Nuclear Energy:
October 20, 2021
Overview of Overview of
December 8, 2023
Congressional Issues
Mark Holt
The policy debate over the role of nuclear power in the nation’s energy mix is rooted in the
The policy debate over the role of nuclear power in the nation’s energy mix is rooted in the
Specialist in Energy Policy
Specialist in Energy Policy
technology’s fundamental characteristics. Nuclear reactors can produce potentially vast amounts
technology’s fundamental characteristics. Nuclear reactors can produce potentially vast amounts
of useful energy with relatively low consumption of natural resources and emissions of
of useful energy with relatively low consumption of natural resources and emissions of
greenhouse gases and other pollutants. However, facilities that produce nuclear fuel for civilian greenhouse gases and other pollutants. However, facilities that produce nuclear fuel for civilian
power reactors can also produce materials for nuclear weapons. In addition, the process of
power reactors can also produce materials for nuclear weapons. In addition, the process of
nuclear fission (splitting of atomic nuclei) to generate power produces radioactive material that can remain hazardous for nuclear fission (splitting of atomic nuclei) to generate power produces radioactive material that can remain hazardous for
thousands of years and must be contained. How to manage the weapons proliferation and safety risks of nuclear power, or thousands of years and must be contained. How to manage the weapons proliferation and safety risks of nuclear power, or
whether the benefits of nuclear power are worth those risks, are issues that have long been debated in Congress. whether the benefits of nuclear power are worth those risks, are issues that have long been debated in Congress.
The 93 licensed nuclear power reactors at
The 93 licensed nuclear power reactors at
5554 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation’s electricity. sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation’s electricity.
Two new reactors are currently under constructionOne new reactor, in Georgia, began operation in June 2023 and a twin unit is scheduled to start up by early 2024. About a dozen . About a dozen
more reactors of various designs are planned or proposed. Whether they more are planned, but with no specific construction dates. Whether they will eventually move forward will depend largely on their economic competitiveness with natural gas and eventually move forward will depend largely on their economic competitiveness with natural gas and
renewable energy sources. Similar economic forces renewable energy sources. Similar economic forces
are affectingaffect existing reactors. existing reactors.
TwelveThirteen U.S. reactors were permanently U.S. reactors were permanently
closed from 2013 through April closed from 2013 through April
2021, and three more are planned for closure through the mid-2020s2022. However, several states . However, several states
have taken action to preventhave taken action to prevent
planned reactor shutdowns, and reactor shutdowns, and
several proposals to support existing reactors are pending in the 117th CongressCongress has enacted federal tax credits and other support for existing reactors as well. as well.
The Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies for decades have conducted research on “advanced” reactor
The Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies for decades have conducted research on “advanced” reactor
technologies, such as fast neutron reactors, that would differ significantly from existing commercial nuclear plants and technologies, such as fast neutron reactors, that would differ significantly from existing commercial nuclear plants and
potentially be far smaller. Proponents of advanced reactors contend that they would be safer, more efficient, and less potentially be far smaller. Proponents of advanced reactors contend that they would be safer, more efficient, and less
expensive to build and operate than today’s conventional light water reactors. expensive to build and operate than today’s conventional light water reactors.
Detractors raise concerns regarding weapons-proliferation risks and cast doubt on their affordability and sustainability. DOE is providing support for several proposed DOE is providing support for several proposed
advanced reactor demonstrations, which could indicate whether the anticipated benefits can be realizedadvanced reactor demonstrations, which could indicate whether the anticipated benefits can be realized
. . Numerous bills have been introduced in the 118th Congress to support development of advanced reactors and fuels, such as S. 1111 and H.R. 5750.
Highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from nuclear reactors is currently stored primarily at power
Highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from nuclear reactors is currently stored primarily at power
plant sites. Development of a permanent underground repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, was suspended by the Obama plant sites. Development of a permanent underground repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, was suspended by the Obama
Administration. The Trump Administration requested funding for FY2018, FY2019,Administration. The Trump Administration requested funding for FY2018, FY2019,
and FY2020 to revive the program, but and FY2020 to revive the program, but
it was not approved by Congress. No Yucca Mountain program funding it was not approved by Congress. No Yucca Mountain program funding
washas since been requested or provided requested or provided
for FY2021, and the Biden Administration did not request any for FY2022. .
The Obama Administration
The Obama Administration
had appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to recommend an appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to recommend an
alternative approach to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act’s focus on Yucca Mountain for permanent high-level waste disposal. In alternative approach to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act’s focus on Yucca Mountain for permanent high-level waste disposal. In
response to the commission’s recommendations, DOE issued a waste strategy in January 2013 that called for the selection of response to the commission’s recommendations, DOE issued a waste strategy in January 2013 that called for the selection of
new candidate sites for nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities through a “consent-based” process. new candidate sites for nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities through a “consent-based” process.
However, Congress has not enacted legislation for such a strategy, so Yucca Mountain remains the sole authorized candidate site, despite its la ck of funding. DOE awarded $26 million in grants to 13 consortia of universities and other organizations in June 2023 to develop consent-based siting approaches. In the meantime, Yucca Mountain remains the sole authorized candidate site for permanent disposal, despite its lack of funding. Nuclear waste bills in the 118th Congress include proposals to require state and local consent for siting a nuclear waste repository (H.R. 1051, S. 404).
The March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan increased attention to nuclear safety
The March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan increased attention to nuclear safety
throughout the world. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which issues and enforces nuclear safety requirements, throughout the world. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which issues and enforces nuclear safety requirements,
established a task force to identify lessons from Fukushima applicable to U.S. reactors. The task force’s report led to NRC’s established a task force to identify lessons from Fukushima applicable to U.S. reactors. The task force’s report led to NRC’s
first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements on March 12, 2012first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements on March 12, 2012
. Several other countries, such as Germany and Japan, eliminated or reduced their planned future reliance on nuclear power after the accident, and its ten-year anniversary heightened safety interest. .
The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants has been a high
The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants has been a high
-profile issue since the 9/11 terrorist -profile issue since the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a series of orders and regulations that substantially attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a series of orders and regulations that substantially
increased nuclear plant security requirements, although industry critics contend that those measures are still insufficient. increased nuclear plant security requirements, although industry critics contend that those measures are still insufficient.
Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they
Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they
a reare not used for not used for
foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. Recent proposals to build foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. Recent proposals to build
nuclear power plantsreactors in several countries in several countries
in the less developed worldwithout nuclear power, including the Middle East, have prompted concerns , including the Middle East, have prompted concerns
that international controls may prove inadequate. about the effectiveness of international controls. Current bills to encourage nuclear exports include S. 1928 and H.R. 806.
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3736 Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
Contents
Synthesis of Key Issues .................................................................................................... 1
Basic Facts and Statistics.............................. 1 Basic Facts and Statistics................................................................................... 2
Major Nuclear Energy Issues .............................. 2 Major Nuclear Energy Issues .............................................................. 4
Radioactive Waste ............................................ 4
Advanced Nuclear Technology ......................................................... 4
Recent Events ........................................... 4
Recent Events ........................................................... 4
Recent Congressional Action—117th Congress.......................................................... 6
116th Congress ...........5 Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress ................................................................ 8 CRS Reports .......................... 6
CRS Reports........................................................................................... 12 Additional References .......................... 7
Additional References ........................................................................................... 8
Nuclear Plant Economic Viability 12
Radioactive Waste ................................................................................ 8
Recent Events ................................... 13
Recent Events ................................................................. 10
Selected Congressional Action—117th Congress...................................................... 12
116th 14 Recent Congressional Action—118th Congress ..................................................................... 15 CRS Reports .............................. 14
CRS Reports....................................................................................... 16 Additional References .............................. 14
Additional References ......................................................................................... 14
Advanced Nuclear Technology 16
Nuclear Plant Economic Viability ................................................................................... 15........ 17
Recent Events .................................................................................................... 16
116th Congress ...................... 18 Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress .............................................................. 20 CRS Reports ............... 20
CRS Reports...................................................................................................... 2220
Additional References ....................................................................................................... 20
Safety and Regulation 22
Safety .................................................................................................................... 2321
Recent Events .................................................................................................... 24
Selected Congressional Action—117th Congress...................................................... 25
116th Congress ........ 23 Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress ........................................................................................... 25
CRS Reports 24 Additional References ....................................................................................................... 26
Additional References
Security and Emergency Response ......................................................................................... 26
Security and Emergency ResponseRecent Events ............................................................................. 26
Recent Events ...................................... 27 Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress .............................................................. 2728
CRS Reports ...................................................................................................... 27
Additional References .............................. 28 Additional References .......................................................................... 27
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation............................. 28
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation ................................................ 28
Recent Events ......................................... 28
Recent Events ........................................................... 28
Selected Congressional Action—117th Congress........................................................ 30
116th29 Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress ................................................................ 31 CRS Reports ................................... 31
CRS Reports.................................................................................... 32 Other References .................. 32
Other References................................................................................................ 32
Tables
Table 1. Recent and Announced U.S. Commercial Reactor Shutdowns Planned Advanced Reactor Demonstration Plants............................................................. 9
Table 2. Planned Advanced Reactor Demonstration Plants7 Table 2. U.S. Commercial Reactor Shutdowns Since 2012 ...................................................... 17
.... 18
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33 33
Congressional Research Service
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Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
Congressional Research Service
Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
Synthesis of Key Issues
The long-running policy debate over the future of nuclear energy is rooted in the technology’s The long-running policy debate over the future of nuclear energy is rooted in the technology’s
inherent characteristics. inherent characteristics.
Initial yInitially developed for its unprecedented destructive power during World developed for its unprecedented destructive power during World
War II, nuclear energy seemed to hold equal promise after the war as a way of providing limitless War II, nuclear energy seemed to hold equal promise after the war as a way of providing limitless
energy to energy to
al all humanity. International diplomacy has focused ever since on finding institutional humanity. International diplomacy has focused ever since on finding institutional
mechanisms for spreading the perceived benefits of nuclear energy throughout the world while mechanisms for spreading the perceived benefits of nuclear energy throughout the world while
preventing the technology from being used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Much of this preventing the technology from being used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Much of this
international effort is focused on key nuclear fuel cycle facilities—plants for enriching uranium in international effort is focused on key nuclear fuel cycle facilities—plants for enriching uranium in
the fissile isotope U-235 and for separating plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. Such plants the fissile isotope U-235 and for separating plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. Such plants
can be used to produce civilian nuclear reactor fuel as can be used to produce civilian nuclear reactor fuel as
wel well as fissile material for nuclear as fissile material for nuclear
warheads.warheads.
Yet even the use of nuclear power solely for peaceful energy production has proven
Yet even the use of nuclear power solely for peaceful energy production has proven
intrinsical yintrinsically controversial. The harnessing of nuclear fission in a reactor creates highly radioactive materials controversial. The harnessing of nuclear fission in a reactor creates highly radioactive materials
that must be kept from overheating and escaping from the reactor building, as occurred during the that must be kept from overheating and escaping from the reactor building, as occurred during the
accidents at Fukushimaaccidents at Fukushima
, Chernobyl in Japan, Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, Three Mile Island, and, to a lesser extent, Three Mile Island
in Pennsylvania. Spent nuclear fuel . Spent nuclear fuel
that is regularly removed from reactors during refueling must be isolated from the environment that is regularly removed from reactors during refueling must be isolated from the environment
for up to 1 for up to 1
mil ion million years. Proposed commercial technologies to reduce long-lived nuclear waste years. Proposed commercial technologies to reduce long-lived nuclear waste
through recycling through recycling
usual yusually involve separating plutonium that possibly could be used for nuclear involve separating plutonium that possibly could be used for nuclear
weapons, although technologies designed to reduce proliferation risks are also the subject of weapons, although technologies designed to reduce proliferation risks are also the subject of
worldwide research and development efforts. worldwide research and development efforts.
Al All nuclear energy technologies, even with nuclear energy technologies, even with
recycling, would recycling, would
stil still leave substantial amounts of radioactive waste to be stored and disposed of. leave substantial amounts of radioactive waste to be stored and disposed of.
Central storage and disposal sites for nuclear waste have proven difficult to develop throughout Central storage and disposal sites for nuclear waste have proven difficult to develop throughout
the world, as the world, as
il ustratedillustrated by the long-running controversy over the proposed U.S. waste repository by the long-running controversy over the proposed U.S. waste repository
at Yucca Mountain, NVat Yucca Mountain, NV
, and proposed consolidated interim storage facilities in New Mexico and Texas. .
The March 2011 disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, which forced the
The March 2011 disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, which forced the
evacuation of areas as far as 30 miles away, evacuation of areas as far as 30 miles away,
has slowed nuclear power expansion plans around the slowed nuclear power expansion plans around the
world, particularly in Japan and Western Europe. world, particularly in Japan and Western Europe.
HoweverNevertheless, dozens of new reactors are , dozens of new reactors are
stil being
still being planned and built in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere.1 In these areas, nuclear power’s initial planned and built in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere.1 In these areas, nuclear power’s initial
promise of generating large amounts of electricity without the need for often-imported fossil promise of generating large amounts of electricity without the need for often-imported fossil
fuels, along with the more recent desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, remains a fuels, along with the more recent desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, remains a
compel ingcompelling motivation. motivation.
With 93 licensed reactors, the United States has the largest nuclear power industry in the world.
With 93 licensed reactors, the United States has the largest nuclear power industry in the world.
But U.S. nuclear power growth has been largely stagnant for the past two decades, as natural gas But U.S. nuclear power growth has been largely stagnant for the past two decades, as natural gas
and renewable energy have captured most of the market for new electric generating capacity and and renewable energy have captured most of the market for new electric generating capacity and
improvements in energy efficiency have slowed electricity demand growth.2 Congress enacted improvements in energy efficiency have slowed electricity demand growth.2 Congress enacted
incentives for new nuclear plants in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), including incentives for new nuclear plants in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), including
production tax credits, loan guarantees, and insurance against regulatory delays. Those incentives, production tax credits, loan guarantees, and insurance against regulatory delays. Those incentives,
combined with rising natural gas prices and concerns about federal restrictions on carbon dioxide combined with rising natural gas prices and concerns about federal restrictions on carbon dioxide
emissions, prompted announcements by late 2009 of up to 30 new nuclear power reactors in the emissions, prompted announcements by late 2009 of up to 30 new nuclear power reactors in the
United States.3 However, subsequent declines in natural gas prices and uncertainty about carbon
1 World Nuclear1 World Nuclear
Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,” Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,”
September 2021November 2023, ,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-
requireme.aspx. requireme.aspx.
2 Energy Information Administration,
2 Energy Information Administration,
“EIA Projects Renewables Share of U.S. Electricity Generation Mix Will Double by 2050,” February 8, 2021Annual Energy Outlook 2023, March 16, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/index.php#TheElectricityMixinth, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46676. 3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications,” updated March 28, 2008, https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/nukerelapse/industry/expectednewrxapplications32808.pdf. .
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1321 Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
United States.3 However, subsequent declines in natural gas prices and uncertainty about carbon dioxide controls dioxide controls have put most of those projects on hold.put most of those projects on hold.
Currently, two new reactors
Some of those projects began construction, with mixed results. A new reactor in Georgia began commercial operation in July 2023 and a twin unit is scheduled to start up by early 2024. A planned advanced nuclear plant in Idaho was terminated by its developers in November 2023 after experiencing numerous delays and cost overruns in Georgia are under construction. Two identical reactors under construction in South Carolina were canceled . Two identical reactors under construction in South Carolina were canceled
July 31,in July 2017. The Georgia and South Carolina projects both experienced large cost overruns and 2017. The Georgia and South Carolina projects both experienced large cost overruns and
schedule delays. An older reactor, Watts Bar 2 in Tennessee, received an NRC operating license schedule delays. An older reactor, Watts Bar 2 in Tennessee, received an NRC operating license
on October 22, 2015, after construction had been suspended for two decades and then completed.on October 22, 2015, after construction had been suspended for two decades and then completed.
A variety of incentives to renew the growth of nuclear power have been proposed.
Existing U.S. nuclear power plants are continuing to face difficult competition from natural gas
Existing U.S. nuclear power plants are continuing to face difficult competition from natural gas
and renewable energy. and renewable energy.
TwelveThirteen U.S. reactors were permanently closed from 2013 through April U.S. reactors were permanently closed from 2013 through April
20212022. Three of those units closed because of the need for expensive repairs, three were retired . Three of those units closed because of the need for expensive repairs, three were retired
under agreements with state utility regulators, and under agreements with state utility regulators, and
sixseven could not compete in their regional could not compete in their regional
wholesale electricity markets. wholesale electricity markets.
The most recent shutdowns were New Jersey’s Oyster Creek plant in September 2018,4 Pilgrim (MA) in May 2019, Three Mile Island (PA) in October 2019, Indian Point 2 (NY) in April 2020, Duane Arnold (IA) in August 2020, and Indian Point 3 in April 2021. Al 12All 13 units had substantial time remaining on their initial units had substantial time remaining on their initial
40-year operating licenses or had 40-year operating licenses or had
received or planned to apply for 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear Regulatory received or planned to apply for 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Three additional reactors are currently scheduled for permanent closure by the mid-2020s (Table 1). The actual and planned shutdowns haveCommission (NRC). (See Table 2.) The shutdowns prompted widespread prompted widespread
discussion about the future of other aging U.S. reactors and proposals for federal assistance. discussion about the future of other aging U.S. reactors and proposals for federal assistance.
Action taken by states has Action taken by states has
forestal edforestalled the announced shutdowns of 20 other U.S. reactors during the announced shutdowns of 20 other U.S. reactors during
the past the past
five years, and additional subsidies are currently under consideration in the 117th
Congressseveral years. Congress has also enacted federal tax credits and other support for existing and new nuclear power plants. .
The extent to which the growth of nuclear power should be encouraged in the United States and
The extent to which the growth of nuclear power should be encouraged in the United States and
around the world around the world
wil will continue to be a major component of the U.S. energy policy debate. continue to be a major component of the U.S. energy policy debate.
Questions for Congress Questions for Congress
wil could include the implementation of policies to encourage or discourage include the implementation of policies to encourage or discourage
nuclear power, post-Fukushima safety standards, development of new nuclear power and fuel nuclear power, post-Fukushima safety standards, development of new nuclear power and fuel
cycle technologies, and nuclear waste management strategies. cycle technologies, and nuclear waste management strategies.
Basic Facts and Statistics
The 93 licensed nuclear power reactors at The 93 licensed nuclear power reactors at
5554 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the sites in the United States generate about 20% of the
nation’s electricity. The oldest of today’s operating reactors were licensed in 1969, and the most nation’s electricity. The oldest of today’s operating reactors were licensed in 1969, and the most
recently licensed was Watts Bar 2 in 2015. Therecent to begin commercial operation was Vogtle 3 in Georgia in July 2023.4 Before that, the most recent most recent
reactors to start up to start up
beforewere Watts Bar 2 Watts Bar 2
wasin 2015 and its its
twin unit, Watts Bar 1, in 1996twin unit, Watts Bar 1, in 1996
in Tennessee.5 All .5 All U.S. reactors were U.S. reactors were
initial yinitially licensed to operate for 40 years, licensed to operate for 40 years,
but nearly but nearly
al all of them have received or applied for 20-year license renewals by NRC.6 NRC of them have received or applied for 20-year license renewals by NRC.6 NRC
issued its first “subsequent license renewals,” which issued its first “subsequent license renewals,” which
al owallow operation for up to 80 years, to the operation for up to 80 years, to the
Turkey Point 1 and 2 reactors in Florida in December 2019. Four more renewals to 80 years, for Turkey Point 1 and 2 reactors in Florida in December 2019. Four more renewals to 80 years, for
Peach Bottom 2 and 3 in Pennsylvania and Surry 1 and 2 in Virginia, were issued in March 2020 Peach Bottom 2 and 3 in Pennsylvania and Surry 1 and 2 in Virginia, were issued in March 2020
and May 2021. Subsequent license renewal applications for another and May 2021. Subsequent license renewal applications for another
seven10 reactors are currently under review, one application is being reviewed for acceptance, and eight others are anticipated during the next two
3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications,” updated March 28, 2008, https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/nukerelapse/industry/expectednewrxapplications32808.pdf.
4 Georgia Power, “Vogtle Unit 3 goes into operation,” news release, July 31, 2023, https://www.georgiapower.com/company/news-center/2023-articles/vogtle-unit-3-goes-into-operation.html reactors are currently
4 T he New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection issued an administrative consent order on December 9,
2010, allowing Oyster Creek to continue running without a cooling tower in return for an agreement by the plant’s owner, Exelon, to retire the plant by the end of 2019, 10 years before the ex piration of its NRC operating license. See https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1109357/000119312510277630/dex991.htm. .
5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Information Digest, 2020-2021, NUREG-1350, vol. 32, Appendix A, , NUREG-1350, vol. 32, Appendix A,
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/index.html. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/index.html.
6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “
6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “
Status of Initial License RenewalStatus of Initial License Renewal
Applications and Industry Initiatives,” October Applications and Industry Initiatives,” October
9, 201913, 2023, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html. , https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html.
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Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
under review, and two more applications are being reviewed for acceptanceyears.7 Under the current .7 Under the current
mixture of 40- and 60- and 80-year licenses, mixture of 40- and 60- and 80-year licenses,
al all of today’s operating reactors would shut down by of today’s operating reactors would shut down by
2055. If newer reactors2055. If newer reactors
, such as Vogtle 3, eventually such as Watts Bar 1 and 2 eventual y were to receive license renewals to were to receive license renewals to
80 years, the shutdown date for the existing fleet could be pushed back by two 80 years, the shutdown date for the existing fleet could be pushed back by two
decades or more.
Whether new reactors will decades or more. However, as noted above, many U.S. reactors have been retired before their license expirations,
with three more currently scheduled to do so.
Whether new reactors wil be constructed to replace the existing fleet or even to expand nuclear be constructed to replace the existing fleet or even to expand nuclear
power’s market share power’s market share
wil will depend largely on costs. The cost of building and operating a new depend largely on costs. The cost of building and operating a new
nuclear power plant in the United States is nuclear power plant in the United States is
general ygenerally estimated to be significantly higher than estimated to be significantly higher than
natural gas combined-cycle plants (which use both combustion and steam turbines to generate natural gas combined-cycle plants (which use both combustion and steam turbines to generate
electricity) and electricity) and
abovehigher than wind and solar as wind and solar as
wel well. For example, the Energy Information . For example, the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) estimates that, for plants coming on line in Administration (EIA) estimates that, for plants coming on line in
20262028, the average cost of , the average cost of
electricity generation from a nuclear power plant would be electricity generation from a nuclear power plant would be
6.37.1 cents per kilowatt-hour (kwh), cents per kilowatt-hour (kwh),
including tax credits, while advanced combined-cycle gas-fired generation would cost including tax credits, while advanced combined-cycle gas-fired generation would cost
3.7
4.3 cents/kwh and an ultracritical coal plant would cost cents/kwh and an ultracritical coal plant would cost
7.38.9 cents/kwh. EIA estimates that electricity cents/kwh. EIA estimates that electricity
from onshore wind would cost 3.from onshore wind would cost 3.
71 cents/kwh, solar photovoltaics cents/kwh, solar photovoltaics
3.02.3 cents/kwh, and geothermal cents/kwh, and geothermal
3.3.
47 cents/kwh.8 Such estimates depend on a wide range of variables, such as future fuel costs, cents/kwh.8 Such estimates depend on a wide range of variables, such as future fuel costs,
regional solar and wind availability,regional solar and wind availability,
current and future tax incentives, and environmental current and future tax incentives, and environmental
regulations and mandates. The specific attributes of each generating technology, such as the regulations and mandates. The specific attributes of each generating technology, such as the
intermittent nature of solar and wind, are also important considerations in power plant intermittent nature of solar and wind, are also important considerations in power plant
construction decisions. construction decisions.
The two new U.S. reactors
The two new U.S. reactors
under construction at the Vogtle nuclear plant site in Georgiaat the Vogtle nuclear plant site in Georgia
, after
experienced considerable construction delays and cost overrunsconsiderable construction delays and cost overruns
, are now scheduled to begin operating in the second quarter of 2022 and the first quarter of 2023.9 As noted above, construction of two new .9 As noted above, construction of two new
units in South Carolina has been terminated. Licenses to build and operate 10 additionalunits in South Carolina has been terminated. Licenses to build and operate 10 additional
reactors reactors
have been issued by NRC. However, applications for 14 other new reactors have been withdrawn have been issued by NRC. However, applications for 14 other new reactors have been withdrawn
or suspended. An application for a license to build a 1.5 megawatt microreactor at Idaho National or suspended. An application for a license to build a 1.5 megawatt microreactor at Idaho National
Laboratory was submitted to NRC on March 11, 2020.10 Aside from the 2 new Vogtle units, the Laboratory was submitted to NRC on March 11, 2020.10 Aside from the 2 new Vogtle units, the
10 other planned reactors with issued licenses do not have specific schedules for moving toward 10 other planned reactors with issued licenses do not have specific schedules for moving toward
construction.
Throughout the world, 444 reactors are currently in service or operable, and 56 more are under construction. France is the most heavily nuclear-reliant country in the world, with 56 reactors generating 71% of the country’s electricity in 2020. Thirty-three countries in 2020 (including
Taiwan) generated at least some of their electricity from nuclear power.11
7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “ Status of Subsequent License Renewal Applications,” August 13, 2021, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/subsequent -license-renewal.html; and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “ NRC Issues Subsequent Renewed Licenses for Surry Reactors,” May 4, 2021, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2021/21-019.pdf.
8 Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2021,” T able 1b, February 2021, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf. construction.
Much of the U.S. interest in new nuclear power plants is focused on “advanced” reactors, using different technology from that of existing light water reactors, which use ordinary (light) water as a coolant and moderator to slow the neutrons in the nuclear chain reaction. There is also considerable interest in “small modular reactors,” which would be smaller than today’s commercial reactors and could use a variety of technologies. In addition to the microreactor noted above, NRC is conducting licensing reviews or pre-application activities for several advanced reactors.11
Throughout the world, 436 reactors are currently in service or operable, and 62 more are under construction. France is the most heavily nuclear-reliant country in the world, with 56 reactors
7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Status of Subsequent License Renewal Applications,” September 6, 2023, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/subsequent-license-renewal.html.
8 Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2023,” p. 8, April 2023, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/electricity_generation/pdf/AEO2023_LCOE_report.pdf. Levelized costs include capital costs averaged over the life of the plant, plus fuel and Levelized costs include capital costs averaged over the life of the plant, plus fuel and
maintenance costs and tax credits, maintenance costs and tax credits,
in 2022in 2020 dollars. dollars.
9 Darrell Proctor, “Another Delay for New Unit at Vogtle Nuclear Plant,” Power, June 17, 2023, https://www.powermag.com/another-delay-for-new-unit-at-vogtle-nuclear-plant9 Georgia Power Company, “Georgia Power Announces Revised Schedule, Cost Forecast for Vogtle Units 3 & 4,” July 29, 2021, https://www.georgiapower.com/company/news-center/2021-articles/cost-forecast -for-vogtle.html. .
10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “
10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “
Combined License Applications for New Reactors,” Combined License Applications for New Reactors,”
May 6, 2020July 3, 2023, ,
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html.
11 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Share Figures, 2010-2020,” June 2021, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/nuclear-generation-by-country.aspx; World Nuclear Association, “ World Nuclear
11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Licensing Activities for Advanced Reactors,” March 31, 2022, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/licensing-activities.html.
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Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
generating 63% of the country’s electricity in 2022. Thirty-two countries in 2022 (plus Taiwan) generated at least some of their electricity from nuclear power.12
After the Fukushima accident, Germany, which had previously generated about 30% of its After the Fukushima accident, Germany, which had previously generated about 30% of its
electricity with nuclear power, electricity with nuclear power,
closed 8 of the country’s 17 power reactors and decided to shut the remainder by 2022began phasing out its 17 power reactors through early 2023. Japan, which had also generated about 30% of its electricity with nuclear . Japan, which had also generated about 30% of its electricity with nuclear
power and had planned to raise that level to 50%, now is planning for about 20% by 2030. power and had planned to raise that level to 50%, now is planning for about 20% by 2030.
Al All Japanese reactors were closed within a year after the Japanese reactors were closed within a year after the
2011 earthquake and tsunami, and tsunami, and
only 1011 of Japan’s 33 operable of Japan’s 33 operable
reactors are currently in commercial service. In addition to the reactors are currently in commercial service. In addition to the
1011 currently approved to operate, currently approved to operate,
1514 Japanese reactors have applied for restart, which involves safety upgrades to meet new Japanese reactors have applied for restart, which involves safety upgrades to meet new
regulatory requirements. It is not clear how many of Japan’s operable reactors regulatory requirements. It is not clear how many of Japan’s operable reactors
wil will ultimately ultimately
resume operation.resume operation.
1213 France had planned to reduce nuclear power to 50% of the country’s total France had planned to reduce nuclear power to 50% of the country’s total
generation generation
by 2025, although that goal was pushed back in 2019 and then rescinded altogether in 2023.14
Major Nuclear Energy Issues
Advanced Nuclear Technology Existing commercial nuclear power plants in the United States are based on light water reactor (LWR) technology, in which ordinary (light) water is used to cool the reactor and to moderate, or slow, the neutrons in a nuclear chain reaction. In the chain reaction, neutrons cause the nuclei of uranium and other heavy atoms to fission (split), releasing large amounts of energy and additional neutrons to maintain the reaction. The federal government developed LWRs for naval propulsion in the 1950s and funded the commercialization of the technology for electricity generation. DOE and its predecessor agencies for decades have also conducted research on “advanced” reactor technologies that use different coolants and moderators, as well as fast neutron reactors that have no moderator.
The term “advanced nuclear reactor” is defined by the Energy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260, Division Z) as a fission reactor that has “significant improvements” over existing commercial reactors, and any fusion reactor. Areas of improvement can include safety, waste generation, performance, resistance to weapons proliferation, “modular sizes,” and integration of electric and non-electric applications (such as heat and hydrogen production). That definition encompasses small modular reactors (SMRs) of any type. Supporters of advanced reactors contend that their potentially lower cost and other advantages over existing commercial reactors could make them highly competitive with other low-emission energy sources and create a vast export market. Several demonstrations of advanced reactor designs are currently planned, which could provide an indication of their commercial viability.
To produce less long-lived radioactive waste than existing reactors, some advanced reactor concepts would involve the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to separate uranium, plutonium,
12 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Share Figures, 2012-2022,” August 2023, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/nuclear-generation-by-country.aspx; World Nuclear Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,” op. cit.
13 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Japan,” August 2023, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx.
14 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in France,” August 2023, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx.
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and other long-lived radioisotopes to make new fuel for fast reactors.15 Such reprocessing, or recycling, would also reduce the need for newly mined uranium to fuel a potentially growing worldwide reactor fleet, according to proponents. However, the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel also raises significant concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation.
SMRs would be smaller than today’s commercial LWRs, which generally have about 1,000 megawatts (MW) of electric generating capacity or more.16 Supporters of SMRs contend that they would be small enough to be assembled in factories and shipped to reactor sites to reduce construction costs. In addition, SMRs could reduce the financial risks of building a new nuclear power plant, because each module would cost less than today’s large reactors and revenues could begin when the first module was complete, rather than after completion of a much larger unit. However, some analysts contend that SMRs would be too small to achieve the economies of scale needed for economic viability.17 None of the currently proposed U.S. designs for SMRs have been constructed, so actual costs and construction times have yet to be demonstrated.18
Very small SMRs are often called “microreactors,” defined by DOE as having thermal energy capacity below 20 MW. They could provide heat or electric power at remote locations. Self-contained microreactor power units would be assembled in a factory, transported to a site in a shipping container, and set up to generate power within a week, according to DOE. Microreactors would be “self regulating,” in that their designs are intended to prevent overheating even without operator intervention.19
Recent Events
DOE’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) supports demonstration plants using advanced nuclear technology and the development of technologies for possible future demonstration.20 The program was initially funded with $230 million by the Further Consolidated
15 Radioisotopes are radioactive isotopes; isotopes are forms of an element that have different numbers of neutrons. Different radioisotopes of the same element will behave the same chemically but have different half-lives and other radioactive characteristics. Long-lived radioisotopes separated from spent fuel could in principle be fissioned or transmuted in a fast reactor into shorter-lived radioisotopes for disposal.
16 A DOE fact sheet says SMRs can “represent a variety of sizes, technology options, capabilities, and deployment scenarios” and are “envisioned to vary in size from tens of megawatts up to hundreds of megawatts.” DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “Advanced Small Modular Reactors (SMRs),” https://www.energy.gov/ne/advanced-small-modular-reactors-smrs. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58, Section 40321) and the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, Section 320, amending P.L. 117-81, NDAA for FY2022) define SMRs as having generating capacity of less than 300 MW. The 300 MW limit is also used by the Atomic Energy Act in setting reactor liability limits for public damages (42 U.S.C. 2210(b)(5)). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as having electrical capacity of up to 300 MW. IAEA, “Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Regulators’ Forum,” https://www.iaea.org/topics/small-modular-reactors/smr-regulators-forum.
17 Deign, Jason, “Interest in Small Modular Nuclear Reactors Is Growing. So Are Fears They Aren’t Viable,” Greentech Media, March 14, 2018, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/interest-in-small-modular-nuclear-grows#gs.ph5LRao.
18 A high-temperature gas-cooled SMR began commercial operation in China in December 2023. The 210 MW (electric) plant took 11 years to construct at a cost that was not announced. See “China’s Demonstration HTR-PM Enters Commercial Operation, World Nuclear News, December 6, 2023, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Chinese-HTR-PM-Demo-begins-commercial-operation.
19 DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “What Is a Nuclear Microreactor?,” February 26, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/what-nuclear-microreactor. Electrical output of a reactor can range from about 34%-39% of its thermal output. World Nuclear Association, “Is the Cooling of Power Plants a Constraint on the Future of Nuclear Power?,” p. 3, https://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA/Publications/WNA_Position_Statements/PS-cooling.pdf.
20 DOE, “Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/advanced-reactor-demonstration-program.
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Nuclear by 2025, although that goal has been delayed to 2035.13
Major Nuclear Energy Issues
Radioactive Waste
After several years in a nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel (primarily uranium) can no longer economical y sustain a nuclear chain reaction and becomes highly radioactive and thermal y hot. Such spent nuclear fuel must be periodical y removed from operating reactors and stored in adjacent pools of water, which prevents overheating and provides radiation shielding. After
several years of cooling, the spent fuel can be placed in dry casks for storage elsewhere on the plant site. When existing U.S. reactors were built, spent fuel had been expected to be taken away for reprocessing (separation of plutonium and uranium to make new fuel) or permanent disposal. However, reprocessing has not become commercialized in the United States, for economic and nonproliferation reasons, and central waste storage and disposal facilities have proven difficult to
site. As a result, the vast majority of U.S. commercial spent fuel remains at the nuclear plants where it was generated—estimated at 86,000 metric tons at the end of 2020 and increasing at the
rate of about 2,200 metric tons per year.14
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-425, NWPA), as amended in 1987, named Yucca Mountain, NV, as the nation’s sole candidate site for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. NWPA required the Department of Energy (DOE) to study the site and seek a license
from NRC to build a repository there.
Recent Events
Citing opposition from the State of Nevada, the Obama Administration decided to halt the Yucca Mountain project, and no new funding has been appropriated for it since FY2010. The Trump Administration included funding to restart Yucca Mountain licensing in its FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020 budget submissions to Congress, but the requests were not approved. The Trump Administration did not seek Yucca Mountain repository funding for FY2021, but only funds for
interim storage planning. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) included the
Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,” op. cit. 12 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Japan,” August 2021, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx.
13 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in France,” January 2021, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx.
14 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Centralized Used Fuel Resource for Information Exchange (CURIE) Interactive Map, viewed September 27, 2021, https://curie.ornl.gov/map.
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proposed interim storage planning funds with no Yucca Mountain project funding. The Biden
Administration submitted a similar request for FY2022.
The Obama Administration appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future
to develop an alternative nuclear waste policy, and its final report was issued in January 2012. DOE largely adopted the Commission’s recommendations in a January 2013 waste strategy that cal ed for a “consent-based” process to select nuclear waste storage and disposal sites and for a surface storage pilot facility to open by 2021.15 DOE issued a Draft Consent-Based Siting Process
shortly before the end of the Obama Administration.16
A federal appeals court on August 13, 2013, ordered NRC to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process with previously appropriated funds.17 In response, NRC issued the final volumes of the Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report (SER), which provided the NRC staff’s
determination that the repository would meet al applicable standards. However, the staff said upon completing the SER that NRC should not authorize construction of the repository until al land and water rights requirements were met and a supplement to DOE’s environmental impact statement (EIS) was completed.18 NRC completed the supplemental EIS in May 2016 and made its database of Yucca Mountain licensing documents publicly available, using nearly al the
remaining previously appropriated licensing funds.19
With no spent fuel disposal or storage facilities currently under development by DOE, two private-sector storage facilities in New Mexico and Texas have been proposed. The Texas facility
received an NRC license on September 13, 2021, and NRC plans to issue a decision on the New Mexico facility in January 2022. These near-surface Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities are intended to hold spent fuel from nuclear power plants around the country until a permanent underground repository is available. 20 However, they are facing strong opposition from the two proposed host states. New Mexico filed a lawsuit against NRC on March 29, 2021, and the Texas
governor signed a law banning new spent fuel storage facilities in the state on August 9, 2021.21
15 DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High -Level Radioactive Waste, January 2013, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013%201-15%20Nuclear_Waste_Report.pdf.
16 DOE, Draft Consent-Based Siting Process for Consolidated Storage and Disposal Facilities for Spent Nuclear Fuel
and High-Level Radioactive Waste, January 12, 2017, https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Draft%20Consent -Based%20Siting%20Process%20and%20Siting%20Considerations.pdf . 17 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of mandamus, August 13, 2013, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf.
18 NRC, “ NRC Publishes Final T wo Volumes of Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation,” news release 15-005, January 29. 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2015/.
19 NRC, Supplement to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository
for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada , NUREG-2184, Final Report, May 2016, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr2184/; “ NRC Staff Issues Volume 3 of Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report, ” news release 14-069, October 16, 2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1949/v3/.
20 NRC, “Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF),” December 8, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/cis.html; NRC, “ NRC Issues License to Interim Storage Partners for Consolidated Spent Nuclear Fuel Interim Storage Facility in T exas,” News Release No. 21-036, September 13, 2021, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2125/ML21257A091.pdf.
21 T exas Governor Greg Abbott, “Interim Storage Partners (ISP) Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Project, Docket ID NRC-2016-0231,” November 3, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2030/ML20309B061.pdf; T exas Legislature Online, Actions, HB7, https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Actions.aspx?LegSess=872&Bill=HB7; and New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, “Comments from Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham on Docket ID NRC-2018-0052,” September 22, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2026/ML20269A025.pdf.
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Recent Congressional Action—117th Congress
Nuclear Waste Task Force Act of 2021 (S. 2871, Markey/H.R. 5401, Levin)
Requires the EPA Administrator to establish a task force to examine whether removing exemptions from environmental laws for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste would help gain state, local, and tribal consent for nuclear waste disposal facilities. Introduced September 28, 2021; Senate bil referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works and House bil
referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Sensible, Timely Relief for America’s Nuclear Districts’ Economic Development
(STRANDED) Act (S. 1290, Duckworth/H.R. 3731, Schneider)
For communities with closed nuclear power plants that are storing “stranded” spent nuclear fuel,
authorizes annual grants of $15 for each kilogram of nuclear waste “to offset the economic and social impacts of stranded nuclear waste.” Authorizes DOE to establish a prize competition for alternative activities at closed reactor sites and to develop a pilot project for each proposal awarded a prize. Requires DOE to establish a task force to conduct a study on resources and options for communities hosting stranded spent fuel. Senate bil introduced April 21, 2021;
referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works. House bil introduced June 4, 2021; referred to Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Financial Services, and Ways and
Means. (Reintroduced from the 116th Congress, S. 1985 and H.R. 5608.)
Storage and Transportation Of Residual and Excess (STORE) Nuclear Fuel Act
(H.R. 2097, Matsui)
Authorizes DOE to develop nuclear waste storage facilities and enter into a contract to store waste at a nonfederal facility. DOE must obtain state, local, and tribal consent for storage
facilities. Financial and technical assistance authorized to states, local governments, and tribes. DOE required to give storage priority to waste from closed reactors and to waste shipments necessary to address emergencies. Introduced March 19, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy
and Commerce. (Reintroduced from the 116th Congress, H.R. 3136.)
Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act (H.R. 1524, Titus/S. 541, Cortez Masto)
Requires the Secretary of Energy to obtain the consent of affected state and loc al governments before making expenditures from the Nuclear Waste Fund for a nuclear waste repository. Both bil s introduced March 2, 2021. House bil referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce; Senate bil referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works. (Reintroduced from the
116th Congress, H.R. 1544 and S. 649.)
116th Congress
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2019 (H.R. 2699, McNerney/S. 2917,
Barrasso)
Would have addressed a major condition for licensing the Yucca Mountain repository by
withdrawing the repository site from use under public lands laws and placing it solely under DOE’s control. Would also have authorized DOE to store spent fuel at an NRC-licensed interim storage facility owned by a nonfederal entity and increased the capacity limit on the Yucca
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Mountain repository from 70,000 to 110,000 metric tons. House bil introduced May 14, 2019; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce; Natural Resources; Armed Services; Budget; and Rules. Approved by Energy and Commerce Committee’s Environment and Climate Change Subcommittee September 26, 2019, by voice vote. Passed the House Energy and Commerce Committee by voice vote November 20, 2019. Legislative hearing on discussion draft of S. 2917 held May 1, 2019, by Senate Environment and Public Works Committee; introduced and referred
to the committee on November 20, 2019.
Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2019 (S. 1234, Murkowski)
Would have established an independent Nuclear Waste Administration (NWA), which would have been authorized to develop nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities with the consent of the affected state, local, and tribal governments. In addition to receiving consent-based siting
authority, NWA would have taken over DOE’s authority under NWPA to construct and operate a repository at Yucca Mountain and DOE’s waste disposal contractual obligations. The bil specifical y provided that it would not have affected the ongoing Yucca Mountain licensing process. Introduced April 30, 2019; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Hearing held June 27, 2019.
Jobs, Not Waste Act (H.R. 1619, Susie Lee/S. 721, Rosen)
Would have prohibited the Secretary of Energy from taking any action relating to the licensing, planning, development, or construction of a nuclear waste repository until the Director of the Office of Management and Budget submitted to Congress a study on alternative economic uses of the Yucca Mountain site and congressional hearings were held on the subject. Both bil s
introduced March 7, 2019; House bil referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce and
Senate bil referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Spent Fuel Prioritization Act of 2019 (H.R. 2995, Mike Levin)
Would have required DOE to give the highest priority for storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel to reactors that have permanently shut down, have the highest surrounding population, and have
the highest earthquake hazard. Introduced May 23, 2019; referred to Committee on Energy and
Commerce.
Dry Cask Storage Act of 2019 (S. 2854, Markey)
Would have required spent fuel at nuclear power plants to be moved from spent fuel pools to dry casks after it had sufficiently cooled, pursuant to NRC-approved transfer plans. Emergency
planning zones would have had to be expanded from 10 to 50 miles in radius around any reactor determined by NRC to be out of compliance with its spent fuel transfer plan. NRC would have been authorized to use interest earned by the Nuclear Waste Fund to provide grants to nuclear power plants to transfer spent fuel to dry storage. Introduced November 13, 2019; referred to
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
CRS Reports
CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, by Mark Holt CRS In Focus IF11201, Nuclear Waste Storage Sites in the United States, by Lance N. Larson CRS Report R42513, U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, by James D. Werner
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Additional References
Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, Government Accountability Office, Key Issues website,
https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_waste/issue_summary
Six Overarching Recommendations for How to Move the Nation’s Nuclear Waste Management
Program Forward, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, April 2021, https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/reports/six-overarching-recommendations-for-how-to-move-the-nation-s-nuclear-waste-
management-program-forward-(april-2020)
Forging a Path Forward on US Nuclear Waste Management: Options for Policy Makers, Matt Bowen, Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, January 2021, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/forging-path-forward-us-nuclear-waste-
management-options-policy-makers
Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, September 2019, https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/reports/preparing-for-nuclear-waste-transportation-
(september-2019)
Reset of America’s Nuclear Waste Management: Strategy and Policy, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation and George Washington University El iott School of
International Affairs, October 15, 2018, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
reset_report_2018_final.pdf
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, November 2017,
http://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/facts-sheets/commercial_snf.pdf?sfvrsn=12
Commercial Nuclear Waste: Resuming Licensing of the Yucca Mountain Repository Would
Require Rebuilding Capacity at DOE and NRC, Among Other Key Steps, GAO-17-340, April 26,
2017, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-340
Report to the Secretary of Energy, Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future,
January 2012, http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620211605/http:/brc.gov
Nuclear Plant Economic Viability
U.S. nuclear power plants are facing severe financial pressure caused primarily by competition from low-cost natural gas, growing supplies of renewable energy, and stagnant electricity demand. Twelve U.S. reactors were permanently closed from 2013 through April 2021, and three more are planned for closure through the mid-2020s (Table 1). Plans for up to 30 new U.S. reactors announced during the past 10 years have largely been put on hold, with 2 currently under
construction and 2 canceled in 2017 after construction had begun.
In light of that situation, Congress is considering whether federal action is needed to keep the
existing nuclear fleet operating and to encourage the construction of new reactors. A key element of that debate is the appropriate role of nuclear power, if any, in meeting national energy and environmental goals. Nuclear power supporters general y point to the technology as crucial for providing a secure, domestic source of energy with low greenhouse gas and other emissions. Supporters also see a viable and growing domestic nuclear power industry as crucial in providing a technology base for naval nuclear reactors and other defense nuclear programs, and in providing
a base for nuclear power plant exports to counter reactor exports being pursued by Russia and China for geopolitical purposes. Opponents general y counter that safety and proliferation risks,
nuclear waste hazards, and high costs outweigh those benefits.
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Potential mechanisms for increased federal support of nuclear power include loan guarantees, tax
credits, clean energy mandates, emissions credits, and electricity market regulations.
Some states have taken action to prevent nuclear plant closures. An Il inois law signed September
15, 2021, provides “carbon mitigation credits” to nuclear plants at risk of closure for economic reasons, averting the planned shutdown of two plants with four operating reactors.22 New York and Il inois provided “zero emission credits” to seven reactors that had been at risk of retirement by 2018.23 Connecticut enacted legislation in 2017 to make nuclear reactors eligible for a state procurement process for zero-emission electricity sources, upon certification of financial need.
New Jersey enacted zero-emission credits for nuclear power in 2018.24 Ohio enacted subsidies in July 2019 that prompted the owner of the state’s two commercial reactors, Davis-Besse and Perry, to rescind the units’ previously planned retirements, although the assistance was repealed in March 2021.25 The planned retirement of the two-unit Beaver Val ey nuclear plant in western Pennsylvania was rescinded in March 2020, after Pennsylvania joined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The plant’s owner, Energy Harbor, said RGGI would provide emissions
credits “which wil begin to help level the playing field for our carbon-free nuclear generators.”26
Table 1. Recent and Announced U.S. Commercial Reactor Shutdowns
Net
Summer
Generating
Major Factors
Capacity
Start-Up
Contributing to
Reactor
State
Shutdown Date
(Megawatts)
Year
Shutdown
Permanent Shutdowns Since 2012
Crystal River 3
Florida
February 2013
860
1977
Cost of major repairs to reactor containment
Kewaunee
Wisconsin
May 2013
566
1974
Operating losses
San Onofre 2
California
June 2013
1,070
1983
Cost of replacing new steam generators
San Onofre 3
California
June 2013
1,080
1984
Cost of replacing new steam generators
Vermont Yankee
Vermont
December 2014
620
1972
Operating losses
22 Illinois General Assembly, Energy T ransition Act (Nuclear Plant Assistance), Public Act 102 -0662, https://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/102/102-0662.htm.
23 Zero-Emission Credits, Nuclear Energy Institute, April 2018, https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf. 24 Solutions for Maintaining the Existing Nuclear Fleet, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2018, https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/solutions-for-maintaining-existing-nuclear-fleet.pdf.
25 “FirstEnergy Solutions Rescinds Deactivation Notices for Competitive Generating Plants in Ohio,” PR Newswire, July 26, 2019, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/firstenergy-solutions-rescinds-deactivation-notices-for-competitive-generating-plants-in-ohio-300891786.html. A bill repealing the Ohio nuclear plant assistance was signed by the governor on March 31, 2021. See Mike DeWine, Governor of Ohio, “ Governor DeWine Signs Ohio T ransportation Budget,” news release, March 31, 2021, https://governor.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/governor/media/news-and-media/transportation-budget-signed-03312021. 26 Energy Harbor, “Energy Harbor Corp Rescinds Deactivation Notice for Nuclear Generating Plant in Pennsylvania,” news release, March 13, 2020, https://energyharbor.com/en/about/news-and-information/energy-harbor-corp-rescinds-deactivation-notice-for-nuclear-gene.
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Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) and was authorized by the Energy Act for funding through FY2025.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA, P.L. 117-58), enacted in 2021, appropriated $2.477 billion through FY2025 for ARDP, in addition to annual appropriations. DOE selected two demonstration projects in October 2020 to receive a total of $3.2 billion from the program over seven years, with the project sponsors matching that amount. Five potential future reactor demonstration projects received 80% cost-share awards under ARDP in December 2020, totaling $600 million of DOE funding over seven years.
In addition to the ARDP projects, DOE announced a cost-shared award of up to $1.4 billion under an earlier program in October 2020 to demonstrate the NuScale water-cooled SMR at Idaho National Laboratory. However, that project was terminated on November 8, 2023, by NuScale and the intended owner of the plant, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS). According to a statement by the companies, UAMPS members (mostly small municipal power systems) did not commit to purchasing enough of the SMR plant’s planned 462 megawatts of electric generation to make the project economically viable.21 The project had experienced a number of delays and cost overruns before being terminated.22
Tax credits for advanced nuclear reactors and other new zero-carbon power plants were included in the law commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA, P.L. 117-169). Qualifying plants can receive a 10-year electricity production tax credit of up to 2.6 cents/kilowatt-hour (as adjusted for inflation23) or a 30% investment tax credit. IRA also includes $700 million for DOE to develop supplies of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), needed for some advanced reactor designs, including the two non-LWR demonstration plants that DOE is supporting. HALEU, not currently available commercially, is uranium enriched in the fissile isotope U-235 above the 3%-5% level used by existing commercial reactors but below the 20% threshold for highly enriched uranium. DOE’s HALEU program was authorized by the Energy Act of 2020. The Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA, P.L. 115-248) authorizes the construction of demonstration reactors funded by the private sector at DOE sites and authorizes grants to help pay for advanced reactor licensing. The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (P.L. 115-439), enacted in 2019, requires NRC to develop a new licensing framework for advanced nuclear technology. Proponents of the law contend that NRC’s existing licensing system is too focused on LWR technology and would potentially cause delays in non-LWR applications.
NRC is currently reviewing a design certification application for the NuScale SMR plant, which would consist of six 77 MW (electric) reactors in a large pool of water.24 NRC is also reviewing construction permit applications by Kairos Power and Abilene Christian University.25 Under ARDP, one of the award recipients, TerraPower, is proposing to build its demonstration plant on
21 NuScale, UAMPS, “Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) and NuScale Power Agree to Terminate the Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP),” news release, November 8, 2023, https://www.cfppllc.com/file/44ac923c-86d2-43de-a87b-2c6e336a0db5.
22 Zach Bright, “NuScale Cancels First-of-a-Kind Nucler Project as Costs Surge,” Energywire, November 9, 2023, https://www.eenews.net/articles/nuscale-cancels-first-of-a-kind-nuclear-project-as-costs-surge.
23 The base renewable energy production tax credit of 1.5 cents/kwh, amended by IRA, was established in 1992 and is annually adjusted for inflation.
24 NRC, “NuScale US460 Standard Design Approval Application Review,” August 1, 2023, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/smr/licensing-activities/current-licensing-reviews/nuscale-us460.html.
25 NRC, “Current Licensing Reviews of Advanced Reactors,” July 31, 2023, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/licensing-activities/current-licensing-reviews.html.
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the site of a closed coal-fired power plant in Wyoming,26 while the other, X-energy, is proposing to build a four-unit demonstration plant at a Dow Chemical plant in Texas.27
Table 1. Planned Advanced Reactor Demonstration Plants
Selected Projects with DOE Funding or NRC License Applications
Reactor
DOE
NRC
Reactor
Tech-
Power
Plant
DOE
Cost
Plant
Licensing
Designer
nology
(electric)
Owner
Funding
Share
Location
Status
Terra
Sodium-
345 MW
PacificCorp
Up to $1.6
50%
Kemmerer,
Pre-
Power
cooled fast
bil ion
WY
application
reactor
activities
X-energy
High-
80 MW
Energy
Up to $1.2
50%
Seadrift, TX
Pre-
temperature
Northwest
bil ion
application
gas-cooled
activities
reactor
Kairos
Fluoride-
35 MW
Kairos
Up to $303
48%
Oak Ridge,
Construction
salt-cooled
mil ion
TN
permit
high-
applications
temperature
submitted
reactor
9/29/2021 and 7/14/2023
Abilene
Molten salt
1 MW
Abilene
Abilene, TX
Construction
Christian
research
Christian
permit
University reactor
University
application submitted 8/12/2022
Previously funded project terminated
NuScale
Light water
77 MW
Utah
Up to $1.4
50%
Idaho Falls,
Standard
SMR
Associated
bil ion
ID (Idaho
Design
Municipal
National
Approval
Power
Laboratory)
application
Systems
submitted
(UAMPS)
1/1/2023
Sources: DOE, NRC, 2023. Note: NuScale/UAMPS project terminated by sponsors November 8, 2023. See news release at https://www.cfppl c.com/file/44ac923c-86d2-43de-a87b-2c6e336a0db5.
The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded a contract in 2022 to BWX Technologies to build a prototype mobile microreactor. An award to develop a second prototype design went to X-energy in 2023. According to DOD’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), “By nurturing and developing
26 DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “Next-Gen Nuclear Plant and Jobs Are Coming to Wyoming,” June 7, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/next-gen-nuclear-plant-and-jobs-are-coming-wyoming.
27 X-energy, “Energy Northwest and X-energy Sign Joint Development Agreement for Xe-100 Advanced Small Modular Reactor Project,” July 19, 2023, https://x-energy.com/media/news-releases/energy-northwest-x-energy-joint-development-agreement-xe-100.
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multiple micro reactor designs, SCO will not just provide options for the military Services, but will also help jumpstart a truly competitive commercial marketplace for micro reactors.”28
DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes reactor modeling and simulation, experimental processing of spent nuclear fuel, development of advanced reactor concepts, and testing of “accident tolerant fuels” for existing LWRs. The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 118-328, Division D) included $1.473 billion for DOE nuclear energy programs. The enacted funding measure provided $85 million for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program and $114 million for accident-tolerant fuels. An additional $300 million was appropriated under Division M of P.L. 118-328 for advanced nuclear reactor demonstrations and fuel availability.
For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested $1.563 billion for nuclear energy programs, while the House approved $1.783 billion (H.Rept. 118-4394, H.Rept. 118-126) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1.551 billion (S. 2443, S.Rept. 118-72).
Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress
Hearing to Examine the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Topics included the supply of HALEU for advanced reactors, domestic nuclear fuel production, and nuclear waste storage and disposal. Held March 9, 2023, https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/3/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle.
Hearing on American Nuclear Energy Expansion: Powering a Clean and Secure Future, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security
Topics included conditions needed for deployment of nuclear technologies, domestic nuclear infrastructure and workforce, regulatory issues, and competition in international markets. Held April 18, 2023, https://energycommerce.house.gov/events/energy-climate-and-grid-security-subcommittee-hearing-american-nuclear-energy-expansion-powering-a-clean-and-secure-future.
Hearing on From Theory to Reality: The Limitless Potential of Fusion Energy, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy
Topics included the status of DOE fusion research and the growth of private-sector companies pursuing commercial fusion. Held June 13, 2023, https://science.house.gov/hearings?ID=1A693FA1-B7A9-4408-BE83-6253FFB7787D.
Atomic Energy Advancement Act (H.R. 6544, Duncan)
Among other provisions, would remove requirements for NRC to recover costs for reviewing applications and conducting pre-application for early site permits for advanced reactors. Would require NRC to develop risk-informed and performance-base strategies and guidance for
28 DOD, “DOD Exercises Option on Second Micro Nuclear Reactor Design,” September 13, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3524458/dod-exercises-option-on-second-micro-nuclear-reactor-design.
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microreactor licensing. Would authorize pilot program for DOE long-term power purchases from a new commercial nuclear power plant. Would require an interagency study of the global nuclear energy industry and global supply chains. Would require NRC to coordinate reactor import and export licensing activities and authorizes an NRC International Nuclear Reactor Export and Innovation Branch. Would extend authority for new reactors to be included in the Price-Anderson Act nuclear accident liability system through 2065. Would authorize the Secretary of Energy to award prizes for the first advanced reactor to receive an NRC operating license and for other licensing categories. Introduced December 1, 2023; approved December 5, 2023, by House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Advanced Reactor Fee Reduction Act (H.R. 6326, Bucshon)
Would limit the hourly rates charged by NRC for reviewing pre-application materials for advanced reactor licenses and for reviewing advanced reactor license applications. Introduced November 9, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Strengthening American Nuclear Competitiveness Act (H.R. 6303, Bill Johnson)
Would require the Secretary of Energy to report to Congress on U.S. nuclear energy industry competitiveness and to review and update the process for granting general authorization to countries for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology. Would establish exceptions to the current prohibition on foreign ownership or control of U.S. nuclear power plants. Would extend the deadline for new reactors to be included in the Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability and compensation system from 2025 to 2065. Introduced November 8, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition the Committee on Foreign Affairs for provisions under its jurisdiction.
Advanced Nuclear Reactor Prize Act (H.R. 6253, Curtis)
Would authorize the Secretary of Energy to make awards to cover regulatory costs relating to licensing certain first-of-a-kind advanced nuclear reactors. Introduced November 7, 2023; referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Green Nuclear Fertilizer Act (H.R. 5750, Donalds)
Would require the secretaries of Energy and Agriculture and NRC to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of producing hydrogen from advanced nuclear reactors to make “green nuclear fertilizer.” Introduced September 27, 2023; referred to Committee on Agriculture, and to the Committee on Energy and Commerce for provisions under its jurisdiction.
Nuclear Fuel Security Act of 2023 (H.R. 5718, Latta; S. 452, Manchin)
Would requirer DOE to ensure supplies of domestic nuclear fuel, at all stages of production, and would set a goal of providing at least 10 metric tons of HALEU for advanced reactors by June 30, 2026. H.R. 5718 introduced September 26, 2023; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Science, Space, and Technology. Ordered to be reported by House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023. S. 442 introduced February 15, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and reported with an amendment July 11, 2023
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(S.Rept. 118-52). Provisions included as Section 3144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 2226), passed by the Senate July 27, 2023.
U.S. Capitol Power Plant Retrofit Act (H.R. 5706, Donalds)
Would require the Architect of the Capitol, in consultation with DOE and NRC, to study the feasibility of “retrofitting the Capitol Power Plant to incorporate an advanced nuclear reactor.” Introduced September 26, 2023; referred to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
Expressing the sense of the Senate and House that advanced nuclear power should be encouraged (S.Res. 321, Budd; H.Res. 124, Donalds)
Expresses the sense of the Senate and House that nuclear power should be promoted as clean, reliable, and secure, that advanced nuclear reactors could be a U.S. export opportunity, and that the necessary supply chain, fuel, and workforce should be established. Senate resolution introduced July 27, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources; House resolution introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to the Committee on Armed Services for provisions under its jurisdiction.
Provide Logistical Aid to airports via advanced Nuclear Energy (PLANE) Act (H.R. 4678, Donalds)
Would require NRC, the Federal Aviation Administration, and DOE to establish procedures to deploy microreactors at airports. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
Leverage Obligated appropriations for Advanced Nuclear (LOAN) Act (H.R. 4677, Donalds)
Would make DOE advanced reactor demonstration projects eligible for DOE innovative technology loan guarantees. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and also the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology for provisions under its jurisdiction.
Advanced Nuclear Feasibility Act (H.R. 4674, Donalds)
Would require DOE to establish a grant program for feasibility studies for the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Civil Nuclear Export Act of 2023 (S. 1928, Manchin)
Would allow for Export-Import (EXIM) Bank financing of fast breeder reactors and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants if they are otherwise permitted by law, add nuclear facilities to the EXIM Bank Program on China and Transformational Exports, and establish EXIM Bank liability limits for damages caused by nuclear projects financed by the bank. Introduced June 12, 2023; referred to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
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21st Century American Atomic Energy Age Act (H.R. 3553, Wittman)
Would require NRC to provide technical assistance to SMR license applicants, among other provisions. Introduced May 18, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to the Committees on Homeland Security and Armed Services for provisions under their jurisdiction.
Advanced Nuclear Support Act (H.R. 3487, Donalds)
Would provide financial support for “commercial planning for, and licensing and construction of, advanced nuclear reactors, and supply chain infrastructure associated with advanced nuclear reactors.” Introduced May 18, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology for provisions under its jurisdiction.
Recoup American Nuclear Global Leadership Act (H.R. 3486, Donalds)
Would establish Nuclear Exports Working Group composed of senior officials from DOE, EXIM Bank, NRC, Department of Commerce, and other relevant agencies. Introduced May 18, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make advanced nuclear facilities eligible for the qualifying advanced energy project credit (H.R. 2488, Donalds)
Would make advanced nuclear facilities eligible for the qualifying advanced energy project tax credit. Introduced April 6, 2023; referred to Committee on Ways and Means.
Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act of 2023 (S. 1111, Capito)
Would authorize NRC to establish an International Nuclear Reactor Export and Innovation Branch, restrict possession of nuclear fuel assemblies manufactured in Russia or China, restrict nuclear exports to countries lacking specified international safeguards, limit NRC fees for advanced reactor license applications, authorize prizes for the first advanced reactor licenses, and exclude NRC costs for reviewing advanced reactors at DOE sites from annual fees, among other provisions. Introduced March 30, 2023; reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute by Environment and Natural Resources Committee July 10, 2023. Text included as Section 8141 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 2226), passed by the Senate July 27, 2023.
International Nuclear Energy Act of 2023 (S. 826, Manchin; H.R. 2938, Donalds)
Would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Energy and Commerce, to conduct meetings with allied and partner nations to pursue collaboration on research, development, licensing, and deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies; and includes other provisions to encourage international civil nuclear cooperation and exports. Senate bill introduced March 15, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House bill introduced April 28, 2023; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means.
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National Strategy to Utilize Microreactors for Natural Disaster Response Efforts Act (H.R. 1009, Donalds)
Would require the President, in consultation with relevant federal agencies, to develop a national strategy to utilize microreactors to assist with natural disaster response efforts. Introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Armed Services, for provisions under their jurisdiction.
Nuclear Assistance for America’s Small Businesses Act (H.R. 1007, Donalds)
Would delay collection of a portion of NRC fees related to advanced reactor license applications and pre-application activities. Introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Global Nuclear Energy Assessment and Cooperation Act (H.R. 995, Carter of Georgia)
Would require NRC to support “the consideration of international technical standards to assist the design, licensing, and construction of advanced nuclear systems” and establish an NRC International Nuclear Reactor Export and Innovation Branch to carry out such activities, among other provisions. Introduced February 14, 2023; approved by Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security October 24, 2023. Also referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs for provisions under its jurisdiction. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
International Nuclear Energy Financing Act of 2023, (H.R. 806, McHenry)
Would require the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Director at the World Bank and other international financial institutions to support assistance for nuclear energy. Introduced February 2, 2023; referred to Committee on Financial Services.
CRS Reports
CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues, by Mark Holt
Additional References
Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN), DOE website, https://gain.inl.gov/SitePages/Home.aspx
Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Advanced Nuclear, DOE, March 2023, https://liftoff.energy.gov/advanced-nuclear
Laying the Foundation for New and Advanced Nuclear Reactors in the United States, National Academy of Engineering, 2023, https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/laying-the-foundation-for-new-and-advanced-nuclear-reactors-in-the-united-states
Proposed U.S. Army Mobile Nuclear Reactors: Costs and Risks Outweigh Benefits, Alan J. Kuperman, University of Texas at Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project, April 22, 2021, http://mail01.tinyletterapp.com/NPPP/2-reports-army-
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Net
Summer
Generating
Major Factors
Capacity
Start-Up
Contributing to
Reactor
State
Shutdown Date
(Megawatts)
Year
Shutdown
Fort Calhoun
Nebraska
October 2016
479
1973
Operating losses
Oyster Creek
New Jersey
September 2018
614
1969
Agreement with state to avoid building cooling towers
Pilgrim
Massachusetts
May 2019
685
1972
Operating losses, rising capital expenditures
Three Mile Island 1
Pennsylvania
October 2019
803
1974
Operating losses
Indian Point 2
New York
April 30, 2020
1,020
1974
Low electricity prices; settlement with state
Duane Arnold
Iowa
August 2020
601
1975
Lower-cost alternative power
Indian Point 3
New York
April 30, 2021
1,035
1976
Low electricity prices; settlement with state
Announced Shutdowns
Palisades
Michigan
April 2022
784
1971
Operating losses, end of power purchase agreement
Diablo Canyon 1
California
November 2024
1,122
1985
Settlement with labor and environmental groups
Diablo Canyon 2
California
August 2025
1,118
1986
Settlement with labor and environmental groups
Source: Company news releases.
Recent Events
A new federal program to provide financial support to nuclear power plants at risk of closure is
included in the Infrastructure Assistance and Jobs Act (H.R. 3684) as passed by the Senate on August 10, 2021. Reactors certified by the Secretary of Energy as being at risk of closure could submit bids to receive credits for four years, specifying an amount per megawatt-hour of electricity generated that would be paid for each credit. A tax credit for existing nuclear power plants of up to 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour is included in budget reconciliation legislation, the
Build Back Better Act (H.R. 5376), introduced September 27, 2021.
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Federal tax credits for electricity production from new nuclear plants were extended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed into law February 9, 2018. Before the extension, new nuclear plants had been required to begin operation before January 1, 2021, to qualify for the production tax credit, which is limited to 6,000 megawatts of total generating capacity. The extension al ows new reactors to use the credit after that date if the capacity limit has not been reached. Along with the extension, the tax credit was modified to al ow non-
taxpaying partners in a nuclear project, such as public power agencies, to transfer their credits to a project’s taxpaying partners. Two U.S. reactors are currently under construction, at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia, totaling about 2,300 megawatts of capacity, wel within the limit. Construction delays have pushed the planned completion dates of the new Vogtle reactors beyond the 2021 deadline, and the production tax credits are widely considered crucial for their financial
viability.
Recent filings by Georgia Power, the lead partner in the Vogtle consortium, with the Georgia Public Service Commission indicate that the company’s share of the project’s construction and
financing costs wil total about $10.4 bil ion. That estimate does not include costs covered by Georgia Power’s $1.5 bil ion share of a Westinghouse contract settlement and $700 mil ion in unrecovered costs. Adding those amounts would bring the Georgia Power construction and financing cost share to about $12.6 bil ion.27 With Georgia Power holding a 45.7% share of the project, the total construction and financing cost of the new reactors is estimated to be about
$27.6 bil ion, or $13.8 bil ion per reactor.
The two new reactors at the Vogtle plant have received loan guarantees from DOE totaling $12 bil ion, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). Energy
Secretary Ernest Moniz announced the issuance of $6.5 bil ion in loan guarantees on February 19, 2014, to two of the three utility partners in the project, Georgia Power and Oglethorpe Power. Another $1.8 bil ion loan guarantee for another partner, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, was issued June 24, 2015. Energy Secretary Rick Perry announced the finalization of an additional $3.7 bil ion in loan guarantees to the three partners in the Vogtle project on March 22,
2019.28 No other proposed nuclear plants have received any commitments for DOE loan
guarantees.
DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program manages cost-shared research projects “to
solve significant highest priority cost and technical problems threatening existing plants.”29 The program includes research on materials used in nuclear plants, modeling of plant aging, and plant upgrades. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) included $47 mil ion for the sustainability program for FY2021, the same as in FY2020. For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $60 mil ion for the program, while the House approved $50 mil ion
(H.R. 4502) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $45 mil ion (S. 2605).
27 Georgia Power, “Georgia Power Announces Revised Schedule, Cost Forecast for Vogtle Units 3 & 4,” July 29, 2021, https://www.georgiapower.com/company/news-center/2021-articles/cost-forecast -for-vogtle.html; Georgia Power, Twentieth/Twenty-first Sem i-Annual Vogtle Construction Monitoring Report, Docket No. 29849, August 2019, p. 11, https://psc.ga.gov/search/facts-document/?documentId=178224. 28 Department of Energy, “ Secretary Perry Announces Financial Close on Additional Loan Guarantees During T rip to Vogtle Advanced Nuclear Energy Project ,” news release, March 22, 2019, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-perry-announces-financial-close-additional-loan-guarantees-during-trip-vogtle.
29 Department of Energy, “Reactor T echnology Program Overview,” presentation by R. Shane Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear T echnology Demonstration and Deployment, to the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, July 9, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/07/f53/RSJ%20Brief%20to%20NEAC%20-%20July%209%202018_0.pdf.
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Federal policy on carbon dioxide emissions could also have a significant impact on the expansion of nuclear power and the economic viability of existing reactors. The Biden Administration’s American Jobs Plan, announced March 31, 2021, includes an Energy Efficiency and Clean Electricity Standard (CES) that would require increasing percentages of power generation to come from non-carbon-emitting sources, including existing nuclear plants.30 The House budget reconciliation bil for FY2022, the Build Back Better Act (H.R. 5376), includes a Clean
Electricity Performance Program that is similar in some ways to a CES.31
Selected Congressional Action—117th Congress
Build Back Better Act (H.R. 5376, Yarmuth)
Budget reconciliation bil for FY2022 that includes provisions to support existing nuclear power plants and communities with closed plants. These include a tax credit of up to 1.5 cents per kwh for generation from existing nuclear plants (section 136109) and an FY2022 appropriation of $500 mil ion to communities with retiring energy facilities, including nuclear (section 110018). It
also includes the Clean Electricity Performance Program, authorizing grants and fees to encourage utilities to increase their supply of low-carbon electricity, including from nuclear power (section 30411). Introduced September 27, 2021, and placed on the Union Calendar
pursuant to budget reconciliation procedures.
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (H.R. 3684, DeFazio)
As passed by the Senate, includes a federal program to provide financial support to nuclear power plants at risk of closure, with appropriations of $6 bil ion through FY2026, and appropriates $2.477 bil ion over four years for DOE’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program. Introduced June 4, 2021; referred to House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Reported by Committee June 22, 2021 (H.Rept. 117-70); passed by House July 1, 2021; passed by Senate with
an amendment August 10, 2021.
Preserving Existing Nuclear Energy Generation Act (H.R. 4960, Kinzinger)
Establishes DOE program to provide credits to nuclear power plants certified by the Secretary of Energy as being at risk of shutdown for financial reasons (similar to the program in H.R. 3684 as passed by the Senate). Each credit equals one megawatt-hour (MWh) of electric generation, and
certified reactors could submit bids specifying the price per MWh of the credits desired. Also authorizes grants for units of local government affected by nuclear plant retirements. Introduced August 6, 2021; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce, Transportation and
Infrastructure, and Financial Services.
Energy Infrastructure Act (S. 2377, Manchin)
Section 3203 establishes credits for at-risk nuclear power plants similar to the program in H.R. 3684 as passed by the Senate. Introduced July 19, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources.
30 House Committee on Energy and Commerce, “Full Committee Markup of Legislative Recommendations for Budget Reconciliation,” staff memorandum, September 9, 2021, https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Memo_FC%20MU_2021.9.9_0.pdf. 31 For more information on the Clean Electricity Performance Plan, see CRS Report R46934, The Clean Electricity
Perform ance Program (CEPP): In Brief, by Ashley J. Lawson.
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American Nuclear Infrastructure Act of 2021 (S. 2373, Capito)
Section 301 establishes credits for at-risk nuclear power plants similar to the program in H.R. 3684 as passed by the Senate, except that the program is run by EPA. Section 503 authorizes grants to units of local government affected by nuclear power plant shutdowns. Introduced July
15, 2021; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Zero-Emission Nuclear Power Production Credit Act of 2021 (H.R. 4024,
Pascrell/S. 2291, Cardin)
Establishes tax credit of up to 1.5 cents per kwh of nuclear energy generation through the end of 2030. The credit amount is reduced as the price of electricity sold by a nuclear plant rises, and is to be adjusted for inflation. The credit amount also would be reduced based on similar state and local credits received. Nuclear plants would have to pay prevailing wages to receive the federal credit. House bil introduced June 21, 2021; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. Senate
bil introduced June 24, 2021; referred to Committee on Finance.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Hearing on Nuclear Energy
The March 25, 2021, hearing focused on “ways to maintain and expand the use of nuclear energy in the United States and abroad.”32 Committee Chairman Joe Manchin followed up the hearing with a letter to President Biden on April 20, 2021, urging him “to take action to preserve our
existing nuclear fleet and prevent further closures. I believe the federal government must use al the tools it has to protect this vital resource, to the maximum extent consistent with the health and safety of the public.”33 Hearing statements, testimony, and video available on the committee website at https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2021/3/full-committee-hearing-on-nuclear-
energy.
Nuclear Industrial Base Act of 2021 (H.R. 1698, Latta)
Establishes DOE Nuclear Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program to monitor and assess the needs of the domestic nuclear industry and supports nuclear power development and deployment partnerships between the federal government and private entities. Introduced March
9, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
CLEAN Energy Future Act (H.R. 1512, Pallone)
Establishes a national clean energy standard (CES), which would require electric utilities to provide specific amounts of power to their customers from low - or zero-carbon generating sources. A CES that includes nuclear energy could increase the demand for electricity from existing reactors and possibly provide an economic incentive for building new ones. Bil includes a CES that would gradual y rise to 100% zero-emission electricity generation, including nuclear
power, by 2035 and afterward. Introduced March 2, 2021, by House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Frank Pal one Jr.; referred to House Energy and Commerce Committee, which held hearings on the bil starting March 18, 2021. Hearing statements, testimony, and video
32 Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, “Full Committee Hearing on Nuclear Energy,” March 25, 2021, https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2021/3/full-committee-hearing-on-nuclear-energy. 33 Letter from Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Joe Manchin III to President Joseph R. Biden, April 20, 2021, https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/FC01A8FF-FC8F-4FFA-A44E-C3D81CF00A2E.
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available on the committee website at https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/
hearings/hearing-on-the-clean-future-act-industrial-climate-policies-to-create.
116th Congress
Energy Act of 2020, P.L. 116-260, Division Z
Includes authorization of $55 mil ion per year for FY2021 through FY2025 for the Sustainability Program for Light Water Reactors to conduct research, development, demonstration, and commercial application of technologies to improve the economics, safety, and lifetime of existing nuclear power plants (Section 2003). Signed into law December 27, 2020. Authorization of the
sustainability program was also included in the Nuclear Energy Renewal Act of 2019 (S. 2368, Coons), approved by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on November 11, 2019
(S.Rept. 116-203).
Nuclear Powers America Act of 2019 (S. 1134, Cramer/H.R. 2314, LaHood)
Would have provided a 30% tax credit for fuel and capital expenses incurred by nuclear power
plants. The credit would have phased out from December 31, 2023, through January 1, 2026. To receive the credit, nuclear power plants were to submit a license renewal to NRC or certify to DOE that a license renewal would be submitted. Senate bil introduced April 10, 2019; referred to Committee on Finance. House bil introduced April 12, 2019; referred to Committee on Ways and
Means.
American Nuclear Infrastructure Act (S. 4897, Barrasso)
Would have established an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) program to provide assistance, subject to appropriation, to nuclear power plants at risk of permanent shutdown. Certified at-risk plants were to submit bids describing the amount of assistance they would require to generate a specific amount of electricity for the subsequent four years. EPA would have
al ocated the available assistance to “as many certified nuclear reactors as possible” based on the bids. Hearings held by Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on discussion draft August 5, 2020 (H.Hrg. 116-270). Bil introduced November 16, 2020; ordered reported with
amendment December 2, 2020.
CRS Reports
CRS Report R46820, U.S. Nuclear Plant Shutdowns, State Interventions, and Policy Concerns,
by Mark Holt and Phil ip Brown
CRS Report R44715, Financial Challenges of Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United
States, by Phil ip Brown and Mark Holt
CRS Report R44852, The Value of Energy Tax Incentives for Different Types of Energy
Resources, by Molly F. Sherlock
Additional References
World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2021, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggat, September
2021, https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/
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Unlocking Reductions in the Construction Costs of Nuclear: A Practical Guide for Stakeholders,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency, July 2020,
http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2020/7530-reducing-cost-nuclear-construction.pdf
Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership, Department of Energy Nuclear Fuel Working Group, April 23, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-brouil ette-announces-
nuclear-fuel-working-groups-strategy-restore-american
The Changing Geopolitics of Nuclear Energy: A Look at the United States, Russia, and China,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 12, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
changing-geopolitics-nuclear-energy-look-united-states-russia-and-china
U.S. Nuclear Energy Leadership: Innovation and the Strategic Global Challenge, Atlantic Council, May 20, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-
nuclear-energy-leadership-innovation-and-the-strategic-global-chal enge-2
The Nuclear Power Dilemma: Declining Profits, Plant Closures, and the Threat of Rising Carbon
Emissions, Union of Concerned Scientists, November 2018, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-Power-Dilemma-full-report.pdf
Promising Market and Federal Solutions for Existing Nuclear Power, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, October 2018, https://www.c2es.org/document/promising-market-and-federal-
solutions-for-existing-nuclear-power/
Nuclear Costs in Context, Nuclear Energy Institute, September 2018, https://www.nei.org/
CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/nuclear-costs-in-context-201909.pdf
Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet—Cost and Revenue
Study, Idaho National Laboratory, September 2017, https://gain.inl.gov/SiteAssets/Teresa/
Market%20Chal enges%20for%20Nuclear%20Fleet-ESSAI%20Study%20Sept2017.pdf
Keeping the Lights on at America’s Nuclear Power Plants, Jeremy Carl and David Fedor, Shultz-
Stephenson Task Force on Energy Policy, Hoover Institution Press, 2017
Advanced Nuclear Technology
Existing commercial nuclear power plants in the United States are based on light water reactor (LWR) technology, in which ordinary (light) water is used to cool the reactor and to moderate, or slow, the neutrons in a nuclear chain reaction. In the chain reaction, neutrons cause the nuclei of
uranium and other heavy atoms to fission (split), releasing large amounts of energy and additional neutrons to maintain the reaction. The federal government developed LWRs for naval propulsion in the 1950s and funded the commercialization of the technology for electricity generation. DOE and its predecessor agencies for decades have also conducted research on “advanced” reactor technologies that use different coolants and moderators, as wel as fast neutron reactors that have
no moderator.
The term “advanced nuclear reactor” is defined by the Energy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260,
Division Z) as a fission reactor that has “significant improvements” over existing commercial reactors, and any fusion reactor. Areas of improvement can include safety, waste generation, performance, resistance to weapons proliferation, “modular sizes,” and integration of electric and non-electric applications (such as heat and hydrogen production). That definition encompasses
smal modular reactors (SMRs) of any type.
To produce less long-lived radioactive waste than existing reactors, some advanced reactor concepts would involve the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to separate uranium, plutonium,
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and other long-lived radioisotopes to make new fuel for fast reactors.34 Such reprocessing, or recycling, would also reduce the need for newly mined uranium to fuel a potential y growing
worldwide reactor fleet, according to proponents.
SMRs, which DOE defines as having generating capacity of 300 megawatts (MW) or below, would be far smal er than today’s commercial LWRs, which average about 1,000 MW of electric generating capacity. Most proposed advanced reactors, including smal LWRs, would meet DOE’s definition of SMRs. Supporters of SMRs contend that they would be smal enough to be assembled in factories and shipped to reactor sites to reduce construction costs. In addition, SMRs
could reduce the financial risks of building a new nuclear power plant, because each module would cost less than today’s large reactors and revenues could begin when the first module was complete, rather than after completion of a much larger unit. However, some analysts contend
that SMRs would be too smal to achieve the economies of scale needed for economic viability.35
Very smal SMRs are often cal ed “microreactors,” defined by DOE as having thermal energy capacity below 20 MW. They could provide heat or electric power at remote locations. Self-contained microreactor power units would be assembled in a factory, transported to a site in a shipping container, and set up to generate power within a week, according to DOE. Microreactors
would be “self regulating,” in that their designs are intended to prevent overheating even without
operator intervention.36
Recent Events
The Energy Act of 2020, signed by President Trump on December 27, 2020, authorized DOE
programs on advanced nuclear energy R&D, fuel supply, and demonstration through FY2025.
The Energy Act requires DOE to implement a program to help make high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) available for advanced reactor R&D and deployment. HALEU is uranium enriched above 5% of the fissile isotope uranium 235 but below 20%, which is the threshold for
high-enriched uranium that poses weapons proliferation concerns. Many proposed advanced reactors are being designed to use HALEU. DOE’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program, initial y funded in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), was
authorized by the Energy Act at $405 mil ion in FY2021, rising to $455 mil ion in FY2025.
Legislation to stimulate the development of advanced nuclear technology, the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA), was signed by the President on September 28, 2018 (P.L. 115-248). Key provisions authorize the construction of demonstration reactors funded by the private sector at DOE sites, authorize DOE to construct a Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) for
advanced nuclear fuels and materials, and authorize grants to help pay for advanced reactor licensing. The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (P.L. 115-439), signed into law January 14, 2019, requires NRC to develop a new licensing framework for advanced nuclear
34 Radioisotopes are radioactive isotopes; isotopes are forms of an element that have different numbers of neutrons. Different radioisotopes of the same element will behave the same chemically but have different half -lives and other radioactive characteristics. Long-lived radioisotopes separated from spent fuel could in principle be fissioned or transmuted in a fast reactor into shorter-lived radioisotopes for disposal.
35 Deign, Jason, “ Interest in Small Modular Nuclear Reactors Is Growing. So Are Fears T hey Aren’t Viable,” Greentech Media, March 14, 2018, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/interest -in-small-modular-nuclear-grows#gs.ph5LRao.
36 DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “What Is a Nuclear Microreactor?,” October 23, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/what -nuclear-microreactor.
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technology. Proponents of the law contend that NRC’s existing licensing system is too focused on
LWR technology and would potential y cause delays in non-LWR applications.
NRC is currently reviewing a design certification application for the NuScale SMR plant, which
would consist of a dozen 60 MW(electric) reactors in a large pool of water.37 DOE announced a cost-shared award of up to $1.4 bil ion for a NuScale demonstration plant on October 16, 2020.38 Oklo Power submitted a combined construction permit and operating license application to NRC on March 11, 2020, for its 1.5 MW(electric) Aurora microreactor.39 Both plants are proposed for construction at Idaho National Laboratory. DOE announced initial awards totaling $160 mil ion
for two demonstration plants under the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program on October 13, 2020.40 One of the award recipients, TerraPower, is proposing to build its demonstration plant on
the site of one of four closed coal-fired power plants in Wyoming.41
Table 2. Planned Advanced Reactor Demonstration Plants
Reactor
DOE
NRC
Reactor
Tech-
Power
Plant
DOE
Cost
Plant
Licensing
Designer
nology
(electric)
Owner
Funding
Share
Location
Status
NuScale
Light water
77 MW
Utah
Up to $1.4
50%
Idaho
Standard
SMR
Associated
bil ion
National
Design
Municipal
Laboratory
Certification
Power
application
Systems
submitted January 2017
Terra
Sodium-
345 MW
PacificCorp
Up to $1.6
50%
Wyoming, at
Pre-
Power
cooled fast
bil ion
1 of 4 closed
application
reactor
coal plants
activities
X-Energy
High-
80 MW
Energy
Up to $1.6
50%
Richland,
Pre-
temperature
Northwest
bil ion
WA
application
gas-cooled
activities
reactor
Oklo
Sodium-
1.5 MW
Oklo
$2.6 mil ion
50%
Idaho
COL
cooled fast
National
application
reactor
Laboratory
submitted 3/11/20
37 NRC, “ Application Review Schedule for the NuScale Design,” May 14, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/smr/nuscale/review-schedule.html. NuScale currently plans to increase each module’s electric generating capacity to 77 MW. See NuScale Power, “T echnology Overview,” https://www.nuscalepower.com/technology/technology-overview.
38 DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “DOE Approves Award for Carbon Free Power Project,” October 16, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/doe-approves-award-carbon-free-power-project. 39 NRC, “Aurora—Oklo Application,” June 17, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/aurora-oklo.html. 40 DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “U.S. Department of Energy Announces $160 Million in First Awards under Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program,” October 13, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/us-department-energy-announces-160-million-first-awards-under-advanced-reactor.
41 DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “Next -Gen Nuclear Plant and Jobs Are Coming to Wyoming,” June 7, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/next -gen-nuclear-plant -and-jobs-are-coming-wyoming.
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Reactor
DOE
NRC
Reactor
Tech-
Power
Plant
DOE
Cost
Plant
Licensing
Designer
nology
(electric)
Owner
Funding
Share
Location
Status
Kairos
Fluoride-
140 MW
Kairos
Up to $303
48%
Oak Ridge,
Pre-
salt-cooled
mil ion
TN
application
high-
activities
temperature reactor
Sources: DOE, NRC. Notes: COL=combined construction permit and operating license.
The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded three contracts on March 9, 2020, for design development of mobile microreactors. “A safe, smal , mobile nuclear reactor would enable units to carry a nearly endless clean power supply, enabling expansion and sustainment of operations for extended periods of time anywhere on the planet,” according to DOD’s announcement of the
awards.42
DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes reactor modeling and simulation, experimental processing of spent nuclear fuel, development of advanced reactor concepts, and testing of “accident tolerant fuels” for existing LWRs. The Energy and Water
Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260, Division D) includes $1.508 bil ion for DOE nuclear energy programs. The enacted funding measure provides $250 mil ion for the Advanced Reactors Demonstration Program, including $160 mil ion for two advanced nuclear reactor demonstration projects, with a cost-share of at least 50% from nonfederal sources, and $40 mil ion to reduce the technical risk of five additional reactor
demonstration proposals, with a nonfederal cost-share of at least 20%. The measure also provides $106 mil ion for accident-tolerant fuels, $45 mil ion to continue development of the VTR, and
$20 mil ion for processing HALEU from various sources at Idaho National Laboratory.
For FY2022, the Biden Administration is requesting $1.851 bil ion for nuclear energy programs, while the House approved $1.675 bil ion (H.R. 4502) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1.591 bil ion (S. 2605). The Administration’s American Jobs Plan would provide $15 bil ion for energy demonstration projects, including advanced nuclear reactors, and $46 bil ion in federal purchases to stimulate clean energy manufacturing, including advanced nuclear
reactors and fuel.43 The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (H.R. 3684) as passed by the Senate would appropriate $2.477 bil ion over four years for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program, and the Build Back Better Act (H.R. 5376) includes $95 mil ion for the VTR. Selected
Congressional Action—117th Congress
Build Back Better Act (H.R. 5376, Yarmuth)
Budget reconciliation bil that includes FY2022 appropriations for advanced nuclear energy technology, including $95 mil ion for the VTR (section 90002) and $53 mil ion for research reactor infrastructure (section 90003). Introduced September 27, 2021, and placed on the Union
Calendar pursuant to budget reconciliation procedures.
42 DOD, “DOD Awards Contracts for Development of a Mobile Microreactor,” March 9, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2105863/dod-awards-contracts-for-development -of-a-mobile-microreactor. 43 White House, “Fact Sheet: T he American Jobs Plan,” March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan.
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Nuclear Power Purchase Agreements Act (H.R. 4834, Luria)
Authorizes DOE to enter into power purchase agreements of up to 40 years from nuclear reactors licensed after January 1, 2020. Power purchase agreements that can provide reliable electricity to off-grid locations and national defense facilities, or for other purposes found to be in the national interest, can include above-market rates. Introduced July 29, 2021; referred to committees on
Energy and Commerce and Oversight and Reform.
National Nuclear University Research Infrastructure Reinvestment Act of 2021
(H.R. 4819, Anthony Gonzalez)
Authorizes a DOE program to strengthen university research and training reactors, including a subprogram to demonstrate advanced nuclear reactor and microreactor concepts. Introduced July
29, 2021; referred to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Energy Infrastructure Act (S. 2377, Manchin)
Requires DOE to prepare a report on the potential use of SMRs and microreactors and authorizes DOE to support feasibility studies on deploying microreactors, SMRs, and advanced reactors in isolated communities. Introduced July 19, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources.
American Nuclear Infrastructure Act of 2021 (S. 2373, Capito)
Authorizes prizes for advanced nuclear reactors and fuel, and removes the costs of advanced reactor early site permits and pre-licensing activities from NRC fee recovery requirements.
Introduced July 15, 2021; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Strengthening American Nuclear Competitiveness Act (H.R. 1748, Bill Johnson)
Expedites DOE review of certain nuclear technology exports, enables increased investment in
U.S. nuclear technology by American al ies, and modifies licensing requirements for new nonelectric uses of nuclear energy and for improved manufacturing techniques. Introduced March
10, 2021; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce and Foreign Affairs.
Advanced Nuclear Deployment Act (H.R. 1746, Hudson)
Facilitates licensing and deployment of advanced civilian nuclear technologies and authorizes
federal agencies to enter into certain long-term power purchase agreements. Introduced March 10, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce and in addition to the Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology.
Nuclear Licensing Efficiency Act (H.R. 1578, Kinzinger)
Establishes timelines and modifies procedures for nuclear power plant permitting and licensing.
Introduced March 3, 2021; referred to House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Modernize Nuclear Reactor Environmental Reviews Act (H.R. 1559, Duncan)
Modifies requirements and procedures for NRC environmental reviews of nuclear power plant licensing and permitting decisions. Introduced March 3, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy
and Commerce.
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reactors-space-reactors/19288238-sites.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2021/04/army-reactor-report-nppp-2021-april.pdf
Small Modular Reactors: Challenges and Opportunities, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency, April 7, 2021, https://www.oecd.org/publications/small-modular-reactors-18fbb76c-en.htm
A Comparison of Advanced Nuclear Technologies, Andrew C. Kadak, Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, March 2021, https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/A%20Comparison%20of%20Nuclear%20Technologies%20033017.pdf
“Advanced” Isn’t Always Better: Assessing the Safety, Security, and Environmental Impacts of Non-Light-Water Nuclear Reactors, Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2021, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/advanced-isnt-always-better
U.S. Advanced Nuclear Energy Strategy for Domestic Prosperity, Climate Protection, National Security, and Global Leadership, Nuclear Innovation Alliance and Partnership for Global Security, February 2021, https://partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/US-Advanced-Nuclear-Energy-Strategy-NIA-PGS-02-16-2021-1.pdf
Metric and Method for Comparing Investments to Decarbonize the Electricity System, Rocky Mountain Institute, September 24, 2019, https://rmi.org/insight/decarbonizing-the-electricity-system
Radioactive Waste After several years in a nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel (primarily uranium) can no longer economically sustain a nuclear chain reaction and becomes highly radioactive and thermally hot. Such spent nuclear fuel must be periodically removed from operating reactors and stored in adjacent pools of water, which prevents overheating and provides radiation shielding. After several years of cooling, the spent fuel can be placed in dry casks for storage elsewhere on the plant site.
When existing U.S. reactors were built, spent fuel had been expected to be taken away for reprocessing (separation of plutonium and uranium to make new fuel) or permanent disposal. However, reprocessing has not become commercialized in the United States, for economic and nonproliferation reasons, and central waste storage and disposal facilities have proven difficult to site. As a result, the vast majority of U.S. commercial spent fuel remains at the nuclear plants where it was generated—estimated at 90,000 metric tons at the end of 2022 and increasing at the rate of about 2,200 metric tons per year.29
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-425, NWPA), as amended in 1987, named Yucca Mountain, NV, as the nation’s sole candidate site for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. NWPA required the DOE to study the site and seek a license from NRC to build a repository there.
Citing opposition from the State of Nevada, the Obama Administration halted the Yucca Mountain project. No new funding has been appropriated for it since FY2010. The Obama Administration appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to develop an alternative nuclear waste policy, and its final report was issued in January 2012. DOE largely adopted the Commission’s recommendations in a January 2013 waste strategy that called for a
29 DOE, Resource Portal for DOE Nuclear Waste Management Information, interactive map, viewed October 24, 2023, https://curie.pnnl.gov/map.
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“consent-based” process to select nuclear waste storage and disposal sites and for a surface storage pilot facility to open by 2021.30 DOE issued a Draft Consent-Based Siting Process shortly before the end of the Obama Administration.31
A federal appeals court on August 13, 2013, ordered NRC to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process with previously appropriated funds.32 In response, NRC issued the final volumes of the Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report (SER), which provided the NRC staff’s determination that the repository would meet all applicable standards. However, the staff said upon completing the SER that NRC should not authorize construction of the repository until all land and water rights requirements were met and a supplement to DOE’s environmental impact statement (EIS) was completed.33 NRC completed the supplemental EIS in May 2016 and made its database of Yucca Mountain licensing documents publicly available, using nearly all the remaining previously appropriated licensing funds.34
Recent Events
The Trump Administration largely halted the consent-based siting process and included funding to restart Yucca Mountain licensing in its FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020 budget submissions to Congress, but the requests were not funded by Congress. The Trump Administration did not seek Yucca Mountain repository funding for FY2021, but only funds for interim storage planning, which were appropriated by Congress. The Biden Administration also requested nuclear waste funds only for planning in FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024 (with those amounts enacted in FY2022 and FY2023).
The Biden Administration resumed the consent-based siting process in December 2021 with a request for information about the design of such a program and issued an updated report on consent-based siting in April 2023.35 Under the updated process, DOE awarded grants on July 9, 2023, to 13 consortia made up of academic, non-profit, and private-sector institutions to “work with communities interested in DOE’s community-centered approach to storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel.”36
With no spent fuel disposal or storage facilities currently under development by DOE, two private-sector storage facilities in New Mexico and Texas have been proposed. NRC issued licenses to the Texas facility on September 13, 2021, and to the New Mexico facility on May 9,
30 DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, January 2013, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013%201-15%20Nuclear_Waste_Report.pdf.
31 DOE, Draft Consent-Based Siting Process for Consolidated Storage and Disposal Facilities for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, January 12, 2017, https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Draft%20Consent-Based%20Siting%20Process%20and%20Siting%20Considerations.pdf.
32 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of mandamus, August 13, 2013, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf.
33 NRC, “NRC Publishes Final Two Volumes of Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation,” news release 15-005, January 29. 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2015/.
34 NRC, Supplement to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, NUREG-2184, Final Report, May 2016, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr2184/; “NRC Staff Issues Volume 3 of Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report,” news release 14-069, October 16, 2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1949/v3/.
35 DOE, Consent-Based Siting Process for Federal Consolidated Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, April 2023, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Consent-Based%20Siting%20Process%20Report-0424%203.pdf.
36 DOE, “DOE Awards $26 Million to Support Consent-Based Siting for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” June 9, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-awards-26-million-support-consent-based-siting-spent-nuclear-fuel.
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2023. These near-surface Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities are intended to hold spent fuel from nuclear power plants around the country until a permanent underground repository is available. 37 However, they are facing strong opposition from the two proposed host states. New Mexico filed a lawsuit against NRC on March 29, 2021, and the Texas governor signed a law banning new spent fuel storage facilities in the state on August 9, 2021.38 In a lawsuit filed by Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 25, 2023, vacated the license for the Texas site on the grounds that NRC lacks authority to license nuclear waste storage facilities other than those specified by NWPA.39 NRC petitioned for review by the full circuit court on October 24, 2023.40
Canadian plans for nuclear waste disposal have also generated congressional controversy, because some proposed sites are near the Great Lakes. In 2019, Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization narrowed its search for a spent nuclear fuel repository to two sites in Ontario, one located near Lake Huron.41
Recent Congressional Action—118th Congress
Increasing Nuclear Safety Protocols for Extended Canister Transfers (INSPECT) Act (H.R. 5115, Levin)
Would require NRC to assign a resident inspector to each commercial nuclear power plant that has permanently ceased operation. Would require the inspector to conduct inspections of decommissioning activities and spent nuclear fuel transfer activities, and remain at the plant until all fuel is transferred from its spent fuel pools to dry storage. Introduced August 1, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Spent Fuel Prioritization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3862, Levin)
Would require that, in determining the order in which spent nuclear fuel will be taken by DOE from nuclear plant sites under NWPA, highest priority shall be given to plants that are permanently closed and are located in the highest-population areas, earthquake zones, and areas that pose national security concerns. Introduced June 6, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
37 NRC, “Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF),” December 8, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/cis.html; NRC, “NRC Issues License to Interim Storage Partners for Consolidated Spent Nuclear Fuel Interim Storage Facility in Texas,” news release 21-036, September 13, 2021, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2125/ML21257A091.pdf; NRC, “NRC Issues License to Holtec International for Consolidated Spent Nuclear Fuel Interim Storage Facility in New Mexico,” news release 23-031, May 9, 2023, https://www.nrc.gov/cdn/doc-collection-news/2023/23-031.pdf.
38 Texas Governor Greg Abbott, “Interim Storage Partners (ISP) Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Project, Docket ID NRC-2016-0231,” November 3, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2030/ML20309B061.pdf; Texas Legislature Online, Actions, HB7, https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Actions.aspx?LegSess=872&Bill=HB7; and New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, “Comments from Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham on Docket ID NRC-2018-0052,” September 22, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2026/ML20269A025.pdf.
39 State of Texas v. NRC, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, August 25, 2023, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-60743-CV0.pdf.
40 NRC Petition for Review of Action, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, October 24, 2023, https://www.exchangemonitor.com/wp-content/up.
41 Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization, “About the Site Selection Process,” viewed December 7, 2023, https://www.nwmo.ca/Site-selection.
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Expressing the sense of the Senate and the House of Representatives that the President and the Secretary of State should ensure that the Government of Canada does not permanently store nuclear waste in the Great Lakes Basin (S.Res. 117, Stabenow; H.Res. 243, Kildee)
Expresses the sense of the House and Senate that Canada should not allow construction of a nuclear waste repository within the Great Lakes Basin, and that the President and the Department of State should work with Canada to prevent such construction and craft a long-term solution for nuclear waste storage that does not threaten the Great Lakes. Senate resolution introduced March 22, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House resolution introduced March 22, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act (H.R. 1051, Titus; S. 404, Cortez Masto)
Would require the Secretary of Energy to obtain the consent of affected state, local, and tribal governments before making expenditures from the Nuclear Waste Fund for a nuclear waste repository. Both bills introduced February 14, 2023. House bill referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce; Senate bill referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
CRS Reports
CRS In Focus IF11201, Nuclear Waste Storage Sites in the United States, by Lance N. Larson
Additional References
CURIE Resource Portal for DOE Nuclear Waste Management Information, DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, https://curie.pnnl.gov
Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, Government Accountability Office, Key Issues website, https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_waste/issue_summary
Commercial Spent Fuel: Congressiona Action Needed to Break Impasse and Develop a Permanent Disposal Solution, Government Accountability Office, September 2021, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-603.
Six Overarching Recommendations for How to Move the Nation’s Nuclear Waste Management Program Forward, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, April 2021, https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/reports/six-overarching-recommendations-for-how-to-move-the-nation-s-nuclear-waste-management-program-forward-(april-2020)
Forging a Path Forward on US Nuclear Waste Management: Options for Policy Makers, Matt Bowen, Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, January 2021, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/forging-path-forward-us-nuclear-waste-management-options-policy-makers
Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, September 2019, https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/reports/preparing-for-nuclear-waste-transportation-(september-2019)
Reset of America’s Nuclear Waste Management: Strategy and Policy, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation and George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, October 15, 2018, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reset_report_2018_final.pdf
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Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, November 2017, http://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/facts-sheets/commercial_snf.pdf?sfvrsn=12
Report to the Secretary of Energy, Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, January 2012, http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620211605/http:/brc.gov
Nuclear Plant Economic Viability U.S. nuclear power plants have faced severe financial pressure caused primarily by competition from low-cost natural gas, growing supplies of renewable energy, and stagnant electricity demand. Thirteen U.S. reactors were permanently closed from 2013 through April 2022 (Table 2). Plans for up to 30 new U.S. reactors announced during the past 15 years have largely been put on hold, with 1 completed, 1 currently under construction, and 2 canceled in 2017 after construction had begun.
In light of that situation, Congress and several states have taken action to keep the existing nuclear fleet operating and to encourage the construction of new reactors. A key element of that debate is the appropriate role of nuclear power, if any, in meeting national energy and environmental goals. Nuclear power supporters generally point to the technology as crucial for providing a secure, domestic source of energy with low greenhouse gas and other emissions. Supporters also see a viable and growing domestic nuclear power industry as crucial in providing a technology base for naval nuclear reactors and other defense nuclear programs, and in providing a base for nuclear power plant exports to counter reactor exports being pursued by Russia and China for geopolitical purposes. Opponents generally counter that safety and proliferation risks, nuclear waste hazards, and high costs outweigh those benefits.
Government support for nuclear power can include loan guarantees, tax credits, clean energy mandates, emissions credits, and electricity market regulations.
The two new reactors at the Vogtle plant have received loan guarantees from DOE totaling $12 billion, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz announced the issuance of $6.5 billion in loan guarantees on February 19, 2014, to two of the three utility partners in the project, Georgia Power and Oglethorpe Power. Another $1.8 billion loan guarantee for another partner, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, was issued June 24, 2015. Energy Secretary Rick Perry announced the finalization of an additional $3.7 billion in loan guarantees to the three partners in the Vogtle project on March 22, 2019.42 No other proposed nuclear plants have received any commitments for DOE loan guarantees.
Federal tax credits for electricity production from new nuclear plants were extended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123). Before the extension, new nuclear plants had been required to begin operation before January 1, 2021, to qualify for the production tax credit, which is limited to 6,000 megawatts of total generating capacity. The extension allows new reactors to use the credit after that date if the capacity limit has not been reached. Along with the extension, the tax credit was modified to allow non-taxpaying partners in a nuclear project, such as public power agencies, to transfer their credits to a project’s taxpaying partners. The two new Vogtle reactors total about 2,300 megawatts of capacity, well within the limit. As noted above, construction delays pushed the startup of the first of the new reactors (Vogtle 3) to July 2023 and
42 Department of Energy, “Secretary Perry Announces Financial Close on Additional Loan Guarantees During Trip to Vogtle Advanced Nuclear Energy Project,” news release, March 22, 2019, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-perry-announces-financial-close-additional-loan-guarantees-during-trip-vogtle.
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the planned completion date of Vogtle 4 to early 2024, well beyond the previous 2021 deadline, and the production tax credits are widely considered crucial for their financial viability.
Table 2. U.S. Commercial Reactor Shutdowns Since 2012
Net
Summer
Generating
Major Factors
Capacity
Start-Up
Contributing to
Reactor
State
Shutdown Date
(Megawatts)
Year
Shutdown
Crystal River 3
Florida
February 2013
860
1977
Cost of major repairs to reactor containment
Kewaunee
Wisconsin
May 2013
566
1974
Operating losses
San Onofre 2
California
June 2013
1,070
1983
Cost of replacing new steam generators
San Onofre 3
California
June 2013
1,080
1984
Cost of replacing new steam generators
Vermont Yankee
Vermont
December 2014
620
1972
Operating losses
Fort Calhoun
Nebraska
October 2016
479
1973
Operating losses
Oyster Creek
New Jersey
September 2018
614
1969
Agreement with state to avoid building cooling towers
Pilgrim
Massachusetts
May 2019
685
1972
Operating losses, rising capital expenditures
Three Mile Island 1
Pennsylvania
October 2019
803
1974
Operating losses
Indian Point 2
New York
April 30, 2020
1,020
1974
Low electricity prices; settlement with state
Duane Arnold
Iowa
August 2020
601
1975
Lower-cost alternative power
Indian Point 3
New York
April 30, 2021
1,035
1976
Low electricity prices; settlement with state
Palisades
Michigan
April 2022
784
1971
Operating losses, end of power purchase agreement; plant
owner now attempting to restart with state and federal support
Source: Company news releases, 2013-2022.
Recent Events
Congress took a major step to improve the economics of existing nuclear plants by establishing a tax credit in IRA Section 13105. The credit provides up to 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, adjusted for inflation, for electricity generated in 2024 through 2032. IRA Section 13701 makes new nuclear reactors eligible for a similar 10-year clean electricity production credit that is available
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for facilities placed into service after 2024. IRA Section 13707 allows nuclear reactors to qualify for a clean electricity investment tax credit of up to 30% if they do not take the clean electricity production credit.
IIJA created a Civil Nuclear Credit Program to provide direct financial support to nuclear power plants at risk of closure for economic reasons. Reactors certified by the Secretary of Energy as being at risk of closure can submit bids to receive credits for four years, specifying an amount per megawatt-hour of electricity generated that would be paid for each credit. DOE announced a conditional Civil Nuclear Credit award totaling $1.1 billion to the two-unit Diablo Canyon plant in California in November 21, 2022.43 The Diablo Canyon credit award, the only one issued by the program to date, is intended to prevent the planned permanent shutdown of the plant in 2025.
The one-unit Palisades nuclear power plant in Michigan ceased operation in April 2022. The plant’s owner, Holtec, had purchased the plant with the intention of decommissioning it, but decided after the shutdown to try to resume operation. Holtec announced the filing of a restart application with NRC on October 6, 2023, and has applied for a DOE loan guarantee. No permanently closed reactors in the United States have ever restarted.44
Several states also have taken action to prevent nuclear plant closures. An Illinois law signed September 15, 2021, provides “carbon mitigation credits” to nuclear plants at risk of closure for economic reasons, averting the planned shutdown of two plants with four operating reactors.45 New York and Illinois provided “zero emission credits” to seven reactors that had been at risk of retirement by 2018.46 Connecticut enacted legislation in 2017 to make nuclear reactors eligible for a state procurement process for zero-emission electricity sources, upon certification of financial need. New Jersey enacted zero-emission credits for nuclear power in 2018.47 Ohio enacted subsidies in July 2019 that prompted the owner of the state’s two commercial reactors, Davis-Besse and Perry, to rescind the units’ previously planned retirements, although the assistance was repealed in March 2021.48 The planned retirement of the two-unit Beaver Valley nuclear plant in western Pennsylvania was rescinded in March 2020, after Pennsylvania joined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The plant’s owner, Energy Harbor, said RGGI would provide emissions credits “which will begin to help level the playing field for our carbon-
43 DOE, “Biden-Harris Administration Announces Major Investment to Preserve America’s Clean Nuclear Energy Infrastructure,” November 21, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-major-investment-preserve-americas-clean-nuclear.
44 Holtec International, “Holtec Formally Initiates Process with NRC to Reauthorize Operations at Palisades Power Plant,” October 6, 2023, https://holtecinternational.com/2023/10/06/holtec-formally-initiates-process-with-nrc-to-reauthorize-operations-at-palisades-power-plant.
45 Illinois General Assembly, Energy Transition Act (Nuclear Plant Assistance), Public Act 102-0662, https://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/102/102-0662.htm.
46 Zero-Emission Credits, Nuclear Energy Institute, April 2018, https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf.
47 Solutions for Maintaining the Existing Nuclear Fleet, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2018, https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/solutions-for-maintaining-existing-nuclear-fleet.pdf.
48 “FirstEnergy Solutions Rescinds Deactivation Notices for Competitive Generating Plants in Ohio,” PR Newswire, July 26, 2019, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/firstenergy-solutions-rescinds-deactivation-notices-for-competitive-generating-plants-in-ohio-300891786.html. A bill repealing the Ohio nuclear plant assistance was signed by the governor on March 31, 2021. See Mike DeWine, Governor of Ohio, “Governor DeWine Signs Ohio Transportation Budget,” news release, March 31, 2021, https://governor.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/governor/media/news-and-media/transportation-budget-signed-03312021.
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free nuclear generators.”49 Michigan enacted legislation on July 31, 2023, to provide $150 million toward restarting the closed Palisades plant.50
DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program manages cost-shared research projects “to solve significant highest priority cost and technical problems threatening existing plants.”51 The program includes research on materials used in nuclear plants, modeling of plant aging, and plant upgrades. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) included $45 million for the sustainability program, nearly the same as in FY2022. For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested $35 million for the program, while the House approved $45 million (H.R. 4394) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $35 million (S. 2443).
Federal policy on carbon dioxide emissions could also have a significant impact on the expansion of nuclear power and the economic viability of existing reactors. The Biden Administration has set a goal of eliminating carbon emissions for the U.S. power sector by 2035.52
Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress
Expressing the sense of Congress relating to nuclear power being a necessary clean baseload energy source to achieve a reliable, secure, and green electric grid (H.Con.Res. 26, Donalds)
Expresses the sense of Congress that “in order to achieve geopolitical energy leadership, reduce carbon emissions, and secure American energy independence, Congress is committed to embracing and accepting nuclear power as a clean baseload energy source that is easily compatible with other intermittent energy sources and necessary to achieve a reliable, secure, and green electric grid.” Introduced March 17, 2003; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
CRS Reports
CRS Report R46820, U.S. Nuclear Plant Shutdowns, State Interventions, and Policy Concerns, by Mark Holt and Phillip Brown
Additional References
Overnight Capital Cost of the Next AP1000, Koroush Shirvan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2022, https://web.mit.edu/kshirvan/www/research/ANP193%20TR%20CANES.pdf
49 Energy Harbor, “Energy Harbor Corp Rescinds Deactivation Notice for Nuclear Generating Plant in Pennsylvania,” news release, March 13, 2020, https://energyharbor.com/en/about/news-and-information/energy-harbor-corp-rescinds-deactivation-notice-for-nuclear-gene.
50 David Dalton, “Michigan Budget Includes $150 Million to Support Nuclear Reactor Restart,” NucNet, July 3, 2023, https://www.nucnet.org/news/michigan-budget-includes-usd150-million-to-support-nuclear-reactor-restart-7-1-2023.
51 Department of Energy, “Reactor Technology Program Overview,” presentation by R. Shane Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Technology Demonstration and Deployment, to the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, July 9, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/07/f53/RSJ%20Brief%20to%20NEAC%20-%20July%209%202018_0.pdf.
52 White House, “President Biden to Catalyze Global Climate Action Through the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate,” fact sheet, April 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-catalyze-global-climate-action-through-the-major-economies-forum-on-energy-and-climate.
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World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2022, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, October 2022, https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/
Unlocking Reductions in the Construction Costs of Nuclear: A Practical Guide for Stakeholders, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency, July 2020, http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2020/7530-reducing-cost-nuclear-construction.pdf
Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership, Department of Energy Nuclear Fuel Working Group, April 23, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-brouillette-announces-nuclear-fuel-working-groups-strategy-restore-american
The Changing Geopolitics of Nuclear Energy: A Look at the United States, Russia, and China, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 12, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-geopolitics-nuclear-energy-look-united-states-russia-and-china
U.S. Nuclear Energy Leadership: Innovation and the Strategic Global Challenge, Atlantic Council, May 20, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-nuclear-energy-leadership-innovation-and-the-strategic-global-challenge-2
The Nuclear Power Dilemma: Declining Profits, Plant Closures, and the Threat of Rising Carbon Emissions, Union of Concerned Scientists, November 2018, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-Power-Dilemma-full-report.pdf
Promising Market and Federal Solutions for Existing Nuclear Power, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, October 2018, https://www.c2es.org/document/promising-market-and-federal-solutions-for-existing-nuclear-power/
Nuclear Costs in Context, Nuclear Energy Institute, September 2018, https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/nuclear-costs-in-context-201909.pdf
Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet—Cost and Revenue Study, Idaho National Laboratory, September 2017, https://gain.inl.gov/SiteAssets/Teresa/Market%20Challenges%20for%20Nuclear%20Fleet-ESSAI%20Study%20Sept2017.pdf
Safety and Regulation The 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant disaster in Japan, triggered by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake and 45-foot tsunami, greatly increased concerns about safety in the nuclear policy debate. The accident clearly demonstrated the potential consequences of a total loss of power (or “station blackout”) at today’s commercial nuclear plants. Even when the nuclear reaction shuts down as designed, as at the Fukushima plant after the initial earthquake, residual radioactivity in the reactor core continues to generate “decay heat” that must be removed, typically by electrically driven or controlled cooling systems.
When the tsunami knocked out power at the three Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors that had been operating when the earthquake struck, the buildup of heat and pressure from residual radioactivity became so great that it melted the reactors’ nuclear fuel and exceeded the limits of their containment structures. The decay heat also caused steam to chemically react with the nuclear fuel cladding in the reactor cores, generating additional heat along with hydrogen that escaped into the upper part of the reactor buildings and exploded. Cooling was also lost in Fukushima’s spent fuel storage pools, causing concern that they could overheat, although later examination indicated that they did not.
Safety requirements for nuclear power plants are established and enforced in the United States by NRC, an independent regulatory agency. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires NRC to ensure
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that licensed nuclear facilities “provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public” (42 U.S.C. 2232). NRC may issue safety requirements that exceed the statutory “adequate protection” standard if their benefits are found to exceed their costs.
NRC safety regulations address the effects of external events such as earthquakes and floods, equipment failure such as breaks in coolant pipes, and other problems that could lead to radioactive releases into the environment. Critics of nuclear power contend that NRC is often reluctant to impose necessary safety requirements that would be costly or disruptive to the nuclear industry. However, the industry has frequently contended that costly safety proposals are unnecessary and would not significantly increase large existing safety margins.
Following the Fukushima disaster, NRC established a task force to identify lessons applicable to U.S. reactors and recommend safety improvements. The task force’s report led to NRC’s first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements, on March 12, 2012. NRC ordered all reactors to develop strategies to maintain cooling and containment integrity during external events, such as floods and earthquakes, that were more severe than anticipated by the plants’ designs (“beyond design basis”). In addition, NRC required that U.S. reactors of similar design to the Fukushima reactors have “reliable hardened vents” to remove excess pressure from their primary containments, and that better instrumentation be installed to monitor the condition of spent fuel pools during accidents.53
The NRC commissioners on March 19, 2013, required NRC staff to study whether to require the newly mandated containment vents to include filters or other means to reduce the release of radioactive material if the vents have to be used. The idea of requiring filters had drawn praise from nuclear critics but opposition from the industry on cost grounds.54 NRC voted on August 19, 2015, not to proceed with rulemaking on filtered vents.55
Congressional controversy was generated by NRC’s final rule for Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (MBDBE), announced January 24, 2019.56 The MBDBE regulation requires nuclear power plants to implement strategies to maintain reactor core cooling when electric power is lost, as occurred during the Fukushima accident. The MBDBE proposed rule, published November 13, 2015,57 and the draft final rule, released by NRC on January 5, 2017,58 would have required the equipment used in those strategies to be able to withstand newly evaluated flooding and seismic risks, and that regular drills and exercises be conducted. The final rule excluded those requirements, among other changes.59 In supporting those exclusions, the Commission majority
53 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Actions in Response to the Japan Nuclear Accident: March 12, 2012,” updated May 30, 2012, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/timeline/03122012.html.
54 NRC, “Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments,” staff requirements memorandum, SECY-12-0157, March 19, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2012/2012-0157srm.pdf; Freebairn, William, “NRC Staff Recommends Ordering Filtered Vents for 31 Power Reactors,” Inside NRC, November 5, 2012, p. 1.
55 NRC, “Hardened Vents and Filtration (for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II containment designs),” http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/hardened-vents.html.
56 NRC, “NRC To Issue Final Rule for Mitigating Severe Events at U.S. Reactors,” news release, January 24, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2019/19-005.pdf.
57 NRC, “Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, November 13, 2015, Vol. 80, No. 219, p. 70610, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-11-13/pdf/2015-28589.pdf.
58 NRC, Final Rule: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events, SECY-16-0142, Enclosure 1, January 5, 2017, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1630/ML16301A005.html.
59 NRC, “Staff Requirements—Affirmation Session,” SRM-M190124A, Enclosure 1, January 24, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1902/ML19023A038.html.
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asserted that the deleted requirements did not meet NRC’s cost-benefit standards.60 NRC is continuing to monitor the implementation of all post-Fukushima regulations and orders.61
Recent Events
NRC published new emergency planning regulations for SMRs and other new nuclear technologies November 16, 2023. The new rules allow SMRs and other new technologies (other than conventional large LWRs) to calculate emergency planning zones (EPZs) based on smaller inventories of radioactive materials, lower frequencies of release, and other safety improvements over existing reactors. For existing reactors, the EPZ for direct radioactive exposure (the “plume exposure pathway”), in which planning for evacuations and other protective actions is required, includes the area within about 10 miles from each reactor. Under the calculations specified by the new rules, an EPZ might not extend beyond the boundary of a nuclear plant site. In its explanation of the new rules, NRC said, “In cases where a plume exposure pathway EPZ does not extend beyond the site boundary, even in the absence of NRC requirements for offsite radiological emergency planning, the responsible OROs [offsite response organizations] would continue to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public.”62 The new rules were long supported by the nuclear industry but criticized by groups skeptical about the nuclear industry’s safety and security record.63
The 10th anniversary of the Fukushima disaster in March 2021 was noted around the world with retrospectives, status reports, and commentary. “An important lesson of Fukushima is that regulators must be strong, independent and adequately resourced,” the International Atomic Energy Agency said in marking the occasion.64 The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum issued a statement declaring, “We in the nuclear industry must reflect on the Fukushima Daiichi accident and learn its lessons thoroughly as we firmly pledge never to allow it to recur, through our unwavering efforts to improve safety.”65
60 Ibid., “Views of the Commission.” 61 NRC, “Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities,” August 13, 2018, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/japan-plants.html.
62 NRC, “Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors and Other New Technologies,” final rule and guidance, Federal Register, November 16, 2023, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/11/16/2023-25163/emergency-preparedness-for-small-modular-reactors-and-other-new-technologies.
63 See, for example, “NRC’s Risky Rule Change Ignores History. More Nuclear Emergency Planning Needed, Not Less. Statement by Dr. Edwin Lyman at the Union of Concerned Scientists,” August 14, 2023, https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/nrcs-risky-rule-change-ignores-history-more-nuclear-emergency-planning-needed-not-less; and Nuclear Energy Instititute, “NRC Staff Agrees Small Modular Reactors Won’t Need Large-Scale Emergency Zones,” August 22, 2018, https://www.nei.org/news/2018/nrc-staff-agrees-smrs-wont-need-large-epzs.
64 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Ten-Year Anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: A Decade of Improving Nuclear Safety,” March 10, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ten-year-anniversary-of-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-accident-a-decade-of-improving-nuclear-safety.
65 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum President Shiro Arai, “Marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident,” February 26, 2021, https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/marking-the-tenth-anniversary-of-the-fukushima-daiichi-accident.
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Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress
Hearing on the Nomination of Jeffery Martin Baran to Be a Member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
Hearing focused on the nominee’s record as an NRC Commissioner and whether his actions were appropriate to ensure adequate safety or imposed unnecessary burdens on the nuclear industry. Held May 10, 2023, https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2023/5/hearing-on-the-nomination-of-jeffery-martin-baran-to-be-a-member-of-the-nuclear-regulatory-commission.
Hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Proposed Fiscal Year 2024 Budget, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
Topics included whether NRC has sufficient budget and staffing to ensure adequate nuclear safety, progress on developing a regulatory framework for advanced reactors, and whether the agency is operating efficiently. Held April 19, 2023, https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2023/4/the-nuclear-regulatory-commission-s-proposed-fiscal-year-2024-budget.
Atomic Energy Advancement Act (H.R. 6544, Duncan)
Title I would require NRC to update its mission statement to include that licensing and regulation should be efficient and not unnecessarily limit the growth and benefits of nuclear power, while remaining consistent with Atomic Energy Act safety standards. Would require NRC to implement procedures for “efficient, timely, and predictable” licensing reviews and make other improvements in licensing efficiency. Would authorize direct hiring and higher compensation if needed to address NRC workforce shortages. Would reduce and restrict fees charged to specified nuclear license applicants. Introduced December 1, 2023, and ordered to be reported by House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Efficient Nuclear Licensing Hearings Act (H.R. 6464, Griffith)
Would allow NRC to issue licenses and permits without holding the currently required mandatory hearing if such a hearing is not requested and allow for use of informal adjudicatory procedures. Introduced November 21, 2023; referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Advancing Nuclear Regulatory Oversight Act (H.R. 6346, Lesko)
Would require NRC to submit reports to Congress on regulatory changes adopted during the COVID-19 health emergency, possible oversight and inspection improvements, and potential reductions in NRC’s costs for office space and facilities. Introduced November 9, 2023; referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Nuclear for Brownfield Site Preparation Act (H.R. 6268, Guthrie)
Would require NRC to submit a report to Congress and initiate a rulemaking on timely licensing reviews for nuclear facilities at retired fossil fuel sites or brownfield sites. Introduced November 7, 2023; referred to the House Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
116th Congress
Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act (H.R. 1760, Flores)
Required DOE to establish a program to support the availability of HALEU as fuel for advanced nuclear reactors. Introduced March 14, 2019; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Passed House by voice vote September 9, 2019. HALEU authorization included in Energy Act of
2020.
Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (S. 903, Murkowski/H.R. 3306, Luria)
Would have authorized federal agencies to sign power purchase agreements (PPAs) with electric utilities for up to 40 years and required DOE to establish a pilot PPA program for new nuclear reactors. Included provisions directing DOE to demonstrate advanced reactor technologies, prepare a nuclear energy strategic plan, and make HALEU available for advanced nuclear reactors. DOE and NRC were to establish a program to support university research on advanced nuclear technologies. Senate bil introduced March 27, 2019; referred to Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources. Legislative hearings held April 30, 2019. Approved by Committee July 16, 2019 (S.Rept. 116-114). House bil introduced June 19, 2019; referred to Committees on Science, Space, and Technology; Energy and Commerce; Oversight and Reform; and Armed Services. Authorizations for HALEU program and university advanced reactor research support
included in Energy Act of 2020.
Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies Act (H.R. 3358, Higgins)
Directed DOE to carry out two advanced nuclear reactor demonstrations by the end of 2025, to the extent practicable, and up to four additional demonstrations by the end of 2035. The demonstrations were to be cost-shared with nonfederal entities. Would have required DOE to submit a nuclear energy strategic plan to specified congressional committees. Introduced June 19,
2019; referred to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Authorization for DOE
Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program included in Energy Act of 2020.
Nuclear Energy Renewal Act of 2019 (S. 2368, Coons)
Included authorizations of appropriations for DOE advanced nuclear R&D programs through FY2029. Appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Technologies Development Program were to
be authorized at $120 mil ion per year; Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program at $200 mil ion per year; Material Recovery and Waste Form Development at $50 mil ion per year; Advanced Fuels at $120 mil ion per year; Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies at $150 mil ion per year; Radiological Facilities Management at $30 mil ion per year; and International Nuclear Energy Cooperation at $10 mil ion per year. Included authorization for DOE and NRC to develop
certification and licensing criteria for advanced reactors and to provide assistance to advanced reactor license applicants. Appropriations were to be authorized at $15 mil ion per year through FY2029. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, aimed at existing reactors, would also have been authorized through FY2029. It would have al owed an exemption to the existing minimum of 20% private-sector cost sharing for programs authorized by the bil . Introduced July
31, 2019; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Approved by Committee November 19, 2019 (S.Rept. 116-203). Authorizations of DOE nuclear energy programs included
in Energy Act of 2020.
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Integrated Energy Systems Act of 2019 (S. 2702, Risch)
Included provisions to establish an integrated energy systems program to integrate nuclear energy with renewable energy, fossil energy, and energy storage; and expand the use of emissions-reducing energy technologies into nonelectric sectors. Introduced November 19, 2019; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and reported the same day with an amendment in
the nature of a substitute (S.Rept. 116-199). Integrated energy systems program authorization
included in Energy Act of 2020.
American Energy Innovation Act (S.Amdt. 1407, Murkowski)
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to S. 2657, including provisions from several nuclear energy bil s reported by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: S. 2368, S. 903, and S.
2702. Amendment submitted March 3, 2020; cloture not invoked March 9, 2020, by vote of 47-
44. Many provisions included in Energy Act of 2020.
Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act (H.R. 6097, Lamb)
Included authorizations for DOE nuclear energy research and demonstration programs for existing commercial reactors; advanced reactor technologies; hybrid nuclear energy systems that
would operate in tandem with storage, renewable, or other technologies; HALEU for advanced reactors; used (spent) nuclear fuel, including recycling and waste disposal; and advanced technology fuels. It would have authorized $3.016 bil ion through FY2025 to construct a versatile neutron source, or versatile test reactor. Authorizations were included for DOE to enter into cost-shared agreements for least two advanced reactor demonstration projects by 2027 and from two to
five additional projects by 2035, for which $3.2 bil ion was to be authorized through FY2025. Authorizations are also included for international nuclear energy cooperation and university scholarships and fel owships in nuclear R&D. Introduced March 5, 2020; referred to House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Authorizations for HALEU, hybrid nuclear energy systems, spent fuel research, versatile neutron source, advanced reactor demonstrations, international energy cooperation, and university scholarships and fel owships included in Energy
Act of 2020.
Nuclear Energy for the Future Act (H.R. 6796, Weber)
Included provisions requiring DOE to carry out an advanced reactor technologies research and development program through public-private partnerships, along with an authorization of $3.016 bil ion through FY2025 to construct a versatile neutron source. Introduced May 8, 2020; referred
to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Versatile neutron source
authorization included in Energy Act of 2020.
Hearing: Advanced Nuclear Technology: Protecting U.S. Leadership and
Expanding Opportunities for Licensing New Nuclear Energy Technologies
Hearing by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety on the international and domestic outlook for advanced nuclear technologies, June 4, 2019. Witnesses included Wil iam D. Magwood, Director General of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency, and representatives of advanced nuclear technology companies and public policy organizations. Video, written statements, and other material can be found at https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
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2019/6/advanced-nuclear-technology-protecting-u-s-leadership-and-expanding-opportunities-for-
licensing-new-nuclear-energy-technologies.
CRS Reports
CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues, by
Daniel e A. Arostegui and Mark Holt
CRS Report R46372, Summary and Analysis of S. 2657, the American Energy Innovation Act,
coordinated by Brent D. Yacobucci
Additional References
Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN), U.S. Department of Energy website,
https://gain.inl.gov/SitePages/Home.aspx
Proposed U.S. Army Mobile Nuclear Reactors: Costs and Risks Outweigh Benefits, Alan J. Kuperman, University of Texas at Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project, April 22, 2021, http://mail01.tinyletterapp.com/NPPP/2-reports-army-reactors-space-reactors/19288238-sites.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2021/04/army-reactor-report-nppp-
2021-april.pdf
Small Modular Reactors: Challenges and Opportunities, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency, April 7, 2021, https://www.oecd.org/
publications/smal -modular-reactors-18fbb76c-en.htm
A Comparison of Advanced Nuclear Technologies, Andrew C. Kadak, Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, March 2021, https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/A%20Comparison%20of%20Nuclear%20Technologies%20033017.pdf
“Advanced” Isn’t Always Better: Assessing the Safety, Security, and Environmental Impacts of
Non-Light-Water Nuclear Reactors, Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2021,
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/advanced-isnt-always-better
Raising the Next Generation of Nuclear: A Road Map for Deployment, Third Way, October 17, 2019, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/raising-the-next-generation-of-nuclear-a-road-map-for-
deployment
Metric and Method for Comparing Investments to Decarbonize the Electricity System, Rocky Mountain Institute, September 24, 2019, https://rmi.org/insight/decarbonizing-the-electricity-
system
Nuclear Innovation and NEPA, Nuclear Innovation Al iance, September 2019,
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/5b05b3_e661eba94a224b28aac2a7e11d60e0c6.pdf
Examination of Federal Financial Assistance in the Renewable Energy Market: Implications and
Opportunities for Commercial Deployment of Small Modular Reactors, Scully Capital and Kutak
Rock for the U.S. Department of Energy, October 2018, https://www.energy.gov/ne/downloads/
report-examination-federal-financial-assistance-renewable-energy-market
Leading on SMRs, Nuclear Innovation Al iance, October 2017, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/
5b05b3_d163208371134cc590a234100429a6fd.pdf
Strategies for Advanced Reactor Licensing, Nuclear Innovation Al iance, April 2016,
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/5b05b3_71d4011545234838aa27005ab7d757f1.pdf
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Advanced Nuclear 101, Third Way, December 1, 2015, http://www.thirdway.org/report/advanced-
nuclear-101
Safety
The 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant disaster in Japan, triggered by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake and 45-foot tsunami, greatly increased concerns about safety in the nuclear policy debate. The accident clearly demonstrated the potential consequences of a total loss of power (or “station blackout”) at today’s commercial nuclear plants. Even when the nuclear reaction shuts
down as designed, as at the Fukushima plant after the initial earthquake, residual radioactivity in the reactor core continues to generate “decay heat” that must be removed, typical y by electrical y
driven or controlled cooling systems.
When the tsunami knocked out power at the three Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors that had been operating when the earthquake struck, the buildup of heat and pressure from residual radioactivity became so great that it melted the reactors’ nuclear fuel and exceeded the limits of their containment structures. The decay heat also caused steam to chemical y react with the nuclear fuel cladding in the reactor cores, generating additional heat along with hydrogen that escaped
into the upper part of the reactor buildings and exploded. Cooling was also lost in Fukushima’s spent fuel storage pools, causing concern that they could overheat, although later examination
indicated that they did not.
Safety requirements for nuclear power plants are established and enforced in the United States by NRC, an independent regulatory agency. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires NRC to ensure that licensed nuclear facilities “provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public” (42 U.S.C. 2232). NRC may issue safety requirements that exceed the statutory “adequate
protection” standard if their benefits are found to exceed their costs.
NRC safety regulations address the effects of external events such as earthquakes and floods, equipment failure such as breaks in coolant pipes, and other problems that could lead to radioactive releases into the environment. Critics of nuclear power contend that NRC is often
reluctant to impose necessary safety requirements that would be costly or disruptive to the nuclear industry. However, the industry has frequently contended that costly safety proposals are
unnecessary and would not significantly increase large existing safety margins.
Following the Fukushima disaster, NRC established a task force to identify lessons applicable to U.S. reactors and recommend safety improvements. The task force’s report led to NRC’s first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements, on March 12, 2012. NRC ordered al reactors to develop strategies to maintain cooling and containment integrity during external events, such as floods and earthquakes, that were more severe than anticipated by the plants’ designs (“beyond
design basis”). In addition, NRC required that U.S. reactors of similar design to the Fukushima reactors have “reliable hardened vents” to remove excess pressure from their primary containments, and that better instrumentation be instal ed to monitor the condition of spent fuel
pools during accidents.44
The NRC commissioners on March 19, 2013, required NRC staff to study whether to require the newly mandated containment vents to include filters or other means to reduce the release of radioactive material if the vents have to be used. The idea of requiring filters had drawn praise
44 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Actions in Response to the Japan Nuclear Accident: March 12, 2012,” updated May 30, 2012, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/timeline/03122012.html.
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from nuclear critics but opposition from the industry on cost grounds.45 NRC voted on August 19,
2015, not to proceed with rulemaking on filtered vents.46
Recent Events
Congressional controversy was generated by NRC’s final rule for Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (MBDBE), announced January 24, 2019.47 The MBDBE regulation requires nuclear
power plants to implement strategies to maintain reactor core cooling when electric power is lost, as occurred during the Fukushima accident. The MBDBE proposed rule, published November 13, 2015,48 and the draft final rule, released by NRC on January 5, 2017,49 would have required the equipment used in those strategies to be able to withstand newly evaluated flooding and seismic risks, and that regular dril s and exercises be conducted. The final rule excluded those requirements, among other changes.50 In supporting those exclusions, the Commission majority
asserted that the deleted requirements did not meet NRC’s cost-benefit standards.51 NRC is
continuing to monitor the implementation of al post-Fukushima regulations and orders.52
The 10th anniversary of the Fukushima disaster in March 2021 was noted around the world with retrospectives, status reports, and commentary. “An important lesson of Fukushima is that regulators must be strong, independent and adequately resourced,” the International Atomic Energy Agency said in marking the occasion.53 The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum issued a statement declaring, “We in the nuclear industry must reflect on the Fukushima Dai chi accident and learn its lessons thoroughly as we firmly pledge never to al ow it to recur, through our
unwavering efforts to improve safety.”54
45 NRC, “Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems f or Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments,” staff requirement s memorandum, SECY-12-0157, March 19, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2012/2012-0157srm.pdf; Freebairn, William, “ NRC Staff Recommends Ordering Filtered Vents for 31 Power Reactors,” Inside NRC, November 5, 2012, p. 1. 46 NRC, “Hardened Vents and Filtration (for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II containment designs),” http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/hardened-vents.html. 47 NRC, “ NRC T o Issue Final Rule for Mitigating Severe Events at U.S. Reactors,” news release, January 24, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2019/19-005.pdf.
48 NRC, “Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, November 13, 2015, Vol. 80, No. 219, p. 70610, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-11-13/pdf/2015-28589.pdf.
49 NRC, Final Rule: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events, SECY-16-0142, Enclosure 1, January 5, 2017, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1630/ML16301A005.html. 50 NRC, “Staff Requirements—Affirmation Session,” SRM-M190124A, Enclosure 1, January 24, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1902/ML19023A038.html.
51 Ibid., “Views of the Commission.” 52 NRC, “ Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities,” August 13, 2018, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/japan-plants.html. 53 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Ten-Year Anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: A Decade of Improving Nuclear Safety ,” March 10, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ten-year-anniversary-of-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-accident -a-decade-of-improving-nuclear-safety.
54 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum President Shiro Arai, “ Marking the T enth Anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident ,” February 26, 2021, https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/marking-the-tenth-anniversary-of-the-fukushima-daiichi-accident .
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Selected Congressional Action—117th Congress
Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Whistleblower
Protection Act (S. 2896, Duckworth)
Specifies that DOE and NRC employees are included in protections against management retaliation under the Energy Reorganization Act (42 U.S.C. 5851) for raising nuclear safety
concerns. Introduced September 29, 2021; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources.
Nuclear Licensing Efficiency Act (H.R. 1578, Kinzinger)
Establishes timelines and modifies procedures for nuclear power plant permitting and licensing. NRC would have to issue safety evaluation reports and final environmental impact statements for
nuclear reactor license applications “to the maximum extent practicable within 42 months after the application is accepted for docketing.” NRC could use informal procedures for licensing hearings if it found formal adjudicatory procedures to be unnecessary. Introduced March 3, 2021;
referred to House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Modernize Nuclear Reactor Environmental Reviews Act (H.R. 1559, Duncan)
Modifies requirements and procedures for NRC environmental reviews of nuclear power plant licensing and permitting decisions. Requires NRC within three years of enactment to promulgate a final rule “establishing an optional generic environmental impact statement that may be used in the licensing process for nuclear reactors” and al owing for environmental assessments and categorical exclusions for environmental reviews where appropriate. Introduced March 3, 2021;
referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
116th Congress
Low-Dose Radiation Research Act of 2019 (H.R. 4733, Posey)
Would have authorized a DOE research program on the effects of exposure to low -dose radiation.
Introduced October 18, 2019; referred to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Whistleblower
Protection Act of 2019 (H.R. 5787, Horsford/S. 1330, Duckworth)
Would have specifical y protected al DOE and NRC employees from retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns (whistleblowing). House bil introduced February 6, 2020; referred to
Committee on Energy and Commerce; Senate bil introduced May 6, 2019Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
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NRC Mission Alignment Act (H.R. 6265, Duncan)
Would require NRC to update its mission statement, while conforming to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to include that licensing of nuclear facilities should be efficient and not unnecessarily limit the potential benefits of nuclear energy. Introduced November 7, 2023; referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Modernize Nuclear Reactor Environmental Reviews Act (H.R. 6252, Weber)
Would direct the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to submit a report and conduct a rulemaking on facilitating efficient, timely environmental reviews of nuclear reactor applications. Introduced November 6, 2023; referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Nuclear Licensing Efficiency Act (H.R. 6236, Allen)
Would tighten timelines for NRC licensing reviews and require NRC, in reviewing applications for nuclear facilities at currently licensed sites, to use information previously used to license that site, to the maximum extent practicable. Introduced November 6, 2023; referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered t be reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Nuclear Red Tape Reduction Act (H.R. 4676, Donalds)
Would establish deadlines for interested parties to request that NRC hold hearings on applications for reactor construction permits and license applications, allow for hearings to be waived in specified circumstances, and require NRC to report to Congress on reactor license renewal periods. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee ; referred to Committee
on Energy and on Energy and
Natural Resources.
Hearing: Preserving and Expanding Clean, Reliable Nuclear Power: U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Reactor Performance Trends and Safety Initiatives
Hearing by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on the safety of existing and potential future nuclear power plants and other issues relating to commercial nuclear power. Witnesses came from industry, government, and advocacy organizations. Video, written
statements, and other material can be found at https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
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2019/11/preserving-and-expanding-clean-reliable-nuclear-power-u-s-commercial-nuclear-reactor-
performance-trends-and-safety-initiatives.
CRS Reports
CRS Report R41694, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, by Mark Holt, Richard J. Campbel , and
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Additional References
Post-Fukushima Safety EnhancementsCommerce.
NRC Office of Public Engagement and Participation Act of 2023 (H.R. 4530, Levin)
Would establish an Office of Public Engagement and Participation within NRC to support, coordinate, and assist public participation in NRC proceedings and advocate for the public interest within NRC. Introduced July 11, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Strengthening the NRC Workforce Act of 2023 (H.R. 4528, DeGette)
Would authorize the NRC Chairman, upon certifying a critical hiring need or shortage of candidates, to “directly appoint highly qualified individuals into the competitive service.” Also would establish procedures for temporarily setting higher compensation levels for certain categories of employees. Introduced July 11, 2023. Related NRC workforce provisions included in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 as passed by the Senate (S. 2226, Section 8141(u)). Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023.
Hydrogen Permitting Simplification Act (H.R. 2962, Lesko)
Would exempt certain major federal actions, including actions that produce hydrogen from nuclear reactors, from requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
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Introduced April 27, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to the Committee on Natural Resources for provisions under its jurisdiction.
Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Whistleblower Protection Act (S. 1112, Duckworth)
Would specify that DOE and NRC employees are included in protections against management retaliation under the Energy Reorganization Act (42 U.S.C. 5851) for raising nuclear safety concerns. Introduced March 30, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Reintroduced from 116th Congress (S. 2962).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Survey Act (H.R. 1006, Donalds)
Would require the NRC inspector general to distribute optional and anonymous surveys about NRC’s efficiency and effectiveness to NRC employees and, if feasible, to stakeholders in the nuclear industry. Introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Additional References
Improving the Efficiency of NRC Power Reactor Licensing: The 1957 Mandatory Hearing Reconsidered, Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, November 21, 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/improving-the-efficiency-of-nrc-power-reactor-licensing-the-1957-mandatory-hearing-reconsidered
Plant-Specific Safety Enhancements After Fukushima,,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page,
reviewed/updated reviewed/updated
March 11, 2020December 7, 2021, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/post-, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/post-
fukushima-safety-enhancements.html fukushima-safety-enhancements.html
Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, World Nuclear Association, March World Nuclear Association, March
20212022, https://www.world-, https://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-
reactors.aspx reactors.aspx
Nuclear Power 101, Natural Resources Defense Council, May 14, 2020, https://www.nrdc.org/ Natural Resources Defense Council, May 14, 2020, https://www.nrdc.org/
stories/nuclear-power-101stories/nuclear-power-101
Nuclear Safety: Countries’ Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the Fukushima
Daiichi Accident, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, , Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Government Accountability Office, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Government Accountability Office,
GAO-14-109, March 2014, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-109 GAO-14-109, March 2014, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-109
State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report, Nuclear Regulatory , Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NUREG-1935, November 2012, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/Commission, NUREG-1935, November 2012, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
nuregs/staff/sr1935 nuregs/staff/sr1935
Security and Emergency Response
The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants became a high-profile issue The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants became a high-profile issue
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a
series of orders and regulations that series of orders and regulations that
substantial ysubstantially increased nuclear plant security requirements, increased nuclear plant security requirements,
although industry critics contend that those measures are although industry critics contend that those measures are
stil still insufficient. Key measures include insufficient. Key measures include
an increase in the level of attacks that nuclear plant security forces must be able to repel, an increase in the level of attacks that nuclear plant security forces must be able to repel,
requirements for mitigating the effects of large fires and explosions, and a requirement that new requirements for mitigating the effects of large fires and explosions, and a requirement that new
reactors be capable of withstanding aircraft crashes without releasing radioactive material. NRC reactors be capable of withstanding aircraft crashes without releasing radioactive material. NRC
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also modified its planning requirements for evacuations and other emergency responses after the also modified its planning requirements for evacuations and other emergency responses after the
9/11 attacks, and the Fukushima disaster 9/11 attacks, and the Fukushima disaster
il ustratedillustrated the importance of emergency response to the importance of emergency response to
radioactive releases from any cause. radioactive releases from any cause.
NRC issued wide-ranging revisions to its emergency preparedness regulations on November 1,
NRC issued wide-ranging revisions to its emergency preparedness regulations on November 1,
2011, dealing with duties of emergency personnel and the inclusion of hostile actions in 2011, dealing with duties of emergency personnel and the inclusion of hostile actions in
emergency planning emergency planning
dril s.55drills.66 In response to Fukushima, NRC staff recommended that nuclear In response to Fukushima, NRC staff recommended that nuclear
emergency plans be required to address events affecting multiple reactors and prolonged station emergency plans be required to address events affecting multiple reactors and prolonged station
55 NRC, “Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,” final rule, Federal Register, November 23, 2011, p. 72560.
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blackout. NRC told nuclear power plants on March 12, 2012, to provide specific information and blackout. NRC told nuclear power plants on March 12, 2012, to provide specific information and
analysis on those issues.analysis on those issues.
5667
The NRC Cyber Security Directorate was established in June 2013 to coordinate rulemaking,
The NRC Cyber Security Directorate was established in June 2013 to coordinate rulemaking,
guidance, and oversight of cybersecurity at nuclear power plants and other regulated nuclear guidance, and oversight of cybersecurity at nuclear power plants and other regulated nuclear
facilities. As part of the Directorate, NRC’s Cyber Assessment Team responds to cybersecurity facilities. As part of the Directorate, NRC’s Cyber Assessment Team responds to cybersecurity
events at NRC-licensed facilities and coordinates threat assessments with other federal agencies.events at NRC-licensed facilities and coordinates threat assessments with other federal agencies.
5768
Recent Events
NRC issued a
NRC issued a
draft final rule final rule
June 7, 2018March 14, 2023, on “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background , on “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background
Checks, and Security Event Notifications.”Checks, and Security Event Notifications.”
58 The draft final rule, which is awaiting Commission approval following a staff revision submitted February 4, 2020,59 would establish69 The rule establishes procedures for procedures for
nuclear power plants and other licensed nuclear facilities to apply for NRC authorization to arm nuclear power plants and other licensed nuclear facilities to apply for NRC authorization to arm
their security personnel with “enhanced” weapons, such as semiautomatic assault weapons and their security personnel with “enhanced” weapons, such as semiautomatic assault weapons and
machine guns, despite any state laws prohibiting such weapons. NRC is authorized to preempt machine guns, despite any state laws prohibiting such weapons. NRC is authorized to preempt
state laws for this purpose under Atomic Energy Act Section 161A, enacted by the Energy Policy state laws for this purpose under Atomic Energy Act Section 161A, enacted by the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58).
The rule also modifiesThe draft final rule would also modify NRC requirements for nuclear NRC requirements for nuclear
power plants and other licensed facilities to report events related to physical security and would power plants and other licensed facilities to report events related to physical security and would
add requirements for reporting suspicious add requirements for reporting suspicious
activities.
Concerns about international nuclear plant security have been raised by Russia’s ongoing military occupation of Ukraine’s six-reactor Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP)—the largest in Europe. Russian forces captured the plant on March 4, 2022, and it has since lost offsite power several times, increasing the risk of damage to the plant’s nuclear fuel and radioactive releases to the environment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report on September 5, 2022, that called for “establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone” around the plant, but the proposal has not been implemented.70
66 NRC, “Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,” final rule, Federal Register, November 23, 2011, p. 72560.
67 NRC, “Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Taskactivities.
CRS Reports
CRS In Focus IF10821, Price-Anderson Act: Nuclear Power Industry Liability Limits and
Compensation to the Public After Radioactive Releases, by Mark Holt
CRS Report RL34331, Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities, by Mark Holt
Additional References
Update on Radiological Emergency Preparedness Enhancement Activities Resulting from Lessons
Learned Following September 11, 2001, and Other Recent Natural Disasters, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, July 19, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1911/ML19116A159.pdf
Backgrounder on Nuclear Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page, last reviewed/updated May 31, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
security-enhancements.html
Nuclear Plant Security, Union of Concerned Scientists, web page, updated February 25, 2016,
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/nuclear-plant-security#.W2RtxtJKiUk
Protecting Our Nation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR-0314, Rev. 4, August
2015, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1523/ML15232A263.pdf
56 NRC, “Request for Information Pursuant to T itle 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-T erm T ask Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Accident,” March 12, 2012, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12053A340.pdf. Accident,” March 12, 2012, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12053A340.pdf.
5768 NRC, NRC,
“Backgrounder on Cyber Security,”“Backgrounder on Cyber Security,”
March 2019, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/March 2019, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
cyber-security-bg.html. cyber-security-bg.html.
5869 NRC, NRC,
“Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications,”“Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications,”
draft final rule, SECY-18-0058, June 7, 2018, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1626/ML16264A000.html. 59 NRC, “Supplement to SECY-18-0058, ‘Draft Final Rule—Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications,’” February 4, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1901/ML19017A025.pdf.
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Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation
Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making
final rule, March 14, 2023, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/14/2023-03944/enhanced-weapons-firearms-background-checks-and-security-event-notifications.
70 IAEA, Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards in Ukraine, September 5, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf.
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Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress
Sanction Russian Nuclear Safety Violators Act of 2023 (H.R. 3246, Meeks)
Would require the President to impose specified sanctions on any foreign person who has endangered the integrity, safety, or undermined Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. Introduced May 11, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary for provisions under its jurisdiction.
To require reports on the dangers posed by nuclear reactors in areas that might experience armed conflict (S. 571, Markey)
Would require the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator for Nuclear Security to submit a report to Congress assessing the dangers posed by nuclear reactors in regions that have experienced armed conflict within the past 25 years or may experience armed conflict under specified scenarios. Introduced February 28, 2023; referred to Committee on Armed Services.
CRS Reports
CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin
CRS In Focus IF10821, Price-Anderson Act: Nuclear Power Industry Liability Limits and Compensation to the Public After Radioactive Releases, by Mark Holt
Additional References
Security Aspects of Nuclear Facilities, International Atomic Energy Agency, website, https://www.iaea.org/topics/security-aspects
Update on Radiological Emergency Preparedness Enhancement Activities Resulting from Lessons Learned Following September 11, 2001, and Other Recent Natural Disasters, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 19, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1911/ML19116A159.pdf
Backgrounder on Nuclear Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page, last reviewed/updated May 31, 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/security-enhancements.html
Nuclear Plant Security, Union of Concerned Scientists, web page, updated February 25, 2016, https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/nuclear-plant-security#.W2RtxtJKiUk
Protecting Our Nation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR-0314, Rev. 4, August 2015, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1523/ML15232A263.pdf
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of
U.S. nuclear energy policy. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires that any country U.S. nuclear energy policy. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires that any country
receiving U.S. nuclear technology, equipment, or materials implement a peaceful nuclear receiving U.S. nuclear technology, equipment, or materials implement a peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with the United States. These so-cooperation agreement with the United States. These so-
cal edcalled 123 agreements are intended to 123 agreements are intended to
ensure that U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries does not result in the production of ensure that U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries does not result in the production of
weapons materials or otherwise encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Section 123 weapons materials or otherwise encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Section 123
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allows nuclear cooperation agreements to take effect after 90 days of continuous congressional nuclear cooperation agreements to take effect after 90 days of continuous congressional
session if they adhere to specified criteria. session if they adhere to specified criteria.
International controls and inspections are intended to ensure the peaceful use of civilian nuclear
International controls and inspections are intended to ensure the peaceful use of civilian nuclear
facilities and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, recent plans or proposals to facilities and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, recent plans or proposals to
build nuclear power plants in build nuclear power plants in
countries60countries71 that have not previously used nuclear energy, including that have not previously used nuclear energy, including
several in the Middle East and several in the Middle East and
elsewhere in the less developed worldcountries without nuclear experience, have prompted concerns , have prompted concerns
that international controls may prove inadequate. Numerous recommendations have been made in that international controls may prove inadequate. Numerous recommendations have been made in
the United States and elsewhere to create new incentives for nations to forgo the development of the United States and elsewhere to create new incentives for nations to forgo the development of
uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities that could produce weapons uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities that could produce weapons
materials as materials as
wel well as civilian nuclear fuel. as civilian nuclear fuel.
Recent Events
Iran’s nuclear energy program is a major example of the tension between peaceful and weapons Iran’s nuclear energy program is a major example of the tension between peaceful and weapons
uses of nuclear technology. Long-standing world concern had focused on the Iranian uranium uses of nuclear technology. Long-standing world concern had focused on the Iranian uranium
enrichment program, which Iran contended was solely for peaceful purposes but which the United enrichment program, which Iran contended was solely for peaceful purposes but which the United
States and other countries suspected was for producing weapons material. The U.N. Security States and other countries suspected was for producing weapons material. The U.N. Security
Council had imposed sanctions and passed several resolutions Council had imposed sanctions and passed several resolutions
cal ingcalling on Iran to suspend its on Iran to suspend its
enrichment program and other sensitive nuclear activities. Iran finalized the Joint Comprehensive enrichment program and other sensitive nuclear activities. Iran finalized the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, with the United States Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, with the United States
(which ceased participating in 201872) and the other four permanent and the other four permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany to lift the U.N. sanctions in return for members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany to lift the U.N. sanctions in return for
specified Iranian actions to preclude nuclear weapons development. specified Iranian actions to preclude nuclear weapons development.
Recent Events
President Trump announced President Trump announced
on May 8, 2018, that on May 8, 2018, that
thehis Administration would cease implementing Administration would cease implementing
the JCPOAthe agreement and reimpose and reimpose
sanctions. Other parties to the JCPOA have not followed the U.S. leadsanctions. Other parties to the JCPOA have not followed the U.S. lead
, however.61.73 Nevertheless, beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits; Iran has since increased the number of activities that violate JCPOA restrictions. The Biden The Biden
AdministrationAdministration
, in April in April
2021 2021, participated in indirect talks with Iran through other JCPOA participated in indirect talks with Iran through other JCPOA
participants about participants about
potential ypotentially returning to compliance if Iran returning to compliance if Iran
does as wel .62did as well.74 A United Kingdom Parliament fact sheet issued in October 2023 says the JCPOA talks have stalled and may “now be derailed by wider geopolitical developments in the Middle East.”75
An extension of the U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea generated
An extension of the U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea generated
controversy but no congressional action to block it. During negotiations on the U.S.-South Korea controversy but no congressional action to block it. During negotiations on the U.S.-South Korea
nuclear cooperation extension, which entered into force November 25, 2015, South Korea had nuclear cooperation extension, which entered into force November 25, 2015, South Korea had
sought advance U.S. consent for spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment. The United sought advance U.S. consent for spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment. The United
States did not provide such consent, on general nonproliferation grounds and because such States did not provide such consent, on general nonproliferation grounds and because such
60
71 World Nuclear World Nuclear
Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,” October 2021, Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,” October 2021,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html.
61
72 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal,” May 8, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal.
73 European Union, “Joint Statement on the Re-imposition of U.S. Sanctions Due European Union, “Joint Statement on the Re-imposition of U.S. Sanctions Due
to Its Withdrawal from the Joint to Its Withdrawal from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” June 8, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” June 8, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/
49141/joint49141/joint
-statement-re-imposition-us-sanctions-due-its-withdrawal-joint-statement-re-imposition-us-sanctions-due-its-withdrawal-joint
-comprehensive-plan-action_en. -comprehensive-plan-action_en.
6274 U.S. U.S.
Department of State, “Department of State, “
Briefing Briefing
Withwith Senior State Department Official Senior State Department Official
Onon Recent U.S. Engagement in Vienna Recent U.S. Engagement in Vienna
RegardingRegarding
the JCPOA,” April 9, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-recent-the JCPOA,” April 9, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-recent-
u-s-engagementu-s-engagement
-in-vienna-regarding-the-jcpoa. -in-vienna-regarding-the-jcpoa.
75 UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, “What Is the Status of the Iran Nuclear Deal?,” October 13, 2023, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9870.
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consent could affect other ongoing issues on the Korean peninsula. The new agreement did,
consent could affect other ongoing issues on the Korean peninsula. The new agreement did,
however, establish a bilateralhowever, establish a bilateral
“high level commission” to further consider those issues. The high-“high level commission” to further consider those issues. The high-
level commission’s deliberations are to be informed by the results of a 10-year Joint Fuel Cycle level commission’s deliberations are to be informed by the results of a 10-year Joint Fuel Cycle
Study by scientists from the two countries that was scheduled to be completed in April 2021. Study by scientists from the two countries that was scheduled to be completed in April 2021.
However, according to DOE, some aspects of the study have not been completed and discussions However, according to DOE, some aspects of the study have not been completed and discussions
on how to move forward are continuing.on how to move forward are continuing.
63 76
Japan’s long-standing nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States
Japan’s long-standing nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States
automatical yautomatically renewed on July 17, 2018, and renewed on July 17, 2018, and
wil will remain in force indefinitely unless terminated by either side.remain in force indefinitely unless terminated by either side.
64
77 The agreement The agreement
al owsallows Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from its U.S.-designed reactors, Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from its U.S.-designed reactors,
separating plutonium and uranium for use in new fuel. A separating plutonium and uranium for use in new fuel. A
long-delayed commercial reprocessing plant at commercial reprocessing plant at
Rokkasho is scheduled to be completed in Rokkasho is scheduled to be completed in
2022.652024 at the earliest.78 Some nuclear nonproliferation groups had Some nuclear nonproliferation groups had
urged the United States to use the renewal of the U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement as an urged the United States to use the renewal of the U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement as an
opportunity to urge Japan not to begin its reprocessing program. They noted that Japan already opportunity to urge Japan not to begin its reprocessing program. They noted that Japan already
has substantial stockpiles of previously separated plutonium that has substantial stockpiles of previously separated plutonium that
could potentiallycould potential y be used for be used for
weapons as weapons as
wel well as reactor fuel.as reactor fuel.
6679 Japan approved a Japan approved a
new Strategic Energy Plan July 3, 2018, that Strategic Energy Plan July 3, 2018, that
includes a pledge to reduce Japanese plutonium inventories, reportedly following pressure from includes a pledge to reduce Japanese plutonium inventories, reportedly following pressure from
the United States and other countries.the United States and other countries.
67
Recent discussions80
Discussions between the United States and Saudi Arabia toward drafting a peaceful between the United States and Saudi Arabia toward drafting a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement have prompted substantial controversy. The U.S. nuclear industry nuclear cooperation agreement have prompted substantial controversy. The U.S. nuclear industry
strongly supports an agreement so that it could supply reactors and other nuclear technology to strongly supports an agreement so that it could supply reactors and other nuclear technology to
Saudi Arabia.Saudi Arabia.
6881 However, nuclear nonproliferation groups want any nuclear cooperation However, nuclear nonproliferation groups want any nuclear cooperation
agreement to include a binding commitment from Saudi Arabia to forswear uranium enrichment agreement to include a binding commitment from Saudi Arabia to forswear uranium enrichment
and spent fuel reprocessing on its territory.and spent fuel reprocessing on its territory.
69 82 Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testified to the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testified to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 24, 2018, that the United States was insisting that Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 24, 2018, that the United States was insisting that
Saudi Arabia accept such a commitment as part of any 123 agreement, despite Saudi arguments Saudi Arabia accept such a commitment as part of any 123 agreement, despite Saudi arguments
that the country has a right to enrich and reprocess under international inspections.70 Energy Secretary Rick Perry told reporters at a meeting in September 2019 that the United States also
would condition any U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement on Saudi acceptance of the Additional Protocol,
63that the
76 Emails from John Krohn, DOE Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, March 31, 2021, and June Emails from John Krohn, DOE Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, March 31, 2021, and June
28, 2021. 28, 2021.
T heThe March email says that “ March email says that “
the US and ROKthe US and ROK
are continuing to talk to determine how to ‘finalize’ the study, are continuing to talk to determine how to ‘finalize’ the study,
as wellas well
as as potential continued work in this area.” potential continued work in this area.”
64 U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Bilateral Agreements For Peaceful Nuclear An article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists quoted an unnamed senior U.S. official as saying that “at least three or four more years will be necessary for the two governments to be in a position to draw any actual conclusions related to the technical and economic feasibility and nonproliferation acceptability of pyroprocessing on the Korean Peninsula.” Frank N. von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, “Why Joint U.S.-South Korean Research on Plutonium Separation Raises Nuclear Proliferation Danger,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/01/why-joint-us-south-korean-research-on-plutonium-separation-raises-nuclear-proliferation-danger.
77 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Bilateral Agreements For Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Pursuant to Section 123 of Cooperation Pursuant to Section 123 of
the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended,” January 20, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2017/the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended,” January 20, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2017/
266975.htm. 266975.htm.
6578 Japan Nuclear Japan Nuclear
Fuel Limited, “Reprocessing,” viewedFuel Limited, “Reprocessing,” viewed
April 27, 2021 Novermber 2, 2023, https://www.jnfl.co.jp/en/business/, https://www.jnfl.co.jp/en/business/
reprocessing. reprocessing.
66
79 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “ Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “
Tokyo and Washington Have Another Nuclear Problem,” August 17, Tokyo and Washington Have Another Nuclear Problem,” August 17,
2017, http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1341&rid=2. 2017, http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1341&rid=2.
6780 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Japanese Ministry of Economy,
T radeTrade, and Industry, “Cabinet Decision on the New Strategic Energy Plan,” July, and Industry, “Cabinet Decision on the New Strategic Energy Plan,” July
3, 3,
2018, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/0703_002.html; Reuters, “2018, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/0703_002.html; Reuters, “
Japan Pledges to Cut Plutonium Japan Pledges to Cut Plutonium
St ockpileStockpile Amid GrowingAmid Growing
Concern by Neighbours,”Concern by Neighbours,”
July July 31, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/31, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/
idAFL4N1UQ3WD. idAFL4N1UQ3WD.
68
81 Nuclear Energy Institute, “ Nuclear Energy Institute, “
As SaudiAs Saudi
Arabia ConsidersArabia Considers
New New Reactors, NEI Conducts Reactors, NEI Conducts
T radeTrade Mission,” April 26, 2018, Mission,” April 26, 2018,
https://www.nei.org/news/2018/saudi-arabia-considers-new-reactors.https://www.nei.org/news/2018/saudi-arabia-considers-new-reactors.
69
82 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Letter to Congress on Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Letter to Congress on Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi
Arabia,” May 24, Arabia,” May 24,
2018, http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1395&rtid=4. 2018, http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1395&rtid=4.
70 Mufson, Steven, “Pompeo: Saudis Must Not Enrich Uranium If It Seeks Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” May 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pompeo-saudis-must-not-enrich-uranium-if-it-seeks-civilian-nuclear-cooperation/2018/05/24/714c5e30-5f92-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html.
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country has a right to enrich and reprocess under international inspections.83 Then-Energy Secretary Rick Perry told reporters at a meeting in September 2019 that the United States also would condition any U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement on Saudi acceptance of the Additional Protocol, which allows strengthened international safeguards on nuclear facilities. strengthened international safeguards on nuclear facilities.
71 84 The Biden Administration has included U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation as a potential element of a larger diplomatic normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an effort that has been suspended but not necessarily abandoned after the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas.85
Congress prohibited Congress prohibited
the use of the use of
FY2021FY2023 funds for Export-Import Bank support for nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia funds for Export-Import Bank support for nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia
until the kingdom has a 123 agreement in effect that commits to renouncing uranium enrichment until the kingdom has a 123 agreement in effect that commits to renouncing uranium enrichment
and reprocessing and has signed an Additionaland reprocessing and has signed an Additional
Protocol with the IAEA (Section 7041(Protocol with the IAEA (Section 7041(
hi) of Division K, P.L. 117-328). The same provision was included for appropriation in FY2022 (P.L. 117-103), FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) and) of Division K, P.L. 116-260). The same prohibition was included in appropriations for FY2020 (P.L.
FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). 116-94).
Selected Congressional Action—117th118th Congress
Iran Nuclear Treaty Act (S. 2031, Johnson)
Declares that any agreement reached by the President regarding Iran’s nuclear program shal be a treaty subject to Senate advice and consent. Introduced June 10, 2021; referred to Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Stopping Activities Underpinning Development In Weapons of Mass Destruction
(SAUDI WMD) Act (S. 1146, Markey)
Prohibits U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia imports nuclear technology without adopting the Additional Protocol for international nuclear facility inspections and reached a
nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. Introduced April 15, 2021Verification Act (H.R. 6057, McClain)
Would prohibit the United States from becoming a party to the JCPOA or any other nuclear agreement with Iran until the President certifies that United Nations inspectors are allowed full access to all Iranian nuclear facilities and have completed a comprehensive report on those facilities. Introduced October 25, 2023; referred to ; referred to
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Strengthening American Nuclear Competitiveness Act (H.R. 1748, Bill Johnson)
Expedites DOE review of certain nuclear technology exports, enables increased investment in U.S. nuclear technology by American al ies, and modifies licensing requirements for new
nonelectric uses of nuclear energy and for improved manufacturing techniques. Introduced March
10, 2021; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce and Foreign Affairs.
Iran Nuclear Deal Advice and Consent Act of 2021 (H.R. 1479, Barr)
Prohibits federal funds to be used for rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action unless the Biden Administration commits to submitting any JCPOA successor to the Senate as a treaty rather
than as an international agreement. Introduced March 2, 2021Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Expressing support of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear security role (S.Res. 429, Lujan/H.Res. 641, Foster)
Resolves that the Senate and House maintain that IAEA “plays an indispensable role in strengthening nuclear security and safety around the globe” and encourage the United States and other nations to ensure that IAEA has sufficient resources to carry out its duties. Senate resolution introduced October 25, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House resolution introduced August 1, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Solidify Iran Sanctions Act of 2023 (S. 1390, Scott/H.R. 3033, Steel)
Would strike the sunset provision in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-172), which imposes various sanctions on Iran for its programs to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Senate bill introduced May 1, 2023; referred to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. House bill introduced April 28, 2023; ordered to be reported by Committee on Foreign Affairs June 21, 2023.
83 Mufson, Steven, “Pompeo: Saudis Must Not Enrich Uranium If It Seeks Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” May 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pompeo-saudis-must-not-enrich-uranium-if-it-seeks-civilian-nuclear-cooperation/2018/05/24/714c5e30-5f92-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html.
84 Natter, Ari, “U.S. Says Saudis Must Forgo Enrichment for Nuclear Sharing ; referred to Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding United States
arms transfers to Saudi Arabia (H.Res. 175, Trone)
Cal s on the U.S. Government to rescind nuclear technology transfer authorizations and “cease significant nuclear cooperation” with Saudi Arabia until Saudi Arabia signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States that guarantees that the Saudi nuclear program is solely for
civilian purposes and prohibits uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, among other provisions. Introduced February 26, 2021; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and
sequential y to the Permanent Select Committee on Intel igence.
71 Natter, Ari, “U.S. Says Saudis Must Forgo Enrichment for Nuclear Sharing Deal,” Deal,”
Bloomberg, September 18, 2019, , September 18, 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-19/u-s-says-saudis-must-forgo-enrichmenthttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-19/u-s-says-saudis-must-forgo-enrichment
-for-nuclear-sharing-deal.
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Iran Diplomacy Act of 2021 (S. 434, Markey)
Declares it to be U.S. policy that the United States and Iran “should promptly return to full compliance with al of their commitments under the JCPOA,” among other provisions. Introduced
February 24, 2021; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
Iran Nuclear Verification Act (H.R. 1203, McClain)
Prohibits the United States from becoming a party to the JCPOA or any other nuclear agreement with Iran until United Nations inspectors are al owed full access to al Iranian nuclear facilities and have completed a comprehensive report on those facilities. Introduced February 22, 2021;
referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
116th Congress
Expressing the sense of Congress that any United States-Saudi Arabia civilian
nuclear cooperation agreement must prohibit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from
enriching uranium or separating plutonium on its own territory, in keeping with
the strongest possible nonproliferation “gold standard” (S.Con.Res. 2,
Merkley/H.Con.Res. 23, Andy Levin)
Would have expressed the sense of Congress that a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia should
prohibit uranium enrichment and plutonium separation in Saudi territory and require Saudi acceptance of the Additional Protocol for nuclear facility inspections. Senate resolution introduced February 12, 2019; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House resolution
introduced February 28, 2019-for-nuclear-sharing-deal.
85 Samuel Hickey, “Amid Gaza War, a Beefed up Saudi Nuke Program Is Still on the Table,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, October 26, 2023, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-nuclear-israel.
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Iran Nuclear Treaty Act (S. 472, Johnson)
Would declare that any agreement reached by the President regarding Iran’s nuclear program shall be a treaty subject to Senate advice and consent. Introduced February 16, 2023; referred to ; referred to
Committee on Foreign Relations.
To terminate certain waivers of sanctions with respect to Iran issued in connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (S. 256, Cruz)
Would revoke certain waivers of sanctions relating to Iran’s nuclear activities and prohibit the President from issuing a new waiver relating to such activities. Introduced February 2, 2023; Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Saudi Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2019 (H.R. 1471, Sherman/S. 612, Markey)
Would have established additional criteria for any 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia and prohibited such an agreement from taking effect without enactment of a joint resolution of Congress. Both bil s introduced February 28, 2018. House bil referred to Committee on Foreign
Affairs; Senate bil referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in Saudi Arabia Act of 2019 (S. 2338, Van
Hollen)
Would have prohibited the U.S. Export-Import Bank from financing nuclear exports to Saudi
Arabia unless Saudi Arabia signs the Additional Protocol and commits not to enrich uranium or separate plutonium in its territory. Introduced July 30, 2019; referred to Committee on Banking,
referred to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban AffairsHousing, and Urban Affairs.
Hearing: Oversight of the Trump Administration’s Iran Policy
Hearing by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North
Africa, and International Terrorism, June 19, 2019, with the U.S. Special Representative for Iran. Video can be found at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/6/oversight-of-the-trump-
administration-s-iran-policy.
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Hearing: An Examination of U.S.-Iran Policy
Hearing by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 16, 2019, with the U.S. Special Representative for Iran. Video and testimony can be found at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/
hearings/an-examination-of-us-iran-policy. .
CRS Reports
CRS Report R41910,
CRS Report R41910,
Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress, ,
by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt
CRS Report RS22937,
CRS Report RS22937,
Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr , by Paul K. Kerr
and Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin
CRS Report RL33192,
CRS Report RL33192,
U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. , by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D.
Nikitin, and Paul K. KerrNikitin, and Paul K. Kerr
CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr
CRS In Focus IF12106, Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production, by Paul K. Kerr
CRS Report R44942,
CRS Report R44942,
U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by , by
Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and ValerieKenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie
Heitshusen Heitshusen
CRS In Focus IF10799,
CRS In Focus IF10799,
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by , by
Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr
Other References
Nuclear Nonproliferation, Government Accountability Office, Key Issues website, , Government Accountability Office, Key Issues website,
https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/nuclear_nonproliferation/issue_summary https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/nuclear_nonproliferation/issue_summary
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, Nuclear Energy Institute website, https://www.nei.org/, Nuclear Energy Institute website, https://www.nei.org/
advocacy/compete-advocacy/compete-
global yglobally/nuclear-cooperation-agreements/nuclear-cooperation-agreements
.
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Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues
Author Information
Mark Holt Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
Specialist in Energy Policy
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This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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