SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview
November 8, 2021March 1, 2023
and Policy Options
Bruce R. Lindsay
The Small Business Administration (SBA) is authorized to provide low-interest, long-term
The Small Business Administration (SBA) is authorized to provide low-interest, long-term
Specialist in American
Specialist in American
disaster loans, either on a direct basis or in partnership with private lenders, to eligible
disaster loans, either on a direct basis or in partnership with private lenders, to eligible
National Government
National Government
individuals, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to help them repair, rebuild, and recover
individuals, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to help them repair, rebuild, and recover
from uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated economic losses after a declared
from uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated economic losses after a declared
Darryl E. Getter
disaster. The SBA has relied exclusively on direct disaster loans since the early 1980s.
disaster. The SBA has relied exclusively on direct disaster loans since the early 1980s.
Specialist in Financial
Specialist in Financial
Economics Economics
Congress provides appropriations for SBA disaster loan administrative expenses and disaster loan
Congress provides appropriations for SBA disaster loan administrative expenses and disaster loan
credit subsidies (the amount necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses). As a
credit subsidies (the amount necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses). As a
direct lending program, the SBA deposits disaster loan payments, including interest, into the direct lending program, the SBA deposits disaster loan payments, including interest, into the
Jared C. Nagel
SBA’s Disaster Direct Loan Financing Account. These funds are then available for relending to
SBA’s Disaster Direct Loan Financing Account. These funds are then available for relending to
Senior Research Librarian
other eligible disaster victims.
Robert Jay Dilger other eligible disaster victims.
The SBA’s disaster loan credit subsidy rate (the net present value of cash flows to and from the
The SBA’s disaster loan credit subsidy rate (the net present value of cash flows to and from the
Senior Specialist in
program, including loan payments, prepayments, interest subsidies, defaults, and recoveries) program, including loan payments, prepayments, interest subsidies, defaults, and recoveries)
American National
determines the amount of appropriations necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative determines the amount of appropriations necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative
Government
expenses. The loan credit subsidy rate is the program’s non-administrative cost divided by the expenses. The loan credit subsidy rate is the program’s non-administrative cost divided by the
amount dispersed, which is expressed as a percentage of the amount dispersed. For example, in amount dispersed, which is expressed as a percentage of the amount dispersed. For example, in
FY2020,FY2020,
the SBA disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate was 13.62%. This means that the SBA disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate was 13.62%. This means that
for each $1 appropriated for SBA disaster loan credit subsidies the SBA can provide about $7.34 for each $1 appropriated for SBA disaster loan credit subsidies the SBA can provide about $7.34
in disaster loans. in disaster loans.
The SBA disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan programs because (1) its
The SBA disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan programs because (1) its
default rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan programs, (2) unlike most other SBA loan programs, the SBA is not default rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan programs, (2) unlike most other SBA loan programs, the SBA is not
authorized to charge disaster loan borrowers fees to help pay for expenses, and (3) disaster loan interest rates are determined authorized to charge disaster loan borrowers fees to help pay for expenses, and (3) disaster loan interest rates are determined
by statutory formulas that underprice the risk associated with these loans. As a result, Congress provides appropriations for by statutory formulas that underprice the risk associated with these loans. As a result, Congress provides appropriations for
SBA disaster loan credit subsidies that otherwise could have been provided, at least in part, by borrower fees and higher SBA disaster loan credit subsidies that otherwise could have been provided, at least in part, by borrower fees and higher
interest rates.interest rates.
The SBA’s disaster loan interest rate formulas provide distinct limits for borrowers unable to secure credit elsewhere and for
The SBA’s disaster loan interest rate formulas provide distinct limits for borrowers unable to secure credit elsewhere and for
borrowers able to secure credit elsewhere. In recent years, some Members of Congress have argued that disaster loan interest borrowers able to secure credit elsewhere. In recent years, some Members of Congress have argued that disaster loan interest
rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to provide greater relief for disaster victims. Some have also questioned rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to provide greater relief for disaster victims. Some have also questioned
whether SBA has the discretionary authority to lower disaster loan interest rates without legislative action. Others worry whether SBA has the discretionary authority to lower disaster loan interest rates without legislative action. Others worry
about the revenue that would be lost by doing so, and additional appropriations may have to be provided to keep the program about the revenue that would be lost by doing so, and additional appropriations may have to be provided to keep the program
whole. Some Members of Congress are reluctant to provide that additional funding, given the size of the federal whole. Some Members of Congress are reluctant to provide that additional funding, given the size of the federal
government’s debt and annual deficits.government’s debt and annual deficits.
This report opens with an overview of the SBA Disaster Loan Program’s financing, followed by the history of SBA disaster
This report opens with an overview of the SBA Disaster Loan Program’s financing, followed by the history of SBA disaster
loan interest rate policy and the statutory formulas that determine these rates. It also provides a more general overview of the loan interest rate policy and the statutory formulas that determine these rates. It also provides a more general overview of the
SBA Disaster Loan Program and summarizes congressional debates over the extent to which the cost of these loans should be SBA Disaster Loan Program and summarizes congressional debates over the extent to which the cost of these loans should be
borne by borrowers or taxpayers. This report concludes with an assessment of various legislative options currently under borne by borrowers or taxpayers. This report concludes with an assessment of various legislative options currently under
consideration and the extent to which the SBA can administratively adjust disaster loan interest rates. consideration and the extent to which the SBA can administratively adjust disaster loan interest rates.
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2827 SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
SBA Disaster Loan Types ................................................................................................................ 2
SBA Real and Personal Property Disaster Loans ...................................................................... 2
SBA Physical Disaster Business Loans ..................................................................................... 3
SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loans ...................................................................................... 3
The SBA Disaster Loan Program’s Financing ................................................................................ 4
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy: 1950s and 1960s ............................................................. 5
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy: 1970s and 1980s ............................................................. 6 7
Current SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy............................................................................. 9
SBA’s Application of the Statutory Interest Rate Formulas ................................................... 10
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Determinations .................................................................... 11
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Pricing ...................................................................................... 12
The Underpricing of SBA Disaster Loan Financial Risk ........................................................ 13
The SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Debate ............................................................................... 15
Arguments For Lower SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates ....................................................... 15
Arguments Against Lower SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates ................................................ 17
An Administrative, as Opposed to Legislative, Response? ..................................................... 17
Concluding Observations .............................................................................................................. 17 18
Figures
Figure 1. SBA Total Credit Subsidy Rates for Selected Programs, FY2015-FY2020 .................. 15
Tables
Table 1. Current Statutory SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Formulas .......................................... 9 10
Table 2. Smal Small Business Administration Appropriations, FY2005-FY2022 ............................. 13.... 12
Table 3. Selected SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates, 2015-2021 .................................................. 16
Appendixes
Appendix A. Disaster Declarations ............................................................................................... 19 20
Appendix B. Selected Proposed Legislation Related to SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates,
112th-117th Congresses ............................................................................................................ 22.... 21
Appendix C. Why Does SBA Issue Disaster Loans Instead of FEMA? ........................................ 2423
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 24 25
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2726 SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
Introduction
The
The
Smal Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Disaster Loan Program has been a major source of Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Disaster Loan Program has been a major source of
assistance for the restoration of commerce and households in areas stricken by natural and assistance for the restoration of commerce and households in areas stricken by natural and
human-caused disasters since the agency’s creation in 1953.1 The SBA is authorized to provide human-caused disasters since the agency’s creation in 1953.1 The SBA is authorized to provide
disaster loans “either directly or in cooperation with banks and other lending institutions through disaster loans “either directly or in cooperation with banks and other lending institutions through
agreements to participate on an immediate [shared] or deferred (guaranteed) basis.”2 Since the agreements to participate on an immediate [shared] or deferred (guaranteed) basis.”2 Since the
early 1980s, the SBA has exclusively offered direct, low-interest, long-term disaster loans to help early 1980s, the SBA has exclusively offered direct, low-interest, long-term disaster loans to help
eligibleeligible
businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals and households to repair, rebuild, and businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals and households to repair, rebuild, and
recover from uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated economic losses after a recover from uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated economic losses after a
declared disaster.3declared disaster.3
Credit Elsewhere
By law, the borrower’s interest rate is determined by
By law, the borrower’s interest rate is determined by
Credit Elsewhere
formulas, with distinct limits for borrowers unable to secure formulas, with distinct limits for borrowers unable to secure
The
The
Smal Small Business Act defines the Business Act defines the
credit elsewhere (not to exceed 4%) and for borrowers able to (not to exceed 4%) and for borrowers able to
term “credit elsewhere”
term “credit elsewhere”
for disaster for disaster
loan purposes as “the availability of loan purposes as “the availability of
secure credit elsewhere (not to exceed 8%).4 In recent years,
secure credit elsewhere (not to exceed 8%).4 In recent years,
credit on reasonable terms
credit on reasonable terms
and and
some Members of Congress have argued that these interest
some Members of Congress have argued that these interest
conditions from
conditions from
non-Federal nonfederal sources sources
rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to provide
rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to provide
taking into consideration the
taking into consideration the
greater relief for disaster victims. Others worry about the cost
greater relief for disaster victims. Others worry about the cost
prevailing rates and terms
prevailing rates and terms
in the in the
community in or near where the community in or near where the
of doing so, given the size of the federal government’s debt
of doing so, given the size of the federal government’s debt
applicant business concern transacts
applicant business concern transacts
and annual deficits.
and annual deficits.
business, or the applicant
business, or the applicant
homeownerhomeowner
resides,resides,
for similar for similar
This report opens with an overview of the SBA Disaster Loan
This report opens with an overview of the SBA Disaster Loan
purposes and periods of time.”
purposes and periods of time.”
Program’s financing, followed by the history of SBA disaster
Program’s financing, followed by the history of SBA disaster
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
§ §632(h)(2)632(h)(2)
loan interest rate policy and the statutory formulas that
loan interest rate policy and the statutory formulas that
determine these rates. It also provides an overview of the SBA determine these rates. It also provides an overview of the SBA
Disaster Loan Program’s four largest lending programs and congressional debates over the extent Disaster Loan Program’s four largest lending programs and congressional debates over the extent
to which cost of these loans should be borne by borrowers or taxpayers. As to which cost of these loans should be borne by borrowers or taxpayers. As
wil will be discussed, the be discussed, the
SBA is not authorized to charge fees to disaster loan borrowers; SBA’s disaster loans are not SBA is not authorized to charge fees to disaster loan borrowers; SBA’s disaster loans are not
underwritten to fully account for default risk; and the program’s interest rates are determined by underwritten to fully account for default risk; and the program’s interest rates are determined by
statutory formulas that statutory formulas that
general ygenerally require the SBA require the SBA
to charge below-market interest rates. As a to charge below-market interest rates. As a
result, the SBA Disaster Loan Program is purposively designed not to generate rates of return that result, the SBA Disaster Loan Program is purposively designed not to generate rates of return that
fully cover the program’s cost. fully cover the program’s cost.
This report concludes with an assessment of various legislative options currently under
This report concludes with an assessment of various legislative options currently under
consideration and the extent to which the SBA can administratively adjust disaster loan interest consideration and the extent to which the SBA can administratively adjust disaster loan interest
rates.
1 See Appendix C rates.
1 See Appendix C for an explanation of why the U.S. Smallfor an explanation of why the U.S. Small
Business Business Administration (SBA) administers the Disaster Administration (SBA) administers the Disaster
Loan Program instead of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Loan Program instead of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
2 15 U.S.C.
2 15 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1)(A). §636(b)(1)(A).
3 In FY2019, the SBA3 In FY2019, the SBA
approved about $2.44 billion in disaster loans. In FY2020, the SBAapproved about $2.44 billion in disaster loans. In FY2020, the SBA
approved about $679 million approved about $679 million
in non-COVID-19-related disaster loans and $195.2 billion in COVID-19-related disaster loans. Seein non-COVID-19-related disaster loans and $195.2 billion in COVID-19-related disaster loans. See
SBA,SBA,
Agency
Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2020, p. 7, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report, p. 7, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report
-agency-financial-report; and SBA, -agency-financial-report; and SBA,
“Small Business“Small Business
Administration Loan Performance, Effective March 31, 2021: Administration Loan Performance, Effective March 31, 2021:
T able 2 Table 2—Gross Approval Amount—Gross Approval Amount
by by
Program,” at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-small-business-administration-loan-program-performance. Program,” at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-small-business-administration-loan-program-performance.
4 15 U.S.C.4 15 U.S.C.
§636(d)(5)(A)-(D) (interest rate caps); and 15 U.S.C.§636(d)(5)(A)-(D) (interest rate caps); and 15 U.S.C.
§632(h)(2) (credit elsewhere definition for disaster §632(h)(2) (credit elsewhere definition for disaster
loan purposes). loan purposes).
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
SBA Disaster Loan Types
As aforementioned, the SBA’s Disaster Loan Program currently provides direct loans to help As aforementioned, the SBA’s Disaster Loan Program currently provides direct loans to help
businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters. Loans may cover the costs to businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters. Loans may cover the costs to
repair or replace uninsured or underinsured property damaged or destroyed in a repair or replace uninsured or underinsured property damaged or destroyed in a
federal yfederally declared declared
or certified disaster.5 This program may also help or certified disaster.5 This program may also help
smal small agricultural cooperatives recover from agricultural cooperatives recover from
economic injury resulting from a disaster.economic injury resulting from a disaster.
As described below, the SBA Disaster Loan Program has four major lending programs: As described below, the SBA Disaster Loan Program has four major lending programs:
1. Real
1. Real
Property Disaster Loans for households; Property Disaster Loans for households;
2. Personal Property Disaster Loans for households;6
2. Personal Property Disaster Loans for households;6
3. Physical Disaster Business Loans for businesses of
3. Physical Disaster Business Loans for businesses of
al all sizes, often sizes, often
cal edcalled
Business Physical Disaster loans; and
Business Physical Disaster loans; and
4. Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) for
4. Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) for
smal small businesses and private businesses and private
non-
profit
nonprofit organizations.7 organizations.7
SBA Real and Personal Property Disaster Loans
SBASBA
Real Property Disaster Loans and Personal Property Loans are available to eligible Real Property Disaster Loans and Personal Property Loans are available to eligible
homeowners and renters who have incurred uninsured or underinsured damage to their home or homeowners and renters who have incurred uninsured or underinsured damage to their home or
personal property located in a declared disaster area.8personal property located in a declared disaster area.8
Real Property Disaster Loans provide up to $200,000 to repair or restore the provide up to $200,000 to repair or restore the
homeowner’s primary residence to its pre-disaster condition.9 The loans may not
homeowner’s primary residence to its pre-disaster condition.9 The loans may not
be used for home upgrades or additions, unless the upgrade or addition is be used for home upgrades or additions, unless the upgrade or addition is
required by city or county building codes. Secondary homes or vacation required by city or county building codes. Secondary homes or vacation
properties are ineligible.10 properties are ineligible.10
Personal Property Disaster Loans provide homeowners and renters located in a provide homeowners and renters located in a
declared disaster area with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property
declared disaster area with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property
5 P.L. 83-163, the Small Business5 P.L. 83-163, the Small Business
Act of 1953, as amended. P.L. 85-536, Act of 1953, as amended. P.L. 85-536,
T oTo Amend the Small Business Amend the Small Business
Act of 1953, Act of 1953,
made the SBAmade the SBA
a permanent agency and placed its disaster assistance programs in section 7(b) of the Smalla permanent agency and placed its disaster assistance programs in section 7(b) of the Small
Business Business
Act. Act.
6 Real Property Disaster loans for households and Personal Property Disaster loans for households are collectively
6 Real Property Disaster loans for households and Personal Property Disaster loans for households are collectively
calledcalled
Home Disaster loans. Home Disaster loans.
7 See7 See
the SBA’sthe SBA’s
regulations for Home Disaster Loans (13 C.F.R.regulations for Home Disaster Loans (13 C.F.R.
§§123.100-123.108); Physical Disaster Business §§123.100-123.108); Physical Disaster Business
Loans (13 C.F.R.Loans (13 C.F.R.
§§123.200-204); and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (13 C.F.R. §123.300§§123.200-204); and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (13 C.F.R. §123.300
-123.303). -123.303).
T heThe SBA also SBA also
provides Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loans (see 13 C.F.R.provides Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loans (see 13 C.F.R.
§§123.500-123.513); and Immediate §§123.500-123.513); and Immediate
Disaster Loans (see 13 C.F.R. §§123.700-123.706). Prior to P.L. 116-123, the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Disaster Loans (see 13 C.F.R. §§123.700-123.706). Prior to P.L. 116-123, the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
Supplemental Supplemental
Appropriat ionsAppropriations Act, 2020, which made economic damage from the Coronavirus Disease Act, 2020, which made economic damage from the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-2019 (COVID-
19) pandemic an eligible19) pandemic an eligible
EIDL expense, most SBAEIDL expense, most SBA
disaster loans (approximately 80%) were awardeddisaster loans (approximately 80%) were awarded
to individuals to individuals
and households rather than to businesses. and households rather than to businesses.
8 In certain circumstances individuals8 In certain circumstances individuals
and households can use FEMAand households can use FEMA
grant assistance and an SBAgrant assistance and an SBA
Home Disaster Loan Home Disaster Loan
to recover from a disaster provided they do not use the combined assistance for lossesto recover from a disaster provided they do not use the combined assistance for losses
for which they have already been for which they have already been
compensated or may expect to be compensated. For more information see CRScompensated or may expect to be compensated. For more information see CRS
Report R45238, Report R45238,
FEMA and SBA
Disaster Assistance for Individuals and Households: Application Processes, Determ inationsDeterminations, and Appeals, by Bruce, by Bruce
R. R.
Lindsay and Elizabeth M. Webster. Lindsay and Elizabeth M. Webster.
9 13 C.F.R. §123.105(2).
9 13 C.F.R. §123.105(2).
10 13 C.F.R. §123.105(2). 10 13 C.F.R. §123.105(2).
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
owned by the disaster survivor.11 Eligible items include furniture, appliances,
owned by the disaster survivor.11 Eligible items include furniture, appliances,
clothing, and automobiles damaged or destroyed in the disaster. clothing, and automobiles damaged or destroyed in the disaster.
SBA Physical Disaster Business Loans
Almost any business regardless of size (other than an agricultural enterprise) or Almost any business regardless of size (other than an agricultural enterprise) or
non-profitnonprofit entity entity
whose real or tangible personal property is damaged in a declared disaster area is eligiblewhose real or tangible personal property is damaged in a declared disaster area is eligible
for a for a
Physical Disaster Business loan.12 These loans are availablePhysical Disaster Business loan.12 These loans are available
to businesses to repair or replace to businesses to repair or replace
uninsured or underinsured disaster-damaged property. Private uninsured or underinsured disaster-damaged property. Private
non-profitnonprofit organizations such as organizations such as
charities, churches, and private universities are also eligible.charities, churches, and private universities are also eligible.
Physical Disaster Business loans provide up to $2 provide up to $2
mil ionmillion to repair or replace to repair or replace
uninsured or underinsured disaster damages to physical property, including
uninsured or underinsured disaster damages to physical property, including
machinery, equipment, fixtures, inventory, and leasehold improvements.13 Loan machinery, equipment, fixtures, inventory, and leasehold improvements.13 Loan
maturity is based on the applicant’s ability to repay and is maturity is based on the applicant’s ability to repay and is
general ygenerally set at either set at either
15 years or 30 years.14 However, businesses with credit available elsewhere are 15 years or 30 years.14 However, businesses with credit available elsewhere are
restricted to a maximum term of seven years. Collateral is required for physical restricted to a maximum term of seven years. Collateral is required for physical
disaster business loans exceeding $25,000. The SBA disaster business loans exceeding $25,000. The SBA
wil will not decline a loan for not decline a loan for
lack of collateral, but requires the applicant to pledge collateral that the SBAlack of collateral, but requires the applicant to pledge collateral that the SBA
has has
determined is available.15 determined is available.15
SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loans
SBA Economic Injury Disaster
Substantial Economic Injury
Loans (EIDLs) are available only to (EIDLs) are available only to
Pursuant to the
Pursuant to the
Smal Small Business Act, the term Business Act, the term
businesses located in a declared
businesses located in a declared
“substantial economic
“substantial economic
injury” means economicinjury” means economic
harm to harm to
disaster area that have suffered
disaster area that have suffered
a business concern that results
a business concern that results
in the inability of the in the inability of the
substantial economic injury, are , are
business concern to:
business concern to:
unable to obtain credit elsewhere, and
unable to obtain credit elsewhere, and
meet its obligations as they mature;
meet its obligations as they mature;
are defined as
are defined as
smal small by SBAby SBA
size size
pay its ordinary and necessary
pay its ordinary and necessary
operating expenses; operating expenses;
regulations (which vary from industry
regulations (which vary from industry
or
or
to industry).16
to industry).16
Smal Small agricultural agricultural
market,
market,
produce, or provide a product or service produce, or provide a product or service
cooperatives and most private
cooperatives and most private
ordinarily
ordinarily
marketed,marketed,
produced, or provided by the produced, or provided by the
nonprofit organizations that have
nonprofit organizations that have
business concern.
business concern.
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
§636(b)(3)(A)(i i) §636(b)(3)(A)(i i)
11 13 C.F.R. §123.105(1). 11 13 C.F.R. §123.105(1).
12 13 C.F.R. §§123.200, 123.201(a). For a list of ineligible12 13 C.F.R. §§123.200, 123.201(a). For a list of ineligible
entities, see 13 C.F.R.entities, see 13 C.F.R.
§123.101 (e.g., if the owner has been §123.101 (e.g., if the owner has been
convicted, duringconvicted, during
the past year, of a felony duringthe past year, of a felony during
and in connection with a riot or civil disorder or other declared and in connection with a riot or civil disorder or other declared
disaster; the damageddisaster; the damaged
property can be repaired or replaced with the proceeds of insurance, gifts, or other property can be repaired or replaced with the proceeds of insurance, gifts, or other
compensation). compensation).
An agricultural enterprise is a businessAn agricultural enterprise is a business
“primarily engaged in the production of food and fiber, ranching and raising of “primarily engaged in the production of food and fiber, ranching and raising of
livestock, aquaculturelivestock, aquaculture
and all other farming and agriculture-related industries.” and all other farming and agriculture-related industries.”
13 13 C.F.R. §123.202(a).
13 13 C.F.R. §123.202(a).
14 SBA,14 SBA,
Office of Disaster Assistance, “Disaster Assistance Program: StandardOffice of Disaster Assistance, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard
Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p.
109, at https://www.sba.gov/document/sop-50-30-9-disaster-assistance-program (hereinafter SBA, “109, at https://www.sba.gov/document/sop-50-30-9-disaster-assistance-program (hereinafter SBA, “
Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance
Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9). Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9).
15 SBA,15 SBA,
“Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP“Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP
50 30 9, p. 12.50 30 9, p. 12.
16 For more information on size standards, see 13 C.F.R. §123.300 for eligibility requirements. Size16 For more information on size standards, see 13 C.F.R. §123.300 for eligibility requirements. Size
standards standards vary vary
according to a variety of factors, including industry type, average firm size, and startaccording to a variety of factors, including industry type, average firm size, and start
-up costs and entry barriers. Size -up costs and entry barriers. Size
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
suffered substantial economic injury as the result of a declared disaster are also
suffered substantial economic injury as the result of a declared disaster are also
eligible.17eligible.17
EIDLs provide up to $2 EIDLs provide up to $2
mil ion million to help meet financial obligations and operating expenses to help meet financial obligations and operating expenses
that could have been met had the disaster not occurred.18 Loan proceeds can only be used that could have been met had the disaster not occurred.18 Loan proceeds can only be used
for working capital necessary to enable the business or organization to for working capital necessary to enable the business or organization to
al eviatealleviate the the
specific economic injury and to resume normal operations.19 EIDL loan amounts are specific economic injury and to resume normal operations.19 EIDL loan amounts are
based on actual economic injury and financial needs, regardless of whether the business based on actual economic injury and financial needs, regardless of whether the business
suffered any property damage.suffered any property damage.
The SBA Disaster Loan Program’s Financing
Al All of the SBA’s lending programs, disaster-focused and not, were of the SBA’s lending programs, disaster-focused and not, were
original yoriginally funded through a funded through a
revolving loan fund in the U.S. Treasury. In 1966, the SBA Disaster Loan Program was provided revolving loan fund in the U.S. Treasury. In 1966, the SBA Disaster Loan Program was provided
its own, separate revolving loan fund in the U.S. Treasury, which continues today.20its own, separate revolving loan fund in the U.S. Treasury, which continues today.20
For funding purposes, the SBA requests advances from the Treasury’s Disaster Loan Program
For funding purposes, the SBA requests advances from the Treasury’s Disaster Loan Program
account as needed, subject to the availability of funds. The SBA then manages these funds account as needed, subject to the availability of funds. The SBA then manages these funds
through the SBA’s Disaster Loans Program Account, the Disaster Direct Loan Financing through the SBA’s Disaster Loans Program Account, the Disaster Direct Loan Financing
Account, and the Disaster Loan Fund Liquidating Account. Account, and the Disaster Loan Fund Liquidating Account.
At the close of each fiscal year, the SBA pays the Treasury interest on the amount of advances
At the close of each fiscal year, the SBA pays the Treasury interest on the amount of advances
outstanding at a rate determined by Treasury, “taking into consideration the current average outstanding at a rate determined by Treasury, “taking into consideration the current average
market yield of outstanding marketable obligations of the Unites States having maturities market yield of outstanding marketable obligations of the Unites States having maturities
comparable to the notes issued by the [SBA] Administration” to SBAcomparable to the notes issued by the [SBA] Administration” to SBA
disaster loan borrowers.21 In disaster loan borrowers.21 In
this context, SBA notes refers to SBA disaster loans and the interest rate Treasury charges the this context, SBA notes refers to SBA disaster loans and the interest rate Treasury charges the
SBA is what is referred to as the SBA’s cost of money.22SBA is what is referred to as the SBA’s cost of money.22
standards are codifiedstandards are codified
at at 13 C.F.R. Part 121. For further analysis, see CRS13 C.F.R. Part 121. For further analysis, see CRS
Report R40860, Report R40860,
Sm allSmall Business Size
Standards: A Historical Analysis of Contem poraryContemporary Issues, by Robert Jay Dilger. P.L. 116-123, the Coronavirus , by Robert Jay Dilger. P.L. 116-123, the Coronavirus
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, made economic injury related to the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, made economic injury related to the Coronavirus
DiseaseDisease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic an eligible2019 (COVID-19) pandemic an eligible
EIDL expense. As a result, EIDL loan volume increased dramatically. EIDL expense. As a result, EIDL loan volume increased dramatically.
DuringDuring
FY2020, the SBA approved 3.6 million COVID-19-related EIDL loans totaling $194 billion, about 99% of all FY2020, the SBA approved 3.6 million COVID-19-related EIDL loans totaling $194 billion, about 99% of all
SBASBA
disaster loans approved in FY2020.16 In FY2019, the SBA approved $2.45 billion among all disaster loan disaster loans approved in FY2020.16 In FY2019, the SBA approved $2.45 billion among all disaster loan
programs. Agriculturalprograms. Agricultural
enterprises are generally not eligible for SBAenterprises are generally not eligible for SBA
assistance so as to minimize duplication of assistance so as to minimize duplication of
services available at the U.S.services available at the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. However, agriculturalDepartment of Agriculture. However, agricultural
enterprises with 500 or fewer enterprises with 500 or fewer
employees wereemployees were
temporarily made EIDL-eligible for damagestemporarily made EIDL-eligible for damages
related to COVID-19 (through December 31, 2021). See related to COVID-19 (through December 31, 2021). See
SBA,SBA,
“Small Business“Small Business
Administration Loan Program Performance: Administration Loan Program Performance:
T able 2 Table 2—Gross Approval Amount by Program,” —Gross Approval Amount by Program,”
effective as of March 31, 2021, at https://www.sba.gov/document/reporteffective as of March 31, 2021, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report
-small-business-administration-loan-program--small-business-administration-loan-program-
performance. performance.
17 13 C.F.R. §123.300.
17 13 C.F.R. §123.300.
18 U.S.18 U.S.
Small Business Small Business Administration, Administration,
Economic Injury Disaster Loans, https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/, https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/
disaster-assistance/economic-injury-disaster-loans. disaster-assistance/economic-injury-disaster-loans.
19 13 C.F.R. §123.105(2).
19 13 C.F.R. §123.105(2).
20 P.L. 89-409, An 20 P.L. 89-409, An
Actact to amend to amend
sectionSection 4(c) of the Small Business 4(c) of the Small Business
Act, and for other purposes. Act, and for other purposes.
For the current month, fiscal year to date, and prior fiscal year to date outlays and receipts for the SBA’sFor the current month, fiscal year to date, and prior fiscal year to date outlays and receipts for the SBA’s
Disaster Disaster
Loans Program account at Loans Program account at
T reasuryTreasury, see U.S., see U.S.
T reasury, “ Treasury, “Monthly Treasury Statement,” at https://fiscal.treasury.gov/Monthly Treasury Statement,” at https://fiscal.treasury.gov/
reports-statements/mts/. reports-statements/mts/.
21 15 U.S.C.
21 15 U.S.C.
§633(c)(5)(A). §633(c)(5)(A).
T heThe SBA paid SBA paid
$7.6 billion in interest payments to the $7.6 billion in interest payments to the
T reasuryTreasury in FY2020. See U.S. Office in FY2020. See U.S. Office
of Management and Budget,of Management and Budget,
“Appendix, Budget of the U.S.“Appendix, Budget of the U.S.
Government, Fiscal Year 2022, Small Business Government, Fiscal Year 2022, Small Business
Administration,” p. 1230, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/appendix_fy22.pdf. Administration,” p. 1230, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/appendix_fy22.pdf.
22 22
T heThe cost of money (cost of funds) in government accounting is similar, but slightly different in meaning from its use cost of money (cost of funds) in government accounting is similar, but slightly different in meaning from its use
in private sector banking and finance. Technically, federal agencies “borrow” from Treasury to fund loans, and their
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The SBA also deposits disaster loan repayments (including interest received) into the revolving
The SBA also deposits disaster loan repayments (including interest received) into the revolving
disaster loan fund to fund additional disaster loans. When loan demand exceeds the amount disaster loan fund to fund additional disaster loans. When loan demand exceeds the amount
availableavailable
in the disaster revolving fund, the SBA must request a supplemental appropriation to in the disaster revolving fund, the SBA must request a supplemental appropriation to
meet the demand, or risk violating the Anti-deficiency Act, which meet the demand, or risk violating the Anti-deficiency Act, which
general ygenerally prohibits agencies prohibits agencies
from making or authorizing expenditures in excess of the amount available.23from making or authorizing expenditures in excess of the amount available.23
Importantly for this discussion, the federal government’s (and, therefore, the SBA’s) cost of
Importantly for this discussion, the federal government’s (and, therefore, the SBA’s) cost of
money is below the prevailing private sector market interest rate for loans of similar maturity and money is below the prevailing private sector market interest rate for loans of similar maturity and
terms because Treasury securities are fully guaranteed by the federal government and are also terms because Treasury securities are fully guaranteed by the federal government and are also
exempt from federal taxation. As a result, the demand for Treasury securities is greater than the exempt from federal taxation. As a result, the demand for Treasury securities is greater than the
demand for private sector securities, resulting in lower interest rates for Treasury securities. demand for private sector securities, resulting in lower interest rates for Treasury securities.
Charging disaster loan borrowers below-prevailing market interest rates (even if the interest rates
Charging disaster loan borrowers below-prevailing market interest rates (even if the interest rates
are higher than the SBA’s cost of money) can incentivize borrowing and further increase SBA’s are higher than the SBA’s cost of money) can incentivize borrowing and further increase SBA’s
costs for administration (financed separately in appropriation acts) and costs related to loan costs for administration (financed separately in appropriation acts) and costs related to loan
defaults (which reduce the amount available to be redeposited into the disaster loan fund). As a defaults (which reduce the amount available to be redeposited into the disaster loan fund). As a
result, when determining provisions governing SBA disaster loan interest rates, Congress takes result, when determining provisions governing SBA disaster loan interest rates, Congress takes
into account and tries to balance the competing interests of borrowers and taxpayers. Setting into account and tries to balance the competing interests of borrowers and taxpayers. Setting
interest rates lower than prevailing market interest rates benefits borrowers by reducing interest interest rates lower than prevailing market interest rates benefits borrowers by reducing interest
expense and the size of loan payments. However, the SBA (and by extension, federal taxpayers) expense and the size of loan payments. However, the SBA (and by extension, federal taxpayers)
incurs additional cost by doing so. incurs additional cost by doing so.
Also, although the SBA is authorized to charge borrowers fees in its non-disaster loan guarantee
Also, although the SBA is authorized to charge borrowers fees in its non-disaster loan guarantee
programs to help pay for program costs, including loan default costs, it is not authorized to charge programs to help pay for program costs, including loan default costs, it is not authorized to charge
disaster loan borrowers fees. As a result, debates about disaster loan interest rates involve disaster loan borrowers fees. As a result, debates about disaster loan interest rates involve
judgments concerning (1) the extent to which these interest rates should meet the SBA’s cost of judgments concerning (1) the extent to which these interest rates should meet the SBA’s cost of
money, (2) the extent to which these interest rates should money, (2) the extent to which these interest rates should
fal fall below prevailing private sector below prevailing private sector
market interest rates (which reflect private sector underwriting judgments related to the risk of market interest rates (which reflect private sector underwriting judgments related to the risk of
nonpayment), and (3) the extent to which these interest rates should cover the SBA Disaster Loan nonpayment), and (3) the extent to which these interest rates should cover the SBA Disaster Loan
Program’s costs. Program’s costs.
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy: 1950s and
1960s
Initial y, Initially, Congress did not include language in the Congress did not include language in the
Smal Small Business Act concerning SBA disaster Business Act concerning SBA disaster
loan interest rates. The SBA set those rates administratively in 1953 at 3% for home disaster loans loan interest rates. The SBA set those rates administratively in 1953 at 3% for home disaster loans
in private sector banking and finance. T echnically, federal agencies “borrow” from T reasury to fund loans, and their cost of funds is set equal to the risk-free rate. T henand 5% for business disaster loans.24 By 1955, all SBA disaster loans had a 3% interest rate.25 At
cost of funds is set equal to the risk-free rate. Then, loans to borrowers are priced as mark-ups above the risk-free rate , loans to borrowers are priced as mark-ups above the risk-free rate
followingfollowing
any restrictions placed by Congress. In contrast, when private lenders borrow fundsany restrictions placed by Congress. In contrast, when private lenders borrow funds
to make loans, their cost to make loans, their cost
of fundsof funds
is belowis below
the risk-free rate, but their loans are still priced as mark-ups (also in the form of interest rate the risk-free rate, but their loans are still priced as mark-ups (also in the form of interest rate
adjustments) above the risk-free rate to account for financial risks; otherwise they wouldadjustments) above the risk-free rate to account for financial risks; otherwise they would
simply purchase risksimply purchase risk
-free -free
T reasuryTreasury securities. For an example of loan pricing in the private sector, see CRS securities. For an example of loan pricing in the private sector, see CRS
In FocusIn Focus
IF10993, IF10993,
Consum erConsumer Credit
Markets and Loan Pricing: The Basics, by Darryl E. Getter. , by Darryl E. Getter.
23 For additional information and analysis concerning the SBA
23 For additional information and analysis concerning the SBA
Disaster Loan Account, seeDisaster Loan Account, see
CRS CRS Insight IN11433, Insight IN11433,
Supplem entalSupplemental Appropriations: SBA Disaster Loan Account, by Bruce, by Bruce
R. Lindsay, Robert Jay Dilger, and JaredR. Lindsay, Robert Jay Dilger, and Jared
C. Nagel.
24 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, Extension of Small Business Act of 1953, hearing on H.R. 4525, H.R. 5207, H.R. 5729, H.R. 6301, H.R. 7069, and S. 2127, 84th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 36.
25 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, Extension of Small Business Act of 1953, hearing on
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
C. Nagel.
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
and 5% for business disaster loans.24 By 1955, al SBA disaster loans had a 3% interest rate.25 At that time, the SBA’s Disaster Loan Program included both SBA direct disaster loans and loans that time, the SBA’s Disaster Loan Program included both SBA direct disaster loans and loans
issued through a SBA-private lender partnership, issued through a SBA-private lender partnership,
cal edcalled participatory disaster loans. A participatory disaster loans. A
participatory disaster loan was participatory disaster loan was
partial ypartially financed by the SBA (using SBA interest rates) and financed by the SBA (using SBA interest rates) and
partial ypartially financed by a private lender (using interest rates set by the lender). SBA regulations financed by a private lender (using interest rates set by the lender). SBA regulations
specified that the private lender’s interest rate on its share of the disaster loan had to be specified that the private lender’s interest rate on its share of the disaster loan had to be
reasonable.reasonable.
The first statutory provision directly affecting SBA disaster loan interest rates was enacted in
The first statutory provision directly affecting SBA disaster loan interest rates was enacted in
1955. P.L. 84-268 limited SBA disaster loan interest rates for the acquisition or construction of 1955. P.L. 84-268 limited SBA disaster loan interest rates for the acquisition or construction of
personal housing to no more than 3%.26 The following year, P.L. 84-402 limited personal housing to no more than 3%.26 The following year, P.L. 84-402 limited
al all SBA disaster SBA disaster
loan interest rates to no more than 3%, which was the SBA’s administratively-set interest rate in loan interest rates to no more than 3%, which was the SBA’s administratively-set interest rate in
place at that time.27 Advocates of the 3% limit argued that it was “sufficient to cover place at that time.27 Advocates of the 3% limit argued that it was “sufficient to cover
al
all Governmental costs in the program and possibly including an increment of profit.”28 Governmental costs in the program and possibly including an increment of profit.”28
During the 1960s, with a few exceptions, the SBA administratively limited the interest rate
During the 1960s, with a few exceptions, the SBA administratively limited the interest rate
charged by private lenders on their share of a participatory disaster loan for individuals to 3% charged by private lenders on their share of a participatory disaster loan for individuals to 3%
(meaning interest for the entire loan was 3%) and to a reasonable interest rate for businesses.29(meaning interest for the entire loan was 3%) and to a reasonable interest rate for businesses.29
In 1969, the Nixon Administration, noting that the private sector’s prime interest rate at that time
In 1969, the Nixon Administration, noting that the private sector’s prime interest rate at that time
had reached 8.5%, argued that the SBA’s disaster loan interest rate cap caused the program to be had reached 8.5%, argued that the SBA’s disaster loan interest rate cap caused the program to be
“conducted at a very substantial loss to the Government” and recommended that the cap be “conducted at a very substantial loss to the Government” and recommended that the cap be
replaced with a formula more aligned with prevailing market rates.30 Later that same year, P.L. replaced with a formula more aligned with prevailing market rates.30 Later that same year, P.L.
91-79 retained the 3% interest rate cap for borrowers lacking access to credit from private sources 91-79 retained the 3% interest rate cap for borrowers lacking access to credit from private sources
(i.e., those who could not locate “credit elsewhere”), but increased the interest rate for borrowers (i.e., those who could not locate “credit elsewhere”), but increased the interest rate for borrowers
with credit availablewith credit available
from private sources to the cost of money (“at a rate equal to the average from private sources to the cost of money (“at a rate equal to the average
annual interest rate on annual interest rate on
al all interest-bearing obligations of the United States having maturities of 20 interest-bearing obligations of the United States having maturities of 20
years or more and forming a part of the public debt as computed at the end of the fiscal year next years or more and forming a part of the public debt as computed at the end of the fiscal year next
preceding the date of the loan, adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of one per centum”).31 preceding the date of the loan, adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of one per centum”).31
24 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, Extension of Small Business Act of 1953, hearing on H.R. 4525, H.R. 5207, H.R. 5729, H.R. 6301, H.R. 7069, and S. 2127, 84th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 36.
25 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, Extension of Small Business Act of 1953, hearing on
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy: 1970s and 1980s In 1973, P.L. 93-24 required the SBA to have the same disaster loan interest rates as the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) as determined under the Consolidated Farm and Rural
H.R. 4525, H.R. 5207, H.R. 5729, H.R. 6301, H.R. 7069, and S.H.R. 4525, H.R. 5207, H.R. 5729, H.R. 6301, H.R. 7069, and S.
2127, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,2127, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,
May 18, 1955 (Washington: May 18, 1955 (Washington:
GPO, 1955), p. 36. GPO, 1955), p. 36.
26 P.L. 84-268,
26 P.L. 84-268,
T oTo Amend the Small Business Amend the Small Business
Act of 1953. Act of 1953.
27 P.L. 84-402, 27 P.L. 84-402,
T oTo Amend the Small Business Amend the Small Business
Act of 1953; 15 U.S.C. §636 (1956). Act of 1953; 15 U.S.C. §636 (1956).
28 U.S.28 U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on Banking and Currency, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Amendment to Small Business Act of 1953, hearing on , hearing on
H.R. 7871, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., January 5, 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 27. H.R. 7871, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., January 5, 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 27.
29 U.S.
29 U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on SmallCongress, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on Small
Business,Business,
Additional
Assistance for Disaster Victim s, Victims, hearing on S.hearing on S.
1796, 89th Cong., 1st sess.,1796, 89th Cong., 1st sess.,
April 27, 1965 (Washington: GPO, 1965), p. April 27, 1965 (Washington: GPO, 1965), p.
13. 13.
30 U.S.30 U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on SmallCommittee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on Small
Business,Business,
Small Business
Legislation of 1969, hearings on “, hearings on “
several billsseveral bills
and a resolution relating to small business,”and a resolution relating to small business,”
91 st 91st Cong., 1st sess., July Cong., 1st sess., July
9, 9,
1969 (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 29. 1969 (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 29.
31 P.L. 91-79, the Disaster Relief Act of 1969, §7; and SBA,
31 P.L. 91-79, the Disaster Relief Act of 1969, §7; and SBA,
“T itle “Title 13—Business Credit and Assistance, Chapter 1— 13—Business Credit and Assistance, Chapter 1—
SmallSmall
Business Business Administration (Revision 4), Part 120Administration (Revision 4), Part 120
—Loan Policy,” 35—Loan Policy,” 35
Federal Register 16165-16166, October 15, 16165-16166, October 15,
1970. 1970.
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy: 1970s and
1980s
In 1973, P.L. 93-24 required the SBA to have the same disaster loan interest rates as the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) as determined under the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act. This policy ensured that Development Act. This policy ensured that
al all federal disaster loans charged the same interest federal disaster loans charged the same interest
rate. As a result, SBA disaster loan interest rates were, temporarily, no longer determined by the rate. As a result, SBA disaster loan interest rates were, temporarily, no longer determined by the
Smal Small Business Act.32 At that time, the U.S. Department of Agriculture set FmHA disaster loan Business Act.32 At that time, the U.S. Department of Agriculture set FmHA disaster loan
interest rates after taking into account the loan’s purpose and the emergency’s effect, capped at no interest rates after taking into account the loan’s purpose and the emergency’s effect, capped at no
more than 3%. As a result, prior to enactment, FmHA disaster loan interest rates were somewhat more than 3%. As a result, prior to enactment, FmHA disaster loan interest rates were somewhat
lower than SBA disaster loan interest rates. The act also increased FmHA’s (and therefore the lower than SBA disaster loan interest rates. The act also increased FmHA’s (and therefore the
SBA’s) disaster loan interest rate cap to 5%. SBA’s) disaster loan interest rate cap to 5%.
In 1975, P.L. 94-68 authorized FmHA to provide disaster loans for both actual losses sustained
In 1975, P.L. 94-68 authorized FmHA to provide disaster loans for both actual losses sustained
and other farmer needs, including on-going production costs. FmHA was authorized to charge and other farmer needs, including on-going production costs. FmHA was authorized to charge
varying disaster loan interest rates depending on the loan’s purpose. The SBA was not provided varying disaster loan interest rates depending on the loan’s purpose. The SBA was not provided
these flexibilities.these flexibilities.
Instead, the SBA’s disaster loan interest rates were capped at the average Instead, the SBA’s disaster loan interest rates were capped at the average
annual interest rate on annual interest rate on
al all U.S. interest bearing obligations that form a part of the public debt (the U.S. interest bearing obligations that form a part of the public debt (the
cost of money), adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1% plus one-fourth of 1%.33 cost of money), adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1% plus one-fourth of 1%.33
In 1976, Congress returned SBA’s disaster loan interest rate determinations to the
In 1976, Congress returned SBA’s disaster loan interest rate determinations to the
Smal Small Business Business
Act, primarily because the SBA and FmHA disaster loan interest rates were no longer linked Act, primarily because the SBA and FmHA disaster loan interest rates were no longer linked
statutorily.34 P.L. 94-305 retained, in slightly modified form, the SBA’s formula for setting its statutorily.34 P.L. 94-305 retained, in slightly modified form, the SBA’s formula for setting its
disaster loan interest rates in accordance with the cost of money: disaster loan interest rates in accordance with the cost of money:
not
not
to exceed the average annual interest rate on all interest-bearing obligations of to exceed the average annual interest rate on all interest-bearing obligations of the the
United States then forming a part of the public debt as computed at the end of the fiscal United States then forming a part of the public debt as computed at the end of the fiscal
yearyear
next preceding the date of the loan and adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 next preceding the date of the loan and adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 per per
centum plus one-quarter of 1 per centum. Provided, however, That the interest rate ... centum plus one-quarter of 1 per centum. Provided, however, That the interest rate ...
shal not exceed the rate of interest which is in effect at the time of the occurrence of shall not exceed the rate of interest which is in effect at the time of the occurrence of the the
disaster.35 disaster.35
Subsequently, the Carter Administration strongly objected to legislative
Subsequently, the Carter Administration strongly objected to legislative
proposals to reduce proposals to reduce
disaster loan interest rates below the cost of money, arguing that such efforts would “encourage disaster loan interest rates below the cost of money, arguing that such efforts would “encourage
frivolous and unwarranted applications, exaggerated claims, and fraud.”36 In response to the frivolous and unwarranted applications, exaggerated claims, and fraud.”36 In response to the
Carter Administration’s concerns that disaster interest rates were too low, in 1980, P.L. 96-302 Carter Administration’s concerns that disaster interest rates were too low, in 1980, P.L. 96-302
32 See P.L. 93-24, An Actmodified the cost of money formula to allow the SBA to add up to an additional 1% (instead of one-quarter of 1%) to the calculated interest rate, but only if a borrower was able to obtain credit elsewhere.37
32 See P.L. 93-24, An act to Amend the Emergency Loan Program Under the Consolidated Farm and Rural to Amend the Emergency Loan Program Under the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act, and for Other Purposes. Development Act, and for Other Purposes.
33 See
33 See
P.L. 94-68, A Bill to Amend the Consolidated Farm and RuralP.L. 94-68, A Bill to Amend the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development ActDevelopment Act
. Using the new formula, the . Using the new formula, the
SBASBA
subsequently increased subsequently increased its disaster loan interest rate to 6.25% from 5%. See U.S.its disaster loan interest rate to 6.25% from 5%. See U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on Committee on
SmallSmall
Business,Business,
Subcommittee on SBASubcommittee on SBA
and SBICand SBIC
Authority and General SmallAuthority and General Small
Business Business Problems, Problems,
Federal Natural
Disaster Assistance Program sPrograms, hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 23. , hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 23.
34 U.S.
34 U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on Small Business,Committee on Small Business,
Amendments to Small Business Act and Small Business
Investm entInvestment Act, report to accompany H.R. 9056, 94th Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 1975, H.Rept. 94-519 , report to accompany H.R. 9056, 94th Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 1975, H.Rept. 94-519
(Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 6, 11. (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 6, 11.
35 P.L. 94-305, An 35 P.L. 94-305, An
Actact to Amend the Small Business to Amend the Small Business
Act and Small Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958 to Provide Investment Act of 1958 to Provide
Additional Assistance Under SuchAdditional Assistance Under Such
Acts, to Create a Pollution Control Financing Program for Small Business,Acts, to Create a Pollution Control Financing Program for Small Business,
and for and for
Other Purposes; and 15 U.S.C.Other Purposes; and 15 U.S.C.
§636(b). §636(b).
36 U.S.
36 U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on Small Business,Committee on Small Business,
Subcommittee on SBASubcommittee on SBA
and SBICand SBIC
Authority and General Small Authority and General Small
BusinessBusiness
Problems, Problems,
Federal Natural Disaster Assistance Program sPrograms, hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess.,, hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess.,
April 6, 1977, April 6, 1977,
(Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 24. (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 24.
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modified the cost of money formula to al ow the SBA to add up to an additional 1% (instead of one-quarter of 1%) to the calculated interest rate, but only if a borrower was able to obtain credit
elsewhere.3737 In addition, P.L. 96-302, To provide authorizations for the Small Business Administration, and for other purposes, required the SBA to determine, three years after disbursement, and every two years thereafter, if the borrower was able to obtain credit elsewhere at reasonable rates and terms. In that circumstance, the SBA was authorized to require the
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The Reagan Administration went further than any other Administration, both before and since, in
The Reagan Administration went further than any other Administration, both before and since, in
advocating for SBA program reductions (including a proposal that would have eliminated the advocating for SBA program reductions (including a proposal that would have eliminated the
SBA altogether).38 For example, in 1981, the Reagan Administration, among many other changes, SBA altogether).38 For example, in 1981, the Reagan Administration, among many other changes,
administratively restricted access to the Physical Disaster Business Loan program to businesses administratively restricted access to the Physical Disaster Business Loan program to businesses
unable to obtain credit elsewhere. The Administration also reduced the loan amount availableunable to obtain credit elsewhere. The Administration also reduced the loan amount available
to
eligible to eligible businesses from 100% to 60% of verified loss.39 The Administration also recommended businesses from 100% to 60% of verified loss.39 The Administration also recommended
that agricultural enterprises lose their eligibilitythat agricultural enterprises lose their eligibility
(which had been provided in 1976) to avoid (which had been provided in 1976) to avoid
duplication with FmHA,40 end non-physical disaster loans entirely, and add a credit elsewhere test duplication with FmHA,40 end non-physical disaster loans entirely, and add a credit elsewhere test
to limitto limit
SBA disaster loans to “only to those who cannot borrow from banks.”41SBA disaster loans to “only to those who cannot borrow from banks.”41
In response, later that same year, Congress passed P.L. 97-35.42 The act prevented the SBA from
In response, later that same year, Congress passed P.L. 97-35.42 The act prevented the SBA from
restricting Physical Disaster Business Loan eligibilityrestricting Physical Disaster Business Loan eligibility
to businesses that cannot obtain credit to businesses that cannot obtain credit
elsewhere and from limiting the loan to less than 100% of verified loss. However, in recognition elsewhere and from limiting the loan to less than 100% of verified loss. However, in recognition
of congressional support for the Reagan Administration’s efforts to reduce SBA spending, the act of congressional support for the Reagan Administration’s efforts to reduce SBA spending, the act
also reduced disaster loan expenses, though not to the extent requested by the Administration and also reduced disaster loan expenses, though not to the extent requested by the Administration and
its congressional its congressional
al iesallies. To reduce costs, the act created new formulas for determining interest . To reduce costs, the act created new formulas for determining interest
rates based on whether the applicant could obtain credit elsewhere. It also limited, but did not rates based on whether the applicant could obtain credit elsewhere. It also limited, but did not
prohibit, SBAprohibit, SBA
disaster loan access for businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere. disaster loan access for businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere.
Specifical ySpecifically, the , the
disaster loan interest rate for homeowners unable to secure credit elsewhere was: disaster loan interest rate for homeowners unable to secure credit elsewhere was:
the rate prescribed by the Administration but not more than one-half the rate determined
the rate prescribed by the Administration but not more than one-half the rate determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average market yield by the Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average market yield
onon
outstanding marketableoutstanding marketable
obligations of the United States with remaining periods obligations of the United States with remaining periods to to
maturity comparable to the average maturities of such loansmaturity comparable to the average maturities of such loans
plus an additional charge of plus an additional charge of
notnot
to exceed 1 per centum per annum as determined by the [SBA] Administrator, and
37 In addition, P.L. 96-302, T o provide authorizations for the Small Business Administration, and for other purposes, required the SBA to determine, three years after disbursement, and every two years thereafter, if the borrower was able to obtain credit elsewhere at reasonable rates and terms. In that circumstance, the SBA was authorized to requir e the to exceed 1 per centum per annum as determined by the [SBA] Administrator, and adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 per centum but not to exceed 8 per centum per annum.43
borrower to accept such loan and repay the SBAborrower to accept such loan and repay the SBA
disaster loan. At that time, eligible homeowners paid 3% on the first disaster loan. At that time, eligible homeowners paid 3% on the first
$55,000 of assistance and the cost of money (then 9.25%) above $55,000. Farmers (provided eligibility by$55,000 of assistance and the cost of money (then 9.25%) above $55,000. Farmers (provided eligibility by
P.L. 94-305 P.L. 94-305
in 1976) were requiredin 1976) were required
to first seek assistance from the Farmers Home Administration, businessesto first seek assistance from the Farmers Home Administration, businesses
unable unable to obtain to obtain
credit elsewherecredit elsewhere
were were charged 5% (up to $500,000 maximum) and businessescharged 5% (up to $500,000 maximum) and businesses
able able to obtain credit elsewhere were to obtain credit elsewhere were
charged interest at the cost of money (then 9.25%) (up to $500,000 maximum). See U.S.charged interest at the cost of money (then 9.25%) (up to $500,000 maximum). See U.S.
Congress,Congress,
Senate Committee Senate Committee
on the Budget,on the Budget,
Om nibus Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, report to accompany S. 1377, 97th Cong., 1st sess., June, report to accompany S. 1377, 97th Cong., 1st sess., June
17, 1981, 17, 1981,
S.Rept. 97-139 (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 948. S.Rept. 97-139 (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 948.
38 U.S.38 U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business,Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business,
S. S. 408408
, A Bill to Authorize and Provide Program Levels for the
Sm all Business Adm inistrationSmall Business Administration for Fiscal Years 1986, 1987, and 1988 , hearing on S. 408, 99th Cong., 1st sess.,, hearing on S. 408, 99th Cong., 1st sess.,
February February
28, 1985, S.Hrg. 99-28 (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 21428, 1985, S.Hrg. 99-28 (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 214
-296 (testimony of David Stockman, then-Director of the -296 (testimony of David Stockman, then-Director of the
U.S.U.S.
Office of Management and Budget). Office of Management and Budget).
39 SBA,
39 SBA,
“Disaster Loans; Changes“Disaster Loans; Changes
in Eligibility,” 46in Eligibility,” 46
Federal Register 18526, March 25, 1981. EIDLs were not18526, March 25, 1981. EIDLs were not
subject subject
to the 60% of verified loss cap, but wereto the 60% of verified loss cap, but were
limited to no more than $100,000. limited to no more than $100,000.
40 P.L. 99-272,
40 P.L. 99-272,
T heThe Consolidated Omnibus Budget Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (Reconciliation Act of 1985 (
T itleTitle XVIII—Small Business XVIII—Small Business
Programs), made agricultural enterprises ineligiblePrograms), made agricultural enterprises ineligible
for SBAfor SBA
disaster loans. disaster loans.
41 U.S.41 U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on the Budget, Committee on the Budget,
T askTask Force on Enforcement, Credit, and Multiyear Budgeting, Force on Enforcement, Credit, and Multiyear Budgeting,
Reagan Budget Changes in Federal Credit Program s Programs, hearing, 97th Cong., 1st sess., March 19, 1981 (Washington: , hearing, 97th Cong., 1st sess., March 19, 1981 (Washington:
GPO, 1981), p. 97. GPO, 1981), p. 97.
42
42
Judith Havemann, “Reagan Abandons Plan to Scuttle SBA,”Judith Havemann, “Reagan Abandons Plan to Scuttle SBA,”
Washington Post, May 31, 1986. Available at , May 31, 1986. Available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1986/05/31/reagan-abandons-plan-to-scuttle-sba/948f098f-9c83-https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1986/05/31/reagan-abandons-plan-to-scuttle-sba/948f098f-9c83-
46f2-b185-0a05f91a0523/. 46f2-b185-0a05f91a0523/.
43 P.L. 97-35, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Title XIX—Small Business, Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Improvement Act of 1981).
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1312 SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 per centum but not to exceed 8 per centum per annum.43
The act determined the disaster loan interest rate for homeowners able to secure credit elsewhere The act determined the disaster loan interest rate for homeowners able to secure credit elsewhere
in the same manner, except that it did not limit the rate.44 in the same manner, except that it did not limit the rate.44
The disaster loan interest rate for businesses unable to obtain credit elsewhere was limited to no
The disaster loan interest rate for businesses unable to obtain credit elsewhere was limited to no
more than 8% more than 8%
annual yannually. Businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere were charged: . Businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere were charged:
the rate prescribed by the Administration but not in excess of the rate prevailing in private
the rate prescribed by the Administration but not in excess of the rate prevailing in private
market for similar loans and not more than the rate prescribed by the Administration as the market for similar loans and not more than the rate prescribed by the Administration as the
maximummaximum
interest rate for deferred participation (guaranteed) loans under section 7(a) of interest rate for deferred participation (guaranteed) loans under section 7(a) of
thisthis
Act. Loans under this subparagraph shall be limited to Act. Loans under this subparagraph shall be limited to a maximum term ofa maximum term of
three three
years.45 years.45
In 1984, P.L. 98-270 reduced the interest rate cap for homeowners unable to secure credit
In 1984, P.L. 98-270 reduced the interest rate cap for homeowners unable to secure credit
elsewhere from 8% to 4%, added an 8% interest rate cap for homeowners able to secure credit elsewhere from 8% to 4%, added an 8% interest rate cap for homeowners able to secure credit
elsewhere, lowered the interest rate cap for businesses unable to obtain credit elsewhere from 8% elsewhere, lowered the interest rate cap for businesses unable to obtain credit elsewhere from 8%
to 4%, and replaced the interest rate cap for businesses able to obtain credit with the following: to 4%, and replaced the interest rate cap for businesses able to obtain credit with the following:
the
the
rate prescribed by the Administration but not in excess of the lowest of (i) the rate prescribed by the Administration but not in excess of the lowest of (i) the rate rate
prevailing in the private market for similar loans, (ii) the rate prescribed by the prevailing in the private market for similar loans, (ii) the rate prescribed by the
Administration as the maximum interest rate for deferred participation (guaranteed) loans Administration as the maximum interest rate for deferred participation (guaranteed) loans
underunder
section 7(a) of thissection 7(a) of this
Act, or (iii) 8 per centum per annum. LoansAct, or (iii) 8 per centum per annum. Loans
under under this this
subparagraph shall be limited to a maximumsubparagraph shall be limited to a maximum
term of three years.46 term of three years.46
The only additional change to the disaster loan interest rate formulas took place in 2011. P.L. 112-
The only additional change to the disaster loan interest rate formulas took place in 2011. P.L. 112-
74 increased the disaster loan term for businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere from three years 74 increased the disaster loan term for businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere from three years
to seven years.47 to seven years.47
Current SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Policy
The SBA’s current statutory disaster loan interest rate formulas are provided iThe SBA’s current statutory disaster loan interest rate formulas are provided i
n Table 1. In al In all cases, the SBA’s disaster loan interest rates applied are those in effect on the date the disaster cases, the SBA’s disaster loan interest rates applied are those in effect on the date the disaster
occurred.
43 P.L. 97-35, T he Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (T itle XIX—Small Business, Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Improvement Act of 1981). 44 P.L. 97-35, T he Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (T itle XIX—Small Business, Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Improvement Act of 1981).
45 P.L. 97-35, T he Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (T itle XIX—Small Business, Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Improvement Act of 1981).
46 P.L. 98-270, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1983 (T itle III—Committee on Small Business). 47 P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012.
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
occurred.
Table 1. Current Statutory SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Formulas
By Entity
By Entity
Individuals and Households
Individuals and
Individuals and
“the rate prescribed
“the rate prescribed
by the [SBA] Administrationby the [SBA] Administration
but not morebut not more
than one-half the rate than one-half the rate
Households Unable
Households Unable
determined
determined
by the Secretaryby the Secretary
of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average
to Secure Credit
to Secure Credit
market
market
yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining
Elsewhere
Elsewhere
periods to maturity comparable to the average maturities
periods to maturity comparable to the average maturities
of such loan plus an additional of such loan plus an additional
(SBA Home
(SBA Home
charge of not to exceed 1 per centum per annum as determined
charge of not to exceed 1 per centum per annum as determined
by the Administrator,by the Administrator,
and and
Disaster
Disaster
loans) loans)
adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 per centum, but not to exceed 4 per centum per
adjusted to the nearest one-eighth of 1 per centum, but not to exceed 4 per centum per
annum.” annum.”
Statutory Citation: 15 U.S.C.15 U.S.C.
§ §636(d)(5)(A).
44 P.L. 97-35, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Title XIX—Small Business, Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Improvement Act of 1981).
45 P.L. 97-35, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Title XIX—Small Business, Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Improvement Act of 1981).
46 P.L. 98-270, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1983 (Title III—Committee on Small Business). 47 P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012.
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
636(d)(5)(A).
Individuals and
Individuals and
“the rate prescribed
“the rate prescribed
by the [SBA] Administrationby the [SBA] Administration
but not morebut not more
than the rate determinedthan the rate determined
by by
Households Able to
Households Able to
the Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average marketthe Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average market
yield on yield on
Secure Credit Secure Credit
outstanding marketable
outstanding marketable
obligations of the United States with remaining periodsobligations of the United States with remaining periods
to maturity to maturity
Elsewhere
Elsewhere
comparable to the average maturities
comparable to the average maturities
of such loan plus an additional charge of not to exceed of such loan plus an additional charge of not to exceed
(SBA Home
(SBA Home
1 per centum per annum as determined
1 per centum per annum as determined
by the Administrator,by the Administrator,
and adjusted to the nearest and adjusted to the nearest
Disaster
Disaster
loans) loans)
one-eighth of 1 per centum, but not to exceed 8 per centum per annum.”
one-eighth of 1 per centum, but not to exceed 8 per centum per annum.”
Statutory Citation: 15 U.S.C.15 U.S.C.
§ §636(d)(5)(B). 636(d)(5)(B).
Businesses, Private Nonprofit Organizations, or Other Eligible Concerns
Businesses,
Businesses,
Private Private
“not to exceed 4 per centum per annum.”
“not to exceed 4 per centum per annum.”
Nonprofit
Nonprofit
Statutory Citation: 15 U.S.C.15 U.S.C.
§ §636(d)(5)(C). 636(d)(5)(C).
Organizations, or
Organizations, or
Other Eligible Other Eligible
Concerns Unable to
Concerns Unable to
Obtain Credit Obtain Credit
Elsewhere Elsewhere
(SBA Economic (SBA Economic
Injury Disaster Injury Disaster
loans and Physical loans and Physical
DisasterDisaster
Business Business
loans) loans)
Businesses
Businesses
Able to Able to
“the rate prescribed
“the rate prescribed
by the [SBA] Administrationby the [SBA] Administration
but not in excess of the lowest of (i) the but not in excess of the lowest of (i) the
Obtain Credit
Obtain Credit
rate prevailing in the private market
rate prevailing in the private market
for similarfor similar
loans, (loans, (
i ii) the rate prescribed) the rate prescribed
by the by the
Elsewhere
Elsewhere
Administration
Administration
as the maximumas the maximum
interest rate for deferredinterest rate for deferred
participation (guaranteed) loans participation (guaranteed) loans
(SBA Physical
(SBA Physical
under subsection (a), or (
under subsection (a), or (
i iii ) 8 per centum per annum. Loans under this subparagraph ) 8 per centum per annum. Loans under this subparagraph
shal shall be be
Disaster
Disaster
Business Business
limited
limited
to a maximumto a maximum
term of 7 years.” term of 7 years.”
loans)
loans)
Statutory Citation: 15 U.S.C.15 U.S.C.
§ §636(d)(5)(D). 636(d)(5)(D).
Source: Based on CongressionalBased on Congressional
Research ServiceResearch Service
interpretation of 15 U.S.C. interpretation of 15 U.S.C.
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Limits
SBA’s Application of the
SBA disaster loans have statutorily-set interest rate
SBA disaster loans have statutorily-set interest rate
Statutory Interest Rate
ceilings,
ceilings,
but no interest rate floors.but no interest rate floors.
If the statutory If the statutory
calculations yield an interest rate above the statutory calculations yield an interest rate above the statutory
Formulas
ceiling,
ceiling,
the interest rate defaults to the ceiling.the interest rate defaults to the ceiling.
SBA Home Disaster loans: 8% per annum, or 4% : 8% per annum, or 4%
As mentioned, SBA’s disaster loan interest
As mentioned, SBA’s disaster loan interest
per annum if the applicant is unable to obtain credit
per annum if the applicant is unable to obtain credit
rates are capped by statutory formulas, with
rates are capped by statutory formulas, with
elsewhere.
elsewhere.
separate limits for borrowers unable to secure
separate limits for borrowers unable to secure
SBA Physical Disaster Business loans: 8% per : 8% per
credit elsewhere (not to exceed 4%) and for
credit elsewhere (not to exceed 4%) and for
annum, or 4% per annum if the applicant is unable to
annum, or 4% per annum if the applicant is unable to
borrowers able to secure credit elsewhere (not
borrowers able to secure credit elsewhere (not
obtain credit elsewhere.
obtain credit elsewhere.
to exceed 8%).
to exceed 8%).
SBA EIDL: 4% per annum. : 4% per annum.
15 U.S.C.15 U.S.C.
§ §636(d)(5)(A)-(D)
To receive an SBA 636(d)(5)(A)-(D)
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
To receive an SBA disaster loan, applicants must have a credit history acceptable to the disaster loan, applicants must have a credit history acceptable to the
SBA. GenerallySBA. General y, the SBA, the SBA
reviews the applicant’s credit reports to determine if obligations, including reviews the applicant’s credit reports to determine if obligations, including
any current or past federal debts, have been or are being met.48 Applicants must also show the any current or past federal debts, have been or are being met.48 Applicants must also show the
ability ability to repay to repay
al all loans. loans.
General yGenerally, the SBA, the SBA
analyzes the applicant’s federal tax returns and analyzes the applicant’s federal tax returns and
income information to substantiate repayment ability and uses that analysis to determine loan income information to substantiate repayment ability and uses that analysis to determine loan
maturities and repayment terms.49
With few exceptions, al SBA disaster loans are repaid in equal monthly instal mentmaturities and repayment terms.49
48 SBA, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. 11; and 13 C.F.R. §123.6. 49 SBA, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. 11; and 13 C.F.R. §123.105(c).
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
With few exceptions, all SBA disaster loans are repaid in equal monthly installment payments of payments of
principal and interest which fully amortize the loan amount and the interest accrued during the principal and interest which fully amortize the loan amount and the interest accrued during the
initial initial deferment period (the first payment due date is deferment period (the first payment due date is
typical ytypically five months from the date of the five months from the date of the
note) within the loan term.50 note) within the loan term.50
The maximum loan term for SBA disaster loans is
The maximum loan term for SBA disaster loans is
general ygenerally 30 years, and is based on the 30 years, and is based on the
applicant’s ability to repay the loan. The maximum loan term for businesses able to obtain credit applicant’s ability to repay the loan. The maximum loan term for businesses able to obtain credit
elsewhere is seven years.51 elsewhere is seven years.51
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Determinations
In accordance with law, the SBA’s current practice is to set disaster loan interest rates in the In accordance with law, the SBA’s current practice is to set disaster loan interest rates in the
following manner:52 following manner:52
For
For
individuals and households unable to secure credit elsewhere, the lower of the following , the lower of the following
options: options:
one-half of the interest rate for individuals and households that are able to secure
one-half of the interest rate for individuals and households that are able to secure
credit elsewhere; or
credit elsewhere; or
the 4% statutory cap.
the 4% statutory cap.
For
For
individuals and households able to secure credit elsewhere, the lowest of the following , the lowest of the following
options: options:
the rate prevailing in the private market for what would be deemed a comparable
the rate prevailing in the private market for what would be deemed a comparable
mortgage loan (calculated by the SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
mortgage loan (calculated by the SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
the rate prescribed by U.S. Treasuries of comparable maturity length plus a mark-
the rate prescribed by U.S. Treasuries of comparable maturity length plus a mark-
up of 1%, then rounded to the nearest 0.125%; or
up of 1%, then rounded to the nearest 0.125%; or
the 8% statutory cap.
the 8% statutory cap.
For
For
businesses unable to obtain credit elsewhere, the lowest of the following options: , the lowest of the following options:
one-half of the rate prevailing
one-half of the rate prevailing
in the private market for what would be deemed a in the private market for what would be deemed a
comparable business loan (calculated by SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
comparable business loan (calculated by SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
48 SBA, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. 11; and 13 C.F.R. §123.6. 49 SBA, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. 11; and 13 C.F.R. §123.105(c). 50 SBA, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. 110; and 13 C.F.R. §123.105(c). T he
the rate prescribed by SBA as the maximum interest rate for 7(a) guaranteed
loans (calculated as the prevailing prime rate plus a mark-up of 2.75%); or
the 4% statutory cap.
For businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere (Physical Disaster Business Loans only, EIDL is not available to these firms), the lowest of the following options:
the rate prevailing in the private market for what would be deemed a comparable
business loan (calculated by SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
50 SBA, “Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP 50 30 9, p. 110; and 13 C.F.R. §123.105(c). The deferment period may be extended. For example, for physical loans, when the construction/major deferment period may be extended. For example, for physical loans, when the construction/major
repair willrepair will
take a protracted period, the borrower may be unabletake a protracted period, the borrower may be unable
to make full payments until the project is substantially to make full payments until the project is substantially
completed. For economic injury loans, a later duecompleted. For economic injury loans, a later due
date may be appropriate when there are major damagesdate may be appropriate when there are major damages
involving involving
lengthy repairs, the injury period extends more than five months into the future, or the borrowing businesslengthy repairs, the injury period extends more than five months into the future, or the borrowing business
is seasonal is seasonal
in nature. in nature.
51 SBA,
51 SBA,
“Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP“Disaster Assistance Program: Standard Operating Procedure,” SOP
50 30 9, p. 50 30 9, p.
1 09109. .
52 SBA,52 SBA,
Office of Disaster Assistance, Office of Disaster Assistance,
t elephonetelephone and email communication with the authors, March 17, 2021. and email communication with the authors, March 17, 2021.
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1615 SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
the rate prescribed by SBA as the maximum interest rate for 7(a) guaranteed
the rate prescribed by SBA as the maximum interest rate for 7(a) guaranteed
loans (calculated as the prevailing
loans (calculated as the prevailing
prime rate plus a mark-up of 2.75%); or
the 4% statutory cap.
For businesses able to obtain credit elsewhere (Physical Disaster Business Loans only, EIDL is
not available to these firms), the lowest of the following options:
the rate prevailing in the private market for what would be deemed a comparable
business loan (calculated by SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
the rate prescribed by SBA as the maximum interest rate for 7(a) guaranteed
loans (calculated as the prevailing prime rate plus a mark-up of 2.75%); or prime rate plus a mark-up of 2.75%); or
the 8% statutory cap.
the 8% statutory cap.
For
For
nonprofit organizations unable able to obtain credit elsewhere, the lower of the following , the lower of the following
options: options:
one-half of the interest rate for
one-half of the interest rate for
non-profitnonprofit organizations that are able to obtain organizations that are able to obtain
credit elsewhere; or
credit elsewhere; or
the 4% statutory cap.
the 4% statutory cap.
For
For
nonprofit organizations able to obtain credit elsewhere, the lowest of the following options: , the lowest of the following options:
the rate prevailing in the private market for what would be deemed a similar
the rate prevailing in the private market for what would be deemed a similar
business loan (calculated by SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
business loan (calculated by SBA’s Chief Financial Officer);
the rate prescribed by U.S. Treasuries of comparable maturity length rounded to
the rate prescribed by U.S. Treasuries of comparable maturity length rounded to
the nearest 0.125%, plus a mark-up of 0.250%; or
the nearest 0.125%, plus a mark-up of 0.250%; or
the 8% statutory cap.
the 8% statutory cap.
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Pricing
As mentioned, from a policy perspective, some Members argue that the SBA’s disaster loan As mentioned, from a policy perspective, some Members argue that the SBA’s disaster loan
interest rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to help SBA disaster loan borrowers. interest rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to help SBA disaster loan borrowers.
Others are concerned about the costs of doing so, particularly given the size of the national debt Others are concerned about the costs of doing so, particularly given the size of the national debt
and annual budget deficits. There have been no recent congressional efforts to increase disaster and annual budget deficits. There have been no recent congressional efforts to increase disaster
loan interest rates to the level necessary to cover loan interest rates to the level necessary to cover
al all program costs, or to impose fees to help pay program costs, or to impose fees to help pay
for those costs, which are covered through for those costs, which are covered through
appropriationsappropriations. Table 2 provides SBA appropriations provides SBA appropriations
from FY2005-FY2022 for disaster assistance (including supplemental appropriations), business from FY2005-FY2022 for disaster assistance (including supplemental appropriations), business
loan credit subsidies, and loan credit subsidies, and
al all other SBA programs. other SBA programs.
The debate over SBA loan interest rates has been over what constitutes the proper balance
The debate over SBA loan interest rates has been over what constitutes the proper balance
between costs (to taxpayers) and benefits (to disaster victims). As between costs (to taxpayers) and benefits (to disaster victims). As
wil will be discussed, from a be discussed, from a
market risk perspective, SBA disaster loan interest rates are underpriced given the potential for market risk perspective, SBA disaster loan interest rates are underpriced given the potential for
default-related losses (often referred to as the loan’s financials). The question Congress may default-related losses (often referred to as the loan’s financials). The question Congress may
consider is “To what extent should the SBA’s disaster loan programs’ interest rates be consider is “To what extent should the SBA’s disaster loan programs’ interest rates be
underpriced?”
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underpriced?”
Table 2. Small Business Administration Appropriations, FY2005-FY2022
(appropriations and available funds; $ in
(appropriations and available funds; $ in
mil ionsmillions) )
Business
Disaster
Loan
Disaster
Assistance
Credit
Other
Total
Total
Fiscal Year
Assistance
Supplemental
Subsidies
Programs
Appropriation
Spent
2022 request
2022 request
$178.0
$178.0
$0.0
$0.0
$6.0
$6.0
$811.5
$811.5
$995.5
$995.5
NA
NA
2021
2021
$168.1
$168.1
$35,460.0
$35,460.0
$297,145.0
$297,145.0
$46,723.7
$46,723.7
$379,496.7
$379,496.7
$406,748.8
$406,748.8
anticipated
anticipated
2020
2020
$177.1
$177.1
$70,582.0
$70,582.0
$687,439.0
$687,439.0
$3,782.4
$3,782.4
$761,980.5
$761,980.5
$589,169.4
$589,169.4
2019
2019
$10.0
$10.0
$0.0
$0.0
$4.0
$4.0
$701.4
$701.4
$715.4
$715.4
$1,253.0
$1,253.0
2018
2018
$0.0
$0.0
$1,659.0
$1,659.0
$3.4
$3.4
$697.4
$697.4
$2,359.8
$2,359.8
$1,828.7
$1,828.7
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Business
Disaster
Loan
Disaster
Assistance
Credit
Other
Total
Total
Fiscal Year
Assistance
Supplemental
Subsidies
Programs Appropriation
Spent
2017 2017
$186.0
$186.0
$450.0
$450.0
$4.3
$4.3
$696.5
$696.5
$1,336.8
$1,336.8
$1,123.0
$1,123.0
2016
2016
$186.9
$186.9
$0.0
$0.0
$3.3
$3.3
$680.8
$680.8
$871.0
$871.0
$1,058.1
$1,058.1
2015
2015
$186.9
$186.9
$0.0
$0.0
$47.5
$47.5
$653.2
$653.2
$887.6
$887.6
$921.2
$921.2
2014
2014
$191.9
$191.9
$0.0
$0.0
$111.6
$111.6
$625.4
$625.4
$928.9
$928.9
$951.2
$951.2
2013
2013
$111.2
$111.2
$740.0
$740.0
$319.7
$319.7
$583.6
$583.6
$1,754.5
$1,754.5
$1,375.0
$1,375.0
2012
2012
$117.3
$117.3
$0.0
$0.0
$210.8
$210.8
$590.7
$590.7
$918.8
$918.8
$1,039.3
$1,039.3
2011
2011
$45.4
$45.4
$0.0
$0.0
$82.8
$82.8
$601.5
$601.5
$729.7
$729.7
$1,002.9
$1,002.9
2010
2010
$78.2
$78.2
$0.0
$0.0
$83.0
$83.0
$1,625.3
$1,625.3
$1,786.5
$1,786.5
$966.7
$966.7
2009
2009
$0.0
$0.0
$0.0
$0.0
$8.5
$8.5
$1,336.7
$1,336.7
$1,345.2
$1,345.2
$980.8
$980.8
2008
2008
$0.0
$0.0
$1,052.8
$1,052.8
$2.0
$2.0
$579.9
$579.9
$1,634.7
$1,634.7
$928.2
$928.2
2007
2007
$114.9
$114.9
$0.0
$0.0
$1.3
$1.3
$455.6
$455.6
$571.8
$571.8
$1,053.6
$1,053.6
2006
2006
$0.0
$0.0
$1,700.0
$1,700.0
$1.3
$1.3
$532.1
$532.1
$2,233.4
$2,233.4
$2,308.0
$2,308.0
2005
2005
$111.8
$111.8
$929.0
$929.0
$1.4
$1.4
$498.0
$498.0
$1,540.2
$1,540.2
$907.7
$907.7
Sources: U.S. U.S.
Smal Small Business AdministrationBusiness Administration
(SBA), (SBA),
Congressional Budget Justification [FY2005-FY2022]; for [FY2005-FY2022]; for
FY2011-FY2022, the SBA’s FY2011-FY2022, the SBA’s
Congressional Budget Justification is available at https://www.sba.gov/document/reportis available at https://www.sba.gov/document/report
—-congressional-budget-justification-annual-performance-report. P.L. 117-2, the Americancongressional-budget-justification-annual-performance-report. P.L. 117-2, the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021. Rescue Plan Act of 2021.
Notes: The appropriation figures in this table have been adjusted to account for rescissions. : The appropriation figures in this table have been adjusted to account for rescissions.
The Underpricing of SBA Disaster Loan Financial Risk
As mentioned, Congress appropriates funds to the SBA for loan administration and disaster loan As mentioned, Congress appropriates funds to the SBA for loan administration and disaster loan
credit subsidies (the amount necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses, credit subsidies (the amount necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses,
including those related to loan defaults). The amount to be appropriated for disaster loan credit including those related to loan defaults). The amount to be appropriated for disaster loan credit
subsidies is determined by the program’s credit subsidy rate, which is the program’s non-subsidies is determined by the program’s credit subsidy rate, which is the program’s non-
administrative cost divided by the amount dispersed. The credit subsidy rate is expressed as a administrative cost divided by the amount dispersed. The credit subsidy rate is expressed as a
percentage of the amount dispersed.53
53 A positive subsidy rate indicates a cost to the government and a negative subsidy rate indicates a budgetary savings. See U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Estim ates of the Cost of Federal Credit Program s in 2022 , October 2021, p. 4, at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57412.
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percentage of the amount dispersed.53
The SBA’s Office of Financial Analysis and Modeling is responsible for ensuring that the
The SBA’s Office of Financial Analysis and Modeling is responsible for ensuring that the
computation of subsidy rates for the SBA’s credit programs are in compliance with the Federal computation of subsidy rates for the SBA’s credit programs are in compliance with the Federal
Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). As indicated on the office’s website, Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). As indicated on the office’s website,
The FCRA requires all credit agencies, including the SBA, to budget and account for the
The FCRA requires all credit agencies, including the SBA, to budget and account for the
cost of credit programs by determining the net present value of cash flows to and from the cost of credit programs by determining the net present value of cash flows to and from the
Government over the life of the portfolio and expressing the net amount as a credit subsidy Government over the life of the portfolio and expressing the net amount as a credit subsidy
rate. The process to develop a subsidy rate is lengthy and complex, requiring unique data rate. The process to develop a subsidy rate is lengthy and complex, requiring unique data
collectioncollection
techniques and analysis efforts. SBA develops its subsidy rates by creating
techniques and analysis efforts. SBA develops its subsidy rates by creating models that incorporate data on loan maturity, borrowers’ interest rates, fees, grace periods, models that incorporate data on loan maturity, borrowers’ interest rates, fees, grace periods,
53 A positive subsidy rate indicates a cost to the government and a negative subsidy rate indicates a budgetary savings. See U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Estimates of the Cost of Federal Credit Programs in 2022, October 2021, p. 4, at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57412.
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interest subsidies, delinquencies, purchases or defaults, recoveries, prepayments, advances interest subsidies, delinquencies, purchases or defaults, recoveries, prepayments, advances
and borrower characteristics.54 and borrower characteristics.54
For example, in FY2020, the SBA
For example, in FY2020, the SBA
disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate was 13.62%.55 disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate was 13.62%.55
This means that for each $1 appropriated for SBA disaster loan credit subsidies the SBA can This means that for each $1 appropriated for SBA disaster loan credit subsidies the SBA can
provide about $7.34 in disaster loans. provide about $7.34 in disaster loans.
The SBA Disaster Loan Program’s credit subsidy rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan
The SBA Disaster Loan Program’s credit subsidy rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan
guarantee programs because guarantee programs because
1. its default rate tends to be higher (e.g., in FY2020, the SBA
1. its default rate tends to be higher (e.g., in FY2020, the SBA
Disaster Loan Disaster Loan
Program’s default rate (10.35%) was more than double the default rate for the
Program’s default rate (10.35%) was more than double the default rate for the
7(a) loan guarantee program (4.75%), the 504/CDC loan guarantee program 7(a) loan guarantee program (4.75%), the 504/CDC loan guarantee program
(4.11%), and the (4.11%), and the
Smal Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program’s Business Investment Company (SBIC) program’s
debentures (4.57%)), debentures (4.57%)),
2. SBA
2. SBA
disaster loans do not have fees, and disaster loans do not have fees, and
3. SBA
3. SBA
disaster loan interest rates are subject to statutory caps.56disaster loan interest rates are subject to statutory caps.56
Figure 1 provides an provides an
il ustrationillustration of the credit subsidy rates (taking into account fees and other of the credit subsidy rates (taking into account fees and other
cash flows) for SBA disaster loans, Microloans, SBIC debentures, 504/CDC loans, and 7(a) loans cash flows) for SBA disaster loans, Microloans, SBIC debentures, 504/CDC loans, and 7(a) loans
from FY2015-FY2020. from FY2015-FY2020.
The interest rate caps imposed by the SBA’s disaster loan interest rate formulas contribute to the
The interest rate caps imposed by the SBA’s disaster loan interest rate formulas contribute to the
SBA Disaster Loan Program’s relatively high loan credit subsidy rate because these formulas SBA Disaster Loan Program’s relatively high loan credit subsidy rate because these formulas
require the SBA to charge at or below prevailing market interest rates for disaster loans that require the SBA to charge at or below prevailing market interest rates for disaster loans that
would otherwise be available from the private sector. would otherwise be available from the private sector.
In other words, for eligible borrowers, SBA disaster loan pricing does not account for various
In other words, for eligible borrowers, SBA disaster loan pricing does not account for various
financial and risk metrics (e.g., borrower income, existing debt obligations) that private lenders financial and risk metrics (e.g., borrower income, existing debt obligations) that private lenders
take into account. Consequently, from an economic perspective, SBA disaster loans are take into account. Consequently, from an economic perspective, SBA disaster loans are
purposively underpriced for risk. purposively underpriced for risk.
In finance, Treasury bond rates are referred to as
In finance, Treasury bond rates are referred to as
risk-free rates because the federal government, because the federal government,
unlike other borrowers, lacks certain financial risks such as default risk, the risk that a debt unlike other borrowers, lacks certain financial risks such as default risk, the risk that a debt
obligation obligation
wil will not be repaid on time or at not be repaid on time or at
al all. Given that SBA. Given that SBA
disaster loans already carry interest disaster loans already carry interest
rates at or below prevailing market levels for above-average levels of market risk, setting these rates at or below prevailing market levels for above-average levels of market risk, setting these
54 SBA, rates equal to Treasury risk-free rates means that the SBA would receive no enhanced compensation for its willingness to assume enhanced levels of default risk.
54 SBA, Office of Financial Analysis and Modeling, “Summary of Responsibilities,”Office of Financial Analysis and Modeling, “Summary of Responsibilities,”
at https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/at https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/
sba-locations/headquarters-offices/office-performance-management-chief-financial-officer/office-performance-sba-locations/headquarters-offices/office-performance-management-chief-financial-officer/office-performance-
planning-chief-financial-officer-resources#section-header-10. planning-chief-financial-officer-resources#section-header-10.
55 SBA,
55 SBA,
Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2020, p. 84, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-agency-financial-, p. 84, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-agency-financial-
reportreport
. .
56 SBA,56 SBA,
Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2020, p. 84, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-agency-financial-, p. 84, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-agency-financial-
reportreport
. For additional information and analysis of the Small. For additional information and analysis of the Small
Business Business Investment Company program, see CRSInvestment Company program, see CRS
Report Report
R41456, R41456,
SBA Sm all Business Investm ent Com pany Program Small Business Investment Company Program, by Robert Jay Dilger. , by Robert Jay Dilger.
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
rates equal to Treasury risk-free rates means that the SBA would receive no enhanced
compensation for its wil ingness to assume enhanced levels of default risk.
Figure 1. SBA Total Credit Subsidy Rates for Selected Programs, FY2015-FY2020
Source: U.S. U.S.
Smal Business Small Business Administration,Administration,
Agency Financial Reports, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-Agency Financial Reports, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-
agency-financial-report. agency-financial-report.
The SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rate Debate
Congress has debated the extent to which SBA disaster loan interest rates should generate revenue Congress has debated the extent to which SBA disaster loan interest rates should generate revenue
to help offset the program’s costs since the program’s inception. For example, in 1983, Senator to help offset the program’s costs since the program’s inception. For example, in 1983, Senator
Dale Bumpers stated the following at a congressional hearing concerning the use of credit Dale Bumpers stated the following at a congressional hearing concerning the use of credit
elsewhere to set interest rates: elsewhere to set interest rates:
How
How
do you determine whether victims have credit elsewhere? I have do you determine whether victims have credit elsewhere? I have mixed emotions mixed emotions
about the credit elsewhere test. We debated that at length in the Senate when we passed about the credit elsewhere test. We debated that at length in the Senate when we passed
that bill. I’m not interested in giving subsidized interest rates to very wealthy people and I that bill. I’m not interested in giving subsidized interest rates to very wealthy people and I
don’t think that ought to be the role of Government. That’s one of the problems I've always don’t think that ought to be the role of Government. That’s one of the problems I've always
had with student loans. The credit elsewhere test necessarily has to be very arbitrary.57 had with student loans. The credit elsewhere test necessarily has to be very arbitrary.57
Many others testifying at that hearing, and several committee Members, argued that SBA disaster
Many others testifying at that hearing, and several committee Members, argued that SBA disaster
loan interest rates should be lowered to help people recover after a disaster. loan interest rates should be lowered to help people recover after a disaster.
Arguments For Lower SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates
Historical yHistorically, proponents of legislative efforts to lower SBA disaster loan interest rates have , proponents of legislative efforts to lower SBA disaster loan interest rates have
argued that, unlike typical SBA loan applicants (such as those seeking to start a new business), argued that, unlike typical SBA loan applicants (such as those seeking to start a new business),
57 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business, Disaster Loan Program disaster victims, through no fault of their own, are already struggling to recover from unanticipated and adverse incidents. Requiring them to pay prevailing market interest rates, or even the somewhat lower than prevailing private sector market interest rates that often result from the SBA Disaster Loan Program’s formulas, can create an additional burden for victims seeking
57 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business, Disaster Loan Program, hearing on the Disaster Loan , hearing on the Disaster Loan
Program, 98th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 1983, S.Hrg. 98-101 (Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 49. Program, 98th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 1983, S.Hrg. 98-101 (Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 49.
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
disaster victims, through no fault of their own, are already struggling to recover from unanticipated and adverse incidents. Requiring them to pay prevailing market interest rates, or even the somewhat lower than prevailing private sector market interest rates that often result from the SBA Disaster Loan Program’s formulas, can create an additional burden for victims seeking to recover and rebuild from a disaster. Furthermore, these proponents argue that the federal to recover and rebuild from a disaster. Furthermore, these proponents argue that the federal
government should not make a profit on SBAgovernment should not make a profit on SBA
disaster loans. disaster loans.
Table 3 provides a sampling of selected SBA disaster loan interest rates for various disaster provides a sampling of selected SBA disaster loan interest rates for various disaster
declarations from 2015 to 2021. declarations from 2015 to 2021.
Table 3. Selected SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates, 2015-2021
Incident
Year
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates
COVID-19
COVID-19
2020 and
2020 and
EIDL:
2021
2021
Smal Small Business:Business:
3.75% Non-profitNonprofit: :
2.75%
Tropical
Tropical
2019
2019
Physical Disaster Loans:
Storm
Storm
Homeowners
Homeowners
with Credit Available Elsewhere:with Credit Available Elsewhere:
3.50%
Imelda
Imelda
Homeowners
Homeowners
without Credit Availablewithout Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
1.75% BusinessesBusinesses
with Credit Availablewith Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
8.00% BusinessesBusinesses
without Credit Available Elsewhere:without Credit Available Elsewhere:
4.00% Non-ProfitNonprofit Organizations: Organizations:
2.75%
EIDL:
Smal Small Business:Business:
4.00% Non-profitNonprofit: :
2.75%
California
California
2018
2018
Physical Disaster Loans:
Wildfires
Wildfires
Homeowners
Homeowners
with Credit Available Elsewhere:with Credit Available Elsewhere:
4.00% HomeownersHomeowners
without Credit Availablewithout Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
2.00% BusinessesBusinesses
with Credit Availablewith Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
7.48% BusinessesBusinesses
without Credit Available Elsewhere:without Credit Available Elsewhere:
3.74% Non-ProfitNonprofit Organizations: Organizations:
2.75% EIDL:
Smal Small Business:Business:
3.74% Non-profitNonprofit: :
2.75%
Hurricane
Hurricane
2017
2017
Physical Disaster Loans:
Maria
Maria
Homeowners
Homeowners
with Credit Available Elsewhere:with Credit Available Elsewhere:
3.50% HomeownersHomeowners
without Credit Availablewithout Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
1.75% BusinessesBusinesses
with Credit Availablewith Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
6.61% BusinessesBusinesses
without Credit Available Elsewhere:without Credit Available Elsewhere:
3.30% Non-ProfitNonprofit Organizations: Organizations:
2.50% EIDL:
Smal Small Business:Business:
3.30% Non-profitNonprofit: :
2.50%
Hurricane
Hurricane
2016
2016
Physical Disaster Loans:
Matthew
Matthew
Homeowners
Homeowners
with Credit Available Elsewhere:with Credit Available Elsewhere:
3.12% HomeownersHomeowners
without Credit Availablewithout Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
1.56% BusinessesBusinesses
with Credit Availablewith Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
6.25% BusinessesBusinesses
without Credit Available Elsewhere:without Credit Available Elsewhere:
4.00% Non-ProfitNonprofit Organizations: Organizations:
2.62% EIDL: Small Business: 4.00% Nonprofit: 2.62%
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SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options
Incident
Year
SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates
EIDL:
Smal Business: 4.00% Non-profit: 2.62% Rates
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
2015
2015
Physical Disaster Loans:
Severe
Severe
Homeowners
Homeowners
with Credit Available Elsewhere:with Credit Available Elsewhere:
3.37%
Storms,
Storms,
Homeowners
Homeowners
without Credit Availablewithout Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
1.68%
Tornadoes,
Tornadoes,
Straight-line Straight-line
Businesses
Businesses
with Credit Availablewith Credit Available
Elsewhere:Elsewhere:
6.00%
Winds, And
Winds, And
Businesses
Businesses
without Credit Available Elsewhere:without Credit Available Elsewhere:
4.00%
Flooding
Flooding
Non-ProfitNonprofit Organizations: Organizations:
2.62% EIDL:
Smal Small Business:Business:
4.00% Non-profitNonprofit: :
2.62%
Source: Compiled Compiled
by CRS using data fromby CRS using data from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency disasterthe Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster
declarations declarations
and U.S. and U.S.
Smal Business Administration Small Business Administration Federal Register notices. notices.
Arguments Against Lower SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates
Historical yHistorically, opponents of legislative efforts to reduce SBA disaster loan interest rates, , opponents of legislative efforts to reduce SBA disaster loan interest rates,
especial y
especially efforts to reduce those interest rates below the federal government’s cost of money, to zero efforts to reduce those interest rates below the federal government’s cost of money, to zero
percent, or to convert the program into a grant program, worry that such actions could encourage percent, or to convert the program into a grant program, worry that such actions could encourage
borrowers to forgo or reduce their insurance coverage (borrowers to forgo or reduce their insurance coverage (
cal edcalled moral hazard, which occurs when moral hazard, which occurs when
individualsindividuals
do not fully internalizedo not fully internalize
the costs of their risk-taking).58 They argue that lower interest the costs of their risk-taking).58 They argue that lower interest
rates could also lead to heightened demand, further increasing program costs. In their view, rates could also lead to heightened demand, further increasing program costs. In their view,
lowering disaster loan interest rates further, lowering disaster loan interest rates further,
especial yespecially given that the program has no fees to help given that the program has no fees to help
pay for program costs and a relatively high default rate, would be pay for program costs and a relatively high default rate, would be
fiscal yfiscally unwise. unwise.
In recent years, there have been no congressional efforts to charge SBA disaster loan borrowers
In recent years, there have been no congressional efforts to charge SBA disaster loan borrowers
prevailing private sector interest rates or to impose fees to move the program towards zero credit prevailing private sector interest rates or to impose fees to move the program towards zero credit
subsidy (self-financing). subsidy (self-financing).
An Administrative, as Opposed to Legislative, Response?
The SBA appears to have the statutory authority to charge disaster loan interest rates below the The SBA appears to have the statutory authority to charge disaster loan interest rates below the
limits set forth by the formulas in P.L. 98-270, and, by selecting the lowest of the formulas’ limits set forth by the formulas in P.L. 98-270, and, by selecting the lowest of the formulas’
respective financial limitingrespective financial limiting
factors, has done so, at least factors, has done so, at least
partial ypartially. The SBA could charge still . The SBA could charge still
lower interest rates. It could also, depending on the calculations for each the formulas’ respective lower interest rates. It could also, depending on the calculations for each the formulas’ respective
financial limitingfinancial limiting
factors, charge higher interest rates than it currently does. Apparently, the SBA factors, charge higher interest rates than it currently does. Apparently, the SBA
has determined that its approach (using the lowest of the formulas’ financial limiting factors to has determined that its approach (using the lowest of the formulas’ financial limiting factors to
determine the disaster loan program’s interest rates) is the appropriate balance between increasing determine the disaster loan program’s interest rates) is the appropriate balance between increasing
cost to taxpayers and providing benefits to the borrower. cost to taxpayers and providing benefits to the borrower.
58 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Economic Growth, T ax and Capital Access, Exam ining the Role of Governm ent Assistance for Disaster Victim s
Concluding Observations Throughout the years, Congress has expressed concern about the ability of businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals and households to recover from disasters. In an attempt to provide
58 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax and Capital Access, Examining the Role of Government Assistance for Disaster Victims, A Review of H.R. 3042, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 3042, 112th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 16, 2012, H.Rept. 112-55 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 14-15. For additional information and analysis of the February 16, 2012, H.Rept. 112-55 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 14-15. For additional information and analysis of the
SBASBA
Disaster Loan Account, see CRSDisaster Loan Account, see CRS
Insight IN11433, Insight IN11433,
Supplem entalSupplemental Appropriations: SBA Disaster Loan Account, ,
coordinated by Brucecoordinated by Bruce
R. Lindsay. SeeR. Lindsay. See
also, RANDalso, RAND
Corporation, Corporation,
Insuring Public Buildings, Contents, Vehicles, and
Equipm entEquipment Against Disasters, p. xvi, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA332-1.html. , p. xvi, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA332-1.html.
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Concluding Observations
Throughout the years, Congress has expressed concern about the ability of businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals and households to recover from disasters. In an attempt to provide debt relief to disaster victims, several legislative proposals have been introduced in recent years debt relief to disaster victims, several legislative proposals have been introduced in recent years
to lower SBA disaster loan interest rates (seto lower SBA disaster loan interest rates (se
e Appendix B). For example, S. 4167, the . For example, S. 4167, the
Smal Small Business Disaster Loan Enhancement Act of 2020, introduced during the 116th Congress, would Business Disaster Loan Enhancement Act of 2020, introduced during the 116th Congress, would
have established an interest rate of not more than 1% for any EIDL during the period beginning have established an interest rate of not more than 1% for any EIDL during the period beginning
on February 15, 2020, and ending on December 31, 2020. on February 15, 2020, and ending on December 31, 2020.
Measures similar to S. 4167 have also been introduced in recent years, but none have been
Measures similar to S. 4167 have also been introduced in recent years, but none have been
enacted. Perhaps this is because a key tenet of current federal emergency management policy is enacted. Perhaps this is because a key tenet of current federal emergency management policy is
that federal disaster assistance is seen as being supplemental in nature and not designed to make that federal disaster assistance is seen as being supplemental in nature and not designed to make
people and businesses whole again.59 There is a general expectation that individuals, businesses people and businesses whole again.59 There is a general expectation that individuals, businesses
and nonprofit organizations are responsible for taking necessary steps to protect themselves and and nonprofit organizations are responsible for taking necessary steps to protect themselves and
their organizations from a disaster, including the purchase of adequate insurance coverage.60 their organizations from a disaster, including the purchase of adequate insurance coverage.60
Although some may argue that the government’s role is to help those in need by offering easily Although some may argue that the government’s role is to help those in need by offering easily
obtainableobtainable
and subsidized disaster loans, others may argue that the SBA’s disaster loans’ terms and subsidized disaster loans, others may argue that the SBA’s disaster loans’ terms
are too favorable and might incentivize some to forgo or reduce insurance. are too favorable and might incentivize some to forgo or reduce insurance.
Congress has sought to negotiate the gap between the positions. For example, at a 2012 hearing
Congress has sought to negotiate the gap between the positions. For example, at a 2012 hearing
entitled entitled
Examining the Rode of Government Assistance for Disaster Victims: A review of H.R. H.R.
3042,3042,
before the House Committee on before the House Committee on
Smal Small Business, Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax, Business, Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax,
and Capital Access, Representative Schrader inquired: and Capital Access, Representative Schrader inquired:
Let us talk about the
Let us talk about the
moral hazard issue. That is something I am concerned about and I moral hazard issue. That is something I am concerned about and I
think... what is the even proper role between SBA and flood insurance? I mean, SBA would think... what is the even proper role between SBA and flood insurance? I mean, SBA would
be a super [form of] disaster assistance, when things go beyond the norm, and obviously be a super [form of] disaster assistance, when things go beyond the norm, and obviously
our flood insurance programs are not doing what they should be doing and... are worried our flood insurance programs are not doing what they should be doing and... are worried
about our debt and deficit at the federal level and so we are very conscious about the cost about our debt and deficit at the federal level and so we are very conscious about the cost
of this particular piece of legislation potentially. So what is the balance.... What is the role of this particular piece of legislation potentially. So what is the balance.... What is the role
of the SBA versus flood insurance? What specific mitigation changes do we need to make of the SBA versus flood insurance? What specific mitigation changes do we need to make
in either program in your opinion to be more effective? And what is the magic interest rate in either program in your opinion to be more effective? And what is the magic interest rate
that gets the right point to avoid moral hazard?61 that gets the right point to avoid moral hazard?61
Reaching a consensus on an appropriate disaster loan interest rate has thus far been elusive. In
Reaching a consensus on an appropriate disaster loan interest rate has thus far been elusive. In
response to the inquiry, Howard Kunreuther, Professor of Decision Sciences and Public Policy at response to the inquiry, Howard Kunreuther, Professor of Decision Sciences and Public Policy at
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania summarized the interest rate conundrum faced the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania summarized the interest rate conundrum faced
by Congress that continues to this day: by Congress that continues to this day:
That
That
is a value judgment. It is a judgment that everyone has to make as to how is a value judgment. It is a judgment that everyone has to make as to how much much
assistance we want to give and whether or not that money could have been spent better in assistance we want to give and whether or not that money could have been spent better in
other ways. I will not answer that question directly because I think at the end of the day we other ways. I will not answer that question directly because I think at the end of the day we
as a society, and Congress plays that role, has to judge at what point do we want to provide as a society, and Congress plays that role, has to judge at what point do we want to provide
59 FEMA, A Citizen’s Guide to Disaster Assistance, “Unit T hreespecial relief. And it certainly could be argued that if it turns out someone would not be able to stay in business unless they were able to get a very, very small loan, a low interest loan, then you may want to go in that direction.62
59 FEMA, A Citizen’s Guide to Disaster Assistance, “Unit Three: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance,” p. 56, : Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance,” p. 56,
September 2003. Available at https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is7complete.pdf. September 2003. Available at https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is7complete.pdf.
60 W.J. Wouter Botzen, Howard Kunreuther, and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “Protecting Against Disaster Risks:60 W.J. Wouter Botzen, Howard Kunreuther, and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “Protecting Against Disaster Risks:
Why Why
Insurance and Prevention May Be Complements,” Insurance and Prevention May Be Complements,”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 59, no. 5 (October 19, 2009), , vol. 59, no. 5 (October 19, 2009),
pp. 151-169. pp. 151-169.
61 U.S.
61 U.S.
Congress, HouseCongress, House
Committee on Small Business,Committee on Small Business,
Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Subcommittee on Economic Growth,
T axTax and Capital Access, and Capital Access,
Exam iningExamining the Role of Governm entGovernment Assistance for Disaster Victim s Victims, A Review of H.R. 3042, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 3042, 112th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 16, 2012, H.Rept. 112-55 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 14-15. February 16, 2012, H.Rept. 112-55 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 14-15.
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special relief. And it certainly could be argued that if it turns out someone would not be able to stay in business unless they were able to get a very, very small loan, a low interest loan, then you may want to go in that direction.62
62 Ibid., p. 15. 62 Ibid., p. 15.
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Appendix A. Disaster Declarations
There are five ways in which the SBA Disaster Loan Program can be put into effect. These There are five ways in which the SBA Disaster Loan Program can be put into effect. These
include two types of presidential declarations as authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster include two types of presidential declarations as authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)63 and three types of SBA declarations.64 Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)63 and three types of SBA declarations.64
While the type of declaration may determine what types of loans are made available, it has no While the type of declaration may determine what types of loans are made available, it has no
bearing on loan terms or loan caps. The SBA Disaster Loan Program becomes available whenbearing on loan terms or loan caps. The SBA Disaster Loan Program becomes available when
:
1. The President issues a major disaster declaration and authorizes both Individual
1. The President issues a major disaster declaration and authorizes both Individual
Assistance (IA) and Public Assistance (PA) under the authority of the Stafford
Assistance (IA) and Public Assistance (PA) under the authority of the Stafford
Act.65 When the President issues such a declaration, SBA disaster loans become Act.65 When the President issues such a declaration, SBA disaster loans become
available available to homeowners, renters, businesses of to homeowners, renters, businesses of
al all sizes, and nonprofit sizes, and nonprofit
organizations located within the disaster area. EIDLs may also be made for organizations located within the disaster area. EIDLs may also be made for
victims in contiguous counties or other political subdivisions. victims in contiguous counties or other political subdivisions.
2. The President makes a major disaster declaration that only provides the state with
2. The President makes a major disaster declaration that only provides the state with
PA. In such a case, a private nonprofit entity located within the disaster area that
PA. In such a case, a private nonprofit entity located within the disaster area that
provides noncritical services may be eligibleprovides noncritical services may be eligible
for a physical disaster loan or for a physical disaster loan or
EIDL.66 It is important to note that Home Physical Disaster Loans and Personal EIDL.66 It is important to note that Home Physical Disaster Loans and Personal
Property Loans are not made available to renters and homeowners under this type Property Loans are not made available to renters and homeowners under this type
of declaration. of declaration.
Additional y, Additionally, Business Physical Disaster Loans, and EIDLs are Business Physical Disaster Loans, and EIDLs are
general ygenerally not made available not made available
to businesses (unless they are a private nonprofit to businesses (unless they are a private nonprofit
entity) if the declaration only provides PA. entity) if the declaration only provides PA.
3. The SBA Administrator issues a physical disaster declaration in response to a
3. The SBA Administrator issues a physical disaster declaration in response to a
gubernatorial request for assistance.67 When the SBA Administrator issues this
gubernatorial request for assistance.67 When the SBA Administrator issues this
type of declaration, SBAtype of declaration, SBA
disaster loans become availabledisaster loans become available
to eligibleto eligible
homeowners, homeowners,
renters, businesses of renters, businesses of
al all sizes, and nonprofit organizations within the disaster sizes, and nonprofit organizations within the disaster
area or contiguous counties and other political subdivisions. area or contiguous counties and other political subdivisions.
63 For more information about Stafford Act declarations, see CRS63 For more information about Stafford Act declarations, see CRS
Report R43784, Report R43784,
FEMA’s Disaster Declaration
Process: A Prim erPrimer, by Bruce, by Bruce
R. Lindsay For an overview of FEMA disaster assistance, see CRSR. Lindsay For an overview of FEMA disaster assistance, see CRS
Video Video WVB00386, WVB00386,
2021 Hurricane and Disaster Seasons: FEMA Disaster Assistance Overview and Policy Considerations: Part 1 , by , by
Diane P. Horn et al. Diane P. Horn et al.
64 Disaster declarations are published64 Disaster declarations are published
in the in the
Federal Register. A list of current disaster declarations can be found on the A list of current disaster declarations can be found on the
SBASBA
website website at https://www.sba.gov/content/currentat https://www.sba.gov/content/current
-disaster-declarations. -disaster-declarations.
65 Administered by FEMA, Individual
65 Administered by FEMA, Individual
Assistance (IA) includesAssistance (IA) includes
various forms of help for families and various forms of help for families and
in dividualsindividuals followingfollowing
a disastera disaster
event. IA authorized by the Stafford Act can includeevent. IA authorized by the Stafford Act can include
housing housing assistance, disaster unemployment assistance, disaster unemployment
assistance, crisis counseling,assistance, crisis counseling,
and other programs intended to address people’s needs.and other programs intended to address people’s needs.
Public Assistance (PA) provides Public Assistance (PA) provides
various categories of assistance to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations. Principally, PA covers the various categories of assistance to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations. Principally, PA covers the
repair or replacement of infrastructure (roads, bridges,repair or replacement of infrastructure (roads, bridges,
public public buildings,buildings,
etc.), but it also includesetc.), but it also includes
debris debris removal and removal and
emergency protective measures, which cover additional costs incurred by local publicemergency protective measures, which cover additional costs incurred by local public
safety groups through their safety groups through their
actions in responding to the disaster. FEMA’s PA program provides assistance only to public and nonprofit entities. For actions in responding to the disaster. FEMA’s PA program provides assistance only to public and nonprofit entities. For
more information on FEMA’s PA program, see CRSmore information on FEMA’s PA program, see CRS
In FocusIn Focus
IF11529, IF11529,
A Brief Overview of FEMA’s Public Assistance
Program , by Erica A. Lee. , by Erica A. Lee.
66 In order to receive FEMA grant assistance, these entities must first have applied for an SBA66 In order to receive FEMA grant assistance, these entities must first have applied for an SBA
disaster loan and must disaster loan and must
have been deemedhave been deemed
ineligible ineligible or must have received the maximum amount of assistance from SBAor must have received the maximum amount of assistance from SBA
before seekingbefore seeking
grant grant
assistance from FEMA. assistance from FEMA.
67
67
T heThe criteria used to determine whether to issue a declaration include criteria used to determine whether to issue a declaration include
a minimum amount of uninsureda minimum amount of uninsured
physical physical
damagedamage
to buildings,to buildings,
machinery, inventory, homes, and other property. Generally, this minimum is at least 25 homes or machinery, inventory, homes, and other property. Generally, this minimum is at least 25 homes or
businessesbusinesses
(or some combination of the two) that have sustained uninsured(or some combination of the two) that have sustained uninsured
losses of 40% or more in any county or losses of 40% or more in any county or
other smaller political subdivisionother smaller political subdivision
of a state or U.S.of a state or U.S.
possession . See possession. See 13 C.F.R. §123.3(3)(ii) and 13 C.F.R. 13 C.F.R. §123.3(3)(ii) and 13 C.F.R.
§123.3(3)(iii). §123.3(3)(iii).
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4. The SBA Administrator may make an EIDL declaration when SBA receives a
4. The SBA Administrator may make an EIDL declaration when SBA receives a
certification from a state governor that at least five
certification from a state governor that at least five
smal small businesses have businesses have
suffered substantial economic injury as a result of a disaster. This declaration is suffered substantial economic injury as a result of a disaster. This declaration is
offered only when other viable forms of financial assistance are unavailable. offered only when other viable forms of financial assistance are unavailable.
Smal Small agricultural cooperatives and most private nonprofit organizations located agricultural cooperatives and most private nonprofit organizations located
within the disaster area or contiguous counties and other political subdivisions within the disaster area or contiguous counties and other political subdivisions
are eligibleare eligible
for SBA disaster loans when the SBA Administrator issues an EIDL for SBA disaster loans when the SBA Administrator issues an EIDL
declaration. declaration.
5. The SBA Administrator may issue a declaration for EIDL loans based on the
5. The SBA Administrator may issue a declaration for EIDL loans based on the
determination of a natural disaster by the Secretary of Agriculture.68 These loans
determination of a natural disaster by the Secretary of Agriculture.68 These loans
are availableare available
to eligibleto eligible
smal small businesses, businesses,
smal small agricultural cooperatives, and agricultural cooperatives, and
most private nonprofit organizations within the disaster area, or contiguous most private nonprofit organizations within the disaster area, or contiguous
counties and other political subdivisions. counties and other political subdivisions.
Additional y, the SBA Additionally, the SBA administrator administrator
may issue a declaration based on the determination of the Secretary of Commerce may issue a declaration based on the determination of the Secretary of Commerce
that a fishery resource disaster or commercial fishery failure has occurred.69that a fishery resource disaster or commercial fishery failure has occurred.69
68 13 C.F.R. §123.3(4). 68 13 C.F.R. §123.3(4).
69 15 U.S.C.69 15 U.S.C.
§632(k)(1). §632(k)(1).
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Appendix B. Selected Proposed Legislation Related
to SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates, 112th-117th
Congresses
Below are selected Below are selected
bil sbills from the 112th to the 117th Congress (2011-date of this report) that from the 112th to the 117th Congress (2011-date of this report) that
include provisions that adjust interest rates for SBA disaster loans. These include provisions that adjust interest rates for SBA disaster loans. These
bil sbills were found by were found by
searching Congress.gov using the search terms “interest rate,” “SBA,” and “disaster loan.” The searching Congress.gov using the search terms “interest rate,” “SBA,” and “disaster loan.” The
bil sbills listed below serve as examples, and not an exhaustive list of legislation. listed below serve as examples, and not an exhaustive list of legislation.
112th Congress
H.R. 6296—Disaster Loan Fairness Act of 2012
Would have amended the
Would have amended the
Smal Small Business Act to provide the interest rate to be Business Act to provide the interest rate to be
charged by the
charged by the
Smal Small Business Administration (SBA) for loans made to Business Administration (SBA) for loans made to
smal small businesses beginning on January 1, 2011, and ending four years after the date of businesses beginning on January 1, 2011, and ending four years after the date of
enactment of this enactment of this
Actact in major disaster areas. Would have required such rate to be in major disaster areas. Would have required such rate to be
the lesser of 4% or one-half the prevailing rate for similar loans in the area for the lesser of 4% or one-half the prevailing rate for similar loans in the area for
those unable to attain credit elsewhere, or three-fourths the prevailing rate for those unable to attain credit elsewhere, or three-fourths the prevailing rate for
those able to attain credit elsewhere. Would have required the SBA Administrator those able to attain credit elsewhere. Would have required the SBA Administrator
to refund excess interest payments made by qualifying borrowers before the to refund excess interest payments made by qualifying borrowers before the
enactment of this act. enactment of this act.
113th Congress
H.R. 2857—Disaster Loan Fairness Act of 2013
Would have amended the
Would have amended the
Smal Small Business Act to provide the interest rate to be Business Act to provide the interest rate to be
charged by the
charged by the
Smal Small Business Administration (SBA) for loans made to Business Administration (SBA) for loans made to
smal small businesses 30 days after the date of enactment of this act or later in major disaster businesses 30 days after the date of enactment of this act or later in major disaster
areas. Would have required such rate to be the lesser of 4% or one-half the areas. Would have required such rate to be the lesser of 4% or one-half the
prevailing rate for similar loans in the area for those unable to attain credit prevailing rate for similar loans in the area for those unable to attain credit
elsewhere, or three-fourths the prevailing rate for those able to attain credit elsewhere, or three-fourths the prevailing rate for those able to attain credit
elsewhere. elsewhere.
116th Congress
S. 4167—Small Business Disaster Loan Enhancement Act of 2020
Would have authorized and provided funding for additional disaster loans and
Would have authorized and provided funding for additional disaster loans and
grants made to
grants made to
smal small businesses by the businesses by the
Smal Small Business Administration (SBA) and Business Administration (SBA) and
temporarily limits the interest rate for certain economic injury disaster loans. temporarily limits the interest rate for certain economic injury disaster loans.
H.R. 6344—Expediting the EIDL Program Act of 2020
Would have established a maximum interest rate on a disaster loan based on an
Would have established a maximum interest rate on a disaster loan based on an
applicant’s ability to obtain credit elsewhere, and expanded the qualifying events
applicant’s ability to obtain credit elsewhere, and expanded the qualifying events
for which a disaster loan may be awarded to include emergencies involving for which a disaster loan may be awarded to include emergencies involving
federal primary responsibility. federal primary responsibility.
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H.R. 6324—Too Small to Fail Act
Would have required the SBA to waive the requirement that
Would have required the SBA to waive the requirement that
smal small businesses businesses
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic be unable to find credit elsewhere in order
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic be unable to find credit elsewhere in order
to be eligibleto be eligible
for SBA loans, and required the SBA to provide loans made in for SBA loans, and required the SBA to provide loans made in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic at no interest rate. In addition, would have response to the COVID-19 pandemic at no interest rate. In addition, would have
authorized the SBA to temporarily defer payments on any SBA loan for a authorized the SBA to temporarily defer payments on any SBA loan for a
smal small business that is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. business that is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
H.R. 6396—Responsible Relief for Americans Act
Would have required the SBA to temporarily pay the principal, interest, and any
Would have required the SBA to temporarily pay the principal, interest, and any
associated fees that are owed on certain SBA loans.
associated fees that are owed on certain SBA loans.
117th Congress
H.R. 399—Border Business COVID–19 Rescue Act
Would require the SBA
Would require the SBA
to make loans of up to $500,000 to border businesses, to make loans of up to $500,000 to border businesses,
with a zero percent interest rate. Would require loan recipients to use the funds to
with a zero percent interest rate. Would require loan recipients to use the funds to
mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their business. mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their business.
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Appendix C. Why Does SBA Issue Disaster Loans
Instead of FEMA?
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed Executive Order 12127. The order merged many of the In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed Executive Order 12127. The order merged many of the
disaster-related responsibilities of separate federal agencies into the Federal Emergency disaster-related responsibilities of separate federal agencies into the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). During FEMA’s formation, it was determined that SBA would Management Agency (FEMA). During FEMA’s formation, it was determined that SBA would
continue to provide disaster loans through the Disaster Loan Program rather than transfer that continue to provide disaster loans through the Disaster Loan Program rather than transfer that
function to FEMA. At the 1978 hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government function to FEMA. At the 1978 hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, Chairman Jack Brooks questioned the rationale for keeping the loan program outside Operations, Chairman Jack Brooks questioned the rationale for keeping the loan program outside
of FEMA.70 According to James T. McIntyre, Director, Office of Management and Budget of FEMA.70 According to James T. McIntyre, Director, Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the rationale was as follows: (OMB), the rationale was as follows:
[O]ne
[O]ne
of the fundamental principles underlying this proposal is that whenever possible emergency responsibilities should be an extension of the regular missions of of the fundamental principles underlying this proposal is that whenever possible emergency responsibilities should be an extension of the regular missions of federal federal
agencies. I believe the Congress also subscribed to this principle in considering disaster agencies. I believe the Congress also subscribed to this principle in considering disaster
legislationlegislation
in the past. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 provides for the direction in the past. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 provides for the direction and and
coordination, in disaster situations, of agencies which have programs which can be applied coordination, in disaster situations, of agencies which have programs which can be applied
to meeting disaster needs. It does not provide that the coordinating agency should exercise to meeting disaster needs. It does not provide that the coordinating agency should exercise
direct operational control.... [I]f the programs ... were incorporated in the new agency we direct operational control.... [I]f the programs ... were incorporated in the new agency we
wouldwould
be required to create duplicate sets of skills and resources.... [S]ince the Small Business Administration administers loan programs other than those just be required to create duplicate sets of skills and resources.... [S]ince the Small Business Administration administers loan programs other than those just for disaster for disaster
victims, both the SBA and the new agency [FEMA] would have to maintain separate staffs victims, both the SBA and the new agency [FEMA] would have to maintain separate staffs
of loan officers and portfolio managers if the disaster loan function were transferred to the of loan officers and portfolio managers if the disaster loan function were transferred to the
new Agency.... [O]ne of our basic purposes for reorganization ... would be thwarted if we new Agency.... [O]ne of our basic purposes for reorganization ... would be thwarted if we
were to have to maintain a duplicate staff function in two or more agencies.71 were to have to maintain a duplicate staff function in two or more agencies.71
McIntyre added, “We believe we have achieved a balance in this new agency [FEMA] between
McIntyre added, “We believe we have achieved a balance in this new agency [FEMA] between
operational activities and planning and coordination functions.” He further stated that “we can operational activities and planning and coordination functions.” He further stated that “we can
provide better service to the disaster victims if oversight of disaster response and recovery provide better service to the disaster victims if oversight of disaster response and recovery
operations is vested in an agency which can adopt a much broader prospective than would be operations is vested in an agency which can adopt a much broader prospective than would be
possible if this agency [FEMA] had operational responsibilities as possible if this agency [FEMA] had operational responsibilities as
wel .”
Additional y, well.”
Additionally, the Stafford Act prohibits recipients of disaster aid from receiving similar types of the Stafford Act prohibits recipients of disaster aid from receiving similar types of
aid from other federal sources and is often cited as a rationale for keeping the entities distinct. aid from other federal sources and is often cited as a rationale for keeping the entities distinct.
Section 312 of the act statesSection 312 of the act states
:
The
The
President, in consultation with the head of each Federal agency administering any program providing financial assistance to persons, business concerns, or other entities suffering losses as a result of a major disaster or emergency, shall assure that no President, in consultation with the head of each Federal agency administering any program providing financial assistance to persons, business concerns, or other entities suffering losses as a result of a major disaster or emergency, shall assure that no such such
person, business concern, or other entity will receive such assistance with respect to any person, business concern, or other entity will receive such assistance with respect to any
part of such loss as to which he has received financial assistance under part of such loss as to which he has received financial assistance under
an yany other program other program
or from insurance or any other source.72or from insurance or any other source.72
70 U.S. Congress, House
70 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security,
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 (Federal Em ergency Managem entEmergency Management Agency), hearing, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., June, hearing, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., June
26 26
and 29, 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 13. and 29, 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 13.
71 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 P.L. 93-288, 15 U.S.C. §5155(a). 72 P.L. 93-288, 15 U.S.C. §5155(a).
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Author Information
Bruce R. Lindsay Bruce R. Lindsay
Jared C. NagelDarryl E. Getter
Specialist in American National Government
Specialist in American National Government
Senior Research Librarian
Darryl E. Getter
Robert Jay Dilger
Specialist in Financial Economics
Senior Specialist in American National GovernmentSpecialist in Financial Economics
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should
n otnot be relied upon for purposes other be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
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