The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Changes from October 26, 2021 to October 27, 2022

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

The Palestinians:
October October ~~26, 2021~~27, 2022
Background and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
oversight—to the ongoing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. oversight—to the ongoing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel.

The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel

agreed with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to exercise limited agreed with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to exercise limited
rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration that rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration that
dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
After the PA’s establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to After the PA’s establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance
and economic development. Since then, Congress has appropriated more than $5 and economic development. Since then, Congress has appropriated more than $5 ~~bil ion~~billion in bilateral in bilateral aid to the aid to the
Palestinians, who rely heavily on external donor assistance. Palestinians, who rely heavily on external donor assistance.
Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented ~~chal enges~~challenges for several Administrations and Congresses. for several Administrations and Congresses.
The United States has The United States has ~~historical y~~historically sought to bolster PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas vis sought to bolster PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas vis -à-vis -à-vis
Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto
control within Gaza, making the security, political, and humanitarian situation there particularly fraught. The control within Gaza, making the security, political, and humanitarian situation there particularly fraught. The
Abbas-led PA Abbas-led PA ~~stil~~ still exercises limited self-rule over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas’s advanced age exercises limited self-rule over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas’s advanced age
(he was born in 1935), observers speculate about who (he was born in 1935), observers speculate about who ~~wil~~ will succeed him and implicationssucceed him and implications of succession for the current situation for the current situation
of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. ~~In April 2021, Abbas controversial y postponed PA legislative and~~
~~presidential elections that had been scheduled for May and July, respectively. Domestic and international criticism~~
~~of corruption and authoritarian practices within the PA have since intensified amid PA authorities ’ repression of~~
~~dissenting voices and public protests.~~
West Bank unrest has intensified in 2022, placing greater attention on U.S.-supported Israel-PA security efforts that many Palestinians criticize. Some domestic and international observers allege that PA leaders engage in corrupt and authoritarian practices to maintain control. Lack of progress toward peace with Israel has led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause more assertively in Lack of progress toward peace with Israel has led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause more assertively in
international fora. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution changed the non-member observer status of international fora. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution changed the non-member observer status of
“Palestine” at the United Nations from an entity to a “state.” Palestinians also have applied international legal “Palestine” at the United Nations from an entity to a “state.” Palestinians also have applied international legal
pressure on Israel. The Palestinians acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in pressure on Israel. The Palestinians acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
April 2015, and the ICC opened an investigation in March 2021 that could conceivably bring charges against April 2015, and the ICC opened an investigation in March 2021 that could conceivably bring charges against
Israeli, Palestinian, or other individualsIsraeli, Palestinian, or other individuals ~~for al eged~~ for alleged war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza. war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza.
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy shifted in a direction that more explicitly Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy shifted in a direction that more explicitly favored Israel over the favored Israel over the
Palestinians. Actions of note included suspending U.S. aid for the Palestinians, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s Palestinians. Actions of note included suspending U.S. aid for the Palestinians, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital and opening an embassy there, and affording more favorable treatment to Israeli settlements in the West capital and opening an embassy there, and affording more favorable treatment to Israeli settlements in the West
Bank. In late 2020, the Administration brokered agreements to help Israel move toward more formal relations Bank. In late 2020, the Administration brokered agreements to help Israel move toward more formal relations
with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. PLO/PA leaders voiced opposition to the with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. PLO/PA leaders voiced opposition to the
agreements insofar as they signaled a change to Arab states’ previous stance that Israel should address Palestinian agreements insofar as they signaled a change to Arab states’ previous stance that Israel should address Palestinian
negotiating demands as a precondition to improved ties. negotiating demands as a precondition to improved ties.
Biden Administration officials have taken steps to improve U.S.-Palestinian ties, including through the resumption Biden Administration officials have taken steps to improve U.S.-Palestinian ties, including through the resumption
of aid and a renewed emphasis on support for an eventual two-state solution. The Administration and Congress of aid and a renewed emphasis on support for an eventual two-state solution. The Administration and Congress
face a number of key issues, including (1) the future of aid; (2) face a number of key issues, including (1) the future of aid; (2) ~~the feasibility of reopening certain diplomatic~~
~~offices in Jerusalem and Washington, DC; (3) reconstruction in Gaza following a May 2021 Israel-Hamas~~
~~conflict; (4) controversies over Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and (5) how to respond to Palestinian actions~~
~~in international fora (including the ICC)~~security and economic stability in the different contexts of the West Bank and Gaza; and (3) how to approach diplomacy, respond to Palestinian actions in international fora, and address Palestinian calls for reopening diplomatic offices in Jerusalem and Washington, DC. The trajectory of some of these issues may depend on a significant . The trajectory of some of these issues may depend on a significant
PLO/PA change to welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals PLO/PA change to welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals ~~al egedly~~allegedly involved in acts of terrorism. involved in acts of terrorism.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page link to page 5 link to page 4042 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction
Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during
the 1990s, Congress has played a significant role in shaping U.S. policymaking toward the the 1990s, Congress has played a significant role in shaping U.S. policymaking toward the
Palestinians. As successive Administrations have sought to facilitate a negotiated solution to the Palestinians. As successive Administrations have sought to facilitate a negotiated solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and increase or decrease Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and increase or decrease
assistance to Palestinians, congressional action has often assistance to Palestinians, congressional action has often ~~influenced executive branch decisions.~~
defined or influenced U.S. policy. After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has appropriated After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has appropriated
more than $5 more than $5 ~~bil ion~~ billion in bilateralin bilateral aid to the Palestinians, while placing a number of restrictions and aid to the Palestinians, while placing a number of restrictions and
other conditions on certain types of aid. For other conditions on certain types of aid. For ~~background information, see~~ historical background, see archived CRS Report RS22967, CRS Report RS22967,
U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
Palestinian Overview and National Aspirations
The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. An estimated West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. An estimated
5.5.~~2 mil ion~~ 35 million Palestinians (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Palestinians (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and East Jerusalem (seand East Jerusalem (see Table 1).1 Of these, about 2.1 Of these, about 2.~~2 mil ion~~3 million are registered as refugees in their are registered as refugees in their
own right or as descendants of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition, own right or as descendants of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition,
approximately approximately ~~635,000~~659,100 Jewish Israeli citizens live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.2 Of the Jewish Israeli citizens live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.2 Of the
more than 6 more than 6 ~~mil ion~~ million diaspora Palestinians livingdiaspora Palestinians living outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, most outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, most
are in Arab states—with more than 3 are in Arab states—with more than 3 ~~mil ion~~million registered as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and registered as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria.3 For more information on Palestinian refugees, Syria.3 For more information on Palestinian refugees, seesee Appendix A.
Table 1. Basic Facts for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Statistic
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Combined
Population Population
3. 3.~~1 mil ion~~
~~2.1 mil ion~~
~~5.2 mil ion~~19 million 2.16 million 5.35 million
Refugees Refugees
~~828~~872,000 ,000
1, 1,~~386~~477,000 ,000
2, 2,~~214~~349,000 ,000
Median age Median age
~~21.9 (2019~~(2020 est.) est.)
~~18.0 (2020 est.)~~
21.9 18.0 - -
Literacy rate ( Literacy rate (~~2018~~2020 est.) est.)
- -
- -
97. 97.25% %
Population growth rate Population growth rate
1.7% 1.7%
2.0% 2.0%
- -
Real GDP growth rate Real GDP growth rate
- -
- -
~~-11.5% (2020 est.)~~

~~2.9% (2021 proj.)~~
~~GDP per capita at PPP~~
-
-
~~$5,316 (2020 est.)~~

~~$5,742 (2021 proj.)~~
~~Unemployment rate~~
~~15.0% (2020 est.)~~
~~43.0% (2020 est.)~~
~~25.9% (2020 est.)~~

~~24.9% (2021 proj.)~~
4.0% GDP per capita at PPP - - $5,348 Unemployment rate 13.8% 44.1% 25.7% Export partners Export partners
- -
- -
Israel 84. Israel 84.26%, %,
( (~~2017~~2021 est.) est.)
~~Arab states 16.6%~~

Jordan 5.1%, United Arab Emirates 1.6% 1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) projections for 2021. PCBS estimated as of 2017 that an additional projections for 2021. PCBS estimated as of 2017 that an additional
1.47 million Palestinians were Arab citizens of Israel. 1.47 million Palestinians were Arab citizens of Israel.
2 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, West Bank. Figures 2 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, West Bank. Figures ~~for West Bank~~ as of 2018, and East Jerusalem as of as of 2018, and East Jerusalem as of
2017. 2017.
3 See3 See the portal of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugeesthe portal of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) at in the Near East (UNRWA) at
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1 1

link to page link to page 4648 link to page link to page 4042 link to page link to page 4951 link to page link to page 4027 link to page link to page 4032 link to page link to page 4942 link to page 42 link to page 51 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Statistic
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Combined
Import partners Import partners
Israel Israel ~~58.1%,~~
~~(2017 est.)~~
-
-
~~European Union~~
~~12.4%, Arab States~~
~~6.2~~56.2%, Turkey - - (2021 est.) 10.2%, Jordan 2.9% %
Sources: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Central Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Central ~~Intel igence~~ Intelligence Agency WorldAgency World Factbook, WorldFactbook, World Bank, Bank,
Economist Economist ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence Unit, International Monetary Fund World Unit, International Monetary Fund World Outlook Database, U.N. Relief and Works Outlook Database, U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Notes: Figures are Figures are ~~2021~~2022 estimates estimates or projections unless otherwiseor projections unless otherwise noted. Population figures exclude Israeli noted. Population figures exclude Israeli
settlers. settlers.
Since the early 20th century, the dominant Palestinian national goal Since the early 20th century, the dominant Palestinian national goal has been to establish an has been to establish an
independent state in historic Palestine (the area covered by the British Mandate until the British independent state in historic Palestine (the area covered by the British Mandate until the British
withdrawal in 1948). Over time, Palestinians have debated among themselves, with Israelis, and withdrawal in 1948). Over time, Palestinians have debated among themselves, with Israelis, and
with others over the nature and extent of such a state and how to achieve it. For more historical with others over the nature and extent of such a state and how to achieve it. For more historical
background, background, seesee Appendix B and CRS Report RL33476, and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Jim Zanotti. by Jim Zanotti.
Today, Fatah and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) are the largest Palestinian Today, Fatah and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) are the largest Palestinian
political movements (political movements (seesee Appendix A for profiles of both groups).4 The positions that their for profiles of both groups).4 The positions that their
leaders express reflect two basic cleavages in Palestinian society: leaders express reflect two basic cleavages in Palestinian society:
1. Between those (including many members of Fatah, 1. Between those (including many members of Fatah, ~~including~~such as its leader Mahmoud its leader Mahmoud
Abbas) who seek to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza by nonviolent Abbas) who seek to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza by nonviolent
means—negotiations, international diplomacy, civil disobedience—and those means—negotiations, international diplomacy, civil disobedience—and those
(including Hamas) who insist on maintaining violence against Israel as an (including Hamas) who insist on maintaining violence against Israel as an
option;5 and option;5 and
2. Between those (Fatah) who favor a secular model of governance and those 2. Between those (Fatah) who favor a secular model of governance and those
(Hamas) who (Hamas) who ~~cal~~ call for a society governed more by Islamic norms. for a society governed more by Islamic norms.
The differences between these two factions are reflected in Palestinian governance (see The differences between these two factions are reflected in Palestinian governance (see
Appendix C). . Since Hamas forcibly seized control of Gaza in 2007, it has exercised de facto rule Since Hamas forcibly seized control of Gaza in 2007, it has exercised de facto rule
there, while Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbasthere, while Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas~~—elected~~ has headed the PA government based in the West Bank since his election as president of the Palestinian Authority as president of the Palestinian Authority
~~(PA) in 2005—has headed the PA government based in the West Bank.~~
(PA) in 2005. Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who
speaks for the Palestinians both speaks for the Palestinians both ~~domestical y and international y~~domestically and internationally. In the West Bank, the PA . In the West Bank, the PA
exercises limited self-rule in specified urban areas (Areas A and B, as identified in a 1995 Israel-exercises limited self-rule in specified urban areas (Areas A and B, as identified in a 1995 Israel-
PLO agreement) where Israel maintains overarching control.6 Both territories face socioeconomic PLO agreement) where Israel maintains overarching control.6 Both territories face socioeconomic
~~chal enges based on~~challenges due to Israeli military measures such as property confiscation and demolition, Israeli military measures such as property confiscation and demolition,

~~4 Hamas has been designated a Foreign T errorist Organization (FT O), a Specially Designated T errorist (SDT ), and a~~
~~Specially Designated Global T errorist (SDGT ) by the U.S. government.~~
5 See Appendix A ~~for a discussion~~ Israeli movement and access restrictions, political uncertainty, longtime Palestinian dependence on foreign aid, and domestic governance problems. Gaza’s economic challenges and overall isolation are more acute (see “PA West Bank Leadership Concerns,” “Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas, 4 Hamas has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT), and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the U.S. government. 5 See Appendix A for a discussion of different schools of thought within Fatah about maintaining violence against of different schools of thought within Fatah about maintaining violence against
Israel as an option. Israel as an option.
6 6 ~~T he~~The PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Various Israel-PLO agreements PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Various Israel-PLO agreements
duringduring the Oslo process in the 1990s created the PA as the organ of governance for limited Palestinian selfthe Oslo process in the 1990s created the PA as the organ of governance for limited Palestinian self -rule in the -rule in the
West Bank andWest Bank and Gaza Strip. Officially, the PLO represents the Palestinian national movement in international bodies, Gaza Strip. Officially, the PLO represents the Palestinian national movement in international bodies,
includingincluding the United Nations, often identified as “the United Nations, often identified as “ Palestine” or “Palestine” or “ State of Palestine.” Because Mahmoud AbbasState of Palestine.” Because Mahmoud Abbas is both is both
PLO chairman and PA president, U.S.PLO chairman and PA president, U.S. officials and other international actors sometimes conflate his roles. For more officials and other international actors sometimes conflate his roles. For more
information on the two entities, information on the two entities, see Appe ndix A, Appe ndix C ,see Appendix A, Appendix C, and the European Council on Foreign Relations’ online and the European Council on Foreign Relations’ online
resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions. resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2 2

link to page link to page 2032 link to page link to page 2251 link to page link to page 4954 link to page link to page 527 link to page 8 link to page link to page 8 link to page ~~9 link to page 9~~ 8 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

~~Israeli movement and access restrictions, political uncertainty, longtime Palestinian dependence~~
~~on foreign aid, and domestic governance problems—with Gaza’s economic chal enges and~~
~~overal isolation more acute (see “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”~~
~~“PA West Bank Leadership~~Conflict, and Humanitarian Concerns,”” Appendix C, and and Appendix D)~~. Se~~e. See Figure 1 andand Figure
~~2 for maps of both territories.~~
~~Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the West Bank and Gaza~~
~~With its global reach, COVID-19 has significantly affected the West Bank and Gaza. As of October 7, the World~~
~~Health Organization identifies 441,882 confirmed cases and 4,465 deaths since March 2020, with Gaza accounting~~
~~for about 75% of active cases. Over 1,439,000 people have been vaccinated, representing around 48% of the target~~
~~population (age 16 and older), with approximately four-fifths of those people ful y vaccinated.7~~
~~During early 2021, disparities between Israeli residents with speedy access to vaccines and West Bank/Gaza~~
~~residents with little or no access led PA officials and some observers—including the World Bank—to cal for~~
~~greater efforts by Israel to share vaccines with Palestinians, and to assist the PA in procuring additional vaccines~~
~~more expeditiously.8 Additional y, some observers criticized PA officials for al egedly directing vaccines to “the~~
~~senior ranks of the governing party, al ies in the media and even to family members of top dignitaries.”9 Israel~~
~~agreed in June to advance up to 1.4 mil ion doses to the PA, but the PA canceled the deal amid popular concern~~
~~about the initial shipment approaching its expiration date.10 By the end of the summer, the PA had received~~
~~sufficient vaccine doses to inoculate most eligible West Bank/Gaza residents, but some vaccine hesitancy has been~~
~~reported.11~~

~~7 T he source for the data in this paragraph is World Health Organization (occupied Palestinian territory), “Coronavirus~~
~~disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report 82,” October 7, 2021.~~
~~8 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, pp. 26-27. For~~
~~differing views on Israel’s responsibility for assisting Palestinians with vaccines, see Eyal Benvenisti, “ Israel is Legally~~
~~Obligated to Ensure the Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Are Vaccinated,” Just Security, January 7, 2021;~~
~~Alan Baker, “ Israel, the Palestinians, and the COVID-19 Vaccines: T he New Blood-Libel,” Jerusalem Center for~~
~~Public Affairs, January 14, 2021.~~
~~9 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines. Many Don't Want to T ake Them ,” New York Times, August 30,~~
~~2021.~~
~~10 Maayan Lubell, “ Israel says COVID-19 vaccines rejected by Palestinians were safe,” Reuters, June 19, 2021.~~
~~11 Rasgon, “Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

3

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

2 for maps of both territories. Figure 1. Map of West Bank

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsU.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory,occupied Palestinian territory, 2018, 2018,
adapted by CRS. adapted by CRS.
Note: Al All boundaries and depictions are approximate. boundaries and depictions are approximate.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

43

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 2. Map of Gaza Strip

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory,occupied Palestinian territory, 2020. 2020.
Note: Al All boundaries and depictions are approximate. boundaries and depictions are approximate.
International diplomacy aimed at resolving Israeli-Palestinian disputes and advancing Palestinian International diplomacy aimed at resolving Israeli-Palestinian disputes and advancing Palestinian
national goals has national goals has ~~stal ed~~stalled, with no direct Israel-PLO negotiations since 2014. , with no direct Israel-PLO negotiations since 2014. ~~Palestinians~~Palestinian leaders
routinely assert that U.S. policy reflects a pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to PLO routinely assert that U.S. policy reflects a pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to PLO
Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s domestic political rivalry with Hamas.Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s domestic political rivalry with Hamas.127 In light In light
of the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, Arab leaders with a range of domestic and other regional of the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, Arab leaders with a range of domestic and other regional
concerns have focused less on championing the Palestinian cause. Many have built or concerns have focused less on championing the Palestinian cause. Many have built or
strengthened informal ties with Israel based on common concerns regarding Iran and other strengthened informal ties with Israel based on common concerns regarding Iran and other
perceived regional threats. In 2020, four countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, perceived regional threats. In 2020, four countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain,
Sudan, and Morocco—agreed to take steps toward formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Their Sudan, and Morocco—agreed to take steps toward formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Their
agreements with Israel are known as the Abraham Accords.agreements with Israel are known as the Abraham Accords.138
Citing the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel, Abbas and other PLO/PA leaders have Citing the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel, Abbas and other PLO/PA leaders have
sought support for Palestinian national aspirations and grievances in the United Nations and other sought support for Palestinian national aspirations and grievances in the United Nations and other
international fora. Some Palestinians advocate the idea of a binationalinternational fora. Some Palestinians advocate the idea of a binational or one-state idea as an or one-state idea as an

~~12 “FULL T EXT~~ 7 “President Abbas at UNGA: Our confidence in achieving peace based on justice and international law is waning,” WAFA, September 23, 2022; “FULL TEXT: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ 2018 UN General Assembly2018 UN General Assembly Speech,” haaretz.com, Speech,” haaretz.com,
September 27, 2018. September 27, 2018.
13 8 For more information, see CRS For more information, see CRS Report R44245, Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

54

link to page link to page 109

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

alternative to a negotiated two-state solution with Israel ( alternative to a negotiated two-state solution with Israel (seesee Figure 3). In a September 2021 ). In a September 2021
speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Abbas said: speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Abbas said:
I warn that I warn that ~~undermining the~~ undermining the two-Statetwo-State solution based on internationalsolution based on international law andlaw and UN UN
resolutions will open the way for other alternatives imposed on us by the situation on the resolutions will open the way for other alternatives imposed on us by the situation on the
ground as a result of the continuation of the Israeli occupation of our State…. ground as a result of the continuation of the Israeli occupation of our State….
If the Israeli occupation authorities continue to entrench the reality of one apartheid state If the Israeli occupation authorities continue to entrench the reality of one apartheid state
as is happening today, our Palestinian people and the entire world will not tolerate such a as is happening today, our Palestinian people and the entire world will not tolerate such a
situation and circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political situation and circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political
rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one State.rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one State.149
Figure 3. Public Opinion Polling: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying CRS graphic, based on underlying ~~pol ing~~polling data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but also to the United States and many other countries and actors around the world for neighbors, but also to the United States and many other countries and actors around the world for
a variety of religious, cultural, and politicala variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. For at least 75 years, the issue has been one reasons. For at least 75 years, the issue has been one
of the most provocative in the international arena. of the most provocative in the international arena.
Key U.S. Policy Considerations and Issues
Major U.S. policy priorities with the Palestinians over successive Administrations have included Major U.S. policy priorities with the Palestinians over successive Administrations have included
facilitating or seeking a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process, helping the West Bank-based PA facilitating or seeking a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process, helping the West Bank-based PA
counter Hamas and other terrorist groups, and using aid to encourage Palestinian governance counter Hamas and other terrorist groups, and using aid to encourage Palestinian governance
reform and economic development. reform and economic development.
During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions that favored During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions that favored
Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and also suspended aid to the Palestinians, as set forth Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and also suspended aid to the Palestinians, as set forth
below.below.
Selected Trump Administration Policy Changes on Israeli-Palestinian Issues
December December 2017 2017
President Trump recognizes President Trump recognizes ~~Jerusalem~~ Jerusalem as Israel’sas Israel’s capital, prompting the PLO/PA capital, prompting the PLO/PA
to cut off high-level diplomaticto cut off high-level diplomatic relations with the United States. relations with the United States.
May 2018 May 2018
The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem. The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem.

~~14 T ranscript~~ 9 Transcript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021) available at of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021) available at
https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210924/7gIp44D6mxWV/8xz66G7sjKRg_en.pdfhttps://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210924/7gIp44D6mxWV/8xz66G7sjKRg_en.pdf . .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

65

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

August 2018 August 2018
The Administration The Administration ends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Reliefends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
September September 2018 2018
The Administration The Administration ~~reprograms~~ reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and
Gaza to other locations,Gaza to other locations, and announces the closureand announces the closure of the PLO office in of the PLO office in
Washington, DC. Washington, DC.
January 2019 January 2019
As a result of the Anti-Terrorism As a result of the Anti-Terrorism ~~Clarification~~ Clarification Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the
AdministrationAdministration ends ends al all bilateral U.S.bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians. aid to the Palestinians.
March 2019 March 2019
The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic an independent diplomatic
missionmission to the Palestinians—isto the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U.S. subsumed under the authority of the U.S.
embassy to Israel.embassy to Israel. President Trump recognizesPresident Trump recognizes ~~Israeli~~ Israeli sovereignty claimssovereignty claims in the in the
Golan Heights. Golan Heights.
November November 2019 2019
Then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration Then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration disagrees disagrees
with a 1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeliwith a 1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli settlements in settlements in
the West Bank are inconsistent with international law. the West Bank are inconsistent with international law.
November November 2020 2020
Secretary Pompeo announces that products imported Secretary Pompeo announces that products imported to the United States from to the United States from
Area C of the WestArea C of the West Bank (where IsraeliBank (where Israeli settlements and somesettlements and some Palestinian Palestinian
~~residential~~ residential areas are located) are to be marked as coming fromareas are located) are to be marked as coming from Israel rather Israel rather
than the West Bank. than the West Bank.

The Abraham Accords signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—as expressed in The Abraham Accords signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—as expressed in
the 2002 Arab Peace the 2002 Arab Peace ~~Initiative15~~Initiative10—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a —that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a
precondition for improved ties.precondition for improved ties.1611 Although Israel reportedly agreed to suspend plans to annex part Although Israel reportedly agreed to suspend plans to annex part
of the West Bank as part of the UAE deal,of the West Bank as part of the UAE deal,1712 PLO/PA officials denounced the deal as an PLO/PA officials denounced the deal as an
abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, claiming that the UAEabandonment of the Palestinian national cause, claiming that the UAE had acquiesced to a West had acquiesced to a West
Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.”Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.”1813
Biden Administration Policies
The Biden Administration has made efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, including by The Biden Administration has made efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, including by
revisiting some Trump-era actions. U.S. officials have resumed some types of aid to the revisiting some Trump-era actions. U.S. officials have resumed some types of aid to the
Palestinians, along with diplomatic engagement with Palestinian leaders. In Palestinians, along with diplomatic engagement with Palestinian leaders. In ~~a March 10, 2021,~~
~~hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated~~
~~that the United States has an obligation to seek to advance the prospects for a two-state solution,~~
~~saying that it “is ultimately the only way that Israel wil truly be secure as a Jewish and~~
~~democratic state and the Palestinians wil have the state to which they are entitled.”19~~

~~15 T he~~his September 2022 address to the U.N. General Assembly, President Biden said: And we will continue to advocate for lasting negotiating peace between the Jewish and democratic state of Israel and the Palestinian people. The United States is committed to Israel’s security, full stop. And a negotiated two-state solution remains, in our view, the best way to ensure Israel’s security and prosperity for the future and give the Palestinians 10 The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdrawto withdraw fully from the fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem,territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and and
provide for the “provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
AssemblyAssembly Resolution 194.” Resolution 194.” ~~T he~~The initiative was proposed by Saudi initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 --
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. ~~T he~~The text of the initiative is available at text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
1611 Annelle Sheline, Annelle Sheline, ~~“ T rump~~ “Trump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East,” East,” Politico Magazine, August, August 14, 2020. 14, 2020.
1712 Jacob Magid, Jacob Magid, “ “US assuredUS assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, ~~T oI~~ToI told,” told,” Times of Israel, ,
September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, seeSeptember 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see ~~CRS~~ archived CRS Report R46433, Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of
~~West~~ West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
1813 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
~~19 T ext of hearing transcript available at~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

76

link to page link to page ~~20 link to page 20 link to page 20~~12 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations the state which—to which they are entitled—both sides to fully respect the equal rights of their citizens; both people enjoying equal measure of freedom and dignity.14 During his visit to the West Bank in July 2022, President Biden stated that he envisioned a two-state solution being organized along the 1967 lines (the armistice lines in place between Israel and the West Bank/Gaza before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war), with “mutually agreed-to swaps.”15 His Administration has not used the Trump Administration’s 2020 proposed peace plan as a reference point. Regarding the U.S. position on Jerusalem, the Administration has said that “our embassy will remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel’s capital. The ultimate status of Jerusalem is a final status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in the context of direct negotiations.”16 In his July 2022 visit, President Biden said: Jerusalem is central to the national visions of both Palestinians and Israelis—to your histories, to your faiths, to your futures. Jerusalem must be a city for all its people—its holy sites preserving the status quo, with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continuing to serve as custodian.17 The following are key issues for the Biden Administration and Congress. U.S. Aid The Biden Administration has resumed some economic development, security, and humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Regarding the U.S. position on Jerusalem, a spokesperson for President Biden confirmed in~~
~~February 2021 that “our embassy wil remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel’s~~
~~capital. The ultimate status of Jerusalem is a final status issue which wil need to be resolved by~~
~~the parties in the context of direct negotiations.”20~~
~~May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict~~
~~From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants led by Hamas.21~~
~~The fol owing were key aspects of the conflict:~~

Overview. Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from Gaza into central Israel. The
~~Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel~~
~~conducted sustained air and artil ery strikes in Gaza. Additional y, intercommunal protests and violence took~~
~~place within Israel and Jerusalem—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem,~~
~~Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.~~

Political context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and trajectory of conflict included
~~tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic~~
~~political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of PA elections).~~

Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel (including 2 Thai nationals) and
~~more than 250 people in Gaza (including more than 60 children) were kil ed.22 Amid unrest in the West Bank~~
~~during that same timeframe (May 10-21), a U.N. source estimates that Israeli security forces kil ed 27~~
~~Palestinians.23~~
~~In the conflict’s aftermath, President Biden committed to “working with the United Nations and other~~
~~international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the~~
~~people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that does not permit~~
~~Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”24 With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to international y-~~
~~supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009,~~
~~2012, and 2014 (see “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”).25 Because of the PA’s inability~~
~~to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction.~~
~~The following are key issues for the Biden Administration and Congress.~~
~~U.S. Aid~~
~~The Biden Administration has resumed some economic development, security, and humanitarian~~
~~aid for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see also~~ ~~“Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-~~
~~Conflict Reconstruction~~”). As noted earlier, in 2019 the Trump Administration suspended . As noted earlier, in 2019 the Trump Administration suspended al all U.S. U.S.
aid to the Palestinians,aid to the Palestinians,2618 after a number of measures by the after a number of measures by the Administration and Congress in 2018 to halt or limit various types of aid.19 Some of these measures reflected Trump Administration policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel Palestinian leaders to resume dialogue with U.S. officials and accept U.S. and Israeli negotiating demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141, and discussed further below), attracted bipartisan support. Under the Biden Administration, total bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians has approached pre-Trump Administration levels (see Figure 4), though the TFA’s enactment in 2018 has limited the allocation of funding for certain purposes due to restrictions against aid directly benefitting the PA. 14 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2022. 15 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. 16 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. 17 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 18 For more information on this development and subsequent ~~Administration and Congress in 2018~~

~~https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/475423704?3&deliveryId=72574526&uid=congressionaltranscripts-6155787.~~
~~20 Niels Lesniewski, “ White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.~~
~~21 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza.~~
~~22 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “ Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,”~~ ~~Los~~
~~Angeles Tim es, May 23, 2021; “ 2 T hai workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombards southern Israel,”~~
Tim es of Israel, May 18, 2021.
~~23 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian T erritory, “ West Bank: Escalation~~
~~of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021.~~
~~24 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East ,” May 20, 2021.~~
~~25 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a T ough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.~~
~~26 For more information on this development and subsequent~~ legislative amendments that facilitated renewed legislative amendments that facilitated renewed
congressional appropriations of bilateral aid for the West Bank and Gazacongressional appropriations of bilateral aid for the West Bank and Gaza starting in FY2020, see starting in FY2020, see ~~CRS~~ archived CRS Report R46274, Report R46274,
The Palestinians and ~~Am endm ents~~Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction , by Jim Zanotti and , by Jim Zanotti and
~~Jennifer K. Elsea.~~
Jennifer K. Elsea. 19 Archived CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

8

~~link to page 14~~ 7 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2023 Request Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS. Notes: All amounts are approximate and reflect appropriations for each fiscal year. Some amounts have been appropriated but not obligated. Amounts for FY2023 have been requested but not appropriated. NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations. In its FY2023 congressional budget justification, the State Department outlined the following as one of five strategic goals for U.S. foreign aid policy in the Middle East and North Africa region: Achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians is a long-standing U.S. national security goal. The United States seeks to advance equal measures of freedom, security, and prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians alike and work toward a negotiated two-state solution in which Israel lives in peace and security alongside a viable Palestinian state…. U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza creates sustainable opportunities for market-oriented growth, strengthens accountability and transparency in governance through civil society development, and improves the quality of life for the Palestinian people.20~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~to halt or limit various types of aid.27 Some of these measures reflected Trump Administration~~
~~policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel Palestinian leaders to resume dialogue with U.S.~~
~~officials and accept U.S. and Israeli negotiating demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor~~
~~Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141, and discussed further~~
~~below), attracted bipartisan support.~~
~~In its FY2022 congressional budget justification, the State Department said:~~
~~U.S. foreign assistance for the West Bank and Gaza serves important U.S. interests,~~
~~including providing critical relief to those in great need and fostering economic~~
~~development and the conditions needed for a sustainable two-state solution.28~~   
Past Administrations have used similar rationales to justify U.S. aid to the Palestinians. After the Past Administrations have used similar rationales to justify U.S. aid to the Palestinians. After the
peace process began between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, U.S. bilateral aid to the peace process began between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, U.S. bilateral aid to the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported U.S. efforts to incline the newly Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported U.S. efforts to incline the newly
established PA toward better governance and economic development, and away from violence established PA toward better governance and economic development, and away from violence
against Israel. Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to aid to the Palestinians in against Israel. Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to aid to the Palestinians in
annual appropriations language.annual appropriations language.29
~~For background information~~21 For historical background on U.S. aid to the Palestinians, see on U.S. aid to the Palestinians, see archived CRS Report RS22967, CRS Report RS22967, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
~~Bilateral Economic and Security Assistance~~
~~Nearly al bilateral aid appropriated by Congress for the Palestinians comes from the following~~
~~accounts (see Figure 4):~~
~~ Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid is the main channel for economic~~
~~development and humanitarian assistance through NGO implementing partners in~~
~~the West Bank and Gaza. The FY2022 congressional budget justification reads:~~
~~“Economic and humanitarian assistance programs improve the lives of mil ions~~
~~of Palestinians by providing immediate relief and advancing development across~~
~~sectors such as health, appropriate infrastructure, economic growth, and civil~~
~~society.”30~~
~~ International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding~~
~~goes toward nonlethal assistance programs that the United States started for the~~
~~PA’s security forces and justice sector in the West Bank in 2008. According to the~~
~~FY2022 congressional budget justification: “Security assistance supports the~~
~~PA’s efforts to build professional and effective security and criminal justice~~
~~institutions that maintain security and stability in the West Bank, uphold the rule~~
~~of law, and contribute directly to regional security.”31~~

~~27 CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~28 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254.~~
~~29 See, for example, sections 7037-7040, and 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).~~
~~30 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254.~~
~~31 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 308.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~link to page 15~~

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2022~~

Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS.
Notes: Al amounts are approximate. Some amounts (including al amounts for FY2021) have been appropriated
~~but not obligated. Amounts for FY2022 have been requested but not appropriated. NADR = Nonproliferation,~~
~~Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law~~
~~Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations.~~
~~The Biden Administration ended the two-year moratorium on bilateral aid to the Palestinians by~~
~~notifying Congress (in March and April 2021, respectively) of its intent to obligate $75 mil ion in~~
~~FY2020 ESF and $40 mil ion in INCLE (about $37 mil ion from FY2016 appropriations and $3~~
~~mil ion from FY2017). According to a June 15, 2021, letter from Senate Foreign Relations~~
~~Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member James Risch to Representative Jamie Raskin, Ranking~~
~~Member Risch and some other Members placed an informal congressional hold on a portion of~~
~~the FY2020 ESF because of potential y differing views between the Members and the~~
~~Administration about whether the funds would directly benefit the PA.32 As mentioned below, the~~
~~Taylor Force Act (Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141) prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA~~
~~unless Palestinian leaders curtail domestical y popular payments that arguably incentivize acts of~~
~~terror. In September 2021, a media report said that Ranking Member Risch released the hold after~~
~~the Biden Administration real ocated $20 mil ion slated for infrastructure projects toward food~~
~~assistance (see Table 2).33~~

~~32 See the text of the letter at https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210615-TO-House-of-~~
~~Representatives-Jamie-Raskin-Response-to-Israel-Gaza-Letter-1.pdf.~~
~~33 Jacob Magid, “ T op Republican releases remaining Palestinian aid he held up for months,” Times of Israel, September~~
~~23, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~link to page 16~~ Taylor Force Act (TFA) and PLO/PA Payments “for Acts of Terrorism” The Biden Administration has said that any provision of aid to the Palestinians will comply with the TFA. The TFA seeks to discourage certain PLO/PA payments “for acts of terrorism” by prohibiting most Economic Support Fund aid (ESF) that “directly benefits” the PA. The TFA does not further define what constitutes a direct benefit. 20 State Department, FY2023 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 23. 21 See, for example, Sections 7037-7040, and 7041(l) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103). Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 42 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more information on violence and terrorism by Palestinians, see Appendix A. Palestinian Payments for “Martyrs” and Prisoners The Palestinian practice of compensating families who lost a member (combatant or civilian) in connection with Israeli-Palestinian violence reportedly dates back to the 1960s.22 Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners or decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second intifada [uprising] of 2000 to 2005.”23 Various PA laws and decrees since 2004 have established parameters for payments.24 U.S. lawmakers and executive branch officials have condemned the practice to the extent it might incentivize violence, focusing particular criticism on an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levels of compensation for prisoners who receive longer sentences.25 As mentioned above, the TFA prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA, with specific exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network (EJHN), and a certain amount for wastewater projects and vaccination programs. Thus, U.S. aid for economic development and humanitarian purposes either is required to fit under those exceptions, or be deemed by an Administration not to directly benefit the PA. The Biden Administration modified its spending plan for FY2020 ESF after some Members of Congress differed with the Administration on whether some items in the initial plan would directly benefit the PA. In September 2021, a media report said that Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member Jim Risch released an informal congressional hold on the ESF after the Administration reallocated $20 million slated for infrastructure projects toward food assistance.26 An Administration can only lift the TFA’s restrictions if it certifies that the PLO/PA has ended or significantly changed the payments in question in such a way that they do not incentivize acts of terrorism, and also certifies that the PLO/PA is taking additional steps to oppose violence against Israelis and Americans. Reportedly, PLO/PA efforts to consider moving toward a more needs-based prisoner payments system, rather than one tied to the severity of prisoners’ sentences, have encountered domestic opposition.27 In June 2021, a public opinion poll found that 70% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza opposed significant changes to the PLO/PA payments.28 22 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy Theory’ That Proved True—but Also More Complicated,” theatlantic.com, April 27, 2018. 23 Eli Lake, “The Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016. 24 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, at http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-intentions/. 25 See, for example, Corker Opening Statement at Hearing on Taylor Force Act, July 12, 2017, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/corker-opening-statement-at-hearing-on-taylor-force-act; Joel Gehrke, “House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley Telhami, “Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’ families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020. 26 Jacob Magid, “Top Republican releases remaining Palestinian aid he held up for months,” Times of Israel, September 23, 2021. 27 Jonah Schrock et al., “Responding to the PA’s Mounting Fiscal Crisis,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1, 2022. 28 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Public Opinion Poll No. 80, June 9-12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 9 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations After Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the TFA, Israel enacted a law in 2018 by which it withholds the transfer of taxes it collects for the PA by the amount of PLO/PA payments Israel estimates to be for acts of terrorism.29 According to World Bank estimates, the Israeli deductions tend to range between $100 million and $185 million annually, amounting to between 2-4% of the annual PA budget.30 Economic Assistance ESF is the main channel for economic development, civil society, and humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organization (NGO) implementing partners in the West Bank and Gaza. The FY2023 congressional budget justification reads: Palestinians are grappling with severe poverty, crippling unemployment, and chronic underdevelopment—particularly in Gaza. These challenges have only become more pronounced as the world continues to emerge from the pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine has accelerated inflation on a number of staples and basic materials. In this fragile context, U.S. assistance programs seek to reduce the likelihood of destabilization by creating new economic opportunities and providing relief to vulnerable populations.31 Table 2. Details of April 2022 Congressional Notification (for FY2021 ESF) Amount Implementing Partner(s) Description $21.1 mil Global Communities and TBD Water supply and sanitation needs $15.5 mil N/A Public health (direct funding for East Jerusalem Hospital Network) $12 mil DAI Global, LLC and TBD Private sector economic development assistance $7.5 mil TBD Civil society and governance, including women’s rights $6.6 mil Mercy Corps and TBD Workforce development, including for youth and entrepreneurs, and vocational training $6.5 mil Catholic Relief Services Rapid humanitarian relief and community resilience $600,000 Global Communities Disaster readiness in water and sanitation for Gaza Source: USAID. Note: TBD = To be determined. During President Biden’s July 2022 trip to Israel and the West Bank, he announced a $100 million U.S. contribution for Palestinian health care via the EJHN. Shortly thereafter, the White House announced that Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had pledged $25 million each to partner with the United States in helping the EJHN “upgrade its infrastructure and improve patient care for thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza who rely on the network for life-saving treatment.”32 $14.5 million of the $100 million U.S. contribution has 29 Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, “Israel: Law on Freezing Revenues Designated for Palestinian Authority,” Updated December 30, 2020. 30 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2022, Table 3. 31 State Department, FY2023 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 286. 32 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States Strengthens Cooperation with Middle East Partners to Address 21st Century Challenges,” July 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations been disbursed as part of FY2021 ESF.33 As of October 2022, additional funding details and timing have not been publicly released. West Bank Security Assistance amid Rising Violence International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding goes toward nonlethal assistance programs that the United States started for the PA’s security forces and justice sector in the West Bank in 2008. According to the FY2023 congressional budget justification: “The request for INCLE security assistance will support the Palestinian Authority (PA) to build professional and effective security and criminal justice institutions that maintain security and stability in the West Bank, uphold the rule of law, and contribute directly to regional security.”34 Annual appropriations provisions since the 110th Congress have required the following reports to Congress:  Benchmarks for assistance and PA steps. Before funding appropriated in each fiscal year can be made available, the State Department is required to report to Congress on (a) benchmarks established for security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and the extent of Palestinian compliance with such benchmarks; and (b) PA steps to end torture or other objectionable treatment of detainees.35  Description of assistance. The State Department is required to report twice yearly to the Appropriations Committees on “assistance provided by the United States for the training of Palestinian security forces, including detailed descriptions of the training, curriculum, and equipment provided; an assessment of the training and the performance of forces after training has been completed; and a description of the assistance that has been pledged and provided to Palestinian security forces by other donors.” This language also requires “a description of modifications, if any, to the security strategy of the Palestinian Authority.”36 Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator The U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), established in 2005, is a U.S.-led multilateral mission of more than 75 security specialists from nine NATO countries based in Jerusalem, with a forward post in the West Bank city of Ramallah, where the PA is headquartered.37 The USSC is headed by a three-star U.S. flag officer who leads U.S. efforts to help develop and reform the PA security sector, and facilitate coordination and communication between Israeli and PA security units. When implementing projects, including those that provide training and equipment to the elements of the PA security forces (PASF) and justice sector, the USSC works in coordination with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. In synchronizing international supporting efforts for PASF, the USSC 33 State Department, “Special Briefing with Ambassador Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,” September 14, 2022. 34 State Department, FY2023 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 349. 35 P.L. 117-103, Section 7039(c)(2). 36 P.L. 117-103, Section 7041(l)(5), citing an original reporting requirement in P.L. 110-252, Section 1404. 37 Information provided by the USSC to CRS, October 20, 2022. The core of the USSC is made up of U.S. military officers hosted by the State Department. Supporting contingents of security specialists from the United Kingdom and Canada work with the U.S. core team, as do smaller contingents from the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Poland, Greece, and Bulgaria. Congressional Research Service 11 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations works closely with other organizations operating in the region, including the Office of the Quartet and the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS).38 Additionally, some media sources report that the Central Intelligence Agency maintains close ties with the PA intelligence service on counterterrorism.39 After more than four years of supporting the PA’s recruitment and training of personnel for National Security Forces and Presidential Guard units (2008-2012), the USSC shifted to a less resource intensive, strategic advisory role alongside continuing efforts to use INCLE funds to assist with  PASF and criminal justice facilities;  nonlethal equipment (including vehicles and communications gear);  training on issues including counterterrorism, community policing, crowd control, emergency response, leadership, and human rights; and  criminal justice reform. In the first years of USSC efforts and INCLE support, the PASF showed increased professionalism and helped improve law enforcement efforts in West Bank cities like Jenin and Nablus. These places had previously been hotbeds of militant and criminal activity, largely spearheaded by factions or clans operating from refugee camps. Israel and the PA assisted efforts to pacify these areas by sponsoring amnesty and compensation packages to provide incentives for militants and older-generation security personnel with long track records of fighting Israelis to cease their activities or retire.40 Since 2014, militant activity in these areas has resumed and gradually expanded, presenting challenges for the PASF and Israel.41 As of 2022, militancy has increased to such a degree that it has become a key U.S. policy concern in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.42 Israeli and PA forces have approached the issue in different ways, leading to some tensions.43 In this context, the USSC’s role in facilitating Israel-PA coordination may become more prominent, and officials and lawmakers may reevaluate the level and nature of U.S. assistance to the PA security sector. Increased Violence and Abu Akleh Controversy During 2022, militants mostly concentrated in northern West Bank urban areas like Jenin and Nablus have been at the center of Israeli and PA counterterrorism operations. In early 2022, a spate of attacks in Israel killed at least 19 people, with Israeli security forces tracing some of the perpetrators to the northern West Bank. Israeli forces have killed more than 120 Palestinians in 38 USSC web portal at https://www.state.gov/about-us-united-states-security-coordinator-for-israel-and-the-palestinian-authority/. The Office of the Quartet (the Quartet is the United Nations, European Union, United States, and Russia) has a mandate to assist Palestinian economic and institutional development. Website: http://www.quartetoffice.org/. EUPOL COPPS website: https://eupolcopps.eu/. 39 See, for example, Barak Ravid, “CIA director to visit Israel, Palestinian Authority,” Axios, August 9, 2021. 40 Dan Murphy and Joshua Mitnick, “Israel offers amnesty to boost Fatah,” Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 2007; Adam Entous, “Abbas overhauls his security forces,” Reuters, June 20, 2008. 41 Ahmad Melhem, “Israel watches closely as the West Bank seethes,” Al-Monitor, September 12, 2022. 42 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022 and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. 43 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” haaretz.com, October 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations the West Bank—including some Palestinian protesters and uninvolved civilians—in connection with efforts to arrest suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.44 As of October 2022, unrest and security standoffs have spread to some extent to Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and the southern West Bank city of Hebron.45 The complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict make it difficult to reach definitive conclusions about the causes of increased violence coming from the West Bank. Some contributing factors may include Israeli-Palestinian tensions over holy sites, evictions, settlers, and demolitions in Jerusalem and the West Bank;46 and socioeconomic challenges stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced foreign support, and domestic corruption and repression.47 Some observers argue that some militant groups may be jockeying for influence in anticipation of the end of aging PA President Abbas’s rule.48 In October 2022, one source cited an Israeli security official in reporting that Israeli West Bank settlers have increased attacks against Palestinians.49 With prospects apparently dim for diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, Israeli and Palestinian militants, activists, officials, and personnel may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel could feed increased tensions.50 Shireen Abu Akleh Killing and Controversy In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive investigation.”51 Evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,52 with the PA asserting that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but Israel denying any such intent.53 In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers filed a complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for years.54 After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct an independent investigation into Abu Akleh’s death,55 44 “Report: Over 100 settler attacks against Palestinians in West Bank in past 10 days,” Times of Israel, October 21, 2022; State Department Press Briefing, September 28, 2022; Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian Authority steps up arrests in Nablus under Israeli, US pressure,” Al-Monitor, September 28, 2022; Isabel Kershner, “Jerusalem on Edge After Deadly Checkpoint Shooting,” New York Times, October 10, 2022. 45 Patrick Kingsley, “Unrest Shakes West Bank and Jerusalem,” New York Times, October 15, 2022. 46 For more information on issues relating to Jerusalem and West Bank tensions and settlements, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 47 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinians alarmed by lawlessness in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, August 3, 2022. 48 Kershner, “Jerusalem on Edge After Deadly Checkpoint Shooting.” 49 Yaniv Kubovich, “Settlers Commit 100 Crimes Against West Bank Palestinians in Last 10 Days,” haaretz.com, October 21, 2022. See also “Report: Over 100 settler attacks against Palestinians in West Bank in past 10 days,” Times of Israel, October 21, 2022. 50 CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 51 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022. 52 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022. 53 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022. 54 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian journalists,” April 26, 2022. 55 Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/ Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 42 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA investigations concluded that Israeli gunfire likely killed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was intentional.”56 PA officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s finding regarding intent.57 A June 2022 public opinion poll indicated that 92% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believe that Abu Akleh was deliberately targeted.58 After conducting an internal investigation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said in September 2022 that there was a “high possibility” that Abu Akleh was accidentally hit by IDF gunfire59—eliciting additional public criticism from PA officials and Abu Akleh family members who assert that the shooting was not accidental.60 In response, the State Department welcomed the IDF review, later adding that U.S. officials would continue to press Israel to “closely review its policies and practices on rules of engagement and consider additional steps to mitigate the risk of civilian harm, protect journalists and prevent similar tragedies in the future.”61 Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Defense Minister Benny Gantz then defended Israel’s rules of engagement and said that no outside party could dictate them.62 To accompany the Senate Appropriations Committee July 2022 markup of the 2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 4662), the explanatory statement seeks to require a report from the Secretary of State on steps taken to facilitate an independent, credible, and transparent investigation into Abu Akleh’s death, including whether 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (also known as the Leahy Law, pertaining to the possibility of gross human rights violations by a foreign security force unit) applies.63 Open source reporting on the militants operating in Jenin and Nablus provide varying descriptions of their affiliations, methods, and sources of support. Many, especially from younger generations, appear to be unaffiliated or only loosely affiliated with organized militias that come from the secular Fatah faction (such as Tanzim/Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades) or the Islamist Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) factions.64 As happened during the second intifada (which took place from 2000 to 2005), some militants—including a group in Nablus calling itself the Lion’s Den—are reportedly making common cause with counterparts across factional or secular- Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf. 56 State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022. 57 “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” Associated Press, July 4, 2022. 58 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 84, June 22-25, 2022. 59 Hiba Yazbek and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Says Reporter Was Probably Shot By One of Its Forces,” New York Times, September 6, 2022. 60 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians reject IDF probe into Shireen Abu Akleh killing, vow to bring case to ICC,” jpost.com, September 5, 2022. 61 Emanuel Fabian and Jacob Magid, “Rebuffing US, Lapid and Gantz say ‘no one will dictate’ IDF’s open-fire regulations,” Times of Israel, September 7, 2022. 62 Ibid. 63 For background on the Leahy Law, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 64 Yaniv Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” haaretz.com, October 12, 2022. See Appendix A for more information on these groups. The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank early in the second intifada and later began operating in Gaza as well. It was added to the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in March 2002. In line with the Abbas-led PA’s effort to centralize control, the Brigades lowered its profile in the West Bank after 2007. However, some observers have noted that militant elements remain within Fatah, including some members of the AAMB, and are generally known as the Tanzim. See, for example, Michael Milshtein, “Fateh’s ‘Tanzim’ Formations: a potential challenge that is liable to intensify in the face of scenarios of deterioration in the Palestinian arena,” IDC Herzliya Institute for Policy and Strategy, June 2020. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2020, Iran has provided AAMB with “funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.” Congressional Research Service 14 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations religious boundaries.65 Some sources debate whether Hamas and other factions seeking to undermine PA rule in West Bank cities are actively sponsoring or seeking to sponsor young militants who appear to be unaffiliated.66 Israeli incursions into PA-administered areas have significantly increased in response to the violence, arguably improving near-term security for Israel while risking a longer-term worsening of West Bank tensions.67 One analyst has argued: There are clear benefits to putting Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and rogue Fatah gunmen in Israeli prisons, but there are costs to these operations as well. Not only does a heavy Israeli presence in Palestinian cities day after day and night after night put Palestinian governmental impotence front and center, it creates resentment among Palestinians who would not otherwise be radicalized but respond to Israeli operations with violence and anger.68 Security Coordination Challenges and U.S. Policy Implications In this context, the PASF face a number of challenges. When they cautiously avoid confrontation with fellow Palestinians, they are vulnerable to criticism from Israeli and U.S. officials that they are weak or incapable of maintaining order, or even sympathetic to the militants’ causes. When they undertake operations to arrest militants—partly in hopes of minimizing Israeli incursions—domestic critics often label them as collaborators with Israel, especially when such operations and the resulting prosecution and imprisonment of suspects appear to be related to Israeli raids, information sharing, or objectives.69 Under these stresses, PA authorities often release detainees absent compelling evidence of serious terrorist plans or affiliations.70 The PA reportedly seeks time and flexibility to address militancy independent of Israeli dictates, with efforts to reach compromises that avoid major armed confrontations or arrests. By agreeing to stop fighting, some militants might receive lighter sentences and have an opportunity—if they uphold their commitment to rule of law—to eventually join the PASF.71 Increasing challenges to PASF operations within this environment could lead some officials and lawmakers to reassess the level and nature of U.S. and international assistance. It is unclear how effective U.S. assistance, training, and coordination can be in encouraging PASF personnel to maintain or improve their professional commitment to keeping order and stopping militants in an increasingly risky environment, especially if political, social, and economic pressures pull them in a different direction. Some personnel reportedly have directly targeted 65 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Fatah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad join forces to fight against IDF,” jpost.com, October 16, 2022. 66 Ahmad Melhem, “Israel accuses Hamas of sponsoring ‘Lion's Den’ group,” Al-Monitor, October 22, 2022; Kubovich and Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Authority”; Khaled Abu Toameh, “The Palestinian power struggle continues with Lions’ Den,” jpost.com, October 14, 2022. 67 Ahmad Melhem, “Israel expands military operations in West Bank ahead of elections,” Al-Monitor, October 27, 2022; Patrick Kingsley, “Palestinians on West Bank Call Israeli Lockdowns ‘Suffocating,’” New York Times, October 27, 2022. 68 Michael J. Koplow, “The Intensification of the West Bank’s Perpetual Catch-22,” Israel Policy Forum, September 8, 2022. 69 Jack Mukand, “A year on, Nizar Banat’s killing sheds light on PA corruption, but justice is on hold,” Times of Israel, October 3, 2022; Melhem, “Palestinian Authority steps up arrests in Nablus.” 70 Melhem, “Palestinian Authority steps up arrests in Nablus.” 71 Kubovich and Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Authority.” Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 21 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Israeli forces or settlers, raising questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.72 Since late 2021, personnel (along with other civil servants) have only been receiving around 80% of their normal salaries because of PA financial difficulties.73 The PA is reportedly discussing various options to reduce payroll expenses, including one option that would—among other reforms—freeze salaries at certain levels for a few years before indexing them to a standard rate of increase.74 In September 2022 remarks before the U.N. Security Council, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield lamented unilateral actions opposed to peace, saying that they include “terrorist attacks and incitement to violence against Israelis” and “violence inflicted by Israeli settlers on Palestinians in their neighborhoods, and in some cases escorted by Israeli Security Forces. I’ll also note that the United States is concerned about increasing tensions and violence in the West Bank among Palestinians, including the recent clashes in Jenin and Nablus.”75 The same day, the State Department spokesperson said, “The United States and other international partners stand ready to help but we cannot substitute for vital actions by the parties to mitigate conflict and to restore calm.”76 Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, in her remarks at the Security Council, said that a “strong and legitimate” PA was in the interest of the entire region, while calling on the PA to respect human rights and “refrain from making payments to those who harm Israelis.”77 In a September 2022 phone briefing, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf said that U.S. officials seek to ensure that Israel-PA “security cooperation is robust and continuing,” while also encouraging an improvement in economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza “because those can help and sustain improvement in security conditions.”78 U.S. Contributions to UNRWA Overview The Administration resumed voluntary contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 2021. UNRWA provides education, health care, and other social services to more than 5 million registered Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. It is funded almost entirely through voluntary contributions from governments and other donors. During FY2022, the Biden Administration announced $364 million in contributions to UNRWA (see Table 3). U.S. contributions come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account, which is administered through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). 72 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, October 12, 2022. 73 Jonah Shrock et al., “Responding to the PA’s Mounting Fiscal Crisis,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1, 2022. 74 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2022, p. 15. 75 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. 76 State Department Press Briefing, September 28, 2022. 77 “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. 78 State Department, “Special Briefing with Ambassador Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,” September 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 16 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Table 3. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA (in $ millions, non-inflation adjusted) Fiscal Year(s) Amount Fiscal Year(s) Amount 1950-1999 2,216.7 2012 233.3 2000 89.0 2013 294.0 2001 123.0 2014 398.7 2003 134.0 2015 390.5 2004 127.4 2016 359.5 2005 108.0 2017 359.3 2006 137.0 2018 65.0 2007 154.2 2019 -0- 2008 184.7 2020 -0- 2009 268.0 2021 318.8 2010 237.8 2022 364.0 2011 249.4 TOTAL 6,931.6 Sources: U.S. State Department and UNRWA. Note: All amounts are approximate. Some Members of Congress and Israeli officials have stated that U.S. officials should pressure UNRWA to reform some of its practices.79 While many supporters of the organization may agree with the need for reform, some also argue that UNRWA provides critical humanitarian support to the Palestinian refugee population.80 UNRWA Contributions: Conditions and Oversight (Including Textbooks) U.S. contributions to UNRWA are subject to various legislative conditions and oversight measures. Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States shall be made to [UNRWA] except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.” Additionally, since FY2015, annual appropriations legislation (for example, Section 7048(d) of P.L. 117-103) has included a provision requiring the State Department to report to Congress on whether UNRWA is:  using Operations Support Officers to inspect UNRWA installations and reporting any inappropriate use;  acting promptly to address any staff or beneficiary violations of Section 301(c) or UNRWA internal policies;  implementing procedures to maintain its facilities’ neutrality, and conducting regular inspections;  taking necessary and appropriate measures to ensure Section 301(c) compliance and related reporting; 79 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, McCaul: Biden Administration should have secured concessions before resuming assistance to Palestinians,” April 7, 2021; Israeli Ambassador to the United States Gilad Erdan, quoted in Pranshu Verma and Rick Gladstone, “Reversing Trump, Biden Restores Aid to Palestinians,” New York Times, April 7, 2021. 80 See, for example, Better World Campaign, “Better World Campaign says UNRWA funding critical to U.S. interests in the Middle East,” January 9, 2018. Congressional Research Service 17 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations  taking steps to ensure the content of educational materials taught in UNRWA-administered schools and summer camps is consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance and does not induce incitement;  not engaging in financial violations of U.S. law, and taking steps to improve financial transparency; and  in compliance with U.N. audit requirements. The State Department (specifically PRM) and UNRWA have a nonbinding “Framework for Cooperation” in place for calendar years 2021 and 2022,81 patterned after similar framework documents from before the Trump Administration’s suspension of contributions in 2018. In the framework document, UNRWA has agreed to submit a report to PRM semiannually—alongside its annual operational report—as a way to evaluate UNRWA’s compliance with U.S. legislative requirements. Regarding UNRWA’s educational activities, it provided the following information to CRS in September 2022: Consistent with UN practice in all refugee situations, UNRWA uses textbooks in its school provided by the “host country.” For the UN this is a matter of national sovereignty, ensures students can matriculate into host country educational systems at any level and more broadly participate in the social and economic life of the host country. No US funding is utilized to purchase textbooks, those are provided by the host government, in this instance [for the West Bank and Gaza] the PA Ministry of Education…. Importantly, UNRWA reviews all textbooks against the UN values of neutrality/bias, gender, and age-appropriateness. In the latest PA textbooks (2021-2022) utilized by the Agency, the majority of the material identified as not in line with UN values (parts of approximately four percent of all pages) are related to maps and references to the occupation. To address these issues, the Agency utilizes a Critical Thinking Approach (CTA) to empower teachers to address the specific identified issues of concern in a way that is in line with UN values. UNRWA reports on its findings regarding textbooks through periodic donor briefs. In 2019, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study examining State Department reporting to Congress pertaining to educational materials in UNRWA-administered schools found that while UNRWA had developed complementary teaching materials to address content in PA textbooks not aligned with U.N. values, “due to financial shortfalls and other constraints, UNRWA officials told GAO that UNRWA did not train teachers or distribute the complementary teaching materials to classrooms.”82 UNRWA officials have since introduced additional safeguards intended to ensure the adherence of educational materials with U.N. values.83 Since then, UNRWA and an activist organization have engaged in some public debate about the practical adherence of UNRWA educational practices and materials with U.N. values.84 In light of renewed public debate regarding PA textbooks since the introduction of new curriculum materials starting in 2016,85 H.R. 2374 was introduced in the House in April 2021. The bill would require a few annual State Department reports to Congress on PA educational material, and on whether U.S. aid is used directly or indirectly to fund the dissemination of the curriculum by the PA. In September 2022, the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered H.R. 2374 to be reported. In a September 2021 SFRC hearing on the nomination of Julieta Valls Noyes to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Noyes said that the Biden Administration shared concerns expressed by some Members via their summer 2021 introduction 81 Text available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021-2022-US-UNRWA-Framework-Signed.pdf. 82 GAO-19-448, West Bank and Gaza: State Has Taken Actions to Address Potentially Problematic Textbook Content but Should Improve Its Reporting to Congress, June 2019. 83 UNRWA press release, “UNRWA Improves Safeguards on Ensuring Adherence of Educational Materials with UN Principles; Prepares to Launch Secure Agencywide Self-Learning Platform,” January 14, 2021. 84 IMPACT-se, Review of 2022 UNRWA-Produced Study Materials in the Palestinian Territories, July 2022; UNRWA press release, “UNRWA Reviews and Responds to Allegations Concerning Agency Educational Materials,” July 15, 2022; IMPACT-se, “Statement on UNRWA’s Response to IMPACT-se Report,” July 21, 2022. 85 Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Report on Palestinian Textbooks, 2021; IMPACT-se, The New Palestinian School Curriculum, April 2019. Congressional Research Service 18 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations of an UNRWA Transparency and Accountability Act (S. 2479 and H.R. 4721) that would further condition U.S. contributions to UNRWA (a nearly identical version was introduced in the Senate in 2022 as S. 3467).86 However, Noyes asserted that the PRM-UNRWA framework document (see text box above) “accounts for the need to make changes and to redouble efforts to ensure efficiency, the effectiveness and the neutrality of UNWRA.” Noyes also stated, “UNRWA is a force for stability in the region by providing vital services to Palestinians in need, education for school children, health care for people, and the only viable alternative to UNRWA in those areas would be Hamas.”87 Similarly, in a May 2022 hearing before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, USAID Administrator (and former U.S. Representative to the United Nations) Samantha Power acknowledged “challenges with UNRWA over the years,” but cautioned that disruptions to UNRWA’s operations in educating Palestinian youth could open the door for greater influence from extremists.88 SFRC Ranking Member Risch has expressed concern that “issues regarding the impartiality of UNRWA, including its education system, have yet to be sufficiently addressed despite this administration’s decision to restore U.S. funding.”89 UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini has voiced worries that political developments might impact U.S. contributions to UNRWA.90 In October 2022, Lazzarini was quoted as saying, “Sometimes funding can be decreased due to political considerations; at times we receive less from some donors that are not prioritizing this region anymore, or because they had to decrease their overseas budget, and this affects us here in the region.”91 FY2023 Appropriations Legislation In the report (H.Rept. 117-401) accompanying the House Appropriations Committee’s markup of the FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (H.R. 8282), the Committee recommended that in addition to regular contributions to UNRWA from the MRA account, an additional $100 million from the International Organizations and Programs account should go to UNRWA for food assistance for vulnerable Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in response to rising food and transport costs. The report also included the following language: As part of the Administration’s ongoing reengagement with UNRWA, the Committee urges the Secretary of State to secure additional contributions to the Agency from countries in the region, work with the Government of Lebanon on job opportunities for refugees, and work with UNRWA on overcoming residual financial impacts to the Agency created by the 2018 suspension of U.S. contributions. In addition to the reports required prior to the obligation of funds made available by this Act to UNRWA, the Secretary of State shall take additional steps to ensure that UNRWA adheres to the UN humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, humanity, and neutrality, and redoubles efforts to (1) implement procedures to maintain the neutrality of 86 Text of hearing transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6341064?1. 87 Ibid. 88 Text of hearing transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/526548624?0&deliveryId=92338759&uid=congressionaltranscripts-6532974. 89 Rachel Oswald, “UN Palestinian refugee agency chief warns office facing existential crisis,” Congressional Quarterly, March 31, 2022. 90 Ibid. 91 Rawan Radwan, “Saudi Arabia cements commitment to Palestinian refugees with UNRWA contribution 25 times the amount it pledged,” Arab News, October 24, 2022. UNRWA donor charts for previous calendar years are available at https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends/donor-charts. Congressional Research Service 19 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations its facilities, including implementing a no-weapons policy and conducting regular inspections of its installations, to ensure they are only used for humanitarian or other appropriate purposes; and (2) take steps to ensure that the content of all educational materials taught in UNRWA-administered schools and summer camps is: (A) consistent with the value of dignity for all persons; and (B) does not induce or encourage incitement, violence, or prejudice. The explanatory statement accompanying the Senate Appropriations Committee’s markup of the FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 4662) said: Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations on reforms implemented by the UN Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA] during the preceding calendar year. Such report shall include a detailed description of any plans to leverage future U.S. contributions to make progress on implementing additional reforms, as appropriate. Such report shall also include information on the degree to which UNRWA is complying with the policies and procedures described in subsection (d) [in Section 7048] and the areas in which the Department is partnering with the Agency on new guidelines or reform efforts. Such report shall include an updated description of the mechanisms UNRWA has in place to identify incitement and other unacceptable subject matters, including anti-Semitic content, in locally produced textbooks, the procedures in place to substitute such material with curricula that emphasizes the importance of human rights, tolerance, and non-discrimination, and a description of steps taken to determine the credibility of the source of, and verify, claims, when made, that UNRWA is not complying with such policies and procedures, as well as any steps taken to respond to claims that are determined to not be credible. Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Programs In the current Israeli-Palestinian context, where U.S. officials support the concept of negotiating a permanent resolution but do not anticipate imminent progress on that point,92 the Administration and Congress have pursued programs fostering Israeli-Palestinian cooperative action. USAID Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization Since 2002, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided a U.S. government vehicle for using foreign assistance to support people-to-people reconciliation activities and to counteract sources of instability and violent conflict. Congress began funding CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians in FY2004.93 According to Section 7060(f) of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103), CMM funding (which has historically come from either the ESF or the Development Assistance [DA] account) is intended to “support people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic, racial, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war.” Through FY2012, Congress annually designated $10 million from CMM amounts for initiatives in the Middle East. Starting in FY2013, Congress removed the directive. Nevertheless, the executive branch continued allocating a portion of the CMM funds appropriated for global use for 92 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2021. 93 Edward Wong, “U.S. Is Eliminating the Final Source of Aid for Palestinian Civilians,” New York Times, September 15, 2018. Congressional Research Service 20 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people initiatives. CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians have been administered through USAID, the U.S. Embassy to Israel, and the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem (before it was subsumed into the embassy in 2019). In September 2018, the Trump Administration changed the CMM program by halting new grants for initiatives involving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. New people-to-people projects were limited to including Arab citizens of Israel as the counterparts to Israeli Jews.94 This change took place as part of the Trump Administration’s general suspension in 2018 and 2019 of most U.S. aid benefitting Palestinians. In April 2021, the Biden Administration announced a resumption of many types of U.S. aid for the Palestinians, including $10 million for people-to-people programs involving Israelis and Palestinians.95 In May 2021, USAID sent formal notification to Congress of its intent to obligate $10 million in DA funding for these programs, rebranded as Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization (CMS).96 In April 2022, it notified Congress of its intent to obligate nearly $15 million in FY2017-FY2020 ESF funding for CMS, saying that “funds for scientific exchanges and cooperative research support the objectives of advancing Middle East peace and improving security in the region. [Middle East Regional Cooperation] research grants provide opportunities for peaceful engagements between Palestinian and Israeli researchers, students, and stakeholders, and provide a forum to engage on social and economic issues affecting their lives and livelihoods.”97 USAID provided additional notification in April 2022 of $5.4 million in similar FY2021 ESF funding for CMS programs involving Israel and various Arab neighbors (to potentially include Palestinians, Egypt, and Jordan).98 Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA) Funds As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the establishment of the following two funds, as well as $50 million in ESF (Congress can specify how to allocate any future appropriations among the two authorized funds) for each year from FY2021 to FY2025): The People-to-People Partnership for Peace Fund (PPPPF) was established in 2021 by the Administrator of USAID. The fund supports dialogue and reconciliation programs, as well as other projects designed, as stated in MEPPA, “to help build the foundation for peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a sustainable two-state solution and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.” Section 8004 of P.L. 116-260 provided authorizing language for the fund by adding Section 535 at the end of Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.). This section provides that the fund: 94 Ibid. A 2020 USAID factsheet describing ongoing CMM grants for Israeli Jews and Arabs is available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL_2020_WBG_CMM_Fact_sheet.pdf. 95 State Department, “The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” April 7, 2021. 96 USAID underwent an organizational restructuring under the Trump Administration. For more, see the relevant section in CRS Report R46656, Selected Trump Administration Foreign Aid Priorities: A Wrap-Up, coordinated by Emily M. Morgenstern. USAID FY2021 Congressional Notification #153, May 13, 2021. 97 USAID FY2022 Congressional Notification #129, April 22, 2022. 98 USAID FY2022 Congressional Notification #128, April 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 26 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations  could work through Israeli, Palestinian, or international organizations committed to its purposes, including those that promote reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Arabs;  could receive contributions, such as from foreign governments and international organizations; and  would have an advisory board of experts appointed in a bipartisan fashion. The Joint Investment for Peace Initiative (JIPI) was established in 2021 by the Chief Executive of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). As stated in MEPPA, the initiative provides “investments in, and support to, entities that carry out projects that contribute to the development of the Palestinian private sector economy in the West Bank and Gaza,” and prioritizes “support to projects that increase economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.” A former PLO adviser raised concerns that the authorizing legislation does not explicitly preclude Israeli settlers in the West Bank from receiving funding from the initiative.99 Appropriations for the PPPPF and JIPI are subject to the same mission directives and vetting practices that USAID applies to bilateral economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza. Section 8006(d) of P.L. 116-260 requires that USAID and DFC submit a joint report to Congress no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year describing lessons learned and best practices from their respective projects and investments, and how those projects and investments have contributed to the funds’ purposes. Congress appropriated $50 million in ESF for each of FY2021 and FY2022, to be allocated between the two MEPPA funds, and the Administration is requesting the same for FY2023. Funding is going toward cooperative Israeli-Palestinian programs as well as programs solely for Palestinians (see Table 4). The Senate Appropriations Committee markup of the FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 4662), would require (in Section 7041(d)) that $1.5 million of the $50 million for FY2023 be used “for a new women’s leadership program that brings together Israeli and Palestinian women who are committed to working in pursuit of Middle East peace.” Table 4. Details of January 2022 Congressional Notification for MEPPA Amount Implementing Partner(s) Description $18 mil TBD Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization. Promote greater (PPPPF) people-to-people understanding by increasing Israeli-Palestinian economic ties and enhance dialogue and reconciliation $10.35 mil TBD Trade and Investment. Support for Israeli-Palestinian-U.S. (PPPPF) private sector partnerships that help integrate Israeli-Palestinian markets $10.35 mil TBD Private Sector Productivity. Promote the expansion of (PPPPF) Israeli-Palestinian-U.S. economic and research partnerships $5.5 mil TBD Civil Society. Support organizations seeking to build Israeli- (PPPPF) Palestinian cooperation. $3.5 mil Middle East Investment Financial Sector. Technical assistance to increase the (JIPI) Initiative development impact of a loan guarantee facility that supports lending to small- and medium-sized Palestinian enterprises. 99 Zaha Hassan, “How a Proposed New Fund to Bolster the Palestinian Economy Stands to Benefit Israeli Settlers,” Responsible Statecraft, September 2, 2020. Congressional Research Service 22 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Amount Implementing Partner(s) Description $2.3 mil TBD Workforce Development. Promote Israeli-Palestinian (PPPPF) exchange programs and mentorship/internship opportunities that build the capacity of the Palestinian workforce. Source: USAID. Notes: TBD = To be determined. Funding is from FY2021 ESF. PA West Bank Leadership Concerns Uncertainty surrounds the future of Palestinian leadership and democracy. Questions include:  Who might eventually succeed Mahmoud Abbas (see text box below for his biography) as leader of the national movement?  Are future elections likely and what factors might influence their being held?  What challenges exist to rule of law and civil liberties in the West Bank? Mahmoud Abbas: Biography Abbas (also known by his Arabic ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Table 2. Details Regarding $75 Million in FY2020 ESF~~
~~Initial March 2021 Budget~~
~~Final September 2021 Budget~~

~~$5.4 mil ion for civil society organizations and~~

~~$5.4 mil ion for civil society organizations and~~
~~independent media outlets.~~
~~independent media outlets in the West Bank.~~

~~$10 mil ion for operating costs for the East~~

~~$10 mil ion for operating costs for the East~~
~~Jerusalem Hospital Network.~~
~~Jerusalem Hospital Network.~~

~~$24.5 mil ion for water supply and sanitation needs ~~
~~$4.3 mil ion for water supply and sanitation needs~~
~~and related general services.~~
~~for vulnerable households in Gaza.~~

~~$4.2 mil ion for community engagement, job~~

~~$8.2 mil ion for community engagement, training,~~
~~placement, and psychosocial support for~~
~~and job placement for Palestinian youth.~~
~~Palestinian youth.~~

~~$15.5 mil ion in economic development assistance.~~

~~$8 mil ion in economic development assistance.~~

~~$11.4 mil ion for rapid response for vulnerable~~

~~$16.5 mil ion for municipal infrastructure in~~
~~populations in Gaza.~~
~~Bethlehem.~~

~~$20.2 in food assistance through the World Food~~

~~$6.4 mil ion for rapid response for vulnerable~~
~~Programme.~~
~~populations in Gaza.~~
Source: USAID.
~~U.S. Contributions to UNRWA~~
~~Additional y, the Administration has resumed voluntary contributions to the U.N. Relief and~~
~~Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA provides education,~~
~~health care, and other social services to more than 5 mil ion registered Palestinian refugees in the~~
~~West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. It is funded almost entirely through voluntary~~
~~contributions from governments and other donors.~~
~~During FY2021, the Biden Administration provided $318.8 mil ion in contributions to UNRWA~~
~~(see Table 3). U.S. contributions come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account,~~
~~which is administered through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and~~
~~Migration (PRM).~~
~~Some Members of Congress and Israeli officials want U.S. officials to pressure UNRWA to~~
~~reform some of its practices.34 While many supporters of the organization may agree with the~~
~~need for reform, some also argue that UNRWA provides critical humanitarian support to the~~
~~Palestinian refugee population.35~~
~~UNRWA Contributions: Conditions and Oversight~~
~~U.S. contributions to UNRWA are subject to various legislative conditions and oversight measures. Section 301(c)~~
~~of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States~~
~~shal be made to [UNRWA] except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] al possible measures to assure that~~
~~no part of the United States contribution shal be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving~~
~~military training as a member of the so-cal ed Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerril a type organization or~~
~~who has engaged in any act of terrorism.”~~

~~34 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, McCaul: Biden Administration should have secured concessions~~
~~before resuming assistance to Palestinians,” April 7, 2021; Israeli Ambassador to the United States Gilad Erdan, quoted~~
~~in Pranshu Verma and Rick Gladstone, “ Reversing T rump, Biden Restores Aid to Palestinians,” New York Times, April~~
~~7, 2021.~~
~~35 See, for example, Better World Campaign, “Better World Campaign says UNRWA funding critical to U.S. interests~~
~~in the Middle East,” January 9, 2018.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Additional y, since FY2015, annual appropriations legislation (for example, Section 7048(d) of P.L. 116-260) has~~
~~included a provision requiring the State Department to report to Congress on whether UNRWA is~~

~~using Operations Support Officers to inspect UNRWA instal ations and reporting any inappropriate use;~~

~~acting promptly to address any staff or beneficiary violations of Section 301(c) or UNRWA internal policies;~~

~~implementing procedures to maintain its facilities’ neutrality, and conducting regular inspections;~~

~~taking necessary and appropriate measures to ensure Section 301(c) compliance and related reporting;~~

~~taking steps to ensure the content of educational materials taught in UNRWA-administered schools and~~
~~summer camps is consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance and does not induce~~
~~incitement;~~

~~not engaging in financial violations of U.S. law, and taking steps to improve financial transparency; and~~

~~in compliance with U.N. audit requirements.~~
~~The State Department (specifical y PRM) and UNRWA have a nonbinding “Framework for Cooperation” in place~~
~~for calendar years 2021 and 2022,36 patterned after similar framework documents from before the Trump~~
~~Administration’s suspension of contributions in 2018. In the framework document, UNRWA has agreed to submit~~
~~a report to PRM semiannual y—alongside its annual operational report—as a way to evaluate UNRWA’s~~
~~compliance with U.S. legislative requirements.~~
~~In a September 2021 SFRC hearing on the nomination of Julieta Val s Noyes to serve as Assistant~~
~~Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Noyes said that the Biden~~
~~Administration shares concerns expressed by some Members via their summer 2021 introduction~~
~~of an UNRWA Transparency and Accountability Act (S. 2479 and H.R. 4721) that would further~~
~~condition U.S. contributions to UNRWA.37 However, Noyes asserted that the PRM-UNRWA~~
~~framework document (see textbox above) “accounts for the need to make changes and to redouble~~
~~efforts to ensure efficiency, the effectiveness and the neutrality of UNWRA.” Noyes also stated,~~
~~“UNRWA is a force for stability in the region by providing vital services to Palestinians in need,~~
~~education for school children, health care for people, and the only viable alternative to UNRWA~~
~~in those areas would be Hamas.”38~~
~~Table 3. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA~~
~~(in $ mil ions, non-inflation adjusted)~~
~~Fiscal Year(s)~~
~~Amount~~
~~Fiscal Year(s)~~
~~Amount~~
~~1950-1989~~
~~1,473.3~~
~~2006~~
~~137.0~~
~~1990~~
~~57.0~~
~~2007~~
~~154.2~~
~~1991~~
~~75.6~~
~~2008~~
~~184.7~~
~~1992~~
~~69.0~~
~~2009~~
~~268.0~~
~~1993~~
~~73.8~~
~~2010~~
~~237.8~~
~~1994~~
~~78.2~~
~~2011~~
~~249.4~~
~~1995~~
~~74.8~~
~~2012~~
~~233.3~~
~~1996~~
~~77.0~~
~~2013~~
~~294.0~~
~~1997~~
~~79.2~~
~~2014~~
~~398.7~~
~~1998~~
~~78.3~~
~~2015~~
~~390.5~~

~~36 T ext available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021-2022-US-UNRWA-Framework-~~
~~Signed.pdf.~~
~~37 T ext of hearing transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6341064?1.~~
~~38 Ibid.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

12

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Fiscal Year(s)~~
~~Amount~~
~~Fiscal Year(s)~~
~~Amount~~
~~1999~~
~~80.5~~
~~2016~~
~~359.5~~
~~2000~~
~~89.0~~
~~2017~~
~~359.3~~
~~2001~~
~~123.0~~
~~2018~~
~~65.0~~
~~2002~~
~~119.3~~
~~2019~~
~~-0-~~
~~2003~~
~~134.0~~
~~2020~~
~~-0-~~
~~2004~~
~~127.4~~
~~2021~~
~~318.8~~
~~2005~~
~~108.0~~
~~TOTAL~~
~~6,567.6~~
Sources: U.S. State Department and UNRWA.
Note: Al amounts are approximate.
~~Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Programs~~
~~In the current Israeli-Palestinian context, where U.S. officials support the concept of negotiating a~~
~~permanent resolution but do not anticipate imminent progress on that point,39 the Administration~~
~~and Congress have pursued programs fostering Israeli-Palestinian cooperative action.~~
~~USAID Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization~~
~~Since 2002, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at the U.S. Agency for~~
~~International Development (USAID) has provided a U.S. government vehicle for using foreign~~
~~assistance to support people-to-people reconciliation activities and counteracting sources of~~
~~instability and violent conflict. Congress began funding CMM projects for Israelis and~~
~~Palestinians in FY2004.40 According to Section 7060(g) of the FY2021 Consolidated~~
~~Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), CMM funding (which comes from either the Economic~~
~~Support Fund (ESF) or the Development Assistance (DA) accounts) is intended to “support~~
~~people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic,~~
~~religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war.”~~
~~Through FY2012, Congress annual y designated $10 mil ion from CMM amounts for initiatives~~
~~in the Middle East. Starting in FY2013, Congress removed the directive. Nevertheless, the~~
~~executive branch continued al ocating a portion of the CMM funds appropriated for global use for~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people initiatives. CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians have~~
~~been administered through USAID, the U.S. Embassy to Israel, and the U.S. consulate general in~~
~~Jerusalem (before it was subsumed into the embassy in 2019).~~
~~In September 2018, the Trump Administration changed the CMM program by halting new grants~~
~~for initiatives involving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. New people-to-people projects~~
~~were limited to including Arab citizens of Israel as the counterparts to Israeli Jews.41 This change~~
~~took place as part of the Trump Administration’s general suspension in 2018 and 2019 of most~~
~~U.S. aid benefitting Palestinians.~~

~~39 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,”~~
~~September 21, 2021.~~
~~40 Edward Wong, “ U.S. Is Eliminating the Final Source of Aid for Palestinian Civilians,” New York Times, September~~
~~15, 2018.~~
~~41 Ibid. A 2020 USAID factsheet describing ongoing CMM grants for Israeli Jews and Arabs is available at~~
~~https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL_2020_WBG_CMM_Fact_sheet.pdf .~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~In April 2021, the Biden Administration announced a resumption of many types of U.S. aid for~~
~~the Palestinians, including $10 mil ion for people-to-people programs involving Israelis and~~
~~Palestinians.42 On May 13, 2021, USAID sent formal notification to Congress of its intent to~~
~~obligate $10 mil ion in DA funding for these programs, rebranded as Conflict Mitigation and~~
~~Stabilization (CMS).43 The notification states:~~
~~In the West Bank and Gaza and Israel, people-to-people reconciliation activities and~~
~~associated capacity building technical assistance will be carried out to address issues of~~
~~common concern for Israelis and Palestinians. Consistent with other Reconciliation Fund~~
~~Programs managed by USAID, activities may include but are not limited to: programs that~~
~~facilitate cooperation and inclusion in the areas of general education, including for people~~
~~with disabilities; mental health; information and communications technology; agriculture~~
~~and trade; joint sports programs; peacebuilding skills development; and programs that~~
~~promote greater understanding and opportunities for peace between Israelis and~~
~~Palestinians through dialogue. Activities will be focused on “cross-border” projects~~
~~implemented through local and U.S. organizations, but may also include activities between~~
~~Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.44~~
~~Funds Under Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act~~
~~As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M.~~
~~Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-~~
~~260) authorized the establishment of the following two funds, as wel as $50 mil ion (Congress~~
~~can specify how to al ocate any future appropriations among the two authorized funds) for each~~
~~of the next five years (FY2022-FY2026):~~
The People-to-People Partnership for Peace Fund is authorized to be established by the
~~Administrator of USAID near the end of December 2021. If established, the fund would support~~
~~dialogue and reconciliation programs, as wel as other projects designed, as stated in MEPPA, “to~~
~~help build the foundation for peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a~~
~~sustainable two-state solution and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic~~
~~cooperation.”~~
~~Section 8004 of P.L. 116-260 provided authorizing language for the fund by adding Section 535~~
~~at the end of Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.).~~
~~This section provides that the fund:~~
~~ could work through Israeli, Palestinian, or international organizations committed~~
~~to its purposes, including those that promote reconciliation between Israeli Jews~~
~~and Arabs;~~
~~ could receive contributions, such as from foreign governments and international~~
~~organizations; and~~
~~ would have an advisory board of experts appointed in a bipartisan fashion.~~
The Joint Investment for Peace Initiative was authorized to be established by the Chief
~~Executive of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) any time after June~~

~~42 State Department, “ The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” April 7, 2021.~~
~~43 USAID underwent an organizational restructuring under the T rump Administration. For more, see the relevant~~
~~section in CRS Report R46656, Selected Trum p Adm inistration Foreign Aid Priorities: A Wrap -Up, coordinated by~~
~~Emily M. Morgenstern.~~
~~44 USAID FY2021 Congressional Notification #153, May 13, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~link to page 40~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~2021. If established, the initiative would, as stated in MEPPA, “provide investments in, and~~
~~support to, entities that carry out projects that contribute to the development of the Palestinian~~
~~private sector economy in the West Bank and Gaza,” and would “prioritize support to projects~~
~~that increase economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.” A former PLO adviser has~~
~~raised concerns that the authorizing legislation does not explicitly preclude Israeli settlers in the~~
~~West Bank from receiving funding from the initiative.45~~
~~Any appropriations for the two funds would be subject to the same mission directives and vetting~~
~~practices that USAID applies to bilateral economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza. If both funds~~
~~are established, Section 8006(d) of P.L. 116-260 requires that USAID and DFC submit a joint~~
~~report to Congress no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year describing lessons~~
~~learned and best practices from their respective projects and investments, and how those projects~~
~~and investments have contributed to the funds’ purposes.~~
~~The congressional budget justification for FY2022 anticipates a total of $50 mil ion in~~
~~appropriations to be al ocated between the two funds.46~~
~~Taylor Force Act (TFA) and PLO/PA Payments “for Acts of Terrorism”~~
~~The Biden Administration has said that any resumption of aid to the Palestinians would comply~~
~~with the TFA. The TFA seeks to discourage certain PLO/PA payments “for acts of terrorism” by~~
~~prohibiting most Economic Support Fund aid (ESF) that “directly benefits” the PA. The TFA does~~
~~not further define what constitutes a direct benefit.~~
~~During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA~~
~~payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of~~
~~terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more~~
~~information on violence and terrorism by Palestinians, see Appendix A.~~
~~Palestinian Payments for “Martyrs” and Prisoners~~
~~The Palestinian practice of compensating families who lost a member (combatant or civilian) in connection with~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian violence reportedly dates back to the 1960s.47 Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners or~~
~~decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second intifada [uprising] of 2000 to~~
~~2005.”48 Various PA laws and decrees since 2004 have established parameters for payments.49 U.S. lawmakers and~~
~~executive branch officials have condemned the practice to the extent it might incentivize violence, focusing~~
~~particular criticism on an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levels of compensation for prisoners who~~
~~receive longer sentences.50~~

~~45 Zaha Hassan, “ How a Proposed New Fund to Bolster the Palestinian Economy Stands to Benefit Israeli Settlers,”~~
Responsible Statecraft, September 2, 2020.
~~46 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, pp. 258 -259.~~
~~47 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy T heory’ T hat Proved T rue—but Also More Complicated,” theatlantic.com, April~~
~~27, 2018.~~
~~48 Eli Lake, “T he Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016.~~
~~49 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing T errorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to T errorists and their Families,”~~
~~Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, at http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-~~
~~intentions/.~~
~~50 See, for example, Corker Opening Statement at Hearing on T aylor Force Act, July 12, 2017,~~
~~https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-list?ID=CFA1D96C-2FF8-4A70-9C29-49451ADD90AE; Joel~~
~~Gehrke, “ House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,”~~
Washington Exam iner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary
~~drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley T elhami, “ Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’~~
~~families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~link to page 9 link to page 46 link to page 49 link to page 49 link to page 52~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~As mentioned above, the TFA prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA, with specific~~
~~exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, and a certain amount for wastewater projects~~
~~and vaccination programs. Thus, U.S. aid for economic development and humanitarian purposes~~
~~either is required to fit under those exceptions, or be deemed by an Administration not to directly~~
~~benefit the PA. As mentioned above, the Biden Administration modified its spending plan for~~
~~FY2020 ESF after some Members of Congress differed with the Administration on whether some~~
~~items in the initial plan would directly benefit the PA.~~
~~An Administration can only lift the TFA’s restrictions if it certifies that the PLO/PA has ended or~~
~~significantly changed the payments in question in such a way that they do not incentivize acts of~~
~~terrorism, and also certifies that the PLO/PA is taking additional steps to oppose violence against~~
~~Israelis and Americans.~~
~~The prospect of the PLO/PA significantly changing these payments may encounter strong~~
~~domestic opposition among Palestinians. Media reports in late 2020 suggested that the PA might~~
~~consider changes—if it could make them domestical y palatable—in hopes of removing obstacles~~
~~to U.S. aid.51 PA officials may also focus on recouping the full amount of taxes that Israel collects~~
~~on the PA’s behalf. After Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the TFA, Israel enacted~~
~~a law in 2018 by which it withholds the transfer of these taxes by the amount of PLO/PA~~
~~payments Israel estimates to be for acts of terrorism.52 Yet, President Abbas made the following~~
~~statement at his speech before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2021:~~
~~Why should we have to clarify and justify providing assistance to families of prisoners and~~
~~martyrs who are the victims of the occupation and its oppressive policies? We cannot~~
~~abandon our people and we will continue striving to free all our prisoners.53~~
~~According to a June 2021 public opinion poll, 70% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza~~
~~oppose significant changes to the PLO/PA payments.54~~
~~Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction~~
~~The Gaza Strip (see Figure 2) presents complicated chal enges for U.S. policy. Hamas, Israel, the~~
~~PA, and several outside actors affect Gaza’s difficult security, political, and humanitarian~~
~~situations. Since Hamas seized de facto control within Gaza in 2007 (for more information on~~
~~Hamas and Gaza, see Appendix B and Appendix C), these situations have fueled periodic~~
~~violence between Israel and Hamas (along with other Palestinian militants based in Gaza) that~~
~~could recur in the future.~~
~~The precarious security situation in Gaza is linked to humanitarian conditions, and because Gaza~~
~~does not have a self-sufficient economy (see Appendix C and Appendix D), external assistance~~
~~largely drives humanitarian welfare. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of~~
~~electricity and safe drinking water.55 Large transfers of aid to the PA (particularly from Western~~

~~51 Adam Rasgon and David M. Halbfinger, “Seeking Restart with Biden, Palestinians Eye End to Prisoner Payments,”~~
New York Tim es, November 19, 2020.
~~52 Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, “ Israel: Law on Freezing Revenues Designated for Palestinian Authority ,”~~
~~Updated December 30, 2020.~~
~~53 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021).~~
~~54 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Public Opinion Poll No. 80, published June 15, 2021~~
~~(poll taken June 9-12, 2021).~~
~~55 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian~~
~~territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, at https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~link to page 46 link to page 53~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~countries, Arab states, and international organizations) have historical y been critical inputs for~~
~~the economy in the West Bank and Gaza, but according to the World Bank the PA received $488~~
~~mil ion in aid in 2020, 20% less than in 2019 and the lowest level in decades.56 According to PA~~
~~financial statements, the PA has received only around $100 mil ion in foreign aid for 2021~~
~~through August.57~~
~~The possibility that humanitarian crisis could destabilize Gaza has prompted some efforts aimed~~
~~at improving living conditions and reducing spil over threats. In fal 2018, Israel started al owing~~
~~shipments of Qatari fuel and cash into Gaza to partial y alleviate the electricity and funding~~
~~shortages.58 In early 2021, Qatar announced that it would increase its annual contribution to Gaza~~
~~by around 50% to $360 mil ion, and also pledged $60 mil ion to ease Gaza’s energy crisis by~~
~~helping build a natural gas pipeline to Gaza from Israel.59~~
~~Four large-scale conflicts took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants in 2008-2009,~~
~~2012, 2014, and 2021. In each of these conflicts, the militants fired rockets into Israel, while~~
~~Israel conducted airstrikes in Gaza targeting militants (for more information on threats to Israel~~
~~from Palestinian violence, see the textbox in Appendix B). Israel also launched some ground~~
~~operations in the 2008-2009 and 2014 conflicts. In the aftermath of each conflict, significant~~
~~international attention focused on the stil largely unfulfil ed tasks of:~~
~~ improving humanitarian conditions and economic opportunities for Palestinians~~
~~in Gaza; and~~
~~ preventing Hamas and other militants from reconstituting arsenals and military~~
~~infrastructure.~~
~~No significant breakthrough has occurred to reconcile civilian infrastructure needs with security~~
~~considerations. Officials in Gaza responsible for post-conflict reconstruction estimate that~~
~~rebuilding costs from the May 2021 conflict would be $479 mil ion, while remaining damages~~
~~from past conflicts would cost another $600 mil ion to repair.60 Although some countries,~~
~~including Qatar and Egypt, have pledged in 2021 to assist with reconstruction, international~~
~~actors only implemented around 15% of the rebuilding assistance pledged after the 2014 conflict,~~
~~due partly to the security concerns mentioned above.61~~
~~Major progress in reconstruction might require one or more of the following: (1) a political~~
~~reunification of Gaza with the West Bank, (2) reduced Israeli and Egyptian restrictions on access~~
~~and commerce, and/or (3) a long-term Hamas-Israel cease-fire. Egypt plays a key role in both~~
~~Israel-Hamas and Hamas-Fatah mediation.62~~

~~critical-humanitarian-indicators.~~
~~56 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, p. 14. Also see~~
Figure D-1.
~~57 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php.~~
~~58 Oren Liebermann, et al., “ Suitcases of $15M in cash from Qatar bring relief for Gaza,” CNN, November 11, 2018.~~
~~59 Aaron Boxerman, “ Qatar raises annual aid to Gaza to $360 million,” Times of Israel, January 31, 2021; “ Qatar says~~
~~to fund $60 million pipeline from Israel to Gaza,” Reuters, February 25, 2021.~~
~~60 Entsar Abu Jahal, “As reconstruction nears, Gaza fears donors won’t deliver on promises,” Al-Monitor, September~~
~~26, 2021.~~
~~61 Ibid.~~
~~62 Maged Mandour, “ Egypt’s Shifting Hamas Policies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 26, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Political reunification would appear to depend on Hamas’s wil ingness to cede control of security~~
~~in Gaza to the PA. In the past, PA President Abbas has insisted that he wil not accept a situation~~
~~where PA control is undermined by Hamas’s militia.63~~
~~The May 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict disrupted the Qatari fuel shipments and cash payments to~~
~~Gaza that (as mentioned above) Israel had al owed since 2018. The fuel shipments resumed in~~
~~June 2021.64 Due to Israeli concerns about the potential for Hamas to divert money to its militia~~
~~or for other purposes, Qatar began an arrangement in October 2021 to provide money transfers to~~
~~needy families through the United Nations.65 However, this mechanism does not address the~~
~~unresolved issue of providing salaries to Gaza’s civil servants.66 Other Israel-Hamas disputes~~
~~have continued and could conceivably escalate, including over what Israel al ows into Gaza, and~~
~~Israelis in Hamas custody.67~~
~~PA West Bank Leadership Concerns~~
~~Uncertainty surrounds the future of Palestinian democracy and leadership. Questions include:~~
~~ Are future elections likely and what factors might influence their being held?~~
~~ Who might eventual y succeed Mahmoud Abbas (see textbox below for his biography) as~~
~~leader of the national movement?~~
~~ What chal enges exist to rule of law and civil liberties in the West Bank?~~

~~63 “Abbas: If PA not handed control of Gaza, Hamas must take full responsibility ,” Times of Israel, August 18, 2018.~~
~~64 “Israel allows fuel tankers into Gaza for first time since clashes,” jpost.com, June 28, 2021.~~
~~65 “Palestinians in Gaza receive $100 handouts from Qatar via UN scheme,” Agence France Presse, October 14, 2021.~~
~~66 Amos Harel, “ Hamas Is Eyeing a Prisoner Swap, While Israel Is Buying T ime with Limited Gestures,” haaretz.com,~~
~~October 11, 2021.~~
~~67 Ibid.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

18

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Mahmoud Abbas: Biography~~
~~Abbas (also known by his Arabic~~ kunya as “Abu Mazen” or “the father of Mazen”—Abbas’s oldest son) is as “Abu Mazen” or “the father of Mazen”—Abbas’s oldest son) is ~~general y~~
generally regarded as the leader of the Palestinian national movement,regarded as the leader of the Palestinian national movement, given his status as the current PLO chairman, PA given his status as the current PLO chairman, PA
president, and head of Fatah—having succeeded Yasser Arafat president, and head of Fatah—having succeeded Yasser Arafat ~~upon~~shortly after his death in 2004. Abbas was elected as PA his death in 2004. Abbas was elected as PA
president in 2005 popular elections,president in 2005 popular elections, and when his four-year term expired in 2009, the PLO Central Council voted and when his four-year term expired in 2009, the PLO Central Council voted
to extend his termto extend his term indefinitely until new electionsindefinitely until new elections could take place. could take place.
Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel.Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel. Abbas and his family left for Syria as refugees in Abbas and his family left for Syria as refugees in
1948 when Israel1948 when Israel was founded. He earned a was founded. He earned a B.A.B.A. in law from Damascus University and a Ph.D. in history from in law from Damascus University and a Ph.D. in history from
Moscow’s Moscow’s ~~Oriental~~ Oriental Institute.Institute.68100
Abbas was an early memberAbbas was an early member of Fatah, joining in Qatar. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abbas became a top deputy to of Fatah, joining in Qatar. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abbas became a top deputy to
Arafat when he headed Fatah and the PLO.Arafat when he headed Fatah and the PLO.69101 Abbas played an important role in negotiating the various Israeli-PLO Abbas played an important role in negotiating the various Israeli-PLO
~~agreements~~ agreements of the 1990s, and returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1995of the 1990s, and returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1995 .
. In March 2003, Abbas was named as the first PA prime minister,In March 2003, Abbas was named as the first PA prime minister, but was not given but was not given
~~ful~~ full authority because Arafat (then the PA president) insisted on retaining ultimate authority because Arafat (then the PA president) insisted on retaining ultimate
decision-makingdecision-making authority and control overauthority and control over security services.security services. Abbas resignedAbbas resigned as prime minister as
~~prime minister~~ in Septemberin September 2003, 2003, ~~apparently~~reportedly as a result as a result of frustration with Arafat, of frustration with Arafat,
~~the United States~~the George W. Bush Administration, and Israel., and Israel.70
102 Since Abbas assumed the leadership of the Palestinian national movementSince Abbas assumed the leadership of the Palestinian national movement after after
Arafat’s death in 2004, he has been a part of the contentious negotiations and Arafat’s death in 2004, he has been a part of the contentious negotiations and
disputes that have largelydisputes that have largely characterized Palestinian relations with the United States characterized Palestinian relations with the United States
and Israel,and Israel, while also cooperating closely with both countries on security matters. while also cooperating closely with both countries on security matters.
~~While Abbas~~ While Abbas 100 Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled The Other Side: The Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “The Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News, November 29, 2012. 101 One of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11 Israeli athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “didn’t know what the money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “The Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002. 102 James Bennet, “The Mideast Turmoil: The Leadership; Abbas Steps Down, Dealing Big Blow to U.S. Peace Plan,” New York Times, September 7, 2003. Congressional Research Service 23 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations praises “martyrs” for the Palestinian cause, he also has made praises “martyrs” for the Palestinian cause, he also has made
repeated public repeated public ~~cal s~~calls for nonviolent approaches to resolving Palestinian disputes for nonviolent approaches to resolving Palestinian disputes
~~with Israel.~~
~~Abbas appears motivated by a complex combination of factors that~~with Israel. A complex combination of factors may drive Abbas’s actions. These potentially include safeguarding his personal authority and include safeguarding his personal authority and
legacy, preventing destabilization and violence,legacy, preventing destabilization and violence, and protecting his family members.and protecting his family members.~~71 Some observers~~ 103 Some observers have argued have argued
that Abbas’s rule became morethat Abbas’s rule became more authoritarian and corrupt after the Hamas takeoverauthoritarian and corrupt after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 limited his of Gaza in 2007 limited his
authority there, and left the PA without a functioning legislatureauthority there, and left the PA without a functioning legislature or realisticor realistic prospects for future elections.prospects for future elections.72
~~Elections~~
~~Since divided rule took hold in 2007—with the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank, and Hamas in~~
~~Gaza—no PA presidential or legislative elections for the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem~~
~~have occurred, and the Palestinian Legislative Council has ceased to function. During the 14-year~~
~~West Bank-Gaza split, Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered agreements~~
~~aimed at ending the split and al owing elections to take place, but have general y not implemented~~
~~these agreements. Municipal elections for some West Bank cities and towns occurred in 2012 and~~
~~2017.~~

~~68 Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled~~ ~~The Other Side: The~~
~~Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism~~ ~~) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of~~
~~collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on~~
~~Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “T he Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish~~
~~nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News,~~
~~November 29, 2012.~~
~~69 One of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11 Israeli~~
~~athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “ didn’t know what the~~
~~money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “T he Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002.~~
~~70 James Bennet, “T he Mideast T urmoil: T he Leadership; Abbas Steps Down, Dealing Big Blow to U.S. Peace Plan,”~~
New York Tim es, September 7, 2003.
~~71 See, for example, Daoud Kuttab, “Abbas bids adieu,” Al-Monitor, August 1, 2018.~~
~~72 Ibid.; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~link to page 24~~

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~In January 2021, the PA announced plans to hold legislative and presidential elections later in the~~
~~year. In April, however, President Abbas postponed the elections, claiming that he did so because~~
~~Israel was unwil ing to al ow East~~ 104 Succession Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA, PLO, and Fatah upon the end of Abbas’s tenure—whether via elections or otherwise.105 Political differences within Fatah and growing violence and unrest in the West Bank suggest that competition for power between different Fatah-affiliated individuals and groups could lead to some type of geographical or bureaucratic division of control, or to periods of political or armed struggle to resolve leadership and succession questions. Marwan Barghouti—a Fatah leader who has supported negotiating with Israel at times, and armed resistance against Israel at other times—is more popular than Abbas in public opinion polls.106 Barghouti joined a breakaway electoral list during the abortive campaign in early 2021 (discussed below). A major obstacle to Barghouti assuming PLO/PA leadership is his imprisonment in Israel since 2002 on multiple murder charges in connection with the second intifada (he was convicted in 2004). Other Palestinian leaders who could be involved in succeeding Abbas include  Hussein al Sheikh (a senior PLO and PA official close to Abbas), Majid Faraj (arguably Abbas’s most trusted security figure), and Salam Fayyad (a previous PA prime minister) are prominent internationally, but have little domestic popular support.  Mohammed Shtayyeh (PA prime minister since 2019) is an internationally visible Fatah insider.  Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril Rajoub have political heft within Fatah, but relatively less international experience.  Nasser al Qudwa (a former PLO diplomat and Arafat’s nephew) is an internationally visible figure who was expelled from Fatah in March 2021 for forming a breakaway electoral list (which Barghouti later joined).  Mohammed Dahlan was a top security figure in Gaza under Arafat who is based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His apparent involvement with Israel-UAE normalization has fueled some speculation about regional and international support for him in future PLO/PA leadership.107 While Dahlan has some political support in the West Bank and Gaza, he remains a pariah within Fatah leadership. The faction expelled him in 2011 after he and Abbas had a falling out, and in 103 See, for example, Daoud Kuttab, “Abbas bids adieu,” Al-Monitor, August 1, 2018. 104 Ibid.; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, “West Bank.” 105 Nathan J. Brown and Vladimir Pran, “A Procedural Guide to Palestinian Succession: The How of the Who,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 27, 2022. 106 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 85, September 13-17, 2022. 107 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “The Talented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020. Congressional Research Service 24 link to page 30 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations 2014 a PA court convicted him in absentia of libel, slander, and contempt of Palestinian institutions. Elections Since divided rule took hold in 2007—with the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza—no PA presidential or legislative elections for the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem have occurred, and the Palestinian Legislative Council has ceased to function. During the 15-year West Bank-Gaza split, Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered agreements aimed at ending the split and allowing elections to take place, but have generally not implemented these agreements. Municipal elections for some West Bank cities and towns occurred in 2012, 2017, and again in 2021-2022 as described below. In 2021, the PA announced and then postponed plans to hold legislative and presidential elections. President Abbas stating he was postponing elections because Israel was unwilling to allow East Jerusalem residents to vote. Some observers argue that Abbas Jerusalem residents to vote. Some observers argue that Abbas
may have been more concerned that Fatah could fare poorly in elections because of two may have been more concerned that Fatah could fare poorly in elections because of two
breakaway electoral lists headed by former Fatah members, and the possibility that these lists breakaway electoral lists headed by former Fatah members, and the possibility that these lists
might coordinate with Hamas to marginalize him and Fatah.might coordinate with Hamas to marginalize him and Fatah.73
~~After Hamas’s May 2021 conflict with Israel, Hamas’s favorability with Palestinians surpassed~~
~~Fatah’s in a June 2021 public opinion poll (see Figure 5). The poll suggested that many~~
~~Palestinians viewed Hamas as defending Jerusalem for them, while also viewing Abbas as largely~~
~~self-interested in postponing elections.74 Hamas lost some of its advantage over Fatah in another~~
~~poll in September 2021.~~
~~Figure 5. Public Opinion Polling: Support for Domestic Political Factions~~
~~(Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)~~

Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying pol ing data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
~~In his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, Abbas claimed that the PA stil plans to~~
~~hold elections as soon as Israel al ows the participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. He~~
~~said that in the meantime, he would continue pursuing efforts to forge a unity government that~~
~~would end the West Bank-Gaza split, and that additional municipal elections would occur in~~
~~coming months.75~~
~~The historical memory of Hamas’s surprise victory in the last PA elections to be held—the~~
~~legislative~~ 108 In his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, Abbas said that the PA was still planning to hold elections as soon as Israel would allow the participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. He said that in the meantime, he would continue pursuing efforts to forge a unity government that would end the West Bank-Gaza split, and that additional municipal elections would occur.109 Municipal elections did take place in the West Bank in December 2021 and March 2022. Hamas did not permit them to take place in Gaza. Most candidates were nominally independent, which obscured how the contest between Fatah and Hamas loyalists played out.110 However, some other elections for university student councils in the West Bank suggest that momentum among younger voters may favor Hamas and work to Fatah’s detriment.111 See Figure 5 for public opinion polling in the past year regarding popular support for Hamas and Fatah. 108 Daoud Kuttab, “Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021. 109 Transcript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). 110 Ahmad Melhem, “West Bank local elections bring Hamas, PFLP closer,” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022. 111 Basil Adraa, “Hamas’ landslide student election win marks major shift in Palestinian politics,” +972 Magazine, May 31, 2022. Congressional Research Service 25 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 5. Public Opinion Polling: Support for Domestic Political Factions (Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying polling data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. The historical memory of Hamas’s surprise victory in the last PA elections to be held—the legislative elections of 2006—could affect various actors’ views on whether and how to hold elections of 2006—could affect various actors’ views on whether and how to hold
future PA elections. After Hamas assumed control over PA ministries with its legislativefuture PA elections. After Hamas assumed control over PA ministries with its legislative majority, majority,
the United States and other Western actors significantly restructured assistance for the PA to the United States and other Western actors significantly restructured assistance for the PA to
prevent its use by those ministries. Changes made to U.S. law and annual appropriations prevent its use by those ministries. Changes made to U.S. law and annual appropriations
legislationlegislation (see textbox below) remain possible constraints on aid to PA governments with Hamas (see textbox below) remain possible constraints on aid to PA governments with Hamas

~~73 Daoud Kuttab, “ Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021.~~
~~74 Joseph Krauss, “ Poll finds dramatic rise in Palestinian support for Hamas,” Associated Press, June 15, 2021.~~
~~75 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

20

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

participation or influence. The ensuing 2006-2007 struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control participation or influence. The ensuing 2006-2007 struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control
of the PA—fueled in part by external actors—contributed to the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split that of the PA—fueled in part by external actors—contributed to the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split that
created the divided rule of today. created the divided rule of today.
Fatah-Hamas “Unity Government” Scenario and U.S. Aid
Per regular annual appropriations provisions, Per regular annual appropriations provisions, U.S. aid is U.S. aid is ~~general y~~generally not permitted for a power-sharing PA not permitted for a power-sharing PA
government that includes Hamas as a member,government that includes Hamas as a member, or that resultsor that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which from an agreement with Hamas and over which
Hamas exercisesHamas exercises “undue influence.” This general restriction“undue influence.” This general restriction is only lifted if the President certifiesis only lifted if the President certifies that the PA that the PA
government, including government, including al all ministers,ministers, has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the ~~fol owing~~following two principles two principles
embodied in Section 620K of the Foreign Assistanceembodied in Section 620K of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism
Act of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446): (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’sAct of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446): (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance right to exist” and (2) acceptance
of previous Israeli-Palestinianof previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.agreements.76 112 If the PA government is “Hamas-If the PA government is “Hamas-~~control ed,”~~ controlled,” PATA applies additional PATA applies additional
conditions, limitations,conditions, limitations, and restrictionsand restrictions on aid. on aid.
If future elections happen, it is unclear what implications they If future elections happen, it is unclear what implications they ~~wil~~ will have for Palestinian have for Palestinian
governance and international relationships. Open questions include whether elections can take governance and international relationships. Open questions include whether elections can take
place in a free and fair manner, include international observers, and garner acceptance from both place in a free and fair manner, include international observers, and garner acceptance from both
Fatah and Hamas in the event of adverse outcomes for either.Fatah and Hamas in the event of adverse outcomes for either.77
~~Succession~~
~~Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA, PLO, and Fatah upon the end of Abbas’s tenure—~~
~~whether via elections or otherwise.~~
Marwan Barghouti—a major Fatah leader who has supported negotiating with Israel at times,
~~and armed resistance against Israel at other times—is more popular than Abbas in public opinion~~
~~polls.78 Barghouti joined one of the breakaway electoral lists during the abortive campaign in~~
~~early 2021.~~
~~Other Palestinian leaders who could be involved in succeeding Abbas include~~
~~ Mohammed Dahlan was a top security figure in Gaza under Arafat who is based~~
~~in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His apparent involvement with Israel-UAE~~
~~normalization has fueled some speculation about regional and international~~
~~support for him in future PLO/PA leadership.79 While Dahlan has some political~~
~~support in the West Bank and Gaza, he remains a pariah within Fatah leadership.~~
~~The faction expel ed him in 2011 after he and Abbas had a fal ing out, and in~~
~~2014 a PA court convicted him in absentia of libel, slander, and contempt of~~
~~Palestinian institutions.~~
 Majid Faraj (arguably Abbas’s most trusted security figure) and Salam Fayyad
~~(a previous PA prime minister) are prominent international y, but have little~~
~~domestic popular support.~~
~~ Mohammed Shtayyeh (PA prime minister since 2019) is an international y~~
~~visible Fatah insider.~~

~~76 P.L. 116-260, §7040(f).~~
77113 112 P.L. 117-103, §7040(f). 113 “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2021. , January 17, 2021.
~~78 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 81, published September 21, 2021 (poll taken September 15-18, 2021).~~
~~79 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “T he T alented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2126

link to page link to page 4951 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

~~ Nasser al Qudwa (a former PLO diplomat and Arafat’s nephew) is another~~
~~international y visible figure who was expel ed from Fatah in March 2021 for~~
~~forming a breakaway electoral list (which Barghouti later joined).~~
~~ Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril Rajoub have political heft within Fatah, but~~
~~relatively less international experience.~~
Governance and Human Rights Concerns
The PA has executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance ( The PA has executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance (seesee Appendix C for an for an
overview), but in practical terms, President Abbas has few domestic checks on his power. The overview), but in practical terms, President Abbas has few domestic checks on his power. The
West Bank-Gaza split rendered the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) inoperative in 2007. West Bank-Gaza split rendered the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) inoperative in 2007.
Since then, Abbas has appointed prime ministers and other cabinet officials without legislative Since then, Abbas has appointed prime ministers and other cabinet officials without legislative
approval and has governed by presidential decree. He dissolved the PLC in 2018 pending future approval and has governed by presidential decree. He dissolved the PLC in 2018 pending future
elections. Some Palestinian judges and other observers have protested President Abbas’s elections. Some Palestinian judges and other observers have protested President Abbas’s
heightened control over the judiciary.heightened control over the judiciary.80114 In 2016, he created a new Constitutional Court made up In 2016, he created a new Constitutional Court made up
of his appointees, and in 2019 he restructured the High Judicial Council that supervises the of his appointees, and in 2019 he restructured the High Judicial Council that supervises the
~~judicial~~ judicial system and nominates judges.system and nominates judges.81
~~In March~~ 115 In 2021, President Abbas issued a decree that requires 2021, President Abbas issued a decree that requires ~~non-governmental organizations~~
~~(NGOs)~~NGOs to submit their yearly plans of action and budgets to the PA. to submit their yearly plans of action and budgets to the PA.82116 Because of the Because of the ~~new layer~~
layer of requirements that the decree of requirements that the decree ~~adds~~has added to existing regulations on NGOs, some observers interpret it to existing regulations on NGOs, some observers interpret it
as giving the PA significant control over the civil society sector in the West Bank.as giving the PA significant control over the civil society sector in the West Bank.83117
Within this governing context, Abbas and the PA routinely face Within this governing context, Abbas and the PA routinely face ~~al egations~~allegations of corruption and non- of corruption and non-
transparency.transparency.84118 The State Department has noted continuing claims of corruption among Fatah The State Department has noted continuing claims of corruption among Fatah
officials, “particularly related to favoritism and nepotism in public-sector appointments.”officials, “particularly related to favoritism and nepotism in public-sector appointments.”85
~~Some developments in 2021 have highlighted domestic and international concerns about PA~~
~~governance. PA authorities reportedly increased repressive measures against public dissent after~~
~~Abbas postponed 2021 PA legislative and presidential elections.86 These measures, which~~
~~continued in the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian violence in May 2021, have included the reported~~
~~arrest of dozens of people for political activity criticizing the PA.87~~
119 Some Palestinians directly associate Israel’s occupation with this claimed corruption by arguing that privileges accorded by Israel to PA elites tie those elites to the system of overarching Israeli control.120 Some sources highlight domestic and international concerns about PA governance and repressive measures against public dissent. In June 2021, Nizar Banat, a prominent activist from Hebron who also had been a candidate in In June 2021, Nizar Banat, a prominent activist from Hebron who also had been a candidate in
the postponed legislative elections, died shortly after PA forces detained him for posting online the postponed legislative elections, died shortly after PA forces detained him for posting online
critiques of PA policies. Claims from Banat’s family and other evidence suggest that the critiques of PA policies. Claims from Banat’s family and other evidence suggest that the
authorities may have beaten him to death.authorities may have beaten him to death.88

~~80 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.”~~
81121 The State Department spokesperson expressed deep disturbance over Banat’s death and its reported circumstances and called for the PA to ensure a thorough and transparent investigation and full accountability.122 The PA charged 14 security personnel in a military court in connection with Banat’s death, but some observers expressed skepticism that the proceedings would significantly change the PA’s 114 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.” 115 European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Palestinian Politics website, European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Palestinian Politics website,
https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/justice_system/. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/justice_system/.
82116 Isabel Kershner and Adam Rasgon, “ Isabel Kershner and Adam Rasgon, “ Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s AuthoritarianismCritic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism ,” ,” New
York ~~Tim es~~Times, July 7, 2021; Qassam Muaddi,, July 7, 2021; Qassam Muaddi, “ “Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOsPalestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab,” raises fear of power grab,”
Middle East Eye, March 3, 2021. , March 3, 2021.
83 117 Muaddi, Muaddi, “Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs“Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab.” raises fear of power grab.”
84118 “Criticism of Palestinian security forces raises pressure on Abbas,” “Criticism of Palestinian security forces raises pressure on Abbas,” Reuters, June 30, 2021. , June 30, 2021.
85119 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for ~~2020~~2021: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza. 120 Mukand, “A year on, Nizar Banat’s killing sheds light on PA corruption.” 121 Joseph Krauss, “Critic of Palestinian Authority dies after violent arrest,” Associated Press, June 24, 2021. 122 State Department, “Death of Palestinian Activist Nizar Banat,” June 24, 2021. Congressional Research Service 27 link to page 8 link to page 48 link to page 51 link to page 51 link to page 54 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations approaches to dissent.123 The defendants were released on bail in June 2022,124 and the trial is ongoing as of October 2022. Additional concerns expressed by governments and human rights monitors regarding PA practices ~~: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza.~~
~~86 Patrick Kingsley, “Palestinian Vote Postponed, Prolonging T ensions,” New York Times, April 30, 2021.~~
~~87 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinian Authority Critic Dies While Under Arrest, Igniting a Demonstration,” New York Times,~~
~~June 25, 2021.~~
~~88 Joseph Krauss, “ Critic of Palestinian Authority dies after violent arrest ,” Associated Press, June 24, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

22

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~The State Department spokesperson expressed deep disturbance over Banat’s death and its~~
~~reported circumstances. He further said:~~
~~We urge the Palestinian Authority to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation and~~
~~to ensure full accountability in this case. We have serious concerns about Palestinian~~
~~Authority restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression by Palestinians and~~
~~harassment of civil society activists and organizations.89~~
~~In September, the PA charged 14 security personnel in a military court in connection with Banat’s~~
~~death, but some observers expressed skepticism that the proceedings would significantly change~~
~~the PA’s approaches to dissent.90~~
~~Heightened concerns regarding PA human rights abuses create a dilemma for U.S. officials who~~
~~resumed security assistance for the PA in 2021 and general y seek to strengthen the PA relative to~~
~~Hamas.91 A U.S. embassy spokesperson was quoted in July 2021 as saying that U.S. security~~
~~assistance for the PA is intended to “to assist in the development of credible institutions of~~
~~governance” in addition to strengthening Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.92~~
~~Additional concerns expressed by governments and human rights monitors regarding PA practices~~
on rule of law and civil liberties include: on rule of law and civil liberties include:
  Internet restrictions. In 2017, President Abbas issued the Electronic Crimes Law, In 2017, President Abbas issued the Electronic Crimes Law,
prescribing heavy fines and lengthy prison terms for a range of vaguely defined offenses, prescribing heavy fines and lengthy prison terms for a range of vaguely defined offenses,
including the publication or dissemination of material that is critical of the state, disturbs including the publication or dissemination of material that is critical of the state, disturbs
public order or national unity, or harms family and religious values.public order or national unity, or harms family and religious values.93125
  Criminal justice. ~~Some reports~~Reports persist of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial or persist of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial or
charges, charges, torture, abuse, and isolation.torture, abuse, and isolation.94126
  Treatment of women. ~~Some reports~~Reports persist of employment discrimination and repressive persist of employment discrimination and repressive
work work conditions for women. conditions for women. ~~Additional y~~Additionally, while the PA has taken some steps toward , while the PA has taken some steps toward
greater legal protection for women, stronger laws or enforcement of the laws may be greater legal protection for women, stronger laws or enforcement of the laws may be
possible in preventing forms of discrimination or possible in preventing forms of discrimination or il ill-treatment, including rape and -treatment, including rape and
~~harassment. In a climate where domestic violence may be underreported, one in five~~
~~married women claim that their spouse has abused them.95~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy and Diplomatic Offices~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for~~
~~direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. At his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech,~~
~~President Biden said:~~

~~89 State Department, “ Death of Palestinian Activist Nizar Banat ,” June 24, 2021.~~
~~90 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinian Authority Indicts 14 Security Force Members in Activist’s Death ,” New York Times,~~
~~September 6, 2021.~~
~~91 Michael J. Koplow, “Holding Your Nose with the Palestinian Authority,” Israel Policy Forum, July 1, 2021.~~
~~92 Kershner and Rasgon, “ Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism .”~~
~~93 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.”~~
~~94 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza.~~
~~95 Ibid.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

23

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~But I continue to believe that a two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel—Israel’s~~
~~future as a Jewish, democratic state living in peace alongside a viable, sovereign, and~~
~~democratic Palestinian state.~~
~~We’re a long way from that goal at this moment, but we must never allow ourselves to give~~
~~up on the possibility of progress.96~~
~~Previously, in May 2021, Secretary Blinken spoke out against steps taken by Israelis or~~
~~Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—~~
~~including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payment to~~
~~terrorists.97~~
~~During his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Abbas said that the~~
~~Palestinians are “ready to work throughout this year on the delineation of borders and solving al~~
~~final status issues under the auspices of the international Quartet and in accordance with United~~
~~Nations resolutions.”98 Abbas also stated that if Israel does not withdraw from the territory it~~
~~occupied in 1967 within a year, the Palestinians would pursue a ruling on the legality of the~~
~~occupation at the International Court of Justice, while also implying that the PLO may revisit its~~
~~recognition of Israel’s right to exist that took place alongside the 1993 Declaration of Principles.~~
~~In August 2021, Abbas had met Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz—his first meeting with an~~
~~Israeli cabinet minister since 2010. Gantz said that the two agreed on steps to improve security~~
~~coordination and assist the PA financial y, including a $155 mil ion Israeli loan.99 Shortly after~~
~~that meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said that while Israel is open to helping the~~
~~PA economical y, Israel has no intention of engaging in a diplomatic process at the time.100~~
~~In addition to the loan mentioned above, Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’~~
~~circumstances, “including issuing 15,000 new work permits inside Israel for [West Bank]~~
~~Palestinians… re-establishing Joint Economic Committees to discuss future projects, al owing~~
~~reunification (i.e. legal status) for Palestinian spouses in the West Bank, and tentatively approving~~
~~2,000 new housing units for Palestinians in the part of the West Bank under full Israeli~~
~~control.”101 In October 2021, Israeli authorities announced an additional 3,000 work permits~~
~~inside Israel for Gazans.102 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli~~
~~efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilateral y rather than responsively address its causes~~
~~through dialogue and negotiation with Palestinians.103~~
~~Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups~~
~~In October 2021, Defense Minister Gantz—apparently acting with the approval of the state prosecutor, but~~
~~without consulting Prime Minister Bennett or other key cabinet ministers—announced the designation of six~~

~~96 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,”~~
~~September 21, 2021.~~
~~97 State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021.~~
~~98 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). T he international Quartet includes the United States, European~~
~~Union, Russia, and the U.N. Secretary-General’s office.~~
~~99 Yaniv Kubovich, “Gantz Says Agreed with Abbas on Confidence-building Measures, Including $155m Loan,”~~
~~haaretz.com, August 30, 2021.~~
~~100 Ibid.~~
~~101 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN,~~
~~September 16, 2021.~~
~~102 “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021.~~
~~103 Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

24

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the~~
~~Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).104 According to the~~
New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian
~~Authority and Hamas, as wel as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women,~~
~~farmworkers and children.”105 The designations, which have sparked some domestic and international criticism,~~
~~could significantly curtail these groups’ funding and activities, and subject their supporters to Israeli criminal~~
~~prosecution. Some of the groups receive funding from the European Union and other international actors. In~~
~~response to a U.S. request for clarification, Israeli officials were preparing as of late October to share evidence~~
~~that they claim supports the terrorist designations.106~~
~~As part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to reengage with the Palestinians, then-Acting U.S.~~
~~Representative to the United Nations Richard Mil s said in January 2021 that the Administration~~
~~would “take steps to re-open diplomatic missions that were closed by the last U.S.~~
~~administration.”107 This statement apparently refers to (1) the U.S. consulate general in~~
~~Jerusalem—which had operated for decades as an independent diplomatic mission engaging the~~
~~Palestinians—that the Trump Administration merged into the U.S. embassy to Israel in 2019; and~~
~~(2) the PLO representative office in Washington, DC, which the Trump Administration caused to~~
~~close in 2018.~~
~~U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem~~
~~Since Ambassador Mil s’s January statement, Biden Administration officials have repeated their~~
~~intention to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, without specifying the timing. One media~~
~~report says that the Administration has agreed to delay the consulate’s reopening until sometime~~
~~after a critical budget deadline for Israel’s new government in mid-November 2021.108 However,~~
~~Israeli Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar said in October that Israel would continue to oppose the~~
~~consulate’s reopening after this deadline. In previously stating his opposition to the reopening,~~
~~Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid voiced concerns that it could destabilize Israel’s government~~
~~and insisted that “Jerusalem is the sovereign capital of Israel and Israel alone.”109 Additional y,~~
~~Prime Minister Bennett revealed that he expressed displeasure about the proposed reopening in~~
~~his August White House visit with President Biden.110~~
~~Since the 2019 merger of the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem into the U.S. embassy to Israel,~~
~~U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem have conducted relations with the Palestinians via the embassy’s~~
~~Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU). Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate~~
~~as an independent diplomatic mission that would work in paral el with, rather than as a part of,~~
~~the embassy.~~
~~A senior Palestinian official was quoted in October 2021 as saying that reopening the consulate is~~
~~more important to Palestinians than the PLO office in Washington, DC, because “the consulate is~~

~~104 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24,~~
~~2021.~~
~~105 Patrick Kingsley, “ Palestine Rights Groups Called T errorists by Israel,” New York Times, October 23, 2021.~~
~~106 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US.”~~
~~107 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, “ Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate~~
~~on the Situation in the Middle East (via VT C),” January 26, 2021.~~
~~108 Shalom Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate in Ramallah or Abu Dis, US said no ,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, September 28, 2021.~~
~~109 “Israel opposes Biden plan to reopen U.S. Palestinian mission in Jerusalem ,” Reuters, September 1, 2021.~~
~~110 Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

25

~~link to page 33 link to page 31~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~the seed of the American Embassy to the future Palestinian state and a statement about everything~~
~~related to the administration’s position on Jerusalem.”111~~ harassment. One in five married women state that their spouse has abused them.127 Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas, Conflict, and Humanitarian Concerns The Gaza Strip (see Figure 2) presents complicated challenges for U.S. policy. Hamas, Israel, the PA, and several outside actors affect Gaza’s difficult security, political, and humanitarian situations. Since Hamas seized de facto control within Gaza in 2007 (for more information on Hamas and Gaza, see Appendix B and Appendix C), these situations have fueled occasional violence between Israel and Hamas (along with other Palestinian militants based in Gaza) that could recur in the future. The precarious security situation in Gaza is linked to humanitarian conditions, and because Gaza does not have a self-sufficient economy (see Appendix C and Appendix D), external assistance largely drives humanitarian welfare. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of electricity and safe drinking water.128 The possibility that humanitarian crisis could destabilize Gaza has prompted some efforts aimed at improving living conditions and reducing spillover threats. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.129 123 Adam Rasgon, “Palestinian Authority Indicts 14 Security Force Members in Activist’s Death,” New York Times, September 6, 2021. 124 Mukand, “A year on, Nizar Banat’s killing sheds light on PA corruption.” 125 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, “West Bank.” 126 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza. 127 Ibid. 128 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, at https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-critical-humanitarian-indicators. 129 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Congressional Research Service 28 link to page 48 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Four large-scale conflicts took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021. In each of these conflicts, the militants fired rockets into Israel, while Israel conducted airstrikes in Gaza targeting militants (for more information on threats to Israel from Palestinian violence, see the text box in Appendix B). Israel also launched some ground operations in the 2008-2009 and 2014 conflicts. In the aftermath of each conflict, significant international attention focused on the still largely unfulfilled tasks of:  improving humanitarian conditions and economic opportunities for Palestinians in Gaza; and  preventing Hamas and other militants from reconstituting arsenals and military infrastructure. No significant breakthrough has occurred to reconcile civilian infrastructure needs with security considerations. Major progress in reconstruction might require one or more of the following: (1) a political reunification of Gaza with the West Bank, (2) reduced Israeli and Egyptian restrictions on access and commerce, and/or (3) a long-term Hamas-Israel cease-fire. Egypt plays a key role in both Israel-Hamas and Hamas-Fatah mediation.130 Political reunification would appear to depend on Hamas’s willingness to cede control of security in Gaza to the PA. In the past, PA President Abbas has insisted that he will not accept a situation where PA control is undermined by Hamas’s militia.131 Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage donor pledges toward post-conflict reconstruction, leading to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.132 With sensitivity to Israel’s worries about diversion, Qatar—which had been providing cash assistance to Gaza since 2018—began an arrangement after the 2021 conflict to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.133 Qatar and Egypt also established a mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to provide assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries.134 For three days in early August 2022, Israel and PIJ militants in Gaza exchanged fire. Hamas stayed out of the violence, with some sources intimating that Israeli measures loosening access restrictions on goods and permitting thousands of Gazans to work in Israel may have provided Hamas with economic incentives not to fight.135 A similar round of violence between Israel and PIJ (with Hamas abstaining) took place in November 2019. Diplomatic and Economic Measures Although Biden Administration officials state their intention to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they have played down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. While voicing support for a two-state solution in his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Biden also said, “We’re a long 130 Maged Mandour, “Egypt’s Shifting Hamas Policies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 26, 2021. 131 “Abbas: If PA not handed control of Gaza, Hamas must take full responsibility,” Times of Israel, August 18, 2018. 132 Ibid. 133 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2021. 134 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 135 See, for example, Dov Lieber et al., “Hamas Considers Cost of Conflict,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2022. Congressional Research Service 29 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations way from that goal at this moment, but we must never allow ourselves to give up on the possibility of progress.”136 In a September 2022 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Abbas expressed frustration with U.S. and Israeli statements that support a two-state solution but do not set forth a specific timetable for negotiations: I listened in the last few days what US President Joe Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and other world leaders said in support of the two-State solution, and this is positive. The real test of the seriousness and credibility of this position is for the Israeli government to sit at the negotiating table immediately to implement the two-State solution on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and the cessation of all unilateral measures that undermine the two-state solution.137 In October 2022, Abbas openly criticized the United States during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and said that the Palestinians do not trust America as the sole party to mediate Israeli-Palestinian disputes. A National Security Council spokesperson defended the Administration’s commitment to working toward lasting peace, and said that Russia was not a credible partner on issues of justice and international law given its actions in Ukraine.138 U.S. and Israeli Engagement Biden Administration officials have repeatedly encouraged measures that can preserve or enhance prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and have spoken out against unilateral steps that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states.139 At a September 2022 U.N. Security Council briefing, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield said: This [type of unilateral action] includes terrorist attacks and incitement to violence against Israelis. This includes plans to develop Har Gilo west [a proposed Israeli settlement just south of Jerusalem], which would further fragment the West Bank—and possible demolitions in Masafer Yatta [a West Bank community that Israel considers to be in a closed military zone]. And this includes violence inflicted by Israeli settlers on Palestinians in their neighborhoods, and in some cases escorted by Israeli Security Forces…. The United States is doing its part to help. This July, while in the region, President Biden announced a number of measures to improve conditions for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza, including additional funding for UNRWA. We’re now working to expand 4G digital connectivity to Gaza and the West Bank and improve accessibility to the Allenby Bridge [the Israeli-administered crossing point between the West Bank and Jordan]. And we encourage the Government of Israel to move these projects forward quickly.140 Since 2021, Israel has taken some steps aimed at assisting Palestinian economic stability and living conditions, including loaning $186 million to the PA and expanding the availability of work 136 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2021. 137 “President Abbas at UNGA: Our confidence in achieving peace based on justice and international law is waning,” WAFA, September 23, 2022. 138 Barak Ravid, “White House ‘very disappointed’ by Palestinian president's remarks to Putin,” Axios, October 15, 2022. 139 See, for example, State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021. 140 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 30 link to page 54 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations permits for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.141 A September 2022 public opinion poll suggested that 69% of Palestinians there support such steps,142 but some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through dialogue and negotiation with Palestinians.143 Israel continues to generally restrict Palestinian businesses from accessing Area C of the West Bank. The World Bank has calculated that permitting such access could “boost the Palestinian economy by a third and increase revenues by 6% of GDP,” which could help address current Palestinian economic challenges that include (1) lingering negative effects from the COVID-19 pandemic, (2) significant inflation largely tied to the Russia-Ukraine war, and (3) systemic debt problems exacerbated by a bloated public sector payroll and a drop in external donor aid as a share of GDP (from 27% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2021).144 See Appendix D for more background on Palestinian economic issues. Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups In October 2021, Israel announced the designation of six Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).145 According to the New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, as well as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women, farmworkers and children.”146 According to one source, “Palestinian senior human rights experts believe that Israel wants to restrict the activities of the Palestinian human rights institutions that worked to submit files to the International Criminal Court and were able to change world opinion about Palestinian human rights issues.”147 Israel has provided information to U.S. and European officials and lawmakers in support of its designations, but the European Union and various EU countries have decided to continue supporting the organizations, with some EU member states saying that they had not received information justifying Israel’s allegations against the groups.148 Israeli assertions have not changed U.S. policy, and some Members of Congress reportedly did not consider Israel’s evidence to be sufficient.149 The State Department spokesperson has said that the United States has never funded any of the organizations.150 In August 2022, Israeli authorities formally ordered the closure of all six organizations, searched their offices, and confiscated or destroyed files and equipment. The groups continue to operate in defiance of the closure orders.151 141 Shrock et al., “Responding to the PA’s Mounting Fiscal Crisis”; Danny Zaken, “Israel adds 2,000 work permits for Gaza Palestinians,” Al-Monitor, June 17, 2022. 142 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 85, published September 20, 2022 (poll taken September 13-17, 2022). 143 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. 144 World Bank press release, “Coordinated Efforts Are Required to Avoid a Worsening Economic and Fiscal Outlook in the Palestinian Territories,” September 18, 2022; World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2022. 145 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24, 2021. 146 Patrick Kingsley, “Palestine Rights Groups Called Terrorists by Israel,” New York Times, October 23, 2021. 147 Mohammed Najib, “Palestinian rights groups defy Israeli threats, reopen offices, resume work,” Arab News, August 26, 2022. 148 Rami Almeghari, “EU resumes funding for six Palestinian NGOs branded as terrorists by Israel,” Radio France Internationale, August 7, 2022. 149 Isaac Scher, “CIA unable to corroborate Israel’s ‘terror’ label for Palestinian rights groups,” Guardian, August 22, 2022. 150 State Department Press Briefing, August 18, 2022. 151 Najib, “Palestinian rights groups defy Israeli threats.” Congressional Research Service 31 link to page 37 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem As Israelis and Palestinians continue to As Israelis and Palestinians continue to
vie for U.S. and international validation of Jerusalem’s role in their respective national vie for U.S. and international validation of Jerusalem’s role in their respective national
narratives,narratives,~~112~~ Israeli-Palestinian tensions over Jerusalem persist, including on issues such as: Israeli-Palestinian tensions over Jerusalem persist, including on issues such as:
 Access to, worship at, and Israeli security measures at holy sites,  Access to, worship at, and Israeli security measures at holy sites, ~~especial y~~especially the Temple the Temple
Mount/Haram al Sharif “status quo.” Mount/Haram al Sharif “status quo.”~~113~~152
 East Jerusalem property issues, particularly actions by Israeli officials toward building  East Jerusalem property issues, particularly actions by Israeli officials toward building
new Jewish settlements and new Jewish settlements and ~~neighborhoods (see “Israeli Settlements in the West Bank”),~~
neighborhood, or favoring Jewish residents or claimed historical sites over Palestinian ones.or favoring Jewish residents or claimed historical sites over Palestinian ones.~~114~~
~~PA officials are unsure whether the U.S. consulate, if reopened, would be located at the West~~
~~Jerusalem (Agron Road) location of the former consulate general (and current PAU) or the East~~
~~Jerusalem (Nablus Road) location currently known as “America House”—the educational and~~
~~cultural arm of the PAU (see Figure 6).115 Reportedly, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett was~~
~~unsuccessful in August in an effort to convince President Biden to open a consulate somewhere in~~
~~the West Bank near (but not within) Jerusalem, such as Ramal ah or the town of Abu Dis.116~~

~~111 Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem~~
~~After Israel Approves Budget ,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.~~
~~112 For background information see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and~~
~~CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~113 Patrick Kingsley and Adam Rasgon, “ Quietly Allowing Jewish Prayer on T emple Mount ,” New York Times, August~~
~~24, 2021. For a description of the “status quo,” see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by~~
~~Jim Zanotti.~~
~~114 “Sheikh Jarrah: Why could Palestinians lose their homes in Jerusalem?” BBC News, August 3, 2021; Stefanie~~
~~Glinski, “A Razed Building and Another Possible Flash Point in East Jerusalem,” foreignpolicy.com, July 1, 2021.~~
~~115 Khoury and Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate.”~~
~~116 Ibid.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

26153 Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without specifying when the consulate might reopen.154 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S. Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU) within the embassy (see Figure 6). Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides appealing to U.S. officials about the importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.155 152 CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 153 Ibid. 154 State Department Press Briefing, May 31, 2022. 155 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 32

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 6. Jerusalem: Key Sites
(including various facilities of the U.S. Embassy to Israel) (including various facilities of the U.S. Embassy to Israel)

~~Notes:~~ Al Note: All boundaries are approximate.boundaries are approximate.
Reestablishing the consulate would Reestablishing the consulate would ~~probably require Israel’s approval~~ require Israeli cooperation, given the need for given the need for
~~cooperation from~~ Israeli Israeli authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.156 In a November 3, 2021, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Brian McKeon said that “the practical reality is we would need privileges and immunities, which only the state of Israel can provide.”157 Several top Israeli officials have voiced strong opposition to a proposed reopening in Jerusalem.158 In late 2021, Members of Congress introduced bills in both houses (S. 3063 and H.R. 6004) that would oppose reopening a consulate in Jerusalem to handle relations with the Palestinians, and prohibit funding for any diplomatic facility in Jerusalem other than the U.S. Embassy in Israel. A December 2021 Israeli media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.159 In June 2022, the PAU was re-branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy while reporting directly to Washington.160 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the 156 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Israeli Discretion?” Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021. 157 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6386943?16. 158 “Next test for Israel PM: US plan for Palestinian mission,” Agence France Presse, November 8, 2021. 159 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel, December 15, 2021. 160 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 33 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations previous consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, President Abbas has continued to press for the reopening of the consulate.161 PLO Office in Washington, DC The possible reopening of the PLO’s representative office in Washington, DC is another issue with resonance for U.S.-Palestinian relations. ~~authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.117 Given~~
~~Israel’s insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality is its capital and the tenuous nature of~~
~~the current multi-party Israeli government coalition, Israeli approval for a separate U.S.~~
~~diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could be political y fraught.~~
~~Members in both Houses have written letters to President Biden sharing varying opinions on a~~
~~possible consulate reopening.118~~
~~It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S. consulate reopening is essential y a practical~~
~~matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is also founded on law such as the 1963~~
~~Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.119 President Trump’s December 2017 proclamation on~~
~~Jerusalem recognized it as Israel’s capital, but did not delineate specific boundaries of Israeli~~
~~sovereignty in Jerusalem.120 After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the~~
~~U.S. consulate general continued to operate independently until it was subsumed into the embassy~~

~~117 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Isra eli Discretion?”~~
~~Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021.~~
~~118 See one letter from Senators at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/6bac9328-6a10-4228-bbcb-~~
~~c2af5e37c891/1B79ECA7429EFB5EA32C8B67826E7BA8.06.07.21 -letter-to-biden-on-palestinian-diplomatic-~~
~~relations.pdf; and one letter from Representatives at https://jstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Letter-to-POTUS-~~
~~on-T rump-Israel-Policy-Rollback.pdf.~~
~~119 For varying views, see Efron and Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate”; Alan Baker, “ A U.S. Consulate for the~~
~~Palestinians Should Be on Palestinian T erritory – Not in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 15,~~
~~2021. T he text of the Vienna Convention is available at~~
~~https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf .~~
~~120 Presidential Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017, “Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel~~
~~and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem,” available at~~
~~https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-11/pdf/2017-26832.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

27

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~in March 2019. Several other countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem~~
~~for decades and continue to do so, including the United Kingdom and France.~~
~~PLO Office in Washington, DC~~
In September 2018, the State Department announced that the office maintained by the PLO in In September 2018, the State Department announced that the office maintained by the PLO in
Washington, DC, would cease operating. Though not Washington, DC, would cease operating. Though not ~~diplomatical y~~diplomatically accredited, the office had accredited, the office had
functioned since the 1990s as a focal point for U.S.-Palestinian relations. functioned since the 1990s as a focal point for U.S.-Palestinian relations.
PLO Office in Washington, DC: Timeline of Key Events
1978 1978
PLO opens office in Washington, DC, to disseminate PLO opens office in Washington, DC, to disseminate information about itself and the Palestinian information about itself and the Palestinian
cause. cause.
1987 1987
Congress passes the Anti-Terrorism Congress passes the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Title X of P.L.Act of 1987 (Title X of P.L. 100-204), which determines that 100-204), which determines that
“the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist“the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization” and (under Section 1003) prohibits the PLO organization” and (under Section 1003) prohibits the PLO
from maintaining an office in the United States. President Reagan signsfrom maintaining an office in the United States. President Reagan signs P.L. 100-204 in DecemberP.L. 100-204 in December but but
adds a signing statement saying that “the right to decide the kind of foreign relations,adds a signing statement saying that “the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the if any, the
United States United States ~~wil~~ will maintain is encompassed by the President’smaintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, authority under the Constitution,
including the express grant of authority in Articleincluding the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receiveII, Section 3, to receive ambassadors.”ambassadors.”~~121~~162 The State The State
Department instructs the PLO to close its office. Department instructs the PLO to close its office.
1994 1994
As the Oslo peace process As the Oslo peace process gets underway, the PLO opens a representativegets underway, the PLO opens a representative office in Washingtonoffice in Washington , ,
DC. DespiteDC. Despite the prohibition of a PLO office in P.L. 100-204, Congress provides waiverthe prohibition of a PLO office in P.L. 100-204, Congress provides waiver authority to authority to
the executive branch. the executive branch.
1997 1997
The PLO office briefly The PLO office briefly closes after a lapse in waivercloses after a lapse in waiver authority, and reopens after Congress authority, and reopens after Congress
reinstitutes the waiverreinstitutes the waiver and the executive branch exercisesand the executive branch exercises it. it.
2017 2017
The State Department announces in November The State Department announces in November that it cannot renew the waiverthat it cannot renew the waiver (required every six (required every six
months in annual appropriations legislation)months in annual appropriations legislation) because of statements made by Palestinian leadersbecause of statements made by Palestinian leaders about about
the International Criminalthe International Criminal Court (ICC),Court (ICC),~~122 but al ows~~163 but allows the PLO office to remain open so long as its the PLO office to remain open so long as its
activities are limitedactivities are limited “to those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive“to those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between the peace between the
IsraelisIsraelis and Palestinians.”and Palestinians.”~~123~~ 164 A State Department spokespersonA State Department spokesperson ~~justifies~~ justifies the actions by saying that the actions by saying that
they “are consistent with the president's authorities to conduct the foreign relationsthey “are consistent with the president's authorities to conduct the foreign relations of the United of the United
States.”States.”~~124~~165
2018 2018
The State Department announces the closure The State Department announces the closure of the PLO office in September. of the PLO office in September.

It is unclear whether the It is unclear whether the ~~Administration can legal y~~ executive branch can legally authorize the PLO to reopen its Washington authorize the PLO to reopen its Washington
office. Under the annual appropriations language found in Section 7041(k) of the Consolidated office. Under the annual appropriations language found in Section 7041(k) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), the general prohibition in Section 1003 of the Anti-Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), the general prohibition in Section 1003 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) on a PLO office can Terrorism Act (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) on a PLO office can ~~general y~~generally only be waived by only be waived by
the President if he can certify that Palestinian leaders have not “actively supported an ICC the President if he can certify that Palestinian leaders have not “actively supported an ICC
~~investigation against Israeli nationals for al eged crimes against Palestinians.” The State~~
~~Department determined in November 2017 that this waiver requirement had not been met because~~
~~of Palestinian statements regarding ICC proceedings relating to Israelis. However, in September~~

~~121~~ 161 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. 162 President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, December 22, 1987, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement1989, December 22, 1987, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement -signing-the-foreign--signing-the-foreign-
relations-authorization-act-fiscal-years-1988-and-1989. relations-authorization-act-fiscal-years-1988-and-1989.
~~122~~ 163 State Department Press Briefing, November 21, 2017. State Department Press Briefing, November 21, 2017.
~~123~~164 Josh Lederman, “ Josh Lederman, “ US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24, US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24,
2017.2017.
~~124 T hen~~165 Then-State Department spokesperson Edgar Vasquez,-State Department spokesperson Edgar Vasquez, ~~quoted in “ US~~ quoted in “US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian backtracks on decision to close Palestinian
office in DC,” office in DC,” Associated Press,, November 24, 2017. November 24, 2017.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2834

link to page 56 link to page 56 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

investigation against Israeli nationals for alleged crimes against Palestinians.” The State Department determined in November 2017 that this waiver requirement had not been met because of PLO/PA statements regarding ICC proceedings relating to Israelis. However, in September 2018, the Justice Department issued a memorandum opinion for the State Department’s legal 2018, the Justice Department issued a memorandum opinion for the State Department’s legal
adviser stating that Congress cannot dictate State Department actions regarding the status of the adviser stating that Congress cannot dictate State Department actions regarding the status of the
PLO office—via the ATA or other legislation—because the President has exclusive constitutional PLO office—via the ATA or other legislation—because the President has exclusive constitutional
authority “to receive foreign diplomatic agents in the United States and to determine the authority “to receive foreign diplomatic agents in the United States and to determine the
conditions under which they may operate.”conditions under which they may operate.”~~125~~166
A separate question is whether the PLO would be A separate question is whether the PLO would be ~~wil ing~~willing to reopen its Washington office. Under to reopen its Washington office. Under
the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA, Section 903 the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA, Section 903
of P.L. 116-94), which became law in December 2019, the PLO’s establishment of an office in the of P.L. 116-94), which became law in December 2019, the PLO’s establishment of an office in the
United States could subject it to liabilityUnited States could subject it to liability in U.S. courts for terrorism-related lawsuits. The extent in U.S. courts for terrorism-related lawsuits. The extent
to which Congress can provide by statute that a foreign entity is deemed to consent to personal to which Congress can provide by statute that a foreign entity is deemed to consent to personal
jurisdiction by establishing or maintaining facilities in the United States appears to be untested in jurisdiction by establishing or maintaining facilities in the United States appears to be untested in
the U.S. legal system.the U.S. legal system.~~126 However, the PSJVTA provision has reportedly given~~167 The PSJVTA provision reportedly led to some Palestinian Palestinian
officials and officials and advisers discussing in the Biden Administration’s early days whether an~~advisers pause about reopening the PLO office, and has led them to engage with the~~
~~Administration and Congress about a possible~~ amendment to the PSJVTA to facilitate the amendment to the PSJVTA to facilitate the PLO office’s office’s
~~reopening.127~~reopening might be possible.168
The Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), introduced by some Members of Congress in September The Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), introduced by some Members of Congress in September
2021, would, among other things, amend the ATA to provide the President with a standing option 2021, would, among other things, amend the ATA to provide the President with a standing option
to waive the prohibition on a PLO office in the United States for national security reasons to waive the prohibition on a PLO office in the United States for national security reasons
(renewable every six months). The (renewable every six months). The ~~bil~~ bill also would make it easier to terminate the ATAalso would make it easier to terminate the ATA completely completely
~~if the PLO/PA discontinues payments targeted by the TFA “for acts of terrorism.”~~
~~Israeli Settlements in the West Bank~~
~~Israeli settlements in the West Bank have presented longstanding policy chal enges for U.S.~~
~~officials and lawmakers.128 As mentioned above, the Trump Administration took a number of~~
~~actions apparently aimed at providing greater legitimacy to Israeli settlements in the West~~
~~Bank.129 Biden Administration officials have not announced whether they intend to reverse or~~
~~otherwise address these Trump Administration actions, but have specified that the United States~~
~~would urge Israel to avoid settlement activity or annexation of territory.130~~
~~Near the end of the Obama Administration in December 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted~~
~~Resolution 2334, with the United States abstaining and al other Security Council members in~~
~~favor. Resolution 2334 reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including East~~
~~Jerusalem) violate international law, and cal ed upon states to “distinguish, in their relevant~~
~~dealings,” between the territory of Israel and of the West Bank.131~~

~~125 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,~~ if the PLO/PA discontinues payments targeted by the TFA “for acts of terrorism.” International Organizations The PLO has pursued a number of initiatives—either directly or with the help of supportive countries—in international organizations to advance its claims to statehood and other positions it takes vis-à-vis Israel. The United States and Israel generally oppose these initiatives and criticize international organizations for negative treatment of Israel. For more on Palestinian initiatives in international fora, see Appendix E. Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the ICC prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza (see Appendix E). The investigation might draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human Rights Council in May 2021 after that month’s major Israel-Gaza conflict.169 The Biden Administration responded skeptically to the creation of the “open-ended” commission 166 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Statutory Restrictions on the PLO’s Washington Office, ,
September 11, 2018, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2021/01/19/2018-09-September 11, 2018, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2021/01/19/2018-09-
11-plo-office.pdf. 11-plo-office.pdf.
~~126~~ 167 For background For background information on information on ~~PSJVT A~~PSJVTA and this issue, and this issue, ~~see CRS~~ see archived CRS Report R46274, Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments
to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction , by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea. , by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.
~~127~~168 “Biden pledge “Biden pledge to reopen PLO mission in Washington faces legal hurdles,”to reopen PLO mission in Washington faces legal hurdles,” Reuters, January 29, 2021. 169 U.N. document, A/HRC/RES/S-30/1, May 27, 2021. The Council mandated the commission “to investigate in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law leading up to and since 13 April 2021, and all underlying root causes of recurrent tensions, instability and protraction of conflict, including systematic discrimination and repression based on national, ethnic, racial or religious identity.” The commission of inquiry has issued reports in June and October 2022. Congressional Research Service 35 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations of inquiry.170 Like its predecessors, the Administration has criticized the Human Rights Council for what it characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.171 In March 2022, 68 Senators signed a letter urging Secretary of State Antony Blinken to lead a multinational effort to end the commission.172 That same month, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for the “situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967” reported to the Council that Israel is practicing “apartheid” in that territory.173 Proposed legislation to reduce U.S. contributions to the U.N. budget, based on a portion of the amount budgeted for the commission of inquiry, has been introduced in the Senate and House (S. 4389 and H.R. 7223). Under U.S. laws passed in 1990 and 1994,174 Palestinian admission to membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2011 triggered the withholding of U.S. assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the organization.175 If the Palestinians were to obtain membership in other U.N. entities, the 1990 and 1994 U.S. laws might trigger withholdings of U.S. financial contributions to these entities.176 Such withholdings could adversely affect these entities’ budgets and complicate the conduct of U.S. foreign policy within the U.N. system and other multilateral settings. In his September 2022 U.N. General Assembly speech, PA President Abbas said that the Palestinians would “initiate procedures” for joining the World Intellectual Property Organization, World Health Organization, and International Civil Aviation Organization.177 In both H.R. 8282 and S. 4662 for FY2023 appropriations, Section 7071 would waive the laws that require U.S. withholding from UNESCO through FY2025 if the President reports to Congress that the waiver would “enable the United States to counter Chinese influence or to promote other national interests of the United States.” Any waiver would lapse if the Palestinians gain membership in the U.N. or a U.N. specialized agency outside of an Israeli-Palestinian negotiating context. Role of Congress As Congress exercises oversight over U.S. policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian developments, and considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians, Members may consider a number of issues, including the following: 170 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Press Statement: UN Human Rights Council Session on the Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021. 171 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council,” February 24, 2021. For more on Israel and the U.N. Human Rights Council, see CRS Report RL33608, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Background and Policy Issues, by Luisa Blanchfield and Michael A. Weber. 172 The text of the letter is available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/2022-03-28%20Letter%20to%20Sec%20Blinken%20on%20UNHRC%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%20on%20Israel.pdf. 173 U.N. document A/HRC/49/87 (Advance Unedited Version), March 21, 2022. The international advocacy groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also have labeled Israeli practices as “apartheid.” For general information on Israeli human rights practices regarding Palestinians, see State Department, 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza. 174 P.L. 101-246 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991) and P.L. 103-236 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995). 175 For more information, see CRS Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), by Luisa Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne. 176 In May 2018, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but without consequences under U.S. law because the United States is not a member of or donor to UNIDO. 177 “President Abbas at UNGA.” Congressional Research Service 36 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations  various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations, including foreign aid and the possible reopening of diplomatic offices;  the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and disputes over violence and incitement, settlements, human rights and humanitarian conditions, and other issues;  Palestinian domestic governance and civil society issues;  economic stability and development concerns;  the role of Arab states in Israeli-Palestinian matters;  Palestinian international initiatives and the ICC’s investigation into possible Israeli and Palestinian war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza;  countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups; and  implications that regional and global issues have for the Palestinians, and vice versa. Some key factors could influence issues for Congress. These factors include whether Israeli-Palestinian relations move toward diplomacy or violence; Israel-PA efforts (encouraged by U.S. and other Western officials) to address ongoing West Bank discontent over security, political, and economic problems; continuing dilemmas over Gaza’s challenges; the status of PLO/PA welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in acts of terrorism; and various PA domestic developments (elections, leadership succession, and governance concerns). Consideration of these factors takes place within the context of Biden Administration efforts, existing and proposed legislation~~Reuters, January 29, 2021.~~
~~128 CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim~~
~~Zanotti; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~129 Abigail Williams and Saphora Smith, “ Pompeo becomes first secretary of state to visit Israeli settlement,”~~ ~~NBC~~
~~News, November 19, 2020.~~
~~130 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills; State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at~~
~~a Press Availability.”~~
~~131 T he most-cited international law pertaining to Israeli settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention, Part III, Section~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

29

~~link to page 34~~

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Israeli officials have continued construction-related announcements regarding settlements in the~~
~~West Bank and East Jerusalem. In January 2021, the planning authority that operates under Israeli~~
~~military jurisdiction approved plans for hundreds of additional homes in settlements whose~~
~~expansion deep within the West Bank could increase the difficulty of negotiating borders between~~
~~Israel and a future Palestinian state.132 Some observers say that construction plans moving~~
~~forward in certain areas of East Jerusalem and its West Bank vicinity could present major~~
~~obstacles to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state (see Figure 7).133~~
~~Figure 7. Selected Planned Settlement Construction Areas in the West Bank~~
~~and East Jerusalem~~

Source: Ha’aretz.

~~III, Article 49 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tim e of War, August 12, 1949, which states in its last~~
~~sentence, “ T he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it~~
~~occupies.” Israel maintains that the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) does not fall under the international law~~
~~definition of “occupied territory,” but is rather “disputed territory” because the previous occupying power (Jordan) did~~
~~not have an internationally recognized claim t o it (only a few countries recognized Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the~~
~~West Bank). Israel claims that given the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the end of the~~
~~British Mandate in 1948, Israel claims that no international actor has superior legal claim to the West Bank. Israel~~
~~Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, November 30, 2015. Jordan renounced its~~
~~claims to the West Bank in 1988 in favor of the PLO. While Israel applies civilian law to East Jer usalem, it considers~~
~~the rest of the West Bank to be “disputed territory.”~~
~~132 Peace Now, “ 780 Settlement Housing Units Approved Ahead of US Presidential T ransition ,” January 17, 2021. See~~
~~also David Makovsky, Building Bridges for Peace: U.S. Policy Toward Arab States, Palestinians, and Israel,~~
~~Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2021, pp. 9 -10.~~
~~133 Jonathan Lis and Nir Hasson, “ Israel Advances T housands of Housing Units in East Jerusalem as Biden Remains~~
~~Silent,” haaretz.com, October 14, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

30

~~link to page 54~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced U.S. concern about prospective~~
~~Israeli actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and cal ed upon Israel and the PA to~~
~~“refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement activity, as wel as retroactive legalization of~~
~~settlement outposts.”134~~
~~International Organizations~~
~~In General~~
~~The PLO has pursued a number of initiatives—either directly or with the help of supportive~~
~~countries—in international organizations to advance its claims to statehood and other positions it~~
~~takes vis-à-vis Israel. The United States and Israel general y oppose these initiatives and criticize~~
~~international organizations for negative treatment of Israel.~~
~~In February 2021, Secretary of State Blinken announced that the United States would reengage~~
~~with the U.N. Human Rights Council—from which the Trump Administration withdrew in June~~
~~2018—as an observer.135 As part of his announcement, Secretary Blinken said~~
~~We recognize that the Human Rights Council is a flawed body, in need of reform to its~~
~~agenda, membership, and focus, including its disproportionate focus on Israel. However,~~
~~our withdrawal in June 2018 did nothing to encourage meaningful change, but instead~~
~~created a vacuum of U.S. leadership, which countries with authoritarian agendas have used~~
~~to their advantage.136~~
~~For more on Palestinian initiatives in international fora, see Appendix E.~~
~~International Criminal Court (ICC) Actions137~~
~~Background~~
~~The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in the early stages of an investigation into possible~~
~~crimes committed by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and~~
~~the Gaza Strip since June 13, 2014. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over al eged genocide, war~~
~~crimes, and crimes against humanity (“ICC crimes”) that occur on the territory of or are~~
~~perpetrated by nationals of an entity deemed to be a State~~
~~ after the Rome Statute enters into force for a State Party;~~
~~ during a period of time in which a nonparty State accepts jurisdiction; or~~
~~ pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in a State to~~
~~the ICC.~~
~~The following actions by Palestinian leaders have influenced the overal context in which the~~
~~ICC’s actions have taken place:~~
~~ In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the~~
~~“State of Palestine” to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after~~

~~134 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021.~~
~~135 In October 2021, the United States regained its membership seat on the Council.~~
~~136 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “ U.S. Decision T o Reengage with the UN Human Rights Council,” February~~
~~8, 2021.~~
~~137 Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, assisted in preparing this subsection.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

31

~~link to page 54~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes al egedly~~
~~“committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since~~
~~June 13, 2014.”~~
~~ Later in January 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as depositary, stated~~
~~that the Rome Statute would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on April~~
~~1, 2015.138~~
~~ Later that same month, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination~~
~~into the “situation in Palestine” to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis~~
~~to proceed with an investigation” against Israelis, Palestinians, or others, having~~
~~found that the Palestinians had the proper capacity to accept ICC jurisdiction in~~
~~light of the November 2012 adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution~~
~~67/19.139 As mentioned in Appendix E, Resolution 67/19 had changed the~~
~~permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (aka “State of Palestine”) from an~~
~~“entity” to a “non-member state.”~~
~~ Palestinian leaders provided information to the ICC on al eged Israeli crimes~~
~~regarding both the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict and settlement activity in~~
~~the West Bank. In May 2018, Palestinian leaders made a formal referral of the~~
~~“situation in Palestine” to the Prosecutor.140~~
~~As referenced above, the State Department cited Palestinian actions relating to the ICC in~~
~~connection with the 2018 closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC. Various U.S. and Israeli~~
~~officials have denounced Palestinian efforts that could subject Israelis to ICC investigation or~~
~~prosecution.141 Neither the United States nor Israel is a State Party to the Rome Statute.~~
~~Palestinian accession and acceptance of jurisdiction grant the ICC Prosecutor authority to~~
~~investigate al al eged ICC crimes committed after June 13, 2014, by any individual—Israeli,~~
~~Palestinian, or otherwise—on “occupied Palestinian territory.” However, Palestinian actions do~~
~~not ensure any formal ICC prosecution of al eged ICC crimes. A party to the Rome Statute can~~
~~refer a situation to the Court and is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor on investigations,~~
~~but it is the role of the Prosecutor to determine whether to bring charges against and prosecute an~~
~~individual. In addition, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the~~
~~subject of “genuine” legal proceedings (as described in Article 17 of the Statute) brought by a~~
~~state with jurisdiction, including a state (such as Israel) that is not party to the Statute.~~
~~The ICC Prosecutor is required to notify al states with jurisdiction over a potential cas e, and such~~
~~states are afforded the opportunity to chal enge ICC jurisdiction over a case on inadmissibility~~
~~grounds.~~

~~138 U.N. Secretary-General Rome Statute Depositary Notification for the State of Palestine, January 6, 2015,~~
~~https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-Eng.pdf.~~
~~139 ICC Press Release, “ T he Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary~~
~~examination of the situation in Palestine,” January 16, 2015.~~
~~140 ICC Statement, “ Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the referral submitted by Palestine,” May~~
~~22, 2018.~~
~~141 See, for example, “ Bolton warns ICC not to go after Israel, confirms closure of PLO’s DC office,” Times of Israel,~~
~~September 10, 2018.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

32

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Investigation of Possible Crimes in West Bank and Gaza~~
~~On March 3, 2021, then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she was opening an~~
~~investigation of possible ICC crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.142 She had previously sought a~~
~~ruling from a pre-trial chamber to confirm her determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the~~
~~situation general y, and to determine the extent of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction~~
~~specifical y.143 In a 2-1 decision, the chamber ruled in February 2021 that the ICC has jurisdiction~~
~~in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem), based on the Palestinians’ status as a State~~
~~Party to the Rome Statute.144 Israel had argued that the ICC should not have jurisdiction in those~~
~~territories because Palestinians do not have sovereign control there.145~~
~~Broader Impact of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Ruling?~~
~~The ICC pre-trial chamber’s February 2021 decision stated that because the ICC exercises jurisdiction over~~
~~natural persons rather than states, its decision “is strictly limited to the question of jurisdiction set forth in the~~
~~Prosecutor’s Request and does not entail any determination on the border disputes between Palestine and Israel.”~~
~~According to one commentator, Palestinians and other international actors could use the decision to support for~~
~~Palestinian statehood and territorial claims.146~~
~~In response to the opening of an ICC investigation, Secretary of State Blinken said on March 3:~~
~~The United States firmly opposes and is deeply disappointed by this decision. The ICC has~~
~~no jurisdiction over this matter. Israel is not a party to the ICC and has not consented to the~~
~~Court’s jurisdiction, and we have serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its~~
~~jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. The Palestinians do not qualify as a sovereign state and~~
~~therefore, are not qualified to obtain membership as a state in, participate as a state in, or~~
~~delegate jurisdiction to the ICC.…~~
~~Moreover, the United States believes a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future for the~~
~~people of the Middle East depends on building bridges and creating new avenues for~~
~~dialogue and exchange, not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut~~
~~efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.~~
~~We will continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, including by~~
~~opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.147~~

~~142 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine ,”~~
~~March 3, 2021.~~
~~143 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the~~
~~Situation in Palestine, and seeking a ruling on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction ,” December 20, 2019.~~
~~144 ICC, “ Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial~~
~~jurisdiction in Palestine,’” February 5, 2021. In a partly dissenting opinion (available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/~~
~~RelatedRecords/CR2021_01167.PDF), Judge Péter Kovács argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction in the West Bank should~~
~~be limited to the competences transferred to the PA in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West~~
~~Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to an interpretation that might require Israel’s consent to ICC investigations of Israeli~~
~~nationals.~~
~~145 Israeli Attorney General,~~ ~~The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So -Called “Situation in~~
~~Palestine,”~~ ~~December 20, 2019. Germany, Brazil, Australia, Uganda, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary had~~
~~filed am icus curiae briefs with the pre-trial chamber offering arguments in line with Israel’s objections to territorial,~~
~~while the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation had filed briefs in support of territorial~~
~~jurisdiction.~~
~~146 T ovah Lazaroff, “ Eight things to know about the ICC war crimes suits against Israel,” jpost.com, February 7, 2021.~~
~~147 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, T he United States Opposes the ICC Investigation into the Palestinian~~
~~Situation, March 3, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

33

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~On March 11, 54 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken commending his statements, and~~
~~urging him to work with like-minded international partners to “steer the ICC away from further~~
~~actions that could damage the Court’s credibility by giving the appearance of political bias.”148~~
~~While Palestinian leaders (from both the PLO/PA and Hamas) welcomed the news of an ICC~~
~~investigation,149 leading Israeli political figures roundly denounced it, with then-Prime Minister~~
~~Binyamin Netanyahu cal ing the decision to investigate biased and anti-Semitic.150~~
~~It is unclear how the current Prosecutor, Karim Khan,151 might choose to handle the investigation.~~
~~The investigation could focus on a number of possible war crimes from Israeli and Palestinian~~
~~actions, including:~~
~~ actions by Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian militant groups during their 2014~~
~~and 2021 Gaza conflicts;~~
~~ lethal force used by Israeli soldiers in 2018-2019 against some Palestinian~~
~~protestors in Gaza seeking to breach or approach the administrative boundary~~
~~with Israel;~~
~~ other Israeli actions in and around the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement~~
~~activity; and~~
~~ possible PA (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) human rights abuses.~~
~~An investigation could take months or years before the Prosecutor makes decisions on bringing~~
~~specific charges against individuals. As mentioned above, if an ICC investigation produces any~~
~~case against Israelis or Palestinians concerning conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal~~
~~proceedings by a state having jurisdiction, it would be inadmissible. In Bensouda’s March 3~~
~~announcement of the investigation, she said:~~
~~As a first step, the Office [of the Prosecutor] is required to notify all States Parties and~~
~~those States which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned about~~
~~its investigation. This permits any such State to request the Office to defer to the State’s~~
~~relevant investigation of its own nationals or others within its jurisdiction in relation to~~
~~Rome Statute crimes referred to in the notification (subject to possible Pre-Trial Chamber~~
~~review).152~~
~~Possible U.S. Responses~~
~~It is unclear what diplomatic or other measures the Biden Administration might take to counter an~~
~~ICC investigation focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Under Executive Order 13928 from June~~
~~2020, President Trump authorized sanctions against foreign persons or entities involved in or~~
~~supporting ICC investigations or actions targeting U.S. personnel or personnel of U.S. al ies~~

~~148 T ext of letter available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-cardin-lead-bipartisan-~~
~~senate-call-secretary-blinken-continue.~~
~~149 “ICC prosecutor opens war crimes probe in Palestinian territories,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2021.~~
~~150 “Netanyahu: ICC war crimes probe is ‘pure antisemitism,’” jpost.com, March 4, 2021.~~
~~151 Before becoming the ICC Prosecutor in June 2021, Khan served as the Special Adviser and Head of the~~
~~Investigative T eam established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2379 (2017) to promote accountability~~
~~efforts for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant~~
~~(ISIL) in Iraq.~~
~~152 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine ,”~~
~~March 3, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

34

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~without the consent of the home government of those personnel.153 In September 2020, the Trump~~
~~Administration imposed sanctions under E.O. 13928 against Prosecutor Bensouda and another~~
~~top ICC official in connection with an investigation regarding Afghanistan that could subject U.S.~~
~~personnel to prosecution.154 President Biden lifted these sanctions in April 2021 while stating~~
~~continued U.S. objections to ICC assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. and al ied personnel.155~~
~~Role of Congress~~
~~As Congress exercises oversight over U.S. policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian developments, and~~
~~considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians, Members~~
~~may consider a number of issues, including the following:~~
~~ various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations, including foreign aid and the~~
~~possible reopening of diplomatic offices;~~
~~ the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and how it relates to Israel’s~~
~~normalization of relations with some Arab states;~~
~~ Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank;~~
~~ Palestinian international initiatives and the ICC’s investigation into possible~~
~~Israeli and Palestinian war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza;~~
~~ human rights, humanitarian, and economic development concerns;~~
~~ countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups;~~
~~ the surrounding region’s effects on the West Bank and Gaza, and vice versa; and~~
~~ Palestinian domestic leadership and civil society.~~
~~Some key factors could influence issues for Congress. These factors include whether the PLO/PA~~
~~significantly changes welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals al egedly involved in acts of~~
~~terrorism, the extent to which Israeli legal institutions and proceedings might preclude the ICC~~
~~from prosecuting cases against Israeli personnel, and how various PA domestic developments~~
~~(elections, leadership succession, and governance concerns) unfold. Consideration of these~~
~~factors takes place within the context of Biden Administration efforts to improve ties with the~~
~~Palestinians, existing legislation such as the TFA, ongoing debate regarding various unilateral~~
, ongoing debate regarding various unilateral Israeli and Israeli and Palestinian actions, and more visible Israel-Arab state relations. Congressional Research Service 37~~Palestinian actions, and more visible Israel-Arab state relations.~~

~~153 Executive Order 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with t he International Criminal Court ,~~
~~June 11, 2020. Prior to E.O. 13928, 67 Senators and 262 Representatives sent letters to then -Secretary of State Michael~~
~~Pompeo asserting that ICC jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza would be improper, and urging him to suppo rt Israel~~
~~in challenging it. T he text of the Senators’ letter is available at https://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/~~
~~cardin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-for-pompeo-to-defend-israel-against -politically-motivated-investigations-~~
~~by-the-international-criminal-court, and the text of the Representatives’ letter is available at https://luria.house.gov/~~
~~sites/luria.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/~~
~~2020.05.12%20Luria%20Gallagher%20letter%20to%20Sec%20Pompeo%20on%20ICC.pdf .~~
~~154 T reasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “ Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the~~
~~International Criminal Court Designations,” September 2, 2020. For background information, see CRS Insight~~
~~IN11428, International Crim inal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crim es in Afghanistan , by~~
~~Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.~~
~~155 White House, “ Executive Order on the T ermination of Emergency With Respect to the International Criminal~~
~~Court ,” April 1, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

35

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Key Palestinian Factions and Groups
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
The PLO is recognized by the United Nations (including Israel since 1993) as the sole legitimate The PLO is recognized by the United Nations (including Israel since 1993) as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may reside. It is an representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may reside. It is an ~~umbrel a~~umbrella organization organization
that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other Islamist groups). The PLO was that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other Islamist groups). The PLO was
founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah movement. founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah movement.
~~Organizational y~~Organizationally, the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council , the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council
(or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.(or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.~~156~~
178 After waging After waging ~~guerril a~~guerrilla warfare against Israel under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the PNC warfare against Israel under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the PNC
declared Palestinian independence and statehood in 1988. This came at a point roughly coinciding declared Palestinian independence and statehood in 1988. This came at a point roughly coinciding
with the PLO’s decision to publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security with the PLO’s decision to publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 242 and to contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had Council Resolution 242 and to contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had
littlelittle practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the
territorial scope of its state.territorial scope of its state.~~157~~179 The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993 upon the The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993 upon the
signing of the Declaration of Principles signing of the Declaration of Principles ~~between the two parties~~(also known as the Oslo Accord) between the two parties at the White House. .
While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the
West Bank, as West Bank, as ~~wel~~ well as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas’s security presence,as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas’s security presence,~~158~~180
the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international
actors. Under the name “State of Palestine,” the PLO maintains a permanent observer mission to actors. Under the name “State of Palestine,” the PLO maintains a permanent observer mission to
the United Nations in New York and in Geneva as a “non-member state,” and has missions and the United Nations in New York and in Geneva as a “non-member state,” and has missions and
embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. The PLO also is a full member of embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. The PLO also is a full member of
both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Fatah
Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and
most prominent faction in the PLO for decades. Since the establishment of the PA and limited most prominent faction in the PLO for decades. Since the establishment of the PA and limited
self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except during the self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except during the
period of partial Hamas rule in 2006-2007. Yet, popular period of partial Hamas rule in 2006-2007. Yet, popular ~~disil usionment~~disillusionment has come from the failure has come from the failure
to establish a Palestinian state, internecine violence, corruption, and poor governance. Arafat’s to establish a Palestinian state, internecine violence, corruption, and poor governance. Arafat’s

~~156 T he~~ 178 The PNC consists of more than 700 members, a majority of whom are from the diaspora. PNC consists of more than 700 members, a majority of whom are from the diaspora. ~~T he~~The Central Council is Central Council is
chaired by the PNC president and has 124 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus (among chaired by the PNC president and has 124 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus (among
others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and prominent interest others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and prominent interest
groups and professions. groups and professions. ~~T he~~The Central Council functions as a link between the Executive Committee and the PNC. Central Council functions as a link between the Executive Committee and the PNC. Either Either
the PNC or the Central Council reportedly can electthe PNC or the Central Council reportedly can elect the 18 members of the Executive Committee, which functions as a the 18 members of the Executive Committee, which functions as a
cabinetcabinet —with each member assuming—with each member assuming discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee elects its own discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee elects its own
chairperson. chairperson. ~~T he~~The European Council on Foreign Relations’ online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at European Council on Foreign Relations’ online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at
https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions is a source for much of the PLO organizational https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions is a source for much of the PLO organizational
information in this paragraph. information in this paragraph.
~~157 T he~~ 179 The declaration included the phrase: “ declaration included the phrase: “ ~~T he~~The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” ~~T he~~The
text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm. text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm.
~~158 T he~~180 The PA’s legal claim to self-rule over Gaza is PA’s legal claim to self-rule over Gaza is subject to the original Oslo-era agreements of the 1990s, the subject to the original Oslo-era agreements of the 1990s, the
agreements between Israel and the PA regardingagreements between Israel and the PA regarding movement and access that were formalized in November 2005 shortly movement and access that were formalized in November 2005 shortly
after Israel’s withdrawalafter Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and the June 2014 formation of a PA government with formal sway over both the from Gaza, and the June 2014 formation of a PA government with formal sway over both the
self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza.self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3638

link to page 48 link to page 18 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

2004 death removed a major unifying symbol, further eroding Fatah’s support under Mahmoud 2004 death removed a major unifying symbol, further eroding Fatah’s support under Mahmoud
Abbas.Abbas.
Fatah’s charter, dating back to the 1960s, Fatah’s charter, dating back to the 1960s, ~~stil~~ still includes clauses includes clauses ~~cal ing~~calling for the destruction of the for the destruction of the
Zionist state and its economic, political, military, and cultural supports, despite the PLO’s 1993 Zionist state and its economic, political, military, and cultural supports, despite the PLO’s 1993
acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.~~159~~181 Abbas routinely expresses support for “legitimate Abbas routinely expresses support for “legitimate
peaceful resistance” to Israeli occupation under international law, complemented by negotiations. peaceful resistance” to Israeli occupation under international law, complemented by negotiations.
However, some of the other Fatah Central Committee members are either less outspoken in their However, some of the other Fatah Central Committee members are either less outspoken in their
advocacy of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or reportedly explicitly insist on the need to advocacy of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or reportedly explicitly insist on the need to
preserve the option of armed struggle.preserve the option of armed struggle.~~160~~
182 Other PLO Factions and Leaders
Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. Al All of these factions have minor of these factions have minor
political support relative to Fatah and Hamas. political support relative to Fatah and Hamas.
A number of Palestinian politicians and other leaders without traditional factional affiliation have A number of Palestinian politicians and other leaders without traditional factional affiliation have
successfully gained followings successfully gained followings ~~domestical y~~domestically and in the international community under the PLO’s and in the international community under the PLO’s
~~umbrel a~~umbrella, even some who are not , even some who are not ~~formal y~~formally affiliated with the PLO. ~~affiliated with the PLO. These figures—such as Salam~~
~~Fayyad, Hanan Ashrawi (a female Christian), and Mustafa Barghouti—often have competing~~
~~agendas. Several of them support a negotiated two-state solution, general y oppose violence, and~~
~~appeal to the Palestinian intel ectual elite and to prominent Western governments and~~
~~organizations.~~
Non-PLO Factions
Hamas
Overview
Hamas (an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a U.S.-designated terrorist Hamas (an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization and Fatah’s main rival for leadership of the Palestinian national movement. organization and Fatah’s main rival for leadership of the Palestinian national movement.
Countering Hamas is a focal point for Israel and the United States. Countering Hamas is a focal point for Israel and the United States.
Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in
Egypt in 1928 with affiliates and sympathizers throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s emergence as Egypt in 1928 with affiliates and sympathizers throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s emergence as
a major politicala major political and military group can be traced to the first Palestinian and military group can be traced to the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising), (or uprising),
which began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to what Hamas terms the Israeli occupation of which began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to what Hamas terms the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian-populated lands. The group presented an alternative to Yasser Arafat and his secular Palestinian-populated lands. The group presented an alternative to Yasser Arafat and his secular
Fatah movement by using violence against Israeli civilianFatah movement by using violence against Israeli civilian and military targets just as Arafat began ~~and military targets just as Arafat began~~

~~159 Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist~~
~~pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy remains over whether the~~
~~PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition ).~~
~~160 T he Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank early in the~~
~~second intifada and later began operating in Gaza as well. It was added to the State Department’s list of Foreign~~
~~T errorist Organizations in March 2002. In line with the Abbas-led PA’s effort to centralize control, the Brigades~~
~~lowered its profile in the West Bank after 2007. However, some observers have noted that militant elements remain~~
~~within Fatah, including some members of the AAMB, and are generally known as the T anzim. See, f or example,~~
~~Michael Milshtein, “ Fateh’s ‘T anzim’ Formations: a potential challenge that is liable to intensify in the face of~~
~~scenarios of deterioration in the Palestinian arena,” IDC Herzliya Institute for Policy and Strategy, June 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

37

~~link to page 46 link to page 49~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

negotiating with Israel. Hamas took a leading role in attacks against Israelis—including suicide negotiating with Israel. Hamas took a leading role in attacks against Israelis—including suicide
bombings targeting civilians—during the second intifada (between 2000 and 2005—see bombings targeting civilians—during the second intifada (between 2000 and 2005—see
Appendix B for more information on the two intifadas and Palestinian violence and terrorism). for more information on the two intifadas and Palestinian violence and terrorism).
Shortly after Arafat’s death in 2004, the group decided to directly involve itself in politics. In Shortly after Arafat’s death in 2004, the group decided to directly involve itself in politics. In
2006, a year after the election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, and just a few months 2006, a year after the election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, and just a few months
after Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestinian after Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestinian
~~Legislative~~ Legislative Council elections. Subsequently, Israel, the United States, and others in the Council elections. Subsequently, Israel, the United States, and others in the
international community have sought to neutralize or marginalize Hamas. As discussed in international community have sought to neutralize or marginalize Hamas. As discussed in
181 Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy remains over whether the PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition). 182 See footnote 64. Congressional Research Service 39 link to page 51 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Appendix C, Hamas~~Appendix C~~, ~~Hamas~~ seized control of Gaza in 2007 and has exercised de facto rule there since seized control of Gaza in 2007 and has exercised de facto rule there since
then. then.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for ~~2019~~2020, Hamas “comprises , Hamas “comprises
several thousand Gaza-based operatives.” several thousand Gaza-based operatives.”
Ideology, Organization, and Leadership
Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s
founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an
Islamic state in Islamic state in al all of historic Palestine.of historic Palestine.~~161~~183 A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding
principles. It clarified that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than the Jews, and principles. It clarified that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than the Jews, and
expressed expressed ~~wil ingness~~willingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it
results from “national consensus.”results from “national consensus.”~~162~~
184 Since Hamas’s inception during the first intifada in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of Since Hamas’s inception during the first intifada in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of
support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip. It also has a significant presence in the support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip. It also has a significant presence in the
West Bank and in various Arab countries.West Bank and in various Arab countries.
In addition to military and political activities, Hamas also provides various social services to Palestinians. The leadership structure of Hamas is opaque, and much of the open source reporting available on The leadership structure of Hamas is opaque, and much of the open source reporting available on
it cannot be independently verified. It is unclear who controls strategy, policy, and financial it cannot be independently verified. It is unclear who controls strategy, policy, and financial
decisions. In previous years, some external leaders reportedly sought to move toward a less decisions. In previous years, some external leaders reportedly sought to move toward a less
militant stance in exchange for Hamas obtaining a significant role in the PLO, which represents militant stance in exchange for Hamas obtaining a significant role in the PLO, which represents
Palestinians internationally. Palestinians internationally.
~~Overal~~ Overall policy guidance comes from a Shura (or consultative) Council, with reported policy guidance comes from a Shura (or consultative) Council, with reported
representation from the West Bank, Gaza, and other places. Qatar-based representation from the West Bank, Gaza, and other places. Qatar-based Ismail Haniyeh is the is the
~~overal~~ overall leader of Hamas’s political bureau (politburo). leader of Hamas’s political bureau (politburo). Yahya Sinwar, previously a top , previously a top
commander from Hamas’s military wing, is the movement’s leader for Gaza.commander from Hamas’s military wing, is the movement’s leader for Gaza.~~163~~185 The militia, The militia,
known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,~~164~~186 is led by is led by Muhammad Deif,,~~165~~187 and may seek to and may seek to
drive political decisions via its control over security. Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Deif have drive political decisions via its control over security. Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Deif have al all been been
named by the Treasury Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. named by the Treasury Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

~~161~~ External Support Hamas reportedly receives support from a number of sources, including some states. Along with some other non-PLO factions, Hamas has historically received much of its political and material support (including funding, weapons, and training) from Iran. Hamas became distant from Iran 183 For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp. For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
~~162~~184 “Hamas in 2017: “Hamas in 2017: ~~T he~~The document in full,” document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. , May 1, 2017. ~~T his~~This document, unlike the 1988 charter, document, unlike the 1988 charter,
does not identify Hamas with the Muslimdoes not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood. Brotherhood.
~~163~~ 185 Yaniv Kubovich, “ Yaniv Kubovich, “ ~~T here~~There’s Something New About Hamas’ Leader in Gaza’s Something New About Hamas’ Leader in Gaza ~~Since~~ Since the War – and Israel Is the War – and Israel Is
Concerned,” haaretz.com, July 20, 2021. Concerned,” haaretz.com, July 20, 2021.
~~164~~186 Izz al Din al Qassam was Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslima Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anticolonialistBrotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anticolonialist
resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He wasresistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces on killed by British forces on
November 19, 1935. November 19, 1935.
~~165~~187 For a profile of Deif, see Joshua Nevett, “ For a profile of Deif, see Joshua Nevett, “ Mohammed Deif: Mohammed Deif: ~~T he~~The one-eyed Hamas chief in Israel's crosshairs” one-eyed Hamas chief in Israel's crosshairs” BBC
News,, May 31, 2021. May 31, 2021.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3840

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

~~External Support~~
~~Hamas reportedly receives support from a number of sources, including some states. Along with~~
~~some other non-PLO factions, Hamas has historical y received much of its political and material~~
~~support (including funding, weapons, and training) from Iran. Hamas became distant from Iran~~
when it broke with Syria’s government in the early years of the country’s civil war. However, the when it broke with Syria’s government in the early years of the country’s civil war. However, the
Hamas-Iran relationship reportedly revived—including Hamas-Iran relationship reportedly revived—including ~~financial y~~financially—around 2017.—around 2017.~~166~~
188 In 2014, a Treasury Department official stated publicly that Qatar “has for many years openly In 2014, a Treasury Department official stated publicly that Qatar “has for many years openly
financed Hamas.”financed Hamas.”~~167~~189 Qatari officials have denied that their government supported Hamas Qatari officials have denied that their government supported Hamas
~~financial y~~financially and have argued that their policy is to support the Palestinian people. and have argued that their policy is to support the Palestinian people.
In addition to external assistance from states, Hamas has other sources of support. According to In addition to external assistance from states, Hamas has other sources of support. According to
the State Department’s profile of Hamas in its Country Reports on Terrorism for the State Department’s profile of Hamas in its Country Reports on Terrorism for ~~2019~~2020, the group , the group
“raises funds in Gulf countries” and “receives donations from some Palestinian and other “raises funds in Gulf countries” and “receives donations from some Palestinian and other
expatriates as expatriates as ~~wel~~ well as from its own charity organizations.” as from its own charity organizations.”
Some Some ~~reports claim~~media accounts allege that Hamas officials that Hamas officials ~~use~~have used Turkey as a base of operations. Turkey as a base of operations.~~168~~ 190 Turkish President Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan Recep Tayyip Erdogan ~~periodical y hosts~~has hosted top Hamas officials and top Hamas officials and ~~expresses~~expressed support for the support for the
group’s political aims. group’s political aims.
~~On January 11, 2021, Representative Brian Mast introduced the~~Amid Turkey-Israel rapprochement in 2022, an Israeli media source reported that Turkey had asked several Hamas activists to leave Turkey, but some pro-Hamas sources have disputed the report. One Gaza-based observer said that Turkey and Hamas have agreed that Hamas would only conduct political—rather than military—activities within Turkey.191 The Hamas International Financing Prevention Act (H.R. 3685) and Palestinian International Palestinian International
Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2021 (H.R. 261Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2021 (H.R. 261~~). The bil , which is virtual y~~ and S. 1904) were introduced in 2021. The bills, which are virtually identical to a bill ~~identical to a~~
~~bil~~ introduced during the 116th Congress (H.R. 1850), would require the President to report to introduced during the 116th Congress (H.R. 1850), would require the President to report to
Congress on foreign sources of support for Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and impose Congress on foreign sources of support for Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and impose
sanctions on these sources as specified, subject to a waiver for national security reasons. sanctions on these sources as specified, subject to a waiver for national security reasons.
Other Rejectionist Groups
Several other Several other ~~smal~~ small Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s
right to exist and to conduct negotiations. They remain active in the West Bank and Gaza and right to exist and to conduct negotiations. They remain active in the West Bank and Gaza and
retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts
at cooperation and conciliation.at cooperation and conciliation. ~~In Gaza, some observers speculate that Hamas permits or even~~
~~supports the operations of some of these groups, including those with a presence in Egypt’s Sinai~~
~~Peninsula, without avowing ties to them. Such groups provide Hamas opportunities to tacitly~~
~~acquiesce to attacks against Israel while avoiding direct responsibility.~~
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
The largest of these other groups is Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a U.S.-designated terrorist The largest of these other groups is Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support
from Iran. PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas. from Iran. PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas.
Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings), Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings),
~~kil ing~~ killing scores of Israelis.scores of Israelis.~~169~~192 PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into

~~166 See,~~ 188 See, for example, Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas turns to Iran,” for example, Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas turns to Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 6, 2017. , July 6, 2017.
~~167~~189 Remarks of Under Secretary for Remarks of Under Secretary for ~~T errorism~~Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David and Financial Intelligence David Cohen Cohen ~~bef ore~~before the Center for a New the Center for a New
American Security on “American Security on “ Confronting New Confronting New ~~T hreats in T errorist~~Threats in Terrorist Financing,” March 4, 2014. Financing,” March 4, 2014.
~~168~~190 “Israel dismantles money transfer channel between Hamas operatives in “Israel dismantles money transfer channel between Hamas operatives in ~~T urkey~~Turkey and West Bank and West Bank ,” ,” i24News, ,
February 15, 2021; “February 15, 2021; “ Revealed: How a bank in Revealed: How a bank in ~~T urkey~~Turkey funded funded Hamas terror operations,” Hamas terror operations,” Arab News, October 20, 2020. , October 20, 2020.
~~169 Suicide bombing figures culled~~ 191 Mai Abu Hasaneen, “Hamas fears Turkish pressure will follow Israel-Turkey normalization,” Al-Monitor, August 31, 2022. 192 Suicide bombing figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs websitefrom Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
~~T errorism~~Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/
Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since. Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3941

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its
credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters. credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters.
PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite
revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of al all of historic of historic
Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has
not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in
elections. elections. ~~Perhaps largely for these reasons,~~ PIJ has not approached the same level of support PIJ has not approached the same level of support
among Palestinians as Hamas. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states. among Palestinians as Hamas. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for ~~2019~~2020, “PIJ has close to , “PIJ has close to
1,000 members.” 1,000 members.”
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Another—though Another—though ~~smal er~~smaller—Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an FTO is the Popular —Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an FTO is the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLP-GC is a splinter group Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLP-GC is a splinter group
from the PFLP. According to the State Department’s from the PFLP. According to the State Department’s ~~2019~~2020 Country Reports on Terrorism, PFLP- Country Reports on Terrorism, PFLP-
GC’s operates in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has several hundred members. Its founder, GC’s operates in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has several hundred members. Its founder,
Ahmed Jibril, died in Damascus (presumably of natural causes) in July 2021. His longtime Ahmed Jibril, died in Damascus (presumably of natural causes) in July 2021. His longtime
deputy, Talal Naji, was elected to replace him.deputy, Talal Naji, was elected to replace him.~~170~~193
Salafist ~~Militant~~ Militant Groups
A number of A number of ~~smal~~ small Palestinian Salafist-Jihadist militant groups evincing affinities toward groups Palestinian Salafist-Jihadist militant groups evincing affinities toward groups
such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State ~~have arisen~~operate in the Gaza Strip. Some Salafist groups in the Gaza Strip. Some Salafist groups
reportedly include former Hamas militiareportedly include former Hamas militia commanders who became disaffected by actions from commanders who became disaffected by actions from
Hamas that they deemed to be overly moderate. Salafist groups do not currently appear to Hamas that they deemed to be overly moderate. Salafist groups do not currently appear to
threaten Hamas’s rule in Gaza. threaten Hamas’s rule in Gaza.
Palestinian Refugees
Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced before and during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, about Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced before and during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, about
one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third in neighboring one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third in neighboring
Arab countries. According to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Arab countries. According to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), there are more than 5 Near East (UNRWA), there are more than 5 ~~mil ion~~ million registered refugees (comprising original registered refugees (comprising original
refugees and their descendants) in UNRWA’s areas of operation—the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, refugees and their descendants) in UNRWA’s areas of operation—the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon. Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, partly owing to its previous Syria, and Lebanon. Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, partly owing to its previous
unilateral annexation of the West Bank (which ended in 1988), but the other refugees in the unilateral annexation of the West Bank (which ended in 1988), but the other refugees in the
region are region are ~~general y~~generally stateless and therefore limited in their ability stateless and therefore limited in their ability to travel. Many of the refugees to travel. Many of the refugees
remain reliant on UNRWAremain reliant on UNRWA for food, health care, and education.for food, health care, and education.
For political and economic reasons, Arab host governments For political and economic reasons, Arab host governments ~~general y~~generally have not actively supported have not actively supported
the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many
Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or
possibly to a future Palestinian state. Many assert a sense of dispossession and betrayal over possibly to a future Palestinian state. Many assert a sense of dispossession and betrayal over
never having been never having been ~~al owed~~allowed to return to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions to return to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions
have organized followings among refugee populations, and militiashave organized followings among refugee populations, and militias have proliferated at various have proliferated at various
times in some refugee areas. The refugees seek to influence both their host governments and the times in some refugee areas. The refugees seek to influence both their host governments and the
PLO/PA to pursue a solution to their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel. PLO/PA to pursue a solution to their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel.

~~170 Albert Aji, “ Syria-based breakaway~~ 193 Albert Aji, “Syria-based breakaway Palestinian faction elects new leader,” Palestinian faction elects new leader,” Associated Press, July, July 18, 2021. 18, 2021.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4042

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

For additional information on Palestinian refugees and UNRWA, see For additional information on Palestinian refugees and UNRWA, see archived CRS Report RS22967, CRS Report RS22967, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4143

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix B. Historical Background
Various perspectives exist on the nature of Palestinian politicalVarious perspectives exist on the nature of Palestinian political identity while the area of historic identity while the area of historic
Palestine was a part of the province of Greater Syria within the Ottoman Empire.Palestine was a part of the province of Greater Syria within the Ottoman Empire.~~171~~194 This identity This identity
developed further during the British Mandate period (1923-1948). Although in 1947 the United developed further during the British Mandate period (1923-1948). Although in 1947 the United
Nations intended to create two states in Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab—with its partition Nations intended to create two states in Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab—with its partition
plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), only the Jewish state came into being.plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), only the Jewish state came into being. ~~Varying~~
~~explanations for the failure to found an Arab state alongside a Jewish state in mandatory Palestine~~
~~place blame on the British, the Zionists, neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians themselves, or~~
~~some combination of these groups.172~~
195 As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1948, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1948, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were
driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians ~~cal~~ call the the nakba (“catastrophe”). Many (“catastrophe”). Many
ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Arab Gulf states such as ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Arab Gulf states such as
Kuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizensKuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens, but were subject to martial law until 1966. Those who were in the West . Those who were in the West
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian
administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure
or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states that or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states that
had conflicting interests. had conflicting interests.
The year 1967 marked a significant turning point~~1967 was a watershed year for the Palestinians~~. In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively . In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively
defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as ~~wel~~ well as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the
Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted
Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between
Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer
zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day. zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day.
After the 1967 war, Israel After the 1967 war, Israel ~~only~~ effectively annexed East Jerusalem (as effectively annexed East Jerusalem (as ~~wel~~ well as the Golan Heightsas the Golan Heights from Syria), ),
leaving the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. However, both territories became leaving the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. However, both territories became
increasingly increasingly ~~economical y~~economically linked with Israel. Furthermore, Israel presided over the settlement of linked with Israel. Furthermore, Israel presided over the settlement of
thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than
Gaza)—Gaza)—~~official y~~officially initiating initiating some of these projects and assuming security responsibility for some of these projects and assuming security responsibility for al all of of
them. Settlement of the West Bank increased markedly once the Likud Party, with its vision of a them. Settlement of the West Bank increased markedly once the Likud Party, with its vision of a
“Greater Israel” extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977. “Greater Israel” extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977.
Having Israelis settle in the West Bank presented some economic Having Israelis settle in the West Bank presented some economic ~~and cultural~~ opportunities for opportunities for
Palestinians, but also new Palestinians, but also new ~~chal enges~~challenges to their identity and cohesion, civil rights, and territorial to their identity and cohesion, civil rights, and territorial
contiguity. These contiguity. These ~~chal enges~~challenges persist and have since intensified. persist and have since intensified.
The Arab states’ defeat in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, The Arab states’ defeat in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza,
~~al owed~~allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the representative of
Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an ~~umbrel a~~umbrella organization of Palestinian organization of Palestinian
factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States (Arab League), the PLO factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States (Arab League), the PLO
asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by staging asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by staging ~~guerril a~~guerrilla raids against Israel from raids against Israel from
Jordanian territory. The late Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO Jordanian territory. The late Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO
in 1969, and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the in 1969, and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the

~~171 See,~~ 194 See, for example, Rashid Khalidi,for example, Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New , New
York: ColumbiaYork: Columbia University Press, 1997; James L. Gelvin, University Press, 1997; James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, ,
NewNew York: CambridgeYork: Cambridge University Press, 2014. University Press, 2014.
~~172~~ 195 See, See, for example, for example, ~~Edward Said,~~ Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, Boston: Beacon Press, 2006; Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, New, New York: York: ~~T imes~~Times Books, 1979; Benny Morris, 1948: A Story of the First Arab-Israeli War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008; ~~Books, 1979;~~ Barry Rubin,Barry Rubin, Israel: An
~~Introduction~~, Introduction, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
See also CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4244

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Palestinian national cause—representing both the refugees and those under Israeli rule in the West Palestinian national cause—representing both the refugees and those under Israeli rule in the West
Bank and Gaza. Often this prominence came infamously from acts of terrorism and militancy. Bank and Gaza. Often this prominence came infamously from acts of terrorism and militancy.
Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to
move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its influence survived. In 1987, move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its influence survived. In 1987,
Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first
intifada, or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the , or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the
Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with
the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and
accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.~~173~~196
Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel may have been partly motivated by Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel may have been partly motivated by
concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from exile, its legitimacy with concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from exile, its legitimacy with
Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (which Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (which
included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much of his Arab state support included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much of his Arab state support
following his politicalfollowing his political backing for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. backing for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right
to exist in 1993, and through the “Oslo agreements” gained limited self-rule for Palestinians in to exist in 1993, and through the “Oslo agreements” gained limited self-rule for Palestinians in
Gaza and parts of the West BankGaza and parts of the West Bank— via the creation of the PA. The agreements were via the creation of the PA. The agreements were ~~gradual y and~~
~~partial y~~gradually and partially implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that they would lead to a final-status implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that they would lead to a final-status
peace agreement has not been realized. peace agreement has not been realized.
Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since the Oslo Agreements
Various Palestinian groups have engaged in a variety of methods of violence Various Palestinian groups have engaged in a variety of methods of violence since the Israel-PLOsince the Israel-PLO ~~agreements~~ agreements of of
the 1990s, the 1990s, ~~kil ing~~ killing hundreds of Israelis—bothhundreds of Israelis—both ~~military~~ military and civilian.and civilian.~~174~~ 197 Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in
asymmetricasymmetric warfare with a strongerwarfare with a stronger enemy point to the thousands of deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis enemy point to the thousands of deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis
since 1993,since 1993,~~175~~198 some some through acts of terrorismthrough acts of terrorism aimed at civilians.aimed at civilians.~~176~~199
Palestinian militants in Gaza Palestinian militants in Gaza ~~periodical y~~ periodically fire rocketsfire rockets and mortarsand mortars into Israel indiscriminately.into Israel indiscriminately. The possibility that a The possibility that a
rocket threat could emergerocket threat could emerge ~~from~~ from the West Bank is one factor that Israelisthe West Bank is one factor that Israelis have cited in explaining their reluctance have cited in explaining their reluctance
to consider a to consider a ~~ful~~ full withdrawal from there.withdrawal from there.~~177~~ 200 Although Palestinian militants maintain rocket and mortarAlthough Palestinian militants maintain rocket and mortar arsenals, arsenals,
Israel’sIsrael’s Iron DomeIron Dome defense systemdefense system ~~reportedly~~ reportedly has decreased the threat to Israel fromhas decreased the threat to Israel from these projectiles.these projectiles.~~178~~
~~Additional y,~~ 201 Additionally, tunnels that Palestinian militantstunnels that Palestinian militants in Gaza used somewhat effectively in a 2014 conflict have been in Gaza used somewhat effectively in a 2014 conflict have been

~~173 UNSCR~~ 196 UNSCR 242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and lasting peace in the Middlelasting peace in the Middle East” East”
basedbased on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2) on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2)
““~~T ermination~~Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundariesrecognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” free from threats or acts of force.”
~~174~~ 197 Statistics available Statistics available from B’from B’~~T selem (T he~~Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied ~~T erritories~~ Territories) )
websitewebsite at http://www.btselem.org/statistics. at http://www.btselem.org/statistics.
~~175~~198 Ibid. Ibid.
~~176 T he~~199 The most prominent attack by an Israeli civilian against Palestinians since 1993 was the killing of at least 29 most prominent attack by an Israeli civilian against Palestinians since 1993 was the killing of at least 29
Palestinians (and possiblyPalestinians (and possibly between 10 to 23 more) and the woundingbetween 10 to 23 more) and the wounding of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch
GoldsteinGoldstein (a Brooklyn-born former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque(a Brooklyn-born former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque of Abraham) in the Cave of the of Abraham) in the Cave of the
Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) whilePatriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) while the victims were at prayer. Seethe victims were at prayer. See George George
J. Church, “When Fury Rules,”J. Church, “When Fury Rules,” Time, March 7, 1994. , March 7, 1994. ~~T his~~This incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation
for the Palestinian suicide bombingfor the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign that followed. campaign that followed.
~~177~~200 See, See, for example, Hirsh Goodman, “for example, Hirsh Goodman, “ ~~T he~~The Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank and Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank and
Eastern Jerusalem,” JerusalemEastern Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2017. Center for Public Affairs, 2017.
~~178~~201 Sebastien Sebastien Roblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal ShapedRoblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gazathe Gaza ~~War o f~~ War of May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. For more May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. For more
on Iron Dome, see CRSon Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4345

link to page link to page 4951 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

neutralized to some extent by systematic Israeli neutralized to some extent by systematic Israeli efforts, with someefforts, with some financial and technological assistance from the financial and technological assistance from the
United States.United States.~~179~~202
Since 2018, someSince 2018, some Palestinians—with reported encouragement fromPalestinians—with reported encouragement from Hamas—have tried to breach fences dividing Hamas—have tried to breach fences dividing
Gaza from Israel,Gaza from Israel, or have used incendiary kitesor have used incendiary kites ~~or bal oons~~ or balloons to set fires to set fires to arable land in southern Israel.to arable land in southern Israel.~~180~~ 203 The The
purpose of these tactics may be to provokepurpose of these tactics may be to provoke ~~Israeli responses~~ Israeli responses that evoke international sympathy for Palestinians that evoke international sympathy for Palestinians
and criticismand criticism of Israel—a dynamic that bolstered Palestinian national aspirations in the late 1980s during the first of Israel—a dynamic that bolstered Palestinian national aspirations in the late 1980s during the first
intifada.intifada.~~181~~204
Isolated attacks Isolated attacks ~~stil~~ still occur within Israeloccur within Israel and the West Bank. Someand the West Bank. Some are perpetrated by Palestinians who are are perpetrated by Palestinians who are
unaffiliated with terroristunaffiliated with terrorist groups and who use groups and who use ~~smal arms~~ small arms or vehiclesor vehicles as weapons. Antipathy between Jewish as weapons. Antipathy between Jewish
settlerssettlers and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on both sides.and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on both sides. Some militantsSome militants have have
staged attacks at or near Gaza border crossingsstaged attacks at or near Gaza border crossings and attempted to capture Israeliand attempted to capture Israeli ~~soldiers~~ soldiers there. there.
Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process. A second Palestinian Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process. A second Palestinian
intifada from 2000 to 2005 was marked by intense terrorist violence inside Israel. In response, intifada from 2000 to 2005 was marked by intense terrorist violence inside Israel. In response,
Israel took actions that it asserted were necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security, rendering Israel took actions that it asserted were necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security, rendering
unusable much of the PA infrastructure built over the preceding decade. During the second unusable much of the PA infrastructure built over the preceding decade. During the second
intifada, U.S.- and intifada, U.S.- and ~~international y~~internationally supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various
auspices failed to gain traction.auspices failed to gain traction.
After Arafat’s death in 2004 and his succession by Mahmoud Abbas, Israel After Arafat’s death in 2004 and his succession by Mahmoud Abbas, Israel ~~unilateral y~~unilaterally withdrew withdrew
its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005. Despite forswearing responsibility for Gaza, its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005. Despite forswearing responsibility for Gaza,
Israel has continued to control most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and even Israel has continued to control most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and even
various buffer zones within the territory. The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined various buffer zones within the territory. The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined
further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006, and its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Having further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006, and its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Having
different Palestinian leaders controlling the West Bank and Gaza since then has complicated the different Palestinian leaders controlling the West Bank and Gaza since then has complicated the
question of who speaks for the Palestinians both question of who speaks for the Palestinians both ~~domestical y and international y (see~~
Appendix C).

~~179 CRS~~ domestically and internationally (see Appendix C). 202 CRS Report RL33222, Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
~~180~~203 Mark Landler, “ Mark Landler, “ As Violence Flares, Kushner As Violence Flares, Kushner ~~T hreatens~~Threatens to Abandon Plan to Rebuild to Abandon Plan to Rebuild Gaza,”Gaza,” New York Times, July , July
23, 2018. 23, 2018.
~~181~~ 204 See, See, for example, Hussein Ibish,for example, Hussein Ibish, ~~“ T he~~ “The Nonviolent Violence of Hamas,” foreignpolicy.com, April 6, 2018. Nonviolent Violence of Hamas,” foreignpolicy.com, April 6, 2018.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4446

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix C. Palestinian Governance
Achieving effective and transparent governance over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing Achieving effective and transparent governance over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing
Israeli-Palestinian violence has proven elusive for Palestinian leaders since their limitedIsraeli-Palestinian violence has proven elusive for Palestinian leaders since their limited self-rule self-rule
~~experiment~~ began in 1994. The split established in 2007 between the Abbas-led PA in the West began in 1994. The split established in 2007 between the Abbas-led PA in the West
Bank and Hamas in Gaza exacerbated these difficulties. Bank and Hamas in Gaza exacerbated these difficulties.
Palestinian Authority (PA)
The Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereafter PA) was granted limited The Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereafter PA) was granted limited
rule under Israeli occupational authority in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in the mid-rule under Israeli occupational authority in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in the mid-
1990s, pursuant to the Oslo agreements.1990s, pursuant to the Oslo agreements.~~182~~205 One of the PLO’s options is to restructure or dissolve One of the PLO’s options is to restructure or dissolve
the PA (either in concert with Israel or the PA (either in concert with Israel or ~~unilateral y~~unilaterally) pursuant to the ) pursuant to the ~~c laim~~claim that the PA is a that the PA is a
constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel.constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel.~~183~~
206 Although not a state, the PA is organized like one—complete with executive, legislative, and Although not a state, the PA is organized like one—complete with executive, legislative, and
judicialjudicial organs of governance, as organs of governance, as ~~wel~~ well as security forces. as security forces. ~~Ramal ah~~Ramallah is its de facto seat, but is not is its de facto seat, but is not
considered to be the PA capital because of Palestinian politicalconsidered to be the PA capital because of Palestinian political consensus that Jerusalem (or at consensus that Jerusalem (or at
least the part east of the 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, or “Green Line”) should be the least the part east of the 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, or “Green Line”) should be the
capital of a Palestinian state. capital of a Palestinian state.
The executive branch has both a president and a prime minister-led cabinet, and the Palestinian The executive branch has both a president and a prime minister-led cabinet, and the Palestinian
LegislativeLegislative Council (PLC) is the PA’s legislature (sidelined since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in Council (PLC) is the PA’s legislature (sidelined since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in
2007). The judicial branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle 2007). The judicial branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle
controversies regarding Palestinian basic law, and also includes a High Judicial Council and controversies regarding Palestinian basic law, and also includes a High Judicial Council and
separate security courts. As mentioned above, President Abbas created and appointed justices to a separate security courts. As mentioned above, President Abbas created and appointed justices to a
new Constitutional Court in 2016. The electoral base of the PA is composed of Palestinians from new Constitutional Court in 2016. The electoral base of the PA is composed of Palestinians from
the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
Leadership succession within the PA after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office could present Hamas Leadership succession within the PA after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office could present Hamas
with opportunities to increase its influence, with opportunities to increase its influence, ~~especial y~~especially if the process does not definitively if the process does not definitively
concentrate power around one or more non-Hamas figures. Though Hamas members have not run concentrate power around one or more non-Hamas figures. Though Hamas members have not run
in past presidential elections, one or more could in past presidential elections, one or more could ~~potential y~~potentially run in future elections. run in future elections.
~~Under~~ Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic ~~Law,184 it appears that if Abbas were to leave office, the~~
~~speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (currently Aziz Dweik, a member of Hamas)~~Law207 says that in the event of a vacancy in the office of PA president, the speaker of the PLC would would
take over duties as president for a period not to exceed 60 days, by which time elections for a take over duties as president for a period not to exceed 60 days, by which time elections for a
~~more permanent successor are supposed to take place.~~
~~Succession to the PA presidency could be determined by elections or under the Palestinian Basic~~
~~Law. Abbas’s term of office was supposed to be four years, with a new round of elections initially~~
~~planned for 2009 that would have al owed Abbas to run for a second and final term. However, the~~
~~split between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza has indefinitely postponed~~
~~PA elections, with the last presidential election having taken place in 2005 and the last legislative~~

~~182 T he~~more permanent successor are supposed to take place. However, because Abbas dissolved the PLC by decree in 2018, it is unclear what role a PLC speaker (at the time of Abbas’s 2018 action, the speaker was Aziz Dweik of Hamas) might play, if any. Two analysts of Palestinian politics wrote a 2022 report presenting various scenarios, including the possible involvement of the PA’s Central Elections Commission and Constitutional Court, or PLO action that claims to supersede the PA.208 205 The relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the
GazaGaza Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gazaand the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995. Strip, dated September 28, 1995.
~~183 T he~~206 The PA was PA was originally intended to be a temporary, transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for originally intended to be a temporary, transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for
final-status negotiations, not an indefinite administrative authority. final-status negotiations, not an indefinite administrative authority.
~~184 T he~~207 The Palestinian Basic Law Palestinian Basic Law is the set of lawsis the set of laws that govern the PA. that govern the PA. ~~T he~~The Palestinian Legislative Council originally Palestinian Legislative Council originally
passedpassed it in 1997, and PA President Yasser Arafat ratified it in 2002. Some amendments have occurred since.it in 1997, and PA President Yasser Arafat ratified it in 2002. Some amendments have occurred since.
208 Brown and Pran, “A Procedural Guide to Palestinian Succession: The How of the Who.” Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4547

link to page link to page 87 link to page link to page 98 link to page link to page 2032 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Succession to the PA presidency could be determined by elections or under the Palestinian Basic Law. Abbas’s term of office was supposed to be four years, with a new round of elections initially planned for 2009 that would have allowed Abbas to run for a second and final term. However, the split between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza has indefinitely postponed PA elections, with the last presidential election having taken place in 2005 and the last legislative ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

election in 2006. In December 2009, the PLO’s Central Council voted to extend the terms of both election in 2006. In December 2009, the PLO’s Central Council voted to extend the terms of both
Abbas and the current PLC until elections can be held. This precedent could lead to PLO action in Abbas and the current PLC until elections can be held. This precedent could lead to PLO action in
selecting or attempting to select a successor to Abbas as PA president. selecting or attempting to select a successor to Abbas as PA president.
West Bank
The PA administers densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank subject to supervening The PA administers densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank subject to supervening
Israeli control under the Oslo agreementsIsraeli control under the Oslo agreements (see ~~(se~~e Figure 1 for map). for map).~~185~~209 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots. soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots.
They maintain permanent posts throughout the West Bank and along the West Bank’s They maintain permanent posts throughout the West Bank and along the West Bank’s
administrative borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers and broader security administrative borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers and broader security
interests. The IDF sometimes takes measures that involve the expropriation of West Bank land or interests. The IDF sometimes takes measures that involve the expropriation of West Bank land or
dispossession of Palestinians from their homes and communities. dispossession of Palestinians from their homes and communities.
Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities ~~general y~~generally takes place discreetly, given the takes place discreetly, given the
political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. In 2002, at political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. In 2002, at
the height of the second intifada, Israel demonstrated its ability to reoccupy PA-controlled areas the height of the second intifada, Israel demonstrated its ability to reoccupy PA-controlled areas
of the West Bank in what it of the West Bank in what it ~~cal ed~~called Operation Defensive Shield. The IDF demolished many official Operation Defensive Shield. The IDF demolished many official
PA buildings, Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure.PA buildings, Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure.~~186~~
210 Gaza
Hamas’s security control of Gaza ( Hamas’s security control of Gaza (seesee Figure 2 for map) presents a conundrum for the Abbas-led for map) presents a conundrum for the Abbas-led
PA, Israel, and the internationalPA, Israel, and the international community. They have been unable to establish a durable community. They have been unable to establish a durable
political-security framework for Gaza that assists Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas. political-security framework for Gaza that assists Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas.
For more information, see For more information, see “Gaza’s ~~Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction~~.”Challenges: Hamas, Conflict, and Humanitarian Concerns.”
Hamas’s preeminence in Gaza can be traced to 2006-2007. After victory in the 2006 PA Hamas’s preeminence in Gaza can be traced to 2006-2007. After victory in the 2006 PA
legislativelegislative elections, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza—while losing it in the West Bank—elections, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza—while losing it in the West Bank—
through violent struggle with Fatah in June 2007. Hamas’s security forces have maintained power through violent struggle with Fatah in June 2007. Hamas’s security forces have maintained power
in Gaza ever since, even after its de facto government relinquished nominal responsibility to the in Gaza ever since, even after its de facto government relinquished nominal responsibility to the
PA in June 2014. The State Department and some NGOs have raised concerns about possible PA in June 2014. The State Department and some NGOs have raised concerns about possible
Hamas violations of the rule of law and civil liberties.Hamas violations of the rule of law and civil liberties.~~187~~211
Since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian authorities have maintained strict Since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian authorities have maintained strict
control over Gaza’s border crossings.control over Gaza’s border crossings.~~188~~212 Israel justifies the restrictions it imposes as a way to deny Israel justifies the restrictions it imposes as a way to deny
~~Hamas materials to reconstitute its military capabilities. However, the restrictions also limit~~

~~185 T he~~ 209 The two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) the Israeli-Palestinian Interim the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995; and (2) the Protocol Concerning the Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995; and (2) the Protocol Concerning the
Redeployment in Hebron, datedRedeployment in Hebron, dated January 17, 1997January 17, 1997 . East Jerusalem is. East Jerusalem is ~~excluded~~ excluded from these agreements, as Israel has from these agreements, as Israel has
effectively annexed it. effectively annexed it.
~~186~~210 Anna Ahronheim, “Fifteen years after Op. Defensive Shield, situation on the ground completely different,” Anna Ahronheim, “Fifteen years after Op. Defensive Shield, situation on the ground completely different,”
jpost.com, April 24, 2017. jpost.com, April 24, 2017.
~~187~~ 211 State Department, State Department, ~~2020~~2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza; Amnesty Amnesty
International, Palestine (State of) International, Palestine (State of) ~~2020/21.~~
~~188~~2021/22. 212 In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S.an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S. and European and European
Union participation in the travel and commerce regime that was supposedUnion participation in the travel and commerce regime that was supposed to emerge postto emerge post -Gaza disengagement,-Gaza disengagement, ~~but this~~
~~agreement was never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure~~
~~regime was further formalized when Israel declared Gaza to be a “hostile entity.” Depending on circumstances since~~
~~then, Israel has eased and re-tightened restrictions on various imports and exports. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of~~
~~Movement, Gaza Up Close, September 1, 2021. Widespread unemployment and poverty persist.~~
but this Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4648

link to page link to page 4042 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Hamas materials to reconstitute its military capabilities. However, the restrictions also limit commerce, affect the entire economy, and delay humanitarian assistance.commerce, affect the entire economy, and delay humanitarian assistance.~~189~~213 For several years, For several years,
Hamas compensated somewhat for these restrictions by routinely smuggling goods into Gaza Hamas compensated somewhat for these restrictions by routinely smuggling goods into Gaza
from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula through a network of tunnels. However, after Egypt’s military from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula through a network of tunnels. However, after Egypt’s military
regained political control in July 2013, it disrupted the tunnel system.regained political control in July 2013, it disrupted the tunnel system.
Observers routinely voice concerns that if current arrangements continue, the dispiriting living Observers routinely voice concerns that if current arrangements continue, the dispiriting living
conditions that have persisted since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could feed radicalization within conditions that have persisted since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could feed radicalization within
Gaza and pressure its leaders to increase violence against Israel for political ends.Gaza and pressure its leaders to increase violence against Israel for political ends.~~190~~214 Israel Israel
disputes the level of legal responsibility for Gaza’s residents that some international actors disputes the level of legal responsibility for Gaza’s residents that some international actors ~~claim~~
argue it retains—given its continued control of most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and it retains—given its continued control of most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and
various buffer zones within the territory. various buffer zones within the territory.
Within limited parameters amid Gaza’s political uncertainties and access restrictions, UNRWA Within limited parameters amid Gaza’s political uncertainties and access restrictions, UNRWA
and other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations take care of many and other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations take care of many
Gazans’ day-to-day humanitarian needs. These groups play significant roles in providing various Gazans’ day-to-day humanitarian needs. These groups play significant roles in providing various
forms of assistance and trying to facilitate reconstruction from previous conflicts. For more forms of assistance and trying to facilitate reconstruction from previous conflicts. For more
information on Palestinian refugees, seinformation on Palestinian refugees, see Appendix A.

~~189~~ agreement was never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure regime was further formalized when Israel declared Gaza to be a “hostile entity.” Depending on circumstances since then, Israel has eased and re-tightened restrictions on various imports and exports. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Gaza Up Close, September 1, 2021. Widespread unemployment and poverty persist. 213 World Bank, World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 2, 2020, p. 24. , June 2, 2020, p. 24.
~~190~~214 See, for example, U.N. OCHA-oPt, U.N. OCHA-oPt, Humanitarian Needs Overview OPT 2021, December 2020. , December 2020.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

47

~~link to page 53~~ 49 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix D. Palestinian Economy
The economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip faces structural difficulties—with Gaza’s real per The economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip faces structural difficulties—with Gaza’s real per
capita income about half that of the West Bank’s.capita income about half that of the West Bank’s.~~191~~215 Palestinians’ livelihoods Palestinians’ livelihoods largely depend on largely depend on
their ties to Israel’s relatively strong economy. Israel is the market for about their ties to Israel’s relatively strong economy. Israel is the market for about 8485% of West % of West
Bank/Gaza exports, and the source for about 56% of West Bank/Gaza imports.Bank/Gaza exports, and the source for about 56% of West Bank/Gaza imports.~~192~~216 Palestinians are Palestinians are
constrained from developing other external ties because of the layers of control that Israel has put constrained from developing other external ties because of the layers of control that Israel has put
in place to enforce security. in place to enforce security.
Because the PA has been unable to become self-sufficient, it has been acutely dependent on Because the PA has been unable to become self-sufficient, it has been acutely dependent on
foreign assistance. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of foreign assistance. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of ~~over $1 bil ion (and wel beyond that~~
~~amount for 2020 and 2021 given COVID-19)~~more than $1 billion, PA officials , PA officials have traditionally ~~have traditional y~~ sought aid from sought aid from
international sources to meet the PA’s financial commitmentsinternational sources to meet the PA’s financial commitments ~~(see Figure D-1). As of August~~
~~2021, external donor funding for the calendar year (including from Arab states and European~~
~~governments) was at a historical y low level of $100 mil ion.193~~
. As of August 2022, the PA had received around $190 million in external donor funding (almost exclusively from Western governments and the World Bank) for the calendar year. Its budgeted target amount is around $510 million.217 Part of the PA’s financial problems stem from a payroll that has become increasingly bloated over Part of the PA’s financial problems stem from a payroll that has become increasingly bloated over
the PA’s the PA’s 2728-year existence. Domestic corruption and inefficiency also appear to pose -year existence. Domestic corruption and inefficiency also appear to pose
difficulties.difficulties.~~194~~218 Absent fundamental changes in revenue and expenses, the PA’s fiscal dependence Absent fundamental changes in revenue and expenses, the PA’s fiscal dependence
~~on external sources is likely to continue.~~

~~191 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, March 19, 2018, pp. 22-23.~~
~~192 Economist Intelligence Unit, Palestine Country Report (accessed March 12, 2021), based on 2019 figures.~~
~~193 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php.~~
~~194 See, e.g., Elliott Abrams, “Corruption in the Palestinian Authority,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 5, 2018.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

48

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure D-1. International Donor Funding to the Palestinian Authority~~

Source: Hugh Lovatt, “The end of Oslo: A new European strategy on Israel-Palestine,” European Council on
~~Foreign Relations, December 9, 2020.~~
on external sources is likely to continue. Lacking sufficient private sector employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, many Lacking sufficient private sector employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, many
Palestinians have Palestinians have ~~historical y~~historically depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their jobs and depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their jobs and
goods. Yet, the second intifada that began in 2000 reduced this access considerably. Israel goods. Yet, the second intifada that began in 2000 reduced this access considerably. Israel
constructed a West Bank separation barrier and increased security at crossing points, and constructed a West Bank separation barrier and increased security at crossing points, and
~~unilateral y~~ unilaterally “disengaged” (withdrew its settlements and official military contingent) from Gaza in “disengaged” (withdrew its settlements and official military contingent) from Gaza in
2005. Israel now issues permits to control access. Its security forces significantly limit the flow of 2005. Israel now issues permits to control access. Its security forces significantly limit the flow of
people and goods to flow between Israel and Gaza, while people and goods to flow between Israel and Gaza, while ~~periodical y~~ periodically halting these flows halting these flows
between Israel and the West Bank. between Israel and the West Bank.
The Palestinians’ alternatives to functional dependence on Israel’s economy includeThe Palestinians’ alternatives to functional dependence on Israel’s economy include
 attracting investment and building a self-sufficient economy;  attracting investment and building a self-sufficient economy;
 looking to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own political  looking to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own political
and economic problems) for economic integration; or and economic problems) for economic integration; or
 depending indefinitely  depending indefinitely on external assistanceon external assistance or sources of income. .
For the West Bank and Gaza to attract enough long-term investment to become more self- For the West Bank and Gaza to attract enough long-term investment to become more self-
sufficient, most observers agree that uncertainties regarding the political and security situation sufficient, most observers agree that uncertainties regarding the political and security situation
and Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital would need to be and Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital would need to be
significantly reduced.significantly reduced.~~195~~219 Such changes may be untenable absent an Such changes may be untenable absent an ~~overal~~ overall resolution of Israeli-resolution of Israeli-
Palestinian disputes. In the meantime, donors and lenders Palestinian disputes. In the meantime, donors and lenders ~~occasional y~~occasionally provide emergency provide emergency
funding to stave off fiscal crisis. funding to stave off fiscal crisis.

~~195 World Bank, June 2, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

49

The PA has a co-development agreement with Egypt for Gaza’s offshore Marine gas field that might provide future revenue to it and Israel. While prospects to 215 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, March 19, 2018, pp. 22-23. 216 Economist Intelligence Unit, Palestine Country Report (accessed October 17, 2022), based on 2021 figures. 217 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php. 218 See, for example, World Bank, September 22, 2022; Shrock et al., “Responding to the PA’s Mounting Fiscal Crisis.” 219 World Bank, September 22, 2022. Congressional Research Service 50 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations develop the field may have increased in light of Europe’s interest in non-Russian energy sources, they remain uncertain.220 Israel reportedly favors development.221 220 “Egypt mediates talks to develop Gaza offshore gas,” Agence France Presse, October 14, 2022; Rasha Abou Jalal, “Egypt persuades Israel to extract Gaza’s natural gas,” Al-Monitor, October 6, 2022. 221 “Egypt, Israel and PA agree to develop natural gas field off the shores of Gaza,” Egypt Independent, October 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 51 link to page 39 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix E. Palestinian Initiatives in
International Fora
The PLO has pursued a number of international initiatives—opposed by the United States and The PLO has pursued a number of international initiatives—opposed by the United States and
Israel—that are part of a broader effort to obtain greater international recognition of Palestinian Israel—that are part of a broader effort to obtain greater international recognition of Palestinian
statehood. Some 139 out of 193 U.N. member states reportedly have statehood. Some 139 out of 193 U.N. member states reportedly have ~~formal y~~formally recognized the recognized the
state of Palestine that the PLO declared in 1988.state of Palestine that the PLO declared in 1988.~~196~~
~~The PLO’s international initiatives~~ 222 Palestinian leaders also have taken actions to facilitate an International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. U.N.-Related Issues Many of the PLO’s international initiatives are centered on the United Nations. In September 2011, PLO are centered on the United Nations. In September 2011, PLO
Chairman Abbas applied for Palestinian membership in the United Nations. Chairman Abbas applied for Palestinian membership in the United Nations. ~~Official y,~~ Officially, the the
application remains pending in the Security Council’s membership committee, whose members application remains pending in the Security Council’s membership committee, whose members
did not achieve consensus during 2011 deliberations.did not achieve consensus during 2011 deliberations.~~197~~223 The application for Palestinian The application for Palestinian
membership would likely face a U.S. veto if it came to a future vote in the Security Council. In membership would likely face a U.S. veto if it came to a future vote in the Security Council. In
~~fal~~ fall 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
~~Organization (UNESCO).198~~
~~Under U.S. laws passed in 1990 and 1994,199 Palestinian admission to membership in UNESCO~~
~~in 2011 triggered the withholding of U.S. assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the~~
~~organization. If the Palestinians were to obtain membership in other U.N. entities, the 1990 and~~
~~1994 U.S. laws might trigger withholdings of U.S. financial contributions to these entities.200~~
~~Such withholdings could adversely affect these entities’ budgets and complicate the conduct of~~
~~U.S. foreign policy within the U.N. system and other multilateral settings. The following are~~
~~some other significant steps for the PLO in international fora:~~

~~196~~Organization (UNESCO).224 As mentioned above (see “International Organizations”), this development triggered withholding of U.S. contributions to UNESCO under U.S. law. The following are some other significant steps for the PLO in international fora:  On November 29, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19. The resolution changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (recognized before as “Palestine” and now as “State of Palestine” within the U.N. system) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”225 222 A list from the PLO’s observer mission to the United Nations is available at https://palestineun.org/about A list from the PLO’s observer mission to the United Nations is available at https://palestineun.org/about --
palestine/diplomatic-relations/. It does not include the United States, Canada,palestine/diplomatic-relations/. It does not include the United States, Canada, Japan, or most Western European Japan, or most Western European
countries, but does includecountries, but does include China, India, and Russia. China, India, and Russia.
~~197~~223 United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council, “ “Report of the Committee on the Admission of NewReport of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the Members concerning the
application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,” S/2011/705, November 11, 2011. application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,” S/2011/705, November 11, 2011.
Paragraph 19 of this report provides a summary of the varying views that committee members advanced Paragraph 19 of this report provides a summary of the varying views that committee members advanced ~~r egarding~~regarding
Palestinian membership: “Palestinian membership: “ ~~T he~~The view was view was expressed that the Committee should recommend to the Council that Palestine expressed that the Committee should recommend to the Council that Palestine
be admitted to membership in the United Nations. A different view wasbe admitted to membership in the United Nations. A different view was expressed that the membership application expressed that the membership application
couldcould not be supported at this time and an abstention was envisagednot be supported at this time and an abstention was envisaged in the event of a vote. Yet another view expressed in the event of a vote. Yet another view expressed
waswas that there were seriousthat there were serious questions about the application, questions about the application, ~~t hat~~that the applicant did not meet the applicant did not meet ~~t he~~the requirements for requirements for
membership and that a favourable membership and that a favourable ~~recommendat ion~~recommendation to the General Assembly would to the General Assembly would not be supported.” not be supported.”
~~198~~224 For more information, see CRS For more information, see CRS Report R42999, Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), by Luisa, by Luisa Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne. 225 The PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. Following the adoption of Resolution 67/19, the “State of Palestine” maintains many of the capacities it had as an observer entity—including participation in General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Despite its designation as a state, the “State of Palestine” is not a member of the United Nations, and therefore does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly on resolutions. However, in November 2013, the “State of Palestine” participated in the balloting for a judge for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 13, Section 2(d) of the Statute for the Tribunal (Annex to U.N. Doc. S/25704, adopted pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), as subsequently amended) includes “non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters” in the election of the tribunal’s judges. Congressional Research Service 52 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations ~~Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne.~~
~~199 P.L. 101-246 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991) and P.L. 103-236 (Foreign~~
~~Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995).~~
~~200 In May 2018, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but~~
~~without consequences under U.S. law because the United States is not a member of or donor to UNIDO.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

50

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~ On November 29, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19.~~
~~The resolution changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO~~
~~(recognized before as “Palestine” and now as “State of Palestine” within the U.N.~~
~~system) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”201~~
 In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate  In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). Change (UNFCCC).~~202~~
226  In 2017, the Palestinians obtained membership in Interpol.  In 2017, the Palestinians obtained membership in Interpol.
 In 2018, the Palestinians applied to join the U.N. Conference on Trade and  In 2018, the Palestinians applied to join the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) Development (UNCTAD)~~203~~227 and deposited an instrument of accession to the and deposited an instrument of accession to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the U.N. Secretary General.Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the U.N. Secretary General.~~204~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Jim Zanotti~~

~~Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~Disclaimer~~
~~This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan~~
~~shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and~~
~~under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other~~
~~than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in~~
~~connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not~~
~~subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in~~
~~its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or~~
~~material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to~~
~~copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.~~

~~201 T he PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. Following the adoption of Resolution~~
~~67/19, the “State of Palestine” maintains many of the capacities it had as an observ er entity—including participation in~~
~~General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on~~
~~Palestinian and Middle East issues. Despite its designation as a state, the “State of Palestine” is not a member of the~~
~~United Nations, and therefore does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly on~~
~~resolutions. However, in November 2013, the “State of Palestine” participated in the balloting for a judge for the~~
~~International T ribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 13, Section 2(d) of the Statute for the T ribunal (Annex to~~
~~U.N. Doc. S/25704, adopted pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), as subsequently amended)~~
~~includes “non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters” in the~~
~~election of the tribunal’s judges.~~
~~202 UNFCCC website, State of Palestine Joins Convention, March 15, 2016.~~
~~203 UNCT AD website, State of Palestine expresses intent to join UNCT AD, May 24, 2018.~~
~~204 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) website, State of Palestine Accedes to the Chemical~~
~~Weapons Convention, May 23, 2018. T he OPCW later announced that the “State of Palestine” had become a State~~
~~Party to the CWC and an OPCW Member State. OPCW website, State of Palestine Joins the Organisation for the~~
~~Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 21, 2018.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~RL34074 · VERSION 52 · UPDATED~~
51228 International Criminal Court (ICC) Actions229 Background The International Criminal Court (ICC) has an open investigation into possible crimes committed by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip since June 13, 2014. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over alleged genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (“ICC crimes”) that occur on the territory of or are perpetrated by nationals of an entity deemed to be a State  after the Rome Statute enters into force for a State Party;  during a period of time in which a nonparty State accepts jurisdiction; or  pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in a State to the ICC. The following actions by Palestinian leaders have influenced the overall context in which the ICC’s actions have taken place:  In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the “State of Palestine” to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes allegedly “committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014.”  Later in January 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as depositary, stated that the Rome Statute would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on April 1, 2015.230  Later that same month, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination into the “situation in Palestine” to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation” against Israelis, Palestinians, or others, having found that the Palestinians had the proper capacity to accept ICC jurisdiction in light of the November 2012 adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 226 UNFCCC website, State of Palestine Joins Convention, March 15, 2016. 227 UNCTAD website, State of Palestine expresses intent to join UNCTAD, May 24, 2018. 228 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) website, State of Palestine Accedes to the Chemical Weapons Convention, May 23, 2018. The OPCW later announced that the “State of Palestine” had become a State Party to the CWC and an OPCW Member State. OPCW website, State of Palestine Joins the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 21, 2018. 229 Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, assisted in preparing this subsection. 230 U.N. Secretary-General Rome Statute Depositary Notification for the State of Palestine, January 6, 2015, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-Eng.pdf. Congressional Research Service 53 link to page 56 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations 67/19.231 As mentioned in Appendix E, Resolution 67/19 had changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (aka “State of Palestine”) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”  Palestinian leaders provided information to the ICC on alleged Israeli crimes regarding both the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict and settlement activity in the West Bank. In May 2018, Palestinian leaders made a formal referral of the “situation in Palestine” to the Prosecutor.232 As referenced above, the State Department cited Palestinian actions relating to the ICC in connection with the 2018 closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC. Various U.S. and Israeli officials have denounced Palestinian efforts that could subject Israelis to ICC investigation or prosecution.233 Neither the United States nor Israel is a State Party to the Rome Statute. Palestinian accession and acceptance of jurisdiction grant the ICC Prosecutor authority to investigate all alleged ICC crimes committed after June 13, 2014, by any individual—Israeli, Palestinian, or otherwise—on “occupied Palestinian territory.” However, Palestinian actions do not ensure any formal ICC prosecution of alleged ICC crimes. A party to the Rome Statute can refer a situation to the Court and is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor on investigations, but it is the role of the Prosecutor to determine whether to bring charges against and prosecute an individual. In addition, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings (as described in Article 17 of the Statute) brought by a state with jurisdiction, including a state (such as Israel) that is not party to the Statute. The ICC Prosecutor is required to notify all states with jurisdiction over a potential case, and such states are afforded the opportunity to challenge ICC jurisdiction over a case on inadmissibility grounds. Investigation of Possible Crimes in West Bank and Gaza On March 3, 2021, then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she was opening an investigation of possible ICC crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.234 She had previously sought a ruling from a pre-trial chamber to confirm her determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the situation generally, and to determine the extent of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction specifically.235 In a 2-1 decision, the chamber ruled in February 2021 that the ICC has jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem), based on the Palestinians’ status as a State 231 ICC Press Release, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine,” January 16, 2015. 232 ICC Statement, “Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the referral submitted by Palestine,” May 22, 2018. 233 See, for example, “Bolton warns ICC not to go after Israel, confirms closure of PLO’s DC office,” Times of Israel, September 10, 2018. 234 ICC, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine,” March 3, 2021. 235 ICC, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the Situation in Palestine, and seeking a ruling on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction,” December 20, 2019. Congressional Research Service 54 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Party to the Rome Statute.236 Israel had argued that the ICC should not have jurisdiction in those territories because Palestinians do not have sovereign control there.237 Broader Impact of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Ruling? The ICC pre-trial chamber’s February 2021 decision stated that because the ICC exercises jurisdiction over natural persons rather than states, its decision “is strictly limited to the question of jurisdiction set forth in the Prosecutor’s Request and does not entail any determination on the border disputes between Palestine and Israel.” According to one commentator, Palestinians and other international actors could use the decision to support for Palestinian statehood and territorial claims.238 In response to the opening of an ICC investigation, Secretary of State Blinken said: The United States firmly opposes and is deeply disappointed by this decision. The ICC has no jurisdiction over this matter. Israel is not a party to the ICC and has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction, and we have serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. The Palestinians do not qualify as a sovereign state and therefore, are not qualified to obtain membership as a state in, participate as a state in, or delegate jurisdiction to the ICC.… Moreover, the United States believes a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future for the people of the Middle East depends on building bridges and creating new avenues for dialogue and exchange, not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution. We will continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, including by opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.239 Later in March 2021, 54 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken commending his statements, and urging him to work with like-minded international partners to “steer the ICC away from further actions that could damage the Court’s credibility by giving the appearance of political bias.”240 While Palestinian leaders (from both the PLO/PA and Hamas) welcomed the news of an ICC investigation,241 leading Israeli political figures roundly denounced it, with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling the decision to investigate biased and anti-Semitic.242 236 ICC, “Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine,’” February 5, 2021. In a partly dissenting opinion (available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2021_01167.PDF), Judge Péter Kovács argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction in the West Bank should be limited to the competences transferred to the PA in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to an interpretation that might require Israel’s consent to ICC investigations of Israeli nationals. 237 Israeli Attorney General, The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So-Called “Situation in Palestine,” December 20, 2019. Germany, Brazil, Australia, Uganda, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary had filed amicus curiae briefs with the pre-trial chamber offering arguments in line with Israel’s objections to territorial, while the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation had filed briefs in support of territorial jurisdiction. 238 Tovah Lazaroff, “Eight things to know about the ICC war crimes suits against Israel,” jpost.com, February 7, 2021. 239 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, The United States Opposes the ICC Investigation into the Palestinian Situation, March 3, 2021. 240 Text of letter available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-cardin-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-secretary-blinken-continue. 241 “ICC prosecutor opens war crimes probe in Palestinian territories,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2021. 242 “Netanyahu: ICC war crimes probe is ‘pure antisemitism,’” jpost.com, March 4, 2021. Congressional Research Service 55 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations The investigation under the current Prosecutor, Karim Khan,243 could focus on a number of possible war crimes from Israeli and Palestinian actions, including:  actions by Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian militant groups during their 2014 and 2021 Gaza conflicts;  lethal force used by Israeli soldiers in 2018-2019 against some Palestinian protestors in Gaza seeking to breach or approach the administrative boundary with Israel;  other Israeli actions in and around the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement activity; and  possible PA (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) human rights abuses. An investigation could take months or years before the Prosecutor makes decisions on bringing specific charges against individuals. As mentioned above, if an ICC investigation produces any case against Israelis or Palestinians concerning conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings by a state having jurisdiction, it would be inadmissible. In Bensouda’s announcement of the investigation, she said: As a first step, the Office [of the Prosecutor] is required to notify all States Parties and those States which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned about its investigation. This permits any such State to request the Office to defer to the State’s relevant investigation of its own nationals or others within its jurisdiction in relation to Rome Statute crimes referred to in the notification (subject to possible Pre-Trial Chamber review).244 Possible U.S. Responses It is unclear what diplomatic or other measures the Biden Administration might take to counter an ICC investigation focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Under Executive Order 13928 from June 2020, President Trump authorized sanctions against foreign persons or entities involved in or supporting ICC investigations or actions targeting U.S. personnel or personnel of U.S. allies without the consent of the home government of those personnel.245 In September 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions under E.O. 13928 against Prosecutor Bensouda and another top ICC official in connection with an investigation regarding Afghanistan.246 President Biden 243 Before becoming the ICC Prosecutor in June 2021, Khan served as the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2379 (2017) to promote accountability efforts for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq. 244 ICC, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine,” March 3, 2021. 245 Executive Order 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court, June 11, 2020. Prior to E.O. 13928, 67 Senators and 262 Representatives sent letters to then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asserting that ICC jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza would be improper, and urging him to support Israel in challenging it. The text of the Senators’ letter is available at https://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-for-pompeo-to-defend-israel-against-politically-motivated-investigations-by-the-international-criminal-court, and the text of the Representatives’ letter is available at https://luria.house.gov/sites/luria.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/2020.05.12%20Luria%20Gallagher%20letter%20to%20Sec%20Pompeo%20on%20ICC.pdf. 246 Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court Designations,” September 2, 2020. For background information, see CRS Insight IN11428, International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack. Congressional Research Service 56 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations lifted these sanctions in April 2021 while stating continued U.S. objections to ICC assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. and allied personnel.247 Author Information Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 247 White House, “Executive Order on the Termination of Emergency with Respect to the International Criminal Court,” April 1, 2021. Congressional Research Service RL34074 · VERSION 54 · UPDATED 57