Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

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Emerging Military Technologies: ~~Background~~
~~October 21~~ November 10, 2021 , 2021
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing
emerging Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
~~emerging~~ military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with
U.S. competitors. The Technology and Global Technology and Global
U.S. U.S. ~~competitors. The U.S.~~ military has long relied upon technological superiority to military has long relied upon technological superiority to
~~Security~~
ensure its dominance in conflict ensure its dominance in conflict Security and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years,and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years,
however, technology has both rapidly however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a

result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the United States’ traditional sources of military United States’ traditional sources of military
advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for
military and security purposes as military and security purposes as ~~wel~~ well as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of
this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense
Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group. Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting
that U.S. national security that U.S. national security ~~wil likely be~~
~~affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character~~ will likely be affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies of war…. New technologies
include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy,
hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars
of the future.of the future.
The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key
strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these
technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant
implications for the future of international security writ large, and implications for the future of international security writ large, and ~~wil~~ will have to be a significant focus for Congress, have to be a significant focus for Congress,
both in terms of funding and program oversight. both in terms of funding and program oversight.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and
Russia: Russia:
 artificial  artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence, ,
 lethal autonomous weapons,  lethal autonomous weapons,
 hypersonic weapons,  hypersonic weapons,
 directed energy weapons,  directed energy weapons,
 biotechnology, and  biotechnology, and
 quantum technology.  quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies,
considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated
issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the
management structure for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging technologies, the ~~chal enges~~challenges associated with recruiting and retaining associated with recruiting and retaining
technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of
emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies. emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies.
Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.

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Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging
military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The
U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict
and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly
evolved and rapidlyevolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode
the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage.1 The Department of Defense (DOD)
has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For has undertaken a number of initiatives in recent years in an effort to arrest this trend. For
example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging
technologies for military and security purposes as technologies for military and security purposes as ~~wel~~ well as associated strategies, tactics, and as associated strategies, tactics, and
concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations concepts of operation.2 In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations
focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense
Wargaming Alignment Group.Wargaming Alignment Group.
More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has echoed the underpinnings of the Third
Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security ~~wil likely~~ will likely be be
affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New
technologiestechnologies ~~include advanced~~ include advanced computing,computing, “big“big data”data” analytics,analytics, artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence,
autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very
technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.3
Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and Although the United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies, China and
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military
technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these technologies. As they are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, these
technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future technologies could hold significant implications for congressional considerations and the future
of international security writ large. of international security writ large.
This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States,
China, and Russia: China, and Russia:
 artificial  artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence, ,
 lethal autonomous weapons,  lethal autonomous weapons,
 hypersonic weapons,  hypersonic weapons,
 directed energy weapons,  directed energy weapons,
 biotechnology,  biotechnology,
 and quantum technology.  and quantum technology.
It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these
technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging militarytechnologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies, and outlines technologies, and outlines

1 Remarks as delivered by1 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days
Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/. Opening Keynote,” September 3, 2014, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/.
2 The Third~~2 T he T hird~~ Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second Offset Strategy is a strategy for maintaining U.S. military superiority. It succeeds the First and Second
Offsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guidedOffsets—nuclear weapons and the precision-guided munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery munitions regime, respectively. Remarks as prepared for delivery
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bobby Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014, at
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/.
3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of 3 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of ~~T he~~The United States of America,” 2018, p. United States of America,” 2018, p.
3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional associated issues for Congress. Such issues could hold implications for congressional
authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making. authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)4
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial Although the U.S. government has no official definition of artificial ~~intel igence, policymakers~~
~~general y~~ intelligence, policymakers generally use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is use the term AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level cognition. AI is
further divided into two categories: narrow AI and general AI. Narrow AI systems can perform further divided into two categories: narrow AI and general AI. Narrow AI systems can perform
only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be only the specific task that they were trained to perform, while general AI systems would be
capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including those for which they were not ~~specifical y~~
specifically trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5trained. General AI systems do not yet—and may never—exist.5
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of military applications by both the
United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to United States and its competitors. Such applications include but are not limited to ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance~~intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;6 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-, and reconnaissance;6 logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies are intended in part to augment or
replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding replace human operators, freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively demanding
work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1) react significantly faster than systems that rely on
operator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data availableoperator input; (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis; for analysis;
and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which and (3) enable new concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting
advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems. advantage by overwhelming adversary defensive systems.
Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of Narrow AI, however, could introduce a number of ~~chal enges~~challenges. For example, such systems may be . For example, such systems may be
subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models. Researchers have
repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of
diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language
processing programs have developed gender bias.7 Such biases could hold significant processing programs have developed gender bias.7 Such biases could hold significant
implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected implications for AI applications in a military context. For example, incorporating undetected
biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended biases into systems with lethal effects could lead to cases of mistaken identity and the unintended
~~kil ing~~ killing of civilians or noncombatants.of civilians or noncombatants.
Similarly, Similarly, narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could narrow AI algorithms can produce unpredictable and unconventional results that could
lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited lead to unexpected failures if incorporated into military systems. In a commonly cited
demonstration of this phenomenon (demonstration of this phenomenon (~~il ustrated~~illustrated i in Figure 1), researchers combined a picture that , researchers combined a picture that
an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled
“nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it “nematode.” The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to the human eye, but it
resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such resulted in the AI system labeling the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence. Such
vulnerabilitiesvulnerabilities could be exploited could be exploited ~~intentional y~~ intentionally by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted by adversaries to disrupt AI-reliant or -assisted
target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or, target identification, selection, and engagement. This could, in turn, raise ethical concerns—or,

4 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS4 For more information about artificial intelligence, see CRS Report R45178, Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National
Security, by, by Kelley M. Sayler. Kelley M. Sayler.
5 For a discussion5 For a discussion of narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as wellof narrow versus general artificial intelligence, as well as as a range of expert opinions about the future a range of expert opinions about the future
of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, of general artificial intelligence, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, United (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6 For a discussion 6 For a discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRSof intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, see CRS Report R46389, Report R46389, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power ~~Com petition~~ Competition, by Nishawn, by Nishawn S. S. Smagh.Smagh.
7 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias7 Brian Barrett, “Lawmakers Can’t Ignore Facial Recognition’s Bias Anymore,” Wired, July 26,Anymore,” Wired, July 26, 2018, at 2018, at
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, “ How to How to
Fix SiliconFix Silicon Valley’s SexistValley’s Sexist Algorithms,” MITAlgorithms,” MIT ~~T echnology~~ Technology Review, November 23, 2016, at Review, November 23, 2016, at
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/.
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~~potential y,~~ potentially, lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting lead to violations of the law of armed conflict—if it results in the system selecting
and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.and engaging a target or class of targets that was not approved by a human operator.
Figure 1. AI Failure in Image Recognition

Source: AndrewAndrew Ilachinski,Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analyses,Analyses, January 2017, p. 61. January 2017, p. 61.
~~Final y~~Finally, recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly , recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role of AI in enabling increasingly
realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries realistic photo, audio, and video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.” Adversaries
could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.8 could deploy this AI capability as part of their information operations in a “gray zone” conflict.8
Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its Deep fake technology could be used against the United States and its ~~al ies~~allies to generate false news to generate false news
reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government reports, influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt blackmail of government
officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to officials. For this reason, some analysts argue that social media platforms—in addition to
deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and deploying deep fake detection tools—may need to expand the means of labeling and
authenticating content.9 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which authenticating content.9 Doing so might require that users identify the time and location at which
the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have the content originated or properly label content that has been edited. Other analysts have
expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social expressed concern that regulating deep fake technology could impose an undue burden on social
media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.10 media platforms or lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and artistic expression.10
These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of These analysts have suggested that existing law is sufficient for managing the malicious use of
deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes deep fakes and that the focus should be instead on the need to educate the public about deep fakes
and minimizeand minimize incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes. incentives for creators of malicious deep fakes.
United States
DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 DOD’s unclassified investments in AI have grown from just over $600 ~~mil ion~~million in FY2016 to in FY2016 to
approximately $874 approximately $874 ~~mil ion~~ million in FY2022, with the department maintaining over 600 active AI in FY2022, with the department maintaining over 600 active AI
projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232), projects.11 Pursuant to the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 115-232),
DOD established the Joint ArtificialDOD established the Joint Artificial ~~Intel igence~~ Intelligence Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate Center (JAIC, pronounced “jake”) to coordinate
DOD projects of over $15 DOD projects of over $15 ~~mil ion~~million; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of ; the JAIC was granted acquisition authority by Section 808 of

8 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below8 “Gray zone” conflicts are those that occur below the threshold of formallythe threshold of formally declared war.declared war. For more information about For more information about
information operations, see CRSinformation operations, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10771, IF10771, Defense ~~Prim er: Inform ation~~Primer: Information Operations, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A.
~~T heohary~~Theohary. .
9 Some social media 9 Some social media platforms such as platforms such as ~~T witter~~Twitter have established rules have established rules for labelingfor labeling and removing certain types of and removing certain types of
synthetic or manipulated media. Seesynthetic or manipulated media. See Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “Yoel Roth and Ashita Achuthan, “ Building rulesBuilding rules in public:in public: Our approach to Our approach to
synthetic & manipulated media,” synthetic & manipulated media,” Twitter,, February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/February 4, 2020, at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html. new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-media.html.
10 Jessica 10 Jessica Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Ice, “Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2019, , 2019,
at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12. at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss2/12.
11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, 11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
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the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).12 The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283).12 The JAIC has undertaken a number of National Mission
Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,13 humanitarian aid and disaster relief, Initiatives for AI, including predictive maintenance,13 humanitarian aid and disaster relief,
warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint warfighter health, and business process transformation. In addition, the JAIC maintains the Joint
Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment” Common Foundation, a “secure cloud-based AI development and experimentation environment”
intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.14 intended to support the testing and fielding of department-wide AI capabilities.14
The FY2019 NDAA The FY2019 NDAA also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and also directed DOD to publish a strategic roadmap for AI development and
fielding, as fielding, as ~~wel~~ well as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the as to develop guidance on “appropriate ethical, legal, and other policies for the
Department governing the development and use of artificial Department governing the development and use of artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence enabled systems and enabled systems and
technologies in operational situations.”15 In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation technologies in operational situations.”15 In support of this mandate, the Defense Innovation
Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted Board (DIB), an independent federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, drafted
recommendations for the ethical use of artificial recommendations for the ethical use of artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence.16 Based on these recommendations, .16 Based on these recommendations,
DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations: DOD then adopted five ethical principles for AI based on the DIB’s recommendations:
responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability,responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.17 On May 26, 2021, Deputy and governability.17 On May 26, 2021, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum providing guidance on the
implementation of Responsible Artificial implementation of Responsible Artificial ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence (RAI), in keeping with the ethical (RAI), in keeping with the ethical
principles.18 The JAIC has been charged with developing and implementing RAI strategy, principles.18 The JAIC has been charged with developing and implementing RAI strategy,
guidance, and policy.19 guidance, and policy.19
~~Final y,~~ Finally, Section 1051 of the FY2019 NDAASection 1051 of the FY2019 NDAA established a National Security Commission on established a National Security Commission on
ArtificialArtificial ~~Intel igence~~ Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI to conduct a comprehensive assessment of militarily relevant AI
technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The technologies and to provide recommendations for strengthening U.S. competitiveness. The
commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and commission’s final report to Congress was delivered in March 2021 and ~~general y~~generally offers offers
recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2) recommendations along five key lines of effort: (1) investing in research and development, (2)
applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and applying AI to national security missions, (3) training and recruiting AI talent, (4) protecting and
building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) building upon U.S. technology advantages, and (5) ~~marshal ing~~marshalling global AI cooperation.20 global AI cooperation.20

12 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 12 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, II, §1051; and P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title VIII, §808. VIII, §808.
13 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance 13 Predictive maintenance uses AI “to predict the failure of critical parts, automate diagnostics, and plan maintenance
~~based~~ based on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense on data and equipment condition.” Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense
Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” February 12, 2019, p. 11, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/
1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-~~ST RAT EGY~~STRATEGY.PDF. .PDF.
14 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html. 14 Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, “Joint Common Foundation,” at https://www.ai.mil/jcf.html.
15 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, 15 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §238. II, §238.
16 For a discussion16 For a discussion of DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as wellof DOD’s rationale for developing principles for ethical AI, as well as DOD’s existing ethical as DOD’s existing ethical
commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of commitments related to AI, see Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/
2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT .PDF. .PDF.
17 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “ 17 For definitions of these principles, see Department of Defense, “ DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial
Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-Intelligence,” February 24, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-
adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.
18 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI 18 RAI is to focus on RAI governance, warfighter trust, AI ~~pro duct~~product and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation, and acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation,
responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks, responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce. For additional information about RAI, see Kathleen H. Hicks,
“Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021,“Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, at at
https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-~~ART IFICIAL-~~
~~INT ELLIGENCE-IN-T HE~~ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. -DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF.
19 Kathleen H. Hicks, “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021, 19 Kathleen H. Hicks, “Implementing Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of Defense,” May 26, 2021,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-~~ART IFICIAL-~~
~~INT ELLIGENCE-IN-T HE~~ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF. -DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF.
20 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 20 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-, March 2021, at https://www.nscai.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Reportcontent/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report -Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND -Digital-1.pdf. Pursuant to Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, RAND
Corporation, a federally fundedCorporation, a federally funded research and development center, additionally conducted a reviewresearch and development center, additionally conducted a review of DOD’s posture of DOD’s posture
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China
China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.21 China is widely viewed as the United States’ closest competitor in the international AI market.21
China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology” China’s 2017 “Next Generation AI Development Plan” describes AI as a “strategic technology”
that has become a “focus of international competition.”22 Recent Chinese achievements in the that has become a “focus of international competition.”22 Recent Chinese achievements in the
field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China field demonstrate China’s potential to realize its goals for AI development. In particular, China
has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into has pursued language and facial recognition technologies, many of which it plans to integrate into
the country’s domestic the country’s domestic ~~surveil ance~~surveillance network. Such technologies could be used to counter network. Such technologies could be used to counter
espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and espionage and aid military targeting. In addition to developing various types of air, land, sea, and
undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which undersea autonomous military vehicles, China is actively pursuing swarm technologies, which
could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source could be used to overwhelm adversary missile defense interceptors. Moreover, open-source
publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.23publications indicate that China is developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations.23
China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.24 In China’s management of its AI ecosystem stands in stark contrast to that of the United States.24 In
general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research general, few boundaries exist between Chinese commercial companies, university research
laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National laboratories, the military, and the central government. China’s National ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence Law, for Law, for
example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national example, requires companies and individuals to “support, assist, and cooperate with national
~~intel igence~~ intelligence work.”25 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military work.”25 As a result, the Chinese government has a direct means of guiding military
AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes. AI development priorities and accessing technology developed for civilian purposes.
Russia
Russian president VladimirRussian president Vladimir Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] Putin has stated that “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] ~~wil~~
will become the ruler of the world.”26 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly become the ruler of the world.”26 At present, however, Russian AI development lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has behind that of the United States and China. As part of Russia’s effort to close this gap, Russia has
released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s released a national strategy that outlines 5- and 10-year benchmarks for improving the country’s
AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.27 Russia AI expertise, educational programs, datasets, infrastructure, and legal regulatory system.27 Russia
has indicated it has indicated it ~~wil~~ will continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which continue to pursue its 2008 defense modernization agenda, which ~~cal ed~~called for for
robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.28 robotizing 30% of the country’s military equipment by 2025.28
The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on The Russian military has been researching a number of AI applications, with a heavy emphasis on
semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat semiautonomous and autonomous military vehicles. Russia has also reportedly built a combat
module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—module for unmanned ground vehicles that may be capable of autonomous target identification—

~~for AI. See Danielle C. T arraf et al.,~~ ~~The Departm ent~~ for AI. See Danielle C. Tarraf et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: ~~Assessm ent and~~
~~Recom m endations~~Assessment and Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html. , RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.
21 See, 21 See, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, for example, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New ~~World~~ World Order (Boston, MA: (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018). Houghton Mifflin Co., 2018).
22 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2. 22 China State Council, “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” p. 2.
23 Elsa Kania, 23 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, ,
Center for a NewCenter for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27.American Security, November 28, 2017, p. 27.
24 Ibid., p. 6. 24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Arjun Kharpal, “25 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei ~~Huawei~~ says it wouldsays it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a
choice,” choice,” CNBC,, March 5, 2019. March 5, 2019.
26 “‘Whoever leads in AI will26 “‘Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’:rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on KnowledgePutin to Russian children on Knowledge ~~Day~~ Day,” ,” RT.com, September 1, , September 1,
2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 2017, at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.
27 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the 27 Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the
Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation” (Center for Security and Emerging ~~T echnology,~~
~~T rans~~Technology, Trans.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president.), October 10, 2019, at https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decree-of-the-president -of-the-russian-federation-on--of-the-russian-federation-on-
the-developmentthe-development -of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/. -of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/.
28 28 ~~T om~~Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels ~~New Global~~ New Global Arms Race,”Arms Race,” Wired,, ~~August~~ August 8, 2017. 8, 2017.
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and, and, ~~potential y~~potentially, target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous , target engagement—and it plans to develop a suite of AI-enabled autonomous
systems.29 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval, systems.29 In addition, the Russian military plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial, naval,
and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.30 These technologies and undersea vehicles and is reportedly developing swarming capabilities.30 These technologies
could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, could reduce both cost and manpower requirements, ~~potential y~~potentially enabling Russia to field more enabling Russia to field more
systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing systems with fewer personnel. Russia is also exploring innovative uses of AI for remote sensing
and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively and electronic warfare, which could in turn reduce an adversary’s ability to effectively
communicate and navigate on the battlefield.31 communicate and navigate on the battlefield.31 ~~Final y~~Finally, Russia has made extensive use of AI , Russia has made extensive use of AI
technologies for domestic propaganda and technologies for domestic propaganda and ~~surveil ance, as wel~~ surveillance, as well as for information operations as for information operations
directed against the United States and U.S. directed against the United States and U.S. ~~al ies~~allies.32 .32
Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant Despite Russia’s aspirations, analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make significant
progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have progress in AI development. For example, some analysts note that Russian academics have
produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications produced few research papers on AI—ranking 22nd in AI-related publications ~~global y33~~globally33—and that —and that
the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by the Russian technology industry has yet to produce AI applications on par with those produced by
the United States and China.34 Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing the United States and China.34 Other analysts counter that such factors may be irrelevant, arguing
that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a that while Russia has never been a leader in internet technology, it has managed to become a
notably disruptive force in cyberspace.35 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing notably disruptive force in cyberspace.35 Russia may also be able to draw upon its growing
technological cooperation with China.36technological cooperation with China.36
International Institutions
A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group A number of international institutions have examined issues surrounding AI, including the Group
of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for of Seven (G7), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which developed the first intergovernmental

~~29 T ristan~~ 29 Tristan Greene, “Russia is Greene, “Russia is Developing AI MissilesDeveloping AI Missiles to Dominate to Dominate ~~th e~~the New Arms Race,” New Arms Race,” The Next Web,, ~~July~~ July 27, 2017, 27, 2017,
at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-at https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-
arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, “ Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer RobotKalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot ,” Popular Mechanics, July,” Popular Mechanics, July 19, 19,
2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-2017, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-
machine-guns/. machine-guns/.
30 Samuel30 Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots Rising:Bendett, “Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of RussianBehind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Unmanned ~~Milit ary~~Military Systems,” Systems,” The
Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017. , December 12, 2017.
31 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia 31 Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, “Russia ~~T ries~~ Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence”; The Wilson Quarterly, ,
SpringSpring 2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel2018; and Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,” Bendett, “Russian AI-Enabled Combat: Coming to a City Near You?,”
War on the Rocks, July, July 31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat31, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/russian-ai-enabled-combat -coming-to-a-city--coming-to-a-city-
near-you/. near-you/.
32 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, 32 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution,
November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-November 15, 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-
warfare/; and Chriswarfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “Meserole and Alina Polyakova, “ Disinformation Wars,” Disinformation Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, at , May 25, 2018, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/.
33 Margarita Konaev et al., 33 Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for , Center for
Security and EmergingSecurity and Emerging ~~T echnology~~ Technology, August 2021, p. 9. , August 2021, p. 9.
34 Leon Bershidsky, “ 34 Leon Bershidsky, “~~T ake~~Take Elon Musk Seriously Elon Musk Seriously on the Russianon the Russian ~~AI T hreat~~ AI Threat,” ,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, at , September 5, 2017, at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Alina
Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15, Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” Brookings Institution, November 15,
2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. 2018, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.
35 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” 35 Gregory C. Allen, “Putin and Musk Are Right: Whoever Masters AI Will Run the World,” CNN,, September 5, 2017. September 5, 2017.
36 Samuel36 Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, Bendett and Elsa Kania, A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, , Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have October 29, 2019, at https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership. Some analysts have
cautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russiancautioned, however, that “the extent and scope of Chinese-Russian collaboration in AI may be overstated by both collaboration in AI may be overstated by both
Chinese and RussianChinese and Russian sources as wellsources as well as as U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., U.S. observers.” Margarita Konaev et al., Headline or Trend Line? Evaluating
Chinese-Russian Collaboration in AI, Center for Security and Emerging , Center for Security and Emerging ~~T echnology~~Technology, August 2021, p. 9., August 2021, p. 9.
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set of principles for AI.37 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and set of principles for AI.37 These principles are intended to “promote AI that is innovative and
trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”38 The United States is one of trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values.”38 The United States is one of
42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 42 countries—including the OECD’s 36 member countries, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the Rica, Peru, and Romania—to have adopted the OECD AI Principles. These principles serve as the
foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-foundation for the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) June 2019 Ministerial Statement on human-
centered AI.39 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop centered AI.39 In addition, the OECD established the AI Policy Observatory in 2019 to develop
policy options that policy options that ~~wil~~ will “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible “help countries encourage, nurture, and monitor the responsible
~~development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.”~~
development of trustworthy AI systems for the benefit of society.” Finally, in October 2021, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released its first AI strategy.40 According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the strategy is to “set standards for responsible use of artificial intelligence, in accordance with international law, outline how [NATO] will accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence in what [it does], set out how [NATO] will protect this technology, and address the threats posed by the use of artificial intelligence by adversaries.”41 NATO is to additionally establish AI test centers and a data and AI review board to “ensure the ‘operationalization’ of the AI strategy.”42 Potential Questions for Congress
 What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial  What measures is DOD taking to implement its ethical principles for artificial
~~intel igence~~intelligence? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the ? Are such measures sufficient to ensure DOD’s adherence to the
principles? principles?
 Do DOD and the  Do DOD and the ~~intel igence~~ intelligence community have adequate information about the community have adequate information about the
state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications state of foreign military AI applications and the ways in which such applications
may be used to harm U.S. national security? may be used to harm U.S. national security?
 How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be  How should national security considerations with regard to deep fakes be
balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of balanced with free speech protections, artistic expression, and beneficial uses of
the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government the underlying technologies? What efforts, if any, should the U.S. government
undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes? undertake to ensure that the public is educated about deep fakes?
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)4043
Although there is no Although there is no ~~international y~~ internationally agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems, agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems,
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 defines LAWS as a class of weapon systems
~~capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage~~
~~and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as~~
~~“human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-~~
~~supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the~~
~~ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous,~~
~~or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target~~
~~groups that have been selected by a human operator.”41~~
~~LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make~~
~~an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in~~
~~widespread development,42 it is believed they would enable military operations in~~

37 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global37 In May 2020, the United States joined the G7’s Global Partnership on AI, which is “Partnership on AI, which is “ to guide the responsible adoption to guide the responsible adoption
of AI basedof AI based on sharedon shared principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.principles of ‘human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth. ’” Matt ’” Matt
O’Brien, “O’Brien, “US US joins G7joins G7 artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020. artificial intelligence group to counter China,” Associated Press, May 28, 2020.
38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at 38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Principles on AI,” June 2019, at
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
39 “G20 Ministerial Statement on 39 “G20 Ministerial Statement on ~~T rade~~Trade and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ and Digital Economy,” June 9, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/
000486596.pdf. 000486596.pdf.
40 40 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” October 22, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_187617.htm?mc_cid=8f2b5c99db&mc_eid=5a3e8d2b43. 41 Vivienne Machi, “NATO ups the ante on disruptive tech, artificial intelligence,” C4ISRNET, November 3, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/nato-ups-the-ante-on-disruptive-tech-artificial-intelligence/. 42 Ibid. 43 For additional information about LAWS, see CRS ~~For additional information about LAWS, see CRS~~ Report R44466, Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for
Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas. , by Nathan J. Lucas.
~~41 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
~~42 Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 7 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress capable of both independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon to engage and destroy the target without manual human control. This concept of autonomy is also known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.”44 LAWS would require computer algorithms and sensor suites to classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development,45 it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to
operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could operate. Some analysts have noted that LAWS could ~~additional y “al ow~~additionally “allow weapons to strike weapons to strike
military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian
casualties.casualties.43
46 Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have Others, including approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations, have
~~cal ed~~called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns such as a perceived lack of
accountability for use and a perceived inabilityaccountability for use and a perceived inability to comply with the proportionality and distinction to comply with the proportionality and distinction
requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the requirements of the law of armed conflict. Some analysts have also raised concerns about the
potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.potential operational risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons.4447 These risks could arise from These risks could arise from
“hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or “hacking, enemy behavioral manipulation, unexpected interactions with the environment, or
simple malfunctions or software errors.”simple malfunctions or software errors.”4548 Although such risks could be present in automated Although such risks could be present in automated
systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be systems, they could be heightened in autonomous systems, in which the human operator would be
unable to unable to ~~physical y~~physically intervene to terminate engagements— intervene to terminate engagements—~~potential y~~potentially resulting in wider-scale or resulting in wider-scale or
more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.more numerous instances of fratricide, civilian casualties, or other unintended consequences.4649
United States
The United States is not known to be developing LAWS, nor does it currently have LAWS in its The United States is not known to be developing LAWS, nor does it currently have LAWS in its
inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of inventory; however, there is no prohibition on the development, fielding, or employment of
~~LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of~~
~~LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety~~
~~rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”47 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be~~
~~designed to “al ow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment~~
~~over the use of force.”48 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human~~
~~“control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human~~
~~involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon wil be employed.~~

~~definition of LAWS. See,~~ 44 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 45 Some analysts have argued that certain loitering munitions such as the Israeli Harpy meet the United States’ definition of LAWS. See, for example, for example, Defense Innovation Board, AI Principles: ~~Recom m endations~~Recommendations on the Ethical Use
of Artificial Intelligence by the ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense - Supporting ~~Docum ent~~Document, October 2019, p. 12, at , October 2019, p. 12, at
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/
~~DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORT ING_DOCUMENT~~ DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. In addition, while.PDF. In addition, while a United Nations report concluded that a United Nations report concluded that
~~T urkey~~Turkey’s deployment of the ’s deployment of the ~~ST M~~STM Kargu-2 constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat, constitutes the first use of a lethal autonomous weapon system in combat,
the the UNU.N. described described the the Kargu-2 as being as being “ program m ed “programmed to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is to attack targets” [emphasis added]. For this reason, it is unlikely unlikely
that the that the Kargu-2 meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, meets the U.S. definition of LAWS. United Nations Security Council, “ “Letter dated 8 March 2021 Letter dated 8 March 2021
from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the (2011) addressed to the President of the
Security Council,”Security Council,” March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229. March 8, 2021, p. 17, at https://undocs.org/S/2021/229.
4346 U.S. U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging ~~T echnologies~~Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,” in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,”
March 28, 2018, at https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/March 28, 2018, at https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf . .
44 47 See, See, for example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a Newfor example, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, American Security,
February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-February 2016, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf. risk.pdf.
4548 Ibid. Ibid.
~~46 Ibid.~~
~~47 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150,~~ ~~Defense Prim er: U.S. Policy on~~
~~Lethal Autonom ous Weapon System s, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~48 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
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~~In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of al systems, including~~
49 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 8 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress LAWS. DODD 3000.09 establishes DOD guidelines for the future development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”50 This directive includes a requirement that LAWS be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”51 “Human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but instead requires broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. In addition, DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of all systems, including lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they lethal autonomous weapons, be tested and evaluated to ensure they
[f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries; [f]unction as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries;
complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions
and, ifand, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input
beforebefore ~~continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to~~ continuing the engagement; and are sufficiently robust to minimize failuresminimize failures that that
could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized
parties. parties.
Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would Any changes to a system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would
require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features require the system to be retested and reevaluated to ensure that it has retained its safety features
and abilityand ability to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS to operate as intended. In addition to the standard weapons review process, LAWS
must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the must undergo a secondary senior-level review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both and Sustainment or the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prior to both
development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide development and fielding. DOD is reportedly in the process of developing a handbook to guide
senior leaders through this review. senior leaders through this review.
China
According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, some Chinese weapons
manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and manufacturers, such as Ziyan, have advertised their weapons as having the ability to select and
engage targets autonomously.engage targets autonomously.4952 It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China It is unclear whether these claims are accurate; however, China
has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that has no prohibition on the development of LAWS, which it has characterized as weapons that
exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes: exhibit—at a minimum—five attributes:
The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [ The first is lethality, which means sufficient pay load (charge) and for means [sic] to be ] to be
lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control lethal. The second is autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control
duringduring ~~the~~ the entire processentire process of executingof executing a task.a task. Thirdly, impossibilityThirdly, impossibility for termination, for termination,
meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate meaning that once started there is no way to terminate the device. Fourthly, indiscriminate
effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of effect, meaning that the device will execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of
conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with conditions, scenarios and targets. Fifthly evolution, meaning that through interaction with
the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities
in a way exceeding human expectations.in a way exceeding human expectations.50
~~Russia~~
~~Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than~~
~~ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement~~
~~of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.51 Russia has noted~~
~~that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while~~
~~contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”52~~
~~Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons~~

~~49 Patrick T ucker~~53 50 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. For an explanation of this directive, see CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler. 51 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 52 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” , “SecDef: China is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, November 5, 2019. , November 5, 2019.
5053 UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ UN CCW, “China: Position Paper,” April 11, 2018, p. 1, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf(httpAssets)/E42AE83BDB3525D0C125826C0040B262/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.7.pdf .
~~51 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous~~
~~weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/~~
~~(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583 BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf .~~
~~52 Ibid.~~
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. Congressional Research Service 9 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Russia Russia has proposed the following definition of LAWS: “unmanned technical means other than ordnance that are intended for carrying out combat and support missions without any involvement of the operator” beyond the decision of whether and how to deploy the system.54 Russia has noted that LAWS could “ensure the increased accuracy of weapon guidance on military targets, while contributing to lower rate of unintentional strikes against civilians and civilian targets.”55 Although Russia has not publicly stated that it is developing LAWS, Russian weapons manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles manufacturer Kalashnikov has reportedly built a combat module for unmanned ground vehicles
capable of autonomous target identification and, capable of autonomous target identification and, ~~potential y~~potentially, target engagement., target engagement.53
56 International Institutions
Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS under the
auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW). The
UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, UN CCW has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS,
as as ~~wel~~ well as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have as proposals to regulate or ban them. At the UN CCW, the United States and Russia have
opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not opposed a preemptive ban on LAWS, while China has supported a ban on the use—but not
development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate development—of LAWS, which it defines as weapon systems that are inherently indiscriminate
and thus in violation of the law of war.and thus in violation of the law of war.5457
Potential Questions for Congress
 To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at  To what extent are potential U.S. adversaries developing LAWS? How, if at al all, ,
should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development? should this affect U.S. LAWS research and development?
 What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?  What role should the United States play in UN CCW discussions of LAWS?
Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration, Should the United States support the status quo, propose a political declaration,
or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?or advocate regulation of or a ban on LAWS?
 If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review  If the United States chooses to develop LAWS, are current weapons review
processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient? processes and legal standards for their employment in conflict sufficient?
Hypersonic ~~Weapons55~~
Weapons58 A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic A number of countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are developing hypersonic
weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. There are weapons—those that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. There are
~~two categories of hypersonic weapons:~~
~~ Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a~~
~~target.56~~
~~ Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the~~
~~duration of their flight.~~
~~In contrast to bal istic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do~~
~~not follow a parabolic bal istic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making~~
~~defense against them difficult.~~
~~Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified~~
~~two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short~~
~~time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable~~

~~53 Kyle Mizokami, “~~ two categories of hypersonic weapons: 54 UN CCW, “Russian Federation: Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous weapons systems,” 2019, at https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B7C992A51A9FC8BFC12583BB00637BB9/$file/CCW.GGE.1.2019.WP.1_R+E.pdf. 55 Ibid. 56 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July, July 19, 2017. 19, 2017.
5457 For additional information about UN CCW discussions For additional information about UN CCW discussions on LAWS,on LAWS, see CRSsee CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11294, IF11294, International
Discussions Concerning Lethal ~~Autonom ous Weapon System s~~Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
5558 For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS For additional information about hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11459, In Focus IF11459, Defense ~~Prim er~~Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide
Weapons, by Kelley M. Sayler, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf. and Amy F. Woolf.
~~56 When hypersonic~~ Congressional Research Service 10 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress  Hypersonic glide vehicles glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target.59  Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed engines throughout the duration of their flight. In contrast to ballistic missiles, which also travel at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic weapons do not follow a parabolic ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their destination, making defense against them difficult. Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: (1) the weapon’s short time-of-flight, which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its unpredictable ~~are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to~~
~~as a hypersonic boost -glide weapon.~~
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flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore flight path, which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict.57
60 Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already possess the ability to strike the United
States with intercontinental States with intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm missiles, which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm
U.S. missile defenses.U.S. missile defenses.5861 Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons, Furthermore, these analysts argue that in the case of hypersonic weapons,
traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is ~~real y~~really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the
world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to use—not to mention to
~~actual y~~actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end ~~wel .”59~~well.”62
United States
The Pentagon has requested $3.8 The Pentagon has requested $3.8 ~~bil ion~~billion in FY2022 for hypersonic weapons and $248 in FY2022 for hypersonic weapons and $248 ~~mil ion~~million for for
hypersonic defense programs.hypersonic defense programs.6063 DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the
Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with
the abilitythe ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as ~~wel~~ well as as
through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.6164 Analysts who support these Analysts who support these
development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as ~~wel~~ well as provide as provide
the U.S. military with an abilitythe U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and 59 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon. 60 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. 61 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, ~~to defeat capabilities such as mobile missile launchers and~~
~~advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-~~
~~access/area denial strategies.62 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no~~
~~additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S military has yet to identify any mission~~
~~requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.63~~
~~The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in~~
~~contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for~~
~~potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop~~

~~57 See, for example, Richard H. Speier et al.,~~ ~~Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of~~
~~Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.~~
~~58 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” T he Daily Beast, January 16, 2019,~~
at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B.
Schneider,Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14. “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
5962 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” ~~T he~~The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
60 63 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/t, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For additional information Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For additional information
about hypersonic missile defense, see CRSabout hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11623, IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by , by
Kelley M. SaylerKelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall. and Stephen M. McCall.
6164 In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle lead the development of a common glide vehicle
for usefor use across the services. across the services. ~~T he~~The services coordinate efforts on a Common services coordinate efforts on a Common ~~Hyperson ic Glide~~ Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors Body Board of Directors
with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg,with rotating chairmanship. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up FundingJr., “Army Ramps Up Funding for Laser Shield,for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Hypersonic Sword,”
Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-Breaking Defense, February 28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-
shield-hypersonic-sword/. For a fullshield-hypersonic-sword/. For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, seehistory of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see ~~CRS~~ CRS Report R41464, Report R41464,
Conventional ~~Prom pt~~Prompt Global Strike and Long -Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. Congressional Research Service 11 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.65 Others have argued that hypersonic weapons confer little to no additional warfighting advantage and note that the U.S military has yet to identify any mission requirements or concepts of operation for hypersonic weapons.66 The United States is unlikely to field an operational hypersonic weapon before 2023; however, in contrast to Russia and China, the United States is not developing hypersonic weapons for potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, the United States is seeking to develop ~~Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.~~
~~62 Roger Zakheim and T om Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at~~
~~the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army~~
~~Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.~~
~~63 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “ Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,”~~
Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-
~~changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/.~~
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hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more hypersonic weapons that can attack targets with greater accuracy, which could be more
~~technical y chal enging~~technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese to develop than nuclear-armed—and less accurate—Russian and Chinese
systems. systems.
China
According to Tong Zhao, a According to Tong Zhao, a ~~fel ow~~fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S. China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.military technology” such as U.S. regional missile defenses.6467 China’s pursuit of hypersonic China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s abilityinfrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.retaliatory strike against the United States.65
68 China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental China has developed the DF-41 intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile (ICBM), which, according to a missile (ICBM), which, according to a
2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear 2014 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, could carry a nuclear
hypersonic glide vehicle.hypersonic glide vehicle.6669 General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S. Northern
Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is Command, seemed to confirm this assessment in February 2020, when he testified that “China is
testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed testing a [nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle … which is designed
to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our abilityto fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”to provide precise warning.”67
70 Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable Reports indicate that China may have tested a nuclear-capable ~~HGV68~~HGV71—launched by a Long —launched by a Long
March rocket—in August 2021.March rocket—in August 2021.6972 In contrast to the In contrast to the ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles that China has previously 65 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” remarks at the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. 66 See, for example, Valerie Insinna, “Air Force’s top civilian hints at changes to hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, September 22, 2021, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/22/air-forces-top-civilian-hints-at-changes-to-hypersonic-weapons-programs/. 67 Tong Zhao, “ ~~missiles that China has previously~~
~~used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS),~~
~~launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with~~
~~a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior~~
~~to a strike.70~~
~~China has additional y tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014.~~
~~U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200~~
~~miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during~~

~~64 T ong Zhao, “~~ Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic ~~T echnology~~Technology and the and the
Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-~~T singhua~~Tsinghua Center for Global Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/
07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-
dilemma-pub-76894. dilemma-pub-76894.
6568 Ibid.; Ibid.; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculusand Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,”on Hypersonic Glide,” ~~August~~ August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide. Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
66 69 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2014 Annual Report, p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/ p. 292, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF.
6770 General General ~~T errence~~Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services“Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February, 13, 2020, Committee,” February, 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf. at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf.
6871 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model asis the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy. that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.
6972 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16, Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,
2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
~~Zhao Lijian has stated that “ this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.~~
~~Zhao Lijian, “ Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,~~
~~October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.~~
~~70 Greg Hadley, “ Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,~~
~~at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.~~
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~~flight.71 Although unconfirmed by intel igence~~ Congressional Research Service 12 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV de-orbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.73 China has additionally tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle at least nine times since 2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately 1,200 miles and have stated that the missile may be capable of performing evasive maneuvers during flight.74 Although unconfirmed by intelligence agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could agencies, some analysts believe the DF-ZF could
have become operational as early as 2020.have become operational as early as 2020.7275 In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested In addition, in August 2018 China successfully tested
Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.Starry Sky-2, a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype.7376 Some reports indicate that the Some reports indicate that the
Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.Starry Sky-2 could be operational by 2025.7477 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the U.S. officials have declined to comment on the
program.program.7578
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-~~Bal istic~~Ballistic Missile Treaty in Missile Treaty in
2002.2002.7679 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated in 2018 that “the US is permitting
constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles, improving their quality, missiles, improving their quality,
and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, ~~eventual y this wil~~ eventually this will result in result in
the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that al all of our missiles could of our missiles could
simply be intercepted.”simply be intercepted.”7780 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they
~~approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its~~
~~sense of strategic stability.78~~
~~Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon~~
~~(or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively~~
~~‘unlimited’ range.”79 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December~~

~~71 “Gliding missiles~~ Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV. Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml. 73 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth From Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/. 74 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at , April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-thathttps://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that -fly-faster-than-mach-5-are--fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-
coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady,coming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, ~~“ China T ests~~ “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US New Weapon Capable of Breaching US ~~Missile~~ Missile Defense Systems,” Defense Systems,” The
~~Diplom at~~Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-
missile-defense-systems/. missile-defense-systems/.
7275 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/, p. 20, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF. default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF.
73 76 Jessie Jessie Yeung, “Yeung, “ China claims to have successfullyChina claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircrafttested its first hypersonic aircraft ,” ,” CNN, August, August 7, 2018, at 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircrafthttps://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft -intl/index.html. See also -intl/index.html. See also U.S.-China ~~Econom ic~~Economic and
Security Review ~~Com m ission~~Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/, p. 220, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf . .
7477 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20. p. 20.
7578 Bill Bill Gertz, “Gertz, “ China Reveals China Reveals ~~T est~~Test of New of New Hypersonic Missile,” Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August, August 10, 2018, at 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
7679 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
~~Arm s~~Arms Control, February, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/. and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
7780 Vladimir Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,”Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. Congressional Research Service 13 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of strategic stability.81 Russia is pursuing two nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons: the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or Zircon). Avangard is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an ICBM, giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”82 Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into service in December 2019.83 Tsirkon, a ship- and submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missile, will reportedly “[complete] trials in 2021 and begin serial deliveries in 2022.”84~~March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/~~
~~president/news/56957.~~
~~78 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See T ong~~
~~Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic T echnology and the Security~~
~~Dilemma,” Carnegie-T singhua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/~~
~~conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-~~
~~pub-76894.~~
~~79 Steve T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.~~
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~~2019.80 Tsirkon, a ship- and submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missile, wil reportedly~~
~~“[complete] trials in 2021 and begin serial deliveries in 2022.”81~~
International Institutions
No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic No international treaty or agreement is dedicated to overseeing the development of hypersonic
weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United weapons. Although the New START Treaty—a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United
States and Russia—does not States and Russia—does not ~~specifical y~~specifically limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which limit hypersonic weapons, it does limit ICBMs, which
could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.could be used to launch hypersonic glide vehicles.8285 Because Russia has deployed its Avangard Because Russia has deployed its Avangard
hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on an SS-19 ICBM, it has agreed that missiles equipped with Avangard
count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes count under New START. Furthermore, Article V of the treaty states that “when a Party believes
that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party ~~shal~~ shall have the right to raise the have the right to raise the
question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateralquestion of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Consultative
Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that it would be possible to negotiate
provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START provisions that would count additional types of hypersonic weapons under the New START
limits.limits.8386 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a short-term
solution.solution.8487 In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries In addition, the treaty would not cover hypersonic weapons developed in countries
other than the United States and Russia. other than the United States and Russia.
~~Final y~~Finally, some analysts have noted that, some analysts have noted that, if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a if any parties to the Outer Space Treaty were to launch a
nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in nuclear-armed HGV on a fractional orbital bombardment system, they would likely be in
violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying violation of Article IV of the treaty, which prohibits the placement of “any objects carrying
~~nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.85~~
~~Potential Questions for Congress~~
~~ What mission(s) wil hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons~~
~~the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?~~
~~ Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how~~
~~should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or~~
~~the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling~~
~~technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?~~
~~ How, if at al , wil the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is~~
~~there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START,~~

80nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit.88 81 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-pub-76894. 82 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20. 83 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019, , December 27, 2019,
at https://tass.com/defense/1104297. at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.
81 84 Dmitry Fediushko and Nikolai Novichkov, “ Dmitry Fediushko and Nikolai Novichkov, “ ~~T sirkon~~Tsirkon hypersonic missile state trials to be completed in 2021,” hypersonic missile state trials to be completed in 2021,” Jane’s
Defense Weekly (subscription required),(subscription required), February 3, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/FG_3887346-February 3, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/FG_3887346-
JDW. JDW.
8285 For example, Russia’s For example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glideAvangard hypersonic glide vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic vehicle is reportedly launched by an intercontinental ballistic
missile.missile. ~~See~~ See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or ~~T actical T ool~~Tactical Tool?,” ?,” Air Force Magazine, May 7, , May 7,
2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/. 2019, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-weapons-strategic-asset-or-tactical-tool/.
8386 James Acton notes: “during [New James Acton notes: “during [New ~~ST ART~~ START] negotiations, Russia] negotiations, Russia ~~argued~~ argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a
~~new~~ new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they wouldkind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussionstrigger bilateral discussions about whether and how about whether and how
they wouldthey would be be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional ~~Prom pt~~Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf. 2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
8487 CRS CRS Report R41219, Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf. , by Amy F. Woolf.
8588 Jeffrey Lewis, Jeffrey Lewis, “ “China’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, BadChina’s Orbital Bombardment System Is Big, Bad News—butNews—but Not a Breakthrough,” Not a Breakthrough,” Foreign Policy, ,
October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/. October 18, 2021, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/hypersonic-china-missile-nuclear-fobs/.
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Potential Questions for Congress  What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions?  Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure?  How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking
transparency and confidence-building activities? transparency and confidence-building activities?
Directed Energy (DE) ~~Weapons86~~Weapons89
DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy,
rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, rather than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment,
facilities, and/or personnel.”facilities, and/or personnel.”8790 DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air DE weapons could be used by ground forces in short-range air
defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, defense (SHORAD), counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), or counter-rocket, ~~artil ery~~artillery, ,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.and mortar (C-RAM) missions.8891 DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming DE weapons could offer low costs per shot and—assuming
access to a sufficient power access to a sufficient power ~~supply89~~supply92—nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing —nearly limitless magazines that, in contrast to existing
conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile conventional systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of defending against missile
salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. salvos or swarms of unmanned systems. ~~Theoretical y~~Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide options , DE weapons could also provide options
for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, as in the case of
hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and hypersonic missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability, technological feasibility, and
utility of this application.utility of this application.9093
High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic High-powered microwave weapons, a subset of DE weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic
means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as means of disabling electronics, communications systems, and improvised explosive devices, or as
~~a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control.~~
~~United States~~
~~Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts~~
~~have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fal en short of~~
~~expectations,” with DOD investing bil ions of dollars in programs that were ultimately~~
~~cancel ed.91 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for~~
~~military applications.92 Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions~~
~~about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality~~

86a nonlethal “heat ray” system for crowd control. 89 For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS For additional information about directed energy weapons, see CRS Report R46925, Report R46925, Department of Defense
Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler. , coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler.
8790 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3 -85, May 22, 2020, GL-6. , May 22, 2020, GL-6.
8891 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRSmissions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, In Focus IF11426, Department of
Defense Counter-~~Unm anned Aircraft System s~~Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
89 92 Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, Although research has been conducted on chemically fueled lasers, most countries are now pursuingmost countries are now pursuing ~~solid~~ solid state state
lasers, whichlasers, which are fueledare fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical by electrical power. As a result, the cost per shot is equivalent to the cost of the electrical
power requiredpower required to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “to fire the shot. See Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will Directed Energy Weapons: Will ~~T hey~~They Ever Be Ready?,” Ever Be Ready?,” National
Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-
weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready.
9093 See, See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “ Bad Idea:Bad Idea: Space-BasedSpace-Based Interceptors and Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic andDirected Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed-energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday,Doubleday, “ “Pentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts fundingPentagon punts MDA‘s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-ledtoward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense, ,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
~~91 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security,~~
~~April 2015, p. 4.~~
~~92 See Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at~~
~~https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-~~
~~ready.~~
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~~and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size~~
~~requirements for integration into current platforms.93~~
Congressional Research Service 15 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress United States Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that “actual directed energy programs … have frequently fallen short of expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that were ultimately cancelled.94 Others contend that developments in commercial lasers could be leveraged for military applications.95 Directed energy weapons programs continue, however, to face questions about their technological maturity, including questions about the ability to improve beam quality and control to militarily useful levels and the ability to meet power, cooling, and size requirements for integration into current platforms.96 The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), The U.S. Navy fielded the first operational U.S. DE weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS),
in 2014 aboard the USS in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable . LaWS was a 30-kilowatt (-kW) laser prototype that “was capable
of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging of blinding enemy forces as a warning, shooting down drones, disabling boats, or damaging
helicopters.”helicopters.”9497 The Navy is testing and plans to The Navy is testing and plans to ~~instal~~ install its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS its 60-kW laser, HELIOS, on the USS
Preble “in line with its deployment schedule,” while the Army plans to field its first “combat “in line with its deployment schedule,” while the Army plans to field its first “combat
relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on relevant” laser—the 50-kW Directed Energy Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System—on
Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.Stryker fighting vehicles in FY2022.9598 Similarly, the Air Force is currently conducting field Similarly, the Air Force is currently conducting field
assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including both laser and high-powered assessments of several counter-UAS DE systems, including both laser and high-powered
microwave systems.microwave systems.96
~~Overal~~ 99 Overall, DOD requested at least $578 , DOD requested at least $578 ~~mil ion~~ million in FY2022 for unclassified DE research, in FY2022 for unclassified DE research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $331 development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $331 ~~mil ion~~ million for unclassified DE for unclassified DE
weapons procurement.weapons procurement.97100 Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed Energy Many of these programs are intended to support DOD’s Directed Energy
Roadmap, which seeks to scale up DE weapon power levels from around 150 kW, as is currently Roadmap, which seeks to scale up DE weapon power levels from around 150 kW, as is currently
feasible, to around 300 kW in FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.feasible, to around 300 kW in FY2022 and to around 500 kW by FY2024.98
~~China~~
~~According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been~~
~~developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing~~
~~HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.99 China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-~~
~~mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided~~
~~weapons.100 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has~~

~~93 Ibid.~~
~~94 Kyle Mizokami, “ T he U.S. Army Plans T o Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet ,” Popular Mechanics,~~
~~August 7, 2019.~~
95 “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Shipboard Laser Being T ested at Wallops Island,” Seapower Magazine~~, August~~ 101 94 Paul Scharre, Preface to “Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security, April 2015, p. 4. 95 See Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-ready. 96 Ibid. 97 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Army Plans To Field the Most Powerful Laser Weapon Yet,” Popular Mechanics, August 7, 2019. 98 “Lockheed Martin’s HELIOS Shipboard Laser Being Tested at Wallops Island,” Seapower Magazine, August 1, 1,
2021, at https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-helios-shipboard-laser-being-tested-at-wallops-island/; and 2021, at https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-helios-shipboard-laser-being-tested-at-wallops-island/; and
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview: United
States ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 10-8, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/, May 2021, p. 10-8, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
9699 Kyle Mizokami, “ Kyle Mizokami, “ ~~T he~~The Air Force Mobilizes Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April 9, , April 9,
2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/. 2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/.
~~97 T hese~~ 100 These figures figures include fundinginclude funding for DOD-widefor DOD-wide programs as wellprograms as well as programs managedas programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and by the Air Force, Army, and
Navy. CRSNavy. CRS analysis of FY2022 budgetanalysis of FY2022 budget documents; for additional information, see Appendix B in CRSdocuments; for additional information, see Appendix B in CRS Report R46925, Report R46925,
~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kelley M. , coordinated by Kelley M.
Sayler. Sayler.
98101 Although there is no consensus regarding Although there is no consensus regarding the precise power level that wouldthe precise power level that would be neededbe needed to neutralize different target to neutralize different target
sets, it is generally believed that a laser of around 100 kW couldsets, it is generally believed that a laser of around 100 kW could engage UAVs,engage UAVs, small boats, rockets, artillery, and small boats, rockets, artillery, and
mortar, whereas a laser of around 300 kW couldmortar, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engageadditionally engage ~~cruise missiles~~ cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying in certain profiles (i.e.,
flying across—rather than atflying across—rather than at —the laser). Dr. Jim —the laser). Dr. Jim ~~T rebes, “~~ Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is
~~OUSD~~ OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS(R&E) Doing?,” Presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with Principal Director for conversation with Principal Director for
Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim ~~T rebes~~Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required, November 17, 2020. Required power levels couldpower levels could ~~be affected by~~
~~additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.~~
~~99 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), USCC 2017 Annual Report, November 2017, p.~~
~~563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf.~~
~~100 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,”~~ ~~Jane’s Defence~~
~~Weekly, November 9, 2018.~~
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~~used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and al ied military aircraft and to~~
~~disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.101~~
~~According to the Defense Intel igence Agency, China is additional y~~ be affected by Congressional Research Service 16 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress China According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has been developing DE weapons since at least the 1980s and has made steady progress in developing HPM and increasingly powerful HELs.102 China has reportedly developed a 30-kilowatt road-mobile DE system, LW-30, designed to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided weapons.103 Reports indicate that China is also developing an airborne DE weapon pod and has used or proposed using DE weapons to interfere with U.S. and allied military aircraft and to disrupt U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific.104 According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is additionally pursuing DE weapons pursuing DE weapons
to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has a limited
capabilitycapability ~~to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China~~ to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. China likely will field a likely will field a
ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors by 2020, and
by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the
structures of non-optical satellites.structures of non-optical satellites.~~102~~105
Russia
Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on Russia has been conducting DE weapons research since the 1960s, with a particular emphasis on
HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several HELs. Russia has reportedly deployed the Peresvet, a mobile, ground-based HEL, with several
mobile intercontinental mobile intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile units. Although little missile units. Although little is publicly known about Peresvet, is publicly known about Peresvet,
including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle including its power level, some analysts assert it is to dazzle ~~satel ites~~satellites and provide point defense and provide point defense
against unmanned aircraft systems.against unmanned aircraft systems.~~103~~106 Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexei Krivoruchko has
stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military stated that efforts are underway to increase Peresvet’s power level and to deploy it on military
aircraft.aircraft.~~104~~107 Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as Reports suggest that Russia may also be developing HPMs as ~~wel~~ well as additional HELs as additional HELs
capable of performing capable of performing ~~antisatel ite~~antisatellite missions. missions.
International Institutions
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”~~105~~108 However, certain applications of DE weapons However, certain applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the are prohibited. For example, Protocol I of the CCW “Protocol on Blinding Lasers” prohibits the
~~employment of “laser weapons specifical y designed, as their sole combat function or as one of~~
~~their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”106 Some analysts~~
~~have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may~~
~~consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or~~
~~lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE~~

~~101 Andrew T ate, “ China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020;~~
~~and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “ Countering China’s Laser Offensive ,” T he~~ additional factors such as adversary countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects. 102 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), USCC 2017 Annual Report, November 2017, p. 563, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 103 Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC’s LW-30 laser weapon system breaks cover,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 9, 2018. 104 Andrew Tate, “China aiming to procure airborne laser-based weapon pod,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2020; and Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
~~102~~105 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 20, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/~~Space_T hreat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.~~
~~103~~Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf. 106 Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/, February 2019, p. 23, at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/
27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/~~Space_T hreat_V14_020119_sm~~Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; and “.pdf; and “ Putin hails new Putin hails new
RussianRussian laser weapons,” laser weapons,” Associated Press,, May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a. May 17, 2019, at https://apnews.com/ff03960c48a6440bacc1c2512a7c197a.
~~104~~107 Bart Hendrickx, “ Bart Hendrickx, “ Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,” The Space Review, June 5, , June 5,
2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1. 2020, at https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1.
~~105~~ 108 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017. Article 36, November 2017.
~~106 T he protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the~~
~~employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.”~~ ~~Additional Protocol to~~
~~the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions o n the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deem ed to~~
~~Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim inate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, T reaty Series,~~
~~vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/T reaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.~~
~~For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS~~
~~Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by~~
~~Ronald O'Rourke.~~
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~~weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.107~~Congressional Research Service 17 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress employment of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”109 Some analysts have suggested that multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays” or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.110 Other analysts have argued that DE Other analysts have argued that DE
weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy
could could ~~potential y~~potentially reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti- reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-
personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might otherwise be used.~~108~~111
Potential Questions for Congress
 Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?  Does the technological maturity of DE weapons warrant current funding levels?
To what extent, if at To what extent, if at al all, can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for , can advances in commercial lasers be leveraged for
military applications? military applications?
 How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to  How successful have U.S. field tests of DE weapons been? Are any changes to
operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use operational concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required to optimize the use
of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military of DE weapons or deconflict the use of DE weapons with other U.S. military
operations? operations?
 In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of  In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of
DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures
should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both should the United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both
war and peacetime? war and peacetime?
Biotechnology
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological applications. A number of developments
in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security in biotechnology hold potential implications for the U.S. military and for international security
writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of writ large. As a 2018 Government Accountability Office report notes, the Departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence
assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,assess that biotechnologies, such as the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR,~~109~~112 have the potential have the potential
to to
alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies alter genes or create DNA to modify plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies
couldcould be usedbe used to enhance [orto enhance [or ~~degrade] the performance~~ degrade] the performance of military personnel. The 109 The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf. For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 110~~of military personnel. The~~
~~proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in~~
~~nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological~~
~~weapons.110~~
~~Similarly, the U.S. intel igence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome~~
~~editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.111~~

~~107~~ Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” ~~T he~~The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
~~108~~111 See, See, for example, Mark Gunzingerfor example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/documents/~~CSBA_ChangingT heGame_ereader.pdf.~~
~~109~~CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf. 112 For a general overview of CRISPR, For a general overview of CRISPR, see CRSsee CRS Report R44824, Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. , by Marcy E.
GalloGallo ~~et al.~~
~~110 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as~~
~~Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf.~~
~~111 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”~~
~~delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016.~~
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et al. Congressional Research Service 18 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological weapons.113 Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment cited genome editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction.114
In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or In addition, biotechnology could be used to create adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or
lighter, stronger, and—lighter, stronger, and—~~potential y~~potentially—self-healing body and vehicle armor.—self-healing body and vehicle armor.~~112~~115 Concerns have been Concerns have been
raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and raised that U.S. competitors may not hold the same ethical standards in the research and
application of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biologicalapplication of biotechnologies, particularly regarding biological weapons, genome editing, or weapons, genome editing, or
more invasive forms of human performance modification.more invasive forms of human performance modification.~~113~~116
United States
Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),Pursuant to Section 1086 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328),~~114~~117 the Trump Administration the Trump Administration
released the released the National Biodefense Strategy, which outlines “how the United States Government , which outlines “how the United States Government
~~wil~~ will manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and manage its activities more effectively to assess, prevent, detect, prepare for, respond to, and
recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international recover from biological threats, coordinating its biodefense efforts with those of international
partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”partners, industry, academia, non-governmental entities, and the private sector.”~~115~~118 As some As some
analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and, analysts have noted, however, this strategy was not accompanied by a resourced action plan and,
thus, was “largely unimplemented.”thus, was “largely unimplemented.”~~116~~119 Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology Furthermore, there is no DOD-specific biotechnology
research strategy.research strategy.~~117~~120
Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on Unclassified U.S. biotechnology programs with military applications center primarily on
improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of improving “readiness, resilience, and recovery.” DARPA, for example, has a number of
biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also biotechnology programs devoted to battlefield medicine, diagnostics, and prognostics. It is also
~~exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric~~
~~il nesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases~~
~~and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program~~
~~seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing~~
~~technologies.”118 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories,~~
~~which completed a $45 mil ion, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology “intended~~
~~to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”119~~

112 Patrick T ucker, “ The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a P riority,” Defense One~~, July 1, 2019; and “~~ 113 Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. 114 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016. 115 Patrick Tucker, “The US Army Is Making Synthetic Biology a Priority,” Defense One, July 1, 2019; and “Army Army
scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/scientists explore synthetic biology potential,” U.S. Army, June 24, 2019, at https://www.army.mil/article/223495/
army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential. army_scientists_explore_synthetic_biology_potential.
~~113~~116 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide ~~T hreat~~ Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
delivereddelivered before the U.S.before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “February 9, 2016; and Daniel R. Coats, “ Statement for Statement for
the Record: Worldwidethe Record: Worldwide ~~T hreat~~ Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services,Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long usedMarch 6, 2018. Although the U.S. military has long used certain drugscertain drugs such as caffeine, such as caffeine,
modafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aidsmodafinil, dextroamphetamine, and various sleep aids to enhance soldier performance, it bans other performanceto enhance soldier performance, it bans other performance --
enhancing drugsenhancing drugs and techniques such as anabolic steroids and bloodand techniques such as anabolic steroids and blood doping. Seedoping. See Paul ScharrePaul Scharre and Lauren Fish,and Lauren Fish, ~~Hum an~~
~~Perform ance Enhancem ent~~ Human Performance Enhancement, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/, Center for a New American Security, November 7, 2018, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1. publications/reports/human-performance-enhancement-1.
~~114~~ 117 P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 114-328, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title X, §1086. X, §1086.
~~115 T he~~118 The White House, White House, National Biodefense Strategy, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf. National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf.
~~116~~119 See, See, for example, for example, ~~T ara O’T oole~~Tara O’Toole, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks, “Remarks at ‘Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks and Opportunities,’” and Opportunities,’”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020. Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2020.
~~117~~ 120 Diane Dieuliis, Diane Dieuliis, “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” “Biotechnology for the Battlefield: In Need of a Strategy,” War on the Rocks, November 27, 2018. , November 27, 2018.
~~T here~~There is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See is, however, a coordinated framework for biotechnology regulation. See ~~“Mo dernizing~~ “Modernizing the Regulatory System the Regulatory System
for Biotechnology Products: Final Versionfor Biotechnology Products: Final Version of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/Biotechnology,” January 2017, at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/
2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf. 2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf.
~~118 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological T echnologies Office,” at~~
~~https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1.~~
~~119 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “ T ri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter~~
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Congressional Research Service 19 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress exploring options for mitigating the effects of traumatic brain injury, treating neuropsychiatric illnesses such as depression and post-traumatic stress, and protecting against infectious diseases and bio-engineered threats to the U.S. food supply. In addition, DARPA’s Safe Genes program seeks “to [protect] service members from accidental or intentional misuse of genome editing technologies.”121 Biotechnology research is also being conducted at the service laboratories, which completed a $45 million, three-year joint research initiative in synthetic biology “intended to develop new bio-based materials and sensors.”122 In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously In addition, some reports suggest that the United States is researching or has previously
researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including researched biotechnology and neuroscience applications to increase soldier lethality, including
applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more applications to make soldiers “stronger, smarter, [and] more capable, and … give them more
endurance than other humans.”endurance than other humans.”~~120~~123 Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this Some groups have expressed ethical concerns about this
research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between research; although the United States had a series of presidential bioethics commissions between
1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.1974 and 2017, there is no current national framework for examining ethical concerns.~~121~~
~~Final y~~124 Finally, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA, per Section 263 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), DOD is to conduct “a review of the (P.L. 116-92), DOD is to conduct “a review of the
military understanding and relevancy of applications of emerging biotechnologies to national military understanding and relevancy of applications of emerging biotechnologies to national
security requirements of the Department of Defense” and provide recommendations for future security requirements of the Department of Defense” and provide recommendations for future
legislativelegislative and administrative activities.”and administrative activities.”~~122~~125 Section 278 of the FY2021 NDAA Section 278 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) (P.L. 116-283)
~~additional y~~ additionally directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison of capabilities in directs DOD to “conduct an assessment and direct comparison of capabilities in
emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ..emerging biotechnologies for national security purposes ... between the capabilities of the United between the capabilities of the United
States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”States and the capabilities of adversaries of the United States.”~~123~~
126 China
Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly Motivated by an aging population and growing health care needs, China has been particularly
interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority interested in conducting biotechnology research. Biotechnology is cited as a key strategic priority
within China’s within China’s Made in China 2025 initiative initiative ~~and is additional y~~ and is additionally highlighted within China’s highlighted within China’s
current five-year development plan.current five-year development plan.~~124~~127 In particular, China is aggressively pursuing In particular, China is aggressively pursuing
biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became biotechnologies for genetic testing and precision medicine. In 2016, Chinese scientists became
the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist the first to use the CRISPR gene-editing tool on humans, and in 2018, a Chinese scientist
produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited produced—perhaps with the approval of the Chinese government—the first “gene-edited
babies.”babies.”~~125~~128 In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic In addition, China maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of genetic
~~information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be~~
~~used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potential y, precision bioweapons.126~~
~~Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of~~
~~biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the~~

~~needs,” Wright -Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017.~~
~~120~~ 121 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Our Research: Biological Technologies Office,” at https://www.darpa.mil/our-research?tFilter=&oFilter=1. 122 Marisa Alia-Novobilski, “Tri-Service effort leverages synthetic biology expertise to address future warfighter needs,” Wright-Patterson AFB, September 27, 2017. 123 Annie Jacobsen, Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America ’s Top-Secret Military
Research Agency (New York: (New York: ~~Litt le~~Little, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross,, Brown and Company, 2015). See also Michael Joseph Gross, ~~“ T he~~ “The Pentagon’s Pentagon’s
Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” Push to Program Soldiers’ Brains,” The Atlantic, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/, November 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what -could-go-wrong/570841/. -could-go-wrong/570841/.
~~121~~124 For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study For a history of these commissions, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,of Bioethical Issues, “ “History of History of
Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html. Bioethics Commissions,” archived January 15, 2017, at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/history.html.
~~122~~ 125 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §263. II, §263.
~~123~~126 P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 116-283, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §278. II, §278.
~~124~~127 “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Development and
Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, , March 12, 2021, ~~T ranslated~~Translated by Etcetera Language Group, by Etcetera Language Group,
Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf. Inc., at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf.
~~125~~ 128 Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely Amidst international outcry, China later sentenced the scientist to three years in jail and termed his work “extremely
abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,”abominable in nature.” Michael Standaert, “'Extremely abominable’: Chinese gene-editing scientist faces law,” Al
Jazeera, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “, November 26, 2018. See also, Elsa Kania, “ ~~Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a~~
~~‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019.~~
~~126 David J. Lynch, “ Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also~~
~~Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “ China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New~~
~~Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jam estown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/~~
~~chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.~~
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~~Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.127~~Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a Congressional Research Service 20 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress information, the National Genebank, which includes U.S. genetic data. Such information could be used to develop personalized disease treatment plans or, potentially, precision bioweapons.129 Open-source information about China’s research into specific military applications of biotechnology is limited; however, China’s policy of military-civil fusion would enable the Chinese military to readily leverage developments in civilian biotechnology.130 Furthermore, Furthermore,
reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain reports indicate that China’s Central Military Commission “has funded projects on military brain
science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials, human performance
enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology,” while the Chinese military’s medical
institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.institutions have conducted extensive research on CRISPR gene editing.~~128~~131
Russia
Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing Although Russia released BIO2020—a whole-of-government strategy for improving the standing
of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag of Russia’s biotechnology sector—in 2012, biotechnology research in Russia continues to lag
behind that of the United States and China.behind that of the United States and China.~~129~~132 BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for BIO2020 identifies Russia’s priority areas for
biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and biotechnology research as biopharmaceutics and biomedicine, industrial biotechnology and
bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental bioenergetics, agricultural and food biotechnology, forest biotechnology, environmental
protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.protection biotechnology, and marine biotechnology.~~130~~
133 Little information is publicly available Little information is publicly available on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies on how Russia might employ such dual-use technologies
within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted within a military or national security context. However, the accusation that the country attempted
to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in to assassinate a former double agent for the United Kingdom using a Novichok nerve agent—in
violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly violation of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention—suggests that it may be similarly
unrestrained in weaponizing biologicalunrestrained in weaponizing biological agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.agents, including those derived from synthetic biology.~~131~~134
Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological Indeed, the Soviet Union is known to have maintained an extensive, long-standing biological
weapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biologicalweapons program, Biopreparat, in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.Weapons Convention.~~132~~135
Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of Furthermore, in August 2020, the End-User Review Committee (ERC)—composed of
representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where representatives of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and, where
appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research appropriate, Treasury—stated that it has “reasonable cause” to believe that three Russian research
institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.institutes are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.~~133~~
~~International Institutions~~
~~Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.134 Some~~
~~international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of~~

~~127 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “ Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of~~
Warfare,’” Defense One~~, August~~ 136 ‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019. 129 David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: the US-China dispute over genetic data,” Financial Times, July 31, 2017. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. 130 Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military Is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of Warfare,’” Defense One, August 14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-14, 2019, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-
biotech/159167/. biotech/159167/.
~~128~~131 Ibid. Ibid.
~~129~~132 Russian Russian Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology Federation, “BIO2020: Summary of the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology
in the Russianin the Russian Federation,” 2012. Federation,” 2012.
~~130~~ 133 Ibid. Ibid.
~~131~~134 Mark Urban, “ Mark Urban, “Salisbury ~~Salisbury~~ attack ‘evidence’ of Russianattack ‘evidence’ of Russian weapon stockpile,”weapon stockpile,” BBC, March 4, 2019. For a full, March 4, 2019. For a full assessment assessment
of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying of the potential national security threats posed by synthetic biology, see the Committee on Strategies for Identifying
and Addressingand Addressing Potential Biodefense VulnerabilitiesPotential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic BiologyPosed by Synthetic Biology ~~Consensus~~ Consensus Report: Report: Biodefense in the
Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academy of Sciences,, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890. 2018, at http://nap.edu/24890.
~~132 Lukas T rakimavičius~~135 Lukas Trakimavičius “Is Russia “Is Russia Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018, Violating the Biological Weapons Convention?,” Atlantic Council, May 23, 2018,
at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/. at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/.
~~133 T he~~ 136 The ERC added ERC added these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national these research institutes to the Entity List, which identifies entities acting “contrary to the national
~~security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “ Addition of Entities to the Entity~~
~~List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/~~
~~27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list.~~
~~134 T he United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally~~
~~binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons.~~
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Congressional Research Service 21 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress International Institutions Only the weaponization of biotechnology is prohibited under international law.137 Some international institutions have demonstrated interest in considering broader implications of biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on biotechnologies. For example, since 1983, ASEAN has maintained a subcommittee on
biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since biotechnology that facilitates coordination of regional biotechnology projects. Similarly, since
1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that 1993, the OECD has maintained an Internal Co-ordination Group for Biotechnology that
monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors monitors developments in biotechnology and facilitates coordination among various sectors
involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment, involved in biotechnology research (e.g., agriculture, science and technology, environment,
industry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biologicalindustry). In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is charged with Diversity is charged with
governing the development and use of governing the development and use of ~~genetical y~~genetically modified organisms. modified organisms.~~135~~138 These entities are not, These entities are not,
however, focused however, focused ~~specifical y~~specifically on military applications of biotechnology. on military applications of biotechnology.
In terms of potential militarization, In terms of potential militarization, the 1972 Biologicalthe 1972 Biological Weapons Convention requires review Weapons Convention requires review
conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing conferences, which every five years assess both the implementation of the treaty and ongoing
developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to developments in biotechnology. Annual meetings are held between review conferences to
~~informal y~~informally consider relevant topics, as consider relevant topics, as ~~wel~~ well as to address national bilateralas to address national bilateral and multilateraland multilateral efforts efforts
to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be to enhance biosecurity. Some analysts have argued that an international framework should be
established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or established to consider the militarization of biotechnologies and discuss potential regulation of or
limits on certain applications.limits on certain applications.~~136~~139
Potential Questions for Congress
 Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research  Is a DOD biotechnology strategy or organization needed to identify research
priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or priorities and coordinate department-wide research? What, if any, resources or
organizational changes would be required to organizational changes would be required to ~~ful y~~fully implement a national implement a national
biodefense strategy? biodefense strategy?
 What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?  What military applications of biotechnologies are U.S. competitors developing?
Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of Is the U.S. military appropriately balancing the potential warfighting utility of
biotechnologies with ethical considerations? biotechnologies with ethical considerations?
 What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the  What, if any, national and international frameworks are needed to consider the
ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies ethical, moral, and legal implications of military applications of biotechnologies
such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance such as synthetic biology, genome editing, and human performance
modification? modification?
~~Quantum Technology137~~
~~Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological~~
~~applications.138 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could~~
~~hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications.~~
~~GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications~~
~~could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able~~

~~135 T he United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols.~~
~~136 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “ We’ve got to talk: T he militarization of biotechnology,”~~ ~~Bulletin of the Atomic~~
~~Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got -to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/.~~
~~137 See also CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~138 T hese principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and~~
~~entanglement —in which “ two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement~~
~~of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily~~
~~Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Quantum Com puting: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences,~~
~~2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS~~
~~Report R45409,~~ ~~Quantum Inform ation Science: Applications, Global Research and Developm ent, an d Policy~~
~~Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may al ow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified,~~
~~classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and~~
~~military operations.”139~~
~~Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which~~
~~could theoretical y enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans~~
~~“transparent.”140~~ security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity List, and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,” August 27, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/27/2020-18909/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-list. 137 The United States, China, and Russia have ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which is a legally binding treaty that bans the development and production of biological weapons. 138 The United States is not a party to this convention or its associated protocols. 139 See, for example, Brett Edwards, “We’ve got to talk: The militarization of biotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 4, 2017, at https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/weve-got-to-talk-the-militarization-of-biotechnology/. Congressional Research Service 22 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Quantum Technology140 Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological applications.141 In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications. GAO reports that DOD, State, DHS, and ODNI have assessed that “quantum communications could enable adversaries to develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, classified, or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and military operations.”142 Quantum technology could have other military applications, such as quantum sensing, which could theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering the oceans “transparent.”143 This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear This could, in turn, compromise the survivability of the U.S. sea-based nuclear
deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing
options that could in theory options that could in theory ~~al ow~~allow militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS- militaries to continue to operate at full performance in GPS-
degraded or GPS-denied environments. degraded or GPS-denied environments.
Military Military application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of application of such technologies could be constrained, however, by the fragility of
quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other quantum states, which can be disrupted by minute movements, changes in temperature, or other
environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use environmental factors. As physicist Mikkel Hueck has explained, “if future devices that use
quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this quantum technologies [continue to] require cooling to very cold temperatures, then this ~~wil~~ will make make
them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption them expensive, bulky, and power hungry.” As a result, widespread adoption ~~wil~~ will likely require likely require
significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques. significant advances in materials science and fabrication techniques.
United States
According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies According to a Defense Science Board Task Force on Applications of Quantum Technologies
assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the assessment, three applications of quantum technologies demonstrate the most promise for the
U.S. military:U.S. military: quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications.~~141 The task~~
~~force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatical y improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain~~
~~missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is~~
~~degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potential y give DOD substantial~~
~~computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum~~
~~communications could improve networking technologies.142 The task force concludes that~~
~~“quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing~~
~~and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar wil not provide~~
~~upgraded capability to DOD.”143 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum~~
~~technology programs across these and other research areas.~~
~~Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under~~
~~Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating these programs~~
~~and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science~~

~~139~~144 The task 140 See also CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler. 141 These principles include superposition—in which “a quantum system can exist in two or more states at once”—and entanglement—in which “two or more quantum objects in a system can be intrinsically linked such that measurement of one dictates the possible measurement outcomes for another, regardless of how far apart the two objects are.” Emily Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, eds., Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences, 2019, at https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/1. For additional information about quantum technology, see CRS Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy Considerations, by Patricia Moloney Figliola. 142 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as
Identified by Federal Agencies, December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances , December 2018, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. Significant advances
in quantum computing willin quantum computing will likely belikely be ~~required~~ required to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a to break current encryption methods. Indeed, some analysts believe that a
quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “quantum computer with around 20 million qubits—shorthand for “ quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the quantum bits,” or computing units that leverage the
principle of superposition—wouldprinciple of superposition—would be requiredbe required to break these methods; the most advanced quantumto break these methods; the most advanced quantum computers today computers today
have around 53 qubits.have around 53 qubits. ~~See “~~ See “How a quantum computer could break 2048How a quantum computer could break 2048 -bit RSA-bit RSA encryption in 8 hours,” encryption in 8 hours,” MIT
Technology Review, May 30, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/30/65724/how-a-quantum-, May 30, 2019, at https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/05/30/65724/how-a-quantum-
computer-could-break-2048-bit-rsa-encryption-in-8-hours/. computer-could-break-2048-bit-rsa-encryption-in-8-hours/.
~~140~~143 Michael J. Biercuk Michael J. Biercuk and Richard Fontaine, “and Richard Fontaine, “~~T he~~The Leap into Quantum Leap into Quantum ~~T echnology~~Technology: A Primer for National Security : A Primer for National Security
Professionals,” Professionals,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-, November 17, 2017, at https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-
technology-primer-national-security-professionals/. technology-primer-national-security-professionals/.
~~141~~ 144 Defense Science Defense Science Board, Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary, October 2019, at , October 2019, at
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htmhttps://dsb.cto.mil/reports.htm.
~~142 Ibid.~~
~~143 Ibid~~. .
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force notes that quantum sensing could “dramatically improve” DOD’s ability to conduct certain missions, providing precision navigation and timing options in environments in which GPS is degraded or denied; that quantum computers could “potentially give DOD substantial computation power” for decryption, signals processing, and AI; and that quantum communications could improve networking technologies.145 The task force concludes that “quantum sensing applications are currently poised for mission use whereas quantum computing and communications are in earlier stages of development…. Quantum radar will not provide upgraded capability to DOD.”146 Both DARPA and the services fund an array of quantum technology programs across these and other research areas. Per Section 234 of the FY2019 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense—acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—is tasked with coordinating these programs and providing “for interagency cooperation and collaboration on quantum information science and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other and technology research and development between the Department of Defense and other
departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”departments and agencies of the United States and appropriate private sector entities.”~~144~~147 In In
addition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAAaddition, Section 220 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary of each (P.L. 116-92) authorizes the Secretary of each
military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers that may military department to establish Quantum Information Science (QIS) Research Centers that may
“engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum “engage with appropriate public and private sector organizations” to advance quantum
research.research.~~145~~148 To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research To date, the Navy has designated the Naval Research Laboratory as its QIS Research
Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research Center, while the Air Force has designated the Air Force Research Laboratory as a QIS Research
Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army says it does not plan to establish a QIS Center for both the Air Force and Space Force. The Army says it does not plan to establish a QIS
Research Center at this time. Research Center at this time.
~~Final y,~~ Finally, Section 214 of the FY2021 NDAASection 214 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and (P.L. 116-283) directs the services to compile and
~~annual y~~annually update a list of technical update a list of technical ~~chal enges~~challenges that quantum computers could that quantum computers could ~~potential y~~potentially address address
within the next one to three years. It also directs the services to establish programs with within the next one to three years. It also directs the services to establish programs with ~~smal~~ small and and
medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and medium businesses to provide quantum computing capabilities to government, industry, and
academic researchers working on these academic researchers working on these ~~chal enges~~challenges. Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an . Section 1722 directs DOD to conduct an
assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as assessment of the risks posed by quantum computers, as ~~wel~~ well as current standards for post-as current standards for post-
quantum cryptography. quantum cryptography.
China
China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.China has increasingly prioritized quantum technology research within its development plans.~~146~~149
Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research Indeed, President Xi has cited quantum communications and quantum computing as key research
initiativesinitiatives “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the “prioritized for major breakthroughs by 2030,” an objective that is also cited in the
country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.country’s National Science and Technology Innovation Program.~~147~~150 China is already a world China is already a world
leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum leader in quantum technology. In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum ~~satel ite~~satellite to to
provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China hosted the first provide a “global quantum encrypted communications capability.” In 2017, China hosted the first
~~quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.148 Furthermore, China is investing heavily in~~
~~terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer~~
~~(approximately 1250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that~~
~~network nationwide in the years to come.149 While such advances in quantum technology have~~
~~been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military~~
~~applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects~~
~~Plan.~~

~~144~~ 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234. P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §234.
~~145~~148 P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, P.L. 116-92, Section 2, Division A, ~~T itle~~Title II, §220. II, §220.
~~146~~149 For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John For a history of China’s quantum technology research and development initiatives, see Elsa B. Kania and John
Costello, Costello, Quantum ~~Hegem ony~~ Hegemony?: China’s ~~Am bitions~~Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership , Center for a New , Center for a New
American Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReportAmerican Security, September 2018, p. 8, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport --
Quantum-Quantum-~~T ech_FINAL~~Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406. .pdf?mtime=20180912133406.
~~147~~ 150 Ibid., p. 6. Congressional Research Service 24 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference.151 Furthermore, China is investing heavily in terrestrial quantum communications networks. It completed construction of a 2,000 kilometer (approximately 1250 miles) Beijing-Shanghai quantum network in 2016 and plans to expand that network nationwide in the years to come.152 While such advances in quantum technology have been driven primarily by academia, China has expressed its intent to leverage them for military applications in the country’s Thirteenth Five-Year S&T Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects Plan. ~~Ibid., p. 6.~~
~~148 Office of the Secretary of Defense,~~ ~~Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the~~
~~People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/~~
~~2019_CHINA_MILIT ARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf .~~
~~149 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello,~~ ~~Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation~~
~~Leadership, p. 14.~~
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Russia
Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial Russian development of quantum technology, as with artificial ~~intel igence,~~ intelligence, lags significantly lags significantly
behind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likelybehind that of the United States and China, with some analysts noting that Russia is likely “5 to “5 to
10 years behind” in quantum computing.10 years behind” in quantum computing.~~150~~153 In an effort to spur development, Russia announced In an effort to spur development, Russia announced
plans in December 2019 to invest $790 plans in December 2019 to invest $790 ~~mil ion~~million in quantum research over the next five years and in quantum research over the next five years and
adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.adopted a five-year Russian Quantum Technologies Roadmap.~~151~~154 These initiatives are not These initiatives are not
military-specific, however, and limited information is availablemilitary-specific, however, and limited information is available in open sources about how Russia in open sources about how Russia
might apply them to its military.might apply them to its military.
International Institutions
No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating No major international institutions have formal initiatives devoted to monitoring or regulating
military or other applications of quantum technology. military or other applications of quantum technology.
Potential Questions for Congress
 Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current  Does the maturity of military applications of quantum technology warrant current
funding levels? To what extent, if at funding levels? To what extent, if at al all, can advances in commercial quantum , can advances in commercial quantum
technology be leveraged for military applications? technology be leveraged for military applications?
 Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and  Are adequate measures being taken to develop quantum-resistant encryption and
to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods? to protect data that has been encrypted using current methods?
 How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of  How mature are U.S. competitor efforts to develop military applications of
quantum technologies? To what extent, if at quantum technologies? To what extent, if at al all, could such efforts threaten , could such efforts threaten
advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation advanced U.S. military capabilities such as submarines and fifth-generation
stealth aircraft? stealth aircraft?
151 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 101, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 152 Elsa B. Kania and John Costello, Quantum Hegemony?: China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership, p. 14. 153 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z. 154 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018, commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years. Congressional Research Service 25 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Potential Implications of Emerging Technologies
for Warfighting
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if
not impossible—to predict, as they not impossible—to predict, as they ~~wil~~ will be a function of many factors, including the rate of be a function of many factors, including the rate of
technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which technological advancement in both the United States and competitor nations, the manner in which
emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the
interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and
international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use. international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use.
Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could ~~potential y~~potentially affect the affect the
future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics, future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as AI, big data analytics,
and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This
could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—~~potential y with~~
~~destabilizing~~ potentially with destabilizing consequences.consequences.
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality—upon
which U.S. military forces have which U.S. military forces have ~~traditional y~~traditionally relied—and quantity, as relied—and quantity, as ~~wel~~ well as between offense and ~~as between offense and~~

~~150 Quirin Schiermeier, “Russia joins race to make quantum dreams a reality,” Nature, December 17, 2019, at~~
~~https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03855-z.~~
~~151 For comparison, the U.S. National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), signed into law in December 2018,~~
~~commits the United States to investing $1.25 billion in quantum research over five years.~~
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defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive defense. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive
systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that
provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging provide a low-cost means of neutralizing such attacks, could favor the defender. Thus, emerging
technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades. technologies could shift the offense-defense balance multiple times over the coming decades.
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or
enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability.
For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce
more powerful methods of machine learning, more powerful methods of machine learning, ~~potential y~~potentially leading to improvements in image leading to improvements in image
recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons.
Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training
environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface” to enhance human cognition
or control prosthetics or robotic systems.or control prosthetics or robotic systems.~~152~~155 Such developments could, in turn, require new Such developments could, in turn, require new
strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.~~153~~156
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and LAWS—could
~~additional y~~ additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These
consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. As
analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue analyst Paul Scharre has noted, “in the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue
engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, ~~potential y~~potentially over a wide area.” over a wide area.”~~154~~157 This This
could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some
analysts to analysts to ~~cal~~ call for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS. 155 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. 156 For a discussion ~~for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS.~~
~~Final y, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For~~
~~example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—~~
~~regardless of whether the weapon could be used legal y—because a human operator would not~~
~~make specific target selection and engagement decisions.155 Others have countered that human~~
~~operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of~~
~~force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the~~
~~requirements of the laws of armed conflict.156 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have~~
~~additional y appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention~~
~~preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the~~
~~dictates of the public conscience.”157 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that~~
~~requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to~~
~~ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is~~

~~152 For additional information about military applications of 5G, see CRS In Focus IF11251,~~ ~~National Security~~
~~Im plications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~153 For a discussion~~ of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis of these and other military and security implications—including implications for deterrence, crisis
stability, force posture, and military roles and missions—seestability, force posture, and military roles and missions—see Robert O. Work and ShawnRobert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for
War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New, Center for a New American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31American Century, January 22, 2014, pp. 31 -35, at https://www.cnas.org/-35, at https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age. publications/reports/20yy-preparing-for-war-in-the-robotic-age.
~~154~~157 Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, FebruaryAmerican Security, February 2016, 2016,
at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf.
~~155 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human~~
~~Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-~~
~~killer-robots.~~
~~156 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at~~
~~https://www.esd.whs.~~
~~157 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human~~
~~Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-~~
~~killer-robots.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”158~~Congressional Research Service 26 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not make specific target selection and engagement decisions.158 Others have countered that human operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the requirements of the laws of armed conflict.159 Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have additionally appealed to the Martens Clause, which appears in the1899 Hague Convention preamble and states that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”160 These analysts believe that LAWS contravene that requirement; however, others have noted that the Martens Clause has not been used previously to ban a weapons system and, furthermore, that the legal status of the Martens Clause is questionable and instead constitutes “merely a recognition of ‘customary international law’.”161
Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that
involve human testing or modification as involve human testing or modification as ~~wel~~ well as the weaponization of biotechnology, which as the weaponization of biotechnology, which
~~could potential y~~could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks. be used for targeted genetic attacks.~~159~~
162 Issues for Congress
Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military Congress has previously demonstrated interest in conducting oversight of emerging military
technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. technologies beyond technology-specific activities. In Section 247 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L.
115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison 115-232), Congress specified “a set of classified reports that set forth a direct comparison
between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of between the capabilities of the United States in emerging technology areas and the capabilities of
adversaries of the United States.”adversaries of the United States.”~~160~~163 These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum These areas include hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum
technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the technology, directed energy weapons, and other relevant technologies as determined by the
Secretary of Defense. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA Secretary of Defense. Section 225 of the FY2019 NDAA ~~additional y~~ additionally tasked the Under Secretary tasked the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for developing of Defense for Research and Engineering with generating procedures for developing
“technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an adversary of “technologies that are urgently needed to react to a technological development of an adversary of
~~the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that are] not~~
~~receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.”~~
~~Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense~~
~~with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to~~
~~emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed~~
~~by the Department,”161 while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the~~
~~Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of~~
~~and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats.~~
~~As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during~~
~~the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding~~
~~considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and~~
~~regulation, and oversight.~~
~~Funding Considerations~~
~~A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy~~
~~weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S.~~

~~158 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future o f War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,~~
~~2018), pp. 263-266.~~
~~159 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824,~~
Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “ China’s
~~Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Jam estown~~ 158 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots. 159 Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, at https://www.esd.whs. 160 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2018, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots. 161 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), pp. 263-266. 162 For a more in-depth discussion of ethical considerations related to biotechnology, see CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by Marcy E. Gallo et al. See also Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-, October 8, 2019, at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-
military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/. military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
~~160~~ 163 Each report is to include Each report is to include the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries the following elements: “(1) an evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries
on such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on suchon such technology, (2) an evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology, (technology, ( 3) an evaluation of 3) an evaluation of
the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology, (4) an assessment of the technological progress of the
United States and adversariesUnited States and adversaries on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such on such technology, (5) descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such
technology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to usetechnology, [and] (6) an assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.” Congressional Research Service 27 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress the United States or to respond to a significant and urgent emerging technology [that are] not receiving appropriate research funding or attention from the Department of Defense.” Furthermore, Section 232 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasked the Secretary of Defense with developing “a process to ensure that the policies of the Department of Defense relating to emerging technology are formulated and updated continuously as such technology is developed by the Department,”164 while Section 236 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) granted the Secretary the authority to establish a Steering Committee tasked with developing assessments of and a strategy for emerging technology and national security threats. As Congress continues to review the Pentagon’s plans for emerging military technologies during the annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider issues surrounding funding considerations, management, personnel, acquisition, technology protection, governance and regulation, and oversight. Funding Considerations A number of emerging military technologies, including hypersonic weapons and directed energy weapons, have experienced fluctuations in funding over the years. According to a U.S. ~~such technology.”~~
~~161 Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by~~
~~the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data~~
~~(commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy,~~
~~hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.”~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations government interagency task force on the defense industrial base, such “fluctuations ~~chal enge~~challenge the the
viabilityviability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishingof suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their abilitytheir ability to hire and retain a to hire and retain a
~~skil ed~~skilled workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.” workforce, [achieve] production efficiencies, and in some cases, [stay] in business.”~~162~~165
Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between Other analysts have noted that such fluctuations are often due to unavoidable tradeoffs between
technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or technology investment priorities or to questions about a given technology’s feasibility or
maturity.maturity.~~163~~
166 Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for Some analysts have suggested that, given the potential for technological surprise, funding for
~~overal~~ overall research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert research and development is inadequate. Summarizing such views, technology expert
Martijn Rasser notes that reducing Martijn Rasser notes that reducing ~~overal~~ overall research and development in order to enable “big bets” research and development in order to enable “big bets”
or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because or heavy investments in a particular technology or technologies, can be a risky approach because
“we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs “we just don’t know where the next breakthroughs ~~wil~~ will come from.”come from.”~~164~~
167 Management
In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately In general, DOD manages each of the aforementioned emerging military technologies separately
due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of due to the distinct expertise required. For example, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
~~Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]), there are separate technical directors or~~
~~assistant directors for artificial intel igence, autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy,~~
~~biotechnology, and quantum science—among other technology areas—which report through the~~
~~Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).165 Development of each of these technologies is~~
~~guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although~~
~~the Director for Modernization has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts~~
~~have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that~~
~~better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.166~~
~~Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military~~
~~technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This~~
~~fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set~~
~~spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”167~~

~~162 Interagency T ask~~ 164 Section 232 defines emerging technology as “technology determined to be in an emerging phase of development by the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for the analysis of large and diverse sets of data (commonly known as ‘big data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology, and such other technology as may be identified by the Secretary.” 165 Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, September 2018, p. 21, at , September 2018, p. 21, at
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-~~ST RENGT HENING-T HE-~~
~~MANUFACT URING~~STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE--AND%20DEFENSE-~~INDUST RIAL~~INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND--BASE-AND- SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.
~~163~~166 See, See, for example, Ariel Robinson, “for example, Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will Directed Energy Weapons: Will ~~T hey~~They Ever Be Ready?,” Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July , July
1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-1, 2015, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-
ever-be-ready. ever-be-ready.
~~164~~167 See, See, for example, Will Knight, “for example, Will Knight, “ ~~T rump~~Trump Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, Proposes a Cut in Research Spending, ~~but~~ but a Boost for AI,” a Boost for AI,” Wired,, February February
11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost11, 2020, at https://www.wired.com/story/trump-proposes-cut-research-spending-boost -ai/. For more information about -ai/. For more information about
federal R&D funding,federal R&D funding, ~~including~~ including a discussiona discussion of DOD R&D funding,of DOD R&D funding, see CRSsee CRS Report R46341, Report R46341, Federal Research and
~~Developm ent~~Development (R&D) Funding: FY2021 ~~, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr.~~
~~165 CRS In Focus IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering , by Marcy E.~~
~~Gallo.~~
~~166 See, for example, Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve~~
~~the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and~~
~~Pete Modigliani,~~ ~~After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new~~
~~era of acquisitions, MIT RE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-~~
~~the-divorce-white-paper.pdf.~~
~~167 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “ T he Defense Department Needs a Real T echnology Strategy ,” Defense One,~~
~~April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Personnel~~
~~Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining~~
, coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. Congressional Research Service 28 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]), there are separate technical directors or assistant directors for artificial intelligence, autonomy, hypersonic weapons, directed energy, biotechnology, and quantum science—among other technology areas—which report through the Director for Modernization to USD(R&E).168 Development of each of these technologies is guided by a standalone technology roadmap and, in the case of AI, a classified strategy. Although the Director for Modernization has oversight over emerging military technologies, some analysts have suggested that there is a need for a more holistic approach to portfolio management that better considers how such technologies might be combined and integrated.169 Furthermore, senior leaders do not always agree on the priorities among emerging military technologies—both in terms of effort and funding—and such priorities can shift frequently. This fluctuation has led some analysts to suggest that DOD should adopt a technology strategy “to set spending priorities that can be sustained over time, outlasting individual leaders.”170 Personnel Some reports indicate that DOD and the defense industry have difficulty recruiting and retaining personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries personnel with expertise in emerging technologies because research funding and salaries
significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.significantly lag behind those of commercial companies.~~168~~171 Other reports suggest that such Other reports suggest that such
~~chal enges~~challenges stem from quality-of-life factors, as stem from quality-of-life factors, as ~~wel~~ well as from a belief among many technology as from a belief among many technology
workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than workers that “they can achieve large-scale change faster and better outside the government than
within it.”within it.”~~169~~172 DOD faces additional DOD faces additional ~~chal enges~~challenges in training and educating its standing workforce. in training and educating its standing workforce.
Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of Examples of recommendations for addressing this set of ~~chal enges~~challenges include increasing technology include increasing technology
education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research education opportunities at military academies, enhancing partnerships between DOD and research
universities, creating government universities, creating government ~~fel owships~~fellowships and accelerated promotion tracks for technology and accelerated promotion tracks for technology
~~workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.170~~
~~Acquisition~~
~~DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-~~
~~use technologies such as AI.171 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it~~
~~takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial~~
~~Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational~~
~~Capability.172 In contrast, commercial companies typical y execute an iterative development~~
~~process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial~~
~~product in six to nine months.173 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software~~
~~acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration~~
~~and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”174 Similar~~
~~efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies.~~

~~168 M.L. Cummings,~~ workers, and improving the technology literacy of human resource teams.173 168 CRS In Focus IF10834, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, by Marcy E. Gallo. 169 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Department of Defense’s Portfolio Management, August 2015, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf; and Pete Modigliani, After the divorce: How the Pentagon can position itself for speed, agility, and innovation in the new era of acquisitions, MITRE, March 2019, at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-03404-3-after-the-divorce-white-paper.pdf. 170 Paul Scharre and Ainikki Riikonen, “The Defense Department Needs a Real Technology Strategy,” Defense One, April 21, 2020, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/pentagon-needs-technology-strategy/164764/. 171 M.L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, at , January 2017, p. 11, at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-
warfare-cummings-final.pdf. warfare-cummings-final.pdf.
~~169~~ 172 Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, ~~“T he~~ “The Divide between Silicon Valley Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security and Washington Is a National-Security ~~T hreat~~Threat,” ,”
The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-, December 13, 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-
valley-and-washington/577963/. valley-and-washington/577963/.
~~170~~173 See See Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board, Applications of Quantum Technologies: Executive Summary; National Security ; National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter ~~Recom m endations~~Recommendations, March 2020, pp. 21-43, at , March 2020, pp. 21-43, at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/https://drive.google.com/file/d/~~1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaT EERbKss/view;~~ 1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view; and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, and Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs,
““~~T he~~The Divide between Silicon Divide between Silicon ~~Valley~~ Valley and Washington.” For example, DOD is establishingand Washington.” For example, DOD is establishing a university consortium for a university consortium for
hypersonic research and workforce developmenthypersonic research and workforce development , while the Defense Digital Service, while the Defense Digital Service now offers one- to two-year now offers one- to two-year
assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create assignments for commercial technology workers. Similarly, the National Security Innovation Network seeks to create
models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government. models and pathways for recruiting technologists to the U.S. government.
~~171 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval~~
~~Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068,~~
Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) , by Heidi M. Peters.
~~172 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189.~~
~~173 Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at~~
~~https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board,~~ ~~Software is Never Done:~~
~~Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Com petitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/~~
~~2002124828/-1/-1/0/~~
~~SOFT WAREISNEVERDONE_REFACT ORINGT HEACQUI SIT IONCODEFORCOMPET IT IVEADVANT AGE_FIN~~
~~AL.SWAP.REPORT .PDF.~~
~~174 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment , “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim~~
~~Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-~~
~~19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~
Congressional Research Service 29 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Acquisition DOD may need to continue adjusting its acquisition process to account for rapidly evolving dual-use technologies such as AI.174 For example, a 2017 internal study of the process found that it takes an average of 81 months for information technology programs to move from the initial Analysis of Alternatives, defining the requirements for a system, to an Initial Operational Capability.175 In contrast, commercial companies typically execute an iterative development process for software systems (such as those involved in AI capabilities), delivering an initial product in six to nine months.176 These findings prompted DOD to issue an interim software acquisition policy intended to “[simplify] the acquisition model to enable continuous integration and delivery of software capability on timelines relevant to the Warfighter/end user.”177 Similar efforts may be needed for other emerging military technologies.
Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging Furthermore, the commercial companies that are often at the forefront of innovation in emerging
technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense technologies may be reluctant to partner with DOD due to the complexity of the defense
acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of acquisition process. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of this issue found that, of
12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, 12 U.S. commercial companies who choose not to do business with DOD, al all 12 cited the 12 cited the
complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.complexity of the defense acquisition process as a rationale for their decision.~~175~~178 DOD has created DOD has created
a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the a number of avenues for rapid acquisitions—including the Strategic Capabilities Office, the
Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome Defense Innovation Unit, and Project Maven—that are intended to streamline cumbersome
processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.processes and accelerate the acquisitions timeline.~~176~~179 Project Maven, for example, was established Project Maven, for example, was established
in Aprilin April 2017; by December, the team was fielding a 2017; by December, the team was fielding a ~~commercial y~~commercially acquired prototype AI system acquired prototype AI system
in combat.in combat.~~177~~180 Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point Although some analysts argue that these are promising developments, critics point
out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive out that the department must replicate such results at scale and implement more comprehensive
acquisitions reform.acquisitions reform.~~178~~
~~Intellectual Property~~
~~Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about~~
~~intel ectual property and data rights.179 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on~~
~~broader chal enges in military acquisitions noted, intel ectual property is the “life blood” of~~
~~commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant~~
~~unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or~~
~~restricted rights.”180 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that~~
~~“establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition,~~
~~licensing, and management of IP.”181 The instruction additional y establishes a DOD IP Cadre to~~
~~advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and cal s for the development~~
~~of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each~~
~~acquisition program.182~~
~~Supply Chain Security~~
~~A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for~~
~~emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have~~

~~175 U.S.~~ 181 174 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval Analysis, January 2017, pp. 190-191. For an overview of recent acquisition reform efforts, see CRS Report R45068, Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters. 175 Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, p. 189. 176 Defense Science Board, “Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems,” February 2018, at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1048883.pdf. See also Defense Innovation Board, Software is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage, May 3, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/30/2002124828/-1/-1/0/SOFTWAREISNEVERDONE_REFACTORINGTHEACQUISITIONCODEFORCOMPETITIVEADVANTAGE_FINAL.SWAP.REPORT.PDF. 177 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Software Acquisition Pathway Interim Policy and Procedures,” January 3, 2020, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/ae/assets/docs/USA002825-19%20Signed%20Memo%20(Software).pdf. 178 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced
by Certain ~~Com panies~~ Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, environment,
lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting
workforce. workforce.
~~176~~179 In certain circumstances, DOD may also use In certain circumstances, DOD may also use other transaction authorities (other transaction authorities (~~OT As~~OTAs) to accelerate research, ) to accelerate research,
prototyping, and production. For additional prototyping, and production. For additional ~~info rmation about OT As, see CRS~~ information about OTAs, see CRS Report R45521, Report R45521, ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense
Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,, by Heidi M. Peters. by Heidi M. Peters.
~~177~~180 Marcus Weisgerber, Marcus Weisgerber, ~~“T he~~ “The Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Pentagon’s New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting ~~T errorists~~Terrorists,” ,” Defense One, ,
December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-December 21, 2017, at http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-
hunting-terrorists/144742/. hunting-terrorists/144742/.
~~178~~181 Andrew Andrew Ilachinski, Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms: Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval , Center for Naval
Analysis, January 2017, p. 190. Analysis, January 2017, p. 190.
~~179 U.S. Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced~~
~~by Certain Com panies.~~
~~180 Ibid., p. 20.~~
~~181 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment , “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual~~
~~Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/~~
~~issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070.~~
~~182 Ibid., pp. 8-11.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

30

~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 30 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress Intellectual Property Commercial technology companies are often reluctant to partner with DOD due to concerns about intellectual property and data rights.182 As an official interviewed for a 2017 GAO report on broader challenges in military acquisitions noted, intellectual property is the “life blood” of commercial technology companies, yet “DOD is putting increased pressure on companies to grant unlimited technical data and software rights or government purpose rights rather than limited or restricted rights.”183 In an effort to manage these concerns, DOD released an instruction that “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the acquisition, licensing, and management of IP.”184 The instruction additionally establishes a DOD IP Cadre to advise and assist the acquisition workforce on matters related to IP and calls for the development of an IP strategy to “identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters” for each acquisition program.185 Supply Chain Security A number of recent reports have raised concerns about the security of the U.S. supply chain for emerging military technologies. For example, one assessment found that China “may have opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage, opportunities to jeopardize the development of hypersonics through industrial espionage,
transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-transfers of technology, or providing unreliable components” due to its potential exposure to low-
level U.S. suppliers.level U.S. suppliers.~~183~~186 Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial Similarly the National Security Commission on Artificial ~~Intel igence~~ Intelligence
found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating, found that “the United States lacks domestic facilities capable of producing, integrating,
assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on assembling, and testing” the microelectronics needed to enable AI, forcing the U.S. “to rely on
foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”foreign fabrication and complex global supply chains for production.”~~184~~
187 Technology Protection
Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 Estimates indicate “that American industry loses more than $600 ~~bil ion~~billion dollars [each year] to dollars [each year] to
theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies theft and expropriation,” including the theft and expropriation of emerging military technologies
and related and related ~~intel ectual~~ intellectual property.property.~~185~~188 The United States has a number of programs devoted to The United States has a number of programs devoted to
addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review addressing this issue. For example, pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging States (CFIUS) now reviews certain foreign investments, including those involving “emerging
and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a and foundational technologies.” In addition, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to consider “whether a
covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared
strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect
~~United States leadership in areas related to national security.”186 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting~~
~~Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial~~
~~base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key~~
~~data.”187 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs~~
~~for smal businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop~~
~~a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section~~
~~1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.188 Some analysts have recommended~~
~~expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. al ies and partners.189~~

~~183 Govini,~~ ~~The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare~~ 182 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced by Certain Companies. 183 Ibid., p. 20. 184 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “DOD Instruction 5010.44 Intellectual Property (IP) Acquisition and Licensing,” October 16, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/501044p.PDF?ver=2019-10-16-144448-070. 185 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 186 Govini, The 2020 Federal Scorecard: High-Intensity Warfare Edition, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/, p. 67, at https://www.govini.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf. uploads/2020/06/Govini-2020-Federal-Scorecard.pdf.
~~184~~187 National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, First Quarter Recommendations, p. 46. , p. 46.
~~185~~188 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical ~~T echnology T ask~~Technology Task Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/cs2018_0459.pdf. Congressional Research Service 31 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress United States leadership in areas related to national security.”189 Similarly, DOD’s Protecting Critical Technology Task Force helps protect universities, labs, and the U.S. defense industrial base against the theft of “classified information, controlled unclassified information, and key data.”190 As part of this effort, the task force intends to institute cybersecurity training programs for small businesses, enhance DOD’s understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities, and develop a prioritized list of technologies that are critical to national security—as mandated by Section 1049 of the FY2019 NDAA—among other activities.191 Some analysts have recommended expanding technology protection efforts to include U.S. allies and partners.192 Governance and Regulation According to then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, “technology developments … are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”193
~~Force,” October 24, 2018, at https://insidecybersecurity.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/2018/nov/~~
~~cs2018_0459.pdf.~~
~~186 T he specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be iden tified by an~~
~~interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, T itle XVII, §1702(c). For more~~
~~information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and~~
~~Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have~~
~~argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “ heavier~~
~~scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial~~
~~Intelligence, Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/~~
~~153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view.~~
~~187 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical T echnology T ask~~
~~Force.”~~
~~188 C. T odd Lopez, “ T ask Force Curbs T echnology T heft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26,~~
~~2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-~~
~~joint -force-strong/.~~
~~189 See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt ,~~ ~~Forging an Alliance Innovation~~
~~Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/document s/~~
~~CNAS-Report -Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909.~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Governance and Regulation~~
~~According to then-Director of National Intel igence Daniel Coats, “technology developments …~~
~~are likely to outpace regulation, which could create international norms that are contrary to US~~
~~interests and increase the likelihood of technology surprise.”190~~ To address this concern, some To address this concern, some
analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic analysts have argued that “the United States should undertake broad, sustained diplomatic
engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”engagement to advance collaboration on emerging technologies, norms, and standards setting.”~~191~~194
Similarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAASimilarly, Section 9414 of the FY2021 NDAA directs the Director of the National Institute of directs the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards Standards and Technology to oversee a study that assesses China’s role in international standards
setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and setting organizations and provides recommendations for mitigating China’s influence and
strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations. strengthening U.S. participation in these organizations.
~~Oversight192~~Oversight195
As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be As Congress conducts oversight of emerging military technologies, it may be ~~chal enged~~challenged in its in its
abilityability to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972, to independently evaluate and assess complex, disparate technical disciplines. In 1972,
Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert Congress established the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide expert
“assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop “assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case studies, and workshop
~~proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.193~~
~~Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of~~
~~government.194 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar~~
~~technology assessment organization.195~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Kelley M. Sayler~~

~~Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global~~
~~Security~~

~~190 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide T hreat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”~~
~~delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 20 18.~~
~~191 Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks,~~ ~~Twin Pillars: Upholding National~~
~~Security and National Innovation in Em erging Technologies Governance~~ ~~, Center for Strategic and International~~
~~Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/~~
~~200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF.~~
~~192 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327,~~ ~~The~~
~~Office of Technology Assessm ent: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr..~~
~~193 Ibid.~~
~~194 Ibid.~~
~~195 For an overview of OT A/technology assessment -related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in~~
~~CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessm ent: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F.~~
~~Sargent Jr..~~
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~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress~~

189 The specific technologies that qualify as “emerging and foundational technologies” are to be identified by an interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA, by James K. Jackson and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. Some entities, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have argued that the U.S. government should consider additional measures of technology protection, such as “heavier scrutiny of the potential end use and end user of specific items.” See National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Interim Report, November 2019, p. 42, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. 190 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force.” 191 C. Todd Lopez, “Task Force Curbs Technology Theft to Keep Joint Force Strong,” DOD News, November 26, 2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2027555/task-force-curbs-technology-theft-to-keep-joint-force-strong/. 192 See, for example, Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, Forging an Alliance Innovation Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, at https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. 193 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” delivered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 6, 2018. 194 Samuel J. Brannen, Christian S. Haig, Katherine Schmidt, and Kathleen H. Hicks, Twin Pillars: Upholding National Security and National Innovation in Emerging Technologies Governance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2020, at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200123_Brannen_TwinPillars_WEB_FINAL.pdf?eljUpAKOjVauOujYfnvuSGDK0xvsQGZF. 195 For a full discussion of issues surrounding congressional oversight of technology, see CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. Congressional Research Service 32 Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress proceedings” that were to inform congressional decisionmaking and legislative activities.196 Congress eliminated funding for OTA in 1995 “amid broader efforts to reduce the size of government.197 Since then, Congress has continued to debate the need for OTA or a similar technology assessment organization.198 Author Information Kelley M. Sayler Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security

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196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 For an overview of OTA/technology assessment-related legislation in the 107th-116th Congresses, see Appendix C in CRS Report R46327, The Office of Technology Assessment: History, Authorities, Issues, and Options, by John F. Sargent Jr.. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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