Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy
September 2, 2021February 10, 2022
and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan,
The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean
Coordinator
based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment
American Affairs American Affairs
for many of the 33 countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic for many of the 33 countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic

linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and
June S. Beittel
irregular; major factors driving migration include proximity and economic and security irregular; major factors driving migration include proximity and economic and security
Analyst in Latin American Analyst in Latin American
conditions. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a long-standing component of relations with conditions. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a long-standing component of relations with
Affairs Affairs
the region, involving close cooperation with Mexico, Colombia, the region, involving close cooperation with Mexico, Colombia, Central America,and countries throughout Central America and the and the

Caribbean. U.S. Administrations have long supported democracy and human rights in the region, Caribbean. U.S. Administrations have long supported democracy and human rights in the region,
with a current focus on with a current focus on authoritarian governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peter J. Meyer Venezuela, as well as democratic backsliding and corruption in other countries. In the past two Specialist in Latin years, supportCuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as corruption and human rights
Peter J. Meyer
concerns in other countries. Support to help the region respond to the to help the region respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Specialist in Latin
public health and economic impacts of the American and Canadian American and Canadian
Affairs Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic (COVID-19) pandemic also has become as a major has become as a major component of U.S. policyU.S. policy component. The Biden Administration focused extensively on addressing the root causes of Central American Clare Ribando Seelke migration during its initial months but has since fleshed out its broader approach toward Latin Specialist in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration’s other priorities include efforts to promote American Affairs public health and economic recovery from the pandemic; to work with partners to promote inclusive democracy throughout the region; to provide support to address Haiti’s difficult Maureen Taft-Morales humanitarian, security, and political challenges; and to engage more broadly with the region to Specialist in Latin address migration challenges. To advance those and other initiatives, the Administration American Affairs .
Affairs

In its initial months, much of the Biden Administration’s focus in the region was on immigration
and Central America. President Biden took executive actions revising some of the previous
Clare Ribando Seelke
Administration’s restrictive immigration policies, while also contending with a large increase in
Specialist in Latin
Central American migrants seeking to enter the United States. The Administration has proposed
American Affairs
allocating $4 billion over four years to implement a new strategy, released in July 2021, to

address the root causes of Central American migration.
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin
Since then, the Administration has begun to flesh out its broader approach to Latin America and
American Affairs
the Caribbean. It is providing significant support to help countries in the region respond to the

COVID-19 pandemic, including, as of August 2021, the donation of almost 40 million vaccine
doses to 26 countries. To support the region’s recovery and advance other initiative
M. Angeles Villarreal
s, the
Acting Section Research
Administration requested nearly $2.1 billion in foreign aid for Latin America and the Caribbean
Manager
requested nearly $2.1 billion in foreign aid for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2022, in FY2022, nearly 16% higher than estimated FY2021 appropriations. nearly 16% higher than estimated FY2021 appropriations. As the humanitarian crisis

in Venezuela continues to drive large-scale migration flows, the Administration has maintained
sanctions on the government while working multilaterally to restore democracy. The
Carla Y. Davis-Castro
Administration is reviewing past policy decisions on Cuba but also imposed a series of targeted
Research Librarian
sanctions against Cuban security entities and individuals in response to the government’s

suppression of protests in July. The Administration expressed continued support for Haiti
following the assassination of the country’s president in July and is providing humanitarian

assistance in the aftermath of an August 14 earthquake.The Administration also is providing significant supplemental pandemic-related assistance to the region, including, as of late January M. Angeles Villarreal Specialist in International 2022, the donation of over 60 million vaccine doses. The upcoming ninth Summit of the Trade and Finance Americas, scheduled to be hosted by the United States on June 6-10, 2022, in Los Angeles, CA, provides a significant opportunity to deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement with hemispheric leaders. Carla Y. Davis-Castro Research Librarian
117th Congress Action. Congress traditionally has played an active role in Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward the region through both U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean through legislation legislation
and oversight. In March 2021, Congress appropriated $10.8 billion (P.L. 117-2, American Rescue and oversight. In March 2021, Congress appropriated $10.8 billion (P.L. 117-2, American Rescue PlantPlan Act of 2021) to Act of 2021) to
respond to respond to COVID-19 worldwide, including in Latin America and the CaribbeanCOVID-19 worldwide, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the House approved H.R. 6, which
would provide a pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United States as children and those from countries with
temporary protected status. In June 2021, the Senate passed S. 1260, the United States Innovation and Competition Act of
2021, which would strengthen the United States’ ability to compete with China worldwide. Among its numerous Latin
America and Caribbean provisions, the bill would authorize a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank and
would require strategies to increase exports of U.S. goods and services and to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and
promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law. A House Foreign Affairs Committee-reported bill, H.R. 3524,
the EAGLE Act, has some of the same provisions as S. 1260 but also includes two provisions to strengthen U.S engagement
with the Caribbean. In July 2021, the House approved its version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill. In November 2021, Congress approved the RENACER Act (P.L. 117-54), which directs the use of diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions against antidemocratic actions and corruption in Nicaragua. In December 2021, Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), which includes provisions on Colombia, Central America, and China’s presence and influence in the region. Both houses approved several resolutions on the region, including H.Res. 760, S.Res. 37, S.Res. 81, S.Res. 310, and S.Res. 489 on the human rights situation in Cuba; S.Res. 22 on Ecuador; and S.Res. 120 on the forthcoming Summit of the Americas. In pending legislation, Congress has not completed an FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill. The House approved its version, H.R. 4373 , H.R. 4373
(H.Rept. 117-84), (H.Rept. 117-84), whichin July 2021, and the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced its version, S. 3075, in October 2021. The House bill would provide assistance to would provide assistance to several key countries and programs in the region at levels key countries and programs in the region at levels either matching or matching or
exceeding the Administration’s budget request, including assistance to Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and regional exceeding the Administration’s budget request, including assistance to Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and regional
assistance to the Caribbean.
In country-specific legislation, in June 2021, the House approved H.R. 2471 on Haiti, which would promote the sustainable
rebuilding and development of Haiti and prioritize U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human rights. In August, the
Senate approved S. 1041 on Nicaragua, which, among its provisions, would direct the Administration to use U.S. diplomatic
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tools and targeted sanctions to support free and fair elections; the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported its version,
H.R. 2946, in July. The Senate also approved five resolutions on U.S. relations with the region: S.Res. 22 on Ecuador; S.Res.
37, S.Res. 81, and S.Res. 310 on the human rights situation in Cuba; and S.Res. 120, on the forthcoming Summit of the
Americas. To date, 16 congressional hearings have focused on a variety of U.S. policy challenges in the region (see
Appendix).
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Contents
Regional Political and Economic Environment assistance to the Caribbean; the Senate committee version would provide slightly more assistance than requested for Colombia and the Caribbean and less than requested for Central America. Both houses have approved broad bills aimed at positioning the United States to better compete with China; these bills include numerous provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean. S. 1260, passed by the Senate in June 2021, and H.R. 4521, passed by the House on February 4, 2022, would require the Administration to develop strategies to increase exports of U.S. goods and services to the region and to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in the region. On Haiti, the House passed H.R. 2471 in June 2021, which would promote the sustainable rebuilding and development of the country and Congressional Research Service link to page 60 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress would prioritize U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human rights; the Senate passed an amended version in January 2022. To date, 28 congressional hearings have focused on U.S. policy challenges in the region (see Appendix). Congressional Research Service link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 26 link to page 28 link to page 31 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 38 link to page 41 link to page 43 link to page 43 link to page 46 link to page 49 link to page 52 link to page 52 link to page 54 link to page 56 link to page 58 link to page 6 link to page 36 link to page 46 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 14 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Contents Regional Political and Economic Environment............................................................................... 1
COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean ....................................................................... 2
Political Situation ...................................................................................................................... 65
Electoral Practices ............................................................................................................... 65
Decline in Democratic Practices ......................................................................................... 76
Economic Situation ................................................................................................................... 9
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean .................................................................. 10
Trump Administration Policy ................................................................................................... 11
Biden Administration Policy ................................................................................................... 1312
Legislative Action in the 117th Congress ................................................................................. 16
Regional U.S. Policy IssuesEnacted Measures and Approved Resolutions .................................................................. 16 Pending Congressional Action .......................................................................................... 17 Regional U.S. Policy Issues 17
U.S. Foreign Aid ..................................................................................................................... 17
Migration Issues 19 U.S. Foreign Aid ...................................................................................................................... 19
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs 19 Migration Issues ..................................................................................... 22
Trade Policy ...................................... 21 Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs...................................................................................... 24
Selected Country and Subregional Issues 23 Trade Policy ......................................................................................... 27
The Caribbean ................................... 26 Selected Country and Subregional Issues ...................................................................................... 27
Caribbean Regional Issues30 The Caribbean ................................................................................................ 27
Cuba ............................. 30 Caribbean Regional Issues ..................................................................................................... 31
Haiti 30 Cuba .................................................................................................................................. 33
Mexico and Central AmericaHaiti .................................................................................................. 36
Mexico ................................ 36 Mexico and Central America ................................................................................................. 36
Central America’s Northern Triangle . 38 Mexico .................................................................................... 38
Nicaragua .......................................... 38 Central America’s Northern Triangle ................................................................................ 41
South America Nicaragua .......................................................................................................................... 44
Bolivia ......South America ......................................................................................................................... 44
47 Brazil ................................................................................................................................. 4547
Colombia ........................................................................................................................... 4649
Venezuela .......................................................................................................................... 4951
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 5153

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean ........................................................................ 1
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries .................................................. 2831
Figure 3. Map of Central America ................................................................................................. 3941

Tables
Table 1. COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Vaccination ProgressDeaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) ...as of February 6, 2022) ....................................................................................................................... 4
Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-20222023 ....................................... 10
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2022 ......................... 18.. 9
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2022 ......................... 20 Table 4. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013-
2020 ............................................................................................................................................ 2527

Table A-1. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts ............................................... 5255
Table A-2. Congressional Hearings in the 117th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean ....................................................................................................................... 5457

Appendixes
Appendix. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Data and Hearings .......................... 5255

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 5559

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

Regional Political and Economic Environment
The Latin American and Caribbean region consists of 33 countries, ranging from the Caribbean The Latin American and Caribbean region consists of 33 countries, ranging from the Caribbean
nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s smallest states, to the South American nation of nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s smallest states, to the South American nation of
Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country. (Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country. (SeeSee Figure 1 andand Table A-1 for a map and basic facts on for a map and basic facts on
the region’s independent countries.) Over the past four decades, the region has made significant the region’s independent countries.) Over the past four decades, the region has made significant
advances in political and economic development. Notable political and economic challenges advances in political and economic development. Notable political and economic challenges
remain, however, and some countries have experienced major setbacksremain, however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks, with Nicaragua and
Venezuela joining Cuba as the region’s three current authoritarian regimes. .
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics.
Notes: Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American
countries are in green. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located countries are in green. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located
on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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BeginningSince its beginning in 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has had widespread in 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has had widespread
public health, economic, social, and political effects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. public health, economic, social, and political effects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates a regional economic decline of 7.0reports that, because of the pandemic, the region registered an economic contraction of 6.9% in 2020, % in 2020,
with almost every country in with almost every country in the region in recession (see “Economic Situation,” below)recession. As a . As a
result, poverty and inequality have increased. result, poverty and inequality have increased. Many countries in the regionAlthough regional economic growth returned in 2021, many countries may struggle with may struggle with
protracted economic recoveries, given that they rely on global investment, trade, and tourism, all protracted economic recoveries, given that they rely on global investment, trade, and tourism, all
of which have been affected by the of which have been affected by the pandemicpandemic (see “Economic Situation,” below). The economic setback associated with the COVID-. The economic setback associated with the COVID-
19 pandemic has contributed to a resurgence of social unrest in some countries similar to that 19 pandemic has contributed to a resurgence of social unrest in some countries similar to that
experienced in 2019. Human rights groups also have expressed concerns about some leaders in experienced in 2019. Human rights groups also have expressed concerns about some leaders in
the region taking advantage of the pandemic to advance their own agendas and limit civil liberties the region taking advantage of the pandemic to advance their own agendas and limit civil liberties
for political gain (see for political gain (see “Political Situation,” below). ” below).
COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean1
As of As of September 1, 2021February 6, 2022, Latin America and the Caribbean had , Latin America and the Caribbean had 43.3almost 60.2 million confirmed COVID- million confirmed COVID-
19 cases (almost 20% of cases worldwide)19 cases and more than 1. and more than 1.46 million COVID-19 deaths (almost million COVID-19 deaths (almost
3228% of deaths worldwide), according to data from Johns Hopkins University, despite the region % of deaths worldwide), according to data from Johns Hopkins University, despite the region
accounting for only about 8.4% of the world’s population. Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and accounting for only about 8.4% of the world’s population. Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and
Argentina had the highest numbers of COVID-19 deaths in the region; Brazil Argentina had the highest numbers of COVID-19 deaths in the region; Brazil and Mexico had the had the
second- and fourthsecond-highest COVID-19 death -highest COVID-19 death tolls globallytoll globally, after the United States. The regional rankings change when . The regional rankings change when
examining mortality (death) rates per 100,000 population; using this metric, Peru had the highest examining mortality (death) rates per 100,000 population; using this metric, Peru had the highest
recorded COVID-19 mortality rate in the region (and globally), followed by Brazil, Argentina, recorded COVID-19 mortality rate in the region (and globally), followed by Brazil, Argentina,
ColombiaColombia, Paraguay, and Mexico, and Paraguay. Some Caribbean countries that have had . Some Caribbean countries that have had relatively smaller numbers of
fewer deaths compared with other countries in the region have deaths compared with other countries in the region have had high mortality rates (seehigh mortality rates (see Table 1).2 .2
Experts have expressed concerns that some countries could be significantly undercounting deaths Experts have expressed concerns that some countries could be significantly undercounting deaths
for a variety of reasons.3
On August 25, 2021for various reasons, including Mexico, where COVID-19 deaths could be more than double those reported.3 On February 2, 2022, during its weekly press briefing on the pandemic, the Pan American Health , during its weekly press briefing on the pandemic, the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), which serves as regional office for the Americas of the World Health Organization (PAHO), which serves as regional office for the Americas of the World Health
Organization, reported that new COVID-19 cases Organization, reported that new COVID-19 cases continued across Latin America and the
Caribbean, with Mexico and Brazil having the highest number of cases and many Central
American countries experiencing a rise in infections. Although hospitalizations were reportedly
decreasing in much of South America, PAHO stated that infections remained high. In the
were surging across Central and South America. As the Omicron variant spread throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, PAHO Caribbean, PAHO reported that deaths increased for the fourth consecutive week, with deaths more than doubling in several Caribbean countries.4 Since the pandemic first surged in the region in reported steep increases in new infections and deaths in Jamaica and some
smaller islands, such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica.4 In a briefing on
September 1, 2021, PAHO highlighted high rates of infection in Belize, Costa Rica, St. Lucia, and
Suriname.5
When the pandemic first began to surge in the region in May 2020, PAHO Director Dr. Carissa 2020, PAHO Director Dr. Carissa
EtienneEtienne has repeatedly expressed concern about the poor and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk. These expressed concern about the poor and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk. These

groups included those living in the Amazon Basin, particularly Indigenous communities; women, who make up 70% of the health workforce in the Americas; people of African descent; migrants 1 For further information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, 1 For further information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by , by
Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer. Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
2 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” 2 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” September 1,
2021February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” , at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” September 1,
2021.)February 6, 2022). Data presented by Johns Hopkins reflect COVID-19 cases and deaths as reported by countries worldwide. Data presented by Johns Hopkins reflect COVID-19 cases and deaths as reported by countries worldwide.
3 “Tracking COVID-19 Excess Deaths Across Countries,” 3 “Tracking COVID-19 Excess Deaths Across Countries,” Economist, , August 19, 2021.
February 3, 2022; “Omicron Comes to Mexico, a Place That Never Really Shut Down,” Economist, January 22, 2022. 4 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s 4 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Opening Remarks,” Remarks,” August 25,
2021February 2, 2022. For the most current PAHO weekly press briefing on COVID-19, see https://www.paho.org/en/media/weekly-. For the most current PAHO weekly press briefing on COVID-19, see https://www.paho.org/en/media/weekly-
press-briefing-covid-19-situation-americas. press-briefing-covid-19-situation-americas.
5 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Opening Remarks,” September 1, 2021.
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link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 17 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress in temporary settlements; and prisoners in crowded jails.5 The PAHO director maintains that the virus has deepened inequities that have long divided the region and exposed vulnerabilities in the region’s health, economic, and social sectors.6 Vaccination Progress. The rollout of vaccines in Latin America and the Caribbean has varied considerably. According to PAHO, 63% of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean was fully vaccinated as of February 2, 2022. At the same time, PAHO’s director noted that despite such progress, vaccination remains uneven in the region, with more than one in four people across the Americas having yet to receive a single dose.7 As of February 6, 2022, according to data from Johns Hopkins University, Chile, Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Peru were leaders in the region, with 70%-89% of their populations fully vaccinated. In contrast, seven countries in the region had less than 40% of their populations fully vaccinated. The countries with the lowest vaccination rates were Haiti (less than 1%), Jamaica (21%), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (25%), and St. Lucia (28%) (see Table 1).8 PAHO has helped countries prepare for vaccine rollout and has facilitated access to vaccines through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by global health organizations to facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; 22 countries in the region have signed agreements to access vaccines through the facility. In addition, 10 countries in the region—Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—benefit from the COVID-19 Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) launched by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, to provide donor-funded vaccines for low- and middle-income economies.9 Latin American and Caribbean countries have been acquiring COVID-19 vaccines from various sources. As of early February 2022, PAHO reported that over 100 million doses had been delivered or were in transit to the region through COVAX, with almost 28 million provided through country donations, including from the United States, Spain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.10 Many countries in the region also have signed commercial agreements with pharmaceutical companies. Both China and Russia have sold, and in some cases donated, COVID-19 vaccines to countries throughout the region. Before infections began to surge in India in March 2021, the Indian government donated thousands of doses to Caribbean countries. The United States significantly ramped up its donation of vaccines to the region beginning in June 2021 (see “Biden Administration Policy,” below).11 5 PAHO, “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 19, 2020; Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

groups included those living in the Amazon Basin, particularly Indigenous communities; women,
who make up 70% of the health workforce in the Americas; people of African descent; migrants
in temporary settlements; and prisoners in crowded jails.6 In 2020, PAHO issued an alert urging
countries to intensify efforts to prevent further spread of the virus among Indigenous
communities in the Americas, and urged health authorities to provide better access to healthcare
for populations of African descent in the region disproportionately affected by the pandemic.7 In
April 2021, the PAHO director asserted that “the virus has deepened the inequities that have long
divided this region” and noted that effectively fighting the pandemic “is impossible without
addressing some of these inequalities and supporting the most vulnerable as they struggle to
protect themselves.”8 In July 2021 remarks, the PAHO director again maintained that the
pandemic has exacerbated long-standing inequities within and among countries. She noted that
the pandemic has exposed vulnerabilities in the region’s health, economic, and social sectors and
has heightened disparities by gender, ethnicity, geographic location, access to affordable and
quality health services, food insecurity, and housing.9
Vaccination Progress. The rollout of vaccines in Latin America and the Caribbean has varied
considerably. Most countries in the region are not expected to achieve widespread vaccination
coverage until mid-2022; for some countries, this could be delayed until 2023, making
populations vulnerable to new waves of the virus and to more transmittable variants.10 On
September 1, 2021, PAHO’s director reported that 75% of the Latin American and Caribbean
population had not been fully vaccinated and that more than a third of countries in the region had
“yet to vaccinate 20% of their populations,” with coverage in some countries far below that
level.11 At a press briefing in August, the director asserted that “vaccine inequity remains the
Achilles’ heel of our response” and that “limited vaccine supplies continue to set us back.”12
As of September 1, 2021, according to Johns Hopkins University, Uruguay and Chile were
vaccination-rate leaders in the region, with 72% of their respective populations fully vaccinated
(see Table 1). Other countries with high numbers of COVID-19 deaths that have begun to make
significant progress in vaccination rates include Ecuador (49%), the Dominican Republic and El
Salvador (43%), Panama (38%), Cuba (33%), and Argentina (32%). In contrast, countries with
less than 10% of their populations fully vaccinated include Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and
Haiti, where reportedly less than 0.1% of the country’s population is fully vaccinated.13

6 PAHO, “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release,
May 19, 2020.
7 PAHO, “PAHO Calls on Countries to Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further Spread of COVID-19 Among Indigenous PAHO, “PAHO Calls on Countries to Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further Spread of COVID-19 Among Indigenous
Peoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020; and PAHO, “Countries Urged to Face Challenge of Better Peoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020; and PAHO, “Countries Urged to Face Challenge of Better
Access to Health for Populations of African Descent in COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, December 2, 2020.Access to Health for Populations of African Descent in COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, December 2, 2020.
8 6 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” April 7, 2021 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” April 7, 2021.
9; and PAHO, “Annual Report of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 2020, Director’s Remarks,” July 21, PAHO, “Annual Report of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 2020, Director’s Remarks,” July 21,
2021.
10 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Slow Vaccine Rollouts Raise Risks to Latam’s Recovery,” July 1, 2021, and
“How Much Will Vaccine Inequity Cost?,” August 25, 2021.
11 “2021. 7 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Opening Remarks,” PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Opening Remarks,” September 1, 2021.
12 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” August 25, 2021.
13February 2, 2022. 8 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Vaccination Progress Across the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Vaccination Progress Across the
World,” World,” September 1, 2021February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international. For Cuba and Haiti, the source for
vaccinations is Josh Holder, “Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,” New York Times, (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins, “Vaccination Progress Across the World,” February 6, 2022). 9 The COVAX Facility, “Committee Agreements; Confirmations of Intent to Participate, and AMC-Eligible Countries,” December 15, 2020. 10 PAHO, “Tracker COVAX Initiative—COVID-19 Deliveries in the Region,” February 6, 2022. 11 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” accessed September 1, September 1,
2021, at 2021, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html.
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Table 1. COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Vaccination Progress in Deaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in Latin America and the Caribbean (as of February 6, 2022) Country DeathsLatin America and the
Caribbean (LAC)
(countries with more than 100 deaths, as of September 1, 2021)
Cases
Deaths per
Population Fully
Country
(millions)
Deaths
100,000
Deaths per 100,000 Population Fully Vaccinated (%) Brazil 632,095 299.50 71.44 Mexico 309,417 242.54 60.73 Peru 206,891 636.38 70.61 Colombia 135,518 269.21 63.72 Argentina 122,584 272.78 78.04 Chile 39,930 210.69 89.65 Ecuador 34,533 198.77 76.73 Bolivia 21,129 183.52 46.34 Paraguay 17,558 249.24 44.26 Guatemala 16,495 99.34 32.26 Honduras 10,512 107.86 44.96 Cuba 8,431 74.39 86.85 Panama 7,813 183.99 59.09 Costa Rica 7,641 151.38 72.84 Uruguay 6,625 191.38 77.84 Venezuela 5,481 19.22 47.94 Dominican Republic 4,322 40.25 54.17 El Salvador 3,933 60.94 65.19 Trinidad and Tobago 3,454 247.60 49.79 Jamaica 2,691 91.27 21.31 Suriname 1,279 220.00 40.12 Guyana 1,180 150.75 40.24 Haiti 804 7.14 0.71 Bahamas 749 192.31 38.90 Belize 629 161.14 52.06 Saint Lucia 341 186.55 28.04 Barbados 286 99.64 51.18 Nicaragua 221 3.38 55.03 Grenada 211 188.39 32.84 Antigua and Barbuda 127 130.77 62.15 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 99 89.52 25.29 Dominica 51 71.02 40.60 Saint Kitts and Nevis 37 70.03 48.65 Total LAC* 1,603,067Vaccinated (%)
Brazil
20.777
580,413
275.01
29.10
Mexico
3.352
259,326
203.27
26.59
Peru
2.150
198,263
609.84
25.10
Colombia
4.909
124,945
248.20
29.17
Argentina
5.186
111,812
248.81
32.02
Chile
1.639
36,937
194.90
72.06
Ecuador
0.501
32,244
185.59
49.28
Bolivia
0.491
18,452
160.27
23.04
Paraguay
0.459
15,767
223.82
23.59
Guatemala
0.470
11,926
71.83
7.21
Honduras
0.339
8,850
90.81
13.42
Panama
0.457
7,061
166.28
38.45
Uruguay
0.385
6,032
174.25
72.46
Costa Rica
0.464
5,506
109.08
24.16
Cuba
0.653
5,303
46.79
33.00
Venezuela
0.334
4,010
14.06
11.70
Dominican Republic
0.350
4,008
37.32
43.38
El Salvador
0.094
2,918
45.22
42.74
Jamaica
0.068
1,518
51.49
4.90
Trinidad and Tobago
0.045
1,291
92.55
28.61
Suriname
0.029
721
124.02
23.17
Guyana
0.026
622
79.46
20.57
Haiti
0.021
586
5.20
<0.1
Belize
0.016
362
92.74
16.63
Bahamas
0.018
354
90.89
14.79
Nicaragua
0.012
200
3.06
3.10
St. Lucia
0.008
104
56.90
15.19
Total LAC*
43.265
1,439,648
— —
— —
Sources: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,”
September 1, 2021February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality,; and “Vaccination Progress Across the World,” and “Vaccination Progress Across the World,”
September 1, 2021 Congressional Research Service 4 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international. For , at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international. For Cuba and HaitiSt. Kitts and Nevis, the source for , the source for
vaccinations is vaccinations is Josh Holder, “Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,” New York Times,
September 1, 2021, at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.htmlOur World in Data, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations,” as of February 2, 2022, at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations. .
Notes: Total LAC includes all independent countries in includes all independent countries in the Latin American and Caribbean regionLatin America and the Caribbean (LAC) but not but not
overseas territories. Peru revised its official COVID-19 death toll in May 2021 to account for excess deaths overseas territories. Peru revised its official COVID-19 death toll in May 2021 to account for excess deaths
attributed to attributed to COVID-19 not previously counted, which tripled the country’s reported death toll. In terms of COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing in Latin America, Cuba’s biotech sector has developed and manufactured three vaccines, two Brazilian companies and a partnership between Argentine and Mexican companies have manufactured some vaccines, and two companies from Brazil and Chile announced plans to manufacture vaccines in 2022.12 In August 2021, PAHO announced a program to boost COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing in the region and subsequently selected biomedical centers in Argentina and Brazil to produce the vaccines.13 Political Situation Electoral Practices In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes (ideologically on both the left and the right) governed 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Today, observers consider four countries in the region—Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and most recently Haiti—to be ruled by authoritarian governments.14 Most governments in the region are elected democracies. Nevertheless, although free and fair elections have become the norm in Latin America and the Caribbean, elections for head of government at times have been controversial and contested, including in Honduras (2017) and Venezuela (2018). In 2019, Guatemala held two presidential election rounds that international observers judged successful, but several popular candidates were disqualified from the race for reasons many observers considered dubious.15 In Bolivia, severe irregularities in October 2019 presidential elections ignited protests and violence that led to the resignation of incumbent President Evo Morales, who was seeking a fourth term. New presidential elections in Bolivia were postponed twice in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic but ultimately were held in October.16 Eight Caribbean countries held general elections in 2020. In Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, incumbent governments were returned to power in free and fair elections. In Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname, opposition 12 Dave Graham, “Mexico to Get First Local COVID-19 Vaccines, Share with Argentina,” Reuters News, May 25, 2021; Ludwig Burger and Manas Mishra, “Brazil’s Eurofarma to Make Pfizer COVID-19 Shots for Latin America,” Reuters News, August 26, 2021; Reuters News, “Brazil Vaccination Pace Slows as Production Issues Halt Second Doses,” June 1, 2021; and “China’s Sinovac to Bottle COVID-19 Vaccine in Chile,” La Prensa, August 4, 2021. 13 PAHO, “PAHO Launches New Collaborative Platform to Produce COVID-19 Vaccines in Latin America and the Caribbean,” press release, September 1, 2021; and PAHO, “PAHO Selects Centers in Argentina, Brazil to Develop COVID-19 MRNA Vaccines,” September 21, 2021. 14 See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2021, February 2022 (hereinafter, EIU, Democracy Index 2021), which classifies all four governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021, which classifies Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free based on their poor records on political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House’s report covering developments in 2021 has not yet been released. 15 Sonia Pérez D. and Peter Orsi, “Court Ruling Puts Guatemala Vote, Anti-Graft Fight in Doubt,” AP News, May 16, 2019. 16 See CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections, by Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke. Congressional Research Service 5 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress COVID-19 not previously counted, which tripled the country’s reported death toll.
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PAHO has helped countries prepare for vaccine rollout and has facilitated access to vaccines
through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by
global health organizations to facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; 22
countries in the region have signed agreements to access vaccines through the facility. In addition,
10 countries in the region—Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are eligible to benefit from the
COVID-19 Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) launched by Gavi, the
Vaccine Alliance, to provide donor-funded vaccines for low- and middle-income economies.14
Latin American and Caribbean countries have been acquiring COVID-19 vaccines from a variety
of sources. As of September 1, 2021, PAHO reported that over 36 million doses had been
delivered through COVAX.15 Vaccine deliveries through COVAX have been slower than expected
due to supply problems and other challenges.16 Beyond COVAX, PAHO announced on August 11
that it would use its revolving fund to help Latin American and Caribbean countries procure
additional vaccines.17 Many countries in the region also have signed commercial agreements with
pharmaceutical companies. Both China and Russia have sold, and in some cases donated,
COVID-19 vaccines to countries throughout the region. Before infections began to surge in India
in March 2021, the Indian government donated thousands of doses to Caribbean countries. The
United States significantly ramped up its donation of vaccines to the region beginning in June
2021, providing some 40 million vaccine doses as of late August (see “Biden Administration
Policy” below).18
In terms of COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing in Latin America, Cuba has developed and
currently manufactures two vaccines. On August 25, PAHO announced it would start a program
to boost COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing in Latin America and the Caribbean and was
analyzing about 30 proposals.19 Two Brazilian companies already manufacture some COVID-19
vaccines—AstraZeneca and China’s Sinovac—and another Brazilian company signed an
agreement in August to manufacture the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine in Brazil by 2022.20 In early
August 2021, China’s Sinovac Biotech also announced it would open a manufacturing plant in
Chile in the first half of 2022.21

14 The COVAX Facility, “Committee Agreements; Confirmations of Intent to Participate, and AMC-Eligible
Countries,” December 15, 2020.
15 PAHO, “Tracker COVAX Initiative—COVID-19 Deliveries in the Region,” August 29, 2021.
16 For example, see Benjamin Mueller and Rebecca Robbins, “Where a Vast Global Vaccination Program Went
Wrong,” New York Times, August 2, 2021.
17 PAHO, “PAHO Will Begin Procuring COVID-19 Vaccine to Expand Access in Latin America and the Caribbean,”
press release, August 11, 2021.
18 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” accessed September 1, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
19 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” August 25, 2021; Daniel Politi, “The W.H.O.
Will Address Inequities by Making Vaccines in Latin America,” New York Times, August 25 2021; and PAHO,
“PAHO Launches New Collaborative Platform to Produce COVID-19 Vaccines in Latin America and the Caribbean,”
press release, September 1, 2021.
20 Ludwig Burger and Manas Mishra, “Brazil’s Eurofarma to Make Pfizer COVID-19 Shots for Latin America,”
Reuters News, August 26, 2021; and Reuters News, “Brazil Vaccination Pace Slows as Production Issues Halt Second
Doses,” June 1, 2021.
21 “China’s Sinovac to Bottle COVID-19 Vaccine in Chile,” La Prensa, August 4, 2021.
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Political Situation
In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes (ideologically on both the left and the right) governed 16
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Today, observers consider three countries in the
region—Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—to be ruled by authoritarian governments.22 Most
governments in the region are elected democracies.
Electoral Practices
Although free and fair elections have become the norm in Latin America and the Caribbean,
recent elections for head of government in several countries have been controversial and
contested, including elections in Honduras (2017) and Venezuela (2018). In 2019, Guatemala
held two presidential election rounds that international observers judged successful, but several
popular candidates were disqualified from the race for reasons many observers considered
dubious.23 In Bolivia, severe irregularities in October 2019 presidential elections ignited protests
and violence that led to the resignation of incumbent President Evo Morales, who was seeking a
fourth term. New presidential elections in Bolivia were postponed twice in 2020 because of the
COVID-19 pandemic but ultimately were held in October.
Eight Caribbean countries held general elections in 2020. In Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, incumbent governments were returned to
power in free and fair elections. In Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname, opposition
parties came to power through similarly peaceful
Latin America and the
parties came to power through similarly peaceful democratic means. In contrast, Guyana’s March democratic means. In contrast, Guyana’s March 2020 2020
Caribbean: Scheduled 2021
elections were marred by allegations of fraud; after a elections were marred by allegations of fraud; after a
Elections
recount and multiple legal challenges, final results were recount and multiple legal challenges, final results were
announced in August 2020 and an opposition government announced in August 2020 and an opposition government
took power.
Ecuador
Feb. 7 / April 11

Peru
Apr. 11 / June 6
Eight countries in the region have held or are scheduled
St. Lucia
July 26
to holdtook power.17 In 2021, six Latin American and Caribbean countries held successful free and fair elections for elections for head of governmenthead of government in 2021(see text
Bahamas
Sept. 16
Haiti
Nov. 7 / Jan. 23 (2022)
box). . Ecuador held two presidential rounds in February held two presidential rounds in February
Nicaragua
Nov. 7
and April, electing center-right candidate Guillermo and April, electing center-right candidate Guillermo
Chile
Nov. 21 / Dec. 19
Lasso, inaugurated Lasso, inaugurated onin May May 24..18 Peru held two president held two president
Honduras
Nov. 28
rounds in April and June; in a close election, Peru’s rounds in April and June; in a close election, Peru’s
national electoral court ultimately declared far-left national electoral court ultimately declared far-left
Notes: Elections for head of government.
candidate Pedro Castillo the winner on July 19, and he
Includes first and potential second rounds
was inaugurated on July 28. St. Lucia held parliamentary
for several presidential elections.
candidate Pedro Castillo the winner in July. St. Lucia held parliamentary elections in July in which Philip Pierre of the opposition elections in July in which Philip Pierre of the opposition
St. Lucia Labour Party became prime minister in a landslide election, ousting the conservative St. Lucia Labour Party became prime minister in a landslide election, ousting the conservative
United Workers Party of Allen Chastanet from power after one term. United Workers Party of Allen Chastanet from power after one term. In theThe Bahamas held parliamentary elections in September in which the opposition center-left Progressive Liberal Party, led by Philip Davis, ousted the ruling center-right Free National Movement of the outgoing prime minister in a landslide. In Honduras, Xiomara Castro of the leftist Liberty and Re-foundation Party won a decisive victory in presidential elections in November, alleviating concerns expressed prior to the election that a close race could be marred by a lack of transparency or fraud allegations, as occurred in 2017. In Chile, leftist and former student leader Gabriel Boric won a decisive victory in a second presidential round held in December; Boric is to be inaugurated on March 11, 2022. The November 2021 presidential race in Nicaragua was the regional exception to free and fair elections for head of state in 2021. Ahead of the election, the government of President Daniel Ortega escalated repression by arresting opposition figures and banning major opposition parties from participating in the race, in which Ortega claimed victory for a fifth (and fourth consecutive) term. Latin America and the Caribbean: So far in 2022, Barbados held successful 2022 Elections elections for head of government in which Prime Minister Mia Mottley won a second term Barbados January 19 in another landslide victory, with her Barbados Costa Rica February 6 / April 3 Labour Party winning all 30 seats in the House of Assembly. Costa Rica held a first presidential Colombia May 29 / June 19 round on February 6 and is scheduled to hold a Brazil Oct. 2/ Oct. 30 second in April. In upcoming months, Colombia Haiti TBD and Brazil are scheduled to hold elections. The date of Haiti’s elections have yet to be Notes: Elections for head of government. Includes determined (see text box). first and potential second rounds for presidential elections. Candidates and parties from the political left won most elections held in the region in 2021, a trend that could be repeated in elections in Colombia and Brazil in 2022. This leftward political shift in the region may be less about ideology than about the unpopularity of incumbent leaders and parties seeking reelection amid tough economic conditions as countries struggle to recover from the pandemic. Decline in Democratic Practices Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean still face considerable challenges. In a number of countries, weaknesses remain in the state’s abilities to deliver public services, ensure 17 For background, see CRS In Focus IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan. 18 For background, see CRS In Focus IF11218, Ecuador: An Overview, by June S. Beittel and Rachel L. Martin. Congressional Research Service 6 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Bahamas, Prime
Minister Hubert Minnis of the center-right Free National Movement announced general elections
for September 16, eight months ahead of their constitutional due date, and will compete for power
with the center-left Progressive Liberal Party. In Chile, multiple candidates will vie for the
presidency in presidential elections scheduled for November to replace outgoing center-right

22 See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2020, February 2021 (hereinafter, EIU, Democracy Index
2020), which classifies all three governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and Freedom House,
Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021, which classifies all three governments as not free based on their poor records
on political rights and civil liberties.
23 Sonia Pérez D. and Peter Orsi, “Court Ruling Puts Guatemala Vote, Anti-Graft Fight in Doubt,” AP News, May 16,
2019.
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President Sebastián, who is ineligible to run for a consecutive term; a second round is scheduled
for December if no candidate receives a majority in the first round.
The conduct of elections in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras, all scheduled for November, will be
under close international scrutiny. In Haiti, presidential elections had been scheduled for
September 2021 but, in the aftermath of the July 7 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse (who
had been ruling by decree since January 2020), the elections were moved to November 7, with a
second round scheduled for January 23, 2022. At this juncture, it remains unclear whether Haiti’s
August 14 earthquake will affect the election timetable.24 In Nicaragua, the government of
authoritarian President Daniel Ortega, running for a fifth term, has arrested more than 30
opposition figures and banned the participation of three opposition parties.25 In Honduras, some
analysts are concerned the 2021 election could be marred by a lack of transparency and by fraud
allegations, as occurred in 2017. Political violence also has increased over the past several
months.26
Decline in Democratic Practices
Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean still face considerable challenges. In a number of
countries, weaknesses remain in the state’s abilities to deliver public services, ensure
accountability and transparency, advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. accountability and transparency, advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security.
Numerous elected presidents in the region have left office early amid severe social turmoil, Numerous elected presidents in the region have left office early amid severe social turmoil,
economic crises, or high-profile corruption; in several cases, the presidents’ own autocratic economic crises, or high-profile corruption; in several cases, the presidents’ own autocratic
actions contributed to their ousters. Corruption scandals either caused or contributed to several actions contributed to their ousters. Corruption scandals either caused or contributed to several
presidents’ resignations or removals—Guatemala in 2015, Brazil in 2016, and Peru in 2018. As presidents’ resignations or removals—Guatemala in 2015, Brazil in 2016, and Peru in 2018. As
noted, severe irregularities in the conduct of Bolivia’s October 2019 elections ignited protests that noted, severe irregularities in the conduct of Bolivia’s October 2019 elections ignited protests that
led to the president’s resignation.led to the president’s resignation.
Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several
countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises, raising countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises, raising
concerns among some observers.concerns among some observers.2719 For example, in February 2020 in El Salvador, President For example, in February 2020 in El Salvador, President
Nayib Bukele used the military in what many observers saw as an effort to intimidate the Nayib Bukele used the military in what many observers saw as an effort to intimidate the
country’s legislature into approving an anti-crime bill; the action elicited strong criticism in El country’s legislature into approving an anti-crime bill; the action elicited strong criticism in El
Salvador and abroad.Salvador and abroad.2820
EIU Democracy Index. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) 20202021 democracy index, democracy index,
issued in February issued in February 2021, shows a steady2022, showed a continuous decline in democratic practices in Latin America since decline in democratic practices in Latin America since
2017.2017.2921 Prior to 2017, the EIU viewed Cuba as the only authoritarian regime in the region. Prior to 2017, the EIU viewed Cuba as the only authoritarian regime in the region.
Venezuela joined Cuba’s authoritarian ranks in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government Venezuela joined Cuba’s authoritarian ranks in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government

24 LatinNews, “Devastating Earthquake Compounds Woes,” Weekly Report, August 19, 2021.
25 LatinNews, “Nicaragua: Main Opposition Party Excluded from Elections,” Weekly Report, August 12, 2021.
26 LatinNews, “Honduras: More of the Same?,” Latin American Special Report, January, 2021; LatinNews, “Honduras:
Electoral Concerns Persist Despite New Electoral Reforms,” Security & Strategic Review, June 2021; and LatinNews,
“Honduras: Political Violence Concerns Grow Ahead of Election,” August 26, 2021.
27 See AQ Editors, “Latin America’s 21st-Century Militaries,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 12-72.
28 See Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Armed Forces, Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different—and Worrying,”
Americas Quarterly, February 13, 2020; and Christine Wade, “Bukele’s Politicization of the Military Revives Old
Fears in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, February 12, 2020.
29 EIU, Democracy Index 2020.
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violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua escalated authoritarian practices in 2018
under longtime President Ortega, as the government violently repressed protests.
The downward trend in democratic practices continued in 2020, according to the EIU, largely
driven by the curbing of civil liberties in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and by democratic
regressions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti. In El Salvador, corruption allegations
proliferated under the Bukele government, and the EIU questioned whether Bukele was “a
dictator in the making.”30 In Guatemala, social unrest broke out in November in response to the
government’s attempt to enact an unpopular budget bill. In Haiti, President Moïse has ruled by
decree since 2020 amid protests calling for new electionsviolently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua escalated authoritarian practices in 2018 under longtime President Ortega, as the government violently repressed protests. The EIU added Haiti to the list of authoritarian governments in the aftermath of the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, which left the country virtually bereft of elected officials functioning at any level. The downward trend in democratic practices accelerated in 2021, according to the EIU, with a particularly sharp decline in the region’s commitment to democratic political culture. This reflects widespread dissatisfaction with governments’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, growing skepticism about democratic governments’ ability to address the region’s challenges, and increasing tolerance of authoritarian practices. According to the EIU, the region’s weak commitment to democratic political culture has enabled illiberal populists to thrive, including Presidents Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Despite these and other notable . Despite these and other notable
challenges, the EIU noted that 80% of the region’s population lived under democratic regimes, challenges, the EIU noted that 80% of the region’s population lived under democratic regimes,
scoring below only Western Europe and North America.scoring below only Western Europe and North America.3122
Freedom House. Much like the EIU, Freedom House cited Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as Freedom House cited Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as
not free in its in its 2021 annual report assessing political rights and civil liberties worldwideannual report assessing political rights and civil liberties worldwide in 2020. The . The
report expressed concerns about Cuba’s wave of intimidation against independent journalists and report expressed concerns about Cuba’s wave of intimidation against independent journalists and
dissident artists; Nicaragua’s harsh cybercrime law, which mandated prison sentences for dissident artists; Nicaragua’s harsh cybercrime law, which mandated prison sentences for
spreading “false information” online; and Venezuela’s extrajudicial executions, enforced spreading “false information” online; and Venezuela’s extrajudicial executions, enforced
disappearances, and arbitrary detentions targeting the political opposition.disappearances, and arbitrary detentions targeting the political opposition.3223
Freedom House also spotlighted El Salvador and Peru for democratic backsliding. In Peru, Freedom House also spotlighted El Salvador and Peru for democratic backsliding. In Peru,
Freedom House reported that many considered the grounds for the legislature’s impeachment of a Freedom House reported that many considered the grounds for the legislature’s impeachment of a
19 See AQ Editors, “Latin America’s 21st-Century Militaries,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 12-72. 20 See Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Armed Forces, Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different—and Worrying,” Americas Quarterly, February 13, 2020; and Christine Wade, “Bukele’s Politicization of the Military Revives Old Fears in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, February 12, 2020. 21 EIU, Democracy Index 2021. 22 Ibid. 23 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress popular president to be dubious and saw the action as a blow to anti-corruption efforts. popular president to be dubious and saw the action as a blow to anti-corruption efforts.
Developments in Peru resulted in Freedom House downgrading Peru from classification as a Developments in Peru resulted in Freedom House downgrading Peru from classification as a free
country to a country to a partly free one. Freedom House also classified 10 other countries in the region as one. Freedom House also classified 10 other countries in the region as
partly free: Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, : Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay. In addition, Freedom House reported that Mexico suffers from Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay. In addition, Freedom House reported that Mexico suffers from
severe rule-of-law deficits that limit political rights and civil liberties; it cited organized-crime-severe rule-of-law deficits that limit political rights and civil liberties; it cited organized-crime-
related violence, public corruption, human rights abuses, and rampant impunity as the most related violence, public corruption, human rights abuses, and rampant impunity as the most
visible of Mexico’s governance challenges.visible of Mexico’s governance challenges.3324
Decline in the Quality of and Satisfaction with Democracy. Public satisfaction with how Public satisfaction with how
democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of democracy in Latin America and democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey, the the Caribbean. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey, the
percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries averaged percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries averaged
39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level since the poll began in 2004.39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level since the poll began in 2004.34
25 In the 2021 AmericasBarometer Survey, satisfaction with democracy increased marginally to 43% among 20 countries in the region, still far lower than in 2012, when 57% of the region expressed satisfaction with democracy.26 Several broad political and economic factors appear to be driving the decline in satisfaction with Several broad political and economic factors appear to be driving the decline in satisfaction with
democracy in the region. Political factors include an increase in authoritarian practices, weak democracy in the region. Political factors include an increase in authoritarian practices, weak
democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems, corruption, high levels of crime and democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems, corruption, high levels of crime and
violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence state institutions. Economic factors violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence state institutions. Economic factors
include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates over the past several years; high include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates over the past several years; high
levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries; increased poverty; and the levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries; increased poverty; and the
inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and advancement opportunities, along inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and advancement opportunities, along
with increased pressure on the region’s previously expanding middle class. Given these trends, with increased pressure on the region’s previously expanding middle class. Given these trends,

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021.
33 Ibid.
34 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt
University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019.
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the eruption of social protests in many countries throughout the region in 2019 was unsurprising the eruption of social protests in many countries throughout the region in 2019 was unsurprising
to to mostmany observers, even though in each country a unique set of circumstances sparked the unrest. observers, even though in each country a unique set of circumstances sparked the unrest.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated many of these economic factors, contributing to The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated many of these economic factors, contributing to
increased protests in the region since late 2020. increased protests in the region since late 2020. In 2021, pandemicPandemic-related protests -related protests have erupted erupted
in several in several countriescountries in 2021, notably in Colombia and Brazil. Regional economic decline, along with difficult security and political conditions, has helped fuel increased migration, especially from Central America, but also from other countries, including Haitians who had migrated to South America in the aftermath of the country’s 2010 earthquake. Human rights groups and other observers have expressed concerns about leaders in the region taking advantage of the pandemic to advance their own agendas and limiting civil liberties for political gain.27 24 Ibid. 25 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019. 26 Noam Lupu, Mariana Rodríguez, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, LAPOP, 2021. 27 See, for example, Catharine Christe, Edison Lanza, and Michael Camilleri, COVID-19 and Freedom of Expression in the Americas, Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020; “COVID-19 Triggers Wave of Free Speech Abuse,” Human Rights Watch, February 11, 2021; and “Press Freedom in Latin America Hurt by COVID-19 Response,” Committee to Protect Journalists, June 30, 2021. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 14 link to page 14 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress , notably in Colombia, Cuba, and Brazil. Human rights groups and other
observers have expressed concerns about leaders in the region taking advantage of the pandemic
to advance their own agendas and restrict freedom of expression. The Inter-American Dialogue
published a report in 2020 with the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression at the
Organization of American States (OAS) expressing concern about the criminalization of free
speech related to governments’ responses to the pandemic, restrictions on pandemic-related
reporting, and some leaders’ stigmatization of media organizations for reporting on the
pandemic.35 In Venezuela, according to Human Rights Watch, the government and security forces
have used a state of emergency imposed to curb the spread of the virus as an excuse to crack
down on dissent and intensify their control of the population.36 In December 2020, Human Rights
Watch issued a report providing examples where it asserts the Cuban government has used
regulations designed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to harass and imprison government
opponents.37
Economic Situation
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a significant toll on Latin American and Caribbean The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a significant toll on Latin American and Caribbean
economies. Even before the onset of the pandemic and its economic effects, the region had economies. Even before the onset of the pandemic and its economic effects, the region had
experienced several years of slow economic growth. The IMF experienced several years of slow economic growth. The IMF estimates a 7.0reported a 6.9% economic % economic
contraction for the region in 2020.contraction for the region in 2020.38 Economic recovery may be a protracted process in countries
that rely heavily on global trade and investment.28 Caribbean nations that depend on tourism Caribbean nations that depend on tourism face
had deep economic recessions, several with deep economic recessions, several with estimated gross domestic product declines of more than gross domestic product declines of more than
15% in 2020. Likewise, experts estimate that several South American nations hard-hit by the
pandemic had economic contractions of more than 10% in 2020.
Most countries in the region are projected to begin economic recovery in 2021. The IMF’s most
recent growth forecast of 5.8% for 2021 is fueled by expected growth in Mexico and Brazil, the
region’s two largest economies (see Table 2).39 An important factor in the region’s economic
recovery is the course of the pandemic, including governments’ responses and the availability and
distribution of vaccines. 15% in 2020.29 Many of the region’s countries began some economic recovery in 2021, with the IMF estimating a regional growth rate of 6.8% for the year, ahead of world economic output. Looking ahead, however, the IMF forecasts more modest growth rates of 2.4% in 2022, lower than originally forecast because of the impact of the COVID-19 Omicron variant, and 2.6% in 2023 (see Table 2), lower than projected world growth.30 Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2023 (annual percentage change, constant prices) Regional Average, Two Largest Economies, and 2021 2022 2023 World Output 2019 2020 Estimate Projection Projection Region: Latin America and 0.1 -6.9 6.8 2.4 2.6 the Caribbean Brazil 1.4 -3.9 4.7 0.3 1.6 Mexico -0.2 -8.2 5.3 2.8 2.7 World Output 2.8 -3.1 5.9 4.4 3.8 Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, and World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021. A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries have implemented A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries have implemented
stimulus programs to help protect their economies and vulnerable populations, stimulus programs to help protect their economies and vulnerable populations, butand many many
countries have needed external financing to respond to the pandemic and associated economic countries have needed external financing to respond to the pandemic and associated economic
downturn. In response, international financial institutions have increased lending to countries downturn. In response, international financial institutions have increased lending to countries
throughout the region.
The decline in economic growth in 2020 has throughout the region. An important factor in the region’s economic recovery is the course of the pandemic, including the availability and distribution of vaccines. Economic recovery may be a protracted process in countries that rely heavily on global trade and investment. The decline in economic growth in 2020 exacerbated poverty and income inequality exacerbated poverty and income inequality
throughout Latin America, with concerns that the region’s past development gains could be set throughout Latin America, with concerns that the region’s past development gains could be set
back more than a decade. According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and back more than a decade. According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and

35 Catharine Christe, Edison Lanza, and Michael Camilleri, COVID-19 and Freedom of Expression in the Americas,
Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020.
36 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, January 2021.
37 Human Rights Watch, “Cuba: COVID-19 Rules Used to Intensify Repression,” December 7, 2020.
38the Caribbean (ECLAC), even before the pandemic, the poverty-reduction gains that the region made from 2002 through 2014 had begun to erode. Overall poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.4% of the region’s population in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014 but crept up slowly to 30.5% in 2019, influenced by several years of slow growth.31 With the pandemic-related economic recession 28 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022. 29 IMF, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021, and World Economic Outlook
Update, July 2021.
39Database, October 2021. 30 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022. 31 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021; and Michael Stott, “Poverty Surge Set Latin America Back over a Decade, says UN,” Financial Times, March 4, 2021. The ECLAC study examines poverty and extreme poverty in 18 Latin American countries. As noted in the study, poverty rates differ considerably by country, Congressional Research Service 9 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2021.
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the Caribbean (ECLAC), even before the pandemic, the poverty-reduction gains that the region
made from 2002 through 2014 had begun to erode. Overall poverty in Latin America decreased
from 45.4% of the region’s population in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014 but crept up slowly to 30.5% in
2019, influenced by several years of slow growth and increasing social tensions (including
widespread social protests in 2019). With the pandemic-related economic recession experienced experienced
by most countries in the region in 2020, poverty increased to by most countries in the region in 2020, poverty increased to an estimated 33.733.0%. This accounted %. This accounted
for an estimated for an estimated 209204 million people—an increase of million people—an increase of 2217 million people in poverty from 2019 to 2020. With economic growth rates increasing in 2021, poverty also declined slightly to 32.1%, with an estimated 201 million people in the region living in poverty.32 According to ECLAC, extreme poverty in Latin America increased from 11.3% of the population in 2019 to 13.1% in 2020 and 13.8% in 2021.33 This increase reflected 16 million more people in extreme poverty in 2021 than in 2019, for a total of 86 million people. According to ECLAC, million people in poverty from 2019 to
2020.40
Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2022
(annual percentage change, constant prices)
Regional Average, Three
Largest Economies, and
2020
2021
2022
World Output
2019
Estimate
Projection Projection
Region: Latin America and
0.1
-7.0
5.8
3.2
the Caribbean
Brazil
1.4
-4.1
5.3
1.9
Mexico
-0.2
-8.3
6.3
4.2
Argentina
-2.1
-9.9
6.4
2.4
World Output
2.8
-3.2
6.0
4.9
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2021.
Likewise, according to ECLAC, extreme poverty increased to 12.5% of Latin America’s
population in 2020 from 11.3% in 2019.41 This increase reflected 8 million more people in
extreme poverty in 2020 than in 2019, for a total of 78 million people. According to ECLAC,
estimates of poverty and extreme poverty were estimated to be highest in rural areas as well as poverty and extreme poverty were estimated to be highest in rural areas as well as
among working-age women, indigenous people, among working-age women, indigenous people, the Afro-descendant Afro-descendant populationpopulations, children and , children and
adolescents, people with less education, and single-parent and extended households. adolescents, people with less education, and single-parent and extended households.
The sharp fall in labor income was the main factor in increasing poverty and extreme poverty in Latin America during the pandemic. ECLAC notes, however, that government programs of income transfers to vulnerable populations helped partially offset the fall in income in the region and that poverty figures would have reached higher levels without such transfers.34 U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political, U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political,
security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages
between the United States and the region, and the United States is a major trading partner and between the United States and the region, and the United States is a major trading partner and
source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade
agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. In agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. In
addition, the Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and addition, the Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and

40 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021; and Michael Stott, “Poverty Surge Set Latin
America Back over a Decade, says UN,” Financial Times, March 4, 2021. The ECLAC study examines poverty and
extreme poverty in 18 Latin American countries. As noted in the study, poverty rates differ considerably by country,
with Uruguay having the lowest poverty rate in the region, just over 5%, and Honduras, the highest, over 58%.
41 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021. As noted, the ECLAC study examines extreme
poverty in 18 Latin American countries. The United Nations defines extreme poverty as living on less than $1.90 day,
struggling to fulfill basic needs such as health and education. See United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals,
“Goal 1, End Poverty in all its forms everywhere,” at https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/.
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irregular; geographic proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving irregular; geographic proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving
migration trends. migration trends.
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component
of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for over 50 years. The flow of of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for over 50 years. The flow of
illicit drugs—including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine from illicit drugs—including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine from
Colombia—poses risks to U.S. public health and safety, and the trafficking of such drugs has Colombia—poses risks to U.S. public health and safety, and the trafficking of such drugs has
contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States. Since 2000, Colombia has contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States. Since 2000, Colombia has
received U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombiareceived U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In and its successor programs. In
addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought to forge close partnerships with other addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought to forge close partnerships with other
countries in the region to combat drug trafficking and related violence and to advance citizen countries in the region to combat drug trafficking and related violence and to advance citizen
security. These efforts include the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007 to support Mexico; the Central security. These efforts include the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007 to support Mexico; the Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin Security America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009. Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009.
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy Another long-standing component of U.S. policy, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has been support for strengthened democratic has been support for strengthened democratic
governance and the rule of law. As described in the previous section, although many countries in governance and the rule of law. As described in the previous section, although many countries in
the region have made enormous strides in terms of the region have made enormous strides in terms of with Uruguay having the lowest poverty rate in the region, just over 5%, and Honduras, the highest, over 58%. 32 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022. 33 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021. As noted, the ECLAC study examines extreme poverty in 18 Latin American countries. The United Nations defines extreme poverty as living on less than $1.90 day, struggling to fulfill basic needs such as health and education. See United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, “Goal 1, End Poverty in all its forms everywhere,” at https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/. 34 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress democratic political development, several face democratic political development, several face
considerable challenges. considerable challenges. Current U.S.-democracy promotion efforts include U.S. policy has long supported democracy-promotion efforts, including
initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and promoting the rule of law and human rights. initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and promoting the rule of law and human rights.
Trump Administration Policy
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean generally Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean generally
moved toward a more confrontational approach, especially regarding efforts to curb irregular moved toward a more confrontational approach, especially regarding efforts to curb irregular
immigration from the region, compared with past Administrations’ emphasis on partnership. In immigration from the region, compared with past Administrations’ emphasis on partnership. In
2018, the State Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on 2018, the State Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on
three pillars for engagement—economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic three pillars for engagement—economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic
governance. The framework reflected continuity with long-standing regional U.S. policy governance. The framework reflected continuity with long-standing regional U.S. policy
priorities but at times appeared to be at odds with the Administration’s occasionally antagonistic priorities but at times appeared to be at odds with the Administration’s occasionally antagonistic
actions and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign aid. In 2020, the White House also set actions and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign aid. In 2020, the White House also set
forth a strategic framework for the Western Hemisphere that included the prevention of illegal forth a strategic framework for the Western Hemisphere that included the prevention of illegal
and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and trafficking as its first line of effort in the and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and trafficking as its first line of effort in the
region.region.4235 According to Gallup and Pew Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. leadership According to Gallup and Pew Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. leadership
in the region increased markedly during the Trump Administration.in the region increased markedly during the Trump Administration.4336
On trade issues, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific On trade issues, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) FTA in 2017. As negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, the TPP Partnership (TPP) FTA in 2017. As negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, the TPP
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, which were parties would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, which were parties
to the agreement. The President also strongly criticized the North American Free Trade to the agreement. The President also strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, threatened U.S. withdrawal, and initiated Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, threatened U.S. withdrawal, and initiated
renegotiations. The three countries agreed in 2018 to the United States-Mexico-Canada renegotiations. The three countries agreed in 2018 to the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force July 1, 2020; the agreement retained many of Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force July 1, 2020; the agreement retained many of
NAFTA’s provisions but included modernizing updates and changes. Before approval, the NAFTA’s provisions but included modernizing updates and changes. Before approval, the
agreement was amended to address congressional concerns regarding labor, the environment, agreement was amended to address congressional concerns regarding labor, the environment,
dispute settlement, and intellectual property rights. dispute settlement, and intellectual property rights.

42 White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August 2020;
and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,” Miami
Herald, August 16, 2020.
43 Gallup, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; and Pew Research Center,
“Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” January 8, 2020.
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From FY2018 to FY2021, the Trump Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for the From FY2018 to FY2021, the Trump Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for the
region would have cut assistance considerably, but Congress rejected those proposals by region would have cut assistance considerably, but Congress rejected those proposals by
providing significantly more assistance than requested. In 2019, the Trump Administration providing significantly more assistance than requested. In 2019, the Trump Administration
withheld some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of Central America—El Salvador, withheld some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of Central America—El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—in an attempt to compel their governments to curb the flow of Guatemala, and Honduras—in an attempt to compel their governments to curb the flow of
migrants to the United States. migrants to the United States.
During the Trump Administration, vehement anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration actions that During the Trump Administration, vehement anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration actions that
shifted the burdens of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to Mexico tested U.S. relations shifted the burdens of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to Mexico tested U.S. relations
with Mexico and Central America. In 2017, the Administration announced it would end Deferred with Mexico and Central America. In 2017, the Administration announced it would end Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program begun in 2012 that provides relief from Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program begun in 2012 that provides relief from
deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children; federal court challenges led to a June deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children; federal court challenges led to a June
2020 Supreme Court decision vacating the Administration’s recession of DACA. The 2020 Supreme Court decision vacating the Administration’s recession of DACA. The
Administration also announced in 2017 that it would terminate temporary protected status (TPS) Administration also announced in 2017 that it would terminate temporary protected status (TPS)
designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court challenges put the designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court challenges put the
35 White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August 2020; and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,” Miami Herald, August 16, 2020. 36 Gallup, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; and Pew Research Center, “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” January 8, 2020. Congressional Research Service 11 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress terminations on hold. In 2018, Mexico’s president agreed to allow the United States to return terminations on hold. In 2018, Mexico’s president agreed to allow the United States to return
certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions. certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions.
The Trump Administration used various policy tools to deter increased unauthorized migration The Trump Administration used various policy tools to deter increased unauthorized migration
from Central America. In addition to aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on from Central America. In addition to aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on
remittances, these tools included controversial asylum cooperative agreementsremittances, these tools included controversial asylum cooperative agreements with Guatemala, with Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from third El Salvador, and Honduras to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from third
countries to the Northern Triangle countries. At the end of 2020, Congress enacted the United countries to the Northern Triangle countries. At the end of 2020, Congress enacted the United
States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260; Division FF, Title III, Subtitle States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260; Division FF, Title III, Subtitle
F), requiring the State Department to develop a five-year strategy to advance economic F), requiring the State Department to develop a five-year strategy to advance economic
prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security
conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
As the situation in Venezuela deteriorated under President Maduro, the Trump Administration As the situation in Venezuela deteriorated under President Maduro, the Trump Administration
imposed numerous broader financial sanctions, including sanctions against the state oil company, imposed numerous broader financial sanctions, including sanctions against the state oil company,
the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration recognized the head of the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration recognized the head of
Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. The Administration also Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. The Administration also
provided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who fled to other countries, provided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who fled to other countries,
especially Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. Congress largely supported the especially Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. Congress largely supported the
Administration’s policy approach toward Venezuela; in December 2019, it enacted the Venezuela Administration’s policy approach toward Venezuela; in December 2019, it enacted the Venezuela
Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-94, Division Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-94, Division
J), which, among its provisions, codified several sanctions and authorized humanitarian J), which, among its provisions, codified several sanctions and authorized humanitarian
assistance. assistance.
On Cuba, the Trump Administration reversed the engagement policy advanced during the Obama On Cuba, the Trump Administration reversed the engagement policy advanced during the Obama
Administration and imposed numerous economic sanctions on Cuba for its poor human rights Administration and imposed numerous economic sanctions on Cuba for its poor human rights
record and its support for the Maduro government in Venezuela. In January 2021, the Secretary of record and its support for the Maduro government in Venezuela. In January 2021, the Secretary of
State designated the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international terrorism. State designated the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international terrorism.
On climate change issues, in June 2017, President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from On climate change issues, in June 2017, President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement, an international accord to address climate change. Withdrawal took effect in the Paris Agreement, an international accord to address climate change. Withdrawal took effect in
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November 2020.44November 2020.37 Securing a clean energy future had been a key priority in U.S. policy toward Securing a clean energy future had been a key priority in U.S. policy toward
Latin America and the Caribbean under the Obama Administration.Latin America and the Caribbean under the Obama Administration.4538
Biden Administration Policy
During the 2020 election campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that his policy toward Latin During the 2020 election campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that his policy toward Latin
America and the Caribbean would be very different from the Trump Administration’s approach. America and the Caribbean would be very different from the Trump Administration’s approach.
He vowed “to rebuild strong hemispheric ties based on respect for democracy, human rights, and He vowed “to rebuild strong hemispheric ties based on respect for democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law” when the United States hosts the next Summit of the Americas (the rule of law” when the United States hosts the next Summit of the Americas (expected in
summer 2022).46now scheduled for June 2022 in Los Angeles, CA).39 He promised to “do away with the Trump Administration’s draconian He promised to “do away with the Trump Administration’s draconian
immigration policies and galvanize international action to address the poverty and insecurity immigration policies and galvanize international action to address the poverty and insecurity
driving migrants” from Central America’s Northern Triangle, including by developing driving migrants” from Central America’s Northern Triangle, including by developing an
assistance strategy for the region.47 On Venezuela, Biden said, “the overriding goal in Venezuela
must be to press for a democratic outcome through free and fair elections, and to help the
Venezuelan people rebuild their country.”48 On Cuba, Biden maintained that he would reverse the
“failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance
democracy and human rights.”49
In the Biden Administration’s initial months, much of its focus in the region was on immigration
and Central America. President Biden took executive actions revising some of the Trump
Administration’s restrictive immigration policies, while at the same time contending with a large
increase in the number of undocumented Central American and Mexican migrants seeking to
enter the United States. The President proposed comprehensive immigration legislation to
Congress; among its provisions, this legislation would provide a pathway to citizenship for those
with DACA and TPS status and would authorize a multiyear assistance program to address the
root causes of migration from Central America. Vice President Kamala Harris, whom President
Biden tasked with overseeing diplomatic engagement with Central America and Mexico, visited
Guatemala, Mexico, and the Southwest border in June. In July 2021, the Administration released
two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and
to collaboratively manage migration in the region. (See “Migration Issues” and “Central
America’s Northern Triangle.”)
The 37 See CRS In Focus IF10668, Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett. 38 For background on climate change issues in U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Obama Administration, see the section on “Climate Change and Clean Energy” in CRS Report R43882, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan. 39 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century,” at https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/. Congressional Research Service 12 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress an assistance strategy for the region.40 On Venezuela, Biden said, “the overriding goal in Venezuela must be to press for a democratic outcome through free and fair elections, and to help the Venezuelan people rebuild their country.”41 On Cuba, Biden maintained that he would reverse the “failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.”42 The Biden Administration’s early broad foreign policy objectives and outlook for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the broad foreign policy objectives and outlook for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean Caribbean appear in the Administration’sappeared in its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, issued by , issued by
the White House in early March 2021, and in Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s March 2021 the White House in early March 2021, and in Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s March 2021
address on U.S. foreign policy. President Biden’s interim guidance, which provides broad foreign address on U.S. foreign policy. President Biden’s interim guidance, which provides broad foreign
policy direction to U.S. agencies and departments, maintained that his policy direction to U.S. agencies and departments, maintained that his Administration would expand engagement throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with Canada and Mexico, “Administration would
“expand U.S. engagement and partnerships throughout the Western Hemisphere—and especially

44 See CRS In Focus IF10668, Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
45 For background on climate change issues in U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Obama Administration, see
the section on “Climate Change and Clean Energy” in CRS Report R43882, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key
Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
46 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet the
Challenges of the 21st Century,” at https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/.
47 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “The Biden Plan to Build Security and Prosperity with the
People of Central America,” at https://joebiden.com/centralamerica/.
48 Americas Quarterly, “Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America,” March 2, 2020 (updated October 29,
2020), at https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/.
49 Ibid.
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with Canada and Mexico—based on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment based on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment
to economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.” This effortto economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.” This effort would include, according , according
to the interim guidance, to the interim guidance, “includes working with Congress to provide Central America with $4 billion working with Congress to provide Central America with $4 billion in foreign assistance over over
four years, and taking other steps four years, and taking other steps “to address the root causes of human insecurity and irregular to address the root causes of human insecurity and irregular
migration, including poverty, criminal violence, and corruption.” The migration, including poverty, criminal violence, and corruption.” The interim guidance also guidance also
maintained that the Administration would maintained that the Administration would “cooperate to confront the regional effects of climate cooperate to confront the regional effects of climate
change, change, while helping our neighbors invest inand help support good governance and democratic institutions good governance and democratic institutions.”50 in the region.43
Many of the foreign policy priorities laid out in Secretary Blinken’s March 2021 speech are Many of the foreign policy priorities laid out in Secretary Blinken’s March 2021 speech are
relevant to relevant to areas of U.S. relations with the region. These priorities include stopping the COVID-19 U.S. relations with the region. These priorities include stopping the COVID-19
pandemic and strengthening global health security; turning around the economic crisis and pandemic and strengthening global health security; turning around the economic crisis and
building a more stable, inclusive global economy; renewing democracy, to counter rising building a more stable, inclusive global economy; renewing democracy, to counter rising
authoritarianism and nationalism around the world; creating a humane and effective immigration authoritarianism and nationalism around the world; creating a humane and effective immigration
system and addressing the root causes of migrationsystem and addressing the root causes of migration that drive so many people to flee their homes;
; revitalizing ties with allies and partners; and tackling the climate crisis and driving a green energy revitalizing ties with allies and partners; and tackling the climate crisis and driving a green energy
revolution.revolution.51
The Biden Administration has reincorporated climate concerns into the U.S. policy approach
toward Latin America and the Caribbean.52 The Administration invited seven Latin American and
Caribbean heads of government to attend the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit on Climate.53 The
summit sought to build support among the world’s leading economies to adopt more ambitious
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in advance of the U.N. Climate Change Conference
scheduled to be held in Glasgow in November. Globally, Latin America and the Caribbean is
considered to face the second-greatest vulnerability from climate change, as a result of the
region’s high rates of urbanization, its vulnerability to extreme weather events affecting tourism
and agriculture, and some countries’ high levels of dependence on petroleum exports and carbon-
intensive industries.
The Biden 44 Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols echoed these priorities in November 2021 congressional testimony. He discussed the Administration’s efforts to promote public health and economic recovery from the pandemic in the Americas; to bolster the hemisphere’s commitment to inclusive democracy; to work with partners to promote democracy in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela; and to address irregular migration and its root causes. According to Nichols, the Administration “seeks to promote a more inclusive, green, secure, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere aligned with U.S. values and interests.”45 The Administration’s FY2022 budget request for foreign assistance to Latin America and Administration’s FY2022 budget request for foreign assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean amounts to almost $2.1 billion, nearly 16% over estimated FY2021 appropriations. the Caribbean amounts to almost $2.1 billion, nearly 16% over estimated FY2021 appropriations.
The FY2022 request includes almost $861 million for Central America, funding the first year of The FY2022 request includes almost $861 million for Central America, funding the first year of
the Administration’s plans to address the root causes of irregular migration. (See “U.S. Foreign
Aid.”)
With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Administration has committed to providing 580
million vaccines doses globally through mid-2022, including to Latin American and Caribbean
countries, through multilateral mechanisms and bilaterally. To date, the United States has
provided almost $218 million in assistance to support the region’s pandemic response and has
donated almost 40 million vaccine doses to 26 countries in the region, both bilaterally and
through COVAX.54 Top recipients of U.S. vaccine doses in the region include Colombia

50 40 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “The Biden Plan to Build Security and Prosperity with the People of Central America,” at https://joebiden.com/centralamerica/. 41 Americas Quarterly, “Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America,” March 2, 2020 (updated October 29, 2020), at https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/. 42 Ibid. 43 White House, President Joseph R. Biden Jr, White House, President Joseph R. Biden Jr, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, at , March 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
5144 U.S. Department of States, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” U.S. Department of States, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,”
speech, March 3, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/. speech, March 3, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.
52 Under the Biden Administration, the United States also rejoined the Paris Agreement in February 2021, reversing the
Trump Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. See CRS In Focus IF11746, United
States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for Congress, by Jane A. Leggett.
53 The seven leaders were from Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico.
5445 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, November 16, 2021 (hereinafter, Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021). Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 56 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress the Administration’s plans to address the root causes of irregular migration. (See “U.S. Foreign Aid.”) COVID-19 Pandemic. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Administration has committed to providing over 1.2 billion vaccines doses globally, including to Latin American and Caribbean countries, through multilateral mechanisms and bilaterally. As of late January 2022, the United States had delivered over 60 million vaccine doses to 29 Latin American and Caribbean countries, both bilaterally and through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility.46 In addition to vaccine donations, the State Department and the U.S. Agency U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as of mid-November 2021, have provided more than $614 million in COVID-19 supplemental (P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136) and American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2) funding to help countries respond to the pandemic, including technical assistance to support vaccine roll-out, case management, and oxygen access.47 Democracy. During an October 2021 visit to Ecuador, Secretary of State Blinken addressed concerns about the state of democracy in the Americas. Secretary Blinken noted how the pandemic has exacerbated economic inequities in the region and contributed to an increase in dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. Blinken focused his remarks on three major challenges and approaches to help make democracy work: (1) more effectively fight corruption by strengthening existing, and developing new, anti-corruption tools; (2) improve civilian security by taking a more holistic approach that deals with the root causes of crime and violence; and (3) tackle economic and social challenges such as bolstering labor standards, expanding access to adequate education and health, and providing more inclusive opportunities.48 President Biden highlighted many of those same themes, as well as the need to defend against authoritarianism and respect human rights, during the December 2021 global Summit for Democracy, in which 25 governments from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as various civil society activists, were invited to participate virtually.49 for International Development (USAID), “COVID-19 – Latin American and the Caribbean Response,
Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2021, June 29, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations,
Western Hemisphere,” August 29, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
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(6 million), Mexico (5.8 million), Guatemala (4.5 million), Argentina (3.5 million), Brazil
(3 million), Honduras (3 million), El Salvador (3 million), Paraguay (2 million), Peru (2 million),
Ecuador (2 million), and Bolivia (1 million).55
On the Venezuela policy challenge, the Biden Administration is continuing to pressure the On the Venezuela policy challenge, the Biden Administration is continuing to pressure the
Maduro government through economic sanctions and providing humanitarian support to Maduro government through economic sanctions and providing humanitarian support to
Venezuelans both inside and outside the country. In a shift from the Trump Administration, in Venezuelans both inside and outside the country. In a shift from the Trump Administration, in
March 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security granted TPS to Venezuelans already in the March 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security granted TPS to Venezuelans already in the
United States. The United States. The Biden Administration alsoAdministration maintains it is committed to maintains it is committed to “robust multilateralism robust multilateralism
aimed at increasing pressure on Venezuela in a coordinated fashion aimed at increasing pressure on Venezuela in a coordinated fashion makingto make clear that the only clear that the only
outcome of this crisisoutcome is negotiation that leads to a democratic solution. is negotiation that leads to a democratic solution.”56 (See “Venezuela.”)
On Cuba, the Biden Administration has not taken action to reverse policies from the previous
Administration. Officials have stated that the Administration is committed to carefully reviewing
past policy decisions, including the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor terrorism. The
Administration maintains that human rights will be a pillar of its policy toward Cuba.57 In the
aftermath of the Cuban government’s suppression of mass protests on July 11, 2021, the Biden
Administration expressed solidarity with the protesters and took several actions, including the
imposition of targeted sanctions against the Cuban security officials and entities involved (see
“Cuba”).
On Nicaragua, the Biden Administration imposed targeted sanctions on several Nicaraguan
officials in response to its arbitrary detentions of opposition leaders. Secretary of State Blinken
asserted in early August 2021 that Nicaragua’s electoral process “has lost all credibility.” 58 (See
“Nicaragua.”)
In the aftermath of the July 7, 2021, assassination of Haitian President Jovenal Moïse, the United
States provided assistance to support the Haitian authorities in conducting an investigation into
the attack and expressed support for continued security assistance, elections assistance, and health
and humanitarian assistance.59 In a July 22 call with new Haitian Prime Minister Dr. Ariel Henry,
Secretary of State Blinken underscored the need to establish conditions necessary for Haitians to
vote in free and fair legislative and presidential elections as soon as possible.60 Following an
August 14, 2021, earthquake in Haiti that resulted in at least 2,207 deaths, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) deployed a disaster response team, with the support of U.S.
military transportation assets, and announced $32 million in humanitarian assistance.61 (See
“Haiti.”)

55 Chase Harrison, “Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas,
August 24, 2021, at https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracker-us-vaccine-donations-latin-america.
56 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela,” press briefing,
March 8, 2021.
57 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National
Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021.
58 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “The Lack of Prospects for Free and Fair Election in
Nicaragua,” press statement, August 7, 2021.
59 White House, “Fact Sheet, U.S. Assistance to Haiti,” July 13, 2021.
60 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Haitian Prime Minister Henry,” readout, July 22, 2021.
61 USAID, “Haiti Earthquake, Fact Sheet #8, FY2021,” August 26, 2021.
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50 Assistant Secretary of State Nichols stated in congressional testimony in November 2021 that the Administration supported negotiations between the Venezuelan opposition and the Maduro regime but noted that it would review U.S. sanctions policies only if the parties make meaningful progress.51 (See “Venezuela,” below.) 46 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated January 26, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/ (this website does not note U.S. vaccine donations to the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago). 47 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021. Also see U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “COVID-19 – Latin American and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2021, October 2021. 48 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Making Democracy Deliver for the Americas,” speech, October 20, 2021. 49 White House, “Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings,” December 23, 2021. 50 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela,” press briefing, March 8, 2021. 51 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 49 link to page 38 link to page 41 link to page 26 link to page 46 link to page 46 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress On Nicaragua, the Administration has used targeted sanctions in response to the antidemocratic actions of the Ortega government and has worked multilaterally to increase international pressure against the Nicaraguan government, including at the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations. (See “Nicaragua,” below.) On Cuba, the Biden Administration in its initial months announced it would review policy decisions made in the prior Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.52 As the human rights situation in Cuba has deteriorated, the Administration has not taken action to reverse policies from the Trump Administration, but has imposed targeted sanctions against Cubans officials involved in the government’s repression against peaceful protesters.53 (Also see “Cuba,” below.) Since mid-2021, the situation in Haiti—with a presidential assassination, a surge in gang violence, and an earthquake—has provided considerable challenges for the Biden Administration. The United States remains the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Haiti. Assistant Secretary of State Nichols testified to Congress in November that although the “Haitian people will determine a timeline for their election,” the United States is working “to support conditions for free and fair elections,” including by providing support to help restore security and address gang violence.54 (Also see “Haiti,” below.) Migration. In the Biden Administration’s initial months, much of its focus in the region was on immigration from Central America. President Biden took executive actions revising some of the Trump Administration’s restrictive immigration policies, but maintained certain COVID-19-related immigration restrictions while contending with a large increase in the number of undocumented Central American and Mexican migrants seeking to enter the United States. Vice President Kamala Harris, whom President Biden tasked with overseeing diplomatic engagement with Central America and Mexico, visited Guatemala, Mexico, and the Southwest border in June. In July 2021, the Administration released two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and to collaboratively manage migration in the region. The Administration subsequently broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-driven economic downturn contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere. Secretary Blinken traveled to Colombia in October 2021 for a Migration Ministerial with the foreign ministers of 16 other Western Hemisphere countries to address regional cooperation regarding irregular migration. (Also see “Migration Issues” and “Central America’s Northern Triangle” below.) Climate Change. The Biden Administration has reincorporated climate change concerns into the U.S. policy approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean.55 The Administration invited seven Latin American and Caribbean heads of government to attend the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit on Climate.56 The summit sought to build support among the world’s leading economies to adopt more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in advance of the U.N. 52 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021. 53 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Visa Restrictions Against Cuban Officials,” press statement, November 30, 2021, and “Visa Restrictions Against Cuban Officials,” press statement, January 6, 2022. 54 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021. 55 Under the Biden Administration, the United States also rejoined the Paris Agreement in February 2021, reversing the Trump Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. See CRS In Focus IF11746, United States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for Congress, by Jane A. Leggett. 56 The seven leaders were from Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico. Congressional Research Service 15 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Climate Change Conference (COP26) in November. In September 2021, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry participated in a virtual High-Level Dialogue on Climate Action in the Americas hosted by Argentina designed to build momentum for climate action in the region ahead of COP26.
Legislative Action in the 117th Congress
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to
the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap, the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap,
particularly in particularly in the areas of immigration and trade. areas of immigration and trade.
Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions Since 2020, Congress has appropriated some $17 billion in international affairs funding to Since 2020, Congress has appropriated some $17 billion in international affairs funding to
respond to COVID-19 globally. In the 117th Congress, this funding included $10.8 billion respond to COVID-19 globally. In the 117th Congress, this funding included $10.8 billion
appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), enacted in March 2021. The appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), enacted in March 2021. The
funding has supported contributions to multilateral efforts and health interventionsfunding has supported contributions to multilateral efforts and health interventions and
humanitarian assistance, humanitarian assistance, and donation of COVID-19 vaccine doses worldwide, including to Latin America and the Caribbean. worldwide, including to Latin America and the Caribbean.
In In March 2021, the House approved H.R. 6, which would provide a pathway to citizenship for
those brought to the United States as children and those from countries with TPS designations
(currently including El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). A comprehensive
immigration bill, the U.S. Citizenship Act (S. 348/H.R. 1177), was introduced in the Senate and
the House, respectively, in February and April 2021 on behalf of the Biden Administration; the
bill would a provide a pathway to citizenship for certain migrants and would authorize $4 billion
over four years to address the root causes of migration from Central America.
In June 2021, the Senate passed S. 1260, the United States Innovation and Competition Act of
2021, which seeks to improve the United States’ ability to compete with China worldwide. As
approved, the bill included numerous Latin America and Caribbean provisions (which had
originated in S. 1169, reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2021). These
provisions would require a strategy to increase the export of U.S. goods and services to the
region; another strategy to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and promote good
governance, human rights, and the rule of law; a report assessing China’s engagement in
international organizations and the defense sector in the region. They also would authorize a
capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (another introduced measure, S.
616, also would authorize an IDB capital increase); support U.S. defense cooperation; and
increase engagement with civil society regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of
pervasive surveillance technologies.
In the House, H.R. 3524, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act
(EAGLE Act), ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2021, has some
of the same Latin America and Caribbean provisions found in S. 1260 but includes two additional
provisions to strengthen U.S. engagement with the Caribbean. One section would require the
Administration to submit to Congress a multiyear strategy to promote regional cooperation with
the Caribbean on energy issues as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (a similar
provision also was included in S. 1201). Another provision would authorize assistance for the
U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership from FY2022 to FY2024 and would require the
Administration to submit to Congress a multiyear strategy aimed at helping Caribbean countries
increase resilience and adapt to both natural disasters and the impacts of severe weather events
and a changing environment.
In June 2021, the House passed H.R. 2471, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and
Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, which would promote the sustainable rebuilding and
development of Haiti and would prioritize U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human
rights. A similar Senate bill, S. 1104, was introduced in April.
November 2021, Congress completed action on the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021, or the RENACER Act (S. 1064, P.L. 117-54). Among its provisions, the measure directed the U.S. government to use its diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions to advance democratic elections and combat corruption. Prior to the bill’s passage, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had ordered reported a similar, although not identical, measure (H.R. 2946) in July 2021, and the Senate had approved S. 1041, amended, in August 2021. In December 2021, Congress completed action on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), which includes several provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean.  Section 1007 extended authority to support a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia.  Section 1035 extended a prohibition on the use of funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Section 1205 provided temporary authority to obligate or expend not more than $2 million in FY2022 to pay for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign national security forces participating in the training program of the United Sates-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security.  Section 1206 required the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a security cooperation strategy for certain combatant commands, including the U.S. Southern Command.  Section 1336 extended a certification requirement for the transfer of vehicles by the Department of Defense (DOD) to Guatemala during FY2022 and required a series of reports (by the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller General, and a federally funded research and development center) on U.S. security cooperation with the Northern Triangle countries. Congressional Research Service 16 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress  Section 1337 required a report, within 180 days, from the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State on the security cooperation relationship between the United States and Colombia and activities focused on human rights and the rule of law.  Section 1338 required a report by June 30, 2022, from the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies, on efforts by China to expand its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. To date, the House and Senate have approved several resolutions on U.S. relations with the region. On the human rights situation in Cuba, the House approved H.Res. 760 in November 2021 and the Senate approved S.Res. 310 in August 2021, both expressing solidarity with Cuban citizens demonstrating peacefully for fundamental freedoms, condemning the Cuban regime’s acts of repression, and calling for the immediate release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. Also on Cuba, the Senate approved S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the San Isidro Movement, a Cuban civil society protest group, S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a women-led nonviolent Cuban human rights group, and S.Res. 489 in January 2022, commending Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists, including José Daniel Ferrer Garcia. Among other resolutions, the Senate passed S.Res. 22 in April 2021, reaffirming the U.S. partnership with Ecuador, and S.Res. 120 in May 2021, recognizing the forthcoming Summit of the Americas and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to a more prosperous, secure, and democratic Western Hemisphere. Pending Congressional Action FY2022 Foreign Aid Appropriations. Congress has not completed action on an FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure. In July 2021, the House approved its version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and In July 2021, the House approved its version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84). As passed, the bill Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84). As passed, the bill
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would provide assistance to several key countries and programs in the region for FY2022 at would provide assistance to several key countries and programs in the region for FY2022 at
levels either matching or exceeding the Administration’s budget request, including assistance to levels either matching or exceeding the Administration’s budget request, including assistance to
Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and regional assistance to the Caribbean. The Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and regional assistance to the Caribbean. The report to the
bill includedSenate Appropriations Committee introduced its version (S. 3075) in October 2021. The Senate committee bill and its draft explanatory statement would provide slightly more assistance than requested for Colombia and the Caribbean but over $200 million less than that requested for Central America. Both the report to the House bill and the draft explanatory statement to the Senate committee bill include numerous directives, recommendations, and reporting requirements for the numerous directives, recommendations, and reporting requirements for the
Administration regarding U.S. assistance to, and policy toward, Latin American and Caribbean Administration regarding U.S. assistance to, and policy toward, Latin American and Caribbean
countries.
In Augustcountries. Competition With China. Both houses have approved broad bills aimed at positioning the United States to better compete with China, both of which include numerous provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean. Both houses will be conferencing on the two bills. In June 2021, the Senate passed S. 2021, the Senate passed S. 1041 the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions
for Electoral Reform Act of 2021 (RENACER Act). Among its provisions, the bill would direct
the U.S. government to use its diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions to support the realization of
free, fair, and transparent elections in Nicaragua. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs
ordered reported a similar, although not identical, measure (H.R. 2946) in July.
To date, the Senate has approved five resolutions on U.S. relations with the region. In April, the
Senate passed S.Res. 22, reaffirming the U.S. partnership with Ecuador, and S.Res. 37, expressing
solidarity with the San Isidro Movement, a Cuban civil society protest group. In May, the Senate
passed S.Res. 81, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a women-led nonviolent Cuban human rights
group, and S.Res. 120, recognizing the forthcoming Summit of the Americas and reaffirming the
U.S. commitment to a more prosperous, secure, and democratic Western Hemisphere. In August,
the Senate passed S.Res. 310, expressing solidarity with Cubans demonstrating peacefully,
condemning the Cuban government’s repression, and calling for the release of those detained. (In
July, the Senate also 1260, the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, which seeks to improve the United States’ ability to compete with China worldwide. Among its Latin America and Caribbean provisions, the bill would require strategies to increase exports of U.S. goods and services and to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in the region. It also would require a report assessing China’s engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean; authorize a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); support U.S. defense cooperation; and increase engagement with civil society regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies. Congressional Research Service 17 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress On February 4, 2022, the House approved H.R. 4521, the America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology, and Economic Strength Act of 2022 (America COMPETES Act of 2022).57 The bill includes most of the Latin America and Caribbean provisions found in S. 1260, with the exceptions of the capital increase for the IDB and the requirement for a strategy to increase to increase exports of U.S. goods and services to the region, but includes two additional provisions to strengthen U.S. engagement with the Caribbean. One provision would require the Administration to submit to Congress a multiyear strategy to promote regional cooperation with the Caribbean on energy issues as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Another provision would authorize assistance for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership from FY2022 to FY2024 and would require the Administration to submit to Congress a multiyear strategy aimed at helping Caribbean countries increase resilience and adapt to both natural disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a changing environment. The bill also includes a section that would require the Secretary of State to devise a strategy to evaluate and expand U.S. educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America and would require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report assessing the nature and impact of China’s educational and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, H.R. 4521 also includes two other reporting requirements: one on multilateral efforts to address Latin American fentanyl trafficking and efforts between China and Latin America to combat the production and flow of illicit fentanyl products and one on major Chinese infrastructure investments in Latin America and the Caribbean. Haiti. In June 2021, the House passed H.R. 2471, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, which would promote the sustainable rebuilding and development of Haiti and would prioritize U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human rights. The Senate approved the bill, amended, in January 2022. Other Action. In other congressional action, the House approved H.R. 6 in March 2021, which would provide a pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United States as children and those from countries with TPS designations (currently including El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). In July 2021, the Senate approved S. 2045, which would rename the street in front of the Cuban approved S. 2045, which would rename the street in front of the Cuban
Embassy after a Cuban democracy activist.Embassy after a Cuban democracy activist.)
Several other bills and resolutions Several other bills and resolutions have beenon the region were reported out of committee. In March 2021, the reported out of committee. In March 2021, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44, which would denounce fraudulent Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44, which would denounce fraudulent
legislative elections in Venezuela. In May, the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered reported legislative elections in Venezuela. In May, the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered reported
H.Res. 408, which would urge the government of El Salvador to respect the country’s democratic H.Res. 408, which would urge the government of El Salvador to respect the country’s democratic
institutions. In July, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee reported institutions. In July, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee reported
S. 688, which would prohibit federal agencies contracting with persons who have business S. 688, which would prohibit federal agencies contracting with persons who have business
operations with Venezuela’s Maduro government, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee operations with Venezuela’s Maduro government, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee
ordered reported H.Res. 549, which would condemn the assassination of the Haitian president and ordered reported H.Res. 549, which would condemn the assassination of the Haitian president and
urge U.S. and global support of Haitian-led solutions.urge U.S. and global support of Haitian-led solutions.
In September 2021, the House Foreign Affair Committee ordered reported H.R. 4133, which would authorize funding for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative through FY2026 and establish monitoring and reporting requirements for the program. 57 The text of the America COMPETES Act of 2022, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, with modifications, is available on House Committee on Rules website as Rules Committee Print 117-31 at https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR4521RH-RCP117-31.pdf. The act includes provisions from the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act or the EAGLE Act, H.R. 3524, ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2021. Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 25 link to page 46 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Regional U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
support development and other U.S. objectives. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities in the support development and other U.S. objectives. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities in the
region have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, region have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America,
combatting drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and combatting drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and
strengthening security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated strengthening security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated
significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering long-term stability in Haiti; significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering long-term stability in Haiti;
addressing security concerns in the Caribbean; and providing humanitarian assistance to the addressing security concerns in the Caribbean; and providing humanitarian assistance to the
nearly 5nearly 5.7 million Venezuelans who have fled million Venezuelans who have fled their home countryto other Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as to their host , as well as to their host
communities.communities.58
Assistance needs in Latin America and the Caribbean have increased in conjunction with Assistance needs in Latin America and the Caribbean have increased in conjunction with
deteriorating conditions in 2020. As noted, the region’s economy as a whole contracted by an deteriorating conditions in 2020. As noted, the region’s economy as a whole contracted by an
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estimated 7.0estimated 6.9% in 2020, largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.% in 2020, largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.6259 The downturn pushed an The downturn pushed an
estimated 22additional 17 million people into poverty and million people into poverty and 811 million into extreme poverty, increasing the million into extreme poverty, increasing the
regional poverty (33.regional poverty (33.70%) and extreme poverty (%) and extreme poverty (12.513.1%) rates to levels not seen for %) rates to levels not seen for 1210 and 20 and 20
years, respectively.years, respectively.6360 Economic recovery may be protracted, as Economic recovery may be protracted, as the region remains an epicenter of
new infections and some countries many countries are facing high levels of debt and some may not achieve widespread vaccination until 2023.may not achieve widespread vaccination until 2023.64 Political
and security conditions also have deteriorated in some Latin American and Caribbean countries
during the pandemic, as governments have rolled back political rights and civil liberties and
criminal organizations have extended their territorial control and influence.
61 The Biden Administration has requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin The Biden Administration has requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin
America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current dollars) would be the largest annual America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current dollars) would be the largest annual
budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If enacted, total State Department- and budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If enacted, total State Department- and
USAID-managed funding for the region would increase by $278.2 million (15.5%) compared USAID-managed funding for the region would increase by $278.2 million (15.5%) compared
with FY2021 estimated levels (sewith FY2021 estimated levels (see Table 3). . The Administration’s FY2022 budget request also The Administration’s FY2022 budget request also
would provide $38 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign would provide $38 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign
assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean. assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Administration would use the vast majority of the increased funding to begin implementation of its four-year, $4 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of irregular migration from Central America (see “Central America’s Northern Triangle”). The FY2022 request includes $860.6 million for Central America—a $298.0 million (53.0%) increase compared with the FY2021 estimate.62 With regard to other regional priorities, the Administration’s FY2022 request would provide $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for Haiti, $116.6 million for Mexico, $66.0 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and $55.0 million for Venezuela. 58 R4V Platforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, “Refugiados y Migrantes Venezolanos en la Región,” January 11, 2022. 59 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update: Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and Higher Inflation, January 2022, p. 5. 60 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022, p. 63. 61 Economist Intelligence Unit, How Much Will Vaccine Inequity Cost?, August 2021. 62 $27.2 million of the $860.6 million requested for Central America would be provided through global accounts that are not included in the regional total for Latin America and the Caribbean. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 25 link to page 25 link to page 25 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2022
(billions of U.S. dollars) (billions of U.S. dollars)
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021 (est.)
2022 (req.)
1.69 1.69
1.67 1.67
1.67a1.67a
1.69 1.69
1.72d1.72b
1.80d1.80b
2.07 2.07
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2022; and FY2018-FY2022; and
U.S. Department of State, “FY2021 Estimate Data,” June 2021. U.S. Department of State, “FY2021 Estimate Data,” June 2021.
Notes: These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary
contributions to the Organization of American States. contributions to the Organization of American States.
a. Final FY2018 allocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 a. Final FY2018 allocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 millionmil ion
of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating some of of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating some of
those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region. those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
b. The FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include supplemental COVID-19 assistance. b. The FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include supplemental COVID-19 assistance.
The Administration would use the vast majority of the increased funding to begin implementation
of its four-year, $4 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of irregular
migration from Central America (see “Central America’s Northern Triangle”). The FY2022
request includes $860.6 million for Central America—a $298 million (53%) increase compared
with the FY2021 estimate.65 With regard to other regional priorities, the Administration’s FY2022
request would provide $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for Haiti, $116.6 million for
Mexico, $66.0 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and $55 million for Venezuela.
Congressional Action:. In March 2021, Congress enacted the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 In March 2021, Congress enacted the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
(P.L. 117-2), which provided $10.8 billion to respond to COVID-19 globally, including through (P.L. 117-2), which provided $10.8 billion to respond to COVID-19 globally, including through
health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and contributions to multilateral response efforts. health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and contributions to multilateral response efforts.
That funding builds on nearly $6.3 billion appropriated during the 116th Congress to support That funding builds on nearly $6.3 billion appropriated during the 116th Congress to support
global vaccine procurement and delivery and other pandemic-related foreign assistance programs. global vaccine procurement and delivery and other pandemic-related foreign assistance programs.

62 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021.
63 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021, pp. 26-27.
64 Economist Intelligence Unit, How Much Will Vaccine Inequity Cost?, August 2021.
65 $27.2 million of the $860.6 million requested for Central America would be provided through global accounts that
are not included in the regional total for Latin America and the Caribbean.
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As of late August 2021, the United States had provided Latin American and Caribbean countries
with at least $217.6 million of pandemic response aid and almost 40 million doses of COVID-19
vaccines.66
Congress is now considering the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request. In July 2021,
the House passed the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84). The bill and the accompanying report do
not specify comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country,
but the amounts they designate for several U.S. initiatives match or exceed the Administration’s
request. The measure would provide $860.6 million for the countries of Central America,
$461.4 million for Colombia, $158.9 million for Mexico, and $80 million for the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative. The Senate has yet to consider FY2022 foreign aid appropriations legislation.
For additional information, see CRS Report R46514, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer and Rachel L. Martin; CRS
Insight IN11657, The FY2022 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Budget Request,
by The United States had provided Latin American and Caribbean countries with at least $614.0 million of pandemic response aid, as of November 2021, and 59.2 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, as of January 26, 2021.63 Congress has not concluded action on FY2022 appropriations. The House passed the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84) in July 2021, and the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced its foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) in October 2021. Congress has not taken further action on either bill. Instead, it has enacted two continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43 and P.L. 117-70) that have funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2021 level since October 1, 2021. P.L. 117-70 extends appropriations through February 18, 2022. Congress may draw from H.R. 4373 and S. 3075 as it considers appropriations for the remainder of the fiscal year. Neither measure specifies comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country, but both measures provide funding directives for some U.S. initiatives in the region. The House-passed bill would designate funding levels for Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and the CBSI that match or exceed the Administration’s request. The Senate bill, which includes fewer country and programmatic directives, would provide slightly more assistance than the Administration requested for Colombia and the CBSI and $206.7 million less than the Administration requested for Central America. In addition to finalizing appropriations, Congress may consider various other legislative measures to guide and oversee U.S. foreign assistance policy in the region. These include measures to authorize certain foreign aid activities in the Caribbean (H.R. 4133) and Central America (H.R. 1177/S. 348 and H.R. 4017/S. 2003), and to evaluate the past decade of U.S. recovery and developments efforts in Haiti (H.R. 2471, passed by the House in June 2021 and by the Senate, with an amendment, in January 2022; S. 1104). 63 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations,” https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha. Congressional Research Service 20 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress For additional information, see CRS Report R47028, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46935, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations, by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern; and CRS In Focus IF11581, Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern; and CRS In Focus IF11581,
Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer. , by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
Migration Issues
Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United
States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and U.S. States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and U.S.
relations with these countries’ governments. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of relations with these countries’ governments. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of
individuals who have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the individuals who have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the
DACA initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum-seekers.DACA initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum-seekers.6764 As a result, As a result,
immigration policy changes implemented by President Trump, many of which President Biden immigration policy changes implemented by President Trump, many of which President Biden
has sought to reverse, have affected countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. has sought to reverse, have affected countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
The Trump Administration’s rhetoric, tariff threats, foreign aid cuts, and restrictive immigration The Trump Administration’s rhetoric, tariff threats, foreign aid cuts, and restrictive immigration
policies tested relations with many countries in the region, and particularly with Mexico and the policies tested relations with many countries in the region, and particularly with Mexico and the
Northern Triangle countries. The Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El Northern Triangle countries. The Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (those terminations are facing legal challenges),Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (those terminations are facing legal challenges),6865 rescinded rescinded
DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper
procedures and had to be vacated,procedures and had to be vacated,6966 and restricted access to asylum. In January 2019, the Trump and restricted access to asylum. In January 2019, the Trump
Administration launched the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a program that required many Administration launched the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a program that required many
migrants and asylum-seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico.migrants and asylum-seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico.70 The The
Administration also signed what it termed Administration also signed what it termed asylum cooperative agreements (ACAs) with (ACAs) with

66 USAID, “COVID-19—Latin American and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, June
29, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations,” at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/
vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
67Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; these agreements would allow the United States to transfer certain asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S. border to Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras to apply for asylum in one of those countries. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement the agreement with Guatemala in November 2019 but suspended implementation in March 2020. DHS finalized ACAs with El Salvador and Honduras in late 2020, but never implemented them. The factors that drive U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and some have changed over time. These factors include poverty and unemployment; political and economic instability; crime and violence; natural disasters, climate change, and food insecurity; relatively close proximity to the United States; familial ties in the United States; and relatively attractive U.S. economic conditions. The economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with ongoing turmoil in Venezuela and Haiti, have prompted increased migration from those and other countries in the region. 64 Temporary protected status (TPS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the Temporary protected status (TPS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by armed conflict, natural Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by armed conflict, natural
disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the
United States. TPS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in United States. TPS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in
2010. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative the Obama Administration 2010. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative the Obama Administration
implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present
individuals who arrived in the United States as children. individuals who arrived in the United States as children.
6865 As legal challenges to the termination of TPS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of TPS As legal challenges to the termination of TPS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of TPS
documents for current beneficiaries through documents for current beneficiaries through October 4, 2021.
69December 31, 2022. 66 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020) U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020).
70 DHS, “Migrant Protection Protocols,” at https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols. .
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; these agreements would allow the United States to
transfer certain asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S. border to Guatemala, El Salvador, or
Honduras to apply for asylum in one of those countries. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) began to implement the agreement with Guatemala in November 2019 but suspended
implementation in March 2020. DHS finalized ACAs with El Salvador and Honduras in
December 2020 but never implemented them.
The factors that drive U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and some have
changed over time. These factors include poverty and unemployment; political and economic
instability; crime and violence; natural disasters, climate change, and food insecurity; relatively
close proximity to the United States; familial ties in the United States; and relatively attractive
U.S. economic conditions. As an example of how changing factors may influence migration,
Venezuela, a historically stable country with limited emigration to the United States, has become
the top country of origin among those who seek U.S. asylum affirmatively due to Venezuela’s
ongoing crisis.71 Recent turmoil in Cuba and in Haiti, which was hit by a 7.2 magnitude
earthquake in mid-August, could fuel future migration flows.72
Migrant apprehensions at the Southwest border reached a 45-year low in 2017 but began to rise in
FY2018. In FY2019, DHS apprehended 851,508 migrants, with unaccompanied children and , with unaccompanied children and
families from the Northern Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, comprising a majority families from the Northern Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, comprising a majority
of apprehensions.of apprehensions.73 In FY2020, apprehensions declined by more than half, particularly after the In FY2020, apprehensions declined by more than half, particularly after the
COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020.COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020.7467 In response to the pandemic, DHS largely In response to the pandemic, DHS largely
suspended asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico border in March 2020 under a Centers for suspended asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico border in March 2020 under a Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention public health order (Title 42); most migrants without valid travel Disease Control and Prevention public health order (Title 42); most migrants without valid travel
documents were expelled into Mexico or returned to their documents were expelled into Mexico or returned to their home countries as quickly as possible.68 In FY2021, border enforcement encounters (apprehensions and expulsions) reached a record 1.7 million, although that total includes individuals expelled into Mexico more than once.69 In FY2021, migrant origins expanded beyond Mexico and Central America to include South American countries and the Caribbean. Sizeable migrant flows also originated from countries as distant as Romania, India, and Turkey. In the Biden Administration’s initial months, much of its focus in the region was on immigration from Central America, although DHS also designated Venezuela for TPS in March 2021. President Biden took executive actions revising some of the Trump Administration’s restrictive immigration policies but maintained certain COVID-19-related immigration restrictions while contending with a large increase in the number of undocumented Central American and Mexican migrants seeking to enterhome countries as quickly as possible.75
More than 846,100 migrants were expelled to Mexico through July 2021.76 Thus far in FY2021,
both apprehensions and expulsions have been increasing. In March 2021, DHS Secretary
Alejandro Mayorkas predicted that total encounters (apprehended or expelled) in FY2021 could
reach a level not seen in 20 years.77
President Biden has announced executive actions on immigration, many of which revise
restrictive policies implemented by the Trump Administration. Pursuant to Executive Order
(E.O.) 14010, which called for the development of a collaborative migration management
strategy, the Administration has suspended the 2019-2020 ACAs, reestablished the Central
American Minors program to allow children with parents who have status in the United States to

71 In FY2018, Venezuela ranked first among countries of origin for those seeking affirmative asylum in the United the United
States. Guatemala and El Salvador ranked second and third, respectively. See DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics,
Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2018, October 2019.
72 Adam Taylor and Claire Parker, “Cuba and Haiti Upheaval Could Mean Twin Migration Crises,” Washington Post,
July 14, 2021.
73 DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Migration FY2019.”
74 CBP, “Southwest Border Migration FY2020.” See explanation of the difference between a Title 8 apprehension
under DHS authority and a Title 42 expulsion under Centers for Disease Control and Prevention authority in the notes.
75 The Biden Administration has exempted unaccompanied children and some families from this policy. See CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB10582, Asylum Processing at the Border: Legal Basics, by Ben Harrington.
76 CBP, “FY2020 Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: Title 8 Enforcement Actions and Title 42 Expulsions; U.S.
Border Patrol Monthly Enforcement Encounters 2021: Title 42 Expulsions and Title 8 Apprehensions,” accessed
August 23, 2021.
77 DHS, “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas Regarding the Situation at the Southwest
Border,” March 16, 2021. Hereinafter Mayorkas, March 2021.
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apply for asylum in their country, and begun processing asylum-seekers previously returned to
Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocols.78 In July 2021, pursuant to E.O. 14010, the Biden
Administration released two new strategies: the Collaborative Management Migration Strategy,
aimed at building a regional framework for safe, orderly, and humane migration in North and
Central America, and the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central
America (see “Central America’s Northern Triangle,” below.) President Biden also proposed a
comprehensive immigration reform bill, introduced as the U.S. Citizenship Act (S. 348/H.R.
1177). Among other measures, the bill as introduced would provide a pathway to citizenship for
certain farmworkers and those with DACA and TPS status. The bill also would authorize $4
billion over four years to address the root causes of migration from Central America. On March 8,
2021, DHS Secretary Mayorkas designated Venezuela for TPS. DHS terminated MPP on June 1,
2021, but the Supreme Court later ruled that the Biden Administration must comply with lower
court rulings that ordered the program’s reinstatement.79
The Biden Administration has exempted unaccompanied children and some families from the
Title 42 policy but otherwise extended the Title 42 order on August 1, 2021; it is facing a legal
challenge.80 The Administration has begun flying some migrants expelled from the United States
to southern Mexico, after which the Mexican government buses them to remote areas in
Guatemala, raising humanitarian concerns.81 Vice President Harris is leading U.S. diplomatic
efforts to engage the governments of Mexico and Central America on migration and border
security issues. She traveled to Mexico and Guatemala in June 2021 for talks with both
presidents.
Congressional Action:States. Vice President Kamala Harris, whom President Biden tasked with overseeing diplomatic engagement with Central America and Mexico, visited Guatemala, Mexico, and the Southwest border in June. In July 2021, the Administration released two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and to collaboratively manage migration in the region. In accordance with the strategies, the Administration allocated $272.2 million of humanitarian assistance to alleviate conditions in Central America in FY2021 and requested $860.6 million to address the root causes of migration from the region in FY2022.70 The Biden Administration sought to terminate the MPP program, but, after a lawsuit challenging the termination, a federal judge ordered DHS to reinstate the program. After losing a Supreme Court appeal, DHS announced the reimplementation of MPP on December 2, 2021. The Administration has broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-driven economic downturn has contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere. Secretary Blinken traveled to Colombia in October 2021 for a Migration Ministerial with the foreign ministers of 16 other Western Hemisphere countries to address regional cooperation on irregular migration. In his remarks, Secretary Blinken focused on the top U.S. priorities: (1) more effective management of the immediate situation through strengthened border enforcement, improved asylum processes, and expanded legal pathways and options for protection and resettlement; (2) protection for the most vulnerable migrants, including victims of human trafficking and smuggling; (3) regional cooperation to address the urgent situation with 67 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Migration FY2020.” See explanation of the difference between a Title 8 apprehension under DHS authority and a Title 42 expulsion under Centers for Disease Control and Prevention authority in the notes. 68 The Biden Administration has exempted unaccompanied children and some families from this policy. See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10582, Asylum Processing at the Border: Legal Basics, by Ben Harrington. 69 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and William A. Kandel. 70 USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #1, FY2022, December 1, 2021. Congressional Research Service 22 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Venezuelan and Haitian migrants, including directing resources to communities across the region hosting migrants from these countries; and (4) efforts to address the root causes of migration.71 Congressional Action. Congress may consider comprehensive immigration measures (S. Congress may consider comprehensive immigration measures (S.
348/H.R. 1177) or piecemeal legislation to address specific issues, such as border security, 348/H.R. 1177) or piecemeal legislation to address specific issues, such as border security,
immigration enforcement, legalization of unauthorized immigrants, temporary and permanent immigration enforcement, legalization of unauthorized immigrants, temporary and permanent
immigration, and humanitarian admissions. In March 2021, the House passed H.R. 6, which immigration, and humanitarian admissions. In March 2021, the House passed H.R. 6, which
would modify the legal pathways available to those in the region and adjust the status of some would modify the legal pathways available to those in the region and adjust the status of some
Central American immigrants in the United States. Amid an increase in child and family arrivals Central American immigrants in the United States. Amid an increase in child and family arrivals
at the Southwest border, Congress may consider legislation to address the sheltering of child at the Southwest border, Congress may consider legislation to address the sheltering of child
migrants, as well as additional appropriations as needed to respond to families. Congress is likely migrants, as well as additional appropriations as needed to respond to families. Congress is likely
to continue funding and overseeing U.S. assistance to respond to the Venezuela regional to continue funding and overseeing U.S. assistance to respond to the Venezuela regional
migration crisis, address the root causes of migration from Central America, and bolster Mexico’s migration crisis, address the root causes of migration from Central America, and bolster Mexico’s
interdiction and humanitarian protection systems.interdiction and humanitarian protection systems.
For additional information, see CRS For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10574, Legal Sidebar LSB10574, Recent White House
Actions on Immigration, by Hillel R. Smith and Kelsey Y. Santamaria; CRS Legal Sidebar , by Hillel R. Smith and Kelsey Y. Santamaria; CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB10582, Asylum Processing at the Border: Legal Basics, by Ben Harrington; CRS Insight
IN11638, Increasing Numbers of Unaccompanied Alien Children at the Southwest Border, by
William A. Kandel; CRS In Focus IF11799, Child Migrants at the Border: The Flores Settlement

78 Executive Order 14010, “Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to
Manage Migration Throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum
Seekers at the United States Border,” February 2, 2021.
79 DHS, “Migrant Protection Protocols,” at https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols; Eileen Sullivan and
Adam Liptak, Robert Barnes, “Supreme Court Says Biden Administration Must Comply with Ruling to Restart
‘Remain in Mexico’ Program for Asylum Seekers,” August 24, 2021.
80 CDC, “CDC Extends Order at the Southern and Northern Land Borders,” August 2, 2021; Sabrina Rodriguez,
“Biden Administration Renews Title 42 Order, as ACLU Fights Back,” Politico, August 2, 2021.
81 Sonia Peréz D., “Mexico Deports Central Americans After Being Flown in by U.S.,” AP, August 11, 2021; The U.N.
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), “UNHCR Concerned Over U.S. Expulsion Flights Under COVID-19 Asylum
Restrictions,” August 11, 2021.
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Agreement and Other Legal Developments, by Kelsey Y. SantamariaLSB10617, Asylum Eligibility for Applicants Fleeing Gang and Domestic Violence: Recent Developments, by Hillel R. Smith; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10582, Asylum Processing at the Border: Legal Basics, by Ben Harrington; CRS Insight IN11741, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) COVID-19 Policies and Protocols at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer; CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and William A. Kandel; CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10215, ; CRS In Focus IF10215,
Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R44849, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R44849, H-2A and
H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy and Related Issues, by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report , by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report
RS20844, RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson; and , by Jill H. Wilson; and
CRS Report R46764, CRS Report R46764, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): By the Numbers, by , by
Andorra Bruno. Andorra Bruno.
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and/or transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets—region’s role as a source and/or transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opioids (plant-based and synthetic)—as well as for cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opioids (plant-based and synthetic)—as well as for
precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs. Heroin abuse and synthetic opioid-precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs. Heroin abuse and synthetic opioid-
related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising questions about how to related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising questions about how to
address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that methamphetamine and address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that methamphetamine and
cocaine overdoses in the United States are rising, with cocaine overdoses frequently linked to the cocaine overdoses in the United States are rising, with cocaine overdoses frequently linked to the
presence of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl. presence of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl.
Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market continue to drive Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market continue to drive
drug production in drug production in MexicoBolivia, Colombia, , Colombia, Peru, and BoliviaMexico, and Peru. Opium poppy cultivation and heroin . Opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production rose in Mexicoproduction rose in Mexico from 2012 through 2017 but have since declined. However, the production of through 2017 but have since declined. However, the production of
fentanyl (a synthetic opioid) and methamphetamine has surged. Over 90% of heroin seized and fentanyl (a synthetic opioid) and methamphetamine has surged. Over 90% of heroin seized and
sampled in the United States comes from Mexicosampled in the United States comes from Mexico and increasingly includes fentanyl (a synthetic
opioid). Since the Chinese government implemented strict controls on all forms of fentanyl, . Since the Chinese government implemented strict controls on all forms of fentanyl,
including fentanyl analogues, in mid-2019, Mexico has become a more important source of including fentanyl analogues, in mid-2019, Mexico has become a more important source of
fentanyl.fentanyl.8272 Despite restrictions on imports of Despite restrictions on imports of some precursor chemicals, Mexican TCOs 71 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks at the Regional Migration Ministerial,” October 20, 2021. 72 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), National Drug Threat Assessment, 2020, February 2021. Hereinafter, Congressional Research Service 23 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress some precursor chemicals, Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) continue continue
to be the primary producers and traffickers of low-cost, high-purity U.S.-bound to be the primary producers and traffickers of low-cost, high-purity U.S.-bound
methamphetamine. Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, which supplies roughly methamphetamine. Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, which supplies roughly
89% of cocaine in the United States, reached record levels in 2020.89% of cocaine in the United States, reached record levels in 2020.83 Estimated coca73 Coca cultivation cultivation
and production in Peru also surged, while coca cultivation fell and potential production increasedand production in Peru also surged, while coca cultivation fell and potential production increased
slightly in Bolivia. in Bolivia.8474
Whereas Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region work Whereas Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region work
closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict illicit flows, the closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict illicit flows, the
Venezuelan and Bolivian governments do not. In March 2020, the Department of Justice Venezuelan and Bolivian governments do not. In March 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted indicted
Venezuela’s leader, Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as Venezuela’s Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as Venezuela’s
legitimate president)legitimate president), and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials. As charged, and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials. As charged,
Maduro allegedly participated in a drug trafficking organization that conspired with the Maduro allegedly participated in a drug trafficking organization that conspired with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to traffic illicit drugs to the United States. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to traffic illicit drugs to the United States.
Over the past several years, Maduro government officials have been identified as conspiring with Over the past several years, Maduro government officials have been identified as conspiring with
FARC dissidents and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas operating in Venezuela to FARC dissidents and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas operating in Venezuela to
smuggle cocaine and illicit gold.smuggle cocaine and illicit gold.8575 U.S. antidrug cooperation with Bolivia decreased under former U.S. antidrug cooperation with Bolivia decreased under former
President Evo Morales (2006-2019) and remains limited under his successor, President Evo Morales (2006-2019) and remains limited under his successor, President Luis Arce. President Luis Arce.

82 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), National Drug Threat Assessment, 2020, February 2021. Hereinafter,
DEA, NDTA 2020.
83 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in
the Andean Region,” June 25, 2021.
84 Ibid.
85 Douglas Farah, The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin
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Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to
degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in
high levels of violence. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin American high levels of violence. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin American
governments, particularly in Mexico and Central America—a region through which roughly 90% governments, particularly in Mexico and Central America—a region through which roughly 90%
of cocaine bound for the United States from South America transited in 2019—continue to suffer of cocaine bound for the United States from South America transited in 2019—continue to suffer
from weak criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies.from weak criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies.8676 Public corruption, including Public corruption, including
high-level cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict drugs, high-level cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict drugs,
investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. At the same time, there is a investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. At the same time, there is a
widespread perception—particularly in Latin America—that U.S. demand for illicit drugs is widespread perception—particularly in Latin America—that U.S. demand for illicit drugs is
largely to blame for the region’s crime problems. The COVID-19 pandemic has lowered violence largely to blame for the region’s crime problems. The COVID-19 pandemic has lowered violence
in most countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remains elevated in Mexico. in most countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remains elevated in Mexico.
Criminal gangs with origins in Southern California, principally the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) Criminal gangs with origins in Southern California, principally the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
and the 18th Street gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority and the 18th Street gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority
in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras,
and urban areas in Guatemala. Gangs have been involved in a range of criminal activities, and urban areas in Guatemala. Gangs have been involved in a range of criminal activities,
including local drug distribution, extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and they including local drug distribution, extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and they
have used violence to enforce COVID-19-related quarantines. Gang-related violence has fueled have used violence to enforce COVID-19-related quarantines. Gang-related violence has fueled
irregular migration to the United States. irregular migration to the United States.
U.S. Policy. For more than 50 years, U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has For more than 50 years, U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has
focused on countering drug trafficking and reducing drug production in the region. The largest focused on countering drug trafficking and reducing drug production in the region. The largest
antidrug support program, Plan Colombia, provided more than $10 billion (current dollars) to antidrug support program, Plan Colombia, provided more than $10 billion (current dollars) to
help Colombia combat both drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade from help Colombia combat both drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade from
DEA, NDTA 2020. 73 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in the Andean Region,” June 25, 2021. 74 Ibid. 75 Douglas Farah, The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin America, Atlantic Council, August 12, 2020. 76 Drug transit data are from U.S. Government, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, based on 2019 data from the Consolidated Counterdrug Database as cited in DEA, NDTA 2020. Congressional Research Service 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress FY2000 to FY2016. After Colombia signed a historic peace accord with the country’s largest FY2000 to FY2016. After Colombia signed a historic peace accord with the country’s largest
leftist guerrilla group, the FARC, the United States provided assistance to help implement the leftist guerrilla group, the FARC, the United States provided assistance to help implement the
agreement. In addition to concerns about cocaine production, some U.S. policymakers have agreement. In addition to concerns about cocaine production, some U.S. policymakers have
expressed concern that parts of the peace accord remain unimplementedexpressed concern that parts of the peace accord remain unimplemented. (see section on
“Colombia” below).
U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included partnerships with U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included partnerships with
other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative with Mexico, CARSI, and the CBSI. During other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative with Mexico, CARSI, and the CBSI. During
the Obama Administration, those initiatives combined U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law assistance the Obama Administration, those initiatives combined U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law assistance
with economic development and violence prevention programs. The Trump Administration with economic development and violence prevention programs. The Trump Administration
sought to focus on security and antidrug efforts while also attempting to reduce overall funding sought to focus on security and antidrug efforts while also attempting to reduce overall funding
for each of the programs. for each of the programs.
In a March 2021 posture statement, then-Commander of U.S. Southern Command Admiral Craig
Faller stated that violent transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) pose a national security
threat to the Southern Command’s area of responsibility.87 Through visa denials and revocations, targeted economic sanctions, and federal criminal investigations and prosecutions, U.S. Administrations also have sought to punish foreign officials and entities complicit with drugs traffickers, gangs, and other criminal groups. The State Department manages several deterrence tools, including multiple visa denial programs targeting foreign drug traffickers, as well programs to offer rewards for information related to significant foreign narcotics traffickers and transnational organized crime. In December 2021, the Department of the Treasury announced Global Magnitsky sanctions against two high-level Salvadoran officials for providing illicit favors to the MS-13 gang (a Treasury-designated TCO subject to sanctions) during covert negotiations.77 In addition to DOJ’s indictment of Maduro in Venezuela, cases in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York have implicated high-level Honduran officials, including former President Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-January 2022).78 The Biden Administration’s first-year The Biden Administration’s first-year
drug policy priorities drug policy priorities focusfocused on domestic treatment and harm reduction but also on domestic treatment and harm reduction but also include a focusfocused on on
working with “key global partners such as China, Colombia, and Mexico to curb illicit drug working with “key global partners such as China, Colombia, and Mexico to curb illicit drug
production and trafficking.”88 The Administration’s regional drug policy may be further informed
by the findings of the congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission
(WHDPC); the commission’s report, released in December 2020, recommended the State

America, Atlantic Council, August 12, 2020.
86 Drug transit data are from U.S. Government, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, based on 2019 data
from the Consolidated Counterdrug Database as cited in DEA, NDTA 2020.
87 Admiral Craig S. Faller, U.S. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2021.
88 The White House, “Biden-⁠Harris Administration Announces First-Year Drug Policy Priorities,” April 1, 2021.
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production and trafficking.”79 Drug policy efforts complement broader efforts to combat corruption, a core component of the Administration’s national security policy.80 In October 2021, the Biden Administration launched a new bicentennial framework for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation that focuses on addressing drugs and violence from a public health perspective, combating transborder crime, and dismantling illicit financial networks.81 The Administration’s regional drug policy may be further informed by the findings of the congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, which recommended the State Department take the lead in regional drug policy and replace the annual drug certification process Department take the lead in regional drug policy and replace the annual drug certification process
with compacts negotiated with countries to identify bilateral priorities.with compacts negotiated with countries to identify bilateral priorities.8982
Congressional Action:. Congress Congress is consideringcontinues to consider the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget
request. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 4373, request. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 4373,
would, among other provisions, require additional human rights conditions on International would, among other provisions, require additional human rights conditions on International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to Colombia and cut INCLE Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to Colombia and cut INCLE
assistance to Mexico, while focusing that assistance on combating opioid production and
trafficking. H.Rept. 117-84 accompanying H.R. 4373 would require a report on bilateral (with
Mexico) and multilateral efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking into the United States, as well as
several reports and evaluations on broader aspects of U.S. drug policy recommended by the
WHDPC.90 Congress also may convene oversight 77 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized Crime,” December 8, 2021. 78 U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, United States v. Juan Antonio Hernández Alvarado, S2 15 Cr. 379 (PKC), Government’s Sentencing Submission, March 16, 2021. 79 The White House, “Biden-⁠Harris Administration Announces First-Year Drug Policy Priorities,” April 1, 2021. 80 The White House, “Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National Security Interest,” June 3, 2021. 81 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2021. 82 Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Charting a New Path Forward, December 2020. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 60 link to page 32 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress assistance to Mexico, while focusing that assistance on combating opioid production and trafficking. H.Rept. 117-84 accompanying H.R. 4373 would require a report on bilateral (with Mexico) and multilateral efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking into the United States, as well as several reports and evaluations on broader aspects of U.S. drug policy recommended by the WHDPC.83 The draft explanatory statement accompanying the Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of the FY2022 foreign aid bill (S. 3075) would require an evaluation of U.S. drug policies over the past several decades and how current efforts differ with those policies within 120 days of the bill’s enactment. The 117th Congress has convened oversight hearings that address drug trafficking and crime in the region, including a November 2021 Senate hearing on drugs and corruption (see Appendix). During its second session, Congress may convene additional hearings, request Government Accountability hearings, request Government Accountability
Office reports, and draft legislation to influence U.S. anti-crime and counterdrug programs in the Office reports, and draft legislation to influence U.S. anti-crime and counterdrug programs in the
Western Hemisphere. Issues of concern may include whether or not to support a resumption of Western Hemisphere. Issues of concern may include whether or not to support a resumption of
aerial eradication in Colombia, how to address drug flows emanating from Venezuela, how to aerial eradication in Colombia, how to address drug flows emanating from Venezuela, how to
resumeimprove antidrug cooperation with Mexico after strains in bilateral relations, and how to improve antidrug cooperation with Mexico after strains in bilateral relations, and how to improve
anti-crime efforts as part of a broader strategy to address the root causes of unauthorized anti-crime efforts as part of a broader strategy to address the root causes of unauthorized
migration from Central America. Newer issues may focus on how to interdict precursor chemicals migration from Central America. Newer issues may focus on how to interdict precursor chemicals
from China and India that are being used to produce fentanyl in Mexico, as well as how to from China and India that are being used to produce fentanyl in Mexico, as well as how to
combat the role of money launderers from China in supporting TCOs in the region.combat the role of money launderers from China in supporting TCOs in the region.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11535, For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11535, Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel
Operations amid COVID-19, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10578, , by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10578,
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021FY2008-FY2022, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus
IF10400, IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security
Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, , by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, Mexico:
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel; CRS , by June S. Beittel; CRS Report R44812In Focus IF10371, ,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for CongressAn Overview, by Peter J. Meyer; , by Peter J. Meyer;
CRS Report R43813, CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel; CRS In , by June S. Beittel; CRS In
Focus IF10789, Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report , by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report CRS
Report R46695, R46695, The U.S. “Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries, ,
by Liana W. Rosen. by Liana W. Rosen.
Trade Policy
The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the United States’ most important regional The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the United States’ most important regional
trading partners. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading partners in trading partners. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading partners in
the region remain strong, despite challengesthe region remain strong, despite challenges, such as the downturn in economic growth and trade such as the downturn in economic growth and trade
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the high levels of violence in some countries. The United due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the high levels of violence in some countries. The United
States accounted for roughly 31% of the region’s merchandise imports and 45% of its States accounted for roughly 31% of the region’s merchandise imports and 45% of its
merchandise exports in 2020. Most of this trade is with Mexico, which accounted for 78% of U.S. merchandise exports in 2020. Most of this trade is with Mexico, which accounted for 78% of U.S.
imports from the region and 62% of U.S. exports to the region in 2020. In 2020, total U.S. trade imports from the region and 62% of U.S. exports to the region in 2020. In 2020, total U.S. trade
with the region declined 14%, with U.S. merchandise exports declining from $413.0 billion in with the region declined 14%, with U.S. merchandise exports declining from $413.0 billion in

89 Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Charting a New Path Forward, December 2020.
902019 to $336.7 billion in 2020 and U.S. merchandise imports declining from $464.7 billion to $416.0 billion (see Table 4). 83 H.Rept. 117-84 also would require a report on whether relevant U.S. sanctions, such as the Foreign Narcotics H.Rept. 117-84 also would require a report on whether relevant U.S. sanctions, such as the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act of 1999, effectively target the most dangerous criminal organizations; an evaluation of the Kingpin Designation Act of 1999, effectively target the most dangerous criminal organizations; an evaluation of the
efficacy of the designation procedures on major illicit narcotics producing and transit countries; a strategy for working efficacy of the designation procedures on major illicit narcotics producing and transit countries; a strategy for working
with international partners to develop new guidelines to reduce the manufacturing, trafficking, and use of illicit with international partners to develop new guidelines to reduce the manufacturing, trafficking, and use of illicit
narcotics; and an assessment of alternative tools for drug trafficking control. narcotics; and an assessment of alternative tools for drug trafficking control.
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2019 to $336.7 billion in 2020 and U.S. merchandise imports declining from $464.7 billion to
$416.0 billion (see Table 4).
The United States has strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the The United States has strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the
past 27 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994, past 27 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994,
which was replaced by the USMCA on July 1, 2020, the United States currently has six FTAs in which was replaced by the USMCA on July 1, 2020, the United States currently has six FTAs in
force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. NAFTA Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. NAFTA
was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region, establishing was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region, establishing
new rules and disciplines that influenced subsequent trade agreements on issues important to the new rules and disciplines that influenced subsequent trade agreements on issues important to the
United States, such as intellectualUnited States, such as intellectual-property- property rights protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute rights protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute
settlement, investment, labor, and the environment. settlement, investment, labor, and the environment.
Table 4. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2013-2020
(in billions of current U.S. dollars) (in billions of current U.S. dollars)
Partner
Country
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
U.S. Exports








Mexico Mexico
226.0 226.0
241.0 241.0
236.5 236.5
230.2 230.2
243.6 243.6
266.0 266.0
256.3 256.3
211.5 211.5
Brazil Brazil
44.1 44.1
42.4 42.4
31.6 31.6
30.2 30.2
37.3 37.3
39.4 39.4
42.9 42.9
34.6 34.6
Chile Chile
17.5 17.5
16.5 16.5
15.4 15.4
12.9 12.9
13.6 13.6
15.3 15.3
15.7 15.7
12.5 12.5
Colombia Colombia
18.4 18.4
20.1 20.1
16.3 16.3
13.0 13.0
13.4 13.4
15.1 15.1
14.8 14.8
11.9 11.9
Total LAC Total LAC
404.3 404.3
418.9 418.9
383.4 383.4
360.7 360.7
388.8 388.8
424.0 424.0
413.0 413.0
336.7 336.7
World World
1,578.5 1,578.5
1,621.9 1,621.9
1,503.3 1,503.3
1,451.5 1,451.5
1,547.2 1,547.2
1,665.8 1,665.8
1,642.8 1,642.8
1,424.9 1,424.9
U.S. Imports








Mexico Mexico
280.6 280.6
295.7 295.7
296.4 296.4
293.5 293.5
312.7 312.7
343.7 343.7
356.2 356.2
325.2 325.2
Brazil Brazil
27.5 27.5
30.0 30.0
27.5 27.5
26.0 26.0
29.5 29.5
31.2 31.2
30.9 30.9
23.4 23.4
Colombia Colombia
21.6 21.6
18.3 18.3
14.1 14.1
13.8 13.8
13.6 13.6
13.8 13.8
14.2 14.2
10.8 10.8
Chile Chile
10.4 10.4
9.5 9.5
8.8 8.8
8.8 8.8
10.6 10.6
11.4 11.4
10.4 10.4
10.1 10.1
Total LAC Total LAC
438.3 438.3
445.3 445.3
411.6 411.6
400.6 400.6
428.2 428.2
465.5 465.5
464.7 464.7
416.0 416.0
World World
2,268.0 2,268.0
2,356.4 2,356.4
2,248.8 2,248.8
2,186.8 2,186.8
2,339.6 2,339.6
2,536.1 2,536.1
2,493.7 2,493.7
2,336.0 2,336.0
Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Department of Commerce provided by Trade Data Monitor. CRS with data from the U.S. Department of Commerce provided by Trade Data Monitor.
Note: This table provides statistics on the top four countries This table provides statistics on the top four countries followedfol owed by the total of U.S. trade with 33 by the total of U.S. trade with 33
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
The United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into NAFTA renegotiations in 2017 and concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September 30, 2018. The agreement, which entered into force on July 1, 2020, continues most of NAFTA’s market opening provisions but modernizes and revises NAFTA with new provisions on digital trade, state-owned enterprises, currency manipulation, anti-corruption, enforcement of workers’ rights, and the environment. Certain revisions to USMCA, including tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor vehicle industry, removal of government-procurement provisions for Canada, and changes to investor-state dispute settlement provisions, are significant because they scale back previous Administrations’ U.S. trade policy goals. In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries
in the region through several trade-preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic in the region through several trade-preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides
Congressional Research Service 27 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress limited duty-free entry of selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign limited duty-free entry of selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign
economic policy response to uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. Several economic policy response to uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. Several
preference programs for Haiti, which expire in 2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral preference programs for Haiti, which expire in 2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral
preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two other preference programs include the Caribbean preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two other preference programs include the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA, P.L. 106-200, Title II), which has been extended through Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA, P.L. 106-200, Title II), which has been extended through
September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which expired September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which expired
on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends to eligible Caribbean countries preferences on on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends to eligible Caribbean countries preferences on
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apparel productsapparel products, similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA (replaced by theand USMCA USMCA). The . The
GSPGSP program, first authorized in the 1970s, , first authorized in the 1970s, has providedprovides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products duty-free tariff treatment to certain products
imported from 120 designated developing countries throughout the world, including Argentina, imported from 120 designated developing countries throughout the world, including Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries. Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries.
In the 15-20 years after NAFTA, some of the largest economies in South America, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the
United States. That opposition has shifted as some countries, including Brazil and Ecuador, have
taken steps to enhance their trade relationships with the United States through “mini” bilateral
trade agreements on trade facilitation, regulatory cooperation, and anti-corruption.
Numerous other bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere Numerous other bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere
do not include the United States. For example, the Pacific Alliance, a trade arrangement do not include the United States. For example, the Pacific Alliance, a trade arrangement
composed of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, has made efforts to negotiate a possible trade composed of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, has made efforts to negotiate a possible trade
arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. OnIn June June 28,
2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political 2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political
agreement in principle for an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement. agreement in principle for an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement. OnIn April April 28, 2020, 2020,
Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA from 2000 Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA from 2000
and remove most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners. and remove most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners.
The Trump Administration made renegotiation and modernization of NAFTA a priority of the
Administration’s trade policy. The United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into NAFTA
renegotiations in 2017 and concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September
30, 2018. The agreement, which entered into force on July 1, 2020, continues NAFTA’s market
opening provisions but modernizes NAFTA with new provisions on digital trade, state-owned
enterprises, currency manipulation, anti-corruption, enforcement of workers’ rights, and the
environment. The USMCA’s tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor vehicle industry,
removal of government-procurement provisions for Canada, and lessening of investor-state
dispute settlement provisions are significant, because they scale back previous Administrations’
U.S. trade policy goals.
In 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain
steel and aluminum products, including products from Latin America, using presidential powers
granted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-74; 19 U.S.C. §1862).
The proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10%
on aluminum imports, with some flexibility on the application of tariffs by country. In May 2018,
President Trump proclaimed Argentina and Brazil permanently exempt from the steel tariffs in
exchange for quota agreements. On May 31, 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on steel and
aluminum imports from Mexico, prompting Mexico to impose retaliatory tariffs on 71 U.S.
products, covering an estimated $3.7 billion worth of trade. By May 2019, President Trump had
exempted Mexico from steel and aluminum tariffs and Mexico had agreed to terminate its
retaliatory tariffs. In August 2020, after Brazil’s tariff-rate quota on ethanol imports from the
United States expired, President Trump tightened the cap on allowable steel imports from Brazil,
stating that the decision was made under Section 232.
The United States’ January 2017 withdrawal from the proposed TPP, Neither of the agreements with the European Union have yet entered into force. Numerous observers have proposed that the United States strengthen trade relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through regional trade agreements or other efforts.84 Some policymakers also have expressed an interest in enhancing trade ties in the Western Hemisphere to enhance economic competitiveness. Although the United States remains the top trading partner with the region, numerous lawmakers point to the rising influence of China and the need to strengthen U.S. economic integration, reinforce regional supply chains, and promote economic growth.85 Although some of the largest economies in South America, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the United States in the first 15-20 years after NAFTA, such opposition has shifted in some countries. For example, Brazil and Ecuador, have taken steps to enhance their trade relationships with the United States through “mini” bilateral trade agreements on trade facilitation, regulatory cooperation, and anti-corruption. However, some Members of Congress have stated that FTAs with Brazil or Ecuador are not feasible in the short term, due to concerns regarding the environment, labor standards, and human rights. The United States’ January 2017 withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an FTA that included an FTA that included
Mexico, Peru, and Chile as signatories, signified Mexico, Peru, and Chile as signatories, signified anothera change to U.S. trade change to U.S. trade policypolicy in the region. In March . In March
2018, all remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-2018, all remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, or TPP-11), which essentially brought into effect a modified TPP. Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, or TPP-11), which essentially brought into effect a modified TPP.
The TPP-11 has entered into force among The TPP-11 has entered into force among seveneight countries— countries—Canada, AustraliaAustralia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, , Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Singapore, and Vietnam. Chile and Peru expect to ratify the agreement eventually.
The remaining signatories have not ratified the agreement. Chile expects to ratify the agreement eventually. Ecuador applied to enter into the agreement in 2021, and Colombia has expressed plans to request entry into the agreement after it enters into force among Colombia has expressed plans to request entry into the agreement after it enters into force among
all partners.all partners.
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26 Some observers have noted 84 Margaret Spiegelman, “Former Envoys: U.S. Must Seize Trade Opportunities in Latin America,” Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, January 11, 2022. 85 See for example, Madeline Halpert, “GOP Lawmakers Urge Engagement in Latin America to Counter China,” Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, October 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 28 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress that the Biden Administration could focus on a comprehensive, high-standard regional trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region by applying to join the CPTPP. The Biden Administration, however, has stated it would not join the CPTPP in its current form. China’s announcement that it had formally submitted a request to join the CPTPP may be an issue for Congress as it considers future of trade policy in the Asia-Pacific region.86 The Administration announced a multifaceted Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in October 2021 but has not issued any details about the framework or whether it will have any future relationship with the Latin America and Caribbean region.

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

Key Policy Issues: Congress may examine how the United States could enhance trade relations Congress may examine how the United States could enhance trade relations
with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, whether through bilateral FTAs or a broader with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, whether through bilateral FTAs or a broader
regional FTAinitiative such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, which was pursued in the such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, which was pursued in the
mid-1990s but never concluded.mid-1990s but never concluded.9187 Congress also may examine whether the United States should Congress also may examine whether the United States should
consider partial trade agreements, such as the limited agreements reached with Brazil and consider partial trade agreements, such as the limited agreements reached with Brazil and
Ecuador in the last quarter of 2020 on trade facilitation, anti-corruption, and good regulatory Ecuador in the last quarter of 2020 on trade facilitation, anti-corruption, and good regulatory
practices. Some Members of Congress favor practices. Some Members of Congress favor using these “mini” agreements, perceiving them as a these “mini” agreements, perceiving them as a
mechanism to eventually develop and enter into a comprehensive FTA with those countries. Other mechanism to eventually develop and enter into a comprehensive FTA with those countries. Other
lawmakers identify that such mini agreements provide less leverage for addressing concerns lawmakers identify that such mini agreements provide less leverage for addressing concerns
regardingregarding human rights, the environment the environment, and workers’ rights in these countries. President Biden and workers’ rights in these countries. President Biden
has said he does not plan any new trade agreements at this time and has said he does not plan any new trade agreements at this time and he will prioritizehas prioritized domestic domestic
economic recovery.economic recovery.88
The 117th Congress may take an interest in The 117th Congress may take an interest in the expiration ofrenewing Trade Promotion Authority Trade Promotion Authority
(Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, or TPA; P.L. 114-26)(Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, or TPA; P.L. 114-26), which expired
on July 1, 2021. Although the Biden Administration is not prioritizing trade agreements, on July 1, 2021. Although the Biden Administration is not prioritizing trade agreements,
lawmakers may consider whether to include new lawmakers may consider whether to include new trade agreement negotiating objectives and priorities or otherpriorities or consultation requirements in TPA requirements in TPA
renewal.renewal. Members may consider how the USMCA could affect U.S. industries, especially the
auto industry, as Mexico has requested USMCA consultations with the United States on USMA
auto rules of origin. They also may consider the USMCA’s overall effects on the U.S. and
Mexican economies, North American supply chains, and trade relations with the Latin American
and Caribbean region. In addition, policymakers may continue to monitor Mexico’s
implementation of labor USMCA commitments, the effects of COVID-19 on U.S. supply chains
with countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, bilateral trade consultations with
Brazil concerning the country’s restrictions on imports of ethanol from the United States, and
China’s increasing economic influence in the region.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade
Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R44981, The United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson; and
CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.
Selected Country and Subregional Issues
The Caribbean
Caribbean Regional Issues
The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories,
including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent
countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago
in the south. In addition, geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and

91 Policymakers also may consider how to use trade policy to boost regional economies, especially in Central America, to help address some of the root causes of migration. Some Members have expressed an interest in the possibility of modifying CAFTA-DR’s rules of origin in the textiles and apparel industries to promote investment and create manufacturing jobs in the region. For example, the flexibilities in CAFTA-DR may allow cumulation of originating content with other U.S. trade agreement partners such as USMCA or the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement, which could broaden and strengthen supply chains in the region. In addition, policymakers may continue to monitor the effects of COVID-19 on U.S. supply chains with countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, the entry into force of the U.S.-Brazil trade protocol, alleged forced labor conditions in the Dominican Republic, and a possible extension of apparel trade preferences for Haiti, which are set to expire in 2025. 86 CRS Insight IN11760, China and Taiwan Both Seek to Join the CPTPP, by Brock R. Williams and Michael D. Sutherland. 87 In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States
and Brazil, the FTAA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. The and Brazil, the FTAA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. The
compromise moved the FTAA away from the comprehensive single-undertaking principle toward a two-tier framework compromise moved the FTAA away from the comprehensive single-undertaking principle toward a two-tier framework
comprising a set of “common rights and obligations” for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral comprising a set of “common rights and obligations” for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral
arrangements with country benefits related to commitments. The FTAA talks stalled in 2004. At the fourth Summit of arrangements with country benefits related to commitments. The FTAA talks stalled in 2004. At the fourth Summit of
the Americas, held in November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to the Americas, held in November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to
restart negotiations. Further action has not occurred. restart negotiations. Further action has not occurred.
88 See Guy Erb and Scott Sommers, Biden’s Trade Policy and Free Trade Areas, Washington International Trade Association, April 8, 2021. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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link to page link to page 33
36 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Members also may consider how the USMCA is affecting U.S. industries, especially the motor vehicle industry. Mexico and Canada recently requested a USMCA panel to resolve a dispute over the U.S. interpretation the rules of origin. For additional information, see CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal; and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson. Selected Country and Subregional Issues The Caribbean Caribbean Regional Issues The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories, including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south. In addition, geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of CARICOM (see Figure 2).Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

Suriname are located on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of
CARICOM (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries

Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist, CRS Graphics.
Notes: With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the
Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by
English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are
members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration,
harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states.
In recent years, U.S. policy toward the Caribbean often has been eclipsed by attention to foreign In recent years, U.S. policy toward the Caribbean often has been eclipsed by attention to foreign
policy crises elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, U.S. interests in the Caribbean policy crises elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, U.S. interests in the Caribbean
are diverse and include economic, political, and security concerns. The U.S.-Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political, and security concerns. The U.S.-Caribbean
relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages (involving trade, investment, relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages (involving trade, investment,
tourism, and large Caribbean diaspora communities in the United States) and by significant tourism, and large Caribbean diaspora communities in the United States) and by significant
cooperation on counternarcotics and other security efforts. Because most Caribbean countries, cooperation on counternarcotics and other security efforts. Because most Caribbean countries,
with the exception of Haiti, have relatively high per capita incomes (classified by the World Bank with the exception of Haiti, have relatively high per capita incomes (classified by the World Bank
as as upper-middle-income or or high-income economies), the region has not received large amounts of economies), the region has not received large amounts of
U.S. development assistance.U.S. development assistance.9289 However, the United States has responded with humanitarian However, the United States has responded with humanitarian
assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes that have devastated several countries in recent years. assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes that have devastated several countries in recent years.
Beginning in the early 2000s, the United States significantly expanded assistance to the region to Beginning in the early 2000s, the United States significantly expanded assistance to the region to
combat HIV/AIDS, with both Guyana and Haiti designated as focus countries in the President’s combat HIV/AIDS, with both Guyana and Haiti designated as focus countries in the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief initiative. Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief initiative.

92 World Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
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In December 2016, Congress enacted the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of In December 2016, Congress enacted the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of
2016 (P.L. 114-291), requiring the State Department to develop a multiyear strategy to support 2016 (P.L. 114-291), requiring the State Department to develop a multiyear strategy to support
U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. Completed in 2017, the strategy established a framework to U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. Completed in 2017, the strategy established a framework to
strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas: (1) security, with the objectives of strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas: (1) security, with the objectives of
countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and advancing citizen security; (2) countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and advancing citizen security; (2)
diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized engagement to forge greater cooperation diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized engagement to forge greater cooperation
at the OAS and the U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth at the OAS and the U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth
and private sector-led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S. and private sector-led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S.
exports of natural gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing exports of natural gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing
on increased exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a on increased exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a
focus on long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. focus on long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
89 World Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups. Congressional Research Service 30 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist, CRS Graphics. Notes: With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration, harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states. In 2019, the State Department issued a report to Congress on the implementation of its multiyear In 2019, the State Department issued a report to Congress on the implementation of its multiyear
strategy. The report maintained that limited budgets and human resources have constrained strategy. The report maintained that limited budgets and human resources have constrained
opportunities for deepening relations, but funding for the strategy’s security pillar has supported opportunities for deepening relations, but funding for the strategy’s security pillar has supported
meaningful engagement and produced tangible results for regional and U.S. security interests.meaningful engagement and produced tangible results for regional and U.S. security interests.9390
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean
nations are vulnerable to use as transit countries for illicit drugs from South America destined for nations are vulnerable to use as transit countries for illicit drugs from South America destined for
the U.S. and European markets. Many Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of the U.S. and European markets. Many Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of
violent crime, including murder, often associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the violent crime, including murder, often associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the
United States launched the CBSI in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to United States launched the CBSI in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to
reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program
dovetails with the first pillar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S. dovetails with the first pillar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S.
engagement, security. From FY2010 through FY2021, Congress appropriated a total of $751 engagement, security. From FY2010 through FY2021, Congress appropriated a total of $751
million (current dollars) for the CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries.million (current dollars) for the CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries.94 The
91 The 90 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report to Congress on Progress of Public Law (P.L.) 114-291: Efforts to Implement the Strategy for U.S. Engagement with the Caribbean Region, July 2019. 91 The 13 countries benefiting from the CBSI are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Congressional Research Service 31 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress program has targeted assistance in five areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law program has targeted assistance in five areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law
enforcement capacity building, (3) border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice enforcement capacity building, (3) border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice
sector reform, and (5) crime prevention and at-risk youth. For FY2022, the Biden Administration sector reform, and (5) crime prevention and at-risk youth. For FY2022, the Biden Administration
is requesting $66 million for the CBSIis requesting $66 million for the CBSI, 10% more than appropriated in FY2020 and about 12%
less than appropriated for FY2021. .
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative. Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and
once participated in Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, which supplied Venezuelan oil under once participated in Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, which supplied Venezuelan oil under
preferential financing terms. The United States launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative preferential financing terms. The United States launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative
(CESI) in 2014, with the goal of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the (CESI) in 2014, with the goal of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the
Caribbean.Caribbean.9592 The CESI includes various initiatives to boost energy security and sustainable The CESI includes various initiatives to boost energy security and sustainable
economic growth by attracting investment in a range of energy technologies through a focus on economic growth by attracting investment in a range of energy technologies through a focus on
improved governance; increased access to finance; and enhanced coordination among energy improved governance; increased access to finance; and enhanced coordination among energy
donors, governments, and stakeholders.donors, governments, and stakeholders.96

93 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report to Congress on Progress of Public Law (P.L.) 114-291: Efforts to Implement
the Strategy for U.S. Engagement with the Caribbean Region, July 2019.
94 The 13 countries benefiting from the CBSI are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
95 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/.
96 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/.
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93
Disaster Resilience and Climate Change. Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme
weather events such as tropical storms and hurricanes, which can significantly affect their weather events such as tropical storms and hurricanes, which can significantly affect their
economies and infrastructure. Recent scientific studies suggest climate change may be increasing economies and infrastructure. Recent scientific studies suggest climate change may be increasing
the intensity of such events.the intensity of such events.9794 In September 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread damage In September 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread damage
to the northwestern Bahamian islands of Grand Bahama and Abaco, with 70 confirmed deaths to the northwestern Bahamian islands of Grand Bahama and Abaco, with 70 confirmed deaths
and many missing.and many missing.9895 The United States responded with nearly $34 million in humanitarian The United States responded with nearly $34 million in humanitarian
assistance, including almost $25 million provided through USAID. Prior to the hurricane, the assistance, including almost $25 million provided through USAID. Prior to the hurricane, the
State Department had launched a U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership in April 2019, with the State Department had launched a U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership in April 2019, with the
goal of increasing regional disaster response capacity and promoting resilience to natural goal of increasing regional disaster response capacity and promoting resilience to natural
disasters. In December 2019, USAID announced it was providing $10 million to improve local disasters. In December 2019, USAID announced it was providing $10 million to improve local
resilience to disasters in the Caribbean. In 2020, USAID joined with CARICOM’s Caribbean resilience to disasters in the Caribbean. In 2020, USAID joined with CARICOM’s Caribbean
Disaster Emergency Management Agency to launch the Caribbean Climate Resilience Initiative. Disaster Emergency Management Agency to launch the Caribbean Climate Resilience Initiative.
As noted, the leaders of both Antigua and Barbuda and Jamaica were invited to participate in As noted, the leaders of both Antigua and Barbuda and Jamaica were invited to participate in
President Biden’s Leaders’ Summit on Climate President Biden’s Leaders’ Summit on Climate onin April April 22-23, 2021.
Pandemic and Vaccine Access. CARICOM leaders issued a statement in February 2021
expressing deep concern about inequitable access to vaccines for small, developing states. The
leaders urged developed countries, especially those in the neighborhood “whose populations
travel frequently to our region, and who host our largest diaspora populations,” to make available
some vaccines to CARICOM as an interim supply, given the immediacy of the need.99 In June
2021, the Biden Administration announced that, as part of a plan to share 80 million vaccine
doses globally, it would be donating vaccines to CARICOM countries.100 As part of this effort, the
State Department announced on August 12, 2021, that it would donate nearly 5.5 million Pfizer
vaccine doses, along with ancillary kits, to CARICOM countries; a first tranche of the vaccine
doses was delivered to several Caribbean countries in August.101 Separately, in July 2021, Haiti
received its first COVID-19 vaccines when the United States donated half a million doses.102
2021. Small Islands Initiative. In March 2021, the Biden Administration launched the Small and Less In March 2021, the Biden Administration launched the Small and Less
Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative, an economic cooperation framework to Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative, an economic cooperation framework to
strengthen U.S. collaboration with island countries, including in the Caribbean. The initiative’s strengthen U.S. collaboration with island countries, including in the Caribbean. The initiative’s
goals are to counter COVID-19 economic challenges, promote economic recovery, respond to the goals are to counter COVID-19 economic challenges, promote economic recovery, respond to the
climate crisis, and advance longer-term shared interests.climate crisis, and advance longer-term shared interests.10396
Congressional Action:. Over the past several years, Congress rejected budget requests that would Over the past several years, Congress rejected budget requests that would
have cut CBSI funding and appropriated foreign assistance to address other challenges in the have cut CBSI funding and appropriated foreign assistance to address other challenges in the
Caribbean, including disaster resilience, energy security, and climate change. Such support for Caribbean, including disaster resilience, energy security, and climate change. Such support for
Caribbean regional programs is continuing in the 117th Congress during consideration of the Caribbean regional programs is continuing in the 117th Congress during consideration of the
Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid request. Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid request.

97 See, for example, Kieran T Bhatia et al., “Recent Increases in Tropical Cyclone Intensification Rates,” Nature
Communications, vol. 10, no. 635 (2019).
98 The Government of the Bahamas, Cabinet & Disaster Management (NEMA), “Hurricane Dorian, NEMA Update,”
November 29, 2019.
99 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Communique—Issued at the Conclusion of the Thirty-Second Inter-sessional
Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community,” February 25, 2021.
100 White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Allocation Plan of 55 Million Doses to be
Shared Globally,” June 21, 2021.
101 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Donation of 5.5 Million Doses of COVID-19 Vaccine to CARICOM Countries,”
press statement, August 12, 2021.
102 “Haiti Gets First Half Million Doses of COVID-19 Vaccine,” VOA News, July 15, 2021.
103 The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84), would provide not less than $80 million for the CBSI (about 21% more than requested), 92 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/. 93 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/. 94 See, for example, Kieran T Bhatia et al., “Recent Increases in Tropical Cyclone Intensification Rates,” Nature Communications, vol. 10, no. 635 (2019). 95 The Government of the Bahamas, Cabinet & Disaster Management (NEMA), “Hurricane Dorian, NEMA Update,” November 29, 2019. 96 White House, “Fact Sheet: Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative,” March 22, 2021. White House, “Fact Sheet: Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative,” March 22, 2021.
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The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept.
117-84), would provide not less than $80 million for the CBSI (about 21% more than requested),
$3 million for the CESI, and $5 million for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. The report to the $3 million for the CESI, and $5 million for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. The report to the
bill also recommended $15 million for strengthening resilience to natural disasters in the bill also recommended $15 million for strengthening resilience to natural disasters in the
Caribbean and $10 million for inclusive economic growth in the region, with a primary focus on Caribbean and $10 million for inclusive economic growth in the region, with a primary focus on
small grants that advance entrepreneurship efforts of women, youth, and other disadvantaged small grants that advance entrepreneurship efforts of women, youth, and other disadvantaged
populations. The report also recommended that $2 million of increased funding for the Inter-populations. The report also recommended that $2 million of increased funding for the Inter-
American Foundation be targeted at building disaster resiliency in the Caribbean and that the U.S. American Foundation be targeted at building disaster resiliency in the Caribbean and that the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation prioritize investments in the Caribbean, International Development Finance Corporation prioritize investments in the Caribbean,
especially investments that support minority- and women-owned businesses and promote especially investments that support minority- and women-owned businesses and promote
women’s economic empowerment. women’s economic empowerment.
Two other bills introduced in the 117th Congress would affect U.S. policy toward the Caribbean.
H.R. 3524, the EAGLE Act, reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021,
would, The draft explanatory statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, S. 3075, introduced in October 2021, would recommend $74.5 million for the CBSI (almost 13% more than requested) and $6.5 million for the Caribbean Energy Initiative (as opposed to the CESI). According to the explanatory statement, the committee continues to support enhanced efforts to help Latin American and Caribbean countries achieve greater energy independence, including by improving governance, renewable energy development, energy efficiency, and electrical interconnectivity. The 117th Congress has taken action on two other bills with provisions on the Caribbean. The House-passed America COMPETES Act of 2022, H.R. 4521, approved February 4, 2022, would, among its provisions, require a multiyear strategy to promote regional cooperation with among its provisions, require a multiyear strategy to promote regional cooperation with
the Caribbean on energy issues and would authorize assistance for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience the Caribbean on energy issues and would authorize assistance for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience
Partnership from FY2022 to FY2024Partnership from FY2022 to FY2024 (such measures also were included in H.R. 3524, the EAGLE Act, ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2021). Another . Another bill, H.R. 4133, ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in September 2021, bill, H.R. 4133, would authorize $74.8 million for would authorize $74.8 million for
the CBSI for each fiscal year from FY2022 to FY2026 and would establish monitoring and the CBSI for each fiscal year from FY2022 to FY2026 and would establish monitoring and
reporting requirements for the program. reporting requirements for the program.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by , by
Mark P. Sullivan; Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF10407, CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke, by Clare Ribando Seelke and
Rachel L. Martin.
; CRS In Focus IF10912, Jamaica, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF10666, The Bahamas: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan. Cuba
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human
rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959 rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959
Cuban revolution. Cuban revolution. Current Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro in 2018.
Castro continued to head as president in 2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party the Cuban Communist Party untilin April 2021 April 2021 when he stepped down as
planned and Díaz-Canel was elected party leader. Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that . Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that
introduced some political and market-oriented reforms but continued the state’s dominance over introduced some political and market-oriented reforms but continued the state’s dominance over
the economy and the Communist Party’s predominant political role. A November 2020 the economy and the Communist Party’s predominant political role. A November 2020
government crackdown on the San Isidro Movementgovernment crackdown on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), a civil society group opposing restrictions , a civil society group opposing restrictions
on artistic expression, spurred a protest by several hundred Cubans. Motivated by the repression on artistic expression, spurred a protest by several hundred Cubans. Motivated by the repression
of the MSI, in February 2021, a group of Cuban recording artists released a song and music of the MSI, in February 2021, a group of Cuban recording artists released a song and music
video, video, Patria y Vida, critical of the government; it became an instant hit. , critical of the government; it became an instant hit.
On July 11, 2021, widespread anti-government demonstrations broke out in Havana and in cities On July 11, 2021, widespread anti-government demonstrations broke out in Havana and in cities
and towns throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans protesting shortages of food and and towns throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans protesting shortages of food and
medicine, daily blackouts, slow progress on COVID-19 vaccinations, and long-standing concerns medicine, daily blackouts, slow progress on COVID-19 vaccinations, and long-standing concerns
about the lack of freedom of expression and assembly. The government responded with harsh about the lack of freedom of expression and assembly. The government responded with harsh
measures, including widespread detentions of hundreds of protesters, activists, and journalists, measures, including widespread detentions of hundreds of protesters, activists, and journalists,
according to Cubanand Cuba human rights groups human rights groups, which reported summary trials for some of those reported summary trials for some of those
detained. The government blocked access to social media and messaging platforms that had been
instrumental in bringing Cubans to the streets.detained. The Cuban Congressional Research Service 33 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress government also denied permission and disrupted plans for a new dissident group, Archipiélago, to conduct a countrywide “civic march for change” on November 15, 2021. As of early February 2022, the human rights groups Cuban Prisoners Defenders reported 932 political prisoners (up from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which 626 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of conscience by CPD, 209 were under some form of conditional release, and 97 were imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.97
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced support from The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced support from
Venezuela, and U.S. economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the country’s economy Venezuela, and U.S. economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the country’s economy
contracted 11% in 2020, and the Economist Intelligence Unit contracted 11% in 2020, and the Economist Intelligence Unit projects 2.2estimated 0.1% growth in 2021.98 % growth in 2021.104

104 EIU, Cuba Country Report, 2nd quarter 2021.
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Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes,
but the slow pace of these reforms has not fostered sustainable growth and development. In but the slow pace of these reforms has not fostered sustainable growth and development. In
January 2021, Cuba eliminated its dual currency system; the long-debated reform January 2021, Cuba eliminated its dual currency system; the long-debated reform has spurred
inflation, but economists maintain it should boost productivity in the long term.ignited inflation, with estimates ranging from 300% to over 700% by the end of 2021.99
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept cases and deaths low, but both began Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept cases and deaths low, but both began
to increase in late 2020 and to increase in late 2020 and have surged since June 2021. As of September 1, 2021surged until August 2021; the country experienced another surge of cases in January 2022 due to the Omicron variant, but deaths remained low because of the country’s high vaccination rate. As of early February 2022, the country , the country
had reported over reported over 5,300 8,400 deaths, with a mortality rate of deaths, with a mortality rate of 4674 per 100,000 people. per 100,000 people.105100 Cuba has developed Cuba has developed
twoand manufactured three COVID-19 vaccines and, as of vaccines and, as of September 1, 2021early February 2022, had fully vaccinated , had fully vaccinated 3386% of its % of its population, one of the highest rates in the region.101population, far from
its original goal of having 70% vaccinated by the end of August.106
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions
aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy
toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation that strengthens—and at times eases—U.S. toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation that strengthens—and at times eases—U.S.
economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from
sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic
relations; the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; and an relations; the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; and an
increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through
regulatory changes. President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy in 2017, issuing a regulatory changes. President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy in 2017, issuing a
national security presidential memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions national security presidential memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump
Administration had largely abandoned engagement and had significantly increased sanctions, Administration had largely abandoned engagement and had significantly increased sanctions,
particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure Cuba on human rights and for its support of the particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure Cuba on human rights and for its support of the
Maduro government in Venezuela government. Maduro government in Venezuela government.
The Biden Administration has been reviewing policy toward Cuba. During the U.S. election
campaign, Biden said he would reverse Trump Administration policies that harmed the Cuban
people without advancing democracy and human rights.107In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba. The White House press secretary said The White House press secretary said
on March 9, 2021, that although a Cuba policy shift was not among the President’s top priorities, on March 9, 2021, that although a Cuba policy shift was not among the President’s top priorities,
the Administration was “committed to making human rights a core pillar” of policy and would the Administration was “committed to making human rights a core pillar” of policy and would
review policy decisions made in the prior Administration, including the decision to designate review policy decisions made in the prior Administration, including the decision to designate
Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.108 Sanctions imposed under the Trump Administration
remain in place. In May 2021, the State Department renewed Cuba’s designation as a country not
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. On July 1, it cited Cuba for labor abuses
associated with its foreign medical missions and continued to rank Cuba as Tier 3, the worst
ranking, in its 2021 Trafficking in Persons report.
Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.102 97 Cuban Prisoners Defenders, “Monthly Update of the Prisoners Defenders’ List of Political Prisoners in Cuba,” February 7, 2022. 98 EIU, Cuba Country Report, 4th quarter 2021. 99 Ibid, and Marc Frank, “Cuban Peso in Free Fall Against the Dollar,” Reuters, January 26, 2022. 100 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6, 2022. 101 Johns Hopkins, “Vaccination Progress Across the World,” February 6, 2022. 102 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021. Congressional Research Service 34 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress In the aftermath of the July 11 protests, the Biden Administration took several actions. President In the aftermath of the July 11 protests, the Biden Administration took several actions. President
Biden and other Administration officials expressed solidarity with the protesters and strongly Biden and other Administration officials expressed solidarity with the protesters and strongly
criticized the Cuban government for its repressive response. criticized the Cuban government for its repressive response. The Treasury DepartmentIn July and August 2021, the Department of the Treasury imposed imposed
four rounds of targeted financial sanctionsfour rounds of targeted financial sanctions, from July 22 to August 19, on three on several Cuban security Cuban security
entities and entities and eight security officials involved in actions to suppress peaceful, democratic protests officials involved in actions to suppress peaceful, democratic protests
in in Cuba. In November 2021, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on Cuban officials implicated in suppressing a planned civic march; in January 2022, it imposed visa restrictions on Cuban officials connected to the detention, sentencing, and imprisonment of the July 11 Cuba. As part of the Administration’s efforts to engage the international community on Cuba,
on July 26, the State Department joined with 20 countries to condemn the Cuban government’s
mass arrests and detention of protesters. Among other actions, the Administration established a

105 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” September 1, 2021.
106 Josh Holder, “Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,” New York Times, September 1, 2021.
107 Americas Quarterly, “Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America,” March 2, 2020 (updated October 29,
2020), at https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/.
108 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National
Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021.
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working group to identify the most effective ways to get remittances directly to the Cuban people,
held engagement sessions with members of the Cuban American community, began reviewing
plans to increase staffing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to facilitate consular services and
engagement with civil society, and stated it was actively collaborating with the private sector to
identify creative ways to ensure Cuban citizens have internet access.
Congressional Action:protesters. Among other actions, the Administration established a working group to identify the most effective ways to get remittances directly to the Cuban people, held engagement sessions with members of the Cuban American community, began reviewing plans to increase staffing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to facilitate consular services and engagement with civil society, and stated it was actively collaborating with the private sector to identify creative ways to ensure Cuban citizens have internet access. In congressional testimony in early February 2022, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affair Brian Nichols maintained that the State Department would soon be deploying temporary duty personnel offices to Havana to increase visa processing and is awaiting a White House decision on remittances. He noted that the remittances working group had provided recommendations to the White House on ways to permit the flow of remittances to Cuba without increasing funds that would go to the Cuban military.103 Congressional Action. Past Congresses supported U.S. funding for human rights and democracy Past Congresses supported U.S. funding for human rights and democracy
programs in Cuba and for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, as well as programs in Cuba and for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, as well as
resolutions expressing concern about human rights, but views among Members often diverged resolutions expressing concern about human rights, but views among Members often diverged
regarding the best approach to influence the Cuban government’s behavior. regarding the best approach to influence the Cuban government’s behavior.
The 117th Congress is considering the Administration’s FY2022 foreign operations request of $20 The 117th Congress is considering the Administration’s FY2022 foreign operations request of $20
million for Cuba democracy programs (same as appropriated annually since FY2014) and million for Cuba democracy programs (same as appropriated annually since FY2014) and
nearly $13$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting (same as appropriated in FY2021). million for Cuba broadcasting (same as appropriated in FY2021). On July 28, the House
approved its version of the Both the House-approved and the Senate-introduced versions of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations billforeign aid appropriations bill, (H.R. 4373H.R. 4373 (, H.Rept. 117-84H.Rept. 117-84), which
; S. 3075) would fully fund both programswould fully fund both programs at the requested amounts. Of the $20 million for Cuba . Of the $20 million for Cuba democracy programs, the House bill would provide not less than $5 milliondemocracy
programs in the bill, not less than $5 million would be made available for programs to support to support
free enterprise andfree enterprise, private business private business organizationorganizations, and people-to-people and people-to-people educational and cultural and cultural
activities. The report to the bill also contains a reporting requirement on the results of the
Administration’s Cuba policy review.
In April and May 2021, the Senate approved two Cuba human rights resolutions: S.Res. 37,
expressing solidarity with the MSI, and S.Res. 81, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a woman-led
nonviolent human rights group. After the July 11 protests, the Senate passed S.Res. 310 on
August 3, expressing solidarity with Cubans demonstrating peacefully, condemning the
government’s repression, and calling for the release of those detained. On July 30, the Senate
approved S. 2045activities. In contrast, the version in the Senate would provide $5 million for such activities in addition to the $20 million in democracy funding. On human rights in Cuba, the House approved H.Res. 760 in early November 2021 and the Senate approved S.Res. 310 in August; both resolutions expressed solidarity with Cubans demonstrating peacefully, condemned Cuba’s acts of repression, and called for the immediate release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. In other action, the Senate passed: S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI; S.Res. 81 in May, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July, which would rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a , which would rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a Cuban
democracy activist, Oswaldo Payá, who died in 2012democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022, commending Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists, including José Daniel Ferrer Garcia. .
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10045, For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P. , by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS Report R45657, Sullivan; CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump
Administration, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Report RL31139, , by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel
103 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Overview of U.S. Priorities in the Western Hemisphere,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, February 3, 2022. Congressional Research Service 35 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report R43835, , by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of
International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack. , by Dianne E. Rennack.
Haiti
In July and August 2021, a presidential assassination, an earthquake, and a tropical storm In July and August 2021, a presidential assassination, an earthquake, and a tropical storm
multipliedexacerbated Haiti’s political, social, and economic woes. The aftermath of these events, on top of Haiti’s political, social, and economic woes. The aftermath of these events, on top of
several preexisting crises in Haiti, likely points to a period of major instability, presenting several preexisting crises in Haiti, likely points to a period of major instability, presenting
challenges for U.S. policymakers and for congressional oversight of the U.S. response and challenges for U.S. policymakers and for congressional oversight of the U.S. response and
assistanceassistance.
Armed assailants assassinated Haitian, including to Haitian emigration and foreign assistance. The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in President Jovenel Moïse in his private home in the capital, the capital,
Port-au-Prince, Port-au-Prince, early on July 7, 2021. Many details of the attack remain under investigation.
Haitian police have arrested more than 40 people, including former Colombian soldiers, several
members of Moïse’s security detail, two Haitian Americans, and a Haitian with long-standing ties
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to Florida.109 A Pentagon spokesperson said the U.S. military helped train a “small number” of the
Colombian suspects in the past.110
Under the administration of the late President Moïse, who was inaugurated in February 2017,
Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, and resurgent gang violence.
Government instability increased after May 2019, when the Superior Court of Auditors delivered
a report to the Senate alleging Moïse had embezzled millions of dollars, which Moïse denied.
Since that time, periodic mass demonstrations have called for the provision of government
services, an end to corruption, and Moïse’s resignation; Moïse had said he would not resign.
on July 7, 2021, left a power vacuum without a clear path forward. Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches during his tenure led to the government not led to the government not
organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary electionsorganizing elections scheduled for 2019. The terms of the entire lower . The terms of the entire lower
Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all
local government posts, without newly elected officials to take their places. Moïse had been local government posts, without newly elected officials to take their places. Moïse had been
ruling by decree since then. ruling by decree since then. After his death, Haiti had no president or legislature and virtually no elected officials functioning at any level. The lack of elected officials makes the question of presidential The lack of elected officials makes the question of presidential
succession and the organization of elections difficult, as officials are not in place to carry out the succession and the organization of elections difficult, as officials are not in place to carry out the
procedures outlined in various articles of the Haitian constitution. procedures outlined in various articles of the Haitian constitution.
In the assassination’s immediate aftermath, interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph was in charge,
as recognized by U.S. and U.N. officials, and he said the police and military were in control of
Haitian security.111 Joseph became interim prime minister in April 2021. The day before the
assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be prime minister, but Henry had yet to be sworn in.
On July 9, one-third of the Haitian Senate, acting without a quorum, declared Senate president
Joseph Lambert provisional president. A Biden Administration delegation met with all three
claimants to power on July 11 in response to Haiti’s request for security and investigative
assistance.112 On July 17, U.S. and U.N. officials changed their position and, along with other
diplomats, expressed support for Henry as prime minister, calling for the formation of a
consensus government and the holding of credible elections as soon as possible.113 Joseph agreed
to step down as prime minister.
U.N. and U.S. officials previously pressed Haiti to hold overdue legislative and municipal
elections as soon as possible. Instead, the Moïse government announced it would hold a
referendum on a new constitution and simultaneous legislative and presidential elections on
September 19. Moïse generated controversy when he appointed by decree, without broad political
consensus, a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to organize the referendum and elections. The
moves were arguably unconstitutional; the constitution stipulates that all three branches of
government are to choose electoral council members (Article 192), two consecutive legislatures
are to approve constitutional changes (Articles 282-283), and constitutional amendment by
referendum is “strictly forbidden” (Article 284.3). The Biden Administration said in mid-July that
it expects Haiti to hold elections,114 and its FY2022 request includes $8 million to strengthen

109 Widlore Mérancourt, Samantha Schmidt, Shawn Boburg, “In Haiti, a Clouded Assassination Probe Prompts Fears of
Political Crackdowns,” Washington Post, August 7, 2021.
110 Deirdre Shesgreen, Tom Vanden Brook, “U.S. Military Trained ‘Small Number’ of the Colombian Suspects in Haiti
Assassination, Pentagon Says,” USA Today, July 15, 2021.
111 Constant Méheut, Michael Crowley, Natalie Kitroeff, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Catherine Porter, “Political Crisis in
Haiti Deepens over Rival Claims to Power,” New York Times, July 8, 2021.
112 “U.S. Delegation to Haiti Met All Three Claimants to Power—White House,” Reuters, July 12, 2021.
113 “Communiqué du Core Group,” Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH), Centre de presse, July 17,
2021.
114Emily Horne, “Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on U.S. Government Delegation to Haiti,” July 12,
2021.
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electoral and other institutions, promote political party competitiveness, and protect human rights.
The CEP postponed elections, scheduling votes for president, the legislature and the
constitutional referendum for November 7 and runoff national and single-round municipal and
local elections for January 23, 2022.115
According to U.N. reports, gangs challenge the Haitian state’s authority.116 Violent crime has
increased: in 2020, kidnappings increased by 200% over 2019, murders increased by 20%, and
reported rapes increased by 12%.117 It also raises questions about the legitimacy of any interim governments. Gangs have been taking advantage of this power vacuum to expand their criminal activities; some observers estimate that gangs now control as much as 50%-60% of Haitian territory.104 On July 17, 2021, after a Haitian power struggle, U.S. and U.N. officials shifted support from the acting prime minister to prime minister-designate Ariel Henry, calling for the formation of a consensus government to hold credible elections as soon as possible and to ensure every citizen receives adequate public services. Some observers have questioned that support, both because Henry was not elected and because of alleged ties to the president’s assassination.105 Henry’s term was due to expire on February 7, 2022, when Moïse’s term would have ended, adding to the urgency of Haitians agreeing on some sort of interim government to follow his. Nonetheless, Henry will most likely stay in place for the time being. Ten senators remain in office but do not constitute a quorum and so cannot act officially. Nonetheless, after the assassination, they voted for Senate leader Joseph Lambert to succeed Moïse. In October 2021, Lambert called for Henry to resign and be replaced by a new interim government, with himself as president.106 The senators argue that their terms expire in January 2023; Henry argues they end in 2022.107 Various coalitions of civil society groups and political parties have proposed plans for an interim government to manage Haiti until conditions are suitable for holding elections, the major ones 104 New York Times, “‘It’s Terror’: In Haiti, Gangs Gain Power as Security Vacuum Grows,” October 27, 2021; and CANANews, “Haiti-Crime-Former Government Official Says Kidnappers Are Better Equipped Than Police,” December 6, 2021. 105 See, for example, Washington Post, “Read: Resignation Letter from U.S. Special Envoy for Haiti, Daniel Foote,” September 23, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary Brian A. Nichols on the Recent International Partners Meeting on Haiti,” special briefing, December 17, 2021. 106 Matt Rivers, “Exclusive: Haiti’s Senate Leader Calls on Prime Minister to Resign,” CNN, October 27, 2021. 107 Telesur, “Haiti: Duration of the Mandate of 10 Senators Prompts Conflicts,” January 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 36 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress being the so-called Montana Group, signers of the Louisiana Unitary Accord, and backers of de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s plan, which he presented in September 2021. Henry’s plan includes holding a referendum on constitutional changes prior to elections, despite constitutional amendment by referendum being “strictly forbidden” by the current constitution (Article 284.3). Henry also dissolved the Provisional Electoral Council, which would have organized elections. At a meeting with donors on January 21, 2022, Henry reportedly said he expected to install a new provisional electoral council within days and pledged to hold elections in 2022.108 According to U.N. reports, gangs challenge the Haitian state’s authority and are often better armed and better equipped than law-enforcement authorities.109 According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, gangs have operated with the support of some Haitian politicians, receiving money, political protection, and firearms in exchange for carrying out attacks designed to create instability and suppress protests over living conditions.110 Some gangs have called for Henry to resign, violently preventing him from carrying out official functions and creating a nationwide fuel shortage in protest. Armed groups attacked Henry on January 1, 2022, in what his office said was an assassination attempt. The Haitian National Police (HNP) force, which became The Haitian National Police (HNP) force, which became
increasingly professional with the support of U.N. peacekeeping forces (2004-2017) and U.S. and increasingly professional with the support of U.N. peacekeeping forces (2004-2017) and U.S. and
other international assistance, has been unable to maintain controlother international assistance, has been unable to maintain control. According to the U.N., the
HNP has committed human rights abuses, including 19 extrajudicial killings in fall 2019.118 The
HNP is underfunded and in the face of increased violence, murders, and kidnapping (including that of 16 U.S. missionaries in October, who have since been released or escaped). The HNP is underfunded and is smaller than international standards for the country’s population. smaller than international standards for the country’s population.
According to the According to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, gangs are often better
armed and better equipped than law-enforcement authorities.119 According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, gangs operate with the support of some Haitian politicians, receiving money,
political protection, and firearms in exchange for carrying out attacks designed to create
instability and suppress protests over living conditions.120U.N., the HNP has committed human rights abuses, including 19 extrajudicial killings in fall 2019.111
Political instability and extreme vulnerability to natural disasters contribute to Haiti being the Political instability and extreme vulnerability to natural disasters contribute to Haiti being the
poorest and one of the most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere. According to the poorest and one of the most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere. According to the
World Bank, a weak economy, political turmoil, and the COVID-19 pandemic reversed modest World Bank, a weak economy, political turmoil, and the COVID-19 pandemic reversed modest
reductions in poverty, leaving almost 60% of Haitians in poverty in 2020. Over 96% of the reductions in poverty, leaving almost 60% of Haitians in poverty in 2020. Over 96% of the
population is vulnerable to natural disasters.population is vulnerable to natural disasters.121 On August 14,112 In August 2021, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 2021, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake
struck Haiti, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and affecting about 1.2 million people, mostly in the struck Haiti, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and affecting about 1.2 million people, mostly in the
southwestern peninsula.southwestern peninsula.122113 The quake destroyed 84,000 homes and many hospitals, schools, and The quake destroyed 84,000 homes and many hospitals, schools, and
crops. Three days later, Tropical Storm Grace hit Haiti, causing mudslides and flooding. crops. Three days later, Tropical Storm Grace hit Haiti, causing mudslides and flooding. The
combined damage worsened conditions and continues to make delivery of humanitarian aid
difficult. Haiti already had one of the highest levels of food insecurity in the world, with 42% of Haiti already had one of the highest levels of food insecurity in the world, with 42% of
the population facing acute food insecurity in September 2020. In the areas hardest hit by the the population facing acute food insecurity in September 2020. In the areas hardest hit by the
recentAugust earthquake, according to the World Food Programme, the number of people urgently earthquake, according to the World Food Programme, the number of people urgently
needing food assistance needing food assistance has increased by one-third.114 Two more earthquakes hit the area on January 24, 2022. 108 Rob Gillies and Dánica Coto, “Canada, U.S. and Allies Talk Aid for Haiti at Meeting,” Associated Press, January 21, 2022. 109 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti, “SRSG La Lime Statement to the Security Council,” October 5, 2020; and U.N. Security Council, “The Question Concerning Haiti,” S/PV.8729, February 20, 2020, p. 3. 110increased by one-third.123
The Biden Administration requested $188 million in U.S. assistance for Haiti in FY2022, $51
million of which would be for development assistance. The United States donated 500,000 doses
of COVID-19 vaccines that arrived on July 14; Haiti’s first vaccination program began on July

115 Samuel Celine, “New Date Set for Haiti Elections, Opposition Wants New Electoral Council,” Haitian Times,
August 13, 2021.
116 “SRSG La Lime Statement to the Security Council,” BINUH News, October 5, 2020.
117 U.N. Security Council Provisional report S/PV.8729, February 20, 2020.
118 Marta Hurtado, “Press Briefing Note on Haiti Unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
November 1, 2019.
119 U.N. Security Council Provisional report S/PV.8729, February 20, 2020.
120 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human
Rights Day: Designations Target Human Rights Abusers in Haiti, Yemen, and Russia,” press release, December 10, Rights Day: Designations Target Human Rights Abusers in Haiti, Yemen, and Russia,” press release, December 10,
2020. 2020.
121111 Marta Hurtado, “Press Briefing Note on Haiti Unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, November 1, 2019. 112 “The World Bank in Haiti: Overview,” “The World Bank in Haiti: Overview,” April 26, 2021, accessed August 31November 8, 2021, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/, 2021, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/
country/haiti/overview. country/haiti/overview.
122113 Amanda Coletta and Ellen Francis, “Stranded by Tropical Storm Grace, Haiti Earthquake Survivors Seek Shelter,” Amanda Coletta and Ellen Francis, “Stranded by Tropical Storm Grace, Haiti Earthquake Survivors Seek Shelter,”
Washington Post, August 19, 2021. , August 19, 2021.
123114 Laura Gottesdiener, “Haiti’s Hunger Crisis Bites Deeper After Devastating Quake,” Reuters, August 30, 2021. Laura Gottesdiener, “Haiti’s Hunger Crisis Bites Deeper After Devastating Quake,” Reuters, August 30, 2021.
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16.124 On July 22, the State Department appointed Ambassador Daniel Foote to serve as its
Special Envoy for Haiti. Although President Biden said the United States is ready to help work
for a secure Haiti, he also said sending in U.S. troops was not currently on the agenda.125
Following the August earthquake, USAID deployed a disaster response team, with U.S. military
transportation support, and announced $32 million in humanitarian assistance.126
Congressional Action. On March 12, The Biden Administration requested $188 million in U.S. assistance for Haiti in FY2022, $51 million of which would be for development assistance. The United States donated 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine doses in July 2021 through COVAX; Haiti returned more than half of the doses in October, since they were set to expire before Haiti could administer them. Haiti reportedly will receive future doses in exchange. From November through January 2022, the United States donated almost 248,000 additional vaccine doses through COVAX.115 As of early February 2022, less than 1% of Haiti’s 11 million people were fully vaccinated.116 In December 2021, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols met with 14 partner countries, several international organizations, and the Haitian foreign minister to discuss challenges in Haiti. The group agreed that the HNP needs additional international support and that “political dialogue must continue among all sectors of Haitian society to build consensus on a political accord.” The group also sought concrete pledges from participants for security, political, and economic assistance.117 On January 21, 2022, two dozen senior international officials pledged to increase aid, including to the HNP, focusing on rule of law, justice, and human rights.118 Congressional Action. In March 2021, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a 2021, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a
hearing on policy recommendations for the Biden Administration on Haitihearing on policy recommendations for the Biden Administration on Haiti (see Appendix)..127 The House passed The House passed
the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act (H.R. 2471) the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act (H.R. 2471)
onin June June 29, 2021. The bill was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations on July 12. 2021, and the Senate approved the bill, with an amendment, on January 13, 2022. The bill would measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and efforts to The bill would measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and efforts to
address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. OnIn July July 29, 2021, the 2021, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered reported H.Res. 549, which would condemn the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered reported H.Res. 549, which would condemn the
assassination of the Haitian president and urge U.S. and global support of Haitian-led solutionsassassination of the Haitian president and urge U.S. and global support of Haitian-led solutions. Measures to extend from 2025 to 2035 duty-free treatment with respect to imports from Haiti under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act have been introduced in both chambers as the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2021 (S. 3279 in November 2021; H.R. 6136 in December 2021). .
See also CRS Insight IN11699, See also CRS Insight IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential Assassination, by Maureen , by Maureen
Taft-Morales; and, for earlier background, CRS Report R45034, Taft-Morales; and, for earlier background, CRS Report R45034, Haiti’s Political and Economic
Conditions, by Maureen Taft-Morales. , by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
Congress has demonstrated sustained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading Congress has demonstrated sustained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading
partner with which the United States has a close but complicated relationship. In recent decades, partner with which the United States has a close but complicated relationship. In recent decades,
U.S.-Mexican relations have improved, as the countries have become close trade partners and U.S.-Mexican relations have improved, as the countries have become close trade partners and
have worked to address migration, crime, and other issues. Nevertheless, the history of U.S. have worked to address migration, crime, and other issues. Nevertheless, the history of U.S.
115 PAHO, Tracker COVAX Initiative – COVID-19 Vaccine Deliveries in the Americas, February 3, 2022; Haiti Libre, “Haiti - Covid: Vaccination Failure, Haiti Will His [sic] Exchange Expired Vaccines,” October 14, 2021; and CE Noticias Financieras, “Haiti to Return Thousands of COVID Vaccines to U.S.; They’re Close to Expiring,” October 13, 2021. 116 Johns Hopkins, “Vaccination Progress Across the World,” February 6, 2022. 117 U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary Brian A. Nichols on the Recent International Partners Meeting on Haiti,” special briefing, December 17, 2021. 118 Rob Gillies and Dánica Coto, “Canada, U.S., and Allies Talk Aid for Haiti at Meeting,” Associated Press, January 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 38 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico and the asymmetrical power dynamics of the relationship military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico and the asymmetry in the relationship continue to
provoke periodic tensions. provoke periodic tensions.
Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took office for a Obrador, leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took office for a
six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador, who created MORENA in 2014, is the first six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador, who created MORENA in 2014, is the first
Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both legislative chambers, Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both legislative chambers,
although the size of those majorities decreased following June 2021 midterm elections. In although the size of those majorities decreased following June 2021 midterm elections. In
addition to combating corruption, he pledged to build infrastructure in southern Mexico, revive addition to combating corruption, he pledged to build infrastructure in southern Mexico, revive
the poorly performing state oil company, address citizen security through social programs, and the poorly performing state oil company, address citizen security through social programs, and
adopt a noninterventionist foreign policy. adopt a noninterventionist foreign policy.
López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained relatively high (59% in Junehigh (65% in November 2021), even as his 2021), even as his
government has struggled to address government has struggled to address rising organized crime-related violence and the health and

124 Chase Harrison, “Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas,
August 24, 2021, and “Start of the COVID-19 Vaccination Campaign in Haiti: First Persons Vaccinated Less Than 48
Hours After the Arrival of the First Vaccines,” Pan American Health Organization, July 17, 2021.
125Joseph Biden and Angela Merkel, “Remarks by President Biden and Chancellor Merkel of the Federal Republic of
Germany in Press Conference,” The White House, July 15, 2021.
126 USAID, “Haiti Earthquake, Fact Sheet #8, FY2021,” August 26, 2021.
127 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Policy Recommendations on Haiti for the Biden
Administration, hearing, March 12, 2021, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2021/3/policy-recommendations-on-haiti-
for-the-biden-administration.
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organized crime-related violence and the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had resulted in more than economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had resulted in more than 259309,000 deaths as ,000 deaths as
of of September 1, 2021.128early February 2022.119 Supporters have generally praised the government’s social programs and Supporters have generally praised the government’s social programs and
minimum-wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with average Mexicans minimum-wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with average Mexicans
through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Many observers have criticized through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Many observers have criticized
López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, autonomousindependent government institutions, institutions, and judicial independence. His government has also received criticism for its austere fiscal policy, which has reduced government spending, especially for autonomous institutions, while sparing and judicial
independence, as well as his government’s overly austere budgets, which have spared his priority his priority
infrastructure projects from cuts.infrastructure projects from cuts.120 Since López Obrador took office, prosecutors have not pursued Since López Obrador took office, prosecutors have not pursued
allegations of corruptioncorruption allegations involving the president’s allies. involving the president’s allies.129121
U.S.-Mexico relations have remained generally cordial under López Obrador. Nevertheless, U.S.-Mexico relations have remained generally cordial under López Obrador. Nevertheless,
tensions have emerged over issues including border security, U.S. investigations of Mexican tensions have emerged over issues including border security, U.S. investigations of Mexican
officials, and policies Mexico has adopted that have negatively affected U.S. energy investors.officials, and policies Mexico has adopted that have negatively affected U.S. energy investors.130
The López Obrador government enacted labor reform measures (May 2019), which The López Obrador government enacted labor reform measures (May 2019), which helped leadcontributed to to
U.S. congressional approval of implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113) for the United States- U.S. congressional approval of implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113) for the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The government accommodated the Trump Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The government accommodated the Trump
Administration’s restrictive border and asylum policy changes, which shifted more of the burden Administration’s restrictive border and asylum policy changes, which shifted more of the burden
of interdicting migrants and offering asylum from the United States to Mexico. The October 2020 of interdicting migrants and offering asylum from the United States to Mexico. The October 2020
arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos in the United States on drug arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos in the United States on drug
trafficking charges deeply angered the Mexican government. Despite Cienfuegos’s subsequent trafficking charges deeply angered the Mexican government. Despite Cienfuegos’s subsequent
release, Mexico enacted legislation to limit U.S. law enforcement operations and U.S.-Mexican release, Mexico enacted legislation to limit U.S. law enforcement operations and U.S.-Mexican
intelligence sharing in the country.intelligence sharing in the country.131122 Security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative, a security Security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative, a security
and rule-of-law partnership for which Congress has appropriated more than $3.3 billion since and rule-of-law partnership for which Congress has appropriated more than $3.3 billion since
FY2008, FY2008, has stalled at the federal level in Mexico, but state and local cooperation stalled at the federal level in Mexico, but state and local cooperation continuescontinued. .
Despite some lingering tension in relations, Mexico is directly involved in addressing several Despite some lingering tension in relations, Mexico is directly involved in addressing several
challenges facing U.S. policymakers. challenges facing U.S. policymakers. President López Obrador and President Biden have
committed to collaborate on bilateral and regional migration issues and on COVID-19 response
and recovery, while reaffirming the importance of the security partnership. High-level talks have
continued, including an in-person meeting between Vice President Harris and President López
Obrador in Mexico in June 2021.132 National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Homeland Security
Secretary Mayorkas, and other top U.S. national security officials met with President López
Obrador and several of his Cabinet secretaries in August 2021.133 A High-Level Economic
Dialogue is scheduled for September 2021, and a Cabinet-level security dialogue also is planned
to occur this year. The August 2021 Supreme A High-Level Economic Dialogue took place in September 2021, and a Cabinet-level security dialogue convened in October to launch a new bicentennial framework for security cooperation to replace the Mérida Initiative. The August 2021 Supreme 119 Carrin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, January 6, 2022; and Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6, 2022. 120 Zedryk Raziel, “Recorte de 75% Compromete Pagos de Servicios Básicos del Gobierno y Arriesga Inversiones en Salud y Ciencia,” Animal Político, June 1, 2020. 121 Americas Society/Council of the Americas and Control Risks, The Capacity to Commit Corruption Index: 2021. 122 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A Dangerous Backtrack on the US-Mexico Security Relationship,” Brookings Institution, December 21, 2021. Congressional Research Service 39 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Court ruling ordering the Biden Administration to Court ruling ordering the Biden Administration to
reinstate the MPP policy reinstate the MPP policy has prompted new discussions on how and under what conditions prompted new discussions on how and under what conditions
Mexico would agree to restart the program. The Biden Administration has provided Mexico with
more than 5.8 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, some of which Mexico has used in northern
border states in hopes of hastening the reopening of the U.S.-Mexico border.134

128 Carrin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, August
18, 2021; and Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Research Center, “Mexico,” September 1, 2021, at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/mexico.
129 Americas Society/Council of the Americas and Control Risks, The Capacity to Commit Corruption Index: 2021.
130 Reuters, “U.S. Voices Concern to Mexico About ‘Deteriorating Climate’ for Energy Investors,” April 2, 2021.
131 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A Dangerous Backtrack on the US-Mexico Security Relationship,” Brookings Institution,
December 21, 2021.
132 The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. -Mexico Bilateral Cooperation,” June 8, 2021.
133 The White House, “Readout from NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Senior Administration Official Travel to
Mexico,” August 11, 2021.
134 Chase Harrison, “Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas,
August 24, 2021.
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Congressional Action: Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has
overseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, the
COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and USMCA implementation.
Mexico would agree to restart the program. MPP restarted in December 2021 under new guidance, providing more assistance with shelter and other services to migrants enrolled in the program and expanding the number of migrants who fall within its criteria. The Biden Administration had provided Mexico with some 11 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines as of December 2021, some of which Mexico had distributed in northern border states to help facilitate the border’s reopening in November 2021.123 The Administration has expressed increasing concerns about a López Obrador-backed electricity reform, now under consideration in the Mexican Congress, that would guarantee a majority of the electricity market to Mexico’s state-owned electricity commission at the expense of private U.S. energy producers. Presidents Biden and López Obrador held bilateral and trilateral (with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) meetings during the North American Leaders summit in November 2021, the first since 2016. Congressional Action. Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request for Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request for
Mexico of $116.5 million, which is nearly 27% lower than the estimated FY2021 appropriation of Mexico of $116.5 million, which is nearly 27% lower than the estimated FY2021 appropriation of
$158.9 million. The Administration’s FY2022 request for INCLE aid for Mexico is $44 million $158.9 million. The Administration’s FY2022 request for INCLE aid for Mexico is $44 million
less than the FY2021 estimated appropriation. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign less than the FY2021 estimated appropriation. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign
aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide $158.9 million for assistance aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide $158.9 million for assistance
to Mexico. It would require a comprehensive review of funds provided through the Mérida to Mexico. It would require a comprehensive review of funds provided through the Mérida
Initiative and a report on any funds appropriated to Mexican agencies involved in migration Initiative and a report on any funds appropriated to Mexican agencies involved in migration
management within 90 days of the bill’s enactment. The measure also would require reports on management within 90 days of the bill’s enactment. The measure also would require reports on
plans to improve data collection on synthetic drug trafficking, crimes committed along Mexico’s plans to improve data collection on synthetic drug trafficking, crimes committed along Mexico’s
northern highways, combating fentanyl flows, and the efficacy of U.S. drug control tools such as northern highways, combating fentanyl flows, and the efficacy of U.S. drug control tools such as
sanctions.
Other legislation would affectsanctions. The Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of the FY2022 foreign aid bill (S. 3075) does not stipulate a total funding level for Mexico but would specify $80 million in INCLE funds. The explanatory statement accompanying the bill would require a review of the Mérida Initiative and a report on Mexico’s human rights efforts. Other legislation would address U.S. relations with Mexico, including H.R. 3524, the EAGLE Act, U.S. relations with Mexico, including H.R. 3524, the EAGLE Act,
reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021, which would require a report reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021, which would require a report
on how the United States, Mexico, and Canada could work together to reduce methane and other on how the United States, Mexico, and Canada could work together to reduce methane and other
emissions and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA, which prohibits importation of goods emissions and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA, which prohibits importation of goods
produced by forced labor. S. 1201, the U.S. Climate Act, introduced in the Senate in April 2021, produced by forced labor. S. 1201, the U.S. Climate Act, introduced in the Senate in April 2021,
contains similar provisions. The bill would require the Secretary of State to produce a report contains similar provisions. The bill would require the Secretary of State to produce a report
including a strategy for reengaging with Mexico and Canada on methane reduction targets and including a strategy for reengaging with Mexico and Canada on methane reduction targets and
would require the President to develop a strategy for enhancing trilateral cooperation on climate would require the President to develop a strategy for enhancing trilateral cooperation on climate
issues.issues.
For additional information, see CRS For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11635, Mexico: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers
in 2021, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R42917, Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RL32934, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends,
Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS , by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada
(USMCA) Trade AgreementAgreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS In Focus ; CRS In Focus
IF10578, IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021FY2008-FY2022, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS
Report R41576, Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. , by June S.
Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; , by Clare Ribando Seelke;
CRS In Focus IF10400, CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico
Security Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS In Focus IF11669, , by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS In Focus IF11669,
Human 123 Chase Harrison, “Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, December 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 40 link to page 46 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances, by Clare Ribando , by Clare Ribando
Seelke and Rachel L. Martin. Seelke and Rachel L. Martin.
Central America’s Northern Triangle
The Northern Triangle region of Central America ( The Northern Triangle region of Central America (seesee Figure 3) has has received considerable received considerable
attention from U.S. policymakers over the past decade, as it has become a major transit corridor attention from U.S. policymakers over the past decade, as it has become a major transit corridor
for illicit drugs and, in some years, has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular for illicit drugs and, in some years, has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular
migration to the United States. In migration to the United States. In the first 10 months of FY2021, for example, U.S. authorities FY2021, for example, U.S. authorities
encountered approximately encountered approximately 250319,000 Hondurans, ,000 Hondurans, 221283,000 Guatemalans, and ,000 Guatemalans, and 7599,000 Salvadorans ,000 Salvadorans
at the Southwest border.at the Southwest border.135 124 These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-
rooted challenges in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial rooted challenges in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial
systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic and systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic and three
tropical storms exacerbated conditions in the region in 2020a series of tropical storms have exacerbated socio-economic difficulties in the region, contributing to a sharp increase in poverty and food insecurity since 2020. Political conditions also have deteriorated over the past two years, as government officials in all three Northern Triangle countries have taken steps to hinder anti-corruption efforts and Salvadoran officials have significantly eroded checks and balances and have restricted civil liberties. U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. , contributing to a sharp increase in

135 CBP, “Southwest Land Border Encounters,” August 12, 2021.
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food insecurity while creating opportunities for criminal organizations to extend their reach and
for governments to curtail civil liberties and engage in corruption.
In 2014, the Obama Administration determined it was in the national security interests of the In 2014, the Obama Administration determined it was in the national security interests of the
United States to work with Central American governments to improve living conditions in the United States to work with Central American governments to improve living conditions in the
region. It drafted a new U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and, with congressional region. It drafted a new U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and, with congressional
support, significantly increased annual foreign assistance for the region. From FY2016 to support, significantly increased annual foreign assistance for the region. From FY2016 to
FY2021, Congress appropriated a total of more than $3.7 billion to implement the strategy, FY2021, Congress appropriated a total of more than $3.7 billion to implement the strategy,
allocating most of the funds to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. allocating most of the funds to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Figure 3. Map of Central America

Source: CRS Graphics. CRS Graphics.
Note: Geographically located in Central America, Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Geographically located in Central America, Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
as well as the Central American Integration System. as well as the Central American Integration System.
124 It is unclear how many of these were unique individuals versus repeat encounters. CBP, “Southwest Land Border Encounters,” January 24, 2022. Congressional Research Service 41 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress The Trump Administration initially maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central The Trump Administration initially maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America but effectively halted the initiative in March 2019, when it suspended aid to the America but effectively halted the initiative in March 2019, when it suspended aid to the
Northern Triangle due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the
region. The Administration reprogrammed $396region. The Administration reprogrammed $396.2 million to other foreign policy priorities and million to other foreign policy priorities and
withheldwithheld most of the remaining assistance for the remaining assistance for more than a yearthe region for up to 14 months while it negotiated a series of while it negotiated a series of
border security and asylum agreements with the Northern Triangle governments. The aid border security and asylum agreements with the Northern Triangle governments. The aid
suspension suspension forced U.S. agencies to scale back projects significantly and cancel planned activities.
In Honduras, for example, the number of beneficiaries of USAID programs fell from 1.5 million
in March 2019 to 640,000 in January 2021.136
adversely affected nearly 39% of the State Department’s assistance projects and 81% of USAID’s assistance projects in the region.125 Biden Administration Policy. The Biden Administration has placed renewed emphasis on engagement with Central America. In The Biden Administration has placed renewed emphasis on engagement with Central America. In
July 2021, pursuant to the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-July 2021, pursuant to the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-
260, Division FF, Subtitle F) and E.O. 14010, the Administration released a new U.S. Strategy for 260, Division FF, Subtitle F) and E.O. 14010, the Administration released a new U.S. Strategy for
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America. The strategy seeks to foster Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America. The strategy seeks to foster
systemic change in the region by (1) addressing economic insecurity and inequality; (2) systemic change in the region by (1) addressing economic insecurity and inequality; (2)
combatting corruption, strengthening democratic governance, and advancing the rule of law; (3) combatting corruption, strengthening democratic governance, and advancing the rule of law; (3)
promoting respect for human rights, labor rights, and a free press; (4) countering and preventing promoting respect for human rights, labor rights, and a free press; (4) countering and preventing
violence, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated by gangs, trafficking networks, and other violence, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated by gangs, trafficking networks, and other

136 USAID data provided to CRS, March 2021.
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criminal organizations; and (5) combatting sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.criminal organizations; and (5) combatting sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.137 The
new126 Although the root causes strategy is similar to the prior U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, strategy is similar to the prior U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, but
Biden Administration officials assert they will Administration officials assert they will incorporateimprove the effectiveness of U.S. efforts by incorporating lessons learned over the past six years. lessons learned over the past six years. In
addition to usingThey intend to use migration data to migration data to better target programs, target programs, the Administration intends to place place
greater emphasis on host country governance, enhance partnerships with local organizations, and greater emphasis on host country governance, enhance partnerships with local organizations, and
increase the scale of U.S. efforts.138 Theincrease the scale of U.S. efforts.127 As part of its increased emphasis on governance concerns, the Administration has named and imposed visa sanctions on more than 60 current and former Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran officials allegedly involved in corruption or undemocratic actions, pursuant to the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F).128 To increase the scale of U.S. efforts, the Administration has proposed allocating $4 billion to the Administration has proposed allocating $4 billion to the
region over four yearsregion over four years and has requested $860.6 million to begin implementing the strategy in
, including $860.6 million in FY2022. FY2022.
The Biden Administration also developed, pursuant to E.O. 14010, a new Collaborative Migration The Biden Administration also developed, pursuant to E.O. 14010, a new Collaborative Migration
Management Strategy intended to build a regional framework for safe, orderly, and humane Management Strategy intended to build a regional framework for safe, orderly, and humane
migration in North and Central America. Released in July 2021, the migration management migration in North and Central America. Released in July 2021, the migration management
strategy calls for a surge of humanitarian assistance to alleviate conditions in the region; strategy calls for a surge of humanitarian assistance to alleviate conditions in the region;
messaging campaigns to deter irregular migration; support for partner governments’ efforts to messaging campaigns to deter irregular migration; support for partner governments’ efforts to
manage their borders, provide protection to vulnerable populations, and reintegrate returned manage their borders, provide protection to vulnerable populations, and reintegrate returned
migrants; and expanded access to legal migration and protection pathways in the United States migrants; and expanded access to legal migration and protection pathways in the United States
and third countries.139 As of August 26, 2021, the Administration had allocated nearly $252
million of humanitarian assistance to address the needs of vulnerable populations in Central
America and Mexico.140 125 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Northern Triangle of Central America: The 2019 Suspension and Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects, GAO-21-104366, September 2021, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104366.pdf. 126 White House, U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf. 127 U.S. Department of State, “On the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy and Root Causes Strategy Toward Migration,” special briefing, July 29, 2021. 128 U.S. Department of State, “Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors Report,” July 1, 2021; and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “United States Announces Actions Against Seven Central American Officials for Undermining Democracy and Obstructing Investigations into Acts of Corruption,” press statement, September 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service 42 link to page 60 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress and third countries.129 In accordance with the strategy, the Administration allocated $272.2 million of humanitarian assistance to address the needs of vulnerable populations in Central America and Mexico in FY2021.130 The Administration also has reestablished and expanded the Central The Administration also has reestablished and expanded the Central
American Minors program, which reunites eligible minors in the Northern Triangle with parents American Minors program, which reunites eligible minors in the Northern Triangle with parents
in the United States, and has made available 6,in the United States, and has made available 6,000500 supplemental H-2B temporary nonagricultural supplemental H-2B temporary nonagricultural
worker visas for worker visas for Northern Triangle nationals in FY2021.141nationals of the Northern Triangle countries and Haiti in FY2022.131
Congressional Action:. The Biden Administration’s approach to Central America has been the The Biden Administration’s approach to Central America has been the
subject of significant congressional debate and oversight, including several hearings (see subject of significant congressional debate and oversight, including several hearings (see
Appendix). . Some Members have demonstrated support for the Administration’s funding Some Members have demonstrated support for the Administration’s funding
priorities. For example, the House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. priorities. For example, the House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure (H.R. 4373, H.Rept.
117-84) would fully fund the Administration’s $860.6 million request for Central America. 117-84) would fully fund the Administration’s $860.6 million request for Central America.
Likewise, the U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 (S. 348/H.R. 1177) would authorize $4 billion over Likewise, the U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 (S. 348/H.R. 1177) would authorize $4 billion over
four years to combat corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and consolidate democratic four years to combat corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and consolidate democratic
governance; reduce criminal violence and improve citizen security; counter sexual, gender-based, governance; reduce criminal violence and improve citizen security; counter sexual, gender-based,
and domestic violence; and and domestic violence; and tackleaddress extreme poverty and extreme poverty and advance economic development in the economic development in the
region.region. Other legislative measures would Other legislative measures would authorizeprovide more limited more limited assistance efforts. For example,
thesupport for assistance efforts in Central America. The foreign aid appropriations bill introduced in the Senate (S. 3075) would provide $653.9 million for the region, which is 24% less than requested. The Central American Women and Children Protection Act of 2021 (S. 2003 /H.R. 4017) would Central American Women and Children Protection Act of 2021 (S. 2003 /H.R. 4017) would
authorize the Administration to enter into agreements with the Northern Triangle governments to authorize the Administration to enter into agreements with the Northern Triangle governments to
prevent and deter violence against women and children, provide support to victims, and hold prevent and deter violence against women and children, provide support to victims, and hold
perpetrators accountable. perpetrators accountable.
Nevertheless, manySimilar provisions were incorporated into the House-passed version of the FY2022 NDAA (H.R. 4350) but were not included in the final legislation (P.L. 117-81). Many Members of Congress remain concerned about widespread corruption and Members of Congress remain concerned about widespread corruption and
impunity in Central America. H.R. 4373impunity in Central America. H.R. 4373 and S. 3075, like previous foreign aid appropriations measures, , like previous foreign aid appropriations measures,
would require the State Department to withhold would require the State Department to withhold mosta portion of the assistance assistance appropriated for the Northern Triangle for the Northern Triangle
governments until it certifies those governments are combatting corruption, protecting human governments until it certifies those governments are combatting corruption, protecting human
rights, and addressing other congressional concerns. The measure would provide $60 million for

137 White House, “U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America,” July 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
138 U.S. Department of State, “On the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy and Root Causes Strategy Toward
Migration,” Special Briefing, July 29, 2021.
139 White House, “rights, and addressing other congressional concerns. H.R. 4373 would also provide $60 million for “entities and activities to combat corruption and impunity” in Central America and $500,000 to increase staff focused on Central America within the State Department’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation. A provision of H.R. 4350 would have extended visa sanctions to cover the immediate families of individuals engaged in corruption, prohibited assistance for Northern Triangle security force units credibly alleged to have engaged in corruption, established a State Department fellowship program to support rule-of-law activities in Central America, and required an intelligence assessment of corrupt networks within Central American governments, among other measures. The erosion of democracy and human rights in the region also remains a top concern for many in Congress. A provision of P.L. 117-81 requires a series of reports on U.S. security cooperation with the Northern Triangle countries. These include a DOD report on ongoing and planned activities in the region focused on human rights and the rule of law, a GAO evaluation of DOD’s 129 White House, Collaborative Migration Management StrategyCollaborative Migration Management Strategy,,” July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf. content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.
140130 USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional Response,” Fact Sheet # USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #1012, FY2021, , FY2021, August 26, 2021.
141 White House, “Collaborative Migration Management Strategy,” JulySeptember 30, 2021. 131 DHS, “For First Time, DHS to Supplement H-2B Cap with Additional Visas in First Half of Fiscal Year,” press release, December 20, 2021. 2021.
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“entities and activities to combat corruption and impunity” in Central America and $500,000 to
increase staff focused on Central America within the State Department’s Office of Economic
Sanctions Policy and Implementation. Other legislative proposals focus specifically on the
situation in Honduras. The Honduras Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2021 (S.
388/H.R. 2716) would restrict U.S. security cooperation with Honduras and direct the
Administration to impose asset blocking and visa sanctions on President Juan Orlando Hernández
for his alleged involvement in narcotics trafficking. The Berta Cáceres Human Rights in
Honduras Act (H.R. 1574) also would restrict U.S. security assistance to Hondurasend-use monitoring procedures in the Northern Triangle, and an evaluation to be conducted by a federally funded research and development center regarding how DOD’s security cooperation programs promote the rule of law and human rights and advance other U.S. objectives in the region. Other bills would restrict U.S. security cooperation with Honduras (S. 388/H.R. 2716 and H.R. 1574) and urge the Salvadoran government to respect the country’s democratic institutions (H.Res. 408). .
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11603, For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11603, Central America’s Northern Triangle:
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF11151, , by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF11151, Central
American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10371, , by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10371,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report , by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report
R44812, R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter , by Peter
J. Meyer; CRS Report R43616, J. Meyer; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando , by Clare Ribando
Seelke; CRS Insight IN11658, Seelke; CRS Insight IN11658, El Salvador: Authoritarian Actions and U.S. Response, by Clare , by Clare
Ribando Seelke; and CRS Report RL34027, Ribando Seelke; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter , by Peter
J. Meyer. J. Meyer.
Nicaragua
Increasing government crackdowns in Nicaragua against the opposition, journalists, and
government critics in 2021 have elevated international concerns, including among Members of
Congress, about political developments, human rights violations, and the erosion of democracy in
Nicaragua, especially leading up to elections scheduled for November 2021.
President Daniel Ortega has been suppressing popular President Daniel Ortega further solidified his control over Nicaraguan institutions and society in November 7, 2021, elections that eliminated all viable candidates and parties from participation. Presidential terms are normally for five years, and Ortega orchestrated the elimination of term limits in 2014. Ortega has been suppressing unrest in Nicaragua in a manner unrest in Nicaragua in a manner
reminiscent of Anastasio Somoza, the dictator Ortega helped overthrow in 1979 as a leader of the reminiscent of Anastasio Somoza, the dictator Ortega helped overthrow in 1979 as a leader of the
leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Ortega served as president from 1985 to leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Ortega served as president from 1985 to
1990, during which time the United States backed right-wing insurgents (1990, during which time the United States backed right-wing insurgents (contrascontras) in an attempt to ) in an attempt to
overthrow the Sandinista government. In the early 1990s, Nicaragua began to establish overthrow the Sandinista government. In the early 1990s, Nicaragua began to establish
democratic governance. democratic governance. Nonetheless, the FSLN and Ortega gradually consolidated control over Nonetheless, the FSLN and Ortega gradually consolidated control over
the country’s institutions. Ortega reclaimed the presidency in 2007 and has served as president for the country’s institutions. Ortega reclaimed the presidency in 2007 and has served as president for
the past 14 years, creating what the State Department calls “a highly centralized, authoritarian the past 14 years, creating what the State Department calls “a highly centralized, authoritarian
system.”142 system.”132 According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), this consolidation of power in the executive “has facilitated Nicaragua’s transformation into a police state in which the executive branch has instituted a regime of terror and of suppression of all freedoms ... supported by the other branches of government.”133 Until 2018, for many Nicaraguans, Ortega’s populist social welfare programs, which Until 2018, for many Nicaraguans, Ortega’s populist social welfare programs, which
had improved their standards of living, outweighed his authoritarian tendencies and self-had improved their standards of living, outweighed his authoritarian tendencies and self-
enrichment; similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua enrichment; similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua
outweighed Ortega’s antidemocratic actions. outweighed Ortega’s antidemocratic actions.
Ortega’s long-term strategy to retain Ortega’s long-term strategy to retain control of the governmentgovernment control began to unravel in 2018, when began to unravel in 2018, when
his proposal to reduce social security benefits triggered protests led by a wide range of his proposal to reduce social security benefits triggered protests led by a wide range of
Nicaraguans. The government’s repressive response included Nicaraguans. The government’s repressive response included an estimated 325-600 extrajudicial extrajudicial
killings, killings, as well as torture, political imprisonment, and suppression of the presstorture, political imprisonment, and suppression of the press, and led to and led to
thousands of citizens going into exile.thousands of citizens going into exile.143134 The government says it was defending itself from coup The government says it was defending itself from coup
attempts. attempts.

142132 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua 2020 Human Rights Report, March 20, 2021. , March 20, 2021.
143133 Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, Nicaragua: Concentration of Power and the Undermining of the Rule of Law, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 288, October 25, 2021, p. 65. 134 Organization of American States (OAS), Organization of American States (OAS), Report of the High-Level Commission on Nicaragua of the Organization of
American States, November 19, 2019.
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The 2018 crisis undermined economic growth in Nicaragua, the hemisphere’s second-poorest The 2018 crisis undermined economic growth in Nicaragua, the hemisphere’s second-poorest
country. Government repression has continued, and country. Government repression has continued, and international economic sanctions, the
the COVID-19 pandemicCOVID-19 pandemic, and hurricane damage have worsened conditions in the country. and hurricane damage have worsened conditions in the country.
Nicaragua’s economy contracted by 3.Nicaragua’s economy contracted by 3.97% in 2019 and % in 2019 and by2.0% in 2020 but grew an estimated an estimated 3.0% in 2020; the IMF
projects it will contract by 0.2% in 2021, with unemployment nearly doubling from 6% to 11%
between 2019 and 2021.144
5% in 2021, according to the IMF. Unemployment nearly doubled, from 6% in 2019 to an estimated 11% in 2021.135 Dialogue between the government and the opposition collapsed in 2019. Opposition elements tried unsuccessfully to unite behind a single candidate. In addition, the Sandinista-controlled legislature passed a series of repressive laws used to eliminate electoral competition, and the government launched a period of increased oppression. According to Amnesty International, “The enforced disappearance of people is the latest tactic that authorities in Nicaragua have adopted to silence any criticism or dissenting voices.”136 By July 2021, the government had arrested seven of the most likely presidential candidates.137 Ortega registered his candidacy for a fourth consecutive term, with his wife, Rosario Murillo, again running as his vice president. A CID Gallup survey published a week prior to the elections found that in a fair election, 65% of voters would vote for any opposition candidate and 17% would support Ortega and Murillo.138 Nonetheless, Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council reportedly said that, with almost all ballots counted, Ortega and Murillo had won over 75% of the vote and voter turnout was 65%.139 A Nicaraguan opposition group, Open Ballot Boxes, which had 1,450 monitors trying to observe the elections, estimated turnout was approximately 18%.140 The international community has sought to hold the Ortega government accountable for human The international community has sought to hold the Ortega government accountable for human
rights abuses and to facilitate the reestablishment of democracy in Nicaragua. An rights abuses and to facilitate the reestablishment of democracy in Nicaragua. An Inter-American
Commission on Human RightsIACHR team concluded in 2018 that the Nicaraguan security forces’ team concluded in 2018 that the Nicaraguan security forces’
actions could be considered crimes against humanity. The OAS has stated multiple times that the actions could be considered crimes against humanity. The OAS has stated multiple times that the
Ortega government has violated the rule of law, altered constitutional order, and violated human Ortega government has violated the rule of law, altered constitutional order, and violated human
rights. In June 2021, the OAS passed a resolution rights. It also has passed resolutions expressing alarm at Nicaragua’s deteriorating expressing alarm at Nicaragua’s deteriorating
human rights situation, “unequivocally condemn[ing]” the arrest and arbitrary restrictions on human rights situation, “unequivocally condemn[ing]” the arrest and arbitrary restrictions on
candidates and the presscandidates and the press, and calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners and the and calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners and the
implementation of measures for transparent and fair elections.implementation of measures for transparent and fair elections.145141 At a U.N. Human Rights At a U.N. Human Rights
Council meeting on June 22, Council meeting on June 22, 2021, 59 countries, including the United States, made a similar statement, 59 countries, including the United States, made a similar statement,
also calling on Nicaragua “to re-establish also calling on Nicaragua “to re-establish dialogue and renew trust in democracy.”142 Following the November elections, the OAS passed resolutions declaring Nicaragua’s elections “were not free, fair or transparent and have no American States, November 19, 2019. 135 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021. 136 Amnesty International, “Nicaragua: Enforced Disappearance Is the New Tactic for Repression,” August 25, 2021. 137 Reuters, “Nicaragua’s Ortega Arrests Another Rival, Says U.S. Aims to Undermine Vote,” July 26, 2021. 138 Federico Rivas Molina and Carlos Salinas Maldonado, “Latin America Prepares for Frantic Month of Elections in November,” El País, Buenos Aires and Mexico, November 4, 2021. 139 Associated Press, “Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega Decries Those Who Question his Reelection,” November 8, 2021. 140 Ibid. 141 Seedialogue and renew trust in democracy.”146
Dialogue between the government and the opposition collapsed in 2019. Elements of the
opposition tried to unite behind a single candidate for the scheduled November 7, 2021, general
elections, but internal divisions persisted. In addition, as Ortega’s popularity has declined, the
Sandinista-controlled legislature has passed a series of repressive laws that require individuals or
groups that receive funding from foreign entities to register as “foreign agents,” ban such
individuals from running for public office, and make them subject to imprisonment. The FSLN
has used these laws to eliminate electoral competition. According to the State Department’s
Nicaragua 2020 Human Rights Report, published in March 2021, “government restrictions on
freedoms of expression, association, and assembly precluded any meaningful choice in elections.”
Since May 2021, the Ortega government has launched a new period of increased oppression,
arresting dozens of government critics, including several revolutionary leaders who once fought
alongside Ortega. Many others, including journalists, have fled the country, citing safety
concerns. Ortega recently defended his actions, saying opposition figures were being used by the
United States, which he referred to as “the empire,” to boycott elections and “re-sow terrorism in
our country.”147 According to Amnesty International, “The enforced disappearance of people is
the latest tactic that authorities in Nicaragua have adopted to silence any criticism or dissenting
voices.”148
By July 2021, the government had arrested seven of the most likely presidential candidates.149
The whereabouts of most of these individuals are unknown, and they were not released in time to

144 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021.
145See, for example, OAS, “Statement from the General Secretariat on the Situation in Nicaragua,” press release E-, for example, OAS, “Statement from the General Secretariat on the Situation in Nicaragua,” press release E-
102/20, October 15, 2020; and OAS, “Resolution Restoring Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights in 102/20, October 15, 2020; and OAS, “Resolution Restoring Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights in
Nicaragua Through Free and Fair Elections,” press release S-019/20, October 22, 2020. OAS, “The Situation in Nicaragua Through Free and Fair Elections,” press release S-019/20, October 22, 2020. OAS, “The Situation in
Nicaragua,” CP/RES. 1175/21, June 15, 2021. Nicaragua,” CP/RES. 1175/21, June 15, 2021.
146142 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in
Nicaragua: Joint Statement on Nicaragua at the Human Rights Council, Presented by the Nicaragua Core Group on Nicaragua: Joint Statement on Nicaragua at the Human Rights Council, Presented by the Nicaragua Core Group on
Behalf of 59 Countries Including the United States,” June 22, 2021. Behalf of 59 Countries Including the United States,” June 22, 2021.
147 Reuters, “Nicaragua’s Ortega Arrests Another Rival, Says U.S. Aims to Undermine Vote,” July 26, 2021.
148 Amnesty International, “Nicaragua: Enforced disappearance is the new tactic for repression,” August 25, 2021.
149 Reuters, “Nicaragua’s Ortega Arrests Another Rival, Says U.S. Aims to Undermine Vote,” July 26, 2021.
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meet the candidate registration deadline of August 2. On August 6, Nicaragua banned one of the
only remaining opposition parties from participating in the elections. Ortega registered his
candidacy for a fourth consecutive term, with his wife, Rosario Murillo, again running as his vice
president. Six other presidential candidates are registered; within two days of registering, the
government expelled vice presidential candidate Berenice Quezada, a former Miss Nicaragua,
from the race, and detained her.150 On August 9, one of Nicaragua’s two main political opposition
alliances, the National Coalition, called on the public to reject the November general election.151
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua focuses on strengthening civil society and promoting respect for
human rights and free and fair elections. The Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of
2018 (P.L. 115-335) instructed U.S. representatives at the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank to oppose new multilateral lending to Nicaragua, except for basic human
needs and democracy promotion. The Trump Administration imposed targeted financial sanctions
on high-level officials and organizations, including Vice President and First Lady Rosario
Murillo, three of the president’s sons, and the Nicaraguan National Police, for corruption and
serious human rights abuses. Under the Biden Administration, in June 2021, the Treasury
Department imposed sanctions on four more government officials, including one of the
president’s daughters, who support the Ortega regime.152 In July 2021, the State Department
imposed visa restrictions on 100 members of the Nicaraguan legislature and judiciary who
“helped to enable the Ortega-Murillo regime’s attacks on democracy and human rights.”153
Secretary of State Blinken asserted in early August 2021 that Nicaragua’s “electoral process,
including its eventual results, has lost all credibility.”154
Congressional Action: In August 2021, the Senate passed S. 1041,democratic legitimacy”143 and saying Nicaragua is not in compliance with its commitments under the Inter-American Democratic Charter.144 Nicaragua then announced it was leaving the OAS. During the two-year withdrawal process, according to the OAS, Nicaragua’s obligations to the OAS and its charters remain in force, as do its international human rights obligations.145 U.S. policy toward Nicaragua focuses on strengthening civil society and promoting respect for human rights and free and fair elections. The Biden Administration requested a total of $15 million for FY2022 assistance for Nicaragua, all for democracy, rights, and governance programs. It imposed financial sanctions on four more government officials, including one of the president’s daughters, who support the Ortega regime.146 In response to the Nicaraguan government’s arrest of 32 political opponents in summer 2021, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on 100 members of the Nicaraguan legislature and judiciary who “helped to enable the Ortega-Murillo regime’s attacks on democracy and human rights”147 and on 50 immediate family members of “regime-affiliated officials” who contributed directly to government measures that “do not meet the conditions for transparent, free, and fair elections.”148 Following what the Administration called “sham elections,” it imposed sanctions against the Nicaraguan Public Ministry and nine Nicaraguan government officials. It then imposed sanctions against members of the government of Nicaragua, their staff, and families.149 On November 7, President Biden declared, “What Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, orchestrated today was a pantomime election that was neither free nor fair, and most certainly not democratic.”150 When Nicaragua broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established them with China in December 2021, the State Department responded that the action “deprives Nicaragua’s people of a steadfast partner in its democratic and economic growth.”151 Congressional Action. In November 2021, Congress completed action on the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s
Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021 (RENACER Act), Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021 (RENACER Act), which, among its
provisions, would takesigned into law as P.L. 117-54, which includes measures to advance the strategic alignment of U.S. diplomatic tools and measures to advance the strategic alignment of U.S. diplomatic tools and
targeted sanctions to support the realization of free, fair, and transparent elections in Nicaragua. targeted sanctions to support the realization of free, fair, and transparent elections in Nicaragua.
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered reported a similar, although not identical
measure, H.R. 2946, in July. The House-passed version ofThe House Appropriations Committee’s report to the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations
bill, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84), would make assistance to Nicaragua available under regional
programs for Central America. The House Appropriations Committee’s report to the bill
recommended $15 million for programs in Nicaragua that promote democracy and the rule of law
and would prohibit providing funds for the central government of Nicaragua or for security
assistance. The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing on human rights
violations in Nicaragua in July 2021, with an emphasis on the plight of political prisoners (see
Appendix).
For additional information, see CRS Report R46860, Nicaragua in Brief: Political Developments
in 2021, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress, by Maureen Taft-Morales.

150 LatinNews, “Nicaragua: Ortega and Murillo Confirm Reelection Bid,” Weekly Report, August 5, 2021.
151 LatinNews, “Nicaragua: Further Blow to Credibility of Election,” Daily, August 10, 2021.
152bill, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84), recommends $15 million for programs in 143 U.S. Mission to the OAS, “OAS General Assembly Condemns the Ortega-Murillo Regime in Nicaragua,” November 12, 2021 (includes resolution text). 144 OAS, “Resolution: Outcome of the Permanent Council’s Deliberations of November 29, 2021, on the Situation in Nicaragua Pursuant to the Resolution Adopted at the Fifty-First Regular Session of the General Assembly,” CP/RES. 1188 (2355/21), December 8, 2021. 145 Ibid. 146 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Nicaraguan Officials for Supporting Ortega’s Efforts to U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Nicaraguan Officials for Supporting Ortega’s Efforts to
Undermine Democracy, Human Rights, and the Economy,” press release, June 9, 2021. Undermine Democracy, Human Rights, and the Economy,” press release, June 9, 2021.
153147 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, “The United States Restricts Visas of 100 Nicaraguans Affiliated with U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, “The United States Restricts Visas of 100 Nicaraguans Affiliated with
Ortega-Murillo Regime,” press statement, July 12, 2021. Ortega-Murillo Regime,” press statement, July 12, 2021.
154148 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “The Lack of Prospects for Free and Fair Election
in Nicaragua,” press statement, August 7, 2021.
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South America
Bolivia
Bolivia experienced relative stability and prosperity from 2006 to 2019, but governance standards
weakened and relations with the United States deteriorated during this period under populist
President Evo Morales. Morales was the country’s first indigenous president and leader of the
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. In November 2019, Morales resigned and went into
exile amid nationwide protests against a disputed presidential election in which he had claimed
victory. An interim government was established. Luis Arce, Morales’s former finance minister,
took office a year later, after winning 55% of the vote in October 2020 elections in which the
MAS maintained a legislative majority.
President Arce is an economist who worked in Bolivia’s central bank prior to serving as minister
of finance. He pledged to govern in a conciliatory fashion, but his government’s arrest and jailing
of conservative Interim President Jeanette Añez has prompted international concern about its
respect for due process and an apolitical judiciary.155 Prosecutors initially cited Añez’s role in
what they described as a “coup” against Morales as the justification for her detention. They have
added “genocide” charges based on the findings of an August 2021 report by a Group of Experts
from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).156 The U.S. and many other
governments have called for Añez’s rights to be respected, even as they have commended the
IACHR-backed report regarding violence and human rights violations in late 2019.157 The Arce
government’s actions could discourage donors and investors whose help Bolivia likely will need
to help its economy recover from a 7.9% contraction in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Responding to COVID-19 remains a key challenge; the pandemic had caused over 18,400 deaths
in Bolivia as of September 1, 2021.158
U.S.-Bolivian relations are likely to remain challenging. Secretary of State Blinken issued a
statement condemning actions taken against interim government officials; Bolivia dismissed this
statement as interventionist.159 Long-standing differences over drug policy and geopolitics also
could prove difficult to overcome. With limited bilateral trade and investment ties, the possibility
of a resumption in U.S. foreign assistance could encourage cooperation on some issues. USAID
provided $5 million to support the 2020 elections, 200 ventilators and related technical assistance
to address COVID-19, and another $926,000 in health and sanitation support. The Biden
Administration also has delivered 1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Bolivia, as of July 2021.160
Congressional Action: As Congress continues to monitor the situation in Bolivia, it may seek to
influence the Biden Administration’s policy through the appropriations process, oversight
hearings, legislation, or letters to the Administration. Some Members of Congress have
congratulated Arce on his victory and expressed hope for improved bilateral relations; others have
expressed concerns about the return of a socialist government in Bolivia. H.Rept. 117-84

155 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Arrest of Bolivian Former Interim Government
Officials,” press statement, March 27, 2021.
156 Samantha Schmidt, “Genocide Prosecution of Former President Tests Bolivia’s Justice System,” Washington Post,
August 23, 2021.
157 Ibid; “Chargé d’Affairs to the United States Calls for Justice for the 2019 Deaths in Bolivia Through Due Process,”
Pen Media Inc., August 17, 2021.
158 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” September 1, 2021.
159 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Arrest of Bolivian Former Interim Government
Officials,” press statement, March 27, 2021.
160 U.S. Embassy in Bolivia, “United States Delivers More Than One Million Free Vaccines to Bolivia,” July 9, 2021.
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accompanying H.R. 4373 urges the Secretary of State to solicit information from “independent,
internationally recognized experts” regarding the legality of Bolivia’s 2019 elections, the role of
the OAS in the elections, and investigations into human rights violations during and after the
elections; this information is to be provided to appropriators.
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.Ned Price, Department Spokesperson, “The United States Restricts Visas of 50 Additional Nicaraguan Individuals Affiliated With Ortega-Murillo Regime,” August 6, 2021. 149 U.S. Department of State, “New Sanctions Following Sham Elections in Nicaragua,” press statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary Of State, November 15, 2021; and White House, “A Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Responsible for Policies or Actions That Threaten Democracy in Nicaragua,” November 16, 2021. 150 The White House, “Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Nicaragua’s Sham Elections,” November 7, 2021. 151 U.S. Department of State, Ned Price, Department Spokesperson, “Nicaragua’s Breaking of Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan,” press statement, December 9, 2021. Congressional Research Service 46 link to page 60 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Nicaragua that promote democracy and the rule of law and would prohibit funding for the central government of Nicaragua or for security assistance. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) would appropriate “not less than” $10 million in Economic Support Funds for civil society programs for Nicaragua. The 117th Congress has held two hearings on Nicaragua, the first in July 2021 on the plight of political prisoners, and the second in September 2021on the international response to the destruction of democracy under President Ortega (see Appendix). For additional information, see CRS Report R46860, Nicaragua in Brief: Political Developments in 2021, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress, by Maureen Taft-Morales. South America
Brazil
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and sixth-most-populous Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and sixth-most-populous
country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Latin America. However, uneven economic performance and political instability have hindered Latin America. However, uneven economic performance and political instability have hindered
Brazil’s rise to Brazil’s rise to international prominence. The country experienced a period of strong economic growth and prominence. The country experienced a period of strong economic growth and
increased international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, but it has struggled increased international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, but it has struggled
with a series of economic, political, security, and health crises since 2014. This domestic with a series of economic, political, security, and health crises since 2014. This domestic
turbulence discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair turbulence discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair
Bolsonaro to win the presidency in 2018. Bolsonaro to win the presidency in 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has implemented some Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has implemented some fiscal economic reforms reforms
favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed measures to ease favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed measures to ease
firearms regulations and promote development in the Brazilian Amazon. Rather than building a firearms regulations and promote development in the Brazilian Amazon. Rather than building a
broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base
mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking
perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of
government. This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the government. This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the
conservative-leaning Brazilian congress and placed additional stress on the country’s already-conservative-leaning Brazilian congress and placed additional stress on the country’s already-
strained democratic institutions. It also has hindered Brazil’s ability to respond to the COVID-19 strained democratic institutions. It also has hindered Brazil’s ability to respond to the COVID-19
pandemic. Although the Brazilian government has enacted significant economic support measures pandemic. Although the Brazilian government has enacted significant economic support measures
to help households, businesses, and state governments during the pandemic, Bolsonaro’s to help households, businesses, and state governments during the pandemic, Bolsonaro’s
resistance to public health restrictions and recommendations has undermined Brazil’s efforts to resistance to public health restrictions and recommendations has undermined Brazil’s efforts to
slow the spread of the virus. As of slow the spread of the virus. As of September 1, 2021early February 2022, Brazil had recorded more than , Brazil had recorded more than 580632,000 ,000
deaths, giving it deaths, giving it one of the the second-highest COVID-19 mortality highest COVID-19 mortality ratesrate in the in the world.161Western Hemisphere.152
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administrationadministration has moved away from Brazil’s traditional has moved away from Brazil’s traditional
commitment to autonomy and toward closer alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro commitment to autonomy and toward closer alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro
coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional challenges, such as the crisis in coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional challenges, such as the crisis in
Venezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations. Venezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations.
The Trump Administration welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-The Trump Administration welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-
Brazilian relations. In 2019, Brazilian relations. In 2019, for example, the Trump Administration the Trump Administration took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation
on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally
for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2321k), and the for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2321k), and the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). The United States and Brazil also forged Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). The United States and Brazil also forged
agreements on several trade and investment matters, including the Protocol on Trade agreements on several trade and investment matters, including the Protocol on Trade 152 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 47 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Rules and Rules and
Transparency, concluded in October 2020, which aims to foster cooperation on trade facilitation Transparency, concluded in October 2020, which aims to foster cooperation on trade facilitation
and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures. and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures.
The Biden Administration has sought to maintain a cooperative relationship with the Bolsonaro The Biden Administration has sought to maintain a cooperative relationship with the Bolsonaro
Administrationadministration, recognizing Brazil’s importance for addressing global challenges. President , recognizing Brazil’s importance for addressing global challenges. President

161 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” September 1, 2021.
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Biden Biden invited Bolsonaro to attend the April 2021 Leaders Summit on Climate, during which invited Bolsonaro to attend the April 2021 Leaders Summit on Climate, during which
Bolsonaro pledged to double funding for environmental enforcement efforts, reiterated Brazil’s Bolsonaro pledged to double funding for environmental enforcement efforts, reiterated Brazil’s
commitment to end illegal deforestation by 2030, and stated that Brazil would reduce its net commitment to end illegal deforestation by 2030, and stated that Brazil would reduce its net
greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050—10 years earlier than the country’s previous goal.greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050—10 years earlier than the country’s previous goal.162
153 The Biden Administration has requested $17 million to support conservation in the Brazilian The Biden Administration has requested $17 million to support conservation in the Brazilian
Amazon in FY2022 but has stated more extensive financial support for Brazil would be Amazon in FY2022 but has stated more extensive financial support for Brazil would be
contingent on the country making demonstrable progress toward its environmental commitments. contingent on the country making demonstrable progress toward its environmental commitments.
There are few signs of such progress to date, with deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon reaching a 15-year high in the annual observation period that ended in July 2021.154 The Biden Administration also has continued to engage with Brazil on security mattersThe Biden Administration also has continued to engage with Brazil on security matters,
expressing support for . Administration officials have expressed support for expanded bilateral security cooperation and Brazil’s participation as a NATO global partner while reiterating concerns Brazil’s participation as a NATO global partner while reiterating concerns
regardingabout the potential use of Chinese equipment in Brazil’s telecommunications infrastructure. the potential use of Chinese equipment in Brazil’s telecommunications infrastructure.163
Congressional Action: They also have sought to coordinate with Brazil, which is serving on the U.N. Security Council for the 2022-2023 term, regarding the Russian military mobilization on Ukraine’s borders.155 Congressional Action. U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on environmental issues has remained a U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on environmental issues has remained a
subject of interest in the 117th Congress. Some Members have called on the Biden Administration subject of interest in the 117th Congress. Some Members have called on the Biden Administration
to condition U.S. relations with Brazil, including U.S. assistance and bilateral economic and to condition U.S. relations with Brazil, including U.S. assistance and bilateral economic and
security cooperation, on the Brazilian government’s efforts to reduce deforestation and combat security cooperation, on the Brazilian government’s efforts to reduce deforestation and combat
environmental crimes.environmental crimes.164156 The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021 (S. 1201), introduced in April 2021, The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021 (S. 1201), introduced in April 2021,
would express the sense of Congress on the importance of conservation of the Amazon River would express the sense of Congress on the importance of conservation of the Amazon River
Basin, including support for U.S. engagement with Brazil on efforts to reduce deforestation and Basin, including support for U.S. engagement with Brazil on efforts to reduce deforestation and
greenhouse gas emissions. greenhouse gas emissions.
The draft explanatory statement accompanying the Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) would recommend $20 million for conservation programs in the Brazilian Amazon.157 Congress also has continued to express concerns about human rights in Brazil. The report Congress also has continued to express concerns about human rights in Brazil. The report
accompanying the House-passed FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure (H.Rept. 117-84 to accompanying the House-passed FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure (H.Rept. 117-84 to
H.R. 4373) H.R. 4373) statedstates that any funding provided for programs in the Brazilian Amazon “should that any funding provided for programs in the Brazilian Amazon “should
protect the rights of indigenous and Afro-Brazilian communities and support the prosecution of protect the rights of indigenous and Afro-Brazilian communities and support the prosecution of
violations of such rights.” The report violations of such rights.” The report also directedwould further direct the Secretary of State to work with the the Secretary of State to work with the
Brazilian government to ensure it consults with Indigenous and Afro-Brazilian communities Brazilian government to ensure it consults with Indigenous and Afro-Brazilian communities
regarding projects and policies that affect them and to prioritize preventative actions to protect
threatened community leaders and environmental human rights defenders.
For additional information, see CRS Report R46236, Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles
Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by Pervaze A.
Sheikh et al.
Colombia
Colombia is a key U.S. ally in Latin America, and the United States is Colombia’s top trading
partner. Because of Colombia’s prominence in illegal drug production, the United States and
Colombia have forged a close relationship over the past two decades. Plan Colombia, a U.S.-
Colombian program that began in 2000, focused initially on counternarcotics and later on
counterterrorism, and laid the foundation for an enduring security partnership with the United
States.
Colombia’s 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
resulted in the demobilization of 13,000 insurgents and the transformation of the FARC from a

162 “Confira Discurso do Presidente Bolsonaro na Cúpula do Clima,” Agência Brasil, April 22, 2021.
163 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Statement by U.S. Embassy Spokesperson, Tobias Bradford, on Advisor
Sullivan’s Visit to Brazil,” August 6, 2021.
164 153 “Confira Discurso do Presidente Bolsonaro na Cúpula do Clima,” Agência Brasil, April 22, 2021. 154 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Monitoramento do Desmatamento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite,” November 19, 2021. 155 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Statement by U.S. Embassy Spokesperson, Tobias Bradford, on Advisor Sullivan’s Visit to Brazil,” August 6, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Brazilian Foreign Minister França,” January 10, 2022. 156 Letter from U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy, Robert Menendez, and Chris Van Hollen, et al. to President Joseph Biden, Letter from U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy, Robert Menendez, and Chris Van Hollen, et al. to President Joseph Biden,
April 16, 2021, April 16, 2021, at https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Amazon%204-15-https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Amazon%204-15-
21.pdf21.pdf. 157 The draft explanatory statement is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF. .
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4648 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress regarding projects and policies that affect them and to prioritize preventative actions to protect threatened community leaders and environmental human rights defenders. The draft explanatory statement accompanying S. 3075 expresses concerns about the potential relocation of Quilombola families to expand the Alcântara space launch center and would prohibit the provision of any State Department-managed security assistance to Brazilian security forces engaged in the forced resettlement of Indigenous or Quilombola communities.158 The House-passed version of the FY2022 NDAA (H.R. 4350) also would have prohibited the use of any DOD-managed security assistance to support Brazilian security forces in the involuntary relocation of such communities. Although that provision was not included in the final FY2022 NDAA legislation (P.L. 117-81), the accompanying explanatory statement called on the Secretary of Defense to ensure any security assistance provided to Brazil is in compliance with U.S. laws and DOD policies regarding adherence to human rights and international law.159 For additional information, see CRS Report R46236, Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al. Colombia Colombia—a close U.S. ally in Latin America—endured more than half a century of internal armed conflict. To address the country’s role in illegal drug production, which fueled the conflict, the United States and Colombia forged a close relationship. Plan Colombia, a program focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism, laid the foundation for an enduring security partnership that has lasted more than two decades. The United States also has supported the implementation of a peace accord that President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) concluded with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the country’s largest leftist guerrilla organization at the time. U.S. assistance over the past two decades has exceeded $12 billion to support Plan Colombia, its successor strategies, and peace accord implementation. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, some 13,300 FARC disarmed. The FARC later transformed from a leftist guerrilla army into a political party known as Comunes. Neither the government nor the rebels have upheld all their commitments under the agreement. Some guerrillas, known collectively as FARC dissidents, include rearmed FARC and others who never demobilized. In early December 2021, on the fifth anniversary of the peace accord’s signing, the U.S. government removed the FARC from its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and designated two FARC dissident groups, Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-People’s Army (FARC-EP), as FTOs. President Iván Duque from the conservative Democratic Center (CD) party came to office in 2018 as a peace accord critic. Some Colombians have protested what they view as the Duque government’s lax peace accord compliance and inadequate efforts to protect human rights defenders and other social activists. Colombia’s Human Rights Ombudsman reported more than 145 targeted assassinations in 2021.160 Others blame ongoing violence on the FARC dissidents and on Colombia’s current largest insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). Duque 158 Quilombolas are inhabitants of communities founded by individuals who escaped or were freed from slavery. 159 Explanatory Material Statement Submitted by Mr. Smith of Washington, Chair of the House Committee on Armed Services, On House Amendment to S. 1605, Congressional Record, vol. 167, No. 211 - Book II (December 7, 2021), p. H7335. 160 BBC, “Colombia Saw 145 Activists Killed in 2021, Ombudsman Says,” January 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 49 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress has faced an enormous influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, with Colombia taking in a reported 40% of the Venezuelan exodus. The COVID-19 pandemic slowed economic recovery, further limited peace accord implementation, and was complicated by hosting impoverished Venezuelans. Duque’s popularity has declined over the past year as his government has struggled to address several challenges. In mid-2021, nationwide protests broke out over an unpopular government-proposed tax increase. A national strike lasted for nearly eight weeks as diverse sectors protested a host of grievances, including police brutality against demonstrators, economic inequality, crime, and unaddressed corruption. Although many protested peacefully, crippling blockades and vandalism resulted in an estimated $3 billion in damages. The shift in political sentiment could benefit leftist Senator Gustavo Petro, who lost to Duque in 2018 but is a presidential candidate in elections scheduled for May 2022. Petro is the highest polling of the likely candidates, and some maintain that he is well placed to compete in a presidential runoff in June. Duque is term limited from seeking reelection. To date, more than 9 million Colombians, or roughly 17% of the population, have registered as conflict victims. Many await promised compensation, including land from which they were forcibly displaced or other reparations. More than 300 former FARC combatants who demobilized have been killed since 2016.161 Delays in funding major peace accord commitments mean they are not on pace to reach their 15-year target.162 A significant portion of the Colombian public is skeptical of the peace process and the FARC’s role in Colombia’s democracy—and most Colombians increasingly rank implementation of the peace agreement much lower as a concern than urban crime, corruption, and the disrupted economy. Other Colombians maintain that full implementation of the peace accord is vital. Some argue that more complete implementation of the agreement would bring unrealized benefits, such as less violence in the rural and remote zones facing armed groups that compete to inherit the former FARC’s illicit businesses. This violence includes multiple “armed conflicts” that are ongoing inside Colombia; though regional, rather than national, in scope, these conflicts have sparked heightened violence, such as along with the border with Venezuela in the Colombian department (equivalent of a state) of Arauca.163 Colombia has set records in cocaine production in recent years, including an estimated 1,010 metric tons produced in 2020, according to the U.S. government.164 In meetings between President Duque and then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2019, the governments reaffirmed a commitment to work together to lower coca crop levels and cocaine production by 50% by 2023.165 The U.S. government depends on the Colombian government to interdict much of the cocaine leaving the country, as it is mainly destined for the United States. President Duque campaigned on resuming forced aerial eradication (i.e., spraying) of coca crops with the herbicide glyphosate; in 2020, his government accelerated forced manual eradication. However, in January 2022, Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled that a halt of coca aerial 161 United Nations Security Council, “Colombia: Quarterly Meeting,” What’s in Blue, Security Council Report, January 19, 2022. 162 Adam Isacson, “A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s Peace Accord after Five Years,” Washington Office on Latin America, November 23, 2021. 163 For more background, see Kyle Johnson, Ángela Olaya, Juanita Vélez,Caras de las disidencias:cinco años de incertitude y evolución,CORE, Foundation Conflict Responses; Juan Diego Posada, “Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: A Fight Too Far at the Colombia-Venezuelan Border?,” InSight Crime, January 11, 2022. 164 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “Updated: ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,” July 16, 2021. 165 U.S. State Department, International Drug Control Strategy Report, March 2021, Volume 1. Congressional Research Service 50 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress spraying would remain until the consent of rural communities who are subject to spraying is obtained within one year, effectively ending the practice until a new government is in place.166 With close to 2 million Venezuelans residing in Colombia in February 2021, the Duque administration unveiled a program offering Venezuelans who entered before January 2021 a decade of temporary protected status (TPS). By January 2022, nearly 1.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants had begun the registration process for the TPS program, with nearly half a million fully enrolled, giving them access to health care, work permits, and other social services.167 Many Members of the U.S. Congress have expressed support for Colombia’s continued leadership role to assist in a democratic transition in Venezuela and to respond to the worsening humanitarian situation. The United States remains Colombia’s top trading partner. In April 2020, Colombia became the third Latin American country-member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), after a seven-year accession process. Furthermore, as near-shoring manufacturing becomes a relevant alternative to Asia in the wake of the pandemic, some Members see U.S.-Colombian trade as a potential opportunity.168 Congressional Action. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid budget request for Colombia is $453.9 million. The House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 4373, would provide $461.4 million and would stipulate 30% of funding under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Foreign

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

leftist guerrilla army to a political party. However, neither the government nor the rebels have
upheld all of their commitments under the agreement, and some guerrillas have re-armed and
formed new groups known collectively as FARC dissidents.165 These challenges have been
compounded by a pandemic-driven 6.8% economic contraction in 2020, spikes in coca cultivation
and cocaine production, violence against human rights defenders and activists, and instability and
violence spilling over from neighboring Venezuela. Absent a renewed focus on peace accord
implementation, some predict Colombia’s half-century internal armed conflict, which produced
some 8 million victims and 262,000 deaths, could resume.166
President Iván Duque of the conservative Democratic Center party has served three years in
office as of August 2021. Duque campaigned as a critic of the peace accord and quickly
suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), now Colombia’s largest leftist
guerrilla group. The administration put in place a “peace with legality” program, which the
President asserts encompasses the most essential of the 2016 peace accord commitments. In
February 2021, the Colombian government announced it would provide 10-year temporary
protection status (TPS) to Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, allowing Venezuelans to obtain
work permits and receive health and other services. Given the humanitarian debacle in Venezuela,
regional governments and the international community welcomed the move.
Although Colombia initially fared well with the COVID-19 pandemic because of the Duque
administration’s measures to contain the virus, cases surged in May and June 2021. As of
September 1, 2021, COVID-19 deaths approached 125,000, and over 29% of the population was
fully vaccinated.167 As the first recipient of vaccines in the Americas through the COVAX Facility
mechanism and the government’s pursuit of other vaccine sources (including U.S. donations), the
Duque government set an ambitious goal of vaccinating 70% of the population by the end of
2021.168 Due to logistics and supply constraints, some analysts warn that goal may not be attained
until mid- to late 2022.169
Duque’s popularity has plummeted since protests broke out in Colombia in April 2021, in
response to a proposed tax increase to cover pandemic-driven budget deficits. While the Duque
administration modified and then discarded the tax increase, the protests continued as frustrations
with other issues surfaced. Protesters’ grievances expanded to include slow implementation of the
2016 peace accords, police brutality, economic inequality, crime, and corruption. While many
protests were peaceful, blockades and vandalism by some demonstrators resulted in an estimated
$3 billion of damage to the Colombian economy. President Duque’s handling of the protests
received national and international criticism, as riot police and other law enforcement clashes
with protesters resulted in 34 killings and thousands of injuries, casting doubt on the prospects for

165 “Four Years Later, Colombia’s Peace Agreement Advances at a Snail’s Pace,” Open Democracy, January 6, 2021.
Nicholas Casey, “Colombia’s Peace Deal Promised a New Era. So Why Are These Rebels Rearming?,” New York
Times, May 17, 2019.
166 Romero, Cesar, “262,197 Muertos Dejó el Conflicto Armado.” Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, August 2,
2018.
167 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Colombia,” September 1, 2021, at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/colombia.
168 President Duque remarks from Atlantic Council, “Transcript: A Conversation with President of Colombia Iván
Duque and U.S. Senators Roy Blunt and Ben Cardin,” March 25, 2021.
169 EIU, Colombia Country Report, July 2021.
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Duque’s party and his allies in the 2022 national elections.170 The IACHR issued a report in June
2021 denouncing the excessive use of force by Colombian law enforcement.171
Colombia has been a key U.S. security partner, training regional security counterparts and
interdicting roughly half of all illicit drugs seized in the Western Hemisphere. For the past two
years, Colombia has led a multination antidrug operation called Campaign Orion.172 While the
U.S. government has praised the competence of Colombia’s police during past collaborations on
counternarcotics efforts, some Members of Congress have called for a pause in U.S. support for
the Colombian National Police, given their response to recent protests.173
In 2019, according to U.S. estimates, Colombia’s cocaine production reached 936 metric tons of
pure cocaine—its highest level ever reported by the U.S. government. U.N. estimates, released in
June 2021, show 2020 production exceeding 2019 production levels by 8%.174 In 2018, President
Duque and then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reaffirmed a commitment to work together to
lower coca crop levels and cocaine production to 50% of 2017 levels by 2023. President Duque
campaigned on resuming forced aerial eradication (i.e., spraying) of coca crops with the herbicide
glyphosate; in 2020, his government accelerated forced manual eradication. In its oversight over
many years, the U.S. Congress has examined the efficacy of aerial spraying. Some Members back
voluntary eradication and alternative development for eliminating coca crops (which is prioritized
in the Colombian-FARC peace accord), and others support use of targeted aerial eradication.
Colombia continues to face severe crime and terror threats, complicating security. The ELN
supports its anti-government campaign in Colombia by deriving revenue from drug trafficking,
gold mining, and other illicit activities conducted in Venezuela.175 In June 2021, the Colombian
government asserted that the ELN bombed a Colombian military base, injuring 36 people, and
attacked President Duque’s helicopter.176 In August 2021, for the first time, Colombia extradited
ELN fighters to the United States on drug trafficking charges.177 The Duque government has
faced accusations that it is unable to protect social activists and labor leaders, including 78 human
rights defenders and other social activists reported killed by mid-2021.178 Colombian former
military serving as mercenaries are implicated in the assassination of the Haitian president in July
2021 (see “Haiti”).
U.S. government assistance to Colombia over the past 20 years has totaled nearly $12 billion,
with funds appropriated mainly to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and to USAID. The

170 Nathaniel Parish Flannery, “Political Risk Analysis: What Do Investors Need to Know about Colombia’s 2022
Election?,” Forbes, July 12, 2021.
171 “Observaciones y Recommendaciones de la Visita de Trabajo de la CIDH a Colombia,” Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, June 2021.
172 INCSR, vol. 1, 2021.
173 Dr. Jarrod Sadulski, “Colombian National Police: Combating Human and Drug Trafficking,” American Military
University, Edge, April 29, 2020; Office of Representative Jim McGovern, “Reps. McGovern, Pocan, Schakowsky,
Grijalva Lead 55 Members of Congress Urging State Department to Clearly and Unambiguously Denounce Police
Brutality in Colombia,” May 14, 2021.
174 Juan Diego Posada and Seth Robbins, “Colombia’s Cocaine Keeps on Reaching New Heights,” InSight Crime, July
30, 2021.
175 R. Evan Ellis, The Reinforcing Activities of the ELN (National Liberation Army) in Colombia and Venezuela, Air
University, July 30, 2021.
176 “Biden Offers Colombia ‘Support’ After Attack on Duque Chopper,” AFP, June 28, 2021.
177 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Colombia Extradites ELN Rebel Fighters to U.S. for First Time,” Reuters, August 19, 2021.
178 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Murders of Colombia Activists Fell in First Half, but Violence Persists- Ombudsman,” Reuters,
August 28, 2021.
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Trump Administration’s focus in U.S.-Colombian relations was largely on containing impacts
from Venezuela and reducing drug flows. In FY2021, Congress provided $463.3 million in
assistance for Colombia, the highest level of bilateral foreign assistance appropriated for
Colombia in a decade. In addition, the United States provided $201.8 million in humanitarian
assistance for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia in FY2021.179 To date, the United States has
donated 6 million COVID-19 vaccines to Colombia, which will allow the government to
vaccinate some of the many Venezuelan refugees it is hosting.180
Colombia, with U.S. financial support, has trained more than 29,200 individuals from 13
countries in the region in counternarcotics and anti-crime measures between 2013 and August
2021.181 Although some policy groups have called for Congress to reconsider this program in
light of the role of alleged police abuses against protesters, Colombian officials maintain that the
anti-riot police squad involved in responding to the protests have not trained foreign, third-
country forces since 2018.182
In recent years, many Members of Congress praised Colombia’s continued leadership role in
promoting a democratic transition in Venezuela and responding to the humanitarian crisis of
migrants fleeing the country. U.S. policy may continue to be shaped by the Biden
Administration’s regional aims of democratic strengthening through building the rule of law and
protecting human rights. The Administration is likely to sustain a close relationship with
Colombia, despite some areas of tension. The State Department has urged more complete peace
accord implementation and an expansion of government presence in Colombia’s remote rural
zones to curb criminal and armed groups, including dissident guerrilla units.
Congressional Action: The Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid budget request for
Colombia is $453.9 million. The House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 4373,
would provide $461.4 million and stipulated that 30% of funding under the INCLE and Foreign
Military Financing programs would be obligated only after the Secretary of State certifies that Military Financing programs would be obligated only after the Secretary of State certifies that
certain human rights conditions certain human rights conditions are met; this includesare met; these conditions include a provision that Colombian a provision that Colombian
security forces involved in gross violations of human rights during the security forces involved in gross violations of human rights during the mass protests are held
accountableprotests are held accountable for abuses. The proposed Senate bill for FY2022, S. 3075, would prohibit assistance to Colombian riot police and would withhold 5% of INCLE funding until the Secretary of State certifies the riot police are held to account. The FY2022 NDDA, P.L. 117-81, enacted in December 2021 includes several provisions on Colombia. These include an extension of authority to support a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia; temporary authority to obligate or expand not more than $2 million in FY2022 for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign national security forces participating in the training program of the United Sates-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security; and a reporting requirement on the security cooperation relationship between the United States and Colombia and activities focused on human rights and the rule of law. .
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11631, For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11631, Colombia: Challenges for U.S.
Policymakers in 2021, by June S. Beittel, by June S. Beittel;, and CRS Report R43813, and CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and
U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel. , by June S. Beittel.
Venezuela
Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, is mired in a deep economic and Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, is mired in a deep economic and
humanitarian crisis worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Maduro has consolidated power over humanitarian crisis worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Maduro has consolidated power over
all of Venezuela’s democratic institutions since his narrow 2013 election following the death of all of Venezuela’s democratic institutions since his narrow 2013 election following the death of
President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). His United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) took President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). His United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) took de
facto control of the National Assembly, the last independent branch of government, in January
2021. Maduro has used repression to quash dissent; rewarded allies, particularly in the security
forces, with income earned from illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities;
and relied on support from Russia, China, Iran, and others to subvert U.S. sanctions and resist

179 USAID, Venezuela Regional Response, Fact Sheet #3, June 22, 2021.
180 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Colombia, “U.S. Donates 3.5 Million Moderna Vaccines to Colombia,”
press release, July 23, 2021.
181 CRS electronic correspondence with staff at the Embassy of Colombia in Washington, DC, August 8, 2021.
182 Ibid.
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166 Steven Grattan, “Colombia Can’t Resume Coca Aerial Spraying for Now, Court Rules,” Al Jazeera, January 20, 2022. 167 Information provided by the Colombian Embassy to the United States, January 25, 2022. The TPS program also includes a path to Colombian citizenship. 168 Senator Roy Blunt, “A Plan for Colombia’s COVID-19 Recovery and Why It Matters for the United States,” Atlantic Council, remote event, December 8, 2021. Congressional Research Service 51 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress control of the National Assembly, the last independent branch of government, in January 2021. The PSUV and its allies won 19 of 23 gubernatorial elections in flawed elections held in November 2021; however, the opposition won a gubernatorial election in Chávez’s home state of Barinas that was rerun in January 2022. Maduro has used repression to quash dissent; rewarded allies, particularly in the security forces, with income earned from illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities; and relied on support from Russia, China, Iran, and others to subvert U.S. sanctions and resist international pressure to step down. Meanwhile, international support for opposition leader Juan international pressure to step down. Meanwhile, international support for opposition leader Juan
Guaidó, the former National Assembly president once regarded as interim president by the United Guaidó, the former National Assembly president once regarded as interim president by the United
States and nearly 60 countries, has dissipated.States and nearly 60 countries, has dissipated.
The COVID-19 pandemic, low oil prices, and years of economic mismanagement and corruption The COVID-19 pandemic, low oil prices, and years of economic mismanagement and corruption
have taken a toll. Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, have taken a toll. Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation,
severe shortages of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that severe shortages of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that has worsened since 2020 worsened since 2020
due to gasoline shortages. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for the economic crisis, but U.S. due to gasoline shortages. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for the economic crisis, but U.S.
officials note that current sanctions include broad exemptions for the delivery of humanitarian officials note that current sanctions include broad exemptions for the delivery of humanitarian
goods. U.N. agencies estimate that goods. U.N. agencies estimate that 5.76 million Venezuelans had fled the country as of million Venezuelans had fled the country as of JulyDecember 2021, 2021,
primarily to neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. primarily to neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
SeekingIn September 2021, seeking sanctions relief and international recognition of his government, sanctions relief and international recognition of his government, Maduro resumed Norway-led negotiations—previously suspended in September 2019—with the opposition Unity Platform (a group that includes Guaidó supporters and other factions). Maduro once again suspended the negotiations, however, after the United States extradited a top ally, Alex Saab, from Cape Verde to stand trial for money laundering. Should the talks resume, the opposition may be in a weaker position than before, since rifts within the opposition hurt its performance in the November elections. Maduro and the
opposition (including Guaidó’s supporters and other factions) agreed to resume Norway-led
negotiations that had been suspended in September 2019. According to a preliminary agreement
reached in August 2021, negotiations are set to begin in Mexico in September 2021. Negotiators
may discuss political prisoners, human rights conditions, humanitarian relief, and conditions for
electoral contests, beginning with scheduled November 2021 state and local elections.
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January
2019. Although the Trump Administration initially discussed the possibility of using military 2019. Although the Trump Administration initially discussed the possibility of using military
force in Venezuela, it ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave office through diplomatic, force in Venezuela, it ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave office through diplomatic,
economic, and legal pressure. Biden economic, and legal pressure. Biden Administration officials have stated that their approach
toward the crisis in Venezuela is focused on supportingofficials have sought to support the Venezuelan people the Venezuelan people and while engaging in engaging in
multilateral diplomacy to press for a return to democracy and hold multilateral diplomacy to press for a return to democracy and hold Maduro officials and
supporters accountable for their actions.183 On corrupt and abusive Maduro officials accountable. As part of its efforts to support the Venezuelan people, on March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration
designated Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), granting certain Venezuelan
nationals residing in the United States without authorization relief from removal and
authorization to work. This came after President Trump ended removals of Venezuelans eligible
for deferred enforced departure on January 19, 2021. The Biden Administration also is reviewing
the humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions. Thedesignated Venezuela as a beneficiary country for TPS. The Administration also has reviewed and maintained U.S. targeted and sectoral sanctions on Venezuela. In June 2021, the State Department issued a joint statement with State Department issued a joint statement with
Canada and the European Union expressing support for “time-bound and comprehensive Canada and the European Union expressing support for “time-bound and comprehensive
negotiation processnegotiation process”184 but.”169 Nevertheless, the Administration remains wary of Maduro’s intentions and appears unlikely to lift U.S. remains wary of Maduro’s intentions and appears unlikely to lift U.S.
sanctions in the short term.sanctions in the short term.
Congressional Action: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols repeated similar statements during a November 2021 Senate hearing in which he also reiterated U.S. support for Interim President Juan Guaidó.170 Congressional Action. The 117th Congress has continued close oversight of U.S. policy toward The 117th Congress has continued close oversight of U.S. policy toward
Venezuela, through Venezuela, through oversight hearings, legislation, and letters to the Administration. The Senate hearings, legislation, and letters to the Administration. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44 in March 2021, which would denounce Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44 in March 2021, which would denounce
fraudulent legislative elections in Venezuela. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental fraudulent legislative elections in Venezuela. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee reported S. 688 in March, which would prohibit contracting with persons who Affairs Committee reported S. 688 in March, which would prohibit contracting with persons who
have business operations with Venezuela’sengage in commerce with the Maduro government. In July Maduro government. In July 2021, the House passed its , the House passed its
version of the version of the 169 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-EU-Canada: Joint Statement on Venezuela,” June 25, 2021. 170 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Holds Hearing on Democracy in Latin America, CQ Congressional Transcripts, November 31, 2021. Congressional Research Service 52 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 4373; the bill would provide $50 FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 4373; the bill would provide $50
million in Economic Support Fundsmillion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for democracy programs in Venezuela. H.Rept. 117-84 for democracy programs in Venezuela. H.Rept. 117-84
accompanying the bill recommendsaccompanying the bill recommends continued humanitarian and development aid to countries sheltering humanitarian and development aid to countries sheltering
Venezuelan migrants and the provision of aid to support a democratic transition in Venezuela if Venezuelan migrants and the provision of aid to support a democratic transition in Venezuela if
conditions permit.conditions permit.
Oversight The Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill, S. 3705, would provide the same level of ESF funding for Venezuela. Congressional oversight has focused on the Biden Administration’s actions to sanction human rights abuses, has focused on the Biden Administration’s actions to sanction human rights abuses,
corruption, and antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its corruption, and antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its backers. Many

183 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela,” press briefing,
March 8, 2021.
184 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-EU-Canada: Joint Statement on Venezuela,” June 25, 2021.
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supporters. Congress is also overseeing the provision of democracy and development assistance to Venezuela, as well as the $1.65 billion in humanitarian aid provided since FY2017 for Venezuelans and countries sheltering them. Many Members of Congress praised the March 2021 designation of TPS for Venezuela. Although some Members of Congress praised the March 2021 designation of TPS for Venezuela. Although some
in Congress support continued pressure on the Maduro government, others favor a more targeted in Congress support continued pressure on the Maduro government, others favor a more targeted
approach, arguing that broad sanctions have not prompted political change but have hurt the approach, arguing that broad sanctions have not prompted political change but have hurt the
Venezuelan people. Some Members have advocated for an end to any sanctions that have Venezuelan people. Some Members have advocated for an end to any sanctions that have
worsened the humanitarian crisis, whereas others have called for more targeted sanctions relief, worsened the humanitarian crisis, whereas others have called for more targeted sanctions relief,
such as ending an October 2020 ban on oil-for-diesel fuel swaps that likely have contributed to such as ending an October 2020 ban on oil-for-diesel fuel swaps that likely have contributed to
fuel shortages in the country.fuel shortages in the country.185
171 For additional information, see CRS Report R44841, For additional information, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10230, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and
U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10715, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S.
Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF11216, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International Efforts to
Resolve the Political Crisis; CRS Report R46213, ; CRS Report R46213, Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic
Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela, by Phillip Brown; and CRS In Focus IF11029, , by Phillip Brown; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19, by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Outlook
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Latin American and Caribbean region was facing Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Latin American and Caribbean region was facing
significant political and economic challenges—most prominently, Venezuela’s ongoing political significant political and economic challenges—most prominently, Venezuela’s ongoing political
impasse and economic and humanitarian crisis, but also increasing public dissatisfaction with the impasse and economic and humanitarian crisis, but also increasing public dissatisfaction with the
state of democracy throughout the region. The pandemic has multiplied the region’s challenges state of democracy throughout the region. The pandemic has multiplied the region’s challenges
and negatively affected its future economic prospects. Instead of registering low economic and negatively affected its future economic prospects. Instead of registering low economic
growth rates, as originally forecast before the pandemic, the region experienced a deep recession growth rates, as originally forecast before the pandemic, the region experienced a deep recession
in 2020, with millions of people impoverished. Although in 2020, with millions of people impoverished. Although regional economic growth economic growth is projected to resume
in resumed in 2021, recovery in some countries may be slow, and could jeopardize the economic and social 2021, recovery in some countries may be slow, and could jeopardize the economic and social
progress that the region has made over the past two decades. progress that the region has made over the past two decades. Vaccine accessibility has been a
significant problem for a number of countries and could delayThe course of the pandemic, including vaccination rates, likely will be key to the region’s economic recovery. economic recovery.
In addition to the pandemic and its economic fallout, the Biden Administration and the 117th In addition to the pandemic and its economic fallout, the Biden Administration and the 117th
Congress are facing a variety of other policy challenges in the Latin American and Caribbean Congress are facing a variety of other policy challenges in the Latin American and Caribbean
region. For example, as the Biden Administration has taken actions to revise the Trump region. For example, as the Biden Administration has taken actions to revise the Trump
Administration’s more restrictive immigration policies, irregular migration from Central AmericaAdministration’s more restrictive immigration policies, irregular migration from Central America, Mexico, and other countries
and Mexico has increased. The political, economic, and humanitarian crises in Venezuela remain has increased. The political, economic, and humanitarian crises in Venezuela remain
a challenge not only for the United States but also for the entire Western Hemisphere and could a challenge not only for the United States but also for the entire Western Hemisphere and could
be an important test for multilateral diplomacy. be an important test for multilateral diplomacy. TheSimilarly, in Nicaragua, 171 U.S. Congressmen Jesús G. “Chuy” Garcia, “Grijalva, García, 17 Members of Congress call for Biden Biden Administration to Change Failed Trump-Era Venezuela Policy,” press release, August 13, 2021; Timothy Gardner, “Democratic Senator Urges Biden Admin to Allow Diesel Swap in Venezuela,” Reuters, March 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 53 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress the Administration has used targeted sanctions and is working multilaterally to increase international pressure against the antidemocratic actions of the Ortega government. With regard to Cuba, although the Administration continues to review U.S. policy,Administration continues to review
U.S. policy toward Cuba, including the previous Administration’s designation of Cuba as a state
sponsor of international terrorism, although the Cuban government’s violent suppression of anti- the Cuban government’s violent suppression of anti-
government protests government protests in July could makemakes it difficult for the Administration to take policy actions it difficult for the Administration to take policy actions
perceived as easing pressure on the Cuban government. perceived as easing pressure on the Cuban government. In Haiti, the Administration continues to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to restore security while supporting Haitian efforts to achieve political consensus that will support the restoration of democratic institutions, including free and fair elections. These and many other policy challenges These and many other policy challenges
discussed in this report may continue to be subjects of legislative initiatives, debate, and oversight discussed in this report may continue to be subjects of legislative initiatives, debate, and oversight
in the 117th Congress. in the 117th Congress.
The ninth Summit of the Americas, originally to be hosted by the United States in 2021The ninth Summit of the Americas, originally to be hosted by the United States in 2021 but now
postponed to summer 2022,, is scheduled to take place in Los Angeles, CA, in June 2022, with the theme of “Building a Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future.” The summit could serve as an opportunity for the Biden Administration to could serve as an opportunity for the Biden Administration to set
forthfurther articulate its policy agenda for the region and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement with hemispheric its policy agenda for the region and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement with hemispheric
leaders on regional and global issues.

185 U.S. Congressmen Jesús G. “Chuy” Garcia, “Grijalva, García, 17 Members of Congress call for Biden
Administration to Change Failed Trump-Era Venezuela Policy,” press release, August 13, 2021; Timothy Gardner,
“Democratic Senator Urges Biden Admin to Allow Diesel Swap in Venezuela,” Reuters, March 23, 2021leaders on regional and global issues. .
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Appendix. Latin American and Caribbean
Countries: Basic Data and Hearings
Table A-1. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts
GDP
GDP per
(2020
capita
Population
est.,
(2020
Area
(2020
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Leader (elected/next
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
election)
Caribbean
Antigua &
171 171
98 98
1.4 1.4
14,16813,967
Gaston Browne Gaston Browne
Barbuda
(Mar. 2018/by Mar. 2023) (Mar. 2018/by Mar. 2023)
Bahamas
5,359 5,359
385 385
11.3
29,221
Hubert Minnis
(May 2017/ Sept. 16, 20219.9 25,734 Philip Davis (Sept. 16, 2021/by Sept, 2026) )
Barbados
166 166
288 288
4.4 4.4
15, 15,163346
Mia Mottley Mia Mottley
((May 2018/ by May 2023)
BelizeJan. 19, 2022/ by Jan. 2027) Belizea
8,867 8,867
419 419
1.7 1.7
3,9454,077
Juan Antonio “Johnny” Briceño Juan Antonio “Johnny” Briceño
(Nov. 2020/by 2025) (Nov. 2020/by 2025)
Cuba
42,803 42,803
11, 11,333
100.0
8,822327 107.4 9,477.9
Miguel Díaz-Canel Miguel Díaz-Canel
( (20192020) )
( (20182020) )
( (20182020) )
(Apr. 2018/ Apr. (Apr. 2018/ Apr. 2023)b
Dominica
290 290
7573
0.5 0.5
6,9047,416
Roosevelt Skerrit Roosevelt Skerrit
(Dec. 2019/by Mar. 2025) (Dec. 2019/by Mar. 2025)
Dominican
18,792 18,792
10, 10,455448
78. 78.79
7, 7,530554
Luis Abinader Luis Abinader
Republic
(July 2020/May 2024) (July 2020/May 2024)
Grenada
133 133
113 113
1.0 1.0
9, 9,186130
Keith Mitchell Keith Mitchell
(Mar. 2018/by Mar. 2023) (Mar. 2018/by Mar. 2023)
GuyanaGuyanaa
83,000 83,000
787 787
5. 5.8
7,3275 6,953
Irfaan Ali Irfaan Ali
(Mar. 2020/by 2025) (Mar. 2020/by 2025)
Haiti
10,714 10,714
11, 11,403743
14. 14.35
1, 1,253235
Ariel Henry (Nov. Ariel Henry (Nov. 2016/postponed until 20222016/Nov. 7,
2021)c
Jamaica
4,244 4,244
2,737 2,737
13.914.0
5, 5,096103
Andrew Holness Andrew Holness
(Sept. 2020/by 2025) (Sept. 2020/by 2025)
St. Kitts & Nevis
101 101
57 57
0.9
14,9191.0 17,173
Timothy Harris Timothy Harris
(June 2020/by 2025) (June 2020/by 2025)
St. Lucia
238 238
181 181
1. 1.7
9,3516 8,934
Philip Pierre Philip Pierre
(July 2021/by 2026) (July 2021/by 2026)
St. Vincent & the
150 150
111 111
0.8 0.8
7, 7,122304
Ralph Gonsalves Ralph Gonsalves
Grenadines
(Nov. 2020/by 2025) (Nov. 2020/by 2025)
SurinameSurinamea
63,251 63,251
604603
2. 2.4
3,9889 4,787
Chandrikapersad “Chan” Chandrikapersad “Chan”
Santokhi (May 2020/2025) Santokhi (May 2020/2025)
Trinidad &
1,980 1,980
1,399 1,399
21. 21.56
15, 15,384425
Keith Rowley Keith Rowley
Tobago
(August 2020/by 2025) (August 2020/by 2025)
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GDP
GDP per
(2020
capita
Population
est.,
(2020
Area
(2020
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Leader (elected/next
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
election)
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
758,449 758,449
127,792 127,792
1, 1,076.2073.9
8, 8,421404
Andrés Manuel López Obrador Andrés Manuel López Obrador
(July 2018/July 2024) (July 2018/July 2024)
Costa Rica
19,730 19,730
5,128 5,128
61. 61.5
11,9828 12,057
Carlos Alvarado Carlos Alvarado
(Feb. & Apr. 2018/Feb. (Feb. & Apr. 2018/Feb. 6, 2022 & April 3, 2022) 2022)
El Salvador
8,124 8,124
6,486 6,486
24.6 24.6
3, 3,794799
Nayib Bukele Nayib Bukele
(Feb. 2019/Feb. 2024) (Feb. 2019/Feb. 2024)
Guatemala
42,042 42,042
17, 17,971974
77. 77.16
4, 4,289318
Alejandro Giammattei Alejandro Giammattei
(June & Aug. 2019/ June 2023) (June & Aug. 2019/ June 2023)
Honduras
43,278 43,278
9,942 9,942
23. 23.78
2, 2,383
Juan Orlando Hernández
(Nov. 2017/Nov. 28, 2021)397 Xiomara Castro (Nov. 28, 2021/Nov. 2025)
Nicaragua
50,336 50,336
6,496 6,496
12. 12.16
1, 1,870943
Daniel Ortega Daniel Ortega
(Nov. (Nov. 2016/Nov. 7, 20217, 2021/Nov. 2025) )
Panama
29,120 29,120
4,279 4,279
52.9 52.9
12,373 12,373
Laurentino Cortizo Laurentino Cortizo
(May 2019/May 2024) (May 2019/May 2024)
South America
Argentina
1,073,518 1,073,518
45,388 45,388
388.3389.1
8, 8,555572
Alberto Fernández Alberto Fernández
(Oct. 2019/Oct. 2023) (Oct. 2019/Oct. 2023)
Bolivia
424,164 424,164
11, 11,722
39.4
3,360630 36.8 3,168
Luis Arce Luis Arce
(Oct. 2020/2025) (Oct. 2020/2025)
Brazil
3,287,957 3,287,957
211, 211,422756
1, 1,434.1444.7
6, 6,783823
Jair Bolsonaro Jair Bolsonaro
(Oct. 7 & 28, 2018/Oct. (Oct. 7 & 28, 2018/Oct. 2 & 30, 2022) 2022)
Chile
291,932 291,932
19,458 19,458
252.8 252.8
12, 12,990993
Sebastián Piñera Sebastián Piñera
(Nov. (Nov. 21 & Dec. 19, 2021/Nov. 2025) (Gabriel Boric to be inaugurated March 11, 2022) & Dec. 2017/Nov. 21,
2021)
Colombia
439,736 439,736
50, 50,878372
271. 271.56
5, 5,336391
Iván Duque Iván Duque
(May & June 2018/May (May & June 2018/May 29, 2022 & June 19, 2022) 2022)
Ecuador
109,484 109,484
17,511 17,511
96.798.8
5, 5,520
Guillermo643 Guil ermo Lasso (Feb. 7 & Apr. Lasso (Feb. 7 & Apr.
11, 2021/Feb. 2025) 11, 2021/Feb. 2025)
Paraguay
157,048 157,048
7,253 7,253
35. 35.97
4, 4,946918
Mario Abdo Benítez Mario Abdo Benítez
(Apr. 2018/Apr. 2023) (Apr. 2018/Apr. 2023)
Peru
496,225 496,225
33,494 33,494
203.8205.5
6, 6,084134
Pedro Pedro CastilloCastil o (Apr. 11 & June (Apr. 11 & June
6, 2021/Apr. 2026) 6, 2021/Apr. 2026)
Uruguay
68,037 68,037
3,531 3,531
55.7
15,77856.6 16,023
Luis Lacalle Pou (Oct. & Nov. Luis Lacalle Pou (Oct. & Nov.
2019/Oct. 2024) 2019/Oct. 2024)
Venezuela
352,144 352,144
27,951 27,951
47.3 47.3
1,691 1,691
Nicolás Maduro Nicolás Maduro
(May 2018/May (May 2018/May 2024)d Congressional Research Service 56 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress )d
Sources: Area statistics are from the Central Intelligence Agency’s Area statistics are from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, with square kilometers , with square kilometers
converted into square miles. Population and economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), converted into square miles. Population and economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Economic Outlook Database, , AprilOctober 2021. Population and economic statistics for Cuba are from the World 2021. Population and economic statistics for Cuba are from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators databank. Bank’s World Development Indicators databank.
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Notes:
a. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern a. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern
coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and
therefore are listed under the Caribbean region. therefore are listed under the Caribbean region.
b. Cuba does not have direct elections for its head of government. Instead, Cuba’s legislature selects the b. Cuba does not have direct elections for its head of government. Instead, Cuba’s legislature selects the
president of the republic for a five-year term. president of the republic for a five-year term.
c. President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated on July 7, 2021. Ariel Henry was sworn in as prime minister on c. President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated on July 7, 2021. Ariel Henry was sworn in as prime minister on
July 20, 2021. Under the Haitian Constitution, either the Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister July 20, 2021. Under the Haitian Constitution, either the Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister
should govern or, in the last year of a presidential term, the legislature should elect a provisional president. should govern or, in the last year of a presidential term, the legislature should elect a provisional president.
Currently, there is no functioning legislature, as most of the legislators’ terms have expired. See CRS Insight Currently, there is no functioning legislature, as most of the legislators’ terms have expired. See CRS Insight
IN11699, IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential Assassination, by Maureen Taft-Morales. , by Maureen Taft-Morales.
d. Venezuela’s May 2018 elections were characterized by widespread fraud. The United States recognizes Juan d. Venezuela’s May 2018 elections were characterized by widespread fraud. The United States recognizes Juan
Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of Venezuela. See CRS In Focus Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of Venezuela. See CRS In Focus
IF10230, IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Clare Ribando Seelke.
Table A-2. Congressional Hearings in the 117th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 3, 2021 March 3, 2021
A Way Forward for Venezuela: The A Way Forward for Venezuela: The
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National
Civilian Security, Migration, and Civilian Security, Migration, and
Security Challenges Facing the Biden Security Challenges Facing the Biden
International Economic Policy International Economic Policy
Administration Administration
House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee
March 12, 2021 March 12, 2021
Policy Recommendations on Haiti for the Policy Recommendations on Haiti for the
Biden Administration Biden Administration
Senate Armed Services Committee Senate Armed Services Committee
March 16, 2021 March 16, 2021
United States Southern Command and United United States Southern Command and United
States Northern Command States Northern Command
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senate Foreign Relations Committee
March 24, 2021 March 24, 2021
The State of Democracy in Latin America and The State of Democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean the Caribbean
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
April 14, 2021 April 14, 2021
Renewing the United States’ Commitment to Renewing the United States’ Commitment to
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration Addressing the Root Causes of Migration
Civilian Security, Migration, and Civilian Security, Migration, and
from Central America from Central America
International Economic Policy International Economic Policy
House Armed Services Committee House Armed Services Committee
April 14, 2021 April 14, 2021
National Security Challenges and U.S. Military National Security Challenges and U.S. Military
Activity in North and South America Activity in North and South America
House Committee on Appropriations, House Committee on Appropriations,
April 15, 2021 April 15, 2021
United States Southern Command United States Southern Command
Subcommittee on Defense Subcommittee on Defense
House Committee on Homeland House Committee on Homeland
May 6, 2021
Stakeholder Perspectives on Addressing
Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Migration Push Factors
Management and AccountabilityApril 27, 2021 Unaccompanied Children at the Border: Security, Subcommittee on Border Stakeholder Perspectives on the Way Security, Facilitation, and Operations Forward House Committee on Homeland April 28, 2021 The Non–Governmental Organization Security, Subcommittee on Government Perspective on the Southwest Border Operations and Border Management House Committee on Homeland May 6, 2021 Stakeholder Perspectives on Addressing Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Migration Push Factors Management and Accountability Congressional Research Service 57 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Committee and Subcommittee Date Title
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
May 13, 2021 May 13, 2021
A Race Against Time: Deploying Vaccines and A Race Against Time: Deploying Vaccines and
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Addressing the Disproportionate Impacts of Addressing the Disproportionate Impacts of
Civilian Security, Migration, and Civilian Security, Migration, and
COVID-19 in Latin America and the COVID-19 in Latin America and the
International Economic Policy International Economic Policy
Caribbean Caribbean
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
June 9, 2021 June 9, 2021
Judicial Independence in Central America Judicial Independence in Central America
House Committee on Homeland House Committee on Homeland
June June 10, 2021 Unaccompanied Children at the Border: Security, Subcommittee on Border Federal Response and the Way Forward Security, Facilitation, and Operations House Committee on Homeland June 11, 2021 11, 2021
Enhancing Border Security: Addressing Enhancing Border Security: Addressing
Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Corruption in Central America Corruption in Central America
Management and Accountability Management and Accountability
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 23, 2021 June 23, 2021
The Biden Administration’s Efforts to Deepen The Biden Administration’s Efforts to Deepen
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
U.S. Engagement in the Caribbean U.S. Engagement in the Caribbean
Civilian Security, Migration, and Civilian Security, Migration, and
International Economic Policy International Economic Policy
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Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
July 1, 2021 July 1, 2021
Protests in Colombia Protests in Colombia
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 20, 2021 July 20, 2021
Historic Protests in Cuba and the Crackdown Historic Protests in Cuba and the Crackdown
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
on Free Expression on Free Expression
Civilian Security, Migration, and Civilian Security, Migration, and
International Economic Policy International Economic Policy
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
July 21, 2021 July 21, 2021
The Ortega Government and the Human The Ortega Government and the Human
Cost of Repression in Nicaragua: Political Cost of Repression in Nicaragua: Political
Prisoner Prisoner
Senate Committee on Finance Senate Committee on Finance
July 27, 2021 July 27, 2021
Implementation and Enforcement of the Implementation and Enforcement of the
United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement: United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement:
One Year After Entry into Force One Year After Entry into Force
House Committee on Homeland House Committee on Homeland
July 28, 2021 July 28, 2021
DHS’s Efforts to Disrupt Transnational DHS’s Efforts to Disrupt Transnational
Security Security
Criminal Organizations in Central America Criminal Organizations in Central America
House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 21, 2021 An International Response to Ortega’s Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Destruction of Democracy in Nicaragua Civilian Security, Migration, and International Economic Policy Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission September 23, 2021 Root Causes of Migration: Food Insecurity and the Right to Food in Central America House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 16, 2021 The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, for Latin America and the Caribbean Civilian Security, Migration, and International Economic Policy Senate Caucus on International November 17, 2021 The Nexus between the Il icit Drug Trade Narcotics Control and Corruption Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 18, 2021 Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America and the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Caribbean: The Importance of U.S. Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Engagement Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues Senate Foreign Relations Committee November 30, 2021 U.S. Policy on Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean Congressional Research Service 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress House Foreign Affairs Committee, January 20, 2022 Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Panama: A New Alliance for Promoting Civilian Security, Migration, and Democracy and Prosperity in the Americas International Economic Policy House Foreign Affairs Committee February 3, 2022 Overview of U.S. Priorities in the Western Hemisphere: Opportunities, Challenges, and the Path Ahead Source: CRS, prepared by Carla Davis-Castro, Research Librarian. CRS, prepared by Carla Davis-Castro, Research Librarian.
Notes: See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings; Senate Foreign Relations Committee at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings; Senate Armed Services hearings; Senate Foreign Relations Committee at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings; Senate Armed Services
Committee at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings; and House Armed Services Committee at Committee at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings; and House Armed Services Committee at
https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings. https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings.


Author Information

Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Maureen Taft-Morales Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs


June S. Beittel June S. Beittel
M. Angeles Villarreal M. Angeles Villarreal
Analyst in Latin American Affairs Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Acting Section Research ManagerSpecialist in International Trade and Finance


Peter J. Meyer Peter J. Meyer
Carla Y. Davis-Castro Carla Y. Davis-Castro
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Research Librarian Research Librarian


Clare Ribando Seelke Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Congressional Research Service

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress



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