap~~
~~to produce, the Iron Dome is costly to maintain. The unit cost of Iron Dome's Tamir interceptors,~~
~~according to one source, may be approximately $53,000.119~~
~~In the aftermath of the conflict, President Joseph Biden assured Israel of his “full support to~~
~~replenish Israel’s Iron Dome short-range anti-rocket system to ensure its defenses and security in~~
~~the future.”120 In early June 2021 during a visit to Israel, Senator Lindsey Graham suggested that~~
~~Israel was planning to request up to $1 billion in supplemental aid for Iron Dome.121 Soon~~
~~thereafter, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz traveled to Washington DC, where he formally~~
~~requested additional U.S. financing. In August, the Administration informed Congress that~~
~~supplemental aid for Iron Dome had its “unequivocal support,” should Congress choose to~~
~~proceed in “funding the request.”122~~

~~Selected Chronology of Congressional Action on Israel and Iron Dome: 2021-2022~~
~~Date~~
~~Legislative Event~~
~~May 2021~~
~~Senator Bil Hagerty introduced S. 1751, the Emergency Resupply for Iron Dome~~
~~Act of 2021, which would direct the President to transfer all unexpended balances~~
~~of appropriations made available for assistance to Gaza to the Department of~~
~~Defense for grants to Israel for Iron Dome.~~
~~May/June 2021~~
~~During House consideration of H.R. 3237, the Emergency Security Supplemental~~
~~Appropriations Act, 2021, Representative Tony Gonzales proposed a Motion to~~
~~Recommit (MTR), stating that “if we adopt the motion to recommit, we wil~~
~~instruct the Committee on Appropriations to consider my amendment to H.R.~~
~~3237. It would provide emergency funding for the Iron Dome defense system.. ”123~~
~~Representative Gonzales’s amendment would have included $73 mil ion for Iron~~
~~Dome, as part of a $500 mil ion total appropriation for all 4 jointly funded Israeli~~
~~missile defense systems. The MTR was not adopted. Several weeks later, some~~
~~lawmakers reportedly considered adding Iron Dome supplemental funding to~~
~~H.R.3237.124 Congress passed H.R.3237 in July (P.L.117-31) without~~
~~Iron Dome aid.~~
~~June 2021~~
~~During House floor consideration of H.R. 256, “To repeal the Authorization for~~
~~Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” HFAC Ranking Member~~
~~Representative Michael McCaul filed an MTR in order to offer an amendment that~~
~~would have established “contingency plans to provide Israel with defense articles~~
~~such as munitions, ISR technology, aircraft, and related services. It would also~~

~~117 Mona El-Naggar, “Gaza’s Rockets: A Replenished Arsenal that Vexes Israel,” New York Times, May 13, 2021.~~
~~118 Shlomo Maital, “Iron Dome: The Inside Story,” The Jerusalem Report, July 26, 2021.~~
~~119 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israeli Army Wants Laser Interceptors Operational by 2022,” Ha’aretz, October 19, 2021.~~
~~120 The White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, May 20, 2021.~~
~~121 “U.S. Senator Expects U.S. to Send More Funds for Israel's 'Iron Dome,'” Reuters, June 1, 2021.~~
~~122 Senate Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Hearing~~
~~entitled, “U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East,” August 10, 2021.~~
~~123 See, Congressional Record, Emergency Security Supplemental to Respond to January 6th Appropriations Act, 2021,~~
~~page H2629, May 20, 2021.~~
~~124 Jennifer Shutt, “Iron Dome Funds May Hitch a Ride on Capitol Security Supplemental,” CQ News, June 3, 2021.~~
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~~create a waiver to expedite arms transfers if Israel is under threat of military~~
~~attack.”125 The MTR failed to pass.~~
~~July 2021~~
~~On July 1, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy sought unanimous consent to~~
~~consider H.J.Res 54, which would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over three~~
~~years. The motion was not considered and, instead, referred to the Committees~~
~~on Appropriations and Budget.~~
~~September 2021~~
~~On September 21, the House Rules Committee published a draft of H.R. 5305,~~
~~the Extending Government Funding & Delivering Emergency Assistance Act, which~~
~~would include $1 bil ion in supplemental assistance for Iron Dome. Within hours~~
~~of the announcement, some lawmakers reportedly objected to the inclusion of~~
~~Iron Dome.126 Subsequently, appropriators pul ed the Iron Dome funding from the~~
~~legislation.~~
~~September 2021~~
~~On September 22, Senator Richard Shelby introduced S.2789, the Extending~~
~~Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act. This continuing~~
~~resolution would have funded the government until December 3 included $1~~
~~bil ion in Iron Dome supplemental aid over three years.~~
~~September 2021~~
~~On September 23, the House voted (by a 420-9 margin, with two voting~~
~~“present”) to pass the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R.~~
~~5323), which would provide $1 bil ion in supplemental funding for Iron Dome~~
~~over the next three years (FY2022-FY2024).~~
~~September 2021~~
~~On September 23, Senator Marco Rubio introduced S.2830, the Iron Dome~~
~~Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, which would provide $1 bil ion for Iron~~
~~Dome over a three-year period. Senator Ted Cruz also introduced S.2839, which~~
~~also would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over three years.~~
~~October 2021~~
~~In early October, the Senate tried to pass H.R.5323 by unanimous consent.~~
~~However, Senator Rand Paul argued that while he supports supplemental aid for~~
~~Iron Dome, the funding should come from funds previously obligated for~~
~~Afghanistan.127~~
~~October 2021~~
~~On October 6, Senator Paul introduced S.2944, the Funding Iron Dome by~~
~~Defunding the Taliban Act. This bil would provide $1 bil ion for Iron Dome over~~
~~three years and would rescind all “of the unobligated balances from the amounts~~
~~appropriated or otherwise made available to the covered funds for reconstruction~~
~~activities in Afghanistan.”~~
~~October 2021~~
~~On October 20, 2021, Senator Jon Tester introduced S.3032, the FY2022 Defense~~
~~Appropriations bil . This annual appropriations bil includes the ful $500 mil ion~~
~~U.S. commitment for Israel’s missile defense per the 2016 MOU (of which $108~~
~~mil ion is for Iron Dome), and also would provide an additional $1 bil ion over~~
~~three years for Iron Dome.~~
~~December 2021~~
~~On December 15, 2021, Senator Paul objected to a motion seeking unanimous~~
~~consent for a floor vote on Iron Dome supplemental aid, the fourth time he had~~
~~done so since September 2021.128~~

~~125 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republicans, “McCaul Speaks on House Floor on Amendment to Reaffirm the~~
~~U.S. will Provide Defense Assistance to Israel,” June 17, 2021.~~
~~126 Erik Wasson, Jarrell Dillard, and Billy House, “Democrats Strip Funds for Israel from Bill to Raise Debt Ceiling,”~~
Bloomberg, September 21, 2021.
~~127 Congressional Record, Senate Procedural Matters, Motion to Discharge, Page S6954, Oct. 7, 2021.~~
~~128 Melissa Weiss, “Paul again Blocks Unanimous Consent Vote on Iron Dome Supplemental Funding,” Jewish Insider,~~
~~December 16, 2021.~~
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~~David’s Sling~~
~~Overview~~
~~In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project agreement” to co-develop~~
~~the David’s Sling system.129 David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system~~
~~designed to counter long-range rockets and slower-flying cruise missiles fired at ranges from 25~~
~~miles~~ 95 The co-production agreement is formally titled, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System Procurement.” 96 The FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, P.L. 113-145, exempted $225 million in Iron Dome funding—requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict—from the co-production requirements agreed upon in March 2014. Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel U.S. Army Procurement of Iron Dome U.S. efforts to acquire Iron Dome have come in the context of lawmakers’ expressing concern over a lack of capability to protect American service members deployed overseas from possible sophisticated cruise missile attacks.97 Congress directed the Army to take interim steps to procure additional systems.98 Section 112 of P.L. 115-232, The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, required the Secretary of Defense to certify whether there is a need for the U.S. Army to deploy an interim missile defense capability (fixed-site, cruise missile defense capability) and, if so, to deploy additional batteries. In response to this mandate, the U.S. Army procured two Iron Dome batteries from Rafael at a cost of $373 mil ion. The Army justified the purchase by referencing Iron Dome’s high interception rate as wel as the Tamir interceptor’s low cost relative to existing U.S. missile defense systems.99 After testing various systems, in September 2021, the U.S, Army selected Dynetics’ Enduring Shield system, rather than Iron Dome, to fulfil its “Indirect Fire Protection Capability”.100 The Iron Dome batteries are now housed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington. Section 111 of P.L. 117-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, amends the 2019 NDAA to eliminate a mandate for two additional U.S. Army purchases of Iron Dome. Currently, the U.S. Marine Corps is evaluating Iron Dome to fulfil its “Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC).” According to one report, the Marine Corps has successful y tested a MRIC prototype that “removes the Rafael-made Iron Dome launcher from its heavy base, mounts it on the back of a trailer to fire Tamir missiles, and integrates it with other service capabilities.”101 Ukraine’s Request for Israeli Missile Defense Systems Since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian government has sought foreign assistance, including from Israel, to repel Russian aggression. Ukraine has made a number of requests for various Israeli-made weapons systems, such as anti-tank Spike guided missiles and Iron Dome. In March 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addressed the Israeli Knesset by video, stating, “Everyone in Israel knows that your missile defense is the best.... And you can definitely help us protect our lives, the lives of Ukrainians, the lives of Ukrainian Jews.”102 Despite repeated Ukrainian entreaties, Israel has generally refrained from providing military support to Ukraine, citing a range of considerations (e.g., concern over losing its air superiority in Russian-supported Syria, concern over Russian capture of Israeli technology, concern over its lack of spare capacity of defense systems, and concern over Russian restrictions on Jewish emigration).103 Israel has accepted tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees (Jewish and non-Jewish) into Israel and provided humanitarian aid (generators and medical equipment) and non-lethal equipment (helmets, flak jackets) to the Ukrainian government. Israel also has pledged to provide the Ukrainian government with up to $200 million in loan guarantees for healthcare and civilian infrastructure. Israel also has operated a field hospital near the Ukrainian-Polish border. 97 Jen Judson, “Congress wants new plans from Army on its indirect fire protection suite development,” Defense News, September 18, 2018. 98 In 2018, some Members of Congress advocated for the selection of Iron Dome to protect U.S. troops deployed abroad against threats emanating from Russia and North Korea. See, “Bipartisan House Letter Requests Iron Dome Use for US Army,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 24, 2018. 99 “US Army Buys Israel’s Iron Dome for Tactical Missile Defense,” Jewish Policy Center, January 22, 2019. 100 Andrew Eversden, “Dynetics Beats Out Iron Dome for $237M Army Missile Defense Contract,” Breaking Defense, September 27, 2021. 101 Ashley Roque, “Marines greenlight mobile Iron Dome launcher development, seek 2025 prototype fielding,” Breaking Defense, January 5, 2023. 102 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Address to the Knesset of Israel on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, March 20, 2022, Kyiv, Ukraine. 103 Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Russia Shrinks Forces in Syria, a Factor in Israeli Strategy There,” New York Times, October 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Once Russia turned to Iran for UAV supplies, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an early-warning system for its civilians, and reportedly began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.104 In November 2022, one Israeli news outlet reported that Israel had begun supplying “strategic materials” to a NATO member for use in Ukraine.105 In January 2023, Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevhen Korniychuk said that Israel was in the process of transferring missile and drone early-warning systems to Ukraine.106 Also in January 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in an interview with CNN, remarked: I have no desire to enter a new Russo-Israeli military confrontation. And neither would anyone. Neither would you. But, at the same time, we've given Ukraine a lot of humanitarian support. We've taken in Jewish and non-Jewish refugees in a very tiny country, Israel, disproportionately. And we've also offered other kinds of aid. I'm looking into other kinds of aid. But, realistically, Israel, in confronting Iran, is also confronting the main partner of Russia.107 Analysis If Israel were to export the entire Iron Dome system or certain system components to Ukraine, there would be several technical, legal, and diplomatic considerations for the United States. For example, because the Iron Dome is co-produced with the United States, Israel and the Department of Defense would need to jointly approve of Israel’s transfer of the system. There have been no official indications of whether the Biden Administration would grant such approval. When asked whether the United States would work with Israel to send defensive systems to Ukraine, the Defense Department has responded, “The United States believes that every nation that provides equipment and systems to Ukraine should do it according to their own dictates. These are sovereign decisions....”108 Other policy considerations include whether Israel has immediate spare interceptor capacity or spare batteries to ship to Ukraine and, if so, whether the Israeli government would be willing to send its own soldiers to operate or provide training on such systems in Ukraine. The United States, which is providing Ukraine with Patriot missile defense systems, has facilitated the transfer of Ukrainian soldiers to the United States for training on the Patriot. In addition, while much international media and Ukrainian government appears to focus on Iron Dome due to its prominent reputation, Israeli companies also manufacture other, lesser-known systems for export, such as Rafael’s Spyder short and medium range mobile air defense system and IAI’s Barak 8 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. According to one report: Israeli sources told Breaking Defense that Ukraine has for months asked Israel to supply its army with systems that will counter Russian missile attacks, and appearance of Iranian-made drones have done nothing to limit the hunger for Israeli systems. The request was mainly for air defense systems Iron Dome and Spyder, both made by Rafael, and the Israel 104 “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving intel on Russia's Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022. 105 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Ha’aretz, November 17, 2022. 106 “Israel will transfer technologies related to smart missile and drone warning to Ukraine – ambassador,” Frontnews (Ukraine), January 13, 2023. 107 CNN Transcripts, “CNN Exclusive: One-On-One With Israel's Netanyahu Amid Surging Violence; Netanyahu On A Possible Peace Deal With The Palestinians; Netanyahu Dismisses Criticism Over Proposed Judicial Changes,” Aired 9- 10p ET, January 31, 2023. 108 U.S. Department of Defense, News Briefing, April 27, 2022. Congressional Research Service 20 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Aerospace Industries-produced Barak 8. For Iron Dome, a US approval is needed due to American funding that helped develop the system. However, during the summer visit of US President Joe Biden in Israel, Israel was asked to support Ukraine in more ways than it has done until today, so an export issue is not expected. The Spyder and Barak 8 are free for export, as the US has not funded either of them.109 Some U.S. lawmakers have been critical of the perceived lack of Israeli support for Ukraine. In early 2023, Senator Lindsey Graham tweeted his displeasure over the new Israeli government’s decision to speak less openly about Ukraine, stating “To stay quiet about Russia’s criminal behavior will not age well.”110 Several months earlier, Senator Chris Murphy told CNN that “Israel needs to get off the sidelines.”111 David’s Sling In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project agreement” to co-develop the David’s Sling system.112 David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system designed to counter long-range rockets and slower-flying cruise missiles fired at ranges from 25 to 186 miles, such as those possessed by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. David’s to 186 miles, such as those possessed by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. David’s
Sling is designed to intercept missiles with ranges and trajectories for which Iron Dome and/or Sling is designed to intercept missiles with ranges and trajectories for which Iron Dome and/or
Arrow interceptors are not optimally configured. It has been developed jointly by Rafael Arrow interceptors are not optimally configured. It has been developed jointly by Rafael
Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon.Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon.~~130~~113 David’s Sling uses Raytheon’s Stunner missile for David’s Sling uses Raytheon’s Stunner missile for
interception, and each launcher can hold up to 16 missiles. In April 2017, Israel declared David’s interception, and each launcher can hold up to 16 missiles. In April 2017, Israel declared David’s
Sling operational and, according to one analysis, “two David’s Sling batteries are sufficient to Sling operational and, according to one analysis, “two David’s Sling batteries are sufficient to
cover the whole of Israel.”cover the whole of Israel.”~~131~~
~~Israel first used David’s Sling in July 2018.~~
~~At the time, Syrian regime forces were~~
~~Figure 7. David’s Sling Launches Stunner~~
~~attempting to retake parts of southern Syria as~~
~~Interceptor~~
~~part of the ongoing conflict there. During the~~
~~fighting, Asad loyalists fired two SS-21~~
~~Tochka or ‘Scarab’ tactical ballistic missiles~~
~~at rebel forces, but the missiles veered into~~
~~Israeli territory. David’s Sling fired two~~
~~Stunner interceptors, but the final impact~~
~~point of the Syrian missiles changed mid-~~
~~flight, and Israel ordered one of the~~
~~interceptors to self-destruct; the other most~~
~~likely landed in Syrian territory.132 Chinese~~
~~media claimed that Asad regime forces~~
~~recovered the Stunner interceptor intact and~~
~~handed it over to Russia; the Israeli~~
~~government did not comment on this~~
~~allegation.133~~

Source: Israel Ministry of Defense.

~~129~~114 109 Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,” Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022. 110 Twitter, @LindseyGrahamSC, January 2, 2023. See, https://twitter.com/LindseyGrahamSC/status/1610043932980690944 111 Congressional Quarterly Newsmaker Transcripts, Sen. Chris Murphy Interviewed on CNN, October 19, 2022. 112 This joint agreement is a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Framework agreement between This joint agreement is a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Framework agreement between
the United States and Israel. The joint program to implement the agreement is known as the Short Range Ballistic the United States and Israel. The joint program to implement the agreement is known as the Short Range Ballistic
Missile Defense (SRBMD) David’s Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Project. The Department of Defense/U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense (SRBMD) David’s Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Project. The Department of Defense/U.S.-Israeli
Cooperative Program Office manages the SRBMD/DSWS program, which is equitably funded between the United Cooperative Program Office manages the SRBMD/DSWS program, which is equitably funded between the United
States and Israel. States and Israel.
~~130~~113 See Raytheon Missile and Defense, David's Sling System and SkyCeptor Missile at See Raytheon Missile and Defense, David's Sling System and SkyCeptor Missile at
https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/davidssling https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/davidssling
~~131~~114 “IDF officially declares David’s Sling Operational,” “IDF officially declares David’s Sling Operational,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 3, 2017. , April 3, 2017.
~~132 See, “Israel, US Complete Successful Advanced David’s Sling Missile Tests,” Jerusalem Post, March 20, 2019, and~~
~~“David’s Sling has Dubious Debut against Syrian Missiles, Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 25, 2018.~~
~~133 Tyler Rogoway, “If an Israeli Stunner Missile Really Did Fall Into Russian Hands It Is a Huge Deal,” The Drive,~~
~~November 13, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

25

~~link to page 32 link to page 31~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Co-production and U.S. Funding~~ Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 27 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Israel first used David’s Sling in July 2018. Figure 9. David’s Sling Launches Stunner At the time, Syrian regime forces were Interceptor attempting to retake parts of southern Syria as part of the ongoing conflict there. During the fighting, Asad loyalists fired two SS-21 Tochka or ‘Scarab’ tactical ballistic missiles at rebel forces, but the missiles veered into Israeli territory. David’s Sling fired two Stunner interceptors, but the final impact point of the Syrian missiles changed mid-flight, and Israel ordered one of the interceptors to self-destruct; the other most likely landed in Syrian territory.115 Chinese media claimed that Asad regime forces recovered the Stunner interceptor intact and handed it over to Russia; the Israeli government did not comment on this assertion.116 Source: Israel Ministry of Defense.
Since FY2006, the United States has contributed over $2. Since FY2006, the United States has contributed over $2.14 billion to the development of David’s billion to the development of David’s
Sling (seeSling (see Table 5)4). In June 2018, the United States and Israel signed a co-production agreement . In June 2018, the United States and Israel signed a co-production agreement
for the joint manufacture of the Stunner interceptor. Some interceptor components are built in for the joint manufacture of the Stunner interceptor. Some interceptor components are built in
Tucson, Arizona, by Raytheon. Tucson, Arizona, by Raytheon.
The Arrow and Arrow II
Under a 1986 agreement allowing Israel to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Under a 1986 agreement allowing Israel to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
the United States and Israel have co-developed different versions of the Arrow anti-ballistic the United States and Israel have co-developed different versions of the Arrow anti-ballistic
missile, and, since 1988, missile, and, since 1988, ~~Israel and the United States~~ have engaged in joint development.have engaged in joint development.~~134~~117 The The
Arrow is designed to counter short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has funded just Arrow is designed to counter short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has funded just
under half of the annual costs of the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel under half of the annual costs of the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel
supplying the remainder. The total U.S. financial contribution (for all Arrow systems) has supplying the remainder. The total U.S. financial contribution (for all Arrow systems) has
exceeded $4exceeded $4.5 billion ( billion (seesee Table 43). The system became operational in 2000 in Israel and has been . The system became operational in 2000 in Israel and has been
tested successfully. tested successfully.
The Arrow II program (officially referred to as the Arrow System Improvement Program or The Arrow II program (officially referred to as the Arrow System Improvement Program or
ASIP), a joint effort of Boeing and IAI, is designed to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. One ASIP), a joint effort of Boeing and IAI, is designed to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. One
Arrow II battery is designed to protect large swaths of Israeli territory. In March 2017, media Arrow II battery is designed to protect large swaths of Israeli territory. In March 2017, media
sources reported the first known use of the Arrow II, sources reported the first known use of the Arrow II, ~~when they said that it~~saying Arrow II successfully successfully
~~intercepted a Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) that had been fired on an Israeli jet returning to~~
~~Israel from an operation inside Syria.135~~
~~In August 2020, nearly 20 years after the first Arrow system became operational, Israel~~
~~successfully tested the Arrow II system. According to one account of the test, Arrow II~~
~~“successfully intercepted a Sparrow simulated long-range, surface-to-surface missile, which~~
~~could one day be fired at Israel by Iran...”136~~

~~134~~intercepted a 115 See, “Israel, US Complete Successful Advanced David’s Sling Missile Tests,” Jerusalem Post, March 20, 2019, and “David’s Sling has Dubious Debut against Syrian Missiles, Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 25, 2018. 116 Tyler Rogoway, “If an Israeli Stunner Missile Really Did Fall Into Russian Hands It Is a Huge Deal,” The Drive, November 13, 2019. 117 Shortly after the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985, the Reagan Administration sought allied Shortly after the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985, the Reagan Administration sought allied
political support through various cooperative technology agreements on ballistic missile defense (BMD). A political support through various cooperative technology agreements on ballistic missile defense (BMD). A
memorandum of understanding was signed with Israel on May 6, 1986, to jointly develop an indigenous Israeli memorandum of understanding was signed with Israel on May 6, 1986, to jointly develop an indigenous Israeli
capability to defend against ballistic missiles. Subsequently, a number of additional agreements were signed, including, capability to defend against ballistic missiles. Subsequently, a number of additional agreements were signed, including,
for example, an April 1989 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to develop an Israeli computer facility as part of the for example, an April 1989 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to develop an Israeli computer facility as part of the
Arrow BMD program, a June 1991 agreement to develop a second generation Arrow BMD capability, and a September Arrow BMD program, a June 1991 agreement to develop a second generation Arrow BMD capability, and a September
2008 agreement to develop a short-range BMD system to defend against very short-range missiles and rockets. Israeli 2008 agreement to develop a short-range BMD system to defend against very short-range missiles and rockets. Israeli
interest in BMD was strengthened by the missile war between Iran and Iraq in the later 1980s, and the experience of interest in BMD was strengthened by the missile war between Iran and Iraq in the later 1980s, and the experience of
being attacked by Scud missiles from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. being attacked by Scud missiles from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
~~135 For more information, See U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Arrow at~~
~~https://www.mda.mil/news/gallery_internationalcoop_arrow.html~~
~~136 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel Successfully Carries out Arrow 2 Interception. Test Simulated Shooting Down of Long-~~
~~Range Missile, Including Possibly from Iran,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

26

~~link to page 32~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Table 4~~Congressional Research Service 22 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) that had been fired on an Israeli jet returning to Israel from an operation inside Syria.118 In August 2020, nearly 20 years after the first Arrow system became operational, Israel successfully tested the Arrow II system. According to one account of the test, Arrow II “successfully intercepted a Sparrow simulated long-range, surface-to-surface missile, which could one day be fired at Israel by Iran...”119 Table 3. U.S. Contributions to the Arrow Program (Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III)
current U.S. dollars in millions current U.S. dollars in millions
Fiscal Year
Total
Fiscal Year
Total
Fiscal Year
Total
1990 1990
52.000 52.000
2004 2004
144.803 144.803
2018 2018
392.300 392.300
1991 1991
42.000 42.000
2005 2005
155.290 155.290
2019 2019
243.000 243.000
1992 1992
54.400 54.400
2006 2006
122.866 122.866
2020 2020
214.000 214.000
1993 1993
57.776 57.776
2007 2007
117.494 117.494
2021 2021
250.000 250.000
1994 1994
56.424 56.424
2008 2008
118.572 118.572

2022 235.000 1995 1995
47.400 47.400
2009 2009
104.342 104.342

2023 253.000 1996 1996
59.352 59.352
2010 2010
122.342 122.342

1997 1997
35.000 35.000
2011 2011
125.393 125.393

1998 1998
98.874 98.874
2012 2012
125.175 125.175

1999 1999
46.924 46.924
2013 2013
115.500 115.500

2000 2000
81.650 81.650
2014 2014
119.070 119.070

2001 2001
95.214 95.214
2015 2015
130.908 130.908

2002 2002
131.700 131.700
2016 2016
146.069 146.069

2003 2003
135.749 135.749
2017 2017
272.224 272.224

Total
4,~~013~~501.811
Source: U.S. Missile Defense Agency. U.S. Missile Defense Agency.
High Altitude Missile Defense System (Arrow III)
Citing a potential nuclear threat from Iran, Israel has sought a missile interceptor that operates at Citing a potential nuclear threat from Iran, Israel has sought a missile interceptor that operates at
a higher altitude and greater range than the original Arrow systems. In October 2007, the United a higher altitude and greater range than the original Arrow systems. In October 2007, the United
States and Israel agreed to establish a committee to evaluate Israel’s proposed “Arrow III,” an States and Israel agreed to establish a committee to evaluate Israel’s proposed “Arrow III,” an
upper-tier system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. upper-tier system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere.
The Arrow III is a more advanced version—in terms of speed, range and altitude—of the current The Arrow III is a more advanced version—in terms of speed, range and altitude—of the current
Arrow II interceptor. In 2008, Israel decided to begin development of the Arrow III and the Arrow II interceptor. In 2008, Israel decided to begin development of the Arrow III and the
United States agreed to co-fund its development despite an initial proposal by Lockheed Martin United States agreed to co-fund its development despite an initial proposal by Lockheed Martin
and the DOD urging Israel to purchase the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the DOD urging Israel to purchase the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile defense system instead.missile defense system instead. ~~In March 2019, the United States deployed a THAAD missile~~
~~battery to Israel.~~
120 The Arrow III, made (like the Arrow II) by IAI and Boeing, has been operational since January The Arrow III, made (like the Arrow II) by IAI and Boeing, has been operational since January
2017. The United States and Israel signed an Arrow III co-production agreement in June 2019; 2017. The United States and Israel signed an Arrow III co-production agreement in June 2019;
118 For more information, see U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Arrow at https://www.mda.mil/news/gallery_internationalcoop_arrow.html. 119 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel Successfully Carries out Arrow 2 Interception. Test Simulated Shooting Down of Long-Range Missile, Including Possibly from Iran,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2020. 120 In March 2019, the United States deployed a THAAD missile battery to Israel for a month of training with Israeli personnel. Congressional Research Service 23 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel their co-production of Arrow III components is ongoing.121~~their co-production of Arrow III components is ongoing.137~~ A U.S.-based subsidiary of IAI, Stark A U.S.-based subsidiary of IAI, Stark
Aerospace Inc. based in Columbus, Mississippi, is producing canisters for the Arrow III system. Aerospace Inc. based in Columbus, Mississippi, is producing canisters for the Arrow III system.
Since co-development began in 2008, Congress has appropriated $1.Since co-development began in 2008, Congress has appropriated $1.14 billion for Arrow III (see billion for Arrow III (see
Table 5)4). In January 2022, Israel successfully tested Arrow III with reported breakthroughs in the . In January 2022, Israel successfully tested Arrow III with reported breakthroughs in the
system’s algorithmic detection of incoming projectiles and calculation of interception launch system’s algorithmic detection of incoming projectiles and calculation of interception launch
trajectories.trajectories.~~138~~

~~137~~122 Export of the Arrow III to Germany Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has prompted some NATO members to enhance their national missile defense. In 2022, German officials expressed interest in purchasing Arrow III for an estimated $2.2 to $3 billion with delivery of a system in 2025. Germany does not possess a missile defense system capable of interception in the exo-atmosphere. Reports suggest that, because Arrow III is jointly produced by the United States and Israel, the Defense Department has granted Israel its preliminary approval to negotiate with the German government over a possible export deal.123 Another unconfirmed report indicates that in exchange for formal U.S. approval of an export license, the United States is demanding that half of all Arrow III contract production for Germany take place in the United States.124 As of March 2023, talks are ongoing. 121 In July 2010, the United States and Israel signed a bilateral agreement (The Upper-Tier Interceptor Project In July 2010, the United States and Israel signed a bilateral agreement (The Upper-Tier Interceptor Project
Agreement) to extend their cooperation in developing and producing the Arrow III, including an equitable U.S.-Israeli Agreement) to extend their cooperation in developing and producing the Arrow III, including an equitable U.S.-Israeli
cost share. cost share.
~~138~~122 Judah Ari Gross, “Israel Successfully Tests Arrow 3 Anti-Ballistic Missile System,” Judah Ari Gross, “Israel Successfully Tests Arrow 3 Anti-Ballistic Missile System,” Times of Israel, January 18, , January 18,
2022.2022. 123 For example, see Anna Ahronheim, “Germany gets approval for Israel's Arrow 3 missile defense system,” Jerusalem Post, April 5, 2022. 124 Anna Ahronheim, “US demands production of Arrow 3 for Germany take place in America,” Jerusalem Post, November 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24
~~Congressional Research Service~~

27

link to page link to page 3230 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Israel’s High Energy Laser (Iron Beam) Interception System In 2014, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems announced that the company was developing a mobile, ground-based high energy laser (HEL) interception system. After eight years of development, Israel publicly demonstrated the capabilities of Iron Beam in 2022. Iron Beam first tracks an incoming rocket, artil ery, or mortar (RAM) or UAV, then fires two electrically sourced high energy lasers at the target, destroying it at a range of up to 2.7 miles away.125 If successful y tested and operational, Iron Beam could significantly enhance Israel’s national counter-RAM and counter-drone defenses. Each use of the Iron Beam would cost between two to four dol ars, compared to tens of thousands of dol ars to manufacture a conventional interceptor. 126 However, HEL interception systems are not necessarily replacements for Israel’s current multi-layered defense system; they are complementary. It is difficult for laser systems to operate in inclement weather and their range is typically shorter than existing kinetic systems, like Iron Dome. In addition, if Israel faced a barrage of RAM or a swarm of drones, it would require a number of HEL batteries to protect its homeland.127 In December 2022, Lockheed Martin and Rafael signed a teaming agreement to jointly develop and manufacture a HEL system based on “the assets that have been developed independently by RAFAEL and the Ministry of Defense's Directorate of Defense Research and Development (DDR&D) within the framework of the IRON BEAM project.”128 As of March 2023, the U.S. government has no official role in this private company partnership. During President Biden’s summer 2022 visit to Israel, multiple sources reported that the Israeli government intended to seek U.S. assistance with Israel’s HEL program.129 Several weeks later, another report indicated that while no government-to-government funding agreement had been reached during the visit, “it was expected [that] the US government would pitch in to the systems’ development in some fashion later on.”130 As noted below, the FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act expands the U.S.-Israel counter unmanned aerial systems program to include “directed energy capabilities.” Table 4 ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Table 5~~. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense:
FY2006-~~FY2021~~FY2023
current U.S. dollars in millions current U.S. dollars in millions
Arrow III
(High
David’s Sling
~~Iron~~
Fiscal Year
Arrow II
Altitude)
(Short-Range)
Iron Dome
Total
FY2006 FY2006
122.866 122.866
— —
10.0 10.0
— —
132.866 132.866
FY2007 FY2007
117.494 117.494
— —
20.4 20.4
— —
137.894 137.894
FY2008 FY2008
98.572 98.572
20.0 20.0
37.0 37.0
— —
155.572 155.572
FY2009 FY2009
74.342 74.342
30.0 30.0
72.895 72.895
— —
177.237 177.237
FY2010 FY2010
72.306 72.306
50.036 50.036
80.092 80.092
— —
202.434 202.434
FY2011 FY2011
66.427 66.427
58.966 58.966
84.722 84.722
205.000 205.000
415.115 415.115
FY2012 FY2012
58.955 58.955
66.220 66.220
110.525 110.525
70.0 70.000a
305.700 305.700
FY2013 After FY2013 After
40.800 40.800
74.700 74.700
137.500 137.500
194.000 194.000
447.000 447.000
Sequestration Sequestration
125 Gareth Jennings, “Israel to deploy protective ‘laser wall', likely Iron Beam,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 2, 2022. 126 “Israel says laser missile shield to cost just $2 per interception,” Reuters, June 1, 2022. 127 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli PM announces ‘laser wall' air defence plan,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 2, 2022. 128 Lockheed Martin press release, “Lockheed Martin and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to Collaborate on High-Energy Laser System,” December 5, 2022. 129 For example, Walla and Jerusalem Post Staff, “Israel to ask Biden for laser defense funding,” Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2022. 130 Arie Egozi, “Israel to spend $150 million on laser defenses, after US hesitation,” Breaking Defense, August 3, 2022. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 30 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Arrow III (High David’s Sling Fiscal Year Arrow II Altitude) (Short-Range) Iron Dome Total FY2014 FY2014
44.363 44.363
74.707 74.707
149.712 149.712
460.309 460.309
729.091 729.091
(includes (includes
supp) supp)
FY2015 FY2015
56.201 56.201
74.707 74.707
137.934 137.934
350.972 350.972
619.814 619.814
FY2016 FY2016
56.519 56.519
89.550 89.550
286.526 286.526
55.000 55.000
487.595 487.595
FY2017 FY2017
67.331 67.331
204.893 204.893
266.511 266.511
62.000 62.000
600.735 600.735
FY2018 FY2018
82.300 82.300
310.000 310.000
221.500 221.500
92.000 92.000
705.800 705.800
FY2019 FY2019
163.000 163.000
80.000 80.000
187.000 187.000
70.000 70.000
500.000 500.000
FY2020 FY2020
159.000 159.000
55.000 55.000
191.000 191.000
95.000 95.000
500.000 500.000
FY2021 FY2021
173.000 173.000
77.000 77.000
177.000 177.000
73 73.000 500.000 FY2022 173.000 62.000 157.000 1,108.000b 1,500.000 FY2023 173.000 80.000 167.000 80.000 .000
500.000 500.000
Total
1,~~453~~799.476
1,~~265~~407.779
2,~~170~~494.317
~~1,727~~2,915.281
68,616.853
Notes: a. These funds were not appropriated by Congress but reprogrammed by the Obama Administration from a. These funds were not appropriated by Congress but reprogrammed by the Obama Administration from
other Department of Defense accounts. other Department of Defense accounts.
b. P.L.117-103, the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $108 mil ion in Iron Dome appropriations from the Defense Department’s Procurement, Defense-Wide and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Defense-Wide accounts. Section 8142 of the Act also provided $1 bil ion in supplemental aid for Iron Dome for fiscal years 2022-2024. Emergency U.S. Stockpile in Israel
In the early 1980s, Israeli leaders sought to expand what they called their “strategic In the early 1980s, Israeli leaders sought to expand what they called their “strategic
collaboration” with the U.S. military by inviting the United States to stockpile arms and collaboration” with the U.S. military by inviting the United States to stockpile arms and
equipment at Israeli bases for American use in wartime.equipment at Israeli bases for American use in wartime.~~139~~131 Beginning in 1984, the United States Beginning in 1984, the United States
began to stockpile military equipment in Israel, but only “single-use” armaments that could not be began to stockpile military equipment in Israel, but only “single-use” armaments that could not be
used by the Israel Defense Forcesused by the Israel Defense Forces~~.140~~ (IDF).132 In 1989, the George H.W. Bush Administration In 1989, the George H.W. Bush Administration ~~decided to~~
~~alter~~altered the terms of the stockpile the terms of the stockpile ~~and~~to provide Israel access to it in emergency situations. provide Israel access to it in emergency situations.~~141~~133 At the At the
time, the United States was attempting to sell Saudi Arabia M1A1 tanks, and U.S. officials time, the United States was attempting to sell Saudi Arabia M1A1 tanks, and U.S. officials ~~sought~~
were seeking Israel’s acquiescence to the deal. Section 514 of the FAA of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2321h) allows U.S. defense articles stored in war reserve stocks to be transferred to a foreign government through FMS or through grant military assistance, such as FMF. Congress limits the value of assets transferred into War Reserves Stock Allies (WRSA) stockpiles located in foreign countries in any fiscal year through authorizing legislation (see below). The United States retains title to the WRSA stocks, and title must be ~~Israel’s acquiescence to the deal.~~

~~139~~131 “U.S. - Israel Strategic Link: Both Sides Take Stock,” “U.S. - Israel Strategic Link: Both Sides Take Stock,” New York Times, October 2, 1981. , October 2, 1981.
~~140~~132 “U.S. Tells Israel it Plans to Sell Saudis 300 Tanks,” “U.S. Tells Israel it Plans to Sell Saudis 300 Tanks,” New York Times, September 29, 1989. , September 29, 1989.
~~141~~133 In October 1989, the United States and Israel agreed to pre-position $100 million worth of dual-use defense In October 1989, the United States and Israel agreed to pre-position $100 million worth of dual-use defense
equipment in Israel. equipment in Israel.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

~~Section 514 of the FAA of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2321h) allows U.S. defense articles stored in war~~
~~reserve stocks to be transferred to a foreign government through FMS or through grant military~~
~~assistance, such as FMF. Congress limits the value of assets transferred into War Reserves Stock~~
~~Allies (WRSA) stockpiles located in foreign countries in any fiscal year through authorizing~~
~~legislation (see below). The U.S. retains title to the WRSA stocks, and title must be transferred~~
~~before the foreign country may use them.~~
~~Until January~~ transferred before the foreign country may use them. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act extended the authorization of WRSA-Israel (WRSA-I) through FY2023.134 Until 2021, the United States 2021, the United States
European Command (EUCOM) European Command (EUCOM) ~~had managed~~managed the WRSA-I
Figure 810. Army Officers Inspect WRSA-I
~~the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-~~
~~I) program.142~~program.135 Since then, U.S. Central Since then, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) has managed the Command (CENTCOM) has managed the
program, through which the United States program, through which the United States
stores missiles, armored vehicles, and artillery stores missiles, armored vehicles, and artillery
ammunition in Israel.ammunition in Israel.~~143~~136 According to one According to one
Israeli officer in 2010, “Officially, all of this Israeli officer in 2010, “Officially, all of this
equipment belongs to the US military…. If equipment belongs to the US military…. If
however, there is a conflict, the IDF [Israel however, there is a conflict, the IDF [Israel
Defense Forces] can ask for permission to use Defense Forces] can ask for permission to use
some of the equipment.”some of the equipment.”~~144~~137 According to one According to one

expert, “WRSA-I is a strategic boon to Israel. expert, “WRSA-I is a strategic boon to Israel.
The process is streamlined: No 60-day The process is streamlined: No 60-day
congressional notification is required, and Source: 405th 405th ~~AFSB~~Army Field Support Brigade exercises War Reserve Stocks exercises War Reserve Stocks
~~for Allies transfer, DVIDS, Defense Visual Information~~
~~congressional notification is required, and~~
~~Distribution Service, February 28, 2019.~~for Allies transfer. (Defense
there’s no waiting on delivery.” there’s no waiting on delivery.”~~145 In February~~
138 In February Visual Information Distribution Service, February 28, 2019, as part of the bilateral military exercise 2019, as part of the bilateral military exercise 2019.) Juniper Falcon 2019, officers from the 405th Army Juniper Falcon 2019, officers from the 405th Army
Field Support Brigade simulated a transfer of munitions from the WRSA-I to Israeli Defense Field Support Brigade simulated a transfer of munitions from the WRSA-I to Israeli Defense
Forces controlForces control (see Figure 10). .
Since 1989, Israel has requested access to the stockpile on at least two occasions, including the Since 1989, Israel has requested access to the stockpile on at least two occasions, including the
following: following:
 During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel requested that  During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel requested that
the United States expedite the delivery of precision-guided munitions to Israel. the United States expedite the delivery of precision-guided munitions to Israel.
The George W. Bush Administration did not use the emergency authority The George W. Bush Administration did not use the emergency authority
codified in the AECA, but rather allowed Israel to access the WRSA-I stockpile. codified in the AECA, but rather allowed Israel to access the WRSA-I stockpile.
 In July 2014, during Israeli military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip,  In July 2014, during Israeli military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip,
the Defense Department permitted Israel to draw from the stockpile, paid with the Defense Department permitted Israel to draw from the stockpile, paid with
~~FMF, to replenish 120-mm tank rounds and 40-mm illumination rounds fired~~
~~from grenade launchers.146~~

~~142 In January 2021, right before leaving office, President Trump moved Israel~~ 134 The 2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283, reauthorized WRSA-I through FY2025. However, the House Office of Legislative Counsel ruled that because the FY2021 NDAA had tried to reauthorize WRSA-I for years that were already addressed in law by the FY2021 Omnibus (the Omnibus passed 5 days before the NDAA), the FY2021 NDAA’s reauthorizing amendment on WRSA-I “could not be executed.” See, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-11978/pdf/COMPS-11978.pdf. 135 In January 2021, President Trump directed that Israel be transferred from the area of responsibility (AOR) of from the area of responsibility (AOR) of
EUCOM to that of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). EUCOM to that of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021. 136 ~~143~~ At present, the United States and Israel have a bilateral agreement that governs the storage, maintenance, in-country At present, the United States and Israel have a bilateral agreement that governs the storage, maintenance, in-country
transit, and other WRSA-related costs. The government of Israel, using both its national funds and FMF, pays for the transit, and other WRSA-related costs. The government of Israel, using both its national funds and FMF, pays for the
construction, maintenance and refurbishment costs of WRSA ammunition storage facilities. It also pays for the construction, maintenance and refurbishment costs of WRSA ammunition storage facilities. It also pays for the
packaging, crating, handling and transportation of armaments to and from the stockpile. In any future expedited packaging, crating, handling and transportation of armaments to and from the stockpile. In any future expedited
procedure, reserve stocks managed by procedure, reserve stocks managed by ~~EUCOM~~CENTCOM could be transferred to Israel; then, U.S. officials would create an-after- could be transferred to Israel; then, U.S. officials would create an-after-
the-fact Foreign Military Sale to account for the transferred equipment. the-fact Foreign Military Sale to account for the transferred equipment.
~~144~~137 “US may give Israel Iraq Ammo,” “US may give Israel Iraq Ammo,” Jerusalem Post, February 11, 2010. , February 11, 2010.
~~145~~138 “Best Friends Don’t Have to Ask,” “Best Friends Don’t Have to Ask,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2014. , August 14, 2014.
~~146 “U.S. Defends Supplying Israel Ammunition during Gaza Conflict,” Reuters, July 31, 2014.~~
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~~The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act extended the authorization of WRSA-I through~~
~~FY2023.147~~
~~At times, Congress has passed legislation that has authorized~~FMF, to replenish 120-mm tank rounds and 40-mm illumination rounds fired from grenade launchers.139 In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells from WRSA-I (and additional materiel from the U.S. stockpile in South Korea) to send to Ukraine.140 According to multiple reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t really need our permission to take it.”141 At times, Congress has passed legislation authorizing the U.S. military to increase the the U.S. military to increase the
value of materiel stored in Israel. According to DSCA, “It should be understood that no new value of materiel stored in Israel. According to DSCA, “It should be understood that no new
procurements are involved in establishing and maintaining these stockpiles. Rather, the defense procurements are involved in establishing and maintaining these stockpiles. Rather, the defense
articles used to establish a stockpile and the annual authorized additions represent defense articles articles used to establish a stockpile and the annual authorized additions represent defense articles
that are already within the stocks of the U.S. armed forces. The stockpile authorizing legislation that are already within the stocks of the U.S. armed forces. The stockpile authorizing legislation
simply identifies a level of value for which a stockpile may be established or increased.”simply identifies a level of value for which a stockpile may be established or increased.”~~148~~142
Stockpiling Precision-Guided Munitions for Israel
Since 2014, Israel has requested that the U.S. military increase its stockpile of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) Since 2014, Israel has requested that the U.S. military increase its stockpile of precision-guided munitions (PGMs)
stored in Israel for possible Israeli emergency use against stored in Israel for possible Israeli emergency use against state and non-state actors (Hezbol ah, Hamas, and other terrorist groupsHezbol ah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups). Section . Section
1273 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, authorized the 1273 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, authorized the
President to conduct a joint assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs necessary for Israel in the event of a President to conduct a joint assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs necessary for Israel in the event of a
prolonged war. prolonged war.
Section 1275 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, amended Section 514 of the FAA (for a three-year period only) to Section 1275 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, amended Section 514 of the FAA (for a three-year period only) to
enable the President to transfer PGMs to Israel without regard to annual limits on their value once they were enable the President to transfer PGMs to Israel without regard to annual limits on their value once they were
stored in Israel provided that such a transfer, among other things, does not harm the U.S. supply of PGMs and the stored in Israel provided that such a transfer, among other things, does not harm the U.S. supply of PGMs and the
combat readiness of the United States. This provision requires the President to certify to Congress that any combat readiness of the United States. This provision requires the President to certify to Congress that any
transfer meets these statutory conditions. It also requires another assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs transfer meets these statutory conditions. It also requires another assessment of the quantity and type of PGMs
necessary for Israel in the event of a prolonged war. necessary for Israel in the event of a prolonged war.
For the years 2024 through 2030, Israeli defense budget planners reportedly are prioritizing the replenishment of the country’s PGM stocks, with plans to make substantial purchases from the United States.143 If the U.S. military has contributed the maximum amount legally permitted in each applicable If the U.S. military has contributed the maximum amount legally permitted in each applicable
fiscal year, then the non-inflation-adjusted value of materiel stored in Israel would currently stand fiscal year, then the non-inflation-adjusted value of materiel stored in Israel would currently stand
at at $4 billion. The following legislation authorized increases in value to the stockpile: . The following legislation authorized increases in value to the stockpile:
 FY1990: P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related  FY1990: P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, provided $165 million for all stockpile Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, provided $165 million for all stockpile
programs and expanded their locations to include Korea, Thailand, NATO programs and expanded their locations to include Korea, Thailand, NATO
members, and countries which were then major non-NATO allies (Australia, members, and countries which were then major non-NATO allies (Australia,
Japan, Korea, Israel, and Egypt). Although the act did not specify funds for Japan, Korea, Israel, and Egypt). Although the act did not specify funds for
Israel, of the $165 million appropriated, $10 million was for Thailand, $55 Israel, of the $165 million appropriated, $10 million was for Thailand, $55
~~million was for South Korea, and $100 million was intended as an initial~~
~~authorization for Israel.149~~
~~ FY1991: P.L. 101-513, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related~~
~~Programs Appropriations Act for FY1991, authorized additions to defense~~
~~articles in Israel “not less than” $300 million in value for FY1991.~~
~~ FY1993: P.L. 102-391, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related~~
~~Programs Appropriations Act for FY1993, authorized additions to defense~~
~~articles in Israel “not less than” $200 million in value for FY1993.~~

~~147 The 2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283, reauthorized WRSA-I through FY2025. However, the House Office of Legislative~~
~~Counsel ruled that because the FY2021 NDAA had tried to reauthorize WRSA-I for years that were already addressed~~
~~in law by the FY2021 Omnibus (the Omnibus passed 5 days before the NDAA), the FY2021 NDAA’s reauthorizing~~
~~amendment on WRSA-I “could not be executed.” See, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-~~
~~11978/pdf/COMPS-11978.pdf.~~
~~148 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), DISAM’s Online Greenbook, Chapter 2, Security~~
~~Legislation and Policy.~~
~~149 Dr. Louis J. Samelson, “Military Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1990,” The DISAM Journal, Winter,~~
~~1989/1990.~~
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139 “U.S. Defends Supplying Israel Ammunition during Gaza Conflict,” Reuters, July 31, 2014. 140 Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023. 141 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023. 142 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), DISAM’s Online Greenbook, Chapter 2, Security Legislation and Policy. 143 Anna Ahronheim, “IDF lacks ammunition and spare parts in inventory - comptroller report,” Jerusalem Post, March 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 28 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel million was for South Korea, and $100 million was intended as an initial authorization for Israel.144  FY1991: P.L. 101-513, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for FY1991, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel “not less than” $300 million in value for FY1991.  FY1993: P.L. 102-391, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for FY1993, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel “not less than” $200 million in value for FY1993.  FY1994: P.L. 103-87, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related  FY1994: P.L. 103-87, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act for FY1994, authorized additions to defense Programs Appropriations Act for FY1994, authorized additions to defense
articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for FY1994. articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for FY1994.
 FY1995: P.L. 103-306, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related  FY1995: P.L. 103-306, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act for FY1995, authorized a total addition to defense Programs Appropriations Act for FY1995, authorized a total addition to defense
articles in Israel of $200 million for FYs 1994 and 1995. articles in Israel of $200 million for FYs 1994 and 1995.
 FY2007-FY2008: Section 13(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Department of State Authorities  FY2007-FY2008: Section 13(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Department of State Authorities
Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-472) amended Section 514 of the FAA, as amended (P.L. Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-472) amended Section 514 of the FAA, as amended (P.L.
87-195; 22 U.S.C. §2321h) to authorize additions to defense articles in Israel of 87-195; 22 U.S.C. §2321h) to authorize additions to defense articles in Israel of
up to $200 million in value for each of FY2007 and FY2008.up to $200 million in value for each of FY2007 and FY2008.~~150~~145
 FY2011-FY2012: P.L. 111-266, the Security Cooperation Act of 2010, authorized  FY2011-FY2012: P.L. 111-266, the Security Cooperation Act of 2010, authorized
additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for each of additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in value for each of
FY2011 and FY2012. FY2011 and FY2012.
 FY2014-FY2015: P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act  FY2014-FY2015: P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act
of 2014, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in of 2014, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 million in
value for each of FY2014 and FY2015. value for each of FY2014 and FY2015.
 FY2016-FY2017: Section 7034(k)(11)(B) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016  FY2016-FY2017: Section 7034(k)(11)(B) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016
Consolidated Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Consolidated Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in
Israel up to $200 million in value for each of FY2016 and FY2017. Israel up to $200 million in value for each of FY2016 and FY2017.
 FY2018-FY2019: Section 7034(l)(7) of P.L. 115-141, the FY2018 Consolidated  FY2018-FY2019: Section 7034(l)(7) of P.L. 115-141, the FY2018 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200
million in value for each of FY2018 and FY2019. million in value for each of FY2018 and FY2019.
 FY2019-FY2020: Section 7048(b)(4)(B) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated  FY2019-FY2020: Section 7048(b)(4)(B) of P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200
million in value for each of FY2019 and FY2020.million in value for each of FY2019 and FY2020.~~151~~146
 FY2021-FY2023: Section 7035(b)(3) of  FY2021-FY2023: Section 7035(b)(3) of P.L.116-260, the FY2021 Consolidated the FY2021 Consolidated
Appropriations Act Appropriations Act, authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200 authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up to $200
million in value for each of FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023. million in value for each of FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023.
~~Defense Budget Appropriations/Authorization for~~
~~Anti-Tunnel Defense~~
~~In 2016, the Israeli and U.S. governments began collaborating on a new system to detect~~
~~underground smuggling tunnels and to counter cross-border tunnels used (most prominently by~~
~~Hamas in the summer 2014 conflict) to infiltrate Israel. Reportedly, this technology uses acoustic~~
~~or seismic sensors and software to detect digging.152 This technology may be based on discovery~~
~~techniques used in the oil and natural gas sector.153~~

~~150~~ 144 Dr. Louis J. Samelson, “Military Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1990,” The DISAM Journal, Winter, 1989/1990. 145 This increase for each fiscal year is based on legislative language contained in Section 12002 of P.L. 108-287, the This increase for each fiscal year is based on legislative language contained in Section 12002 of P.L. 108-287, the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005.
~~151~~146 P.L. 116-94, the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act also authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up P.L. 116-94, the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act also authorized additions to defense articles in Israel up
to $200 million in value for each of FY2020 and FY2021. to $200 million in value for each of FY2020 and FY2021.
~~152 “Israel’s Underground War—Technology and Specialist Troops deployed in face of Subterranean Threat,”~~ ~~Wall~~
~~Street Journal, March 2, 2016.~~
~~153 “Israeli official bets Advances in anti-tunnel technology will secure Gaza Border,” Washington Post, March 6, 2018.~~
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Congressional Research Service 29 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Defense Budget Appropriations for Anti-Tunnel Defense In 2016, the Israeli and U.S. governments began collaborating on a system to detect underground smuggling tunnels and to counter cross-border tunnels used (most prominently by Hamas in the summer 2014 conflict) to infiltrate Israel. Reportedly, this technology uses acoustic or seismic sensors and software to detect digging.147 This technology may be based on discovery Table 5. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Tunnel techniques used in the oil and natural gas Cooperation sector.148 current U.S. dollars in millions Section 1279 of P.L. 114-92, the FY2016 Fiscal Year Appropriation
~~Section 1279 of P.L. 114-92, the FY2016~~ National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the
establishment of a U.S.-Israeli establishment of a U.S.-Israeli FY2016 40.0 anti-tunnel cooperation program.anti-tunnel cooperation program.~~154~~149 This FY2017 42.5 ~~This~~ authorization allowed authorization allowed
funds from the research, funds from the research, FY2018 47.5 development, test, and evaluation defense-wide account to be used (in development, test, and evaluation defense-wide account to be used (in
combination with combination with FY2019 47.5 Israeli funds) to establish anti-tunnel Israeli funds) to establish anti-tunnel FY2020 - capabilities that capabilities that “detect, map, and detect, map, and
~~neutralize underground tunnels that threaten the United~~ neutralize” FY2021 47.5 underground tunnels that threaten the United FY2022 47.5 States or Israel. The authorization States or Israel. The authorization
requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on, requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on, FY2023 47.5 among other things, the sharing of among other things, the sharing of
research research Total 320.0 and development costs between the United States and Israel.and development costs between the United States and Israel.
~~Table 6. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Tunnel Cooperation~~
~~current U.S. dollars in millions~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Appropriation~~
~~FY2016~~
~~40.0~~
~~FY2017~~
~~42.5~~
~~FY2018~~
~~47.5~~
~~FY2019~~
~~47.5~~
~~FY2020~~
-
~~FY2021~~
~~47.5~~
~~Total~~
~~225.0~~
Source: Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts for FY2016-2021. See, –
~~“Combatting Terrorism~~ Source: Joint Explanatory Statements accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts Over the years, the Israel Defense Forces have for FY2016-2023. See, – “Combatting Terrorism become more adept at detecting tunnels. In Technology Support” in Defense Explanatory Technology Support” in Defense Explanatory Statement. 2021, Israel completed an anti-tunnel barrier along the entirety of the 40-mile Israel-Gaza border. The barrier is an underground concrete wall equipped with sensors. Israeli anti-tunnel technology reportedly has detected Hamas tunnels at depths of up to 230 feet belowground.150 Defense Budget Appropriations for ~~Statement.~~
~~Over the years, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have become more adept at detecting tunnels.~~
~~Reportedly, the Gaza division of the IDF maintains a technology lab for analyzing soil and~~
~~developing new mapping techniques; units within its engineering corps also possess drilling~~
~~systems and robotic devices for inspecting tunnels.155~~
~~Defense Budget Appropriations/Authorization for~~
Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems
As As ~~unmanned aerial vehicle~~UAV technology has proliferated across the Middle East, Israel has sought technology has proliferated across the Middle East, Israel has sought
U.S. assistance in countering various systems used by state and non-state actors. In an effort to U.S. assistance in countering various systems used by state and non-state actors. In an effort to
counter unmanned drones, states are researching various methods to detect incoming unmanned counter unmanned drones, states are researching various methods to detect incoming unmanned
~~aircraft (using radio or optical sensors) and then either disabling, destroying, or seizing them by~~
~~jamming their communications, intercepting their flight paths, or hacking their electronic~~
~~systems.156 Several Israeli companies have counter-drone solutions in development, including:~~
~~Drone Dome (Rafael), ReDrone (Elbit Systems), and Drone Guard (Israel Aerospace Industries or~~
~~IAI). According to one unnamed executive at IAI, “Drone defence is an expensive business as~~

~~154 Section 1279 of P.L. 116-92, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, extended the authority of the anti-~~
~~tunnel cooperation program through December 31, 2024.~~
~~155 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Test Classified Tunnel Tech to Stymie Terrorists; US Watches,” Breaking Defense, August 13,~~
~~2019.~~
~~156 Ilan Ben Zion, “As Attack Drones Multiply, Israeli Firms Develop Defenses,” Associated Press, September 26,~~
~~2019.~~
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aircraft (using radio 147 “Israel’s Underground War—Technology and Specialist Troops deployed in face of Subterranean Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2016. 148 “Israeli official bets advances in anti-tunnel technology will secure Gaza border,” Washington Post, March 6, 2018. 149 Section 1279 of P.L. 116-92, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, extended the authority of the anti-tunnel cooperation program through December 31, 2024. 150 “230 feet down: Elite IDF unit reveals deepest Hamas tunnel ever found,” Times of Israel, April 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 30 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel or optical sensors) and then either disabling, destroying, or seizing them by jamming their communications, intercepting their flight paths, or hacking their electronic systems.151 Several Israeli companies have counter-drone solutions in development, including: Drone Dome (Rafael), ReDrone (Elbit Systems), and Drone Guard (IAI). According to one unnamed executive at IAI, “Drone defense is an expensive business as countries have a large number of facilities to protect....It’s a crazy arms race because the countries have a large number of facilities to protect....It’s a crazy arms race because the
technological possibilities for drone use continue to increase.”technological possibilities for drone use continue to increase.”~~157~~152
Congress first authorized a cooperative U.S.-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C- Congress first authorized a cooperative U.S.-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C- Table 6. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Drone UAS) UAS)
program by expanding the scope of the program by expanding the scope of the Cooperation anti-tunnel cooperation program for anti-tunnel cooperation program for current U.S. dollars in millions FY2019.153~~FY2019.158~~ In the In the
FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116- Fiscal Year Appropriation 92), Congress created a separate authority (Section 1278), which 92), Congress created a separate authority (Section 1278), which
authorized the authorized the FY2020 13.0 Secretary of Defense to “carry out research, Secretary of Defense to “carry out research, FY2021 25.0 development, test, and evaluation development, test, and evaluation
activities, on a joint basis with Israel, to establish activities, on a joint basis with Israel, to establish ~~capabilities for countering unmanned aerial~~
~~systems that threaten the United States or Israel.” Section 1278 requires~~ FY2022 25.0 capabilities for countering unmanned aerial FY2023 25.0 systems that threaten the United States or Total 88.0 Israel.” Section 1278 required a matching contribution a matching contribution
from the government of Israel from the government of Israel Source: Joint Explanatory Statements and capped~~and caps~~ the annual U.S. contribution at the annual U.S. contribution at accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts 2020-2023. See “Combatting Terrorism $25 million. Congress $25 million. Congress
~~authorized the program through FY2024.~~
~~Table 7. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Drone Cooperation~~
~~current U.S. dollars in millions~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Appropriation~~
~~FY2020~~
~~13.0~~
~~FY2021~~
~~25.0~~
~~Total~~
~~38.0~~
Source: Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Acts 2020-2021. See
~~“Combatting Terrorism Technology Support” in Defense Explanatory Statement.~~
authorized the program Technology Support” in Defense Explanatory through FY2024. Statement. Section 1277 of P.L. 117-263, the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, modifies the authorization for the C-UAS program to now include “directed energy capabilities.”154 It also raises the cap on annual U.S. contributions to the program from $25 to $40 million. It extends the program’s authorization through calendar year 2026. Aid Restrictions and Possible Violations
U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel, like those to other foreign recipients, are subject to U.S. law. U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel, like those to other foreign recipients, are subject to U.S. law.
Some U.S. citizens and interest groups periodically call upon Congress to ensure that U.S. Some U.S. citizens and interest groups periodically call upon Congress to ensure that U.S.
military assistance to Israel military assistance to Israel ~~is compliant~~complies with applicable U.S. laws and policies and with with applicable U.S. laws and policies and with
international humanitarian law. international humanitarian law.
~~Arms Sales and Use of U.S.-Supplied Equipment159~~
~~The 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent arms agreements between Israel~~
~~and the United States limit Israel’s use of U.S. military equipment to defensive purposes.160 The~~
~~AECA (22 U.S.C. §2754) authorizes the sale of U.S. defense articles and services for specific~~
~~purposes, including “legitimate self-defense.”161 The AECA (22 U.S.C. §2753) states that~~

~~157 “Why Drones are~~ 151 Ilan Ben Zion, “As Attack Drones Multiply, Israeli Firms Develop Defenses,” Associated Press, September 26, 2019. 152 “Why Drones Are Becoming Iran’s Weapons of Choice,” Becoming Iran’s Weapons of Choice,” The Economist, November 10, 2021. , November 10, 2021.
~~158~~153 See Section 1272 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. See Section 1272 of P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.
~~159 See, CRS In Focus IF11197,~~ ~~U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked~~
~~Questions, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen.~~
~~160 U.S. State Department, Treaties in Force, Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance, Entered into force July~~
~~23, 1952; TIAS 2675.~~
~~161 Pursuant to the AECA, when Israel, like other foreign nations, purchases U.S. defense articles and services, it must~~
~~sign a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the United States government. The LOA lists the items and/or~~
~~services, estimated costs, and the terms and conditions of sale. Unless otherwise specified, the standard terms and~~
~~conditions for Israel are consistent with the general terms for all U.S. arms sales abroad. These terms and conditions~~
~~permit the use of items acquired: for internal security; for legitimate self-defense; for preventing or hindering the~~
~~proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons; to permit the Purchaser to~~
~~participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or~~
~~otherwise to permit the Purchaser to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~recipients may not use such articles “for purposes other than those for which [they have been]~~
~~furnished” without prior presidential consent.162~~154 Section 1280 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, stated that the Defense Department may establish a program to carry out “research, development, test, and evaluation activities, on a joint basis with Israel, to promote directed energy capabilities of mutual benefit to both the United States and Israel...” Congressional Research Service 31 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Arms Sales and Use of U.S.-Supplied Equipment155 The 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent arms agreements between Israel and the United States limit Israel’s use of U.S. military equipment to defensive purposes.156 The AECA (22 U.S.C. §2754) authorizes the sale of U.S. defense articles and services for specific purposes, including “legitimate self-defense.”157 The AECA (22 U.S.C. §2753) states that recipients may not use such articles “for purposes other than those for which [they have been] furnished” without prior presidential consent. The AECA also states in 22 U.S.C. §2753 that the consent of the President shall not be required for the transfer by a foreign country or international organization of defense articles sold by the United States, if the recipient is the government of a member country of NATO, the Government of Australia, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of Israel, or the Government of New Zealand. The act stipulates that sale agreements entered The act stipulates that sale agreements entered
into after November 29, 1999 must grant the U.S. government the right to verify “credible into after November 29, 1999 must grant the U.S. government the right to verify “credible
reports” that articles have been used for unauthorized purposes. The FAA of 1961, as amended, reports” that articles have been used for unauthorized purposes. The FAA of 1961, as amended,
also contains general provisions on the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment.also contains general provisions on the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment.~~163~~158
Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act
Section 502B(a)(2) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2)) stipulates that, absent the exercise of Section 502B(a)(2) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2)) stipulates that, absent the exercise of a
certain presidential presidential ~~waiver~~waivers due to extraordinary circumstances, “no security assistance may be provided due to extraordinary circumstances, “no security assistance may be provided
to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.”internationally recognized human rights.”159 ~~164~~
For the purposes of Section 502B, “security assistance” is defined broadly to include sales of For the purposes of Section 502B, “security assistance” is defined broadly to include sales of
defense articles or services, extensions of credits, and guaranties of loans under the AECA, defense articles or services, extensions of credits, and guaranties of loans under the AECA,
licenses for exports to foreign government military or security forces, and certain categories of licenses for exports to foreign government military or security forces, and certain categories of
assistance authorized under the FAA. The term “gross violations of internationally recognized assistance authorized under the FAA. The term “gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights” is defined to include 1) “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or human rights” is defined to include 1) “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment”; 2) “prolonged detention without charges and trial”; 3) forced disappearance; and 4) punishment”; 2) “prolonged detention without charges and trial”; 3) forced disappearance; and 4)
“other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.” Pursuant to this “other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.” Pursuant to this
provision, the executive branch may make a determination that a foreign government has engaged provision, the executive branch may make a determination that a foreign government has engaged
in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” and is in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” and is
~~therefore ineligible for security assistance.~~
~~Pursuant to Section 502B(c), Congress also may, through a resolution of the House or Senate or~~
~~by request of SFRC or HFAC, require a report within 30 days from the Secretary of State~~
~~concerning human rights in a specific country, including an assessment of whether extraordinary~~
~~circumstances exist that necessitate a continuation of security assistance. After receiving such~~
~~report, Congress, by joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance~~
~~to such country. As~~ therefore ineligible for security assistance. As a general matter, the executive branch appears to have rarely restricted a general matter, the executive branch appears to have rarely restricted
assistance pursuant to this provision. There is no statutory requirement for the executive branch to assistance pursuant to this provision. There is no statutory requirement for the executive branch to
notify Congress when it notify Congress when it chooses to unilaterally invoke 502B. 155 See, CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen. 156 U.S. State Department, Treaties in Force, Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance, Entered into force July 23, 1952; TIAS 2675. 157 Pursuant to the AECA, when Israel, like other foreign nations, purchases U.S. defense articles and services, it must sign a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the United States government. The LOA lists the items and/or services, estimated costs, and the terms and conditions of sale. Unless otherwise specified, the standard terms and conditions for Israel are consistent with the general terms for all U.S. arms sales abroad~~chooses to unilaterally invoke 502B. In the 116th Congress, several~~
~~lawmakers introduced resolutions that, among other things, would have required the Secretary of~~
~~State to submit a report to Congress pursuant to section 502B(c), including:~~
~~ S.Res.409 - A resolution requesting information on Turkey’s human rights~~
~~practices in Syria pursuant to section 502B(c) of the FAA of 1961;~~

~~of maintaining or restoring international peace and security; for the purpose of enabling foreign military forces in less~~
~~developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to social and economic~~
~~development; for purposes specified in any Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the USG and the~~
~~Purchaser; or, for purposes specified in any other bilateral or regional defense agreement to which the USG and the~~
~~Purchaser are both parties~~. For a sample LOA, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance . For a sample LOA, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance
Management Manual, available at Management Manual, available at https://www.samm.dsca.mil/figure/figure-c5f4 158~~https://www.samm.dsca.mil/figure/figure-c5f4~~
~~162 Nevertheless, in 22 U.S.C. §2753, the AECA also states that the consent of the President shall not be required for~~
~~the transfer by a foreign country or international organization of defense articles sold by the United States if the~~
~~recipient is the government of a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Government of~~
~~Australia, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of Israel, or the~~
~~Government of New Zealand.~~
~~163~~ For example, see (among other sections), Section 502B, Human Rights (22 U.S.C. §2304), Section 505, Conditions For example, see (among other sections), Section 502B, Human Rights (22 U.S.C. §2304), Section 505, Conditions
of Eligibility (22 U.S.C. §2314), and Section 511, Considerations in Furnishing Military Assistance (22 U.S.C. of Eligibility (22 U.S.C. §2314), and Section 511, Considerations in Furnishing Military Assistance (22 U.S.C.
§2321d). §2321d).
~~164~~159 op.cit., CRS In Focus (IF11197). op.cit., CRS In Focus (IF11197).
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

~~ S.Res.243 - A resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia’s human rights~~
~~practices in Yemen pursuant to section 502B(c) of the FAA of 1961;~~
~~ S.Res.754 - A resolution requesting information on the Government of~~
~~Azerbaijan’s human rights practices pursuant to section 502B(c) of the FAA of~~
~~1961; and~~
~~ S.Res.169 - A resolution requesting a statement under section 502B(c) of the~~
~~FAA of 1961 with respect to violations of human rights by the Government of~~
~~Saudi Arabia.~~Pursuant to Section 502B(c), Congress also may, through a resolution of the House or Senate or by request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) or House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), require a report within 30 days from the Secretary of State concerning human rights in a specific country, including an assessment of whether extraordinary circumstances exist that necessitate a continuation of security assistance. After receiving such report, Congress, by joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to such country. End-Use Monitoring
It is the statutory responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense, pursuant to the AECA, It is the statutory responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense, pursuant to the AECA,
to conduct end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that recipients of U.S. defense articles use such to conduct end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that recipients of U.S. defense articles use such
items solely for their intended purposes. The AECA also provides authority to the President items solely for their intended purposes. The AECA also provides authority to the President
(through a presidential determination) and Congress (joint resolution) to prohibit the sale or (through a presidential determination) and Congress (joint resolution) to prohibit the sale or
delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles to a recipient country if it has used such articles “for a delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles to a recipient country if it has used such articles “for a
purpose not authorized” by the AECA or the FAA.purpose not authorized” by the AECA or the FAA.~~165~~160
Questions over the misuse of U.S.-supplied equipment to Israel have arisen in several instances in Questions over the misuse of U.S.-supplied equipment to Israel have arisen in several instances in
past decades, including over the sale of tear gas to Israel during the late 1980s,past decades, including over the sale of tear gas to Israel during the late 1980s,~~166~~161 the sale of the sale of
Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers to Israel allegedly used in the destruction of Palestinian homes,Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers to Israel allegedly used in the destruction of Palestinian homes,~~167~~162 and and
Israel’s 2006 use of U.S.-supplied cluster munitions in Lebanon.Israel’s 2006 use of U.S.-supplied cluster munitions in Lebanon.~~168~~163 In 2020 and 2021, some In 2020 and 2021, some
lawmakers wrote a series of letters to the State Department lawmakers wrote a series of letters to the State Department ~~out of~~expressing concern that Israel may have concern that Israel may have
been using U.S.-origin construction equipment to demolish the homes of Palestinians that Israel been using U.S.-origin construction equipment to demolish the homes of Palestinians that Israel
has accused of committing terrorism.has accused of committing terrorism.~~169~~164 In House In House ~~Report~~report language accompanying H.R. language accompanying H.R.~~4373,~~ 8282, the the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, ~~2022~~2023, ,
appropriators urged “the Secretary of State to address in bilateral consultations with Israel the appropriators urged “the Secretary of State to address in bilateral consultations with Israel the
importance of ensuring that MOU-supported equipment is not used in any way that undermines importance of ensuring that MOU-supported equipment is not used in any way that undermines
the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution.”the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution.”~~170~~

~~165~~165 Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Law)166 Section 620M of the FAA of 1961 (codified as 22 U.S.C. §2378d), as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the AECA to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S. embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training. In 2022, Congress amended 22 U.S.C. §2378d to address cases in which the specific unit(s) that will ultimately receive assistance cannot be identified prior to the transfer of assistance (as may be the 160 See CRS In Focus IF11533, See CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana , by Paul K. Kerr and Liana
W. Rosen, and CRS In Focus IF10392, W. Rosen, and CRS In Focus IF10392, Foreign Military Sales Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~166~~161 See Government Accountability Office, See Government Accountability Office, Israel: Use of U.S.-Manufactured Tear Gas in the Occupied Territories,
NSIAD-89-128, April 13, 1989. NSIAD-89-128, April 13, 1989.
~~167~~162 CORRIE v. CATERPILLAR INC, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, filed March 15, 2005. CORRIE v. CATERPILLAR INC, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, filed March 15, 2005.
~~168~~163 See, U.S. See, U.S. ~~Department of State~~State Department, “U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy,” Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for , “U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy,” Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Political-Military Affairs, On-the-Record Briefing, May 21, 2008. Political-Military Affairs, On-the-Record Briefing, May 21, 2008.
~~169~~164 Posted on Twitter by Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, March 12, 2021, 2:14pm. Posted on Twitter by Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, March 12, 2021, 2:14pm.
~~170~~165 H.Rept. 117- H.Rept. 117-84401, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, , State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2023. 166 For background, see CRS InFocus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), Updated August 5, 2022. 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3533 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel case for some equipment). For such cases, the Secretary of State is to regularly provide the recipient government a list of units that are prohibited from receiving assistance and, effective December 31, 2022, such assistance “shall only be made available subject to a written agreement that the recipient government will comply with such prohibition.” The United States and Israel maintain such an agreement. In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered an international outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning Abu Akleh's killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation.167 In July 2022, the State Department issued a statement that said that the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) oversaw an independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA investigations concluded that Israeli gunfire likely killed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was intentional.”168 After conducting an internal investigation, the IDF said in September 2022 that there was a “high possibility” that Abu Akleh was accidentally hit by IDF gunfire169—eliciting additional public criticism from PA officials and Abu Akleh family members who assert that the shooting was not accidental.170 In November 2022, media reports said that the FBI had opened an investigation into Abu Akleh's death.171 Members have reacted in different ways to calls for investigating the death of Abu Akleh and possibly applying the Leahy law. In December 2022, eight Senators wrote a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice demanding that U.S. government investigations into the IDF be closed immediately.172 During the 117th Congress, Senator Leahy remarked in a floor statement that “Whether her killing was intentional, reckless, or a tragic mistake, there must be accountability. And if it was intentional, and if no one is held accountable, then the Leahy Law must be applied.”173 The explanatory statement accompanying the Senate-introduced 2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 4662) would have required a report from the Secretary of State on steps taken to facilitate an independent, credible, and transparent investigation into Abu Akleh's death, including whether 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 applies.174 This reporting requirement was not included in the enacted version of the bill (P.L.117-328). In fall 2022, Ha’aretz reported that staff at the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem were preparing an internal report on the IDF’s ultra-Orthodox Netzah Yehuda battalion to determine whether some 167 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing, May 11, 2022. 168 U.S. State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022. 169 Hiba Yazbek and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Says Reporter Was Probably Shot By One of Its Forces,” New York Times, September 6, 2022. 170 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians reject IDF probe into Shireen Abu Akleh killing, vow to bring case to ICC,” Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2022. 171 Barak Ravid, “FBI opens investigation into killing of Palestinian American Shireen Abu Akleh,” Axios, November 14, 2022. 172 Senator James Lankford, Press Release, Lankford, Colleagues Warn FBI Against Politically-Charged Investigation of Israeli Defense Forces, December 15, 2022. 173 Congressional Record, Senate Speeches and Inserts, Page S4635, Shireen Abu Akleh, September 15, 2022. 174 See, Senate Appropriations Committee, available online at: https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSFY23RPT.pdf Congressional Research Service 34 link to page 44 link to page 43 link to page 43 link to page 45 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel of its soldiers committed violations while serving in the West Bank.175 As of January 2023, the IDF reportedly had conducted its own investigation of the unit and had dismissed or reassigned several commanders while transferring the entire battalion from the West Bank to the Golan Heights.176 Use of U.S. Funds within Israel’s Pre-June 1967 Borders In some instances, U.S. assistance to Israel may be used only in areas subject to the administration of Israel prior to June 1967 (see “Loan Guarantees”). For example, U.S. State Department-provided Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA, see “Migration and Refugee

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Some Congressional Opposition to Sale of PGMs to Israel~~
~~During the May 2021 conflict in Gaza, some Members critical of Israel’s conduct during the hostilities sought to~~
~~block a proposed sale of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Israel. On May 5, 2021, five days before the start~~
~~of hostilities, the State Department formally notified SFRC and HFAC of a proposed $735 mil ion Direct~~
~~Commercial Sale (DCS) of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits and Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs)~~
~~manufactured by Boeing to Israel. On May 20, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-~~
~~Cortez, Mark Pocan, and Rashida Tlaib introduced respective resolutions (S.J.Res.19 and H.J.Res.49) of disapproval~~
~~against the proposed sale of munitions.171 The resolutions did not receive a vote in either chamber and, on May~~
~~21, the Biden Administration approved an export license for the sale. Senator Sanders reportedly then placed a~~
~~hold on all State Department nominees, but lifted it soon after the State Department pledged additional~~
~~humanitarian aid for the Palestinians.172 After the State Department issued the license, Secretary Blinken stated in~~
~~a televised interview that: “When it comes to arms sales, two things. First, the President’s been equally clear: We~~
~~are committed to giving Israel the means to defend itself, especial y when it comes to these indiscriminate rocket~~
~~attacks against civilians. Any country would respond to that, and we – we’re committed to Israel’s defense. At the~~
~~same time, any arms sale is going to be done in ful consultation with Congress. We’re committed to that. And we~~
~~want to make sure that that process works effectively.”173~~
~~Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Law)174~~
~~Section 620M of the FAA of 1961, as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized~~
~~by the FAA and the AECA to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information~~
~~that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S.~~
~~embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and~~
~~units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training.~~
~~In February 2016, Senator Leahy and 10 other Members of Congress sent a letter to then-~~
~~Secretary of State John Kerry asking the State Department to determine whether alleged~~
~~extrajudicial killings or torture by Israeli military and police (and Egypt separately) should trigger~~
~~Leahy law restrictions.175 In its response to Congress, the State Department stated that no Israeli~~
~~individual or unit potentially involved in the letter’s alleged incidents had been submitted to~~
~~receive U.S. assistance.176~~

~~171 During House consideration of H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, several~~
~~lawmakers proposed an amendment to suspend the “transfer of Boeing Joint Direct Attack Munition weaponry under~~
~~the $735 million direct commercial sale to the Israeli government.” The House did not include this amendment in its~~
~~final bill. See House Committee on Rules, H.R. 4350 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.~~
~~172 Jeff Abramson, “U.S. Arms Sales to Israel Challenged,” Arms Control Today, June 2021.~~
~~173 U.S. State Department, Secretary Antony J. Blinken on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos, May 23,~~
~~2021.~~
~~174 For background on the Leahy Law, see CRS Report R43361,~~ ~~“Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security~~
~~Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.~~
~~175 The letter’s text is available at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000153-c56c-d662-a75b-cfecc6be0000.~~
~~176 See the text of then Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield’s April 18, 2016, response letter~~
~~to Representative Henry C. Johnson at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000154-7c2f-d905-a357-7c7f04750000.~~
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~~link to page 46 link to page 45 link to page 49~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~H.R. 2590, the Defending the Human Rights of Palestinian Children and Families~~
~~Living Under Israeli Military Occupation Act~~
~~For the third consecutive Congress, Representative Betty McCol um has introduced legislation focused on Israel’s~~
~~treatment of the Palestinians.177 In addition to its findings, sense of Congress, and statement of administration~~
~~policy sections, as well as other directives, H.R. 2590 contains a section (Section 5) entitled, “Limitation on~~
~~Assistance.” It contains the fol owing provisions:~~
~~Section 5(a) – “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” this section would prohibit foreign assistance funds~~
~~to the Government of Israel for, among other things, (1) “Supporting the military detention, interrogation, abuse,~~
~~or il -treatment of Palestinian children,” (2) “Supporting the seizure, appropriation, or destruction of Palestinian~~
~~property and forcible transfer of civilians in the Israeli-control ed and occupied West Bank,” and (3) “Deploying,~~
~~or supporting the deployment of personnel, training, services, lethal materials, equipment, facilities, logistics,~~
~~transportation, or any other activity to territory in the occupied West Bank to facilitate or support further~~
~~unilateral annexation by Israel.”~~
~~Section 5(b) – This section would require the Secretary of State to make an initial certification to Congress,~~
~~fol owed by a regular annual one, that no U.S. assistance from the previous fiscal year has been used by Israel to~~
~~support “personnel, training, lethal materials, equipment, facilities, logistics, transportation, or any other activity~~
~~that supports or is associated with any of the activities” prohibited in Section 5(a). Or, the Secretary could certify~~
~~that U.S. assistance funds from the previous fiscal year were used for a prohibited activity (as specified in Section~~
~~5(a)), in which case the Secretary must accompany the certification with a report to Congress describing “in detail~~
~~the amount of such funds used by the Government of Israel in violation of such subsection and each activity~~
~~supported by such funds.”~~
~~Use of U.S. Funds within Israel’s Pre-June 1967 Borders~~
~~In some instances, U.S. assistance to Israel may be used only in areas subject to the~~
~~administration of Israel prior to June 1967 (see “Loan Guarantees”). For example, U.S. State~~
~~Department-provided MRA assistance (see~~ “~~Migration & Refugee~~ Assistance”), per agreement ), per agreement
between the State Department and United Israel Appeal, may only be used for absorption centers, between the State Department and United Israel Appeal, may only be used for absorption centers,
ulpanim (intensive Hebrew-language schools (intensive Hebrew-language schools, many of which are located at immigrant absorption centers with particular focus on immigrants to Israel), or with particular focus on immigrants to Israel), or
youth youth aliyah (relocation to Israel) institutions located within Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of (relocation to Israel) institutions located within Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of
control.control.~~178~~177
Until recently, no program funded by the endowments of U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (see Until recently, no program funded by the endowments of U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (see
“U.S.-Israeli Scientific & Business Cooperation”) could be “conducted in geographic areas ) could be “conducted in geographic areas
which came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967which came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967~~, and may not~~

~~177 In the 115th Congress, Representative McCollum introduced H.R. 4391, Promoting Human Rights by Ending Israeli~~
~~Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act, that would have, among other things, prohibited U.S. assistance to~~
~~Israel (notwithstanding any other provision of law) from being used to support the military detention, interrogation, or~~
~~ill-treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law. This bill was referred to the House~~
~~Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see further committee or floor action. In the 116th Congress, Representative~~
~~McCollum introduced a similar version of the legislation (H.R. 2407), that, rather than specifically addressing U.S.~~
~~military assistance to Israel, would have altered Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.~~
~~§2378d; commonly known as the "Leahy Law") by prohibiting foreign assistance to a foreign country that may be used~~
~~to support the military detention, interrogation, abuse, or ill-treatment of children in violation of international~~
~~humanitarian law. H.R. 2407 also would have authorized $19 million each year for nongovernmental organizations~~
~~monitoring possible human rights abuses associated with reported Israeli military detention of Palestinian children.~~
~~This bill also was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and it did not see further committee or floor action.~~
~~178 This stipulation is found in grant agreements between the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees,~~
~~and Migration (PRM) and United Israel Appeal (clause 8. F. 2—Use in Territories Subject to the Administration of the~~
~~State of Israel Prior to June 1967). The FY2013 agreement (S-PRMCO-13-GR-1041—March 13, 2013) is for $15~~
~~million. CRS Correspondence with U.S. State Department, March 2014.~~
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37

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~relate to subjects primarily pertinent to such areas.”179 In~~ ...”178 In October 2020, the Trump Administration October 2020, the Trump Administration
announced that it had removed geographic restrictions from the founding agreements establishing announced that it had removed geographic restrictions from the founding agreements establishing
the three main U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (BIRD, BARD, BSF), thereby permitting the three main U.S.-Israeli binational foundations (BIRD, BARD, BSF), thereby permitting
universities in the West Bank to apply for grant funding.universities in the West Bank to apply for grant funding.~~180~~179 According to an October 2020 press According to an October 2020 press
statement released by the U.S. Embassy in Israel: statement released by the U.S. Embassy in Israel:
~~Upon entry of force of the Protocol signed here in Judea and Samaria, more Israeli partners~~
~~will be eligible to receive funding for scientific collaboration in a wide variety of~~
~~fields....Established in the 1970s, the~~ Established in the 1970s, the BIRD, BARD, and BSFBIRD, BARD, and BSF ~~Agreements~~ Agreements for each of the three Foundations have not permitted support for projects conducted in areas that came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967. These ~~for each of the~~
~~three Foundations have not permitted support for projects conducted in areas that came~~
~~under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, 1967. These~~ geographic geographic
restrictions are no longer consistent with U.S. policy following (i) the Administration’s restrictions are no longer consistent with U.S. policy following (i) the Administration’s
opposition to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, (ii) the opposition to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, (ii) the
Administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the U.S. Embassy Administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the U.S. Embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, (iii) the Administration’s recognition of Israel’s sovereignty from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, (iii) the Administration’s recognition of Israel’s sovereignty
over the Golan Heights, and (iv) the Administration’s announcement that the U.S. will no over the Golan Heights, and (iv) the Administration’s announcement that the U.S. will no
longer consider that the establishment of civilian settlements in the West Bank is per se longer consider that the establishment of civilian settlements in the West Bank is per se
inconsistent with international law.... Updating the Agreements further strengthens the inconsistent with international law.... Updating the Agreements further strengthens the
special bilateral relationship between the United States and Israel and continues efforts to special bilateral relationship between the United States and Israel and continues efforts to
generate significant mutual scientific and economic benefits.generate significant mutual scientific and economic benefits.~~181~~180
In the 117th Congress, Section 5 of H.R.5344, the Two-State Solution Act, would In the 117th Congress, Section 5 of H.R.5344, the Two-State Solution Act, would have, among other , among other
things, things, ~~restrict~~restricted the United States government from providing “support for projects 175 Amos Harel, “U.S. Examining Allegations Against Israel's Orthodox West Bank Battalion,” Ha’aretz, September 6, 2022. 176 Amos Harel, “Violent ultra-Orthodox Battalion Moves to Golan Heights,” Ha’aretz, January 2, 2023. 177 This stipulation is found in grant agreements between the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and United Israel Appeal (clause 8. F. 2—Use in Territories Subject to the Administration of the State of Israel Prior to June 1967). 178 See “Regulations” document at http://www.bsf.org.il/BSFPublic/DefaultPage1.aspx?PageId=221&innerTextID=221. 179 Noa Landau, Hagar Shezaf, and Shira Kadari-Ovadia, “Netanyahu, Ambassador Friedman Ink Deal Expanding Scientific Cooperation to Settlements,” Ha’aretz, October 28, 2020. 180 U.S. State Department, U.S., Israel Expand Reach of Binational Foundations and Establish New Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement, U.S. Embassy Jerusalem, Press Release, October 28, 2020. Congressional Research Service 35 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel ~~the United States government from providing “support for projects~~ conducted in conducted in
geographic areas which came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5, geographic areas which came under the administration of the Government of Israel after June 5,
1967.1967.~~..”~~
” The bill was not considered. Israeli Arms Transfers to Third Parties
Per Section 3(a) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2753) and Section 505(e) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. Per Section 3(a) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2753) and Section 505(e) of the FAA (22 U.S.C.
§2314), the U.S. government must review and approve any transfer of U.S.-origin equipment §2314), the U.S. government must review and approve any transfer of U.S.-origin equipment
from a recipient to a third party that was not previously authorized in the original acquisition.from a recipient to a third party that was not previously authorized in the original acquisition.~~182~~181
Third Party Transfer (or TPT) is the retransfer of title, physical possession or control of defense Third Party Transfer (or TPT) is the retransfer of title, physical possession or control of defense
articles from the authorized recipient to any person or organization not an employee, officer or articles from the authorized recipient to any person or organization not an employee, officer or
agent of that recipient country.agent of that recipient country.~~183~~182
As previously mentioned, Israel is a major global manufacturer of armaments. As previously mentioned, Israel is a major global manufacturer of armaments. ~~Yet, it~~It also also
possesses significant quantities of major U.S.-origin defense equipment stemming from its possesses significant quantities of major U.S.-origin defense equipment stemming from its
decades-old security partnership with the United States. At times, third parties have sought to decades-old security partnership with the United States. At times, third parties have sought to
procure U.S. equipment held by Israel, and U.S.-Israel differences over approval of retransfer has procure U.S. equipment held by Israel, and U.S.-Israel differences over approval of retransfer has
at times caused friction in the bilateral relationship. For example, in 2017, Croatia solicited bids at times caused friction in the bilateral relationship. For example, in 2017, Croatia solicited bids
for the for the procurement of fighter aircraft and, a year later, chose to purchase 12 used F-16 Barak fighters ~~procurement of fighter aircraft and, a year later, chose to purchase 12 used F-16 Barak~~

~~179 See “Regulations” document at http://www.bsf.org.il/BSFPublic/DefaultPage1.aspx?PageId=221&innerTextID=~~
~~221.~~
~~180 Noa Landau, Hagar Shezaf, and Shira Kadari-Ovadia, “Netanyahu, Ambassador Friedman Ink Deal Expanding~~
~~Scientific Cooperation to Settlements,” Ha’aretz, October 28, 2020.~~
~~181 U.S. State Department, U.S., Israel Expand Reach of Binational Foundations and Establish New Scientific and~~
~~Technological Cooperation Agreement, U.S. Embassy Jerusalem, Press Release, October 28, 2020.~~
~~182 See, U.S. State Department, “Third Party Transfer Process and Documentation,” Bureau of Political-Military~~
~~Affairs, December 17, 2018.~~
~~183 See, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),”~~
~~Edition 39, January 2019.~~
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~~fighters~~ from Israel in a deal worth an estimated $500 million, conditioned on U.S. TPT approval. from Israel in a deal worth an estimated $500 million, conditioned on U.S. TPT approval.
In December 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress that it had approved the sale, but In December 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress that it had approved the sale, but
only if all Israeli modifications were removed beforehand. Reportedly, Croatia did not want the F-only if all Israeli modifications were removed beforehand. Reportedly, Croatia did not want the F-
16s returned to their original condition, and 16s returned to their original condition, and canceled the deal after~~the deal was cancelled despite~~ high-level negotiations high-level negotiations
between Israeli and U.S. officialsbetween Israeli and U.S. officials~~.184~~ did not resolve the issue.183
Israel and China
Amidst ongoing global U.S.-Chinese competition in various fields, Israel’s defense and Amidst ongoing global U.S.-Chinese competition in various fields, Israel’s defense and
technology trade with China has at times come under U.S. scrutiny.technology trade with China has at times come under U.S. scrutiny.~~185~~184 Since the middle of the last Since the middle of the last
decade, Israeli defense exports to China have nearly ceased. Two planned Israeli sales to China decade, Israeli defense exports to China have nearly ceased. Two planned Israeli sales to China
drew significant opposition both from successive Administrations and from Congress drew significant opposition both from successive Administrations and from Congress
(PHALCON airborne radar systems in 2000 and upgrade of Chinese Harpy Killer drone aircraft (PHALCON airborne radar systems in 2000 and upgrade of Chinese Harpy Killer drone aircraft
in 2004/2005).in 2004/2005).~~186~~185 Apparently as a result of U.S. pressure on Israel to cease its long-standing and Apparently as a result of U.S. pressure on Israel to cease its long-standing and
sometimes clandestine defense relationship with China, Israel created its own arms export control sometimes clandestine defense relationship with China, Israel created its own arms export control
agency, known as the Defense Export Control Agency (DECA agency, known as the Defense Export Control Agency (DECA – see textbox ~~above~~~~). In addition,~~
~~the~~“Israeli Exports of Spyware”). The United States and Israel signed a 2005 bilateral agreement, known as the “Declaration of United States and Israel signed a 2005 bilateral agreement, known as the “Declaration of
~~Understanding on Technology Exports,” whereby both countries pledged to ensure defense export~~
~~transparency, with the United States pledging not to ban Israel’s defense deals on commercial~~
~~grounds to ensure Israeli competitiveness globally.187~~
~~Though official Israeli-Chinese defense ties have essentially ended,188 China is now Israel’s~~
~~second largest single-state trading partner (after the United States), and there is still some concern~~
~~that Israeli technology transfer in the commercial sphere will be used by China to compete with~~
~~the United States and potentially threaten its national security in various fields, such as~~
~~cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and robotics.189 According to one analyst in 2018, “Since~~
~~they cannot buy defense equipment from Israel, Chinese companies with links to the country’s~~
~~military have looked to civilian technologies instead, particularly those adaptable to military~~
~~use.”190 Partly due to U.S. concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel~~
~~created an advisory panel on foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.191 However, this panel~~

~~184~~Understanding on Technology Exports,” whereby both countries pledged to 181 See, U.S. State Department, “Third Party Transfer Process and Documentation,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, December 17, 2018. 182 See, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),” Edition 39, January 2019. 183 “Croatia cancels F-16 Deal with Israel due to U.S. Objections,” “Croatia cancels F-16 Deal with Israel due to U.S. Objections,” Axios, January 10, 2019. , January 10, 2019.
~~185~~184 See, “The Evolving Israel-China Relationship,” See, “The Evolving Israel-China Relationship,” RAND Corporation, 2019. , 2019.
~~186~~185 Representative Representative ~~Sonny~~ Callahan of Alabama, then Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Callahan of Alabama, then Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee, told a hearing on April 6, 2000, that he would block $250 million in FY2001 military Appropriations Committee, told a hearing on April 6, 2000, that he would block $250 million in FY2001 military
assistance to Israel unless Israel cancelled the PHALCON sale to China. Representative Callahan offered an assistance to Israel unless Israel cancelled the PHALCON sale to China. Representative Callahan offered an
amendment during a June 20 subcommittee markup to withhold $250 million from the $2.88 billion in total economic amendment during a June 20 subcommittee markup to withhold $250 million from the $2.88 billion in total economic
and military assistance proposed for Israel for FY2001, but the amendment failed by a vote of nine to six. See, “Israel-and military assistance proposed for Israel for FY2001, but the amendment failed by a vote of nine to six. See, “Israel-
China Radar Deal Opposed,” China Radar Deal Opposed,” Washington Post, April 7, 2000 and “U.S. Congressman: We’ll Block Israeli Aid Unless , April 7, 2000 and “U.S. Congressman: We’ll Block Israeli Aid Unless
China Deal Cancelled,” China Deal Cancelled,” Jerusalem Post, April 7, 2000. , April 7, 2000.
~~187 “Israel, U.S. Draft Agreement for Openness, Equality in Arms Deals,” Ha’aretz, June 27, 2005.~~
~~188 In late 2021, three Israeli companies and 10 suspects were indicted on charges of exporting cruise missiles to China~~
~~without a permit. According to one report, “Israel is home to some 1,600 licensed arms exporters, which employ~~
~~150,000 to 200,000 people. In addition, there is a large supply chain of subcontractors who supply software, hardware,~~
~~raw materials, and other goods necessary for arms production. DECA is supposed to watch over this massive system,~~
~~guided by strict rules governing Israel’s arms export industry. The body, which operates with nearly no transparency, is~~
~~supposed to vet deals to ensure that arms do not go to enemy countries, endanger Israel in any way, include classified~~
~~technology, or stand to harm Israel’s international standing.” See, “10 Israelis set to be Indicted for Illegally Exporting~~
~~Missiles to China,” Times of Israel, December 20, 2021.~~
~~189 “China Tech Push in Israel Stirs Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2019.~~
~~190 “Israel and China Take a Leap Forward—but to Where?” Mosaic, November 5, 2018.~~
~~191 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.~~
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Congressional Research Service 36 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel ensure defense export transparency, with the United States pledging not to ban Israel’s defense deals on commercial grounds to ensure Israeli competitiveness globally.186 Though official Israeli-Chinese defense ties have essentially ended,187 China is now Israel’s second largest single-state trading partner (after the United States). There is concern that China will use Israeli technology transfer in the commercial sphere to compete with the United States and potentially threaten its national security in various fields, such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and robotics.188 Partly due to U.S. concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.189 However, this panel reportedly does not have the authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that reportedly does not have the authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that
accounted for most of China’s investments in Israel in the previous decade.accounted for most of China’s investments in Israel in the previous decade.~~192~~
~~Both successive~~190 Successive Administrations and Congress have urged Israel to do more to limit Chinese Administrations and Congress have urged Israel to do more to limit Chinese
investment. Section 1289 of P.L. 116-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020, investment. Section 1289 of P.L. 116-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020,
expressed a sense of the Senate that the United States government should “urge the Government expressed a sense of the Senate that the United States government should “urge the Government
of Israel to consider the security implications of foreign investment in Israel.” According to one of Israel to consider the security implications of foreign investment in Israel.” According to one
Israeli analysis, President Israeli analysis, President Donald Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019 Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019
that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese
companies establish a 5G communications network in Israel, in line with similar warnings that companies establish a 5G communications network in Israel, in line with similar warnings that
the Administration had communicated to other U.S. allies and partners.the Administration had communicated to other U.S. allies and partners.~~193~~191 In spring 2020, after In spring 2020, after
the United States again raised concern over Chinese investment in major Israeli projects, the the United States again raised concern over Chinese investment in major Israeli projects, the
subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based company lost a bid to build Israel’s largest desalination plant. subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based company lost a bid to build Israel’s largest desalination plant.
Shortly before Israel announced the bid decision, thenShortly before Israel announced the bid decision, then -Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited
Israel and publicly stated, “We do not want the Chinese Communist Party to have access to Israeli Israel and publicly stated, “We do not want the Chinese Communist Party to have access to Israeli
infrastructure, Israeli communication systems, all of the things that put Israeli citizens at risk and infrastructure, Israeli communication systems, all of the things that put Israeli citizens at risk and
in turn put the capacity for America to work alongside Israel on important projects at risk as in turn put the capacity for America to work alongside Israel on important projects at risk as
well.”well.”~~194~~192
The Biden Administration also has continued to warn regional partners about Chinese investment The Biden Administration also has continued to warn regional partners about Chinese investment
in critical infrastructure. According to in critical infrastructure. According to ~~Mira Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional~~
~~Security at the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “We know our~~
~~partners and allies in the Middle East have trade relations with China and that’s OK, but we made~~
~~it clear that there is a certain kind of cooperation with China we cannot live with.”195~~
~~State-owned and private Chinese companies continue to do business in Israel. A state-owned~~
~~Chinese company (the Shanghai International Port Group) began operating the new terminal at~~
~~Haifa’s seaport for 25 years. Another state-owned Chinese company (a subsidiary of China~~
~~Harbour Engineering Company) is developing Ashdod’s new port. Both Haifa and Ashdod host~~
~~Israeli naval bases. Due to the Chinese contract for Haifa, the Biden Administration has~~
~~reportedly pressed Israeli counterparts to regularly check heavy machinery at the port for~~
~~technology that could be employed to spy on the nearby naval base.196 The China Civil~~
~~Engineering Construction Company has helped build several road tunnels and is working on the~~
~~construction of Tel Aviv’s Light Rail project.~~
~~In 2022, after repeated high level U.S. engagement with Israel on China, Israel has reportedly~~
~~agreed to “update Washington about any major deals with Beijing, especially in infrastructure and~~
~~technology” and “would reconsider any such deals at America’s request.”197 In early 2022, Israel~~

~~192 Shira Efron,~~one unnamed U.S. Embassy in Israel spokesperson, “We would like to see Israel’s investment screening system strengthened and expanded, especially in the field of high tech.... We have been candid with our Israeli friends over risks to our shared national security interests.”193 In 2022, after repeated high level U.S. engagement with Israel on 186 “Israel, U.S. Draft Agreement for Openness, Equality in Arms Deals,” Ha’aretz, June 27, 2005. 187 In late 2021, three Israeli companies and 10 suspects were indicted on charges of exporting cruise missiles to China without a permit. According to one report, “Israel is home to some 1,600 licensed arms exporters, which employ 150,000 to 200,000 people. In addition, there is a large supply chain of subcontractors who supply software, hardware, raw materials, and other goods necessary for arms production. DECA is supposed to watch over this massive system, guided by strict rules governing Israel’s arms export industry. The body, which operates with nearly no transparency, is supposed to vet deals to ensure that arms do not go to enemy countries, endanger Israel in any way, include classified technology, or stand to harm Israel’s international standing.” See, “10 Israelis set to be Indicted for Illegally Exporting Missiles to China,” Times of Israel, December 20, 2021. 188 “China Tech Push in Israel Stirs Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2019. 189 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019. 190 Shira Efron et al., et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and
the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020, pp. 24-25. , RAND Corporation, 2020, pp. 24-25.
~~193~~191 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G
Dominance,” Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019. Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.
~~194~~192 Shirley Zhao and Ivan Levingston, “Li Ka-Shing Hong Kong Group Loses Israel Deal amid U.S. Push,” Shirley Zhao and Ivan Levingston, “Li Ka-Shing Hong Kong Group Loses Israel Deal amid U.S. Push,” Bloomberg, ,
May 26, 2020. May 26, 2020.
~~195 Barak Ravid, “CIA Director Raised China Concerns with Israeli Prime Minister,” Axios.com, August 18, 2021.~~
~~196 Arie Egozi, “US Presses Israel on Haifa Port amid China Espionage Concerns: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October~~
~~5, 2021.~~
~~197 Lahav Harkov, “Israel Agrees to Update US about China Trade to Avoid Tension,” Jerusalem Post, January 3,~~
~~2022.~~
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~~chose other foreign companies over Chinse bidders for the next phase of Tel Aviv’s light rail~~
~~construction.~~
~~Other Ongoing Assistance and~~
~~Cooperative Programs~~
~~Migration & Refugee Assistance~~
~~Since 1973, Israel has received a total of approximately $1.68 billion in grants from the State~~
~~Department’s Migration and Refugee Assistance account (MRA) to assist in the resettlement of~~
~~migrants to Israel.198~~193 Sarah Zheng and Coco Liu, “The US is Thwarting China’s Love Affair with Israeli Tech,” Bloomberg, July 12, Congressional Research Service 37 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel China, Israel reportedly agreed to “update Washington about any major deals with Beijing, especially in infrastructure and technology” and said it “would reconsider any such deals at America’s request.”194 In early 2022, Israel chose other foreign companies over Chinese bidders for the next phase of Tel Aviv’s light rail construction. During President Biden’s visit to Israel in summer 2022, the United States and Israel launched the “U.S.-Israel Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology,” which, among other things, will focus on managing “risks to our respective technology ecosystems, including in research security, export controls, and investment screening.”195 In summer 2022 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf noted: We have been frank with our Israeli friends about our concerns, and the value of rigorous investment screening mechanisms to ensure that technology, strategic infrastructure, and other critical assets are not compromised by external funding. Israel's adoption of such a mechanism has been a critical first step, and one we would like to help them improve upon. We also hope to work together on other issues like monitoring research institutions and expanding export controls to protect Israel's valuable technological contributions from being exploited by PRC companies.196 2022. 194 Lahav Harkov, “Israel Agrees to Update US about China Trade to Avoid Tension,” Jerusalem Post, January 3, 2022. 195 The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Israel Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology, September 30, 2022. 196 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism Subcommittee, Hearing entitled, “China's Role in the Middle East,” Testimony of Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. State Department, August 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 38 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Other Ongoing Assistance and Cooperative Programs Migration and Refugee Assistance Since 1973, Israel has received a total of approximately $1.69 billion in grants from the State Department’s Migration and Refugee Assistance account (MRA) to assist in the resettlement of migrants to Israel.197 Funds are paid to the United Israel Appeal, a private philanthropic Funds are paid to the United Israel Appeal, a private philanthropic
~~organization in the United States, which in turn transfers the funds to the Jewish Agency for~~
~~Israel.199~~ Table 7. Migration and Refugee organization in the United States, which in Assistance Funding Levels for Israel turn transfers the funds to the Jewish Agency current U.S. dollars in millions for Israel.198 Between 1973 and 1991, the United States Between 1973 and 1991, the United States ~~gave~~provided about $460 million for about $460 million for Fiscal Year Total resettling Jewish resettling Jewish
refugees in Israel. refugees in Israel. ~~During the 1990s~~From 1992 to 1999, after the collapse of the Soviet Union , after the collapse of the Soviet Union FY2000-FY2012 $519.3 and the resettlement of and the resettlement of
hundreds of thousands hundreds of thousands FY2013 $15.0 of Jewish immigrants in Israel, MRA grants to of Jewish immigrants in Israel, MRA grants to FY2014 $15.0 Israel increased to almost Israel increased to almost
$80 million per year $80 million per year ~~from 1992 to 1999~~ FY2015 $10.0 ($630 million). Since then, annual grants have decreased ($630 million). Since then, annual grants have decreased
based at least based at least ~~partly~~in part on the FY2016 $10.0 ~~on the~~ declining number of Jews leaving the former declining number of Jews leaving the former FY2017 $7.5 Soviet Union and other Soviet Union and other
~~areas for Israel (see Table 8).~~
~~Table 8. Migration and Refugee Assistance Funding Levels for Israel~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Total~~
~~FY2000-FY2012~~
~~$519.3 mil ion~~
~~FY2013~~
~~$15 mil ion~~
~~FY2014~~
~~$15 mil ion~~
~~FY2015~~
~~$10 mil ion~~
~~FY2016~~
~~$10 mil ion~~
~~FY2017~~
~~$7.5 mil ion~~
~~FY2018~~
~~$7.5 mil ion~~
~~FY2019~~
~~$5.0 mil ion~~
~~FY2020~~
~~$5.0 mil ion~~
~~FY2021~~
~~$5.0 mil ion~~
~~Total~~
~~$599.3 million~~
Source: U.S. State Department.
~~Congress has changed the earmark~~areas for Israel (see FY2018 $7.5 Table 7). MRA assistance largely supports Jews who have migrated from Ethiopia. FY2019 $5.0 FY2020 $5.0 Congress has changed the directive language since the first refugee resettlement funds were language since the first refugee resettlement funds were
FY2021 $5.0 appropriated in 1973. At first, the appropriated in 1973. At first, the ~~congressional language said the funds were~~ FY2022 $5.0 congressional language said the funds were FY2023 $5.0 for “resettlement in for “resettlement in
Israel of refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from Israel of refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from Total $609.3 Communist countries in Communist countries in
Eastern Europe.” But Eastern Europe.” But Source: U.S. State Department. starting in 1985, the language was simplified to “refugees resettling in starting in 1985, the language was simplified to “refugees resettling in
Israel” to ensure that Ethiopian Jews would be covered by the funding. Technically, the legislative Israel” to ensure that Ethiopian Jews would be covered by the funding. Technically, the legislative
language designates funds for refugee resettlement, but in Israel little language designates funds for refugee resettlement, but in Israel little differentiation is made between Jewish “refugees” and other Jewish immigrants, and the funds are used to support the absorption of all Jewish immigrants. ~~differentiation is made~~

~~198~~197 The MRA account is authorized by 22 U.S.C. § 2601. Funding for the account comes from appropriations in the The MRA account is authorized by 22 U.S.C. § 2601. Funding for the account comes from appropriations in the
foreign operations appropriations bill. foreign operations appropriations bill.
~~199~~198 The Jewish Agency for Israel’s website is available at http://www.jafi.org.il/. The Jewish Agency for Israel’s website is available at http://www.jafi.org.il/.
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~~between Jewish “refugees” and other Jewish immigrants, and the funds are used to support the~~
~~absorption of all Jewish immigrants.~~
Loan Guarantees
Overview
Since 1972, the United States has extended loan guarantees to Israel to assist with housing Since 1972, the United States has extended loan guarantees to Israel to assist with housing
shortages, Israel’s absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and shortages, Israel’s absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and
its economic recovery following the 2000-2003 recession, which was probably caused in part by its economic recovery following the 2000-2003 recession, which was probably caused in part by
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict known as the second intifada. Loan guarantees are a form of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict known as the second intifada. Loan guarantees are a form of
indirect U.S. assistance to Israel; they enable Israel to borrow from commercial sources at lower indirect U.S. assistance to Israel; they enable Israel to borrow from commercial sources at lower
rates. Congress directs that subsidies be set aside in a U.S. Treasury account in case of a possible rates. Congress directs that subsidies be set aside in a U.S. Treasury account in case of a possible
Israeli default. These subsidies, which are a percentage of the total loan (based in part on the Israeli default. These subsidies, which are a percentage of the total loan (based in part on the
credit rating of the borrowing country), have come from the U.S. or credit rating of the borrowing country), have come from the U.S. or ~~the~~ Israeli government.Israeli government.199 Israel Israel
has never defaulted on a U.S.-backed loan guarantee. has never defaulted on a U.S.-backed loan guarantee.
Loan Guarantees for Economic Recovery
In 2003, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon requested an additional $8 billion in loan guarantees to In 2003, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon requested an additional $8 billion in loan guarantees to
help the Israeli government stimulate Israel’s then-ailing economy. The loan guarantee request help the Israeli government stimulate Israel’s then-ailing economy. The loan guarantee request
accompanied a request for an additional $4 billion in military grants to help Israel prepare for accompanied a request for an additional $4 billion in military grants to help Israel prepare for
possible attacks during an anticipated U.S. war with Iraq. P.L. 108-11, the FY2003 Emergency possible attacks during an anticipated U.S. war with Iraq. P.L. 108-11, the FY2003 Emergency
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, authorized $9 billion in loan guarantees over three Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, authorized $9 billion in loan guarantees over three
years for Israel’s economic recovery and $1 billion in military grants. P.L. 108-11 stated that the years for Israel’s economic recovery and $1 billion in military grants. P.L. 108-11 stated that the
proceeds from the loan guarantees could be used only within Israel’s pre-June 5, 1967, area of proceeds from the loan guarantees could be used only within Israel’s pre-June 5, 1967, area of
control; that the annual loan guarantees could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel control; that the annual loan guarantees could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel
spends on settlements outside of Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of control; that Israel would pay all spends on settlements outside of Israel’s pre-June 1967 area of control; that Israel would pay all
fees and subsidies; and that the President would consider Israel’s economic reforms when fees and subsidies; and that the President would consider Israel’s economic reforms when
determining terms and conditions for the loan guarantees.200 determining terms and conditions for the loan guarantees.200
On November 26, 2003, the Department of State announced that the $3 billion in loan guarantees On November 26, 2003, the Department of State announced that the $3 billion in loan guarantees
for FY2003 were reduced by $289.5 million because Israel continued for FY2003 were reduced by $289.5 million because Israel continued ~~to build~~building settlements in the settlements in the
occupied territories and occupied territories and ~~continued construction~~constructing of a security barrier separating key Israeli and of a security barrier separating key Israeli and
Palestinian population centers.201 In FY2005, the U.S. government reduced the amount available Palestinian population centers.201 In FY2005, the U.S. government reduced the amount available
for Israel to borrow by an additional $795.8 million. Since then, Israel has not borrowed any for Israel to borrow by an additional $795.8 million. Since then, Israel has not borrowed any
funds. funds.
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Israel is legally obligated to use the proceeds According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Israel is legally obligated to use the proceeds
of guaranteed loans for refinancing its government debt and also has agreed that proceeds shall of guaranteed loans for refinancing its government debt and also has agreed that proceeds shall

not be used for military purposes or to support activities in areas outside its pre-June 5, 1967, areas of control. However, U.S. officials in 2009 noted that because Israel’s national budget is 199 Office of Management and Budget, Credit Supplement, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2023. 200 According to P.L. 108-11, “[Loan] guarantees may be issued under this section only to support activities in the 200 According to P.L. 108-11, “[Loan] guarantees may be issued under this section only to support activities in the
geographic areas which were subject to the administration of the Government of Israel before June 5, 1967: geographic areas which were subject to the administration of the Government of Israel before June 5, 1967: Provided
further, That the amount of guarantees that may be issued shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount extended , That the amount of guarantees that may be issued shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount extended
or estimated to have been extended by the Government of Israel during the period from March 1, 2003, to the date of or estimated to have been extended by the Government of Israel during the period from March 1, 2003, to the date of
issue of the guarantee, for activities which the President determines are inconsistent with the objectives and issue of the guarantee, for activities which the President determines are inconsistent with the objectives and
understandings reached between the United States and the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of the understandings reached between the United States and the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of the
loan guarantee program: loan guarantee program: Provided further, That the President shall submit a report to Congress no later than September , That the President shall submit a report to Congress no later than September
30 of each fiscal year during the pendency of the program specifying the amount calculated under the preceding 30 of each fiscal year during the pendency of the program specifying the amount calculated under the preceding
proviso and that will be deducted from the amount of guarantees authorized to be issued in the next fiscal year.” proviso and that will be deducted from the amount of guarantees authorized to be issued in the next fiscal year.”
201 U.S. State Department, “Boucher 201 U.S. State Department, “Boucher ~~cites~~Cites Concerns over Settlement Building and Security Fence Route,” State Concerns over Settlement Building and Security Fence Route,” State
Department Press Releases And Documents, November 26, 2003. Department Press Releases And Documents, November 26, 2003.
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~not be used for military purposes or to support activities in areas outside its pre-June 5, 1967,~~
~~areas of control (the West Bank—including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, and the Golan~~
~~Heights). However, U.S. officials in 2009 noted that because Israel’s national budget is~~ fungible, fungible,
proceeds from the issuance of U.S.-guaranteed debt that are used to refinance Israeli government proceeds from the issuance of U.S.-guaranteed debt that are used to refinance Israeli government
debt free up domestic Israeli funds for other uses.202 debt free up domestic Israeli funds for other uses.202
As of As of ~~2021~~2023, Israel had issued $4.1 billion in U.S.-backed bonds.203 After deducting the amounts , Israel had issued $4.1 billion in U.S.-backed bonds.203 After deducting the amounts
mentioned above, Israel might still be authorized to issue up to $3.814 billion in U.S.-backed mentioned above, Israel might still be authorized to issue up to $3.814 billion in U.S.-backed
bonds. However, if the Israeli government sought to issue new U.S.-backed bonds, it is unclear bonds. However, if the Israeli government sought to issue new U.S.-backed bonds, it is unclear
whether the loan guarantees available to Israel might be subject to reduction based on Israel’s whether the loan guarantees available to Israel might be subject to reduction based on Israel’s
estimated cumulative subsequent expenditures for settlements in the West Bank. The original loan estimated cumulative subsequent expenditures for settlements in the West Bank. The original loan
guarantee program authorization for Israel was through FY2005. Since then, Congress has guarantee program authorization for Israel was through FY2005. Since then, Congress has
extended the program five times.204 The program is currently authorized through the end of extended the program five times.204 The program is currently authorized through the end of
FY2023. FY2023.
In general, Israel may view U.S. loan guarantees as In general, Israel may view U.S. loan guarantees as ~~a “last resort” option~~an option of last resort, which its treasury could , which its treasury could
use if unguaranteed local and international bond issuances become too expensive. According to use if unguaranteed local and international bond issuances become too expensive. According to
one Israeli official in 2012, “We consider the loan guarantees as preparation for a rainy day.... one Israeli official in 2012, “We consider the loan guarantees as preparation for a rainy day....
This is a safety net for war, natural disaster and economic crisis, which allows Israel to maintain This is a safety net for war, natural disaster and economic crisis, which allows Israel to maintain
economic stability in unstable surroundings.”205 Israeli officials may believe that although they economic stability in unstable surroundings.”205 Israeli officials may believe that although they
have not used the loan guarantees in the last have not used the loan guarantees in the last 1718 years, maintaining the program boosts the years, maintaining the program boosts the
~~country’s fiscal standing among international creditors in capital markets.~~

~~202 CRS correspondence with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs, October 2009.~~
~~203 This includes $1.6 billion in FY2003; $1.75 billion in FY2004; and $750 million in FY2005.~~
~~204 P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, first extended the authority of the loan guarantees from~~
~~FY2005 to FY2007. P.L. 109-472, the 2006 Department of State Authorities Act, extended the authority to provide~~
~~loan guarantees through FY2011. Under that legislation, the loan guarantee program had a stated end of September 30,~~
~~2011; however, there was also a “carryover” provision in the statute under which Israel could draw on unused U.S.~~
~~guarantees until September 30, 2012. In the summer of 2012, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L.~~
~~112-150, the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012. Section 5(b) of the law extended the~~
~~loan guarantee authority until September 30, 2015. Section 7034(k)(10) of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Consolidated~~
~~Appropriations Act, further extended the program until September 30, 2019, allowing unused amounts to be carried~~
~~over into FY2020. P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, further extended the program until~~
~~September 30, 2023, allowing unused amounts to be carried over into FY2024.~~
~~205 “U.S. to Grant Three-year Extension of Loan Guarantees to Israel,” Ha’aretz, January 24, 2012.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Table 9. U.S. Loan Guarantees to Israel: FY2003-FY2021~~
~~current U.S. dollars in millions~~
~~Deductions~~
~~Amount~~
~~for~~
~~Amount~~
~~Available for~~
~~Settlement~~
~~Borrowed by~~
~~Israel to~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Activity~~
~~Israel~~
~~Borrow~~
~~FY2003~~
~~289.5~~
~~1,600.0~~
~~1,110.5~~
~~FY2004~~
—
~~1,750.0~~
~~1,250.0~~
~~FY2005~~
~~795.8~~
~~750.0~~
~~1,454.2~~
~~FY2006~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2007~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2008~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2009~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2010~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2011~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2012~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2013~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2014~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2015~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2016~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2017~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2018~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2019~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2020~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
~~FY2021~~
—
—
~~3,814.7~~
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. State Department.
Note: For FY2003-FY2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury authorized Israel to borrow up to $3 bil ion
~~per year of the total $9 bil ion authorized for the Loan Guarantee program.~~
country’s fiscal standing among international creditors in capital markets. American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA)206
Through Foreign Operations appropriations bills, Congress has funded the ASHA program as part Through Foreign Operations appropriations bills, Congress has funded the ASHA program as part
of the overall Development Assistance (DA) appropriation to the United States Agency for of the overall Development Assistance (DA) appropriation to the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). According to USAID, ASHA is designed to strengthen self-International Development (USAID). According to USAID, ASHA is designed to strengthen self-
sustaining schools, libraries, and medical centers that best demonstrate American ideals and sustaining schools, libraries, and medical centers that best demonstrate American ideals and
practices abroad. ASHA has been providing support to institutions in the Middle East since 1957, practices abroad. ASHA has been providing support to institutions in the Middle East since 1957,
and a number of universities and hospitals in Israel have been recipients of ASHA grants. and a number of universities and hospitals in Israel have been recipients of ASHA grants.
Institutions based in Israel combined receive $2Institutions based in Israel combined receive $2 to -$4 million annually in ASHA grants. In $4 million annually in ASHA grants. In
~~FY2020,~~ FY2021, (the most recent year for which data are available), ASHA grant recipients in Israel/West (the most recent year for which data are available), ASHA grant recipients in Israel/West
Bank included American Committee for Shaare Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem, Bank included American Committee for Shaare Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem, ~~American Friends~~
~~of the Episcopal Diocese of Jerusalem, Hadassah - The Women’s Zionist Organization of~~
~~America, and Trustees of the Feinberg Graduate School~~Trustees of the Feinberg Graduate School, and the Nazareth Project, Inc. According to USAID, institutions based . According to USAID, institutions based
in Israel have received the most program funding in the Middle East region.in Israel have received the most program funding in the Middle East region.

207 U.S.-Israeli Scientific & Business Cooperation In the early 1970s, Israeli academics and business professionals began looking for ways to expand investment in Israel’s nascent technology sector. The sector, which would later become 202 CRS correspondence with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs, October 2009. 203 This includes $1.6 billion in FY2003; $1.75 billion in FY2004; and $750 million in FY2005. 204 P.L. 116-6, the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, extended the program until September 30, 2023, allowing unused amounts to be carried over into FY2024. 205 “U.S. to Grant Three-year Extension of Loan Guarantees to Israel,” Ha’aretz, January 24, 2012. 206 According to USAID, recipients of ASHA grants on behalf of overseas institutions must be private U.S. 206 According to USAID, recipients of ASHA grants on behalf of overseas institutions must be private U.S.
organizations, headquartered in the United States, and tax-exempt. The U.S. organization organizations, headquartered in the United States, and tax-exempt. The U.S. organization ~~must also~~also must serve as the serve as the
founder and/or sponsor of the overseas institution. Schools must be for secondary or higher education and hospital founder and/or sponsor of the overseas institution. Schools must be for secondary or higher education and hospital
centers must conduct medical education and research outside the United States. Grants are made to U.S. sponsors for centers must conduct medical education and research outside the United States. Grants are made to U.S. sponsors for
the exclusive benefit of institutions abroad. See the exclusive benefit of institutions abroad. See ~~http~~https://www.usaid.gov/://www.usaid.gov/~~our_work/cross-cutting_programs/asha/~~work-usaid/business-funding/grant-programs/american-schools-and-hospitals-abroad. 207 CRS correspondence with USAID ASHA, October 2018. .
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link to page link to page 5047 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel the ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~U.S.-Israeli Scientific & Business Cooperation~~
~~In the early 1970s, Israeli academics and businessmen began looking for ways to expand~~
~~investment in Israel’s nascent technology sector. The sector, which would later become the~~
driving force in the country’s economy, was in need of private capital for research and driving force in the country’s economy, was in need of private capital for research and
developmentdevelopment ~~at the time~~. The United States and Israel launched several programs to stimulate . The United States and Israel launched several programs to stimulate
Israeli industrial and scientific research, and Congress has on several occasions authorized and Israeli industrial and scientific research, and Congress has on several occasions authorized and
appropriated funds for this purpose to the following organizations: appropriated funds for this purpose to the following organizations: ~~207~~208
  The BIRD Foundation (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development
Foundation). Foundation).~~208~~209 BIRD, which was established in 1977, provides matchmaking BIRD, which was established in 1977, provides matchmaking
services between Israeli and American companies in research and development services between Israeli and American companies in research and development
with the goal of expanding cooperation between U.S. and Israeli private high-with the goal of expanding cooperation between U.S. and Israeli private high-
tech industries. The mission of the Foundation is “to stimulate, promote and tech industries. The mission of the Foundation is “to stimulate, promote and
support joint (nondefense) industrial R&D of mutual benefit to…” the two support joint (nondefense) industrial R&D of mutual benefit to…” the two
countries.countries.~~209~~210 Projects are supported in the areas of homeland security, Projects are supported in the areas of homeland security,
communications, electronics, electro-optics, software, life sciences, and communications, electronics, electro-optics, software, life sciences, and
renewable and alternative energy, among others.renewable and alternative energy, among others.~~210~~211 According to the Foundation, According to the Foundation,
$$~~372~~381 million in grants have been awarded to 1, million in grants have been awarded to 1,~~018~~033 projects. Awards typically projects. Awards typically
range from $700,000 to $900,000range from $700,000 to $900,000~~. The award size varies~~ and vary based on total project based on total project
budget and other considerations. The recipients must provide at least 50% of the budget and other considerations. The recipients must provide at least 50% of the
total project budget. total project budget.
  The BSF Foundation (U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation). (U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation).~~211~~212 BSF, BSF,
which was started in 1972, promotes cooperation in scientific and technological which was started in 1972, promotes cooperation in scientific and technological
research. Since 2012, BSF has partnered with the National Science Foundation research. Since 2012, BSF has partnered with the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to jointly fund collaborative U.S.-Israeli scientific research. In August (NSF) to jointly fund collaborative U.S.-Israeli scientific research. In August
2019, Israel’s Council of Research announced that it would provide $56 million 2019, Israel’s Council of Research announced that it would provide $56 million
over a five-year period to expand the BSF-NSF program. over a five-year period to expand the BSF-NSF program.
  The BARD Foundation (Binational Agriculture and Research and Development (Binational Agriculture and Research and Development
Fund). BARD was created in Fund). BARD was created in ~~1978212~~1978213 and supports U.S.-Israeli cooperation in and supports U.S.-Israeli cooperation in
agricultural research.agricultural research.~~213 Since then, it has~~214 As of 2020, it had disbursed $315 million in grants disbursed $315 million in grants

~~207~~208 With the exception of With the exception of ~~recent funding for U.S.-Israeli energy cooperation (~~funding for specific fields of research (for example, see see “U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation”
sectionsection ~~below~~), Congress has not appropriated funding ), Congress has not appropriated funding ~~for binational foundations~~directly to the binational foundations for operational expenses since the since the mid-1980s.The foundations have been~~mid-1980s. At this point,~~
~~the foundations are~~ able to sustain grant making with interest earned from their respective endowments and fees able to sustain grant making with interest earned from their respective endowments and fees
(repayments) collected from companies who successfully profited after receiving research support from the (repayments) collected from companies who successfully profited after receiving research support from the
foundations. Since its founding, BIRD has received $foundations. Since its founding, BIRD has received $~~113~~115 million in fees from million in fees from ~~470~~477 companies. companies.
~~208~~209 See See ~~http~~https://www.birdf.com/://www.birdf.com/~~default.asp~~. Congress helped establish BIRD’s endowment with appropriations of $30 . Congress helped establish BIRD’s endowment with appropriations of $30
million and $15 million in 1977 (P.L. 95-26) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the million and $15 million in 1977 (P.L. 95-26) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the
Israeli government for a total endowment of $90 million. Israeli government for a total endowment of $90 million.
~~209~~210 Eitan Ydilevich, “Building U.S.-Israel Economic Partnerships, The BIRD Model,” Washington, Eitan Ydilevich, “Building U.S.-Israel Economic Partnerships, The BIRD Model,” Washington, DCD.C., June 10, 2010, ., June 10, 2010,
p. 2. p. 2.
~~210~~211 BIRD Foundation, BIRD Foundation, “What is BIRD?What is BIRD?,” available at available at ~~http~~https://www.birdf.com/://www.birdf.com/~~Index.asp?CategoryID=22&ArticleID=79.~~
~~211 See, http~~what-is-bird/. 212 See, https://www.bsf.org.il/://www.bsf.org.il/~~Gateway4/~~. In 1972 and 1984, the United States and Israel contributed a total of $100 . In 1972 and 1984, the United States and Israel contributed a total of $100
million ($50 million each) for BSF’s endowment. The U.S. share ($50 million) first came in 1972 in the form of a $30 million ($50 million each) for BSF’s endowment. The U.S. share ($50 million) first came in 1972 in the form of a $30
million accelerated Israeli repayment of earlier food aid debt to the United States. A second tranche followed in 1984 million accelerated Israeli repayment of earlier food aid debt to the United States. A second tranche followed in 1984
with $20 million congressional appropriation (P.L. 98-473). According to the treaty establishing the Foundation, the with $20 million congressional appropriation (P.L. 98-473). According to the treaty establishing the Foundation, the
Foundation shall use the interest, as well as any funds derived from its activities, for the operations of the Foundation. Foundation shall use the interest, as well as any funds derived from its activities, for the operations of the Foundation.
~~212~~213 Congress originally authorized BARD in Section 1458(e) of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Congress originally authorized BARD in Section 1458(e) of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and
Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. §3291(e)). Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. §3291(e)).
~~213~~214 See http://www.bard-isus.com/. Congress helped establish BARD’s endowment with appropriations of $40 million See http://www.bard-isus.com/. Congress helped establish BARD’s endowment with appropriations of $40 million
and $15 million in 1979 (P.L. 95-481) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the State of Israel for a total endowment of $110 million. Congress had provided funds for BARD in annual Agriculture Appropriations legislation at approximately $500,000 to $1 million a year. For FY2023, Congress appropriated $2 million for BARD to expand programming for food and nutrition, technology acceleration, and artificial intelligence. See, House Report Language (House Report 117-392 accompanying H.R.8239, the Agriculture, Rural Development, Congressional Research Service 42 ~~Congressional Research Service~~

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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

(typically three-year, $310,000 grants) for over 1,330 projects. (typically three-year, $310,000 grants) for over 1,330 projects.~~214~~215 In the 115th In the 115th
Congress, P.L. 115-334 amended the original 1977 authorization of binational Congress, P.L. 115-334 amended the original 1977 authorization of binational
agricultural cooperation by adding that BARD should promote research in “drip agricultural cooperation by adding that BARD should promote research in “drip
irrigation, pesticides, aquaculture, livestock, poultry, disease control, and farm irrigation, pesticides, aquaculture, livestock, poultry, disease control, and farm
equipment.” In 2018, BARD signed a cooperative agreement with equipment.” In 2018, BARD signed a cooperative agreement with ~~The~~the National National
Institute of Food and Agriculture. Congress has encouraged cooperation between Institute of Food and Agriculture. Congress has encouraged cooperation between
those two entities.those two entities.~~215~~216
 In 1995, the United States and Israel established  In 1995, the United States and Israel established the~~The~~ U.S.-Israel Science and
Technology Foundation (USISTF) to fund and administer projects mandated by to fund and administer projects mandated by
the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC),the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC),~~216~~217 a bilateral a bilateral
entity jointly established by the United States Department of Commerce and the entity jointly established by the United States Department of Commerce and the
Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor in 1994 to foster scientific, Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor in 1994 to foster scientific,
technological, and economic cooperation between the two countries. technological, and economic cooperation between the two countries.
Since 2007, Congress has repeatedly authorized and appropriated funds for the creation of new Since 2007, Congress has repeatedly authorized and appropriated funds for the creation of new
U.S.-Israeli cooperative programs in various fields. Most of these new programs fall under the U.S.-Israeli cooperative programs in various fields. Most of these new programs fall under the
administrative purview of the BIRD Foundation. They include the following: administrative purview of the BIRD Foundation. They include the following:
U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation (BIRD Energy)
BIRD Energy is a cooperative program between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli BIRD Energy is a cooperative program between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli
Ministry of Energy designed to further research in renewable energy and energy efficiency. It is Ministry of Energy designed to further research in renewable energy and energy efficiency. It is
nominally part of the BIRD Foundation. Congress authorized the creation of the program in nominally part of the BIRD Foundation. Congress authorized the creation of the program in
Section 917 of P.L. 110-140, the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency Section 917 of P.L. 110-140, the Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency
Act of 2007.Act of 2007.~~217~~218 Although the law did not appropriate any funds for joint research and Although the law did not appropriate any funds for joint research and
development, it did establish a grant program to support research, development, and development, it did establish a grant program to support research, development, and
commercialization of renewable energy or energy efficiency. The law also authorized the commercialization of renewable energy or energy efficiency. The law also authorized the
Secretary of Energy to provide funds for the grant program as needed. Congress authorized the Secretary of Energy to provide funds for the grant program as needed. Congress authorized the
program for seven years from the time of enactment, which was on December 19, 2007. Then, in program for seven years from the time of enactment, which was on December 19, 2007. Then, in
December 2014, December 2014, ~~the President~~President Obama signed into law P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic signed into law P.L. 113-296, the United States-Israel Strategic
Partnership Act of 2014, which reauthorized the U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation program for an Partnership Act of 2014, which reauthorized the U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation program for an
additional 10 years until September 30, 2024. additional 10 years until September 30, 2024.

~~and $15 million in 1979 (P.L. 95-481) and 1985 (P.L. 98-473), respectively. These grants were matched by the State of~~
~~Israel for a total endowment of $110 million. In recent years, Congress has provided funds for BARD in annual~~
~~Agriculture Appropriations legislation at approximately $500,000 a year.~~
~~214~~Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2023). 215 Shoshanna Solomon, “20 Agriculture Projects of US-Israel Fund Added $3 Billion to Economies,” Shoshanna Solomon, “20 Agriculture Projects of US-Israel Fund Added $3 Billion to Economies,” Times of Israel, ,
November 16, 2020. November 16, 2020.
~~215~~216 See, the Explanatory Statement for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related See, the Explanatory Statement for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021, accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021, accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
~~216~~217 See, http://usistf.org/. The U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC) was established in 1993 to facilitate cooperative The U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Commission (USISTC) was established in 1993 to facilitate cooperative
ventures between high tech industries in the two countries. The goal of the program is to “to maximize the contribution ventures between high tech industries in the two countries. The goal of the program is to “to maximize the contribution
of technology to economic growth.” While the collaborative work may be somewhat similar to that supported by the of technology to economic growth.” While the collaborative work may be somewhat similar to that supported by the
BIRD Foundation, “the Science and Technology Commission assists in the commercialization of new technologies BIRD Foundation, “the Science and Technology Commission assists in the commercialization of new technologies
with longer lead times to market. These projects involve higher risk and require substantial capital commitments.” The with longer lead times to market. These projects involve higher risk and require substantial capital commitments.” The
ventures are funded and administered by the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Foundation. The U.S. and Israeli ventures are funded and administered by the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology Foundation. The U.S. and Israeli
governments each committed $15 million to the effort over three years for a total of $30 million. governments each committed $15 million to the effort over three years for a total of $30 million.
~~217~~218 Congress first considered authorizing a program to expand U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation in the field of Congress first considered authorizing a program to expand U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation in the field of
renewable energy in legislation entitled, The United States-Israel Energy Cooperation Act (H.R. 1838—110th renewable energy in legislation entitled, The United States-Israel Energy Cooperation Act (H.R. 1838—110th
Congress). Congress).
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Through Through ~~FY2021~~FY2023, Congress and the Administration have provided a total of , Congress and the Administration have provided a total of $2327.7 million for for
BIRD Energy.BIRD Energy.~~218~~219 As of As of ~~2021~~2023, total combined U.S. and Israeli investment in BIRD Energy for , total combined U.S. and Israeli investment in BIRD Energy for 6054
signed projects stood at $signed projects stood at $~~47.5 million.~~
~~In late 2021, the United States and Israel announced the awards of $5.48 million in BIRD Energy~~
~~grants to six clean energy projects to advance “vehicle technologies, batteries, energy efficiency~~
~~measures, energy storage and the water-energy nexus.”219~~
45.7 million. U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology
(Energy Center)
In 2018, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli Energy Ministry agreed to establish a new In 2018, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Israeli Energy Ministry agreed to establish a new
program known as the U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water program known as the U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water
Technology (“the Energy Center”). To date, Congress has appropriated220 Technology (“the Energy Center”). To date, Congress has appropriated220 $1624 million for the for the
center, and the Israeli government and private sector partners have matched those funds.221 center, and the Israeli government and private sector partners have matched those funds.221
Potential research areas identified by the Energy Center include energy cybersecurity in critical Potential research areas identified by the Energy Center include energy cybersecurity in critical
infrastructure, energy storage, and production and utilization of natural gas. According to the infrastructure, energy storage, and production and utilization of natural gas. According to the
Center, the total expected government funding for the Energy Center is $40 million for 5 years.222 Center, the total expected government funding for the Energy Center is $40 million for 5 years.222
BIRD Homeland Security (BIRD HLS)
The BIRD Foundation also manages the BIRD Homeland Security Program, a cooperative The BIRD Foundation also manages the BIRD Homeland Security Program, a cooperative
undertaking between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Israel Ministry of undertaking between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Israel Ministry of
Public Security (MOPS) to further joint research of advanced technologies for Homeland Public Security (MOPS) to further joint research of advanced technologies for Homeland
Security.223 Currently, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is working together Security.223 Currently, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is working together
with Israeli counterparts to develop technologies for first responders.224 To date, Congress has with Israeli counterparts to develop technologies for first responders.224 To date, Congress has
provided a total of provided a total of $1115 million in funding for BIRD HLS.225 Other examples of bilateral homeland security projects include search and rescue systems, wearable indoor positioning systems, and an artificial intelligence-based analytics video security solution used to protect public facilities. ~~million~~ ~~in funding for BIRD HLS.225~~

~~218~~219 Congress specifies funds for BIRD Energy in conference report language accompanying energy and water Congress specifies funds for BIRD Energy in conference report language accompanying energy and water
appropriations legislation. For appropriations legislation. For ~~FY2021~~FY2023, see Division D of the , see Division D of the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Explanatory Statement accompanying the ~~FY2021~~FY2023
Consolidated Appropriations Act. Consolidated Appropriations Act.
~~219 U.S. Embassy Israel, U.S. Department of Energy and Israeli Partners Invest $5.48 Million In Cooperative Clean~~
~~Energy Projects, December 9, 2021.~~
~~220 For FY2021~~220 For FY2023, see Division D of the Explanatory Statement accompanying the , see Division D of the Explanatory Statement accompanying the ~~FY2021~~FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Consolidated Appropriations
Act. Act.
221 The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the President to promote cooperative programs 221 The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the President to promote cooperative programs
with Israel in the fields of energy, water, agriculture, and alternative fuel technologies. P.L. 114-322, the WIIN Act with Israel in the fields of energy, water, agriculture, and alternative fuel technologies. P.L. 114-322, the WIIN Act
(Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act), called on the White House Office of Science and Technology (Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act), called on the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy to develop a coordinated strategic plan that, among other things, strengthened “research and development Policy to develop a coordinated strategic plan that, among other things, strengthened “research and development
cooperation with international partners, such as the State of Israel, in the area of desalination technology.” cooperation with international partners, such as the State of Israel, in the area of desalination technology.”
222 BIRD Foundation, Annual Report, 2020. 222 BIRD Foundation, Annual Report, 2020.
223 The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting 223 The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting
through the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and with the concurrence of the through the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, to enter into cooperative research pilot programs with Israel to enhance Israel’s capabilities in Secretary of State, to enter into cooperative research pilot programs with Israel to enhance Israel’s capabilities in
border, maritime, and aviation security, explosives detection, and emergency services. In 2016, Congress passed P.L. border, maritime, and aviation security, explosives detection, and emergency services. In 2016, Congress passed P.L.
114-304, the United States-Israel Advanced Research Partnership Act of 2016, a law that permanently authorized the 114-304, the United States-Israel Advanced Research Partnership Act of 2016, a law that permanently authorized the
expansion of BIRD HLS to include cybersecurity technologies. expansion of BIRD HLS to include cybersecurity technologies.
224 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Snapshot: Israel & U.S.: A Unique Partnership in Science, Technology 224 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Snapshot: Israel & U.S.: A Unique Partnership in Science, Technology
and Business,” January 23, 2018. and Business,” January 23, 2018.
225 See Division F of the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the 225 See Division F of the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the ~~FY2021~~FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Report language for Division F, FY2023 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations, states that “Unless otherwise specifically noted in this Joint Explanatory Statement, directives set forth in House Report 117-396 carry the same weight as those included in the JES.” In House Report 117-396, appropriators provided $2 million for the BIRD Homeland Security Program. ~~Consolidated Appropriations Act.~~
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~~Other Congressionally Authorized Cooperative Endeavors~~
~~The following is a list of other congressionally authorized cooperative endeavors between the~~
~~United States and Israel, which could lead to the establishment of grant programs managed by~~
~~both governments.~~
~~ Directed Energy (Lasers) – Section 1280 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA,~~
~~stated that the Defense Department may establish a program to carry out~~
~~“research, development, test, and evaluation activities, on a joint basis with~~
~~Israel, to promote directed energy capabilities of mutual benefit to both the~~
~~United States and Israel...”~~BIRD Cyber Israel is one of the global leaders in cybersecurity technology. According to one report, nearly 40% of private global investment in cybersecurity now takes place in Israel.226 Section 1551 of P.L.117-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, required the Department of Homeland Security to establish a grant program to support U.S.-Israeli cooperation in cybersecurity research and commercialization of cybersecurity technology. The act authorized not less than $6 million a year for such activities from FY2022 through FY2026. The BIRD Cyber program is a collaboration between the foundation, DHS, Israel’s National Cyber Directorate, and private industry and academia. BIRD Cyber has identified various sectors of concentration, such as, among other things, secure architecture for protecting operational processes; and risk assessment solutions for airports.227 In FY2023, Congress appropriated $6 million for BIRD Cyber.228 Other Congressionally Authorized Cooperative Endeavors The following is a list of other congressionally authorized cooperative endeavors between the United States and Israel, which could lead to the establishment of grant programs managed by both governments.
  Health/COVID-19 Cooperation – Section 1280A of P.L.116-283, the 2021 – Section 1280A of P.L.116-283, the 2021
NDAA, authorized $4 million a year (FY2021-FY2023) for bilateral cooperation NDAA, authorized $4 million a year (FY2021-FY2023) for bilateral cooperation
between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the
Government of Israel to focus on health technologies to address the challenge of Government of Israel to focus on health technologies to address the challenge of
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. U.S.-Israeli health the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. U.S.-Israeli health
cooperation is longstanding. Since 1978, medical and health researchers from the cooperation is longstanding. Since 1978, medical and health researchers from the
U.S. Army and Israel Defense Forces have held the biennial Shoresh conference U.S. Army and Israel Defense Forces have held the biennial Shoresh conference
to share information on military operational medicine, infectious disease, and to share information on military operational medicine, infectious disease, and
combat care.combat care.~~226 In the Joint Explanatory Statement for the Departments of Labor,~~
~~Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies accompanying~~
~~the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $2 million~~
~~in FY2021 funding for “for the development of health technologies, including but~~
~~not limited to the following: artificial intelligence, biofeedback, sensors,~~
~~monitoring devices, and kidney care.”227~~
~~ Cybersecurity – Section 1551 of P.L.117-81, the National Defense Authorization~~
~~Act for Fiscal Year 2022, required the Department of Homeland Security to~~
~~establish a grant program to support U.S.-Israeli cooperation in cybersecurity~~
~~research and commercialization of cybersecurity technology. The act authorized~~
~~not less than $6 million a year for such activities from FY2022 through FY2026.~~
 Regional Cooperation ~~- Section 1279~~229 To date, Congress has appropriated $9.08 million for this cooperative health program.230  U.S.-Israel Cooperation in International Development - In 1985, Congress first authorized (by amending Section 106 of the FAA) and appropriated foreign assistance funds to “finance cooperative projects among the United States, Israel, and developing countries.”231 Based on this congressional mandate, USAID launched two programs in partnership with Israel: the Cooperative Development Program (CDP - training and technical assistance projects run by Israel in the developing world) and the Cooperative Development Research Program (CDR - scientific research on problems of developing countries). 232 For nearly two 226 op.cit., Bloomberg, July 12, 2022. 227 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “US- Israel joint cybersecurity investment announced,” Jerusalem Post, July 4, 2022. 228 See Division F of the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 229 U.S. Army, U.S. and Israeli Collaboration at 20th Shoresh Meeting Promotes Advancement of CBRN Medical Countermeasure Development, December 8, 2022. 230 See Division H of the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 231 See Section 307 of P.L. 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 and P.L. 98-473, the FY1985 Continuing Appropriations Act. This original legislative concept for U.S.-Israeli cooperation in international development came from the 98th Congress and was based on H.R.5424, “A bill to provide for joint United States-Israeli development assistance projects.” 232 USAID partnered with Mashav, Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation in the Ministry of Congressional Research Service 45 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel decades, Israel used cash aid grants (either from the ESF or DA accounts) to train their development personnel in Israel and in foreign nations. USAID phased out the CDP program after FY2003.233 Section 1278 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, further amended Section 106 of the FAA of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2151d) to authorize $2 million a year (FY2021-FY2023) to finance cooperative projects among “the United States, Israel, and developing countries that identify and support local solutions to address sustainability challenges relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage.” To date, Congress has appropriated $4 million for this program.234 Foreign Affairs. 233 See Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, Related Programs, House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program, FY2004. 234 Report language for Division K of the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act states that “In implementing this agreement, Federal departments, agencies, commissions, and other entities are directed to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions contained in the H. Rept. 117-401 (House report) accompanying H.R. 8282 (House bill) as though stated in this explanatory statement, unless specifically directed to the contrary.” In House Report 117-401, appropriators provided $2 million for the U.S. Agency for International Development-Israel international development cooperation program to respond to challenges relating to water scarcity, agriculture, and energy storage. Congressional Research Service 46 link to page 51 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Appendix A. Bilateral Aid to Israel Table A-1 shows cumulative U.S. aid to Israel for FY1946 through FY2020 in current dollars. Table A-1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel current U.S. dollars in millions (current non-inflation-adjusted) Fiscal Year Economic Military Total 1946-2016 34,267.2 91,628.1 125,895.3 2017 50.1 3,178.0 3,228.1 2018 10.8 3,100.1 3,110.9 2019 8.5 3,300.0 3,308.5 2020 10.9 3,300.0 3,310.9 Total 34,347.5 104,506.2 138,853.7 Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2020. Congressional Research Service 47 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Appendix B. Israel and FY2023 Legislation The following tables (Table 1 and Table 2) delineate all U.S. foreign aid authorized and appropriated by Congress for Israel for fiscal year (FY) 2023. They include U.S. foreign military aid and funding for joint missile defense pledged to Israel as part of the ongoing 10-year, $38 billion Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, successive administrations have requested from Congress $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) per year for Israel and $500 million in joint missile defense programs ($3.8 billion total). MOU-related authorizations (missile defense only235) and appropriations totaling $3.8 billion are in italics within each cell. Items relating to U.S. funding for joint defense and nondefense cooperative programs, but that fall outside the MOU, are not in italics. Overall, Congress specifically authorized $520 million for joint U.S.-Israel defense programs in the FY2023 NDAA. Per the terms of the MOU, Congress appropriated $3.8 billion for Israel in the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, and added $98.58 million in funding for other cooperative defense and nondefense programs. Table B-1. Authorized Aid for Israel in P.L. 117-263, the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 Authorization Section Title Description Amount Section 1277 - Modifies the authorization for the U.S.-Israeli Counter n/a Modification and Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) program to include extension of United “directed energy capabilities.” Raises the cap on annual U.S. States-Israel cooperation contributions to the program from $25 to $40 mil ion. to counter unmanned Extends the program’s authorization through calendar year aerial systems 2026. Section 1659 - Iron Dome Authorizes “not more than” $80 million for Israel to procure $80 million short-range rocket defense components for the Iron Dome Short-Range Rocket Defense system and Israeli System through co-production in the United States. Prior to the cooperative missile defense initial obligation of funds, the Under Secretary of Defense for program co-development Acquisition and Sustainment must make various certifications that, and co-production among other things, the United States and Israel are adhering to bilateral agreements on Iron Dome. Authorizes “not more than” $40 million for Israel to procure $40 million components for the David’s Sling Weapon System through co-production in the United States. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment must certify that Israel has demonstrated successful completion of various knowledge points in its co-production agreement with the United States. Authorizes “not more than” $80 million for Israel to procure $80 million components for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program through co-production in the United States. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment must certify that, among other things, Israel has demonstrated successful completion of various knowledge points in its co-production agreement with the United States. 235 Congress authorized FY2023 FMF for Israel in P.L.116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Congressional Research Service 48 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Authorization Section Title Description Amount Section 4201 - Research, Authorizes funds from the Combating Terrorism Technology $20 mil ion Development, Test, and Support account for U.S.-Israeli C-UAS cooperation, Evaluation specifically for Joint Laser development ($15 mil ion). The authorization also includes cooperation on developing Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) loitering munitions ($5 mil ion). Authorizes $300 of the remaining $500 million in MOU-pledged $300 million joint missile defense programs for U.S.-Israeli cooperation. Section 5599D - Sense Among other things, states that “It is essential to the strategic n/a Of Congress Regarding interest of the United States to continue to offer security Israel assistance and related support to Israel; and such assistance and support is especial y vital as Israel confronts a number of potential challenges at the present time, including continuing threats from Iran.” Source: Congress.gov. Note: Italics indicates amounts in line with the US-Israel MOU on assistance. Table B-2. Appropriated Aid to Israel in P.L. 117-328, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 Bill Text, House Report Language, or Joint Explanatory Appropriations Statement (JES) Section Title Description Amount Bill Text Division C - Department of Provides $500 million for $500 million Defense Appropriations Act, U.S.-Israeli cooperative 2023, Section 8073 missile defense programs, including: $80 million for the Iron Dome, $167 million for David’s Sling, $80 million for Arrow III, and $173 million for the Arrow System Improvement Program. Bil Text Division K - Department Provides $5 mil ion in $5 mil ion of State, Foreign grants from the State Operations, and Related Department's Migration Programs Appropriations and Refugee Assistance Act, 2023, Migration and account (MRA) to assist Refugee Assistance in the resettlement of migrants to Israel. Bil Text Division K - Department Extends the authorization n/a of State, Foreign of loan guarantees to Operations, and Related Israel through FY2028. Programs Appropriations Act, 2023, Special Provisions, Section 7034 (k)(6) Bill Text Division K - Department of Provides “not less than” $3.3 billion State, Foreign Operations, $3.3 billion in FMF grants and Related Programs for Israel. These funds must Appropriations Act, 2023, be disbursed within 30 days after the bill’s enactment. Congressional Research Service 49 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Bill Text, House Report Language, or Joint Explanatory Appropriations Statement (JES) Section Title Description Amount Middle East and North Of the $3.3 billion, $775.3 Africa, Section 7041(d) million is for use in Israel, also known as off-shore procurement (OSP). JES Division C - Department Provides $72.5 mil ion for $72.5 mil ion of Defense multiple U.S.-Israeli Appropriations Act, 2023, cooperative defense Research, Development, programs, including anti- Test and Evaluation, tunneling ($47.5 mil ion) Defense-Wide and C-UAS ($25 mil ion). House Report Language Committee Provisions Report language for $2 mil ion (House Report 117-392 Division A, FY2023 accompanying H.R.8239, Agricultural the Agriculture, Rural Appropriations, states Development, Food and that “Unless otherwise Drug Administration, and noted, the language set Related Agencies forth in House Report Appropriations Bil , 2023) 117-392 carries the same weight as language included in this joint explanatory statement and should be complied with unless specifically addressed to the contrary in this joint explanatory statement.” In House Report 117-392, appropriators provided a $1 mil ion increase to the U.S.-Israeli Binational Agricultural Research and Development (BARD) Foundation to support BARD’s “historical grant-making functions and expand programming for food and nutrition, technology acceleration, and artificial intelligence.” This increase raised the annual U.S. contribution to BARD to $2 mil ion. JES Division D - Energy and Provides $2 mil ion for $6 mil ion Water Development and the Israel Binational Related Agencies Industrial Research and Appropriations Act, 2023 Development (BIRD) Foundation and $4 mil ion to continue the U.S. Israel Center of Excellence in Energy Engineering and Water Technology. Congressional Research Service 50 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Bill Text, House Report Language, or Joint Explanatory Appropriations Statement (JES) Section Title Description Amount JES Division F - Department Provides $6 mil ion for $6 mil ion of Homeland Security U.S.-Israel Cybersecurity Appropriations Act, 2023 Cooperation grant program. JES Division H - Departments Provides $3.08 mil ion for $3.08 mil ion of Labor, Health and a bilateral cooperative Human Services, and program with Israel for Education, and Related the development of health Agencies Appropriations technologies (to fight Act, 2023 COVID-19). House Report Language Middle East and North Report language for $2 mil ion (House Report 117-401 Africa Division K, FY2023 accompanying H.R.8282, Department of State, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Related Programs Appropriations, states Appropriations Bil , 2023) that “In implementing this agreement, Federal departments, agencies, commissions, and other entities are directed to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions contained in the H. Rept. 117-401 (House report) accompanying H.R. 8282 (House bil ) as though stated in this explanatory statement, unless specifically directed to the contrary.” In House Report 117-401, appropriators provided $2 mil ion for the U.S. Agency for International Development-Israel international development cooperation program to respond to challenges relating to water scarcity, agriculture, and energy storage. House Report Language Research, Development, Report language for $2 mil ion (House Report 117-396, and Innovation Division F, FY2023 accompanying H.R.8257, Department of Homeland the Department of Security Appropriations, Homeland Security states that “Unless Appropriations Bil , 2023) otherwise specifically noted in this JES [Joint Explanatory Statement], Congressional Research Service 51 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Bill Text, House Report Language, or Joint Explanatory Appropriations Statement (JES) Section Title Description Amount directives set forth in House Report 117-396 carry the same weight as those included in the JES.” In House Report 117-396, appropriators provided $2 mil ion for the BIRD Homeland Security (BIRD HLS) Program. Sources: Congress.gov, Senate Appropriations Committee. Note: Italics indicates amounts in line with the US-Israel MOU on assistance. Congressional Research Service 52 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Appendix C~~NDAA,~~
~~authorized the State Department and USAID to establish a “program between the~~
~~United States and appropriate regional partners to provide for cooperation in the~~
~~Middle East region by supporting projects related to innovation and advanced~~
~~technologies.”~~
~~U.S.-Israel Cooperation in International Development~~
~~In 1985, Congress first authorized (by amending Section 106 of the FAA) and appropriated~~
~~foreign assistance funds to “finance cooperative projects among the United States, Israel, and~~
~~developing countries.”228 Based on this congressional mandate, USAID launched two programs in~~

~~226 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), USAMRMC Hosts Israeli Defense Force~~
~~at 18th Shoresh Conference, July 8, 2019.~~
~~227 See Division H, Joint Explanatory Statement for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and~~
~~Education, and Related Agencies, accompanying the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act.~~
~~228 See Section 307 of P.L. 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 and P.L. 98-~~
~~473, the FY1985 Continuing Appropriations Act. This original legislative concept for U.S.-Israeli cooperation in~~
~~international development came from the 98th Congress and was based on H.R.5424, “A bill to provide for joint United~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

48

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~partnership with Israel: the Cooperative Development Program (CDP - training and technical~~
~~assistance projects run by Israel in the developing world) and the Cooperative Development~~
~~Research Program (CDR - scientific research on problems of developing countries). 229 For nearly~~
~~two decades, Israel used cash aid grants (either from the ESF or DA accounts) to train their~~
~~development personnel in Israel and in foreign nations. USAID phased out the CDP program after~~
~~FY2003.230~~
~~Section 1278 of P.L.116-283, the 2021 NDAA, further amended Section 106 of the FAA of 1961~~
~~(22 U.S.C. §2151d) to authorize $2 million a year (FY2021-FY2023) in order to finance~~
~~cooperative projects among “the United States, Israel, and developing countries that identify and~~
~~support local solutions to address sustainability challenges relating to water resources,~~
~~agriculture, and energy storage.” In FY2021, the explanatory statement accompanying the~~
~~Consolidated Appropriations Act included $2 million in ESF for “USAID-Israel International~~
~~Development Cooperation.”~~

~~States-Israeli development assistance projects.”~~
~~229 USAID partnered with Mashav, Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation in the Ministry of~~
~~Foreign Affairs.~~
~~230 See Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, Related Programs, House Committee on~~
~~Appropriations, Hearings on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program, FY2004.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

49

~~link to page 54~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Appendix. Bilateral Aid to Israel~~
~~Table A-1~~ ~~shows cumulative U.S. aid to Israel for FY1946 through FY2019 in current dollars.~~
~~Table A-1. U.S. Bilateral Aid to Israel~~
~~millions of U.S. dollars (current non-inflation-adjusted)~~
~~Fiscal Year~~
~~Economic~~
~~Military~~
~~Total~~
~~1946-2015~~
~~34,251.9~~
~~88,526.7~~
~~122,778.6~~
~~2016~~
~~15.3~~
~~3,101.5~~
~~3,116.8~~
~~2017~~
~~50.1~~
~~3,178.0~~
~~3,228.1~~
~~2018~~
~~10.8~~
~~3,100.1~~
~~3,110.8~~
~~2019~~
~~8.5~~
~~3,300.0~~
~~3,308.5~~
~~Total~~
~~34,336.6~~
~~101,206.3~~
~~135,542.8~~
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), ~~U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and~~
~~Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2019.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

50

~~U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel~~

~~Appendix A~~. Common Acronyms and Abbreviations
used in this Report

AECA AECA
Arms Export Control Act Arms Export Control Act
DOD DOD
Department of Defense Department of Defense
DSCA DSCA
Defense Security Cooperation Agency Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ESF ESF
Economic Support Fund Economic Support Fund
FAA FAA
Foreign Assistance Act Foreign Assistance Act
FMF FMF
Foreign Military Financing Foreign Military Financing
FMS FMS
Foreign Military Sale Foreign Military Sale
HFAC HFAC
House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee
IDF IDF
Israel Defense Forces Israel Defense Forces
LOA LOA
Letter of Offer and Acceptance Letter of Offer and Acceptance
MOU MOU
Memorandum of Understanding Memorandum of Understanding
MRA MRA
Migration and Refugee Assistance Migration and Refugee Assistance
NDAA NDAA
National Defense Authorization Act National Defense Authorization Act
OSP OSP
Off-Shore Procurement Off-Shore Procurement
QME QME
Qualitative Military Edge Qualitative Military Edge
SFOPS SFOPS
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
SFRC SFRC
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senate Foreign Relations Committee
UAE UAE
United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates
USAID USAID
U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Agency for International Development
WRSA WRSA
War Reserves Stock Allies War Reserves Stock Allies

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

5153

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

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