Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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Department of Defense Directed Energy
September September ~~28, 2021~~13, 2022
Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Kelley M. Sayler,
Directed energy (DE) weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic Directed energy (DE) weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic
Coordinator
energy, to combat enemy forces. Although the United States has been researching directed energy, to combat enemy forces. Although the United States has been researching directed
Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced
energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that the Department of Defense (DOD) has energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
Technology and Global Technology and Global
invested billions of dollars in DE programs that failed to reach maturity and were ultimately invested billions of dollars in DE programs that failed to reach maturity and were ultimately
Security Security
cancelled. In recent years, however, DOD has made progress on DE weapons development, cancelled. In recent years, however, DOD has made progress on DE weapons development,

deploying the first operational U.S. DE weapon in 2014 aboard the USS deploying the first operational U.S. DE weapon in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. Since then, DE . Since then, DE
Andrew Feickert
weapons development has continued, with DOD issuing a Directed Energy Roadmap to weapons development has continued, with DOD issuing a Directed Energy Roadmap to
Specialist in Military Specialist in Military
coordinate the department’s efforts. DOD has also introduced a High Energy Laser Scaling coordinate the department’s efforts. DOD has also introduced a High Energy Laser Scaling
Ground Forces Ground Forces
Initiative, which seeks to strengthen the defense industrial base for DE weapons and improve Initiative, which seeks to strengthen the defense industrial base for DE weapons and improve

laser beam quality and efficiency. laser beam quality and efficiency.
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Military This report provides background information and issues for Congress on DE weapons, including This report provides background information and issues for Congress on DE weapons, including
~~Analyst in Military~~
Capabilities and Programs Capabilities and Programs
high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, and outlines selected high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, and outlines selected

unclassified DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. If successfully fielded, HELs could unclassified DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. If successfully fielded, HELs could
be used by ground forces in a range of missions, including short-range air defense (SHORAD); be used by ground forces in a range of missions, including short-range air defense (SHORAD);
Ronald O'Rourke
counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM)
Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
missions. HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and missions. HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and

communications systems. Compared with traditional munitions, DE weapons could offer lower communications systems. Compared with traditional munitions, DE weapons could offer lower
logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—assuming access to a sufficient power logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—assuming access to a sufficient power

supply—deeper magazines. These weapons could, however, face a number of limitations supply—deeper magazines. These weapons could, however, face a number of limitations not not
faced by their kinetic counterparts. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g., rain, fog, obscurants) could potentially limit faced by their kinetic counterparts. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g., rain, fog, obscurants) could potentially limit
the range and beam quality of DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness. the range and beam quality of DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness.
As DOD continues to invest in DE weapons, Congress may consider the weapons’ technological maturity, lifecycle cost, As DOD continues to invest in DE weapons, Congress may consider the weapons’ technological maturity, lifecycle cost,
characteristics, mission utility, industrial base, intelligence requirements, and oversight structure. Congress may also consider characteristics, mission utility, industrial base, intelligence requirements, and oversight structure. Congress may also consider
the implications of DE weapons for future arms control agreements. the implications of DE weapons for future arms control agreements.

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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on Department of Defense This report provides background information and issues for Congress on Department of Defense
(DOD) efforts to develop and procure directed energy (DE) weapons. The report provides an (DOD) efforts to develop and procure directed energy (DE) weapons. The report provides an
overview of certain DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. Two other CRS reports overview of certain DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. Two other CRS reports
provide additionalprovide additional discussion of Army and Navy DE programs.1 Some types of DE weapons, such discussion of Army and Navy DE programs.1 Some types of DE weapons, such
as particle-beam weapons, are outside the scope of this report. as particle-beam weapons, are outside the scope of this report.
DOD’s efforts on DE weapons pose a number of potential issues for Congress. Decisions that DOD’s efforts on DE weapons pose a number of potential issues for Congress. Decisions that
Congress makes on these issues could have substantial implications for future DOD capabilities Congress makes on these issues could have substantial implications for future DOD capabilities
and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base. and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base.
Overview of Directed Energy Weapons2
DOD defines directed energy weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather DOD defines directed energy weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather
than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities,
and/or personnel.”3 DE weapons include high-energy laser (HEL) and high-powered microwave and/or personnel.”3 DE weapons include high-energy laser (HEL) and high-powered microwave
(HPM) weapons. (HPM) weapons.
HEL HEL weapons might be used by ground forces in various missions, including short-range air weapons might be used by ground forces in various missions, including short-range air
defense (SHORAD); counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, defense (SHORAD); counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, ~~artil ery~~artillery, ,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.4 The weapons might be used to “dazzle” (i.e., temporarily and mortar (C-RAM) missions.4 The weapons might be used to “dazzle” (i.e., temporarily
disable) or damage disable) or damage ~~satel ites~~satellites and sensors. This could in turn interfere with and sensors. This could in turn interfere with ~~intel igence~~intelligence-gathering -gathering
operations; military communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing systems used for operations; military communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing systems used for
weapons targeting. In addition, HEL weapons could weapons targeting. In addition, HEL weapons could ~~theoretical y~~theoretically provide options for boost-phase provide options for boost-phase
missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, experts disagree on the missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, experts disagree on the
affordability, technological feasibility, and utilityaffordability, technological feasibility, and utility of this application.5 of this application.5
In general, HEL In general, HEL weapons might offer lower logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—weapons might offer lower logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—
assuming access to a sufficient power supply—deeper magazines compared with traditional assuming access to a sufficient power supply—deeper magazines compared with traditional
munitions. (Although a number of different types of HELs exist, many of the United States’ munitions. (Although a number of different types of HELs exist, many of the United States’
current programs are solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost current programs are solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost
per shot would be equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot.)6 per shot would be equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot.)6 ~~This~~

~~1 See CRS~~ These 1 See CRS Report R45098, Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential
Issues for Congress, by Andrew, by Andrew ~~Feickert ;~~ Feickert, and CRS and CRS Report R44175, Report R44175, Navy ~~Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided~~
~~Projectile~~Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 This~~2 T his~~ section was section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRSwritten by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced ~~T echnology~~Technology and Global and Global Security. For more Security. For more
information—including information about DE weapons programs in China and Russia—seeinformation—including information about DE weapons programs in China and Russia—see ~~CRS~~ CRS Report R46458, Report R46458,
~~Em erging~~Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3 -85, May 22, 2020, p. GL-6. , May 22, 2020, p. GL-6.
4 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS4 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRSmissions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, In Focus IF11426, Department of
Defense Counter-~~Unm anned Aircraft System s~~Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
5 See, 5 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “ Bad Idea:Bad Idea: Space-BasedSpace-Based Interceptors and Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic andDirected Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed energy-systems/; and Justin https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday,Doubleday, “ “Pentagon punts MDA’s laser ambitions, shifts fundingPentagon punts MDA’s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-ledtoward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense, ,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling. toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
6 Ariel Robinson, “6 Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will Directed Energy Weapons: Will ~~T hey~~They Ever Be Ready?,” Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at , July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

characteristics could in turn produce a favorable cost-exchange ratio for could in turn produce a favorable cost-exchange ratio for ~~the~~a defender, whose marginal costs defender, whose marginal costs
would be significantly lower than those of would be significantly lower than those of ~~the~~an aggressor. aggressor.
Similarly, HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and Similarly, HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and
communications systems. These weapons could communications systems. These weapons could ~~potential y~~potentially generate effects over wider areas— generate effects over wider areas—
disabling any electronics within their electromagnetic cone—than HEL weapons, which emit a disabling any electronics within their electromagnetic cone—than HEL weapons, which emit a
narrower beam of energy (narrower beam of energy (seesee Figure 1). Some analysts have noted that HPM weapons might ). Some analysts have noted that HPM weapons might
provide more effective area defense against missile salvos and swarms of unmanned aircraft provide more effective area defense against missile salvos and swarms of unmanned aircraft
systems. HPM weapons in an anti-personnel configuration might provide a means of nonlethal systems. HPM weapons in an anti-personnel configuration might provide a means of nonlethal
crowd control, perimeter defense, or patrol or convoy protection.7 Potential advantages and crowd control, perimeter defense, or patrol or convoy protection.7 Potential advantages and
limitations of both HELlimitations of both HEL and HPM weapons are discussed in greater detail and HPM weapons are discussed in greater detail inin Appendix A.
Figure 1. Illustrative Effects of HELs vsVersus HPM Weapons

Source: CRS image based on an image in Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, CRS image based on an image in Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise
of Directed-Energy Weapons,, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ~~April~~ April 19, 2021, p. 40, at 19, 2021, p. 40, at
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
Note: Units of measurementUnits of measurement are il ustrative.are il ustrative.
Selected Defense-Wide Directed Energy Programs8
DOD directed energy programs are coordinated by the Principal Director for Directed Energy DOD directed energy programs are coordinated by the Principal Director for Directed Energy
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(OUSD[R&E]). The Principal Director for Directed Energy is(OUSD[R&E]). The Principal Director for Directed Energy is ~~additional y~~ responsible for responsible for
development and oversight of the Directed Energy Roadmap, which articulates DOD’s objective development and oversight of the Directed Energy Roadmap, which articulates DOD’s objective
of “[achieving] dominance in DE military applications in every mission and domain where they of “[achieving] dominance in DE military applications in every mission and domain where they
give advantage.”9 give advantage.”9 ~~The~~According to OUSD(R&E), the current roadmap outlines DOD’s roadmap outlines DOD’s ~~plan~~plans to increase power levels of HEL to increase power levels of HEL weapons weapons
from around 150 kilowatt (kW), as is currently feasible, to around 300 kW by from around 150 kilowatt (kW), as is currently feasible, to around 300 kW by ~~FY2022, 500 kW~~
~~by FY2024, and 1 megawatt (MW) by FY2030.10 For reference, although no consensus exists~~

~~ready.~~
~~7 See,~~ FY2023, “with goal milestones to achieve 500 kW class with reduced size and weight by FY2025 ready. 7 See, for example, Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, “Active Denial System FAQs,” for example, Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, “Active Denial System FAQs,”
https://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Active-Denial-System-FAQs/. https://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Active-Denial-System-FAQs/.
8 8 ~~T his~~This section was section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRSwritten by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced Analyst in Advanced ~~T echnology~~Technology and Global and Global Security. Security.
9 Dr. Jim 9 Dr. Jim ~~T rebes~~Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” (R&E) Doing?,” ~~Presentation~~presentation at at
the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.
~~10 Kilowatts and megawatts are units of power. One kilowatt is equal to one thousand watts, while one megawatt is~~
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

and to further reduce size and weight and increase power to MW [megawatt] levels by FY2026.”10 For reference, although no consensus exists regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target sets, DOD regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target sets, DOD
briefing documents (briefing documents (seesee Figure 2) suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage ) suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage
UASs, rockets, UASs, rockets, ~~artil ery~~artillery, and mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could , and mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could ~~additional y~~
~~engage smal~~ additionally engage small boats and cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than boats and cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than
at—the laser).11 Lasers of 1 MW could at—the laser).11 Lasers of 1 MW could ~~potential y neutralize bal istic~~ potentially neutralize ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles and hypersonic
weapons.12 weapons.12
Figure 2. Summary of DOD Directed Energy Roadmap

Source: Dr. Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities:Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,”
presentation at the Institute for Defensepresentation at the Institute for Defense and Governmentand Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020. Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.
In addition to In addition to managing the DE roadmap, OUSD(R&E) manages the High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative the DE roadmap, OUSD(R&E) manages the High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative
(HELSI), which seeks “to demonstrate laser output power scaling while maintaining or improving (HELSI), which seeks “to demonstrate laser output power scaling while maintaining or improving
beam quality and efficiency.”13 HELSI is intended to strengthen the defense industrial base for beam quality and efficiency.”13 HELSI is intended to strengthen the defense industrial base for
potential future DE weapons by providing near-term prototyping opportunities for industry potential future DE weapons by providing near-term prototyping opportunities for industry
partners.14 OUSD(R&E) has completed a DOD-wide Laser Lethality Analysis Process Review to partners.14 OUSD(R&E) has completed a DOD-wide Laser Lethality Analysis Process Review to
identify future needs for the department and best practices for DE development and use. In identify future needs for the department and best practices for DE development and use. In
addition, OUSD(R&E) is addition, OUSD(R&E) is ~~establishing~~developing a Directed Energy Lethality Database, a searchable a Directed Energy Lethality Database, a searchable
repository for DOD’s DE analyses.15 repository for DOD’s DE analyses.15

~~equal to one million watts.~~
~~11 Dr. Jim T rebes~~ 10 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 8, 2022. Kilowatts and megawatts are units of power. For example, 1 kilowatt is equal to 1,000 watts, and 1 megawatt is equal to 1 million watts. 11 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” (R&E) Doing?,” ~~Presentation~~presentation
at IDGA,at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRSOctober 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim
~~T rebes~~Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required, November 17, 2020. Required power levels could bepower levels could be ~~impacted by addit ional~~ affected by additional factors such as adversary factors such as adversary
countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects. countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.
12 Dr. Jim 12 Dr. Jim ~~T rebes~~Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” (R&E) Doing?,” ~~Presentation~~presentation
at IDGA,at IDGA, October 21, 2020. October 21, 2020.
13 Dr. Jim 13 Dr. Jim ~~T rebes~~Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” (R&E) Doing?,” ~~Presentation~~presentation
at IDGA,at IDGA, October 21, 2020. October 21, 2020.
14 Industry participants in HELSI include14 Industry participants in HELSI include ~~nLight~~ nLight-Nutronics (sponsored by the Navy), Lockheed Martin (sponsored by -Nutronics (sponsored by the Navy), Lockheed Martin (sponsored by
the Army), and Generalthe Army), and General Atomics (sponsored by the Air Force). SeeAtomics (sponsored by the Air Force). See Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Scaling ~~Scaling~~ Up: Army Up: Army
Advances 300kW-class Laser Prototype,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Advances 300kW-class Laser Prototype,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical ~~T echnologies~~Technologies Office, March 3, 2020, at Office, March 3, 2020, at
https://www.army.mil/article/233346/scaling_up_army_advances_300kw_class_laser_prototype. https://www.army.mil/article/233346/scaling_up_army_advances_300kw_class_laser_prototype.
15 15 ~~OUSD(R&E) plans to have the database available for data incorporation and use by early 2022. CRS correspondence~~
~~with Distinguished Scientist for Laser Weapon Systems Lethality Dr. Christopher Lloyd, January 11, 2021.~~The database has been populated with limited data and is being updated based on user feedback. OUSD(R&E) plans
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

In support of these initiatives, DOD maintains a number of In support of these initiatives, DOD maintains a number of ~~Defense-wide~~ research programs, research programs,
including programs at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense including programs at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA). For example, MDA’s (OSD), and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA). For example, MDA’s
Directed Energy Demonstrator Development program Directed Energy Demonstrator Development program “addresses addresses “technology risk reduction and technology risk reduction and
maturation for high powered strategic lasers, beam control, lethality, and related technologies” in maturation for high powered strategic lasers, beam control, lethality, and related technologies” in
support of OUSD(R&E)’s Directed Energy Roadmap.16 The program received $42 support of OUSD(R&E)’s Directed Energy Roadmap.16 The program received $42 ~~mil ion in~~
~~FY2021.~~million in FY2021. Although MDA did not request funding for the program in FY2022 “due to a shift in Department MDA did not request funding for the program in FY2022 “due to a shift in Department
of Defense prioritiesof Defense priorities~~”; however, program tests are scheduled to continue through 2022.17~~
~~In FY2022, OSD requested $15 mil ion~~,” Congress appropriated $39 million to continuing development efforts.17 MDA did not request funds for the Directed Energy Demonstrator Development program in FY2023.18 In FY2023, OSD requested $16 million for High Energy Laser Research Initiatives, including for High Energy Laser Research Initiatives, including
basic research and educational grants, and $basic research and educational grants, and $~~46 mil ion~~49 million for High Energy Laser Development, for High Energy Laser Development,
which funds applied research.which funds applied research.~~18 OSD additional y~~19 OSD additionally requested $ requested $~~107 mil ion in FY2022~~111 million in FY2023 for High for High
Energy Laser Advanced Development, which is focused on “scaling the output power of DE Energy Laser Advanced Development, which is focused on “scaling the output power of DE
systems to reach systems to reach ~~operational y~~operationally effective power levels applicable to broad mission areas across the effective power levels applicable to broad mission areas across the
DOD.”DOD.”1920 OSD requested $11 OSD requested $11 ~~mil ion in FY2022~~million in FY2023 to continue assessments of directed energy to continue assessments of directed energy
weapons, including assessments of the weapons’ effects, effectiveness, and limitations.weapons, including assessments of the weapons’ effects, effectiveness, and limitations.~~20 Final y~~21 Finally, ,
DARPA’s Waveform AgileDARPA’s Waveform Agile Radio-frequency Directed Energy (WARDEN) program seeks to Radio-frequency Directed Energy (WARDEN) program seeks to
“extend the range and lethality of high power microwave weapons ... [for] counter-unmanned “extend the range and lethality of high power microwave weapons ... [for] counter-unmanned
aerial systems, vehicle and vessel disruption, electronic strike, and guided missile defense.”aerial systems, vehicle and vessel disruption, electronic strike, and guided missile defense.”22 to have an updated version of the database available in FY2023. CRS correspondence with Distinguished Scientist for Laser Weapon Systems Lethality Dr. Christopher Lloyd, August 29, 2022. 16 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 2a of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, pp. 601-603, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf. 17 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 2a of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, pp. 601-602, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf. 18 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 2a of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, p. 601, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf. 19 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, pp. 1 and 91, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2023.pdf. These programs were transferred to OSD
~~DARPA received $6 mil ion for WARDEN in FY2021 and requested $15 mil ion for the program~~
~~in FY2022.21~~
~~Overal , DOD requested at least $578 mil ion in FY2022 for unclassified DE research,~~
~~development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $331 mil ion for unclassified DE~~
~~weapons procurement.22~~

~~16 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense -Wide~~
~~Justification Book Volum e 2a of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, p. 554, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/~~
~~RDT E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf .~~
~~17 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense -Wide~~
~~Justification Book Volum e 2a of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Defense -Wide, pp. 535 and 534, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/~~
~~RDT E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf .~~
~~18 T hese programs were transferred to OSD~~ from the Air Force to “better align [the] research area to Department of from the Air Force to “better align [the] research area to Department of
Defense Science andDefense Science and ~~T echnology~~ Technology strategy and priorities for Directed Energy.” strategy and priorities for Directed Energy.” ~~T his~~This transfer could reflect greater transfer could reflect greater
coordination across DOD DE programs. DOD, coordination across DOD DE programs. DOD, ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget ~~Estim ates,~~ Estimates, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-Wide Justification Book ~~Volum e~~Volume 3 of 5 Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test &
Evaluation, pp. 1 and 79, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/, pp. 1 and 79, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/
budget_justification/pdfs/budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/RDT E_Vol3_OSD_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf .~~
1903_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol3_OSD_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf. 20 DOD, DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) ~~2022~~2023 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-
Wide Justification Book ~~Volum e~~Volume 3 of 5 Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation , p. , p. ~~335~~327, at , at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~fy2022~~fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs//budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/~~
~~RDT E_Vol3_OSD_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf .~~
2003_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2023.pdf. 21 DOD, DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) ~~2022~~2023 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense -
Wide Justification Book ~~Volum e~~Volume 3 of 5 Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation , p. , p. ~~357~~348, at , at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/~~fy2022~~fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs//budget_justification/pdfs/~~03_RDT _and_E/~~
~~RDT E_Vol3_OSD_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.~~
2103_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2023.pdf. 22 DOD, DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) ~~2022~~2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects
~~Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volum e 1 of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation~~ ~~, p. 141, at~~
~~https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/~~
~~RDT E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf .~~
~~22 T hese figures include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and~~
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~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Selected Air Force Directed Energy~~
~~Weapons Programs23~~ Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 10 link to page 27 link to page 31 link to page 31 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress DARPA received $20 million for WARDEN in FY2022 and requested $23 million for the program in FY2023.23 Overall, DOD requested at least $669 million in FY2023 for unclassified DE research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)—up from its FY2022 request of at least $578 million and down from its FY2022 appropriation of at least $745 million. The department requested at least $345 million for unclassified DE weapons procurement in FY2023—up from its FY2022 request of at least $332 million and its FY2022 appropriation of at least $325 million.24 Selected Air Force Directed Energy Weapons Programs25
The Air Force is developing and testing a number of DE technologies through the Directed The Air Force is developing and testing a number of DE technologies through the Directed
Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The following section provides Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The following section provides
a brief description of selected unclassifieda brief description of selected unclassified efforts. efforts.
Tactical High-Power Operational Responder (THOR)
The Tactical High-Power Microwave Operational Responder (THOR) technology demonstrator The Tactical High-Power Microwave Operational Responder (THOR) technology demonstrator
((seesee Figure 3), designed by AFRL in collaboration with industry partners, is intended to provide a , designed by AFRL in collaboration with industry partners, is intended to provide a
viable DE C-UAS weapon system focused on short-range air base defense.viable DE C-UAS weapon system focused on short-range air base defense.2426 THOR is housed in THOR is housed in
a standardized 20-foot transport container that enables it to fit inside a C-130 transport aircraft. a standardized 20-foot transport container that enables it to fit inside a C-130 transport aircraft.
Users reportedly can deploy the system in three hours and operate its user interface with only Users reportedly can deploy the system in three hours and operate its user interface with only
rudimentary training.rudimentary training.2527 According to Air Force press releases, THOR has successfully completed According to Air Force press releases, THOR has successfully completed
a two-year test period and is to inform follow-on prototype efforts.a two-year test period and is to inform follow-on prototype efforts.26
~~Figure 3. THOR Demonstrator~~

Source: U.S. Air Force, AFRL Directed Energy Directorate, press release, September 24, 2019.
~~Phaser High-Powered Microwave~~
~~The Phaser High-Powered Microwave system (see Figure 4), developed by Raytheon, is intended~~
~~to provide a short-range C-UAS capability similar to that of THOR. The Air Force reportedly~~

~~Navy. CRS analysis of FY2022 budget documents; see Appe ndix B and Appe ndix C for additional information.~~
~~23 T his section was written by former CRS Research Assistant Samuel D. Ryder and updated by John R. Hoehn, CRS~~
~~Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.~~
~~24 Industry partners include BAE Systems, Leidos, and Verus Research. T HOR also features a proprietary radar system~~
~~developed by Black Sage.~~
~~25 Bryan Ripple, “Enemy drone operators may soon face the power of T HOR,” 88th Air Base Wing Public~~ 28 Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 145, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf. 23 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 145, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf. 24 The dollar amounts in this paragraph include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy. CRS analysis of FY2022 and FY2023 budget documents; see Appendix B and Appendix C for additional information. 25 This section was written by former CRS Research Assistant Samuel D. Ryder and updated by John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs. 26 Industry partners include BAE Systems, Leidos, and Verus Research. THOR also features a proprietary radar system developed by Black Sage. 27 Bryan Ripple, “Enemy drone operators may soon face the power of THOR,” 88th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, Affairs,
September 24, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-laboratory-September 24, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-laboratory-
completes-successful-shootcompletes-successful-shoot -down-of-air-launched-m/. -down-of-air-launched-m/.
2628 1st Lt. James Wymer, “AFRL’s drone killer, 1st Lt. James Wymer, “AFRL’s drone killer, ~~T HOR will~~ THOR will welcome newwelcome new drone ‘hammer,’” drone ‘hammer,’” U.S. Air Force, August, August 2, 2,
2021, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2713908/afrls-drone-killer-thor-will-welcome-new-drone-2021, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2713908/afrls-drone-killer-thor-will-welcome-new-drone-
hammer/. hammer/.
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Figure 3. THOR Demonstrator Source: U.S. Air Force, AFRL Directed Energy Directorate, press release, September 24, 2019. Phaser High-Powered Microwave The Phaser High-Powered Microwave system (see Figure 4), developed by Raytheon, is intended to provide a short-range C-UAS capability similar to that of THOR. The Air Force reportedly
procured a $16.3 procured a $16.3 ~~mil ion~~million prototype Phaser for testing and overseas field assessments; however, it prototype Phaser for testing and overseas field assessments; however, it
is unclear whether the system has been deployed outside the United States.is unclear whether the system has been deployed outside the United States.27
29 Figure 4. Phaser Demonstrator

Source: Raytheon MissilesRaytheon Missiles and Defense,and Defense, ~~Phaser~~ Phaser product page, February 2020. product page, February 2020.
Counter-Electronic High -Power Microwave Extended -Range Air
Base Defense (CHIMERA)
AFRL awarded Raytheon Missiles and Defense a contract for testing of the Counter-Electronic AFRL awarded Raytheon Missiles and Defense a contract for testing of the Counter-Electronic
HighHigh -Power Microwave ExtendedPower Microwave Extended -Range Air Base Defense (CHIMERA) system in October 29 Joe Pappalardo, “The Air Force Is Deploying Its First Drone-Killing Microwave Weapon,” Popular Mechanics, September 24, 2019, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a29198555/phaser-weapon-air-force/; and Theresa Hitchens, “AF Says Lasers Are Being Field Tested, but NOT THOR or Other Microwave Weapons,” Breaking Defense, December 22, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/af-says-lasers-are-being-field-tested-but-not-thor-or-other-microwave-weapon/. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 12 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress ~~Range Air Base Defense (CHIMERA) system in October~~ 2020. 2020.
In contrast to THOR and Phaser, which are designed for a short-range C-UAS mission, the In contrast to THOR and Phaser, which are designed for a short-range C-UAS mission, the
CHIMERACHIMERA system is intended to be able to engage UAS at greater distances.system is intended to be able to engage UAS at greater distances.2830 Unclassified Unclassified
information about the CHIMERAinformation about the CHIMERA system is limited. system is limited.
High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)
The High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) is to serve as a mobile C-UAS capability for The High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) is to serve as a mobile C-UAS capability for
air base defense (seair base defense (see Figure 5). The system comprises a laser weapon and multispectral targeting . The system comprises a laser weapon and multispectral targeting
system mounted on the back of a Polaris MRZR system mounted on the back of a Polaris MRZR al all-terrain vehicle and can reportedly operate at -terrain vehicle and can reportedly operate at
distances of up to 3 km.distances of up to 3 km.2931 HELWS developer Raytheon claims the laser can fire dozens of shots HELWS developer Raytheon claims the laser can fire dozens of shots
using a single charge from a standard 220-volt outlet, and an indefinite number of shots if using a single charge from a standard 220-volt outlet, and an indefinite number of shots if
connected to an external power source such as a generator.connected to an external power source such as a generator.3032 The Air Force acquired the first HELWS in October 2019 and reportedly deployed HELWS overseas for field assessments in April 2020.33 The Air Force awarded Raytheon a $15.5 million contract for an upgraded version of HELWS in April 2021.34 This version is to be “delivered unmounted on pallets for potential use with different platforms.”35 30 Sara Sirota, “AFRL to award ~~The Air Force acquired the first~~

~~27 Joe Pappalardo, “T he Air Force Is Deploying Its First Drone-Killing Microwave Weapon,” Popular Mechanics,~~
~~September 24, 2019, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a29198555/phaser-weapon-air-force/;~~
~~and T heresa Hitchens, “ AF Says Lasers Are Being Field T ested, but NOT T HOR or Other Microwave Weapons,”~~
Breaking Defense, December 22, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/af-says-lasers-are-being-field-tested-
~~but-not-thor-or-other-microwave-weapon/.~~
~~28 Sara Sirota, “AFRL to award~~ Raytheon sole-sourced contract for directed energy weapon,” Raytheon sole-sourced contract for directed energy weapon,” Inside Defense, October , October
29, 2020, at29, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/insider/afrl-award-raytheon-sole-sourced-contract-directed-energy-weapon. https://insidedefense.com/insider/afrl-award-raytheon-sole-sourced-contract-directed-energy-weapon.
2931 Raytheon, “ Raytheon, “ Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for ~~op erational~~operational use,” use,”
September 14, 2020, https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-September 14, 2020, https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-
delivers-another-air-force-laser-system-ready; and Nathan Strout, “delivers-another-air-force-laser-system-ready; and Nathan Strout, “ Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser
weapon,” weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-, April 7, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-
upgrade-laser-weapon/.upgrade-laser-weapon/.
30 32 Kyle Mizokami, “ Kyle Mizokami, “ ~~T he~~The Air Force Mobilizes Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April 9, , April 9,
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~~HELWS in October 2019 and reportedly deployed HELWS overseas for field assessments in~~
~~April 2020.31 The Air Force additional y awarded Raytheon a $15.5 mil ion contract for an~~
~~upgraded version of HELWS in April 2021.32 This version is to be “delivered unmounted on~~
~~pal ets for potential use with different platforms.”33~~
~~Figure 5. HELWS Prototype~~

~~Source:~~ ~~Raytheon Missiles and Defense, HELWS product page, April~~ 2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/; and Raytheon, “Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for operational use,” September 14, 2020, at https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-delivers-another-air-force-laser-system-ready. 33 Raytheon, “Raytheon Delivers First Laser Counter-UAS System to U.S. Air Force,” October 22, 2019, at https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2019-10-22-Raytheon-delivers-first-laser-counter-UAS-System-to-U-S-Air-Force#:~:text=Laser%20dune%20buggy%20set%20for,Air%20Force%20earlier%20this%20month; and 88th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, “AFRL gives warfighters new weapons system,” April 6, 2020, at https://www.whs.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2138161/afrl-gives-warfighters-new-weapons-system/. 34 Nathan Strout, “Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-upgrade-laser-weapon/. 35 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 13 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Figure 5. HELWS Prototype Source: Raytheon Missiles and Defense, HELWS product page, April 2020. 2020.
Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD)
The Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) is a prototype system in The Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) is a prototype system in
development by AFRL, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman (sedevelopment by AFRL, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman (see Figure 6). It is ). It is
intended to mount as an external pod on Air Force aircraft—from fourth-generation F-15 fighters intended to mount as an external pod on Air Force aircraft—from fourth-generation F-15 fighters
to sixth-generation aircraft currently in development—and target incoming air-to-air and surface-to sixth-generation aircraft currently in development—and target incoming air-to-air and surface-
to-air missiles.to-air missiles.3436 The Air Force conducted a series of tests of the Demonstrator Laser Weapon The Air Force conducted a series of tests of the Demonstrator Laser Weapon
System, a ground-based test surrogate for SHiELD, in AprilSystem, a ground-based test surrogate for SHiELD, in April 2019. The demonstrator successfully 2019. The demonstrator successfully
engaged incoming missiles and helped validate SHiELD’s technology; however, technical engaged incoming missiles and helped validate SHiELD’s technology; however, technical
~~chal enges and chal enges~~issues and challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic have reportedly pushed SHiELD’s related to the COVID-19 pandemic have reportedly pushed SHiELD’s
first flight demonstration from FY2021 to FY2024.first flight demonstration from FY2021 to FY2024.3537 Furthermore, at a June 2020 Mitchell Institute event, then-Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Will Roper stated that the Air Force is reassessing the technological maturity of and use cases for SHiELD, as well as its potential role in missile defense missions.38 Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin has noted that he is “extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft and use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.”39 36 See Joanne Perkins, “AFRL’s SHiELD set to receive critical assembly,” ~~Furthermore, at a June 2020 Mitchel~~

~~2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/; and Raytheon,~~
~~“Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for operational use,” September 14,~~
~~2020, at https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-delivers-another-~~
~~air-force-laser-system-ready.~~
~~31 Raytheon, “Raytheon Delivers First Laser Counter-UAS System to U.S. Air Force,” October 22, 2019, at~~
~~https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2019-10-22-Raytheon-delivers-first-laser-counter-UAS-System-to-U-S-Air-~~
~~Force#:~:text=Laser%20dune%20buggy%20set%20for,Air%20Force%20earlier%20this%20month ; and 88th Air Base~~
~~Wing Public Affairs, “ AFRL gives warfighters new weapons system,” April 6, 2020, at https://www.whs.mil/News/~~
~~News-Display/Article/2138161/afrl-gives-warfighters-new-weapons-system/.~~
~~32 Nathan Strout, “ Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-upgrade-laser-weapon/.~~
~~33 Ibid.~~
~~34 See Joanne Perkins, “ AFRL’s SHiELD set to receive critical assembly,”~~ Air Force Research Laboratory, February , February
23, 2021, at https://www.afrl.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2511692/afrls-shield-set-to-receive-critical-23, 2021, at https://www.afrl.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2511692/afrls-shield-set-to-receive-critical-
assembly/.assembly/.
35 37 “Air Force Research Laboratory completes successful shoot down of air-launched missiles,” 88th Air Base “Air Force Research Laboratory completes successful shoot down of air-launched missiles,” 88th Air Base Wing Wing
PublicPublic Affairs, May 3, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-Affairs, May 3, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-
laboratory-completes-successful-shootlaboratory-completes-successful-shoot -down-of-air-launched-m/; Valerie Insinna, “-down-of-air-launched-m/; Valerie Insinna, “ US Air Force delaysUS Air Force delays timeline for testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/; and Nathan Strout, “Air Force to begin assembly of airborne laser,” C4ISRNET, February 23, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2021/02/23/air-force-to-begin-assembly-of-airborne-laser/. 38 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force delays timeline for testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/. 39 Aaron Mehta, “Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense,” Defense News, May 20, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 14 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress ~~timeline for~~
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~~Institute event, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Wil Roper stated that the Air Force is~~
~~reassessing the technological maturity of and use cases for SHiELD, as wel as its potential role~~
~~in missile defense missions.36 Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering~~
~~Mike Griffin has noted that he is “extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft~~
~~and use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.”37~~
Figure 6. SHiELD Prototype Rendering

Source: Lockheed Martin, Tactical AirborneLockheed Martin, Tactical Airborne Laser Weapon System,Laser Weapon System, September 14, 2020September 14, 2020 . .
Selected Army- Directed Energy Weapons ~~Programs38~~
~~In support of its directed energy strategy, the Army is developing both HEL and HPM weapons~~
~~with the intent of “field[ing] prototypes to operational units starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.”39~~
~~Multi-Mission HEL (MMHEL) and~~ Programs40 The Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) is currently managing three major Army DE weapons programs:  Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD),  Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL), and  Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM).41 The Army is developing DE weapons to counter UAS and rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM), in turn increasing Army air and missile defense capability and reducing total system lifecycle costs by means of reduced logistical demands.42 Directed Energy Maneuver-
Short-Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD)
~~MMHEL~~ DE M-SHORAD, also known as Guardian (se(see Figure 7) , seeks to integrate a 50 kWseeks to integrate a 50 kW~~-class~~ laser on a Stryker combat vehicle to laser on a Stryker combat vehicle to
~~provide SHORAD~~provide short-range air defense support to the Army’s support to the Army’s ~~maneuver~~combat brigades. brigades. The Army reportedly tested two DE M-SHORAD prototypes—one from Raytheon/Kord and one from Northrop Grumman—in a “shoot-off” at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, in July 2021.43 According to Director of the RCCTO Lieutenant General Neil Thurgood, DE M-SHORAD successfully defeated UAS but failed to defeat mortar rounds during this test; Northrop Grumman subsequently withdrew from the program.44 The Army tested the Raytheon/Kord prototype again 40 This section was written by Andrew Feickert, CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces. 41 Lieutenant General (LTG) L. Neil Thurgood, “Space and Missile Defense Symposium,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, August 11, 2021. 42 Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Army Advances First Laser Weapon Through Combat Shoot-Off,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, August 10, 2021, at https://www.army.mil/article/249239/army_advances_first_laser_weapon_through_combat_shoot_off. 43 Jared Keller, “The Army’s First Laser Weapon Almost Ready for a Fight,” Task and Purpose, August 12, 2021; and Ethan Sterenfeld, “Laser M-SHORAD works against mortars in Army test,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2022. 44 Evan Oschner, “Army set to deliver first 50-kilowatt lasers,” Inside Defense, August 10, 2022; and Jen Judson, Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 15 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress in 2022, during a four-week exercise at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.45 According to a Raytheon press release, the prototype “acquired, tracked, targeted, and defeated multiple mortars and successfully accomplished multiple tests simulating real-world scenarios.”46 The Army plans to deliver the first DE M-SHORAD systems to a Ft. Sill-based air defense unit by the end of September 2022, with plans to deliver additional prototype systems in FY2023 and FY2024.47 In FY2025, the Army is to transfer the program from the RCCTO to the Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space M-SHORAD Product Office.48 The Product Office is to then “initiate acquisition and contract documents to support a competitive production decision.”49 Figure 7. Guardian DE M-SHORAD Source: Kristen Burroughs, “The Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office’s Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) Rapid Prototyping Effort is On-Track to Deliver,” Army News, August 18, 2021. Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL) IFPC-HEL, also known as Valkyrie (see Figure 8), is to protect fixed and semi-fixed sites from cruise missiles, UAS, and RAM threats.50 According to Army budget documents, the system is to include “a vehicle, 300 kW class [>250 kW] laser subsystem, power and thermal subsystem, and a beam control subsystem integrated with a battle management command, control, and “Northrop bows out of competition to build laser weapon for Strykers,” Defense News, August 18, 2021. 45 Ethan Sterenfeld, “Laser M-SHORAD works against mortars in Army test,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2022. 46 Ethan Sterenfeld, “Laser M-SHORAD works against mortars in Army test,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2022. 47 Max Hauptman, “The Army is Putting Lasers on Strykers Powerful Enough to Shoot Down Drones and Helicopter,” Task and Purpose, January 26, 2022; Evan Ochsner, “Army Set to Deliver First 50-Kilowatt Lasers,” InsideDefense.com, August 10, 2022; and SAM.gov, “Notice of Intent to Sole Source - DE M-SHORAD Prototype Effort under Other Transaction Agreement,” November 17, 2021, at https://sam.gov/opp/3ad5a9cbdba94c6ea2872374bdaefd48/view. 48 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 563, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. 49 Ibid., p. 564. 50 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 405, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 17 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress communication software.”51 Army RCCTO issued a request for white papers for IFPC-HEL in January 2022, “with the intent of awarding one or more Other Transaction Agreement for Prototype.”52 Reports indicate that the Army subsequently selected Dynetics to serve as systems integrator for IFPC-HEL.53 Four IFPC-HEL prototypes are to be delivered by the fourth quarter of FY2024, with “major test events” scheduled in 2022.54 IFPC-HEL is~~The Army has stated that “the~~
~~[system’s] average cost per kil is approximately $30.”40 The Army expects to conduct~~

~~testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-~~
~~force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/; and Nathan Strout, “ Air Force to begin assembly of airborne~~
~~laser,” C4ISRNET, February 23, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2021/02/23/air-force-to-begin-~~
~~assembly-of-airborne-laser/.~~
~~36 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force delays timeline for testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at~~
~~https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/.~~
~~37 Aaron Mehta, “ Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense,” Defense News, May 20, 2020, at~~
~~https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/.~~
~~38 T his section was written by Andrew Feickert, CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces. For more information about~~
~~U.S. Army DE programs, including information about the Army’s past DE development programs, see CRS Report~~
~~R45098,~~ ~~U.S. Arm y Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Program s: Background and Potential Issues for~~
~~Congress, by Andrew Feickert .~~
~~39 “Army Directed Energy Strategy,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, August 20, 2021.~~
~~40 Richard Sisk, “Army Works to Slim Down Powerful New Laser Defense System ,” Military.com, May 2, 2019, at~~
~~https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/05/01/army-works-slim-down-powerful-new-laser-defense-system.html.~~
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~~demonstrations in FY2021 to engage a variety of targets to lead to a technology readiness level~~
~~(TRL) of 7.41 MMHEL is intended to inform requirements and reduce risk for the Army’s DE M-~~
~~SHORAD program, which is to deliver four prototype systems in FY2022.42~~
~~Figure 7. Prototype Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser (MMHEL)~~

Source: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, HEL Configurations Summary, May 24, 2017 .
~~High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD) and~~
~~Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL)~~
~~The HEL TVD program involves the development of a 100 kW-class laser to be mounted on an~~
~~existing Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck to provide a counter rocket, artil ery,~~
~~and mortar (C-RAM) capability to protect fixed sites, as wel as to provide limited protection in a~~
~~mobile mode (see Figure 8). In addition, the HEL TVD could be adapted in a short-range air~~
~~defense (SHORAD) role to protect against UAVs and, if successfully scaled to higher power~~
~~levels, cruise missiles. In March 2019, the Army announced that Dynetics and Lockheed Martin~~
~~were awarded a $130 mil ion contract to develop the HEL TVD.43 The Army seeks to increase the~~
~~power output of HEL TVD to 300 kW and leverage the technology within the IFPC-HEL~~
~~program.44 IFPC-HEL is scheduled to complete initial demonstrations in FY2022, to deliver four~~
~~prototypes in FY2024,45 and~~ to transition to a program of record in FY2025. to transition to a program of record in FY2025.46

~~41 T echnology Readiness Levels range from 1 to 9, where 1 signifies that a technology is potentially possible and 9~~
~~signifies that a system is in operational use. DOD defines T RL 7 as a prototype near or at the status of an operational~~
~~system requiring a demonstration. DOD,~~ ~~Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estim ates, Arm y~~
~~Justification Book Volum e 2a of 2 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation - Volum e II Budget Activity 4, p. 502, at~~
55 Figure 8. Valkyrie IFPC-HEL Source: “Dynetics to Build and Increase Power of U.S. Army Laser Weapons,” May 7, 2020, https://www.dynetics.com/newsroom/news/2020/dynetics-to-build-and-increase-power-of-us-army-laser-weapons, accessed August 12, 2022. IFPC-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM) The Army is developing IFPC-HPM (see Figure 9)—a transportable, containerized system—to counter swarms of Group 1 and Group 2 UAS.56 IFPC-HPM is to be “paired with IFPC-HEL as part of a layered defense to protect fixed and semi-fixed sites.”57 According to Army budget documents, the program “leverages previous HPM technology demonstrations and 51 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 403, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/~~2022~~2023/Base%20Budget/rdte//Base%20Budget/rdte/
~~RDT E_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.~~
~~42 Devon L. Suits, “ Army to field laser-equipped Stryker prototypes in FY 2022,” U.S. Army, August 20, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.army.mil/article/249549/army_to_field_laser_equipped_stryker_prototypes_in_fy_2022 .~~
~~43 Jen Judson, “Dynetics-Lockheed team beats out Raytheon to build 100-kilowatt laser weapon,” Defense News, May~~
~~15, 2019, at https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/05/16/dynetics-lockheed-team-beats-out-raytheon-to-build-100-~~
~~kilowatt -laser-weapon/.~~
~~44 IFPC-HEL is intended to complement the kinetic interception capability of IFPC.~~
~~45 Jared Keller, “T he Army is tripling the power of one of its vehicle-mounted laser systems,” Task and Purpose, May~~
~~8, 2020, at https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-laser-weapon-power/; and Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “ Scaling Up:~~
~~Army Advances 300kW-class Laser Prototype,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, March 3,~~
~~2020, at https://www.army.mil/article/233346/scaling_up_army_advances_300kw_class_laser_prototype.~~
46 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justifica tion Book Volume 2a of 2
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~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Figure 8. Prototype High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD)~~

Source: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, HEL Configurations Summary, May 24, 2017.
~~IFPC-High Power Microwave (HPM)~~
~~The Army is developing IFPC-HPM to counter groups or swarms of UAS. IFPC-HPM is to be~~
~~“paired with IFPC-HEL as part of a layered defense to protect fixed and semi-fixed sites.”47 In~~
~~support of this program, the Army is to begin investing in FY2022 as a partner in~~ vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. 52 SAM.gov, “Request for White Papers (RFWP) Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL) Prototypes Prime Contractor,” January 20, 2022, at https://sam.gov/opp/fe1cce00fde64c328b5234be24c795b1/view. For additional information about Other Transaction Agreements, see CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters. 53 Andrew Eversden, “US Army successfully tests Iron Dome at White Sands Missile Range,” Breaking Defense, August 2, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/us-army-successfully-tests-iron-dome-at-white-sands-missile-range/. 54 Jen Judson, “This infantry squad vehicle is getting a laser to destroy drones,” Defense News, August 11, 2022. 55 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 403, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. 56 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 411, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. Group 1 UAS are “typically hand-launched, portable systems,” while Group 2 UAS are “typically medium-sized, catapult-launched, mobile systems.” For additional information about UAS groups, see U.S. Army, US. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035, pp. 12-13, at https://irp.fas.org/program/collect/uas-army.pdf. 57 “Army Directed Energy Strategy,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, August 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 17 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress experimentation campaigns such as the [the Air Force’s the Air Force’s
~~THOR program, as wel as in other Air Force demonstrators.48 The Army’s “THOR prototype~~
~~wil undergo a series of risk reduction and system characterization efforts” before its intended~~
~~field testing in FY2024.49 IFPC-HPM is scheduled to~~THOR program].”58 The Army intends to develop, test, and deliver four IFPC-HPM prototypes by the fourth quarter of FY2024 and to conduct planning for a potential transition to a program of record in transition to a program of record in
~~FY2025.50~~
FY2025.59 Lasers on Next-Generation Army Combat Vehicles?
Army officials Army officials ~~suggest~~have suggested that next-generation combat vehicles could feature an active protection that next-generation combat vehicles could feature an active protection
system employing directed energy to protect the vehicle and to replace traditional mounted system employing directed energy to protect the vehicle and to replace traditional mounted
weapons.weapons.5160 The Army asserts that active protection systems featuring lasers could provide 360- The Army asserts that active protection systems featuring lasers could provide 360-
degree protection from incoming rounds or degree protection from incoming rounds or ~~UAVs~~UASs, and that laser weapons might also be used to , and that laser weapons might also be used to
disable or possibly destroy enemy vehicles. Officials note that to begin fielding Army units with a disable or possibly destroy enemy vehicles. Officials note that to begin fielding Army units with a
next-generation combat vehicle in 2035, major decisions would need to be made by 2025. This next-generation combat vehicle in 2035, major decisions would need to be made by 2025. This
time frame suggests that the Army has time frame suggests that the Army has ~~less~~fewer than than ~~four~~three years to advance laser weapons technology years to advance laser weapons technology
to a point where it can be considered a viable option, if it is to be incorporated into next-to a point where it can be considered a viable option, if it is to be incorporated into next-
generation combat vehicles.generation combat vehicles.52

Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation - Volum e II Budget Activity 4, p. 395, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/
~~Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDT E_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.~~
~~47 “Army Directed Energy Strategy,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, August 20, 2021.~~
~~48 See Ashley Roque, “ US Army eyes T HOR fielding by 2024,” Jane’s (subscription required), February 23, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-eyes-thor-fielding-by-2024; and “ US Army to test new~~
~~microwave weapon for defeating drones,” Associated Press, February 24, 2021.~~
~~49 Ashley Roque, “ US Army eyes T HOR fielding by 2024,” Jane’s (subscription required), February 23, 2021, at~~
~~https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-eyes-thor-fielding-by-2024.~~
~~50 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume 2a of 2~~
~~Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation - Volum e II Budget Activity 4, pp. 402-403~~61 Selected Navy Directed Energy Programs62 The Navy installed its first prototype DE weapon, a 30 kW laser capable of countering small surface craft and UAS, on the USS Ponce in 2014.63 Since then, the Navy has been developing lasers with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAS and is in the process of developing a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Current Navy DE programs include the following:  Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM);  Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN);  Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS); and  High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP). The Navy’s laser development roadmap is illustrated in Figure 9. 58 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 411, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. 59 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 412, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/
Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/~~2022~~2023/Base%20Budget/rdte//Base%20Budget/rdte/~~RDT E_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.~~
~~51 CRS~~ vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. 60 CRS Report R44598, Report R44598, Army and Marine Corps Active Protection System (APS) Efforts, by Andrew, by Andrew Feickert. Feickert.
5261 See See Gary Sheftick, “Gary Sheftick, “~~T he~~The Next Next -Generation Combat Vehicle Could-Generation Combat Vehicle Could Have Lasers, RunHave Lasers, Run on Hybrid Power,” Army News Service, November 3, 2016, and Hope Hodge Seck, “Next Army Combat Vehicle May Feature Active Protection, Laser Weapons,” Defense Tech, October 30, 2017. 62 This section was written by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Specialist in Naval Affairs. For more information about U.S. Navy DE programs, including information about the Navy’s past DE development programs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 63 Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Navy Allowed to Use Persian Gulf Laser for Defense,” USNI News, December 10, 2014. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Figure 9. Navy Laser Development Roadmap Source: Navy briefing slide provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on September 10, 2021. As shown in Figure 9, SSL-TM, ODIN, and SNLWS Increment 1/HELIOS are included in the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NLFoS). (The Navy has since completed work on the fourth NLFoS effort shown in Figure 9, the Ruggedized High Energy Laser [RHEL].) As also shown in Figure 9, the Navy intends for both NLFoS and HELCAP efforts, along with DOD laser technologies, to support the development of future, more capable lasers referred to as SNLWS Increment 2 and SNLWS Increment 3. Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) The SSL-TM program (see Figure 10) is to develop a prototype shipboard laser called the Laser Weapons System Demonstrator (LWSD) “to on Hybrid Power,” Army News
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~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Selected Navy Directed Energy Programs53~~
~~The Navy is currently developing lasers with improved capability for countering surface craft and~~
~~UAVs, and eventual y a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The Navy’s~~
~~development roadmap is il ustrated in Figure 9. Navy efforts to develop these more capable~~
~~lasers include the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NLFoS):~~
~~ the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort;~~
~~ the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN);~~
~~ the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as~~
~~the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveil ance~~
~~(HELIOS); and~~
~~ the completed Ruggedized High Energy Laser (RHEL).~~
~~The Navy is also developing the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).~~
~~NLFoS, HELCAP, and other DOD technologies are to support the development of future, more~~
~~capable lasers referred to as SNLWS Increment 2 and SNLWS Increment 3.~~
~~Figure 9. Navy Laser Weapon Development Approach~~

Source: Navy briefing slide provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on May 6, 2019.

Service, November 3, 2016, and Hope Hodge Seck, “ Next Army Combat Vehicle May Feature Active Protection, Laser
~~Weapons,” Defense Tech, October 30, 2017.~~
~~53 T his section was written by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Specialist in Naval Affairs. For more information about U.S.~~
~~Navy DE programs, including information about the Navy’s past DE development programs, see CRS Report R44175,~~
Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
~~O'Rourke.~~
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~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~SSL-TM~~
~~The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission states that the SSL Technology Maturation (SSL-TM; see~~
Figure 10) program
~~is developing an integrated Laser Weapons System Demonstrator (LWSD) that will be~~
~~installed on [the amphibious ship] USS Portland (LPD-27) during FY 2019…. SSL-TM~~
~~will provide a new capability to the Fleet to~~ address known capability gaps against address known capability gaps against
asymmetric threats (UAS, small boats, and ISR sensors)asymmetric threats (UAS, small boats, and ISR sensors) ~~and will~~ .”64 The program is to additionally “inform future acquisition inform future acquisition
strategies, system designs, integration architectures, and fielding plans for laser weapon strategies, system designs, integration architectures, and fielding plans for laser weapon
~~systems.54~~
~~The Navy announced in January 2018 that it intended to instal LWSD on the USS Portland.55~~
~~According to the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the demonstration on Portland is to~~
~~continue through FY2022, and the system is to be removed in early FY2023.56~~
~~Figure 10. Navy Graphic of SSL-TM Laser System~~

Source: Navy briefing slide accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “Mysterious Object Northrop Is Barging From
~~Redondo Beach Is A High-Power Naval Laser,” The Drive, October 18, 2019. The blog post credits the slide to~~
~~the Navy and describes it as a “recent slide.”~~

~~54 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy,~~systems.”65 The Navy reportedly installed a 150 kW LWSD on the USS Portland in the fall of 2019 and has since completed onboard testing.66 According to Navy budget documents, “SSL-TM is planned to start de-installation [of LWSD], ship restoration, and hardware 64 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, ~~February 2020, p. 188. For additional discussion of SSL-T M, see~~
~~U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, pp. 180-181.~~
~~55 Megan Eckstein, “LPD Portland Will Host ONR Laser Weapon Demonstrator, Serve as RIMPAC 2018 Flagship,”~~
USNI News, January 10, 2018; Richard Abott, “ Next Navy Amphib Will Feature Laser Weapon Demo, Chosen As
~~Flagship For RIMPAC 2018,” Defense Daily, January 11, 2018.~~
56April 2022, p. 184, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 65 DOD, DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) ~~2021~~2023 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, ~~February 2020~~ ~~, p. 191~~April 2022, p. 184, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 66 Christopher P. Cavas, “Lasers Sprout in San Diego,” Defense & Aerospace Report, March 1, 2020. .
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~~On May 22, 2020, the Navy announced that the USS Portland had used its LWSD to successfully~~
~~disable a UAV in an at-sea test that was conducted on May 16, 2020.57~~ disposition activities during FY23.”67 Program closeout is to occur by the fourth quarter of FY2024.68 Figure 10. Navy Graphic of SSL-TM Laser System Source: Navy briefing slide accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “Mysterious Object Northrop Is Barging From Redondo Beach Is A High-Power Naval Laser,” The Drive, October 18, 2019. The blog post credits the slide to the Navy and describes it as a “recent slide.”
Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy (ODIN)
According to the Navy’s According to the Navy’s ~~FY2021~~FY2023 budget submission, the Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy budget submission, the Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy
(ODIN) effort is designed to provide “near-term, directed energy, shipboard Counter-(ODIN) effort is designed to provide “near-term, directed energy, shipboard Counter-~~Intel igence,~~
~~Surveil ance~~Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C-ISR) capabilities to dazzle , and Reconnaissance (C-ISR) capabilities to dazzle ~~Unmanned Aerial Systems~~
~~(UASs)~~UAS and other platforms that address urgent operational needs of the Fleet.” and other platforms that address urgent operational needs of the Fleet.” 5869 The Navy has reportedly deployed seven ODIN units on Arleigh ~~The Navy plans~~
~~to procure ODIN to deploy on Arleigh Burke Flight IIA destroyers. FY2021 funding for ODIN~~
~~would complete the procurement, assembly, checkout, integration, test and evaluation, and~~
~~instal ation of ODIN units 4 and 5; continue the procurement, assembly, checkout, integration,~~
~~test and evaluation of units 6, 7, and 8; and provide for the operation and sustainment of units 1~~
~~through 5.59~~
~~ODIN is reportedly the successor to the 30 kW HEL program60 and instal ed aboard the USS~~
~~Portland~~ ~~and the USS Dewey.61 The press has reported that the ODIN system has been identified~~
~~to fil an urgent need for Pacific Fleet.62~~
~~SNLWS Increment 1 (HELIOS)~~
~~SNLWS Increment 1 is the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveil ance~~
~~(HELIOS). The HELIOS effort is focused on rapid development and rapid fielding of a 60 kW-~~
~~class high-energy laser (with growth potential to 150 kW) and dazzler in an integrated weapon~~
~~system, for use in countering UAS, smal boats, and ISR sensors, and for combat identification~~
~~and battle damage assessment.63 HELIOS is currently in land-based testing and is to be instal ed~~

~~57 Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “ USS Portland Conducts Laser Weapon System Demonstrator T est,”~~
Navy News Service, May 22, 2020. See also Megan Eckstein, “ VIDEO: USS Portland Fires Laser Weapon, Downs
~~Drone in First At -Sea T est ,” USNI News, May 22, 2020; Paul McLeary, “ US Warship Fries Drone With Powerful New~~
~~Laser,” Breaking Defense, May 22, 2020; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “ Watch T his Ship-mounted Navy Laser Shoot Down a~~
~~Drone,” Navy Tim es, May 26, 2020.~~
~~58 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy,~~Burke Flight IIA destroyers, with the deployment of one additional unit planned for FY2023.70 67 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 195, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 68 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, ~~February 2020~~ ~~, pp. 1031, 1032.~~
59April 2022, p. 200, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 69 DOD, DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) ~~2021~~2023 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 998, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 70 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy~~, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020~~ ~~, p. 1031. See also Joseph T revithick, “ Navy T o Add~~
~~Laser Weapons T o At Least Seven More Ships In T he Next T hree Years,” The Drive, July 8, 2020.~~
~~60 Hope Hodge Seck, “ T he Navy Has Installed the First Drone-Stopping Laser on a Destroyer,” Military.com, February~~
~~21, 2020. See also Justin Katz, “Navy Installs Laser on Destroyer to Counter Unmanned Intelligence Drones,”~~ ~~Inside~~
~~Defense, February 21, 2020.~~
~~61 Christopher P. Cavas, “Lasers Sprout in San Diego,” Defense & Aerospace Report, March 1, 2020. See also Kris~~
~~Osborn, “New Destroyer-Fired Laser Weapons Might Stop Hypersonic Missile Attacks,” Warrior Maven, March 1,~~
~~2020, which was republished as Kris Osborn, “ Could Naval Lasers Be T he Solution T o China’s Hypersonic Missile~~
~~T hreat?” National Interest, March 7, 2020.~~
~~62 Daniel P. T aylor, “ The ODIN Shipboard Laser: Science Fiction No More,” Seapower, May 26, 2020.~~
~~63 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy,~~ Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, ~~February 2020~~ ~~, p. 1021~~April 2022, p. 999, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. .
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~~on a Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Preble, in December 2021.64 The system is to~~
~~remain on the ship for fleet testing and sustainment through at least the end of FY2025.65~~
~~Following a full and open competition based on a request for proposals (RFP) released on June~~
~~18, 2017, the Navy on January 26, 2018, awarded Lockheed Martin a $150 mil ion contract for~~
~~the development, manufacture, and delivery of two HELIOS systems—one for instal ation on a~~
~~DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, the other for land-based testing—by FY2020.66 The contract~~
~~includes options for up to 14 additional HELIOS systems that if exercised could increase the total~~
~~value of the contract to $942.8 mil ion.67~~
~~A March 21, 2019, press report states that Lockheed Martin was developing a 60-150 kW single~~
~~laser beam (presumably HELIOS) designed to engage unmanned aircraft systems and smal~~
~~boats. 68 The report states that the weapon is designed to provide ISR data into the ship’s combat~~
~~system in order to perform sensor dazzling at lower power levels.69 Then-Rear Admiral Boxal ,~~
~~the direct of Navy Surface Warfare, described the primary chal enges with the HELIOS program~~
~~as being the integration of the weapon system with the command and control systems currently~~
~~instal ed and the amount of available power due to increased power consumption of current~~
~~systems and sensors, particularly the upgraded SPY-6 radar.70 In addition to instal ing HELIOS on~~
~~current destroyers, the Navy plans to instal the system on the USS Little Rock, a Littoral Combat~~
~~Ship.71 A contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin on March 9, 2020 to instal the system.72~~

~~64 Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Installing More Directed Energy Weapons on DDGs, Conducting Land-Based Laser T esting~~
~~T his Year,” USNI News, April 7, 2021.~~
~~65 Ibid., p. 1030.~~
~~66 See DOD contract awards for January 26, 2018 (Release No: CR-017-18, January 26, 2018); “ Lockheed Gets $150m~~
~~Contract to Install High Energy Laser on a Flight IIA DDG-51 destroyer,” NavalToday.com , January 29, 2018;~~
~~Kimberly Underwood, “ Navy Selects Lockheed Martin to Deliver Laser Energy Weapon ,” Signal, January 30, 2018;~~
~~Richard Scott, “ Lockheed Martin to Develop HELIOS Laser Weapon for DDG 51 Flight IIA Destroyer,”~~ ~~Jane’s Navy~~
~~International, January 30, 2018; “ Lockheed Martin Receives $150 Million Contract to Deliver Integrated High Energy~~
~~Laser Weapon Systems to U.S. Navy,” Lockheed Martin, March 1, 2018; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “ First Combat Laser~~
~~For Navy Warship: Lockheed HELIOS,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2018; Jeff Hecht, “ Lockheed Martin to Develop~~
~~Laser Weapons for U.S. Navy Destroyers,” IEEE Spectrum , March 2, 2018; Justin Bachman, “ T he Navy Wants a Laser~~
~~to Blow Drones Out of the Sky,” March 2, 2018.~~
~~67 Richard Abott, “HELIOS Laser T o Be First Fully Integrated On U.S. Ship,” Defense Daily, March 5, 2018: 10-12.~~
~~68 Rich Abott, “Navy T o ‘Burn T he Boats’ With Laser For Destroyer In 2021, Needs Bugger LSC For Lasers,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~Daily, March 21, 2019. See also Sam LaGrone, “ Navy Ready to ‘Burn the Boats’ with 2021 Laser Installation on a~~
~~Destroyer,” USNI News, March 20, 2019; Kyle Mizokami, “T he Navy Plans to Put HELIOS Laser Weapon on~~
~~Destroyer by 2021,” Popular Mechanics, March 21, 2019; Justin Katz, “HELIOS Set for Critical Design Review in~~
~~2020, Delivery in May 2021,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2019; Marc Selinger, “US Navy T weaks Destroyer-Based Laser~~
~~Effort,” Shephard Media, May 8, 2019.~~
~~69 T he article does not describe what power levels would be required to dazzle ISR sensors. Specifics for this capability~~
~~are most likely classified.~~
~~70 Rich Abott, “Navy T o ‘Burn T he Boats’ With Laser For Destroyer In 2021, Needs Bugger LSC For Lasers,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~Daily, March 21, 2019. See also Sam LaGrone, “ Navy Ready to ‘Burn the Boats’ with 2021 Laser Installation on a~~
~~Destroyer,” USNI News, March 20, 2019; Kyle Mizokami, “T he Navy Plans to Put HELIOS Laser Weapon on~~
~~Destroyer by 2021,” Popular Mechanics, March 21, 2019; Justin Katz, “HELIOS Set for Critical Design Review in~~
~~2020, Delivery in May 2021,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2019; Marc Selinger, “US Navy T weaks Destroyer-Based Laser~~
~~Effort,” Shephard Media, May 8, 2019.~~
~~71 Megan Eckstein, “ Littoral Combat Ship Will Field Laser Weapon as Part of Lockheed Martin, Navy T est ,”~~ ~~USNI~~
~~News, January 13, 2020.~~
~~72 Department of Defense, “Contracts for March 9, 2020.” See also Rich Abott, “ Lockheed Martin Nabs $22 Million~~
~~Contract For Layered Laser Defense Prototype On LCS,” Defense Daily, March 16, 2020.~~
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~~HELCAP~~
~~The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission states that the HELCAP effort~~
~~will expedite the development, experimentation, integration and demonstration of critical~~
~~technologies to defeat crossing Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) by addressing the~~
~~remaining technical challenges, e.g.: atmospheric turbulence, automatic target~~
~~identification and aim point selection, precision target tracking with low jitter in high~~
~~clutter conditions, advanced beam control, and higher power HEL development. HELCAP~~
~~will assess, develop, experiment, and demonstrate the vario us laser weapon system~~
~~technologies and methods of implementation required to defeat ASCMs in a crossing~~
~~engagement.73~~
~~According to the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, demonstrations of HELCAP include~~
~~“adapting an OSD 300 kW+ laser source for transport and integration with the prototype~~
~~system.”74 The Navy plans to demonstrate its ability to detect and defeat ASCMs in the second~~
~~through fourth quarters of FY2023.75~~
~~Potential Issues and Questions for Congress76~~
~~Technological Maturity~~
~~Directed energy weapons programs continue to face questions about their technological maturity,~~
~~including the ability to improve beam quality and control to militarily useful levels, and to meet~~
~~size, weight, and power (SWaP) and cooling requirements for integration into current platforms.77~~
~~Some DE systems are smal enough to fit on military vehicles, but many require larger and/or~~
~~fixed platforms that could potential y limit deployment options and operational utility. Congress~~
~~may consider directing DOD to establish metrics for assessing the pace of technological~~
~~advancement. In what ways, if any, are DOD technology maturation efforts reducing the SWaP~~
~~and cooling requirements of DE systems?~~
~~Cost~~
~~Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts~~
~~have observed that “actual directed-energy programs … have frequently fal en short of~~
~~expectations,” with DOD investing bil ions of dollars in programs that failed to reach maturity~~
~~and were ultimately cancel ed.78 Directed energy weapons may therefore require greater up-front~~

~~73 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy,~~ SNLWS Increment 1 (HELIOS) SNLWS Increment 1 is also known as the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS). The HELIOS effort is focused on rapid development and rapid fielding of a 60 kW-class high-energy laser (with growth potential to 120 kW) and dazzler in an integrated weapon system, for use in countering UAS, small boats, and ISR sensors, and for combat identification and battle damage assessment.71 HELIOS systems integrator Lockheed Martin has stated that HELIOS could eventually be integrated into the Aegis Combat System to provide alternative “selections in [Aegis’s] weapon system component.”72 According to Navy budget documents, HELIOS was installed on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Preble, in FY2022 and is to continue at-sea testing in FY2023.73 The system is to remain on the ship for fleet testing and sustainment through at least the end of FY2027.74 High Energy Laser Counter ASCM Project (HELCAP) The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission states that the HELCAP effort will expedite the development, experimentation, integration and demonstration of critical technologies to defeat crossing Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) by addressing the remaining technical challenges, e.g.: atmospheric turbulence, automatic target identification and aim point selection, precision target tracking with low jitter in high clutter conditions, advanced beam control, and higher power HEL development. HELCAP will assess, develop, experiment, and demonstrate the various laser weapon system technologies and methods of implementation required to defeat ASCMs in a crossing engagement.75 The HELCAP prototype system is to include a beam control testbed, 300 kW+ class laser source—selected and adapted from a laser source developed under OSD’s laser scaling initiative, prototype control system, and auxiliary prime power and cooling.76 The Navy plans to begin system experimentation in FY2023, focusing on “ASCM detect to engage experimentation against targets of increasing complexity up to and including static and dynamic ground targets 71 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020, p. 1021. Although the Navy previously identified HELIOS as being scalable to 150 kW, recent reports indicate that the system is to be scalable to only 120 kW. See, for example, Richard R. Burgess, “HELIOS Laser Weapon System Delivered for Installation on USS Preble,” Seapower Magazine, March 31, 2022, at https://seapowermagazine.org/helios-laser-weapon-system-delivered-for-installation-on-uss-preble/. 72 See Justin Katz, “Lockheed delivers high-energy laser four years in the making to US Navy,” Breaking Defense, August 18, 2022. For additional information about the Aegis Combat System, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 73 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1011, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 74 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1019, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 75 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1001, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 76 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1003, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 17 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress and low-cost unmanned aerial targets.”77 HELCAP experimentation is to continue through FY2027.78 Layered Laser Defense (LLD) System An additional Navy laser development effort (not shown in Figure 9) is called the Layered Laser Defense (LLD) system. A March 9, 2020, DOD contract award announcement stated that the Navy awarded Lockheed Martin a $22 million contract for the integration, demonstration, testing and operation of the Layered Laser Defense (LLD) weapon system prototype onboard a Navy littoral combat ship [LCS] while that vessel is underway.… Key areas of work to be performed include development of a prototype structure and enclosure to protect the LLD from ships motion and maritime environment in a mission module format; system integration and test with government-furnished equipment; platform integration and system operational verification and test; systems engineering; test planning; data collection and analysis support; and operational demonstration.79 Press reports indicate that the Office of Naval Research—in partnership with Lockheed Martin and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—demonstrated the system in February 2022 against a “target representing a subsonic cruise missile in flight.”80 The Navy reportedly does not plan to field the LLD.81 Potential Issues and Questions for Congress82 Technological Maturity One question regarding directed energy weapons programs involves their technological maturity, including the ability to improve beam quality and control to militarily useful levels, and to meet size, weight, and power (SWaP) and cooling requirements for integration into current platforms.83 Some DE systems are small enough to fit on military vehicles, but many require larger and/or fixed platforms that could potentially limit deployment options and operational utility. Congress 77 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1003, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 78 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, ~~Developm ent~~Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, ~~February 2020~~ ~~, pp. 1011-1012. See also~~ ~~Departm ent of Defense~~
~~Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estim ates, Navy, Justification Book Volum e 1 of 5, Research, Developm ent, Test &~~
~~Evaluation, Navy, February 2020, p. 415.~~
~~74 DOD,~~ ~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,~~
~~Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020~~ ~~, p. 1012.~~
~~75 Ibid., p. 1020.~~
~~76 T his section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced T echnology and Global Security, and John~~
~~R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and P rograms.~~
~~77 Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,”~~ April 2022, p. 1008, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. 79 Department of Defense, “Contracts for March 9, 2020.” See also Rich Abott, “Lockheed Martin Nabs $22 Million Contract For Layered Laser Defense Prototype On LCS,” Defense Daily, March 16, 2020. 80 Warren Duffie Jr., “Laser Trailblazer: Navy Conducts Historic Test of New Laser Weapon System,” Office of Naval Research, April, 13, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2998829/laser-trailblazer-navy-conducts-historic-test-of-new-laser-weapon-system/. 81 Warren Duffie Jr., “Laser Trailblazer: Navy Conducts Historic Test of New Laser Weapon System,” Office of Naval Research, April, 13, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2998829/laser-trailblazer-navy-conducts-historic-test-of-new-laser-weapon-system/. 82 This section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security, and John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs. 83 Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at , July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready. ready.
~~78 Paul Scharre, Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects, Center for a New American Security, April 2015,~~
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~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~investment than traditional~~ Congressional Research Service 16 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress may consider directing DOD to establish metrics for assessing the pace of technological advancement. In what ways, if any, are DOD technology maturation efforts reducing the SWaP and cooling requirements of DE systems? Cost The United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, yet some experts have observed that “actual directed-energy programs … have frequently fallen short of expectations,” with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that failed to reach maturity and were ultimately cancelled.84 Directed energy weapons may therefore require greater up-front investment than traditional kinetic weapons in order to field a successful weapons system. kinetic weapons in order to field a successful weapons system.
Congress may consider requesting an independent assessment of the technological maturity and Congress may consider requesting an independent assessment of the technological maturity and
life cycle cost estimates for various DE weaponslife cycle cost estimates for various DE weapons, as well ~~as wel~~ as a comparative assessment of costs of as a comparative assessment of costs of
DE weapons versus comparable kinetic weapons. How do estimates of the total lifecycle costs of DE weapons versus comparable kinetic weapons. How do estimates of the total lifecycle costs of
DE weapons compare with those of their kinetic counterparts? Does the technological maturity of DE weapons compare with those of their kinetic counterparts? Does the technological maturity of
DE weapons warrant current funding levels? DE weapons warrant current funding levels?
Weapons Characteristics
Although DE weapons may offer a lower cost per shot than traditional weapons such as missiles, Although DE weapons may offer a lower cost per shot than traditional weapons such as missiles,
DE weapons are subject to a number of limitations. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g., DE weapons are subject to a number of limitations. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g.,
rain, fog, obscurants) and SWaP and cooling requirements can limit the range and beam quality of rain, fog, obscurants) and SWaP and cooling requirements can limit the range and beam quality of
DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness. Traditional weapons, in contrast, are less DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness. Traditional weapons, in contrast, are less
affected by these factors.affected by these factors.7985 How, if at How, if at al all, might the limitations of DE weapons be mitigated by , might the limitations of DE weapons be mitigated by
technological developments such as adaptive optics, concepts of operation, or other methods? technological developments such as adaptive optics, concepts of operation, or other methods?
What impact might a failure to mitigate these limitationsWhat impact might a failure to mitigate these limitations have on future military operations? have on future military operations?
Mission Utility
Given the strengths and weaknesses of DE weapons, DOD is conducting multiple utility studies Given the strengths and weaknesses of DE weapons, DOD is conducting multiple utility studies
to analyze potential concepts of operation for DE weapons and to assess the scenarios in which to analyze potential concepts of operation for DE weapons and to assess the scenarios in which
they might be militarilythey might be militarily useful.useful.8086 How might Congress draw upon the conclusions of these How might Congress draw upon the conclusions of these
analyses as it conducts oversight of DE weapons programs? What is the appropriate balance analyses as it conducts oversight of DE weapons programs? What is the appropriate balance
between DE weapons and traditional munitions within the military’s portfolio of capabilities? between DE weapons and traditional munitions within the military’s portfolio of capabilities?
Defense Industrial Base
Some analysts have expressed concerns that, in the past, DOD did not provide stable funding for Some analysts have expressed concerns that, in the past, DOD did not provide stable funding for
DE weapons programs or sufficient opportunities for the DE workforce. Acknowledging these DE weapons programs or sufficient opportunities for the DE workforce. Acknowledging these
concerns, DOD’s Principal Director for Directed Energy, Dr. Jim Trebes, has stated that, although concerns, DOD’s Principal Director for Directed Energy, Dr. Jim Trebes, has stated that, although
~~he believes the DE industrial base is currently healthy, its capacity could be strained in the future~~
~~if DOD begins to buy larger numbers of DE systems. Dr. Trebes has additional y noted that, while~~
~~today’s DE workforce is sufficient to need, it may face a demographic problem in the future due~~
~~to retirement.81 According to OUSD(R&E), HELSI is intended to address such concerns about the~~
~~future of the DE industrial base by providing industry with assured prototyping opportunities. In~~
~~what ways, if any, has HELSI strengthened the defense industrial base for DE weapons? What, if~~
~~any, chal enges does the base continue to face, and how might they be mitigated?~~

~~p. 4.~~
~~79 Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,”~~ 84 Paul Scharre, Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects, Center for a New American Security, April 2015, p. 4. 85 Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at , July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready; and David Vergun,ready; and David Vergun, “ “Army developing lasers that pierce fog, dust to destroy targets,” Army developing lasers that pierce fog, dust to destroy targets,” ~~Arm y~~Army News Service, ,
October 23, 2017, at https://www.army.mil/article/195650/October 23, 2017, at https://www.army.mil/article/195650/
army_developing_lasers_that_pierce_fog_dust_to_destroy_targets. army_developing_lasers_that_pierce_fog_dust_to_destroy_targets.
8086 Dr. Jim Dr. Jim ~~T rebes~~Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,(R&E) Doing?, ~~” Presentation~~” presentation
at IDGA,at IDGA, ~~October 21, 2020.~~
~~81 CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Dr. Jim T rebes, November 17, 2020. See also Dr. Jim~~
~~T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation at IDGA,~~
~~October 21, 2020.~~
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~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~
October 21, 2020. Congressional Research Service 17 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress he believes the DE industrial base is currently healthy, its capacity could be strained in the future if DOD begins to buy larger numbers of DE systems. Dr. Trebes has noted that although today’s DE workforce is sufficient, it may face a demographic problem in the future due to retirement.87 According to OUSD(R&E), HELSI is intended to address such concerns about the future of the DE industrial base by providing industry with assured prototyping opportunities. In what ways, if any, has HELSI strengthened the defense industrial base for DE weapons? What, if any, challenges does the base continue to face, and how might they be mitigated?
Intelligence Requirements
Some analysts have questioned whether DOD has sufficient knowledge of adversary DE weapons Some analysts have questioned whether DOD has sufficient knowledge of adversary DE weapons
systems and materials to develop its own weapons requirements. DOD is currently attempting to systems and materials to develop its own weapons requirements. DOD is currently attempting to
further define its DE collection requirements for the further define its DE collection requirements for the ~~intel igence~~intelligence community (IC) through the community (IC) through the
Directed Energy Lethality Directed Energy Lethality ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence initiative. initiative.82 88 To what extent, if at To what extent, if at al all, is this initiative , is this initiative
improving connectivity between DOD’s DE community and the IC? What collection improving connectivity between DOD’s DE community and the IC? What collection
requirements, if any, remain? requirements, if any, remain?
Coordination ~~within~~Within DOD
Pursuant to Section 219 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-Pursuant to Section 219 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-
328), OUSD(R&E)’s Principal Director for Directed Energy is tasked with coordinating DE 328), OUSD(R&E)’s Principal Director for Directed Energy is tasked with coordinating DE
efforts across DOD and with developing DOD’s Directed Energy Roadmap, which is to guide efforts across DOD and with developing DOD’s Directed Energy Roadmap, which is to guide
development efforts. Section 215 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) development efforts. Section 215 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) ~~additional y~~ established a established a
Directed Energy Working Group to “analyze and evaluate the current and planned directed energy Directed Energy Working Group to “analyze and evaluate the current and planned directed energy
programs of each of the military departments ... [and] make recommendations to the Secretary of programs of each of the military departments ... [and] make recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense.” These recommendations are intended to improve DOD DE coordination activities and Defense.” These recommendations are intended to improve DOD DE coordination activities and
accelerate the fielding of DE capabilities. To what extent are the military departments and defense accelerate the fielding of DE capabilities. To what extent are the military departments and defense
agencies adhering to OUSD(R&E)’s roadmap? What, if any, additional authorities or structural agencies adhering to OUSD(R&E)’s roadmap? What, if any, additional authorities or structural
changes would be required to ensure proper implementation of the roadmap and execution of the changes would be required to ensure proper implementation of the roadmap and execution of the
working group’s recommendations? working group’s recommendations?
Arms Control
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”8389 However, some applications of DE weapons However, some applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. Article 1 of the Protocol on Blindingare prohibited. Article 1 of the Protocol on Blinding Lasers prohibits the employment of “laser Lasers prohibits the employment of “laser
weapons weapons ~~specifical y~~specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions,
to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”84
~~Some analysts have suggested that additional multilateral agreements should be considered. For~~
~~example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—~~
~~such as “heat rays”85 or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain~~
~~military applications of DE weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.86 Other~~

~~82 Dr. Jim T rebes~~90 87 CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. See also Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation at IDGA, October 21, 2020. 88 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” (R&E) Doing?,” ~~Presentation~~presentation
at IDGA,at IDGA, October 21, 2020. October 21, 2020.
8389 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017. Article 36, November 2017.
~~84 T he~~ 90 The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the it prohibit the
employment of laser weapons that may cause blindnessemployment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “ “as an incidental or collateral effectas an incidental or collateral effect .” .” Additional Protocol to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be ~~Deem ed~~Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have ~~Indiscrim inate~~Indiscriminate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, , Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, ~~T reaty Series,~~
~~vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/T reaties~~Treaty Series, Congressional Research Service 18 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Some analysts have suggested that additional multilateral agreements should be considered. For example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—such as “heat rays”91 or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain military applications of DE weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.92 Other analysts have argued that DE weapons could be considered more humane than conventional weapons because their accuracy could reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances when lethal force might otherwise be used.93 In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures should the United States consider regarding the use of DE weapons in both war and peacetime? vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf. /1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.
For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS
Report R41526, Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by , by
Ronald O'Rourke. Ronald O'Rourke.
8591 See See “Active Denial “Active Denial ~~T echnology~~Technology: Fact Sheet,” Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, May 11, 2020, at : Fact Sheet,” Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, May 11, 2020, at
https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Facthttps://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Fact -Sheets/Article-View-Fact-sheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology/. -Sheets/Article-View-Fact-sheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology/.
86 92 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at , April 2, 2020, at
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~~analysts have argued that DE weapons could be considered more humane than conventional~~
~~weapons because their accuracy could potential y reduce collateral damage and because they~~
~~could provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might~~
~~otherwise be used.87 In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use~~
~~of DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures should the~~
~~United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both war and peacetime?~~

~~https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.~~
~~87 See,~~ https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/. 93 See, for example, Mark Gunzingerfor example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/documents/~~CSBA_ChangingT heGame_ereader~~CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf. .pdf.
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Appendix A. Potential Advantages and Limitations
of Directed Energy ~~Weapons88~~Weapons94
This appendix provides additional information on potential advantages and limitations of High-This appendix provides additional information on potential advantages and limitations of High-
Energy Laser (HEL) and High-Powered Microwave (HPM) weapons. The advantages and Energy Laser (HEL) and High-Powered Microwave (HPM) weapons. The advantages and
limitations of any HELlimitations of any HEL or HPM weapons would be specific to the system; as such, or HPM weapons would be specific to the system; as such, al all advantages advantages
and limitationsand limitations might not might not ~~equal y~~equally apply to each system. apply to each system.
Potential Advantages of HEL Weapons
In addition to deeper magazines, lower logistics requirements, and lower costs per shot, potential In addition to deeper magazines, lower logistics requirements, and lower costs per shot, potential
advantages of HEL weapons include the following: advantages of HEL weapons include the following:
  Fast engagement times. Light from a laser beam can reach a target almost Light from a laser beam can reach a target almost
instantly, thereby eliminating instantly, thereby eliminating the need to calculate an intercept course, as the need to calculate an intercept course, as
interceptor missiles must do. By remaining focused on a particular spot on the interceptor missiles must do. By remaining focused on a particular spot on the
target, a laser can cause disabling damage to the target within seconds, depending target, a laser can cause disabling damage to the target within seconds, depending
on the laser power. After disabling one target, a laser can be redirected to another on the laser power. After disabling one target, a laser can be redirected to another
target in several seconds. target in several seconds.
  Ability to counter radically maneuvering missiles. HEL weapons can follow HEL weapons can follow
and maintain and maintain their beam on their beam on ~~radical y~~radically maneuvering missiles that might stress the maneuvering missiles that might stress the
maneuvering capabilities of kinetic interceptors. maneuvering capabilities of kinetic interceptors.
  Precision engagements. HEL weapons are precision-engagement weapons—the HEL weapons are precision-engagement weapons—the
area irradiated by the laser, which might be several area irradiated by the laser, which might be several ~~mil imeters~~ millimeters to several inches to several inches
in diameter, affects what it hits, while in diameter, affects what it hits, while ~~general y~~generally not affecting (at least not not affecting (at least not
directly) separate nearby objects. directly) separate nearby objects.
  Graduated responses. HEL weapons can perform functions other than HEL weapons can perform functions other than
destroying targets, including detecting and monitoring targets and producing destroying targets, including detecting and monitoring targets and producing
nonlethal effects, including reversible jamming of electro-optic (EO) sensors. nonlethal effects, including reversible jamming of electro-optic (EO) sensors.
HELs offer the potential for graduated responses that range from warning targets HELs offer the potential for graduated responses that range from warning targets
to reversibly jamming their systems, to causing limited but not disabling damage to reversibly jamming their systems, to causing limited but not disabling damage
(as a further warning), and then (as a further warning), and then ~~final y~~finally causing disabling damage. causing disabling damage.
Potential Limitations of HEL Weapons
Potential limitationsPotential limitations of HEL weapons include the following: of HEL weapons include the following:
  Line of sight. Since laser light passes through the atmosphere on an Since laser light passes through the atmosphere on an ~~essential y~~essentially
straight path, HEL weapons would be limited to line-of-sight engagements, and straight path, HEL weapons would be limited to line-of-sight engagements, and
consequently could not counter over-the-horizon targets or targets obscured by consequently could not counter over-the-horizon targets or targets obscured by
intervening objects. As a result, potential engagement ranges against certain intervening objects. As a result, potential engagement ranges against certain
targets (e.g., low-flying targets) would be limited. targets (e.g., low-flying targets) would be limited.
  Atmospheric absorption, scattering, and turbulence. Substances in the Substances in the
atmosphere—particularly water vapor, but also sand, dust, salt particles, smoke, atmosphere—particularly water vapor, but also sand, dust, salt particles, smoke,
and other air pollution—absorb and scatter lightand other air pollution—absorb and scatter light, and atmospheric turbulence can and atmospheric turbulence can
defocus a laser beam. These effects can reduce the effective range of defocus a laser beam. These effects can reduce the effective range of ~~the HEL~~

~~88 T his appendix was~~ an HEL 94 This appendix was written by Ronald O’Rourke (HEL weapons) and Andrewwritten by Ronald O’Rourke (HEL weapons) and Andrew Feickert (HPM weapons), CRS Feickert (HPM weapons), CRS
SpecialistSpecialist in Naval Affairs andin Naval Affairs and ~~CRS~~ CRS Specialist in Military GroundSpecialist in Military Ground Forces, respectively. Forces, respectively.
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weapon. Absorption by water vapor is a particular consideration for shipboard weapon. Absorption by water vapor is a particular consideration for shipboard
lasers because marine environments feature substantial amounts of water vapor in lasers because marine environments feature substantial amounts of water vapor in
the air. There are certain wavelengths of light (i.e., “sweet spots” in the the air. There are certain wavelengths of light (i.e., “sweet spots” in the
electromagnetic spectrum) where atmospheric absorption by water vapor is electromagnetic spectrum) where atmospheric absorption by water vapor is
markedly reduced. Lasers can be designed to emit light at or near those sweet markedly reduced. Lasers can be designed to emit light at or near those sweet
spots, so as to maximize their potential effectiveness. Absorption spots, so as to maximize their potential effectiveness. Absorption ~~general y~~generally grows grows
with distance to target, making it in general less of a potential problem for short-with distance to target, making it in general less of a potential problem for short-
range operations than for longer-range operations. Adaptive optics, which make range operations than for longer-range operations. Adaptive optics, which make
rapid, fine adjustments to a laser beam on a continuous basis in response to rapid, fine adjustments to a laser beam on a continuous basis in response to
observed turbulence, can counteract the effects of atmospheric turbulence. Even observed turbulence, can counteract the effects of atmospheric turbulence. Even
so, lasers might not work so, lasers might not work ~~wel~~ well, or at , or at al all, in rain or fog, preventing lasers from , in rain or fog, preventing lasers from
being an being an al all-weather solution. -weather solution.
  Thermal blooming. A laser that continues firing in the same exact direction for a A laser that continues firing in the same exact direction for a
certain amount of time can heat up the air it is passing through, which in turn can certain amount of time can heat up the air it is passing through, which in turn can
defocus the laser beam, reducing its ability to disable the intended target. This defocus the laser beam, reducing its ability to disable the intended target. This
effect, effect, ~~cal ed~~called thermal blooming, can make lasers less effective for countering , can make lasers less effective for countering
targets that are coming straight at them, on a constant bearing (i.e., “down-the-targets that are coming straight at them, on a constant bearing (i.e., “down-the-
throat” shots). Most tests of laser systems have been against crossing targets throat” shots). Most tests of laser systems have been against crossing targets
rather than “down-the-throat” shots. In general, thermal blooming becomes more rather than “down-the-throat” shots. In general, thermal blooming becomes more
of a concern as the power of the laser beam increases. of a concern as the power of the laser beam increases.
  Saturation attacks. Since a HEL weapon can attack only one target at a time, Since a HEL weapon can attack only one target at a time,
~~require~~requires several seconds to disable the target, and several seconds to disable the target, and ~~require~~requires several more to be several more to be
redirected to the next one, a HELredirected to the next one, a HEL weapon can disable only so many targets within weapon can disable only so many targets within
a given period of time. This places an upper limit on the ability of an individual a given period of time. This places an upper limit on the ability of an individual
laser to deal with saturation attacks—attacks by multiple weapons that approach laser to deal with saturation attacks—attacks by multiple weapons that approach
the platform simultaneously or within a few seconds of one another. This the platform simultaneously or within a few seconds of one another. This
limitationlimitation can be mitigated by can be mitigated by ~~instal ing~~ installing more than one laser on the platform, up more than one laser on the platform, up
to space and energy availability. to space and energy availability.
  Hardened targets and countermeasures. Less powerful lasers—that is, lasers Less powerful lasers—that is, lasers
with beam powers measured in kilowatts (kW) rather than megawatts (MW)— with beam powers measured in kilowatts (kW) rather than megawatts (MW)—
can can ~~have less effectiveness~~be less effective against targets that incorporate shielding, ablative against targets that incorporate shielding, ablative
material, or highly reflective surfaces, or that tumble or rotate rapidly (so that the material, or highly reflective surfaces, or that tumble or rotate rapidly (so that the
laser spot does not remain continuously on a single location on the target’s laser spot does not remain continuously on a single location on the target’s
surface). Smoke or other obscurants can reduce the susceptibility of a target surface). Smoke or other obscurants can reduce the susceptibility of a target
platform to laser attack. Such measures, however, can increase the cost and/or platform to laser attack. Such measures, however, can increase the cost and/or
weight of the target platform. weight of the target platform.
Potential Advantages of HPM Weapons
In addition to deep magazines, low costs per shot, fast engagement times, and graduated In addition to deep magazines, low costs per shot, fast engagement times, and graduated
responses, potential advantages of HPM weapons include the following: responses, potential advantages of HPM weapons include the following:
  Temporary or system-specific effects. HPM weapons can generate waves at HPM weapons can generate waves at
different frequencies and power levels to temporarily or permanently disrupt different frequencies and power levels to temporarily or permanently disrupt
targeted electronic systems while leaving others unaffected. targeted electronic systems while leaving others unaffected.
  Broad effects. HPM weapons can destroy a wide array of unshielded electronic HPM weapons can destroy a wide array of unshielded electronic
systems, including both military and commercial systems. In addition, they are systems, including both military and commercial systems. In addition, they are
capable of disabling any unshielded electronic system within their capable of disabling any unshielded electronic system within their
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electromagnetic cone (i.e., they can disable numerous systems, including swarms electromagnetic cone (i.e., they can disable numerous systems, including swarms
of UAS, at once). of UAS, at once).
  Nonlethal applications. Certain HPM weapons, such as “heat rays,” could Certain HPM weapons, such as “heat rays,” could
provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal
force might otherwise be used. force might otherwise be used.
  Limitation of collateral damage. HPM weapons would generate little to no HPM weapons would generate little to no
collateral damage of physical structures. collateral damage of physical structures.8995 This feature could make them This feature could make them
attractive weapons in urban areas or in situations “short of war.” attractive weapons in urban areas or in situations “short of war.”
Potential Limitations of HPM Weapons
Potential limitationsPotential limitations of HPM weapons include the following: of HPM weapons include the following:
  Range constraints. Because HPM beams are more diffuse than lasers and cannot Because HPM beams are more diffuse than lasers and cannot
be as tightly be as tightly focused, the “energy per unit area in HPM beams decreases focused, the “energy per unit area in HPM beams decreases
significantly over distance.”significantly over distance.”~~90 This~~ 96 This characteristic could limit the range at which HPM weapons could limit the range at which HPM weapons
~~are operational y~~are operationally effective. effective.
  Potential for fratricide. Because HPM weapons could affect Because HPM weapons could affect al all unshielded unshielded
electronic systems within range, measures must be taken to ensure that friendly electronic systems within range, measures must be taken to ensure that friendly
systems are properly shielded or kept outside of the weapon’s range when the systems are properly shielded or kept outside of the weapon’s range when the
weapon is in use. weapon is in use.
  Effectiveness of countermeasures. Because electromagnetic radiation can be Because electromagnetic radiation can be
absorbed by shielding, HPM weapons may not be effective against shielded absorbed by shielding, HPM weapons may not be effective against shielded
targets. targets.

89 95 Anti-personnel HPM weapons could not, however, discriminate between military personnel and civilians and could Anti-personnel HPM weapons could not, however, discriminate between military personnel and civilians and could
therefore impact civilians within the weapon’s electromagnetic cone. Similarly, HPM weapons usedtherefore impact civilians within the weapon’s electromagnetic cone. Similarly, HPM weapons used against military against military
electronic equipment could disableelectronic equipment could disable ~~unshielded~~ unshielded civilian equipment. civilian equipment.
90 96 Mark Gunzinger Mark Gunzinger and Chrisand Chris Dougherty, Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for , Center for
Strategic and BudgetaryStrategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, p. 39, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Assessments, April 19, 2021, p. 39, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/
~~CSBA_ChangingT heGame_ereader~~CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf. .pdf.
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Appendix B. Funding for Directed
Energy ~~Programs91~~
~~DOD appears to provide some~~Programs97 DOD has previously provided limited summary funding information for DE programs in budget summary funding information for DE programs in budget
documentation. For example, in the FY2020 Defense Budget Overview document, the department documentation. For example, in the FY2020 Defense Budget Overview document, the department
stated it planned to request $235 stated it planned to request $235 ~~mil ion~~million for certain offensive and defensive DE capabilities, for certain offensive and defensive DE capabilities,
including implementing DE applications for base defense, testing and procuring multiple types of including implementing DE applications for base defense, testing and procuring multiple types of
lasers, and researching and developing scalable high-power density applications.lasers, and researching and developing scalable high-power density applications.~~92 The document~~
~~does not detail which specific programs, projects, and activities are associated with this funding.~~
~~It does not appear to include al of the department’s DE programs, projects, and activities.~~
98 DOD has not included such funding information in defense budget overview documents since FY2020. The following sections provide estimates, based on keyword searches, of how much funding The following sections provide estimates, based on keyword searches, of how much funding
DOD has requested for DE programs, how much funding Congress has authorized for these DOD DOD has requested for DE programs, how much funding Congress has authorized for these DOD
DE programs, and how much funding Congress has appropriated for these DE programs, and how much funding Congress has appropriated for these ~~DOD DE~~ programs. programs.
CRS is unable to authoritatively identify CRS is unable to authoritatively identify al all DOD funding associated with DE, in part because the DOD funding associated with DE, in part because the
department’s budget documents do not include standard data elements identifying department’s budget documents do not include standard data elements identifying al all funding funding
associated with such work and do not require financial managers to explicitly reference certain associated with such work and do not require financial managers to explicitly reference certain
words or terms in program and project descriptions. words or terms in program and project descriptions.
Determining Funding Levels for Programs
CRS used the Defense Technical Information Center’s (DTIC’s) DOD Investment Budget Search CRS used the Defense Technical Information Center’s (DTIC’s) DOD Investment Budget Search
tool to identify directed energy research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and tool to identify directed energy research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and
procurement programs.procurement programs.9399 Search terms included “directed energy” and “lasers.” Search terms included “directed energy” and “lasers.”94100 These search These search
terms returned 264 research and development program elements and 90 procurement line items in terms returned 264 research and development program elements and 90 procurement line items in
FY2020. After assessing each of these programs, CRS identified 13 research and development FY2020. After assessing each of these programs, CRS identified 13 research and development
program elements and four procurement line items funding directed energy efforts. Using these program elements and four procurement line items funding directed energy efforts. Using these
results, CRS then traced the funding for these program elements and line items from FY2017 to results, CRS then traced the funding for these program elements and line items from FY2017 to
~~FY2022~~FY2023. .
To assess whether a program element or line item is developing or procuring DE systems, CRS To assess whether a program element or line item is developing or procuring DE systems, CRS
analyzed budget documents. If a program element or line item identifiedanalyzed budget documents. If a program element or line item identified more than 50% of its more than 50% of its
funding for DE or lasers, it was counted as a DE program listed ifunding for DE or lasers, it was counted as a DE program listed in Appendix C. This approach This approach
may have certain methodological may have certain methodological ~~chal enges~~challenges. For example, different search terms might include . For example, different search terms might include
or exclude certain program elements or line items. Inclusion of a program element or line item or exclude certain program elements or line items. Inclusion of a program element or line item
may overstate the amount of funding involved in DE efforts if, for example, the program element may overstate the amount of funding involved in DE efforts if, for example, the program element

~~91 T his appendix was~~ 97 This appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRSwritten by John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs. Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
9298 DOD, DOD, Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
March 2019, Defense Budget Overview, United States ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request , pp. 1-, pp. 1-
9, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/9, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/
fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
~~93 DOD’s Defense T echnical Information Center, or DT IC, no longer maintains a publicly accessible website~~ The document does not, however, detail which specific programs, projects, and activities are associated with this funding. It does not appear to include all of the department’s DE programs, projects, and activities. 99 DOD’s Defense Technical Information Center, or DTIC, no longer maintains a publicly accessible website to search to search
procurement and research and development budget documentation (including R-2 and P-40 exhibits). For more procurement and research and development budget documentation (including R-2 and P-40 exhibits). For more
information, see Jason Sherman, “information, see Jason Sherman, “ DOD moves Google-like tool for searching U.S.DOD moves Google-like tool for searching U.S. military weapon spendingmilitary weapon spending behind behind
firewall,”firewall,” Inside Defense, November 3, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-moves-google-tool-, November 3, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-moves-google-tool-
searching-us-military-weapon-spending-behind-firewall. searching-us-military-weapon-spending-behind-firewall.
94100 Due to database access Due to database access limitations, CRSlimitations, CRS ~~was unable~~ was unable to conduct a search for “microwave.” to conduct a search for “microwave.”
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or line item supports other purposes. These results therefore should be considered or line item supports other purposes. These results therefore should be considered ~~il ustrative and~~
illustrative and not comprehensive or exact. not comprehensive or exact.
After identifying specific program elements and line items, CRS used the National Defense After identifying specific program elements and line items, CRS used the National Defense
Authorization Acts from FY2017 through Authorization Acts from FY2017 through ~~FY2021~~FY2022 to identify how much each program element or to identify how much each program element or
line item was authorized to receive in a given fiscal year. CRS used two methods to identify line item was authorized to receive in a given fiscal year. CRS used two methods to identify
appropriated amounts for each program element or line item. First, DOD appropriated amounts for each program element or line item. First, DOD ~~typical y~~typically reports reports
appropriated amounts from the two previous fiscal years when it requests funding in budget appropriated amounts from the two previous fiscal years when it requests funding in budget
justifications. FY2019 through FY2022 budget justification documentation provided justifications. FY2019 through FY2022 budget justification documentation provided
appropriation amounts for FY2017 through FY2020.appropriation amounts for FY2017 through FY2020.95101 For FY2021 For FY2021 and FY2022 appropriations, CRS analyzed appropriations, CRS analyzed
funding tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the funding tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the respective Department of Defense Department of Defense
Appropriations Acts (P.L. 116-260Appropriations Acts (P.L. 116-260 and P.L. 117-103).102~~).96~~
Analysis
Figure B-1 depicts the differences between the President’s budget requestdepicts the differences between the President’s budget request, and congressional and congressional
authorizations and appropriations in RDT&E and procurement across five fiscal years. Program authorizations and appropriations in RDT&E and procurement across five fiscal years. Program
element and lineelement and line item funding are combined to provide an overview of the appropriation category. item funding are combined to provide an overview of the appropriation category.
Individual program elements or line items trends may differ from the overview depicted below. Individual program elements or line items trends may differ from the overview depicted below.
Appendix C provides a detailed list of RDT&E program elements and procurement line items. provides a detailed list of RDT&E program elements and procurement line items.

95 101 When available, this report uses the “actual” values reported in the DOD When available, this report uses the “actual” values reported in the DOD ~~Budget~~ budget justifications becausejustifications because the data the data
reported reported ~~represents both Congressional~~represent both congressional appropriations and appropriations and ~~Congressionally -~~congressionally approved reprogramming decisions. approved reprogramming decisions. ~~T hus~~
~~the~~ Thus the “actuals” are a more complete representation of “actuals” are a more complete representation of ~~Congressional~~congressional action on an individual program. action on an individual program.
96 102 The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-93, The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-93, Congressional Record,, December 17, 2019, December 17, 2019,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2019-12-17/pdf/CREC-2019-12-17-house-bk2.pdfhttps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2019-12-17/pdf/CREC-2019-12-17-house-bk2.pdf,
~~beginning on p. H10613~~; and H.Rept. 116-453; and H.Rept. 116-453.
, and Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 117-103, Congressional Record, March 9, 2022, at https://docs.house.gov/floor/Default.aspx?date=2022-03-07. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Figure B-1. Requested, Authorized, and Appropriated Funding Levels for Selected
DE Programs

Source: CRS analysis ofCRS analysis of FY2017-FY2017-~~FY2022~~FY2023 Army, Air Army, Air Force,Force, Navy, and Defense-WideNavy, and Defense-Wide Research,Research, Development, Development,
Test and Evaluation and ProcurementTest and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications,Budget Justifications, P.L.P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92, 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
P.L. 116-93, P.L. 116-260,P.L. 116-93, P.L. 116-260, P.L. 116-283, P.L. 117-81 and P.L. 117-103 ~~and P.L. 116-283~~. .
Note: Funding levels Funding levels are in current U.S. dol ars. are in current U.S. dol ars.
The military services sometimes change the funding source for programs and activities, including The military services sometimes change the funding source for programs and activities, including
those related to DE. Two program elements in particular from FY2017 through FY2019 were those related to DE. Two program elements in particular from FY2017 through FY2019 were
significantly restructured: Electronics and Electronic Devices (PE 0602705A) and Weapons and significantly restructured: Electronics and Electronic Devices (PE 0602705A) and Weapons and
Munitions Advanced Technology (PE 0603004A). These two program elements funded a number Munitions Advanced Technology (PE 0603004A). These two program elements funded a number
of DE projects, which were shifted into multiple new program elements to support the Army’s of DE projects, which were shifted into multiple new program elements to support the Army’s
new modernization strategy. Based on FY2020 budget documents, these projects now primarily new modernization strategy. Based on FY2020 budget documents, these projects now primarily
reside in Air and Missile Defense Technology (PE 0602150A) and Air and Missile Defense reside in Air and Missile Defense Technology (PE 0602150A) and Air and Missile Defense
Advanced Technology (PE 0603466A). These new program elements fund a number of other Advanced Technology (PE 0603466A). These new program elements fund a number of other
projects, but these alignments appear to provide the best linkage to historical programs.projects, but these alignments appear to provide the best linkage to historical programs.97103 There were no changes to programs in FY2023.
Many of the programs identified in this analysis appear to be defensive countermeasures designed Many of the programs identified in this analysis appear to be defensive countermeasures designed
to protect aircraft. The Air Force’s Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures, the Army’s to protect aircraft. The Air Force’s Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures, the Army’s
Common Infrared Countermeasures, and the Navy’s Tactical Air Directed Infrared Common Infrared Countermeasures, and the Navy’s Tactical Air Directed Infrared
Countermeasures are examples of these countermeasures. Other examples of DE programs Countermeasures are examples of these countermeasures. Other examples of DE programs
~~include the Army’s Maneuver - Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and the Air Force’s~~
~~Threat Simulator Development.~~

~~97 Figures~~ 103 Figures document total funding in a program element or line item. Due to the data fidelity of FY2020 appropriations, document total funding in a program element or line item. Due to the data fidelity of FY2020 appropriations,
~~CRS was unable~~ CRS was unable to assessto assess DE fundingDE funding at the project level. at the project level.
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~~Reviewing funding for FY2021~~ include the Army’s Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and the Air Force’s Threat Simulator Development. Reviewing funding for FY2022, CRS noted several issues related to both procurement and , CRS noted several issues related to both procurement and
research and development. Using this methodology, it appears that the research and development. Using this methodology, it appears that the ~~Trump~~Biden Administration Administration
requested approximately $requested approximately $~~709 mil ion,98 was authorized $718 mil ion~~909 million,104 was authorized $1,052 million, and was appropriated , and was appropriated ~~$873~~
~~mil ion~~$1,070 million. The deviation in . The deviation in ~~FY2021~~FY2022 funding between authorization and appropriation levels and the funding between authorization and appropriation levels and the
President’s budget request can largely be attributed to two research and development programs, President’s budget request can largely be attributed to two research and development programs,
which received relatively large increases in appropriations compared with the request: (1) the Air which received relatively large increases in appropriations compared with the request: (1) the Air
Force’s Air and Missile Defense Advanced Technology ($Force’s Air and Missile Defense Advanced Technology ($~~125 mil ion~~97 million) and (2) the Army’s Air and ) and (2) the Army’s Air and
Missile Defense ($Missile Defense ($~~53 mil ion~~74 million). Other ). Other ~~smal er~~smaller increases and decreases are predominately increases and decreases are predominately
offsetting. offsetting.
Two additional trends occur across the two appropriation categories. First, it appears that DE Two additional trends occur across the two appropriation categories. First, it appears that DE
research and development programs received additional appropriations compared with both the research and development programs received additional appropriations compared with both the
requested amount and the authorized amount. Second, programs that were in procurement over requested amount and the authorized amount. Second, programs that were in procurement over
the previous four years seem to have been appropriated less funding than was requested, though the previous four years seem to have been appropriated less funding than was requested, though
on average it appears that appropriations have been larger than authorizations. on average it appears that appropriations have been larger than authorizations.

~~98 T he FY2021 budget request did~~ 104 The FY2023 budget request did not provide an estimate for directed energy programs. However, the not provide an estimate for directed energy programs. However, the Trump Administration Administration
stated in its FY2020 budgetstated in its FY2020 budget request that it funded $235 million in DE programs, whereasrequest that it funded $235 million in DE programs, whereas ~~CRS calculated~~ CRS calculated the the
Administration’s request to be $634 million. Administration’s request to be $634 million. ~~T he~~The difference between these two funding difference between these two funding levels islevels is most likely basedmost likely based on on
methodological differences. methodological differences.
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Appendix C. List of Selected Line Items and
Program ~~Elements99~~Elements105
Table C-1. Selected Directed Energy Procurement Line Items
Requested
Authorized Appropriated
Line
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Fiscal Year
Item
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Large Aircraft Large Aircraft
Air Air Force Force
~~2022~~2023
LAIRCM LAIRCM
~~57,001~~25,286
— —
— —
Infrared Infrared
Countermeasures Countermeasures
(CM) (CM)
Large Aircraft Large Aircraft
Air Air Force 2022 LAIRCM 57,001 57,001 57,001 Infrared CM Large Aircraft Air Force Force
2021 2021
LAIRCM LAIRCM
57,521 57,521
57,521 57,521
46,321 46,321
Infrared CM Infrared CM
Large Aircraft Large Aircraft
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
LAIRCM LAIRCM
97,093 97,093
53,335 53,335
97,093 97,093
Infrared CM Infrared CM
Large Aircraft Large Aircraft
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
LAIRCM LAIRCM
149,778 149,778
149,778 149,778
149,778 149,778
Infrared CM Infrared CM
Large Aircraft Large Aircraft
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
LAIRCM LAIRCM
4,046 4,046
4,066 4,066
4,066 4,066
Infrared CM Infrared CM
Large Aircraft Large Aircraft
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
LAIRCM LAIRCM
135,801 135,801
135,801 135,801
135,801 135,801
Infrared CM Infrared CM
Common Infrared Common Infrared
Army Army
~~2022~~2023
5399AZ3537 5399AZ3537
~~240,412~~288,209
— —
— —
CM (CIRCM) CM (CIRCM)
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2022 5399AZ3537 240,412 238,012 234,012 CIRCM Army 2021 2021
5399AZ3537 5399AZ3537
237,467 237,467
237,464 237,464
234,117 234,117
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2020 2020
5399AZ3537 5399AZ3537
178,094 178,094
168,784 168,784
178,094 178,094
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2019 2019
5399AZ3537 5399AZ3537
60,899 60,899
36,839 36,839
60,899 60,899
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2018 2018
AZ3537 AZ3537
49,777 49,777
43,440 43,440
108,721 108,721
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2017 2017
AZ3537 AZ3537
108,721 108,721
108,721 108,721
80,677 80,677
Survivability CM Survivability CM Army 2023 5044AZ3507 6,622 — — Survivability CM
Army Army
2022 2022
5044AZ3507 5044AZ3507
5,104 5,104
—
—5,104 5,104
Survivability CM Survivability CM
Army Army
2021 2021
5044AZ3507 5044AZ3507
8,035 8,035
8,035 8,035
8,035 8,035
Survivability CM Survivability CM
Army Army
2020 2020
5044AZ3507 5044AZ3507
8,388 8,388
8,388 8,388
8,388 8,388
Survivability CM Survivability CM
Army Army
2019 2019
5044AZ3507 5044AZ3507
5,853 5,853
5,853 5,853
5,853 5,853
Survivability CM Survivability CM
Army Army
2018 2018
AZ3507 AZ3507
5,884 5,884
5,884 5,884
5,884 5,884
Survivability CM Survivability CM
Army Army
2017 2017
AZ3507 AZ3507
9,565 9,565
9,565 9,565
9,565 9,565
MAGTF EW for MAGTF EW for
Navy Navy
~~2022~~2023
0587 0587
~~29,151~~24,684 — — Aviation 105 This appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRS
—
—
~~Aviation~~
~~MAGTF EW for~~
~~Navy~~
~~2021~~
~~0587~~
~~27,794~~
~~27,794~~
~~26,822~~
~~Aviation~~
~~MAGTF EW for~~
~~Navy~~
~~2020~~
~~0587~~
~~26,536~~
~~26,536~~
~~26,536~~
~~Aviation~~

~~99 T his appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRS~~ Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs. Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
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Requested
Authorized Appropriated
Line
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Fiscal Year
Item
thousands) thousands)
thousands)
~~thousands)~~MAGTF EW for Navy 2022 0587 29,151 29,151 29,151 Aviation MAGTF EW for Navy 2021 0587 27,794 27,794 26,822 Aviation MAGTF EW for Navy 2020 0587 26,536 26,536 26,536 Aviation
MAGTF EW for MAGTF EW for
Navy Navy
2019 2019
0587 0587
11,590 11,590
11,590 11,590
11,590 11,590
Aviation Aviation
MAGTF EW for MAGTF EW for
Navy Navy
2018 2018
0587 0587
10,111 10,111
10,111 10,111
10,111 10,111
Aviation Aviation
MAGTF EW for MAGTF EW for
Navy Navy
2017 2017
0588 0588
5,676 5,676
5,676 5,676
21,968 21,968
Aviation Aviation
Source: CRS analysis ofCRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, AirFY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force,Force, Navy, and Defense-WideNavy, and Defense-Wide Research,Research, Development, Development,
Test and Evaluation and ProcurementTest and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications,Budget Justifications, P.L.P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92, 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
and P.L.and P.L. 116-93. 116-93.
Notes: Blank Blank ~~cel s represent~~ cells represent data that weredata that were not available at the time of publication. MAGTF EW stands for not available at the time of publication. MAGTF EW stands for
Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare. Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare.

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link to page 37 link to page 37 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Table C-2. Selected Directed Energy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Program Elements
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Directed Directed ~~Energy~~
~~Air~~ Energy Air Force 2023 0604032F 4,269 — — Prototyping Directed Energy Air Force Force
2022 2022
0604032F 0604032F
10,820 10,820
—
—10,820 15,820
Prototyping Prototyping
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2021 2021
0604032F 0604032F
20,964 20,964
20,964 20,964
19,464 19,464
Prototyping Prototyping
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
0604032F 0604032F
10,000 10,000
20,000 20,000
42,390 42,390
Prototyping Prototyping
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
0604032F 0604032F
— —
—- —-
50,000 50,000
Prototyping Prototyping
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
0604032F 0604032F
— —
— —
— —
Prototyping Prototyping
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
0604032F 0604032F
— —
— —
— —
Prototyping Prototyping
Directed Directed ~~Energy~~
~~Air~~ Energy Air Force 2023 0602605F 109,302 — — Technology Directed Energy Air Force Force
2022 2022
0602605F 0602605F
121,869 121,869
—
—113,522 116,456
Technology Technology
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2021 2021
0602605F 0602605F
128,113 128,113
128,113 128,113
130,613 130,613
Technology Technology
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
0602605F 0602605F
32,020 32,020
124,379 124,379
114,279 114,279
Technology Technology
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
0602605F 0602605F
33,506 33,506
141,898 141,898
141,800 141,800
Technology Technology
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
0602605F 0602605F
33,047 33,047
141,293 141,293
132,993 132,993
Technology Technology
Directed Directed Energy Energy
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
0602605F 0602605F
127,163 127,163
127,163 127,163
127,365 127,365
Technology Technology
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
~~OSD~~
~~2022~~
~~0602890D8Z~~
~~45,997~~
—
—
~~Development~~
~~High Energy Laser~~
~~Air~~ Air Force Force
2022 2022
0602890F 0602890F
— —
— —
— —
~~Research~~Researcha
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2021 2021
0602890F 0602890F
45,088 45,088
45,088 45,088
29,208 29,208
Research Research
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
0602890F 0602890F
44,221 44,221
44,221 44,221
47,462 47,462
Research Research
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
0602890F 0602890F
43,359 43,359
45,859 45,859
43,192 43,192
Research Research
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
0602890F 0602890F
43,049 43,049
43,049 43,049
43,049 43,049
Research Research
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
0602890F 0602890F
42,300 42,300
42,300 42,300
39,545 39,545
Research Research
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
~~OSD~~
~~2022~~
~~0601108D8Z~~
~~15,390~~
—
—
~~Research Initiatives~~
~~High Energy Laser~~
~~Air~~ Air Force Force
2022 2022
0601108F 0601108F
— —
— —
— —
Research Research ~~Initiatives~~Initiativesb
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2021 2021
0601108F 0601108F
15,085 15,085
15,085 15,085
15,085 15,085
Research Initiatives Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
0601108F 0601108F
14,795 14,795
14,795 14,795
13,736 13,736
Research Initiatives Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
0601108F 0601108F
14,506 14,506
14,506 14,506
13,106 13,106
Research Initiatives Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
0601108F 0601108F
14,417 14,417
14,417 14,417
14,417 14,417
Research Initiatives Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
0601108F 0601108F
14,168 14,168
14,168 14,168
13,224 13,224
Research Initiatives Research Initiatives
Large Aircraft IR Large Aircraft IR
Air Air Force Force
~~2022~~2023
0401134F 0401134F
~~5,504~~2,909
— —
— —
Countermeasures Countermeasures
(LAIRCM) (LAIRCM)
LAIRCM LAIRCM
Air Air Force 2022 0401134F 5,504 5,504 5,504 LAIRCM Air Force Force
2021 2021
0401134F 0401134F
5,507 5,507
5,507 5,507
5,507 5,507
LAIRCM LAIRCM
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
0401134F 0401134F
5,424 5,424
5,424 5,424
5,247 5,247
LAIRCM LAIRCM
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
0401134F 0401134F
4,334 4,334
4,334 4,334
4,334 4,334
LAIRCM LAIRCM
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
0401134F 0401134F
5,283 5,283
5,283 5,283
5,095 5,095
LAIRCM LAIRCM
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
0401134F 0401134F
5,166 5,166
5,166 5,166
5,011 5,011
Threat Simulator Threat Simulator
Air Air Force 2023 0604256F 21,607 — — Development Threat Simulator Air Force Force
2022 2022
0604256F 0604256F
41,909 41,909
—
—41,909 46,909
Development Development
Threat Simulator Threat Simulator
Air Air Force Force
2021 2021
0604256F 0604256F
57,725 57,725
57,725 57,725
57,725 57,725
Development Development
Threat Simulator Threat Simulator
Air Air Force Force
2020 2020
0604256F 0604256F
59,693 59,693
59,693 59,693
58,906 58,906
Development Development
Threat Simulator Threat Simulator
Air Air Force Force
2019 2019
0604256F 0604256F
34,256 34,256
34,256 34,256
34,206 34,206
Development Development
Threat Simulator Threat Simulator
Air Air Force Force
2018 2018
0604256F 0604256F
35,405 35,405
35,405 35,405
35,405 35,405
Development Development
Threat Simulator Threat Simulator
Air Air Force Force
2017 2017
0604256F 0604256F
21,630 21,630
21,630 21,630
21,377 21,377
Development Development
Air Air and Missile and Missile
Army Army
~~2022~~2023
0603466A 0603466A
~~48,826~~11,147
— —
— —
Defense Advanced Defense Advanced
Technology Technology
Air Air and Missile and Missile
Army Army
~~2021~~2022
0603466A 0603466A
~~58,130~~
~~73,630~~
~~182,630~~48,826 68,826 145,826
Defense Advanced Defense Advanced
Technology Technology
Air Air and Missile and Missile
Army Army
~~2020~~2021 0603466A 58,130 73,630 182,630 Defense
~~0603466A~~
~~60,613~~
~~60,613~~
~~79,817~~
~~Defense Advanced~~
~~Technology~~
~~Weapons and~~
~~Army~~
~~2019~~
~~0603004A~~
~~102,686~~
~~122,686~~
~~241,581~~
~~Munitions~~ Advanced Advanced
Technology Technology
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Air and Missile Army 2020 0603466A 60,613 60,613 79,817 Defense Advanced Technology Weapons and Army 2019 0603004A 102,686 122,686 241,581 Munitions Advanced Technology Weapons and Weapons and
Army Army
2018 2018
0603004A 0603004A
84,709 84,709
84,079 84,079
84,079 84,079
Munitions Advanced Munitions Advanced
Technology Technology
Weapons and Weapons and
Army Army
2017 2017
0603004A 0603004A
68,714 68,714
68,714 68,714
198,245 198,245
Munitions Advanced Munitions Advanced
Technology Technology
Air Air and Missile Army 2023 0602150A 27,016 — — Defense Technology Air and Missile and Missile
Army Army
2022 2022
0602150A 0602150A
19,316 19,316
—
—72,566 93,566
Defense Technology Defense Technology
Air Air and Missile and Missile
Army Army
2021 2021
0602150A 0602150A
56,298 56,298
66,298 66,298
109,298 109,298
Defense Technology Defense Technology
Air Air and Missile and Missile
Army Army
2020 2020
0602150A 0602150A
50,771 50,771
50,771 50,771
19,316 19,316
Defense Technology Defense Technology
Common Infrared Common Infrared
Army Army
~~2022~~2023
0605035A 0605035A
~~16,630~~11,523
— —
— —
Countermeasures Countermeasures
(CIRCM)(CIRCM) CIRCM Army 2022 0605035A 16,630 16,630 16,630
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2021 2021
0605035A 0605035A
23,321 23,321
28,321 28,321
28,321 28,321
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2020 2020
0605035A 0605035A
46,258 46,258
11,770 11,770
22,226 22,226
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2019 2019
0605035A 0605035A
53,848 53,848
2,670 2,670
33,809 33,809
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2018 2018
0605035A 0605035A
127,318 127,318
21,540 21,540
97,746 97,746
CIRCM CIRCM
Army Army
2017 2017
0605035A 0605035A
107,877 107,877
10,900 10,900
127,318 127,318
Electronics and Electronics and
Army Army
2019 2019
0602705A 0602705A
58,283 58,283
58,283 58,283
96,760 96,760
Electronic Devices Electronic Devices
Electronics and Electronics and
Army Army
2018 2018
0602705A 0602705A
58,352 58,352
60,352 60,352
90,613 90,613
Electronic Devices Electronic Devices
Electronics and Electronics and
Army Army
2017 2017
0602705A 0602705A
56,322 56,322
56,322 56,322
72,979 72,979
Electronic Devices Electronic Devices
Maneuver - Short Maneuver - Short
Army Army
~~2022~~2023
0604117A 0604117A
~~39,376~~225,147
— —
— —
Range Air Defense Range Air Defense
(M-SHORAD)(M-SHORAD) M-SHORAD Army 2022 0604117A 39,376 39,376 39,376
M-SHORAD M-SHORAD
Army Army
2021 2021
0604117A 0604117A
4,995 4,995
4,995 4,995
4,995 4,995
M-SHORAD M-SHORAD
Army Army
2020 2020
0604117A 0604117A
39,100 39,100
29,400 29,400
41,690 41,690
M-SHORAD M-SHORAD
Army Army
2019 2019
0604117A 0604117A
118,085 118,085
23,000 23,000
79,016 79,016
M-SHORAD M-SHORAD
Army Army
2018 2018
0604117A 0604117A
20,000 20,000
20,000 20,000
19,201 19,201
~~M-SHORAD~~
~~Army~~
~~2017~~
~~0604117A~~
—
—
~~95,085~~
~~Directed Energy and~~
~~Navy~~
~~2022~~
~~0603925N~~
~~71,803~~
—
—
~~Electric Weapon~~
~~System~~
~~Directed Energy and~~
~~Navy~~
~~2021~~
~~0603925N~~
~~128,845~~
~~128,845~~
~~126,895~~
~~Electric Weapon~~
~~System~~
~~Directed Energy and~~
~~Navy~~
~~2020~~
~~0603925N~~
~~118,169~~
~~118,169~~
~~136,535~~
~~Electric Weapon~~
~~System~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

30

~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Requested~~
~~Authorized~~
~~Appropriated~~
~~Fiscal~~
~~Program~~
~~($ in~~
~~($ in~~
~~($ in~~
~~Title~~
~~Agency~~
~~Year~~
~~Element~~
~~thousands)~~
~~thousands)~~
~~thousands)~~
~~Directed~~ Congressional Research Service 31 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Requested Authorized Appropriated Fiscal Program ($ in ($ in ($ in Title Agency Year Element thousands) thousands) thousands) M-SHORAD Army 2017 0604117A — — 95,085 Directed Energy and Navy 2023 0603925N 65,080 — — Electric Weapon System Directed Energy and Navy 2022 0603925N 71,803 81,803 81,803 Electric Weapon System Directed Energy and Navy 2021 0603925N 128,845 128,845 126,895 Electric Weapon System Directed Energy and Navy 2020 0603925N 118,169 118,169 136,535 Electric Weapon System Directed Energy and Energy and
Navy Navy
2019 2019
0603925N 0603925N
223,344 223,344
142,412 142,412
142,814 142,814
Electric Weapon Electric Weapon
System System
Directed Directed Energy and Energy and
Navy Navy
2018 2018
0603925N 0603925N
107,310 107,310
122,310 122,310
92,856 92,856
Electric Weapon Electric Weapon
System System
Directed Directed Energy and Energy and
Navy Navy
2017 2017
0603925N 0603925N
32,700 32,700
32,700 32,700
34,039 34,039
Electric Weapon Electric Weapon
System System
Tact Air Tact Air Dir Infrared Dir Infrared
Navy Navy
~~2022~~2023
0604272N 0604272N
~~33,246~~15,028
— —
— —
CM (TADIRCM) CM (TADIRCM) TADIRCM Navy 2022 0604272N 33,246 33,246 33,246
TADIRCM TADIRCM
Navy Navy
2021 2021
0604272N 0604272N
59,776 59,776
52,026 52,026
50,281 50,281
TADIRCM TADIRCM
Navy Navy
2020 2020
0604272N 0604272N
68,346 68,346
58,449 58,449
54,175 54,175
TADIRCM TADIRCM
Navy Navy
2019 2019
0604272N 0604272N
47,278 47,278
47,278 47,278
47,278 47,278
TADIRCM TADIRCM
Navy Navy
2018 2018
0604272N 0604272N
46,589 46,589
46,844 46,844
51,311 51,311
TADIRCM TADIRCM
Navy Navy
2017 2017
0604272N 0604272N
72,910 72,910
34,920 34,920
59,753 59,753
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
OSD OSD 2023 0603924D8Z 111,149 — — Advanced Development High Energy Laser OSD
2022 2022
0603924D8Z 0603924D8Z
107,397 107,397
—
—107,397 83,497
Advanced Advanced
Development Development
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
OSD OSD
2021 2021
0603924D8Z 0603924D8Z
105,410 105,410
92,270 92,270
112,910 112,910
Advanced Advanced
Development Development
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
OSD OSD
2020 2020
0603924D8Z 0603924D8Z
85,223 85,223
85,223 85,223
78,057 78,057
Advanced Advanced
Development Development
High Energy Laser High Energy Laser
OSD OSD
2019 2019
0603924D8Z 0603924D8Z
69,533 69,533
69,533 69,533
74,364 74,364
Advanced Advanced
Development Development
~~High Energy Laser~~
~~OSD~~
~~2018~~
~~0603924D8Z~~
—
—
—
~~Advanced~~
~~Development~~
~~High Energy Laser~~
~~OSD~~
~~2017~~
~~0603924D8Z~~
—
—
—
~~Advanced~~
~~Development~~
Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
~~Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,~~
~~and P.L. 116-93.~~
Notes: Blank cel s represent data that were not available at the time of publication. Tact Air Dir Infrared stands
~~for Tactical Aircraft Directable Infrared.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

31

~~Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Congressional Research Service 32 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Requested Authorized Appropriated Fiscal Program ($ in ($ in ($ in Title Agency Year Element thousands) thousands) thousands) High Energy Laser OSD 2018 0603924D8Z — — — Advanced Development High Energy Laser OSD 2017 0603924D8Z — — — Advanced Development High Energy Laser OSD 2023 0602890D8Z 48,587 — — Development High Energy Laser OSD 2022 0602890D8Z 45,997 115,997 45,997 Development High Energy Laser OSD 2023 0601108D8Z 16,257 — — Research Initiatives High Energy Laser OSD 2022 0601108D8Z 15,390 15,390 20,390 Research Initiatives Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92, and P.L. 116-93. Notes: Blank cells represent data that were not available at the time of publication. Tact Air Dir Infrared stands for Tactical Aircraft Directable Infrared. a. Funding transferred to OSD High Energy Laser Development (0602890D8Z) in FY2022. b. Funding transferred to OSD High Energy Laser Research Initiatives (0601108D8Z) in FY2022.
Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler, Coordinator Kelley M. Sayler, Coordinator
John R. Hoehn John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs
Security Security

Andrew Feickert Andrew Feickert
Ronald O'Rourke Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Military Ground Forces Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
Congressional Research Service 33 Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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