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Net Neutrality Law: An Overview

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Net Neutrality Law: An Overview
November 22, 2021May 27, 2022
While there is general support for the basic concept of the open internet, net neutrality has been a While there is general support for the basic concept of the open internet, net neutrality has been a
perennially difficult subject for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission). perennially difficult subject for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission).
Chris D. Linebaugh
The complexity lies, in part, in the fact that the FCC’s ability to adopt net neutrality rules The complexity lies, in part, in the fact that the FCC’s ability to adopt net neutrality rules
Legislative Attorney Legislative Attorney
depends on the legal classification it gives to broadband internet access service under the depends on the legal classification it gives to broadband internet access service under the

Communications Act of 1934. As amended, the Act defines two mutually exclusive categories of Communications Act of 1934. As amended, the Act defines two mutually exclusive categories of
services: telecommunications services and information services. While telecommunications services: telecommunications services and information services. While telecommunications

service providers are treated as highly regulated common carriers under Title II of the service providers are treated as highly regulated common carriers under Title II of the
Communications Act, the FCC has much more limited regulatory authority over information service providers. Communications Act, the FCC has much more limited regulatory authority over information service providers.
The FCC has alternated between classifying broadband as a telecommunications service and an information service. The U.S. The FCC has alternated between classifying broadband as a telecommunications service and an information service. The U.S.
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have affirmed the FCC’s discretion to make this classification decision, but courts Supreme Court and lower federal courts have affirmed the FCC’s discretion to make this classification decision, but courts
have also established that the FCC’s ability to adopt net neutrality regulations is contingent on its classification choice. In have also established that the FCC’s ability to adopt net neutrality regulations is contingent on its classification choice. In
2010, the FCC tried to adopt binding net neutrality rules while classifying broadband as an information service, and the U.S. 2010, the FCC tried to adopt binding net neutrality rules while classifying broadband as an information service, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit largely overturned this effort. The FCC responded in 2015 by reclassifying broadband Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit largely overturned this effort. The FCC responded in 2015 by reclassifying broadband
as a Title II telecommunications service and adopting even more extensive net neutrality rules that the D.C. Circuit upheld. as a Title II telecommunications service and adopting even more extensive net neutrality rules that the D.C. Circuit upheld.
These rules, among other things, prohibited broadband providers from discriminating against lawful internet traffic by These rules, among other things, prohibited broadband providers from discriminating against lawful internet traffic by
blocking it, degrading it, or favoring other internet traffic over it in exchange for payment. The FCC’s action was blocking it, degrading it, or favoring other internet traffic over it in exchange for payment. The FCC’s action was
controversial, but not only because of the net neutrality rules. The Title II reclassification gave the FCC extensive regulatory controversial, but not only because of the net neutrality rules. The Title II reclassification gave the FCC extensive regulatory
authority over broadband and came with a new set of requirements, such as Title II’s prohibition on carriers charging unjust authority over broadband and came with a new set of requirements, such as Title II’s prohibition on carriers charging unjust
and unreasonable rates to consumers. and unreasonable rates to consumers.
Following a change in leadership, the FCC changed course again in 2017. Citing the regulatory uncertainty and compliance Following a change in leadership, the FCC changed course again in 2017. Citing the regulatory uncertainty and compliance
costs of Title II, the FCC reclassified broadband as an information service and jettisoned the 2015 net neutrality rules. This costs of Title II, the FCC reclassified broadband as an information service and jettisoned the 2015 net neutrality rules. This
action likewise largely survived legal challenges, and remains in effect. This action has not, however, ended the debate on net action likewise largely survived legal challenges, and remains in effect. This action has not, however, ended the debate on net
neutrality regulation. Some states have passed their own net neutrality laws, and a further change in federal policy—either neutrality regulation. Some states have passed their own net neutrality laws, and a further change in federal policy—either
from Congress or the FCC—is possible. from Congress or the FCC—is possible.
This report provides an overview of net neutrality law as it has developed through FCC actions and court decisions. The This report provides an overview of net neutrality law as it has developed through FCC actions and court decisions. The
report first lays out the statutory provisions that set the legal boundaries for the FCC’s regulatory authority in this area. The report first lays out the statutory provisions that set the legal boundaries for the FCC’s regulatory authority in this area. The
report then provides a historical overview of the FCC’s actions classifying broadband internet access service and addressing report then provides a historical overview of the FCC’s actions classifying broadband internet access service and addressing
net neutrality, and examines the judicial decisions reviewing these actions. The report concludes by considering possible next net neutrality, and examines the judicial decisions reviewing these actions. The report concludes by considering possible next
steps in the field of net neutrality law, such as potential actions by Congress or the FCC. steps in the field of net neutrality law, such as potential actions by Congress or the FCC.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 41
Statutory Framework ....................................................................................................................... 63
Titles I and III ............................................................................................................................ 74
Title II ........................................................................................................................................ 96
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act ............................................................................. 7 10
FCC Actions and Court Decisions ................................................................................................... 8 11
Early Classification of BIAS and the Brand X Decision.......................................................... 11. 8 Internet Policy Statement and the Comcast Decision ............................................................. 10
2010 Order and the Verizon Decision ....................................................................................... 11 13
2015 Open Internet Order and the USTA decision .................................................................. 1412
RIF Order ................................................................................................................................ 1715
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC .............................................................................................................. 1917
2020 Remand Order ................................................................................................................ 2119
Next Steps...................................................................................................................................... 2220

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 2421

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Introduction
President Biden signed an executive order on July 9, 2021, calling on the Federal President Biden signed an executive order on July 9, 2021, calling on the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to consider adopting “net neutrality” rules.1 Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to consider adopting “net neutrality” rules.1
Net neutrality generally refers to the idea that internet service providers should neither control Net neutrality generally refers to the idea that internet service providers should neither control
how consumers use their networks nor discriminate among the content providers that use their how consumers use their networks nor discriminate among the content providers that use their
networks.2 Should the FCC follow the President’s prompt, it will not be the first time the agency networks.2 Should the FCC follow the President’s prompt, it will not be the first time the agency
has wrestled with net neutrality. Rather, for more than a decade, net neutrality has been a has wrestled with net neutrality. Rather, for more than a decade, net neutrality has been a
perennially challenging issue for the Commission. perennially challenging issue for the Commission.
The difficulty springs The difficulty springs in part from the fact that the FCC’s ability to adopt net neutrality rules is tied to from the fact that the FCC’s ability to adopt net neutrality rules is tied to
the legal classification it gives to broadband internet access service (BIAS) under the the legal classification it gives to broadband internet access service (BIAS) under the
Communications Act of 1934 (the Communications Act).3 The Communications Act, as amended, Communications Act of 1934 (the Communications Act).3 The Communications Act, as amended,
gives the FCC different levels of regulatory authority depending on whether the Commission gives the FCC different levels of regulatory authority depending on whether the Commission
classifies a service as a “telecommunications service” or an “information service.”4 The FCC has classifies a service as a “telecommunications service” or an “information service.”4 The FCC has
broad authority under Title II of the Communications Act to regulate providers of broad authority under Title II of the Communications Act to regulate providers of
telecommunications services as common carriers.5 By contrast, the FCC’s regulatory authority telecommunications services as common carriers.5 By contrast, the FCC’s regulatory authority
over information services—which are not subject to Title II—is limited.6 over information services—which are not subject to Title II—is limited.6
The FCC has alternated between classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service and an The FCC has alternated between classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service and an
information service. In the early years of BIAS, the FCC concluded that BIAS provided over information service. In the early years of BIAS, the FCC concluded that BIAS provided over
telephone lines—referred to as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service—involved a pure telephone lines—referred to as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service—involved a pure
transmission of information that was best classified as a telecommunications service.7 Several transmission of information that was best classified as a telecommunications service.7 Several
years later, the Commission took a different approach toward BIAS provided over cable years later, the Commission took a different approach toward BIAS provided over cable
television networks.8 It determined that the pure-transmission aspect of cable broadband television networks.8 It determined that the pure-transmission aspect of cable broadband
functionally integrated with a variety of other features that the Commission deemed information functionally integrated with a variety of other features that the Commission deemed information
services.9 Consequently, the FCC classified cable broadband service as a single integrated services.9 Consequently, the FCC classified cable broadband service as a single integrated
information service.10 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s classification of cable BIAS in information service.10 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s classification of cable BIAS in
its landmark 2005 decision in its landmark 2005 decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services
.11 .11 Brand X established the FCC’s discretion to choose between the established the FCC’s discretion to choose between the
telecommunications and information service categories in classifying BIAS.12 Following telecommunications and information service categories in classifying BIAS.12 Following Brand

1 Exec. Order No. 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (issued July 9, 2021). 1 Exec. Order No. 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (issued July 9, 2021).
22 See CRS In Focus IF10955, CRS In Focus IF10955, Access to Broadband Networks: Net Neutrality, by Angele A. Gilroy (“While there is no , by Angele A. Gilroy (“While there is no
single accepted definition of net neutrality most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that single accepted definition of net neutrality most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that
owners of the networks that comprise and provide access to the internet should not control how consumers lawfully use owners of the networks that comprise and provide access to the internet should not control how consumers lawfully use
that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network.”). that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network.”).
3 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–646. 3 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–646.
4 4 Id. § 153(24), (53). § 153(24), (53).
5 5 Id. §§ 153(51), 201–231. §§ 153(51), 201–231.
6 6 Id. § 153(24), (53). § 153(24), (53).
7 In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 7 In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 FCC Rcd.
24012 (1998) [hereinafter DSL Order]. 24012 (1998) [hereinafter DSL Order].
8 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) 8 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002)
[hereinafter Cable Broadband Order]. [hereinafter Cable Broadband Order].
9 9 Id.
10 10 Id.
11 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 11 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
12 12 Id. As discussed later in the report, the Court also held that the FCC is free to change its position, within the limits of As discussed later in the report, the Court also held that the FCC is free to change its position, within the limits of
a reasonable statutory interpretation, as long as it provides an adequate justification for the change. a reasonable statutory interpretation, as long as it provides an adequate justification for the change. Id. at 1001. at 1001.
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X, the FCC reclassified DSL service and uniformly treated all forms of BIAS as information , the FCC reclassified DSL service and uniformly treated all forms of BIAS as information
services.13 services.13
At the same time, the FCC took steps toward promoting net neutrality. In 2005, the Commission At the same time, the FCC took steps toward promoting net neutrality. In 2005, the Commission
adopted a policy statement proclaiming that consumers are entitled to lawful internet content, adopted a policy statement proclaiming that consumers are entitled to lawful internet content,
applications, and services of their choice.14 In 2010, applications, and services of their choice.14 In 2010, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) rejected the FCC’s effort to enforce this policy District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) rejected the FCC’s effort to enforce this policy
statement against Comcast, the Commission went a step further by adopting binding rules on
internet openness.15 These rules imposed a transparency requirement on BIAS providers and
prohibited them from blocking or discriminating against lawful internet traffic, services, or
devices.16 As the FCC still classified BIAS as an information service, the Commission grounded
its authority for the rules instatement against the BIAS provider Comcast in Comcast v. FCC, concluding that the Commission failed to ground its action in a statutory provision giving it affirmative regulatory authority.15 The Commission responded by issuing a new order (2010 Order) that adopted binding rules on internet openness.16 The FCC based its authority for the 2010 Order on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, a non-Title II provision Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, a non-Title II provision
that directs the Commission to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable that directs the Commission to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis” of timely basis” of
“advanced telecommunications capability.”17 “advanced telecommunications capability.”17 In its 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit overturnedThe 2010 Order imposed a transparency requirement on BIAS providers and prohibited them from blocking or discriminating against lawful internet traffic, services, or devices.18 The D.C. Circuit again invalidated the FCC’s action in its 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC, overturning the anti-blocking and discrimination rules. the anti-blocking and discrimination rules.1819 The court held that the anti- The court held that the anti-
blocking and discrimination rules treated BIAS-providers as common carriers, which is blocking and discrimination rules treated BIAS-providers as common carriers, which is
prohibited under the Communications Act unless they are classified as telecommunications prohibited under the Communications Act unless they are classified as telecommunications
carriers subject to Title II.carriers subject to Title II.1920
The FCC responded to the The FCC responded to the Verizon decision by issuing a new order (2015 Open Internet Order) decision by issuing a new order (2015 Open Internet Order)
that reclassified BIAS as a Title II telecommunications service.that reclassified BIAS as a Title II telecommunications service.2021 The 2015 Open Internet Order The 2015 Open Internet Order
imposed three bright-line rules designed to foster net neutrality,imposed three bright-line rules designed to foster net neutrality,2122 prohibiting BIAS providers prohibiting BIAS providers
from: (1) “blocking” lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; from: (1) “blocking” lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices;
(2) “throttling” (i.e., impairing or degrading) lawful internet traffic on the basis of content, (2) “throttling” (i.e., impairing or degrading) lawful internet traffic on the basis of content,
applications, services, or non-harmful devices; and (3) engaging in “paid prioritization,” defined applications, services, or non-harmful devices; and (3) engaging in “paid prioritization,” defined
as favoring some internet traffic over others in exchange for consideration.as favoring some internet traffic over others in exchange for consideration.2223 The 2015 Open The 2015 Open
Internet Order also established a more flexible standard, known as the “General Conduct Rule,” Internet Order also established a more flexible standard, known as the “General Conduct Rule,”
which prohibited BIAS providers from “unreasonably interfer[ing] or unreasonably which prohibited BIAS providers from “unreasonably interfer[ing] or unreasonably
disadvantag[ing]” users from accessing the content or services of their choice.disadvantag[ing]” users from accessing the content or services of their choice.23
The D.C. Circuit upheld the 2015 Open Internet Order in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC
(USTA),24 but the Commission itself reversed course under new leadership a few years later.25 In a
new order adopted in December of 2017, called “Restoring Internet Freedom” (RIF Order), the
24
13 In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC 13 In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC
Rcd. 14853 (2005) [hereinafter DSL Reclassification Order]. Rcd. 14853 (2005) [hereinafter DSL Reclassification Order].
14 In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC 14 In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC
Rcd. 14986, 14988 (2005) [hereinafter Rcd. 14986, 14988 (2005) [hereinafter 2005Internet Policy Statement]. Policy Statement].
15 15 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 16 In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Order]. In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Order].
1617 Id. 18
17 Id.
18 19 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
1920 Id.
2021 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open
Internet Order]. Internet Order].
2122 Id.
2223 Id.
23 Id.
24 825 F.3d 674 (2016).
25 In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) [hereinafter RIF Order].
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24 Id. Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 23 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview The D.C. Circuit upheld the 2015 Open Internet Order in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA),25 but the Commission itself reversed course under new leadership a few years later.26 In a new order adopted in December of 2017, called “Restoring Internet Freedom” (RIF Order), the FCC reclassified BIAS as an information service and eliminated the bright-line rules and the FCC reclassified BIAS as an information service and eliminated the bright-line rules and the
General Conduct rule, leaving in place only a transparency rule applicable to BIAS providers.General Conduct rule, leaving in place only a transparency rule applicable to BIAS providers.2627
The FCC justified the new approach by explaining that a “light-touch” regulatory framework for The FCC justified the new approach by explaining that a “light-touch” regulatory framework for
BIAS would promote investment and innovation better than the “heavy-handed utility-style BIAS would promote investment and innovation better than the “heavy-handed utility-style
regulation” of Title II.regulation” of Title II.2728 It also reasoned that the 2015 Open Internet Order’s net-neutrality rules It also reasoned that the 2015 Open Internet Order’s net-neutrality rules
were unnecessary, given the transparency requirements, antitrust laws, and consumer protection were unnecessary, given the transparency requirements, antitrust laws, and consumer protection
laws that would still apply to BIAS providers.laws that would still apply to BIAS providers.2829 The D.C. Circuit subsequently upheld the bulk of The D.C. Circuit subsequently upheld the bulk of
the RIF Order in the RIF Order in Mozilla Corp. v. FCC..2930
The net neutrality debate did not end with the RIF Order and the The net neutrality debate did not end with the RIF Order and the Mozilla decision. Several states decision. Several states
have enacted net neutrality laws, and have enacted net neutrality laws, and these laws have generated legal challenges from litigants
who argue that they conflict with the deregulatory policy of the RIF Order and are preempted.30the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) has rejected arguments that California’s net neutrality law is preempted by federal law.31
The 116th Congress also considered several bills that would The 116th Congress also considered several bills that would have directly directly addressaddressed net neutrality. For net neutrality. For
instance, the Save the Internet Act, which instance, the Save the Internet Act, which would restore the 2015 Order, passed the U.S. House of passed the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2020Representatives in 2020 and may be reintroduced in the 117th Congress.31, would have restored the 2015 Order.32 Absent congressional Absent congressional
action, the action, the FCC itself FCC might adopt a new net neutrality ordermight adopt a new net neutrality order, particularly if President Biden’s nominees
are confirmed and there are no vacancies on the Commission.32.33
This report provides an overview of net neutrality law as it has developed through FCC actions This report provides an overview of net neutrality law as it has developed through FCC actions
and court decisions. The report first lays out the statutory provisions that set the legal boundaries and court decisions. The report first lays out the statutory provisions that set the legal boundaries
for the FCC’s authority, including the difference between a telecommunications service subject to for the FCC’s authority, including the difference between a telecommunications service subject to
Title II and a more lightly regulated information service. The report then provides a historical Title II and a more lightly regulated information service. The report then provides a historical
overview of the FCC’s various actions classifying BIAS and addressing net neutrality, and overview of the FCC’s various actions classifying BIAS and addressing net neutrality, and
it examines courts’ review of these actions in examines courts’ review of these actions in Brand X, , Comcast, Verizon, , USTA, and , and Mozilla. The report . The report
concludes by considering possible next steps in the realm of net neutrality law, such as potential concludes by considering possible next steps in the realm of net neutrality law, such as potential
actions by Congress or the FCC.actions by Congress or the FCC.3334
Statutory Framework
The FCC has relied on its legal authority under the Communications Act and the The FCC has relied on its legal authority under the Communications Act and the
Telecommunications Act of Telecommunications Act of 199634199635 (Telecommunications Act) to formulate its regulatory policy (Telecommunications Act) to formulate its regulatory policy
towards BIAS and net neutrality. Under the Communications Act, wire and radio communications towards BIAS and net neutrality. Under the Communications Act, wire and radio communications
are subject to a unified federal framework overseen by the FCC.35 The Communications Act is

26 Id. at 312–13.
27 Id. at 312.
28 Id. at 313.
29 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
30 25 825 F.3d 674 (2016). 26 In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) [hereinafter RIF Order]. 27 Id. at 312–13. 28 Id. at 312. 29 Id. at 313. 30 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 31 See the section See the section “Next Steps” for a discussion of state net neutrality laws and possible congressional or FCC actions. for a discussion of state net neutrality laws and possible congressional or FCC actions.
31 Id.
32 President Biden has nominated current FCC Chair Jessica Rosenworcel to serve an additional term, and he has
nominated Gigi Sohn to fill the remaining vacant position. See President Biden Announces Key Nominations,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/10/26/president-biden-announces-key-nominations-8/.
3332 Id. 33 Id. 34 For a discussion of policy issues related to net neutrality For a discussion of policy issues related to net neutrality see CRS Report R40616, CRS Report R40616, The Federal Net Neutrality
Debate: Access to Broadband Networks
, by Patricia Moloney Figliola and CRS In Focus IF10955, , by Patricia Moloney Figliola and CRS In Focus IF10955, Access to
Broadband Networks: Net Neutrality
, by Angele A. Gilroy. , by Angele A. Gilroy.
3435 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
35 47 U.S.C. § 151 (“[B]y centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting
additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a
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are subject to a unified federal framework overseen by the FCC.36 The Communications Act is divided into various titles, the first three of which are relevant to this report. Titles I and III define divided into various titles, the first three of which are relevant to this report. Titles I and III define
categories of services that determine whether a service provider may be classified as a highly categories of services that determine whether a service provider may be classified as a highly
regulated common carrier or a lightly regulated information service provider.regulated common carrier or a lightly regulated information service provider.3637 Title II contains Title II contains
the substantive requirements applicable to common carriers.the substantive requirements applicable to common carriers.3738 Along with these three titles, Along with these three titles,
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act figures prominently in the FCC’s net neutrality Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act figures prominently in the FCC’s net neutrality
actions. While much of the Telecommunications Act amended the Communications Act, Section actions. While much of the Telecommunications Act amended the Communications Act, Section
706 is a stand-alone provision that directs the FCC to encourage the deployment of broadband.706 is a stand-alone provision that directs the FCC to encourage the deployment of broadband.3839
Each of these provisions is discussed further below. Each of these provisions is discussed further below.
Titles I and III
Title I of the Communications Act defines two terms foundational to the FCC’s net neutrality Title I of the Communications Act defines two terms foundational to the FCC’s net neutrality
actions: “telecommunications service” and “information service.”actions: “telecommunications service” and “information service.”3940 “Telecommunications “Telecommunications
service,” means the “offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.”service,” means the “offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.”4041
“Telecommunications,” in turn, is defined as “the transmission, between or among points “Telecommunications,” in turn, is defined as “the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content
of the information as sent and received.”of the information as sent and received.”4142
“Information service” is defined as the “offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, “Information service” is defined as the “offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications.”telecommunications.”4243 This definition exempts “any such ability for the management, control, or This definition exempts “any such ability for the management, control, or
operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service” operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service”
(referred to as the “telecommunications management exception”).(referred to as the “telecommunications management exception”).4344
The Supreme Court has explained that these two key terms, which Congress added to the The Supreme Court has explained that these two key terms, which Congress added to the
Communications Act in the Telecommunications Act, have their origins in the FCC’s 1980 Communications Act in the Telecommunications Act, have their origins in the FCC’s 1980
“Computer II” order.“Computer II” order.4445 The Commission developed the Computer II rules to regulate computer- The Commission developed the Computer II rules to regulate computer-
processing services offered over telephone wires. The rules distinguished between “basic” service processing services offered over telephone wires. The rules distinguished between “basic” service
(i.e., telephone service) governed by Title II and “enhanced” service (i.e., computer processing (i.e., telephone service) governed by Title II and “enhanced” service (i.e., computer processing
service), which was not.service), which was not.4546 The Computer II rules also recognized a third category called “adjunct- The Computer II rules also recognized a third category called “adjunct-
to-basic,” which was a precursor to the telecommunications management exception.46 The

36 47 U.S.C. § 151 (“[B]y centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’ . . . .”). commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’ . . . .”).
3637 See id. §§ 153, 332(c). §§ 153, 332(c).
3738 See id. §§ 201–231. §§ 201–231.
3839 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153–54 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1302). Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153–54 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1302).
3940 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (53). 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (53).
4041 Id. § 153(53). § 153(53).
4142 Id. § 153(50). § 153(50).
4243 Id. § 153(24). § 153(24).
4344 Id.; ; see also USTA, 825 F.3d at 705 (“[T]he Communications Act’s telecommunications management exception. . . . , 825 F.3d at 705 (“[T]he Communications Act’s telecommunications management exception. . . .
excludes from the definition of an information service ‘any [service] for the management, control, or operation of a excludes from the definition of an information service ‘any [service] for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.’”) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(123)).telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.’”) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(123)).
4445 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976 (“These two statutory classifications originated in the late 1970’s, as the Commission , 545 U.S. at 976 (“These two statutory classifications originated in the late 1970’s, as the Commission
developed rules to regulate data-processing services offered over telephone wires. That regime, the Computer II rules, developed rules to regulate data-processing services offered over telephone wires. That regime, the Computer II rules,
distinguished between basic service (like telephone service) and enhanced service (computer-processing service offered distinguished between basic service (like telephone service) and enhanced service (computer-processing service offered
over telephone lines).”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). over telephone lines).”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
4546 See id.; ; see also In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417–35 (1980) (discussing the distinctions between basic and enhanced services) Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417–35 (1980) (discussing the distinctions between basic and enhanced services)
[hereinafter Computer II Order].
46 See In re Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905, 21958 (1996) (“In [a previous]
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to-basic,” which was a precursor to the telecommunications management exception.47 The “adjunct-to-basic” category included telephone services such as speed dialing, call forwarding, “adjunct-to-basic” category included telephone services such as speed dialing, call forwarding,
and computer-provided directory assistance.and computer-provided directory assistance.4748 While such adjunct-to-basic services technically While such adjunct-to-basic services technically
fell under the enhanced services definition, the Commission treated them as basic because of their fell under the enhanced services definition, the Commission treated them as basic because of their
role in facilitating basic telephone service.role in facilitating basic telephone service.4849
In keeping with Computer II’s dichotomy between enhanced and basic services, Title I specifies In keeping with Computer II’s dichotomy between enhanced and basic services, Title I specifies
that entities providing telecommunications service—called telecommunications carriers—“shall that entities providing telecommunications service—called telecommunications carriers—“shall
be treated as common carriers” and are governed by Title II.be treated as common carriers” and are governed by Title II.4950 While the Act does not expressly While the Act does not expressly
state that “information service” providers shall not be treated as common carriers, the Supreme state that “information service” providers shall not be treated as common carriers, the Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit have described these two categories as mutually exclusive, and have Court and the D.C. Circuit have described these two categories as mutually exclusive, and have
stated that information-service providers are not subject to Title II.stated that information-service providers are not subject to Title II.5051
Along with these Title I definitions, Title III of the Communications Act defines two similar Along with these Title I definitions, Title III of the Communications Act defines two similar
categories that are specific to mobile service: “commercial mobile service” and “private mobile categories that are specific to mobile service: “commercial mobile service” and “private mobile
service.”service.”5152 Like telecommunications carriers, Title III says that a commercial mobile service Like telecommunications carriers, Title III says that a commercial mobile service
provider “shall be treated as a common carrier” insofar as it is engaged in the provision of such provider “shall be treated as a common carrier” insofar as it is engaged in the provision of such
service.service.5253 Title III defines commercial mobile service to include any mobile service that is Title III defines commercial mobile service to include any mobile service that is
“provided for profit and makes interconnected service available to the public.”“provided for profit and makes interconnected service available to the public.”5354 It further defines It further defines
“interconnected service” as “service that is interconnected with the public switched network (as “interconnected service” as “service that is interconnected with the public switched network (as
such terms are defined by regulation by the Commission).”such terms are defined by regulation by the Commission).”5455 Title III defines private mobile [hereinafter Computer II Order]. 47 See In re Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905, 21958 (1996) (“In [a previous] Title III defines private mobile
service in the negative, simply stating that it is any mobile service “that is not a commercial
mobile service or the functional equivalent of a commercial mobile service.”55

order, the Commission held that the enhanced services definition did not encompass adjunct-to-basic services. . . . order, the Commission held that the enhanced services definition did not encompass adjunct-to-basic services. . . .
Similarly, we conclude that ‘adjunct-to-basic’ services are also covered by the ‘telecommunications management Similarly, we conclude that ‘adjunct-to-basic’ services are also covered by the ‘telecommunications management
exception’ to the statutory definition of information services, and therefore are treated as telecommunications services exception’ to the statutory definition of information services, and therefore are treated as telecommunications services
under the 1996 Act”). under the 1996 Act”).
4748 Id. at 21958, n.245 (“Adjunct-to-basic services include, inter alia, speed dialing, call forwarding, computer-provided at 21958, n.245 (“Adjunct-to-basic services include, inter alia, speed dialing, call forwarding, computer-provided
directory assistance, call monitoring, caller i.d., call tracing, call blocking, call return, repeat dialing, and call tracking, directory assistance, call monitoring, caller i.d., call tracing, call blocking, call return, repeat dialing, and call tracking,
as well as certain Centrex features.”). as well as certain Centrex features.”).
4849 Computer II Order, 77 F.C.C.2d at 421, 77 F.C.C.2d at 421 (“We indicated [in a tentative decision] that computer processing (“We indicated [in a tentative decision] that computer processing
applications such as call forwarding, speed calling, directory assistance, itemized billing, traffic management studies, applications such as call forwarding, speed calling, directory assistance, itemized billing, traffic management studies,
voice encryption, etc., may be used in conjunction with voice service. The intent was to recognize that while [telephone voice encryption, etc., may be used in conjunction with voice service. The intent was to recognize that while [telephone
service] is a basic service, there are ancillary services directly related to its provision that do not raise questions about service] is a basic service, there are ancillary services directly related to its provision that do not raise questions about
the fundamental communications or data processing nature of a given service. Accordingly, we are not here foreclosing the fundamental communications or data processing nature of a given service. Accordingly, we are not here foreclosing
telephone companies from providing to consumers optional services to facilitate their use of traditional telephone telephone companies from providing to consumers optional services to facilitate their use of traditional telephone
serviceservice.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also USTA, 825 F.3d at 691 (“Although adjunct-to-basic , 825 F.3d at 691 (“Although adjunct-to-basic
services fell within the definition of enhanced services, the Commission nonetheless treated them as basic because of services fell within the definition of enhanced services, the Commission nonetheless treated them as basic because of
their role in facilitating basic services.”). their role in facilitating basic services.”).
4950 47 U.S.C. § 153(51). 47 U.S.C. § 153(51).
5051 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975 (“The Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not information-service , 545 U.S. at 975 (“The Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not information-service
providers, as common carriers.”); providers, as common carriers.”); USTA, 825 F.3d at 691 (“The [Act] subjects a telecommunications service, the , 825 F.3d at 691 (“The [Act] subjects a telecommunications service, the
successor to basic service, to common carrier regulation under Title II. By contrast, an information service, the successor to basic service, to common carrier regulation under Title II. By contrast, an information service, the
successor to an enhanced service, is not subject to Title II. . . . The appropriate regulatory treatment therefore turns on successor to an enhanced service, is not subject to Title II. . . . The appropriate regulatory treatment therefore turns on
what services a provider offers to the public: if it offers telecommunications, that service is subject to Title II what services a provider offers to the public: if it offers telecommunications, that service is subject to Title II
regulation.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). regulation.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
5152 47 U.S.C. § 332(c). 47 U.S.C. § 332(c).
5253 Id. § 332(c)(1)(A). § 332(c)(1)(A).
5354 Id. § 332(d)(1). § 332(d)(1).
5455 Id. § 332(d)(2). § 332(d)(2).
55 Id. § 332(d)(3).
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service in the negative, simply stating that it is any mobile service “that is not a commercial mobile service or the functional equivalent of a commercial mobile service.”56 Title II
Title II sets out the requirements applicable to entities that are classified as common carriers per Title II sets out the requirements applicable to entities that are classified as common carriers per
Titles I and Titles I and II.56III.57 Many of these provisions are common-carrier requirements drawn from the now- Many of these provisions are common-carrier requirements drawn from the now-
repealed Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.repealed Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.5758 In particular, Sections 201 and 202 require carriers In particular, Sections 201 and 202 require carriers
to (1) provide communication service upon “reasonable request”; (2) charge “just and reasonable to (1) provide communication service upon “reasonable request”; (2) charge “just and reasonable
rates”; and (3) engage in “no unjust or unreasonable discrimination.”rates”; and (3) engage in “no unjust or unreasonable discrimination.”5859 Title II also incorporates Title II also incorporates
the Interstate Commerce Act’s tariffing provisions, requiring carriers to file their rates with the the Interstate Commerce Act’s tariffing provisions, requiring carriers to file their rates with the
FCC and restricting the ability of carriers to depart from these filed rates.FCC and restricting the ability of carriers to depart from these filed rates.5960 It further requires It further requires
carriers to obtain authorization from the Commission before taking certain actions, such as carriers to obtain authorization from the Commission before taking certain actions, such as
discontinuing or reducing service.discontinuing or reducing service.6061
Along with the original common-carrier requirements, later statutes, such as the Along with the original common-carrier requirements, later statutes, such as the
Telecommunications Act, have amended Title II to impose a variety of other obligations on Telecommunications Act, have amended Title II to impose a variety of other obligations on
common carriers. For instance, carriers must comply with requirements ensuring service is common carriers. For instance, carriers must comply with requirements ensuring service is
available to those with a hearing or speech disability,available to those with a hearing or speech disability,6162 abide by privacy rules when handling abide by privacy rules when handling
customer information,customer information,6263 and, if they provide interstate service, must contribute to a fund used to and, if they provide interstate service, must contribute to a fund used to
support “universal service” in rural and high-cost areas (the “Universal Service Fund”).support “universal service” in rural and high-cost areas (the “Universal Service Fund”).6364
Although Title II regulation is extensive, the Telecommunications Act amended the Although Title II regulation is extensive, the Telecommunications Act amended the
Communications Act to give the FCC authority to refrain (or “forbear”) from applying particular Communications Act to give the FCC authority to refrain (or “forbear”) from applying particular
legal requirements to telecommunications carriers.legal requirements to telecommunications carriers.6465 Specifically, the FCC must forbear from Specifically, the FCC must forbear from
applying any statutory or regulatory requirement under the Communications Act to applying any statutory or regulatory requirement under the Communications Act to
telecommunications carriers if it determines that: (1) enforcement is unnecessary to ensure just, telecommunications carriers if it determines that: (1) enforcement is unnecessary to ensure just,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates or practices; (2) enforcement is unnecessary for the reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates or practices; (2) enforcement is unnecessary for the
protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance is consistent with the public interest.65 Similarly,
Title III allows the Commission to “specify by regulation” any Title II requirements—other than
the antidiscrimination and other core Title II requirements—that are inapplicable to commercial

56 56 Id. § 332(d)(3). 57 Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“A provider of CMRS (commercial mobile radio service) such as Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“A provider of CMRS (commercial mobile radio service) such as
Verizon is ‘a common carrier’ subject to Title II of the Communications Act.”). Verizon is ‘a common carrier’ subject to Title II of the Communications Act.”).
5758 See, e.g., Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 49 (2007) (“In , Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 49 (2007) (“In
authorizing this traditional form of [common carrier] regulation, Congress copied into the 1934 Communications Act authorizing this traditional form of [common carrier] regulation, Congress copied into the 1934 Communications Act
language from the earlier Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). language from the earlier Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
The Interstate Commerce Act was the first federal law to codify common-carrier requirements that had been developed The Interstate Commerce Act was the first federal law to codify common-carrier requirements that had been developed
by courts at common law. by courts at common law. See, e.g., FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1091 (N. Cal. 2015) (“The , FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1091 (N. Cal. 2015) (“The
Interstate Commerce Act was the first federal regulation to impose duties on common carriers and applied to ‘any Interstate Commerce Act was the first federal regulation to impose duties on common carriers and applied to ‘any
common carrier or carriers’ engaged in the railroad transportation of people or property interstate.”) (internal citations common carrier or carriers’ engaged in the railroad transportation of people or property interstate.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). The Act initially applied only to railroads but, with the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, expanded to and quotations omitted). The Act initially applied only to railroads but, with the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, expanded to
include interstate telegraph and telephone service. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544–45 (1910). include interstate telegraph and telephone service. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544–45 (1910).
5859 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a)–(b), 202(a). 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a)–(b), 202(a).
5960 See also MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The Act requires carriers to file their MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The Act requires carriers to file their
tariffs with the FCC, and they are prohibited from charging consumers except as provided in the tariffs.”) (internal tariffs with the FCC, and they are prohibited from charging consumers except as provided in the tariffs.”) (internal
citations omitted). citations omitted).
6061 47 U.S.C. § 214; 47 C.F.R. part 63. 47 U.S.C. § 214; 47 C.F.R. part 63.
6162 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 255. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 255.
6263 Id. § 222. For an overview of Title II’s privacy requirements, see CRS Report R45631, § 222. For an overview of Title II’s privacy requirements, see CRS Report R45631, Data Protection Law: An
Overview
, by Stephen P. Mulligan and Chris D. Linebaugh. , by Stephen P. Mulligan and Chris D. Linebaugh.
6364 47 U.S.C. § 254. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
64 Id. § 160.
65 65 Id. § 160 § 160(a). .
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9 6 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance is consistent with the public interest.66 Similarly, Title III allows the Commission to “specify by regulation” any Title II requirements—other than the antidiscrimination and other core Title II requirements—that are inapplicable to commercial

Net Neutrality Law: An Overview

mobile services.mobile services.6667 The FCC has used these authorities to, for example, eliminate tariffing for The FCC has used these authorities to, for example, eliminate tariffing for
services offered by long-distance telephone carriers and by commercial mobile service services offered by long-distance telephone carriers and by commercial mobile service
providers.providers.6768
Should a common carrier violate Title II’s requirements, the Act provides a process by which any Should a common carrier violate Title II’s requirements, the Act provides a process by which any
person can file a complaint with the Commission.person can file a complaint with the Commission.6869 The Commission is obligated to resolve the The Commission is obligated to resolve the
complaint and, if it determines the complainant is entitled to damages, may order the carrier to complaint and, if it determines the complainant is entitled to damages, may order the carrier to
pay damages to the complainant.pay damages to the complainant.6970 As an alternative to the complaint process, Title II also allows As an alternative to the complaint process, Title II also allows
individuals injured by a carrier’s violation to sue the carrier in federal district court for damages individuals injured by a carrier’s violation to sue the carrier in federal district court for damages
and attorney’s fees.and attorney’s fees.7071 The FCC also has civil enforcement authority and may impose a “forfeiture The FCC also has civil enforcement authority and may impose a “forfeiture
penalty” against carriers who willfully or repeatedly violate the statute or the FCC’s penalty” against carriers who willfully or repeatedly violate the statute or the FCC’s
implementing regulations.implementing regulations.7172
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act is the final key statutory provision underlying the Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act is the final key statutory provision underlying the
FCC’s net neutrality actions. Section 706 directs the FCC to “encourage the deployment on a FCC’s net neutrality actions. Section 706 directs the FCC to “encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”7273 It It
defines advanced telecommunications capability as “high-speed, switched, broadband defines advanced telecommunications capability as “high-speed, switched, broadband
telecommunications capability” that enables users to “originate and receive high-quality voice, telecommunications capability” that enables users to “originate and receive high-quality voice,
data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.”data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.”7374 It specifies that, in doing It specifies that, in doing
so, the Commission shall, in a manner consistent with the public interest, use “price cap so, the Commission shall, in a manner consistent with the public interest, use “price cap
regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure.”telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure.”7475
It further requires that the FCC conduct regular studies on the availability of advanced It further requires that the FCC conduct regular studies on the availability of advanced
telecommunications capability.telecommunications capability.7576 When the Commission finds that advanced telecommunications When the Commission finds that advanced telecommunications
capability is not being deployed to all Americans in a “reasonable and timely fashion,” it must capability is not being deployed to all Americans in a “reasonable and timely fashion,” it must
take “immediate action” to accelerate deployment by “removing barriers to infrastructure take “immediate action” to accelerate deployment by “removing barriers to infrastructure
investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.”investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.”76
As discussed further below, a key question is whether Section 706 is an affirmative grant of
regulatory authority, or whether it is merely exhorting the FCC to use its existing authority under
the Communications Act to encourage broadband deployment. The FCC has alternated views on
this issue, most recently taking the position that it is not an affirmative grant of regulatory

6677 66 Id. § 160(a). 67 Id. § 332(c)(1)(A). § 332(c)(1)(A).
6768 See, e.g., , Orloff, 352 F.3d at 418–19 (“Congress gave the Commission authority to render [the tariff provisions] , 352 F.3d at 418–19 (“Congress gave the Commission authority to render [the tariff provisions]
inapplicable to CMRS and, in 1994, the Commission exercised that authority.”); inapplicable to CMRS and, in 1994, the Commission exercised that authority.”); MCI WorldCom, 209 F.3d 762–66 , 209 F.3d 762–66
(upholding the FCC’s use of its forbearance authority to require mandatory de-tariffing of long-distance carriers). (upholding the FCC’s use of its forbearance authority to require mandatory de-tariffing of long-distance carriers).
6869 47 U.S.C. § 208. 47 U.S.C. § 208.
6970 Id. §§ 208–09. §§ 208–09.
7071 Id. §§ 206–07. §§ 206–07.
7172 Id. § 503(b)(1). For telecommunications carriers, forfeiture penalties may be up to $207,314 for each violation or § 503(b)(1). For telecommunications carriers, forfeiture penalties may be up to $207,314 for each violation or
each day of a continuing violation. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2). The total amount assessed for any continuing violation may each day of a continuing violation. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2). The total amount assessed for any continuing violation may
not exceed $2,073,133 for any “single act or failure to act.” not exceed $2,073,133 for any “single act or failure to act.” Id.
7273 (a). (a).
7374 Id. § 1302(d)(1). § 1302(d)(1).
7475 Id. § 1302(a). § 1302(a).
7576 Id. § 1302(b). § 1302(b).
7677 Id.
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10 7 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview As discussed further below, a key question is whether Section 706 is an affirmative grant of regulatory authority, or whether it is merely exhorting the FCC to use its existing authority under the Communications Act to encourage broadband deployment. The FCC has alternated views on this issue, most recently taking the position that it is not an affirmative grant of regulatory

Net Neutrality Law: An Overview

authority. The D.C. Circuit has upheld both the FCC’s disclaimer and its exercise of regulatory authority. The D.C. Circuit has upheld both the FCC’s disclaimer and its exercise of regulatory
authority under Section 706.authority under Section 706.7778
FCC Actions and Court Decisions
The FCC has relied on the foregoing statutory provisions to create a regulatory framework for The FCC has relied on the foregoing statutory provisions to create a regulatory framework for
BIAS and net neutrality. The Commission’s approach, however, has not always been consistent, BIAS and net neutrality. The Commission’s approach, however, has not always been consistent,
and the FCC has had mixed success defending its actions before courts. This section describes the and the FCC has had mixed success defending its actions before courts. This section describes the
FCC’s various attempts to articulate a regulatory policy towards BIAS and net neutrality. It starts FCC’s various attempts to articulate a regulatory policy towards BIAS and net neutrality. It starts
by reviewing the Commission’s early efforts to determine the appropriate classification of BIAS by reviewing the Commission’s early efforts to determine the appropriate classification of BIAS
under the Communications Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in under the Communications Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, which confirmed , which confirmed
the FCC’s authority to make such a determination. The section then discusses the FCC’s various the FCC’s authority to make such a determination. The section then discusses the FCC’s various
net neutrality actions and the court decisions resolving challenges to those actions. net neutrality actions and the court decisions resolving challenges to those actions.
Early Classification of BIAS and the Brand X Decision
In the early years of broadband, the Commission grappled with the question of whether to treat In the early years of broadband, the Commission grappled with the question of whether to treat
BIAS as an information service or a telecommunications service. The Commission’s first BIAS as an information service or a telecommunications service. The Commission’s first
broadband classification decision dealt with Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service.broadband classification decision dealt with Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service.7879 DSL service DSL service
uses packet-switching technology to deliver high-speed internet over telephone lines.uses packet-switching technology to deliver high-speed internet over telephone lines.7980 In a 1998 In a 1998
order (1998 Order), the FCC concluded that DSL has both telecommunications service and order (1998 Order), the FCC concluded that DSL has both telecommunications service and
information service components.information service components.8081 The aspect of DSL service that uses phone lines to transmit the The aspect of DSL service that uses phone lines to transmit the
data is a telecommunications service, the FCC explained, because it involves the pure data is a telecommunications service, the FCC explained, because it involves the pure
transmission of information “without change in the form or content of the information as sent and transmission of information “without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.”received.”8182 On the other hand, the FCC recognized a separate information service component of On the other hand, the FCC recognized a separate information service component of
DSL service, in which DSL providers perform additional functions that enable the users to access DSL service, in which DSL providers perform additional functions that enable the users to access
the internet.the internet.8283 While the 1998 Order did not describe precisely what this separate information While the 1998 Order did not describe precisely what this separate information
service component entails, the FCC would later explain that it includes things like Domain Name service component entails, the FCC would later explain that it includes things like Domain Name
System (DNS) capability, which matches the user’s selected website address with the IP address System (DNS) capability, which matches the user’s selected website address with the IP address
of the website’s host server.of the website’s host server.8384 In the 1998 Order, the FCC concluded that telephone carriers In the 1998 Order, the FCC concluded that telephone carriers
providing DSL services would be regulated as Title II telecommunications carriers, unless they providing DSL services would be regulated as Title II telecommunications carriers, unless they
created a separate affiliate to provide only the internet access service component of DSL.created a separate affiliate to provide only the internet access service component of DSL.84
In a 2002 order (2002 Order), the Commission took a different approach to BIAS provided by
cable television operators.85 By the time of the 2002 Order, cable broadband had become the most
widely used form of broadband service, and phone companies had pared back their DSL85

7778 See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 641 (upholding the FCC’s interpretation of Section 706 to grant regulatory authority to , 740 F.3d at 641 (upholding the FCC’s interpretation of Section 706 to grant regulatory authority to
promulgate non-common-carrier regulations over BIAS providers); Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 46 (D.C. Cir. promulgate non-common-carrier regulations over BIAS providers); Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 46 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (upholding the FCC’s interpretation of Section 706 as hortatory). 2019) (upholding the FCC’s interpretation of Section 706 as hortatory).
7879 DSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012. DSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012.
7980 Id. at 24027. at 24027.
8081 Id. at 24030–31. at 24030–31.
8182 Id. at 24030. at 24030.
8283 Id.
8384 DSL Reclassification Order, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14863. DSL Reclassification Order, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14863.
8485 Id. at 24030, 24052. at 24030, 24052.
85 Cable Broadband Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798.
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11 Congressional Research Service 8 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview In a 2002 order (2002 Order), the Commission took a different approach to BIAS provided by cable television operators.86 By the time of the 2002 Order, cable broadband had become the most widely used form of broadband service, and phone companies had pared back their DSL

Net Neutrality Law: An Overview

deployment plans.deployment plans.8687 Up to that point, the FCC had not clarified cable broadband’s regulatory Up to that point, the FCC had not clarified cable broadband’s regulatory
treatment.treatment.8788 The FCC explained that, in addressing this question, it was guided by policy goals of The FCC explained that, in addressing this question, it was guided by policy goals of
encouraging the widespread availability of broadband and maintaining the “vibrant and encouraging the widespread availability of broadband and maintaining the “vibrant and
competitive free market” for internet services by avoiding unnecessary regulatory costs.competitive free market” for internet services by avoiding unnecessary regulatory costs.8889 Rather Rather
than treating the transmission and internet access components as separate stand-alone offerings, than treating the transmission and internet access components as separate stand-alone offerings,
the Commission concluded that they formed a “single, integrated information service.”the Commission concluded that they formed a “single, integrated information service.”8990
The FCC explained that the classification of a service depends on the nature of what it offers the The FCC explained that the classification of a service depends on the nature of what it offers the
end user.end user.9091 Cable broadband providers, the FCC concluded, were offering not only the ability to Cable broadband providers, the FCC concluded, were offering not only the ability to
transmit and receive data over the internet, but also information service functions offered by the transmit and receive data over the internet, but also information service functions offered by the
internet service providers.internet service providers.9192 For instance, the FCC observed, providers typically gave users the For instance, the FCC observed, providers typically gave users the
ability to set up their own email address or web page and participate in newsgroups.ability to set up their own email address or web page and participate in newsgroups.9293 Cable Cable
broadband providers also facilitated users’ ability to communicate with the rest of the internet by broadband providers also facilitated users’ ability to communicate with the rest of the internet by
providing things like DNS, IP address number assignment, network security, and “caching” providing things like DNS, IP address number assignment, network security, and “caching”
(which allows users to access a website more quickly by storing the website’s data on a local (which allows users to access a website more quickly by storing the website’s data on a local
server).server).9394 The FCC concluded that these features were not separable from the pure transmission The FCC concluded that these features were not separable from the pure transmission
component, and comprised a single, integrated offering that is properly classified as an component, and comprised a single, integrated offering that is properly classified as an
information service rather than a Title II telecommunications service.information service rather than a Title II telecommunications service.9495
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld this classification of cable broadband in The Supreme Court subsequently upheld this classification of cable broadband in Brand X, ,
applying the framework set forth in applying the framework set forth in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.
,,9596 under which courts generally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an under which courts generally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory provision.ambiguous statutory provision.9697 In the course of its analysis, the Court concluded that the term In the course of its analysis, the Court concluded that the term
“offering” in the telecommunications service definition is ambiguous and that it is reasonable for “offering” in the telecommunications service definition is ambiguous and that it is reasonable for
the FCC to interpret it as only referring to the finished product offered by a provider, rather than the FCC to interpret it as only referring to the finished product offered by a provider, rather than
the discrete parts of that product.the discrete parts of that product.9798 The relevant question then, the Court explained, was whether The relevant question then, the Court explained, was whether
the transmission components and the information service components were “sufficiently the transmission components and the information service components were “sufficiently
integrated” such that it is “reasonable to describe the two as a single, integrated offering.”integrated” such that it is “reasonable to describe the two as a single, integrated offering.”98 The
Court held that the Commission had reasonably answered this question in the affirmative.99 The
Court explained that BIAS providers’ use of DNS services and caching supported the FCC’s
classification,100 even though users could access third-party websites rather than a provider’s own

86 Id. at 4804.
87 Id. at 4801.
88 Id. at 4802.
89 Id. at 4823.
9099 The 86 Cable Broadband Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798. 87 Id. at 4804. 88 Id. at 4801. 89 Id. at 4802. 90 Id. at 4823. 91 Id. at 4822 (“[W]e conclude that the classification of cable modem service turns on the nature of the functions that at 4822 (“[W]e conclude that the classification of cable modem service turns on the nature of the functions that
the end user is offered.”). the end user is offered.”).
9192 Id. at 4822. at 4822.
9293 Id. at 4821–22. at 4821–22.
9394 Id. at 4811, n.76. at 4811, n.76.
9495 Id. at 4823–32. at 4823–32.
9596 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9697 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. For a more detailed overview of the , 545 U.S. at 980. For a more detailed overview of the Chevron deference framework, see CRS Report deference framework, see CRS Report
R44954, R44954, Chevron Deference: A Primer, by Valerie C. Brannon and Jared P. Cole. , by Valerie C. Brannon and Jared P. Cole.
9798 Id. at 989–99. at 989–99.
9899 Id. at 990. Congressional Research Service 9 Id. at 990.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 990–91.
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web page or email service.101 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview Court held that the Commission had reasonably answered this question in the affirmative.100 The Court explained that BIAS providers’ use of DNS services and caching supported the FCC’s classification,101 even though users could access third-party websites rather than a provider’s own web page or email service.102 The Court also rejected the petitioner’s contention that the The Court also rejected the petitioner’s contention that the
Commission acted “arbitrar[ily] and capricious[ly],” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Commission acted “arbitrar[ily] and capricious[ly],” in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), by treating cable broadband differently from DSL.Act (APA), by treating cable broadband differently from DSL.102103 Under the arbitrary and Under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, agencies must demonstrate that they engaged in reasoned decisionmaking in capricious standard, agencies must demonstrate that they engaged in reasoned decisionmaking in
reaching their determinations.reaching their determinations.103104 The Court explained that the FCC is free to change its position, The Court explained that the FCC is free to change its position,
within the limits of a reasonable statutory interpretation, as long as it “adequately justifies the within the limits of a reasonable statutory interpretation, as long as it “adequately justifies the
change.”change.”104105 The Court held that the Commission had given an adequate justification, given the The Court held that the Commission had given an adequate justification, given the
FCC’s explanation of changed market conditions.FCC’s explanation of changed market conditions.105
2010 Order and the Verizon 106 Internet Policy Statement and the Comcast Decision
In the wake of In the wake of Brand X, the Commission unified its treatment of all forms of BIAS by similarly , the Commission unified its treatment of all forms of BIAS by similarly
classifying DSL and mobile broadband internet service as integrated offerings of information classifying DSL and mobile broadband internet service as integrated offerings of information
services.services.106107 Even though Even though it could not rely onBIAS providers were not subject to the anti-discrimination and other provisions the anti-discrimination and other provisions
applicable to common carriers under Title II, the Commission still sought to further the principles applicable to common carriers under Title II, the Commission still sought to further the principles
of internet openness. In 2005, the FCC adopted a policy statementof internet openness. In 2005, the FCC adopted a policy statement (Internet Policy Statement) in which it declared, among in which it declared, among
other things, that consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice and other things, that consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice and
to run applications and use the services of their choice.to run applications and use the services of their choice.107108 The FCC stated that these principles The FCC stated that these principles
would ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed and accessible to all consumers and would ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed and accessible to all consumers and
that it would incorporate them into its ongoing that it would incorporate them into its ongoing policymaking activities.109 The Internet Policy Statement also asserted that, even without Title II, the FCC had jurisdiction to impose regulatory obligations on BIAS providers under “its Title I ancillary jurisdiction,” which allows the agency to regulate any interstate communication by wire or radio if the regulation is in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities.110 Five years later, in the 2010 case Comcast v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s attempt to enforce the principles in its Internet Policy Statement.111 In Comcast, non-profit 100 Id. 101 Id. at 990–91. 102 Id. 103 Id. at 706–10. 104policymaking activities.108
Several years later, in 2010, the FCC went further by issuing a binding order (2010 Order).109 The
Commission took this action in response to a 2010 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit), which overturned the FCC’s attempt to enforce its
2005 policy statement against the BIAS provider Comcast.110 The 2010 Order imposed three
binding rules on BIAS providers: (1) a transparency rule requiring them to disclose their network
management practices, performance, and commercial terms; (2) an anti-blocking rule prohibiting
them from blocking lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; and (3) an

101 Id.
102 Id. at 706–10.
103 See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983) (“In this case, the Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983) (“In this case, the
agency’s explanation for rescission of the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable us to conclude that agency’s explanation for rescission of the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable us to conclude that
the rescission was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.”) (emphasis in original). For further background on the the rescission was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.”) (emphasis in original). For further background on the
arbitrary and capricious standard, see CRS Report R44699, arbitrary and capricious standard, see CRS Report R44699, An Introduction to Judicial Review of Federal Agency
Action
, by Jared P. Cole. , by Jared P. Cole.
104105 545 U.S. at 1001. 545 U.S. at 1001.
105106 Id.
106107 DSL Reclassification Order, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14,863–64; In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband DSL Reclassification Order, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14,863–64; In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband
Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901–02 (2007). Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901–02 (2007).
107 DSL Reclassification Order108 Internet Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14,988. , 20 FCC Rcd. at 14,988.
108 Id.
109 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905.
110 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (2010). In Comcast, non-profit 109 Id. 110 Id. at 14,987–88. For a further discussion of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, see CRS Report R46736, Stepping In: The FCC’s Authority to Preempt State Laws Under the Communications Act, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes. 111 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Congressional Research Service 10 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview advocacy organizations filed a complaint with advocacy organizations filed a complaint with
the FCC alleging that the FCC alleging that the BIAS provider Comcast violated the Comcast violated the 2005 policy statementInternet Policy Statement by interfering with subscribers’ use of peer-to-peer by interfering with subscribers’ use of peer-to-peer
programs that allowed them to share large files directly with each other.programs that allowed them to share large files directly with each other. Id. at 644.112 The FCC resolved the complaint The FCC resolved the complaint
through an adjudication, issuing an order requiring Comcast to implement a plan through an adjudication, issuing an order requiring Comcast to implement a plan that would bring itsto ensure that it would no longer engage in “unreasonable “unreasonable
management practices” to an end. In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13028, 13028, 13060 (2008).
The D.C. Circuit vacated this order, however. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 113. It reasoned that the FCC failed to tie its action
to a statutory provision giving itmanagement practices.”113 Similar to its position in the Internet Policy Statement, the FCC maintained that it had authority to regulate Comcast’s network management practices in this way under its ancillary jurisdiction.114 The D.C. Circuit, however, invalidated the FCC’s order.115 The court said that the FCC failed to show that its regulation of Comcast’s network management practices furthered the effective performance of its “statutorily mandated responsibilities.”116 The court reasoned that the FCC primarily relied on congressional statements of policy, which by themselves do not create statutorily mandated responsibilities.117 The court acknowledged that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, which is one of the provisions the FCC relied upon, could be read as giving the FCC affirmative affirmative regulatory authority over broadband.118 However, in a prior order the FCC had disclaimed regulatory authority under Section 706, and the Commission was bound by this prior interpretation since it had never rescinded it.119 2010 Order and the Verizon Decision The FCC responded to the Comcast decision by issuing a new order (2010 Order).120 In the 2010 Order, the FCC repudiated its prior reading of Section 706 and reinterpreted it as vesting the Commission with affirmative regulatory authority.121 The 2010 Order also set forth binding net neutrality requirements applicable to BIAS providers. Specifically, BIAS providers had to comply with: (1) a transparency rule requiring them to disclose their network management practices, performance, and commercial terms; (2) an anti-blocking rule prohibiting them from blocking lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; and (3) an regulatory authority. Id. at 651–61.
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anti-discrimination rule prohibiting them from unreasonably discriminating in transmitting lawful anti-discrimination rule prohibiting them from unreasonably discriminating in transmitting lawful
network traffic.network traffic.111 122 While the first two rules applied to both “fixed” (e.g., residential) and mobile While the first two rules applied to both “fixed” (e.g., residential) and mobile
BIAS providers, the FCC applied the anti-discrimination requirement only to fixed BIAS, citing BIAS providers, the FCC applied the anti-discrimination requirement only to fixed BIAS, citing
greater competition greater competition and higher operational constraints in the mobile market.123 In its 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit again overturned the FCC’s attempt at enforcing net neutrality rules.124 The court vacated the 2010 Order’s anti-blocking and anti- 112 Id. at 644. 113 In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13028, 13028, 13060 (2008). 114 Id. at 13034–44. 115 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644. 116 Id. 117 Id. at 644, 651–661. 118 Id. at 658. 119 Id. at 659. 120 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. at 17906. 121 Id. at 17968–72. 122 Id. at 17906. 123 Id. at 17956–62. 124 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Congressional Research Service 11 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview discrimination rules, leaving only the transparency rule intact.125and higher operational constraints in the mobile market.112 Since the
Commission still classified BIAS as an information service, the FCC grounded its legal authority
for the 2010 Order in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, rather than Title II.113 While an
earlier FCC order had disclaimed regulatory authority under Section 706, the Commission now
repudiated that position and interpreted the provision as vesting it with affirmative regulatory
authority.114
In its 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2010 Order’s anti-blocking
and anti-discrimination rules, leaving only the transparency rule intact.115 The court deferred to The court deferred to
the FCC’s interpretation of Section 706 as an independent grant of authority sufficient to support the FCC’s interpretation of Section 706 as an independent grant of authority sufficient to support
the rules established by the 2010 Order.the rules established by the 2010 Order.116126 The court concluded, however, that the anti-blocking The court concluded, however, that the anti-blocking
and anti-discrimination rules amounted to and anti-discrimination rules amounted to per se common carrier regulation because they required common carrier regulation because they required
BIAS providers to offer service indiscriminately,BIAS providers to offer service indiscriminately,117127 which is the fundamental characteristic which is the fundamental characteristic
distinguishing common carriers from private carriers.distinguishing common carriers from private carriers.118128 Because the FCC had classified BIAS Because the FCC had classified BIAS
providers as information service providers instead of telecommunications service providers, this providers as information service providers instead of telecommunications service providers, this
per se common carrier treatment was unlawful. The court explained that common carrier treatment was unlawful. The court explained that itthe FCC was prohibited by Title was prohibited by Title
I’s statement that “[a] telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier . . . only to I’s statement that “[a] telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier . . . only to
the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”119129
2015 Open Internet Order and the USTA decision
After After Verizon, the FCC changed its approach. In a 2015 order titled “In the Matter of Protecting , the FCC changed its approach. In a 2015 order titled “In the Matter of Protecting
and Promoting the Open Internet”and Promoting the Open Internet” (2015 Open Internet Order), the Commission reclassified BIAS (2015 Open Internet Order), the Commission reclassified BIAS
as a telecommunications service subject to Title II.as a telecommunications service subject to Title II.120130 This reclassification allowed the FCC to This reclassification allowed the FCC to
impose net neutrality rules on BIAS providers, like those struck down in impose net neutrality rules on BIAS providers, like those struck down in Verizon, without running , without running
afoul of the Communications Act.afoul of the Communications Act.121131 As a policy rationale for its action, the FCC maintained that As a policy rationale for its action, the FCC maintained that
net neutrality rules are essential to preserving a “virtuous cycle” of broadband growth.net neutrality rules are essential to preserving a “virtuous cycle” of broadband growth.122132 This This
virtuous cycle occurs when innovation by edge providers (i.e., companies who provide content virtuous cycle occurs when innovation by edge providers (i.e., companies who provide content
and services to internet users) enhances consumer demand for broadband services, which leads to and services to internet users) enhances consumer demand for broadband services, which leads to
expanded investment in broadband infrastructure by broadband providers, which in turns leads to expanded investment in broadband infrastructure by broadband providers, which in turns leads to
more innovation by edge providers.more innovation by edge providers.123133 The Commission explained that the “key insight” of the The Commission explained that the “key insight” of the
virtuous cycle is that BIAS providers have the “incentive and ability to act as gatekeepers” virtuous cycle is that BIAS providers have the “incentive and ability to act as gatekeepers”

111 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. at 17906.
112 Id. at 17956–62.
113 Id. at 17968–72.
114 Id. at 17969–72.
115 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
116 Id. at 636–49.
117 Id. at 655–56.
118 Id. at 651–52.
119 Id. at 650 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(51)).
120 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601.
121 Id. at 5733–34.
122 Id. at 5604.
123 Id.
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between content providers and consumers, for instance by blocking or exacting unfair tolls on between content providers and consumers, for instance by blocking or exacting unfair tolls on
edge providers who compete with the BIAS providers’ own services.edge providers who compete with the BIAS providers’ own services.124134 Consequently, the Consequently, the
Commission concluded, net neutrality rules are necessary to prevent this harmful gatekeeping Commission concluded, net neutrality rules are necessary to prevent this harmful gatekeeping
behavior.behavior.125135
From a legal perspective, the agency reasoned that BIAS fit the telecommunications service From a legal perspective, the agency reasoned that BIAS fit the telecommunications service
definition due to changes in the broadband market.definition due to changes in the broadband market.126136 According to the Commission, consumers According to the Commission, consumers
primarily use BIAS as a “conduit” to reach content and services provided by third parties.primarily use BIAS as a “conduit” to reach content and services provided by third parties.127137 Any Any
information services, such as BIAS-provided email, are perceived by consumers as distinct information services, such as BIAS-provided email, are perceived by consumers as distinct
offerings.offerings.128138 The FCC said that BIAS providers’ use of DNS and caching did not prevent this The FCC said that BIAS providers’ use of DNS and caching did not prevent this
125 Id. at 628. 126 Id. at 636–49. 127 Id. at 655–56. 128 Id. at 651–52. 129 Id. at 650 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(51)). 130 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601. 131 Id. at 5733–34. 132 Id. at 5604. 133 Id. 134 Id. at 5608. 135 Id. at 5625. 136 Id. at 5752–57. 137 Id. at 5615, 5752–57. 138 Id. at 5773. Congressional Research Service 12 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview classification because these services fell under the telecommunications management exception classification because these services fell under the telecommunications management exception
and thus were not information services.and thus were not information services.129139
Along with reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service, the FCC reclassified mobile Along with reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service, the FCC reclassified mobile
BIAS as a commercial mobile service instead of a private mobile service.BIAS as a commercial mobile service instead of a private mobile service.130140 This reclassification, This reclassification,
the Commission explained, ensured equivalent treatment between mobile and fixed BIAS, since the Commission explained, ensured equivalent treatment between mobile and fixed BIAS, since
private mobile service providers may not be treated as common carriers subject to Title II.private mobile service providers may not be treated as common carriers subject to Title II.131141 The The
FCC accomplished this reclassification by exercising its express statutory authority to define FCC accomplished this reclassification by exercising its express statutory authority to define
“public switched network”—a term integral to the commercial mobile service definition.“public switched network”—a term integral to the commercial mobile service definition.132142 While While
the FCC previously defined public switched network to cover networks using the North American the FCC previously defined public switched network to cover networks using the North American
Numbering Plan, it broadened this definition to include networks using public IP addresses.Numbering Plan, it broadened this definition to include networks using public IP addresses.133143
With these new classifications, the 2015 Open Internet Order proceeded to impose three “bright- With these new classifications, the 2015 Open Internet Order proceeded to impose three “bright-
line” line” rules134rules144 that banned BIAS providers from: (1) “blocking” that banned BIAS providers from: (1) “blocking” lawful content, applications, lawful content, applications,
services, or non-harmful devices; (2) “throttling” (i.e., impairing or degrading) lawful internet services, or non-harmful devices; (2) “throttling” (i.e., impairing or degrading) lawful internet
traffic on the basis of content, applications, service, or non-harmful devices; and (3) engaging in traffic on the basis of content, applications, service, or non-harmful devices; and (3) engaging in
“paid prioritization”—defined as favoring some internet traffic over others—in exchange for “paid prioritization”—defined as favoring some internet traffic over others—in exchange for
consideration.consideration.135145 The 2015 Open Internet Order also imposed a more flexible standard referred to The 2015 Open Internet Order also imposed a more flexible standard referred to
as the “General Conduct Rule,”as the “General Conduct Rule,”136146 which prohibited BIAS providers from “unreasonably which prohibited BIAS providers from “unreasonably
interfer[ing] with or unreasonably disadvantag[ing]” both end users’ ability to access or select and interfer[ing] with or unreasonably disadvantag[ing]” both end users’ ability to access or select and
content providers’ ability to provide lawful content, applications, services, or devices.content providers’ ability to provide lawful content, applications, services, or devices.137147 The The
2015 Open Internet Order likewise built on the transparency rule of the 2010 Order upheld in 2015 Open Internet Order likewise built on the transparency rule of the 2010 Order upheld in
Verizon..138148 The new transparency rule retained the three basic disclosure categories established in The new transparency rule retained the three basic disclosure categories established in

124 Id. at 5608.
125 Id. at 5625.
126 Id. at 5752–57.
127 Id. at 5615, 5752–57.
128 Id. at 5773.
129 Id. at 5766–71.
130 Id. at 5778–90.
131 Id. at 5788.
132the 2010 Order—network management practices, performance, and commercial terms149—and specified additional information that BIAS providers must disclose regarding these categories, including pricing details, fees, data caps, packet loss, and network practices applied to traffic associated with a particular user or user group.150 To ensure a “light touch” regulatory regime facilitating investment and innovation, the Commission used its authority under Section 10 of the Communications Act to forbear from applying the “vast majority” of Title II provisions to BIAS providers.151 It did not, however, forbear from applying Title II’s prohibition of unjust and unreasonable rates and its complaint and enforcement procedures.152 The 2015 Open Internet Order also applied a handful of other Title II 139 Id. at 5766–71. 140 Id. at 5778–90. 141 Id. at 5788. 142 Id. at 5783–88; at 5783–88; see also 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(2) (stating that “interconnected service” means “service that is 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(2) (stating that “interconnected service” means “service that is
interconnected with the public switched network (as such terms are defined by regulation by the Commission . . . .”)). interconnected with the public switched network (as such terms are defined by regulation by the Commission . . . .”)).
133143 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5779–80. 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5779–80.
134144 Id. at 5646–47. at 5646–47.
135145 Id. at 5647–58. at 5647–58.
136146 Id. at 5659–64. at 5659–64.
137147 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5660. 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5660.
138148 Id. at 5672. 149 Id. 150 Id. at 5672–77. 151 Id. at 5616–17, 5805–68. 152 Id. at 5809–16. While the Commission did not Id. at 5672.
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the 2010 Order—network management practices, performance, and commercial terms139—and
specified additional information that BIAS providers must disclose regarding these categories,
including pricing details, fees, data caps, packet loss, and network practices applied to traffic
associated with a particular user or user group.140
To ensure a “light touch” regulatory regime facilitating investment and innovation, the
Commission used its authority under Section 10 of the Communications Act to forbear from forbear from
applying the “vast majority” of Title II provisions to BIAS providers.141 It did not, however,
forbear from applying Title II’s prohibition of unjust and unreasonable rates and its complaint and
enforcement procedures.142 The 2015 Open Internet Order also applied a handful of other Title II
applying Sections 201 and 202 to BIAS providers, it also stated that it could not envision using Sections 201 and 202 to adopt “new ex ante rate regulation of broadband Congressional Research Service 13 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview provisions to BIAS providers, such as certain requirements relating to privacy, disability access, provisions to BIAS providers, such as certain requirements relating to privacy, disability access,
and universal service.and universal service.143153 To preserve this “carefully tailored regulatory scheme,” the FCC To preserve this “carefully tailored regulatory scheme,” the FCC
“announced [its] firm intention” to preempt any state regulations that conflicted with the order.“announced [its] firm intention” to preempt any state regulations that conflicted with the order.144154
It noted, however, that it would proceed on a “case-by-case basis in light of the fact specific It noted, however, that it would proceed on a “case-by-case basis in light of the fact specific
nature of particular preemption inquiries.”nature of particular preemption inquiries.”145155
The 2015 Open Internet Order was not unanimous, with commissioners Ajit Pai and Michael The 2015 Open Internet Order was not unanimous, with commissioners Ajit Pai and Michael
O’Rielly dissenting.O’Rielly dissenting.146156 These commissioners viewed the order’s neutrality rules as unnecessary These commissioners viewed the order’s neutrality rules as unnecessary
because, in their view, there was little evidence of BIAS providers disfavoring lawful internet because, in their view, there was little evidence of BIAS providers disfavoring lawful internet
traffic.traffic.147157 They also contended that reclassifying BIAS as a Title II telecommunications service They also contended that reclassifying BIAS as a Title II telecommunications service
would create significant regulatory costs and would slow broadband investment and would create significant regulatory costs and would slow broadband investment and
innovation.innovation.148158
The following year, in The following year, in USTA v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet , the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet
Order in its entirety.Order in its entirety.149159 The court applied the The court applied the Chevron framework to uphold the Commission’s framework to uphold the Commission’s
reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications service.reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications service.150160 Following Following Brand X, it concluded that , it concluded that
“offering” was ambiguous and that the relevant question was the extent to which information and “offering” was ambiguous and that the relevant question was the extent to which information and
transmission services were integrated.transmission services were integrated.151161 On this issue, the court held that the Commission On this issue, the court held that the Commission

139 Id.
140 Id. at 5672–77.
141 Id. at 5616–17, 5805–68.
142 Id. at 5809–16. While the Commission did not forbear from applying Sections 201 and 202 to BIAS providers, it
also stated that it could not envision using Sections 201 and 202 to adopt “new ex ante rate regulation of broadband
reasonably concluded that BIAS providers were “offering” a standalone transmission service.162 The court credited extensive evidence in the record that consumers perceived the transmission service as separate from any information services like email and cloud storage.163 The court further upheld the FCC’s conclusion that DNS and caching fell under the telecommunications management exception.164 The Commission had relied for that conclusion on the test for the adjunct-to-basic standard under the Computer II regime.165 Under this test, a service would be deemed adjunct-to-basic if it facilitated the use of the network and did not alter the “fundamental character” of the service.166 According to the court, the Commission reasonably concluded that internet access in the future,” and consequently forbore from applying those provisions “to that extent.” internet access in the future,” and consequently forbore from applying those provisions “to that extent.” Id. at 5814. at 5814.
143153 Id. at 5820–38. at 5820–38.
144154 Id. at 5804. at 5804.
145155 Id.
146156 Id. at 5921, 5985 (statements of commissioners Ajit Pai and Michael O’Rielly, dissenting). at 5921, 5985 (statements of commissioners Ajit Pai and Michael O’Rielly, dissenting).
147157 Id. at 5933 (“The Internet is not broken. There is no problem for the government to solve. . . . The evidence of these at 5933 (“The Internet is not broken. There is no problem for the government to solve. . . . The evidence of these
continuing threats [to internet openness]? There is none; it’s all anecdote, hypothesis, and hysteria.”); continuing threats [to internet openness]? There is none; it’s all anecdote, hypothesis, and hysteria.”); id at 5987 (“Even at 5987 (“Even
after enduring three weeks of spin, it is hard for me to believe that the Commission is establishing an entire Title II/net after enduring three weeks of spin, it is hard for me to believe that the Commission is establishing an entire Title II/net
neutrality regime to protect against hypothetical harms. There is not a shred of evidence that any aspect of this structure neutrality regime to protect against hypothetical harms. There is not a shred of evidence that any aspect of this structure
is necessary.”). is necessary.”).
148158 Id. at 5927–28 (“The record is replete with evidence that Title II regulations will slow investment and innovation in at 5927–28 (“The record is replete with evidence that Title II regulations will slow investment and innovation in
broadband networks. . . . “[The Order] goes even further and injects tremendous uncertainty into the market. . . .[A] broadband networks. . . . “[The Order] goes even further and injects tremendous uncertainty into the market. . . .[A]
thick regulatory haze–rules that are unclear with the overhang of more rules to come–should make any rational thick regulatory haze–rules that are unclear with the overhang of more rules to come–should make any rational
business hold back on investment and start returning any free cash back to their shareholders.”). business hold back on investment and start returning any free cash back to their shareholders.”).
149159 825 F.3d 674 (2016). 825 F.3d 674 (2016).
150160 Id. at 701–06. at 701–06.
151161 Id. at 701–02. 162 Id. at 704–05. 163 Id. 164 Id. at 705–06. 165 Id. at 705. 166 Id. Congressional Research Service 14 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview Id. at 701–02.
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reasonably concluded that BIAS providers were “offering” a standalone transmission service.152
The court credited extensive evidence in the record that consumers perceived the transmission
service as separate from any information services like email and cloud storage.153 The court
further upheld the FCC’s conclusion that DNS and caching fell under the telecommunications
management exception.154 The Commission had relied for that conclusion on the test for the
adjunct-to-basic standard under the Computer II regime.155 Under this test, a service would be
deemed adjunct-to-basic if it facilitated the use of the network and did not alter the “fundamental
character” of the service.156 According to the court, the Commission reasonably concluded that
DNS and caching satisfied this test, as the petitioner challenging the 2015 Open Internet Order DNS and caching satisfied this test, as the petitioner challenging the 2015 Open Internet Order
did not give any reason to believe otherwise.did not give any reason to believe otherwise.157167
The court also rejected the petitioner’s contention that the Commission’s reclassification of BIAS The court also rejected the petitioner’s contention that the Commission’s reclassification of BIAS
as a telecommunications service was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the APA.as a telecommunications service was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the APA.158168 Under Under
this standard, the court explained, agencies must provide reasoned explanations for their this standard, the court explained, agencies must provide reasoned explanations for their
decisions, including good reasons for policy changes.decisions, including good reasons for policy changes.159169 The court held that the agency met this The court held that the agency met this
standard, as it had explained that it could not legally establish the three bright-line rules (anti-standard, as it had explained that it could not legally establish the three bright-line rules (anti-
blocking, anti-throttling, and anti-paid-prioritization rules) without the reclassification, given the blocking, anti-throttling, and anti-paid-prioritization rules) without the reclassification, given the
Verizon decision.decision.160170 The court also upheld the 2015 Order’s reclassification of mobile broadband The court also upheld the 2015 Order’s reclassification of mobile broadband
as a commercial mobile service.as a commercial mobile service.161171 The court reasoned that the statute expressly gave the The court reasoned that the statute expressly gave the
Commission authority to define the “key definition components” of the commercial and private Commission authority to define the “key definition components” of the commercial and private
mobile service categories.mobile service categories.162172 It further concluded that the Commission’s reclassification was It further concluded that the Commission’s reclassification was
reasonable, since the record evidence demonstrated that mobile broadband use had grown rapidly reasonable, since the record evidence demonstrated that mobile broadband use had grown rapidly
and was nearly universal.and was nearly universal.163173
RIF Order
Although the Although the USTA decision upheld the 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC again changed course decision upheld the 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC again changed course
a few years later. Under new leadership, the Commission issued a declaratory ruling, report, and a few years later. Under new leadership, the Commission issued a declaratory ruling, report, and
order titled “Restoring Internet Freedom” (RIF Order), which the Commission adopted in order titled “Restoring Internet Freedom” (RIF Order), which the Commission adopted in
December of 2017 and released in January of 2018.December of 2017 and released in January of 2018.164174 The RIF Order once more classified fixed The RIF Order once more classified fixed
BIAS as an information service and mobile BIAS as a private mobile service.BIAS as an information service and mobile BIAS as a private mobile service.165175 The Order also The Order also
eliminated the 2015 Open Internet Order’s bright-line rules and General Conduct Rule.eliminated the 2015 Open Internet Order’s bright-line rules and General Conduct Rule.166176 While While
the RIF Order retained a transparency rule, it removed many of the 2015 Order’s additional the RIF Order retained a transparency rule, it removed many of the 2015 Order’s additional

152 Id. at 704–05.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 705–06.
155 Id. at 705.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 705–06.
158 Id. at 706–10.
159 Id. at 706–07.
160 Id. at 707.
161 Id. at 716–24.
162 Id. at 717.
163 Id. at 716, 723–24.
164 RIF Order, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311
165 Id.
166 Id. at 312–13, 450–69.
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disclosure obligations and reverted to a transparency rule similar to the one set forth in the 2010 disclosure obligations and reverted to a transparency rule similar to the one set forth in the 2010
Order.Order.167177
The Commission explained its change in position by characterizing the 2015 Open Internet Order The Commission explained its change in position by characterizing the 2015 Open Internet Order
as an “abrupt shift” to “heavy-handed utility-style regulation” of BIAS.as an “abrupt shift” to “heavy-handed utility-style regulation” of BIAS.168178 The FCC stated that the The FCC stated that the
“balance of evidence in the record” indicated that the 2015 Open Internet Order’s Title II “balance of evidence in the record” indicated that the 2015 Open Internet Order’s Title II
reclassification had reduced broadband providers’ investment in networks because of regulatory reclassification had reduced broadband providers’ investment in networks because of regulatory
uncertainty.uncertainty.169179 The FCC further characterized the “utility-style regulation” of Title II classification The FCC further characterized the “utility-style regulation” of Title II classification
as a “solution in search of a problem”as a “solution in search of a problem”170180 and said that the benefits of Title II and the conduct rules and said that the benefits of Title II and the conduct rules
167 Id. at 705–06. 168 Id. at 706–10. 169 Id. at 706–07. 170 Id. at 707. 171 Id. at 716–24. 172 Id. at 717. 173 Id. at 716, 723–24. 174 RIF Order, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311 175 Id. 176 Id. at 312–13, 450–69. 177 Id. at 435–50. 178 Id. at 312. 179 Id. at 364 180 Id. at 375. Congressional Research Service 15 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview were either small or “approximately zero.”181were either small or “approximately zero.”171 The Commission also pointed out that removal of The Commission also pointed out that removal of
the Title II classification would restore the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) ability to enforce the Title II classification would restore the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) ability to enforce
consumer protection and antitrust laws against BIAS providers, since the FTC has no jurisdiction consumer protection and antitrust laws against BIAS providers, since the FTC has no jurisdiction
over common carriers.over common carriers.172182 The FCC maintained that this enforcement, in combination with the The FCC maintained that this enforcement, in combination with the
disclosures required under the transparency rule, would mitigate the harms the 2015 Open disclosures required under the transparency rule, would mitigate the harms the 2015 Open
Internet Order intended to address.Internet Order intended to address.173183
Beyond these policy reasons, the agency put forward a number of legal arguments supporting its Beyond these policy reasons, the agency put forward a number of legal arguments supporting its
reclassification of fixed and mobile BIAS. With respect to the information service classification, reclassification of fixed and mobile BIAS. With respect to the information service classification,
it maintained that fixed BIAS providers “offer” an information service because DNS and caching it maintained that fixed BIAS providers “offer” an information service because DNS and caching
are functionally integrated with broadband service.are functionally integrated with broadband service.174184 It relatedly concluded that DNS and It relatedly concluded that DNS and
caching are information services because, contrary to the 2015 Open Internet Order, they do not caching are information services because, contrary to the 2015 Open Internet Order, they do not
fall under the telecommunications system management exception.fall under the telecommunications system management exception.175185 To reach this conclusion, the To reach this conclusion, the
FCC drew on the judicial precedent interpreting the Modification of Final Judgement (MFJ), a FCC drew on the judicial precedent interpreting the Modification of Final Judgement (MFJ), a
consent decree governing the breakup of the AT&T Monopoly.consent decree governing the breakup of the AT&T Monopoly.176186 The MFJ incorporated the The MFJ incorporated the
telecommunications management exception that Congress later largely adopted in the 1996 Act. telecommunications management exception that Congress later largely adopted in the 1996 Act.
According to the Commission, the MFJ precedent construed this exception as directed only at According to the Commission, the MFJ precedent construed this exception as directed only at
“internal operations” rather than services for customers or end users.“internal operations” rather than services for customers or end users.177187 The FCC maintained that The FCC maintained that
DNS and caching did not meet this exception because they are not simply internal management DNS and caching did not meet this exception because they are not simply internal management
functions but are useful to end users, allowing users to navigate the internet and quickly retrieve functions but are useful to end users, allowing users to navigate the internet and quickly retrieve
information.information.178188
The Commission also reclassified mobile BIAS as a private mobile service by removing the The Commission also reclassified mobile BIAS as a private mobile service by removing the
reference to public IP addresses from the “public switched network” definition, which had been reference to public IP addresses from the “public switched network” definition, which had been
added by the 2015 Open Internet Order.added by the 2015 Open Internet Order.179189 With this phrase removed, the Commission concluded With this phrase removed, the Commission concluded

167 Id. at 435–50.
168 Id. at 312.
169 Id. at 364
170 Id. at 375.
171 Id. at 493–95.
172that mobile BIAS did not meet the definition of a commercial mobile service because it is not interconnected with the public switched network.190 Finally, to ensure BIAS providers are governed by uniform regulations rather than a “patchwork” of state and local laws, the RIF Order preempted state and local requirements inconsistent with the RIF Order’s deregulatory approach.191 Specifically, the Commission preempted any state or local laws “that would effectively impose rules or requirements that [it] repealed or decided to 181 Id. at 493–95. 182 Id.; ; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (removing common carriers from the FTC’s jurisdiction under the Federal Trade 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (removing common carriers from the FTC’s jurisdiction under the Federal Trade
Commission Act). Commission Act).
173183 RIF Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 493–95. RIF Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 493–95.
174184 Id. at 325. at 325.
175185 Id. at 326–28. at 326–28.
176186 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (MFJ Initial Decision), United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (MFJ Initial Decision), aff'd sub
nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
177187 RIF Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 328. RIF Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 328.
178188 Id. at 328–29, 332–33. at 328–29, 332–33.
179189 Id. at 354–56. The 2018 Order also reverted back to the prior definition of “interconnected service” by reinserting at 354–56. The 2018 Order also reverted back to the prior definition of “interconnected service” by reinserting
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that mobile BIAS did not meet the definition of a commercial mobile service because it is not
interconnected with the public switched network.180
Finally, to ensure BIAS providers are governed by uniform regulations rather than a “patchwork”
of state and local laws, the RIF Order preempted state and local requirements inconsistent with
the RIF Order’s deregulatory approach.181 Specifically, the Commission preempted any state or
local laws “that would effectively impose rules or requirements that [it] repealed or decided to
the word “all”—defining it as a service “that gives subscribers the capability to communicate to or receive communication from all other users on the public switched network.” Id. at 56. The Commission explained that this change would reflect the Commission’s view that interconnected service “is one that enables communication between its users and all other users of the public switched network.” Id. 190 Id. at 357–58. 191 Id. at 426–27. Congressional Research Service 16 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview refrain from imposing” or that imposed “more stringent requirements for any aspect of broadband refrain from imposing” or that imposed “more stringent requirements for any aspect of broadband
service” addressed by the RIF Order.service” addressed by the RIF Order.182192
Similar to the 2015 Open Internet Order, the Commission divided over the RIF Order, with Similar to the 2015 Open Internet Order, the Commission divided over the RIF Order, with
commissioners Mignon Clyburn and Jessica Rosenworcel dissenting.commissioners Mignon Clyburn and Jessica Rosenworcel dissenting.183Among193Among other things, the other things, the
dissenting commissioners cited to the 2015 Open Internet Order’s broad popularity with dissenting commissioners cited to the 2015 Open Internet Order’s broad popularity with
consumers;consumers;184194 faulted the majority for abdicating regulatory oversight over BIAS providers; faulted the majority for abdicating regulatory oversight over BIAS providers;185195
and criticized the majority’s legal reasoning and empirical analysis, such as disputing the and criticized the majority’s legal reasoning and empirical analysis, such as disputing the
evidence that the 2015 Open Internet Order led to decreased investment by BIAS providers.evidence that the 2015 Open Internet Order led to decreased investment by BIAS providers.186196
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC
Several internet companies, non-profits, and state and local governments petitioned the D.C. Several internet companies, non-profits, and state and local governments petitioned the D.C.
Circuit to review the RIF Order, arguing that it exceeded the FCC’s statutory authority and Circuit to review the RIF Order, arguing that it exceeded the FCC’s statutory authority and
violated the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.violated the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.187197 In In Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit , the D.C. Circuit
rejected most of these arguments and upheld the bulk of the Order.rejected most of these arguments and upheld the bulk of the Order.188198 Applying the usual Applying the usual Chevron
framework, the court held the Commission’s reclassification of fixed BIAS as an information framework, the court held the Commission’s reclassification of fixed BIAS as an information
service was reasonable in light of the FCC’s reliance on DNS and caching.service was reasonable in light of the FCC’s reliance on DNS and caching.189199 The D.C. Circuit The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X supported this approach because it had supported this approach because it had
upheld the Commission’s information service classification in light of the integrated nature of upheld the Commission’s information service classification in light of the integrated nature of
these services.these services.190200 The D.C. Circuit also upheld the Commission’s conclusion that DNS and The D.C. Circuit also upheld the Commission’s conclusion that DNS and

the word “all”—defining it as a service “that gives subscribers the capability to communicate to or receive
communication from all other users on the public switched network.” Id. at 56. The Commission explained that this
change would reflect the Commission’s view that interconnected service “is one that enables communication between
its users and all other users of the public switched network.” Id.
180 Id. at 357–58.
181 Id. at 426–27.
182 Id. at 427.
183caching fell outside the telecommunications system management exception.201 The court acknowledged that this issue was not directly addressed in Brand X, and that, in USTA, the D.C. Circuit had upheld the Commission’s contrary interpretation.202 The court explained, however, that the exception was “an ambiguous statutory phrase” and, under Chevron, it is the FCC’s prerogative to change its interpretation of the exception as long as its new construction is reasonable.203 The court held that the FCC had met this reasonability requirement, given its reliance on MFJ precedent and its view that the alternative approach would allow the exception to “swallow” the information service category.204 Along with the information service 192 Id. at 427. 193 Id. at 533, 579 (statements of commissioners Mignon Clyburn and Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting). at 533, 579 (statements of commissioners Mignon Clyburn and Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting).
184194 Id. at 362, 364 (“We have heard story after story of what net neutrality means to consumers and small businesses at 362, 364 (“We have heard story after story of what net neutrality means to consumers and small businesses
from places as diverse as Los Angeles’ Skid Row and Marietta, Ohio . . . . I have been asking myself repeatedly, why from places as diverse as Los Angeles’ Skid Row and Marietta, Ohio . . . . I have been asking myself repeatedly, why
the majority is so singularly-focused on overturning these wildly-popular rules?”). the majority is so singularly-focused on overturning these wildly-popular rules?”).
185195 Id. at 363 (“We will be in a world where regulatory substance fades to black, and all that is left is a broadband at 363 (“We will be in a world where regulatory substance fades to black, and all that is left is a broadband
provider’s toothy grin and those oh so comforting words: we have every incentive to do the right thing. What they will provider’s toothy grin and those oh so comforting words: we have every incentive to do the right thing. What they will
soon have, is every incentive to do their own thing.”); soon have, is every incentive to do their own thing.”);
186196 Id. at 365–66 (“[T]he majority’s reliance on broadband providers[’] assertions of reductions in investment is highly- at 365–66 (“[T]he majority’s reliance on broadband providers[’] assertions of reductions in investment is highly-
flawed. Nothing in this item convinces me that investment has dropped as a result of our net neutrality policies. . . . To flawed. Nothing in this item convinces me that investment has dropped as a result of our net neutrality policies. . . . To
suggest that net neutrality rules shifted billions of dollars in capital beggars the imagination, and the record offers no suggest that net neutrality rules shifted billions of dollars in capital beggars the imagination, and the record offers no
proof that investment trends match the regulatory landscape.”). proof that investment trends match the regulatory landscape.”).
187197 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17. , 940 F.3d at 17.
188198 Id. at 18. at 18.
189199 Id. at 20. at 20.
190200 Id. at 20–22. 201 Id. at 23–32. 202 Id. at 23–24. 203 Id. 204 Id. at 24–26. Congressional Research Service 17 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview Id. at 20–22.
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caching fell outside the telecommunications system management exception.191 The court
acknowledged that this issue was not directly addressed in Brand X, and that, in USTA, the D.C.
Circuit had upheld the Commission’s contrary interpretation.192 The court explained, however,
that the exception was “an ambiguous statutory phrase” and, under Chevron, it is the FCC’s
prerogative to change its interpretation of the exception as long as its new construction is
reasonable.193 The court held that the FCC had met this reasonability requirement, given its
reliance on MFJ precedent and its view that the alternative approach would allow the exception to
“swallow” the information service category.194 Along with the information service
reclassification, the court upheld the RIF Order’s reclassification of mobile broadband as a reclassification, the court upheld the RIF Order’s reclassification of mobile broadband as a
private mobile service.private mobile service.195205 Echoing its reasoning in Echoing its reasoning in USTA, the D.C. Circuit stated that the , the D.C. Circuit stated that the
Commission had explicit statutory authority to modify its definition of the integral phrase “public Commission had explicit statutory authority to modify its definition of the integral phrase “public
switched network.”switched network.”196206 The court concluded that the FCC also had “compelling policy grounds” The court concluded that the FCC also had “compelling policy grounds”
for this change because, given its new information service classification of BIAS, it would ensure for this change because, given its new information service classification of BIAS, it would ensure
consistent treatment of fixed and mobile BIAS.consistent treatment of fixed and mobile BIAS.197207
For the most part, the court also upheld the RIF Order against the petitioners’ claim that the Order For the most part, the court also upheld the RIF Order against the petitioners’ claim that the Order
violated the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.violated the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.198208 Petitioners argued that the RIF Order was Petitioners argued that the RIF Order was
arbitrary and capricious because the Commission failed to adequately consider a number of arbitrary and capricious because the Commission failed to adequately consider a number of
issues, such as the Order’s impact on investment and innovation, and the reliance interests issues, such as the Order’s impact on investment and innovation, and the reliance interests
engendered by the 2015 Open Internet Order.engendered by the 2015 Open Internet Order.199209 While the court rejected most of these arguments, While the court rejected most of these arguments,
it held the FCC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously with respect to three issues: public safety, it held the FCC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously with respect to three issues: public safety,
utility pole attachments, and the Lifeline Program.utility pole attachments, and the Lifeline Program.200210 On public safety, the court concluded the On public safety, the court concluded the
FCC failed to address arguments that the RIF Order could imperil first responders’ ability to FCC failed to address arguments that the RIF Order could imperil first responders’ ability to
communicate with the public during a crisis. Specifically, the Commission failed to consider communicate with the public during a crisis. Specifically, the Commission failed to consider
arguments that the RIF Order allowed BIAS providers to demand payment for top-rate speeds and arguments that the RIF Order allowed BIAS providers to demand payment for top-rate speeds and
prioritize internet traffic at their discretion, which could subject public safety communications to prioritize internet traffic at their discretion, which could subject public safety communications to
slower speeds.slower speeds.201211
Regarding utility pole attachments, the court concluded the FCC did not adequately consider how Regarding utility pole attachments, the court concluded the FCC did not adequately consider how
the Order would impact the regulatory regime’s application to BIAS providers.the Order would impact the regulatory regime’s application to BIAS providers.202212 As the court As the court
explained, Section 224 of the Communications Act allows local governments to regulate the explained, Section 224 of the Communications Act allows local governments to regulate the
terms and conditions of utility pole attachments and requires utility companies to provide access terms and conditions of utility pole attachments and requires utility companies to provide access
to their poles on a nondiscriminatory basis.to their poles on a nondiscriminatory basis.203213 This section, however, only expressly applies to This section, however, only expressly applies to
cable television systems or telecommunications services—there is no reference to information cable television systems or telecommunications services—there is no reference to information

191 Id. at 23–32.
192 Id. at 23–24.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 24–26.
195 Id. at 35.
196 Id. at 37–38.
197 Id. at 39.
198 Id. at 49–73.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 59, 65, 68.
201 Id. at 59–62.
202 Id. at 65–67.
203 Id. at 65–66; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c), (f).
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services.204services.214 Despite Section 224’s seeming inapplicability to BIAS, as a newly reclassified Despite Section 224’s seeming inapplicability to BIAS, as a newly reclassified
information service, the court said the Commission “whistle[d] past the graveyard” and suggested information service, the court said the Commission “whistle[d] past the graveyard” and suggested
without explanation that Section 224 would continue to apply.without explanation that Section 224 would continue to apply.205215
The court likewise held the Commission failed to adequately address how the RIF Order would The court likewise held the Commission failed to adequately address how the RIF Order would
impact the Lifeline Program, which subsidizes service to low-income customers.impact the Lifeline Program, which subsidizes service to low-income customers.206216 The court The court
explained, by way of background, that the Act requires entities receiving Lifeline funding to be explained, by way of background, that the Act requires entities receiving Lifeline funding to be
eligible telecommunications carriers.eligible telecommunications carriers.207217 The Commission added broadband to the Lifeline The Commission added broadband to the Lifeline
Program in 2016, which, the court said, “made sense” given BIAS’ designation as a Program in 2016, which, the court said, “made sense” given BIAS’ designation as a
205 Id. at 35. 206 Id. at 37–38. 207 Id. at 39. 208 Id. at 49–73. 209 Id. 210 Id. at 59, 65, 68. 211 Id. at 59–62. 212 Id. at 65–67. 213 Id. at 65–66; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c), (f). 214 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 66; 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4), (f)(1). 215 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 66–67. 216 Id. at 68–69. 217 Id. at 68. Congressional Research Service 18 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview telecommunications carrier.218telecommunications carrier.208 The court held that the FCC failed, however, to consider in the RIF The court held that the FCC failed, however, to consider in the RIF
Order how its reclassification would impact broadband’s eligibility for the program.Order how its reclassification would impact broadband’s eligibility for the program.209219 The court The court
remanded the case to the FCC for further consideration of all three of these issues.remanded the case to the FCC for further consideration of all three of these issues.210220
Finally, the court vacated the RIF Order’s “sweeping” preemption of any state or local Finally, the court vacated the RIF Order’s “sweeping” preemption of any state or local
requirements inconsistent with the Order’s deregulatory approach.requirements inconsistent with the Order’s deregulatory approach.211221 At bottom, the court faulted At bottom, the court faulted
the Commission for failing to ground its preemption in any affirmative source of statutory the Commission for failing to ground its preemption in any affirmative source of statutory
authority. The court explained that the FCC no longer has affirmative regulatory authority over authority. The court explained that the FCC no longer has affirmative regulatory authority over
BIAS, now that it is classified as an information service, and the Commission could not preempt BIAS, now that it is classified as an information service, and the Commission could not preempt
state law in an area over which it does not have regulatory authority, absent an express state law in an area over which it does not have regulatory authority, absent an express
authorization from Congress.authorization from Congress.212222 For a detailed discussion of For a detailed discussion of Mozilla’s preemption analysis, see ’s preemption analysis, see
CRS Report R46736, CRS Report R46736, Stepping In: The FCC’s Authority to Preempt State Laws Under the
Communications Act
, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes. , by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes.
2020 Remand Order
As just discussed, although the court in As just discussed, although the court in Mozilla upheld the bulk of the RIF Order, it remanded upheld the bulk of the RIF Order, it remanded
three discrete issues for the FCC’s further consideration: the Order’s effect on public safety, pole three discrete issues for the FCC’s further consideration: the Order’s effect on public safety, pole
attachments, and the Lifeline Program.attachments, and the Lifeline Program.213223 As a result, the FCC issued an order in 2020 (2020 As a result, the FCC issued an order in 2020 (2020
Remand Order) with further analysis on these issues.Remand Order) with further analysis on these issues.214224 For each of the three matters, the 2020 For each of the three matters, the 2020
Remand Order concluded that there was no basis to change the RIF Order’s conclusions.Remand Order concluded that there was no basis to change the RIF Order’s conclusions.215225
On public safety, the Commission concluded that the “light-touch” regulatory framework of the On public safety, the Commission concluded that the “light-touch” regulatory framework of the
RIF Order would actually benefit public safety communications by incentivizing BIAS providers RIF Order would actually benefit public safety communications by incentivizing BIAS providers
to invest in their networks, such as by upgrading their networks to 5G.to invest in their networks, such as by upgrading their networks to 5G.216226 The Commission The Commission
maintained that such upgrades would benefit public safety entities, as well as other users.maintained that such upgrades would benefit public safety entities, as well as other users.217 The

204 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 66; 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4), (f)(1).
205 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 66–67.
206 Id. at 68–69.
207 Id. at 68.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 69.
210 Id. at 86.
211 Id. at 74.
212 Id. at 74–76.
213 Id. at 86.
214 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 35 FCC Rcd. 12328 (2020).
215 Id. at 12336.
216 Id. at 12344–48.
217 Id. at 12344.
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227 The agency further concluded that there is little evidence the RIF Order would cause harm to public agency further concluded that there is little evidence the RIF Order would cause harm to public
safety communications. It pointed out, among other things, that all major BIAS providers have safety communications. It pointed out, among other things, that all major BIAS providers have
committed to maintaining internet openness and that there are strong business incentives for committed to maintaining internet openness and that there are strong business incentives for
providers to ensure the integrity of public safety communications.providers to ensure the integrity of public safety communications.218228 The Commission also The Commission also
discounted a handful of situations where commenters alleged that public safety communications discounted a handful of situations where commenters alleged that public safety communications
were throttled, such as an incident in 2018 in which the Santa Clara fire department’s were throttled, such as an incident in 2018 in which the Santa Clara fire department’s
communications were allegedly throttled after the department exceeded its data cap.communications were allegedly throttled after the department exceeded its data cap.219229 The The
Commission reasoned that the facts in these situations “are heavily contested” and that, even if Commission reasoned that the facts in these situations “are heavily contested” and that, even if
218 Id. 219 Id. at 69. 220 Id. at 86. 221 Id. at 74. 222 Id. at 74–76. 223 Id. at 86. 224 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 35 FCC Rcd. 12328 (2020). 225 Id. at 12336. 226 Id. at 12344–48. 227 Id. at 12344. 228 Id. at 12349–50. 229 Id. 12353–55. Congressional Research Service 19 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview the allegations in the Santa Clara case were true, the conduct would have been permitted under the allegations in the Santa Clara case were true, the conduct would have been permitted under
the 2015 Open Internet Order, which did not prohibit data caps.the 2015 Open Internet Order, which did not prohibit data caps.220230
Regarding pole attachments, the FCC concluded that the overall benefits of reclassifying BIAS as Regarding pole attachments, the FCC concluded that the overall benefits of reclassifying BIAS as
an information service outweigh any drawbacks of certain BIAS providers no longer being an information service outweigh any drawbacks of certain BIAS providers no longer being
subject to Section 224’s pole attachment provisions. The FCC reasoned that the “vast majority” subject to Section 224’s pole attachment provisions. The FCC reasoned that the “vast majority”
of BIAS providers also offer cable services and would continue to be governed by Section 224.of BIAS providers also offer cable services and would continue to be governed by Section 224.221231
While broadband-only providers would not benefit from Section 224’s anti-discrimination While broadband-only providers would not benefit from Section 224’s anti-discrimination
protections, the Commission noted that these providers could still negotiate agreements with pole protections, the Commission noted that these providers could still negotiate agreements with pole
owners and that, since the RIF Order, there are only a small number of broadband-only providers owners and that, since the RIF Order, there are only a small number of broadband-only providers
who indicated they experienced increased costs related to pole attachments.who indicated they experienced increased costs related to pole attachments.222232 Consequently, the Consequently, the
Commission concluded that there is “no question” the overall benefits of Title I reclassification Commission concluded that there is “no question” the overall benefits of Title I reclassification
outweighed any limited costs resulting from broadband-only providers losing their Section 224 outweighed any limited costs resulting from broadband-only providers losing their Section 224
pole-attachment protections.pole-attachment protections.223233
Finally, with respect to Lifeline, the FCC acknowledged that eligible recipients of Lifeline Finally, with respect to Lifeline, the FCC acknowledged that eligible recipients of Lifeline
funding must be common carriers,funding must be common carriers,224234 but it also pointed out that many BIAS providers offer voice but it also pointed out that many BIAS providers offer voice
telephony service and thus maintain common carrier status.telephony service and thus maintain common carrier status.225235 The Commission reasoned that The Commission reasoned that
Section 254 of the Communications Act gives it broad authority to designate the types of services Section 254 of the Communications Act gives it broad authority to designate the types of services
or facilities supported through the Lifeline program,or facilities supported through the Lifeline program,226236 citing as support a 2014 decision of the citing as support a 2014 decision of the
Tenth Circuit upholding an FCC order that required carriers to offer broadband capabilities in Tenth Circuit upholding an FCC order that required carriers to offer broadband capabilities in
order to receive support under a separate Section 254 program.order to receive support under a separate Section 254 program.227237 The FCC thus concluded that, The FCC thus concluded that,
even under the RIF Order, it may continue to use Lifeline to support BIAS services provided by even under the RIF Order, it may continue to use Lifeline to support BIAS services provided by
common carriers.common carriers.228238
Next Steps
While the While the Mozilla decision left decision left in place the RIF Order the RIF Order in place, it may not be the final chapter in federal , it may not be the final chapter in federal
net neutrality law. On July 9, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order urging the FCC to net neutrality law. On July 9, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order urging the FCC to

218 Id. at 12349–50.
219 Id. 12353–55.
220 Id. at 12354.
221 Id. at 12371.
222 Id. at 12373.
223 Id. at 12376.
224 Id. at 12382.
225 Id. at 12381
226 Id. at 12380–81.
227 Id. at 12381.
228 Id. at 12380.
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adopt net neutrality rules similar to those in the 2015 Open Internet Order.229 FCC Chair Jessica
Rosenworcel—whom President Biden has nominated for another term230—and Commissioner
Geoffery Starks may be open to this step, as they have both been critical of the RIF Order.231 Gigi
Sohn, whom President Biden has nominated to fill the existing vacancy on the adopt net neutrality rules similar to those in the 2015 Open Internet Order.239 FCC Chair Jessica Rosenworcel—whom the Senate confirmed on December 7, 2021, for another five-year term240—and Commissioner Geoffery Starks may be open to this step, as they have both been critical of the RIF Order.241 Gigi Sohn, whom President Biden has nominated to fill the existing vacancy on the 230 Id. at 12354. 231 Id. at 12371. 232 Id. at 12373. 233 Id. at 12376. 234 Id. at 12382. 235 Id. at 12381 236 Id. at 12380–81. 237 Id. at 12381. 238 Id. at 12380. 239 Exec. Order No. 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (issued July 9, 2021). 240 167 Cong. Rec. S8,944 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2021) (vote on Rosenworcel nomination). 241 See, e.g., 2018 Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 846–48 (Statement of Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting); Commissioner Starks Statement on the Passage of the Save the Internet Act, FCC.gov (April 10, 2019), https://www.fcc.gov/document/commissioner-starks-passage-net-neutrality-legislation. Congressional Research Service 20 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview Commission, has Commission, has
also been critical of the RIF Order.also been critical of the RIF Order.232242 The remaining two commissioners—Brendan Carr and The remaining two commissioners—Brendan Carr and
Nathan Simington—may be less inclined to change the FCC’s current policy. Commissioner Carr Nathan Simington—may be less inclined to change the FCC’s current policy. Commissioner Carr
voted for the RIF Order and Commissioner Simington has expressed reservations about Title II voted for the RIF Order and Commissioner Simington has expressed reservations about Title II
net neutrality regulations.net neutrality regulations.233243 Consequently, until all five seats on the Commission are filled, the Consequently, until all five seats on the Commission are filled, the
FCC may be deadlocked on the issue of net neutrality. FCC may be deadlocked on the issue of net neutrality.
Congress, however, could decide to take the decision out of the FCC’s hands entirely by enacting Congress, however, could decide to take the decision out of the FCC’s hands entirely by enacting
a federal statutory net neutrality policy. In the 116th Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives a federal statutory net neutrality policy. In the 116th Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the Save the Internet Act, which would have repealed the RIF Order and restored the 2015 passed the Save the Internet Act, which would have repealed the RIF Order and restored the 2015
Open Internet Order.Open Internet Order.234244 Other bills introduced in the 116th Congress, such as H.R. 1101, H.R. Other bills introduced in the 116th Congress, such as H.R. 1101, H.R.
1006, H.R. 2136, and H.R. 1096, would have amended Title I to include net neutrality 1006, H.R. 2136, and H.R. 1096, would have amended Title I to include net neutrality
requirements, such as prohibitions on blocking or throttling, and would have given the FCC requirements, such as prohibitions on blocking or throttling, and would have given the FCC
limited regulatory and enforcement authority to implement the requirements.limited regulatory and enforcement authority to implement the requirements.235245 These bills have These bills have
not been reintroduced in the 117th Congress. not been reintroduced in the 117th Congress.
Absent federal net neutrality requirements, states may increasingly fill the regulatory space with Absent federal net neutrality requirements, states may increasingly fill the regulatory space with
their own net neutrality laws. Some states, such as California and Washington, have already their own net neutrality laws. Some states, such as California and Washington, have already
enacted net neutrality laws with requirements similar to the 2015 Open Internet Order.enacted net neutrality laws with requirements similar to the 2015 Open Internet Order.236 BIAS
providers, however, have brought legal challenges arguing that the laws are preempted by the RIF
Order. These legal challenges are ongoing, although the district court overseeing challenges to
California’s law rejected the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and allowed the law to
go into effect.237 For further discussion of these laws and the legal challenges, see CRS Report

229 Exec. Order No. 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (issued July 9,
2021).
230 President Biden Announces Key Nominations, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/26/president-biden-announces-key-
nominations-8/.
231 See, e.g., 2018 Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 846–48 (Statement of Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting); Commissioner Starks
Statement on the Passage of the Save the Internet Act, FCC.gov (April 10, 2019),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/commissioner-starks-passage-net-neutrality-legislation.
232246 While BIAS providers challenged California’s net neutrality law in court, arguing that federal law preempts it, the Ninth Circuit rejected these preemption arguments in the case ACA Connects v. Bonta.247 For further discussion of these laws and the legal challenges, see CRS Report R46736, Stepping In: The FCC’s Authority to Preempt State Laws Under the Communications Act, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10693, ACA Connects v. Bonta: Ninth Circuit Upholds California’s Net Neutrality Law in Preemption Challenge, by Chris D. Linebaugh. Author Information Chris D. Linebaugh Legislative Attorney 242 See President Biden Announces Key Nominations, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2021), , WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/26/president-biden-announces-key-https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/26/president-biden-announces-key-
nominations-8/ (nominating Gigi Sohn for FCC Commissioner); Gigi Sohn, nominations-8/ (nominating Gigi Sohn for FCC Commissioner); Gigi Sohn, Statement of Gigi Sohn on the FCC’s
December 14 Vote to Abdicate its Responsibility to Protect Consumers and Competition and Repeal the 2015 Net
Neutrality Rules
, GIGISOHN.COM (Dec. 12, 2017), http://gigisohn.com/media/statement-gigi-sohn-fccs-december-14-, GIGISOHN.COM (Dec. 12, 2017), http://gigisohn.com/media/statement-gigi-sohn-fccs-december-14-
vote-abdicate-responsibility-protect-consumers-competition-repeal-2015-net-neutrality-rules/ (criticizing the RIF as a vote-abdicate-responsibility-protect-consumers-competition-repeal-2015-net-neutrality-rules/ (criticizing the RIF as a
“complete abdication of the FCC’s oversight over broadband Internet access [that] will leave every American Internet “complete abdication of the FCC’s oversight over broadband Internet access [that] will leave every American Internet
user out in the cold”). user out in the cold”).
233243 See 2018 Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 843 (Statement of Brendan Carr); Commissioner Nathan Simington Comments on 2018 Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 843 (Statement of Brendan Carr); Commissioner Nathan Simington Comments on
Competition Executive Order, FCC.GOV (July 9, 2021), https://www.fcc.gov/document/commissioner-simington-Competition Executive Order, FCC.GOV (July 9, 2021), https://www.fcc.gov/document/commissioner-simington-
comments-competition-executive-order. comments-competition-executive-order.
234244 H.R. 1644, 116th Cong. (2019). H.R. 1644, 116th Cong. (2019).
235245 H.R. 1101, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1006, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1096, 116th Cong. (2019). H.R. 1101, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1006, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1096, 116th Cong. (2019).
236246 California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3100–3104 (2018); California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3100–3104 (2018);
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.385.020 (2018). California's law in fact goes beyond the 2015 Open Internet Order by Wash. Rev. Code § 19.385.020 (2018). California's law in fact goes beyond the 2015 Open Internet Order by
prohibiting zero rating practices. Cal. Civ. Code § 3101. prohibiting zero rating practices. Cal. Civ. Code § 3101.
237 Oral Ruling Den. Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Am. Cable Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-CV-02684 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2021).
Congressional Research Service
R46973 · VERSION 1 · NEW
23247 24 F.4th 1233 (9th Cir. 2022). Congressional Research Service 21 Net Neutrality Law: An Overview

Net Neutrality Law: An Overview

R46736, Stepping In: The FCC’s Authority to Preempt State Laws Under the Communications
Act
, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes.

Author Information

Chris D. Linebaugh

Legislative Attorney



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