Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Changes from February 17, 2022 to June 22, 2022

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:
~~February 17~~June 22, 2022 , 2022
In Brief
Clayton Thomas
Even by the standards of Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, 2021 marked a major watershed for Even by the standards of Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, 2021 marked a major watershed for
Analyst in Middle Eastern Analyst in Middle Eastern
the country. In 2021, U.S. and international forces departed after nearly two decades of the country. In 2021, U.S. and international forces departed after nearly two decades of
Affairs Affairs
operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed Afghan government and its military forces operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed Afghan government and its military forces

collapsed; and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from collapsed; and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from
1996 to 2001, retook power. The aftershocks of these events continue to reverberate within 1996 to 2001, retook power. The aftershocks of these events continue to reverberate within

Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States as Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States as ~~publics and~~ Afghans and U.S. policymakers alike policymakers alike
grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule. grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.
The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored
and supported it. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including about 2,400 and supported it. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including about 2,400
fatalities) in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the robust and growing Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated fatalities) in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the robust and growing Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated
~~approximately $144~~over $140 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. billion for reconstruction and security forces there. ~~At the same time~~During this same period, an elected Afghan government , an elected Afghan government
replaced the Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made replaced the Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made ~~limited~~modest but uneven improvements in most measures of improvements in most measures of
human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries. human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.
After over a year of negotiations initiated After over a year of negotiations initiated ~~by the Trump Administration in 2018, U.S.~~in 2018, Trump Administration officials signed a February 2020 officials signed a February 2020
agreement with the Taliban in which the United States committed to the withdrawal of all international military forces and agreement with the Taliban in which the United States committed to the withdrawal of all international military forces and
contractors by May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to take unspecified action to prevent other groups contractors by May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to take unspecified action to prevent other groups
(including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, U.S. (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, U.S.
officials contended that the Taliban were not fulfilling their commitments, given increased violence between the Taliban and officials contended that the Taliban were not fulfilling their commitments, given increased violence between the Taliban and
Afghan government and continuing Taliban links with Al Qaeda, even as the Trump Administration drew down U.S. forces, Afghan government and continuing Taliban links with Al Qaeda, even as the Trump Administration drew down U.S. forces,
which reached a low of 2,500 in January 2021. Afghan officials sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. military which reached a low of 2,500 in January 2021. Afghan officials sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. military
withdrawal on their own forces’ capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicated that the withdrawal could lead to withdrawal on their own forces’ capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicated that the withdrawal could lead to
gains by the Taliban, who already controlled or contested half of the country by 2020. gains by the Taliban, who already controlled or contested half of the country by 2020.
In 2021, President Joseph Biden announced that the United States would withdraw its troops, though several months later In 2021, President Joseph Biden announced that the United States would withdraw its troops, though several months later
than the date to which it agreed in the U.S.-Taliban accord. On August 15, 2021, two weeks before that withdrawal was to than the date to which it agreed in the U.S.-Taliban accord. On August 15, 2021, two weeks before that withdrawal was to
conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that shocked many in the United conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that shocked many in the United
States and Afghanistan. In the last two weeks of August, U.S. military forces oversaw the evacuation of over 120,000 States and Afghanistan. In the last two weeks of August, U.S. military forces oversaw the evacuation of over 120,000
individuals, including U.S. and international diplomatic personnel and Afghan partners, from Kabul’s international airport, individuals, including U.S. and international diplomatic personnel and Afghan partners, from Kabul’s international airport,
before departing on August 30, 2021. No U.S. military or diplomatic personnel are in Afghanistan as of before departing on August 30, 2021. No U.S. military or diplomatic personnel are in Afghanistan as of ~~February~~June 2022. 2022.
The Taliban announced the formation of a new government dominated by Taliban loyalists on September 7, 2021. The The Taliban announced the formation of a new government dominated by Taliban loyalists on September 7, 2021. The
composition of that government and the Taliban’s suppression of peaceful protests against its rule indicate the group has composition of that government and the Taliban’s suppression of peaceful protests against its rule indicate the group has
prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures that might prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures that might ~~be welcomed~~
have been welcomed by the United States and other countries. by the United States and other countries. ~~Other than a regional Islamic State affiliate, no armed opposition to the Taliban~~
~~appears to exist as of February 2022, although some anti-Taliban Afghan leaders have sought U.S. support. The Taliban’s~~
~~renewed rule has~~Some anti-Taliban Afghan leaders have sought U.S. support and have claimed guerilla-style attacks against Taliban forces. However, the regional Islamic State affiliate may pose a more potent threat to the Taliban. U.S. policymakers have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule, including the status of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and U.S. efforts to counter these groups “over the horizon.” Taliban actions have been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a ~~longstanding~~longtime U.S. policy U.S. policy ~~interest~~concern, with girls prohibited from attending school above the secondary level and women’s roles curtailed. The . The
status of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to status of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to
leave the country, also remain closely scrutinizedleave the country, also remain closely scrutinized by U.S. policymakers. .
Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result
of challenges both of challenges both ~~old~~pre-existing (such as droughts, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and Afghanistan’s weak (such as droughts, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and Afghanistan’s weak
economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the
U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). The Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate these crises, U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). The Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate these crises,
but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies
in tandem may prove complicated. in tandem may prove complicated.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

Introduction
The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in
Afghanistan and the United States alike. This report provides background information and Afghanistan and the United States alike. This report provides background information and
analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including
 the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human  the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country; rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
 regional dynamics; and  regional dynamics; and
 the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.  the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has
influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central
bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the
Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule. Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.
Background: Taliban Takeover
At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner, the At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner, the
result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment
of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance. of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance.
President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. ~~forces~~troops, the lowest U.S. force level , the lowest U.S. force level
since 2001, in advance of the full since 2001, in advance of the full ~~troop~~military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the
February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 Still, U.S. officials committed to continue to provide February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 Still, U.S. officials committed to continue to provide
~~critical~~ financial support to Afghan forces and expressed financial support to Afghan forces and expressed ~~optimism~~confidence about their capabilities vis-a- about their capabilities vis-a-
vis the Taliban, emphasizing the Taliban’s failure to capture any of Afghanistan’s provincial vis the Taliban, emphasizing the Taliban’s failure to capture any of Afghanistan’s provincial
capitals. capitals.
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained
territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade
insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep
internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed
certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and
financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.2 financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.2
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart
Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide
swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it
already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising:
some northern areas had some northern areas had ~~militarily~~successfully resisted the Taliban resisted the Taliban militarily when the group was in power when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source ~~in the 1990s,~~

1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29,
2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” ~~guarantees~~“guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, : the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021,
and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the
United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement. 02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
2 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” 2 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, January , January
2021. 2021.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

~~making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source~~ estimated that the estimated that the
Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.3 The speed Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.3 The speed
of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with one commander of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with one commander
saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the
scheduled departure of U.S. forces.4 scheduled departure of U.S. forces.4
The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced
stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were
taken with minimal fighting.5 In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender taken with minimal fighting.5 In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender
or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through
the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.6the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.6
The Taliban captured their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the The Taliban captured their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the
Afghan government and its security forces accelerated. Within a week, the Taliban were nearing Afghan government and its security forces accelerated. Within a week, the Taliban were nearing
Kabul, which they entered on August 15, 2021. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-Kabul, which they entered on August 15, 2021. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-
year tenure was characterized by electoral year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, ~~crises, factional infighting,~~ pervasive corruption, and pervasive corruption, and
the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country that same day and remains, as of the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country that same day and remains, as of
~~February~~June 2022, in the United Arab Emirates. 2022, in the United Arab Emirates.
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The
Taliban refer to their Taliban refer to their ~~new~~ government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom members of this government might be Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom members of this government might be
replaced going forward and why, or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from replaced going forward and why, or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from
permanent positions.7 permanent positions.7 ~~One Taliban spokesman reportedly said in September 2021 that the group~~
~~intends to temporarily “implement” the 1964 constitution of the former Afghan monarchy~~
~~“without any content that contradicts Islamic law and the principles of the Islamic Emirate,” with~~
~~another speculating that the group might draft a new constitution in 2022.~~The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (sharia) but have not established “a clear and cohesive legal framework, judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms.”8 8
Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone
strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances
and only one verified photograph and only one verified photograph of him reportedly exists.9 Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as reportedly exists.9 Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as
~~governor of Kandahar and~~ foreign minister in the 1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime foreign minister in the 1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime
Minister. One analyst has described Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure Minister. One analyst has described Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure
who more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban prefer to their rivals.10 Abdul Ghani Baradar,
3 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second 3 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second
Resistance,’” Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021. , July 2, 2021.
4 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing 4 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing
in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021. in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
5 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” 5 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021. , August 1, 2021.
6 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” 6 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15, , August 15,
2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” 2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times, ,
August 18, 2021. August 18, 2021.
7 One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the 7 One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the
Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021. Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
8 8 ~~S. K. Khan, “Taliban to implement monarch-era Constitution in Afghanistan,” Anadolu Ajansi, September 28, 2021;~~
“Taliban plans to form ‘commission’ in 2022 to draft new constitution,” ANI~~, September 23, 2021~~U.S. Department of State, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan, June 2, 2022. .
9 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Mysterious Public Appearances of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader,” 9 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Mysterious Public Appearances of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader,” Newlines, December , December
20, 2021; “Haibatullah Akhundzada: Shadowy Taliban supreme leader whose son was suicide bomber,” 20, 2021; “Haibatullah Akhundzada: Shadowy Taliban supreme leader whose son was suicide bomber,” Reuters, ,
September 7, 2021. September 7, 2021.
10 Martine van Bijlert, “The Focus of the Taleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

~~whose selection forestalls competition among more powerful figures and factions within the~~
~~Taliban.10 Abdul Ghani Baradar,~~ who led Taliban negotiations with the United States from 2018 to who led Taliban negotiations with the United States from 2018 to
2021, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister. 2021, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister.
~~The composition of the Taliban government is overwhelmingly homogeneous.~~ Nearly all Nearly all
members of the members of the ~~“caretaker cabinet”~~government are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists. All are are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists. All are
male, male, ~~and~~ the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which
represents a plurality represents a plurality ~~though not a majority~~ of the population), and most are from southern of the population), and most are from southern
Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N.
sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of
State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of
Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
~~Organization (FTO). Some argue the role of Haqqani Network-associated figures in the Taliban~~
~~caretaker government is a reflection of their outsized military import and could make U.S.~~
~~cooperation with the Taliban more difficult.11~~
~~Some~~Organization (FTO). In the initial days of the transition, some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government
officials (such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held some meetings with senior Taliban officials (such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held some meetings with senior Taliban
figures after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from outside the movement as part of their figures after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from outside the movement as part of their
promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The Taliban have not, however, reached beyond promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The Taliban have not, however, reached beyond
their own ranks to fill senior positionstheir own ranks to fill senior positions~~.12 The Taliban~~ and are reportedly staffing government positions are reportedly staffing government positions
with military and/or religious figures with little relevant with military and/or religious figures with little relevant experience, exacerbating the group’s administrative challenges and some internal tensions.11 Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes, governing Afghanistan in 2022 presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based decision-making. Points of tension reportedly exist between members of the group’s political wing (such as Baradar) and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the most credit for the group’s victory;12 between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;13 and between those with different ideological perspectives and ethnic identities.14~~experience, including some long resident~~
~~in neighboring Pakistan, exacerbating the group’s administrative challenges.13~~
~~In the immediate wake of the Taliban’s takeover, some reports indicated dissension in the Taliban~~
~~ranks, largely between the group’s political wing (which reportedly advocates for greater~~
~~inclusion of diverse elements from within Afghan society, with an eye toward international~~
~~recognition, e.g., Baradar) and its military wing (which opposes such compromises, e.g., the~~
~~Haqqanis).14 Other analysts emphasize the Taliban’s history of effectively managing internal~~
~~disputes.15 Even if the Taliban succeed in limiting factional infighting, their exclusive approach to~~
~~governing may carry its own risks of inspiring opposition or insurgency against its rule. Central~~
~~governance has often proved challenging throughout Afghan history, though the Taliban’s current~~
~~position appears relatively secure.~~
Current and Potential Opposition
While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts,
~~does~~ did not reflect massive popular support for the movement but rather a lack of support for the not reflect massive popular support for the movement but rather a lack of support for the
former government.former government.1615 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to

~~10 Martine van Bijlert, “The Focus of the Taleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,”~~
~~Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.~~
~~11 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times,~~
~~September 10, 2021.~~
~~12 “Who Will Run the Taliban Government?” op. cit.~~
~~13 Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, January 13, 2022.~~
14view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility despite ascribing a lack of violence unseen in decades to the group’s takeover.16 Both armed opponents and sporadic peaceful protests against the Taliban’s rule point to a potential for future unrest as well as future repression. 11 Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,” New York Times, January 13, 2022; Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2611 (2021) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2022/419, May 26, 2022. 12 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: Taliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: Taliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September , September
15, 2021; 15, 2021; ~~Ali Latifi, “How deep are divisions among the Taliban?” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2021.~~
~~15 Andrew Watkins, “An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months,” CTC Sentinel, November 2021.~~
16“Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” ANI, February 15, 2022. 13 Stephanie Glinski, “Taliban struggle to maintain unity six months into their reign,” Foreign Policy, February 28, 2022. 14 Sudarsan Raghavan, “A popular Uzbek commander fought for the Taliban for more than two decades. He was arrested anyway,” Washington Post, February 1, 2022. 15 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid, “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility.17 Sporadic protests against the group’s rule,~~
~~and the Taliban’s uncompromising response to them, point to a potential for future unrest as well~~
~~as future repression.~~
~~One initial effort to form an armed resistance to the Taliban was short-lived and evidently~~
~~collapsed in September 2021. That brief armed resistance attempted to form a base~~“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021. 16 Loveday Morris and Ruby Mellen, “Portraits of fear and loss,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022; “Afghans say Congressional Research Service 3 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief The most coherent effort to oppose the Taliban militarily is the National Resistance Front (NRF), formed by figures aligned with the former Afghan state after the Taliban takeover. An attempt by the NRF to resist the Taliban in the central in the central
province of Panjshir, which was never conquered by province of Panjshir, which was never conquered by the Taliban during their prior rule, collapsed in September 2021 but the group has claimed responsibility for a rising number of guerilla-style attacks on Taliban forces, mostly in and around Panjshir.17 NRF leaders have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, D.C.-based representation.18 They have not won public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran. The Taliban dismiss NRF claims as “propaganda,” but continued NRF attacks undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and could galvanize further opposition to the group.19 An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global caliphate. Since the Taliban takeover, ISKP’s ranks have swelled to as many as 4,000 fighters despite a concerted Taliban offensive, and a series of major attacks claimed by or attributed to ISKP in spring 2022 (many targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the Hazaras) raises the prospect of greater violence.20~~the Taliban during their prior rule, but~~
~~Taliban forces quickly quelled the resistance. The Taliban appear to effectively control the entire~~
~~country, unlike in the 1990s when Taliban foes (the former Northern Alliance) represented~~
~~significant armed opposition and held roughly 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also~~
~~have stronger ties with regional powers, including some that once supported the Northern~~
~~Alliance against the Taliban, such as Russia and Iran. Still, if they were to emerge, the existence~~
~~of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a rallying point or galvanize~~
~~Taliban opponents in the country, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or other~~
~~international assistance. It is not clear how likely this prospect is. Formerly Panjshir-based~~
~~opposition leaders (including Ahmad Massoud, son of famed Northern Alliance leader Ahmad~~
~~Shah Massoud) formed the National Resistance Front (NRF) in the aftermath of the Taliban’s~~
~~takeover; the location of its leaders, who have retained Washington, D.C.-based representation, is~~
~~unclear.18 In a January 2022 visit to Tehran, Taliban leaders reportedly met with an NRF~~
~~delegation including Massoud.19~~
~~An armed threat to the Taliban does exist in the form of the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic~~
~~State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. The group~~
~~has escalated its attacks against both Afghan civilians and Taliban forces, challenging the~~
~~Taliban’s legitimacy.~~ Experts disagree about the potency of the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self- Experts disagree about the potency of the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self-
asserted ability to counter the group without external assistance.asserted ability to counter the group without external assistance.2021 Some Afghans, including Some Afghans, including
former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), have reportedly former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), have reportedly
taken up arms with ISKP, purportedly attractedtaken up arms with ISKP, purportedly attracted in part by ISKP cash payments.22 Beyond armed resistance, some Afghans have ~~by ISKP cash payments and by the group’s status~~
~~as the sole active armed opposition to the Taliban.21~~
~~In the weeks after the takeover, some Afghans~~ demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their
rights and express opposition to the Taliban. rights and express opposition to the Taliban. ~~Protests by hundreds of women in Kabul in~~
~~September gained international attention, and some Afghans demonstrated in Jalalabad,~~
~~Kandahar, and other cities as well to protest Taliban actions.22 The Taliban monitored most~~
~~protests, and violently dispersed some. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on~~
~~September 8, 2021, banning unapproved demonstrations though some sporadic, small-scale~~

~~“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.~~
~~17 Loveday Morris and Ruby Mellen, “Portraits of fear and loss,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022.~~
~~18 Trevor Filseth, “After Renegade Province’s Fall, Panjshir Resistance Leaders Surface in Tajikistan,”~~ ~~National~~
~~Interest, September 23, 2021; Lachlan Markey, “Taliban resistance ramps up U.S. lobbying efforts,” Axios, October 27,~~
~~2021.~~
~~19 “Shirshah Rasooli, “Resistance Front Proposed Transitional Govt to Islamic Emirate,” TOLOnews, January 11, 2022.~~
~~20 Samya Kullab, “Islamic State attacks test Taliban’s control in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13,~~
~~2021; Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “The Taliban can’t take on the Islamic State alone,” War on the Rocks,~~
~~October 14, 2021.~~
21The Taliban appear to have monitored most protests, and violently dispersed some. The Interior Ministry issued a September 2021 decree banning unapproved demonstrations, and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on September 13, 2021, that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against protesters and journalists.”23 Some sporadic, small-scale protests have nevertheless continued.24 U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may create opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in they feel safer but less hopeful under Taliban rule,” Associated Press, February 15, 2022. 17 Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022. 18 Ahmad Massoud, “The mujahideen resistance to the Taliban begins now. But we need help,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Lachlan Markey, “Taliban resistance ramps up U.S. lobbying efforts,” Axios, October 27, 2021; 19 Zia Ur Rehman, op. cit. 20 Susannah George, “Taliban sends hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan to wage war against Islamic State,” Washington Post, November 22, 2021. 21 Abdul Sayed, “Why Islamic State Khurasan poses an indigenous threat to the Afghan Taliban,” Nexus, May 9, 2022. 22 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers Turn to Islamic Yaroslav Trofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers Turn to Islamic
State,” State,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2021. , October 31, 2021.
~~22 Susannah George and Ezzatullah Mehrdad, “Space for dissent opened in Afghanistan after the Taliban was ousted 20~~
~~years ago. Now the militants are trying to slam it shut,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021; “Thousands protest~~
against Taliban in Kandahar over evictions,” Reuters~~, September 14, 2021~~23 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48th Session of the Human Rights Council, September 13, 2021. 24 “Afghan women call for rights, protest alleged Taliban killings,” Al Jazeera, December 28, 2021; Julian Busch, “Standing up to the Taliban’s burqa decree,” Spiegel International, June 9, 2022. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

~~protests have continued.23 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on~~
~~September 13 that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against protesters and~~
~~journalists.”24 The Taliban have publicized demonstrations in favor of Taliban rule, in which some~~
~~reportedly participated under duress.25~~
~~Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power~~
~~The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may~~
~~create opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in~~
~~Afghanistan, and complicates (if not rendering obsolete) original~~Afghanistan, and renders obsolete former U.S. plans to partner with U.S. plans to partner with
Afghan authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of Afghan authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of
women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since
~~2001; those rights appear at risk with the Taliban back in power. Looming over these and other~~
~~developments is the critical humanitarian and economic crisis that Afghanistan now faces.~~
~~Counterterrorism~~
~~For decades, a variety~~2001; the Taliban have taken numerous actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many Members of Congress, also remain focused on securing the relocation of Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains ongoing as of June 2022. Counterterrorism A number of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in
Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISKP are Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISKP are
two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect
them differently. them differently.
Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, AQ ties with the Taliban, which Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, AQ ties with the Taliban, which
go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong.go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong.2625 In October 2020, Afghan In October 2020, Afghan ~~forces~~government troops killed a killed a
high-ranking AQ operative high-ranking AQ operative ~~in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he~~who reportedly was living and reportedly was living and
working with Taliban forces, underscoring the close and interrelated connections between the working with Taliban forces, underscoring the close and interrelated connections between the
~~groups and their operatives.27 In May 2021,~~groups.26 U.N. sanctions U.N. sanctions monitors reported in February 2022 that Al Qaeda has “maintained a strategic silence, likely an effort not to compromise Taliban efforts to gain international recognition and legitimacy,” in light of counterterrorism commitments made by the Taliban to secure the withdrawal of U.S. forces.27 Estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect AQ capabilities differ. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Frank McKenzie said in a December 2021 interview that the AQ presence in Afghanistan had “probably slightly increased” since August 2021.28 On the other hand, some analysts have argued that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S. counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential Taliban constraints.29 The U.S. intelligence community assesses that AQ “will gauge its ability operate in Afghanistan under Taliban restrictions” as the two groups recalibrate their relationship and activities.30 On the other hand, the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan has clashed with the Taliban, who have struggled to contain the group’s growth since the Taliban takeover (as mentioned above). ISKP has long been a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, and under the former U.S.-backed government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.31 At a~~monitors reported that Al Qaeda~~
~~“minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to ‘lay low’ and not~~
~~jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”28~~
~~Estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect AQ capabilities differ. According to~~
~~media accounts, U.S. officials reportedly told some Senators in August 2021, “terror groups like~~
~~al-Qaida may be able to grow much faster than expected” in Afghanistan under the Taliban.29~~
~~Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Frank McKenzie, said in a December 2021~~
~~interview that the AQ presence in Afghanistan had “probably slightly increased” since August~~
~~2021. 30 On the other hand, some analysts argued in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban~~

~~23 “Afghan women call for rights, protest alleged Taliban killings,” Al Jazeera, December 28, 2021.~~
~~24 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48th Session of the Human Rights Council, September~~
~~13, 2021.~~
~~25 “Were Afghan women forced to attend the pro-Taliban rally?” TRT World, September 15, 2021.~~
26 ~~Twelfth~~ September 1, 2021, press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General Milley said, “It’s possible.”32 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected the notion of 25 Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution ~~2557~~
~~(2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability~~
~~and security of Afghanistan,~~ ~~U.N. Document S/2021/486, released May 27, 2020.~~
272368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. Document S/2022/83, released February 3, 2022. 26 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26, , October 26,
2020. 2020.
~~28 U.N. Document S/2021/486, op. cit.~~
~~29 Michael Balsamo, et al., “Concerns over US Terror Threat Rising as Taliban hold Grows,” Associated Press, August~~
~~15, 2021.~~
~~30 Robert Burns and Lolita Baldor, “US commander: Al-Qaida numbers in Afghanistan up ‘slightly,’”~~ ~~Associated~~
~~Press, December 10, 2021.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~takeover that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S.~~
~~counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential~~
~~Taliban constraints.31 U.N. sanctions monitors reported in February 2021 that the Taliban’s~~
~~takeover had given Al Qaeda “a significant boost” and that Al Qaeda has since “maintained a~~
~~strategic silence, likely an effort not to compromise Taliban efforts to gain international~~
~~recognition and legitimacy.”32~~
~~The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban since its~~
~~2015 establishment, and the two groups have often clashed. ISKP (with 1,500-2,200 fighters, per~~
~~U.N. sanctions monitors) views the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as~~
~~counter to its own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The Taliban have deployed hundreds~~
~~of fighters to eastern Afghanistan, where ISKP attacks appear most frequent, and have been~~
~~accused of extra-judicial killings of suspected ISKP members.33 Under the former U.S.-backed~~
~~government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a~~
~~rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.34 At a September 1, 2021, press conference, when~~
~~asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General~~
~~Milley said, “It’s possible.”35 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected such cooperation in~~
~~October 2021, saying, “We are able to tackle [ISKP] independently.”36~~27 Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, op cit. 28 Robert Burns and Lolita Baldor, “US commander: Al-Qaida numbers in Afghanistan up ‘slightly,’” Associated Press, December 10, 2021. 29 Daniel Byman and Asfandyar Mir, “How strong is Al-Qaeda? A debate,” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2022. 30 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 2022. 31 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020. 32 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the Congressional Research Service 5 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief such cooperation in October 2021.33 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10 million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people, including over 30 U.S. service members.34
From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would
maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as AQ and ISKP without a maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as AQ and ISKP without a
military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what
U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.3735 With the Taliban in control of With the Taliban in control of
Afghanistan, the United States Afghanistan, the United States ~~will have~~has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the
continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. Cooperation with continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. Cooperation with
Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too diplomatically or politically fraught. Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too diplomatically or politically fraught.
Collaboration with non-Taliban-affiliated Afghans via clandestine or covert action authorities Collaboration with non-Taliban-affiliated Afghans via clandestine or covert action authorities
could yield counterterrorism gains, but would also carry risks. could yield counterterrorism gains, but would also carry risks. ~~Incoming~~In practice, according to the Department of Defense’s Acting Inspector General, over-the-horizon “relies primarily on unmanned aerial vehicles operating from U.S. facilities in Doha, Qatar,” but the United States has not conducted any airstrikes in Afghanistan since August 2021, as of a May 2022 Office of the Inspector General report.36 CENTCOM Commander CENTCOM Commander
General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as “extremely difficult but not General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as “extremely difficult but not
impossible” in February 2022 testimony.impossible” in February 2022 testimony.3837
Human Rights: Focus on Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities
~~Present-day Afghanistan is~~The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a different country than the one in many ways a different country than the one ~~the Taliban~~they last ruled in last ruled in
~~2001. Women have been~~2001. After 2001, women became active participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for active participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for
them, and ethnic and religious them, and ethnic and religious minorities, were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution. While some early Taliban actions suggested a possible measure of moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule, UN Rapporteur Bachelet said in June 2022 that “what we are witnessing in Afghanistan today is the institutionalized, systematic oppression of women” and that “Afghan women are rapidly facing the worst-case scenario many-feared.”38 The Taliban takeover appears to have reduced high levels of violence that characterized the conflict, particularly welcomed by those in rural areas,39 but it has increased fears of many Afghans about repression and women’s rights.40 The Taliban have closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and have reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021. 33~~minorities, were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution.~~
~~Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to~~

~~31 Ahmad Siddiqi, “The West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman,~~
~~“Will Afghanistan Become a Terrorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021.~~
32 ~~Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368~~
~~(2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,~~ ~~U.N. Document S/2022/83,~~
~~released February 3, 2022.~~
~~33 Susannah George, “Taliban sends hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan to wage war against Islamic State,”~~
Washington Post, November 22, 2021.
~~34 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.~~
~~35 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the~~
~~U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.~~
36 Kathy Gannon, “Taliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021. Kathy Gannon, “Taliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021.
3734 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022. 35 See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021. 36 Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and Operation Enduring Sentinel, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, May 17, 2022. 37 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx. 38 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Afghanistan,” June 15, 2022. 39 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021; Salar Bazaar, “On former front line in long Afghan war, an appreciation for peace,” Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 2022. 40 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,” New York Times, December 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 6 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief interpretation of Islam in the 1990s.41 The ministry has issued guidance that ~~See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021.~~
~~38 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~protecting women’s rights “within the framework of sharia,”39 and their early actions suggest at~~
~~least some moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule. Nonetheless, their return to~~
~~power has ushered in “immediate and dramatic reversals on women’s rights and fundamental~~
~~freedoms,” according to the United Nations.40~~
~~The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Some~~
~~observers have noted, however, that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of~~
~~women’s rights, particularly in rural areas, where 76% of the population resides.41 For some~~
~~Afghans, including some women, the Taliban takeover may represent an improvement over high~~
~~levels of violence that characterized the Taliban’s insurgency.42 This may be particularly so for~~
~~those in rural areas more affected by conflict.~~
~~For other Afghans, particularly in urban areas, the Taliban’s takeover has increased fears of~~
~~repression, and has created longer-term concerns over the future of women’s rights under a~~
~~Taliban government.43 The Taliban have closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been~~
~~a part of the former Afghan government, and have reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of~~
~~Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the 1990s.44~~
~~Guidance issued by that ministry in late December 2021~~ seeks to impose new restrictions on seeks to impose new restrictions on
Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel long distances Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel long distances
~~without a male guardian.45 The disappearance of several women activists (some of whom were~~
~~involved in protests mentioned above) in January 2022 attracted considerable international~~
~~attention and raised fears of a broader Taliban crackdown on women’s rights.46~~
~~Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for~~
~~Afghan girls. Some signs suggest that the Taliban may permit education for women and girls in at~~
~~least some cases, with secondary public schools for girls having reopened in some provinces.47 In~~
~~many other provinces, however, a de facto ban on girls’ education, at least above the primary~~
~~level, remains in place. For months, Taliban officials have said that they intend to create “a safe~~
~~learning environment” in which girls’ schools can reopen,48 but many women’s rights advocates~~
~~are skeptical of these claims and fearful that the group never intends to officially allow such~~
~~education. In the 1990s, the Taliban did not formally ban secondary or higher education for girls,~~
~~but similarly prohibited it on an ostensibly temporary basis due to unspecified security concerns,~~

~~39 “Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021. Sharia refers broadly to~~
~~concepts and principles of Islamic religious jurisprudence that vary in their interpretation under different schools of~~
~~practice. For more, see Matthew Nelson, “The Taliban’s (Islamic) Isolation,” Chatham House, October 21, 2020.~~
~~40 “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: Where Are We Now?” United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the~~
~~Empowerment of Women, December 2021.~~
~~41 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution,~~
~~September 2020.~~
~~42 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021.~~
~~43 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, December 15, 2021.~~
~~44 Rachel Pannett, “Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the Taliban’s top~~
~~officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021.~~
~~45 “No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2021.~~
~~46 Patricia Grossman, “Afghan women’s rights activists forcibly disappeared,” Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2022;~~
~~Sudarsan Raghavan, “Faced with disappearances, beatings and intimidation, Afghanistan’s women’s rights activists go~~
~~quiet on the streets,” Washington Post, February 8, 2022.~~
~~47 Kate Clark, “Who gets to go to school? (1): What people told us about education since the Taleban took over,”~~
Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 26, 2022.
~~48 “Girls to return to secondary school ‘soon as possible’: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2021.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~a de facto ban that lasted the entirety of the group’s five-year rule.49 A Taliban spokesman said in~~
~~a January 2022 interview that the group intended to reopen girls’ schools across the country by~~
~~March 2022, describing the delay as a “question of capacity.”50 Public universities reopened in~~
~~February 2022 with women permitted to attend but only when separated from men.51~~
~~Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities have also received~~
~~scrutiny. Many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who comprise 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population and~~
~~represent one of the country’s largest ethnoreligious minorities) previously expressed fear about~~
~~the Taliban’s possible return.52 Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a~~
~~more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, even as reports~~
~~emerge of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central~~
~~Afghanistan.53 Surveying these mixed messages, one observer speculated in early September~~
~~2021 that “the Taliban political leadership’s more pragmatic approach toward the Hazara is~~
~~necessary to maintain its fragile control over all of Afghanistan,” but that persecution could~~
~~increase in the absence of international attention.54~~
~~Ongoing Relocations of American Citizens and Certain Afghans~~
~~The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15~~without a male guardian and that male relatives of women who do not wear a hijab that fully covers their bodies should be punished.42 Those restrictions, together with the overall economic decline, have led to a decline in women’s participation in the workforce.43 Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for Afghan girls. Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’ schools, effectively shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022.44 However, on March 23, with some girls already present in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that schools for girls would remain closed, shocking many observers.45 One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of hardline clerics within the group and Akhundzada.46 Other Taliban figures, including both Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate their own daughters abroad).47 The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative leaders (over that of pragmatists who urge greater engagement with the outside world) suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions. In response to the reversal, the United States canceled meetings on economic issues with the Taliban and the World Bank reportedly suspended $150 million in education programming in Afghanistan. Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities have also received scrutiny from U.S. policymakers. Many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who comprise 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population and represent one of the country’s largest ethnoreligious minorities) previously expressed fear about the Taliban’s possible return.48 Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan in fall 2021.49 While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras in 2021 and 2022.50 41 Rachel Pannett, “Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the Taliban’s top officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021. 42 “No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2021; David Zucchino and Safiullah Padshah, “Taliban impose head-to-toe coverings for women,” New York Times, May 7, 2022. 43 International Labor Organization, “Employment prospects in Afghanistan; A rapid impact assessment,” January 2022; Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori, “‘We are worse off’: Afghanistan further impoverished as women vanish from workforce,” Guardian, May 16, 2022. 44 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022. 45 Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022. 46 Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 29, 2022. 47 Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership divisions,” Guardian, March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes starting to change from within?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 7, 2022. 48 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,” New York Times, March 27, 2019. 49 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence under Taliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021. 50 Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, 2022. Congressional Research Service 7 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Ongoing Relocations of American Citizens and Certain Afghans The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021 triggered the mass evacuation of tens of thousands triggered the mass evacuation of tens of thousands
of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and Afghans who of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and Afghans who
worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. ~~That effort largely came to~~
~~a close with the final departure of U.S. military forces on August 30. U.S. officials say that they~~
~~intend to secure the relocation of all remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who~~
~~seek to leave the country, but some Members of Congress and other observers express concern~~
~~about the pace of relocations.~~
~~U.S.~~ U.S. officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals,
including 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, including 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, ~~which General Milley described~~
as “the largest air evacuation in US history.”“the largest air evacuation in US history.”5551 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the
State Department said that as of December 13, 2021, it has assisted in the departure of 479 U.S. State Department said that as of December 13, 2021, it has assisted in the departure of 479 U.S.
citizens, 450 lawful permanent citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and over 2,200 Afghans.52 On April 28, 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the State Department had directly assisted in the departure of 636 American citizens and “many” lawful permanent residents.53 U.S. officials have said that their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country have “no deadline.”54 According to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has fluctuated in the midst of continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens come forward to make themselves known, and, in many instances, ask for assistance to leave.55 On April 28, 2022, Secretary Blinken said, “There are at present 126, as of a few days ago, American citizens remaining of whom 37 seek to leave and that we are assisting.”56 One December 2021 press report, citing a State Department official, stated that around 62,000 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain in Afghanistan.57 This figure excludes the tens of thousands of Afghans who may be at risk and eligible for other forms of relief but have not applied or are not eligible for an SIV. In a February 2022 report, an advocacy group for SIV-eligible persons stated that 78,000 of the estimated 81,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan with visa applications pending as of August 15, 2021 remain in Afghanistan.58 The State Department has disputed the accuracy of this report.59 In May 2022, the State Department reportedly estimated that between 70,000 and 160,000 Afghans were eligible for SIVs.60 Status of Kabul Airport Relocation efforts have been complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. After the final departure of U.S. forces, Qatar and Turkey worked to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar system, and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. Domestic flights restarted 51~~residents, and over 2,200 Afghans.56 It is not clear how many of~~
~~those departed via overland routes or via the U.S.-backed Qatar Airways charter flights that~~
~~periodically left Kabul, despite issues with the international airport there (see textbox).~~
~~The number of U.S. citizens remaining in Afghanistan appears to be in flux. The Department said~~
~~on December 13 that it was in contact with “fewer than a dozen U.S. citizens” who wanted and~~

~~49 Margot Buff, “‘Our Futures Will Be Ruined’: Afghan Girls Fear Denial of Education Under Taliban,” Gandhara,~~
~~September 21, 2021; Rasmussen and Nazari, op. cit.~~
~~50 Kathy Gannon, “The AP Interview: Taliban pledge all girls in school soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022.~~
~~51 Ehsan Popalzai and Hande Atay Alam, “Afghan universities reopen to female students but with strict rules on~~
~~mixing,” CNN, February 3, 2022.~~
~~52 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, March 27, 2019.~~
~~53 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence~~
~~under Taliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021.~~
~~54 Tom Mutch, “Afghanistan’s Hazaras Get Mixed Messages From the Taliban,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2021.~~
55 Statement available at https://www.armed- Statement available at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf. services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
5652 U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” December 13, 2021. U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” December 13, 2021. ~~On January 11,~~
~~2022, a State Department spokesperson similarly noted that the State Department had directly assisted with the~~
~~departure of 479 U.S. citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and approximately 2,000 Afghans.~~
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~~were prepared to leave Afghanistan; a spokesperson said on January 11, 2022, “We are working~~
~~currently with a few dozen U.S. citizens and their families who have identified themselves as~~
~~prepared to depart and who have the necessary travel documents to do so.”57 That spokesperson~~
~~added that there were “probably fewer than 200” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, leaving “about 150~~
~~other U.S. citizens who don’t want to leave Afghanistan at this point or [are] otherwise not ready~~
~~to depart.”58~~
~~One December 2021 press report, citing a State Department official, stated that around 62,000~~
~~Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain in Afghanistan.59 This figure excludes~~
~~the tens of thousands of Afghans at risk who are not eligible for an SIV.~~
~~Status of Kabul Airport~~
~~Relocation efforts are complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. Since the final departure of U.S.~~
~~forces, Qatar and Turkey have been working to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar~~
~~system, and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. Domestic flights~~
~~restarted in early September 2021, but international flights~~53 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit. 54 “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” op. cit. 55 Department Press Briefing – April 12, 2022, U.S. Department of State, April 12, 2022. 56 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit. 57 Jessica Donati, “More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2021. 58 Association of Wartime Allies, “On The Ground Report - Feb 2022.” 59 Dan De Luce, “U.S. ‘left behind’ 78,000 Afghan allies in chaotic withdrawal: NGO report,” NBC News, March 1, 2022. 60 Alex Thompson and Allie Bice, “Biden’s broken promise to SIV holders,” Politico, May 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief in early September 2021, but flights by foreign carriers have been mostly limited to charter Qatar Airways have been mostly limited to charter Qatar Airways
flights as carriers cite high insurance charges as well as security and logistical concerns as impediments to regular flights as carriers cite high insurance charges as well as security and logistical concerns as impediments to regular
commercial air travel.commercial air travel.~~60 In late December 2021, Qatar and Turkey reportedly signed an agreement to operate the~~
~~Kabul airport jointly, along with four other airports in Afghanistan.61 The United Arab Emirates reportedly has also~~
~~held talks with the Taliban about operating the Kabul airport, possibly in a bid to diminish the influence of Qatar,~~
~~its regional rival.62 The foreign minister of Turkey, which in 2022 improved relations with the UAE, raised the~~
~~prospect of a trilateral arrangement as talks with the Taliban continue.63~~
~~Beyond logistical problems at Kabul airport, another impediment to continued relocations has~~
~~been the issue of travel documentation, particularly passports, without which Afghans cannot~~
~~leave the country. The Taliban began re-issuing passports several weeks after taking control of the~~
~~country, but the operations of passport offices have been sporadic and hamstrung by delays, long~~
~~lines, and administrative challenges.64~~
~~Additionally, some Afghans who seek to relocate remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution~~
~~against individuals who worked for the former Afghan government and/or with the United States.~~
~~The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but U.N. Secretary-General Antonio~~
~~Guterres reportedly stated in January 2022 that the United Nations has received “credible~~
~~allegations” of Taliban reprisals against those individuals, including dozens of killings.65~~
~~In mid-December 2021, reports emerged that the Taliban had halted evacuation flights from~~
~~Afghanistan after Qatar ceased providing seats on chartered Qatar Airways flights for Taliban-~~
~~designated individuals to work abroad and earn money to be remitted back to Afghanistan amid~~

~~57 Ibid; Department Press Briefing – January 11, 2022, U.S. Department of State, January 11, 2022.~~
~~58 Department Press Briefing – January 11, 2022, op. cit.~~
~~59 Jessica Donati, “More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~December 16, 2021.~~
~~60 Aftab Khan, “PIA prepared to run regular flights to Kabul: CEO,” Express Tribune, November 13, 2021.~~
~~61 “Turkey, Qatar Await Taliban Green Light to Run Afghan Airports,” Voice of America, December 28, 2021.~~
~~62 Alexander Cornwell, “EXCLUSIVE: UAE holds talks with Taliban to run Kabul airport – foreign diplomats,”~~
Reuters, November 24, 2021.
~~63 “Kabul Airport May be Run Jointly by Turkey, Qatar, UAE,” TOLOnews, December 28, 2021.~~
6461 Despite a preliminary December 2021 deal with Qatar and Turkey to operate five airports in Afghanistan, the Taliban in May 2022 announced that they had reached a seemingly similar deal with the United Arab Emirates; the terms of that agreement remain unclear.62 Beyond logistical problems at Kabul airport and issues with Afghans obtaining travel documentation,63 some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to a press account, a report from U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to the Security Council in January 2022 stated that the United Nations has received “credible allegations” of Taliban reprisals against those individuals, including dozens of killings.64 In April 2022, Secretary Blinken noted attacks by the Taliban against “those who are part of the former government,” adding that most appeared to be happening “at a local level” and were not “centrally directed.”65 The Taliban have reportedly interfered with flights at times, including by demanding seats for Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money.66 Secretary Blinken said in late April 2022 that the Taliban had allowed freedom of movement to some degree but cautioned that there were still limited means of transportation to enable individuals to leave Afghanistan.67 The United States has reportedly paid, through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to Qatar for individuals to leave Afghanistan.68 Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Policy The Taliban’s return to power has exacerbated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries. A number of interrelated factors, including the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, have all contributed to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis. 61 Susannah George, “Taliban signs deal to hand control of Afghan airports to UAE company,” Washington Post, May 24, 2022. 62 Rahim Faiez, “Taliban say deal signed with UAE firm to manage airports,” Diplomat, May 25, 2022. 63 Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing
travel documents,” travel documents,” Washington Post, October 6, 2021;, October 6, 2021; “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January , January
16, 2022. 16, 2022.
6564 “UN chief accuses Taliban of scores of revenge killings since seizing control in Afghanistan,” “UN chief accuses Taliban of scores of revenge killings since seizing control in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January 30, , January 30,
2022. 2022.
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~the country’s severe economic difficulties. While some suggest Qatar forced the Taliban to cease~~
~~this practice at the behest of the United States, others have stated that this dispute is entirely~~
~~between the Taliban and Qatar.66 Qatar, Turkey, and the Taliban have had negotiations on~~
~~resuming airport operations, and reportedly reached a preliminary agreement on airport security~~
~~in January 2022.67 The first relocation flight in several months, a Qatar Airways charter paid for~~
~~by the U.S. State Department, reportedly left Kabul in late January 2022.68~~
~~Humanitarian and Economic Crisis69~~
~~The Taliban’s return to power has triggered what U.N. officials describe as potentially the worst~~
~~humanitarian crisis in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-~~
~~dependent countries.70 A number of interrelated factors, including the cut-off of international~~
~~development assistance, U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on~~
~~Afghanistan’s central bank assets, have all contributed to the economic breakdown that underlies~~
~~the humanitarian crisis.~~
~~Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in~~
~~Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Indicators suggest~~
~~that conditions have worsened significantly since August 2021: the World Food Program reported~~
~~in December 2021 that the proportion of Afghans with insufficient food had increased from 80%~~
~~to 98% since the Taliban’s takeover.71 In October 2021, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF)~~
~~estimated that “at least 1 million” Afghan children are “at risk of dying due to severe acute~~
~~malnutrition without immediate treatment.”72~~
~~The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars each year to support~~
~~the former Afghan government, financing over half of the government’s $6 billion annual budget~~
~~and as much as 80% of total public expenditures.73 That development assistance halted with the~~
~~Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, plunging the country into what U.N. officials describe as~~
~~economic “free fall” as the country’s economy has contracted as much as 40% since August 2021~~
~~as of December 2021.74 The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) warned in November 2021~~
~~that, under various scenarios, poverty rates could reach as high as 97% by July 2022.75~~

~~66 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan~~
~~for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021.~~
~~67 Callie Patteson, “Turkey, Qatar in talks to restart Afghan evacuation flights,” New York Post, December 28, 2021;~~
~~Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Turkey, Qatar reached preliminary deal on Kabul airport security- Turkish sources,” Reuters,~~
~~January 20, 2022.~~
~~68 Courntey Kube et al., “First flight of American evacuees in months leaves Kabul airport for Qatar,” NBC News,~~
~~January 27, 2022.~~
~~69 See CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions.~~
~~70 “Get the facts: What’s happening now in Afghanistan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),~~
~~January 18, 2022.~~
~~71 “Afghanistan Food Security Update,” World Food Program, December 8, 2021.~~
~~72 “Half of Afghanistan’s children under five expected to suffer from acute malnutrition as hunger takes root for~~
~~millions,” UNICEF Afghanistan, October 5, 2021.~~
~~73 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that~~
~~undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021.~~
~~74 Yaroslav Trofimov, “For a Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan, and the Rest of the World, a Crisis Looms,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal~~ ~~December 13, 2021.~~
~~75 “Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022,” UNDP Afghanistan, November 30, 2021.~~
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65 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State Department's Foreign Policy Priorities and the FY23 Budget Request, op. cit. 66 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021. 67 Testimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for the Department of State, hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 28, 2022. 68 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 8, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions have worsened significantly since August 2021: the World Food Program reported in June 2022 that 92% of Afghans reported not having enough to eat, a slight decrease from the previous month but an increase from the 80% of Afghans that had insufficient food before the Taliban takeover.69 WFP also reported that global food price increases and supply chain delays caused by the war in Ukraine are “having a direct impact on WFP’s Afghanistan operations.” The U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan said in March 2022 that due to emergency assistance from international donors, “we have perhaps averted our worst fears of famine and widespread starvation,” though the situation remains dire.70 Nonetheless, in May 2022, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 3.2 million Afghan children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022, with 1 million children potentially at risk of death.71 The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as 80% of total public expenditures.72 Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, plunging the country into what U.N. officials describe as economic “free fall” as the country’s economy contracted by as much as a third in the last four months of 2021.73 Humanitarian aid, including cash transfers, has “supported some economic stabilization,” according to the World Bank, but Afghanistan’s economic outlook remains “stark.”74 The Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request proposes $345 million for health, education, and other forms of assistance in Afghanistan; the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan may complicate or constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S. funding.
U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to
what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan; the head of the Norwegian what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan; the head of the Norwegian
Refugee Council said in January 2021 that sanctions have “held back” their operations.Refugee Council said in January 2021 that sanctions have “held back” their operations.7675 Since Since
the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses
outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the provision of outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the provision of
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.7776 Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions or other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by refusing to engage in the country rather than risk violation of U.S. sanctions. For more on U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, see CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions.
In at least some parts of the country, food is available but many Afghans do not have money with In at least some parts of the country, food is available but many Afghans do not have money with
which to pay for it, illustrating the impact of the country’s economic crisis on humanitarian which to pay for it, illustrating the impact of the country’s economic crisis on humanitarian
conditions. Afghanistan is a highly cash-dependent society, but shipments of dollars halted with conditions. Afghanistan is a highly cash-dependent society, but shipments of dollars halted with
the U.S. freeze on Afghan central bank assets in August 2021 and Afghanistan does not have the the U.S. freeze on Afghan central bank assets in August 2021 and Afghanistan does not have the
ability to print its own currency. The result is a severe liquidity crisis that threatens to destroy the ability to print its own currency. The result is a severe liquidity crisis that threatens to destroy the
~~country’s banking system. In October 2021, Secretary-General Guterres urged “the world to take~~
~~action and inject liquidity into the Afghan economy to avoid collapse,” and Secretary of State~~
~~Antony Blinken said in December 2021 that the United States was “looking intensely at ways to~~
~~put more liquidity into the Afghan economy, to get more money into people’s pockets...in a way~~
~~that doesn’t directly benefit the Taliban.” 78~~
~~The World Bank in December 2021 decided to release $280 million in Afghanistan~~
~~Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) monies to U.N. agencies to support Afghan health and~~
~~education workers’ salaries, injecting much-needed money into the Afghan economy; the United~~
~~States has reportedly “encouraged” the World Bank to release additional ARTF funds.79~~
~~Additionally, the Asian Development Bank approved $405 million in grants to four U.N. agencies~~
~~to provide food, health care, and education to millions of Afghans.80~~
~~Both the Taliban and some foreign leaders (including Secretary-General Guterres)~~ 69 “Afghanistan Situation Report,” World Food Program, June 10, 2022. 70 “Briefing by Special Representative Deborah Lyons to the Security Council,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, March 2, 2022. 71 “Afghanistan: Humanitarian Situation Report #5, 1-31 March 2022,” UNICEF, May 26, 2022. 72 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021. 73 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, April 13, 2022 74 Ibid. 75 See interview at https://twitter.com/nrc_norway/status/1486778209387565058. 76 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf. Congressional Research Service 10 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief country’s banking system. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in December 2021 that the United States was “looking intensely at ways to put more liquidity into the Afghan economy, to get more money into people’s pockets ... in a way that doesn’t directly benefit the Taliban.”77 Both the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the have urged the
United States to release the hold on Afghan central bank assets, which total around $7 billion. On United States to release the hold on Afghan central bank assets, which total around $7 billion. On
February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it will “seek to facilitate access of February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it will “seek to facilitate access of
$3.5 billion [of the assets]$3.5 billion [of the assets] ...... for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation
related to the September 11, 2001, related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.78 The Administration has not detailed how it intends to dispose of the assets for the Afghan people; possible uses include funding for humanitarian relief through U.N. agencies or other organizations. Alternatively, the $3.5 billion could contribute to “the potential recapitalization of a future central bank...and the recapitalization of a financial system,” according to Tom West, the State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan. For more, see CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves. Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers. Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors. Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its subsequent insurgency.~~attacks.81~~
~~Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors~~
~~Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has~~
~~throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers.~~
~~Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.~~

~~76 See interview at https://twitter.com/nrc_norway/status/1486778209387565058.~~
~~77 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at~~
~~https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf.~~
~~78 Jonathan Landay, “U.N. chief: Liquidity needed to stem Afghanistan economic, humanitarian crises,” Reuters,~~
~~October 11, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” December 21, 2021.~~
~~79 David Ignatius, “How the U.S. is helping vulnerable Afghans without recognizing the Taliban,” Washington Post,~~
~~January 18, 2022.~~
~~80 “$405 million in ADB grants to support food security, health, and education in Afghanistan through United Nations,”~~
~~Asian Development Bank, January 25, 2022.~~
~~81 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf and briefing at~~
~~https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-on-u-s-support-for-~~
~~the-people-of-afghanistan/.~~
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Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
~~which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for~~
~~decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule. Pakistan’s security~~
~~services maintain ties to Afghan armed groups, most notably the Haqqani Network.82 Former~~
~~Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, attributed much of the Taliban’s strength~~
~~either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support.83 The Trump Administration sought Islamabad’s~~
~~assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban in 2018, and U.S. assessments of Pakistan’s role were~~
~~generally more positive thereafter.84~~ Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially
as a triumph for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to as a triumph for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to ~~Pakistan’s long history of support for the~~
~~Taliban and statement~~statements of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani Prime Minister Imran of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani Prime Minister Imran
Khan and others.Khan and others.8579 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban
government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021. government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.
However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose ~~serious~~
challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost
to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i
Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against
Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani
government to seek government to seek ~~an Afghan Taliban-mediated ceasefire with the TTP that ended in December~~
~~2021.86 Moreover, state-run Pakistan International Airlines ended its flights to Kabul in October~~
~~2021 due to the Taliban’s “unprofessional attitude.”87~~ the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires, most recently in June 2022.80 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further
complicated by the presence of over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-complicated by the presence of over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-
running and ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile borderrunning and ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border~~.88~~, at which Taliban and Pakistani Taliban and Pakistani
~~government forces reportedly clashed at the border in December 2021 and January 2022.89~~
Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule
~~but has maintained relations with the group in recent years while emphasizing the need for~~
~~representation for Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties~~
~~(namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims).~~
~~Official Taliban visits to Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover, and have continued~~
~~since then, including with the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022.~~
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
~~have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover, including the only regional rejection of~~

~~82 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.~~
~~83 White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. Some~~
~~Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself.~~
~~Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018.~~
~~84 “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had~~
~~been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010. Baqir Sajjad Syed,~~
~~“Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” Dawn, March 23, 2021.~~
85government forces have intermittently clashed in the past six months.81 77 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” December 21, 2021. 78 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf and briefing at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-on-u-s-support-for-the-people-of-afghanistan/. 79 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, , August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani,
“Pakista’“Pakista’'’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021. , July 22, 2021.
~~86 “Pakistani Taliban ends ceasefire, future of peace talks uncertain,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021; Abdul Sayed,~~
~~“The Evolution and Future of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December~~
~~21, 2021.~~
~~87 Aftab Khan, “PIA prepared to run regular flights to Kabul: CEO,” Express Tribune, November 13, 2021.~~
8880 Umair Jamal, “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan declares unilateral ceasefire,” Diplomat, June 13, 2022. 81 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but
successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British
Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
89; Asfandyar Mir et al., “Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Dispute Heats Up,” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 12, 2022. Asfandyar Mir et al., “Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Dispute Heats Up,” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 12, 2022.
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~~the group’s government. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing~~
~~economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural~~
~~gas pipeline, and have had official engagements with the Taliban (such as a visit to Kabul by the~~
~~Uzbek foreign minister in October 2021 and a visit to Turkmenistan by the Taliban’s acting~~
~~foreign minister in January 2022).90~~Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Official Taliban visits to Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover, and have continued since then, including with the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022. Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had numerous official engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has rejected the Taliban’s Tajikistan, on the other hand, has rejected the Taliban’s
government and emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s government and emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s
own own ~~historical~~ struggles with Islamist militancy as well as struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ~~ethnolinguistic~~ ties with Afghan Tajiks ties with Afghan Tajiks
(the country’s second largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule. (the country’s second largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule. ~~Tajikistan~~
~~has reportedly offered refuge to prominent anti-Taliban Afghan leaders, and its officials have~~
~~criticized the Taliban government, prompting the Taliban to warn Tajikistan against interfering in~~
~~Afghan affairs.91~~Anti-Taliban leaders initially fled to Tajikistan after the Taliban takeover.
China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some
congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.9282 China, which played a relatively limited role China, which played a relatively limited role
in Afghanistan under the former government, in Afghanistan under the former government, ~~has~~ made some economic investments in made some economic investments in
Afghanistan (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) Afghanistan (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban takeover, but major but major
projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and other projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and other
~~limitations.93 China initially signaled support for the Taliban but has not formally recognized the~~
~~group to date, and may be reluctant to pursue closer relations due to~~limitations.83 Despite concerns about Afghanistan- concerns about Afghanistan-
~~based Islamist terrorist groups.94~~
~~Congressional Action and Outlook~~
~~President Biden’s April 2021 announcement of his intention to fully withdraw U.S. forces by~~
~~September 11, 2021, drew both praise and criticism across partisan lines from some Members of~~
~~Congress who for years had debated the relative costs and benefits of the U.S. military presence~~
~~in Afghanistan. Some welcomed the announcement, citing what they characterize as U.S.~~
~~counterterrorism successes or a need to reprioritize U.S. global interests.95 Other Members urged~~
~~President Biden to reconsider in favor of a conditions-based approach.96~~
based Islamist terrorist groups, China has signaled acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”84 Congressional Action and Outlook The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public attention. Many Members The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public attention. Many Members
characterized the August 2021 characterized the August 2021 U.S. military withdrawal as chaotic and damaging to U.S. interest and global withdrawal as chaotic and damaging to U.S. interest and global
standing; some said they supported the removal of U.S. troops but not the way in which it was standing; some said they supported the removal of U.S. troops but not the way in which it was
carried out.carried out.9785 In the months since the Taliban entered Kabul, U.S. public attention appears to have In the months since the Taliban entered Kabul, U.S. public attention appears to have
decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of significant congressional decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of significant congressional interest as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule. At least six congressional committees held hearings on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover,86 and Congress established an Afghanistan War Commission (Section 1094 of 82 See, for example, H.R. 5404 and S. 2826. 83~~interest as some~~

~~90 Bruce Pannier, “For the Turkmen and Uzbek leaders, a meeting of minds on Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, October 9,~~
~~2021; Orkhan Jalilov, “Turkmen, Afghan Officials Discuss Energy and Transport Projects,” Caspian News, January 18,~~
~~2022.~~
~~91 Vinay Kaura, “Tajikistan’s evolving relations with the Taliban 2.0,” Middle East Institute, December 1, 2021.~~
~~92 See, for example, H.R. 5404 and S. 2826.~~
~~93 Matthew Funaiole and Brian Hart, “Afghanistan Is No Treasure Trove for China,” Foreign Policy, September 28,~~
~~2021.~~
~~94 Atal Ahmadzai, “Why China Is Slow-Rolling Taliban Cooperation,” Foreign Policy, January 27, 2022.~~
~~95 Representative Andy Kim, “Congressman Kim Statement on Announcement of U.S. Troop Withdrawal from~~
~~Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021; Senator Ed Markey (@SenMarkey), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:29PM.~~
~~96 Senator Jim Inhofe (@JimInhofe), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:26PM.~~
~~97 Barbara Sprunt, “There’s a bipartisan backlash to how Biden handled the withdrawal from Afghanistan,” NPR,~~
~~August 17, 2021.~~
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~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the~~
~~Taliban’s renewed rule.~~
~~At least six congressional committees held hearings on Afghanistan in the weeks after the~~
~~Taliban’s takeover.98 Some of these hearings focused on contemporaneous U.S. policy actions,~~
~~whereas others sought to examine the two decades of U.S. policy decisions that preceded the~~
~~Taliban’s takeover. Perhaps the most comprehensive effort to investigate U.S. efforts in~~
~~Afghanistan is Congress’s establishment of the Afghanistan War Commission (Section 1094 of~~
~~the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81). The Commission’s 16~~
~~members are to be appointed by the chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House armed~~
~~services, foreign affairs, and intelligence committees, as well as by House and Senate majority~~
~~and minority leaders, within 60 days of enactment. They are charged with examining “the key~~
~~strategic, diplomatic, and operation decisions that pertain to the war in Afghanistan” and~~
Matthew Funaiole and Brian Hart, “Afghanistan Is No Treasure Trove for China,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2021. 84 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022. 85 Barbara Sprunt, “There’s a bipartisan backlash to how Biden handled the withdrawal from Afghanistan,” NPR, August 17, 2021. 86 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by: House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5, Congressional Research Service 12 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final
report to be issued within three years.report to be issued within three years.
In the meantime, some Members express an intent to remain focused on developments in In the meantime, some Members express an intent to remain focused on developments in
~~Afghanistan. Some of these Members argue~~Afghanistan, arguing that a U.S. failure to remain engaged in Afghanistan that a U.S. failure to remain engaged in Afghanistan
may lead to may lead to athe sort of broader societal collapse broader societal collapse ~~and civil war akin to the environment~~ in which Al Qaeda in which Al Qaeda
thrived and planned the September 11, 2001, attacks after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.thrived and planned the September 11, 2001, attacks after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.9987
How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is one issue on which Members might engage, How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is one issue on which Members might engage,
especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as
competing U.S. policy priorities.competing U.S. policy priorities.~~100~~ The Biden Administration initially framed and has since The Biden Administration initially framed and has since
defended the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as helping to make the United States more defended the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as helping to make the United States more
prepared to confront other, and ostensibly more strategically important, challenges, such as those prepared to confront other, and ostensibly more strategically important, challenges, such as those
posed by Russia and China.posed by Russia and China.~~101~~88
Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, will be influenced and likely Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, will be influenced and likely
constrained by a number of factors, includingconstrained by a number of factors, including:
 a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.  a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.
diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on
journalists; and journalists; and

~~98 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by: House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with~~
~~Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed~~
~~Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House~~
~~Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie);~~
~~Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee~~
~~(October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5,~~
 the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically difficult. Beyond the challenges of how to formulate U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Members may seek to articulate and shape what U.S. goals in Afghanistan should be. Many Members express an interest in minimizing humanitarian suffering, containing regionally based terrorist groups, and continuing support for Afghan women and girls. At the same time, many Members (with the evident support of the Biden Administration) evidently seek to avoid any actions, including the provision of development assistance, that might have the effect of benefiting the Taliban or improving the group’s position in power.89 Some of these priorities may come into tension: providing purely humanitarian aid may be sufficient to stave off mass casualties, but is unlikely to boost the Afghan economy. Financial assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. Going forward, Members may weigh the financial and social costs of providing humanitarian assistance indefinitely with the political and moral costs of boosting (or at least refraining from undermining) the Taliban’s rule. In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of policy options, including: 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International
Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee
(October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former
U.S. officials). U.S. officials).
9987 Letter available at https://crow.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-crow-malinowski-meijer-press- Letter available at https://crow.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-crow-malinowski-meijer-press-
president-biden-release. president-biden-release.
~~100 See, for example, CRS Report R43838,~~ ~~Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for~~
~~Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~101~~88 See for example “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” White House, April 14, 2021; See for example “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” White House, April 14, 2021;
“Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” White House, August 31, 2021; Department “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” White House, August 31, 2021; Department
Press BriefingPress Briefing – —January 24, 2022, U.S. Department of State. January 24, 2022, U.S. Department of State.
89 See S. 2863. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1413 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief  Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration about its “over-the-horizon” plans to counter terrorism in Afghanistan to assess the feasibility of those plans, and may consider adjustments to the resources and/or authorities it provides to the Executive Branch to carry them out;  Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may impact Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the ability of Afghan girls to attend schools in particular, to inform congressional consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2023 appropriations;  Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation;  Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the targeted individuals, the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, including by requiring reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the Government Accountability Office, to assess whether they are achieving their intended objectives;  Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration about its plans for Afghan central bank assets held in the United States (though opportunities for congressional action may be limited in light of ongoing litigation); and  Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S. efforts in Afghanistan to shape future oversight mechanisms, including those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners (such as Ukraine). Author Information Clayton Thomas Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

~~ the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make~~
~~cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically~~
~~difficult.~~
~~Changes in dynamics in Afghanistan, such as further deterioration of the humanitarian situation or~~
~~actions by the Taliban (including the planned March 2022 reopening of public education for~~
~~Afghan girls), could prompt some Members to initiate or call for new U.S. policy measures. In~~
~~addition to direct congressional action (including appropriating, authorizing, or limiting funding~~
~~for various purposes), congressional options for overseeing the Administration’s approach to~~
~~Afghanistan include continued hearings, letters to executive branch officials, public statements,~~
~~reporting requirements, requesting assessments from the Government Accountability Office~~
~~(GAO), and legislation pertaining to sanctions policy or other issues. The Administration’s~~
~~February 2022 announcement on the disposition of U.S.-based Afghan central bank assets may be~~
~~one policy area for congressional engagement and oversight.~~
~~Beyond the challenges of how to formulate U.S. policy toward the new situation in Afghanistan,~~
~~Members may seek to articulate and shape what U.S. goals in Afghanistan should be. Many~~
~~Members express an interest in minimizing humanitarian suffering, containing regionally based~~
~~terrorist groups, and continuing support for Afghan women and girls. At the same time, many~~
~~Members (with the evident support of the Biden Administration) evidently seek to avoid any~~
~~actions, including the provision of development assistance, that might have the effect of~~
~~benefiting the Taliban or improving the group’s position in power.102~~
~~Some of these priorities may come into tension: providing purely humanitarian aid may be~~
~~sufficient to stave off mass casualties, but is unlikely to boost the Afghan economy. Financial~~
~~assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but~~
~~comes with the risk of diversion of some funds to the Taliban. Going forward, Members may~~
~~weigh the financial and social costs of providing humanitarian assistance indefinitely with the~~
~~political and moral costs of boosting (or at least refraining from undermining) the Taliban’s rule.~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Clayton Thomas~~

~~Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~102 See S. 2863.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief~~

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