Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Changes from September 30, 2021 to July 13, 2022

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations
~~September 30, 2021~~July 13, 2022
Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its
geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which ~~is one of~~opened in
Jeremy M. Sharp
1869 and is one of the world’s most the world’s most ~~well-known~~critical maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and ~~Red Seas.~~
~~Specialist in Middle~~
Specialist in Middle Red Seas. As of early 2022, an estimated 10% of global trade, including 7% of the world’s oil, Eastern Affairs flows through the Suez Canal. Egypt’s population of more than Egypt’s population of more than ~~100~~103 million people makes it by far the most populous Arabic- million people makes it by far the most populous Arabic-
~~Eastern Affairs~~
speaking country. Although today it may speaking country. Although today it may ~~not play the same type of leading~~play a smaller political or military political or military

role in the Arab world role in the Arab world asthan it has in the past, Egypt may retain some “soft power” by virtue of its it has in the past, Egypt may retain some “soft power” by virtue of its
history, media, and culture. Cairo hosts both the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar history, media, and culture. Cairo hosts both the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar

University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has
symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship.
Additionally, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the Additionally, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the
promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain ~~cold~~limited, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have , the Israeli and Egyptian governments have
increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.
Since taking office, President Since taking office, President Joseph Biden has balanced Biden has balanced ~~some~~various considerations in his approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations, praising considerations in his approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations, praising
Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for Egyptian President President Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s continued domestic crackdown. In the Sisi’s continued domestic crackdown. In the ~~year after~~nearly two years since the the
United States started facilitating the historic Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which United States started facilitating the historic Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which ~~ha s~~
has maintained its peace treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic maintained its peace treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic ~~outrea ch~~
~~to Israel~~outreach to Israel. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war have negatively affected Egypt’s food security, economy, and national budget. As a result, Gulf Arab States, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have pledged over $22 billion in various forms of support to Egypt in some cases in return for stakes in Egyptian public entities and assets. .
Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $ Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $8485 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in ~~hist orical~~historical
dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after 1979. Annual dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after 1979. Annual
appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. Successive U.S. Administrations appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. Successive U.S. Administrations
have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on longhave justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long -running cooperation with the -running cooperation with the
Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the
procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors.
For For ~~FY2022,~~ FY2023, the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress
appropriated the previous year. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriated the previous year. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
account.account. ~~All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense~~
~~contractors.~~
~~As of September 20, 2021, the World Health Organization reports that since January 3, 2020, there have been 295,745~~
~~confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 16,938 deaths in Egypt. As of September 14, 2021, a total of 12,194,537 vaccine doses~~
~~have been administered. As of September 15, the COVAX facility has delivered 2.9 million doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca~~
~~vaccine to Egypt.~~
~~Beyond the United States, President Sisi has improved or expanded Egypt’s ties with several key partners, including the Arab~~
~~Gulf states, Israel, Russia, China, France, and Italy.~~
~~In April 2019, Egyptian voters approved constitutional amendments that extend Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him~~
~~to run for a third term, potentially keeping him in office until 2030.~~

H.R. 8282, the House FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPs), bill would provide $1.3 billion in FMF and not less than $125 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Egypt. The bill would withhold $300 million in FMF from obligation unless the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is meeting specific democracy-related conditions. Of the $300 million withheld, the bill would allow the Administration to waive the withholding requirement on up to $170 million in FMF. Unlike in previous years, the House-introduced SFOPs bill would not permit the Administration to exempt FMF from withholding for “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs.” That exemption had dated back to P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (passed January 2014) and had been inserted in annual SFOPs legislation since then to allow for greater flexibility in providing FMF to Egypt. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
As of As of ~~fal 2021, Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country of more than 100 mil ion~~
~~people,1 is attempting to modernize and reassert itself on the regional stage. Led by President~~
~~Abdel Fattah al Sisi (hereinafter referred to as President Sisi), a former military officer who took~~
~~power in a 2013 coup, Egypt is undergoing significant infrastructure development, exemplified~~
~~by the construction of a new capital city. Military modernization also is ongoing, as Egypt has~~
~~become the world’s third-largest importer of weapons, acquiring fighter planes and warships from~~
~~Russian and European suppliers. Diplomatical y, President Sisi has mediated a crisis in Gaza and~~
~~expanded ties to Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq. Egypt’s renewed regional assertiveness and domestic~~
~~activity follows a period of political unrest that had paralyzed the country in the previous decade.~~
~~Egypt’s renewed confidence, however, may mask systemic underlying chal enges that could limit~~
~~the extent of its regional influence. Economical y, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has~~
~~grown, even throughout the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, poverty is~~
~~pervasive—with the national rate at 29.7% (as of December 2020). Egypt’s national debt~~
~~constitutes 92% of GDP (as of September 2021), and servicing it takes up nearly 36% of the~~
~~national budget,2 limiting the state’s ability to invest in its citizenry’s wel -being.~~
~~As of September 20, 2021, the World Health Organization reports that since January 3, 2020,~~
~~there have been 295,745 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 16,938 deaths in Egypt.3 As of~~
~~September 14, 2021, a total of 12,194,537 vaccine doses have been administered. As of~~
~~September 15, the COVAX facility has delivered 2.9 mil ion doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca~~
~~vaccine to Egypt.4 In late September 2021, the United States provided Egypt with 1.6 mil ion~~
~~doses of the Pfizer vaccine.~~
~~President Sisi has used emergency powers and broad legal authority granted to the executive by~~
~~parliament to suppress opposition and perceived criticism, both before and during the pandemic.~~
~~Authorities have used media laws to arrest journalists who questioned government caseload~~
~~statistics on charges of spreading “false news.”5 The Egyptian parliament also has amended and~~
~~extended the nationwide state of emergency, which has been in place since April 2017, most~~
~~recently in July 2021.~~
~~Since taking office, President Biden has attempted to take a balanced approach to U.S.-Egyptian~~
~~relations, praising Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for President Sisi’s~~
~~continued domestic crackdown. In the year after the United States started facilitating the historic~~
~~Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which has maintained its peace~~

~~1 Beyond the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Egypt has long struggled with scarce domestic~~
~~resources due to population pressures. Egypt’s population surpassed 100 million in 2020 and is predicted to rise as high~~
~~as 160 million by 2050 (United Nations–World Population Prospects–2019). Population size, particularly in the Cairo~~
~~metropolis, has contributed to overcrowded classrooms, unemployment, and crippling traffic. See “ As Egypt’s~~
~~Population Hits 100 Million, Celebration is Muted,” Fanack.com , December 19, 2019. T he Egyptian government has~~
~~launched family planning initiatives, which is a challenge in more rural areas. See “ ‘T wo is Enough,’ Egypt T ells Poor~~
~~Families as Population Booms,” Reuters, February 20, 2019.~~
~~2 Mirette Magdy and T arek El-T ablawy, “Egypt Keeps Interest Rate on Hold with an Eye on Fed T apering,”~~
Bloom berg, September 16, 2021.
~~3 See the World Health Organization’s Egypt Dashboard at https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/eg.~~
~~4 “FACT BOX-Vaccines Delivered under COVAX Sharing Scheme for Poorer Countries,” Reuters, September 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~5 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Prisons are Now Journalists’ Newsrooms,” Public Statement, May 3, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic~~
~~outreach to Israel.6~~
~~Figure 1. Map of Egypt~~

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
~~Historical Background~~
~~Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement,~~
summer 2022, Egypt, like many World Bank-classified lower middle income countries,1 is feeling financial strain as a result of a confluence of crises. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rising interest rates in the United States and Europe, and continued global supply chain strains resulting from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have all contributed to budgetary and inflationary pressures, forcing the Egyptian government to reevaluate longstanding policies while turning to foreign creditors for additional support. Figure 1. Map of Egypt Source: CRS Graphics, CIA World Factbook As Egypt experiences these external shocks, it is attempting to modernize its economy and reassert itself diplomatically on the regional stage. Led by President Abdel Fattah al Sisi (hereinafter referred to as President Sisi), a former military officer who took power in a 2013 takeover that many observers termed a coup,2 Egypt has embarked on a number of rebuilding projects, exemplified by the construction of the $58 billion New Administrative Capital (NAC – See Figure 1). In November 2022, Egypt will host the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm el Sheikh. Military modernization also is ongoing, as Egypt has become the world’s third-largest importer of weapons, acquiring fighter planes and warships from Russian and European suppliers. 1 For World Bank country classifications by income, see Nada Hamadeh Catherine Van Rompaey and Eric Metreau, “New World Bank Country Classifications by Income Level: 2021-2022,” July 1, 2021. 2 Amid mass protests in 2013, the military deposed an elected president, suspended the constitution, and installed an interim president. The U.S. State Department did not issue a determination as to whether or not a coup occurred. Congressional Research Service 1 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Egyptian Population Growth Egypt’s population surpassed 103 mil ion in 2022 and is predicted to rise as high as 160 mil ion by 2050 (United Nations–World Population Prospects–2019). Population size, particularly in the Cairo metropolis, has contributed to overcrowded classrooms, unemployment, and crippling traffic.3 A 2022 study commissioned by the Egyptian Senate warned that “runaway growth of population poses a serious threat to the country’s future, economic development, and national security.”4 Egypt’s renewed confidence, however, may mask systemic underlying challenges that could limit the extent of its regional influence. Economically, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown, even throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, poverty is pervasive—with the national rate at 29.7% (as of December 2020). Egypt’s national debt constitutes 94% of GDP, and servicing it takes up over a third of the national budget, limiting the state’s ability to invest in its citizenry’s well-being. President Sisi has used broad legal authority granted to the executive by parliament to suppress opposition and perceived criticism. As discussed below, international human rights monitoring organizations rank Egypt toward the bottom globally on metrics such as democratic governance, free speech, and corruption. Since taking office, President Joseph Biden has attempted to take a balanced approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations, praising Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for President Sisi’s continued domestic crackdown. In November 2021, the United States and Egypt conducted their first “Strategic Dialogue” since 2015. The year 2022 marks the centennial of the establishment of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations, and both sides have been using the anniversary to reinvigorate bilateral ties.5 Historical Background Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, ousted the British-backed king, Egypt’s military has produced four presidents: Gamal Abdel ousted the British-backed king, Egypt’s military has produced four presidents: Gamal Abdel
Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah al Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah al
Sisi (2013-present). These four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country’s Sisi (2013-present). These four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country’s
security establishment almost security establishment almost ~~continual y~~continually. The one exception has been the brief period of rule by . The one exception has been the brief period of rule by
Muhammad Morsi, who was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see below). That Muhammad Morsi, who was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see below). That
organization has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by organization has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by
a vaguely articulated combination of civil and a vaguely articulated combination of civil and ~~Shariah~~sharia (Islamic) law. (Islamic) law. ~~For the most part~~In general, the , the
Muslim Brotherhood has been the Muslim Brotherhood has been the ~~only~~most significant and abiding opposition during the decades of significant and abiding opposition during the decades of
military-backed rule. military-backed rule.
The one departure from Egypt’s decades of military rule, the brief period in which Morsi ruled, The one departure from Egypt’s decades of military rule, the brief period in which Morsi ruled,
took place between 2011 and 2013took place between 2011 and 2013~~, after popular~~. Popular demonstrations dubbed the “Arab Spring,” ~~demonstrations dubbed the “Arab Spring,”~~

~~6 U.S. State Department, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, At the One Year Anniversary of the Abraham Accords:~~
~~Normalization Agreements in Action, September 17, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

which had started in neighboring Tunisia, which had started in neighboring Tunisia, ~~compel ed~~compelled the military to force the resignation of the military to force the resignation of
former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced
tremendous political tumult, culminating in Morsi’s one-year presidency. When Morsi took office tremendous political tumult, culminating in Morsi’s one-year presidency. When Morsi took office
on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt’s first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt’s first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension
to the presidency was expected to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period.to the presidency was expected to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period.76 Proposed Proposed
~~timelines for~~ timelines for 3 For more information, see “Egypt’s President Sisi Wants to Reshape its Cities,” The Economist, March 5, 2022. 4 Gamal Essam El Din, “Egypt's Strategy to Curb Runaway Population Growth,’ Al Ahram, April 15, 2022. 5 “Shoukry, Blinken Commemorate Centennial of Egypt-US Diplomatic Ties,” Al Ahram, April 13, 2022. 6 David Kirkpatrick, “Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History,” New York Times, June 24, 2012. Congressional Research Service 2 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military’s relinquishing of elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military’s relinquishing of
power to a civilian government had been power to a civilian government had been ~~constantly~~repeatedly changed, contested, and sometimes even changed, contested, and sometimes even
overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi’s rule exposed overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi’s rule exposed
the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt’s public and private the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt’s public and private
sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters. sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters.
The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated
Morsi’s presidency provided Egypt’s military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an Morsi’s presidency provided Egypt’s military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an
opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass public opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass public
demonstrations against Morsi’s rule, the military demonstrations against Morsi’s rule, the military ~~unilateral y~~ unilaterally dissolved Morsi’s government, dissolved Morsi’s government,
suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and ~~instal ed Sisi as~~installed an interim interim
president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military’s actions a coup president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military’s actions a coup
d’etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt’s military and national police launched a d’etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt’s military and national police launched a
violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing
live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the ~~kil ing~~ killing of at of at
least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the
encampments as a threat to national security.encampments as a threat to national security.87 Since 2013, the power of President Abdel Fattah al Sisi has gone mostly unchallenged. President Sisi assumed office formally in June 2014 after winning a May 2014 election with 96% of the vote. In 2018, he was reelected for a second term, receiving 97% of all valid votes cast. Both elections were widely perceived as favoring Sisi. 8 Possible Issues for Congress The 2022 Russian-Ukraine War: Implications for Egypt Egypt’s position vis-a-vis Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is one of neutrality; while Egypt voted in favor of the March 2022 United Nations General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia end its invasion of Ukraine, in its bilateral diplomacy, Egypt has not sanctioned Russia, and President Sisi continues to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In June 2022, President Sisi personally attended the plenary session of the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. To the extent that Egypt has taken any definitive position on the conflict, beyond the initial U.N. resolution, it has done so through the medium of the Arab League. An Arab League statement released on February 28, 2022 called for dialogue to preserve security and end the fighting and did not condemn Russia’s invasion.9 The Arab League subsequently offered 7 “Egyptian Cabinet Vows to Disperse Pro-Morsi Protest Camps,” The Guardian (UK), July 31, 2013. 8 In 2014, Democracy International conducted an observation mission and concluded: “Unfortunately, although Egypt’s constitution guarantees freedom of speech and association, continued suppression of political dissent and restrictions on fundamental freedoms have prevented free political participation and severely compromised the broader electoral environment. This environment made a genuinely democratic presidential election impossible.” See, Democracy International, Egypt Presidential Election Observation Report, July 2014. In 2018, a consortium of international human rights groups said Egyptian authorities had “trampled over even the minimum requirements for free and fair elections,” and labeled the exercise “farcical.” See, Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Planned Presidential Vote Neither Free nor Fair,” February 13, 2018. 9 Mohammed Abu Zaid, “Arab League Following Ukraine Developments with 'Great Concern,'” Arab News, February 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 32 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations to mediate between Ukraine and Russia and sent a delegation to Moscow and Poland for consultations in April 2022. From Egypt’s perspective, its diplomatic ambiguity may reflect a reluctance to alienate the United States, Western Europe, and Russia - Egypt’s primary sources for arms, trade, tourism, and credit.10 In some ways, Egypt’s diplomatic stance mirrors its stance throughout the Cold War, when it was a leading advocate of the Non-Aligned Movement.11 Nevertheless, despite Egypt’s diplomatic position, Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war have negatively affected Egypt’s food security, economy, and national budget (see below). Egyptian-Russian Relations under Sisi Since President Sisi came to power in 2014, he has strengthened Egypt’s relationship with Russia. President Sisi turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when the U.S.-Egyptian relationship became more strained (see the Appendix).12 Egypt and Russia have strengthened their ties in a number of ways, including through arms deals and joint military exercises. To bolster Russia’s support for political forces in eastern Libya, Egypt and Russia reportedly have a basing agreement allowing reciprocal access to airfields and airspace.13 Additionally, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In 2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba’a, 80 miles northwest of Cairo. Various reasons could explain why Egyptian-Russian relations have improved under President Sisi, none of which are mutually exclusive. For one, President Sisi appears to have determined that Egypt’s national security interests are best served by having global powers compete for Egypt’s favor. As a lower-middle-income country with relatively high poverty and a military that relies on the appearance of strength for deterrence, Egypt seeks cost efficiencies for its military acquisitions. Part of Egypt’s rebalancing of its foreign policy may be seen as a quest to secure the most advanced military hardware on the most generous financing terms available. With U.S. FMF grants relatively unchanged since 1987 (Congress has appropriated $1.3 bil ion a year since then), the purchasing power of U.S. military aid has decreased substantially given the rising costs of major defense systems. Moreover, U.S. defense technology, particularly in fighter aircraft, has evolved to the point where Egypt either cannot afford the latest generation of U.S. fighters (such as the F-35), lacks the technical know-how to maintain them, or may be prohibited from purchasing certain items if they negate Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).14 Egypt has turned to Russia and France to source naval and air force acquisitions (including fourth-generation fighters, such as the Su-35 from Russia and the Rafale from France) while using U.S. assistance to maintain its existing stocks of U.S. materiel. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2000 to 2009, Egypt’s major arms supplier was the United States, accounting for 75% of Egypt’s total arms imports; however, from 2010 to 2019, U.S. arms imports accounted for 23% of Egypt’s total arms imports.15 Food Security Declines in food commodity exports as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are reducing supplies of some goods in international markets and leading to increases in prices for commodities and derived products. This trend poses challenge to importers of Ukrainian and 10 Vivian Yee, “Egypt, America’s Middle Eastern Ally, Maintains Warm Relations with Putin,” New York Times, June 17, 2022. 11 Ignatious Annor, “African States May Be Pushing to Revive Non-Aligned Movement, Analysts Say,” Voice of America, April 13, 2022. 12 “Analysis: Egyptian Air Force Modernization,” Jane’s International Defence Review, November 10, 2016. 13 Adam R. Grissom, Samuel Charap, Joe Cheravitch, Russell Hanson, Dara Massicot, Christopher A. Mouton, and Jordan R. Reimer, Russia’s Growing Presence in Africa, RAND Corporation, 2022. 14 See CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. 15 Alexandra Kuimova, “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Background Paper, October 2020. Congressional Research Service 4 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Russian commodities and foodstuffs as well as to those who purchase such goods sourced from other suppliers on the international market. In Egypt, the world’s largest importer of wheat (more than 70% of which comes from Russia and Ukraine – see Figure 2), the government banned wheat and flour exports; meanwhile, Egypt’s General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) has approved 16 countries-of-origin for its wheat imports and is negotiating with India, Argentina, Australia, Kazakhstan, and France for new purchase agreements on the spot market. GASC also is accepting wheat with a higher moisture content in order to adapt to tightened market conditions.16 Though alternative suppliers are available, shipping costs are much higher than for wheat sourced from the Black Sea region.17 As of May 2022, Russia’s continued blockade of Ukrainian ports had left 300,000 metric tonnes (mts) of wheat purchased by GASC before the invasion undelivered (Egypt imported 4.7 million mts of wheat in 2021).18 Figure 2. Egypt’s Wheat Imports: 2017-2021 Source: Trade Data Monitor LLC and U.S. Agriculture Department, Foreign Agricultural Service For decades, Egypt has subsidized whole wheat flour bread (aish baladi in Egyptian Arabic), at a cost of an estimated several billion dollars annually.19 The price of subsidized bread essentially has remained unchanged since the late 1970s (about one U.S. cent). When Egypt tried to lift the subsidy in 1977, riots ensued and hundreds of people were killed in clashes with police. Cuts to the bread subsidy could generate social unrest and pose a challenge to President Sisi. The government already has instituted price controls on the cost of unsubsidized bread. On June 1, GASC announced one of its first international tenders since the start of the Ukraine invasion. Egypt plans to purchase 465,000 mts of wheat from Russia, Romania, and Bulgaria at a cost of $480 per tonne, a 41% hike from Egypt’s last tender before the invasion.20 Several weeks later, GASC made its largest wheat purchase on the spot market since 2012, buying 815,000 mts 16 “Egypt Raises Accepted Moisture Level for Imported Wheat,” Reuters, May 26, 2022. 17 One report notes how GASC contracted with a Japanese trading company based in the state of Washington for 60,000 metric of tons of wheat, which had to be shipped from Vancouver to ports in Egypt. Jesse Newman and Patrick Thomas, “Countries Race to Avert Grain Crisis --- With Ukraine War Disrupting Wheat Trade, Soaring Prices put Poor Nations at Risk,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2022. 18 “About 300,000 T of Wheat Bought by Egypt Stranded in Ukraine –Trade,” Reuters, May 17, 2022. 19 “Egypt’s Modest Fuel Price Rise Suggests heavy Subsidy,” EIU, Views Wire, April 26, 2022. 20 “Egypt's GASC Buys 465,000 tonnes of Wheat in Tender,” Reuters, June 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations of Russian, French, Romanian, and Bulgarian wheat.21 In June 2022, the World Bank gave $500 million in support to help the Egyptian government purchase additional stocks of wheat from abroad and increase its domestic grain storage capacity.22 In June 2022, ambassadors representing G7 nations pledged to stand by their “commitment to support Egypt through this crisis caused by Russia’s war.”23 Debt, Inflation, and Gulf Aid While Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has been a major catalyst for the downturn in Egypt’s economy, it is not the only factor driving widespread fiscal concern. Prior to the war, Egypt had accrued significant foreign debt; deficit spending has supported subsidy programs, mega infrastructure projects, and social welfare programs to counter the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Egypt’s Central Bank, from 2014 to 2021, medium-and long-term external debt more than tripled to $121.5 billion.24 Nevertheless, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Egypt had been considered a leading destination for emerging market capital due to its high yields on foreign currency-denominated and local bonds.25 However, Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine apparently changed the risk calculation for many investors. The Egyptian government estimates that $20 billion in foreign capital fled the Egyptian bond market in early 2022, as investors moved money out of emerging markets and into U.S. Treasury bonds. According to Egypt’s finance minister, “The lesson we have learned (is that) you cannot depend on this type of investment. It is coming just to get high yields, and once there is a shock it leaves the country.”26 In order to reassure investors and keep exports competitive, the Central Bank devalued the Egyptian pound by 15% in March 2022. The devaluation, coupled with rising global food and fuel prices, has led to increased local inflation (13.5% in May 2022). To counter inflation, the Central Bank has raised interest rates several times. As global monetary conditions tighten and interest rates rise in advanced markets like the United States, Egypt’s borrowing costs are set to increase. The national deficit for the coming fiscal year alone is anticipated to be $30 billion.27 Moody’s may downgrade Egypt’s credit rating, noting in late May 2022 that its outlook changed from stable to negative due to “the rising downside risks to the sovereign’s external shock absorption capacity in light of a significant narrowing in the foreign exchange reserve buffer to meet upcoming external debt service payments.”28 From January to May 2022, Egypt paid $24 billion to service its foreign debt ($10 billion) and cover the withdrawal of funds by foreign investors ($14 billion).29 21 “Egypt Buys 815,000 Tons of Wheat in Tender from France, Romania, Russia and Bulgaria,” Al Ahram, June 30, 2022. 22 “World Bank to give Egypt $500 Mln to Boost food Security,” Reuters, June 29, 2022. 23 U.S. Embassy Cairo, G7 Ambassadors on Food Security: G7 Stand to Support Egypt in Grain Crisis Caused by Russia, June 14, 2022. 24 “Egypt Faces Sharp Rise in Costs to Finance Proposed $30 bln Deficit,” Reuters, May 16, 2022. 25 Mirette Magdy, “Egypt Keeps the World’s Highest Real Interest Rate,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2021. 26 “Egypt Can No Longer Depend on Hot Money for Budget: Finance Minister,” Reuters, June 27, 2022. 27 Ibid. 28 Sylvia Westall, “Egypt Risks First Downgrade Since 2013 as Moody’s Turns Negative,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2022. 29 “Egypt Repays $24 Billion to Cover Foreign Debt, Departing Investors,” Reuters, June 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 Egypt: Background
~~Issues for Congress~~
~~Egyptian Cooperation with Israel~~
~~Following 30 years of intermittent war and enduring confrontation, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty~~
~~with Israel remains one of the single most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion~~
~~of Arab-Israeli peace. Congress has long been concerned with the preservation of the peace treaty~~
~~and has appropriated foreign assistance and exercised oversight to help both parties maintain it.~~
~~Since 2012, congressional appropriators have included a requirement in foreign operations~~
~~appropriations legislation that before foreign aid funds can be provided to Egypt, the Secretary of~~
~~State must certify that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.9~~
~~While people-to-people relations remain limited, Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific~~
~~areas in which they can cooperate, such as containing the Palestinian group Hamas (a U.S.-~~
~~designated terrorist organization) in the Gaza Strip, countering terrorism, and developing natural~~
~~gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see sections below).~~

~~7 David Kirkpatrick, “ Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History,” New York Times, June 24, 2012.~~
~~8 “Egyptian Cabinet Vows to Disperse Pro-Morsi Protest Camps,” The Guardian (UK), July 31, 2013.~~
~~9 See Section 7041(a)(1) of P.L. 116-260, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. In addition to sustaining the~~
~~treaty, the certification also requires Egypt to sustain its “ strategic relationship with the United States.”~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Since 2020, when Israel reached various~~
~~agreements to normalize or improve relations~~
~~Figure 2. Bennett-Sisi Meeting~~
~~with the United Arab Emirates (UAE),~~
~~September 2021 in Egypt~~
~~Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco (known as the~~
~~“Abraham Accords”), there has been a~~
~~noticeable increase in Israeli-Egyptian~~
~~bilateral contacts. In February 2021, Egyptian~~
~~Minister of Energy Tarek al Molla visited~~
~~Israel to discuss cooperation on natural gas~~
~~projects. Before this visit, no Egyptian~~
~~cabinet officials other than foreign ministers~~
~~or intel igence chiefs had visited Israel in the~~
~~past 15 years. In May 2021, Israel’s then-~~
~~Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi visited~~
~~Cairo for meetings with Foreign Minister~~
~~Sameh Shoukry, marking the first time in 13~~

~~years that an Israeli foreign minister had~~
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
~~official y visited Egypt. In August 2021,~~
~~Abbas Kamel, the chief of Egypt’s General Intel igence Directorate, visited Israel to discuss the~~
~~security situation in Gaza, where Egypt helped negotiate an end to Israel-Hamas hostilities earlier~~
~~in the year (see below).~~
~~Bilateral engagement increased in September 2021, when Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet~~
~~traveled to the resort town of Sharm al Sheikh in southern Sinai for a meeting with President Sisi.~~
~~Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last made an official visit to Egypt in 2011~~
~~(and an unofficial visit in 2018). Shortly after the Bennett-Sisi summit, EgyptAir, the national~~
~~airline of Egypt, announced that it would offer direct flights between Cairo and Tel Aviv starting~~
~~in October 2021. Previously, air travel between Egypt and Israel had been discreet, limited to~~
~~unmarked planes run by a subsidiary of EgyptAir.~~
~~Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians~~
~~Egypt’s triangular relationship with Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is complex. On the one~~
~~hand, Israel and Egypt cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as they have since Sisi’s rise to~~
~~power in 2013. In general, the Egyptian government is opposed to Islamist groups wielding~~
~~political power across the Middle East, and opposes Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas.10 On~~
~~the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza11 and has~~
~~accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai. On the other hand, in~~
~~an acknowledgement of Hamas’ entrenched rule in Gaza since 2007, Egypt couples its policy of~~
~~containment with ongoing dialogue. Maintaining a relationship with Hamas has provided the~~
~~Egyptian security and intel igence services an opportunity to mediate between Hamas and Israel~~

~~10 “How Israel and Egypt are Coordinating on Gaza,” Al Monitor, July 12, 2018.~~
~~11 T he Egyptian military has taken a number of steps to stop smuggling tunnel construction beneath the Egyptian -Gaza~~
~~border. T o date, it has destroyed numerous tunnels and created a “buffer zone” along the Gaza border by demolishing~~
~~parts of Rafah city and flooding trenches in the area with seawater from the Mediterranean. T he military also has~~
~~erected concrete walls and barbed wire fencing along the buffer zone to protect against attacks from the Islamic State -~~
~~Sinai Province. According to Human Rights Watch, which has criticized the military’s actions, since 2013, a little less~~
~~than one-quarter of all northern Sinai residents have been displaced or otherwise left the region as a result of the home~~
~~demolitions and intensifying military hostilities. See, Human Rights Watch, “ Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely~~
~~War Crimes,” March 17, 2021.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~and between Hamas and its rival Palestinian faction Fatah (led by Palestinian Authority President~~
~~Mahmoud Abbas). Egypt, at times, has attempted to broker a long-term Israel-Hamas truce.12 In a~~
~~September 2021 speech, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid set forth Israeli conditions for a~~
~~possible truce with Hamas, and said, “It’s worth emphasizing the critical importance of Egypt in~~
~~this whole process. It won't happen without the support and involvement of our Egyptian partners~~
~~and without their ability to talk to everyone involved.”13~~
~~Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, making Rafah the only non-Israeli-controlled~~
~~passenger entryway into the Strip, which Egypt periodical y closes for security reasons. Control~~
~~over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian~~
~~authorities appear to use it carefully to avoid sparking a humanitarian crisis on their border.14~~
~~Egypt also controls the Salah al Din Gate, a previously used crossing north of Rafah that opened~~
~~for commercial use in 2018. According to one report, both Hamas and Egypt tax imported goods~~
~~moving into Gaza through the gate, earning Hamas tens of mil ions of dollars per year in~~
~~revenue.15~~
~~The May 2021 Israel-Hamas Conflict and Egyptian Mediation~~
~~In May 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas in which Palestinian militants fired~~
~~rockets at Israeli populated areas, while Israeli forces targeted Hamas and other militants in the~~
~~densely populated urban areas of Gaza. After 11 days of fighting that resulted in over 250~~
~~Palestinians kil ed and 12 deaths inside Israel, Egypt helped mediate a cease-fire. President Sisi~~
~~also provided Gaza with humanitarian aid and pledged $500 mil ion for reconstruction (Qatar~~
~~also pledged $500 mil ion). On May 20, President Biden extended “my sincere gratitude to~~
~~President Al Sisi and the senior Egyptian officials who played a critical role in this diplomacy. ”16~~
~~Days later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Cairo for a meeting with President Sisi in~~
~~which he conveyed “President Biden’s appreciation to President Sisi for Egypt’s critical~~
~~mediation efforts in support of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and other groups in Gaza~~
~~and for Egypt’s help in evacuating American citizens to safety.”17 Since then, Egypt has kept open~~
~~(with some exceptions) its Rafah border crossing to al ow for wounded Gazans to be evacuated~~
~~and the import of reconstruction materials. According to one account, “Al of this is helpful for~~
~~Palestinians—but it is more helpful stil for Mr. Sisi’s reputation.”18~~
~~As of September 2021, Egypt has continued to serve as a mediator between Israel and Hamas as~~
~~both sides negotiate over the infusion of additional reconstruction aid for Gaza and the return of~~
~~Israeli civilians held in Gaza.19 As in the aftermath of the three previous major Israel-Hamas~~
~~conflicts (in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014), Egypt, Israel, and other international actors face~~
~~chal enges in balancing Gaza’s humanitarian and economic needs with concerns that Hamas~~
~~could divert money and supplies brought into Gaza for military purposes.~~

~~12 “Egypt T rying to Broker Broad Israel-Hamas T ruce, Hamas Says,” Associated Press, August 2, 2018.~~
~~13 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FM Lapid addresses World Summit on Counter T errorism, September 12, 2021.~~
~~14 “For Hamas, Reconciliation with Egypt Worth More than Qatari Cash,” Al Monitor, January 31, 2019.~~
~~15 “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions about Blockade Policies,” PolicyWatch, number 3205, T he Washington~~
~~Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.~~
~~16 T he White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, May 20, 2021.~~
~~17 U.S. State Department, Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Egyptian President Al Sisi, May 26, 2021.~~
~~18 “Sisi Sees an Opportunity,” The Economist, Middle East & Africa, July 3, 2021 edition.~~
~~19 Hamas is holding two Israelis captive, Hisham al Sayed and Avera Mengistu. Israel is demanding their return and the~~
~~return of the remains of two soldiers killed in Gaza during the 2014 war.~~
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~~link to page 11~~ ~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Sinai Peninsula~~
~~Several terrorist groups based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency~~
~~against the Egyptian government since 2011. The Islamic State’s Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP)~~
~~is the most lethal terrorist organization in the peninsula.20 Since its inception in 2014, IS-SP has~~
~~attacked the Egyptian military continual y, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of~~
~~worship,21 and occasional y fired rockets into Israel.~~
~~To counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of~~
~~emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main~~
~~roads. Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of~~
~~terrorist attacks somewhat. According to one analyst, as of late 2020, militant attacks had fal en to~~
~~15 a month from 40 in late 2017.22 However, though the pace of IS-SP attacks have dropped,~~
~~other experts believe that IS-SP is a significant security threat, especial y when pitted against~~
~~poorly trained Egyptian conscript soldiers serving in the Sinai. According to one report from IHS~~
~~Markit, “Although militant capabilities have not returned to the levels of sophistication seen from~~
~~2014-16, the group has shown it stil retains high level capabilities.”23~~
~~The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the~~
~~Sinai, subject to the parties’ negotiation of changes to address particular circumstances. Egypt and~~
~~Israel agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt’s military presence in the Sinai and to the~~
~~construction of military and/or dual-use infrastructure. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai~~
~~to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partial y demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an~~
~~effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO,~~
~~which are partial y funded by the United States, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of~~
~~the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 3).~~

~~20 T his group was formerly known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem).~~
~~It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its~~
~~numerical composition range from 500 t o 1,000. In Arabic, it is known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province). Also referred~~
~~to as ISIS-Sinai, ISIS-Egypt, and the Islamic State in the Sinai.~~
~~21 In November 2018, IS-SP claimed responsibility for an attack against Coptic Christian pilgrims traveling t o the~~
~~monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor 85 miles south of Cairo in the western desert.~~
~~22 “Shifting Militant T actics Curb Development in Egypt ’s North Sinai,” Reuters, November 9, 2020.~~
~~23 Jack Kennedy, “ T errorism in Egypt: Examining the Data and What to Expect in 2021,” IHS Markit, December 18,~~
~~2020.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~At times, Egypt and Israel have cooperated~~
~~to counter terrorism in the Sinai. In a~~
~~Figure 3. The Sinai Peninsula~~
~~televised interview in 2019, President Sisi~~
~~responded to a question on whether~~
~~Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was~~
~~the closest it has ever been, saying “That is~~
~~correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes~~
~~needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that’s~~
~~why we have a wide range of coordination~~
~~with the Israelis.”24 One news account~~
~~suggested that, as of February 2018, Israel,~~
~~with Egypt’s approval, had used its own~~
~~drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out~~
~~more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt~~
~~against militant targets.25~~
~~Natural Gas~~
~~Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation has~~
~~significantly expanded since 2018. For~~
~~Egypt, cooperation with Israel is a key~~
~~component of its broader regional strategy to~~
~~become a major player in the development~~

~~of undersea natural gas in the Eastern~~
~~Mediterranean. Egypt is attempting to~~
Source: http://www.mfo.org
~~position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while~~
~~imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported.26 Egypt has the~~
~~Eastern Mediterranean’s only two large-scale liquefied natural gas terminals (located at Idku and~~
~~Damietta), operating as partnerships between the state and foreign companies such as Italy’s ENI~~
~~and Royal Dutch Shel .~~
~~In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement worth an estimated~~
~~$15 bil ion, according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas is exported to Egypt for either~~
~~domestic use or liquefaction and reexport. In August 2021, Israeli and Egyptian officials~~
~~discussed possible plans to liquefy Israeli gas for reexport at the Egyptian terminals mentioned~~
~~above.~~
~~Israeli and Egyptian companies bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline (the~~
~~EMG pipeline) connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula. The pipeline is now used to~~
~~transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt as part of the previously mentioned gas deal.~~
~~As energy ties bind Israel and Egypt closer together, they have also made both parties wary of~~
~~competitors such as Turkey. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern~~
~~Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the~~
~~Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies~~

~~24 “Egypt’s President El-Sisi Denies Ordering Massacre in Interview his Government Later T ried to Block,”~~ 60
~~Minutes, January 6, 2019.~~
~~25 “Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, with Cairo’s O.K,” New York Times, February 3, 2018.~~
~~26 “Egypt Says U.S. Oil Firms Showing Appetite for Offshore P rojects,” Reuters, November 24, 2018.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~and reduce costs.27 In September 2020, the EMGF became an official intergovernmental~~
~~organization based in Cairo. Turkey, which has longstanding disputes with Greece and Cyprus~~
~~that have shaped Eastern Mediterranean energy debates, is considered a rival of the EMGF~~
~~countries.28 As Turkey expanded its role in Libya, Libya’s then-Government of National Accord~~
~~(GNA) signed a maritime boundary agreement with it in late 2019.29 Egypt cal ed the deal “il egal~~
~~and not binding”; Israel said the deal could “jeopardize peace and stability in the area.”30 In 2020,~~
~~Egypt and Greece signed an exclusive economic zone agreement—general y seen in part as a~~
~~response to the Turkey-Libya deal—in an area of the Mediterranean containing oil and gas~~
~~reserves. Turkey claims that this zone fal s in the area of its continental shelf.31~~
~~Possible Egyptian Purchase of Russian Advanced Fighter Aircraft~~
~~Since 2018, there have been periodic reports of Egyptian plans to purchase Russian Sukhoi Su-35~~
~~Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, a move that could potential y trigger U.S. sanctions under~~
~~Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R.~~
~~3364, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II—hereinafter~~
~~referred to as CAATSA).32 In May 2020, TASS Russian News Agency reported that the Gagarin~~
~~Aircraft Manufacturing Association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur had started production of the~~
~~aircraft under a contract signed in 2018.33 As of September 2021, U.S. officials have not publicly~~
~~confirmed that Egypt and Russia are moving ahead with the deal. The Su-35 is Russia’s most~~
~~advanced fighter aircraft. In May 2021, a report suggested that Russia had delivered five Su-35s~~
~~to Egypt.34 A month later, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov said that 11 Su-35 aircraft~~
~~wil be delivered to Egypt this year.35 Several months earlier, in a phone cal with the Egyptian~~
~~foreign minister, Secretary of State Antony Blinken “raised concerns over human rights, which he~~
~~emphasized would be central to the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, and Egypt’s potential~~
~~procurement of Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia.”36~~
~~Section 231 of CAATSA requires that the President impose a number of sanctions on a person or~~
~~entity who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with anyone who is part of, or operates~~
~~for or on behalf of, the defense or intel igence sectors of the Government of the Russian~~
~~Federation. The Secretary of State has determined that the manufacturer of the Su-35,~~
~~Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Organization (KNAAPO) is a part of, or operates on~~

~~27 “Natural Gas Fields Give Israel a Regional P olitical Boost,” Associated Press, January 23, 2019.~~
~~28 CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas.~~
~~29 Selcan Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, “T urkish Offshore Gas Deal with Libya Upsets Mediterranean Boundaries,”~~
Bloom berg, December 6, 2019.
~~30 “T urkey-Libya Maritime Deal Rattles East Mediterranean,” Reuters, December 25, 2019.~~
~~31 “Egypt and Greece Sign Agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone,” Reuters, August 6, 2020.~~
~~32 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 , title II, Countering America’s Adversaries~~
~~T hrough Sanctions Act (CAAT SA; P.L. 115-44). For additional background, see CRS Report R45415,~~ ~~U.S. Sanctions~~
~~on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt .~~
~~33 Derek Bisaccio, “Su-35 Production for Egypt Begins,” Defense and Security Monitor, May 18, 2020.~~
~~34 Dan Arkin, “Egyptian Air Force Starts to Receive Su-35 Fighter,” Israel Defense, May 7, 2021.~~
~~35 Jeremy Binnie, “Russian Official Indicates Egypt Will Receive 11 Su-35s this Year,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June~~
~~23, 2021.~~
~~36 U.S. State Department, Secretary Blinken’s Call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry, February 23, 2021.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~behalf of, Russia’s defense and intel igence sectors for the purpose of meeting the definitional~~
~~requirements of CAATSA Section 231.37~~
~~While Egypt’s procurement of Russian (and French) fighter aircraft has drawn media attention,~~
~~U.S.-origin aircraft compose the largest component of Egypt’s fixed-wing inventory, including~~
~~around 200 F-16 variant combat aircraft. Egypt’s diversification strategy is particularly~~
~~chal enging for its air force, which must balance different training and maintenance procedures~~
~~for European, Russian, and U.S. platforms~~and U.S. Relations In order to secure short-term capital for domestic investment and stabilize its foreign exchange reserves ($33.4 billion as of June 2022), Egypt has turned to the Gulf Arab states and international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Government talks with the IMF are ongoing, though Egypt has borrowed over $20 billion from the IMF since 2016 and has already exceeded its credit quota. To increase the prospects for an IMF program, Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) have pledged well over $22 billion in various forms of assistance (currency deposits in the Central Bank, joint investments).30 However, unlike previous instances of Gulf largesse toward Egypt that mainly involved cash infusions, in 2022 Gulf Arab states are seeking to purchase Egyptian state-owned assets or private companies.31 Egyptian Natural Gas Exports to Europe With the EU poised to phase out purchases of Russian gas (150 billion cubic meters or bcm annually), Europeans are looking to various global suppliers to make up for lost supply. Egypt is the third-largest natural gas producer in Africa, following Algeria and Nigeria. Some economists believe that, if Egyptian capacity can be increased, Egypt has the potential to account for 5%-10% of Europe’s natural gas import needs.32 In June 2022, the EU signed a trilateral gas supply agreement with Egypt and Israel. Egypt currently imports Israeli natural gas (at 85bcmover a 15-year period) and will re-liquefy Israeli gas at its two liquefied natural gas terminals at Damietta port for re-export to Europe (in 2021 Israel exported 4.25bcm to Egypt).33 However, lack of transport and processing capacity is a major challenge for Israel and Egypt in becoming significant suppliers to Europe. There are only two pipelines capable of transporting Israeli gas to Egypt, and Egypt’s LNG facilities are working at maximum capacity to meet both domestic and foreign demand.34 In 2021, Egypt exported 8.8bcm of natural gas. Israel is reportedly considering constructing a new onshore pipeline to Egypt.35 Possible Egyptian Purchase of Russian Advanced Fighter Aircraft Since 2018, there have been periodic reports of Egyptian plans to purchase Russian Sukhoi Su-35 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, a move that could potentially trigger U.S. sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44).36 The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced fighter aircraft. In May 2020, TASS Russian News Agency reported that Russian defense contractors had started production of the aircraft under a contract signed in 30 In November 2021, Saudi Arabia deposited $3 billion in the Central Bank of Egypt. It has since extended that deposit and added $2.3 billion more. In June 2022, the Saudi-based Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) extended another $3 billion in credit to Egypt. In June 2022, Saudi Arabia and Egypt signed joint investment deals worth $7.7 billion. Qatar has pledged $5 billion in various investments. Various UAE wealth funds and conglomerates (ADQ, Al Futtaim Group, Abu Dhabi Ports) also have pledged to invest several billion dollars in Egypt. 31 “Egypt Gets Gulf Help Again as Eyes Turn to Currency Flexibility,” Reuters, April 4, 2022. 32 “Can Europe Fully Replace Russian Gas?” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 24, 2022. 33 John Ainger and Alberto Nardelli, “EU, Egypt Near Gas Supply Deal in Shift Away From Russia,” Bloomberg, June 3, 2022. 34 Marc Espanol, “Egypt's Gas Imports from Israel Hit all-time High,” Al Monitor, June 7, 2022. 35 Ron Bousso and Ari Rabinovitch “Israel Considering New Pipeline to Boost Gas Exports to Egypt,” Reuters, October 21, 2021. 36 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, title II, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44). For additional background, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt. Congressional Research Service 7 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations 2018.37 As of June 2022, U.S. officials have not publicly confirmed that Egypt and Russia are moving ahead with the deal. Section 231 of CAATSA requires that the President impose a number of sanctions on a person or entity who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with anyone who is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Secretary of State has determined that the manufacturer of the Su-35, Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Organization (KNAAPO) is a part of, or operates on behalf of, Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors for the purpose of meeting the definitional requirements of CAATSA Section 231.38 In December 2021, Indonesia abandoned plans to purchase 11 Su-35 fighters; in 2022 Indonesia purchased a combination of French Rafale fighters and U.S. F-15s. While Egypt’s procurement or possible procurement of Russian (and French) fighter aircraft has drawn media attention, U.S.-origin aircraft compose the largest component of Egypt’s fixed-wing inventory, including around 200 F-16 variant combat aircraft. Egypt’s diversification strategy is particularly challenging for its air force, which must balance different training and maintenance procedures for European, Russian, and U.S. platforms. For years, Egypt has sought to upgrade its U.S.-supplied combat fighter aircraft to more advanced platforms; Egypt may even have requested that the Trump Administration provide it with the F-35.39 To date, it is unclear how the Russian invasion of Ukraine might be influencing Egypt’s possible decision to proceed with the Su-35 acquisition. During the invasion, Russia has flown numerous sorties using its advanced jets, allowing for some evaluation of its performance. Ukrainian forces, equipped with older generations of Russian combat jetfighters, have claimed to have shot down several Su-35s in air-to-air combat. Biden Administration officials may perceive that the war in Ukraine could pose an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to persuade Egypt to abandon their pursuit of Russian combat aircraft. In mid-March 2022, outgoing U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Frank McKenzie stated at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the United States may potentially sell the F-15 fighter aircraft to Egypt.40 During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the FY2023 Department of State budget request, Secretary of State Antony Blinken remarked in an exchange with Senator Murphy on Egypt military aid conditionality that: This is a critical time too in the relationship with a number of countries, particularly countries that may be reconsidering their own relationships and potential dependencies on Russia. They’re seeing how Russian military equipment is performing or not performing in Ukraine. They’re seeing growing challenges to Russia being able to sustain and ultimately export its … military equipment. They’re making different decisions about the future. That presents a strategic opportunity for us when we want to make sure that we also have flexibility to take advantage of. But I completely share your focus on and concern about human rights, including in Egypt. It is, it will remain a central part of our policy even as we work to strengthen what is a -- a vital partnership for us.41 37 Derek Bisaccio, “Su-35 Production for Egypt Begins,” Defense and Security Monitor, May 18, 2020. 38 See U.S. State Department, Section 231 of CAATSA, at https://www.state.gov/t/isn/caatsa/. 39 Ali Dizboni, Karim El-Baz, “Understanding the Egyptian Military’s Perspective on the Su-35 Deal,” Fikra Forum, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2021. 40 Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command,” hearing, March 15, 2022. 41 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Review of the FY 2023 State Department Budget Request,” hearing, April 26, Congressional Research Service 8 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations One recent report suggests that as of early 2022, Egypt may have still been planning on moving ahead with the Su-35 acquisition. According to a June 2022 report in Africa Intelligence: US military intelligence has been keeping a wary eye on a small detachment of Egyptian pilots that travelled to Russia at the start of the year to be trained on handling the Su-35 air-defence fighter, the Sukhoi range's flagship.... In March [2022], Russian media published photos and videos of aircraft being assembled on Sukhoi's production lines in Russia in Komsomolsk-on-Amur sporting the Egyptian Air Force's characteristic camouflage markings. These sources believe 21 aircraft were produced.42 Egyptian Cooperation with Israel Following 30 years of intermittent war and enduring confrontation, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the single most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. Congress has long been concerned with the preservation of the peace treaty and has appropriated foreign assistance and exercised oversight to encourage both parties to maintain it. Since 2012, congressional appropriators have included a requirement in foreign operations appropriations legislation that before foreign aid funds can be provided to Egypt, the Secretary of State must certify that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.43 While people-to-people relations remain limited, Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific areas in which they can cooperate, such as containing the Palestinian group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) in the Gaza Strip, countering terrorism, and developing natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see sections below). Since 2020, when Israel reached various agreements to normalize or improve relations Figure 3. Egypt Hosts Israel and the UAE with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), March 2022 Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco (known as the “Abraham Accords”), there has been a noticeable increase in Israeli-Egyptian bilateral contacts and multilateral summits. In March 2022, Israel and Egypt announced the establishment of direct commercial flights between Tel Aviv and Sharm el Sheikh. Days later, Egypt hosted a trilateral summit between Israel, the UAE, and itself (see Figure 3). A week later, Israel hosted the Negev Summit, in which the foreign ministers of Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco Source: Egyptian Presidential Spokesman attended. Reportedly, mutual concern over Iran drove Negev Summit attendees to agree to share real-time intelligence about Iranian drones.44 2022; transcript via Bloomberg Government. 42 “US Warnings Ineffective on Egypt's Su-35 Plans as Pilots Train in Russia,” Africa Intelligence, June 8, 2022. 43 See Section 7041(a)(1) of P.L. 117-103, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022. In addition to sustaining the treaty, the certification also requires Egypt to sustain its “strategic relationship with the United States.” 44 Arie Egozi, “Iran Fears Push Israel, Arab Nations to Once-‘Unthinkable’ Security Partnerships,” Breaking Defense, March 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians Egypt’s triangular relationship with Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is complex. On the one hand, Israel and Egypt cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as they have since Sisi’s rise to power in 2013. In general, the Egyptian government is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East.45 On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza46 and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai. On the other hand, in an acknowledgement of Hamas’ entrenched rule in Gaza since 2007, Egypt couples its policy of containment with ongoing dialogue. Maintaining a relationship with Hamas has provided the Egyptian security and intelligence services an opportunity to mediate between Hamas and Israel and between Hamas and its rival Palestinian faction Fatah (led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas). Egypt, at times, has attempted to broker a long-term Israel-Hamas truce.47 In a September 2021 speech, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid set forth Israeli conditions for a possible truce with Hamas, and said, “It’s worth emphasizing the critical importance of Egypt in this whole process. It won't happen without the support and involvement of our Egyptian partners and without their ability to talk to everyone involved.”48 Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, making Rafah the only non-Israeli-controlled passenger entryway into the Strip, which Egypt periodically closes for security reasons. Control over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian authorities appear to use it carefully to avoid sparking a humanitarian crisis on their border.49 Egypt also controls the Salah al Din Gate, a previously used crossing north of Rafah that opened for commercial use in 2018. According to one report, both Hamas and Egypt tax imported goods moving into Gaza through the gate, earning Hamas tens of millions of dollars per year in revenue.50 The May 2021 Israel-Hamas Conflict and Egyptian Mediation In May 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas in which Palestinian militants fired rockets at Israeli populated areas, while Israeli forces targeted Hamas and other militants in the densely populated urban areas of Gaza. After 11 days of fighting that resulted in over 250 Palestinians killed and 12 deaths inside Israel, Egypt helped mediate a cease-fire. President Sisi also provided Gaza with humanitarian aid and pledged $500 million for reconstruction (Qatar also pledged $500 million). On May 20, President Biden extended “my sincere gratitude to 45 “How Israel and Egypt are Coordinating on Gaza,” Al Monitor, July 12, 2018. 46 The Egyptian military has taken a number of steps to stop smuggling tunnel construction beneath the Egyptian-Gaza border. To date, it has destroyed numerous tunnels and created a “buffer zone” along the Gaza border by demolishing parts of Rafah city and flooding trenches in the area with seawater from the Mediterranean. The military also has erected concrete walls and barbed wire fencing along the buffer zone to protect against attacks from the Islamic State-Sinai Province. According to Human Rights Watch, which has criticized the military’s actions, since 2013, a little less than one-quarter of all northern Sinai residents have been displaced or otherwise left the region as a result of the home demolitions and intensifying military hostilities. See, Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely War Crimes,” March 17, 2021. 47 “Egypt Trying to Broker Broad Israel-Hamas Truce, Hamas Says,” Associated Press, August 2, 2018. 48 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FM Lapid addresses World Summit on Counter Terrorism, September 12, 2021. 49 “For Hamas, Reconciliation with Egypt Worth More than Qatari Cash,” Al Monitor, January 31, 2019. 50 “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions about Blockade Policies,” PolicyWatch #3205, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Congressional Research Service 10 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations President Al Sisi and the senior Egyptian officials who played a critical role in this diplomacy.”51 According to one account, “All of this is helpful for Palestinians—but it is more helpful still for Mr. Sisi’s reputation.”52 Since the 2021 conflict, President Sisi has called on the international donor community to pledge further reconstruction aid to Gaza. In the meantime, Egyptian military construction companies have been involved in removing rubble, repairing Gaza’s coastal road, and rebuilding housing. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reportedly slowed the pace of Egypt’s rebuilding efforts.53 Building material costs have risen significantly since late February 2022, and Egypt has restricted the export of certain goods, such as cement. As of June 2022, Egypt (Egyptian General Intelligence) has continued to serve as a mediator between Israel and Hamas as both sides negotiate over the infusion of additional reconstruction aid for Gaza and the return of Israeli civilians held in Gaza.54 As in the aftermath of the three previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts (in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014), Egypt, Israel, and other international actors face challenges in balancing Gaza’s humanitarian and economic needs with concerns that Hamas could divert money and supplies brought into Gaza for military purposes. Sinai Peninsula Several terrorist groups based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency against the Egyptian government since 2011. The Islamic State’s Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP) is the most lethal terrorist organization in the peninsula.55 Since its inception in 2014, IS-SP has attacked the Egyptian military continually, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of worship,56 and occasionally fired rockets into Israel. To counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main roads. Moreover, the Egyptian Army has enlisted local Sinai tribes in what is known as the Sinai Tribes Union to help buttress its own forces. Israel also has supported Egyptian efforts with information sharing and coordinated air strikes.57 The Egyptian government also has used non-military means, such as increased economic development in the Sinai, in an effort to win support amongst the local population. In 2021, the government inaugurated in northern Sinai the world’s largest agricultural wastewater treatment plant. 51 The White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, May 20, 2021. 52 “Sisi Sees an Opportunity,” The Economist, Middle East & Africa, July 3, 2021, edition. 53 Sanaa Alswerky, “Economic Fallout from the Russia-Ukraine War Hits Gaza Hard,” Jerusalem Post, March 21, 2022. 54 Hamas is holding two Israelis captive, Hisham al Sayed and Avera Mengistu. Israel is demanding their return and the return of the remains of two soldiers killed in Gaza during the 2014 war. Hamas is demanding that Israel release an unknown number of high profile Hamas members from Israeli prison. 55 This group was formerly known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem). It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its numerical composition range from 500 to 1,000. In Arabic, it is known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province). Also referred to as ISIS-Sinai, ISIS-Egypt, and the Islamic State in the Sinai. 56 In November 2018, IS-SP claimed responsibility for an attack against Coptic Christian pilgrims traveling to the monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor 85 miles south of Cairo in the western desert. 57 James Trigg, “Islamic State Attack on Egyptian Forces Demonstrates Continued Insurgent Capabilities Despite Intensive Counterinsurgency,” Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, May 13, 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks. According to one analysis, as of late 2021, fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2021 were 9% of the total number of deaths in 2017.58 In June 2022, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker wrote that “The Egyptian military finally appears to be making progress in rolling back the group. Not only have there been fewer attacks, but Cairo’s funneling of economic development funds to the peninsula has also generated some goodwill among the long-restive population.”59 Though the pace of IS-SP attacks have dropped, other experts believe that IS-SP remains a significant security threat, especially when pitted against poorly trained Egyptian conscript soldiers serving in the Sinai. According to one report from IHS Markit, “Although militant capabilities have not returned to the levels of sophistication seen from 2014-16, the group has shown it still retains high level capabilities.”60 In May 2022, IS-SP launched two separate attacks against Egyptian forces killing 16 people. Sinai militants used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and pickup trucks armed with machine guns to attack Egyptian soldiers. Afterward, the head of CENTCOM, General Michael E. Kurilla, offered to dispatch the head of U.S. counter-terrorism forces in the Middle East, U.S. Rear Admiral Mitchell Bradley, to Egypt for “guidance and additional assistance.”61 The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy Figure 4. The Sinai Peninsula in the Sinai, subject to the parties’ negotiation of changes to address particular circumstances (known as the Agreed Activities Mechanism). Egypt and Israel agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt’s military presence in the Sinai and to the construction of military and/or dual-use infrastructure. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partially demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, which are partially funded by the United States, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 4). .
Democracy, Human Rights, and Religious Freedom
Egypt’s record on human rights and Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism Source: Multinational Force and Observers 58 Ido Levy, “Egypt’s Counterinsurgency Success in Sinai,” PolicyWatch#3555, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 9, 2021. 59 David Schenker, “Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg,” ForeigPolicy.com, June 3, 2022. 60 Jack Kennedy, “Terrorism in Egypt: Examining the Data and What to Expect in 2021,” IHS Markit, December 18, 2020. 61 “Egypt, U. S. Eye Counter-Terrorism Ties in Wake of Deadly Sinai Attack,” Reuters, May 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations ~~democratization has sparked regular criticism~~ from U.S. from U.S.
officials and some Members of Congress. The Egyptian government rejects foreign criticism of officials and some Members of Congress. The Egyptian government rejects foreign criticism of
its human rights practices as its human rights practices as ~~il egitimate~~illegitimate interference in Egypt’s domestic affairs. interference in Egypt’s domestic affairs.38 62 Certain Certain
practices of President Sisi’s government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been the practices of President Sisi’s government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been the
subjects of U.S criticism. According to the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights subjects of U.S criticism. According to the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights
conditions in Egypt in conditions in Egypt in ~~2020:~~
~~Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including~~
~~extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents and terrorist~~ 2021: Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents, and by terrorist groups; forced groups; forced
disappearancedisappearance by state security; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment ; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
by by the government; harsh and life-threatening prisonthe government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions;conditions; arbitrary detention; arbitrary detention;
political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated ~~reprisal against individuals located~~
~~outside the country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on~~
~~free expression, the press, and the internet~~reprisals against individuals located in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly enforced disappearances, abductions, physical abuses, and extrajudicial killings; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including arrests or prosecutions of journalists, , including arrests or prosecutions of journalists,
censorship, site blocking, and the censorship, site blocking, and the ~~existence of criminal libel laws, which were not enforced;~~
abuse of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the substantial interference with the ~~rights~~freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, of peaceful assembly and freedom of association,
~~such as overly restrictive laws governing civil society organizations; restrictions on~~
~~political participation; violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and~~including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement, including travel bans imposed on human rights defenders, journalists, and activists; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government restrictions on domestic and international human rights organizations; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex intersex
persons and use of the law to arrest and prosecute arbitrarily such personspersons and use of the law to arrest and prosecute arbitrarily such persons~~; and forced or~~
~~compulsory child labor, including its worst forms.39~~.63
Egyptian authorities employ a host of legal authorities to suppress peaceful political opposition Egyptian authorities employ a host of legal authorities to suppress peaceful political opposition
and civil society, including the and civil society, including the ~~folowing~~following: :
  Emergency Law. ~~As previously mentioned, Egypt has~~In October 2021 President Sisi suspended Egypt’s state of emergency; Egypt had been in a near continuous state of been in a near continuous state of
emergency since 2017.emergency since 2017.40 64 The 2014 constitution, as amended, limited the president’s The 2014 constitution, as amended, limited the president’s
~~ability~~ ability to declare an indefinite state of emergency, though the pro-government parliament to declare an indefinite state of emergency, though the pro-government parliament
~~has~~ had continuously approved three-month extensions of the continuously approved three-month extensions of the ~~President~~president’s emergency ’s emergency
declarations (most recently in July 2021). Emergency powers, which were in effect for declarations (most recently in July 2021). Emergency powers, which were in effect for
decades under the rule of the late Hosni Mubarak, enable the state to refer civilians to decades under the rule of the late Hosni Mubarak, enable the state to refer civilians to
State Security Emergency Courts rather than civilian courts for various infractions.State Security Emergency Courts rather than civilian courts for various infractions.
Despite President Sisi’s suspension of Egypt’s emergency state, under the 1958 Emergency Law (Number 162 of 1958), state security emergency courts must continue to examine current cases and those referred to them before the state of emergency had been lifted, though no new cases may be referred to emergency courts.65   Anti-terrorism law. Egypt’s 2015 anti-terrorism law has been widely criticized Egypt’s 2015 anti-terrorism law has been widely criticized by
by human rights groups for creating a broad definition of terrorism that can be used by human rights groups for creating a broad definition of terrorism that can be used by
authorities to crack down against peaceful political opposition. According to one critique, authorities to crack down against peaceful political opposition. According to one critique,
“By writing into law a broad definition for terrorism and creating new prosecutorial and “By writing into law a broad definition for terrorism and creating new prosecutorial and

~~37 See U.S. State Department, Section 231 of CAAT SA, at https://www.state.gov/t/isn/caatsa/.~~
~~38 “Egypt calls on US not to interfere~~judicial mechanisms, the Counter-terrorism 62 “Egypt Calls on US not to Interfere in its Affairs,” in its Affairs,” The Middle East Monitor, March 15, 2019. , March 15, 2019.
3963 U.S. U.S. State DepartmentState Department , ~~2020~~, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: : Egypt, t, ~~March 30, 2021.~~
40April 12, 2022. 64 For an overview of the Egypt’s emergency law, see “Egypt’s Emergency Law Explained,” For an overview of the Egypt’s emergency law, see “Egypt’s Emergency Law Explained,” Al Jazeera, April 11, , April 11,
20172017. 65 The Legal Agenda, “Ending Egypt’s Perpetual State of Emergency: What Next?” December 13, 2021. .
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~~judicial mechanisms, the Counter-terrorism~~ Law expands the scope of acts that can be Law expands the scope of acts that can be
tried as terrorism; subjects even nonviolent, tried as terrorism; subjects even nonviolent, ~~constitutional y~~constitutionally protected actions of protected actions of
everyday citizens, journalists, and rights defenders to possible prosecution under everyday citizens, journalists, and rights defenders to possible prosecution under
terrorism legislation; and contributes to a culture in which national security concerns terrorism legislation; and contributes to a culture in which national security concerns
~~automatical y~~automatically trump human rights and legal obligations.” trump human rights and legal obligations.”4166
  NGO Law. For years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in For years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt have Egypt have
charged that the government has used the legal system to restrict civil organizations from charged that the government has used the legal system to restrict civil organizations from
conducting lawful activities without government interference. Egypt’s Law #149 of 2019 conducting lawful activities without government interference. Egypt’s Law #149 of 2019
on activities of nongovernmental organizations prohibits domestic and foreign NGOs on activities of nongovernmental organizations prohibits domestic and foreign NGOs
from pursuing activities that violatefrom pursuing activities that violate “national security,” “public order,” “public morals,” “national security,” “public order,” “public morals,”
and “national unity” without defining any of these terms.and “national unity” without defining any of these terms.4267
Authorities also restrict access to the internet, censor online content, and monitor private online Authorities also restrict access to the internet, censor online content, and monitor private online
communications.communications.4368 In 2018, parliament passed amendments to the Media and Press Law that, In 2018, parliament passed amendments to the Media and Press Law that,
among other changes, grant the regulatory body known as the Supreme Media Council “the among other changes, grant the regulatory body known as the Supreme Media Council “the
authority to suspend a social media account that has 5,000 followers or more if it posts false authority to suspend a social media account that has 5,000 followers or more if it posts false
news, promotes violence, or spreads hateful views.”news, promotes violence, or spreads hateful views.”4469 The Egyptian government also has The Egyptian government also has
attempted to require that technology companies share their user data with authorities.attempted to require that technology companies share their user data with authorities.4570 In October In October
2019, the Egyptian cabinet issued a resolution mandating, among other things, that ride-sharing 2019, the Egyptian cabinet issued a resolution mandating, among other things, that ride-sharing
companies such as Uber submit to the Ministry of Transportation six months’ worth of customers’ companies such as Uber submit to the Ministry of Transportation six months’ worth of customers’
data from data from ~~al rides.46~~
all rides.71 Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide
the following global rankings for Egyptthe following global rankings for Egypt (see Table 1). .
Table 1. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Indicators
Issue
Index
Ranking
Democracy Democracy
Freedom Freedom ~~House, Freedom~~ House, Freedom in the Worldin the World ~~2021~~ 2022
“Not Free” “Not Free”
Press Freedom Press Freedom
Reporters Reporters Without Borders,Without Borders, ~~World~~ World Press Press
~~166~~168/180 Countries /180 Countries
Freedom Freedom Index Index ~~2021~~2022
Corruption Corruption
Transparency International, Corruption Transparency International, Corruption
117/180 Countries 117/180 Countries
Perceptions Index Perceptions Index ~~2020~~2021
Human Human
United Nations Human Development United Nations Human Development
116/189 Countries 116/189 Countries
Development Development
Programme, Programme, Human DevelopmentHuman Development Index 2020 Index 2020
Sources: Freedom Freedom House, ReportersHouse, Reporters Without Borders,Without Borders, Transparency International, and United Nations Human Transparency International, and United Nations Human
DevelopmentDevelopment ~~Programme.~~

~~41 T he T ahrir~~ Programme. 66 The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “ Institute for Middle East Policy, “~~T IMEP~~TIMEP Brief: Counter- Brief: Counter-~~T errorism~~Terrorism Law,” August Law,” August 15, 2018. 15, 2018.
4267 George George Sadek,Sadek, “Egypt: New Law“Egypt: New Law Enacted RegulatingEnacted Regulating Activities of Nongovernmental Organizations,” Activities of Nongovernmental Organizations,” Global Legal
Monitor, , ~~T he~~The Law Library, Library of Congress, September 11, 2019. Law Library, Library of Congress, September 11, 2019.
~~43 See “T he~~68 See “The Eye on the Nile,” Eye on the Nile,” Check Point Research, October 3, 2019. , October 3, 2019.
4469 “Egypt: Parliament Passes Amendments to Media and Press Law,” “Egypt: Parliament Passes Amendments to Media and Press Law,” Global Legal Monitor, , ~~T he~~The Law Library, Library Law Library, Library
of Congress,of Congress, ~~August~~ August 6, 2018. 6, 2018.
4570 Declan Walsh, “Dilemma for Uber and Rival: Egypt’s Demand for Data on Riders,” “Dilemma for Uber and Rival: Egypt’s Demand for Data on Riders,” New York Times, June, June 10, 2017. 10, 2017.
4671 “Egypt: Ministerial Resolution Issued “Egypt: Ministerial Resolution Issued to Regulate Activities of Ride-Sharingto Regulate Activities of Ride-Sharing Companies,” Companies,” Global Legal Monitor, ,
~~T he~~The Law Library, Library of Congress, Law Library, Library of Congress, October 22, 2019. October 22, 2019.
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Gender Equality
Despite a constitutional provision affirming gender equality, Egyptian women do not enjoy the Despite a constitutional provision affirming gender equality, Egyptian women do not enjoy the
same legal rights and opportunities as men and experience widespread discrimination.same legal rights and opportunities as men and experience widespread discrimination.4772 The The
World Economic Forum ranks Egypt 129th of 156 countries on the Global Gender Gap indexWorld Economic Forum ranks Egypt 129th of 156 countries on the Global Gender Gap index~~, and~~
~~4th within the MENA region~~; the country performs in the bottom 10 countries on the measure of ; the country performs in the bottom 10 countries on the measure of
women’s economic participation and opportunity. Men participate in the labor force at more than women’s economic participation and opportunity. Men participate in the labor force at more than
three times the rate of women in Egypt (75.2% compared with 20% for women), and less than three times the rate of women in Egypt (75.2% compared with 20% for women), and less than
10% of firms have women in top management positions.10% of firms have women in top management positions.~~48 Egypt performs lower than the regional~~
~~MENA average on the~~73 According to the World Bank’s Women, Business, and the Law index, an annual study Women, Business, and the Law index, an annual study ~~by the World Bank~~
~~that measures~~that evaluates the laws and regulations that affect women’s economic opportunity in 190 the laws and regulations that affect women’s economic opportunity in 190
~~economies. The World Bank has found that “constraints on freedom of movement, laws affecting~~
~~women’s decisions to work, laws affecting women’s pay, constraints related to marriage, laws~~
~~affecting women’s work after having children, constraints on women’s starting and running a~~
~~business, and gender differences in property and inheritance” contribute to Egypt’s score of 45~~
~~out of 100.49~~
economies, Egypt’s score of 50.6 is lower than the regional Middle East and North Africa (MENA) average of 53.1. However, the 2022 report notes that Egypt for the first time issued a regulation (Decree No. 827/2021) to establish a help center for women victims of domestic violence.74 Violence against women and rampant sexual harassment Violence against women and rampant sexual harassment ~~remain problems in Egypt, due in part to~~
~~the lack of a comprehensive law criminalizing al forms of violence against girls and women.50~~persist in Egypt. According to a 2017 survey, nearly two-thirds of men in Egypt have sexually harassed women or girls in public.75
Child marriage and female genital mutilationChild marriage and female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) are both practiced to some or cutting (FGM/C) are both practiced to some
extent, despite laws against them. extent, despite laws against them. ~~The State Department reports the government “did not~~
~~effectively enforce the FGM/C law” and that FGM/C remains a “serious problem.”51 Egyptian~~
~~law does not prohibit domestic violence or spousal abuse. The government has recently increased~~
~~the punishment for sexual harassment and claims to be prioritizing efforts to address it, perhaps in~~
~~response to the 2020 social media movement about sexual assault that some dubbed Egypt’s~~
~~#MeToo moment.52~~According to Amnesty International, “Authorities continued to prosecute women social media influencers for how they acted, dressed and earned money on social media apps.”76
Coptic Christians
Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, but a relatively Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, but a relatively ~~smal~~ small percentage (perhaps 5% or less) are percentage (perhaps 5% or less) are
Coptic Christians, and this minority has faced discrimination and persecution, from the Coptic Christians, and this minority has faced discrimination and persecution, from the
government as government as ~~wel~~ well as from other citizens and terrorist groups. Congress has at times urged the as from other citizens and terrorist groups. Congress has at times urged the
government of Egypt to protect this communitygovernment of Egypt to protect this community, which is the largest population of Christians remaining in any single country in the Middle East and North Africa region. For example, in the 117th Congress, H.Res. 117, . For example, in the 117th Congress, H.Res. 117,
among other provisions, among other provisions, ~~urges~~would urge the Government of Egypt to enact “serious and legitimate reforms the Government of Egypt to enact “serious and legitimate reforms
in the public sector, athletics, and society to ensure Coptic Christians are given the same rights in the public sector, athletics, and society to ensure Coptic Christians are given the same rights
and opportunities as and opportunities as al all other Egyptian citizens.” other Egyptian citizens.”
For years, the Coptic Christian community in Egypt has For years, the Coptic Christian community in Egypt has ~~cal ed~~called for equal treatment under the for equal treatment under the
law.law.5377 Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly ~~cal ed~~called for greater Muslim-Christian for greater Muslim-Christian

~~47 Op.~~coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt’s Coptic Cathedral of 72 Op. cit., U.S. State Department, cit., U.S. State Department, ~~2020~~2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, , ~~March 30, 2021.~~
48April 12, 2022. 73 World Economic Forum, World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2021, March 2021. March 2021.
4974 World Bank, World Bank, Women, Business, and the Law ~~2021~~ 2022, data as of October 1, , data as of October 1, ~~2020.~~
~~50 Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Efforts to Combat Violence against~~
~~Women in Egypt: Milestones, Challenges, and Recommendations,” UN Human Rights Council, June 8, 2021.~~
~~51 Op.cit., U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021.~~
~~52 “Egypt tightens punishment for sexual harassment ,” Reuters, July 12, 2021; Declan Walsh, “ T he 22-Year-Old Force~~
~~Behind Egypt’s Growing #MeT oo Movement,” The New York Times, October 2, 2020.~~
532021. 75 Miriam Berger, “The Car Ad Tried to Extol its HD Camera. Instead, it Promoted Sexual Harassment in Egypt, Critics Say,” Washington Post, December 30, 2021. 76 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2021/2022 State of the World’s Human Rights, Egypt, 2022. 77 In late 2019, an Egyptian Coptic woman won a landmark inheritance case before the Cairo Court of Appeal. In late 2019, an Egyptian Coptic woman won a landmark inheritance case before the Cairo Court of Appeal. ~~T he~~The
court granted the plaintiff, a Coptic Christian woman, a share of her late father’s inheritance equal to that of her two court granted the plaintiff, a Coptic Christian woman, a share of her late father’s inheritance equal to that of her two
male brothers by applying Christian Orthodox Personal Status Bylawsmale brothers by applying Christian Orthodox Personal Status Bylaws rather than Islamic law (which grants sons twice the share of daughters). The plaintiff had argued that, per the Egyptian Constitution of 2014, she should not be subject to Islamic law in matters related to family law. See George Sadek, “Egypt: Court Grants Christian Woman Share of Father’s Estate Equal to Share of Her Two Brothers,” Global Legal Monitor, The Law Library, Library of Congress, January 9, 2020. ~~rather than Islamic law (which grants sons twice~~
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~~coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt’s Coptic Cathedral of~~
~~Nativity in the new administrative capital~~Nativity in the New Administrative Capital east of Cairo saying, “This is an important moment in east of Cairo saying, “This is an important moment in
our history.... We are one and we our history.... We are one and we ~~wil~~ will remain one.”remain one.”5478
Despite these public Despite these public ~~cal s~~calls for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian
community continues to face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional community continues to face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional
sectarian attacks. According to the sectarian attacks. According to the ~~2021~~2022 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
report, “report, “~~religious discrimination [in Egypt] remained pervasive, including a disparity in policies~~
~~regarding places of worship, a lack of opportunities for non-Muslims to work in key areas of~~
~~government service, state security harassment of former Muslims, and recurring incidents of anti-~~
~~Christian mob violence, particularly in rural areas.”55~~
~~Major terrorist~~Acts of violence against individual Coptic victims, especially in rural areas, occurred in social environments with persistent imbalances in the treatment of perpetrators from the Muslim majority and their Coptic victims.”79 Terrorist attacks against Christian places of worship also continue to threaten the Coptic attacks against Christian places of worship also continue to threaten the Coptic
community. Suicide bomber attacks against Coptic cathedrals in 2011, 2016, and 2017 community. Suicide bomber attacks against Coptic cathedrals in 2011, 2016, and 2017
collectively collectively ~~kil ed~~killed over 95 people and injured hundreds of others. In April 2021, IS-SP posted a over 95 people and injured hundreds of others. In April 2021, IS-SP posted a
video depicting the group’s murder of a 62-year-old Copt from Bir al Abd in North Sinai. video depicting the group’s murder of a 62-year-old Copt from Bir al Abd in North Sinai.
Coptic Christians also have long voiced concern about state regulation of church construction. Coptic Christians also have long voiced concern about state regulation of church construction.
They have demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (some dating back to the They have demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (some dating back to the
nineteenth century) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt’s nineteenth century) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt’s
2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016, 2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016,
parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government
approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures. approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures.
Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law,Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law,~~56 critics claimed that it continues to al ow~~
~~for discrimination. According to Human Rights Watch, “the new law al ows governors to deny~~
~~church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built~~
~~‘commensurate with’ the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that~~
~~risk subjecting decisions on whether to al ow church construction to the whims of violent~~
~~mobs.”57~~80 some sources report that the approval process for new Coptic houses of worship is proceeding too slowly.81
Domestic Developments
Domestic Politics
President Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s tenure appears to have been predicated on the idea that a President Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s tenure appears to have been predicated on the idea that a
sufficient segment of the public, exhausted after several years of unrest and distrustful of Islamist sufficient segment of the public, exhausted after several years of unrest and distrustful of Islamist
rule, remains rule, remains ~~wil ing~~ willing to forgo democratic liberties in exchange for the rule of a strongman hailing to forgo democratic liberties in exchange for the rule of a strongman hailing
from the military. The extent to which Egyptiansfrom the military. The extent to which Egyptians’ political quiescence reflects endorsement of political quiescence reflects endorsement of
military rule or strategic silence in the face of suppression is impossible to quantify, given the military rule or strategic silence in the face of suppression is impossible to quantify, given the
closed political environment enforced by the current government. The authorities have limited closed political environment enforced by the current government. The authorities have limited
dissent by maintaining a constant crackdown, which dissent by maintaining a constant crackdown, which ~~initial y~~initially was aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood, but has evolved to cover a broader range of political speech, encompassing anyone criticizing the government. While successive Egyptian presidents since 1952 were effective at centralizing power, both within the ruling system and outside it, certain institutions (judiciary, military) and individuals enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from the executive. However, under President Sisi, there has been arguably an unprecedented attempt to consolidate control over all branches of government while stymying opposition to his rule. In April 2019, voters approved amendments to 78 “Egypt’s Sisi Opens Mega-Mosque and Middle East’s Largest Cathedral in New Capital,” Reuters, January 6, 2019. 79 ~~was aimed at the Muslim~~

~~the share of daughters). T he plaintiff had argued that, per the Egyptian Constitution of 2014, she should not be subject~~
~~to Islamic law in matters related to family law. See George Sadek, “ Egypt: Court Grants Christian Woman Share of~~
~~Father’s Estate Equal to Share of Her T wo Brothers,” T he Law Library, Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor,~~
~~January 9, 2020.~~
~~54 “Egypt’s Sisi Opens Mega-Mosque and Middle East’s Largest Cathedral in New Capital,” Reuters, January 6, 2019.~~
55 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, April Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, April ~~2021.~~
562022. 80 “HH Pope “HH Pope ~~T awadros~~Tawadros II: Church Construction Law Corrected an Error and Bandaged II: Church Construction Law Corrected an Error and Bandaged Wounds,”Wounds,” Coptic Orthodox Coptic Orthodox
CulturalCultural Center, September 1, 2016. Center, September 1, 2016.
57 “Egypt: New Church Law Discriminates Against Christians,” Human Rights Watch~~, September 15, 2016~~ 81 Mohamed Ezz, “Protests, Arrests in Minya Village Point to Longstanding Discriminatory Policies over Church Permits,” Mada Masr, February 10, 2022. .
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Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations ~~and U.S. Relations~~

~~Brotherhood, but has evolved to cover a broader range of political speech, encompassing anyone~~
~~criticizing the government.~~
~~While successive Egyptian presidents since 1952 were effective at centralizing power, both~~
~~within the ruling system and outside it, certain institutions (judiciary, military) and individuals~~
~~enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from the executive. However, under President~~
~~Sisi, there has been arguably an unprecedented attempt to consolidate control over al branches of~~
~~government while stymying opposition to his rule. In April 2019, voters approved amendments to~~
the constitution that extend President Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him to run for a the constitution that extend President Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him to run for a
third term, third term, ~~potential y~~potentially keeping him in office until 2030. The amendments also granted the keeping him in office until 2030. The amendments also granted the
president the authority to appoint president the authority to appoint al all chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies and the public chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies and the public
prosecutor. During summer 2019, President Sisi made those judicial appointments, leading one prosecutor. During summer 2019, President Sisi made those judicial appointments, leading one
anonymous Egyptian judge to question this authority, saying that “The role of the judge is to be at anonymous Egyptian judge to question this authority, saying that “The role of the judge is to be at
arm’s length from the executive, but this is inconsistent now with the fact the president of the arm’s length from the executive, but this is inconsistent now with the fact the president of the
republic is involved with a judge’s transfer, promotion and accountability.”republic is involved with a judge’s transfer, promotion and accountability.”5882 President Sisi also President Sisi also
placed his older brother and oldest son in key security and placed his older brother and oldest son in key security and ~~intel igence~~intelligence positions, although his son positions, although his son
is no longer in that role.is no longer in that role.59
83 Egypt’s bicameral parliament consists of a Egypt’s bicameral parliament consists of a
596-member House of Representatives (568 596-member House of Representatives (568
Figure 45. President Abdel Fattah al Sisi
elected and 28 appointed by the president) elected and 28 appointed by the president)
and a 300-member Senate (200 of whom are and a 300-member Senate (200 of whom are
elected, and 100 appointed by the president). elected, and 100 appointed by the president).
According to Egypt’s Political Rights Law, at According to Egypt’s Political Rights Law, at
least 25% of the elected seats in the House of least 25% of the elected seats in the House of
Representatives are set aside for female Representatives are set aside for female
candidates; 10% of candidates; 10% of al all Senate seats are Senate seats are
designated for women. designated for women. 6084 Women’s right to Women’s right to
vote was recognized in 1956, and women vote was recognized in 1956, and women
currently constitute 27.7% of representatives currently constitute 27.7% of representatives

in the lower parliament and 13% of seats in in the lower parliament and 13% of seats in
Source: Egyptian State Information Service. Egyptian State Information Service.
the upper house. the upper house.6185
Parliamentary elections took place in late 2020 amidst a turnout estimated at less than 30%. Parliamentary elections took place in late 2020 amidst a turnout estimated at less than 30%.
Mostaqbal Watan (translated as either Future of the Homeland or Nation’s Future) (translated as either Future of the Homeland or Nation’s Future)6286 emerged as emerged as
the leading pro-Sisi party, with 316 seats in the House. When parliament began its work in early the leading pro-Sisi party, with 316 seats in the House. When parliament began its work in early
2021, it featured the most women legislators in Egypt’s history. Egyptian lawmakers 2021, it featured the most women legislators in Egypt’s history. Egyptian lawmakers
overwhelmingly support the president’s legislative agenda, as overwhelmingly support the president’s legislative agenda, as Mostaqbal Watan has become the has become the

~~58 “Fears Over Egypt’s Judiciary Abound after Sisi Appointments,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2019.~~
~~59 Reportedly, President Sisi has since removed his son Mahmoud from the deputy head of the GIS. According to one~~
~~controversial report in the Egyptian publication Mada Masr, Mahmoud Sisi lost his position in the GIS after the~~
~~president’s inner circle concluded that his reputation was harmful to the Sisi regime. See “President’s Eldest Son,~~
~~Mahmoud al-Sisi, Sidelined from Powerful Intelligence Position to Diplomatic Mission in Russia,” Mada Masr,~~
~~November 20, 2019. After Mada Masr published this account, security services temporarily detained an editor and two~~
~~journalists and had their personal electronics confiscated. See “ Egypt News Outlet Raided after Report on Sisi’s Son,”~~
Financial Tim es, November 24, 2019.
~~60 See, Genders Quota Database, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) ,~~
~~Stockholm, Sweden.~~
~~61 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments, accessed September 9, 2021.~~
~~62 T he party’s website is available in English at https://mostaqbal-watan.org/en/.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

successor to the now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), the former pro-government party successor to the now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), the former pro-government party
of the late Hosni Mubarak. According to one observer, “Sisi’s circle is presenting a democratic, of the late Hosni Mubarak. According to one observer, “Sisi’s circle is presenting a democratic,
pluralistic picture of this outcome, but in truth the legislature pluralistic picture of this outcome, but in truth the legislature ~~wil~~ will be dominated by one major be dominated by one major
party surrounded by party surrounded by ~~smal~~ small parties that serve as window dressing, thereby mimicking an parties that serve as window dressing, thereby mimicking an
opposition just enough to opposition just enough to ~~occasional y~~occasionally channel the public’s frustration at socioeconomic channel the public’s frustration at socioeconomic
conditions. This is straight from the Mubarak playbook.”conditions. This is straight from the Mubarak playbook.”6387 The next parliamentary elections are The next parliamentary elections are
~~expected to take place in 2025.~~
~~The Economy~~
~~As an emerging market, Egypt has weathered the COVID-19 pandemic and has witnessed~~
~~positive GDP growth both in 2020 (3.6%) and 2021 (2.8% estimated). In the face of the~~
~~pandemic’s disruption to global tourism (tourism in Egypt accounts for 9.5% of al employment),~~
~~the Egyptian government has enacted various fiscal stimulus measures while receiving various~~
~~low-interest loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF. According to a July~~
~~2021 IMF analysis,~~
~~over the past 12 months, the [Egyptian] authorities’ commitment to prudent policies and~~
~~their strong performance under the IMF program have helped mitigate the health and social~~
~~impact of the pandemic while safeguarding economic stability, debt sustainability, and~~
~~investor confidence. Growth is expected to rebound strongly in FY2021/22 to 5.2 percent,~~
~~but the outlook is still clouded by uncertainty related to the pandemic, including regarding~~
~~the full recovery of tourism.64~~
~~Egypt Constructs a New Capital City~~
~~Since 2015, Egypt has been constructing a yet unnamed new capital city (temporarily referred to as the New~~
~~Administrative Capital, or NAC) 28 miles east of Cairo. The new city is planned to house 6.5 mil ion people and is~~
~~to feature new headquarters for most government agencies and a new financial center. The city is designed to be a~~
~~“smart” city, in which residents may use smartphone applications to access basic services. The city is to feature an~~
~~extensive surveil ance network of cameras to “monitor crowds and traffic congestion, detect incidents of theft,~~
~~observe suspicious people or objects, and trigger automated alarms in emergency situations,” according to~~
~~Honeywel , the contractor building the network.65 The German company Siemens Mobility is partnering with local~~
~~Egyptian companies to construct a high-speed rail line linking Cairo to the NAC and Red Sea coastal cities to ports~~
~~on the Mediterranean.~~
~~The construction of the NAC is the biggest “mega project” inaugurated by President Sisi. Since his ascension to~~
~~power, Egypt has widened the Suez Canal, expanded the network of tunnels and bridges connecting the Sinai~~
~~Peninsula to the mainland, and constructed several new military bases. Some observers, however, have questioned~~
~~the economic and environmental viability of building a city of 6 mil ion in an undeveloped desert area. According~~
~~to The Economist, “There are myriad questions about the city’s viability. Water is scarce; property prices are too~~
~~high for most Egyptians. Critics say the money would be better spent fixing the poor infrastructure in ‘old’~~
~~Cairo.”66~~
~~While Egypt has been able to access global capital to finance its infrastructure expansion, demand~~
~~for its debt could shift if interest rates rise elsewhere. Egypt’s Central Bank offers one of the~~
~~highest bond interest rates (8.25%) among emerging market economies, making the country’s~~
~~debt attractive to foreign investors. Overseas investors hold around $33 bil ion of Egypt’s~~

~~63 Haisam Hassanein, “Egypt’s New Parliament: Reopening Political Life, But Only So Far,” Policy Analysis, T he~~
~~Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2021.~~
~~64 T he International Monetary Fund, “Egypt: Overcoming the COVID Shock and Maintaining Growth,” July 14, 2021.~~
~~65 “From Creaking Cairo, Egypt Plans High-T ech Leap with new Capital,” Reuters, September 2, 2021.~~
~~66 “Egypt: Always Going Big,” The Economist, April 3, 2021.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Treasury bil s and bonds.67 International financial institutions now hold about half of Egypt’s~~
~~external debt. However, some economists are concerned that any increase in U.S. and European~~
~~interest rates may lead investors to sel Egyptian debt and move their money into safer markets.~~
~~Relatively low borrowing costs have enabled Egypt to finance public works projects and other~~
~~deficit spending initiatives. According to S&P Global Ratings, Egypt’s has one of the highest~~
~~debt-service burdens among al sovereigns, and the government requires funding from equity~~
~~sources in order to cope with possible increases in global interest rates.68~~
~~Some economists argue that Egypt relies too heavily on a few key economic sectors, such as~~
~~energy and tourism, while the rest of the private sector remains underdeveloped and poverty rates~~
~~remain high. According to the Economist, “The purchasing managers’ index, a measure of~~
~~private-sector activity, has spent most of the past five years contracting. As many as 30% of~~
~~Egyptians fel below the official poverty line of 857 pounds ($55) a month at the end of 2020.”69~~
~~For decades, Egypt’s military has played a key role in the nation’s economy as a food producer~~
~~and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political~~
~~sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified. Egypt’s military is believed to~~
~~be largely economical y self-sufficient. It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then~~
~~sel s surplus goods for additional revenue.~~
~~Under President Sisi, who has commissioned massive infrastructure projects, Egyptian military~~
~~companies have been the main beneficiaries of government contracts.70 Military-owned~~
~~manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods that are cheaper~~
~~than either foreign imports or domestical y produced goods made by the private sector (including~~
~~appliances, cement, fertilizer, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment).~~
~~Proponents of the military’s expanded role argue that its companies can move goods to market~~
~~more quickly and sel them to consumers at prices below those charged by private corporations.~~
~~Critics argue that the military is distorting the economic system and benefitting from a legal~~
~~system that gives the military unfair advantages. Reportedly, the military does not pay corporate~~
~~income taxes and employs low-wage conscript labor to keep overhead costs at a minimum.71~~expected to take place in 2025. 82 “Fears Over Egypt’s Judiciary Abound after Sisi Appointments,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2019. 83 Reportedly, President Sisi has since removed his son Mahmoud from the deputy head of the GIS. According to one controversial report in the Egyptian publication Mada Masr, Mahmoud Sisi lost his position in the GIS after the president’s inner circle concluded that his reputation was harmful to the Sisi regime. See “President’s Eldest Son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, Sidelined from Powerful Intelligence Position to Diplomatic Mission in Russia,” Mada Masr, November 20, 2019. After Mada Masr published this account, security services temporarily detained an editor and two journalists and confiscated their personal electronics. See “Egypt News Outlet Raided after Report on Sisi’s Son,” Financial Times, November 24, 2019. 84 See, Gender Quotas Database, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, Sweden. 85 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments, accessed September 9, 2021. 86 The party’s website is available in English at https://mostaqbal-watan.org/en/. 87 Haisam Hassanein, “Egypt’s New Parliament: Reopening Political Life, But Only So Far,” Policy Analysis, The Congressional Research Service 17 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations
Egypt’s Foreign Policy
Under President Sisi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been more active after a period of dormancy Under President Sisi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been more active after a period of dormancy
during the latter years of the late President Hosni Mubarak and the tumultuous two-and-a-half-during the latter years of the late President Hosni Mubarak and the tumultuous two-and-a-half-
year transition that followed Mubarak’s resignation.year transition that followed Mubarak’s resignation.7288 While President Sisi has continued Egypt’s ~~While President Sisi has continued Egypt’s~~

~~67 Mirette Magdy and T arek El-T ablawy, “Egypt Keeps Interest Rate on Hold with an Eye on Fed T apering,”~~
Bloom berg, September 16, 2021.
~~68 Op.cit., Mirette Magdy and Manus Cranny, “Egypt Has Crisis Experience to Handle a Fed T aper, Minister Says,”~~
Bloom berg, September 8, 2021.
~~69 “Egypt is again under Military Rule, but Sisi Lacks Nasser’s Appeal,” The Economist, August 28, 2021 edition.~~
~~70 “Egypt’s Economy Falls to the Military,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2018.~~
~~71 “Army’s Economic Role Fuels Debate in Egypt,” Middle East Online, April 3, 2018.~~
~~72 From about 2000 to 2013, Egypt had turned inward, unable to either lend its support or unilaterally advance major~~
~~U.S. initiatives in the region, such as the war in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, the terrorist~~
~~attacks of September 11, 2001, profoundly and negatively impacted how some U.S. policymakers viewed Egypt.~~
~~Whereas the bilateral relationship had previously focused on promoting regional peace and stability, the 9/11 attacks~~
~~reoriented U.S. policy during the George W. Bush Administration, as Americans considered the possibility that popular~~
~~disillusionment from authoritarianism might contribute to terrorism. Egypt has been a key element of this reorient ation,~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

longtime policy of playing an intermediary role between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt under longtime policy of playing an intermediary role between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt under
President Sisi has attempted to play a bigger role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. President Sisi has attempted to play a bigger role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Since 2014, as Egypt has developed off-shore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, Since 2014, as Egypt has developed off-shore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, ~~President~~
and President Sisi has modernized the Egyptian Navy and improved economic ties with Israel, Italy, Sisi has modernized the Egyptian Navy and improved economic ties with Israel, Italy, ~~and~~Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus Cyprus
while also looking to deter regional rivals, such as Turkey. In January 2020, Egypt inaugurated a while also looking to deter regional rivals, such as Turkey. In January 2020, Egypt inaugurated a
new base (Berenice) on the Red Sea which, according to one account, new base (Berenice) on the Red Sea which, according to one account, ~~wil al ow~~will allow Egypt to Egypt to
“project military power into the southern Red Sea.”“project military power into the southern Red Sea.”7389
As part of President Sisi’s strategy to revitalize Egyptian power in its immediate vicinity, it has As part of President Sisi’s strategy to revitalize Egyptian power in its immediate vicinity, it has
maintained longstanding U.S.-Egyptian security ties while strengthening defense relationships maintained longstanding U.S.-Egyptian security ties while strengthening defense relationships
with other actors.with other actors.7490 During Sisi’s presidency, Egypt has diversified its military-to-military and During Sisi’s presidency, Egypt has diversified its military-to-military and
trade relationships away from the United States to include closer relations with Russia, China, trade relationships away from the United States to include closer relations with Russia, China,
and European nations such as France, Italy,and European nations such as France, Italy,7591 and Germany. and Germany.7692 Between Between ~~2016~~2017 and and ~~2020~~2021, Egypt was , Egypt was
the third-largest arms importer the third-largest arms importer ~~global y~~globally (after Saudi Arabia and India) with (after Saudi Arabia and India) with ~~France, Russia, and~~
~~the United States~~Russia, France, and Italy being Egypt’s principal suppliers. being Egypt’s principal suppliers.77
~~In 2021,~~ 93 Egypt also has been more active in the Middle East, Egypt also has been more active in the Middle East, ~~specifical y~~specifically in Lebanon and Iraq, in Lebanon and Iraq,
two countries where Iran exerts influence over some of the Shia Arab population. In Lebanon, two countries where Iran exerts influence over some of the Shia Arab population. In Lebanon,
which remains in the throes of a crippling economic and energy crisis, Egypt is planning to ship which remains in the throes of a crippling economic and energy crisis, Egypt is planning to ship
natural natural gas through Jordan and Syria to the Deir Ammar power plant in Lebanon.94 Some U.S. lawmakers are concerned that such an arrangement would be, without a waiver, a violation of the Caesar Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2021. 88 From about 2000 to 2013, Egypt had turned inward, unable to either lend its support or unilaterally advance major U.S. initiatives in the region, such as the war in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, profoundly and negatively impacted how some U.S. policymakers viewed Egypt. Whereas the bilateral relationship had previously focused on promoting regional peace and stability, the 9/11 attacks reoriented U.S. policy during the George W. Bush Administration, as Americans considered the possibility that popular disillusionment from authoritarianism might contribute to terrorism. Egypt has been a key element of this reorientation, as several Egyptian terrorists helped form the original core of Al Qaeda. For example, see Nabil Fahmy, “Egypt in the World,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Summer 2012. 89 Jeremy Binnie, “Egypt Inaugurates Major Red Sea Base Complex,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 16, 2020. 90 The United States continues to fund the procurement of major defense systems. Since the start of the Biden Administration, the Defense Security ~~gas through Jordan and Syria to the Deir Ammar power plant in Lebanon.78 Egypt may~~
~~need to receive a waiver from the United States in order to comply with the Caesar Syria Civilian~~
~~Protection Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXIV). According to Barbara Leaf, the President’s~~
~~nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, “This is a project that, as I~~
~~understand, it is endorsed by the World Bank, so that a State Department is looking at it carefully~~
~~within the framework of US law and sanctions policy. But it shows some promise on the face of~~
~~it. And of course, the department wil consult thoroughly with Treasury on the way forward.”79 In~~
~~Iraq in 2021, President Sisi became the first Egyptian president to visit Baghdad in 30 years.~~

~~as several Egyptian terrorists helped form the original core of Al Qaeda. For example, see Nabil Fahmy, “ Egypt in the~~
~~World,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Summer 2012.~~
~~73 Jeremy Binnie, “Egypt Inaugurates Major Red Sea Base Complex,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 16, 2020.~~
~~74 T he United States continues to fund the procurement of major defense systems, as the Defense Security~~ Cooperation Cooperation
Agency (DSCA)Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress of potential defense sales to Egypt worth an estimated $has notified Congress of potential defense sales to Egypt worth an estimated $~~4.9 billion since 2018.~~
6 billion. For a list of major arms sales notifications to Egypt, see https://www.dsca.mil/tags/EgyptFor a list of major arms sales notifications to Egypt, see https://www.dsca.mil/tags/Egypt . .
7591 Italy has supplied Italy has supplied the Egyptian Navy with two FREMM Frigates from the Italian defense contractor Fincantieri for the Egyptian Navy with two FREMM Frigates from the Italian defense contractor Fincantieri for
an estimated $1.4 billion. Egypt has also armed its Italian frigates withan estimated $1.4 billion. Egypt has also armed its Italian frigates with Aster-15 medium-range surface-to-air missiles. Aster-15 medium-range surface-to-air missiles.
See,See, “Italy Advances Arms Deals“Italy Advances Arms Deals with Egypt Despite Opposition,” with Egypt Despite Opposition,” Al Monitor, March 27, 2021. A year earlier, Egypt , March 27, 2021. A year earlier, Egypt
purchased 24 AW149 and eight AW189 helicopters from Italian defense contractor Leonardo for $957 millionpurchased 24 AW149 and eight AW189 helicopters from Italian defense contractor Leonardo for $957 million . See . See
Gareth Jennings, “Italy Reveals Leonardo Helo SalesGareth Jennings, “Italy Reveals Leonardo Helo Sales to Egypt,” to Egypt,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,, May 21, 2020. May 21, 2020.
~~76 T hyssenKrupp~~92 ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems ( Marine Systems (~~T KMS~~TKMS) is supplying) is supplying the Egyptian Navy with four the Egyptian Navy with four ~~T ype~~Type 209/1400mod submarines 209/1400mod submarines
(for $1.7 billion). (for $1.7 billion). ~~T he~~The same German company also is same German company also is providing the navy with MEKO A‑200 frigates. Egypt is providing the navy with MEKO A‑200 frigates. Egypt is
procuring VL MICAprocuring VL MICA NG NG surface-to-air missiles from MBDA to protect these new frigates. surface-to-air missiles from MBDA to protect these new frigates.
~~77 “T rends~~93 “Trends in International Arms in International Arms ~~T ransfers, 2020~~Transfers, 2021,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ( ~~SIPRI), March~~
~~2021.~~
~~“Egypt looks beyond the US to meet Defence Needs,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 15, 2019. Report used data~~
~~from the Stockholm International P eace Research Institute’s database on arms transfers.~~
78SIPRI), March 2022. 94 “Lebanon to get Egyptian Gas via Syria “Lebanon to get Egyptian Gas via Syria in Plan to Ease Crisis,”in Plan to Ease Crisis,” Reuters, September 8, 2021. ~~Reuters, September 8, 2021.~~
~~79 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pending Nominations,” Congressional Quarterly,~~
~~Congressional T ranscripts, September 15, 2021.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

16

~~link to page 36~~ 18 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXIV). The Administration claims that Egypt’s gas transfer to Lebanon via Syria is an “in-kind” transfer and will not involve any “cash transfer” to Assad government.95 Lebanon is hoping that the combination of imported Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity will enable it to increase its electrical supply from a few hours a day to up to 10 hours.96 In 2021, President Sisi became the first Egyptian president to visit Baghdad in 30 years. Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have agreed to expand various types of energy and military cooperation, as well as trilateral trade and investment.97 Water and Climate Change Egypt’s high temperatures, lack of rainfall, low-lying delta regions, and reliance on the Nile River make it water scarce and susceptible to the effects of global warming, such as extreme heat waves, coastal flooding, and loss of agricultural productivity.98 Rising Sea Levels and the Nile Delta Low-lying deltas like Egypt’s Nile Delta and other parts of Egypt’s coast are susceptible to sea-level rise. Higher sea levels can result in more frequent flooding from high tides and extreme rainfall, greater impacts from coastal storms, damage to coastal fresh groundwater, changes to coastal habitats for fish and other species, and land lost to coastal erosion and inundation.99 The Nile Delta is Egypt’s most important agricultural region and home to significant population and economic centers, such as Alexandria and Port Said. Scientists have warned that the Nile Delta’s flood risk may increase in the years ahead due to a combination of factors.100 These include rising sea levels, which generally are anticipated to increase in the coming decades with warming temperatures, and local conditions contributing to land subsidence and loss, such as upstream dams capturing sediments needed for maintaining the delta and land subsidence from groundwater, oil, and gas extraction.101 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “The low-lying northern coast and Nile Delta region are a high priority for adaptation to climate change.”102 The Egyptian government’s record on taking steps to address climate change is mixed. On the one hand, decarbonization is difficult when a significant portion of the economy is dedicated to oil and natural gas extraction and production. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, hydrocarbon production is “by far the largest single industrial activity in the country, representing around 24 percent of total GDP in FY 2019-2020.”103 95 Rachel Oswald, “Senators Signal Skepticism toward Biden's Syria Policy,” CQ News, June 8, 2022. 96 “Lebanon, Egypt to Sign 'Final' Gas Deal on June 21 – Spokesperson,” Reuters, June 17, 2022. 97 “Is Egypt Back as a Power Player in the MENA Region?” Fanack.com, August 30, 2021. 98 See CRS In Focus IF11878, Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa, by Jeremy M. Sharp, Nicole T. Carter, and Kezee Procita. 99 For more information on how sea levels may effect coasts, see CRS ~~and U.S. Relations~~

~~Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have agreed to expand various energy and military cooperation, as wel as~~
~~trilateral trade and investment.80~~
~~Russia~~
~~Egypt and Russia, close partners in the early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened~~
~~bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international~~
~~prestige. His relationship with Russian President Putin, in the words of one observer, has~~
~~benefitted from “a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era.”81~~
~~President Sisi turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when the U.S.-Egyptian~~
~~relationship became more strained (see the Appendix).82~~
~~Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have strengthened their ties in a number of ways, including through~~
~~arms deals and joint military exercises. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy~~
~~Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant.83 Egypt also has purchased 46~~
~~standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force, along with the naval version of the Ka-~~
~~52 for use on Egypt’s two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels, and the S-~~
~~300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia.84 In June 2020, Egyptian media~~
~~reported that the Egyptian Army had agreed to purchase 500 Russian T-90 Main Battle Tanks~~
~~from Uralvagonzavod, though reportedly both sides are stil negotiating whether the tanks can be~~
~~assembled in Egypt (M1A1 tanks have been assembled in Egypt).85~~
~~Additional y, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In~~
~~2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-~~
~~megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba’a, 80 miles~~
~~northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 bil ion over 35 years to finance the construction~~
~~and operation of the nuclear power plant (this loan is to cover 85% of the project’s total costs).~~
~~The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant’s nuclear fuel for 60 years and to transfer~~
~~and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors. Rosatom anticipates that construction wil begin~~
~~in 2022 and that the plant wil be operational in 2028.86~~
~~Egyptian-Russian ties are not without complications. In the aftermath of a 2015 terrorist attack~~
~~against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian~~
~~tourists, previously the country’s largest source of tourists, dropped.87 Russian commercial~~
~~aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo and, after six years, to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and~~
~~Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest~~
~~global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat.~~
~~Several possible reasons could explain why Egyptian-Russian relations have improved under~~
~~President Sisi, none of which are mutual y exclusive. For one, President Sisi has most likely made~~
~~the determination that Egypt’s national security interests are best served by having global powers~~

~~80 “Is Egypt Back as a Power Player in the MENA Region?” Fanack.com , August 30, 2021.~~
~~81 “T he United States and the Future of Egyptian-Russian Relations,” The Caravan, Hoover Institution, March 9, 2017.~~
~~82 “Analysis: Egyptian Air Force Modernization,” Jane’s International Defence Review, November 10, 2016.~~
~~83 See Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Air Force- Egypt, August 7, 2018.~~
~~84 “Egyptian S-300VM SAM Delivery Confirmed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 6, 2017.~~
~~85 See, Jane’s World Armies, Egypt, March 17, 2021.~~
~~86 “Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plans Back on T rack,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 4, 2021.~~
~~87 Before 2015, Russian visitors accounted for 20%-30% of Egypt’s tourist arrivals. “Russian T ourist Numbers Set to~~
~~Recover Slowly,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2018.~~
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~~link to page 36~~ ~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~compete for Egypt’s favor. As a lower-middle-income country with relatively high poverty~~
~~(29.7%) and a military that relies on the appearance of strength for deterrence, Egypt seeks cost~~
~~efficiencies for its military acquisitions. Part of Egypt’s rebalancing of its foreign policy may be~~
~~seen as a quest to secure the most advanced hardware on the most generous financing terms~~
~~available. With U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants relatively unchanged since 1987~~
~~(Congress has appropriated $1.3 bil ion a year since then), the purchasing power of U.S. military~~
~~aid has decreased substantial y given the rising costs of major defense systems. Moreover, U.S.~~
~~defense technology, particularly fighter aircraft, has evolved to the point where Egypt either~~
~~cannot afford the latest generation of U.S. fighters (such as the F-35), lacks the technical know-~~
~~how to maintain them, or may be prohibited from purchasing certain items if they negate Israel’s~~
~~Qualitative Military Edge (QME).88 Egypt has turned to Russia and France in recent years to~~
~~source naval and air force acquisitions (fourth-generation fighters, such as the Su-35 from Russia~~
~~and the Rafale from France) while using U.S. assistance to maintain its existing stocks of U.S.~~
~~materiel. According to SIPRI, from 2000 to 2009, Egypt’s major arms supplier was the United~~
~~States, accounting for 75% of Egypt’s total arms imports; however, from 2010 to 2019, U.S. arms~~
~~imports accounted for 23% of Egypt’s total arms imports.89~~
~~Since the Egyptian military ousted former President Morsi in 2013, the Egyptian government~~
~~under President Sisi has rejected international criticism of its human rights record90 and has~~
~~sought out foreign partners that do not condition support based on Egyptian domestic policies.91~~
~~In 2014, while U.S. assistance to Egypt was under review (see the Appendix), then-Defense~~
~~Minister Sisi and Russian President Vladmir Putin held a series of meetings in which President~~
~~Putin endorsed Sisi for president, and the two leaders signed several unnamed military deals~~
~~possibly financed by Gulf Arab states.92 Russia and Egypt issued a joint communique at the time~~
~~that “condemned foreign interference in domestic affairs of any country and cal ed for solving al~~
~~existing problems and crises exclusively by peaceful means and broad al -inclusive dialogue.”93~~
~~France~~
~~Like Russia, France stands out as a country with which President Sisi has sought to build a~~
~~diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In late 2020, President Sisi visited France, and~~
~~French President Emmanuel Macron stated during a joint press conference that “I wil not~~
~~condition matters of defence [sic] and economic cooperation on these disagreements [over human~~
~~rights].... It is more effective to have a policy of demanding dialogue than a boycott which would~~
~~only reduce the effectiveness of one of our partners in the fight against terrorism.”94 Egypt has~~
~~purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the~~
~~following:~~
~~ 54 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). In 2015, Egypt~~
~~became the first foreign buyer of the Rafale when it ordered 24 fighter jets. In~~
~~2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to~~

~~88 See CRS Report R46580,~~ ~~Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab~~
~~Em irates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
~~89 Alexandra Kuimova, “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Background Paper, October 2020.~~
~~90 “Egypt Rejects Western Countries’ Criticism at UN Human Rights Council,” Al Ahram, March 12, 2021.~~
~~91 “Macron avoids ‘lecturing’ Egypt on rights, Sisi defends his record,” Reuters, October 24, 2017.~~
~~92 See, Molly Hunter, “From Russia with Love: Vladimir Putin Gives Sissi AK-47,” ABC News, February 10, 2015.~~
~~93 “Vladimir Putin pre-empts presidency bid by Egypt’s military chief,” Associated Press, February 13, 2014.~~
~~94 “Macron says French arms sales to Egypt will not be conditional on human r ights,” France 24, December 7, 2020.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~export the U.S.-made SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the~~
~~Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR)~~
~~agreement.95 The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of~~
~~sensitive technology to Egypt. In 2021, Egypt purchased an additional 30 Rafale~~
~~fighters in a $4.5 bil ion deal financed by a French sovereign loan guarantee on~~
~~85% of the total amount borrowed from various French commercial banks (BNP~~
~~Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale and CIC).96 France also provided a~~
~~sovereign loan guarantee on 65% of the financing for Egypt’s initial purchase of~~
~~24 jets.97~~
~~ Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group). This deal was signed in July~~
~~2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette~~
~~construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt.98~~
~~ One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group). Named the~~
Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This
~~ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as~~
~~Cleopatra.~~
~~ Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group). In fal 2015,~~
~~France announced that it would sel Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter~~
~~Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and~~
~~13 tanks) for $1 bil ion. The LHDs were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt~~
~~announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Al igator helicopters, which~~
~~can operate on the LHDs.99~~
~~China~~
~~Unlike Russia, France, and the United States, China has not been a key military partner of the~~
~~Egyptian Armed Forces, with the exception of its exports of armed drones to the Egyptian Air~~
~~Force.100 Moreover, although China has received some media attention for its investment in~~
~~projects relating to Egypt’s construction of its new capital,101 Chinese-Egyptian trade remains~~

~~95 “France Could Replace US Parts in SCALP Missile to Circumvent IT AR Restrictions for Egypt, But at Some~~
~~Delay,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 2, 2018.~~
~~96 Although unconfirmed, the French newspaper La Tribune also reported that Egypt intends to buy two Airbus MRT T~~
~~refueling tankers, four T hales Ground Master 400 long-range air surveillance radars, and one Airbus observation~~
satellite. See Michel Cabirol, “ Egypt: a Contract (Rafale) May Hide Other Orders (Spy Satellite, MRT T ),” La Tribune
~~(France), May 6, 2021.~~
~~97 “Egypt Buys French Fighter Jets,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 5, 2021.~~
~~98 In fall 2018, it was reported that the German manufacturer T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems is competing with the~~
~~French company Naval Group for a possible new Egyptian Navy purchase of corvettes.~~
~~99 According to one report, the effectiveness of the Mistral as a helicopter carrier depends on whether the helicopters on~~
~~board have foldable rotors. If they don’t, it “ reduces the size of their air wings from 16 helicopters to the six that can be~~
~~carried on deck.” See Jeremy Binnie, “ Egypt Deploys Ka-52s on Mistral LHD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 7,~~
~~2020.~~
~~100 “T he Aisheng ASN-209 was a Joint-Development of a MAME UAV System between China and Egypt,”~~
~~militaryfactory.com, April 27, 2020.~~
~~101 T he Chinese State Construction and Engineering Company (CSCEC) has secured a contract to build the business~~
~~district of Egypt’s New Administrative Capital. In the Suez Canal industrial zone, Chinese state-owned conglomerate~~
~~T EDA operates an industrial park with 85 companies and more than 4,000 employees. See “ T he Competition for~~
~~Egypt: China, the West, and Megaprojects,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2021.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~relatively modest. According to one report, Egypt represents less than 5% of China’s trade with~~
~~Middle Eastern and North African countries.102~~
~~Though Chinese-Egyptian trade and investment does not match China’s presence in other parts of~~
~~the region, the United States has warned Egypt over accepting Chinese investment in critical~~
~~technological infrastructure, such as 5G networks. According to one report, during the Trump~~
~~Administration, U.S. officials warned Egypt not to al ow Chinese companies, such as Huawei, to~~
~~build critical data networks in Egypt due to their inability to protect user data.103~~
~~The Nile Basin Countries~~
~~Egypt relies on the Nile River104 for~~
~~hydroelectricity, agriculture, and most of its~~
~~Figure 5. GERD Talks in Washington, DC~~
~~domestic water needs, and thus treats~~
~~restrictions to the flow of the Nile from~~
~~upstream countries as an existential issue.~~
~~According to the United Nations, “Egypt’s~~
~~dependency ratio is one of the world’s highest~~
~~with 96.9 percent of the total renewable water~~
~~resources flowing into the country from~~
~~neighboring countries. The total renewable~~
~~water resources per capita stands at 700~~
~~m3/year/capita in 2014, but considering~~

~~population growth is expected to drop below~~
~~the 500 m3 threshold of absolute water~~
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.
~~scarcity by 2030.”105 Experts expect climate change to increase the frequency of hot and dry years~~
~~for farmers along the Nile.106~~
~~The government has been at odds with Nile Basin countries to Egypt’s south that seek to revisit~~
~~colonial-era treaties governing the Nile waters. Tensions are particularly strong with Ethiopia~~
~~(population 110 mil ion), which is nearing completion of the $4.2 bil ion Grand Ethiopian~~
~~Renaissance Dam (GERD), a major hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile, which starts in~~
~~Ethiopia. Egypt argues that the dam, once fil ed, wil limit the flow of the Nile below Egypt’s~~
~~share,107 as agreed upon in a 1959 deal with Sudan (of which Ethiopia was not part).108 Ethiopia~~

~~102 Mohamed El Dahshan, “Egyptian Exceptionalism in a Chinese-led World,” Chatham House, February 10, 2021.~~
~~103 Khalid Hassan, “US Warns Egypt to Avoid Chinese Companies on 5G Connections,” Al Monitor, November 3,~~
~~2020.~~
~~104 T he Nile is the longest river in the world (4,184), stretching from Kenya’s Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean Sea.~~
~~T he Blue Nile and White Nile merge in Sudan before flowing into Egypt.~~
~~105 FAO. 2016. AQUAST AT Country Profile—Egypt. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations~~
~~(FAO). Rome, Italy.~~
~~106 Declan Walsh and Somini Sengupta, “For T housands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam T hreatens~~
~~T hat,” New York Times, February 9, 2020.~~
~~107 “Egypt Denounces Ethiopia for Moving Ahead with Nile Dam Amid Water: Shortage Fears,” Reuters, October 3,~~
~~2019.~~
~~108 International agreements on apportioning the flow of the Nile River date back to the British colonial period when~~
~~some Nile riparian countries were not parties themselves to the agreemen ts. T he last major agreement, the 1959 Nile~~
~~Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, divided the entire average annual flow of the Nile between Egypt and~~
~~Sudan. Ethiopia was not part of this agreement. T he 1959 agreement revised Egypt’s share of the Nile waters upward~~
~~from a previous arrangement reached between Egypt and the British colonial authorities in Sudan , which also excluded~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~claims that the dam, which would double its electricity generating capacity, is critical to its efforts~~
~~to eradicate poverty. Sudan, which sits in the middle of the dispute, stands to benefit from~~
~~Ethiopia’s prospective electricity exports and the regulated water flow, which would curtail~~
~~flooding and improve its agricultural potential.109~~
~~After years of failed talks, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan continue to disagree over how long~~
~~Ethiopia should take to fil the dam, as wel as how much water should be released from the~~
~~GERD on an annual basis, particularly during prolonged droughts.110 Reduced Nile flow through~~
~~Sudan into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages in both countries and cause short-term~~
~~political problems for the Egyptian government, given its extensive unmet domestic water needs.~~
~~Rising Sea Levels and the Nile Delta~~
~~Low-lying deltas like Egypt’s Nile Delta and other parts of Egypt’s coast are susceptible to sea-level rise. Higher~~
~~sea levels can result in more frequent flooding from high tides and extreme rainfal , greater impacts from coastal~~
~~storms, damage to coastal fresh groundwater, changes to coastal habitats for fish and other species, and land lost~~
~~to coastal erosion and inundation.111 The Nile Delta is Egypt’s most important agricultural region and home to~~
~~significant population and economic centers, such as Alexandria and Port Said. Scientists have warned that the Nile~~
~~Delta’s flood risk may increase in the years ahead due to a combination of factors.112 These include rising sea~~
~~levels, which general y are anticipated to increase in the coming decades with warming temperatures, and local~~
~~conditions contributing to land subsidence and loss, such as upstream dams capturing sediments needed for~~
~~maintaining the delta and land subsidence from groundwater, oil, and gas extraction.113 According to the~~
~~Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “The low-lying northern coast and Nile Delta region are a~~
~~high priority for adaptation to climate change.”114~~
~~The Egyptian government is taking some steps to address climate change. With support from the International~~
~~Finance Corporation, it has built one of the world’s largest solar parks at Benban in Aswan and aims to~~
~~dramatical y increase its national reliance on solar power. It also has built storm barriers along Alexandria’s shore~~
~~to stave off flooding, and has received funding from the United Nations Development Program to protect dams~~
~~along the Nile. In order to cope with anticipated freshwater shortages, Egypt is building two large wastewater~~
~~treatment plants, limiting cultivation of water-intensive crops such as bananas and rice, and planning to construct~~
~~desalination plants. 115~~
~~To break the deadlock over Nile water-sharing, Egypt has repeatedly sought third-party~~
~~mediation, particularly from the United States,116 the United Nations, and the Africa Union.~~

~~Ethiopia.~~
~~109 See International Crisis Group, “Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute,” March 20, 2019.~~
~~110 See International Crisis Group, “Calming the Choppy Nile Dam T alks,” October 23, 2019.~~
~~111 For more information on how sea levels may effect coasts, see CRS~~ Report R44632, Report R44632, Sea-Level Rise and U.S.
Coasts: Science and Policy Considerations, by Peter Folger and Nicole T, by Peter Folger and Nicole T . Carter. Higher sea levels. Carter. Higher sea levels can impair drainage can impair drainage
of runoff from rainfall events. of runoff from rainfall events.
~~112~~100 Mohamed Shaltout, Kareem Mohamed Shaltout, Kareem ~~T onbol~~Tonbol, and Anders Omstedt, “Sea-Level Change, and Anders Omstedt, “Sea-Level Change and Projected Future Floodingand Projected Future Flooding Along Along
the Egyptian Mediterranean Coast,” the Egyptian Mediterranean Coast,” Oceanologia, vol. 57, no. 4 (2015); , vol. 57, no. 4 (2015); IPCC, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing ~~Clim ate~~Climate, in press, September 24, 2019, p. 4-61. , in press, September 24, 2019, p. 4-61.
~~113~~101 Esayas Gebremichael Esayas Gebremichael et al., “Assessinget al., “Assessing Land Deformation and Sea Encroachment in the Nile Delta: A Radar Land Deformation and Sea Encroachment in the Nile Delta: A Radar
Interferometric and Inundation Modeling Approach,” Interferometric and Inundation Modeling Approach,” JGR Solid Earth, vol. 123, no. 4 (April 2, 2018). , vol. 123, no. 4 (April 2, 2018).
~~114~~ 102 IPCC, IPCC, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, in press, September 24, 2019, , in press, September 24, 2019,
p. 4-61. p. 4-61.
~~115 “Egypt Seeks to Diversify its Water Supply Sources,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2021.~~
~~116 During a June 2021 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ambassador Robert F. Godec, Acting~~
~~Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs, stated, “ What I would emphasize is that there are solutions—~~
~~technical solutions that address the concerns of all of the parties, that allow Ethiopia to build the dam and have~~
~~electricity, that allows Egypt to have water, that allows Sudan to have water, and meets the needs of all of the people of~~
~~the region. T he issue is really a question of political will. T he leaders in these countrie s have to come to an agreement.”~~103 U.S. Commerce Department, International Trade Administration, Country Commercial Guide, Egypt, September 5, 2021.
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Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations On the other hand, as Egypt prepares to host the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27), it has accelerated national climate adaptation efforts. At COP26, President Sisi pledged to double Egypt’s use of renewable energy from 20% to 42% and reduce subsidies for fossil fuels.104 In May 2022, the government published the National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction, a broad-based plan to sustain economic growth while transitioning to a low-emissions economy. With support from the International Finance Corporation, Egypt has built one of the world’s largest solar parks at Benban in Aswan. An Israeli company provides solar panel-cleaning robots to service the power plant.105 Egypt also has built two wind farms (Ras Ghareb and West Bakr) in partnership with several foreign companies. The Nile River Egypt relies on the Nile River106 (see Figure 6) for hydroelectricity, agriculture, and most of its domestic water needs, and thus treats restrictions to the flow of the Nile from upstream countries as an existential issue. According to the United Nations, “Egypt’s dependency ratio is one of the world’s highest with 96.9 percent of the total renewable water resources flowing into the country from neighboring countries. The total renewable water resources per capita stands at 700 m3/year/capita in 2014, but considering population growth is expected to drop below the 500 m3 threshold of absolute water scarcity by 2030.”107 Experts expect climate change to increase the frequency of hot and dry years for farmers along the Nile.108 104 U.S. State Department, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry Opening Remarks for the U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue, November 8, 2021. 105 George Mikhail, “Israel Eyes Solar Opportunities in Egypt,” Al Monitor, November 30, 2021. 106 The Nile is the longest river in the world (4,184), stretching from Kenya’s Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean Sea. The Blue Nile and White Nile merge in Sudan before flowing into Egypt. 107 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), FAO. 2016. AQUASTAT Country Profile—Egypt. 108 Declan Walsh and Somini Sengupta, “For Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That,” New York Times, February 9, 2020. Congressional Research Service 20 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations The government has been at odds with Nile Basin countries to Egypt’s south that seek to Figure 6. The Nile River revisit colonial-era treaties governing the allocation of Nile waters. Tensions are particularly strong with Ethiopia (population 110 million), which operates the $4.2 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a major hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile, which starts in Ethiopia. Egypt argues that the dam, once filled, will limit the flow of the Nile below Egypt’s share,109 as agreed upon in a 1959 Egyptian deal with Sudan (of which Ethiopia was not part).110 Ethiopia claims that the dam, which would double its electricity generating capacity, is critical to its efforts to eradicate poverty. After years of failed talks, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan continue to disagree over how long Ethiopia should take to fill the dam, as well as how much water should be released from the GERD on an annual basis, particularly during prolonged droughts.111 Source: CRS Graphics. U.S.-Egyptian Relations Key Components At a broad level, the United States views the stability of Egypt, the most populous country in the Middle East, as pivotal to regional stability, and therefore maintains a decades-long security partnership to strengthen Egypt’s armed forces and its ability to combat terrorism.112 In April 2021, Egypt joined the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Combined Maritime Forces,113 a 34-nation naval partnership to combat terrorism, prevent piracy, and encourage regional cooperation. In September 2021, 600 U.S. service personnel from CENTCOM participated in Operation Bright Star, a biennial multinational military training exercise cohosted by the United 109 “Egypt Denounces Ethiopia for Moving Ahead with Nile Dam Amid Water: Shortage Fears,” Reuters, October 3, 2019. 110 International agreements on apportioning the flow of the Nile River date back to the British colonial period when some Nile riparian countries were not parties themselves to the agreements. The last major agreement, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, divided the entire average annual flow of the Nile between Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia was not part of this agreement. The 1959 agreement revised Egypt’s share of the Nile waters upward from a previous arrangement reached between Egypt and the British colonial authorities in Sudan, which also excluded Ethiopia. 111 Eric Reguly, “Why Egypt Sees a Massive Dam in Ethiopia as a Matter of Life and Death,” The Globe and Mail (UK), June 7, 2022. 112 U.S. State Department, Joint Statement on the U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue, November 9, 2021. 113 See https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 14 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations ~~and U.S. Relations~~

~~However, as of September 2021, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia continue to be at an impasse in~~
~~reaching a trilateral agreement governing Ethiopia’s usage of the GERD to manage the flow of~~
~~the Nile River. International mediation efforts by the United States and the Africa Union (AU),~~
~~among others, have to date not resolved the dispute.117 After numerous rounds of unsuccessful~~
~~talks, Egypt’s negotiating position remains focused on securing a long term, international y~~
~~legal y binding agreement limiting Ethiopia’s dam-fil ing in drought years. Ethiopia, which~~
~~perceives its control over the dam as a matter of national pride and sovereignty, has sought to~~
~~retain the flexibility to release waters from the dam’s reservoir. In July 2021, Ethiopia fil ed the~~
~~dam’s reservoir for the second time, potential y fil ing it enough to begin producing~~
~~hydroelectricity for the first time.~~
~~Egypt, with support from the Arab League,~~
~~also has continued to press the issue at the~~
~~Figure 6. The Nile River~~
~~United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In~~
~~July 2021, the UNSC held a meeting on the~~
~~GERD, in which Egypt presented draft text~~
~~for a UNSC resolution cal ing for a binding~~
~~agreement within six months; for the rejection~~
~~of unilateral actions, including the fil ing of~~
~~the dam; and for world powers to play a more~~
~~active role in mediation.118 In September~~
~~2021, the Security Council adopted a~~
~~presidential statement cal ing for a~~
~~resumption of African Union-led negotiations~~
~~in order to reach a “binding agreement on the~~
~~fil ing and operation of the GERD.”119~~
~~However, Egypt’s entreaties to the~~
~~international community have not born fruit.~~
~~According to one analyst, “From a~~
~~psychological point of view, Egypt is for the~~
~~first time dependent on a major country of a~~
~~size that is comparable to Egypt, of an~~
~~economic power that is quickly catching up~~
~~with Egypt.”~~

~~120~~
Source: CRS Graphics.
~~Libya~~
~~Since the 2011 uprising that toppled long-time authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi,~~
~~Egyptian policy in Libya has focused on securing its western border, protecting its citizens~~
~~working in Libya, and supporting eastern Libyan political and military forces. During Libya’s~~
~~recent period of internal conflict (2014-2020), Egypt intervened militarily to strike armed Islamist~~

~~See House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing entitled, T he Conflict in Ethiopia, June 29, 2021.~~
~~117 A mediation effort by the T rump Administration stalled in 2020 after Ethiopia rejected a draft agreement put forth~~
~~by then-T reasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and accused the United States of bias toward Egypt.~~
~~118 United Nations, “ Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Regional Relations,” What’s in Blue, July~~
~~7, 2021.~~
~~119 “Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD),” What’s in Blue,~~
~~September 15, 2021.~~
~~120 Max Bearak and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Africa’s Largest Dam Powers Dreams of Prosperity in Ethiopia —and Fears~~
~~of Hunger in Egypt,” Washington Post, October 15, 2020.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~groups in eastern Libya and provided diplomatic and material support to Field Marshal Khalifa~~
~~Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement. The LNA stil controls most of eastern~~
~~Libya despite its unsuccessful attempt to seize al of Libya between 2019 and 2020. Although~~
~~Egypt’s support to Haftar and the LNA has been limited, Haftar’s priorities align with President~~
~~Sisi’s to a certain extent, as both men hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political~~
~~forces.~~
~~Beyond its immediate borders and from a broader geo-political perspective, Egypt seeks to limit~~
~~Turkish influence in Libya, which it sees as destabilizing. Turkey’s support for Islamist~~
~~movements, including the Egyptian-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, has long been a strain in their~~
~~bilateral relationship, particularly since the ouster of former president Muhammad Morsi in 2013.~~
~~Support for opposing factions in Libya further exacerbated tensions.~~
~~Since a cease-fire among Libyans went into effect in October 2020, Egypt has engaged~~
~~diplomatical y with Libyan military leaders and the interim Government of National Unity~~
~~(GNU). In 2021, President Sisi has met several times with GNU interim Prime Minister Abdul~~
~~Hamid Dabaiba. Egypt has pledged to reopen its embassy in Tripoli (which has been closed since~~
~~2014) and consulate in Benghazi. At the same time, Egypt has engaged Turkey in a series of~~
~~bilateral talks (the first since 2013) aimed at reaching mutual understandings in Libya and the~~
~~eastern Mediterranean. Despite improved ties, Cairo may stil be suspicious of Turkish long-term~~
~~intentions in Libya. According to Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, progress in Libya~~
~~depends on “real change in Turkish policy,” and “words are not enough, they must be matched by~~
~~deeds.”121 According to one analyst, “Egypt fears that Ankara’s military patronage of Tripoli~~
~~combined with the long-lasting Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood could create an~~
~~Islamic-oriented government in Tripoli. This is a risk that Egyptian President Sisi does not want~~
~~to run.”122~~
~~U.S.-Egyptian Relations~~
~~Key Components~~
~~At a broad level, the United States views the stability of Egypt, the most populous country in the~~
~~Middle East, as key to regional stability, and therefore maintains a decades-long security~~
~~partnership to strengthen Egypt’s armed forces and its ability to combat terrorism.123 In April~~
~~2021, Egypt joined the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Combined Maritime Forces,124 a~~
~~34-nation naval partnership to combat terrorism, prevent piracy, and encourage regional~~
~~cooperation. In September 2021, 600 U.S. service personnel from the U.S. Central Command~~
~~(CENTCOM) participated in Operation Bright Star,125 a biennial multinational military training~~

~~121 Lazar Berman, “Egypt Uses Military to Send Firm Message to Newly Conciliatory T urkey, Times of Israel, July 7,~~
~~2021.~~
~~122 Alessia Melcangi, “Egypt recalibrated its strategy in Libya because of T urkey,” MENASource, Atlantic Council,~~
~~June 1, 2021.~~
~~123 T he White House, President Donald J. T rump Remains Committed to Egypt and Middle East Stability, April 9,~~
~~2019.~~
~~124 See https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/.~~
~~125 Since 1980, shortly after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the United States and Egypt have~~
~~conducted large-scale joint military exercises known as “ Bright Star.” In 1980, both countries conducted annual single~~
~~service bilateral ground maneuver events. However, starting in the mid-1980s, Bright Star became a biennial~~
~~multinational military training exercise. For the first 25 years of its existence, Bright Star was one of the largest~~
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~~link to page 8~~ ~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~exercise cohosted by the United States and Egypt that, since the early 1980s, has helped foster the~~
States and Egypt that, since the early 1980s, has helped foster the interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces.interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces.~~126~~
114 Another key U.S. component of U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation has been expedited naval Another key U.S. component of U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation has been expedited naval
access through the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government has long provided U.S. warships with access through the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government has long provided U.S. warships with
the courtesy of front-of-the-line access to the Canal for expedited passage.the courtesy of front-of-the-line access to the Canal for expedited passage.~~127~~115 After the March After the March
2021 temporary blockage of the canal by a stranded container ship, U.S. officials have reiterated 2021 temporary blockage of the canal by a stranded container ship, U.S. officials have reiterated
the importance of open access to the canal for commercial trade and military operations.the importance of open access to the canal for commercial trade and military operations.~~128~~116
Successive Administrations also have expressed admiration for Egypt’s role in Middle East Successive Administrations also have expressed admiration for Egypt’s role in Middle East
peacemaking (see the peacemaking (see the “Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians” section above). According to U.S. section above). According to U.S.
Ambassador to Egypt Jonathan Cohen, “The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership is vital to both Ambassador to Egypt Jonathan Cohen, “The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership is vital to both
nations and spans decades. We have cooperated with one another every day, across the nations and spans decades. We have cooperated with one another every day, across the
administrations of eight U.S. presidents on a wide agenda which began with Egypt’s pioneering administrations of eight U.S. presidents on a wide agenda which began with Egypt’s pioneering
role in promoting Middle East peace.”role in promoting Middle East peace.”~~129~~117 Since 1982, the United States has continued to Since 1982, the United States has continued to
participate in the Sinai Peninsula peacekeeping and monitoring mission, participate in the Sinai Peninsula peacekeeping and monitoring mission, ~~know n~~known as the as the
~~Multinational~~ Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).118 114 U.S. Defense Department, United States Central Command, Readout from Gen. McKenzie’s Visit to Egypt, September 11, 2021. 115 While the Suez Canal Transit Authority provides the U.S. Navy with expedited passage, the United States, like other foreign nations transiting the canal, pays the authority fees for transit, tug boat assistance, late fees, and port dues. 116 See testimony of Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, House Armed Services Committee Hearing entitled “National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa,” April 20, 2021. See also John Bowden, “Pentagon: Suez Canal Stoppage May Impact Transit of Military Vessels,” The Hill, March 28, 2021. 117 Hany Assai, “INTERVIEW: US Ambassador to Cairo says strategic partnership vital to both nations, spans decades,” Al Ahram, July 4, 2021. 118 See CRS Insight IN11403, Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula, by Jeremy M. Sharp. P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, includes Section 1292, which requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress of any planned withdrawal of U.S. troops that would bring total U.S. military participation in the MFO below 430 soldiers. Congressional Research Service 22 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 7. U.S.-Egyptian Bilateral Trade 2010-2021 not seasonally adjusted Source: U.S. Census Bureau Though military-to-military relations remain the backbone of the bilateral relationship, the United States and Egypt seek opportunities to expand trade and investment deemed mutually beneficial. Despite having the largest population in the Middle East, Egypt ranks as the region’s fifth-largest economy by GDP (behind Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel). By total 2021 volume of trade, Egypt ranks as the 49th-largest U.S. trading partner, at $9.1 billion (see Figure 7).119 Egypt is the largest export market for U.S. goods in Africa. The United States has a trade surplus with Egypt and exports wheat and ~~Force and Observers (MFO).130~~
~~Though military-to-military relations remain the backbone of the bilateral relationship, the United~~
~~States and Egypt seek opportunities to expand trade and investment deemed mutual y beneficial.~~
~~Despite having the largest population in the Middle East, Egypt ranks as the region’s fifth-largest~~
~~economy by GDP (behind Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel). By total 2020 volume of~~
~~trade, Egypt ranks as the 50th-largest U.S. trading partner, at $6.8 bil ion (a 20% drop from 2019~~
~~due to the pandemic).131 The United States has a trade surplus with Egypt and exports wheat and~~

~~coalition military exercise conducted by CENT COM. It included the ground, naval, and air forces of both the United~~
~~States and Egypt, along with troops from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece,~~
~~Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, T urkey, Pakistan, and Kuwait. During the 1999/2000 eve nt, 11 nations contributed~~
~~over 70,000 troops to the exercise. At times, regional conflict or tensions in the U.S. -Egyptian relationship have led to~~
~~the cancellation of Bright Star. Due to the wars in Iraq, Bright Star was cancelled in 1991 and 2003. Due t o political~~
~~unrest in Egypt, the Egyptian armed forces cancelled Bright Star in 2011. In 2013, President Obama suspended U.S.~~
~~participation in Bright Star due to U.S. concerns over the military’s ousting of Egypt’s civilian -led government. T hus,~~
~~Bright Star did not take place from 2010 to 2016. It resumed in September 2017, when an estimated 200 U.S. soldiers~~
~~participated in the exercise at Mohamed Naguib Military Base in Egypt, where U.S. and Egyptian forces conducted~~
~~battle simulations involving U.S.-origin major defense equipment, such as Egyptian F-16s and M1A1 Egyptian tanks.~~
~~In August 2018, approximately 800 U.S. troops participated in Operation Bright Star 18. T hat event featured Egyptian~~
~~special operations forces conducting counterterrorism and irregular warfare training operations, working in close~~
~~collaboration with US special operators. In 2020, the United States and Egypt cancelled Bright Star due to the COVID -~~
~~19 pandemic.~~
~~126 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Central Command, Readout from Gen. McKenzie’s Visit to Egypt,~~
~~September 11, 2021.~~
~~127 While the Suez Canal T ransit Authority provides the U.S. Navy with expedited passage, the United States, like other~~
~~foreign nations transiting the canal, pays the authority fees for transit, tug boat assistance, late fees, and port dues.~~
~~128 See testimony of Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, House~~
~~Armed Services Committee Hearing entitled “ National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater~~
~~Middle East and Africa,” April 20, 2021. See also John Bowden, “Pentagon: Suez Canal Stoppage may Impact T ransit~~
~~of Military Vessels,” The Hill, March 28, 2021.~~
~~129 Hany Assai, “INT ERVIEW: US Ambassador to Cairo says Strategic Partnership Vital to both Nations, Spans~~
~~Decades,” Ahram online, July 4, 2021.~~
~~130 See CRS Insight IN11403, Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula , by Jeremy M.~~
~~Sharp. P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 ,~~
~~includes Section 1292, which requires the Secretary of Defense to notif y Congress of any planned withdrawal of U.S.~~
~~troops that would bring total U.S. military participation in the MFO below 430 soldiers.~~
~~131 T rade statistics generated by T rade Data Monitor, LLC using trade information from Egypt’s Central Agency for~~
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24

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

corn, mineral fuel and oil, machinery, aircraft, and iron and steel products. U.S. imports corn, mineral fuel and oil, machinery, aircraft, and iron and steel products. U.S. imports from Egypt include include
apparel, natural gas and oil, fertilizers, textiles, and agricultural products.apparel, natural gas and oil, fertilizers, textiles, and agricultural products.~~132~~120 According to the U.S. According to the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Egypt Country Commercial Guide, U.S. foreign direct investment Department of Commerce’s Egypt Country Commercial Guide, U.S. foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Egypt was $1.37 (FDI) in Egypt was $1.37 ~~bil ion~~billion in 2019 (latest data available), making the United States the in 2019 (latest data available), making the United States the
third-largest foreign investor in Egypt, behind the United Kingdom and Belgium. Most FDI from third-largest foreign investor in Egypt, behind the United Kingdom and Belgium. Most FDI from
the United States is concentrated in the oil and natural gas sectors.the United States is concentrated in the oil and natural gas sectors.~~133~~
~~Challenges in the Bilateral Relationship~~121 U.S. Concerns about Domestic Egyptian Developments
Various U.S. concerns about Egypt’s internal security, political repression, and social stagnation Various U.S. concerns about Egypt’s internal security, political repression, and social stagnation
complicate longstanding bilateralcomplicate longstanding bilateral military and economic cooperative endeavorsmilitary and economic cooperative endeavors~~, but the countries~~
~~continue to share security interests~~. After nearly a decade of terrorist attacks and insurgent . After nearly a decade of terrorist attacks and insurgent
~~warfare, the Sinai Peninsula continues to be an area of~~ warfare, the Sinai Peninsula continues to be an area of 119 See, U.S. Commerce Department, United States Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, Annual Revision, Release Number: CB 22-92, BEA 22-23, Exhibit 13. U.S. Trade in Goods by Country and Area: 2021, June 7, 2022. Trade statistics generated by Trade Data Monitor, LLC using trade information from Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 120 U.S. State Department, U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, September 20, 2019. 121 U.S. Commerce Department, International Trade Administration, Egypt Country Commercial Guide, Updated September 5, 2021. Congressional Research Service 23 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations significant concern to U.S. policymakers. significant concern to U.S. policymakers.
According to the latest U.S. State Department Report on Terrorism, “According to the latest U.S. State Department Report on Terrorism, “~~Nearly al~~ All terrorist attacks in terrorist attacks in
~~Egypt~~ Egypt during the year took place in the Sinai Peninsula....ISIS-Sinai Province conducted regular small arms and IED attacks against security forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure.”122 ~~took place in the Sinai Peninsula and largely targeted security forces, but terrorist attacks~~
~~targeting civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt remained a concern.”134~~
Beyond the spate of violence emanating from the Sinai is concern over Egypt’s dynamism as a Beyond the spate of violence emanating from the Sinai is concern over Egypt’s dynamism as a
21st-century nation state that meets the growing demands of its educated and interconnected 21st-century nation state that meets the growing demands of its educated and interconnected
youth. According to Tamara Cofman Wittes, youth. According to Tamara Cofman Wittes, ~~the President~~President Biden’s nominee for ’s nominee for ~~USAID assistant~~
~~administrator~~the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Assistant Administrator for Middle East: for Middle East:
Even in the face of a relationship that has today as many differences as areas of agreement, Even in the face of a relationship that has today as many differences as areas of agreement,
many parts of the United States government continue to view the nation of Egypt as ‘too many parts of the United States government continue to view the nation of Egypt as ‘too
big to fail.’ There is good reason for this view. Egyptians represent a full one-fifth of the big to fail.’ There is good reason for this view. Egyptians represent a full one-fifth of the
entire Arab world. An economic or political disruption in Egypt would, as it did in 2011, entire Arab world. An economic or political disruption in Egypt would, as it did in 2011,
have profound effects across the region.have profound effects across the region.~~135~~
~~The COVID-19 pandemic has further strained state finances, forcing the government to continue~~
~~to rely on foreign creditors to finance its large public debt, which, as of September 2021, was~~
~~equal to 92% of Gross Domestic Product. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)~~123 As previously mentioned, Egyptian state finances are straining under the weight of its public debt, which, as of July 2022, was equal to 94% of GDP. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the single largest expenditure in Egypt’s state budget is interest payments on domestic and foreign debt, accounting for a third of total spending ($37 billion).124 Once government salaries, subsidy payments, and interest are taken into account, analysts note that the state has insufficient resources remaining for spending on health and education.125 President Sisi himself has acknowledged that the social contract between state and citizen may need adjusting. According to Sisi, “There is an entrenched culture unique to our country that one can buy things and receive services for less than they cost, and have children and expect someone else to feed them... This has held the country back in recent years.”126 The IMF has repeatedly has repeatedly
lent Egypt funds with the stipulation that it cuts spending on food and fuel subsidies, changes that lent Egypt funds with the stipulation that it cuts spending on food and fuel subsidies, changes that
successive Egyptian governments have been slow to make because of fear of igniting popular successive Egyptian governments have been slow to make because of fear of igniting popular
~~unrest. Since 2016, the IMF has lent Egypt $20 bil ion; it continues to emphasize~~unrest. The IMF also has emphasized that in order for that in order for
Egypt to unlock its growth potential, Egypt’s private sector needs to grow and the state needs to Egypt to unlock its growth potential, Egypt’s private sector needs to grow and the state needs to
reduce its role in certain sectors while “fostering labor market participation of women and youth, reduce its role in certain sectors while “fostering labor market participation of women and youth,
and encouraging and encouraging exports.”127 The state is attempting to sell unproductive state-owned enterprises to foreign entities or take certain state-owned companies public, including military-run businesses.128 Successive U.S. Administrations also have expressed concerns over the Sisi government’s continued crackdown against political dissent and nonviolent opposition. Biden Administration officials have reiterated this concern while attempting to maintain the uneasy balance of U.S. longstanding concern for human rights in Egypt with close ties to the military. At the November 2021 U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue between high level U.S. and Egyptian officials, U.S. 122 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Egypt. 123 Testimony of Tamara Wittes, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, hearing entitled “Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020. 124 “Egypt 's 2022/23 Budget Based on Optimistic Assumptions,” ViewsWire, Economist Intelligence Unit, May 17, 2022. 125 “Egypt Faces Sharp Rise in Costs to Finance Proposed $30 bln Deficit,” Reuters, May 16, 2022. 126 Tarek El Tablawy and Abdel Latif Wahba, “A Surging Population Brings Risks for Next Global Climate Talks Host,” Bloomberg, February 5, 2022. 127 The International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review under the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for the Arab Republic of Egypt and Concludes 2021 Article IV Consultation, June 23, 2021. 128 “Egypt Outlines Broad Plan to Sell State Assets,” Reuters, May 15, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke about how U.S. officials intended to incorporate human rights concerns into its bilateral dialogue with Egypt, saying: Third, our delegations and teams will discuss human rights. We very much welcome Egypt’s launch of a national human rights strategy. We’re committed to working together to advance key goals like reforming pretrial detention regulations, protecting the right to a free press and freedom of expression. There are also other issues of concern, more areas where positive steps can be taken, not because the United States or anyone else is asking, but because, as the foreign minister, the president said, it’s what’s in the interests of the Egyptian people. The work that Egypt is doing, the steps that are undertaken, are because it is good and right for the Egyptian people. As we discussed this morning, making tangible and lasting improvements on human rights is also essential to strengthening our bilateral relationship, and the United States will continue to support those efforts however we can.129 Recent Action on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. Lawmakers have included a national security waiver to allow~~exports.”136 According to one longtime expert on Egypt, Professor Robert~~
~~Springborg:~~
~~Egypt’s biggest challenge comes down to the state’s money: where does it come from and~~
~~where does it go? The al-Sisi regime is based on the proposition that Egypt is too big to~~

~~Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).~~
~~132 U.S. State Department, U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,~~
~~September 20, 2019.~~
~~133 U.S. Commerce Department, International T rade Administration, Egypt Country Commer cial Guide, Updated~~
~~September 5, 2021.~~
~~134 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt.~~
~~135 T estimony of T amara Wittes, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and~~
~~International T errorism, hearing entitled “ Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020.~~
~~136 T he International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review under the Stand-By~~
~~Arrangement (SBA) for the Arab Republic of Egypt and Concludes 2 021 Article IV Consultation, June 23, 2021.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~fail and therefore that the world will continue to support it financially. But there are serious~~
~~questions regarding regime sustainability in the face of a global financial crisis. Egypt’s~~
~~foreign debt position is extremely vulnerable. Foreign direct investment is limited to~~
~~hydrocarbons and real estate investment, which create few jobs. As for where the money~~
~~goes, it is not being distributed fairly. The regime is not investin g in public services,~~
~~education, or health care. Sectors that according to the 2014 constitution are supposed to~~
~~receive at minimum between three to four percent of annual GDP do not. Seventy percent~~
~~of Egyptians are living on less than five and a half dollars a day.137~~
~~Successive U.S. Administrations also have expressed concerns over the Sisi government’s~~
~~continued crackdown against political dissent and nonviolent opposition. Biden Administration~~
~~officials have reiterated this concern while attempting to maintain the uneasy balance of U.S.~~
~~longstanding concern for human rights in Egypt with close ties to the military. During a 2021~~
~~State Department press conference, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price remarked:~~
~~When it comes to Egypt, it is true that Egypt plays an important role in promoting some of~~
~~our key interests in the region: regional security and stability through the guardianship of~~
~~the Suez Canal; counterterrorism cooperation; and its leadership in promoting Middle East~~
~~peace. Secretary Blinken has had an opportunity to discuss some of these issues with his~~
~~counterpart, Foreign Minister Shoukry, just as we raise human rights, just as we raise our~~
~~values. These two things, they’re not separate. They’re inextricably linked. If we don’t~~
~~stick up for our values, if we don’t stick up for human rights, we’re not sticking up for our~~
~~interests. We recognize that, and we can do both. We have deep concerns, as we have said,~~
~~about the human rights situation in Egypt, including undue res trictions on civil society,~~
~~undue restrictions on freedom of expression, some of the detentions you have mentioned.~~
~~There is repression of civil society and human rights abuses. They undercut Egypt’s own~~
~~dynamism and stability as a partner of ours. We will consistently raise these issues. We~~
~~will not shy away from them. We’ll do that both publicly, as we have, and we’ll do it~~
~~privately, too. We’ll also work and seek to find a partner in Congress to champion these~~
~~same issues.138~~
~~Recent Action on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt~~
~~Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S.~~
~~officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations~~
~~legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that~~
~~Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception~~
~~of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to al ow the Administration to~~
~~waive these congressional y~~ the Administration to waive these congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions; however, starting in FY2021, Congress began withholding a portion of FMF without permitting it to be subject to a national security waiver (see Figure 8).130 When Congress appropriates FMF to Egypt, it typically makes funds available for two years only. 129 op. cit., U.S. State Department, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry Opening Remarks for the U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue, November 8, 2021. 130 In FY2014, Congress did not provide a waiver for certification requirements but allowed for the ~~mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. When~~
~~Congress appropriates FMF to Egypt, it typical y makes funds available for two years only.~~

~~137 Clare Ulmer, “T en Years after Mubarak’s Fall, What is Egypt’s Biggest Challenge?” Project on Middle East~~
~~Democracy, February 22, 2021.~~
~~138 https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-11-2021/#post-225613-EGYPT 1.~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure 7. Egypt: Withholding Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance Allocations~~
~~In mil ions of current dol ars~~

Sources: Prepared by CRS based on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) al ocations and terms from annual SFOPS
~~appropriations acts, FY2011-FY2021.~~
Notes: In FY2014, Congress did not provide a waiver for certification requirements but al owed for the
obligation of tranches of aid for defined purposes and at defined rates if the executive branch could not make obligation of tranches of aid for defined purposes and at defined rates if the executive branch could not make
certain democracy and human rights-relatedcertain democracy and human rights-related certifications.certifications. For FY2015, Congress again linked aid tranches and For FY2015, Congress again linked aid tranches and
rates to certain democracyrates to certain democracy and human rights-relatedand human rights-related certifications,certifications, but provided a waiver.but provided a waiver. ~~From~~ From FY2012 through FY2012 through
~~FY2021~~FY2022, Congress conditioned , Congress conditioned al all U.S. assistance to Egypt by requiring the executive branch to certify that Egypt U.S. assistance to Egypt by requiring the executive branch to certify that Egypt
was meetingwas meeting its commitmentsits commitments under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and sustaining its strategic relationship under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and sustaining its strategic relationship
~~with the United States. From FY2014 onward, Congress did not provide a waiver for these certifications.~~
~~FY2020~~
~~Section 7041(a)(3) of the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) provided $1.3~~
~~bil ion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) “to remain available until September 30, 2021.” The~~
~~act also withheld $300 mil ion in FMF unless the Secretary of State could make a certification on~~
~~democracy-related conditions in Egypt. Congress also enabled the Secretary to waive the~~
~~certification requirement on national security grounds. In October 2020, the State Department~~
~~notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1 bil ion in FY2020 FMF. Several lawmakers and~~
~~human rights advocates had cal ed on the Administration to not exercise the waiver authority.139~~
~~Biden Administration Withholds Some Military Aid~~
~~On September 14, 2021, the Administration notified Congress its intent to obligate the remaining~~
~~$300 mil ion in FY2020 FMF using the authority in Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 116-94, which~~
~~exempts FY2020 FMF funds from certification if used for “counterterrorism, border security, and~~
~~nonproliferation programs” for Egypt.140 In its communications to Congress, the Administration~~

~~139 For example, see Charles Dunne, “It’s T ime for Biden to Get T ough on Sisi,” foreignpolicy.com , July 20, 2021, and~~
~~Nahal T oosi, “ In D.C. Visit, Egypt Spy Boss Claims U.S. Agreed—in Writing—to Jail American Activist ,” Politico,~~
~~July 12, 2021.~~
~~140 T his provision in appropriations for Egypt dates back to P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014~~
~~(passed January 2014). At the time, President Obama had initiated a review of U.S. military assistance to Egypt. P.L.~~
~~113-76 divided annual aid to Egypt into two tranches ($976 million and $576.8 million) and conditioned their~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~claimed that it could not certify that Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps related to the~~
~~human rights-related conditions. However, because human rights concerns remain, the State~~
~~Department has said that it wil not move forward with the application of $130 mil ion in FMF,~~
~~the maximum amount it can withhold, and wil not deposit it into Egypt’s Federal Reserve Bank~~
~~account unless Egypt affirmatively addresses U.S. concerns.141~~
~~The Biden Administration suspension represents the first time any Administration has refused to~~
~~waive Egypt democracy and human conditions on national security grounds since Congress~~
~~inserted such criteria in FY2012. Though the Administration did not official y use the waiver to~~
~~obligate the $300 mil ion withheld FMF, it did use another broad authority Congress has granted~~
~~the executive for years in exempting “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation~~
~~programs” from certification. Congress has not defined in law which programs qualify as~~
~~“counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation.”~~
~~If the Biden Administration ultimately decides that Egypt cannot meet its human rights criteria,142~~
~~then the $130 mil ion in FY2020 FMF would presumably by reprogrammed for other uses, and~~
~~would represent the largest amount of FMF ever rescinded (other than by across the board~~
~~spending cuts by Congress). President Trump reduced the FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by~~
~~$65.7 mil ion, citing “Egypt’s ongoing relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of~~
~~Korea, lack of progress on the 2013 convictions of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental~~
~~organization (NGO) workers, and the enactment of a restrictive NGO law that wil likely~~
~~complicate ongoing and future U.S. assistance to the country.”143~~
~~A coalition of 19 human rights group cal ed the Biden Administration’s obligation of the $300~~
~~mil ion in FMF a “terrible blow to its stated commitment to human rights and to the rule of~~
~~law.”144 There has been no official response from the Egyptian government, though the state did~~
~~release a “National Strategy for Human Rights” the same week that Biden obligated the~~
~~remaining FY2020 FMF aid. Former Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy remarked that~~
~~“constructive engagement is a better approach than attempting to use assistance as a weapon or~~
~~the withholding of access to facilities.”145~~

~~obligation without providing a national security waiver. T hus, this provision may have been inserted to allow for~~
~~greater flexibility in providing certain types of military aid to Egypt.~~
~~141 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing, September 15, 2021.~~
~~142 According to one unnamed U.S. official, the Biden Administration will provide the $130 million on the condition~~
~~that “ Egypt ends protracted prosecutions against rights and civil society organizations known as Case 173, and drops~~
~~charges against or releases 16 individuals the United States has identified and raised with Cairo since June.” See, John~~
~~Hudson and Missy Ryan, “Facing Pressure on Human Rights, Biden Administration Attaches New Conditions to Egypt~~
~~Security Aid,” Washington Post, September 14, 2021. In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43~~
~~individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the Nati onal~~
~~Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations~~
~~that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173, or the “foreign~~
~~funding case”). In 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges, but Case 173 has since remained active, as the~~
~~judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists. See Hadeer El-Mahdawy,~~
~~“What’s Next in Case 173? 4 NGOs, 5 Civil Society Workers in the Clear but Investigations Continue,” Mada Masr,~~
~~September 1, 2021.~~
~~143 Congressional Notification T ransmittal Sheet, Mary K. Water, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, January~~
~~23, 2018.~~
~~144 Biden Decision to Grant Military Aid to Egypt a Betrayal of Human Rights Commitments, Project on Middle East~~
~~Democracy, September 14, 2021.~~
~~145 “T he T akeaway: Business As Usual: US-Egypt Alliance Finds its Center,” Al Monitor, September 16, 2021.~~
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~~link to page 14~~ ~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~In Congress, Republicans largely refrained from commenting on the Administration’s action,~~
~~while Democrats were somewhat divided on the issue. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs~~
~~Committee Gregory Meeks stated, “I support the Biden administration’s decision to withhold a~~
~~portion of security assistance to Egypt contingent on measurable progress on important bipartisan~~
~~human rights criteria.... This decision is consistent with the law and our values as a country.”146 In~~
~~the Senate, Senator Christopher Murphy stated, “This was a big missed opportunity to stand up~~
~~strongly and unequivocal y for human rights. Egypt had almost two years to meet the human~~
~~rights improvements required by Congress, but arguably the situation on the ground in Egypt has~~
~~gotten worse.”147~~
~~Analysis~~
~~The Biden Administration’s withholding of some military aid has reignited a longstanding debate~~
~~in the broader foreign policy community over the efficacy of using foreign aid as leverage to~~
~~promote greater respect for human rights in the Middle East and elsewhere.148 In Egypt’s case,~~
~~this debate usual y breaks down between the human rights community, which seeks to either end~~
~~U.S. military aid to Egypt or reprogram it as economic and democracy assistance,149 and those~~
~~who do not support modifying or conditioning longstanding military-to-military ties seen as~~
~~contributing to Egypt’s peaceful relationship with Israel150 and its efforts to counter terrorism in~~
~~the Sinai.151 Successive Administrations have often found themselves in the midst of the debate,~~
~~attempting to balance the security relationship with congressional prerogatives to consider what~~
~~many international monitoring organizations believe is the country’s woeful human rights record~~
~~(see Table 1).~~
~~As mentioned above, since 2013, the Obama, Trump, and now Biden Administrations have al~~
~~taken various actions (suspended weapons deliveries, ended cash flow financing, reprogrammed~~
~~aid and withheld assistance) to limit U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. In looking back at these~~
~~past nine years, proponents of cutting aid argue that the lack of any credible, discernable change~~
~~in Egypt’s behavior is because the United States has not used al of its policy levers to pressure~~
~~the Sisi government enough.152 Opponents of halting assistance often charge that conditioning aid~~
~~wil only further harden Egypt’s resolve to resist U.S. pressure and push Egypt to develop deeper~~
~~ties with countries less concerned about its human rights record. Others have argued that U.S.-~~
~~Egyptian relations have atrophied since the arguable high point in the 1980s to the point in which~~
~~U.S. leverage is overestimated by participants in this debate.153 According to David Schenker, a~~

~~146 Meeks Issues Statement on Admin Placing Human Rights Conditions on Part of Egypt’s Security Aid, House~~
~~Foreign Affairs Committee, September 14, 2021.~~
~~147 Senator Chris Murphy, Murphy on Administration’s Decision to Send Aid to Egypt Despite Human Rights~~
~~Concerns, September 13, 2021.~~
~~148 In 2021, the journal Democracy in Exile, published by the human rights organization known as Dawn (Democracy~~
~~for the Arab World Now), published a series of articles on foreign aid conditionality in the Middle East. See~~
~~https://dawnmena.org/dawns-advocacy/aid-conditionality/.~~
~~149 T estimony of Michele Dunne, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and~~
~~International T errorism, hearing entitled “ Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020.~~
~~150 Jacob Magid, “Israeli Officials Cautioned Biden against Heavy Criticism of Egypt, Saudi Arabia,” Times of Israel,~~
~~September 2, 2021.~~
~~151 Rachel Oswald, “Military Aid to Egypt Shapes Up as Human Rights T est for Biden,” Congressional Quarterly,~~
~~August 16, 2021.~~
~~152 Charles Dunne, “It’s T ime for Biden to Get T ough on Sisi,” ForeignPolicy.com , July 20, 2021.~~
~~153 Senator Murphy, Congressional Record, Senate Procedural Matters, p. S5129, July 28, 2021.~~
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~~former Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs at the State Department, the value of U.S.~~
~~military aid to Egypt has declined over time and aid cuts or even sanctions would not effectively~~
~~change Egypt’s behavior.154 Schenker argues that the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship may~~
~~need to be recalculated and reducing some aid to Egypt would al ow the United States to send a~~
~~signal to Cairo of its displeasure with its policies without causing a permanent diplomatic~~
~~rupture.155~~
~~FY2021~~
~~For FY2021, the Trump Administration requested a total of $1.4 bil ion in bilateral assistance for~~
~~Egypt, the same amount Congress appropriated in FY2020. Nearly al of the U.S. funds for Egypt~~
~~come from the FMF account and are in turn used to purchase U.S.-origin military equipment,~~
~~spare parts, training, and maintenance from U.S. firms.~~
~~The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) withholds $225 mil ion in FMF~~
~~from obligation until the Secretary of State makes democracy-related certifications and provides~~
~~waiver authority on national security grounds. The act also includes a condition that withholds~~
~~$75 mil ion in FMF until the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Egypt is~~
~~making clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with~~
~~due process of law. This condition is new in the FY2021 act and affords no national security~~
~~waiver. Because the act made the funds available for two years, obligation decisions about~~
~~FY2021 assistance for Egypt may not occur until calendar year 2022.~~
~~Table 2.Bilateral Aid to Egypt~~
~~current U.S. dol ars in mil ions~~
~~FY2017~~
~~FY2018~~
~~FY2019~~
~~FY2020~~
~~FY2021~~
~~FY2022~~
~~actual~~
~~actual~~
~~actual~~
~~actual~~
~~allocated~~
~~request~~

~~ESF~~
~~112.50~~
~~106.87~~
~~112.50~~
~~125.00~~
~~125.00~~
~~125.00~~
~~FMF~~
~~1,234.30~~
~~1,300.00~~
~~1,300.00~~
~~1,300.00~~
~~1,300.00~~
~~1,300.00~~
~~IMET~~
~~1.74~~
~~1.80~~
~~1.80~~
~~0.00~~
~~1.80~~
~~1.80~~
~~INCLE~~
~~2.00~~
~~2.00~~
~~2.00~~
~~2.00~~
~~0.35~~
~~0.00~~
~~NADR~~
~~3.00~~
~~3.00~~
~~3.00~~
~~3.50~~
~~3.00~~
~~3.50~~
~~Total~~
~~1,353.54~~
~~1,413.67~~
~~1,419.30~~
~~1,430.50~~
~~1,430.15~~
~~1,430.30~~
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
~~(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Al ocation Report, and CRS calculations.~~
~~Note:~~ ~~Economic Support Fund (ESF),~~ with the United States. Congressional Research Service 25 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 8. Egypt: Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance current U.S. dollars in millions, appropriations Egypt FMF Withholding 1,400 1,200 195 195 300 300 300 225 235 1,000 FMF subject to withholdingwithout waiver 800 FMF subject to withholding with 600 waiver FMF not subject to withholding 400 200 0 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 Sources: Prepared by CRS based on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocations and terms from annual SFOPS appropriations acts, FY2011-FY2022. Congress appropriated $1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt in FY2021 (see Table 2), $1 billion of which was obligated by the Biden Administration in January 2022. As of mid-June 2022, and with only three-and-a-half months before the end of the fiscal year, the remaining $300 million in FY2021 FMF had yet to be obligated. In January 2022, the Biden Administration reprogrammed $130 million in FY2020 FMF that it had withheld from obligation pending certain improvements it sought in Egypt’s human rights record. Some lawmakers, such as Senator Chris Murphy, approved of the decision;131 a coalition of human rights organizations also welcomed the Biden Administration’s decision, but objected to the continued provision of military aid and arms sales.132 Just days before the Administration’s decision on aid reprogramming, it notified Congress of two possible Foreign Military Sales to Egypt worth an estimated combined $2.5 billion. Soon after the Administration’s decision, then CENTCOM Commander General Frank McKenzie remarked while on a trip to Egypt that “Compared to the amount of other money that's in play, it's a very small amount. But I think it's intended to be a signal....We still have a very robust weapons program with Egypt and we're still very heavily engaged with them.”133 H.R. 8282 (117th Congress), the House FY2023 SFOPs bill, would provide $1.3 billion in FMF and not less than $125 million in ESF for Egypt. The bill would withhold $300 million in FMF from obligation unless the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is meeting specific democracy-related conditions. Of the $300 million withheld, the bill would allow the Administration to waive the withholding requirement on up to $170 million in FMF. Unlike in previous years, the House-introduced SFOPs bill would not permit the Administration to exempt FMF from withholding for 131 Senator Chris Murphy, Press Release, Murphy Applauds the Biden Administration's Decision to Reprogram Aid to Egypt Due to Human Rights Concerns, January 28, 2022. 132 Freedom House, Biden Administration’s Decision to Reprogram Military Aid to Egypt Is Necessary but Insufficient, Joint Statement, February 1, 2022. 133 “American General in Egypt for Talks after U.S. Cuts Military Aid,” Reuters, February 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 26 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs.” The provision permitting such exemptions from withholding Egypt had dated back to P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (passed January 2014) and had been inserted in annual SFOPs legislation since then to allow for greater flexibility in providing FMF to Egypt. Table 2.Bilateral Aid to Egypt In millions of current dollars FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 Account actual actual actual actual estimate request ESF 106.87 112.50 125.00 130.05 125.00 125.00 GH - - - - - 6.00 FMF 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,170.00* 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00 IMET 1.80 1.80 0.00 1.80 1.80 1.80 INCLE 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.35 0.00 - NADR 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.00 3.50 3.50 Total 1,413.67 1,419.30 1,300.50 1,435.20 1,430.30 1,436.30 Sources: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2019-FY2023) and CRS calculations. Notes: Economic Support Fund (ESF), Global Health (GH), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and
Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation,Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Anti-
Terrorism,Terrorism, Demining and Related ProgramsDemining and Related Programs (NADR). *The Biden Administration reprogrammed $130 mil ion in FY2020 FMF appropriated for Egypt due to human rights concerns. Recent Arms Sales and Resolutions of Disapproval S.J.Res. 35 Members of Congress have at times scrutinized the sale and transfer of U.S. weapons to Egypt. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as amended requires that, for sales over a certain valuation, the administration must provide formal notification to Congress 30 calendar days before taking steps to conclude the sale, during which time Congress may adopt a joint resolution of disapproval, which, if signed by the President, will prevent the sale from going forward.134 In the 117th Congress, Senator Rand Paul has condemned various Egyptian human rights abuses and has sponsored multiple resolutions disapproving of various proposed arms sales to Egypt.135 Senator Paul asserted that “The United States cannot proudly affirm human rights to be at the center of our foreign policy, while it arms a regime at war with its own people.”136 On March 10, 2022, the Senate rejected a motion to discharge from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 19-80 with one not voting.137 Voting on other Senator Paul-sponsored resolutions of disapproval awaits Senate floor action. 134 For more information on this process and historical examples thereof, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 135 These include: S.J.Res. 35, S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 48, S.J.Res. 50, S.J.Res. 51, and S.J.Res. 52. 136 “Senators Turn Back Rand Paul's Bid to Halt Arms Sale to Egypt,” Congressional Quarterly, March 11, 2022. 137 See Roll Call Vote Number 73, 117th Congress at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1172/vote_117_2_00073.htm. Congressional Research Service 27 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Appendix. Background on U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt Overview Between 1946 and 2019, the United States provided Egypt with $81.4 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation).138~~(NADR).~~
~~FY2022~~
~~For FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 bil ion in bilateral assistance for Egypt,~~
~~the same amount Congress appropriated the previous year. H.R. 4373, the House-passed version~~

~~154 David Schenker, “Getting T ough with Egypt Won’t Work,” Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch 3459, T he Washington~~
~~Institute for Near East Policy, March 25, 2021.~~
~~155 Op.cit, Schenker, “Getting T ough wit h Egypt Won’t Work.”~~
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~~of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022,~~
~~would:~~
~~ Provide not less than $125 mil ion in ESF, of which not less than $40 mil ion~~
~~should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than~~
~~$15 mil ion for scholarships.~~
~~ Provide $1.3 bil ion in FMF, provided that $150 mil ion of FMF funds shal be~~
~~withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that the~~
~~Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to, among other~~
~~things, strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions and, human rights in~~
~~Egypt, implement reforms to protect civil liberties, hold Egyptian security forces~~
~~accountable, investigate and prosecute cases of extrajudicial kil ing and forced~~
~~disappearances, provide access for U.S. officials to monitor such assistance, and~~
~~prevent the intimidation and harassment of American citizens. This certification~~
~~shal not apply to funds appropriated for counterterrorism, border security, and~~
~~nonproliferation programs, and may be waived if the Secretary determines that it~~
~~is in the national security interest of the United States. An additional $135 mil ion~~
~~in FMF, not subject to a waiver, would be withheld until the Secretary of State~~
~~determines and reports that the Government of Egypt is making progress in~~
~~releasing political prisoners. An additional $15 mil ion in FMF, not subject to a~~
~~waiver, would be withheld until the Secretary of State determines and reports that~~
~~the Government of Egypt has provided American citizens with fair and~~
~~commensurate compensation for injuries suffered as a result of an attack against~~
~~a tour group by the Egyptian military.~~
~~ Reauthorize ESF for loan guarantees.~~
~~The Biden Administration has indicated that it would oppose certain FMF conditions contained in~~
~~H.R. 4373. According to the Office of Management and Budget, “The administration strongly~~
~~opposes section 7041(a) of the bil , which would reduce the administration’s flexibility in regards~~
~~to FMF [Foreign Military Financing] to Egypt undermining its leverage as it operationalizes its~~
~~commitment to a constructive human rights dialogue with Egypt.”156~~

~~156 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R.~~
~~4373—Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, July 27, 2021.~~
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~~Appendix. Background on U.S. Foreign Assistance~~
~~to Egypt~~
~~Overview~~
~~Between 1946 and 2019, the United States provided Egypt with $81.4 bil ion in bilateral foreign~~
~~aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation).157~~ The 1979 Peace Treaty The 1979 Peace Treaty
between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United
States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter
Administration pledged that it would “endeavor to take into account and Administration pledged that it would “endeavor to take into account and ~~wil~~ will endeavor to be endeavor to be
responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.” In his letter to Egypt, responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.” In his letter to Egypt,
~~former~~ then U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following: U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following:
In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared
toto ~~enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of~~
~~military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those~~ enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, sales,
subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required.subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required.~~158~~
Al 139 All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any country) is U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any country) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. The . The
1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the
United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid
obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be ~~potential y~~potentially
construed in conjunction with the treaty were through construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ~~ancil ary~~ancillary documents or other documents or other
communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above). communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above).
However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has ~~traditional y~~traditionally
provided foreign aid to both countries to provided foreign aid to both countries to ~~ensure~~support a regional balance of power and sustain security a regional balance of power and sustain security
cooperation with both countries. cooperation with both countries.
In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU)
with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected
time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed
foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan, but not with Egypt.foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan, but not with Egypt.~~159~~
140 Congress Congress ~~typical y~~typically specifies a precise specifies a precise ~~al ocation~~allocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the
foreign operations appropriations foreign operations appropriations ~~bil~~ bill. Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three . Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three
primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and

~~157 U.S.~~ 138 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 -September 30, 2019. -September 30, 2019.
~~158~~139 See See Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Brown) toLetter From the Secretary of Defense (Brown) to- the Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production (Ali), the Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production (Ali),
March 23, 1979, “United States SalesMarch 23, 1979, “United States Sales of Military Equipment and Servicesof Military Equipment and Services to Egypt.” Ultimately, the United States to Egypt.” Ultimately, the United States
provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. ~~T he~~The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 ( Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 ( P.L. P.L.
96-35) provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of96-35) provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively, though this 3 to 2, respectively, though this
ratio wasratio was not enshrined in the treaty as Egypt wouldnot enshrined in the treaty as Egypt would later claim. later claim.
~~159~~140 In July In July 2007, the George W. Bush2007, the George W. Bush Administration announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region, that it Administration announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region, that it
wouldwould ~~begin discussions~~ begin discussions with Egypt on a proposed $13 billion military aid agreement over a 10with Egypt on a proposed $13 billion military aid agreement over a 10 -year period. Since -year period. Since
Egypt wasEgypt was already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement represented no already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement represented no
major change in U.S.major change in U.S. ~~aid~~ aid policy toward Egypt. No such bilateral MOU on U.S.policy toward Egypt. No such bilateral MOU on U.S. military aid to Egypt has been reached military aid to Egypt has been reached
by the Bush, Obama, by the Bush, Obama, ~~T rump~~Trump, or Biden, or Biden Administrations with the Egyptian government. Administrations with the Egyptian government.
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International Military Education and Training (IMET). International Military Education and Training (IMET).~~160~~141 The United States offers IMET training The United States offers IMET training
to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term. to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term.
Military Aid and Arms Sales
Overview
Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large
amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an
investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and
sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be ~~mutual y~~mutually reinforcing. Egypt has used reinforcing. Egypt has used
U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems, U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems,
such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack
~~helicopter.~~
~~Frequently Asked Question: Is U.S. Military Aid Provided to Egypt~~
~~as a Cash Transfer?~~
~~No. Al U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services~~ ~~from U.S. defense~~
~~contractors.161 The United States provides military assistance to U.S. partners and al ies to help them acquire U.S.~~
~~military equipment and training. Egypt is one of the main recipients of FMF, a program with a corresponding~~
~~appropriations account administered by the Department of State but implemented by the Department of Defense.~~
~~FMF is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment and associated training from the U.S.~~
~~government or to access equipment directly through U.S. commercial channels.~~
~~Most countries receiving FMF general y purchase goods and services through government-to-government~~
~~contracts, also known as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). According to the Government Accountability Office, “under~~
~~this procurement channel, the U.S. government buys the desired item on behalf of the foreign country (Egypt),~~
~~general y employing the same criteria as if the item were being procured for the U.S. military.” The vast majority~~
~~of what Egypt purchases from the United States is conducted through the FMS program funded by FMF. However,~~
~~U.S. officials have been encouraging Egypt to use national funds for U.S. military equipment purchases.162~~
~~Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formal y notified 30 calendar~~
~~days before the Administration can take the final steps of a government-to-government foreign military sale of~~
~~major U.S.-origin defense equipment valued at $14 mil ion or more, defense articles or services valued at $50~~
~~mil ion or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 mil ion or more. In practice pre-notifications~~
~~to congressional committees of jurisdiction occur, and proposed arms sales general y do not proceed to the public~~
~~official notification stage until issues of potential concern to key committees have been resolved.~~
~~Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt~~
~~In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from~~
~~certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries, listed below.~~

~~160 Egypt also receives, though not consistently, relatively small sums from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,~~
~~Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement~~
~~(INCLE) account. NADR funds support counterterrorism training through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program.~~
~~INCLE funds support police training and respect fo r human rights in law enforcement. The Administration typically~~
~~requests these funds, but they are not usually specifically earmarked for Egypt (or for most other countries) in~~
~~legislation. After the passage of a foreign operations appropriations bill, federal agencies such as the State Department~~
~~and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate funds to Egypt from these aid accounts. T hey~~
~~then submit a country allocation report (653a Report) to Congress for review.~~
~~161 For the relevant legal authorities, see §604 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2354) and §503 of~~
~~the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311).~~
~~162 During a 2021 hearing on security assistance, Dana Stroul, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle~~
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~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

helicopter. 141 Egypt also receives, though not consistently, relatively small sums from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. NADR funds support counterterrorism training through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. INCLE funds support police training and respect for human rights in law enforcement. The Administration typically requests these funds, but they are not usually specifically earmarked for Egypt (or for most other countries) in legislation. After the passage of a foreign operations appropriations bill, federal agencies such as the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate funds to Egypt from these aid accounts. They then submit a country allocation report (653a Report) to Congress for review. Congressional Research Service 29 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Frequently Asked Question: Is U.S. Military Aid Provided to Egypt as a Cash Transfer? No. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors.142 The United States provides military assistance to U.S. partners and allies to help them acquire U.S. military equipment and training. Egypt is one of the main recipients of FMF, a program with a corresponding appropriations account administered by the Department of State but implemented by the Department of Defense. FMF is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment and associated training from the U.S. government or to access equipment directly through U.S. commercial channels. Most countries receiving FMF generally purchase goods and services through government-to-government contracts, also known as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “under this procurement channel, the U.S. government buys the desired item on behalf of the foreign country [Egypt], generally employing the same criteria as if the item were being procured for the U.S. military.”143 The vast majority of what Egypt purchases from the United States is conducted through the FMS program funded by FMF. However, U.S. officials have been encouraging Egypt to use national funds for U.S. military equipment purchases.144 Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps of a government-to-government foreign military sale of major U.S.-origin defense equipment valued at $14 mil ion or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 mil ion or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 mil ion or more. In practice, pre-notifications to congressional committees of jurisdiction occur, and proposed arms sales generally do not proceed to the public official notification stage until issues of potential concern to key committees have been resolved. Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries, listed below.   Early Disbursal and Interest-Bearing Account: Between FY2001 and FY2011, : Between FY2001 and FY2011,
Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the
enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Federal Reserve Bank of New York.~~163~~145 Interest accrued from the rapid 142 For the relevant legal authorities, see §604 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2354) and §503 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311). 143 United States General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Government Accountability Office), Military Sales to Israel and Egypt: DOD Needs Stronger Controls over U.S.-Financed Procurements, July 1993. 144 During a 2021 hearing on security assistance, Dana Stroul, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, remarked, “In terms of the FMF, it remains an important tool for us to work with Egypt in making sure that they have U.S.-origin defense articles oriented towards what we assess to be shared security threats, whether it’s counterterrorism, maritime security, border security. And I would note here that Egypt is interested in continuing this relationship with us. They recently agreed to upgrade their Apache helicopter fleet by using blended financing, not just U.S. security assistance but also Egyptian national funds.” See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism Hearing on Middle East Security Assistance, August 10, 2021. 145 By law, ~~Interest accrued from the rapid~~
~~disbursement of aid has al owed Egypt to receive additional funding for the~~
~~purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the~~
~~obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had~~
~~been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early~~
~~disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on~~
~~FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.~~
~~ The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the~~
~~United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and~~
~~al ied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its~~
~~own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages~~
~~the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of~~
~~outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at~~
~~either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated “major non-NATO al y,” Egypt~~
~~is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and~~
~~Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act.~~
~~Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights~~
~~Historical y, Congress had placed certain conditions on economic aid to Egypt. After Egypt’s~~
~~2011 uprising and initial change of government, lawmakers have conditioned, and in some cases~~
~~withheld, U.S. military aid to Egypt on executive branch certifications to the Committees on~~
~~Appropriations that the Egyptian government is taking steps toward democratic governance and~~
~~supporting human rights.~~

~~East , remarked, “ In terms of the FMF, it remains an important tool for us to work with Egypt in making sure that they~~
~~have U.S.-origin defense articles oriented towards what we assess to be shared security threats, whether it ’s~~
~~counterterrorism, maritime security, border security. And I would note here that Egypt is interested in continuing this~~
~~relationship with us. T hey recently agreed to upgrade their Apache helicopter fleet by using blended financing, not just~~
~~U.S. security assistance but also Egyptian national funds.” See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Foreign~~
~~Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterorism Hearing on Middle East Security~~
~~Assistance, August 10, 2021.~~
~~163 By law,~~ Egypt and Israel are permitted to earn interest on congressionally appropriated Foreign Military Financing Egypt and Israel are permitted to earn interest on congressionally appropriated Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). During the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration (especially the U.S. Defense Department) and the Egyptian (FMF). During the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration (especially the U.S. Defense Department) and the Egyptian
government sought to increase U.S. military aid to Egypt. One proposal had been to grant Egypt a benefit already government sought to increase U.S. military aid to Egypt. One proposal had been to grant Egypt a benefit already
enjoyed by Israel—the useenjoyed by Israel—the use of an interestof an interest -bearing account in which unspent FMF funds-bearing account in which unspent FMF funds can accumulate interest to be can accumulate interest to be
usedused for future purchases. Duringfor future purchases. During Senate consideration of legislation to provide Senate consideration of legislation to provide ~~E gypt~~Egypt access to an interest access to an interest -bearing -bearing
account, Sen. Mitch McConnell remarked that “In the State Department briefing justifying the request, U.S.account, Sen. Mitch McConnell remarked that “In the State Department briefing justifying the request, U.S. officials officials
urgedurged our support becauseour support because of Mubarak’sof Mubarak’s need to addressneed to address the requirements of ‘his key constituents, the military.’ the requirements of ‘his key constituents, the military.’
Frankly, I think Mr. Mubarak needs to worry less about satisfying the military and spend more time and effort shoring Frankly, I think Mr. Mubarak needs to worry less about satisfying the military and spend more time and effort shoring
up democratic institutions and civic society.” Seeup democratic institutions and civic society.” See Congressional Record-Senate, S5508, JuneCongressional Record-Senate, S5508, June 21, 2000. In October 21, 2000. In October
2000, Congress passed2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-280, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which authorized FY2001 FMF fundsP.L. 106-280, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which authorized FY2001 FMF funds for for
Egypt to be disbursedEgypt to be disbursed to an interestto an interest -bearing account in the Federal Reserve-bearing account in the Federal Reserve ~~Bank of New York. T he law required that~~
~~none of the interest accrued by such account should be obligated unless first notified to relevant congressional~~
~~appropriations and oversight committees. In November 2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-429, the FY2001 Foreign~~
~~Operations Appropriations Act, which included an interest-bearing account for Egypt in appropriations legislation.~~
~~Since then, this provision has remained in annual appropriations legislation, most recently in P.L. 114-113, the~~
~~Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

34

~~Egypt: Background~~ Bank of New York. The law required that Congressional Research Service 30 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations disbursement of aid has allowed Egypt to receive additional funding for the purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated “major non-NATO ally,” Egypt is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights Historically, Congress had placed certain conditions on economic aid to Egypt. After Egypt’s 2011 uprising and initial change of government, lawmakers have conditioned, and in some cases withheld, U.S. military aid to Egypt on executive branch certifications to the Committees on Appropriations that the Egyptian government is taking steps toward democratic governance and supporting human rights. none of the interest accrued by such account should be obligated unless first notified to relevant congressional appropriations and oversight committees. In November 2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-429, the FY2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which included an interest-bearing account for Egypt in appropriations legislation. Since then, this provision has remained in annual appropriations legislation, most recently in P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. Congressional Research Service 31 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure A-1. The Military Aid “Pipeline”

Source: Information from Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Graphic created by CRS. Information from Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Graphic created by CRS.
In response to political changes in Egypt from 2011 through 2016, the Obama Administration and In response to political changes in Egypt from 2011 through 2016, the Obama Administration and
Congress altered U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, and strains increased in U.S.-Egyptian relations. In Congress altered U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, and strains increased in U.S.-Egyptian relations. In
FY2012, Congress enacted new restrictions on aid to Egypt that have carried forward to today. FY2012, Congress enacted new restrictions on aid to Egypt that have carried forward to today.
The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. 112-74) specified The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. 112-74) specified
that no funds could be made availablethat no funds could be made available to Egypt until the Secretary of State certified that Egypt to Egypt until the Secretary of State certified that Egypt
was meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (due to concerns that a was meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (due to concerns that a
~~future democratical y~~future democratically elected Egyptian government might abrogate the treaty). elected Egyptian government might abrogate the treaty).
It further specified that no military funds could be provided until the Administration certified that It further specified that no military funds could be provided until the Administration certified that
the government of Egypt was supporting a transition to civilian rule, including by holding free the government of Egypt was supporting a transition to civilian rule, including by holding free
and fair elections and by implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and and fair elections and by implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and
religion, and due process of law. It permitted the Secretary of State to waive these requirements religion, and due process of law. It permitted the Secretary of State to waive these requirements
by reporting to Congress with a “detailed justification” that doing so was “in the national security by reporting to Congress with a “detailed justification” that doing so was “in the national security
interest of the United States.”interest of the United States.”
On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military suspended the constitution and ousted former President On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military suspended the constitution and ousted former President
Mohamed Morsi. Subsequently, the Obama Administration took several steps to express U.S. Mohamed Morsi. Subsequently, the Obama Administration took several steps to express U.S.
displeasure with Morsi’s ouster. In 2013, President Obama announced a comprehensive review of displeasure with Morsi’s ouster. In 2013, President Obama announced a comprehensive review of
U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, canceled a joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, canceled a joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise
(Operation Bright (Operation Bright ~~Star~~Star146), suspended the deliveries of certain military items to Egypt (such as F-), suspended the deliveries of certain military items to Egypt (such as F-
~~16s, along with Apache helicopters, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tanks) pending progress toward~~
~~democracy, and cancel ed planned cash transfers of economic aid.164 Ultimately, the Obama~~
~~Administration accepted the Egyptian military’s overthrow of a democratical y elected president~~

~~164 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Assistance to Egypt,” Press Statement, October 9, 2013.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

35

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~as a fait accompli and attempted to redefine certain components of the U.S.-Egyptian~~
~~relationship.165~~
~~In FY2014, Congress further conditioned the obligation aid for Egypt by applying certification~~
146 Since 1980, shortly after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the United States and Egypt have conducted large-scale joint military exercises known as “Bright Star.” In 1980, both countries conducted annual single service bilateral ground maneuver events. However, starting in the mid-1980s, Bright Star became a biennial multinational military training exercise. For the first 25 years of its existence, Bright Star was one of the largest coalition military exercises conducted by CENTCOM. It included the ground, naval, and air forces of both the United States and Egypt, along with troops from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece, Congressional Research Service 32 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations 16s, along with Apache helicopters, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tanks) pending progress toward democracy, and cancelled planned cash transfers of economic aid.147 Ultimately, the Obama Administration accepted the Egyptian military’s overthrow of a democratically elected president as a fait accompli and attempted to redefine certain components of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship.148 In FY2014, Congress further conditioned the obligation aid for Egypt by applying certification requirements to distinct tranches of aid; for example, the Secretary of State was required to certify requirements to distinct tranches of aid; for example, the Secretary of State was required to certify
to the Committees on Appropriations prior to obligation of one tranche that Egypt had held a to the Committees on Appropriations prior to obligation of one tranche that Egypt had held a
constitutional referendum and was taking steps to support a democratic transition. Prior to constitutional referendum and was taking steps to support a democratic transition. Prior to
obligation of a second tranche, Congress required certification that Egypt had held parliamentary obligation of a second tranche, Congress required certification that Egypt had held parliamentary
and presidential elections, and had a new elected government that was taking steps to govern and presidential elections, and had a new elected government that was taking steps to govern
~~democratical y.166~~democratically.149
By the spring of 2015, as terrorist attacks against Egypt continued amid the global rise of the By the spring of 2015, as terrorist attacks against Egypt continued amid the global rise of the
Islamic State, some lawmakers Islamic State, some lawmakers ~~cal ed~~called on the Administration to end its weapons export on the Administration to end its weapons export
suspension.suspension.~~167~~150 The Obama Administration responded with a change in U.S. policy. On March 31, The Obama Administration responded with a change in U.S. policy. On March 31,
2015, the White House announced it would 2015, the White House announced it would ~~al ow~~allow the deliveries of select weapons systems to the deliveries of select weapons systems to
Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013, and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013, and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 ~~bil ion~~billion in annual military aid from Congress. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Turkey, Pakistan, and Kuwait. During the 1999/2000 event, 11 nations contributed over 70,000 troops to the exercise. At times, regional conflict or tensions in the U.S.-Egyptian relationship have led to the cancellation of Bright Star. Due to the wars in Iraq, Bright Star was cancelled in 1991 and 2003. Due to political unrest in Egypt, the Egyptian armed forces cancelled Bright Star in 2011. In 2013, President Obama suspended U.S. participation in Bright Star due to U.S. concerns over the military’s ousting of Egypt’s civilian-led government. Thus, Bright Star did not take place from 2010 to 2016. It resumed in September 2017, when an estimated 200 U.S. soldiers participated in the exercise at Mohamed Naguib Military Base in Egypt, where U.S. and Egyptian forces conducted battle simulations involving U.S.-origin major defense equipment, such as Egyptian F-16s and M1A1 Egyptian tanks. In August 2018, approximately 800 U.S. troops participated in Operation Bright Star 18. That event featured Egyptian special operations forces conducting counterterrorism and irregular warfare training operations, working in close collaboration with US special operators. In 2020, the United States and Egypt cancelled Bright Star due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 147 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Assistance to Egypt,” Press Statement, October 9, 2013. 148 President Obama said, “Going forward, the United States will in
~~annual military aid from Congress.~~
~~However, the White House simultaneously announced that future military assistance to Egypt~~
~~would be largely reformulated by ending cash flow financing.168 Section 23 of the Arms Export~~
~~Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of~~
~~defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign~~
~~countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine~~
~~consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this~~
~~authority to permit Israel (and, until 2018, Egypt) to set aside almost al FMF funds for current~~
~~year payments only, rather than set aside the amount needed to meet the full cost of multiyear~~
~~purchases.~~
~~From 2017 through 2020, some bilateral tensions diminished as President Trump sought to~~
~~improve ties with President Sisi. President Trump continued to request that Congress appropriate~~
~~$1.3 bil ion in military aid to Egypt, but did not restore the Egyptian military’s ability to benefit~~
~~from Cash Flow Financing. Moreover, as previously mentioned, President Trump reduced the~~

~~165 President Obama said, “Going forward, the United States will~~ maintain a constructive relationship with the Interim maintain a constructive relationship with the Interim
Government that promotes core interests like the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism. We'll continue support in Government that promotes core interests like the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism. We'll continue support in
areas like education that directly benefit the Egyptian people. But we have not proceeded with the delivery of certain areas like education that directly benefit the Egyptian people. But we have not proceeded with the delivery of certain
military systems, and our support will dependmilitary systems, and our support will depend upon Egyptupon Egypt ’s progress in pursuing’s progress in pursuing a more democratic path.” U.S. a more democratic path.” U.S.
President (Obama), “President (Obama), “ Remarks to the United Nations General AssemblyRemarks to the United Nations General Assembly in Newin New York City,” Daily Compilation of York City,” Daily Compilation of
Presidential Documents, 2013 DCPD-201300655, September 24, 2013, pp. 6Presidential Documents, 2013 DCPD-201300655, September 24, 2013, pp. 6 -7. -7.
~~166~~149 Congress did Congress did not provide a waiver for these conditions, but took steps to allow for the continuation of some aid not provide a waiver for these conditions, but took steps to allow for the continuation of some aid
under some circumstances. Congressunder some circumstances. Congress provided that if the certifications could not be made, then FMF obligations were provided that if the certifications could not be made, then FMF obligations were
to “be made availableto “be made available at the minimum rate necessary to continue existing contracts ... except that defense articles and at the minimum rate necessary to continue existing contracts ... except that defense articles and
services from such contracts” were not to be deliveredservices from such contracts” were not to be delivered until the certification requirements were met. Congressuntil the certification requirements were met. Congress applied applied
parallel requirements on any useparallel requirements on any use of prior-year FMF and International Military Education and of prior-year FMF and International Military Education and ~~T raining~~Training (IMET (IMET ) funds ) funds
that remained available. Congress exempted fundsthat remained available. Congress exempted funds that were to be usedthat were to be used for counterterrorism, border security, and for counterterrorism, border security, and
nonproliferation programs in Egypt, and for development activities in the Sinai. Congressnonproliferation programs in Egypt, and for development activities in the Sinai. Congress applied a similar tranche and applied a similar tranche and
minimum rate necessary framework in FY2015, requiring certification of different criteria, and providing a waiver.minimum rate necessary framework in FY2015, requiring certification of different criteria, and providing a waiver.
~~167~~ 150 In February 2015, House State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Kay Granger In February 2015, House State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Kay Granger
wrote wrote ~~t o~~to President Obama stating that “ President Obama stating that “ ~~t hey~~they [the Egyptians] need these planes and other weapons immediately to [the Egyptians] need these planes and other weapons immediately to
continue the fight against ISIL and other terrorists threatening Egyptcontinue the fight against ISIL and other terrorists threatening Egypt ’s security, but your Administration has refused’s security, but your Administration has refused to to
useuse the authority Congress provided you in lawthe authority Congress provided you in law to provide Egypt these weapons.” Congressional Research Service 33 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations However, the White House simultaneously announced that future military assistance to Egypt would be largely reformulated by ending cash flow financing.151 Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this authority to permit Israel (and, until 2018, Egypt) to set aside almost all FMF funds for current year payments only, rather than set aside the amount needed to meet the full cost of multiyear purchases. From 2017 through 2020, some bilateral tensions diminished as President Trump sought to improve ties with President Sisi. President Trump continued to request that Congress appropriate $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt, but did not restore the Egyptian military’s ability to benefit from Cash Flow Financing. Moreover, as previously mentioned, President Trump reduced the FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by $65.7 million ~~to provide Egypt these weapons.”~~
~~168 For more information, see CRS Report R44060, Ending Cash Flow Financing to Egypt: Issues for Congress, by~~
~~Jeremy M. Sharp (out of print but available to congressional requesters from the author).~~
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36

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by $65.7 mil ion~~ as a result of Egypt’s relationship with North as a result of Egypt’s relationship with North
Korea and prosecution of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers. Korea and prosecution of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers.
Economic Aid
Overview
From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, U.S. economic aid to Egypt helped modernize the From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, U.S. economic aid to Egypt helped modernize the
nation’s energy, telecommunications, and waste water infrastructure. Beginning in the mid to late nation’s energy, telecommunications, and waste water infrastructure. Beginning in the mid to late
1990s, as Egypt moved from being an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income 1990s, as Egypt moved from being an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income
economy,economy,~~169~~152 the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing
“trade not aid.”“trade not aid.”~~170~~153 Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a
10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the
“Glide Path Agreement,” which “Glide Path Agreement,” which ~~gradual y~~gradually reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to $400 reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to $400 ~~mil ion~~million by by
2008.2008.~~171~~154 Congress also placed conditions on economic assistance in order to encourage Egypt to Congress also placed conditions on economic assistance in order to encourage Egypt to
modernize its economy and political system. modernize its economy and political system. ~~172~~155 U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 ~~mil ion~~million per year by the end of the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President 151 For more information, see CRS Report R44060, Ending Cash Flow Financing to Egypt: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp (out of print but available to congressional requesters from the author). 152 See
~~per year by the end of the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President~~
~~Hosni Mubarak suffered173 over the latter’s reaction to the Administration’s democracy agenda in~~
~~the Arab world.174~~
~~During the Obama Administration, the President and Congress found common support for the use~~
~~of enterprise funds, which are U.S. government-funded entities whose purpose is to promote the~~
~~development and strengthening of a private sector in a foreign country by directly investing in its~~
~~local firms. In May 2011, President Obama laid out his Administration’s initial response to~~
~~Middle East uprisings by remarking that U.S. officials were “working with Congress to create~~
~~enterprise funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. And these wil be modeled on funds that~~
~~supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fal of the Berlin Wal .”175 In December~~
~~2011, Congress drew on a late Cold War precedent to authorize the establishment of enterprise~~

~~169 See~~ World Bank historic data at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-World Bank historic data at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-
country-and-lending-groups country-and-lending-groups
~~170~~153 Ahmed Galal, Ahmed Galal, Robert Z. Lawrence (editors), Robert Z. Lawrence (editors), Building Bridges: An Egypt-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Brookings , Brookings
Institution Press, 1998. Institution Press, 1998.
~~171~~154 In January 1998, Israeli officials, sensing In January 1998, Israeli officials, sensing that their economic growth had obviated the need for that type of U.S. aid that their economic growth had obviated the need for that type of U.S. aid
at a time when Congress sought to reduceat a time when Congress sought to reduce foreign assistance expenditures, negotiated with the United States to reduce foreign assistance expenditures, negotiated with the United States to reduce
economic aid and increase military aid over a 10economic aid and increase military aid over a 10 -year period. A 3:2 ratio that long prevailed in the overall levels of -year period. A 3:2 ratio that long prevailed in the overall levels of
U.S.U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt wasaid to Israel and Egypt was applied to the reduction in economic aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and $40 applied to the reduction in economic aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and $40
million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt didmillion reduction for Egypt), but Egypt did not receive an increase in military assistance. not receive an increase in military assistance. ~~T hus, Congress reduced ESF~~
~~aid~~ Thus, Congress reduced ESF aid to Egypt from $815 million in FY1998 to $411 million in FY2008.to Egypt from $815 million in FY1998 to $411 million in FY2008.
~~172~~ 155 From the late 1990s through FY2005, Congress specified From the late 1990s through FY2005, Congress specified that economic aid (ESF cash transfer) wouldthat economic aid (ESF cash transfer) would be be provided provided
“with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms” beyond those previously undertaken. “with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms” beyond those previously undertaken.
BeginningBeginning in the FY2006 appropriations act (P.L. 109-102), Congress changed the phrasing of this condition to include in the FY2006 appropriations act (P.L. 109-102), Congress changed the phrasing of this condition to include
“significant economic “significant economic and political reforms” (emphasis added). Beginning reforms” (emphasis added). Beginning in FY2008 and thereafter through FY2010, in FY2008 and thereafter through FY2010,
CongressCongress changed the condition phrasing to “significant economic and changed the condition phrasing to “significant economic and democratic reforms.” For FY2010, Congress reforms.” For FY2010, Congress
also allocated “up to” $20 million for democracy, human rights and governance programs, and “not less than” $35 also allocated “up to” $20 million for democracy, human rights and governance programs, and “not less than” $35
million for education programs. Seemillion for education programs. See Division F, Division F, ~~T itle~~Title III, III, ~~Econom ic~~Economic Support Fund, P.L. 111-117. Congressional Research Service 34 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Hosni Mubarak suffered156 over the latter’s reaction to the Administration’s democracy agenda in the Arab world.157 During the Obama Administration, the President and Congress found common support for the use of enterprise funds, which are U.S. government-funded entities whose purpose is to promote the development and strengthening of a private sector in a foreign country by directly investing in its local firms. In May 2011, President Obama laid out his Administration’s initial response to Middle East uprisings by remarking that U.S. officials were “working with Congress to create enterprise funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. And these will be modeled on funds that supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.”158 In December 2011, Congress drew on a late Cold War precedent to authorize the establishment of enterprise funds in Egypt in ~~Support Fund, P.L. 111-117.~~
~~173 See Helene Cooper, “ With Egypt, Diplomatic Words Often Fail,” New York Times, January 29, 2011.~~
~~174 T he George W. Bush Administration requested that Congress cut ESF aid by half in FY2009 to $200 million.~~
~~Congress appropriated the President’s request.~~
~~175 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama,~~
~~2011, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks at the Department of State, May 19, 2011, pp. 552 -560.~~
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37

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~funds in Egypt in~~ the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L.
112-74) 112-74)
The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) was established by grant agreement with The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) was established by grant agreement with
USAID on March 23, 2013. USAID on March 23, 2013. Since its inception, the EAEF has received $300 million in ESF funds. After eight years in operation, it After eight years in operation, it ~~general y~~generally has been considered a has been considered a
modest success in boosting Egypt’s private sector, particularly in the financial and technology modest success in boosting Egypt’s private sector, particularly in the financial and technology
~~sectors. According to USAID, the EAEF produced an annual return of 17.5% and has helped~~
~~create 5,000 new full-time jobs, attracted several hundred mil ion dollars in foreign direct~~
~~investment, and seeded some of the top private equity funds in Egypt.176 Since its inception, the~~
~~EAEF has received $300 mil ion in ESF funds. As of May 2021, the EAEF has invested in 94~~
~~companies, supported 15,000 jobs and has a market value of over $600 mil ion.177~~sectors. According to the EAEF’s most recent impact report, the funds has invested $250 million of the original $300 million authorized by the U.S. Congress; at the end of 2021, the market value of the EAEF’s portfolio was estimated to be $600 million.159
During the Obama Administration, the Egyptian military pushed back against U.S. support for a During the Obama Administration, the Egyptian military pushed back against U.S. support for a
competitive, transparent electoral process.competitive, transparent electoral process.~~178~~160 After reasserting power in 2013, the military moved After reasserting power in 2013, the military moved
to arrest American employees (as to arrest American employees (as ~~wel~~ well as Egyptian and other foreign nationals) of U.S.-based and as Egyptian and other foreign nationals) of U.S.-based and
foreign democracy promotion organizations.foreign democracy promotion organizations.~~179~~
161 In the final years of the Obama Administration, wariness of U.S. democracy promotion assistance In the final years of the Obama Administration, wariness of U.S. democracy promotion assistance
led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance programs.led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance programs.~~180~~162
According to the According to the ~~Government Accountability Office (GAO)~~GAO, the Department of State and the U.S. , the Department of State and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of ~~mil ions~~millions of dollars ($460 of dollars ($460
~~mil ion~~ million as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding.as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding.~~181~~163 These growing unobligated balances These growing unobligated balances
~~created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes. In~~
~~2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming for other purposes~~
~~$108 mil ion of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated.~~
~~The Administration claimed that its actions were due to “continued government of Egypt process~~
~~delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs.”182 In 2017, the~~
~~Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt.~~
~~During the Trump and Biden Administrations, U.S. economic assistance has averaged $114~~
~~mil ion a year in ESF. From 2017 to present, USAID has expanded its role in assisting the~~
~~Egyptian government develop the Sinai Peninsula. In north Sinai, the United States has funded~~

~~176 USAID, “Activity Fact Sheet: Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, available at https://www.usaid.gov/egypt/~~
~~economic-growth-and-trade/egyptian-american-enterprise-fund.~~
~~177 T he Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, Press Release, “ T he Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund Sells Stake in~~
~~Part of Fawry’s $80 Million Secondary Offering,” August 23, 2021.~~
~~178 Prior to 2011, U.S. funding for democracy promotion activities and good govern ance~~created pressure on 156 See Helene Cooper, “With Egypt, Diplomatic Words Often Fail,” New York Times, January 29, 2011. 157 The George W. Bush Administration requested that Congress cut ESF aid by half in FY2009 to $200 million. Congress appropriated the President’s request. 158 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks at the Department of State, May 19, 2011, pp. 552-560. 159 Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, Impact Report 2021, May 2022. 160 Prior to 2011, U.S. funding for democracy promotion activities and good governance had been a source of acrimony had been a source of acrimony
between the United States and Egypt. Using the appropriations process, Congressbetween the United States and Egypt. Using the appropriations process, Congress has mandated that “has mandated that “ democracy and democracy and
governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country.governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country. ” Originally ” Originally
referred to as the Brownback amendment, this legislative languagereferred to as the Brownback amendment, this legislative language ~~began~~ began in reference to Egyptin reference to Egypt (Division D, (Division D, ~~T itle II,~~
~~Econom ic~~Title II, Economic Support Fund, P.L. 108-447), and was expanded in FY2008 to include “, P.L. 108-447), and was expanded in FY2008 to include “ any foreign country.” (Division J, any foreign country.” (Division J,
Sec.Sec. 634(o), P.L. 110-161). 634(o), P.L. 110-161).
~~179 See footnote 150 on Case 173.~~161 From FY2014 to FY2019, Congress mandated in From FY2014 to FY2019, Congress mandated in annual appropriations legislation annual appropriations legislation
that the Secretary of State shall withhold an amount of ESFthat the Secretary of State shall withhold an amount of ESF to Egypt determined to be equivalent to that expended by to Egypt determined to be equivalent to that expended by
the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with
democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies that Egypt has dismisseddemocracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies that Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the the convictions issued by the
Cairo Criminal Court on JuneCairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013. 4, 2013.
~~180~~ 162 House Foreign Affairs Committee, hearing entitled, “Egypt: Challenges and House Foreign Affairs Committee, hearing entitled, “Egypt: Challenges and ~~Opportun ities~~Opportunities for U.S. Policy,” for U.S. Policy,”
Prepared Statement by Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy, June 15, 2016.Prepared Statement by Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy, June 15, 2016.
~~181 EGYPT : U.S.~~ 163 Government Accountability Office, EGYPT: U.S. Government ShouldGovernment Should Examine Options for Using Unobligated Congressional Research Service 35 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming for other purposes $108 million of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated. The Administration statedthat its actions were due to “continued government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs.”164 In 2017, the Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt. During the Biden Administration, U.S. economic assistance has averaged $125 million a year in ESF. From 2017 to present, USAID has expanded its role in assisting the Egyptian government develop the Sinai Peninsula. In north Sinai, the United States has funded ~~Examine Options for Using Unobligated Funds and Evaluating Security~~
~~Assistance Programs, GAO-15-259: Published: February 11, 2015. Publicly Released: March 12, 2015.~~
~~182 “US Shifts Egypt Aid to Other Countries,” Al Monitor, October 16, 2016.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

38

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

the Al Arish desalination facility that provides 126,000 residents with potable water.the Al Arish desalination facility that provides 126,000 residents with potable water.~~183~~165 USAID USAID
also has delivered commuter buses to isolated communities in central Sinai to improve access to also has delivered commuter buses to isolated communities in central Sinai to improve access to
workplaces, commerce, education, and government services.workplaces, commerce, education, and government services.~~184~~166
Table A-1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt: 1946-2020
(calculated in historical (calculated in historical ~~dol ars~~dollars, not adjusted for inflation) , not adjusted for inflation)
Year
Military
Economic
Annual Total
1946 1946
n/a n/a
$9,600,000 $9,600,000
$9,600,000 $9,600,000
1948 1948
n/a n/a
$1,400,000 $1,400,000
$1,400,000 $1,400,000
1951 1951
n/a n/a
$100,000 $100,000
$100,000 $100,000
1952 1952
n/a n/a
$1,200,000 $1,200,000
$1,200,000 $1,200,000
1953 1953
n/a n/a
$12,900,000 $12,900,000
$12,900,000 $12,900,000
1954 1954
n/a n/a
$4,000,000 $4,000,000
$4,000,000 $4,000,000
1955 1955
n/a n/a
$66,300,000 $66,300,000
$66,300,000 $66,300,000
1956 1956
n/a n/a
$33,300,000 $33,300,000
$33,300,000 $33,300,000
1957 1957
n/a n/a
$1,000,000 $1,000,000
$1,000,000 $1,000,000
1958 1958
n/a n/a
$601,000 $601,000
$601,000 $601,000
1959 1959
n/a n/a
$44,800,000 $44,800,000
$44,800,000 $44,800,000
1960 1960
n/a n/a
$65,900,000 $65,900,000
$65,900,000 $65,900,000
1961 1961
n/a n/a
$73,500,000 $73,500,000
$73,500,000 $73,500,000
1962 1962
n/a n/a
$200,500,000 $200,500,000
$200,500,000 $200,500,000
1963 1963
n/a n/a
$146,700,000 $146,700,000
$146,700,000 $146,700,000
1964 1964
n/a n/a
$95,500,000 $95,500,000
$95,500,000 $95,500,000
1965 1965
n/a n/a
$97,600,000 $97,600,000
$97,600,000 $97,600,000
1966 1966
n/a n/a
$27,600,000 $27,600,000
$27,600,000 $27,600,000
1967 1967
n/a n/a
$12,600,000 $12,600,000
$12,600,000 $12,600,000
Funds and Evaluating Security Assistance Programs, Published: February 11, 2015. Publicly Released: March 12, 2015. 164 “US Shifts Egypt Aid to Other Countries,” Al Monitor, October 16, 2016. 165 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, U.S. Ambassador Visits North Sinai, June 24, 2021. 166 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, United States Delivers 20 Brand New Buses to North Sinai Governorate, August 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 36 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Year Military Economic Annual Total 1972 1972
n/a n/a
$1,500,000 $1,500,000
$1,500,000 $1,500,000
1973 1973
n/a n/a
$800,000 $800,000
$800,000 $800,000
1974 1974
n/a n/a
$21,300,000 $21,300,000
$21,300,000 $21,300,000
1975 1975
n/a n/a
$370,100,000 $370,100,000
$370,100,000 $370,100,000
1976 1976
n/a n/a
$464,300,000 $464,300,000
$464,300,000 $464,300,000
1976tq
n/a
$552,501,000
$552,501,000
1977 1977
n/a n/a
$907,752,000 $907,752,000
$907,752,000 $907,752,000
1978 1978
$183,000 $183,000
$943,029,000 $943,029,000
$943,212,000 $943,212,000
1979 1979
$1,500,379,000 $1,500,379,000
$1,088,095,000 $1,088,095,000
$2,588,474,000 $2,588,474,000
1980 1980
$848,000 $848,000
$1,166,423,000 $1,166,423,000
$1,167,271,000 $1,167,271,000

~~183 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, U.S. Ambassador Visits North Sinai, June 24, 2021.~~
~~184 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, United States Delivers 20 Brand New Buses to North Sinai~~
~~Governorate, August 16, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

39

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Year~~
~~Military~~
~~Economic~~
~~Annual Total~~
1981 1981
$550,720,000 $550,720,000
$1,130,449,000 $1,130,449,000
$1,681,169,000 $1,681,169,000
1982 1982
$902,315,000 $902,315,000
$1,064,936,000 $1,064,936,000
$1,967,251,000 $1,967,251,000
1983 1983
$1,326,778,000 $1,326,778,000
$1,005,064,000 $1,005,064,000
$2,331,842,000 $2,331,842,000
1984 1984
$1,366,458,000 $1,366,458,000
$1,104,137,000 $1,104,137,000
$2,470,595,000 $2,470,595,000
1985 1985
$1,176,398,000 $1,176,398,000
$1,292,008,000 $1,292,008,000
$2,468,406,000 $2,468,406,000
1986 1986
$1,245,741,000 $1,245,741,000
$1,293,293,000 $1,293,293,000
$2,539,034,000 $2,539,034,000
1987 1987
$1,301,696,000 $1,301,696,000
$1,015,179,000 $1,015,179,000
$2,316,875,000 $2,316,875,000
1988 1988
$1,301,477,000 $1,301,477,000
$873,446,000 $873,446,000
$2,174,923,000 $2,174,923,000
1989 1989
$1,301,484,000 $1,301,484,000
$968,187,000 $968,187,000
$2,269,671,000 $2,269,671,000
1990 1990
$1,295,919,000 $1,295,919,000
$1,093,358,000 $1,093,358,000
$2,389,277,000 $2,389,277,000
1991 1991
$1,301,798,000 $1,301,798,000
$998,011,000 $998,011,000
$2,299,809,000 $2,299,809,000
1992 1992
$1,301,518,000 $1,301,518,000
$933,320,000 $933,320,000
$2,234,838,000 $2,234,838,000
1993 1993
$1,302,299,892 $1,302,299,892
$753,532,569 $753,532,569
$2,055,832,461 $2,055,832,461
1994 1994
$1,329,014,520 $1,329,014,520
$615,278,400 $615,278,400
$1,944,292,920 $1,944,292,920
1995 1995
$1,342,039,999 $1,342,039,999
$975,881,584 $975,881,584
$2,317,921,583 $2,317,921,583
1996 1996
$1,373,872,023 $1,373,872,023
$824,526,772 $824,526,772
$2,198,398,795 $2,198,398,795
1997 1997
$1,304,889,154 $1,304,889,154
$811,229,175 $811,229,175
$2,116,118,329 $2,116,118,329
1998 1998
$1,303,343,750 $1,303,343,750
$833,244,554 $833,244,554
$2,136,588,304 $2,136,588,304
1999 1999
$1,351,905,310 $1,351,905,310
$862,062,972 $862,062,972
$2,213,968,282 $2,213,968,282
2000 2000
$1,333,685,882 $1,333,685,882
$742,458,662 $742,458,662
$2,076,144,544 $2,076,144,544
2001 2001
$1,299,709,358 $1,299,709,358
$393,734,896 $393,734,896
$1,693,444,254 $1,693,444,254
2002 2002
$1,301,367,000 $1,301,367,000
$1,046,193,772 $1,046,193,772
$2,347,560,772 $2,347,560,772
2003 2003
$1,304,073,715 $1,304,073,715
$646,856,655 $646,856,655
$1,950,930,370 $1,950,930,370
2004 2004
$1,318,119,661 $1,318,119,661
$720,241,709 $720,241,709
$2,038,361,370 $2,038,361,370
2005 2005
$1,294,700,384 $1,294,700,384
$495,849,544 $495,849,544
$1,790,549,928 $1,790,549,928
2006 2006
$1,301,512,728 $1,301,512,728
$351,242,871 $351,242,871
$1,652,755,599 $1,652,755,599
2007 2007
$1,305,235,109 $1,305,235,109
$737,348,773 $737,348,773
$2,042,583,882 $2,042,583,882
Congressional Research Service 37 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Year Military Economic Annual Total 2008 2008
$1,294,902,533 $1,294,902,533
$314,498,954 $314,498,954
$1,609,401,487 $1,609,401,487
2009 2009
$1,301,332,000 $1,301,332,000
$688,533,322 $688,533,322
$1,989,865,322 $1,989,865,322
2010 2010
$1,301,900,000 $1,301,900,000
$300,943,891 $300,943,891
$1,602,843,891 $1,602,843,891
2011 2011
$1,298,779,449 $1,298,779,449
$,242,205,488 $,242,205,488
$1,540,984,937 $1,540,984,937
2012 2012
$1,302,233,562 $1,302,233,562
$90,260,730 $90,260,730
$1,392,494,292 $1,392,494,292
2013 2013
$1,239,659,511 $1,239,659,511
$330,610,024 $330,610,024
$1,570,269,534 $1,570,269,534
2014 2014
$274,031 $274,031
$178,748,169 $178,748,169
$179,022,200 $179,022,200
2015 2015
$1,345,091,943 $1,345,091,943
$222,864,445 $222,864,445
$1,567,956,387 $1,567,956,387
2016 2016
$1,126,658,738 $1,126,658,738
$133,150,380 $133,150,380
$1,259,809,118 $1,259,809,118
2017 2017
$201,103,590 $201,103,590
$173,179,863 $173,179,863
$374,283,453 $374,283,453
~~Congressional Research Service~~

40

~~Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations~~

2018 2018
$1,002,517,764 $1,002,517,764
$233,703,233 $233,703,233
$1,236,220,998 $1,236,220,998
2019 2019
$1,05,992,890 $1,05,992,890
$161,968,390 $161,968,390
$1,419,961,281 $1,419,961,281
2020 2020
$1,301,497,657 $1,301,497,657
$126,511,470 $126,511,470
$1,428,009,127 $1,428,009,127
Totals
$49,661,424,152
$33,189,150,268
$82,850,574,420
~~Source~~Sources: U.S. Overseas U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30,
20192019,; and ForeignAssistance.gov, and ForeignAssistance.gov, last updated July 26, 2021 (the year FY2020 is last updated July 26, 2021 (the year FY2020 is ~~partial y~~partially reported). reported).
~~Note~~ Notes: This chart does not account for the repurposing of assistance funds which had been previously This chart does not account for the repurposing of assistance funds which had been previously ~~obliga ted~~ obligated
for Egypt. Total numbers may be slightly higher than official sourcesfor Egypt. Total numbers may be slightly higher than official sources due to a timedue to a time delay in government agency delay in government agency
reporting of obligated funds. It is unclear why FY2014 militaryreporting of obligated funds. It is unclear why FY2014 military assistance funds are significantly lowerassistance funds are significantly lower than than
previous years. previous years.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Congressional Research Service 38 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

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