Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)
October 19December 9, 2021 , 2021
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Navy’s new Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program envisions procuring a class of 24 to
The Navy’s new Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program envisions procuring a class of 24 to
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Specialist in Naval Affairs
35 new amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new
35 new amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new
Marine Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). (A
Marine Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). (A
June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document envisions procuring a total of 24 to 35 June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document envisions procuring a total of 24 to 35
LAWs, while other Navy documents refer to a requirement for 35 LAWs.) The Navy envisions
LAWs, while other Navy documents refer to a requirement for 35 LAWs.) The Navy envisions
the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $13.2 million in research and the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $13.2 million in research and
development funding for the program. development funding for the program.
The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Under
The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Under
the concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver the concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver
around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as
to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese
forces. The LAW ships would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, and forces. The LAW ships would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, and
subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units. subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units.
As conceived by the Navy and Marine Corps, LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure
As conceived by the Navy and Marine Corps, LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure
and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. The Navy estimates that the first LAW would cost about $156 million and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. The Navy estimates that the first LAW would cost about $156 million
to procure, and that subsequent LAWs would cost about $130 million each to procure. to procure, and that subsequent LAWs would cost about $130 million each to procure.
The LAW as outlined by the Navy is small enough that it could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy’s
The LAW as outlined by the Navy is small enough that it could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy’s
baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships, but the Navy is open to having them built in multiple yards baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships, but the Navy is open to having them built in multiple yards
to the same design if doing so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively. The Navy to the same design if doing so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively. The Navy
plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract for the LAW plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract for the LAW
program in the second quarter of FY2022, and to award the contract in the first quester of FY2023. program in the second quarter of FY2022, and to award the contract in the first quester of FY2023.
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including the merits of the EABO concept,
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including the merits of the EABO concept,
how LAWs would fit into the Navy’s future fleet architecture, the Navy’s preliminary unit procurement cost target for the how LAWs would fit into the Navy’s future fleet architecture, the Navy’s preliminary unit procurement cost target for the
ship, and the industrial-base implications of the program. ship, and the industrial-base implications of the program.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and envisioned
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and envisioned
acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program could affect Navy and Marine Corps acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program could affect Navy and Marine Corps
capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
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2625 link to page 12 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ...... 1
Background............................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships in General .................................................................................. 1
Roles and Missions ............................................................................................................. 1
Current Types of Amphibious Ships ................................................................................... 2
Amphibious Ship Force Level at End of FY2020 ..................................................................... 2
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal ......................................................................................... 3
Current Force-Level Goal ................................................................................................... 3
Potential New Force-Level Goal ........................................................................................ 3
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program ............................................................................ 8
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 8
Ship Design ......................................................................................................................... 8 8
Procurement Schedule .......................................................................................... 10
Procurement Cost ............ 10 Procurement Cost ............................................................................................................... 11
Potential Builders .............................................................................................................. 12
Acquisition Strategy .......................................................................................................... 12
FY2022 Funding Request ................................................................................................. 16
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 16
Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal ............................................................................ 16
EABO Operational Concept .................................................................................................... 17
Preliminary Cost Target ........................................................................................................... 18 18
Potential Alternative of Adapting Existing Army LSVs ......................................................... 19
Industrial-Base Implications ................................................................................................... 21
Legislative Activity for FY2022 .................................................................................................... 22
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2022 Funding Request .......................................... 22
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792)/S. 1605) ........................... 23
House ................................................................................................................................ 22
House 23 Senate ......................................................................................................................... 22
Senate....... 24 HASC-SASC-Negotiated Proposal .................................................................................... 24
Section 1022 of the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal for S. 1605 states: .......................... 23
.. 24 FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432/S. XXXX) .................................................... 24.. 25
House ................................................................................................................................ 25 Senate ..... 24
Senate .............................................................................................................. 24............. 25
Figures
Figure 1. One Firm’s Design for LAW ........................................................................................... 11
Figure 2. One Firm’s Design for LAW .......................................................................................... 12
Figure 3. One Firm’s Design for LAW .......................................................................................... 13
Figure 4. Besson-Class Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) ............................................................... 21
Tables
Table 1. Current and Potential New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goals ................................ 8
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2022 Procurement Funding Request.............................. 22................... 8
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3233 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2022 Procurement Funding Request .................................. 22
Appendixes
Appendix. Proposed Change in Amphibious-Ship Force Architecture and EABO ...................... 25. 26
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 29 28
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s new Light This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s new Light
Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which envisions procuring a class of 24 to 35 new Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which envisions procuring a class of 24 to 35 new
amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps
operational concept operational concept
cal edcalled Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy
envisions the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget envisions the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget
requests $13.2 requests $13.2
mil ionmillion in research and development funding for the program. in research and development funding for the program.
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for
Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and
envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program
could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base. shipbuilding industrial base.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s programs for building much-larger LPD-17 Flight II
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s programs for building much-larger LPD-17 Flight II
and LHA-class amphibious ships.1 Other CRS reports provide an overview of new Navy and and LHA-class amphibious ships.1 Other CRS reports provide an overview of new Navy and
Marine Corps operational concepts, including EABO, the Marine Corps operational concepts, including EABO, the
overal overall strategic and budgetary context strategic and budgetary context
in which amphibious ship and other Navy shipbuildingin which amphibious ship and other Navy shipbuilding
programs may be considered, and the programs may be considered, and the
Marine Corps’ plans for redesigning Marine Corps units and their equipment.2 Marine Corps’ plans for redesigning Marine Corps units and their equipment.2
Background
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships in General
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. The primary are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. The primary
function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and their function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and their
weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct
expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships can be used to support expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships can be used to support
Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive
or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and
their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from
ship to shore without need for port facilities,3 amphibious ships are ship to shore without need for port facilities,3 amphibious ships are
potential y potentially useful for a range useful for a range
of combat and noncombat operations.4 of combat and noncombat operations.4
1 CRS
1 CRS Report R43543, Report R43543,
Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald
O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
2 CRS2 CRS
Report RL32665, Report RL32665,
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by , by
Ronald O'Rourke;Ronald O'Rourke;
and CRSand CRS
Insight IN11281, Insight IN11281,
New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew, by Andrew
Feickert Feickert. .
3 Amphibious ships have
3 Amphibious ships have
bert hingberthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
((
VT OLVTOL) fixed-wing) fixed-wing
aircraft aircraft; and in many cases; and in many cases
well well decks for storing anddecks for storing and
launching their landing craftlaunching their landing craft
. (A well. (A well
deck is deck is
a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return
to the ship. Access to the well deckto the ship. Access to the well deck
is protected by a largeis protected by a large
stern gate that is somewhat like a garagestern gate that is somewhat like a garage
door.) door.)
4 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used4 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used
for launching and conducting humanitarianfor launching and conducting humanitarian
--
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnershipassistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership
-building activities, such -building activities, such
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations
cal edcalled amphibious amphibious
groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis, groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis,
particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for
responding to responding to
smal ersmaller-scale or noncombat contingencies. -scale or noncombat contingencies.
Current Types of Amphibious Ships
The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force consists entirely of large amphibious ships, including
The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force consists entirely of large amphibious ships, including
the so-the so-
cal edcalled “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the
smal er (but stil smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships, quite sizeable) amphibious ships,
designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes
cal ed “smal called “small-deck” amphibious ships.5 As -deck” amphibious ships.5 As
mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s current programs for procuring mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s current programs for procuring
new LHA- and LPD-type ships.6 The LAWs discussed in this CRS report would be much new LHA- and LPD-type ships.6 The LAWs discussed in this CRS report would be much
smal er
smaller than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. than the Navy’s current amphibious ships.
Amphibious Ship Force Level at End of FY2020
The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2020 included 33 ships, including 10 The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2020 included 33 ships, including 10
amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and 8 LHDs), 11 LPD-17 Flight I ships, and 12 older LSD-amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and 8 LHDs), 11 LPD-17 Flight I ships, and 12 older LSD-
41/49 class ships. The LSD-41/49 class ships are to be replaced by new LPD-17 Flight II class 41/49 class ships. The LSD-41/49 class ships are to be replaced by new LPD-17 Flight II class
ships. ships.
One of the Navy’s LHDs—
One of the Navy’s LHDs—
Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6)—was extensively damaged by a fire in (LHD-6)—was extensively damaged by a fire in
July 2020. It was decommissioned on April 15, 2021, and July 2020. It was decommissioned on April 15, 2021, and
wil will be scrapped.7 Excluding LHD-6, be scrapped.7 Excluding LHD-6,
as exercises; other nation-building operations, such asas exercises; other nation-building operations, such as
reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritimeforeign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime
-security -security
operat ionsoperations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale , such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale
groundground
combat operations. Amphibious ships andcombat operations. Amphibious ships and
their embarked Marine forces can also betheir embarked Marine forces can also be
used used for maintaining for maintaining
forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability. forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
5 U.S.5 U.S.
Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibiousNavy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious
landing. LHA can be . LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can betranslated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be
translated as landingtranslated as landing
ship, helicopter-capable, well ship, helicopter-capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSDdeck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD
can be translated as landingcan be translated as landing
ship, ship,
wellwell
deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have welldeck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well
decks.decks.
T he The exceptions are LHAs 6 exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, whichand 7, which
do not have well decksdo not have well decks
and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of
wellwell
decks, seedecks, see
footnote 3. T he terms “ footnote 3. The terms “large-deck” and “large-deck” and “
small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck. small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck.
6 CRS
6 CRS
Report R43543, Report R43543,
Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald
O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
7 The7 T he four-day (some sources four-day (some sources
say five-day) fire on LHD-6 begansay five-day) fire on LHD-6 began
on July 12, 2020, while the ship wason July 12, 2020, while the ship was
at pier in San at pier in San
Diego. At the time of the fire, the ship wasDiego. At the time of the fire, the ship was
22 years old and had thus expended about 50% of its expected service life of 22 years old and had thus expended about 50% of its expected service life of
40 to 45 years. Following40 to 45 years. Following
the fire, the Navy spent months assessing condition of the ship and examining options for the fire, the Navy spent months assessing condition of the ship and examining options for
repairing it andrepairing it and
returning it to service in some capacity. On November 30, 2020, the Navy announced that due to thereturning it to service in some capacity. On November 30, 2020, the Navy announced that due to the
estimated cost and time to repair the ship and return it to service, the Navy had decidedestimated cost and time to repair the ship and return it to service, the Navy had decided
to decommission the ship and to decommission the ship and
scrap it. scrap it.
T heThe Navy stated that about 60% of the ship was ruined Navy stated that about 60% of the ship was ruined
and wouldand would
need to be rebuilt or replaced. Repairing the need to be rebuilt or replaced. Repairing the
ship and returning it to service as an LHD, the Navy estimated, wouldship and returning it to service as an LHD, the Navy estimated, would
cost between $2.5 billion and $3.2 billion and cost between $2.5 billion and $3.2 billion and
take about five to seven years to complete. (By then, portions of the ship would betake about five to seven years to complete. (By then, portions of the ship would be
27 to 29 years old.) By comparison, 27 to 29 years old.) By comparison,
the Navy said, a newthe Navy said, a new
replacement LHA-type ship would cost an estimated $4.1 billion to procure and take about six replacement LHA-type ship would cost an estimated $4.1 billion to procure and take about six
years to build.years to build.
(T he (The Navy’s estimated repair cost for LHD-6 equates to about 61% to 78% of the Navy’s estimated Navy’s estimated repair cost for LHD-6 equates to about 61% to 78% of the Navy’s estimated
procurement cost for a replacement LHA. A new-builtprocurement cost for a replacement LHA. A new-built
LHA wouldLHA would
have a fullhave a full
40- to 45-year expected service life.) 40- to 45-year expected service life.)
Repairing LHD-6 andRepairing LHD-6 and
reconfiguring it for use asreconfiguring it for use as
either a hospital ship or a tender (i.e., a ship usedeither a hospital ship or a tender (i.e., a ship used
to repair, maintain, to repair, maintain,
or otherwise support other Navy ships), the Navy estimated, would cost more than $1 billion, and also take five to or otherwise support other Navy ships), the Navy estimated, would cost more than $1 billion, and also take five to
seven years to complete. seven years to complete.
T heThe Navy stated that designing and building Navy stated that designing and building
a newa new
hospital ship or tender wouldhospital ship or tender would
cost lesscost less
than than
repairing LHD-6 and converting it into a hospital ship or tender. repairing LHD-6 and converting it into a hospital ship or tender.
T heThe Navy estimated that decommissioning the ship, Navy estimated that decommissioning the ship,
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
the Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2020 included 32 ships, including 9
the Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2020 included 32 ships, including 9
LHA/LHD-typeLHA/LHD-type
amphibious assault ships. amphibious assault ships.
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
Current Force-Level Goal
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016,
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016,
cal scalls for achieving and for achieving and
maintaining a 355-ship fleet that includes 38 amphibious ships—12 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 maintaining a 355-ship fleet that includes 38 amphibious ships—12 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13
LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (12+13+13).8 This 38-ship force-LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (12+13+13).8 This 38-ship force-
level goal predates the initiationlevel goal predates the initiation
of the LAW program and consequently includes no LAWs. of the LAW program and consequently includes no LAWs.
Potential New Force-Level Goal
Overview
The Navy and DOD since 2019 have been working to develop a new force-level goal to replace The Navy and DOD since 2019 have been working to develop a new force-level goal to replace
the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. This new force-level goal is expected to introduce a the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. This new force-level goal is expected to introduce a
once-in-a-generation change in fleet architecture, meaning basic the types of ships that make up once-in-a-generation change in fleet architecture, meaning basic the types of ships that make up
the Navy and how these ships are used in combination with one another to perform Navy the Navy and how these ships are used in combination with one another to perform Navy
missions. This new fleet architecture is expected to be more distributed than the fleet architecture missions. This new fleet architecture is expected to be more distributed than the fleet architecture
reflected in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy force-level goals. In particular, the new fleet reflected in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy force-level goals. In particular, the new fleet
architecture is expected to feature architecture is expected to feature
a
a
smal ersmaller proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers, proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers,
destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships);
destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships);
a larger proportion of
a larger proportion of
smal ersmaller ships (such as frigates, corvettes, ships (such as frigates, corvettes,
smal ersmaller
amphibious ships,
amphibious ships,
smal ersmaller resupply ships, and perhaps resupply ships, and perhaps
smal ersmaller aircraft carriers); aircraft carriers);
and and
a new third tier of surface vessels about as large as corvettes or large patrol craft
a new third tier of surface vessels about as large as corvettes or large patrol craft
that
that
wil will be either lightly manned, be either lightly manned,
optional yoptionally manned, or unmanned, as manned, or unmanned, as
wel well as as
large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).
Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is
Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is
operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;9
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;9
salvaging usable
salvaging usable parts of it for useparts of it for use
on other Navy ships (which beganon other Navy ships (which began
in September 2020), towing the ship to its in September 2020), towing the ship to its
scrapping site, and scrapping the ship wouldscrapping site, and scrapping the ship would
cost about $30 million. (Seecost about $30 million. (See
Megan Eckstein, “Megan Eckstein, “
UPDAT EDUPDATED: Navy Will : Navy Will
Scrap USSScrap USS
Bonhomme Richard,” USNIBonhomme Richard,” USNI
News,News,
November 30, 2020; Geoff Ziezulewicz,November 30, 2020; Geoff Ziezulewicz,
“ “Navy Will Scrap FireNavy Will Scrap Fire
--
RavagedRavaged
Bonhomme Richard,” Bonhomme Richard,”
Navy Times, November 20, 2020; Nancy A. Youssef, “Navy Will Decommission Ship , November 20, 2020; Nancy A. Youssef, “Navy Will Decommission Ship
DamagedDamaged
in Five-Day Blaze,” in Five-Day Blaze,”
Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2020; Andrew Dyer, “, November 30, 2020; Andrew Dyer, “
Ravaged by Fire, USS Ravaged by Fire, USS
Bonhomme Richard BoundBonhomme Richard Bound
for Scrapyard, Navy Says,”for Scrapyard, Navy Says,”
San Diego Union-Tribune, November 30, 2020.) , November 30, 2020.)
8 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS8 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS
Report RL32665, Report RL32665,
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force , by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force
structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRSstructure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS
Report RL34476, Report RL34476,
Navy LPD-17 Am phibious Ship
Procurem entAmphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald
O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
9 See,9 See,
for example, David B. Larter, “With China Gunning for Aircraft Carriers, USfor example, David B. Larter, “With China Gunning for Aircraft Carriers, US
Navy SaysNavy Says
It Must Change HowIt Must Change How
It It
Fights,” Fights,”
Defense News,,
December 6, 2019; Arthur H. Barber, “RedesignDecember 6, 2019; Arthur H. Barber, “Redesign
the Fleet,” the Fleet,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, ,
January 2019. Some observers have long urgedJanuary 2019. Some observers have long urged
the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds
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technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers
of UVs; and of UVs; and
affordable—no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current —no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current
fleet architecture, so as to fit within expected future Navy budgets.10
fleet architecture, so as to fit within expected future Navy budgets.10
Operational Rationale
To improve their ability to perform various missions in coming years, including a potential To improve their ability to perform various missions in coming years, including a potential
mission of countering Chinese forces in a possible conflict in the Western Pacific, the Navy and mission of countering Chinese forces in a possible conflict in the Western Pacific, the Navy and
Marine Corps want to implement a new operational concept Marine Corps want to implement a new operational concept
cal edcalled Distributed Maritime Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO).11 DMO Operations (DMO).11 DMO
cal scalls for U.S. naval forces (meaning the Navy and Marine Corps)12 to for U.S. naval forces (meaning the Navy and Marine Corps)12 to
operate at sea in a less concentrated, more distributed manner, so as to complicate an adversary’s operate at sea in a less concentrated, more distributed manner, so as to complicate an adversary’s
task of detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting U.S. naval forces, while task of detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting U.S. naval forces, while
stil still being able to being able to
bring lethal force to bear against adversary forces. To support the implementation of DMO, the bring lethal force to bear against adversary forces. To support the implementation of DMO, the
Navy wants to shift to the new and more distributed fleet architecture outlined above. Navy wants to shift to the new and more distributed fleet architecture outlined above.
In
In
paral el parallel with DMO, and with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios in the Western Pacific with DMO, and with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios in the Western Pacific
against Chinese forces, the Marine Corps has developed two supporting operational concepts, against Chinese forces, the Marine Corps has developed two supporting operational concepts,
cal edcalled Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations (EABO). Under the EABOBase Operations (EABO). Under the EABO
concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other
things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver around the theater, moving things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver around the theater, moving
from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as
that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number
of individuallyof individually
larger and more expensive surface ships—islarger and more expensive surface ships—is
increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD
capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential
adversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributedadversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributed
architecture, these observers have argued,architecture, these observers have argued,
would would
•
•
complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger
complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger
n umber number of Navy units of Navy units
to detect, identify, and track; to detect, identify, and track;
•
•
reduce
reduce
the loss in aggregatethe loss in aggregate
Navy capability that wouldNavy capability that would
result from the destruction of an individualresult from the destruction of an individual
Navy Navy
platform; platform;
•
•
give U.S.
give U.S.
leaders leaders the option of deploying USVsthe option of deploying USVs
and UUVs and UUVs in wartime to sea locations that would be in wartime to sea locations that would be
tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and
•
•
increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing mission needs.
increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing mission needs.
For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see
For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see
CRS CRS Report RL33153, Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization:
Im plicationsImplications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 For additional discussion,
10 For additional discussion,
see CRSsee CRS
Report RL32665, Report RL32665,
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald
O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
11 For additional discussion,11 For additional discussion,
see CRSsee CRS
Report RL32665, Report RL32665,
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald
O'Rourke, and CRSO'Rourke, and CRS
Report RL33153, Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Im plicationsImplications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
12 Although the term
12 Although the term
naval is often used is often used
to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and
Marine Corps, becauseMarine Corps, because
both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes
operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and
Iraq), andIraq), and
is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law,is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law,
a naval service. 10a naval service. 10
U.S.C. U.S.C.
§8001(a)(3) states, “§8001(a)(3) states, “
The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or
conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navyconscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy
--
Marine Corps team. For additional discussion,Marine Corps team. For additional discussion,
see CRSsee CRS
In Focus IF10484, In Focus IF10484,
Defense Prim er: Departm entPrimer: Department of the Navy, ,
by Ronald O'Rourke. by Ronald O'Rourke.
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to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and
to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and
deny sea control to Chinese forces. deny sea control to Chinese forces.
More
More
specifical yspecifically, the Marine Corps states that the EABO concept includes, among other things, , the Marine Corps states that the EABO concept includes, among other things,
establishing and operating “multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that establishing and operating “multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that
can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and
refueling of aircraft, refueling of aircraft,
intel igence, surveil anceintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and , and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and
air-defense and early warning,”13 The use of Marine Corps units to contribute to U.S. sea-denial air-defense and early warning,”13 The use of Marine Corps units to contribute to U.S. sea-denial
operations against an opposing navy by shooting ASCMs would represent a new mission for the operations against an opposing navy by shooting ASCMs would represent a new mission for the
Marine Corps.14 Marine Corps.14
Light Amphibious Warships (LAWs) would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs
Light Amphibious Warships (LAWs) would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs
embarking, transporting, landing, and subsequently reembarking these embarking, transporting, landing, and subsequently reembarking these
smal small Marine Corps units. Marine Corps units.
An August 27, 2020, press report states, “Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary An August 27, 2020, press report states, “Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary
warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps
the most important investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary the most important investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary
advance base operations (EABO).”15 The December 9, 2020, shipbuilding document submitted by advance base operations (EABO).”15 The December 9, 2020, shipbuilding document submitted by
the Trump Administration stated that the Marine Corps the Trump Administration stated that the Marine Corps
is reducing a number of legacy systems to reinvest in development of more NDS [National
is reducing a number of legacy systems to reinvest in development of more NDS [National
DefenseDefense
Strategy]-relevant capabilitiesStrategy]-relevant capabilities
such as Marine such as Marine Littoral RegimentsLittoral Regiments
(MLRs),(MLRs),
as as
outlined in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and Force Design. The FNFSoutlined in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and Force Design. The FNFS
[Future Naval Force Study] highlights the important contributions MLRs provide to Sea Denial and Sea Control missions. This approach requires a new mix of [Future Naval Force Study] highlights the important contributions MLRs provide to Sea Denial and Sea Control missions. This approach requires a new mix of amphibious warships amphibious warships
including the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which is critical to MLR mobility and including the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which is critical to MLR mobility and
sustainability.sustainability.
The overall number of amphibious warships grows to support the The overall number of amphibious warships grows to support the more more
distributed expeditionary force design, with an increased number of LAW complementing distributed expeditionary force design, with an increased number of LAW complementing
fewer legacy amphibious warships.16 fewer legacy amphibious warships.16
A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO
A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO
states states
Littoral maneuver
Littoral maneuver
will rely heavily on surface platforms such as the light will rely heavily on surface platforms such as the light amphibious amphibious
warship (LAW) and a range of surface connectors, as well as aviation assets. The LAW is warship (LAW) and a range of surface connectors, as well as aviation assets. The LAW is
envisioned as the principal littoral maneuver vessel of the littoral force.… envisioned as the principal littoral maneuver vessel of the littoral force.…
13 Emailed statement from Marine Corps as quoted in Shawn13 Emailed statement from Marine Corps as quoted in Shawn
Snow,Snow,
“ “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight
in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,” in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,”
Marine Tim esTimes, May 14, 2020. See also David H. Berger, , May 14, 2020. See also David H. Berger,
“Preparing for the Future, Marine Corps Support to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals,” “Preparing for the Future, Marine Corps Support to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals,”
Military Review, April , April
2021, 8 pp. 2021, 8 pp.
14 For press articles discussing
14 For press articles discussing
these envisioned operations, see, for example, these envisioned operations, see, for example,
Justin Katz, “Marines’ New Warfighting Concept Focuses on Small, Agile Forces with an Eye on China,” Breaking Defense, December 1, 2021; Bill Gertz, Bill Gertz,
““ Marine Commandant Reveals Marine Commandant Reveals
New New Mission Preparing for China ConflictMission Preparing for China Conflict
,” Washington ,” Washington
T imesTimes, April 21, 2021; Megan Eckstein, “, April 21, 2021; Megan Eckstein, “
CMC Berger CMC Berger
Outlines HowOutlines How
Marines CouldMarines Could
Fight SubmarinesFight Submarines
in the Future,” in the Future,”
USNI News,,
December 8, 2020; David Axe, “December 8, 2020; David Axe, “
Meet Meet
Your NewYour New
Island-Hopping, Missile-SlingingIsland-Hopping, Missile-Slinging
U.S.U.S.
Marine Corps,” Marine Corps,”
Forbes, May 14, 2020; Shawn Snow,, May 14, 2020; Shawn Snow,
“ “New Marine New Marine
Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,” Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,”
Marine Tim esTimes, May 14, , May 14,
2020; William Cole (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), “2020; William Cole (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), “
T heThe Marine Corps Is Forming a First Marine Corps Is Forming a First
-of-its-Kind Regiment in -of-its-Kind Regiment in
Hawaii,”Hawaii,”
Military.com , May 12, 2020; Joseph , May 12, 2020; Joseph
T revithick, “ Trevithick, “Marines Marines
T oTo Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Radically Remodel Force, Cutting
T anks, Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles,”Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles,”
The Drive, March 23, 2020; Chris “Ox” Harmer, “, March 23, 2020; Chris “Ox” Harmer, “
Marine Boss’s Audacious Marine Boss’s Audacious
Plan T o T ransformPlan To Transform The Corps By Giving Up Big The Corps By Giving Up Big
Amphibious Ships,”Amphibious Ships,”
The Drive, September 5, 2019. , September 5, 2019.
15 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies
15 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies
for Light Amphibiousfor Light Amphibious
Warship, In BidWarship, In Bid
to Field to Field
T hemThem ASAP,” ASAP,”
USNI News,,
August August 27 (updated August27 (updated August
28), 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “28), 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “
‘If It Floats, It Fights:’ Navy’s ‘If It Floats, It Fights:’ Navy’s
NewNew
Small Ship Small Ship Strategy,” Strategy,”
Breaking Defense, August, August
28, 2020. 28, 2020.
16 U.S.
16 U.S.
Navy, Navy,
Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels,,
December 9, December 9,
2020, p. 11. 2020, p. 11.
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2930 Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The LAW supports the day-to-day maneuver of stand-in forces operating in the LOA [littoral operations area]. It complements L-class amphibious ships17 and other surface connectors. Utilizing the LAW to transport forces of the surface reduces the impacts
The LAW supports the day-to-day maneuver of stand-in forces operating in the LOA [littoral operations area]. It complements L-class amphibious ships17 and other surface connectors. Utilizing the LAW to transport forces of the surface reduces the impacts of of
tactical vehicles on the road network, increases deception, and allows for the sustainment tactical vehicles on the road network, increases deception, and allows for the sustainment
of forces during embarkation. The range, endurance, and austere access of LAWs enable of forces during embarkation. The range, endurance, and austere access of LAWs enable
the littoral force to deliver personnel,the littoral force to deliver personnel,
equipment,equipment,
and sustainmentand sustainment
across across a widely a widely
distributed area. Shallow draft and beaching capability are keys to providing the volume distributed area. Shallow draft and beaching capability are keys to providing the volume
and agility to maneuver the required capabilities to key maritime terrain. and agility to maneuver the required capabilities to key maritime terrain.
LAW employment requires reconnaissance and prior planning relating to the bathymetry
LAW employment requires reconnaissance and prior planning relating to the bathymetry
of the littoral environment. Effective LAW employment relies on knowledge of the beach of the littoral environment. Effective LAW employment relies on knowledge of the beach
makeup, slope, currents, tidal effects, and other environment factors. makeup, slope, currents, tidal effects, and other environment factors.
As envisioned and
As envisioned and
when properly postured, LAWs possess the range, endurance, speed, when properly postured, LAWs possess the range, endurance, speed,
sea-keeping,sea-keeping,
and C4ISR capabilities to support and conduct complementary and C4ISR capabilities to support and conduct complementary operations operations
with, but not as part of, US Navy tactical groups, including an expeditionary strike group with, but not as part of, US Navy tactical groups, including an expeditionary strike group
(ESG) or(ESG) or
amphibious ready group (ARG). amphibious ready group (ARG). Forward-positionedForward-positioned
LAWs may augment LAWs may augment the the
capabilities of deploying ARG/MEUs during regional engagement and response to crises capabilities of deploying ARG/MEUs during regional engagement and response to crises
or contingencies. or contingencies.
The LAW with embarked forces, generates and/or enables the following effects:
The LAW with embarked forces, generates and/or enables the following effects:
Rapidly maneuver forces from shore-to-shore
Rapidly maneuver forces from shore-to-shore
in a contested environment in a contested environment
Sustain a combat-credible force ashore
Sustain a combat-credible force ashore
Conduct enduring operations
Conduct enduring operations
Enable persistent joint-force operations and power projection
Enable persistent joint-force operations and power projection
Provide increased and capable forward presence18
Provide increased and capable forward presence18
The survivability of the LAW ships would come from their ability to hide among islands and
The survivability of the LAW ships would come from their ability to hide among islands and
other sea traffic, from defensive support they would receive from other U.S. Navy forces, and other sea traffic, from defensive support they would receive from other U.S. Navy forces, and
from the ability of their associated Marine Corps units to fire missiles at Chinese ships and from the ability of their associated Marine Corps units to fire missiles at Chinese ships and
aircraft that could attack them with their own missiles (which can be viewed as an application of aircraft that could attack them with their own missiles (which can be viewed as an application of
the notion that the best defense is a good offense). the notion that the best defense is a good offense).
For additional background information on the proposed change in the amphibious-ship force
For additional background information on the proposed change in the amphibious-ship force
architecture and the EABO-related operational rationale behind it, see architecture and the EABO-related operational rationale behind it, see
thethe Appendix.
December 9, 2020, Shipbuilding Document
On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding
document that document that
cal edcalled for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446 for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446
manned ships and 143 to 242 large unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (UVs). Within the manned ships and 143 to 242 large unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (UVs). Within the
total of 382 to 446 manned ships, the document total of 382 to 446 manned ships, the document
cal edcalled for an amphibious fleet of 61 to 67 for an amphibious fleet of 61 to 67
amphibious ships, including 9 to 10 LHA/LHD-typeamphibious ships, including 9 to 10 LHA/LHD-type
ships and a combined total of 52 to 57 LPD-ships and a combined total of 52 to 57 LPD-
type ships and LAWs. The December 9, 2020, document did not break down the above figure of type ships and LAWs. The December 9, 2020, document did not break down the above figure of
52 to 57 amphibious ships into separate figures for LPD-type ships and LAWs. 52 to 57 amphibious ships into separate figures for LPD-type ships and LAWs.
17 T he
17 The term term
L-class amphibious ships refers to the Navy’s LHA/LHD- and LPD-type amphibious ships, whose refers to the Navy’s LHA/LHD- and LPD-type amphibious ships, whose
designation beginsdesignation begins
with the letter L in reference to amphibious with the letter L in reference to amphibious
landing. .
18 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 18 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations, February, February
2021, pp. 7-9 to 7-10. 2021, pp. 7-9 to 7-10.
Congressional Research Service
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June 17, 2021, Department of the Navy Testimony
At a June 17, 2021, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the At a June 17, 2021, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on seapower programs in the Department of the Navy’s House Armed Services Committee on seapower programs in the Department of the Navy’s
proposed FY2022 budget, Department of the Navy officials provided figures that appear similar proposed FY2022 budget, Department of the Navy officials provided figures that appear similar
to those in the December 9, 2020, long-range Navy shipbuilding document. A June 21, 2021, to those in the December 9, 2020, long-range Navy shipbuilding document. A June 21, 2021,
press report about the June 17, 20201, hearing states (emphasis added): press report about the June 17, 20201, hearing states (emphasis added):
The U.S. Navy and Marine
The U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps haveCorps have
finessed their requirement for amphibiousfinessed their requirement for amphibious
ships ships
andand
are now askingare now asking
for for
28 to 31 traditional [i.e,. LHA/LHD-type and LPD-type]
amphibious ships that that
could could flow in to supportflow in to support
other expeditionary forces already
other expeditionary forces already operating during a conflict…. operating during a conflict….
Now, the Marines
Now, the Marines
are looking at a one-MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade] lift are looking at a one-MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade] lift
requirement to move in Marines that would augment and back up those already deployed requirement to move in Marines that would augment and back up those already deployed
andand
operating in a given region, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for operating in a given region, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Combat
Development and Integration Lt. Gen. Eric Smith explained during a June 17 House Armed Development and Integration Lt. Gen. Eric Smith explained during a June 17 House Armed
Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing. Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing.
“The requirement, based on a study
“The requirement, based on a study
that [Deputythat [Deputy
Chief of Naval OperationsChief of Naval Operations
for for
Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Vice Adm. Jim Kilby], my friend Jim,Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Vice Adm. Jim Kilby], my friend Jim,
and I did together was you need 31 traditional and I did together was you need 31 traditional amphibious ships in the appropriate mix,
which is 10 big decks, LHA/LHD, and 21 LSD/LPD,” Smith said, with the LHAs and ,” Smith said, with the LHAs and
LHDs beingLHDs being
the America-class and Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, the America-class and Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, respectively, respectively,
supplemented by San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks (LPD-17s) and their Flight supplemented by San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks (LPD-17s) and their Flight
II variant that will replace the aging Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships (LSD-41/49). II variant that will replace the aging Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships (LSD-41/49).
“
“
The low end of that study is 28, and the difference in those three is that there’s additional , and the difference in those three is that there’s additional
risk in arrival times,” he continued.risk in arrival times,” he continued.
“And“And
that’sthat’s
based based on a single MEB, Marine on a single MEB, Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, forcible entry, and our expeditionary units that are out always, and Expeditionary Brigade, forcible entry, and our expeditionary units that are out always, and
our forward-deployed naval force in Japan.” our forward-deployed naval force in Japan.”
In
In
the past, having just one MEB to flow in behind any deployed or forward -deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) would not be enough —but now, those the past, having just one MEB to flow in behind any deployed or forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) would not be enough—but now, those deployed deployed
MEUs will be supplemented by MEUs will be supplemented by
35 Light Amphibious Warships ….19 ….19
June 17, 2021, Shipbuilding Document
On the evening of June 17, 2021, following conclusion of the hearing discussed above, the Biden On the evening of June 17, 2021, following conclusion of the hearing discussed above, the Biden
Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that
cal scalls for a Navy with a for a Navy with a
more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large
unmanned surface and underwater UVs. Within the total of 321 to 372 manned ships, the unmanned surface and underwater UVs. Within the total of 321 to 372 manned ships, the
document document
cal scalls for an amphibious fleet of 48 to 63 amphibious ships, including 8 to 9 LHA/LHD- for an amphibious fleet of 48 to 63 amphibious ships, including 8 to 9 LHA/LHD-
type ships, 16 to 19 LPD-type ships, and 24 to 35 LAWs. type ships, 16 to 19 LPD-type ships, and 24 to 35 LAWs.
Current and Potential New Amphibious Ship Ship Force-Level Goals
Table 1 compares the force-level goal for amphibious ships within the Navy’s 355-ship plan to compares the force-level goal for amphibious ships within the Navy’s 355-ship plan to
the emerging force-level goals for amphibious ships in the December 9, 2020, long-range Navy the emerging force-level goals for amphibious ships in the December 9, 2020, long-range Navy
shipbuilding document, the Department of the Navy’s June 17, 2021, testimony, and the June 17, shipbuilding document, the Department of the Navy’s June 17, 2021, testimony, and the June 17,
2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document. 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document.
19 Megan Eckstein, “19 Megan Eckstein, “
Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Marines Explain Vision for Fewer
T raditionalTraditional Amphibious Warships,” Amphibious Warships,”
Defense News,,
June 21, June 21,
2021. 2021.
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 1. Current and Potential New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goals
Emerging force-
Department
Emerging force-
level goal in
of Navy
level goal in
Trump
testimony at
Biden
355-
Administration
June 17,
Administration
ship
December 9,
2021,
June 17, 2021,
Ship type
goal
2020, document
hearing
document
Large-deck (LHA/LHD)
Large-deck (LHA/LHD)
12
12
9 to 10
9 to 10
Up to 10
Up to 10
8 to 9
8 to 9
LPD-type
LPD-type
26
26
n/a
n/a
Up to 21
Up to 21
16 to 19
16 to 19
Subtotal larger ships (LHA/LHD-
38
n/a
28 to 31
24 to 28
type and LPD-type)
Light Amphibious
Light Amphibious
Warships (LAWs) Warships (LAWs)
0
0
n/a
n/a
35
35
24 to 35
24 to 35
LPD-type and LAWs
LPD-type and LAWs
combined combined
26
26
52 to 57
52 to 57
Up to 56
Up to 56
40 to 54
40 to 54
TOTAL all types
38
61 to 67
63 to 66
48 to 63
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S.Table prepared by CRS based on U.S.
Navy data. Navy data.
Note: N/a means not available. N/a means not available.
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program20
Overview
As shown i
As shown i
n Table 1, the June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document envisions the June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document envisions
procuring a total of 24 to 35 LAWs. Other Navy documents refer to a requirement for 35 LAWs. procuring a total of 24 to 35 LAWs. Other Navy documents refer to a requirement for 35 LAWs.
The figure of 35 LAWs includes nine operational LAWs for each of three envisioned Marine The figure of 35 LAWs includes nine operational LAWs for each of three envisioned Marine
Littoral Regiments (MLRs), plus eight additionalLittoral Regiments (MLRs), plus eight additional
LAWs to account for factors such as a certain LAWs to account for factors such as a certain
number of LAWs being in maintenance at any given moment. LAWs would be much number of LAWs being in maintenance at any given moment. LAWs would be much
smal er and individual y smaller and individually much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious
ships. The Navy envisions the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed ships. The Navy envisions the first LAW being procured in FY2023. The Navy’s proposed
FY2022 budget requests $13.2 FY2022 budget requests $13.2
mil ionmillion in research and development funding for the program. in research and development funding for the program.
Ship Design
The Navy wants LAWs to be a relatively simple and relatively
The Navy wants LAWs to be a relatively simple and relatively
inexpensive ships with the inexpensive ships with the
following features, among others: following features, among others:
a length of 200 feet to 400 feet;21
a length of 200 feet to 400 feet;21
20 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section about the LAW is taken from Navy briefing slides20 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section about the LAW is taken from Navy briefing slides
and Navy and Navy
answersanswers
to industry questionsto industry questions
from LAW program industry daysfrom LAW program industry days
that were held on that were held on
Marc hMarch 4 and April 9, 2020, and 4 and April 9, 2020, and
posted on March 20, May 5, and May 7, 2020, at “posted on March 20, May 5, and May 7, 2020, at “
RFI: US Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW),” RFI: US Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW),”
https://beta.sam.gov/opp/90a9ece86ade48089e9f6d57d2969d23/view, accessed by CRShttps://beta.sam.gov/opp/90a9ece86ade48089e9f6d57d2969d23/view, accessed by CRS
on May 15, 2020. on May 15, 2020.
For press articles about the LAW, see Megan Eckstein, “
For press articles about the LAW, see Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Researching NewNavy Researching New
Class Class of Mediumof Medium
Amphibious Ship, Amphibious Ship,
NewNew
Logistics Ships,”Logistics Ships,”
USNI News,,
February 20, 2020. See also Rich Abott, “February 20, 2020. See also Rich Abott, “
FY 2021 Request Starts Work on Future FY 2021 Request Starts Work on Future
Amphibs and Logistics Ships,”Amphibs and Logistics Ships,”
Defense Daily, February, February
20, 2020; David Axe, “20, 2020; David Axe, “
T hisThis Weird Little Ship Could Weird Little Ship Could
Be the Be the
Future of AmphibiousFuture of Amphibious
Warfare,” Warfare,”
National Interest, February, February
24, 2020; Mallory Shellbourne, “24, 2020; Mallory Shellbourne, “
Navy beginsNavy begins
pursuit of pursuit of
Light AmphibiousLight Amphibious
Warship,” Warship,”
Inside Defense, March 26, 2020; Joseph , March 26, 2020; Joseph
T revithick, “ Trevithick, “Navy Wants Navy Wants
T oTo Buy 30 New Buy 30 New
Light Light
Amphibious Warships Amphibious Warships
T oTo Support Radical Support Radical
Shift In Marine Ops,” Shift In Marine Ops,”
The Drive,,
May 5, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “May 5, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Navy
Officials Reveal Details of NewOfficials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News,,
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
21 Megan Eckstein, “21 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
8
8
Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
a maximum draft of 12 feet;
a maximum draft of 12 feet;
a displacement of up to 4,000 tons;22 a displacement of up to 4,000 tons;22
a ship’s crew of no more than 40 Navy sailors;23 a ship’s crew of no more than 40 Navy sailors;23
an ability an ability
to embark at least 75 Marines; to embark at least 75 Marines;
4,000 to 8,000 square feet of cargo area for the Marines’ weapons, equipment, 4,000 to 8,000 square feet of cargo area for the Marines’ weapons, equipment,
and supplies;24
and supplies;24
a stern or bow landing ramp for moving the Marines and their weapons,
a stern or bow landing ramp for moving the Marines and their weapons,
equipment, and supplies the ship to shore (and vice versa) across a beach;
equipment, and supplies the ship to shore (and vice versa) across a beach;
a modest suite of C4I equipment;25
a modest suite of C4I equipment;25
a 25mm or 30mm gun system and .50 caliber machine guns for self-defense; a 25mm or 30mm gun system and .50 caliber machine guns for self-defense;
a transit speed of at least 14 knots, and preferably 15 knots;26 a transit speed of at least 14 knots, and preferably 15 knots;26
a minimum unrefueled transit range of 3,500 nautical miles;27 a minimum unrefueled transit range of 3,500 nautical miles;27
a “Tier 2+” plus level of survivability (i.e., ruggedness for withstanding battle a “Tier 2+” plus level of survivability (i.e., ruggedness for withstanding battle
damage)—a level, broadly comparable to that of a
damage)—a level, broadly comparable to that of a
smal ersmaller U.S. Navy surface U.S. Navy surface
combatant (i.e., a corvette or frigate), that would permit the ship to absorb a hit combatant (i.e., a corvette or frigate), that would permit the ship to absorb a hit
from an enemy weapon and keep the crew safe until they and their equipment from an enemy weapon and keep the crew safe until they and their equipment
and supplies can be transferred to another LAW;28 and supplies can be transferred to another LAW;28
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
22 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New
22 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
23 A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy 23 A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy
releasedreleased
on October 16, 2020, states that “on October 16, 2020, states that “
The ship shall be capable of at least 11 day missionsThe ship shall be capable of at least 11 day missions
without replenishment without replenishment
for 40 crewfor 40 crew
and 50 embarked personnel.” (“and 50 embarked personnel.” (“
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of RequirementsLight Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Requirements
(CoR), Draft (CoR), Draft
for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “
RFI: DRAFTRFI: DRAFT
US US Navy Light Navy Light
Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23,
2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
24 Megan Eckstein, “
24 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “
ship shall have a cargo deck capable of carrying 648 ship shall have a cargo deck capable of carrying 648
STST
[short tons] and a minimum deck area of 8000” square feet. (“[short tons] and a minimum deck area of 8000” square feet. (“
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, VerRequirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver
0.12, 100.12, 10
-13-20, PDF page 5 of 19, attachment to “-13-20, PDF page 5 of 19, attachment to “
RFI: RFI:
DRAFTDRAFT
US US Navy Light AmphibiousNavy Light Amphibious
Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of WorkWarship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work
,” Beta.sam.gov, ,” Beta.sam.gov,
accessedaccessed
November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
25 C4I is command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
25 C4I is command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
26 Megan Eckstein, “26 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “
ship shall be capable of a minimum transit speed of ship shall be capable of a minimum transit speed of
14 knots in Sea14 knots in Sea
State three (SS3)State three (SS3)
at the shipat the ship
’s full’s full
load condition….” (“load condition….” (“
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) CircularLight Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular
of of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, VerRequirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver
0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “
RFI: RFI:
DRAFTDRAFT
US US Navy Light AmphibiousNavy Light Amphibious
Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,
accessedaccessed
November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
27 Megan Eckstein, “
27 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that
T heThe ship shall be capable ship shall be capable
of 3500 nautical miles endurance of 3500 nautical miles endurance
at 14 knots without refueling at the ship’s full loadat 14 knots without refueling at the ship’s full load
condition….” (“condition….” (“
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) CircularLight Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular
of of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, VerRequirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver
0.12, 100.12, 10
-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “
RFI: RFI:
DRAFTDRAFT
US US Navy Light AmphibiousNavy Light Amphibious
Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” BetaWarship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta
.sam.gov, .sam.gov,
accessedaccessed
November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.) November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
28 Megan Eckstein, “28 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
9
9
link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 5
link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 5
Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
an ability
an ability
to operate within fleet groups or deploy independently; and to operate within fleet groups or deploy independently; and
a 20-year expected service life.29 a 20-year expected service life.29
In addition to the above points, the Navy states that the LAW’s design can be based on a
In addition to the above points, the Navy states that the LAW’s design can be based on a
commercial-ship design. commercial-ship design.
A ship fitting the requirements listed above would be only a fraction as large as the Navy’s
A ship fitting the requirements listed above would be only a fraction as large as the Navy’s
current amphibious ships. The Navy’s LHA/LHD-type ships are 844 to 855 feet long and have a current amphibious ships. The Navy’s LHA/LHD-type ships are 844 to 855 feet long and have a
full load displacements between 40,000 and 45,000 tons, while its and LPD-17 class ships are 684 full load displacements between 40,000 and 45,000 tons, while its and LPD-17 class ships are 684
feet long and have a full load displacement of 24,900 tons. As noted in the third bullet point feet long and have a full load displacement of 24,900 tons. As noted in the third bullet point
above, the LAW is to have a displacement of up to 4,000 tons—about 1/10th or 1/11th the above, the LAW is to have a displacement of up to 4,000 tons—about 1/10th or 1/11th the
displacement of an LHA/LHD-typedisplacement of an LHA/LHD-type
ship, and about 1/6th the displacement of an LPD-17 class ship, and about 1/6th the displacement of an LPD-17 class
ships. ships.
The LAW’s maximum draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit
The LAW’s maximum draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit
shal owshallow waters on waters on
its way to and from landing beaches. The Navy prefers that the ship’s cargo space be in the form its way to and from landing beaches. The Navy prefers that the ship’s cargo space be in the form
of open deck storage. Unlike most of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, the LAW would not of open deck storage. Unlike most of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, the LAW would not
have a have a
wel well deck.30 A transit speed of about 15 knots would be less than the approximate 22-knot deck.30 A transit speed of about 15 knots would be less than the approximate 22-knot
maximum sustained speed of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships, but it is a relatively fuel-maximum sustained speed of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships, but it is a relatively fuel-
efficient speed for moving ships through water,31 which would permit the ship to be equipped efficient speed for moving ships through water,31 which would permit the ship to be equipped
with a less powerful and consequently less expensive propulsion plant. The 20-year expected with a less powerful and consequently less expensive propulsion plant. The 20-year expected
service life is less than the 30- to 45-year expected service lives of larger U.S. Navy amphibious service life is less than the 30- to 45-year expected service lives of larger U.S. Navy amphibious
ships—a difference that could reduce the LAW’s construction cost for a ship of its type and ships—a difference that could reduce the LAW’s construction cost for a ship of its type and
size—and closer to the 25-year expected service life of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships size—and closer to the 25-year expected service life of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs).32 (LCSs).32
Figure 1, Figure 2,,
and and Figure 3 show one firm’s LAW design. The design reportedly has a show one firm’s LAW design. The design reportedly has a
length of 120 meters (about 394 feet), a displacement of 4,500 tons, and 10,500 square feet of length of 120 meters (about 394 feet), a displacement of 4,500 tons, and 10,500 square feet of
deck space for rolling stock or other cargoes.33 The Navy’s eventual preferred design for the LAW deck space for rolling stock or other cargoes.33 The Navy’s eventual preferred design for the LAW
might or might not look like this design. might or might not look like this design.
Procurement Schedule
Navy plans
Navy plans
cal call for the first LAW to be procured in FY2023. The December 9, 2020, long-range for the first LAW to be procured in FY2023. The December 9, 2020, long-range
Navy shipbuildingNavy shipbuilding
document submitted by the Trump Administration showed the first LAW as document submitted by the Trump Administration showed the first LAW as
scheduled for procurement in FY2022 rather than FY2023, and the first 10 LAWs as being scheduled for procurement in FY2022 rather than FY2023, and the first 10 LAWs as being
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
29 Megan Eckstein, “29 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
30 As noted in
30 As noted in
footnote 3, footnote 3, a well deck is a large, covered, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded a well deck is a large, covered, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded
with water so that landing craft can leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck iswith water so that landing craft can leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck is
protected by a largeprotected by a large
stern gate stern gate
that is somewhat like a garagethat is somewhat like a garage
door. door.
31 Due to the density of water, fuel consumption for moving monohull ships through the water tends to increase steeply 31 Due to the density of water, fuel consumption for moving monohull ships through the water tends to increase steeply
for speedsfor speeds
above 14 to 16 knots. above 14 to 16 knots.
32 For more on the LCS
32 For more on the LCS
program, see CRSprogram, see CRS
Report RL33741, Report RL33741,
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
33 Martin Manaranche, “
33 Martin Manaranche, “
Sea Air SpaceSea Air Space
2021: Austal USA2021: Austal USA
Unveils Its LAW Design,”Unveils Its LAW Design,”
Naval News,,
August August 3, 2021. See 3, 2021. See
also also
T homasThomas Newdick, “Austal’s Light Amphibious Warship Design Newdick, “Austal’s Light Amphibious Warship Design
Is A T hrowback T o WWII’s T ank Is A Throwback To WWII’s Tank Landing Landing
Ships,”Ships,”
The Drive,,
August August 6, 2021. 6, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
scheduled for procurement in FY2022-FY2026 in annual quantities of 1-1-2-3-3. A June 21,
scheduled for procurement in FY2022-FY2026 in annual quantities of 1-1-2-3-3. A June 21,
2021, press report stated 2021, press report stated
In its recent
In its recent
fiscal 2022 budget request,fiscal 2022 budget request,
the Navy the Navy did notdid not
ask for moneyask for money
to begin to begin
procurement in FY22, though. Navy spokesman Capt. Clay Doss told Defense News the procurement in FY22, though. Navy spokesman Capt. Clay Doss told Defense News the
program would begin acquisition in FY23 ifprogram would begin acquisition in FY23 if
Congress funds the Navy’s request for just Congress funds the Navy’s request for just
research and development funds in FY22 to prepare for acquisition in FY23. He said the research and development funds in FY22 to prepare for acquisition in FY23. He said the
decisiondecision
to slow the program down was a fiscal one, not a sign of engineering or to slow the program down was a fiscal one, not a sign of engineering or other other
challenges.34 challenges.34
Figure 1. One Firm’s Design for LAW
Artist’s rendering
Artist’s rendering
Source: Cropped version Cropped version
of il ustration of Austal USA’sof il ustration of Austal USA’s
design for LAWdesign for LAW
accompanying Martin Manaranche, accompanying Martin Manaranche,
“Sea Air“Sea Air
Space 2021: Austal USA UnveilsSpace 2021: Austal USA Unveils
Its LAW Design,”Its LAW Design,”
Naval News, August 3, 2021. A caption credits the , August 3, 2021. A caption credits the
il ustrationil ustration
to Austal. to Austal.
Procurement Cost
The Navy estimates that the first LAW would cost about $156
The Navy estimates that the first LAW would cost about $156
mil ionmillion to procure, and that to procure, and that
subsequent LAWs would cost about $130 subsequent LAWs would cost about $130
mil ionmillion each to procure.35 each to procure.35
By way of comparison, the Navy’s most recently procured LHA-type amphibious ship, which
By way of comparison, the Navy’s most recently procured LHA-type amphibious ship, which
was procured in FY2017, has an estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY2022 budget was procured in FY2017, has an estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY2022 budget
34 Megan Eckstein, “34 Megan Eckstein, “
Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Marines Explain Vision for Fewer
T raditionalTraditional Amphibious Warships,” Amphibious Warships,”
Defense News,,
June 21, June 21,
2021. See also Megan Eckstein, “2021. See also Megan Eckstein, “
US Navy’s Light AmphibiousUS Navy’s Light Amphibious
Warship No Longer on Warship No Longer on
T rackTrack for 2022 Contract for 2022 Contract
Award,”Award,”
Defense News,,
June June 10, 2021. 10, 2021.
35 Source:35 Source:
Navy briefingNavy briefing
on LAW program for CRSon LAW program for CRS
and CBO,and CBO,
July 19, 2021. July 19, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
Congressional Research Service
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11
link to page 12
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
submission of about $3.8
submission of about $3.8
bil ionbillion, and LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships being procured by the , and LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships being procured by the
Navy have unit procurement costs of about $2.0 Navy have unit procurement costs of about $2.0
bil ionbillion. .
Figure 2. One Firm’s Design for LAW
Photograph of model displayed at trade show
Photograph of model displayed at trade show
Source: Cropped versionCropped version
of photograph of model of Austal USA’sof photograph of model of Austal USA’s
design for LAWdesign for LAW
accompanying Martin accompanying Martin
Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAWManaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW
Design,” Design,”
Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model , August 3, 2021. The model
was displayed at the Sea Airwas displayed at the Sea Air
Space 2021 exposition. Space 2021 exposition.
As additional comparisons, the Navy’s Ship-to-Shore Connectors (SSCs)—its new air-cushioned
As additional comparisons, the Navy’s Ship-to-Shore Connectors (SSCs)—its new air-cushioned
landing craft—are about 92 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of roughly $65 landing craft—are about 92 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of roughly $65
mil ionmillion, ,
the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are 154 feet long and have a unit the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are 154 feet long and have a unit
procurement cost of about $65 procurement cost of about $65
mil ionmillion, and the Navy’s new TATS towing, salvage, and rescue , and the Navy’s new TATS towing, salvage, and rescue
ships are 263 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of about $80 ships are 263 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of about $80
mil ionmillion. .
Potential Builders
The LAW as outlined by the Navy is
The LAW as outlined by the Navy is
smal small enough that it could be built by any of several U.S. enough that it could be built by any of several U.S.
shipyards. shipyards.
Acquisition Strategy
Overview
The Navy’s baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build The Navy’s baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build
al all 24 to 35 ships, but the Navy 24 to 35 ships, but the Navy
is open to having them built in multipleis open to having them built in multiple
yards to the same design if doing so could permit the yards to the same design if doing so could permit the
program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.36 program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.36
36 T he
36 The Q&A document from the Navy’s April 9, 2020, industry day on the LAW program (see Q&A document from the Navy’s April 9, 2020, industry day on the LAW program (see
footnote 20)footnote 20) states states
Q [from industry]: Once [the industry] studies
Q [from industry]: Once [the industry] studies
are done, what is the likelihood of [the Navy are done, what is the likelihood of [the Navy
making] multiple [contract] awards [for the making] multiple [contract] awards [for the
n extnext stage]? stage]?
A [from Navy]: When the [industry] studies are done, there will
A [from Navy]: When the [industry] studies are done, there will
be multiple [contract] awards for be multiple [contract] awards for
preliminary design [work]. preliminary design [work].
T henThen [the Navy will] down [the Navy will] down
select for a [preferred] prototype. [There is] select for a [preferred] prototype. [There is]
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Navy plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail design and construction
The Navy plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail design and construction
(DD&C) contract for the LAW program in the second quarter of FY2022, and to award the (DD&C) contract for the LAW program in the second quarter of FY2022, and to award the
contract in the first quester of FY2023. contract in the first quester of FY2023.
Figure 3. One Firm’s Design for LAW
Photograph of model displayed at trade show
Photograph of model displayed at trade show
Source: Cropped versionCropped version
of photograph of model of Austal USA’sof photograph of model of Austal USA’s
design for LAWdesign for LAW
accompanying Martin accompanying Martin
Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAWManaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW
Design,” Design,”
Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model , August 3, 2021. The model
was displayed at the Sea Airwas displayed at the Sea Air
Space 2021 exposition. Space 2021 exposition.
Reported July 2020 Contract Awards
An October 6, 2020, press report stated that the Navy in July 2020 awarded contracts for LAW An October 6, 2020, press report stated that the Navy in July 2020 awarded contracts for LAW
concept design studies to 15 firms, with the studies due in November 2020. According to the concept design studies to 15 firms, with the studies due in November 2020. According to the
press report, the 15 companies awarded contracts included Austal USE, BMT Designers, press report, the 15 companies awarded contracts included Austal USE, BMT Designers,
BollingerBollinger
Shipyards, Crescere Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Shipyards, Crescere Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime
Assessment Associates, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St John Assessment Associates, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St John
Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Technology Associates, Thoma-Sea, and VT Halter Marine. The studies Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Technology Associates, Thoma-Sea, and VT Halter Marine. The studies
No plan for [building
No plan for [building
the ships at] multiple [ship]yards and [buildingthe ships at] multiple [ship]yards and [building
them to multiple] designs like them to multiple] designs like
[the] LCS [Littoral Combat Ship program]. It’s too hard of a logistics tail [to provide lifecycle [the] LCS [Littoral Combat Ship program]. It’s too hard of a logistics tail [to provide lifecycle
support for ships builtsupport for ships built
to multiple designs].to multiple designs].
But options are open if it is cheaper/faster.But options are open if it is cheaper/faster.
Q [from industry]: Do you envision something similar to LCS
Q [from industry]: Do you envision something similar to LCS
variance [sic: variants]? Multiple variance [sic: variants]? Multiple
yards and designs? yards and designs?
A [from Navy]: No, it involves too much logistics and O&S
A [from Navy]: No, it involves too much logistics and O&S
[operation and support costs]. [operation and support costs].
T hisThis drives overall costs initially [i.e., locks higher life-cycle support costs into the program from the drives overall costs initially [i.e., locks higher life-cycle support costs into the program from the
outset of the program] and we’reoutset of the program] and we’re
not trying to go down that path. As we’ve saidnot trying to go down that path. As we’ve said
before, if studies before, if studies
tell ustell us
we we are wrong,are wrong,
if it’s affordable and fieldsif it’s affordable and fields
faster, then we won’t ignore it. faster, then we won’t ignore it.
T heThe data and cost data and cost
drivers willdrivers will
help us decide.help us decide.
T he The Government wants to field [the ships] as rapidly as possible, and Government wants to field [the ships] as rapidly as possible, and
wewe
believe that using multiple yardsbelieve that using multiple yards
is not the best and most affordable path.is not the best and most affordable path.
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reportedly were intended to help inform concepts of operation, technical risk, and cost estimates
reportedly were intended to help inform concepts of operation, technical risk, and cost estimates
for the LAW program, in support of a planned lead-ship contract award in FY2022. An August for the LAW program, in support of a planned lead-ship contract award in FY2022. An August
27, 2020, press report states 27, 2020, press report states
The
The
Navy and Marine Corps’ new Light Amphibious Warship program is already Navy and Marine Corps’ new Light Amphibious Warship program is already in in
industry studies, with the service pushing ahead as quickly asindustry studies, with the service pushing ahead as quickly as
possible in an possible in an
acknowledgement that they’re already behind in their transformation of the force. acknowledgement that they’re already behind in their transformation of the force.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director
of expeditionaryof expeditionary
warfare on the chief of naval warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAVoperations’ staff (OPNAV
N95),N95),
said today thatsaid today that
LAW LAW was perhaps thewas perhaps the
most important most important
investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base
operations (EABO). operations (EABO).
“Having these LAWs out there as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our
“Having these LAWs out there as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our
Navy, engaging with our partners and allies, building partner capacity, is what I think we Navy, engaging with our partners and allies, building partner capacity, is what I think we
need to be doing right now. I think we’re late to need with building the Light Amphibious need to be doing right now. I think we’re late to need with building the Light Amphibious
Warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly,” he said, saying that N95 was copying Warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly,” he said, saying that N95 was copying
the surface warfare directorate’s playbook from the frigate program, which moved quickly the surface warfare directorate’s playbook from the frigate program, which moved quickly
from requirements-developmentfrom requirements-development
to design to getting under contract thanks to the use to design to getting under contract thanks to the use of of
mature technology and designs from industry.37 mature technology and designs from industry.37
October 2020 Request for Information (RFI)
On October 16, 2020, the Navy released a request for information (RFI) to solicit industry input On October 16, 2020, the Navy released a request for information (RFI) to solicit industry input
on draft versions of documents relating to an eventual solicitation for conducting design work on on draft versions of documents relating to an eventual solicitation for conducting design work on
the ship.38 the ship.38
November 2020 Press Report About Concept Designs
A November 9, 2020, press report stated that, as part of its LAW industry studies, the Navy had A November 9, 2020, press report stated that, as part of its LAW industry studies, the Navy had
received nine LAW concept designs from 16 design firms and shipyards, some of which have received nine LAW concept designs from 16 design firms and shipyards, some of which have
paired into teams. The report quoted a Navy official as stating that the following firms paired into teams. The report quoted a Navy official as stating that the following firms
w erewere participating in the industry studies: Austal USA, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere participating in the industry studies: Austal USA, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere
Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates, Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates,
Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St. John Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St. John Shipbuilding, Swiftships,
Technology Associates Inc., Thoma-Sea, VT Halter Marine and Fincantieri.39 A November 19, Technology Associates Inc., Thoma-Sea, VT Halter Marine and Fincantieri.39 A November 19,
2020, press report stated that “about six industry teams are working with the sea services [i.e., the 2020, press report stated that “about six industry teams are working with the sea services [i.e., the
Navy and Marine Corps] after two industry days and industry studies over the summer.40 Navy and Marine Corps] after two industry days and industry studies over the summer.40
A January 11, 2021, press report stated
A January 11, 2021, press report stated
37 Megan Eckstein, “37 Megan Eckstein, “
Marines Already In Industry StudiesMarines Already In Industry Studies
for Light Amphibiousfor Light Amphibious
Warship, In BidWarship, In Bid
to Field to Field
T hemThem ASAP,” ASAP,”
USNI News,,
August August 27 (updated August27 (updated August
28), 2020. See also Rich Abott, “28), 2020. See also Rich Abott, “
Marine Corps In Industry Studies Marine Corps In Industry Studies
For Light Amphibious Warship, For Light Amphibious Warship,
T rying T oTrying To Move Quickly Move Quickly
,” ,”
Defense Daily, August, August
28, 2020. 28, 2020.
38 See38 See
“RFI: DRAFT“RFI: DRAFT
US US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of WorkNavy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work
,” ,”
Beta.sam.gov, accessedBeta.sam.gov, accessed
November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?
index=opp. Seeindex=opp. See
also Rich Abott, “also Rich Abott, “
Navy Issues RFI For Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary DesignNavy Issues RFI For Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design
,” ,”
Defense
Daily, October 19, 2020; Aidan Quigley,, October 19, 2020; Aidan Quigley,
“ “Navy Solicits Light AmphibiousNavy Solicits Light Amphibious
Warship Preliminary Designs,” Warship Preliminary Designs,”
Inside
Defense, October 19, 2020. , October 19, 2020.
39 Aidan Quigley,
39 Aidan Quigley,
“ “Nine Concept Designs SubmittedNine Concept Designs Submitted
for LAW Industry Studies,”for LAW Industry Studies,”
Inside Defense, November 9, 2020. ense, November 9, 2020.
40 Megan Eckstein, “40 Megan Eckstein, “
Navy Officials Reveal Details of NewNavy Officials Reveal Details of New
$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept$100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept
,” ,”
USNI News, ,
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
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The Navy and Marine Corps are quickly seeking new ideas that allow Marines to support
The Navy and Marine Corps are quickly seeking new ideas that allow Marines to support
the Navy in sea control and other maritime missions, including the rapid acquisition of a the Navy in sea control and other maritime missions, including the rapid acquisition of a
light amphibious ship and a movement toward using Marine weapons while at sea. light amphibious ship and a movement toward using Marine weapons while at sea.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director
of expeditionaryof expeditionary
warfare on the chief of naval warfare on the chief of naval
operations’operations’
staff staff (OPNAV N95), told(OPNAV N95), told
USNI NewsUSNI News
during during a Jan.a Jan.
8 media call that8 media call that
the the
services are moving quickly to buy their first light amphibious warship (LAW) in Fiscal services are moving quickly to buy their first light amphibious warship (LAW) in Fiscal
Year 2022,Year 2022,
as outlined in the recent long-range shipbuilding plan. as outlined in the recent long-range shipbuilding plan.
“We’re moving out at flank speed; I got a chance to brief the CNO and the commandant
“We’re moving out at flank speed; I got a chance to brief the CNO and the commandant
recently, and they told me to maintain course and heading,” he said during the media recently, and they told me to maintain course and heading,” he said during the media
cal call ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium. ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium.
“We’re going through the formal JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
“We’re going through the formal JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System)System)
process right now. [Naval Sea Systems Command] has completed its process right now. [Naval Sea Systems Command] has completed its second second
industry studies, and we’re working on all those documents.” industry studies, and we’re working on all those documents.”
For now, 10 or 11
For now, 10 or 11
industry industry teams remain involved in theteams remain involved in the
NAVSEA competition,NAVSEA competition,
which which
recently held a second round of industry studies. NAVSEA is working with those teams to recently held a second round of industry studies. NAVSEA is working with those teams to
help iterate what King called “novel” designs, to ensure they were the right size and could help iterate what King called “novel” designs, to ensure they were the right size and could
achieveachieve
cost and cost and performance requirements.performance requirements.
Mid Mid next year,next year,
he he said,said,
NAVSEA would NAVSEA would
downselect to three teams for full design, and then would downselect to just one todownselect to three teams for full design, and then would downselect to just one to
build build
the first LAW in late FY2022. the first LAW in late FY2022.
“My suspicion is that we’ll begin [research, development, test and evaluation] next year,
“My suspicion is that we’ll begin [research, development, test and evaluation] next year,
and then we are aiming at lead ship construction in FY ’22, it’s going to be late in FY ’22 and then we are aiming at lead ship construction in FY ’22, it’s going to be late in FY ’22
,but I still consider that pretty fast,” King said. ,but I still consider that pretty fast,” King said.
“We’re just going to build one, get that out and start playing with it. We’ll probably build
“We’re just going to build one, get that out and start playing with it. We’ll probably build
one the next year because we’ve got to get the doctrine right. The [Marine one the next year because we’ve got to get the doctrine right. The [Marine Littoral Littoral
Regiments] are going to start coming online at about the same time – first one’s in Hawaii, Regiments] are going to start coming online at about the same time – first one’s in Hawaii,
we’ll get it out there and let them play with it. And then we’ll go into a build profile of, I we’ll get it out there and let them play with it. And then we’ll go into a build profile of, I
don’t know, probably four or five a year or something like that is what we’re going to aim don’t know, probably four or five a year or something like that is what we’re going to aim
for.”41 for.”41
June 2021 Contract Awards
A June 17, 2021, press report states A June 17, 2021, press report states
The
The
Navy this week issued “concept design” contracts to five companies for the Navy this week issued “concept design” contracts to five companies for the Light Light
Amphibious Warship ahead of the Fiscal Year 2023 design selection, a service spokesman Amphibious Warship ahead of the Fiscal Year 2023 design selection, a service spokesman
confirmed to USNI News. confirmed to USNI News.
Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers were selected
Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers were selected
for the contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau said. for the contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau said.
“A
“A
Concept Studies (CS) contract has been awarded to five offerors with a follow-on
Concept Studies (CS) contract has been awarded to five offerors with a follow-on option for Preliminary Design (PD),” Baribeau said in a statement.option for Preliminary Design (PD),” Baribeau said in a statement.
“The CS/PD efforts “The CS/PD efforts
include engineering analyses, tradeoff studies, and development of engineering and design include engineering analyses, tradeoff studies, and development of engineering and design
documentation defining concepts studies/preliminary designs.” documentation defining concepts studies/preliminary designs.”
41 Megan Eckstein, “41 Megan Eckstein, “
Marines, Navy Moving Quickly on Light Amphib, Anti-Ship MissilesMarines, Navy Moving Quickly on Light Amphib, Anti-Ship Missiles
to Create More Warfighting to Create More Warfighting
Options,” Options,”
USNI News,,
January 11, 2021. Material in brackets as in original. SeeJanuary 11, 2021. Material in brackets as in original. See
also Rich Abott, “also Rich Abott, “
Kilby Outlines Kilby Outlines
Factors LeadingFactors Leading
T o To Faster New Light Amphib Faster New Light Amphib
Developm entDevelopment,” ,”
Defense Daily, February 5, 2021. , February 5, 2021.
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link to page 12
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Navy did not disclose the amount of
The Navy did not disclose the amount of
money each company received to perform the money each company received to perform the
work, butwork, but
Baribeau confirmed to USNI News that the total combined amount Baribeau confirmed to USNI News that the total combined amount of the of the
contracts was less than $7.5 million.42 contracts was less than $7.5 million.42
RFP and Award of Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) Contract
As mentioned earlier, the Navy plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail As mentioned earlier, the Navy plans to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detail
design and construction (DD&C) contract for the LAW program in the second quarter of FY2022, design and construction (DD&C) contract for the LAW program in the second quarter of FY2022,
and to award the contract in the first quester of FY2023. and to award the contract in the first quester of FY2023.
FY2022 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $13.2
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $13.2
mil ionmillion in research and development in research and development
funding for the program. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium funding for the program. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium
Amphibious Ship) of PE (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which Amphibious Ship) of PE (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which
is line number 46 in the Navy’s FY2022 research and development account. is line number 46 in the Navy’s FY2022 research and development account.
Issues for Congress
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including those The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including those
discussed briefly in the sections below. discussed briefly in the sections below.
Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
One issue for Congress concerns the future amphibious ship force-level goal, which could affect One issue for Congress concerns the future amphibious ship force-level goal, which could affect
future procurement quantities for LHA-type ships, LPD-17 Flight II class ships, and LAWs. In future procurement quantities for LHA-type ships, LPD-17 Flight II class ships, and LAWs. In
connection with this issue, one potential oversight question for Congress concerns the difference connection with this issue, one potential oversight question for Congress concerns the difference
between the emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships in the Biden Administration’s June between the emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships in the Biden Administration’s June
17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document and the emerging force-level goal for 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document and the emerging force-level goal for
amphibious ships in the Trump Administration’s December 9, 2020, long-range Navy amphibious ships in the Trump Administration’s December 9, 2020, long-range Navy
shipbuilding document. Using the figures shown ishipbuilding document. Using the figures shown i
n Table 1, the Trump Administration’s the Trump Administration’s
emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships includes about 6%-27% more amphibious ships emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships includes about 6%-27% more amphibious ships
in total than the Biden Administration’s emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships. A in total than the Biden Administration’s emerging force-level goal for amphibious ships. A
potential oversight question is to what degree this difference between the two emerging force-potential oversight question is to what degree this difference between the two emerging force-
level goals is due to differences between the two Administrations regarding one or more of the level goals is due to differences between the two Administrations regarding one or more of the
following factors: following factors:
U.S. national security strategy and U.S. national defense strategy;
U.S. national security strategy and U.S. national defense strategy;
projections of future capabilities of potential adversaries such as China and projections of future capabilities of potential adversaries such as China and
Russia;
Russia;
consequent requirements, from the two factors above, for day-to-day forward-
consequent requirements, from the two factors above, for day-to-day forward-
deployed Navy capacity and capability and Navy warfighting capacity and
deployed Navy capacity and capability and Navy warfighting capacity and
capability; capability;
assumptions about the capabilities of future U.S. Navy manned and unmanned
assumptions about the capabilities of future U.S. Navy manned and unmanned
ships;
ships;
Navy homeporting arrangements and operational cycles;
Navy homeporting arrangements and operational cycles;
42 Mallory Shelbourne,42 Mallory Shelbourne,
“Navy Awards“Navy Awards
5 Companies Light Amphibious Warship ‘Concept Design’ Contracts,” 5 Companies Light Amphibious Warship ‘Concept Design’ Contracts,”
USNI
News,,
June 17, 2021. June 17, 2021.
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
projections about future Navy budgets, including future Navy shipbuilding
projections about future Navy budgets, including future Navy shipbuilding
budgets; and
budgets; and
the degree of operational risk deemed acceptable regarding the ability of the
the degree of operational risk deemed acceptable regarding the ability of the
Navy to successfully perform its various day-to-day and warfighting missions.
Navy to successfully perform its various day-to-day and warfighting missions.
A related potential oversight issue for Congress concerns how the LAW would fit into the Navy’s
A related potential oversight issue for Congress concerns how the LAW would fit into the Navy’s
overal overall future fleet architecture. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: future fleet architecture. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
What is the analytical basis for the envisioned procurement quantity of 24 to 35
What is the analytical basis for the envisioned procurement quantity of 24 to 35
LAWs?43
LAWs?43
How
How
wel well can the cost-effectiveness of a force of 24 to 35 LAWs be assessed if can the cost-effectiveness of a force of 24 to 35 LAWs be assessed if
the remainder of the Navy’s amphibious ship fleet architecture is not yet fully
the remainder of the Navy’s amphibious ship fleet architecture is not yet fully
known? known?
EABO Operational Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of the EABO operational Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of the EABO operational
concept that the LAW is intended to help Marine Corps implement. Debate on the merits of the concept that the LAW is intended to help Marine Corps implement. Debate on the merits of the
EABO EABO concept concerns issues such as concept concerns issues such as
whether the concept is focused too exclusively on potential conflict scenarios
whether the concept is focused too exclusively on potential conflict scenarios
with China at the expense of other kinds of potential Marine Corps missions;
with China at the expense of other kinds of potential Marine Corps missions;
the ability
the ability
of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would
operate;
operate;
the ability
the ability
to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;44 to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;44
the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;45 the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;45
how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would
make in contributing to
make in contributing to
overal overall U.S. sea-denial operations; and U.S. sea-denial operations; and
potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be
potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be
needed to implement EABO.46
needed to implement EABO.46
43 For an article that raises questions concerning the analytical foundation for the LAW 43 For an article that raises questions concerning the analytical foundation for the LAW
pr ogramprogram, see Daniel Goure, , see Daniel Goure,
“Light Amphibious Warship: A Mistake For “Light Amphibious Warship: A Mistake For
T heThe U.S. Marine Corps And Navy?” U.S. Marine Corps And Navy?”
19FortyFive, July 27, 2021. , July 27, 2021.
44 See,44 See,
for example, John M. Doyle, “for example, John M. Doyle, “
Berger SaysBerger Says
Supporting a Widely DistributedSupporting a Widely Distributed
Maritime Force Will Be a Maritime Force Will Be a
Challenge,” Challenge,”
Seapower, May 14, 2021. , May 14, 2021.
45 See,
45 See,
for example, Yasmin for example, Yasmin
T adjdehTadjdeh, “Light Amphibious Warships Face Survivability Questions,” , “Light Amphibious Warships Face Survivability Questions,”
National Defense, ,
April 23, 2021. April 23, 2021.
46 For a CRS
46 For a CRS
report on the proposed redesign of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as EABO, report on the proposed redesign of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as EABO,
see CRSsee CRS
Insight IN11281, Insight IN11281,
New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew, by Andrew
Feickert Feickert. .
For Marine Corps statements about the redesign of the Marine Corps and EABO, see U.S.
For Marine Corps statements about the redesign of the Marine Corps and EABO, see U.S.
Marine Corps, Marine Corps,
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps,,
undated, released Julyundated, released July
2019, 23 pp.; U.S. 2019, 23 pp.; U.S.
Marine Corps, Marine Corps,
Force Design 2030, March 2020, 13 pp.; David H. Berger, “, March 2020, 13 pp.; David H. Berger, “
T heThe Case for Change,” Case for Change,”
Marine Corps
Gazette, June 2020: 8-12. See also Megan Eckstein, “, June 2020: 8-12. See also Megan Eckstein, “
Marines Marines
T estingTesting Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping
Future,” Future,”
USNI News,,
June 4 (updated June 12), 2020; Megan Eckstein, “June 4 (updated June 12), 2020; Megan Eckstein, “
Marines Look to Marines Look to
T woTwo New Ship Classes New Ship Classes
to to
Define FutureDefine Future
of Amphibious Operations,” of Amphibious Operations,”
USNI News,,
June 4 (updated JuneJune 4 (updated June
12), 202; David Berger, “12), 202; David Berger, “
Marines Will Marines Will
Help Fight Submarines,”Help Fight Submarines,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2020. , November 2020.
For press articles discussing
For press articles discussing
the proposed redesignthe proposed redesign
of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as of the Marine Corps to support new operational concepts such as
EABO, see Philip Athey, “EABO, see Philip Athey, “
Marines vs. China―the Corps Just Put Marines vs. China―the Corps Just Put
T hese T acticsThese Tactics to the to the
T estTest,” ,”
Marine Corps Times, ,
October 19, 2020; Mark Perry, “October 19, 2020; Mark Perry, “
The Marines Corps Is RollingThe Marines Corps Is Rolling
Out a ‘Subversive’Out a ‘Subversive’
New New Strategy to Strategy to
T akeTake on China,” on China,”
BusinessBusiness
Insider, October 15, 2020; David B. Larter, “Insider, October 15, 2020; David B. Larter, “
Are the US Army and USAre the US Army and US
Marine Corps Competing for Missions Marine Corps Competing for Missions
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?
What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?
What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and war What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and war
games to develop and test the concept?
games to develop and test the concept?
Would EABO
Would EABO
be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of
the funding and personnel?
the funding and personnel?
Preliminary Cost Target
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s preliminary procurement cost Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s preliminary procurement cost
target for the LAW. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: target for the LAW. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
Is the Navy’s estimated unit procurement cost reasonable, given the features the
Is the Navy’s estimated unit procurement cost reasonable, given the features the
Navy wants the ship to have?
Navy wants the ship to have?
As the LAW program proceeds,
As the LAW program proceeds,
wil will the operational requirements (and thus cost) the operational requirements (and thus cost)
of the LAW increase?
of the LAW increase?
In connection questions such as these, a September 21, 2020, press report states
In connection questions such as these, a September 21, 2020, press report states
The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class
The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class
of light amphibious of light amphibious
warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it willwarship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will
be based or what capabilities be based or what capabilities
it willit will
bring to the fight. bring to the fight.
The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make
The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make
a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport
Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day
presentation. presentation.
While
While
the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy requirements, requirements,
that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build, that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build,
in the Pacific?” in the Pacific?”
Defense News,,
October 14, 2020; Michael Fabey, “October 14, 2020; Michael Fabey, “
T emplateTemplate For Change: Marine Corps’ New For Change: Marine Corps’ New
Vision Vision
SetsSets
A Headmark For U.S. Navy A Headmark For U.S. Navy
T ransformation Transformation,” ,”
Jane’s Navy International, September 9, 2020; Chris “, September 9, 2020; Chris “
Junior” Junior”
Cannon, “Cannon, “
T heThe Commandant Needs Our Help: Accelerating Marine Corps Force Development Commandant Needs Our Help: Accelerating Marine Corps Force Development
,” Center for International ,” Center for International
Maritime Security (CIMSEC),Maritime Security (CIMSEC),
August August 25, 2020; Mallory Shelbourne,25, 2020; Mallory Shelbourne,
“ “Panel: New Focus on China Fight CouldPanel: New Focus on China Fight Could
Rob Rob
Marine Corps of Versatility,” Marine Corps of Versatility,”
USNI News,,
July July 30, 2020; 30, 2020;
T annerTanner Greer, “ Greer, “
T he T ipThe Tip of the American Military Spear Is of the American Military Spear Is
BeingBeing
Blunted,” Blunted,”
Foreign Policy, July, July
6, 2020; Ben Wan Beng Ho, “6, 2020; Ben Wan Beng Ho, “
Shortfalls in the Marine Corps’ EABO ConceptShortfalls in the Marine Corps’ EABO Concept
,” ,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2020; J. Noel Williams, “, July 2020; J. Noel Williams, “
Force Design,” Force Design,”
Marine Corps Gazette, July, July
2020; 2020;
Dakota Wood, “Dakota Wood, “
T heThe Marines: Marines:
T oTo Boldly Go Where the Corps Has Gone Before,” Boldly Go Where the Corps Has Gone Before,”
Washington Times, June 24, 2020; , June 24, 2020;
Paul McLeary, “Paul McLeary, “
In War, Chinese ShipyardsIn War, Chinese Shipyards
Could Could Outpace USOutpace US
in Replacing Losses;in Replacing Losses;
Marine CommandantMarine Commandant
,” ,”
Breaking
Defense, June 17, 2020; Dakota Wood, , June 17, 2020; Dakota Wood,
The U.S. Marine Corps: A Service in Transition , Heritage Foundation, June , Heritage Foundation, June
216, 2020, 18 pp.; David B. Larter, “216, 2020, 18 pp.; David B. Larter, “
In His Fight to Change the Corps, America’s In His Fight to Change the Corps, America’s
T op Marine T akesTop Marine Takes Friendly Fire,” Friendly Fire,”
Defense News,,
June 11, 2020; Gina Harkins, “June 11, 2020; Gina Harkins, “
Marine 3-Star Hits Back at Claims that Corps’ Future Design Is Marine 3-Star Hits Back at Claims that Corps’ Future Design Is
T ooToo China-Focused,”China-Focused,”
Military.com , June 2, 2020; Frank G., June 2, 2020; Frank G.
Hoffman, “Hoffman, “
Still First to Fight?” Still First to Fight?”
Marine Corps Gazette, June , June
2020; Gary Anderson, “2020; Gary Anderson, “
Addressing Addressing the Chinese the Chinese
T hreatThreat in the Indo-Pacific Area,” in the Indo-Pacific Area,”
Washington Times, May 25, 2020; , May 25, 2020;
Matthew Fay andMatthew Fay and
Michael A. Hunzeker, “No SureMichael A. Hunzeker, “No Sure
Victory: Victory:
T heThe Marines New Marines New
Force DesignForce Design
Pla n Plan and the Politics of and the Politics of
Implementation,” Implementation,”
War on the Rocks, May 14, 2020; Jim Webb, “cks, May 14, 2020; Jim Webb, “
T heThe Future of the U.S. Marine Corps,” Future of the U.S. Marine Corps,”
National
Interest, May 8, 2020; Grant Newsham, “, May 8, 2020; Grant Newsham, “
US Marines Revamp AmidUS Marines Revamp Amid
China’s GrowingChina’s Growing
T hreat Threat,” ,”
Asia Tim esTimes, May 7, , May 7,
2020; Jeff Cummings,2020; Jeff Cummings,
Scott Cuomo, Olivia A. Garard,Scott Cuomo, Olivia A. Garard,
and Noah Spataro, “and Noah Spataro, “
Getting the Context of Marine Corps Getting the Context of Marine Corps
Reform Right,” Reform Right,”
War on the Rocks, May 1, 2020; Benjamin Jensen, “, May 1, 2020; Benjamin Jensen, “
T heThe Rest of the Story: Evaluating the U.S. Marine Rest of the Story: Evaluating the U.S. Marine
Corps Force DesignCorps Force Design
2030,” 2030,”
War on the Rocks, April 27, 2020; T, April 27, 2020; T
. X. Hammes, “. X. Hammes, “
Building Building a Marine Corps for Every a Marine Corps for Every
Contingency, Clime, and Place,” Contingency, Clime, and Place,”
War on the Rocks, April 15, 2020; Mark F. Cancian, “, April 15, 2020; Mark F. Cancian, “
T heThe Marine Corps’ Radical Marine Corps’ Radical
Shift toward China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),Shift toward China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
March 25, 2020.March 25, 2020.
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crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet [beyond its
crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet [beyond its
currently envisioned role]? currently envisioned role]?
Analysts,
Analysts,
experts and sources experts and sources with knowledgewith knowledge
of internalof internal
discussions who spoke discussions who spoke to to
Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon…. Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon….
When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to
When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to
align with the Navy’s desire to be more spread out over a large area during a fight, [he align with the Navy’s desire to be more spread out over a large area during a fight, [he
chief of naval operations’chief of naval operations’
director of expeditionary warfare, director of expeditionary warfare, Maj. Gen. TracyMaj. Gen. Tracy
King] King]
answered in the affirmative. answered in the affirmative.
“[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build
“[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build
an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.” an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.”
The
The
unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors and and
requirements, it willrequirements, it will
slow down the process and increase the cost. slow down the process and increase the cost.
An alystsAnalysts who spoke to who spoke to
Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on
the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive…. the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive….
“The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,” “The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,”
saidsaid
Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation.
Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation. “This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship LCS:47 It started out as a very light, near-“This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship LCS:47 It started out as a very light, near-
shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started
ad dingadding on on
requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you
get into all kinds of problemsget into all kinds of problems
….” ….”
[Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group] acknowledged
[Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group] acknowledged
thatthat
the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have more more
capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something
costly and elaborate. costly and elaborate.
“What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can
“What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can
be purchased.”48 be purchased.”48
Potential Alternative of Adapting Existing Army LSVs
Another potential issue for Congress is whether at least some portion of the operational Another potential issue for Congress is whether at least some portion of the operational
requirements for the LAW program could be met cost effectively met by adapting existing U.S. requirements for the LAW program could be met cost effectively met by adapting existing U.S.
military military ships rather than building new LAWs. Some observers, for example, argue that at least ships rather than building new LAWs. Some observers, for example, argue that at least
some portion of the operational requirements for the LAW program could be met more cost-some portion of the operational requirements for the LAW program could be met more cost-
effectively by transferring existing Army watercraft known as Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs) effectively by transferring existing Army watercraft known as Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs)
(Figure 4) to the Navy and adapting these LSVs to the LAW mission. to the Navy and adapting these LSVs to the LAW mission.
A June 22, 2020, opinion piece discussing this idea states A June 22, 2020, opinion piece discussing this idea states
The Navy intends to acquire up to 30 new light amphibious warships, or LAW, to support
The Navy intends to acquire up to 30 new light amphibious warships, or LAW, to support
new Marine Corps requirements.… Rather than accepting a new amphibious design built new Marine Corps requirements.… Rather than accepting a new amphibious design built
from the ground up, however, decision-makers should take advantage of the fact that many from the ground up, however, decision-makers should take advantage of the fact that many
key requirements of the new vessels are very similar to the capabilities of vessels operated key requirements of the new vessels are very similar to the capabilities of vessels operated
by U.S. Army Transportation Command. by U.S. Army Transportation Command.
47 For more on the LCS47 For more on the LCS
program, see CRSprogram, see CRS
Report RL33741, Report RL33741,
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
48 David B. Larter, “48 David B. Larter, “
US Marines Wants to Move Fast on a Light Amphibious Warship. But What is It?” US Marines Wants to Move Fast on a Light Amphibious Warship. But What is It?”
Defense News, ,
September 21, 2020. September 21, 2020.
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The Navy and Marine Corps should delay any new construction and immediately acquire
The Navy and Marine Corps should delay any new construction and immediately acquire
some of these existing vessels to drive experimentation and better inform their some of these existing vessels to drive experimentation and better inform their
requirements for the LAW program…. requirements for the LAW program….
U.S. Army Transportation
U.S. Army Transportation
Command has over 100 vessels, and dozens have similar capabilities to those required of the LAW. The Army’s LCU-2000s, also Command has over 100 vessels, and dozens have similar capabilities to those required of the LAW. The Army’s LCU-2000s, also called the called the
Runnymede-class large landing crafts, are smaller,Runnymede-class large landing crafts, are smaller,
with roughlywith roughly
half of the cargo space half of the cargo space
designeddesigned
for the LAW and slightly slower, but they boast nearly double the range. for the LAW and slightly slower, but they boast nearly double the range. The The
Runnymede-class vessels have nearly 4,000 square feet of cargo space and can travel 6,500 Runnymede-class vessels have nearly 4,000 square feet of cargo space and can travel 6,500
miles when loaded and at 12 knots; and they can unload at the beach with their bow ramp. miles when loaded and at 12 knots; and they can unload at the beach with their bow ramp.
The
The
Army’s GeneralArmy’s General
Frank S.Frank S.
Besson-class logistics support vessels areBesson-class logistics support vessels are
larger than the larger than the
future LAW, at 273 feet in length but can claim 10,500 square feet of cargo space and a future LAW, at 273 feet in length but can claim 10,500 square feet of cargo space and a
6,500-mile6,500-mile
range loaded to match the LCU-2000. These vessels also have both a bow and range loaded to match the LCU-2000. These vessels also have both a bow and
stern ramp for roll-on/roll-off capability at the beach or ship-to-ship docking at sea. The stern ramp for roll-on/roll-off capability at the beach or ship-to-ship docking at sea. The
version built for the Phillipine military also has a helipad. version built for the Phillipine military also has a helipad.
Army Transportation Command
Army Transportation Command
has has 32 Runnymede-class32 Runnymede-class
and eight and eight General Frank S. General Frank S.
Besson-class vessels in service. Mostly built in the 1990s, both classes of vessel have many Besson-class vessels in service. Mostly built in the 1990s, both classes of vessel have many
years left in their life expectancy and more than meet the Navy’s 10-year life expectancy years left in their life expectancy and more than meet the Navy’s 10-year life expectancy
for the LAW. for the LAW.
These vessels are operable today and could be transferred from the Army to the Navy or
These vessels are operable today and could be transferred from the Army to the Navy or
MarineMarine
Corps Corps tomorrow. In fact, thetomorrow. In fact, the
Army was attemptingArmy was attempting
to divest to divest itself of these itself of these
watercraft less than a year ago, which underscores the importance of this opportunity even watercraft less than a year ago, which underscores the importance of this opportunity even
further. Congress is firmly set against the Army getting rid of valuable, seaworthy vessels further. Congress is firmly set against the Army getting rid of valuable, seaworthy vessels
and has quashed all of the Army’s efforts to do so thus far, but transferring this equipment and has quashed all of the Army’s efforts to do so thus far, but transferring this equipment
to the Navy is a reasonable course of action that should satisfy all parties involved…. to the Navy is a reasonable course of action that should satisfy all parties involved….
By acquiring a watercraft that meets most of their requirements from the Army, the Navy
By acquiring a watercraft that meets most of their requirements from the Army, the Navy
andand
Marine Corps simultaneously fill current capability gaps and obtain an Marine Corps simultaneously fill current capability gaps and obtain an invaluable invaluable
series of assets they can use to support the evaluation and experimentation of new designs series of assets they can use to support the evaluation and experimentation of new designs
and concepts. This will allow Navy and Marine leaders to give their units the maximum and concepts. This will allow Navy and Marine leaders to give their units the maximum
amount of time to evaluate and experiment with new designs to get a better idea of what amount of time to evaluate and experiment with new designs to get a better idea of what
they need both in future amphibious craft as well as operational and support equipment…. they need both in future amphibious craft as well as operational and support equipment….
Often overlooked, the availability of surplus vessels is absolutely critical to the process of
Often overlooked, the availability of surplus vessels is absolutely critical to the process of
developing new technologies, developing the tactics to employ them, conducting training, developing new technologies, developing the tactics to employ them, conducting training,
andand
providing decision-makers the requisite capacity to providing decision-makers the requisite capacity to remain flexible in theremain flexible in the
face of
face of unexpected challenges…. unexpected challenges….
[The
[The
Navy and Marine Corps have] long been in need of a boost in their Navy and Marine Corps have] long been in need of a boost in their amphibious amphibious
capabilities so as to be better positioned to meet the demands of today and prepare for the capabilities so as to be better positioned to meet the demands of today and prepare for the
challenges of tomorrow, and taking possession of the Army’s Runnymede- and Frank S. challenges of tomorrow, and taking possession of the Army’s Runnymede- and Frank S.
Benson-class vessels is a solution on a silver platter.49 Benson-class vessels is a solution on a silver platter.49
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
How many of these watercraft would be available for transfer to the Navy for use
How many of these watercraft would be available for transfer to the Navy for use
in meeting the operational requirements of the LAW program?
in meeting the operational requirements of the LAW program?
How do the capabilities of these watercraft compare with those required for the
How do the capabilities of these watercraft compare with those required for the
LAW?
LAW?
How much remaining service life do these watercraft have?
How much remaining service life do these watercraft have?
49 Walker D. Mills49 Walker D. Mills
and Joseph Hanacek, “and Joseph Hanacek, “
T heThe US Navy and Marine Corps Should US Navy and Marine Corps Should
Acquire Acquire Army Watercraft,” Army Watercraft,”
Defense
News,,
June 22, 2020. June 22, 2020.
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Given the number of these watercraft that would be available for transfer to the
Given the number of these watercraft that would be available for transfer to the
Navy, their operational capabilities, and their remaining service life, what portion
Navy, their operational capabilities, and their remaining service life, what portion
of the LAW program’s operational requirements could transferred watercraft of the LAW program’s operational requirements could transferred watercraft
meet? How many LAWs, if any, would meet? How many LAWs, if any, would
stil still need to be built to fully or need to be built to fully or
substantial ysubstantially meet the LAW program’s operational requirements? meet the LAW program’s operational requirements?
How do the acquisition and operation and support (O&S) costs of these
How do the acquisition and operation and support (O&S) costs of these
watercraft compare to the estimated acquisition and O&S costs of the LAWs they
watercraft compare to the estimated acquisition and O&S costs of the LAWs they
would replace? would replace?
Taking into account capabilities, acquisition costs, and O&S costs, how does the
Taking into account capabilities, acquisition costs, and O&S costs, how does the
cost effectiveness of an approach involving the transfer of these watercraft
cost effectiveness of an approach involving the transfer of these watercraft
compare to that of the Navy’s baseline approach of meeting the LAW program’s compare to that of the Navy’s baseline approach of meeting the LAW program’s
requirements through the acquisition of 24 to 35 new LAWs? requirements through the acquisition of 24 to 35 new LAWs?
What would be the potential industrial-base implications of using transferred
What would be the potential industrial-base implications of using transferred
watercraft to meet at least some portion of the LAW program’s operational
watercraft to meet at least some portion of the LAW program’s operational
needs? needs?
Figure 4. Besson-Class Logistics Support Vessel (LSV)
Source: Cropped versionCropped version
of photograph accompanying Walkerof photograph accompanying Walker
D. Mil s and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and D. Mil s and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and
Marine Corps Should Acquire ArmyMarine Corps Should Acquire Army
Watercraft,” Watercraft,”
Defense News, June 22, 2020. The caption to the photograph , June 22, 2020. The caption to the photograph
credits the photograph to the U.S. Navy and states, “U.S. Navy sailorscredits the photograph to the U.S. Navy and states, “U.S. Navy sailors
conduct a simulatedconduct a simulated
disaster reliefdisaster relief
supply supply
offload from a Generaloffload from a General
Frank S. Besson-classFrank S. Besson-class
logistics logistics support vesselsupport vessel
at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickamat Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
on July on July
10, 2016.” 10, 2016.”
Industrial-Base Implications
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base implications Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base implications
of the LAW program. In recent years, of the LAW program. In recent years,
al all Navy amphibious ships have been built by the Navy amphibious ships have been built by the
Ingal sIngalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, a part of Huntington shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, a part of Huntington
Ingal sIngalls Industries (HII/ Industries (HII/
Ingal sIngalls). As noted ). As noted
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earlier, LAWs could be built by multiple U.S. shipyards.50 Potential oversight questions for
earlier, LAWs could be built by multiple U.S. shipyards.50 Potential oversight questions for
Congress include, What implications might the LAW program have for the distribution of Navy Congress include, What implications might the LAW program have for the distribution of Navy
shipbuilding work among U.S. shipyards? How many jobs would the LAW program create at the shipbuilding work among U.S. shipyards? How many jobs would the LAW program create at the
shipyard that builds the ships, at associated supplier firms, and indirectly in surrounding shipyard that builds the ships, at associated supplier firms, and indirectly in surrounding
communities? In a situation of finite defense resources, what impact, if any, would funding the communities? In a situation of finite defense resources, what impact, if any, would funding the
procurement of LAWs have on funding availableprocurement of LAWs have on funding available
for procuring other types of amphibious ships, for procuring other types of amphibious ships,
and thus on workloads and employment levels at HII/and thus on workloads and employment levels at HII/
Ingal sIngalls, its associated supplier firms, and , its associated supplier firms, and
their surrounding communities?51 their surrounding communities?51
Legislative Activity for FY2022
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2022 Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2022 procurement funding request for the summarizes congressional action on the FY2022 procurement funding request for the
LAW program. LAW program.
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2022 Procurement Funding Request
Mil ions of dol arsMillions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation
Request
HASC-
HASC
SASC
Conf.SASC
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Research and development
Research and development
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.2
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2022 budget submission,Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2022 budget submission,
committee committee and conference and conference
reports,reports,
and explanatory statements on FY2022 National Defenseand explanatory statements on FY2022 National Defense
Authorization Act and FY2022 DOD Authorization Act and FY2022 DOD
Appropriations Act. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium Amphibious Ship) of PE Appropriations Act. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium Amphibious Ship) of PE
(Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which is line (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which is line
4 646 in the Navy‘s FY2022 research in the Navy‘s FY2022 research
and developmentand development
account. account.
Notes: HASC is House Armed is House Armed
Services Services Committee; Committee;
SASC is Senate Armed is Senate Armed
Services Services Committee;Committee;
HAC is is
House Appropriations Committee;House Appropriations Committee;
SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC-SASC is HASC-SASC-negotiated agreement; Conf. is conference agreement.
50 10 U.S.C. §8679 requires SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on
H.R. 4350, recommended the funding level shown in the HASC column of Table 2.
Section 1049 of H.R. 4350 as reported by the committee states
50 10 U.S.C. §8679 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be
constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any suchconstructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such
vessel, mayvessel, may
be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes
appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuildingappropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding
account (the Shipbuildingaccount (the Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains
these provisos: “these provisos: “
… … Provided further, ,
T hatThat none of the funds provided under none of the funds provided under
this heading for the construction or this heading for the construction or
conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall beconversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be
expended in foreign facilities expended in foreign facilities
for the construction of major components of such vessel: for the construction of major components of such vessel:
Provided further, ,
T hatThat none of the funds provided under this none of the funds provided under this
heading shall beheading shall be
used used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards….” for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards….”
51 Two51 T wo observers argue observers argue
that shifting the Navy to a fleet architecture that includes a larger proportion of smaller ships that shifting the Navy to a fleet architecture that includes a larger proportion of smaller ships
wouldwould
have beneficial impacts on U.S.have beneficial impacts on U.S.
shipbuilding shipbuilding industry’s ability to support Navy shipbuildingindustry’s ability to support Navy shipbuilding
needs. Seeneeds. See
Bryan Bryan
Clark and Clark and
T imothyTimothy A. Walton, “ A. Walton, “
Shipbuilding SuppliersShipbuilding Suppliers
Need More T han Need More Than Market Forces to Stay Afloat Market Forces to Stay Afloat
,” ,”
Defense News, ,
May 20, 2020. May 20, 2020.
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792/S. 1605)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on H.R. 4350, recommended the funding level shown in the HASC column of Table 2.
Section 1049 of H.R. 4350 as reported by the committee states
SEC. 1049. REPORT ON ACQUISITION, DELIVERY, AND USE OF MOBILITY SEC. 1049. REPORT ON ACQUISITION, DELIVERY, AND USE OF MOBILITY
ASSETS THAT ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED ASSETS THAT ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED
BASE OPERATIONS. BASE OPERATIONS.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
that includes a detailed description of each of the following: that includes a detailed description of each of the following:
(1) The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and
(1) The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities required to operate and maintain a force of 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships, facilities required to operate and maintain a force of 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships,
as well as the feasibility of accelerating the current Light Amphibius Warship procurement as well as the feasibility of accelerating the current Light Amphibius Warship procurement
plan and delivery schedule. plan and delivery schedule.
(2) The specific number, type, and mix of manned and unmanned strategic mobility wing-
(2) The specific number, type, and mix of manned and unmanned strategic mobility wing-
in-ground effect platforms requiredin-ground effect platforms required
to support distributed maritime operat ions to support distributed maritime operations and and
expeditionary advanced base operations. expeditionary advanced base operations.
(3) The
(3) The
feasibility of the Navy and Marine Littoral Regiments using other joint feasibility of the Navy and Marine Littoral Regiments using other joint and and
interagency mobility platforms prior to the operational availability of Light Amphibious interagency mobility platforms prior to the operational availability of Light Amphibious
Warships or wing-in-ground effect platforms, including— Warships or wing-in-ground effect platforms, including—
(A) United States Army Transportation Command’s more than 100 LCU-2000,
(A) United States Army Transportation Command’s more than 100 LCU-2000,
Runnymede-class and the eight General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels; Runnymede-class and the eight General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels;
(B) commercial vessel
(B) commercial vessel
options, currently available, that meet Marine Littoral options, currently available, that meet Marine Littoral Regiment Regiment
requirements for movement, maneuver, sustainment, training, interoperability, and cargo requirements for movement, maneuver, sustainment, training, interoperability, and cargo
capacity and delivery; capacity and delivery;
(C) maritime prepositioning force vessels; and
(C) maritime prepositioning force vessels; and
(D) Coast Guard vessels.
(D) Coast Guard vessels.
(4) The specific number, type, and mix of long-range unmanned surface vessel platforms
(4) The specific number, type, and mix of long-range unmanned surface vessel platforms
required to support distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced base required to support distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced base
operations, along with their operational interaction with the fleet’s warfighting capabilities; operations, along with their operational interaction with the fleet’s warfighting capabilities;
(5) The feasibility of integrating Marine Littoral Regiments with—
(5) The feasibility of integrating Marine Littoral Regiments with—
(A) Special Operations activities;
(A) Special Operations activities;
(B) joint and interagency planning;
(B) joint and interagency planning;
(C) information warfare operations; and
(C) information warfare operations; and
(D) command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and
(D) command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, and security cooperation activities. reconnaissance, and security cooperation activities.
(6) The projected cost, and any additional resources required, to accelerate the operational
(6) The projected cost, and any additional resources required, to accelerate the operational
deploymentdeployment
of Marine Littoral Regiments and deliver the capabilitiesof Marine Littoral Regiments and deliver the capabilities
described described in in
paragraphs (1) through (5) by not later than three years after the date of the enactment of paragraphs (1) through (5) by not later than three years after the date of the enactment of
this Act. this Act.
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(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a
publicly accessible, unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. publicly accessible, unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative
day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding level shown in the SASC day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding level shown in the SASC
column of Table 2.
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FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432/S. XXXX)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R.
4432, recommended the funding level shown in the HAC column of Table 2.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18, 2021, for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommended the funding level
column of Table 2.
HASC-SASC-Negotiated Proposal
The joint explanatory statement for the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal for the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1605) that was released on December 7, 2021, recommends the funding level shown in the HASC-SASC column of Table 2.
Section 1022 of the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal for S. 1605 states:
SEC. 1022. REPORT ON ACQUISITION, DELIVERY, AND USE OF MOBILITY ASSETS THAT ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes a detailed description of each of the following:
(1) The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities required to operate and maintain a force of 24 to 35 Light Amphibious Warships, including—
(A) the estimated timeline for procuring and delivering such warships;
(B) the estimated cost to procure, man, train, operate, maintain, and modernize such warships for each of the 10 years following the year in which the report is submitted, together with the notional Department of Defense appropriations account associated with each such cost; and
(C) the feasibility of accelerating the current Light Amphibius Warship procurement plan and delivery schedule.
(2) The specific number, type, and mix of manned and unmanned platforms required to support distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations.
(3) The feasibility of Marine Littoral Regiments using other joint and interagency mobility platforms prior to, in addition to, or in lieu of the operational availability of Light Amphibious Warships, including—
(A) Army LCU-2000, Runnymede-class and General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels;
(B) Navy LCU-1610 or LCU-1700, Landing Craft Air Cushioned, and Ship-to-Shore Connector vessels;
(C) commercial vessel options that—
(i) are available as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(ii) meet Marine Littoral Regiment requirements for movement, maneuver, sustainment, training, interoperability, and cargo capacity and delivery;
(D) maritime prepositioning force vessels; and
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(E) Coast Guard vessels.
(4) The specific number, type, and mix of long range unmanned surface vessel platforms required to support distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced base operations, along with their operational interaction with the warfighting capabilities of the fleet, including—
(A) the estimated timeline for procuring and delivering such platforms; and
(B) the estimated cost to procure, man, train, operate, maintain, and modernize such platforms for each of the 10 years following the year in which the report is submitted, together with the notional Department of Defense appropriations account associated with each such cost.
(5) The feasibility of integrating Marine Littoral Regiments with—
(A) special operations activities;
(B) joint and interagency planning;
(C) information warfare operations; and
(D) command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and security cooperation activities.
(6) The projected cost and timeline for deploying Marine Littoral Regiments, including—
(A) the extent to which such regiments will deploy with the capabilities listed in paragraphs
(1) through (5) during each of the 10 years following the year in which the report is sub
mitted; and
(B) options to accelerate such deployments or increase the capabilities of such regiments if additional resources are available, together with a description of such resources.
(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a publicly accessible, unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432/S. XXXX)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R. 4432, recommended the funding level shown in the HAC column of Table 2.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18, 2021, for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommended the funding level shown in the SAC column shown in the SAC column
ofof Table 2.
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Appendix. Proposed Change in Amphibious-Ship
Force Architecture and EABO
This appendix presents additional background information on the proposed change in the This appendix presents additional background information on the proposed change in the
amphibious-ship force architecture and the EABO-related operational rationale behind it. amphibious-ship force architecture and the EABO-related operational rationale behind it.
Proposed Change in Amphibious Ship Force Architecture
Regarding the shift to a new amphibious-ship force architecture, the July 2019 Regarding the shift to a new amphibious-ship force architecture, the July 2019
Commandant’s
Planning Guidance document states in part (emphasis as in the original): document states in part (emphasis as in the original):
Our Nation’s
Our Nation’s
ability to project power and influence beyond its shores is ability to project power and influence beyond its shores is increasingly increasingly
challenged by long-range precisionchallenged by long-range precision
fires; expanding air, surface, and subsurface threats; fires; expanding air, surface, and subsurface threats;
and the continued degradation of our amphibious and auxiliary ship readiness. The ability and the continued degradation of our amphibious and auxiliary ship readiness. The ability
to project and maneuver from strategic distances will likely be detected and contested from to project and maneuver from strategic distances will likely be detected and contested from
the point of embarkation during a major contingency. Our naval the point of embarkation during a major contingency. Our naval
exped itionaryexpeditionary forces must forces must
possess a variety of deployment options, including L-class [amphibious ships] and E-class possess a variety of deployment options, including L-class [amphibious ships] and E-class
[expeditionary ships] ships, but also increasingly look to other available options such as [expeditionary ships] ships, but also increasingly look to other available options such as
unmannedunmanned
platforms, stern landing vessels, other ocean -going connectors, and platforms, stern landing vessels, other ocean-going connectors, and smaller smaller
more lethal and more risk-worthy platforms. more lethal and more risk-worthy platforms.
We must continue to seek the affordable
and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future
amphibious portion of the fleet.
We
We
must also explore new options, such as inter-theater connectors and commercially available ships and craft that are smaller and less expensive, thereby increasing the affordability and allowing acquisition at a greater quantity. We recognize that we must also explore new options, such as inter-theater connectors and commercially available ships and craft that are smaller and less expensive, thereby increasing the affordability and allowing acquisition at a greater quantity. We recognize that we must must
distribute our forces ashore given the growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so distribute our forces ashore given the growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so
it wouldit would
be illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) be illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the is the
preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design of smaller, more preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design of smaller, more
lethal,lethal,
and and more risk-worthymore risk-worthy
platforms. We must be fully integrated with the Navy to develop a vision and a new fleet platforms. We must be fully integrated with the Navy to develop a vision and a new fleet architecture that can be successfularchitecture that can be successful
against our against our peer peer
adversaries while also maintaining affordability. To achieve this difficult task, the Navy adversaries while also maintaining affordability. To achieve this difficult task, the Navy
and Marine Corps must ensure larger surface combatants possess mission agility across sea and Marine Corps must ensure larger surface combatants possess mission agility across sea
control, littoral, and amphibious operations, while we concurrently expand the control, littoral, and amphibious operations, while we concurrently expand the
qu antityquantity of of
more specialized manned and unmanned platforms…. more specialized manned and unmanned platforms….
We will no longer use a “2.0 MEB requirement” as the foundation for our arguments
regarding amphibious ship building, to determine the requisite capacity of vehicles
or other capabilities, or as pertains to the Maritime Prepositioning Force. We will no
longer reference the 38-ship requirement memo from 2009, or the 2016 Force
Structure Assessment, as the basis for our arguments and force structure
justifications. The ongoing 2019 Force Structure Assessment will inform the amphibious The ongoing 2019 Force Structure Assessment will inform the amphibious
requirementsrequirements
based upon based upon this guidance.this guidance.
The global optionsThe global options
for amphibs [types of for amphibs [types of
amphibious ships] include many more options than simply LHAs, LPDs, and LSDs. I will amphibious ships] include many more options than simply LHAs, LPDs, and LSDs. I will
workwork
closely with the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) closely with the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to to
ensure there are adequate numbers of the right types of ships, with the right capabilities, to ensure there are adequate numbers of the right types of ships, with the right capabilities, to
meet national requirements. meet national requirements.
I do
I do
not believe joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) are irrelevan t or an not believe joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) are irrelevant or an operational operational
anachronism; however, we must acknowledge that different approaches are required given anachronism; however, we must acknowledge that different approaches are required given
the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in mutually contested the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in mutually contested
spaces. Visions of a massed naval armada nine nautical miles off-shore in the South China spaces. Visions of a massed naval armada nine nautical miles off-shore in the South China
Sea preparingSea preparing
to launch the landing force to launch the landing force in swarms of ACVs [amphibiousin swarms of ACVs [amphibious
combat combat
vehicles],vehicles],
LCUs [utility landingLCUs [utility landing
craft], andcraft], and
LCACs [air-cushionedLCACs [air-cushioned
landing landing craft] are craft] are
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impractical and unreasonable. We must accept the realities created by the proliferation of
impractical and unreasonable. We must accept the realities created by the proliferation of
precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart-weapons, and seek innovative ways to precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart-weapons, and seek innovative ways to
overcomeovercome
those threat capabilities. I encourage experimentation with lethal long those threat capabilities. I encourage experimentation with lethal long-range -range
unmanned systems capable of traveling 200 nautical miles, penetrating into the adversary unmanned systems capable of traveling 200 nautical miles, penetrating into the adversary
enemy threat ring, and crossing the shoreline—causing the adversary to allocate resources enemy threat ring, and crossing the shoreline—causing the adversary to allocate resources
to eliminate the threat, create dilemmas, and further create opportunities for fleet maneuver. to eliminate the threat, create dilemmas, and further create opportunities for fleet maneuver.
We cannot wait to identify solutions to our mine countermeasure needs, and must make We cannot wait to identify solutions to our mine countermeasure needs, and must make
this a priority for our future force development efforts…. this a priority for our future force development efforts….
Over the coming months,
Over the coming months,
we will releasewe will release
a new concepta new concept
in supportin support
of the Navy’s of the Navy’s
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept and the NDS called – Stand-in Forces. Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept and the NDS called – Stand-in Forces.
The Stand-in Forces concept is designed to restore the strategic initiative to naval forces The Stand-in Forces concept is designed to restore the strategic initiative to naval forces
andand
empower our empower our allies andallies and
partners to successfully confront regional hegemons that infringe on their territorial boundaries and interests. Stand-in Forces are designed partners to successfully confront regional hegemons that infringe on their territorial boundaries and interests. Stand-in Forces are designed to
generate technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements that confront aggressor
naval forces with an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms
and payloads. Stand-in forces take advantage of the relative strength of the contemporary Stand-in forces take advantage of the relative strength of the contemporary
defense and rapidly-emerging new technologies to create an integrated maritime defense defense and rapidly-emerging new technologies to create an integrated maritime defense
that is optimized to operate in close and confined seas in defiance of adversary long-range that is optimized to operate in close and confined seas in defiance of adversary long-range
precision “stand-off capabilities.” precision “stand-off capabilities.”
Creating
Creating
new capabilities that intentionally initiate stand-in engagements is a disruptive
new capabilities that intentionally initiate stand-in engagements is a disruptive “button hook” in force development that runs counter to the action that our adversaries “button hook” in force development that runs counter to the action that our adversaries
anticipate.anticipate.
Rather than heavily investing in expensive and exquisite capabilities Rather than heavily investing in expensive and exquisite capabilities that that
regional aggressors have optimized their forces to target, naval forces will persist forward regional aggressors have optimized their forces to target, naval forces will persist forward
with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms that can economically host a dense with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms that can economically host a dense
array of lethal and nonlethal payloads. array of lethal and nonlethal payloads.
By exploiting the technical revolution in autonomy, advanced manufacturing, and artificial
By exploiting the technical revolution in autonomy, advanced manufacturing, and artificial
intelligence, the naval forces can create many new risk-worthy unmanned and minimally-intelligence, the naval forces can create many new risk-worthy unmanned and minimally-
mannedmanned
platforms that can be employedplatforms that can be employed
in stand-inin stand-in
engagements engagements to create tactical to create tactical
dilemmas that adversaries will confront when attacking our allies and forces forward.52 dilemmas that adversaries will confront when attacking our allies and forces forward.52
EABO
Regarding EABO, the Regarding EABO, the
Commandant’s Planning Guidance states the following (emphasis as in the states the following (emphasis as in the
original): original):
The
The
2016 2016
Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) predates the current set of Corps Operating Concept (MOC) predates the current set of national national
strategy and guidance documents, but it was prescient in many ways. It directed partnering strategy and guidance documents, but it was prescient in many ways. It directed partnering
with the Navy to develop two concepts, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment with the Navy to develop two concepts, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment
(LOCE) and(LOCE) and
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) that nest exceptionaly well with the current strategic guidance. It is time to move beyond the MOC itself, however, and partner with the Navy to complement LOCE and EABO with Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) that nest exceptionally well with the current strategic guidance. It is time to move beyond the MOC itself, however, and partner with the Navy to complement LOCE and EABO with classified, classified,
threat-specific operating concepts that describe how naval forces will conduct the range of threat-specific operating concepts that describe how naval forces will conduct the range of
missions articulated in our strategic guidance…. missions articulated in our strategic guidance….
52 U.S.
52 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps,
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated, released , undated, released
JulyJuly
2019, pp. 4-5, 10. 2019, pp. 4-5, 10.
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EABO complement complement the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations Concept and and will
inform how we approach missions against peer adversaries ….
EABO are driven by the aforementioned adversary deployment of long -range precision
fires designed to support a strategy of “counter-intervention” directed against U.S. and coalition forces. EABO, as an operational concept, enables the naval force to ….
EABO are driven by the aforementioned adversary deployment of long-range precision fires designed to support a strategy of “counter-intervention” directed against U.S. and coalition forces. EABO, as an operational concept, enables the naval force to persist persist
forward within the arc of adversary long-range precision fires to support our treaty partners forward within the arc of adversary long-range precision fires to support our treaty partners
with combat credible forces on a much more resilient and difficult to target forward basing with combat credible forces on a much more resilient and difficult to target forward basing
infrastructure.infrastructure.
EABO are designed to restore force resiliency and enable the EABO are designed to restore force resiliency and enable the persistent persistent
naval forward presence that has long been the hallmark of naval forces. Most significantly, naval forward presence that has long been the hallmark of naval forces. Most significantly,
EABO reverse the cost imposition that determined adversaries seek to impose on the joint EABO reverse the cost imposition that determined adversaries seek to impose on the joint
force. EABO guide an apt and appropriate adjustment in future naval force development force. EABO guide an apt and appropriate adjustment in future naval force development
toto
obviate the significant investment our adversaries have made in long-range obviate the significant investment our adversaries have made in long-range precision precision
fires. Potential adversaries intend to target our forward fixed and vulnerable bases, as fires. Potential adversaries intend to target our forward fixed and vulnerable bases, as
wel well as deep water ports, long runways, large signature platforms, and ships. By developing a as deep water ports, long runways, large signature platforms, and ships. By developing a
new expeditionary naval force structure that is not dependent on concentrated, vulnerable, new expeditionary naval force structure that is not dependent on concentrated, vulnerable,
andand
expensive forward infrastructure and platforms, we will frustrate enemy efforts expensive forward infrastructure and platforms, we will frustrate enemy efforts to to
separate U.S. Forces from our allies and interests. EABOseparate U.S. Forces from our allies and interests. EABO
enable naval forces to partner enable naval forces to partner
and persist forward to control and deny contested areas where legacy naval forces cannot and persist forward to control and deny contested areas where legacy naval forces cannot
be prudently employed without accepting disproportionate risk…. be prudently employed without accepting disproportionate risk….
In February
In February
of 2019, the Commandant and Chief of 2019, the Commandant and Chief of Naval Operationsof Naval Operations
co co-signed-signed
the the
concept for EABO. The ideas contained in this document are foundational to ourconcept for EABO. The ideas contained in this document are foundational to our
future future
force development efforts and are applicable in multiple scenarios.53 force development efforts and are applicable in multiple scenarios.53
A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO
A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO
defines EABOdefines EABO
as follows: as follows:
EABO are a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the
EABO are a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the
emplo ymentemployment of mobile, low- of mobile, low-
signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain naval expeditionary forces signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain naval expeditionary forces
from a seriesfrom a series
of austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore within a contested of austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore within a contested or or
potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or
enable fleet sustainment. enable fleet sustainment.
EABO support the projection of naval power by integrating with and supporting the larger
EABO support the projection of naval power by integrating with and supporting the larger
naval campaign. Expeditionary operations imply austere conditions, forward deployment, naval campaign. Expeditionary operations imply austere conditions, forward deployment,
andand
projection of power. EABO are distinct from other expeditionary operations in projection of power. EABO are distinct from other expeditionary operations in that that
forces conducting them combine various forms of operations to persist within the reach of forces conducting them combine various forms of operations to persist within the reach of
adversary lethal and nonlethal effects. It is critical that the composition, distribution, and adversary lethal and nonlethal effects. It is critical that the composition, distribution, and
disposition of forces executing EABO limitdisposition of forces executing EABO limit
the adversary’s ability to target them, engage the adversary’s ability to target them, engage
them with fires and other effects, and otherwise influence their activities. them with fires and other effects, and otherwise influence their activities.
Missions of EABO include
Missions of EABO include
Support sea control operations;
Support sea control operations;
Conduct sea denial operations within the littorals;
Conduct sea denial operations within the littorals;
Contribute to maritime
Contribute to maritime
domain awareness; domain awareness;
Provide forward command, control, communications,
Provide forward command, control, communications,
computers,computers,
combat systems,combat systems,
intel igence, surveil ance, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,reconnaissance,
targeting (C5ISRT), and counter-C5ISRT capability; targeting (C5ISRT), and counter-C5ISRT capability;
Provide forward sustainment.
Provide forward sustainment.
EABO tasks include
EABO tasks include
Conduct
Conduct
surveil ance surveillance and reconnaissance; and reconnaissance;
53 U.S.
53 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps,
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated, released , undated, released
JulyJuly
2019, pp. 9, 11, 19. See also Jim Lacey, “2019, pp. 9, 11, 19. See also Jim Lacey, “
T heThe ‘Dumbest Concept Ever’ Just Might Win Wars,” ‘Dumbest Concept Ever’ Just Might Win Wars,”
War on the Rocks, ,
JulyJuly
29, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “How to Seize29, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “How to Seize
Islands, Set Up a ForwardIslands, Set Up a Forward
Refueling Refueling Point: Marine Corps Recipes for Point: Marine Corps Recipes for
Expeditionary Operations,” Expeditionary Operations,”
USNI News, September 13, 2019. , September 13, 2019.
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Conduct operations in the information environment;
Conduct operations in the information environment;
Conduct screen/guard/cover;
Conduct screen/guard/cover;
Deny or control key maritime
Deny or control key maritime
terrain; terrain;
Conduct surface warfare operations;
Conduct surface warfare operations;
Conduct air and missile
Conduct air and missile
defense; defense;
Conduct strike
Conduct strike
operations; operations;
Conduct antisubmarine warfare;
Conduct antisubmarine warfare;
Conduct sustainment operations;
Conduct sustainment operations;
Conduct forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations.
Conduct forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations.
FMF formations may execute these tasks across the competition continuum both above and
FMF formations may execute these tasks across the competition continuum both above and
below the threshold of violence. In the former case, they are normally conducted to deny below the threshold of violence. In the former case, they are normally conducted to deny
an adversary access to adjacent battlespace or to support a more comprehensive effort to an adversary access to adjacent battlespace or to support a more comprehensive effort to
establish sea control. In the latter, they are often conducted with the goal of deterring the establish sea control. In the latter, they are often conducted with the goal of deterring the
enemy while preparing for conflict if deterrence failsenemy while preparing for conflict if deterrence fails
…. ….
EABO provide
EABO provide
engagement capabilities throughout the competition continuum. engagement capabilities throughout the competition continuum. During During
competition below the threshold of violence, EABO engage allies and partners, preserve competition below the threshold of violence, EABO engage allies and partners, preserve
access, and shape the theater for future operations. EABO also enables stand-in access, and shape the theater for future operations. EABO also enables stand-in
engagementengagement
capabilities by the persistent posturing of littoral forces within a potential
capabilities by the persistent posturing of littoral forces within a potential adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ). During armed conflict, the combination of adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ). During armed conflict, the combination of
stand-in and stand-off engagement capabilities… places the adversary on the horns of a stand-in and stand-off engagement capabilities… places the adversary on the horns of a
dilemma:dilemma:
while the adversary seeks to discover and engage friendly standwhile the adversary seeks to discover and engage friendly stand
-off forces, he -off forces, he
exposes himself to the sensing, nonlethal, and lethal capabilities of stand-in forces…. exposes himself to the sensing, nonlethal, and lethal capabilities of stand-in forces….
The assigned
The assigned
mission sets within mission sets within EABO are conductedEABO are conducted
within within a joint anda joint and
coalition coalition
framework,framework,
as part of not merely an interoperable, but an integrated naval force. Task-organized Marine and Navy units project naval power through EABO by fusing as part of not merely an interoperable, but an integrated naval force. Task-organized Marine and Navy units project naval power through EABO by fusing their their
landward and seaward roles…. landward and seaward roles….
A stand-in force executing EABO is strategically cost-effective by virtue of its ability to
A stand-in force executing EABO is strategically cost-effective by virtue of its ability to
undermineundermine
a potentiala potential
adversary’sadversary’s
cost-impositioncost-imposition
strategy. Potential adversaries are investing in large numbers of comparatively inexpensive systems of adequate letha lity,
extended range, and greater precision strategy. Potential adversaries are investing in large numbers of comparatively inexpensive systems of adequate lethality, extended range, and greater precision to hold at risk the US military’s expensive, to hold at risk the US military’s expensive,
sophisticated,sophisticated,
and relatively and relatively few multimissionfew multimission
platforms.platforms.
Forces executing Forces executing EABO are EABO are
small, numerous, dispersed, and relatively inexpensive and difficult to target, thus inverting small, numerous, dispersed, and relatively inexpensive and difficult to target, thus inverting
an adversary’s cost-benefit calculation when deciding whether to engage and upsetting the an adversary’s cost-benefit calculation when deciding whether to engage and upsetting the
cost-imposition strategy.54 cost-imposition strategy.54
Author Information
Ronald O'Rourke Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Specialist in Naval Affairs
54 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 54 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations, February, February
2021, pp. 1-3 to 1-5. See also Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand-in Forces, December 2021, 23 pp. 2021, pp. 1-3 to 1-5.
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