Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
October 6, 2021April 11, 2022
The State of Qatar, a small Arab Gulf monarchy which has about 300,000 citizens The State of Qatar, a small Arab Gulf monarchy which has about 300,000 citizens in among a total a total
population of about 2.4 million, has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional population of about 2.4 million, has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional
Kenneth Katzman
influence, often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: influence, often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Saudi
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE) [UAE], Bahrain, and Oman), Bahrain, and Oman) alliance. Qatar has . Qatar has
fostered a Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
fostered a close defense andclose security security alliancepartnership with the United States with the United States and has maintained ties to a

while engaging with a wide range of actors who wide range of actors who are often at odds with each other, including are often at odds with each other, including some Sunni Islamists, Iran and Sunni Islamists, Iran and
Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials.Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials.

Qatar’s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its sometimes controversial Al Jazeera media network
have contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE Some of Qatar’s fellow GCC and Arab states object to Qatar’s independent foreign policy and the criticism of Arab leaders often seen on its Al Jazeera media network. In June 2017, Saudi . In June 2017, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed
limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump
Administration sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift was hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a broad front Administration sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift was hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a broad front
of Arab states to counter Iran. of Arab states to counter Iran. During the rift, Following its Arab neighbors’ actions, Qatar deepened relations with Turkey and Iran. On January 5, 2021, Saudi Qatar deepened relations with Turkey and Iran. On January 5, 2021, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the blockadeArabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the blockade, and Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against
those countries in international organizations. The intra-GCC reconciliation process has since proceeded, albeit unevenly, and
particularly slowly with the UAE.
and restore ties, although the UAE although lingering resentments remain, and the UAE and Bahrain have not reopened their embassies in Doha. Like other GCC leaders, Qatar’s leaders work with the United States to secure the Persian GulfQatar’s leaders work with the United States to secure the Persian Gulf, as do the other GCC leaders. The and the broader region. Since 1992, the United States and United States and
Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar,
consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts more
than 8,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities,
including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces deployed at these facilities participate in operations throughout the region.
Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States
inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” that has included discussion of efforts to improve accommodations for U.S. personnel
deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, which has beenIn January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” to institutionalize joint discussions on security and stability in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In 2017, the United States and Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding to cooperate against international terrorism. In recognition of Qatar’s support for U.S. policy, during the visit to Washington, DC of Qatar’s leader on January 31, 2022, President Biden announced that Qatar would be designated as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally. Qatari military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base, host the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and about 8,000 U.S. forces deployed there participate in operations throughout the region. Al Udeid Air Base was used extensively in the U.S. operation to evacuate U.S. personnel and used extensively in the U.S. operation to evacuate U.S. personnel and
Afghan allies from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Qatar has been active as a mediator between the international Afghan allies from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Qatar has been active as a mediator between the international
community and the community and the new Taliban regime there, and Doha has served as the temporary location for a U.S. embassy to Taliban regime there, and Doha has served as the temporary location for a U.S. embassy to
Afghanistan after U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in the course of the Afghanistan after U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in the course of the U.S. withdrawal. Qatar’s record on human rights and political freedoms is mixed. U.S. withdrawal. In 2017, the United States and Qatar
signed a broad memorandum of understanding to cooperate against international terrorism.
The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s former leader marked a departureformer Amir (ruler) departed from GCC patterns of governance in from GCC patterns of governance in
which leaders generally remain in power for lifewhich leaders generally remain in power for life. At the same time, apparently or are removed by rival members of the ruling family. Apparently out of concern for out of concern for opening upwidening divisions in divisions in
Qatari society and politics, Qatar delayed holding elections for a legislative body for several years, but the first vote for 30 Qatari society and politics, Qatar delayed holding elections for a legislative body for several years, but the first vote for 30
out of 45 seats of the out of 45 seats of the “Shura Council”Shura Council (Consultative Council) was held on October 2, 2021. U.S. and international reports, which are scrutinizing was held on October 2, 2021. U.S. and international reports, which are scrutinizing
Qatar Qatar asin advance of its hosting of the World Cup soccer tournament its hosting of the World Cup soccer tournament approaches inin October 2022, criticize Qatar for not adhering to international 2022, criticize Qatar for not adhering to international
standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps to improve the conditions for expatriate workers. standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps to improve the conditions for expatriate workers.
LikeAs have other GCC states, Qatar has wrestled with volatility in prices of its oil exports and changes in international gas markets, as well as the economic effects of measures taken to mitigate spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. However, other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014 and were
compounded by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. As of early October, Qatar has reported about
237,000 infections and 600 deaths from the disease, which has affected Qatar’s expatriate population disproportionately.
Qatar has been able to weather economic headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and its Qatar has been able to weather economic headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and its
favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic
diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar withdrew from the On December 3, 2018, Qatar withdrew from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order, stating that it wanted to focus on its natural gas export sector; Qatar has the third to focus on its natural gas export sector; Qatar has the third
largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world. largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world.
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link to page 4 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13U.S. officials reportedly are urging Qatar to increase supplies of natural gas to European Union countries, which have articulated an intention to reduce their dependence on supplies from Russia. A Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic Relationships remains active. In recent years, many Members of Congress have visited Qatar to attend regional security conferences and to conduct oversight of U.S. regional policy and U.S. military operations in Qatar. Congressional Research Service Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 2018 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 2122 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 523 link to page 6 link to page 24 link to page link to page 24 link to page 45 link to page 24 link to page 24 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Contents
Brief History .................................................................................................................................... 1
Governance ...................................................................................................................................... 2 3
October 2, 2021, ShuraShura Council Election ................................................................................. 3
Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................................. 4
Freedom of Expression ....................................................................................................... 4
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 7
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Issues ............................................................................. 7 7
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 8
Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................................. 8 Iran 8
Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute ................................................................................. 9
Iran ......................................................... 10 Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas .............................................................. 10
Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas ................................ 11 Afghanistan/Taliban ................................................ 11
Afghanistan/Taliban Office .................................................................. 12 U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation .......................................... 12
Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts ......................................................... 13
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation 12 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ................................................................................ 13 Al Udeid Air Base (Air Force/CENTCOM 13
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ..................................................................... 14
Al Udeid Air Base (Air Force/CENTCOM) 13 As Saliyah Facility (Army) and Hamad Port .................................................................... 14
As Saliyah Facility (Army) and Hamad Port Major Non-NATO Ally Designation ................................................................................. 1514
U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar ......................................................................................................... 14 Other Defense Partnerships ........ 15
Other Defense Partnerships ....................................................................................... 17
Counter-terrorism Cooperation ...... 16 Counter-terrorism Cooperation ............................................................................................... 17
Terrorism Financing Issues ............................................................................................... 17 Countering Violent Extremism ........ 18
Countering Violent Extremism ................................................................................. 18
Economic Issues amid COVID-19 and the GCC Rift ............................................................................................................................ 18
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations .............................................................................................. 19
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................. 19 20

Figures
Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance ............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure ........................................... 20 21

Tables
Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar ..................................................................................................... 1 1

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20 21


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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Brief History
Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders offrom what is now neighboring Bahrain, the Al neighboring Bahrain, the Al
Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main European main Western
power in the Persian Gulf region, to power in the Persian Gulf region, to instal install a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what
is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim, is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim,
the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism,
belonged.1 Thus, Qatar official y subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it
sharesconservative Sunni religious scholar whose followers have formed a centuries long partnership with the ruling Al Saud family of Saudi Arabia, belonged.1 Qatar’s officially sanctioned religious practices and doctrines reflect conservative Islamic traditions long associated with Saudi Arabia. with Saudi Arabia.
In 1916, in the midst of World War I and after the Ottoman Empire relinquished its territorial In 1916, in the midst of World War I and after the Ottoman Empire relinquished its territorial
claims over Qatar, the Al Thani family signed an agreement under which Qatar claims over Qatar, the Al Thani family signed an agreement under which Qatar formal yformally became a became a
British protectorate. In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility British protectorate. In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility
for Persian Gulf security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates for Persian Gulf security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates
(principalities) that were then (principalities) that were then cal edcalled the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent rather than join that union. (UAE). However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent rather than join that union.
The UAEThe UAE was separately formed in late 1971. Qatar was separately formed in late 1971. Qatar had adopted its first written constitution in April adopted its first written constitution in April
1970 and became fully independent on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy 1970 and became fully independent on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy
in Doha in 1973. The United States is currently represented by Charge D’Affaires in Doha in 1973. The United States is currently represented by Charge D’Affaires John
Desrocher, appointed to that post in June 2021.
Natalie Baker. Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar
Position
Leader
Amir Amir (ruler) and Minister(ruler) and Minister of Defense of Defense
Tamim Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2013) bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2013)
Deputy Amir Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent) and Crown Prince (heir apparent)
Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2014) Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2014)
Prime Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Minister and Minister of Interior
Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani (since 2020) Thani (since 2020)
Deputy Prime Deputy Prime Minister and MinisterMinister and Minister of State for of State for
Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah (since 2017) Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah (since 2017)
Defense Affairs Defense Affairs
Deputy Prime Deputy Prime Minister and MinisterMinister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (since 2017) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (since 2017)
Minister of Finance Minister of Finance
Ali Ali Sharif al-Imadi (since 2013) Sharif al-Imadi (since 2013)
President of the Shura Council
Ahmad bin Abdal ah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud (since 2017)
Ambassador Ambassador to the United States to the United States
Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 2017) Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 2017)
Source: Qatari Government Websites. Qatari Government Websites.

1 Information in this section is taken from 1 Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” Policy Brief: Norwegian Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” Policy Brief: Norwegian
Peacebuilding Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2013. Resource Centre, February 2013.
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Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance

Area
11,586 sq. km (slightly 11,586 sq. km (slightly smal er smaller than Connecticut)than Connecticut)
People
Population: 2.3 2.4 mil ion, mil ion, of which about 90% are expatriates of which about 90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and
1% other. Figures1% other. Figures include expatriates. include expatriates.
Ethnic Groups: Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include
expatriates. expatriates. Virtual y al Virtually all citizens are Arab. citizens are Arab.
Economy
Gross Domestic Product Product (GDP): $ $350275 bil ion on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis bil ion on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis
GDP per capita: $125 $103,000 on ppp basis ,000 on ppp basis
Inflation: 0.6%2.3% (2021) GDP Growth Rate: 2.9% (2021)
GDP Growth Rate: 1.5% in 2019; -3% in 2020
Export Partners: (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE
Import Partners: (In descending order) United States, China, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States.amounts to the United States.
Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry.
Gas (LNG) Exports: 126 bil ion cubic metersGas (LNG) Exports: 126 bil ion cubic meters per year per year
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map bordersGraphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State; World Bank Group, Esri; and GoogleDepartment of State; World Bank Group, Esri; and Google Maps. At-a-glance informationMaps. At-a-glance information from CIA World from CIA World
Factbook, Economist Factbook, Economist Intel igenceIntelligence Unit Country Report: Qatar; World Unit Country Report: Qatar; World Bank; http://www.statista.com.
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Bank. Governance
Qatar’s governing structure Qatar’s governing structure approximatesresembles that of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council that of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman)(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) in that it. It is led by a hereditary is led by a hereditary
Amir (literal y Amir Congressional Research Service 2 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (literally “prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani“prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.2 He
,2 who became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, relinquished became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, relinquished
power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs through a power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs through a
prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are
members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. OnIn January January 28, 2020, the Amir appointed a 2020, the Amir appointed a
new Prime Ministernew prime minister, U.S.-educated Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani. The Amir’s , U.S.-educated Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani. The Amir’s
younger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamadyounger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad Al Thani, is deputy Amir. In part because the Amir is relatively young, succession issues in Qatar have received little discussion within the ruling family and among Qatari elites, to date. Formal political parties are banned and political disagreements are usually aired in private as part of an informal process of consensus-building. Citizens, is deputy Amir and the heir apparent.
Political parties are banned and authorities prohibit political y oriented associations. Political
disagreements in Qatar are aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in
which the leadership tries to balance the interests of the country’s families. There have been no
significant protests by Qatari citizens in many years, but some in the large expatriate community
have sometimes protested for improved working conditions. On the other hand, the elections were
held on October 2, 2021, for a Shura (Advisory) Council, a legislative body that wil expand
popular participation in national decisionmaking.
Qatari citizens approved a constitution in a 2003 referendum approved a constitution in a 2003 referendum, by a 98% vote in favor. The by a 98% vote in favor. The
document affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate, specifies Islamic law as a key source of document affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate, specifies Islamic law as a key source of
legislation,3 and provides for elections for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council legislation,3 and provides for elections for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council
((Majlis Ash-Shura, Shura Council), a national legislative body. ), a national legislative body. According to the constitution, theThe
Shura Council is empowered to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), Shura Council is empowered to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), to approve a national approve a national
budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation, although subject to a veto by the Amir. budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation, although subject to a veto by the Amir. Stil ,
Still, it remains unclear how much influence the it remains unclear how much influence the new Shura Council wil haveShura Council has on sensitive issues such on sensitive issues such
as foreign and defense policyas foreign and defense policy, economic and energy policy, and citizenship laws.
. The country has long held elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the The country has long held elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the
government on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each serving a four-year government on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each serving a four-year
term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration in 2019 was lower than was lower than the government expected; roughly expected; roughly 1one in 13 Qatari in 13 Qatari
adults cast adults cast bal ots.4
ballots.4 October 2, 2021, ShuraShura Council Election
Qatar’s leaders long delayed Qatar’s leaders long delayed the Shura Council electionselections for a Shura Council, a legislative body that expands popular participation in nation decision-making, reportedly out of concern that the , reportedly out of concern that the
elections would divide Qataris and elections would divide Qataris and potential y potentially provide opportunity for Qatar’s neighbors to provide opportunity for Qatar’s neighbors to
interfere in interfere in Qatari politics. InQatari politics. Apparently deciding that the country should move forward to expand
political participation, in October 2019, the Amir ordered the establishment of a committee, October 2019, the Amir ordered the establishment of a committee,
chaired by the Prime Minister, to organize the first Council elections.5 In November 2020, the chaired by the Prime Minister, to organize the first Council elections.5 In November 2020, the
Amir announced the first Amir announced the first ShuraShura Council elections would take place in October 2021. An election Council elections would take place in October 2021. An election
law adopted in early August 2021 to govern the Council elections law adopted in early August 2021 to govern the Council elections requiresrequired voters to be above 18 voters to be above 18
years old, be “original”years old, be “original” Qataris (families present in Qatar prior to 1930), be born in Qatar, and Qataris (families present in Qatar prior to 1930), be born in Qatar, and

2 Shaykh is an honorific term.
3 Amy Hawthorne, “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the T op,” August 26, 2008.
4 Justin Gengler, “Qatar’s first elections since 2017 reveal unexpected impact of GCC crisis,” Al Monitor, April 24,
2019.
5 “Qatar takes step toward first Shura Council election: QNA agency,” Reuters, October 31, 2019.
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have Qatari grandfathers. Candidates are also to be fluent in Arabic. That definitionhave Qatari grandfathers. In sum, these criteria excluded excluded
from voting many members of the Al Murrah from voting many members of the Al Murrah tribe, tribe, which is nomadic, and many of whom do not many of whom do not
have Qatari citizenship. Several hundred have Qatari citizenship. Several hundred Al Murrah protestedmembers of the tribe held a public protest against the election law on August 9, the election law on August 9, 2021,6 and 6 and
have continued to continued to argueprotest their exclusion through established complaint processes after the their exclusion through established complaint processes after the October
2 election. election.
According to Qatari officials, 284 candidates ran According to Qatari officials, 284 candidates ran in the October 2, 2021, electionfor the 30 elected seats, of which 28 , of which 28
were women. Campaigning was said to focus on appeals to familial and tribal relationships rather were women. Campaigning was said to focus on appeals to familial and tribal relationships rather
than issues and differences of opinion among competing candidates. The turnout was about 63% than issues and differences of opinion among competing candidates. The turnout was about 63%
of eligible voters. None of the women was elected. The government noted in post-election
releases that the Amir wil soon appoint the 15 remaining seats of the Shura Council to “ensure
representation across communities in Qatar,” but no date for those appointments has been
announced.
Human Rights Issues7
The State Department human rights report for 2020of 2 Shaykh is an honorific term. 3 Amy Hawthorne, “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the Top,” August 26, 2008. 4 Justin Gengler, “Qatar’s first elections since 2017 reveal unexpected impact of GCC crisis.” Al Monitor, April 24, 2019. 5 “Qatar takes step toward first Shura Council election: QNA agency,” Reuters, October 31, 2019. 6 “Protests in Doha: The Qatari Citizenship Is Not Enough for Voting,” Al Bawaba, August 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy eligible voters. None of the women who ran was elected, however. On October 14, the Amir included two women among his 15 appointments to the Council.7 Human Rights Issues8 The State Department human rights report for 2020 (latest available) identifies the most significant human rights identifies the most significant human rights
problems in Qatar asproblems in Qatar as: restrictions on free expression; restrictions on peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor unions; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of
restrictions on free expression, including criminalization of libel; restrictions on peaceful
assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor
unions; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement; limits on the ability of movement; limits on the ability of
citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; lack of investigation of and
accountability for violence against women; criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual
conduct; and citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; lack of investigation of and accountability for violence against women; criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct; and reports of forced labor. reports of forced labor.
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), which investigates A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), which investigates al egationsallegations of human rights of human rights
abuses, operates independently, but it is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by the abuses, operates independently, but it is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by the
Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza. Among the NHRC’s functions is to monitor the situation of about
1,000-2,000 stateless residents (“bidoons”),8 mostly members of families whose citizenship was
revoked decades ago for opposing Qatar’s leaders. Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza. Although the constitution provides for an Although the constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, the Amir appoints independent judiciary, the Amir appoints al all judges. judges.
Freedom of Expression
Despite the absence of Despite the absence of opensignificant visible opposition among the citizenry, the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings opposition among the citizenry, the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings
apparently prompted the government to increase penalties for criticizing the leadership. In 2014, apparently prompted the government to increase penalties for criticizing the leadership. In 2014,
the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three years in prison for the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three years in prison for
spreading “false news.” spreading “false news.” OneA law law, enacted in enacted in January 2020,2020 authorizes imprisonment for anyone authorizes imprisonment for anyone
who “broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biased rumors, statements, or news, or who “broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biased rumors, statements, or news, or
inflammatory propaganda, inflammatory propaganda, domestical ydomestically or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir
up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public system of the state.”9 Qatari up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public system of the state.”9 Qatari
officials assert that the law targets those who organize violent opposition activities.

6 “Protests in Doha: T he Qatari Citizenship Is Not Enough for Voting,” Al Bawaba, August 10, 2021.
7 Much of the information in this section is based on U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021.
8 Bidoon is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country.
9 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Repressive new law further curbs freedom of expression,” January 20, 2020.
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Al Jazeera Media Network
According to the 2020 State Department human rights report, the government owns and partial y
funds the Al Jazeera Media Network, which has evolved since its establishment in the mid-1990s
into a global media organization. A U.S.-based representative for Al Jazeera says that, in 2011, its
legal standing was changed to an independent legal entity with characteristics similar to a U.S.
non-profit.10 The network features a wide range of guests from al over the region debating issues;
Arab leaders have sometimes reacted to the network’s critical coverage by closing Al Jazeera’s
bureaus or imprisoning its journalists. The network has run stories that criticize Qatar, including
on the situation of expatriate laborers.11 The State Department quotes “some observers and former
Al Jazeera employees” as al eging that Qatar’s government “influences” Al Jazeera content.12
Officials in the United Arab Emirates and other neighboring countries have sometimes criticized
Al Jazeera for providing a platform for Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other Islamists to
promote their ideology.13 officials assert that the law targets those who organize violent opposition activities. The government organizes an annual, highly publicized “Doha Forum” in which numerous regional and international officials discuss major issues; some Members of Congress and congressional staff typically attend the gathering. Al Jazeera Media Network According to the State Department’s human rights reports, the government owns and partially funds the Al Jazeera Media Network, which has evolved into a global media organization that features a wide range of guests from all over the region debating issues. According to Al Jazeera representatives, it has a legal status in Qatar similar to a U.S. nonprofit.10 The State Department quotes “some observers and former Al Jazeera employees” as alleging that Qatar’s government “influences” Al Jazeera content.11 Some experts and officials criticize the network as giving individuals affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other Islamist groups a platform 7 Qatar News Agency, October 14, 2021. 8 Much of the information in this section is based on U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021. 9 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Repressive new law further curbs freedom of expression,” January 20, 2020. 10 Information provided to CRS in August 2020 by CLS Strategies, a firm that represents Al Jazeera in the United States. 11 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy to promote their ideology,12 and some Arab leaders have reacted to the network’s critical coverage by closing Al Jazeera’s bureaus or imprisoning its journalists. The network has run stories that criticize the Qatari government policies, for example on the situation of expatriate laborers.13 Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of
the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the Foreign the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act Agents Registration Act (FARA).14 12 Jared Malsin, “In the Eye of the Storm: Can Al Jazeera Survive the Gulf Crisis?” Time, August 21, 2017. 13 See, e.g., “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address Treatment(FARA).14

10 Information provided to CRS in August 2020 by CLS Strategies, a firm that represents Al Jazeera in the United
States.
11 See, e.g., “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address T reatment of Migrant Workers,” Al Jazeera, of Migrant Workers,” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019. 14 Office of Senator Tom Cotton, “Lawmakers Seek FARA September 19, 2019.
12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021.
13 Jared Malsin, “ In the Eye of the Storm: Can Al Jazeera Survive the Gulf Crisis?” Time, August 21, 2017.
14 Office of Senator T om Cotton, “ Lawmakers Seek FARA Evaluation of Qatari-owned Al Jazeera,” press release, June Evaluation of Qatari-owned Al Jazeera,” press release, June
19, 2019. 19, 2019.
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Qatari Leadership

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of
the formerthe former Amir,Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani rulerHamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar. in Qatar.
He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh
Jasim,Jasim, renounced his claim. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2013, when Amir renounced his claim, reportedly based on his father’s lack of confidence in
Shaykh Jasim’s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2013, when
Amir Hamad stepped down in a voluntary transfer of power that was unprecedented Hamad stepped down in a voluntary transfer of power that was unprecedented
for Qatar and the Gulf region.for Qatar and the Gulf region. Amir Tamim Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain’s was educated at Great Britain’s
Sherbourne School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in Sherbourne School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in
1998, from which his father graduated in 1971. 1998, from which his father graduated in 1971. Amir Tamim heads the Qatari
Investment Authority, which has bil ions of dol ars of investments in Europe, the
United States, and elsewhere. He is reportedlyA wide range of observers assess him as highly popular for resisting highly popular for resisting Saudi-led Saudi-led
pressure pressure during the intra-GCC crisisduring the intra-GCC crisis.
from 2017-2021.
Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Amir Amir Tamim’sTamim’s father, father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, seized power from his seized power from his
father, Amirfather, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in June 1995, during his father’s absence in Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in June 1995, during his father’s absence in
Europe. In 1972, after finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of Europe. In 1972, after finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of
somesome Qatari militaryQatari military units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a
bloodlessbloodless seizure of power whileseizure of power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Alithen-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani wasAl Thani was on a on a
hunting trip in Iran. hunting trip in Iran.
WhileWhile Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’s ruler,Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’s ruler, he, his wife he, one of his wives, and several, and several of their of their
other children remainother children remain key figures in the ruling establishment.key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media Qatari media refer refer to to
Shaykh Hamad as “The Father Amir”Shaykh Hamad as “The Father Amir” and acknowledge that he has some continuing and acknowledge that he has some continuing
role role in many aspects of policy.in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad
Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science,
and Community Developmentand Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, where several Western universities where
several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor have established branches and which is a large investor
in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ful sisterin the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ful sister of the current Amir), of the current Amir),
Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a majorShaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork. buyer of global artwork.
Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters
graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani,
remains active in Qatar’s investment activities and international circles. During Amir
Hamad’s rule, During Amir Hamad’s rule, Shaykh Hamad bin JasimShaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister,was Foreign Minister, Prime Prime Minister,Minister, and and
architect of Qatar’s relativelyarchitect of Qatar’s relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’s father, independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’s father,
formerformer Amir Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016. Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016.
Sources: various press,: various press, and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Women’s Rights
According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues,
despite the constitutional assertion of equality.despite the constitutional assertion of equality.15 The15The application of Islamic law, which is not application of Islamic law, which is not
gender-neutral on marriage, divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, as gender-neutral on marriage, divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, as wel well as a as a
lack of laws against domestic violence, contribute to this gender inequality.16 Laws prevent lack of laws against domestic violence, contribute to this gender inequality.16 Laws prevent
women from passing citizenship to their children, though a 2018 permanent residency law has women from passing citizenship to their children, though a 2018 permanent residency law has
created a mechanism for children born to Qatari women married to non-Qatari men to access created a mechanism for children born to Qatari women married to non-Qatari men to access
governmentgovernment-funded health and education. Guardianship laws require health and education. Guardianship laws require young women to obtain permission from women to obtain permission from
their male guardians to travel alonetheir male guardians to travel alone before the age of 25 if they are unmarried, as wel , as well as “to as “to
marry, obtain a government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and marry, obtain a government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and
obtain some reproductive health care.”17 obtain some reproductive health care.”17
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and Women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of business owners and more
than a third of the overal workforce, including as professionals. Women serve in public office,
such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation, head of the General Authority for
Museums, and ambassadors to the United Nations and several countrieswork in the government and private sector. Qatar’s constitution . Qatar’s constitution
recognizes the right of women to vote and hold officerecognizes the right of women to vote and hold office, and two women have been elected at the
municipal council level. . In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to the In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to the Majlis As-
Shura for the first time in the body’s history. for the first time in the body’s history.18 As18As noted noted above, noabove, however, none of the women women
candidates candidates waswere elected in the October 2, 2021, elected in the October 2, 2021, ShuraShura Council elections, but the Amir included two women among his 15 appointments to the Council Council elections. In December 2019, the . In December 2019, the
spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, Lolwah Al Khater, was appointed “assistant minister” of spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, Lolwah Al Khater, was appointed “assistant minister” of
Foreign Affairsforeign affairs (number two at the Foreign Ministry).19 (number two at the Foreign Ministry).19
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Issues20
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 20202021 maintained Qatar at a Tier 2 maintained Qatar at a Tier 2
ranking on the basis that the government ranking on the basis that the government makes significant efforts to comply withdoes not fully meet the minimum the minimum
standards for the elimination of traffickingstandards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. Qatar has enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better . Qatar has enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better
protect those workers and it has established a coordinating body for anti-trafficking initiatives. protect those workers and it has established a coordinating body for anti-trafficking initiatives.
Stil , Still, Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a
much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers remain vulnerable to trafficking much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers remain vulnerable to trafficking
due to their positioning in private residences. Alongside the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic due to their positioning in private residences. Alongside the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic
Dialogue,” the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to Dialogue,” the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to
combat trafficking in persons.21combat trafficking in persons.21
Scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has centered on the status of the many expatriate workers hired to prepare for the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament in October. The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor laws as not adequately protecting the rights of The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor laws as not adequately protecting the rights of
workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari
law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for
union activity. union activity. Yet, the The State Department State Department creditsdoes credit the country with taking the country with taking some steps to protect labor steps to protect labor
rights, including for expatriate workers. rights, including for expatriate workers. In 2016, a labor reform law went into effect that provided

15 U.S. According to the State Department Trafficking in Persons report for 2021: 15 U.S. Department of State, Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2021. , March 2021.
16 16 CRS For more information and source material, see: CRS Report R46423, Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress,, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R. by Zoe Danon and Sarah R.
Collins. Collins.
17 Human Rights Watch, 17 Human Rights Watch, “Everything I Have to Do is Tied to a Man”: Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules,
March 29, 2021. March 29, 2021.
18 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “IPU welcomes appointment of four women to Qatar’s Parliament18 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “IPU welcomes appointment of four women to Qatar’s Parliament ,” November 13, 2017. ,” November 13, 2017.
19 “Amir appoints Lolwah 19 “Amir appoints Lolwah AlKhaterAl Khater as Assistant to FM as Assistant to FM.,” ” Gulf Times, December 2, 2019. , December 2, 2019.
20 20 T hisThis section is based section is based on the U.S. Department of State, on the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 25, 2020. June 25, 2020.
21 U.S.21 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,”Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, media note,
January 30, 2018. January 30, 2018.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy “The government announced and implemented reforms to its sponsorship system, including the removal of the No Objection Certificate (NOC) to allow all workers to transfer jobs at any time during their contract period.” Reforms that U.S. Policy

for changes to the “kafala” system (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable
employees to switch employers at the end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave
Qatar. The law abolished the kafala system entirely at the end of 2019, and further reforms that
took effect in August 2020, established a monthly minimum wage of $275 and provide for stricter took effect in August 2020, established a monthly minimum wage of $275 and provide for stricter
penalties for those that fail to provide their mostly expatriate labor force with adequate housing. penalties for those that fail to provide their mostly expatriate labor force with adequate housing.
The government also has increased its cooperation with the International Labor Organization The government also has increased its cooperation with the International Labor Organization
(ILO) to help expatriate workers obtain their rights.
Scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has centered on the plight of the many expatriate workers
hired to prepare for the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament. An Amnesty International
report from September 2019 al eged that workers sometimes are not paid for work and adequate
dispute resolution mechanisms are lacking.22 The Qatar government responded by stating: “Many
of the cases included in the report precede recent legislative amendments—including the
establishment of the Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly
improved the processes and increased the speed for resolving labour disputes.” Hundreds of
expatriate workers demonstrated in August 2019 against poor working conditions and unpaid and
delayed wages. Some studies suggested that crowded conditions for expatriate laborers in Qatar
fueled a relatively high per capita infection rate from COVID-19 in the spring of 2020(ILO) to help expatriate workers. Some studies suggested that crowded conditions for expatriate laborers fueled their relatively high per capita infection rate from COVID-19 in 2020.22 Amnesty International released a report in mid-2021 that found that Qatari authorities had failed to investigate the deaths of thousands of migrant workers over the past decade, despite evidence of links between premature deaths and unsafe working conditions.23 .23
Religious Freedom24
Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of
legislation,” but Qatari laws also incorporate secular legal traditions. The overwhelming majority legislation,” but Qatari laws also incorporate secular legal traditions. The overwhelming majority
(about 95%) of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining(about 95%) of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining an absence of observable an absence of observable
sectarian tensions. The government permits eight registered Christian denominations to worship sectarian tensions. The government permits eight registered Christian denominations to worship
publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex, and it has publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex, and it has al owedallowed the Evangelical Churches the Evangelical Churches
Al iance Alliance of Qatar to build a church. Hindu, Jewish, of Qatar to build a church. Hindu, Jewish, BuddhistsBuddhist, or other non-Muslim religious , or other non-Muslim religious
groups are registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairsgroups are registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they have established and they have established vil as villas and private homes as houses of worship. The law provides for a prison sentence of up to seven years for offending or misinterpreting the Quran, “offending” Islam or any of its rites or beliefs, insulting any of the prophets, or defaming, desecrating, or committing blasphemy against Islam, Christianity, or Judaism. Foreign Policy Over the past two decades, Qatar’s aims to influence political outcomes in the Middle East and North Africa and mediate conflicts in the region and beyond have required Qatari officials to build ties to individuals and parties at odds with those supported by some other regional states, including fellow GCC members Saudi Arabia and the UAE. One source of friction has been Qatar’s engagement with regional Islamist movements, including those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatari officials maintain that it is useful to maintain ties to Islamist groups, including the Brotherhood, that participate in the legitimate political process.25 Leaders of some of the other Gulf states, particularly the UAE, assert that the Brotherhood and other Islamist movements seek to destabilize established governments in the region and should be isolated, not engaged. In 2014, differences over this and other issues led Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors from Doha, returning them after Qatar pledged to implement a 22 “These two countries are tiny, rich and have the world’s highest coronavirus infection rates,” Associated Press, July 23, 2020. 23 Amnesty International. “Qatar: Failure to investigate migrant worker deaths leaves families in despair.” August 26, 2021. 24 This section draws from the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom. 25 For analysis of the differing views of the Gulf states on the Muslim Brotherhood, see: Eric Trager, The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis, The Atlantic, July 2, 2017, Congressional Research Service 8 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy November and
private homes as houses of worship. According to the International Religious Freedom report for
2019, in January 2019, a delegation led by the Secretary of State met with senior counterparts in
Doha and signed a statement of intent to “support the shared ideals of tolerance and appreciation
for diversity.”
Foreign Policy
Qatar uses its ample financial resources to support a foreign policy that attempts to influence
outcomes in the region. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate some regional conflicts, as
wel as to back regional actors at odds with those supported by some of the other GCC states.
Qatar has at times also used its military forces in its interventions. Regional and bilateral issues
reportedly constitute the focus of high-level U.S.-Qatar meetings.25

22 Amnesty International, All Work No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar’s Migrant Workers for Justice, September 19, 2019.
23 “T hese two countries are tiny, rich and have the world’s highest coronavirus infection rates,” Associated Press, July
23, 2020.
24 T his section draws from the U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom , June 10,
2020.
25 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Third U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, September 18,
2020.
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Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute
A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’s relationship with Muslim
Brotherhood movements. Qatari officials maintain that the Brotherhood, a political Islamist
movement, participates in the legitimate political process. UAE leaders, in particular, assert that
the Brotherhood seeks to destabilize established governments in the region. In 2014, differences
over this and other issues led Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors
from Doha, returning them several months later after Qatar pledged to implement a November
2013 commitment to end support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.26 The differences 2013 commitment to end support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.26 The differences
erupted again in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and erupted again in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and
Jordan, cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari Jordan, cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari
nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. These countries presented Qatar
with 13 demands as conditions for lifting the blockade, including closing Al Jazeera, severing
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Iran, and closing a Turkish
military baseThe group initially demanded that, as a condition for ending the boycott, Qatar close Al Jazeera, sever relations with Muslim Brotherhood organizations, downgrade relations with Iran, and end the deployment of Turkish military personnel in Qatar.27 Amir Tamim expressed openness to negotiations but said Qatar would in Qatar.27 Amir Tamim expressed openness to negotiations but said Qatar would
not “surrender” its sovereignty by agreeing to the demands.
President Trump initial y echoed criticism of Qatar’s policies, and mediation of the rift was
spearheaded by then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson who, working with Kuwaiti leaders,
conducted “shuttle diplomacy” in the region during July 2017. A U.S. envoy appointed in 2017 to
work on the issue, General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in 2019. In July 2019, Jordan started
a thaw in the boycott by restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar.28not “surrender” its sovereignty by agreeing to the demands. One month after the intra-GCC rift began, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on the causes of the rift and the status of U.S.-Qatar relations. Among the issues raised in that hearing were Qatar’s engagement with and possible funding of regional Islamist groups.28 President Trump initially echoed criticism of Qatar’s policies, but later backed efforts by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to mediate a resolution of the intra-GCC rift. Realizing few benefits from continuing the blockade, by 2019, Saudi Arabia and the UAE apparently began to look for a resolution - an outcome strongly urged by the Trump Administration.29 In July 2019, Jordan restored diplomatic relations with Qatar, signaling the beginning of a resolution of the blockade.30 During October 2019-January During October 2019-January
2020, Qatar and Saudi Arabia held high-level direct talks, but the talks were suspended in early 2020, Qatar and Saudi Arabia held high-level direct talks, but the talks were suspended in early
January 2020.January 2020.29
31 At the 41st GCC summit in Al-Ula,At the 41st GCC summit in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia,Saudi Arabia, on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the
UAE, and Egypt announced that they would UAE, and Egypt announced that they would be restoringrestore diplomatic relations with Qatar diplomatic relations with Qatar, while
Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international
organizations. The Al-Ula . The Al-Ula Declaration Declaration does not make direct reference to the 13 demands
original y articulated in June 2017, but rather did not commit Qatar to meeting any of the initial Saudi/UAE demands, but referred to restoring “collaboration among to restoring “collaboration among al all Member Member
States” and strengthening “the bonds of States” and strengthening “the bonds of brotherhood among them.”32Tensions between Qatar and the UAE, in particular, have continued to simmer since the formal reconciliation, as demonstrated by the fact that the UAE has not reopened its embassy in Doha. But, the UAE National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan visited Qatar in August 2021brotherhood among them.”30 Direct flights between Doha
and Riyadh resumed on January 11, and flights between Qatar and the other blockading nations
resumed on January 18.31 A senior UAE official visited Qatar on August 26, the first such visit in , the first such visit in
over four years, to discuss “.. ways to further develop cooperation.. especial y in the economic
and trade fields...”32 And, in late September, the Amir, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE National Security Advisor met at a Red Sea resort, signaling an acceleration of the thaw.
Analysts expect the normalization between GCC countries to boost Qatar’s tourism sector,

26 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. T he November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.
27 T he list of demands can be found at “ List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated
Press, June 23, 2017.
28 “Inching Away from Saudi-UAE Axis, Jordan Restores T ies with Qatar,” Al Jazeera English, July 9, 2019.
29 Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January, Al Jazeera, February 15, 2020.
30 T uqa Khalid, “ Full transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf unity ,” Al Arabiya, January 6,
2021; Sultan Barakat, “ Qatar-GCC agreement: A victory for measured diplomacy,” opinion, Al Jazeera, January 8,
2021.
31 Isabel Debre, “ Qatar-Saudi Arabia direct flights resume amid Gulf detente,” AP News, January 11, 2021; Egypt,
UAE resume first Qatar flights after blockade,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2021.
32 “Emir of Qatar receives delegation led by T ahnoun bin Zayed,” Emirates News Agency, August 26, 2021.
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improve attendance at the 2022 World Cup in Doha, and improve economic cooperation in the
region more general y.33
The intra-GCC rift had roots in and implications for the broader region:
 In Egypt, Qatar supported, political y and financial y, the government of Muslim
Brotherhood-linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, who was elected president in
2012. The UAE and Saudi Arabia backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s military in
2013 and have financial y backed the regime of former military leader and now
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
 In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner
over four years.33 In September 2021, the Amir, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and Shaykh Tahnoun met at a Red Sea resort. Amir Tamim attended the GCC summit in Saudi Arabia in January 2022. The intra-GCC rift has played out in the broader region and beyond:34  In Egypt, Qatar supported and financially assisted the government of a Muslim Brotherhood-linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, who was elected president in 2012. The UAE and Saudi Arabia backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s military in 26 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. The November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman. 27 The list of demands can be found at “List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated Press, June 23, 2017. 28 House of Representatives. Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship. July 26, 2017. 29 “US secretary of state in Qatar urges end to Gulf diplomatic rift,” Deutsche Welle, January 13, 2019. 30 “Inching Away from Saudi-UAE Axis, Jordan Restores Ties with Qatar,” Al Jazeera English, July 9, 2019. 31 “Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January,” Al Jazeera, February 15, 2020. 32 Tuqa Khalid, “Full transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf unity,” Al Arabiya, January 6, 2021; Sultan Barakat, “Qatar-GCC agreement: A victory for measured diplomacy,” opinion, Al Jazeera, January 8, 2021. 33 “Emir of Qatar receives delegation led by Tahnoun bin Zayed,” Emirates News Agency, August 26, 2021. 34 For background and analysis on Qatar’s competition with other Gulf states in East Africa, see: Omar Mahmood, The Middle East’s Complicated Engagement in the Horn of Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace, January 28, 2020. Congressional Research Service 9 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 2013, and they support former military leader and now President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Egypt joined the boycott of Qatar in 2017, but Qatar has sought recently to improve relations with Egypt. In late March 2022, Qatar announced a $5 billion investment in the country.35  In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and other partner countries in air countries in air operations to help oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in operations to help oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in
2011. Subsequently, Qatar, reportedly in partnership with Turkey, 2011. Subsequently, Qatar, reportedly in partnership with Turkey, has supported supported
the U.N.-backed government in Tripolithe U.N.-backed government in Tripoli, which is supported by Muslim
Brotherhood-linked factions. The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia support ex-
. The UAE and Egypt have supported ex-military commander Khalifa Haftar, military commander Khalifa Haftar, who controls large parts of eastern and
northern Libya and who sought to seize control of Tripoli in 2019.34
a staunch opponent of Islamist factions who unsuccessfully sought to seize control of Tripoli and oust the U.N.-backed government in 2019.36Qatar is publicly supporting a U.N.-backed process to reconcile Libya’s contending factions through national elections, which were to be held in December 2021 but have been postponed.  In Yemen, in 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition to battle Iran-  In Yemen, in 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition to battle Iran-
backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels, including deploying about 1,000 military backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels, including deploying about 1,000 military
personnel, along with armor, to guard the Saudi border from Houthi incursions. personnel, along with armor, to guard the Saudi border from Houthi incursions.
The Qatari Air Force also flew air strikes against the Houthis.The Qatari Air Force also flew air strikes against the Houthis.35 As a result of37 After the the
intra-GCC riftintra-GCC rift, erupted in mid-2017 in mid-2017, Qatar withdrew from the mission. Qatar withdrew from the mission.
 In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to  In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to Islamist rebels fighting the rebels fighting the regime of regime of
President Bashar Al AsadPresident Bashar Al Asad, including those reportedly linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood.36.38 Qatar Qatar also claimed that its ties to Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), an Al
Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO), wereclaimed that its engagement with Syrian Islamist groups was instrumental in persuading instrumental in persuading the groupthem to sever to sever itstheir ties to ties to
Al QaedaAl Qaeda in 2016, and to release and to release its Lebanese and Western prisoners.37
Western prisoners they were holding.39 Iran
Qatari leaders have consistently pursued dialogue with Iran Qatari leaders have consistently pursued dialogue with Iran to reduce regional tensions, while
simultaneouslywhile cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran strategical ystrategically. In solidarity with its . In solidarity with its
GCC partners, Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 during a Saudi-GCC partners, Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 during a Saudi-
Iranian rift over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric. However, Qatar turned to Iran to Iranian rift over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric. However, Qatar turned to Iran to
help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying
Iranian airspace to fly around the GCC countries that were boycotting QatarIranian airspace. Qatar Airways paid . Qatar Airways paid
Iran over Iran over $130 million $130 mil ion per year in overflight fees.per year in overflight fees.3840 In August 2017, Qatar restored full diplomatic In August 2017, Qatar restored full diplomatic

33 Davide Barbuscia and Saeed Azhar, “Gulf economy gets a boost from healing of Saudi-Qatar rift,” Reuters, January
5, 2021; Aarti Nagraj, “ AlUla agreement: What does resetting ties with Qatar mean for the GCC region?” Gulf
Business, February 11, 2021.
34 U.N. Security relations with Iran, and Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region should not lead to “escalation.”41 Through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, Qatar and Iran sought to de-escalate the U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf in 2019.42 Qatar has since supported dialogue between 35 “Qatar to invest $5bn in Egypt as ties improve.” Al Jazeera, March 29, 2022. 36 U.N. Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973
(2011), March 9, 2016. For information on the conflict in Libya, see CRS(2011), March 9, 2016. For information on the conflict in Libya, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11556, IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy, by , by
Christopher M. Blanchard. Christopher M. Blanchard.
3537 Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel, 2019. Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel, 2019.
3638 Anand Gopal and Jeremy Hodge, Anand Gopal and Jeremy Hodge, Social Networks, Class, and the Syrian Proxy War,, International Security Report, International Security Report,
NewNew America, April 6, 2021. America, April 6, 2021.
3739 “Analysts: Saudi “Analysts: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, pushed al-NusraArabia, Qatar, pushed al-Nusra Front to break with al-Qaeda,” Front to break with al-Qaeda,” Agencia EFE, July, July 29, 2016. 29, 2016.
3840 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,” of millions of dollars,” Fox News,, July 14, 2020. 41 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018. 42 “The Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis,” Fox News, May 16, 2019. July 14, 2020.
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relations with Iran, and Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015
multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region
should not lead to “escalation.”39 Through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, Qatar and Iran
sought to de-escalate the U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf in 2019,40 and Qatar reportedly has sought
to start a formal dialogue between the GCC and Iran to lower Gulf tensions U.S. Policy the GCC countries and Iran to lower Gulf tensions.43Qatari officials express support for Biden Administration efforts to restore full Iranian and U.S. adherence to the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Qatar and Iran have . Qatar and Iran have
shared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incidentshared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although some Iranian
officials have occasional y accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.41
.44 Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas42
Qatar has maintained contact with al parties in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, including hosting a
Hamas45 Qatar has had high-level contacts with Israel since the mid-1990s. It hosted a visit by then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres in 1996 and visit by then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres in 1996 and al owingallowed Israel to open a formal Israel to open a formal
trade office in Doha from 2000 until trade office in Doha from 2000 until thea 2009 Israel-Hamas conflict erupted. 2009 Israel-Hamas conflict erupted. However, smal
levels ofSmall-scale direct Israel-Qatar trade, as direct Israel-Qatar trade, as wel well as visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes, as visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes,
doctors, and other Israelis, reportedly continued after that clash.doctors, and other Israelis, reportedly continued after that clash.4346 At the same time, Amir Tamim regularly accuses Amir Tamim regularly accuses
Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and expresses support for Palestinian efforts to gain full Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and expresses support for Palestinian efforts to gain full
United Nations membership and recognition.United Nations membership and recognition.44
47 Qatari officials say they have ruled out joining the UAE and Bahrain in normalizing relations with Israel until there is substantial progress toward resolving the Israel-Palestinian dispute.48 Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.- Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.-
designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari
officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian peace.officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian peace.4549
Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its political Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its political
bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly relocated there in 2020.bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly relocated there in 2020.46 Much of Qatar’s leverage with
Hamas and Israel comes in the form of50 Qatar provides substantial financial substantial financial aidaid it provides to the people of Gaza, to the people of Gaza,
which Israeli officials support as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.which Israeli officials support as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.47 Qatar’s
51 The aid is provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official aid is provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official
Mohammad Al-Emadi, who serves Mohammad Al-Emadi, who serves informal yinformally as an envoy to Israel. Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, reportedly facilitated, in part, by additional pledges of aid to Gaza.52 Among legislative action on the issue of financial support to Hamas, in the 115th Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of 2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017, would have sanctioned foreign governments determined to be providing financial or other material support to Hamas or its leaders. Versions of that bill introduced in the 116th Congress, H.R. 1850 and S. 2680, contained sanctions exceptions for purely humanitarian aid. H.R. 1850 passed the House on July 23, 2019, by voice vote. The bill was reintroduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 261) but has not advanced. It provides for a presidential waiver. 43 “Gulf states and Iran should agree on format for dialogue, says Qatari minister,” Reuters, May 6, 2021. 44 “Iran, Qatar, Face off Over North Field, South Pars, Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016. 45 See CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 46 “Qatar cozies up to Israel, again,” Electronic Intifada, February 26, 2020. 47 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. 48 “Interview: Qatar's FM rules out normalization with Israel, Syria.” Axios, February 2, 2022. 49 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June 12, 2017. 50 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar – report,” Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020. 51 Neville Teller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?,” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019. 52 “Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure.” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021. Congressional Research Service 11 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Afghanistan/Taliban53 Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan when the movement ruled Afghanistan during 1996-2001. However, the stalemate in the subsequent as an envoy to Israel. In March 2020, Qatar
donated $10 mil ion to the Palestinian Authority to help it cope with the COVID-19 outbreak. In
June 2020, Qatar reportedly threatened to suspend the payments to Gaza if Israel proceeded with
its plans to annex some West Bank areas.48 Qatar criticized the August 13, 2020, UAE-Israeli
announcement of a commitment to normalized relations (“Abraham Accords”) as a UAE betrayal
of the Palestinian cause, and indicated that Qatar would not join the Accords unless and until
there were a broader Israel-Palestinian settlement. Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of
clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, reportedly facilitated, in part, by new pledges of
Qatari aid to Gaza.49

39 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.
40 T he Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis, Fox News, May 16, 2019.
41 “Iran, Qatar, Face off Over North Field, South Pars, Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016.
42 See CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
43 “Qatar cozies up to Israel, again,” Electronic Intifada, February 26, 2020.
44 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015.
45 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June
12, 2017.
46 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar – report,” Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020.
47 Neville T eller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?,” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.
48 “Qatar to suspend Gaza payments to pressure Israel over annexation,” Axios, June 23, 2020.
49 ”Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure.” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021.
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Qatar’s critics assert that the country’s relations with Hamas leaders constitute support for a
terrorist organization. In the 115th Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act
of 2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017,
appeared directed at Qatar by sanctioning foreign governments determined to be providing
financial or other material support to Hamas or its leaders. Versions of that bil introduced in the
116th Congress, H.R. 1850 and S. 2680, did not directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and
contained exceptions for purely humanitarian aid.50 H.R. 1850 passed the House on July 23, 2019,
by voice vote. The bil was reintroduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 261).
Afghanistan/Taliban Office
Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan when the
movement ruled during 1996-2001. However, the stalemate in the conflict there apparently conflict there apparently
contributed to a Qatari decisioncontributed to a Qatari decision, with U.S. support, to al ow the Taliban to open a in 2013, supported by the United States, to host a Taliban representative representative
office in Doha office in Doha in 2013, through which moderate Taliban figures could through which moderate Taliban figures could engage with international diplomats. During the Trump Administrationengage with outside
stakeholders in the Afghan situation. U.S.-Taliban talks led to a May 2014, exchange of captured
U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban figures who subsequently joined the Taliban office in
Doha. After the Trump Administration decided to engage the Taliban with the intent of winding
down U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Qatar brokered and , Qatar brokered and hosted hosted many rounds of talks between talks between
the United States and Taliban representatives, culminating in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement the United States and Taliban representatives, culminating in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement that
was signed in Dohasigned on February 29, 2020 ( on February 29, 2020 (the “Doha Agreement”). Doha also hosted “Doha Agreement”). Doha also hosted several rounds
of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban on a politicaltalks between the Afghan government and the Taliban on a political solution for Afghanistan.54 Throughout the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan duringsolution for Afghanistan,
which proved unsuccessful.51 In addition, Qatar’s contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is an al y of the Taliban, helped produce a
November 2019 prisoner exchange that included the release from Afghan custody of Anas
Haqqani, the brother of the deputy leader of the Taliban movement, Sirajuddin Haqqani.52
During 2001-2021, Qatari ground forces did not deploy to Afghanistan, but U.S. forces 2001-2021, Qatari ground forces did not deploy to Afghanistan, but U.S. forces engaged
thereoperating in Afghanistan used Qatari facilities, and Qatar’s air force delivered cargo and provided other logistical used Qatari facilities, and Qatar’s air force delivered cargo and provided other logistical
support to U.S. forces.support to U.S. forces. Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country, Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country, QatarQatari diplomats in Kabul helped helped
the United States evacuate the United States evacuate U.S. and Afghan citizens from Kabul. In addition to other support, a
Qatari diplomat to Afghanistan reportedly escorted smal a total of 75,000 U.S., Afghan, and third-country nationals from Kabul, including by escorting small groups of Americans into the Kabul groups of Americans into the Kabul
airport for evacuation.53 Afterairport.55 Since the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, 2021, several Qatar several Qatar
Airways charter flights Airways charter flights evacuatedhave evacuated additional U.S. and other nationals. Senior U.S. officials, including U.S. and other nationals, facilitated by Qatari technical support
that enabled Kabul airport to reopen. Senior U.S. officials, including in visits to Doha in
September 2021 by Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin, thanked Qatar Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin, thanked Qatar
for its help in the evacuation operation, for its help in the evacuation operation, as well as for Doha’s hosting of a as wel as for its hosting, in Doha, of a temporary U.S. U.S.
embassy to Afghanistan. U.S. Embassy Kabul was closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal embassy to Afghanistan. U.S. Embassy Kabul was closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal
and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats were transferred and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats were transferred to Doha. Qatar has agreed to host some Afghan nationals for a limited period while their vetting and processing for onward migration is completed. Several Members of Congress visited Qatar in the course of the evacuation operations to exercise oversight of U.S. activities. In the 117th Congress, Members introduced a resolution (S.Res. 390) that would thank Qatar for its support of the United States during the 2021 evacuation. U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation56 Regional and bilateral issues remain a key topic of high-level U.S.-Qatar meetings. U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are extensive, including through yearly “Strategic Dialogue” meetings since January 2018. The U.S-Qatar defense relationship began to take shape after the six Gulf monarchies formed the GCC in 1981 to back Iraq against Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. GCC forces joined the U.S.-led military coalition that expelledto Doha. Also in September, Qatar’s
Foreign Minister became the first senior foreign official to visit Kabul for official meetings with
Taliban government leaders; he also met with senior figures from the ousted government,

50 “Eliot Engel Weakens Hamas Sanctions Bill After Lobbying from Qatar,” New York Post, September 21, 2019.
51 Mjuab Mashal, “Afghanistan Peace T alks Open in Qatar, Seeking End to Decades of War ,” New York Times,
September 12, 2020. See also CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, by Clayton
T homas.
52 “Afghan Government Releases Militants In Apparent Exchange For American, Australian Captives,” RFE/RL,
November 11, 2019.
53 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,”
Washington Post, August 22, 2021.
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including former president Hamid Karzai and former chief executive officer Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah, who sought unsuccessfully to broker a broad-based Afghan government. He and other
Qatari officials have sought to pressure the Taliban to respect rights and protect civilians.54
Qatar also came in for some criticism for its difficulties handling the large number of evacuees
sent to Al Udeid Air Base in a short period of time. About 40,000 evacuees were processed at that
base by the time the last U.S. soldier left Kabul on August 30. Reports from the first week of
evacuations found that evacuees were facing unsanitary and crowded conditions at Al Udeid.
DOD and Department of State officials told news outlets that they were working to reduce
bottlenecks and deploy extra staff to al eviate the “dire conditions” at Al Udeid.55 Security
screening processes at Al Udeid detected at least one Afghan evacuee with potential ties to ISIS,
and at least 100 others were flagged for potential matches to intel igence agency watch lists. In
most of those cases, the individuals were ultimately cleared by follow-on screening.56
Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts
Elsewhere in the region
 In March 2021, Qatar, along with Turkey and Russia, launched new consultations
to reach a political settlement to the Syrian civil war, in line with U.N.
resolutions, as wel as to discuss mechanisms to deliver humanitarian aid.57
 In Sudan, Qatar provided funds and promises of investment to achieve a series of
agreements between the government and various rebel factions in Darfur.58
Qatar’s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of the ouster of longtime President
Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is uncertain, amid competition with other GCC
states for influence there.
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation59
U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are extensive, including through a “Strategic Dialogue”
that first convened in January 2018. The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged after the six
Gulf monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 to back Iraq against the threat posed by Iran in the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In the latter stages of that war, Iran attacked international shipping in the
Gulf and some Gulf state oil loading facilities, but none in Qatar. GCC forces participated in the
U.S.-led military coalition that expel ed Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991, and Qatari armored Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991, and Qatari armored
forces helped defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji in January 1991. forces helped defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji in January 1991.
Qatar isMore recently, Qatar has been a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (the Islamic State a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (the Islamic State
organization). In 2014, Qatar flew some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions.
However, by the end of 2014, the coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition
strikes inside Syria. In 2019, Qatar indicated it would join the U.S.-led maritime security mission
(Operation Sentinel) intended to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the

54 “Qatar calls on T aliban to protect civilians,” AFP, August 17, 2021.
55 Jordan Williams, “Afghan refugees living in ‘dire conditions’ at US air base: report,” T he Hill, August 24, 2021.
56 T ara Copp, “ Kabul Evacuee With Potential ISIS T ies Detained at Qatar Base,” Defense One, August 24, 2021.
57 “T urkey, Russia, Qatar to push for political resolution in Syria,” Reuters, March 11, 2021.
58 UNAMID, “ Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,” May 31, 2011.
59 Much of this section is derived from: U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Security Cooperation With Qatar,” fact sheet,
January 20, 2021.
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Gulf, which includes Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.60 The Qatar government has not
announced whether it is participating in that mission, which began operations in late 2019.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The United States and Qatar signed a formal DCA on June 23, 1992, and it was organization), and coalition press releases identified Qatar as undertaking airstrikes 53 See CRS Report R46879, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by Clayton Thomas. 54 Mjuab Mashal, “Afghanistan Peace Talks Open in Qatar, Seeking End to Decades of War,” New York Times, September 12, 2020. See also CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, by Clayton Thomas. 55 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,” Washington Post, August 22, 2021. 56 Much of this section is derived from: U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” fact sheet, July 30, 2021. Congressional Research Service 12 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy in Syria as part of that campaign in 2014. In 2019, Qatar joined the multilateral, U.S.-led maritime security mission (International Maritime Security Construct, IMSC) established to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the Gulf.57 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) The United States and Qatar signed a formal DCA on June 23, 1992, renewed for 10 renewed for 10
years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. The text of the pact is classified, years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. The text of the pact is classified,
but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, prepositioning of U.S. but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, prepositioning of U.S.
armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar’s military forces.armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar’s military forces.61 More than
8,00058 Over the past several years, the number of U.S. military personnel are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid U.S. military personnel are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid
Air Base, discussed further below.62
Qatar’s force of about 16,500 is the smal estAir Base, has ranged from about 8,000 to over 10,000.59 Qatar’s total force of about 17,000 personnel is the smallest in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about
12,000 are ground forces, 2,500 are naval forces, and 2,000 are air forces. Qatar has sought to 12,000 are ground forces, 2,500 are naval forces, and 2,000 are air forces. Qatar has sought to
compensate for the compensate for the smal small size of its force with purchases of advanced weaponry such as U.S.-size of its force with purchases of advanced weaponry such as U.S.-
made combat aircraft and German-made Leopard tanksmade combat aircraft and German-made Leopard tanks,63 as discussed further below.
.60 Al Udeid Air Base (Air Force/CENTCOM)6461
Most of the U.S. military personnel in Qatar are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al Most of the U.S. military personnel in Qatar are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al
Udeid air base southwest of Doha.Udeid air base southwest of Doha.65 Al Udeid Base also hosts the forward headquarters for
CENTCOM.62 The base is host to: the headquarters of U.S. Central Command Forward, U.S. Air Force Central Command Forward, and U.S. Special Operations Command Central Command Forward, as well as Combined Joint Interagency Task Force – Syria, U.S. Central Command’s Combined Air Operations Center, and the U.S. Air Force’s 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.63 U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization, and they provide a substantial Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization, and they provide a substantial
capability against Iran. capability against Iran. In conjunction with U.S.-Iran tensions since mid-2019, the United States
deployed F-22 combat aircraft to Al UdeidThe United States stations some of its most sophisticated combat aircraft at the facility. .
The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue has produced agreements to expand defense and security The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue has produced agreements to expand defense and security
cooperation, including the cooperation, including the possibility of “permanent” U.S. basing there, centered on the
expansion and improvements of Al Udeid over the next two decades. In January 2019, during the
second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogueestablishment of fixed housing and other structures for U.S. personnel deployed at Al Udeid. In January 2019, the Qatar Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of , the Qatar Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of
Defense Defense (DOD) signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred to as a “positive step towards signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred to as a “positive step towards
the eventual formalizationthe eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future
infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”66Al64Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and 57 “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced
with Qatari funding (over $8 bil ion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since
2003) and about $500 mil ion in U.S. military construction funding since 2003.67 Qatar reportedly

60 “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will join naval coalition, official says,” join naval coalition, official says,” Reuters, November 25, 2019. November 25, 2019.
6158 U.S. U.S. Library of Congress,Library of Congress, Country Studies: Persian Gulf States, 1994. Some provisions of DCA’s 1994. Some provisions of DCA’s with other GCC with other GCC
states are discussedstates are discussed in Samiin Sami Hajjar, Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. (U.S. Army War Army War
College:College: Strategic StudiesStrategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27. Institute), March 2002, p. 27.
62 59 U.S. U.S. Department of State, “Department of State, “ Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. SalesCoordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales T ravels Travels to Qatar,” media to Qatar,” media
note, August 12, 2020note, August 12, 2020.
63 “Qatar is now one of the most well-equipped military forces in the Middle East ,” Army Recognition, July 20, 2020.
64 U.S. ; Department of Defense, “U.S. and Qatar Sign MOU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” January 14, 2019. 60 “Qatar is now one of the most well-equipped military forces in the Middle East,” Army Recognition, July 20, 2020. 61 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” mediaDepartment of State, “Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, note,
January 30, 2018. January 30, 2018.
65 62 Adam Adam T aylor, “ As T rumpTaylor, “As Trump tries to end ‘endless wars,’ tries to end ‘endless wars,’ America’s biggestAmerica’s biggest Mideast base isMideast base is getting bigger,”getting bigger,” The
Washington Post, August, August 21, 2019. 21, 2019.
6663 U.S. U.S. Department of Department of Defense, “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S.
Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” press release, January 14, 2019.
67 Figures compiled by CRS.
State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” fact sheet, July 30, 2021. 64 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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is providing another $1.8 bil ion for the Al Udeid expansion plan.68 The FY2021 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) authorized $790 mil ion for military construction
projects for Al Udeid, pursuant to an agreement with the State of Qatar for required in-kind
contributions. In 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of equipment, with an
estimated value of about $200 mil ion, to upgrade its Air Operation Center.
U.S. Policy enhanced with Qatari funding (over $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since 2003) as well as U.S. military construction funding.65 As Saliyah Facility (Army) and Hamad Port
From 1992 until 2021, the U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command From 1992 until 2021, the U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command prepositions armor
(enoughprepositioned enough armor to outfit one brigade to outfit one brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha. U.S. armor stationed in Qatar at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha. U.S. armor stationed in Qatar
was deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that was deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that removedousted Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in
2003. Because the ground force threat to the Gulf from Iraq has largely ended since the 2003 Iraq
war’s regime in Iraq in 2003. Since that war, which largely ended the Iraqi threat to the Gulf states, the Defense Department has de-emphasized prepositioning armor in Qatar. The As Sayliyah , the Defense Department has de-emphasized prepositioning armor in Qatar. The As Sayliyah
facility was closed in June 2021facility was closed in June 2021.69 By contrast, the naval threat in the Gulf has increased, and
,66 although it was reopened in August 2021 to help evacuate U.S., Afghan, and third country nationals from Afghanistan after the Taliban regained power there in August 2021. Some third country nationals have remained housed at the facility under U.S.-Qatari agreement while their onward migration is arranged. In response to the heightened naval threat from Iran, Qatar has been expanding the Hamad Port to be able to Qatar has been expanding the Hamad Port to be able to potential ypotentially accommodate larger U.S. accommodate larger U.S.
Navy operations.
Navy operations. Major Non-NATO Ally Designation Coincident with the January 31, 2022 White House visit of Amir Tamim, President Biden announced that he would designated Qatar as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). Qatar joins Bahrain and Kuwait as Gulf states given that designation, which qualifies Qatar to purchase certain U.S. arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the United States for which it would not otherwise be eligible. On February 14, 2022, the President transmitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the notice of the intent to designate Qatar as a Major Non-NATO Ally. U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar
Over the past two decades, Qatar has shifted its weaponry mix from European sources toward Over the past two decades, Qatar has shifted its weaponry mix from European sources toward
U.S.-made equipment.U.S.-made equipment.7067 According to the State Department military cooperation factsheet cited According to the State Department military cooperation factsheet cited
above, the United States has $above, the United States has $25 bil ion26 billion dollars in active government-to-government sales cases dollars in active government-to-government sales cases
with Qatar under the Foreign Militarywith Qatar under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and, since Sales (FMS) system, and, since 20142016, the United States has , the United States has
authorized the permanent export of over $2.8 authorized the permanent export of over $2.8 bil ionbillion in defense articles to Qatar via the Direct in defense articles to Qatar via the Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS) process. Qatar has a 100% favorable rate on Blue Lantern end-use Commercial Sales (DCS) process. Qatar has a 100% favorable rate on Blue Lantern end-use
monitoring (EUM) checks for direct commercial sales and a “satisfactory” rating for the FMS monitoring (EUM) checks for direct commercial sales and a “satisfactory” rating for the FMS
Golden Sentry EUM monitoring program. Golden Sentry EUM monitoring program.
  Tanks. Qatar fields 30 French-made AMX-30s Qatar fields 30 French-made AMX-30s main battle tanks andbattle tanks and, since 2016,
Germany has delivered 62 “ 62 German-made Leopard 2Leopard 2” tanks tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased . Qatar has not purchased
U.S.-made tanks, to date. U.S.-made tanks, to date.
  Combat Aircraft. On November 17,In 2016, based on a 2016, based on a 2013 Qatari requestQatari request in 2013, the , the
Defense Security Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential
sale to Qatar of up to 72 U.S.-made F-15s, with an estimated value of $21
bil ion.71 The approval came after an evaluation of the sale with respect to the
U.S. legal requirement to preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME).72
During June-December 2017, the United States and Qatar signed agreements for
Qatar to purchase of al 72 of them, with deliveries to be completed by 2023.
Qatar signed a $7 bil ion agreement in May 2015 to buy 24 French-made Rafale

68 “’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” op. cit.
69 “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar sale to Qatar of Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” press release, January 14, 2019. 65 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” fact sheet, July 30, 2021. 66 “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar after three decades supporting readiness, resilienceafter three decades supporting readiness, resilience.” News: First T heater,” News: First Theater Sustainment Sustainment
Command, JuneCommand, June 24, 2021. 24, 2021.
70 67 Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived from from T heThe International Institute for International Institute for
Strategic Studies,Strategic Studies, “T he “The Military Balance: Military Balance: T heThe Middle East and Middle East and North Africa.”
71 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) T ransmittal Number 16-58. T he FY2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect
on Israel’s QME.
72 For information on the QME requirement, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
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aircraft,73 North Africa.” Congressional Research Service 14 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy up to 72 U.S.-made F-15s, with an estimated value of $21 billion.68 The approval came after an evaluation of the sale with respect to the U.S. legal requirement to preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME).69 During June-December 2017, the United States and Qatar signed agreements for Qatar to purchase of all 72 of them, with deliveries to be completed by 2023. Subsequent upgrades to the technology associated with the F-15s have been agreed. Qatar signed a $7 billion agreement in 2015 to buy 24 French-made Rafale aircraft,70 and deliveries began and deliveries began in in early 2019. In September 2017, Qatar signed a 2019. In September 2017, Qatar signed a
“Statement of Intent” with the United Kingdom to purchase 24 Typhoon combat “Statement of Intent” with the United Kingdom to purchase 24 Typhoon combat
aircraft. aircraft.
  Attack Helicopters. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache, UH-. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache, UH-
60 M Blackhawk, and MH-60 helicopters, with an estimated value of about $6.6 60 M Blackhawk, and MH-60 helicopters, with an estimated value of about $6.6
bil ion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA announced that the State Department had
approved a sale to Qatar ofbillion. In 2018, the United States agreed to provide 5,000 Advanced Precision 5,000 Advanced Precision Kil Kill Weapons Systems II Weapons Systems II
Guidance Sections for use on the ApachesGuidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of $300
mil ion. On May 9, . In May 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another
24 AH-64E Apaches to help Qatar defend its oil and gas platforms, at an 24 AH-64E Apaches to help Qatar defend its oil and gas platforms, at an
estimated cost of $3 estimated cost of $3 bil ion. billion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to
prohibit the sale but, after the Administration stated an intent to veto the prohibit the sale but, after the Administration stated an intent to veto the bil , a
bill, a motion to discharge the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from further motion to discharge the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from further
consideration consideration of the bil failed 42-57.74
failed 42-57.71 The differences between the Administration and some in Congress on the sale came in the context of broad congressional questions about the degree of oversight of the sale of arms to the GCC states that could potentially be used in the conflict in Yemen or other conflicts in the region.72   Short-Range Missile and Rocket Systems. During 2012-2016, the United During 2012-2016, the United
States sold Qatar States sold Qatar Hel fire Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, Javelin air-to-ground missiles, Javelin guided missilesanti-tank systems, the , the
M142 High Mobility M142 High Mobility Artil ery Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided MultipleMissile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). Launch Rocket
System (GMLRS). On April 22, 2016, DSCA notified to Congress a potential
sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C Rolling Airframe Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM
116C-2 Rolling Airframe Telemetry Missiles, at an estimated cost of $260
mil ion.75 A July 2019, joint U.S.-Qatar statement said that Qatar had A July 2019, joint U.S.-Qatar statement said that Qatar had
recommittedrecommitted to a 2018 agreement to buy 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air to buy 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air
Missile Systems (NASAM)Missile Systems (NASAM), at an estimated value of $215 at an estimated value of $215 mil ion. On July 10,
million. In July 2019, Raytheon announced that Qatar 2019, Raytheon announced that Qatar wil would be the first country to purchases its be the first country to purchases its
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air MissileAdvanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile – Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER) – Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER)
weapon.weapon.7673
  Ballistic Missiles. At its national day parade in December 2017, the Qatari At its national day parade in December 2017, the Qatari
military displayed a newly military displayed a newly-purchased purchased Chinese-origin SY 400-BP-12A SY 400-BP-12A bal istic ballistic missile, which missile, which
has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.77
 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Qatar has purchased various U.S.-made BMD
systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf missile
defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United States sold
Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units and missiles
at an estimated value of nearly $10 bil ion. Also that year, the United States
agreed to sel Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD), the
most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the United States has
made available for sale.78 No THAAD purchase has been finalized.

73 T om74 68 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal Number 16-58. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect on Israel’s QME. 69 For information on the QME requirement, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 70 Tom Hussain, “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” Hussain, “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” McClatchy, McClatchy, M ayMay 1, 2015; Awad 1, 2015; Awad Mustafa Mustafa
and Joe Gould,and Joe Gould, “ “Senators Begin Push for Jet SalesSenators Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait,to Kuwait, Qatar,” Defense NewsQatar,” Defense News, , January 22, 2016. January 22, 2016.
7471 Record Vote Number 162, June 13, 2019. See Congressional Record, MOTION TO DISCHARGE--S.J. RES. 20 AND S.J. RES. 26; S3457-S3462, Vol. 165, No. 99, June 13, 2019; and, Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to block arms sales to Bahrain and Qatar,” Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to block arms sales to Bahrain and Qatar,” Politico, JuneJune 13, 2019.
75 DSCA T ransmittal Number 16-07.
76 13, 2019. 72 “Senate rejects Paul bid to block arms sales to Bahrain, Qatar,” Roll Call, June 13, 2019. 73 Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019. Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019.
7774 “Why is Qatar Showing “Why is Qatar Showing Off its NewOff its New Short Short-Range Ballistic Missile-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” Arsenal?” Al Arabiya English, December 20, , December 20,
2017.
78 DSCA announcement, November 5, 2012, http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-
defense-thaad.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy  Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Qatar has purchased various U.S.-made BMD systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf missile defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units and missiles at an estimated value of nearly $10 billion. The United States has agreed to sell Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD), the most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the United States has made available for sale.75 Qatar has not finalized an agreement to buy the system.  U.S. Policy

 Naval Vessels. In 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an In 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an
unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other
equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 mil ionmillion. In August 2017, . In August 2017,
Qatar finalizedQatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast
patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, estimated at $5 patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, estimated at $5 bil ion.79
billion.76 Other Defense Partnerships
Qatar has developed defense relations with several other partners. Qatar has developed defense relations with several other partners.
  NATO. Qatar established relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation Qatar established relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative” (ICI). Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with Initiative” (ICI). Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with
NATO, the headquarters of which is based near Brussels.NATO, the headquarters of which is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’s
Defense Minister said that his country’s long-term “ambition” is to join NATO.80
  France. Prior to 2000, Qatar bought most of its major combat systems from . Prior to 2000, Qatar bought most of its major combat systems from
France. In March 2019, France and Qatar signed agreements on defense France. In March 2019, France and Qatar signed agreements on defense
information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and education.information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and education.81
77   Turkey. . Turkey helpedTo help Qatar cope with the Qatar cope with the intra-GCC rift by increasing food
exports to Qatar. Turkey alsoSaudi/UAE-led blockade, Turkey increased food exports to Qatar and added more than 1,500 troops to its Tariq bin Ziyad added more than 1,500 troops to its Tariq bin Ziyad
base in Qatar, which was established in 2014base in Qatar, which was established in 2014, and it opened a . Turkish forces deployed to a second military second military
base in Qatar in September 2019.82 To limit Turkey’s influence in the Gulf, the
Saudi-led boycotting states demanded that Qatar close the Turkish bases.83
base in Qatar in 2019.78   Russia. Since 2016, Qatar has Since 2016, Qatar has broadenedbeen broadening its relationship with Russia, its relationship with Russia, including
including with several visits to Russia by Amir Tamim, apparently in recognition of with several visits to Russia by Amir Tamim, apparently in recognition of
Russia’s heightened role in the region.Russia’s heightened role in the region. One of Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds has
increased its investments in Russia, particularly in the Rosneft energy firm. Qatar
is79 Qatar reportedly reportedly consideringconsidered buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system, buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system,8480 but but
U.S. opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale apparently U.S. opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale apparently has
have contributed to Qatar’s contributed to Qatar’s lack of movement to complete thedecision, to date, not to move forward on that purchase. Section 231 purchase. Section 231
of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L.
115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s 115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s
defense defense or intelligence sector. Qatar supported the U.N. General Assembly resolution denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited 2017. 75 DSCA announcement, November 5, 2012, http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad. 76 “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees Three Ship Types to Be Delivered,” IHS Jane’s Navy International, June 17, 2016. 77 “Qatar, France sign 5 defense, security deals,” Xinhua, March 28, 2019. 78 Stasa Salacanin, “Turkey expands its military base and influence in Qatar,” The New Arab, September 10, 2019. 79 “Qatari emir in Russia to discuss Syrian crisis,” Al Jazeera, March 25 2018. 80 “Qatar still studying Russian defense system, minister says,” Reuters, March 4, 2019. Congressional Research Service 16 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Moscow in mid-March 2022 to attempt to help mediate a cessation of Russia’s war against Ukraine as well as to discuss regional issues such as multilateral talks to revive the JCPOA.81 Qatar has publicly committed to maintaining its supplies of natural gas to Europe during the crisis and has announced humanitarian aid for Ukrainian refugees. Counter-terrorism Cooperation82 According to the State Department, the United States and Qatar have continued to increase counter-terrorism cooperation since the signing of a bilateral counter-terrorism memorandum of understanding in July 2017.or intel igence sector.
Counter-terrorism Cooperation85
According to the State Department, “The United States and Qatar continued to increase CT
[counter-terrorism] cooperation in 2019, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of
State and Qatari Foreign Minister signed a CT MOU [memorandum of understanding] in July

79 “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees T hree Ship T ypes to Be Delivered,” IHS Jane’s Navy
International, June 17, 2016.
80 Benas Gerdziunas, “NAT O dashes membership hopes of Qatar,” Politico, June 6, 2018.
81 “Qatar, France sign 5 defense, security deals,” Xinhua, March 28, 2019.
82 Stasa Salacanin, “T urkey expands its military base and influence in Qatar,” The New Arab, September 10, 2019.
83 “UAE official says T urkish base in Qatar destabilises region,” Reuters, October 10, 2020; “ How Qatar and T urkey
came together,” The Econom ist, January 21, 2021.
84 “Qatar still studying Russian defense system, minister says,” Reuters, March 4, 2019.
85 Much of the information in this section is taken from: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on T errorism 2019: Qatar,” released June 2020 (latest available).
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2017.” The State Department’s recent reports on international terrorism state that U.S. technical The State Department’s recent reports on international terrorism state that U.S. technical
assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies have increasedhas been expanding. A Department of . A Department of
Justice resident legal advisor has been stationed in Qatar since Justice resident legal advisor has been stationed in Qatar since April 2018, providing technical 2018, providing technical
assistance to Qatar’s assistance to Qatar’s CTcounter-terrorism efforts and building prosecutorial efforts and building prosecutorial capacity. Qatar uses national funds to pay for participation of Qatari personnel in thecapacity. In November 2018, Qatar
began using its own funds to pay for a three-year U.S. Department of State Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) training program, including training pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host Assistance (ATA) training program, including training pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host
the FIFA World Cup in 2022.the FIFA World Cup in 2022. There were There have been no terrorist incidents no terrorist incidents reported in Qatar in in Qatar in 2019 or 2020.
At the same timerecent years. In 2019, the Qatari government finalized new counter-terrorism legislation that enhanced penalties for committing acts of terror and enabled the prosecution of Qataris who commit acts of terror. Both laws went into effect in February 2020. However, Qatar’s efforts to prevent the movement of terrorists in or through Qatar , Qatar’s efforts to prevent the movement of terrorists in or through Qatar were
at times said to be lacking. Athave at times been lacking: at least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda
figures residing in or transiting Qatar, including figures residing in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks
mastermind Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.86
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, the suspected mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks.83 Terrorism Financing Issues
U.S. officials credit Qatar with taking steps to prevent terrorism financing and the movement of U.S. officials credit Qatar with taking steps to prevent terrorism financing and the movement of
suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. According to the State Department, the Qatari suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. According to the State Department, the Qatari
government passed a new AML/CFT (anti-money laundering/countering the financing of government passed a new AML/CFT (anti-money laundering/countering the financing of
terrorism) law in 2019terrorism) law in 2019 and sought feedback from the International Monetary Fund and the U.S.
government during the drafting process. Qatar continued to maintain restrictions, imposed in . Qatar continued to maintain restrictions, imposed in
2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring al all such activity to be conducted such activity to be conducted
through one of two approved charities in an effort to better monitor charitable giving for terrorist through one of two approved charities in an effort to better monitor charitable giving for terrorist
financing abuse. financing abuse.
The country is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force The country is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENAFATF), a regional(MENAFATF), a regional body that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and body that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and
terrorism financing. terrorism financing. In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the “Egmont Group” consisting
of 152 country Financial Intel igence Units. Its Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is a member of the Egmont Group - a network of over 150 countries’ FIU’s that share information and best practices on AML/CFT. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist Financing Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist Financing
Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced in May 2017 Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced in May 2017 and Qatar joined the
United States and other TFTC countries inthat has designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and IS
later in 2017the Islamic State. In September 2021, the United States and Qatar conducted a joint operation to . In September 2021, the United States and Qatar conducted a joint operation to
uncover and sanction a Gulf-based financing network used by Lebanese Hezbollah, a designated uncover and sanction a Gulf-based financing network used by Lebanese Hezbollah, a designated
FTOforeign terrorist organization (FTO) that is extensively linked to Iran. that is extensively linked to Iran.87
Countering Violent Extremism
State Department officials maintain that: “Qatar has made significant strides in addressing state-
sourced internal and external support for educational and religious content espousing intolerance,
discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples are stil found in textbooks and
disseminated through satel ite television and other media.” Qatar has hosted workshops and
participated in regional meetings on the issue.
Economic Issues amid COVID-19 and the GCC Rift
Qatar has been wrestling with volatility in world energy prices since mid-2014, and the economic
effects of the intra-GCC rift and the COVID-19 pandemic. About 40% of Qatar’s food was

86 Final Report of the National Commission on T errorist Attacks upon the United States.
87 Department of the Treasury. “ The United States and Qatar T ake Coordinated Action against Hizballah Financiers.”
September 29, 2021.
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link to page 24 link to page 5 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

imported from Saudi Arabia prior to the intra-GCC crisis, and there were reports of runs on stocks
of food when the blockade began in June 2017. However, Qatar’s main sovereign wealth fund,
run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as wel as funds held by the Central Bank, total
about $350 bil ion, according to Qatar’s Central Bank, giving the country a substantial ability to
weather financial demands.88 The government was able to procure similar goods from Turkey,
Iran, and India. After an initial spike of COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, government-
mandated lockdowns, social distancing, and travel restrictions resulted in a relatively low number
of deaths through the end of 2020, and a total of about 600 deaths from the disease to date. Over
75% of the population (including expatriates) have been fully vaccinated to date, using both the
Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.89 Qatar’s 2020 budget, announced in December 2019,
anticipated a surplus of about $1.2 bil ion,90 but the economic effects of COVID-19 are expected
to put the country’s budget into deficit for al of 2021.91 As a public health crisis, observers have
noted that the infection spread most rapidly among Qatar’s expatriate labor population that often
live in crowded conditions.92
Large oil and gas reserves and its smal citizen population have combined to make Qatar the
country with the world’s highest per capita income. Oil and gas stil account for over 90% of
Qatar’s export earnings, and over half of government revenues. Proven oil reserves of about 25
bil ion 84 81 “Foreign Minister meets Russian Foreign Minister,” The Peninsula, March 14, 2022. 82 Much of the information in this section is taken from: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Qatar. Released December 16, 2021. 83 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 84 Department of the Treasury, “The United States and Qatar Take Coordinated Action against Hizballah Financiers,” September 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 24 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Countering Violent Extremism Recent annual State Department reports on international terrorism maintain that: “Qatar has made significant strides in addressing state-sourced internal and external support for educational and religious content espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples are still found in textbooks and disseminated through satellite television and other media.” Qatar has hosted workshops and participated in regional meetings on the issue. Economic Issues Over the past decade, Qatar’s substantial energy exports, a sovereign wealth fund estimated at more than $350 billion, and its small population, have enabled the country to weather such varied economic challenges as energy price volatility, the intra-GCC rift, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 COVID-19 pandemic.85About 40% of Qatar’s food was imported from Saudi Arabia prior to the intra-GCC crisis, and there were reports of runs on stocks of food when the blockade began, but the government was able to replace those imports with goods from Turkey, Iran, and India. Large oil and gas reserves and its small citizen population have combined to make Qatar on of the countries with the world’s highest per capita incomes. Oil and gas still account for over 90% of Qatar’s export earnings, and over half of government revenues. Proven oil reserves of about 25 billion barrels enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels barrels enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels
per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas are about 13% of the world’s total per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas are about 13% of the world’s total
and it is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world. and it is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world. 9386 In 2018, Qatar withdrew from In 2018, Qatar withdrew from
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in orderOPEC in order, it stated, to focus on its more to focus on its more
high-priority natural gas exports. high-priority natural gas exports. Some experts assessed that the intra-GCC rift represented an additional cause of Qatar’s decision to leave that grouping.87 Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas
Project established by the Project established by the UAE UAE in 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project in 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project
involves production and processing of natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which involves production and processing of natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which is
connected to Iran’s South Pars Field (see the country shares with Iran (see Figure 2)), and transportation , and transportation of the processed gas by
by subsea pipeline to the UAEsubsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.and Oman.94 Qatar Petroleum announced in early 2021 that it wil
boost LNG output by about 40% by 2026 through expansion projects at its North Field.95 Qatar
did not reduced its gas supplies to the other GCC states as retaliation for the blockade. Some
economic data is presented in Figure 1.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade
agreements (FTAs) with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an
FTA. However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to

88 “Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says,” Istanbul Sabah
Online, July 10, 2017; Arwa Ibrahim, “ Beating the blockade: How Qatar prevailed over a siege,” Al Jazeera, June 5,
2020.
89 World Health Organization, “Qatar,” Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, accessed April 2, 2021; State of
Qatar, Ministry of Public Health, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” 2021.
90 “Qatar Announces 2020 Budget, its Biggest in Five Years,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2019.
91 David Barbuscia, “ Qatar expects $9.5 billion deficit next year on lower revenues,” Reuters, December 11, 2020.
92 “Coronavirus spreads “exponentially” in Qatar’s labor camps,” CBS News, March 15, 2020.
93 CIA, The World Factbook.
94 Dolphin Energy website, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us.
95 Jessica Jaganathan, “Analysis: Qatar tightens global gas market grip with bold expansion moves,” Reuters, March
16, 2021.
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undertake large investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington,
DC. Also, several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornel University, Carnegie
Mel on University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have
established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha. The
joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” QIA’s 88 Qatar did not reduce gas deliveries to other GCC states during the intra-GCC rift. Qatar’s gas resources have made the country a focus of European efforts to reduce their dependence on natural gas supplies from Russia. Whether Qatar might potentially supply additional gas to Europe was a focus of Amir Tamim’s meeting with President Biden on January 31, as Russia was positioning forces around Ukraine.89Qatar Petroleum announced in early 2021 that it will boost LNG output by about 40% by 2026 through expansion projects at its North Field.90 However, gas supplies from Qatar and other gas exporters are largely committed to buyers in Asia and elsewhere under long term contracts, and Qatari energy officials stressed that no combination of major gas exporters could supply enough natural gas to Europe, on short notice, to compensate completely for a shutoff of gas supplies from Russia. In March 2022, in the 85 “Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says,” Istanbul Sabah Online, July 10, 2017; Arwa Ibrahim, “Beating the blockade: How Qatar prevailed over a siege,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2020. 86 CIA, The World Factbook. 87 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen. “Why Is Qatar Leaving OPEC?,” New York Times, op-ed, December 10, 2018. 88 Dolphin Energy website, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us. 89 “Biden Hosts Qatari Leader to Talk Gas Supplies, Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy, January 31, 2022. 90 Jessica Jaganathan, “Analysis: Qatar tightens global gas market grip with bold expansion moves,” Reuters, March 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 18 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy context of a European Union effort to wean off Russian gas supplies by 2027, Germany and Qatar reached agreement to discuss a long term contract for the supply of Qatari natural gas to Germany.91 U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an FTA. In 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which Qatar has used to undertake large investments in the United States. The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” the Qatar Investment Authority’s commitment of $45 billion commitment of $45
bil ion in future investments in U.S. companies and real estate. in future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Foreign Trade Statistics” compilation, in 2020, U.S.
exports to Qatar were about $3.4 bil ion, and U.S. imports from Qatar were about $1.2 bil ion.
Several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S.
imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or
natural gas have declined to negligiblenatural gas have declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in
U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S. U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S.
LNG export market.LNG export market.96
92 Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft, although the
status of additional planned purchases of U.S. aircraft is unclear in light of the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic on air travel.97 Some U.S. airlines have chal enged. Coincident with Amir Tamim’s visit to Washington, DC in January 2022, Qatar Airways announced that it would purchase up to 50 cargo aircraft and 50 737 Max passenger aircraft from Boeing.93 Some U.S. airlines have challenged Qatar Airways’ benefits Qatar Airways’ benefits
under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges
under that agreement should be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by under that agreement should be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by
Qatar’s government, giving it an unfair competitive advantage.Qatar’s government, giving it an unfair competitive advantage.9894 The United States and Qatar The United States and Qatar
reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar
Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick
up passengers in Europe for flights to the United up passengers in Europe for flights to the United States.States. Some assert that Qatar Airway’s 2018
purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations.
U.S. Assistance
In large part because of its wealth, Qatar receives In large part because of its wealth, Qatar receives virtual y nonegligible amounts of U.S. assistance. At times, U.S. assistance. At times, smal
small amounts of U.S. aid have been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling amounts of U.S. aid have been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling
of arms and narcotics, and the movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or of arms and narcotics, and the movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or
around its waterways. In around its waterways. In FY2016FY2020, the United States , the United States spentprovided Qatar about $ about $100,000 on programs in Qatar,
about two-thirds of which was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States
provided a total of $78,000 in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatar’s
counter-narcotics capabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs.
Virtual y no U.S. aid of any kind was provided for Qatar programs in FY2019, the last fiscal year
for which precise data is available.

96 Adam Schreck, “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price,” Associated Press, May 24, 2016.
97 T he White House announced after the July 9 T rump-T amim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five Boeing
777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and services to power its 787 and 777
aircraft. White House, “U.S.-Qatar Joint Statement,” July 9, 2019.
98 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and 106,000 (Defense Department funding) to help build institutional capacity in its security sector. 95 91 “Germany agrees gas deal with Qatar to help end dependency on Russia,” The Guardian, March 20 2022. 92 Adam Schreck, “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price,” Associated Press, May 24, 2016. 93 “Boeing lands huge airplane order from Qatar Airways.” Associated Press, January 31, 2022. 94 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016. 95 USAID Explorer Database, March 2022. Congressional Research Service 19 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS. U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.



Author Information

Kenneth Katzman Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa
Section.Section.
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