Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief December 30, 2021June 7, 2022
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment featuring several
bilateral, regional, and Turkish domestic considerations. Recent tensions have raised questions
Jim Zanotti
about the future of bilateral relations and have led to U.S. actions against Turkey, including
Specialist in Middle
sanctions and informal congressional holds on major new arms sales. Nevertheless, both
Eastern Affairs
and—as of mid-2022—with Turkey in economic distress. Existing U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed Jim Zanotti 2016 coup in Turkey—including via disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 Specialist in Middle procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the Eastern Affairs future of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of countries’ officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.-Turkey cooperation and continued U.S.-Turkey cooperation and

Turkey’s membership in Turkey’s membership in NATOthe North Atlantic Treaty Clayton Thomas Organization (NATO). The following are . The following are keymajor factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Clayton ThomasSpecialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Erdogan’s rule and Turkey’s
Analyst in Middle Eastern
currency crisiseconomic challenges. Many observers voice Many observers voice concerns about the largely
Affairs
authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. One of his biggest challenges is

Turkey’s economy: a currency crisis that accelerated in late 2021 has generated major domestic
concern. With the country facing significant inflation, Erdogan pressured Turkey’s central bank

to lower interest rates—a response counter to conventional economic theory. In December, he
announced measures aimed at alleviating domestic concerns about the cost of living that may largely simulate interest rate
hikes. While Turkey’s currency regained some of the ground it had lost against the dollar, its future financial stability
remains unclear. Key opposition politicians have called for early elections (the next presidential and parliamentary elections
are scheduled for June 2023) to address growing public discontent, and Erdogan might schedule them if he perceives an
advantage in doing so. Additionally, some observers debate whether free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan or
whether disgruntled Erdogan supporters would actually vote for opposition parties. Separately, some sources have questioned
Erdogan’s health.
Russian S-400 purchase and U.S. responses. Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system in July
2019 has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter program. In December 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency
for the S-400 transaction under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44). The
continuing U.S.-Turkey impasse over the S-400 could prevent major Western arms sales to Turkey. In late 2021, Turkey
requested some new U.S.-origin F-16s and upgrades to others in its aging fleet. Some Members of Congress oppose the F-16
transactions, partly due to the S-400 issue. If Turkey cannot partner with the United States to modernize its fighter aircraft, it
could turn to Russia or other alternative suppliers. If Turkey transitions to Russian weapons platforms with multi-decade
lifespans, it is unclear how it can stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters.
Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and
NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports.
Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles highlight the risks it faces in jeopardizing these ties. A number of complicated
situations in Turkey’s surrounding region—including those involving Syria, Greece, Cyprus, and Libya—affect its
relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent foreign policy. Additionally,
President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly explain his
actions in some of the situations mentioned above.
In addition to the S-400 transaction, Turkey-Russia cooperation has grown in some areas in recent years. However, Turkish
efforts (especially during 2020) to counter Russia in several theaters of conflict at relatively low cost—using domestically
produced drone aircraft and Syrian mercenaries—suggest that Turkey-Russia cooperation is situational rather than
comprehensive in scope.
Turkey’s tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean with countries such as the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Greece have
negatively influenced its relations with several countries in the region, some of whom (such as the ROC, Greece, Israel, and
Egypt) have grown closer as a result. In this context, some observers have advocated that the United States explore
alternative basing arrangements for U.S. and NATO military assets in Turkey. Turkey has made some headway in softening
tensions with some Middle Eastern governments—most notably the United Arab Emirates—in late 2021.
Outlook and U.S. options. Congressional and executive branch action on arms sales, sanctions, or military basing regarding
Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s
strategic orientation and financial well-being. How closely to engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S.
perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor might change his policies in
light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Domestic Turkish Developments .................................................................................................... 1
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule ........................................................................ 1
Currency Crisis and Its Domestic Implications ......................................................................... 2
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and Military Involvement ..................................... 5
General Assessment .................................................................................................................. 5
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, U.S. Sanctions, and F-16
Request ................................................................................................................................... 7
Background ......................................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Policy Implications ..................................................................................................... 9
Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components, and Exports ......................... 10
U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations ...................................................................................... 12
Regional Conflicts and Disputes ............................................................................................. 13
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 13
Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas ................................................. 14
Middle East Rivalries and Libya ....................................................................................... 15
Outlook and U.S. Options ............................................................................................................. 16

Figures
Figure 1. Turkey: Currency Exchange Rate and Central Bank Interest Rate .................................. 3

Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance ..................................................................................................... 17
Figure A-2. Bayraktar TB2 Drone ................................................................................................. 18
Figure A-3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey ................................................ 19
Figure A-4. Syria-Turkey Border .................................................................................................. 20
Figure A-5. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean ...................................................... 21

Appendixes
Appendix. Maps, Facts, and Figures ............................................................................................. 17

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 22

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link to page 20 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics:
 Domestic Turkish political and economic developments under President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s largely authoritarian and polarizing rule, including an ongoing
currency crisis and its implications;
 Turkey’s strategic orientation—including toward the United States and Russia—
as affected by Turkey’s S-400 surface-to-air defense system acquisition from
Russia and U.S. responses (including sanctions), Turkey’s greater use and export
of drone aircraft, the continuing U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and regional
disputes and conflicts (such as those involving Syria, Greece, Cyprus, and
Libya); and
 various U.S. options regarding Turkey, including a possible sale and upgrade of
F-16 aircraft, sanctions, military basing, and balancing U.S. ties with Turkey and
its regional rivals.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and figures about
Turkey.
Domestic Turkish Developments
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003 and, during that time,
has deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became
president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a
mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he
cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some
allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in both elections.1 worries about President Erdogan’s largely authoritarian rule. In late 2021, an ongoing currency crisis accelerated after he installed a central bank governor who lowered interest rates, generating major domestic concern about inflation and the country’s future financial stability. Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 2023, and public opinion polls suggest that Erdogan may be vulnerable to defeat. Some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place, (2) opposition parties can attract support across ideological lines, and (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral loss. Turkey’s strategic orientation. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding region affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent foreign policy. These include Russia’s 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine, Syria’s civil war (during which more than 3.6 million refugees have come to Turkey), and other challenges involving Greece, Cyprus, and Libya. Since 2021, Turkey has made some headway in easing tensions and boosting trade with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Key NATO Issues: Russia’s war on Ukraine and Swedish/Finnish accession. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey has not joined sanctions against Russia, with which it has close trade and energy ties, likely because it hopes to minimize spillover effects to its national security and economy. However, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims may have converged, as Turkey has joined other NATO countries in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Under Turkey’s authority to regulate access to the Black Sea under the 1936 Montreux Convention, it has generally barred Russian and Ukrainian warships from transiting the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, drawing statements of support from U.S. officials. Turkey also has advised other countries’ naval vessels to avoid the Straits, leading some observers to raise questions about security and freedom of navigation for other Black Sea countries, and about NATO’s role in the region. Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense cooperation, and the drones appear to have successfully played a role in targeting Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships. These reported successes have bolstered the TB2’s already strong reputation from conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, increasing the demand for Turkish defense exports from other countries, as well as opportunities for Turkey to build broader ties with those countries. As Sweden and Finland formally applied for NATO membership in May 2022, Turkish officials demanded that the two countries address certain Turkish concerns before agreeing to their accession. These demands center on having Sweden, Finland, and other NATO allies (including the United States) end support for Kurdish individuals or groups that Turkey considers to be connected to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), including a Syrian Kurdish group helping the anti-Islamic State coalition. Given the other NATO allies’ support for Sweden and Finland’s access, continued Turkish objections might increase U.S.-Turkey tensions and Turkish isolation within NATO. U.S.-Turkey arms sales issues (including F-16s). Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system in July 2019 has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and U.S. sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency. The continuing U.S.-Turkey impasse over the S-400 could prevent or complicate major Western arms sales to Turkey. In April 2022, the Biden Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, with Members of Congress expressing mixed views about the transaction. The potential sale could affect the military balance between Turkey and Greece. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 20 link to page 27 link to page 28 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Contents Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations ......................................................................... 1 Domestic Issues ............................................................................................................................... 1 Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule ........................................................................ 1 Major Economic Challenges ..................................................................................................... 3 Future Elections ........................................................................................................................ 4 Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and Defense .......................................................... 5 General Assessment .................................................................................................................. 5 U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations ........................................................................................ 6 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine .................................................................................................... 7 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 7 Black Sea Access ................................................................................................................ 8 Conditions on NATO Accession for Sweden and Finland ........................................................ 9 U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues ............................................................................................... 10 Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program and U.S. Sanctions ................. 11 Possible F-16 Upgrades and Congressional Views ........................................................... 12 Syria ........................................................................................................................................ 14 Figures Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance ..................................................................................................... 17 Figure A-2. Turkey: Annual Inflation Rate .................................................................................... 18 Figure A-3. Bayraktar TB2 Drone ................................................................................................. 19 Figure A-4. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey ................................................ 20 Figure A-5. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits ........................................................... 21 Figure A-6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean ...................................................... 22 Figure A-7. Syria Conflict Map ..................................................................................................... 23 Appendixes Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures .......................................................................................... 17 Appendix B. Relations with Israel and Arab States....................................................................... 24 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 25 Congressional Research Service link to page 20 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and defense matters. Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. He has limited his meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the sidelines of multilateral conferences. This approach may reflect a U.S. and European inclination to keep Turkey at arms’ length until after the 2023 elections.1 Nevertheless, Turkey’s geostrategic significance, cautious support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s 2022 invasion, and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved U.S.-Turkey relations.2 For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and figures about Turkey. Domestic Issues Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.3 Since a failed July 2016 Since a failed July 2016
coup attemptcoup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym , Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of
their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist MovementAction Party (Turkish acronym Party (Turkish acronym
MHP). As Turkey’s currency has struggled in recent years, leading to broader negative economic
effects (discussed below), some observers write that deflecting domestic political attention from
economic difficulties has partly motivated a more assertive, nationalistic turn by Erdogan in
foreign policy.2
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure,3 and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule. The AKP maintained the largest

1MHP). Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.4 The AKP won the largest share of votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP). 1 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” SWP Comment (German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 6, 2022. 2 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2022. 3 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). 2018 (published June 25, 2018).
2 Yasmeen Serhan, “The End of the Secular Republic,” theatlantic.com, August 13, 2020.
3 Seren Selvin Korkmaz, “Facing a changing main opposition, Erdogan doubles down on polarization,” Middle East
Institute, January 84 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. , 2021.
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link to page 6 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.5 In response to the 2016 coup attempt, the government detained tens of thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media outlets.6 Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen movement orchestrated the coup attempt, in which more than 250 people were killed and thousands were injured.7 Forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted the apparent efforts of some renegade military personnel (which included airstrikes targeting Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament building) to seize state control. Some leading opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.8 In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced civil society figure Osman Kavala to life imprisonment after convicting him of conspiring against the government. The European Court of Human Rights, whose rulings are supposed to be binding for Turkey due to its Council of Europe membership, had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said that Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,” while also criticizing “continued judicial harassment of civil society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases.”9 With national elections scheduled for 2023 (discussed below)Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

share of votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to
opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym
CHP). The CHP and some other parties critical of Erdogan and the AKP have agreed on some
steps toward a broad opposition platform for the next national elections—scheduled to take place
by June 2023—focused on strengthening legislative and judicial checks on executive power.
These opposition party leaders include Erdogan’s former high-ranking cabinet officials Ahmet
Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, who one observer has said could help the opposition appeal more to
disgruntled Erdogan supporters.4 Additionally, some sources in late 2021 have questioned
Erdogan’s health.5
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 In the government’s massive
response to the 2016 coup attempt, it detained tens of thousands, enacted sweeping changes to the
military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media
outlets.7 In October 2021, President Erdogan threatened to expel 10 ambassadors from Western
countries, including the United States, for a letter urging Turkey to abide by a European Court of
Human Rights ruling calling for the release from prison of civil society figure Osman Kavala.
The crisis ended after the ambassadors publicly agreed to respect Turkey’s sovereignty.8
In 2021, the Erdogan government has pursued a Constitutional Court ruling to close down the , the Erdogan government has pursued a Constitutional Court ruling to close down the
Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in
Turkey’s parliament. The government Turkey’s parliament. The government is seeking to ban the HDP on the basis of claims that itclaims that the HDP has has
ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization).organization).9 In March 2021, the10 The State Department State Department has said that banning the HDP “would unduly said that banning the HDP “would unduly
subvert the will of Turkish voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny millions of subvert the will of Turkish voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny millions of
Turkish citizens their chosen representation.”Turkish citizens their chosen representation.”1011 How Kurds who feel politically marginalized How Kurds who feel politically marginalized
might respond might respond to the HDP’s ban is unclear. Major violence between Turkish authorities and PKK militants—which is unclear. Major violence between Turkish authorities and PKK militants—which
has taken place on and off since the 1980s—wracked Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015 has taken place on and off since the 1980s—wracked Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015
and 2016.
Currency Crisis and Its Domestic Implications
Turkey is facing significant challenges as its currency, the lira, has depreciated in value more than
35% against the dollar in 2021.11 By reducing its key interest rate from 19% to 14% between
September and December, Turkey’s central bank may have accelerated rather than dampened
annual inflation, which has been officially estimated to be around 30% and unofficially estimated
as high as 58%.12 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with the decline
driven by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy (see Figure 1).

4 Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Opposition Joins Forces Against Erdogan,” New York Times, October 24, 2021.
5 “Rumors swirl over Erdogan’s declining health after G20 hobble,” Arab News, November 4, 2021.
6 Department of State, “Turkey,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020; European Commission, Turkey
2021 Report, October 19, 2021.
7 Department of State, “Turkey”; European Commission, Turkey 2021 Report.
8 Carlotta Gall, “Diplomacy Halts Erdogan’s Push to Expel Envoys,” New York Times, October 26, 2021.
9and 2016, and the Turkish military has continued targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.12 5 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkey 2021 Report, October 19, 2021. 6 Ibid. 7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America, July 15, 2019. Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” For more on Gulen, see CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 8 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. 9 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022. 10 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye, ,
March 20, 2021. March 20, 2021.
10 Department of State11 State Department, “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021. , “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021.
11 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021.
12 Ibid.; Caitlin Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall,” Wall Street Journal, December 8, 202112 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 18, 2022. .
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link to page 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Major Economic Challenges Ongoing economic problems in Turkey have considerably worsened in the past year as its currency, the lira, depreciated in value nearly 45% against the U.S. dollar in 2021 and has continued its slide during 2022. In May 2022, official annual inflation in Turkey swelled to 73.5% (see Figure A-2), the highest since 1998.13 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish central bank’s reduction of its key interest rate from 19% to 14% between September and December 2021, with additional inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.14 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with its decline driven by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.15 Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.16 Erdogan also has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap between rich and poor.17 The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Figure 1. Turkey: Currency Exchange Rate and Central Bank Interest Rate

Source: Reuters, November 2021.
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that raising interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
appears to have sought to bring Turkish fiscal and monetary policy more in line with his views. In
public statements, Erdogan has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment,
and exports.13 Erdogan also has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and
as exacerbating the gap between rich and poor.14
Legacy of the 1999-2001 Financial Crisis15
The Turkish financial crisis of 1999-2001—amid domestic political instability fueled by a recession and 69%
inflation at its outset—was a formative experience for President Erdogan and many other Turkish leaders of his
generation. During the time of the crisis, Erdogan and his moderately Islamist political allies were forming a party
(the AKP, founded in 2001) to run competitively on the national stage. While the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)-assisted response to the 1999-2001 crisis arguably placed Turkey on a better long-term footing, especial y
with the restructuring of its banking system, Erdogan’s stated unwil ingness in 2021 to accept IMF intervention in

13 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021.
14 Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3,
2021; Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy.”
15 Sources used for this text box include Calum Miller, “Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Turkey,” Global
Governance, vol. 12, no. 4, October-December 2006, pp. 449-464; Gokhan Capoglu, “Anatomy of a Failed IMF
Program: The 1999 Program in Turkey,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, vol. 40, no. 3, May-June 2004, pp. 84-
100; Koen Brinke, “The Turkish 2000-01 banking crisis,” Rabobank, September 4, 2013, at
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/september/the-turkish-2000-01-banking-crisis/; Emin
Avundukluoglu, “Turkey will never submit its economic future to IMF: President Erdogan,” Anadolu Agency,
December 1, 2021; “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

resolving Turkey’s current crisis may stem in part from (1) serious volatility shocks (including extreme fluctuations
in interest rates and capital outflows) that occurred during the first 18 months of the Turkey-IMF program in
1999-2001, (2) the years of oversight that Turkey faced while paying off IMF loans, and (3) the decisive November
2002 electoral defeat of the coalition government that presided over the crisis.
In that election, Turkish voters did not give any of the coalition parties enough votes to stay in parliament, and the
AKP won a majority of parliamentary seats. Despite its criticism during the 2002 campaign that involving the IMF
compromised Turkey’s sovereignty, the AKP continued implementing Turkey’s standing agreements with the IMF
on economic reform, and the country benefitted from several years of strong economic growth—ful y paying off
its IMF debt (some of which dated back to 1961) in 2013.
The currency crisis has had several implications for Turkey and its people. The cost of living for
consumers and the cost of international borrowing for banks and private for banks and private sector companies.18 The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts and subsidies for basic expenses and borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.19 According to one source, by December 2021 almost 65% of Turkish bank deposits were in foreign currencies20—up from around 41% at the time of the 2016 coup attempt.21 In that month, the governmentsector companies
increased dramatically because Turkey relies heavily on imports for its population’s basic needs,
including energy, and most foreign loans are denominated in dollars.16 A Turkish economist
expressed concern over a possible “brain drain” of highly educated Turks, while also stating that
despite lower interest rates, the economy could contract rather than grow “as a result of the panic
and uncertainty and escalating costs coming from this crisis.”17 In December, Erdogan announced announced
a 50% increase in Turkey’s minimum wage.18 Though presumably intended to bolster Turks’
purchasing power given the weakened lira, higher wages could spark layoffs by employers.19
Turkish official sources presented some information that could justify interest rate cuts. A central
bank financial stability report from November 2021 stated that the Turkish banking sector is
sufficiently strong and has enough liquid assets to manage risks related to the lira’s value.20
Other sources questioned the resilience of Turkey’s financial system. A December 2021 Wall
Street Journal article said, “A sudden surge in requests among Turkish residents to withdraw
dollars could force banks to draw down their foreign currency reserves or for the government to
impose capital controls that limit what people can remove.”21 According to one source, as of mid-
December almost 65% of Turkish bank deposits were in foreign currencies22—up from around
41% at the time of the 2016 coup attempt and 55% in January 2021.23 The central bank’s position
became more precarious after its efforts in 2019 and 2020 to shore up the lira by selling a
substantial amount of its foreign exchange reserves.24 As of November 2021, one source stated
that the bank’s foreign exchange liabilities outweighed its assets by $15 billion when accounting
for all transactions (including currency swaps).25
On December 20, President Erdogan announced a government plan to broadly guarantee certain
lira-denominated bank accounts against currency depreciation, in apparent coordination with a

16 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press.
17 Ibid.; Ozge Ozdemir, “Why Turkey’s currency crash does not worry Erdogan,” BBC, December 3, 2021.
18 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2021.
19 Nazlan Ertan, “Turkish lira tumbles ahead of key decision on rate cuts, wages,” Al-Monitor, December 14, 2021.
20 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi), “Financial Stability Report,”
November 2021, Volume 33.
21 Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall.”
22 Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut.”
23 Capital Economics graphic, from Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall.”
24 “‘Where is the $128B?’ Turkey’s opposition presses Erdogan,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2021; Mustafa Sonmez, “Where
is the money? Erdogan feels the heat over foreign reserves drain,” Al-Monitor, February 24, 2021.
25 “Turkey’s lira dives back into crisis territory,” Reuters, November 18, 2021.
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significant state-backed market intervention.26 In response, the lira gained back some of its earlier
losses against the dollar, with some analysts expecting the practical results of the government’s
action to largely simulate a hike in interest rates.27 It is unclear whether the government’s credit
and domestic savers’ confidence will be sufficient to prevent future financial panic.
The volatility of Turkey’s currency has implications for domestic politics. Publica plan to insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency depreciation, in apparent coordination with a significant state-backed market intervention.22 It is unclear whether the government’s credit and domestic savers’ confidence will be sufficient to prevent future financial panic.23 13 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish consumer inflation soars to 73.5%,” Al-Monitor, June 3, 2022. 14 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022. 15 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. 16 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. 17 Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021; Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy.” 18 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press. 19 “Turkey’s inflation surges to 70%, putting Erdogan in bind,” Reuters; Balci and Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts.” 20 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2021. 21 Capital Economics graphic, from Caitlin Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall,” Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2021. 22 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021. 23 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish taxpayers outraged at cost of lira protection scheme,” Al-Monitor, March 25, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Future Elections Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place by June 2023. Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems, public opinion polls opinion polls
suggest that support for Erdogan and the AKP suggest that support for Erdogan and the AKP have been at historic lows,28 feeding speculation
about negative election outcomes foris at a historic low.24 Observers speculate about whether Erdogan and Erdogan and the existingthe current AKP-MHP parliamentary
coalition.29 Given youth unemployment estimates of 25%,30 some observers have speculated that
the economic concerns of millions of young voters could affect Erdogan’s prospects.31
Rivals from the CHP and other parties have called for early presidential and parliamentary
elections to allow for a change in leadership, but Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections
before June 2023 and has thus far stated his unwillingness to do it. Rather than compel elections
in Turkey, domestic instability could lead Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with
the potential to delay elections.32 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free and fair
elections could take place under Erdogan,33 (2) disgruntled Erdogan supporters would actually
vote for opposition parties,34 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.35 Some
analysts speculate that Erdogan’s December 2021 moves aimed at helping Turks gain back some
of the purchasing power they lost in recent years could signal a plan to call elections for the near
future.36
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and
Military Involvement
General Assessment
Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to
Turkey’s overall strategic orientation, as it has sought greater independence of action as a
regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkey’s foreign policy course is
arguably less oriented to the West now than at any time since it joined NATO in 1952. Turkish

26 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters.
27 Amberin Zaman, “Lira rallies as Erdogan unveils new financial scheme, but jitters prevail,” Al-Monitor, December
21, 2021.
28 Jared Malsin, “Erdogan’s Support Sinks as Turkey’s Currency Collapses,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2021.
29 “Autumn of the patriarch,” Economist, October 30, 2021.
30 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tries to Ward Off Meltdown of Economy,” New York Times, December 15, 2021.
31 Ozdemir, “Why Turkey’s currency crash does not worry Erdogan.”
32 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14,
2021; Carlotta Gall, “Frustration Rises as Turkey’s Lira Continues Plunge,” New York Times, December 2, 2021.
33 Simon A. Waldman, “Why Erdogan Will Survive Turkey’s Horrifying Crash,” haaretz.com, December 17, 2021;
Kemal Kirisci and Berk AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition can remain in power.25 How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote—with or without the HDP’s participation—could impact the outcome.26 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,27 (2) opposition parties can convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,28 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.29 The CHP and some other opposition parties have agreed on some steps toward a joint platform focused on strengthening legislative and judicial checks on executive power.30 However, it remains unclear which opposition candidate will challenge Erdogan for president: CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the Alevi religious minority), or either of the two mayors who won control of Istanbul and Ankara for the party in 2019 (Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas, respectively) and generally poll higher than Kilicdaroglu.31 In a sign to some of government attempts to sideline opponents, Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity because of criminal charges accusing him of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council in 2019.32 Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.33 How closely U.S. and other international actors engage Erdogan’s government ahead of elections could depend on perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical and domestic considerations. 24 Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022. 25 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, January 10, 2022. 26 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment (German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 2022. 27 Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey”; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades
in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
34in Power?” 28 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, ,
November 1, 2021. November 1, 2021.
35 Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?”; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be
Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?”
36 “Erdogan Looking to Cash in on Economy Gains With Early Election, Analysts Say,” Reuters, December 29, 2021.
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29 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” 30 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February 15, 2022. 31 Ibid.; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” 32 Andrew Wilks, “Cases against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022. 33 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 27 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and Defense General Assessment Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkish Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western
influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some
actions with Russiaactions with Russia, such as in Syria and in Syria and purchasewith Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system.
Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history
of discord—including of discord—including overin political political outcomes inand military crises involving Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region
disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan). disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan).
In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and
South Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key actors. Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key actors.
U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter
Turkish actions.Turkish actions. Nevertheless,34 In the past year, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions with major U.S. partners in the Middle East—namely Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia (see Appendix B). U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on
regional security matters remains mutually important.regional security matters remains mutually important.3735
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.actors and maintain its leverage with them.3836 Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the
United States and United States and NATOthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment
(including a customs union with the EU since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy (including a customs union with the EU since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy
imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s
military strength and economic well-being appear to remain largely dependent on these traditional military strength and economic well-being appear to remain largely dependent on these traditional
relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces
in jeopardizingif it jeopardizes these ties. these ties.3937
Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to
consolidate controlmaintain power domestically. Because Erdogan’s domestically. Because Erdogan’s Islamist-friendly AKP maintains a
parliamentary majority in partnershipcontrol over parliament depends on the AKP’s coalition with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to
maintain thepreserve support support offrom core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A
largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment
with the West.with the West.4038 Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of great power Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of great power
aggression contributes to wide domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and
discourse, as well as sympathy for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish
regional prestige.
Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. The Biden
Administration arguably signaled a more distant approach to Erdogan than President Trump’s
with President Biden’s April 2021 statement recognizing as genocide actions by the Ottoman
Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state) against Armenians during World War I.41 The Biden
Administration also has been more outspoken on what it sees as threats to democracy, rule of law,
and human rights in Turkey. However, the Administration, along with the EU, has praised
Turkey’s approach to hosting refugees.42 Of the refugees currently residing in Turkey, according

37 “Biden, Erdogan upbeat about ties but disclose no breakthrough,” Reuters, June 14, 2021; State Department, “U.S.
Relations with Turkey: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021.
38 aggression contributes to wide 34 Ahmed Qandil, “East Med Gas Forum turns into regional organisation, in blow to Turkey,” Arab Weekly, September 23, 2020. 35 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” May 18, 2022. 36 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and
the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. 37 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy Analysis, February 17, 2022. 38 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, New York: Routledge, 2013 (3rd edition). Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 22 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse, as well as sympathy for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish regional prestige. Turkish Hard Power and “Drone Diplomacy”U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
39 Diego Cupolo, “Turkish lira nears record lows as emerging markets struggle,” Al-Monitor, May 13, 2021.
40 Marc Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU in 2020?” Carnegie Europe, January 29, 2020.
41 White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2021.
42 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield during a Press
Briefing at the Conclusion of Travel to Turkey,” June 4, 2021; Nazlan Ertan, “Amid Afghan influx, Turkey’s refugee
policy gets tested with fire,” Al-Monitor, July 28, 2021.
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link to page 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 3.6 million refugees have
come from Syria, and about 320,000 persons of concern from other countries (including
Afghanistan).43
Turkish Hard Power: Using Drones and Proxy Forces in Regional Conflicts
During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region
(with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern (with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern
Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military
deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however, deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however,
Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especial y the case after Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especial y the case after
Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating
power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt. power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt.
Under this modified approach, Turkey Under this modified approach, Turkey now relieshas relied more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically, more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically,
Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces
(particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in (particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in
theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.4439 Partly because the Partly because the
drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less constraintrestraint in in
deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less
mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-assisted forcesorigin equipment in Syria, Libya, and in Syria, Libya, and
Nagorno-Karabakh).Nagorno-Karabakh).45
How these efforts might influence political outcomes remains unclear (see “Regional Conflicts and Disputes”
below for discussions of Syria and Libya). In December 2021, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu
announced Turkey’s intention to move toward normalizing its relations with Armenia, a course of action
reportedly suggested by President Biden to President Erdogan.46
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, U.S.
Sanctions, and F-16 Request
Background
Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system, which Turkey ordered in
2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,47 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with
Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the
Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019,
and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.48 In

43 UNHCR, “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey,” https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-
turkey.
4440 Turkey’s demonstrated battlefield successes with its drones have significantly increased demand for exports to other countries.41 The growing global popularity of the Bayraktar TB2 drone in particular (see Figure A-3) has prompted one Western arms industry figure to call it the “Kalashnikov [rifle] of the 21st century.”42 One analyst explained the TB2’s appeal by saying that it “strikes a favorable balance between price and capability, being more affordable and accessible compared to US drones while being far more reliable and effective than Chinese models.”43 At the same time Turkey markets drones to other countries with fewer constraints than Western countries, it generally seeks to broaden military, political, and economic linkages with them.44 While this “drone diplomacy” appears to be helping Turkey build important regional and global connections, some observers have raised concerns. One worry is that Turkey may enable human rights violations; an example is the Ethiopian government’s use of TB2s (alongside drones originally from Iran and China) against Tigrayan rebels.45 Another concern is that without greater oversight and transparency, exporting drones broadly could result in unintended, adverse consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.46 U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about 39 See, e.g., Rich Outzen, See, e.g., Rich Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection, Washington , Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021. Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021.
4540 James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” Wall Street Journal, ,
June 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year—here’s how he did it,” June 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year—here’s how he did it,” Business
Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
46 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Moves to Normalize Armenia Ties in Bid to Please Biden,” Bloomberg, December 13,
2021. For more on Turkey-Armenia relations41 Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish drone success in Ukraine sets stage for Asia roadshow,” Nikkei Asia, March 16, 2022. 42 Ibid. For background information on the initial development of Turkey’s drone aircraft industry, see CRS Report R41368, , see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by , by
Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
47 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later.
48 CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
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explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program, then-Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian
intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35
program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth
capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of
the F-35 program.”49
Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby
bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision.
Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms
embargo over Cyprus.50 Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of
Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval
vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly does not feature technology
sharing,51 Turkish officials have expressed hope that a future deal with Russia involving
technology sharing and co-production might be possible to address Turkey’s longer-term air
defense needs, with another potential option being Turkish co-development of a system with
European partners.52 Lack of agreement between the United States and Turkey on technology
sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering non-
U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a
Chinese system.53
Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 instead of the Patriot.
One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.54 Another is Turkish
President Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used
by some Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.55
Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally
operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expects to purchase a
second S-400 system.56 Secretary of State Antony Blinken has warned Turkey that acquiring an
additional system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.57 Turkey may need to forgo
possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.

(CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
49 Department of Defense transcript, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey
Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System, July 17, 2019.
50 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019.
51 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, July 29, 2019.
52 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News,
January 10, 2020.
53 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.
54 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018.
55 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United
States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So
Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019.
56 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021.
57 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021.
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President Erdogan has called for the Biden Administration to apply $1.4 billion that Turkey paid
toward F-35s to the approximate $6 billion cost for the F-16 package.58 President Biden
reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in
Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and
notification process with Congress.59
U.S. Policy Implications
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers. For decades, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin
equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military
strength.60 Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 and its exploration of possibly acquiring Russian
fighter aircraft (as discussed below) may raise the question: If Turkey transitions to major Russian
weapons platforms with multi-decade lifespans, how can it stay closely integrated with the United
States and NATO on defense matters?
Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least
100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and
industrial production of the aircraft.61 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless
the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400.
An August 2020 Defense News article reported that some Members of Congress had “blocked”
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. Such a
disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales has not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over
Cyprus.62 Major sales (valued at $25 million or more) on hold, according to the article, included
F-16 upgrades and export licenses for engines involved in a Turkish sale of attack helicopters to
Pakistan. Sales already underway or for smaller items and services—such as spare parts,
ammunition, and maintenance packages for older equipment—were not subject to these reported
holds.
Biden Administration discussions with Turkey have sought to end the countries’ impasse over the
S-400, in hopes of halting CAATSA sanctions and bringing U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation
closer to past levels. President Erdogan reiterated his unwillingness to give up the S-400 in a June
2021 meeting with President Biden.63

58 Abraham Mahshie, “Turkey’s Erdogan and Biden to Face Off over F-16 and F-35 Debacle,” Air Force Magazine,
October 29, 2021.
59 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
60 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
61 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
62 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,
August 12, 2020.
63 “Erdogan says he told Biden Turkey is not shifting on S-400s—state media,” Reuters, June 17, 2021.
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Turkey’s request to purchase new F-16s and upgrade others faces some opposition in Congress,
partly based on the S-400 issue.64 At a September 28, 2021, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing, Chairman Bob Menendez said, “I see no arms sales going to Turkey, unless there is a
dramatic change around on the S-400.”65 If Turkey cannot partner with the United States to
modernize its fighter aircraft, it could turn to Russia or other alternative suppliers.66 Turkish
officials have expressed openness to acquiring Russia’s Su-35 aircraft.67
Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components,
and Exports
Over the past decade, Turkey has built up a formidable arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), or drone aircraft, to carry out armed attacks or perform target acquisition. Their primary
purpose has been to counter the PKK or PKK-linked militias in southeastern Turkey, Iraq, and
Syria. Turkey and its allies also have reportedly used armed drones against other actors in Syria,
Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (see text box above). Open source accounts have reported that the
drones have been effective in targeting adversaries, while also raising concerns about the legality
of their use in these settings and the danger they pose to civilians.68
Turkey has focused on producing drones domestically. This is partly due to its failure in the early
2010s to acquire U.S.-made armed MQ-9 Reapers—reportedly because of congressional
opposition69—and partly due to reported concerns that Israel may have deliberately delivered
underperforming versions of its Heron reconnaissance drones to Turkey in 2010.70 Kale Group
and Baykar Technologies have produced the Bayraktar TB2 (see Figure A-2), and Turkish
Aerospace Industries (TAI) has produced the Anka-S. Turkey anticipates adding both larger and
smaller drones to its arsenal over the next decade.71 Selcuk Bayraktar, a son-in-law of President
Erdogan, has played a key role in engineering the Bayraktar drones that dominate Turkey’s
fleet.72

64 The text of a letter from 42 Representatives to Secretary Blinken opposing the F-16 transaction is available at
https://pappas.house.gov/media/press-releases/pappas-leads-colleagues-opposing-sale-f-16s-turkey-demands-
information-state.
65 Congressional Quarterly Congressional Transcripts (requires paid subscription), available at http://www.cq.com/doc/
congressionaltranscripts-6353520?5&search=s5LStXmK.
66 Aaron Stein, “Not a Divorce but a Defense Decoupling: What’s Next for the U.S.-Turkish Alliance,” War on the
Rocks, October 18, 2021.
67 Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com,
March 15, 2021.
68 Dan Gettinger, “Turkey’s military drones: an export product that’s disrupting NATO,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, December 6, 2019. A panel of experts reporting in March 2021 on U.N. Security Council sanctions
regarding Libya wrote that conflict during 2020 in Libya featured Turkish loitering munitions such as the Kargu-2
(produced by Turkish company STM) being programmed to fire autonomously on their targets without human
involvement. U.N. Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established
pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 8, 2021.
69 Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will.
70 Itamar Eichner, “Turkey accuses Israel of selling them defective drones,” Ynetnews, June 24, 2018.
71 Paul Iddon, “Turkey’s Drones Are Coming in All Sizes These Days,” forbes.com, October 4, 2020.
72 Umar Farooq, “The Second Drone Age: How Turkey Defied the U.S. and Became a Killer Drone Power,” The
Intercept, May 14, 2019.
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While Turkish companies have assembled the drones, they have apparently relied on Western
countries for some key components, including engines, optical sensors, and camera systems.73
After a Canadian-produced camera system was reportedly found in a Bayraktar TB2 downed in
Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020, Canada halted export permits for parts used in Turkish
drones, concluding in April 2021 that their use was “not consistent with Canadian foreign policy,
nor end-use assurances given by Turkey.”74 Also in October 2020, a Canadian company whose
Austrian subsidiary had produced engines for Bayraktar TB2s announced that it would suspend
engine deliveries to “countries with unclear usage.”75 Additionally, Armenian sources raised
concerns about the possible use of some U.S.-origin components in Bayraktar TB2s,76 and Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Menendez proposed an amendment to the FY2022 National
Defense Authorization Act that would have required a report on recent Turkish drone exports and
whether they contained U.S.-origin components and violated U.S. arms export control law.77
It is unclear how effective Turkish replacements for Western-origin drone components can be
going forward. Since 2018, TAI has reportedly been integrating domestically produced engines
into its drones, including the Anka-S.78 In June 2021, Baykar Technologies officials said that their
newly produced drones featured Turkish cameras and anticipated having domestically produced
engines by the end of the year.79 Additionally, Ukraine is reportedly producing engines for some
Turkish drones.80
Turkish drones’ apparent effectiveness to date—such as in destroying Russian-origin air defense
systems81—may have boosted global demand for Turkish defense exports. In addition to
Azerbaijan purchasing Bayraktar TB2s that it used in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Qatar,
Ukraine, Poland, Morocco, and Ethiopia have reportedly purchased or agreed to purchase TB2s.82
Tunisia has signed a deal to purchase Anka-Ss.83 Some other countries also have supposedly
expressed interest in Turkish drones.84 It is unclear whether the Turkish provision of drones to
other countries—thus involving Turkey at some level in those countries’ political disputes and
military conflicts—is a net plus or minus for Turkey’s fragile economy, in light of the potential

73 “Canadian decision to halt tech exports exposes key weakness in Turkish drone industry,” Turkish Minute, October
17, 2020.
74 “Canada scraps export permits for drone technology to Turkey, complains to Ankara,” Reuters, April 12, 2021.
75 Levon Sevunts, “Bombardier Recreational Products suspends delivery of aircraft engines used on military drones,”
Radio Canada International, October 25, 2020.
76 “How much does the production of Turkish ‘local’ Bayraktar TB2 ATS depend on foreign supplies?” Ermeni Haber
Ajansi (translated from Armenian), October 26, 2020.
77 Senator Bob Menendez website, “Chairman Menendez Announces NDAA Amendments to Hold Turkey and
Azerbaijan Accountable,” November 4, 2021.
78 Beth Davidson, “IDEF’19: Anka Aksungur to Fly with Turkish Engine by Year-end,” AIN Online, May 1, 2019.
79 Marson and Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics.”
80 Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,” War on the Rocks,
December 15, 2021.
81 Seth Frantzman, “Russian air defense systems outmatched by Turkish drones in Syria and Libya,” Long War Journal
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies), June 10, 2020.
82 Aishwarya Rakesh, “How Turkey’s Bayraktar Drones Became an International Success,” defenseworld.net, May 27,
2021; “Turkey expands armed drone sales to Ethiopia and Morocco – sources,” Reuters, October 14, 2021.
83 “After big wins, interest in Turkish combat drones soars,” Agence France Presse, March 19, 2021.
84 See, for example, “Armed with drones, Turkey explores African arms sales,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 15,
2021.
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for Turkey’s actions to isolate it from major powers that represent key sources of trade and
investment.85
U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations
Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key
U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO
ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-3).
From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns
about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World
War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem
from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement in places such as Syria and Ukraine, and may partly
motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian objectives in various
conflict arenas.86
As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the
safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated
exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.87 Some reports suggest that expanded or
potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, Jordan and
Romania might be connected with concerns about Turkey.88
Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the
Eastern Mediterranean (see “Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas” below)—
particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among
those allies and partners.89 In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale
of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S.
arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.90
Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries
bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish
defense cooperation with or arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Azerbaijan may present
opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter
Russia.91 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both

85 See, for example, Metin Gurcan, “Turkey’s foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized,” Al-Monitor, September
22, 2020; Sinan Ulgen, “A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy,” foreignpolicy.com, October
6, 2020.
86 Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.”
87 See, for example, Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures, April 19, 2019.
88 Marc Pierini and Francesco Siccardi, “Understanding Turkey’s Direction: Three Scenarios,” Carnegie Europe,
December 9, 2021; “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September
16, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with
Turkey, Iraq,” The Drive, January 14, 2019.
89 Rauf Baker, “The EastMed Gas and Philia Forums: Reimagining Cooperation in the Mediterranean,” Fikra Forum,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 18, 2021.
90 “Pompeo says US will lift arms embargo on Cyprus, Turkey furious,” Reuters, September 2, 2020.
91 See, for example, Gonul Tol and Yoruk Isik, “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot,”
Middle East Institute, February 16, 2021.
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U.S. and Russian ambitions, or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.92 A
case in point will be how Turkey regulates and controls other countries’ maritime access to and
from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936
(with provisions to give Turkey greater control when at war).93
Regional Conflicts and Disputes
Syria94
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has
severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.95 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during
the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has
engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on
some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United
States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates
River where U.S. forces have been based.
Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)
from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s
government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD),
to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have
emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish
authorities.96 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an
umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S.
ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October
2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have
U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action
against Turkey in Congress.97
In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-4), Turkey has set
up local councils. These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these
areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future
governance and Turkey’s overarching role.
The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future
of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups
(including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian
government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict
in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and produced casualties on many
sides. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s

92 See, for example, Stein, “From Ankara with Implications.”
93 Text of the convention available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-
Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf.
94 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
95 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.
96 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019.
97 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019.
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unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy
weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.98
Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas
A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) about
Eastern Mediterranean exploration for natural gas reserves (see text box below for broader
historical context) has brought the ROC, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer together.99 Turkey has
objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector because they have not
involved the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) that controls the northern
one-third of the island. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims to an exclusive
economic zone around part of the island. The ROC, Greece, and Israel have discussed possible
cooperation to export gas finds to Europe via a pipeline bypassing Turkey,100 and an Eastern
Mediterranean Gas Forum officially established itself in 2021, with the ROC, Greece, Israel, and
Egypt among the founding members (and the United States and EU as observers).
Turkish Disputes Regarding Greece and Cyprus: Historical Background101
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, even bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders between each country’s territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and continental shelfJim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 43 Gabriel Honrada, “The Turkish drones winning the Ukraine war,” Asia Times, May 12, 2022. 44 Rich Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey,” New/Lines Magazine, April 26, 2022. 45 Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,” Voice of America, February 2, 2022. 46 Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January 31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 23 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.47 Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-4). Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Overview Russia’s 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine—a country Russia first invaded and partly occupied in 2014—has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. In recent years, Turkey’s links with Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have fueled major U.S.-Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported informal congressional holds on arms sales (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—may have converged as Turkey has participated alongside other NATO countries to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.48 While Turkey has denounced Russia’s invasion and supplied Ukraine with armed drone aircraft (see text box below) and humanitarian assistance, Turkey likely hopes to minimize spillover effects to its national security and economy. The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. As mentioned above, the conflict appears to have worsened Turkey’s ongoing inflation crisis. Additionally, decreases in Russian and Ukrainian tourism are likely to hurt Turkey’s economy, as could cutoffs of imported Russian natural gas and wheat, or Russian military actions in Syria that create new refugee flows.49 Turkey has engaged in mediation between Russia and Ukraine, including some involvement in broader international efforts seeking a corridor through Russian-blockaded waters for Ukrainian grain exports that could alleviate global supply concerns.50 With Turkish officials arguably motivated to improve the country’s economic profile while anticipating closely contested national elections in 2023, they have welcomed sanctioned Russian oligarchs as tourists and investors. Turkey’s actions raise questions about whether it can and will prevent Russian investors from evading Western sanctions.51 47 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, 2022; Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.” 48 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. 49 Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine.” 50 William Mauldin et al., “The Ukraine Crisis: Talks Press Plan to Free Shipments of Grain,” Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2022. 51 Giacomo Tognini, “Why Turkey Could Become the Next Haven for Russian Oligarchs Fleeing Sanctions,” forbes.com, May 3, 2022; Karen Gilchrist, “Turkey may become the new playground for Russian oligarchs – but it’s a Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 24 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Ukraine’s Use of Bayraktar TB2 Drones and Broader Implications Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense cooperation since 2019,52 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has periodically delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion.53 Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s successful use of TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships—often in coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have destroyed Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.54 Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.55 Ukraine became an important alternative source for Turkey in procuring engines after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to concerns about Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.56 Expanding Turkish defense cooperation—including drone exports—with countries near Russia may present opportunities to renew common cause between the West and Turkey in countering Russia.57 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions,58 or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.59 Black Sea Access Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (see Figure A-5) under the 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux Convention”) is important to U.S. interests.60 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of war between Russia and Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which generally bars belligerent countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are returning to their base of origin).61 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for Ukraine.62 (The United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms since it went into effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.) Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may limit Russia from replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some risky strategy,” CNBC, March 30, 2022. 52 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, 2022. 53 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022. 54 Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” New Yorker, May 16, 2022. 55 Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022. 56 Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022. 57 Suat Kiniklioglu, “Necessary friends: Turkey’s improving relationship with the West,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2022. 58 Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey.” 59 Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2021. 60 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” foreignpolicy.com, April 25, 2022. Text of the Convention is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf. 61 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022. 62 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 17 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Russian ships, Russia’s existing Black Sea fleet remains powerful, now controls the key Ukrainian port of Mariupol, and has essentially disabled Ukraine’s navy.63 In March 10 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that (under the Montreux Convention) Turkey has only formally closed the Straits to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent countries, while advising all other countries to refrain from sending warships through the Straits. Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other countries from transit could put NATO at a disadvantage.64 One has asserted that Black Sea access is “essential for the alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania and Bulgaria.65 It is unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside from Russia) to take direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom of navigation, and how that could affect regional security. Conditions on NATO Accession for Sweden and Finland When Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022 (sparked by growing security concerns in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), President Erdogan indicated that Turkey has objections that he wants the two countries to overcome before Turkey will agree to their accession. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies can only happen with the unanimous agreement of existing members. Addressing Turkey’s parliament on May 18, Erdogan said, “The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the respect that is shown to our sensitivities.”66 Erdogan and other Turkish officials have complained that Sweden and Finland support or harbor sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK and the Fethullah Gulen movement.67 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist group.) Turkey is demanding that both countries lift the arms embargoes they have maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against a PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition (see “Syria”).68 Turkish officials also have requested the extradition of alleged PKK members from Sweden and Finland, and reportedly seek to have both countries curtail PKK- and Gulen movement-related activities on their territory.69 After meeting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in New York on May 18, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Turkey expected more support from all NATO allies related to its concerns about the PKK and YPG. He called for U.S. officials to remove the sanctions 63 Jon Jackson, “Russia Risks Losing Its Power in the Black Sea,” Newsweek, May 2, 2022. 64 Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog, March 5, 2022. 65 James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com, March 1, 2022. 66 Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” Washington Post, May 19, 2022. See also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” Economist, May 30, 2022. 67 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, 2022. 68 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. 69 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey demands extradition of PKK members from Sweden, Finland for Nato bid,” Middle East Eye, May 16, 2022; Richard Milne and Laura Pitel, “Erdoğan blocks Nato accession talks with Sweden and Finland,” Financial Times, May 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 17 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief placed on Turkey for its acquisition of an S-400 system from Russia and suspend their support for the YPG in Syria.70 Such calls, which Cavusoglu did not explicitly say were conditions of Swedish and Finnish accession, may be connected with Turkey’s proposed plans to expand its areas of control in northern Syria at the YPG’s expense (see “Syria”). Many U.S. and NATO officials, including President Biden, strongly support Swedish and Finnish accession and have voiced confidence that Turkey will not block it.71 In 2009, Turkey ultimately withdrew objections it had to former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen serving as NATO Secretary General, and in 2019 NATO countries resolved a Turkish delay to defense planning—with both cases at least partly related to Kurdish issues.72 Erdogan might be adopting a nationalistic tone on a globally prominent issue for domestic political gain.73 Some observers express concern that Turkish actions to delay accession could increase its isolation within NATO at a time when the Russia-Ukraine war has presented opportunities to highlight Turkey’s value to NATO and bolster the alliance’s strength.74 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez has called on the Administration to tell Erdogan “you’ve got to act in a different way if you want consideration for anything,” such as the upgrade to its fleet of F-16 aircraft that Turkey is seeking from the United States (discussed below). Senator Thom Tillis, Co-Chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, has said that the United States could act to compel Turkey’s cooperation, but expressed a preference for not escalating tensions.75 U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.76 Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system (discussed below) has raised questions about whether Turkey can remain closely integrated with the United States and NATO on defense matters. However, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey appears less inclined to consider purchases of additional Russian arms. One source quoted a senior Turkish diplomat as saying, “The war has practically killed all potential Turkish-Russian deals in strategic weapons systems.”77 70 Jared Szuba, “US assures Sweden, Finland of military support as Turkey delays NATO entry,” Al-Monitor, May 19, 2022. 71 Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden”; State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at a Joint Press Availability,” June 1, 2022. 72 Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”; Zaman, “Turkey continues to play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership.” 73 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey continues to play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, May 16, 2022. 74 Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”; Zaman, “Turkey continues to play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership.” 75 Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden.” 76 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 77 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program and U.S. Sanctions Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,78 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.79 In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of the F-35 program.”80 Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least 100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and industrial production of the aircraft.81 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish officials continue to publicly express hope that they can acquire the F-35 at some future time. Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision. Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo over Cyprus.82 Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly did not feature technology sharing,83 one reason Turkish officials favored the S-400 was a hope that it could open the door for future technology sharing on air defense with Russia.84 Lack of agreement between the United States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.85 78 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a second system to come later. 79 CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 80 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. 81 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. 82 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019. 83 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 29, 2019. 84 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News, January 10, 2020. 85 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course. Congressional Research Service 11 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400. One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.86 Another is Turkish President Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used by some Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.87 Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expected to purchase a second S-400 system.88 Secretary of State Blinken warned Turkey that acquiring an additional system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.89 Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. Possible F-16 Upgrades and Congressional Views In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet. President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and notification process with Congress.90 Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a new crisis implicating European security—Russia’s war on Ukraine—may have boosted the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,91 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”92 While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”93 In April 2022, the Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade some of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet and provide short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles (Sidewinder AIM-9X and AMRAAM AIM-120D) at a total cost to Turkey of around $500 million.94 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described what upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 86 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018. 87 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019. 88 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021. 89 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021. 90 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 91 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf. 92 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022. 93 Ibid. 94 Jared Malsin, “Biden Administration Asks Congress to Approve New Weapons Deal with Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2022; Daniel Flatley and Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Wins Biden Backing for Its F-16 Fighter Jets Upgrades,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2022. For information on informal and formal congressional notifications, see CRS Congressional Research Service 12 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail, including a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.95 Other countries that may receive new or upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.96 U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to develop technology for the TF-X.97 If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials had previously hinted that they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft.98 After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey’s calculus reportedly changed. According to a Turkish defense analyst, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its fighter jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter] Typhoon, Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”99 Turkey’s support for Ukraine may be inclining some key Members of Congress toward accepting a possible U.S. upgrade or sale of F-16s for Turkey. After the S-400 transaction, some Members reportedly placed informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey, in the biggest disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.100 However, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a May 2022 article interviewed some congressional committee leaders with oversight responsibilities for arms sales.101 Most signaled openness to considering F-16 transactions. Chairman Menendez remained skeptical, saying, “[Turkey] acts in ways that are contrary to our interests in a whole host of things. I think the administration has to stop seeing … the aspirational part of what we would like Turkey to be and realize that Turkey is under Erdogan.”102 In a later interview after Turkey announced conditions on its support for Swedish and Finnish NATO accession, House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Mike McCaul indicated that this Turkish stance could present problems for upgrading Turkey’s F-16s.103 With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in 2021,104 U.S. willingness to upgrade Turkish F-16s could have significant implications for the Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 95 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021. 96 Ibid. 97 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.” 98 Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com, March 15, 2021. 99 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.” 100 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020. 101 Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4, 2022. 102 Ibid. 103 Bryant Harris, “Greece seeks to join F-35 program as it lobbies against Turkey F-16 sale,” Defense News, May 17, 2022. 104 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,” August 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 25 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.105 Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a May 17 joint session of Congress.106 Turkey and Greece have long-standing disputes over maritime and airspace boundaries, energy exploration, and the status of Cyprus (see text box). A recent 2019-2020 spike in tensions has somewhat subsided, but during that time Greece strengthened its relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.107 Turkish Disputes Regarding Greece and Cyprus: Historical Background108 Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves (see Figure A-6). These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major . These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major
unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from a 1974 conflict. The
internationally recognized ROCthe 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, which has close ties to Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its , which has close ties to Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its
effective administrative control is limited to the southern effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority.
Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent
there since the 1974 there since the 1974 conflict.102clash.109 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of the island the In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of the island the TRNC,
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, although no country other although no country other than Turkey recognizes it. Syria110 Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.111 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River where U.S. forces have been based. Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s 105 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022. 106 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress,” May 17, 2022. 107 Seethan Turkey recognizes it.
In late 2019, the Turkey-Cyprus dispute became intertwined with some long-standing Turkey-
Greece disagreements (discussed in the text box above) when Turkey signed an agreement with
Libya’s then-Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries (see Figure A-
5).103 The dispute increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions, especially after Greece and Egypt
reached a maritime boundary agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal.104

98 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-
idlib-revealed-1.771953.
99 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2020.
100 “Battling over boundaries,” Economist, August 22, 2020. The feasibility of such a pipeline is unclear. Sue Surkes,
“Mistake to leave Turkey out of new East Med gas club – international expert,” Times of Israel, September 27, 2020.
101 For more information, see CRS Report R41368, CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and , by Jim Zanotti and
Clayton Thomas and CRS Report R41136, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, by Vincent L. Morelli.
102Clayton Thomas. 108 Ibid. 109 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between 50,000 50,000
and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprusreserves. “Cyprus— - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February 3, 2021Army,” Jane’s Group UK, October 2019. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission . The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission
(UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia.
The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of
the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
103 See also “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org.
104 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?”
foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020.
110 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. 111 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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link to page 26 link to page 12 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.112 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.113 In May 2022, Erdogan said that Turkey was considering a military operation to expand areas of Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence.114 In response, the State Department spokesperson recognized Turkey’s “legitimate security concerns” but condemned any escalation and said that the United States supports maintenance of the current ceasefire lines to avoid destabilization and putting U.S. forces at risk in the campaign against the Islamic State.115 In early June, Turkey announced plans that involve areas west of the Euphrates River away from U.S. forces, which are concentrated on the river’s east side (see Figure A-7).116 Russian officials also have raised some concerns about how a new Turkish offensive might escalate tensions and may seek to encourage greater Turkish coordination with Syrian government forces.117 In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils. These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future governance and Turkey’s overarching role. The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups (including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and caused several Turkish and Syrian casualties. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.118 Questions related to the Russia-Ukraine war about the effect of Turkish measures to limit Russian military access to Syria 112 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria), see footnote 68. 113 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019. 114 Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2022. 115 State Department Press Briefing, May 24, 2022. The United States and Russia established separate arrangements with Turkey in October 2019 for managing certain areas of northeast Syria. White House, “The United States and Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” October 17, 2019; State Department, “Special Representative for Syria Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the Traveling Press,” October 17, 2019; President of Russia, “Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation,” October 22, 2019. 116 Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan announces military operations in Syria's Manbij, Tal Rifaat,” Al-Monitor, June 1, 2022. 117 Fehim Tastekin, “Ukraine, Syria top Lavrov’s agenda in Turkey,” Al-Monitor, June 6, 2022. 118 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-idlib-revealed-1.771953. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief by air and sea,119 and possible Russian moves to limit humanitarian access, could affect future developments.120 Refugees in Turkey Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion Syrian refugees—more than any other country—along with hundreds of thousands from other countries.121 A few weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine began, Turkey estimated that 20,000 Ukrainians had come to Turkey.122 Refugees’ and other migrants’ living situations, effect on Turkey’s population, and access to employment, education, and public services vary based on the differing circumstances that they face. Turkey closed off most access to migrants from Syria in 2015123 and has sought to repatriate refugees who are wil ing to return,124 with a few hundred thousand reportedly having done so to date.125 Reportedly, Turkish authorities have forcibly returned some refugees to Syria.126 Per a 2016 Turkey-EU agreement to minimize the flow of migrants to the EU, Greece can return Syrian migrants to Turkey that come to its islands. As part of a structured process, the deal calls for the same number of people to be resettled from Turkey in EU countries.127 The agreement also mandated EU economic assistance for refugees in Turkey. During some times of crisis, President Erdogan has threatened to open Turkey’s borders to allow migrants into Greece and Bulgaria. Those countries implement security measures—with the assistance of the EU’s border and coast guard agency—to minimize the number of crossings via land or sea, and some sources have criticized them for alleged ethical or international legal violations related to the treatment of refugees or migrants.128 119 Dorian Jones, “Ankara Tightens Russian Access to Syria,” Voice of America, May 10, 2022. 120 Lara Jakes, “Fear That Russia Plans to Leverage Syrian Aid for an Edge in Ukraine,” New York Times, June 1, 2022. 121 See https://reporting.unhcr.org/turkey#toc-narratives. 122 Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan steps up pro-refugee rhetoric as 20,000 Ukrainians come to Turkey,” Al-Monitor, March 17, 2022. 123 Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria,” New York Times, March 29, 2015. 124 “Turkey talks with UN over returning Syrian refugees,” Associated Press, September 12, 2021. 125 Durrie Bouscaren, “Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey face a difficult decision to return home,” The World, September 23, 2021. 126 Sultan al-Kanj, “Turkey forcibly deports dozens of Syrians,” Al Monitor, February 8, 2022. 127 Text of agreement available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/. 128 “Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy,” Amnesty International, June 23, 2021; “Bulgaria: Pushbacks Escalate as Government Discusses Reinforcements at Borders,” European Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance Geography Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas People Population: 83,047,706 Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. % of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) Economy GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $37,488 Real GDP Growth: 2.7% Inflation: 60.5% Unemployment: 11.3% Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 4.8% Public Debt as % of GDP: 43.3% Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 5.7% Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022 estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. Congressional Research Service 17 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure A-2. Turkey: Annual Inflation Rate Sources: Reuters (May 2022) using data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical Institute. Congressional Research Service 18 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure A-3. Bayraktar TB2 Drone Congressional Research Service 19 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure A-4. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets since 2011. Note: All locations are approximate. Congressional Research Service 20 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure A-5. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits Congressional Research Service 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure A-6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. Congressional Research Service 22 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure A-7. Syria Conflict Map Congressional Research Service 23 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Appendix B. Relations with Israel and Arab States Since the 2010s, Turkey’s relations with Israel and with Sunni Arab governments that support traditional authoritarian governance models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—have been fraught with tension. Under President Erdogan, Turkey and Israel have clashed politically over Israel’s handling of Palestinian issues and Turkey’s support for the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), even though the countries have continued to expand trade ties.129 The Sunni Arab governments have regarded Turkey with suspicion largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.130 Developments in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and its rivalries with the Sunni Arab governments because they supported opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. In late 2019, Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s then-Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries, complicating the legal and economic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Tensions spiked further after Greece and Egypt reached a maritime boundary agreement in August 2020 that ignores the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal. In the past year, however, Turkey has sought rapprochement with some of its regional rivals. The potential economic benefits could help alleviate Turkey’s financial crisis ahead of closely contested presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023. For example, Erdogan and UAE President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan have visited each other in recent months, and the two countries have signed a currency swap deal along with many other agreements on economic cooperation and investment.131 Additionally, figures indicate that Turkish trade with Saudi Arabia increased year-on-year by 25% in the first quarter of 2022.132 In April 2022, Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia after Turkey transferred jurisdiction to the Saudis over the trial Turkey had previously convened for Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. One media report anticipates UAE investment in Turkey’s defense industry and Turkish defense exports to the Gulf—potentially including drones, air defense systems, and various air, sea, and land platforms.133 Moreover, Israel and Turkey have shown signs of improving ties over the past year. The two countries maintain diplomatic relations but have not had ambassadors stationed in each other’s country since 2018. Israeli openness to rapprochement with Turkey may stem from a confluence of factors, including  Potentially greater Turkish willingness to reduce its support for Hamas in hopes of better political and economic relations with Israel and other key U.S. partners in the region (Sunni Arab governments such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia)—partly to improve Turkey’s image in Washington. Some reports from early 2022 129 Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell, “President Herzog’s visit to Ankara: A first step in normalizing Turkey-Israel relations?” Brookings Institution, March 7, 2022. 130 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020. 131 “UAE and Turkey central banks seek further co-operation after currency swap deal,” The National, February 17, 2022. 132 Sinem Cengiz, “Echoes from President Erdoğan's Saudi Arabia Visit: A Fresh Start?” Politics Today, May 5, 2022. 133 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals,” Defense News, March 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief  hinted at Turkey’s willingness to expel Hamas members allegedly involved in militant operations from its territory.134  Increasing Israeli focus on how relations with Turkey and other regional countries might help counter Iran.  The 2021 leadership change from the Netanyahu government to the Bennett- Lapid power-sharing government. In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey. In May, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Israel (and the West Bank), and the two countries anticipate future bilateral meetings and steps to improve political and economic relations. President Erdogan and other top Turkish officials have made public statements expressing interest in energy cooperation with Israel. However, Israeli officials reportedly remain skeptical about prospects for a subsea Israel-Turkey natural gas pipeline.135 While Israel has pursued greater high-level interaction with Turkey, it may be cautious about significant near-term improvements in bilateral relations, and appears to remain committed to close strategic ties with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.136 Author Information Jim Zanotti Clayton Thomas Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs SpecialistTurkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

Efforts by individual European governments, the EU, NATO, and the United States to de-escalate
tensions have highlighted competing international interests and objectives.105 Greece and the
ROC are EU members, but Turkey is not, and prospects for its accession are dim for the
foreseeable future. Greece and Turkey are NATO members, but the ROC is not.
Turkey-Greece talks on territorial disputes resumed in January 2021 after a five-year hiatus, but
significant progress on the underlying issues of dispute remains elusive. Additionally, preliminary
United Nations-led talks on Cyprus stalled in April 2021.106 ROC President Nicos Anastasiades
has said he will not negotiate as long as the TRNC’s leader Ersin Tatar, who assumed office in
October 2020, advocates Turkish Cypriot independence and a “two-state solution.”107 President
Erdogan has echoed Tatar’s advocacy of a two-state solution.108
Middle East Rivalries and Libya
In the Middle East, Sunni Arab governments that support traditional authoritarian governance
models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—
regard Turkey with suspicion, largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for
Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.109 Ties with Turkey have bolstered
Qatar to the extent other Arab states have sought to isolate it, and while Qatar’s efforts to
reintegrate with its Arab Gulf neighbors may somewhat limit its cooperation with Turkey, Qatari
resources have helped Turkey strengthen its troubled financial position and support its regional
military posture.110 Further signs of tension between Turkey and Sunni Arab states come from a
Turkish military presence at bases in Qatar and Somalia.111
Libya represents another aspect of Turkey’s rivalry with these states. Turkey has played a
prominent role in conflict in Libya since late 2019, when Turkish officials reached maritime
boundary and security agreements with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), which
was recognized at that time by the United States and the U.N. Security Council. Turkish military
personnel then began providing advice and material support (including drone aircraft and Syrian
mercenaries) to Islamist-friendly western Libya-based forces fighting against Khalifa Haftar’s
Libyan National Army (LNA) movement.112 Egypt, the UAE, Russia, and others have backed
Haftar’s LNA movement. After a U.N.-brokered cease-fire was reached in October 2020, Libyans
approved a new Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2021. While the terms of the

105 For example, The United States has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though it
does recognize UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law. Greece and the ROC have ratified
UNCLOS; Turkey has not.
106 John Psaropoulos, “Cyprus’ reunification: What next after failed talks?” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2021. The U.N.
Security Council reaffirmed its support for “an enduring, comprehensive, and just settlement based on a bicommunal,
bizonal federation with political equality” in a resolution adopted on January 29, 2021 (UNSC Resolution 2561/2021).
107 “After another Cyprus talks collapse, Anastasiades walking away,” National Herald, May 3, 2021.
108 Dorian Jones, “Erdogan Calls for Two-state Solution on Cyprus,” Voice of America, July 20, 2021.
109 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting
MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020.
110 Fehim Tastekin, “Turkey’s good relations with Qatar may not be enough for Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, December 8,
2021; Ibrahim Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar: Foul-Weather Friends!” Defence Turkey, vol. 14, issue 98, 2020, pp. 34-
47.
111 Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar”; “Turkey to train 1/3 of entire Somali military, envoy says,” Daily Sabah, August 4,
2020.
112 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, North and West
Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-
March 30, 2020, July 16, 2020.
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cease-fire and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2570 call for all mercenaries and foreign fighters
to be withdrawn from Libya, Turkey has reportedly delayed taking action, perhaps partly because
of uncertainty about Libya’s future leadership and political course.113
Turkey’s involvement in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern
Mediterranean and its rivalry with other states in the region. In 2021, Turkey has made some
headway in softening tensions with Sunni Arab governments, highlighted by a November 2021
visit to Ankara by UAE de facto leader Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan and
accompanying Turkey-UAE agreements on economic cooperation and investment.114 Prospects
for broader regional rapprochement remain unclear, including with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Israel.115 Turkey maintains diplomatic ties and significant levels of trade with Israel, but Turkey-
Israel relations have deteriorated significantly during Erdogan’s rule.116
Outlook and U.S. Options
The future of U.S.-Turkey relations could depend on a number of factors, including the following:
 whether President Erdogan is able to maintain control in the country given its
currency crisis and various human rights and rule of law concerns.
 whether Turkey makes its Russian S-400 system fully operational and purchases
additional Russian arms;
 how various regional crises (Syria, Libya, Eastern Mediterranean disputes with
Greece and Cyprus) develop and influence Turkey’s relationships with key actors
(including the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Israel, Iran, and
Sunni Arab governments); and
 whether Turkey can project power and create its own sphere of influence using
military and economic cooperation (including defense exports).
Administration and congressional actions regarding Turkey can have implications for bilateral
ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial
well-being. These actions could include responding to Turkey’s late 2021 request to purchase and
upgrade F-16s, evaluating and possibly changing CAATSA sanctions, assessing U.S./NATO
basing options, and balancing relations with Turkey and its regional rivals. U.S. actions related to
Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 also could affect U.S. relations with respect to other key
partners who have purchased or may purchase advanced weapons from Russia—including India,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
How closely the U.S. government might engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S.
perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor
might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations.
Support for Erdogan relative to other key domestic figures may hinge partly on national security
and economic conditions and developments, and partly on ideological or group identity
considerations stemming from ethnicity, religion, gender, and class.

113 “Turkey calls for preserving calm in Libya after elections delay,” Xinhua, December 24, 2021.
114 Orhan Coskun, “Turkey, UAE sign investment accords worth billions of dollars,” Reuters, November 24, 2021.
115 “Erdogan’s visit to Qatar to yield deals but no MbS meeting,” Reuters, December 6, 2021; “Erdogan says Turkey
seeking to mend troubled ties with Israel,” Agence France Presse and Times of Israel, November 29, 2021.
116 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
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Appendix. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 82,482,383. Most populous cities (2020): Istanbul 15.2 mil, Ankara 5.1 mil, Izmir 3.0
mil, Bursa 2.0 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.7 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4%
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 7%-12% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $31,080
Real GDP Growth: 8.0% (2021), 3.3% (2022 proj.)
Inflation: 18.9%
Unemployment: 13.0%
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 3.1%
Public Debt as % of GDP: 39.4%
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 2.4%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2021
estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook.
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Figure A-2. Bayraktar TB2 Drone


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Figure A-3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS.
Note: All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-4. Syria-Turkey Border

Sources: CRS, using area of influence data from IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor. All areas of influence approximate
and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports.
Note: This map does not depict all U.S. bases in Syria.

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Figure A-5. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.


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Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs in Middle Eastern Affairs




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134 Ariel Kahana, “Report: Israel, Turkey working to deport Hamas officials from Ankara,” Israel Hayom, February 15, 2022; Ofer Bengio, “Turkey Finds Israel Useful Again,” Tablet, March 13, 2022. 135 Lazar Berman, “FM’s visit shows Turkey eager to accelerate reconciliation, but Israel more cautious,” Times of Israel, May 24, 2022. While such a pipeline may be the most feasible pipeline option for transporting Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to Europe, political and economic obstacles may make liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from liquefaction terminals in Egypt a more practical option. “Turkey best option for East Med gas transit to Europe: Experts,” Daily Sabah, March 10, 2022; Sean Mathews, “Russia-Ukraine war: Conflict boosts hopes for East Mediterranean energy, experts say,” Middle East Eye, April 5, 2022. 136 “Summit in Ankara: Turkey is wooing a reluctant Israel,” Americans for Peace Now, March 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service R44000 · VERSION 71 · UPDATED 25 Congressional Research Service
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