Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Changes from August 27, 2021 to October 6, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
~~August 27~~October 6, 2021 , 2021
The State of Qatar, a The State of Qatar, a ~~smal~~ small Arab Gulf monarchy which has about 300,000 citizensArab Gulf monarchy which has about 300,000 citizens in a in a
total population of about 2.4 total population of about 2.4 ~~mil ion~~million, has employed its ample financial resources to exert, has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional Kenneth Katzman
~~regional~~ influence, often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation influence, often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC: Saudi Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
~~Council (GCC: Saudi~~ Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab EmiratesArabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and (UAE), Bahrain, and
~~Eastern Affairs~~
~~Oman) al iance. Qatar has~~ Oman) alliance. Qatar has Eastern Affairs fostered a close defense and security fostered a close defense and security ~~al iance~~alliance with the United with the United

States and has maintained ties to a States and has maintained ties to a wide range of actors who are often at odds with each wide range of actors who are often at odds with each

other, including Sunni Islamists, Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials.other, including Sunni Islamists, Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials.
Qatar’s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its Qatar’s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its sometimes controversial Al Jazeera media network have Al Jazeera media network have
contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by ~~fel ow~~fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and
imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The
Trump Administration sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift was hindering U.S. efforts to Trump Administration sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift was hindering U.S. efforts to
~~formalize a “Middle East Strategic Al iance” of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the~~
~~region to counter Iran. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms purchases and deepening~~
formalize a broad front of Arab states to counter Iran. During the rift, Qatar deepened relations with Turkey and Iran. On January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,relations with Turkey and Iran. On January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the
blockade, and Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international organizations. blockade, and Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international organizations.
The intra-GCC reconciliation process has since proceeded, albeit unevenly, and particularly slowly with the UAE. Qatar’s leaders work with the United States to secure the Persian Gulf, as do the other GCC leaders. The United Qatar’s leaders work with the United States to secure the Persian Gulf, as do the other GCC leaders. The United
States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop
presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under
the DCA, Qatar hosts more than 8,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command the DCA, Qatar hosts more than 8,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces deployed at these (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces deployed at these
~~facilities~~ facilities participate in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, participate in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry,
including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” that inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” that
has included discussion of efforts to improve accommodations for U.S. personnel deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, has included discussion of efforts to improve accommodations for U.S. personnel deployed to Al Udeid Air Base,
which has been used extensively in the U.S. operation to evacuate U.S. personnel and which has been used extensively in the U.S. operation to evacuate U.S. personnel and Afghan allies from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Qatar has been active as a mediator between the international community and the new Taliban regime there, and Doha has served as the temporary location for a U.S. embassy to Afghanistan after U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in the course of the U.S. withdrawal~~Afghan al ies from~~
~~Afghanistan in August 2021~~. In 2017, the United States and Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding . In 2017, the United States and Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding
to cooperate against international terrorism. to cooperate against international terrorism.
The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s former Amir (ruler) departed from GCC patterns of The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s former Amir (ruler) departed from GCC patterns of
governance in which leaders governance in which leaders ~~general y~~generally remain in power for life. At the same time, remain in power for life. At the same time, ~~Qatar is the only one of the~~
~~smal er GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body~~apparently out of concern for opening up divisions in Qatari society and politics, Qatar delayed holding elections for a legislative body for several years, but the first vote for 30 out of 45 seats of the “Shura Council” was held on October 2, 2021. U.S. and international reports, which are . U.S. and international reports, which are
scrutinizing Qatar as its hosting of the World Cup soccer tournament approaches in 2022, criticize Qatar for not scrutinizing Qatar as its hosting of the World Cup soccer tournament approaches in 2022, criticize Qatar for not
adhering to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps to improve the conditions adhering to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps to improve the conditions
for expatriate workers. for expatriate workers.
Like other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014 Like other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014
and were compounded by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)and were compounded by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. As of early . As of early ~~April~~October, Qatar has reported about , Qatar has reported about
~~178~~237,000,000 infections and infections and ~~290~~600 deaths from the disease, which has affected Qatar’s expatriate population deaths from the disease, which has affected Qatar’s expatriate population
disproportionately. Qatar has been able to weather economic headwinds because of its disproportionately. Qatar has been able to weather economic headwinds because of its ~~smal~~ small population, population,
substantial financial reserves, and its favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with substantial financial reserves, and its favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with
~~virtual y al~~ virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of
hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar withdrew from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar withdrew from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its natural gas export sector; Qatar has the third largest proven reserves of Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its natural gas export sector; Qatar has the third largest proven reserves of
natural gas in the world. natural gas in the world.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Brief History
Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al
Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main Western Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main Western
power in the Persian Gulf region, to instal a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what power in the Persian Gulf region, to instal a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what
is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim, is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim,
the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism,
belonged.1 Thus, Qatar official y subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it belonged.1 Thus, Qatar official y subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it
shares with Saudi Arabia. shares with Saudi Arabia.
In 1916, in the midst of World War I and after the Ottoman Empire relinquished its territorial In 1916, in the midst of World War I and after the Ottoman Empire relinquished its territorial
claims over Qatar, the Al Thani family signed an agreement under which Qatar formal y became a claims over Qatar, the Al Thani family signed an agreement under which Qatar formal y became a
British protectorate. In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility British protectorate. In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility
for Persian Gulf security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates for Persian Gulf security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates
(principalities) that were then cal ed the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates (principalities) that were then cal ed the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent rather than join that union. (UAE). However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent rather than join that union.
The UAE was separately formed in late 1971. Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April The UAE was separately formed in late 1971. Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April
1970 and became fully independent on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy 1970 and became fully independent on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy
in Doha in 1973. The United States is currently represented by Charge D’Affaires in Doha in 1973. The United States is currently represented by Charge D’Affaires ~~Greta Holtz,~~
John Desrocher, appointed to that post appointed to that post onin June June ~~14, 2020~~2021. .
Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar
Position
Leader
Amir (ruler) and Minister of Defense Amir (ruler) and Minister of Defense
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2013) Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2013)
Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent) Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent)
Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2014) Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2014)
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani (since 2020) Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani (since 2020)
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for
Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah (since 2017) Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah (since 2017)
Defense Affairs Defense Affairs
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (since 2017) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (since 2017)
Minister of Finance Minister of Finance
Ali Sharif al-Imadi (since 2013) Ali Sharif al-Imadi (since 2013)
President of the Shura Council President of the Shura Council
Ahmad bin Abdal ah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud (since 2017) Ahmad bin Abdal ah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud (since 2017)
Ambassador to the United States Ambassador to the United States
Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 2017) Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 2017)
Source: Qatari Government Websites. Qatari Government Websites.

1 Information in this section is taken from Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” Policy Brief: Norwegian 1 Information in this section is taken from Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” Policy Brief: Norwegian
Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2013. Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2013.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance

Area
11,586 sq. km (slightly smal er than Connecticut) 11,586 sq. km (slightly smal er than Connecticut)
People
Population: 2.3 mil ion, of which about 90% are expatriates 2.3 mil ion, of which about 90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and
1% other. Figures include expatriates. 1% other. Figures include expatriates.
Ethnic Groups: Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include
expatriates. Virtual y al citizens areexpatriates. Virtual y al citizens are Arab. Arab.
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $350 bil ion on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis $350 bil ion on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis
GDP per capita: $125,000 on ppp basis $125,000 on ppp basis
Inflation: 0.6% 0.6%
GDP Growth Rate: 1.5% in 2019; -3% in 2020 : 1.5% in 2019; -3% in 2020
Export Partners: (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE
Import Partners: (In descending order) United States, China, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy (In descending order) United States, China, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States. Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States.
Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry. Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry.
Gas (LNG) Exports: 126 bil ion cubic meters per year Gas (LNG) Exports: 126 bil ion cubic meters per year
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State; World Bank Group, Esri; and Google Maps. At-a-glance information from CIA World Department of State; World Bank Group, Esri; and Google Maps. At-a-glance information from CIA World
Factbook, Economist Intel igence Unit Country Report: Qatar; World Bank; http://www.statista.com. Factbook, Economist Intel igence Unit Country Report: Qatar; World Bank; http://www.statista.com.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Governance
Qatar’s governing structure approximates that of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council Qatar’s governing structure approximates that of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) in that it is led by a hereditary (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) in that it is led by a hereditary
Amir (literal y “prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.2 He Amir (literal y “prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.2 He
became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, relinquished became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, relinquished
power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs through a power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs through a
prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are
members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. On January 28, 2020, the Amir appointed a members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. On January 28, 2020, the Amir appointed a
new Prime Minister, U.S.-educated Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani. The Amir’s new Prime Minister, U.S.-educated Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani. The Amir’s
younger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, is deputy Amir and the heir apparent. younger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, is deputy Amir and the heir apparent.
Political parties are banned and authorities prohibit political y oriented associations. Political Political parties are banned and authorities prohibit political y oriented associations. Political
disagreements in Qatar are aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in disagreements in Qatar are aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in
which the leadership tries to balance the interests of the country’s families. There have been no which the leadership tries to balance the interests of the country’s families. There have been no
significant protests by Qatari citizens in many years, but some in the large expatriate community significant protests by Qatari citizens in many years, but some in the large expatriate community
have sometimes protested for improved working conditions. have sometimes protested for improved working conditions.
On the other hand, the elections were held on October 2, 2021, for a Shura (Advisory) Council, a legislative body that wil expand popular participation in national decisionmaking. Qatari citizens approved a constitution in a 2003 referendum, by a 98% vote in favor. The Qatari citizens approved a constitution in a 2003 referendum, by a 98% vote in favor. The
document affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate, specifies Islamic law as a key source of document affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate, specifies Islamic law as a key source of
legislation,3 and provides for elections for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council legislation,3 and provides for elections for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council
((Majlis Ash-Shura, Shura Council), a national legislative), a national legislative ~~body. After it is elected, the Majlis would be able to~~
body. According to the constitution, the Shura Council is empowered to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), to approve a national approve a national budget, and to draft and vote budget, and to draft and vote
on proposed legislationon proposed legislation, although (subject to subject to ~~concurrence~~a veto by the Amir by the Amir~~). In October 2019, the Amir ordered~~
~~the establishment of a committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, to organize the first Council~~
~~elections.4 In November 2020, the Amir announced the first Advisory Council elections wil take~~
~~place in October 2021. An election law adopted in early August 2021 to govern the upcoming~~
~~Advisory Council elections requires voters to be above 18 years old, be “original” Qataris, be~~
~~born in Qatar, and have Qatari grandfathers. That definition excludes from voting many members~~
~~of the Al Murrah tribe, which is nomadic, and many of whom do not have Qatari citizenship.~~
~~Several hundred Al Murrah protested the election law on August 9.5~~
~~The country holds elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the~~
~~government on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each serving a four-year~~
~~term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration was lower than expected; roughly 1 in 13 Qatari~~
~~adults cast bal ots.6~~
~~Human Rights Issues7~~
~~The State Department human rights report for 2020 identifies the most significant human rights~~
~~problems in Qatar as~~. Stil , it remains unclear how much influence the new Shura Council wil have on sensitive issues such as foreign and defense policy, economic and energy policy, and citizenship laws. The country has long held elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the government on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each serving a four-year term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration was lower than expected; roughly 1 in 13 Qatari adults cast bal ots.4 October 2, 2021, Shura Council Election Qatar’s leaders long delayed the Shura Council elections, reportedly out of concern that the elections would divide Qataris and potential y provide opportunity for Qatar’s neighbors to interfere in Qatari politics. Apparently deciding that the country should move forward to expand political participation, in October 2019, the Amir ordered the establishment of a committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, to organize the first Council elections.5 In November 2020, the Amir announced the first Shura Council elections would take place in October 2021. An election law adopted in early August 2021 to govern the Council elections requires voters to be above 18 years old, be “original” Qataris (families present in Qatar prior to 1930), be born in Qatar, and

2 Shaykh is an honorific term. 2 Shaykh is an honorific term.
3 Amy Hawthorne, “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the T op,” August 26, 2008.3 Amy Hawthorne, “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the T op,” August 26, 2008. 4 Justin Gengler, “Qatar’s first elections since 2017 reveal unexpected impact of GCC crisis,” Al Monitor, April 24, 2019. 5
4 “Qatar takes step toward first “Qatar takes step toward first Shura Council election: QNA agency,” Council election: QNA agency,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, October 31, 2019. Congressional Research Service 3 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy have Qatari grandfathers. Candidates are also to be fluent in Arabic. That definition excluded from voting many members of the Al Murrah tribe, which is nomadic, and many of whom do not have Qatari citizenship. Several hundred Al Murrah protested the election law on August 9,6 and have continued to argue their exclusion through established complaint processes after the October 2 election. According to Qatari officials, 284 candidates ran in the October 2, 2021, election, of which 28 were women. Campaigning was said to focus on appeals to familial and tribal relationships rather than issues and differences of opinion among competing candidates. The turnout was about 63% of eligible voters. None of the women was elected. The government noted in post-election releases that the Amir wil soon appoint the 15 remaining seats of the Shura Council to “ensure representation across communities in Qatar,” but no date for those appointments has been announced. Human Rights Issues7 The State Department human rights report for 2020 identifies the most significant human rights problems in Qatar as~~, October 31, 2019.~~
~~5 “Protests in Doha: T he Qatari Citizenship Is Not Enough for Voting,” Al Bawaba, August 10, 2021.~~
~~6 Justin Gengler, “Qatar’s first elections since 2017 reveal unexpected impact of GCC crisis,” Al Monitor, April 24,~~
~~2019.~~
~~7 Much of the information in this section is based on: U.S. Department of State,~~ ~~2020 Country Reports on Human~~
~~Rights Practices: Qatar,~~ ~~March 30, 2021.~~
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

restrictions on free expression, including criminalization of libel; restrictions on peaceful restrictions on free expression, including criminalization of libel; restrictions on peaceful
assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor
unions; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement; limits on the ability of unions; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement; limits on the ability of
citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; lack of investigation of and citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; lack of investigation of and
accountability for violence against women; criminalization of accountability for violence against women; criminalization of ~~con sensual~~consensual same-sex sexual same-sex sexual
conduct; and reports of forced labor. conduct; and reports of forced labor.
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), which investigates al egations of human rights A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), which investigates al egations of human rights
abuses, operates independently, but it is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by the abuses, operates independently, but it is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by the
Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza. Among the NHRC’s functions is to monitor the situation of about Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza. Among the NHRC’s functions is to monitor the situation of about
1,000-2,000 stateless residents (“1,000-2,000 stateless residents (“bidoons”),8 mostly members of families whose citizenship was ”),8 mostly members of families whose citizenship was
revoked decades ago for opposing Qatar’s leaders. Although the constitution provides for an revoked decades ago for opposing Qatar’s leaders. Although the constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, the Amir appoints al judges. independent judiciary, the Amir appoints al judges.
Freedom of Expression
Despite the absence of open opposition among the citizenry, Despite the absence of open opposition among the citizenry, ~~since~~ the 2011 “Arab Spring” the 2011 “Arab Spring”
~~uprisings, Qatar has adopted some laws that~~uprisings apparently prompted the government to increase penalties for criticizing the leadership. In increase penalties for criticizing the leadership. In
2014, the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three years in prison for 2014, the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three years in prison for
spreading “false news.” One law, enacted in January 2020, authorizes spreading “false news.” One law, enacted in January 2020, authorizes ~~the~~ imprisonment imprisonment of
“for anyone who anyone who “broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biased rumors, statements, or news, or broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biased rumors, statements, or news, or
inflammatory propaganda, domestical y or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir inflammatory propaganda, domestical y or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir
up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public system of the state.”9 Qatari up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public system of the state.”9 Qatari
officials assert that the law targets those who organize violent opposition activities. officials assert that the law targets those who organize violent opposition activities.
6 “Protests in Doha: T he Qatari Citizenship Is Not Enough for Voting,” Al Bawaba, August 10, 2021. 7 Much of the information in this section is based on U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021. 8 Bidoon is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country. 9 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Repressive new law further curbs freedom of expression,” January 20, 2020. Congressional Research Service 4 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Al Jazeera Media Network
According to the 2020 State Department human rights report, the government owns and partial y According to the 2020 State Department human rights report, the government owns and partial y
funds the Al Jazeera Media Network, which has evolved since its establishment in the mid-1990s funds the Al Jazeera Media Network, which has evolved since its establishment in the mid-1990s
into a global media organization. A U.S.-based representative for Al Jazeera says that, in 2011, its into a global media organization. A U.S.-based representative for Al Jazeera says that, in 2011, its
legal standing was changed to an independent legal entity with characteristics similar to a U.S. legal standing was changed to an independent legal entity with characteristics similar to a U.S.
non-profit.10 The network features a wide range of guests from al over the region debating issues; non-profit.10 The network features a wide range of guests from al over the region debating issues;
Arab leaders have sometimes reacted to the network’s critical coverage by closing Al Jazeera’s Arab leaders have sometimes reacted to the network’s critical coverage by closing Al Jazeera’s
bureaus or imprisoning its journalists. The network has run stories that criticize Qatar, including bureaus or imprisoning its journalists. The network has run stories that criticize Qatar, including
on the situation of expatriate laborers.11 The State Department quotes “some observers and former on the situation of expatriate laborers.11 The State Department quotes “some observers and former
Al Jazeera employees” as al eging that Qatar’s government “influences” Al Jazeera content.12 Al Jazeera employees” as al eging that Qatar’s government “influences” Al Jazeera content.12
Officials in the United Arab Emirates and other neighboring countries have sometimes criticized Officials in the United Arab Emirates and other neighboring countries have sometimes criticized
Al Jazeera for providing a platform for Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other Islamists to Al Jazeera for providing a platform for Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other Islamists to
promote their ideology.13 Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of promote their ideology.13 Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of
the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the Foreign the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA).14 Agents Registration Act (FARA).14

~~8 Bidoon is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country.~~
~~9 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Repressive new law further curbs freedom of expression,” January 20, 2020.~~
10 Information provided to CRS in August 2020 by CLS Strategies, a firm that represents Al Jazeera in the United 10 Information provided to CRS in August 2020 by CLS Strategies, a firm that represents Al Jazeera in the United
States. States.
11 See, e.g., “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address T reatment of Migrant Workers,” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019. 11 See, e.g., “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address T reatment of Migrant Workers,” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019.
12 U.S. Department of State, 12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021. March 30, 2021.
13 Jared Malsin, “ In the Eye of the Storm: Can Al Jazeera Survive the Gulf Crisis?” 13 Jared Malsin, “ In the Eye of the Storm: Can Al Jazeera Survive the Gulf Crisis?” Time, August 21, 2017. , August 21, 2017.
14 Office of Senator T om Cotton, “ Lawmakers Seek FARA Evaluation of Qatari-owned Al Jazeera,” press release, June 14 Office of Senator T om Cotton, “ Lawmakers Seek FARA Evaluation of Qatari-owned Al Jazeera,” press release, June
19, 2019. 19, 2019.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Qatari Leadership

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of
the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar. the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar.
He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh
Jasim, renounced his claim, reportedly based on his father’s lack of confidence in Jasim, renounced his claim, reportedly based on his father’s lack of confidence in
Shaykh Jasim’s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2013, when Shaykh Jasim’s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2013, when
Amir Hamad stepped down in a voluntary transfer of power that was unprecedented Amir Hamad stepped down in a voluntary transfer of power that was unprecedented
for Qatar and the Gulf region. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain’s for Qatar and the Gulf region. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain’s
Sherbourne School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in Sherbourne School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in
1998, from which his father graduated in 1971. Amir Tamim heads the Qatari 1998, from which his father graduated in 1971. Amir Tamim heads the Qatari
Investment Authority, which has bil ions of dol ars of investments in Europe, the Investment Authority, which has bil ions of dol ars of investments in Europe, the
United States, and elsewhere. He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led United States, and elsewhere. He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led
pressure during the intra-GCC crisis. pressure during the intra-GCC crisis.

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Amir Tamim’s father, Amir Tamim’s father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, seized power from his seized power from his
father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in June 1995, during his father’s absence in father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in June 1995, during his father’s absence in
Europe. In 1972, after finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of Europe. In 1972, after finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of
some Qatari military units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a some Qatari military units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a
bloodless seizure of power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani wasbloodless seizure of power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani was on a on a
hunting trip in Iran. hunting trip in Iran.
While Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’s ruler, he, his wife, and several of their While Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’s ruler, he, his wife, and several of their
other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to
Shaykh Hamad as “The Father Amir” and acknowledge that he has some continuing Shaykh Hamad as “The Father Amir” and acknowledge that he has some continuing
role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad
Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science,
and Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, where and Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, where
several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor
in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ful sister of the current Amir), in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ful sister of the current Amir),
Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork. Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork.
Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters
graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani,
remains active in Qatar’s investment activities and international circles. During Amir remains active in Qatar’s investment activities and international circles. During Amir
Hamad’s rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and Hamad’s rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and
architect of Qatar’s relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’s father, architect of Qatar’s relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’s father,
former Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016. former Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016.
Sources: various press, and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. : various press, and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Women’s Rights
According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues,
despite the constitutional assertion of equality.15 The despite the constitutional assertion of equality.15 The ~~World Economic Forum ranks Qatar 142nd~~
~~out of 156 countries for achieving gender parity across economic, political, social and health~~
~~measures.16 The~~ application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage, divorce, application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage, divorce,
child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, as wel as a lack of laws against domestic child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, as wel as a lack of laws against domestic
violence, contribute to this gender inequality.violence, contribute to this gender inequality.1716 Laws prevent Laws prevent women from passing citizenship to women from passing citizenship to
their children, though a 2018 permanent residency law has created a mechanism for children born their children, though a 2018 permanent residency law has created a mechanism for children born
to Qatari women married to non-Qatari men to access government health and education. to Qatari women married to non-Qatari men to access government health and education.
Guardianship laws require women to obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone Guardianship laws require women to obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone
before the age of 25 if they are unmarried, as wel as “to marry, obtain a government scholarship before the age of 25 if they are unmarried, as wel as “to marry, obtain a government scholarship
to pursue higher education, work in to pursue higher education, work in ~~many government jobs~~government, and ~~, and~~ obtain some reproductive health obtain some reproductive health
care.”care.”1817
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of business owners and more Women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of business owners and more
than a third of the overal workforce, including as professionals. Women serve in public office, than a third of the overal workforce, including as professionals. Women serve in public office,
such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation, head of the General Authority for such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation, head of the General Authority for
Museums, and ambassadors to the United Nations and several countries. Qatar’s constitution Museums, and ambassadors to the United Nations and several countries. Qatar’s constitution
recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office, and two women have been elected at the recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office, and two women have been elected at the
municipal council level. In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to the municipal council level. In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to the Majlis As-
Shura for the first time in the body’s history. for the first time in the body’s history.1918 As noted above, however, none of the women candidates was elected in the October 2, 2021, Shura Council elections. In December 2019, the ~~In December 2019, the~~ spokeswoman for the spokeswoman for the
Foreign Ministry, Lolwah Al Khater, was appointed “assistant minister” of Foreign Ministry, Lolwah Al Khater, was appointed “assistant minister” of Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs
(number two at the Foreign Ministry).(number two at the Foreign Ministry).2019
Trafficking in Persons and Labor ~~Issues21~~Issues20
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2020 maintained Qatar at a Tier 2 The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2020 maintained Qatar at a Tier 2
ranking on the basis that the government makes significant efforts to comply with the minimum ranking on the basis that the government makes significant efforts to comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. Qatar has enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better standards for the elimination of trafficking. Qatar has enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better
protect protect ~~domestic~~those workers and it has established a coordinating body workers and it has established a coordinating body ~~to oversee and facilitate~~for anti- anti-
trafficking initiatives. trafficking initiatives. ~~But,~~ Stil , Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to
forced labor and, to a much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers remain forced labor and, to a much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers remain
~~particularly~~ vulnerable to trafficking due to their vulnerable to trafficking due to their ~~isolation~~positioning in private residences. Alongside the in private residences. Alongside the
January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic Dialogue,” the two countries signed a memorandum of Dialogue,” the two countries signed a memorandum of
understanding to create a framework to understanding to create a framework to combat trafficking in persons.combat trafficking in persons.2221
The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor laws as not adequately protecting the rights of The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor laws as not adequately protecting the rights of
workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari
law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for
union activity. Yet, the State Department credits the country with taking steps to protect labor rights, including for expatriate workers. In 2016, a labor reform law went into effect that provided
15 U.S. Department of State, 15 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2021. , March 2021.
16 16 ~~World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2021, March 30, 2021.~~
17 CRS Report R46423, CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R. , by Zoe Danon and Sarah R.
Collins. Collins.
1817 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, “Everything I Have to Do is Tied to a Man”: Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules,
March 29, 2021. March 29, 2021.
1918 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “IPU welcomes appointment of four women to Qatar’s Parliament ,” November 13, 2017. Inter-Parliamentary Union, “IPU welcomes appointment of four women to Qatar’s Parliament ,” November 13, 2017.
2019 “Amir appoints Lolwah AlKhater as Assistant to FM.” “Amir appoints Lolwah AlKhater as Assistant to FM.” Gulf Times, December 2, 2019. , December 2, 2019.
2120 T his section is based on the U.S. Department of State, T his section is based on the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 25, 2020. June 25, 2020.
2221 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note,
January 30, 2018. January 30, 2018.
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~~union activity. Yet, the State Department credits the country with taking steps to protect labor~~
~~rights, including for expatriate workers. In 2016, a labor reform law went into effect that provided~~
for changes to the “for changes to the “kafala” system (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable ” system (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable
employees to switch employers at the end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave employees to switch employers at the end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave
Qatar. The law abolished the Qatar. The law abolished the kafala system entirely at the end of 2019, and further reforms that system entirely at the end of 2019, and further reforms that
took effect took effect onin August August ~~30,~~ 20202020, established a monthly minimum wage of established a monthly minimum wage of ~~1,000 Qatari riyals~~
~~($275)~~$275 and provide for stricter penalties and provide for stricter penalties for those that fail to provide their mostly expatriate labor force that fail to provide their mostly expatriate labor force
with adequate housing. The government also has increased its cooperation with the International with adequate housing. The government also has increased its cooperation with the International
Labor Organization Labor Organization (ILO) to help~~(ILO) to take in worker complaints and inform~~ expatriate workers expatriate workers ofobtain their their
rights.rights.
Scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has centered on the plight of the many Scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has centered on the plight of the many ~~additional, mostly~~
~~expatriate, engineers, construction workers, and other laborers~~ expatriate workers hired to prepare for the 2022 FIFA hired to prepare for the 2022 FIFA
World Cup soccer tournament. An Amnesty International report from September 2019 al eged World Cup soccer tournament. An Amnesty International report from September 2019 al eged
that workers sometimes are not paid for work and adequate dispute resolution mechanisms are that workers sometimes are not paid for work and adequate dispute resolution mechanisms are
lacking.lacking.2322 The Qatar government responded The Qatar government responded ~~to the report~~ by stating: “Many of the cases included by stating: “Many of the cases included
in the report precede recent legislative amendments—including the establishment of the in the report precede recent legislative amendments—including the establishment of the
Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly improved the Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly improved the
processes and increased the speed for resolving labour disputes.” Hundreds of processes and increased the speed for resolving labour disputes.” Hundreds of expatriate workers expatriate workers
demonstrated in August 2019 against poor working conditions and unpaid and demonstrated in August 2019 against poor working conditions and unpaid and delayed wages. ~~delayed wages.~~
~~The State Department reported that during the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, “the~~
~~government gave the private sector the right to alter employee contracts without legal liability due~~
~~to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Companies forced workers to take a combination of~~
~~unpaid leave, decreased salaries, or premature contract terminations, negatively affecting tens of~~
~~thousands of workers.” The government also instructed directed state employers to “reduce~~
~~monthly costs for non-Qatari employees by 30%, by either cutting salaries or laying off workers~~
~~with a two-month notice.”24~~ Some studies suggested that crowded conditions for expatriate Some studies suggested that crowded conditions for expatriate
laborers in Qatar laborers in Qatar fueled a relatively high per capita infection rate from COVID-19 in the spring of fueled a relatively high per capita infection rate from COVID-19 in the spring of
2020.2020.2523
Religious ~~Freedom26~~Freedom24
Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of
legislation,” but Qatari laws also incorporate secular legal traditionslegislation,” but Qatari laws also incorporate secular legal traditions~~. The law recognizes only~~
~~Islam, Christianity, and Judaism~~. The overwhelming majority (about 95%) of Qatari citizens are . The overwhelming majority (about 95%) of Qatari citizens are
Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining an absence of observable sectarian tensions. The government Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining an absence of observable sectarian tensions. The government
permits eight registered Christian denominations to worship publicly at the Mesaymir Religious permits eight registered Christian denominations to worship publicly at the Mesaymir Religious
Complex, and it has al owed the Evangelical Churches Al ianceComplex, and it has al owed the Evangelical Churches Al iance of Qatar to build a church. Hindu, of Qatar to build a church. Hindu,
Jewish, Buddhists, or other non-Muslim religious Jewish, Buddhists, or other non-Muslim religious groups are registered with the Ministry of groups are registered with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and they have established vil asForeign Affairs and they have established vil as and private homes as houses of worship. and private homes as houses of worship.
According to the International Religious Freedom report for 2019, in January 2019, a delegation According to the International Religious Freedom report for 2019, in January 2019, a delegation
led by the Secretary of State met with senior counterparts in Doha and signed a statement of led by the Secretary of State met with senior counterparts in Doha and signed a statement of
intent to “support the shared ideals of tolerance and appreciation intent to “support the shared ideals of tolerance and appreciation for diversity.” Foreign Policy Qatar uses its ample financial resources to support a foreign policy that attempts to influence outcomes in the region. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate some regional conflicts, as wel as to back regional actors at odds with those supported by some of the other GCC states. Qatar has at times also used its military forces in its interventions. Regional and bilateral issues reportedly constitute the focus of high-level U.S.-Qatar meetings.25 22 Amnesty International, All Work No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar’s Migrant Workers for Justice, September 19, 2019. 23~~for diversity.”~~

~~23 Amnesty International, All Work No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar’s Migrant Workers for Justice, September 19, 2019.~~
~~24 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2021, p. 24.~~
25 “T hese two countries are tiny, rich and have the world’s highest coronavirus infection rates,” “T hese two countries are tiny, rich and have the world’s highest coronavirus infection rates,” Associated Press, July , July
23, 2020. 23, 2020.
26 24 T his section draws from the U.S. Department of State, T his section draws from the U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom , June 10, , June 10,
2020. 2020.
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~~Foreign Policy~~
~~Qatar uses its ample financial resources to support a foreign policy that attempts to influence a~~
~~wide range of regional actors. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate some regional conflicts ,~~
~~as wel as to back regional actors at odds with those supported by some of the other GCC states.~~
~~Qatar has at times also used its military forces to intervene in regional conflicts. Regional and~~
~~bilateral issues have reportedly constituted the focus of high-level U.S.-Qatar meetings.27~~25 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Third U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, September 18, 2020. Congressional Research Service 8 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute
A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’s relationship with Muslim A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’s relationship with Muslim
Brotherhood movements. Qatari officials Brotherhood movements. Qatari officials ~~argue~~maintain that the Brotherhood that the Brotherhood ~~is a moderate~~, a political political
~~Islamist movement that can foster regional stability through participation~~Islamist movement, participates in the legitimate in the legitimate
political process. UAE leaders, in particular, assert that the Brotherhood seeks to destabilize political process. UAE leaders, in particular, assert that the Brotherhood seeks to destabilize
established governments in the region. In 2014, differences over this and other issues established governments in the region. In 2014, differences over this and other issues ~~erupted and~~
led Saudi Arabia, UAE, and BahrainSaudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain ~~withdrew~~ to withdraw their ambassadors from Doha, returning them several their ambassadors from Doha, returning them several
months later after Qatar pledged to implement a November months later after Qatar pledged to implement a November 2013 commitment to end support for 2013 commitment to end support for
Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.2826 The differences erupted again in June 2017 when The differences erupted again in June 2017 when
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and Jordan, cut diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and Jordan, cut diplomatic relations with
~~Qatar, expel ed Qatar’s diplomats, recal ed their ambassadors,~~Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and imposed limits on the entry
and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. These and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. These
countries presented Qatar with 13 demands as conditions for lifting the blockade, including countries presented Qatar with 13 demands as conditions for lifting the blockade, including
closing Alclosing Al Jazeera, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Jazeera, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with
Iran, and closing a Turkish Iran, and closing a Turkish military base in Qatar.military base in Qatar.2927 Amir Tamim expressed openness to Amir Tamim expressed openness to
negotiations but said Qatar would negotiations but said Qatar would not “surrender” its sovereignty not “surrender” its sovereignty ~~and argued that Qatar has~~
~~historical y given refuge to Islamists from the region, including Brotherhood adherents~~by agreeing to the demands. .
President Trump initial y echoed criticism of Qatar’s policies, and mediation of the rift was President Trump initial y echoed criticism of Qatar’s policies, and mediation of the rift was
spearheaded by then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson who, working with Kuwaiti leaders, spearheaded by then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson who, working with Kuwaiti leaders,
conducted “shuttle diplomacy” in the region during July 2017. A U.S. envoy appointed in 2017 to conducted “shuttle diplomacy” in the region during July 2017. A U.S. envoy appointed in 2017 to
work on the issue, General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in 2019. In July 2019, Jordan work on the issue, General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in 2019. In July 2019, Jordan ~~broke~~
~~with the boycotting states~~started a thaw in the boycott by restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar by restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar~~,30 and the then-Prime~~
~~Minister of Qatar attended the annual GCC summit during December 10-11, 2019.31~~.28 During During
October 2019-January 2020, Qatar and Saudi Arabia held high-level direct talks, but October 2019-January 2020, Qatar and Saudi Arabia held high-level direct talks, but ~~Qatar’s~~
~~Foreign Minister stated that~~ the talks were suspended in early the talks were suspended in early January 2020.January 2020.3229
At the 41st GCC summit in Al At the 41st GCC summit in Al ~~Ula~~-Ula, Saudi Arabia, on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and UAE, and
Egypt announced that they would be restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar, while Qatar agreed Egypt announced that they would be restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar, while Qatar agreed
to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international organizations. The Al-Ulato drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international organizations. The Al-Ula
Declaration does not make direct reference to the 13 demands original yDeclaration does not make direct reference to the 13 demands original y articulated in June 2017, but rather to restoring “collaboration among al Member States” and strengthening “the bonds of brotherhood among them.”30 Direct flights between Doha and Riyadh resumed on January 11, and flights between Qatar and the other blockading nations resumed on January 18.31 A senior UAE official visited Qatar on August 26, the first such visit in over four years, to discuss “.. ways to further develop cooperation.. especial y in the economic and trade fields...”32 And, in late September, the Amir, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and the UAE National Security Advisor met at a Red Sea resort, signaling an acceleration of the thaw. Analysts expect the normalization between GCC countries to boost Qatar’s tourism sector, 26~~articulated in June 2017,~~

~~27 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Third U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, September 18,~~
~~2020.~~
28 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia, Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. T he November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman. Kuwait, and Qatar. T he November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.
2927 T he list of demands can be found at “ List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” T he list of demands can be found at “ List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated
Press, June 23, 2017. , June 23, 2017.
30 28 “Inching Away from Saudi-UAE Axis, Jordan Restores T ies with Qatar,” Al Jazeera English, July 9, 2019. “Inching Away from Saudi-UAE Axis, Jordan Restores T ies with Qatar,” Al Jazeera English, July 9, 2019.
~~31 GCC summit calls for unity amid hopes of easing Gulf crisis, Al Jazeera, December 10, 2019.~~
~~32 Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January, Al Jazeera, February 15, 2020.~~
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~~but rather to restoring “collaboration among al Member States” and strengthening “the bonds of~~
~~brotherhood among them.”33 Direct flights between Doha and Riyadh resumed on January 11, and~~
~~flights between Qatar and the other blockading nations resumed on January 18.34 A senior UAE~~
~~official visited Qatar on August 26, the first such visit in over four years, to discuss “bilateral~~
~~relations and ways to further develop cooperation between the two countries, especial y in the~~
~~economic and trade fields and vital investment projects.”35 Analysts expect the normalization~~
~~between GCC countries to boost Qatar’s tourism sector,~~ 29 Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January, Al Jazeera, February 15, 2020. 30 T uqa Khalid, “ Full transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf unity ,” Al Arabiya, January 6, 2021; Sultan Barakat, “ Qatar-GCC agreement: A victory for measured diplomacy,” opinion, Al Jazeera, January 8, 2021. 31 Isabel Debre, “ Qatar-Saudi Arabia direct flights resume amid Gulf detente,” AP News, January 11, 2021; Egypt, UAE resume first Qatar flights after blockade,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2021. 32 “Emir of Qatar receives delegation led by T ahnoun bin Zayed,” Emirates News Agency, August 26, 2021. Congressional Research Service 9 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy improve attendance at the 2022 World improve attendance at the 2022 World
Cup in Doha, and improve economic cooperation in the Cup in Doha, and improve economic cooperation in the region more general y.33 ~~region more general y.36 It is not clear~~
~~whether the Biden Administration wil continue the Trump Administration’s efforts to assemble a~~
~~new “Middle East Strategic Al iance” (MESA)—to consist of the United States, the GCC~~
~~countries, and other Sunni-led states—to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups.~~
The intra-GCC rift had roots in and implications for the broader region: The intra-GCC rift had roots in and implications for the broader region:
  In Egypt, Qatar supported, political y and financial y, the government of Muslim Qatar supported, political y and financial y, the government of Muslim
Brotherhood-linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, who was elected president Brotherhood-linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, who was elected president of
~~Egypt in~~ in 2012. The UAE and Saudi Arabia backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s 2012. The UAE and Saudi Arabia backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s
military in military in 2013 and have financial y backed the regime of former military leader 2013 and have financial y backed the regime of former military leader
and now President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. and now President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
 In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner  In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner
countries in air operations to help oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in countries in air operations to help oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in
2011. Subsequently, Qatar, reportedly in partnership with Turkey, has supported 2011. Subsequently, Qatar, reportedly in partnership with Turkey, has supported
the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli, which the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli, which ~~has~~is supported by Muslim Brotherhood-linked Muslim Brotherhood-linked
~~factions supporting it~~factions. The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia support ex-military . The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia support ex-military
commander Khalifa Haftar, who commander Khalifa Haftar, who ~~has taken control of~~controls large parts of eastern and large parts of eastern and
northern Libya and who northern Libya and who ~~attempted~~sought to seize control of Tripoli in 2019. to seize control of Tripoli in 2019.3734
 In Yemen, in 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition to battle Iran-  In Yemen, in 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition to battle Iran-
backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels, including deploying about 1,000 military backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels, including deploying about 1,000 military
personnel, along with armor, to guard the Saudi border from Houthi incursions. personnel, along with armor, to guard the Saudi border from Houthi incursions.
The Qatari Air Force also flew air strikes against the Houthis.The Qatari Air Force also flew air strikes against the Houthis.3835 As a result of the As a result of the
intra-GCC rift, in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the mission. intra-GCC rift, in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the mission.
 In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of  In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of
President Bashar Al Asad, including those reportedly linked to the Muslim President Bashar Al Asad, including those reportedly linked to the Muslim
BrotherhoodBrotherhood ~~and which competed with anti-Asad factions supported by Saudi~~
~~Arabia.39~~.36 Qatar also claimed that its ties to Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), an Al Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), were instrumental in persuading the group to sever its ties to Al Qaeda in 2016, and to release its Lebanese and Western prisoners.37 Iran Qatari leaders have consistently pursued dialogue with Iran to reduce regional tensions, while simultaneously cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran strategical y. In solidarity with its GCC partners, Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 during a Saudi- Iranian rift over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric. However, Qatar turned to Iran to help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying Iranian airspace to fly around the GCC countries that were boycotting Qatar. Qatar Airways paid Iran over $130 mil ion per year in overflight fees.38 In August 2017, Qatar restored full diplomatic 33 ~~Qatar also claimed that its ties to Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), an Al Qaeda~~

~~33 T uqa Khalid, “ Full transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf unity ,” Al Arabiya, January 6,~~
~~2021; Sultan Barakat, “ Qatar-GCC agreement: A victory for measured diplomacy,” opinion, Al Jazeera, January 8,~~
~~2021.~~
~~34 Isabel Debre, “ Qatar-Saudi Arabia direct flights resume amid Gulf detente,” AP News, January 11, 2021; Egypt,~~
~~UAE resume first Qatar flights after blockade,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2021.~~
~~35 “Emir of Qatar receives delegation led by T ahnoun bin Zayed,” Emirates News Agency, August 26, 2021.~~
36 Davide Barbuscia and Saeed Azhar, “Gulf economy gets a boost from healing of Saudi-Qatar rift,” Davide Barbuscia and Saeed Azhar, “Gulf economy gets a boost from healing of Saudi-Qatar rift,” ~~Reuters~~Reuters, January , January
5, 2021; Aarti Nagraj, “ AlUla agreement: What does resetting ties with Qatar mean for the GCC region?” Gulf 5, 2021; Aarti Nagraj, “ AlUla agreement: What does resetting ties with Qatar mean for the GCC region?” Gulf
Business, February 11, 2021. Business, February 11, 2021.
3734 U.N. Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 U.N. Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973
(2011), March 9, 2016. For information on the conflict in Libya, see CRS In Focus IF11556, (2011), March 9, 2016. For information on the conflict in Libya, see CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy, by , by
Christopher M. Blanchard. Christopher M. Blanchard.
3835 Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel, 2019. Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel, 2019.
3936 Anand Gopal and Jeremy Hodge, Anand Gopal and Jeremy Hodge, Social Networks, Class, and the Syrian Proxy War, International Security Report, , International Security Report,
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist~~
~~Organization (FTO), were instrumental in persuading the group to sever its ties to~~
~~Al Qaeda in 2016, and to release its Lebanese and Western prisoners.40~~
~~Iran~~
~~Qatari leaders have consistently pursued dialogue with Iran to reduce regional tensions, while~~
~~simultaneously cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran strategical y. In February 2010, as~~
~~Crown Prince, Shaykh Tamim visited Iran for talks with Iranian leaders, and as Amir, he has~~
~~maintained direct contact with Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani.41 Qatar withdrew its Ambassador~~
~~from Tehran in January 2016 during a Saudi-Iranian rift over the Saudi execution of a dissident~~
~~Shiite cleric.~~
~~Iran helped Qatar cope with the GCC rift by exporting additional foodstuffs to Qatar and by~~
~~permitting Qatar Airways to overfly its airspace. In return, Qatar Airways has paid Iran over $130~~
~~mil ion per year in overflight fees.42 In August 2017, Qatar formal y restored full diplomatic~~
New America, April 6, 2021. 37 “Analysts: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, pushed al-Nusra Front to break with al-Qaeda,” Agencia EFE, July 29, 2016. 38 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,” Fox News, July 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service 10 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy relations with Iran, and Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 relations with Iran, and Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015
multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region
should not lead to “escalation.”should not lead to “escalation.”4339 Through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, Qatar and Iran Through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, Qatar and Iran
sought to de-escalate the U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf in 2019sought to de-escalate the U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf in 2019,40 and Qatar reportedly has sought to start a formal dialogue between the GCC and Iran to lower Gulf tensions.~~.44~~ Qatar and Iran have shared a Qatar and Iran have shared a
large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although some Iranian large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although some Iranian officials have officials have
occasional y accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.occasional y accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.4541
Israeli-Palestinian Issues/~~Hamas46~~Hamas42
Qatar has maintained contact with al parties in the Israeli-Palestinian disputeQatar has maintained contact with al parties in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute~~. In 1996, then-Amir~~
~~Hamad hosted a~~ , including hosting a visit by then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres visit by then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres ~~and in 2000, it al owed~~in 1996 and al owing Israel ~~Israel~~
to open a formal trade office in Dohato open a formal trade office in Doha~~. The trade office has been closed since~~ from 2000 until the 2009 Israel- the 2009 Israel-
Hamas conflictHamas conflict~~, but~~ erupted. However, smal levels of direct Israel-Qatar trade, as wel as visits to Doha by Israeli smal levels of direct Israel-Qatar trade, as wel as visits to Doha by Israeli
security officials, athletes, doctors, and other Israelis, reportedly security officials, athletes, doctors, and other Israelis, reportedly ~~continue.47~~
~~Despite these Israel-Qatar contacts,~~continued after that clash.43 Amir Tamim regularly accuses Amir Tamim regularly accuses Israel of abuses against the Israel of abuses against the
Palestinians and expressesPalestinians and expresses ~~consistent~~ support for Palestinian efforts support for Palestinian efforts ~~for~~to gain full full United Nations United Nations
~~membership and recognition, while at the same time backing negotiations between the~~
~~Palestinians and Israel.48 Qatar reacted to the Trump Administration’s January 2020 unveiling of~~

~~New America, April 6, 2021.~~
~~40 “Analysts: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, pushed al-Nusra Front to break with al-Qaeda,” Agencia EFE, July 29, 2016.~~
~~41 “Iran, Qatar Seek Improved Relations despite Differences,” Al Arabiya, June 19, 2015.~~
~~42 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,” Fox News, July 14, 2020.~~
~~43 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.~~
~~44 T he Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis, Fox News, May 16, 2019.~~
~~45 “Iran, Qatar, Face Off Over North Field, South Pars, Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016.~~
~~46 See CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL34074,~~
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
~~47 “Qatar cozies up to Israel, again,” Electronic Intifada, February 26, 2020.~~
~~48 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015.~~
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~its Israel-Palestinian peace proposals by saying that it welcomed efforts to broker “longstanding~~
~~peace,” but warned that was unattainable without concessions to the Palestinians.49~~membership and recognition.44
Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.- Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.-
designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari
officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian peace.officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian peace.5045
Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its political Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its political
bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly relocated there in 2020.bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly relocated there in 2020.5146 Much of Qatar’s leverage with Much of Qatar’s leverage with
Hamas and Israel comes in the form of substantial financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza, Hamas and Israel comes in the form of substantial financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza,
which Israeli officials support as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border. which Israeli officials support as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.5247 Qatar’s Qatar’s
aid is provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official aid is provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official
Mohammad Al-Emadi, who serves informal y as an envoy to Israel. In March 2020, Qatar Mohammad Al-Emadi, who serves informal y as an envoy to Israel. In March 2020, Qatar
donated $10 mil ion to the Palestinian Authority to help it cope with the COVID-19 outbreak. In donated $10 mil ion to the Palestinian Authority to help it cope with the COVID-19 outbreak. In
June 2020, Qatar reportedly threatened to suspend the payments to Gaza if Israel proceeded with June 2020, Qatar reportedly threatened to suspend the payments to Gaza if Israel proceeded with
its plans to annex some West Bank areas.its plans to annex some West Bank areas.5348 Qatar criticized the August 13, 2020 Qatar criticized the August 13, 2020, UAE-Israeli UAE-Israeli
announcement of a commitment to normalized relations announcement of a commitment to normalized relations (“Abraham Accords”) as a UAE ~~as a UAE~~ betrayal of the Palestinian betrayal of the Palestinian
~~cause, despite the simultaneous Israeli suspension of its annexation plans. Hamas announced on~~
~~August 31, 2020, that, through Qatari mediation, a deal had been reached to avoid Israel-Hamas~~
~~escalations and restore calm along the border with Israel after several weeks of high tensions.54~~
~~Qatar’s critics assert that Hamas leaders are too often featured on Al Jazeera and that Qatar’s~~
~~relations with Hamas~~ cause, and indicated that Qatar would not join the Accords unless and until there were a broader Israel-Palestinian settlement. Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, reportedly facilitated, in part, by new pledges of Qatari aid to Gaza.49 39 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018. 40 T he Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis, Fox News, May 16, 2019. 41 “Iran, Qatar, Face off Over North Field, South Pars, Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016. 42 See CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 43 “Qatar cozies up to Israel, again,” Electronic Intifada, February 26, 2020. 44 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. 45 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June 12, 2017. 46 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar – report,” Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020. 47 Neville T eller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?,” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019. 48 “Qatar to suspend Gaza payments to pressure Israel over annexation,” Axios, June 23, 2020. 49 ”Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure.” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021. Congressional Research Service 11 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Qatar’s critics assert that the country’s relations with Hamas leaders constitute support for a terrorist organization. In the 115th Congress, the constitute support for a terrorist organization. In the 115th Congress, the
Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of 2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of 2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be
reported to the full House on November 15, 2017, appeared directed at Qatar by sanctioning reported to the full House on November 15, 2017, appeared directed at Qatar by sanctioning
foreign governments determined to be providing financial or other material support to Hamas or foreign governments determined to be providing financial or other material support to Hamas or
its leaders. Versions of that bilits leaders. Versions of that bil introduced in the 116th Congress, H.R. 1850 and S. 2680introduced in the 116th Congress, H.R. 1850 and S. 2680, did not did not
directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and contained exceptions contained exceptions ~~if aid to Hamas or related~~
~~groups is purely humanitarian.55~~for purely humanitarian aid.50 H.R. 1850 passed the House on July 23, 2019 H.R. 1850 passed the House on July 23, 2019 , by voice vote. The by voice vote. The
~~act has been~~bil was reintroduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 261). reintroduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 261).
Afghanistan/Taliban Office
~~Seeking to contribute to a potential political solution in Afghanistan, Qatar has brokered and~~
~~hosted many rounds of talks between the United States and Taliban representatives. Even though~~
~~Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan when the~~
~~movement ruled during 1996-2001, it al owed the Taliban to open a representative office in Qatar~~
~~in 2013. U.S.-Taliban talks led to the~~Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan when the movement ruled during 1996-2001. However, the stalemate in the conflict there apparently contributed to a Qatari decision, with U.S. support, to al ow the Taliban to open a representative office in Doha in 2013, through which moderate Taliban figures could engage with outside stakeholders in the Afghan situation. U.S.-Taliban talks led to a May 2014, exchange of captured U.S. soldier Bowe May 2014, exchange of captured U.S. soldier Bowe
Bergdahl for five Taliban figures who subsequently joined the Taliban office in Bergdahl for five Taliban figures who subsequently joined the Taliban office in Doha. After the Trump Administration decided to engage the Taliban with the intent of winding down U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Qatar brokered and hosted many~~Doha. Doha~~
~~hosted the U.S.-Taliban talks that culminated in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement that was signed~~
~~in Doha on February 29, 2020. Qatar has hosted several~~ rounds of talks between rounds of talks between the United States and Taliban representatives, culminating in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement that was signed in Doha on February 29, 2020 (“Doha Agreement”). Doha also hosted several rounds of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban on a political solution for Afghanistan, which proved unsuccessful.51 In addition, ~~the Afghan~~

~~49 Qatar welcomes US Mideast peace plan, but urges changes, AFP, January 29, 2020.~~
~~50 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June~~
~~12, 2017.~~
~~51 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar – report,” Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020.~~
~~52 Neville T eller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?,” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.~~
~~53 “Qatar to suspend Gaza payments to pressure Israel over annexation,” Axios, June 23, 2020.~~
~~54 “Hamas Announces Qatar-brokered Deal to Avoid Escalation with Israel,” Haaretz, August 31, 2020.~~
~~55 “Eliot Engel Weakens Hamas Sanctions Bill After Lobbying from Qatar,” New York Post, September 21, 2019.~~
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11

~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~government and the Taliban on a political solution for Afghanistan since September 2020.56~~
Qatar’s contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Qatar’s contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) that is (FTO) that is ~~a semi-autonomous component~~an al y of the Taliban, of the Taliban, ~~bore some fruit in a~~ helped produce a November 2019 November 2019
prisoner exchange that included the release from Afghan custody of Anas prisoner exchange that included the release from Afghan custody of Anas Haqqani, the brother of Haqqani, the brother of
the deputy leader of the Taliban movementthe deputy leader of the Taliban movement~~—a release that might have built confidence between~~
~~U.S. and Taliban negotiators.57~~
, Sirajuddin Haqqani.52 During 2001-2021, Qatari ground forces Qatari ground forces ~~have not deployed~~did not deploy to Afghanistan, but to Afghanistan, but ~~Qatari facilities are used in U.S.~~
~~operations there.~~U.S. forces engaged there used Qatari facilities, and Qatar’s air force Qatar’s air force ~~has~~ delivered cargo and provided other logistical delivered cargo and provided other logistical support to U.S. forces. Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country, Qatar helped the United States evacuate~~support to the~~
~~U.S.-led security operations there. Following the fal of Kabul to the Taliban in mid-August 2021,~~
~~Qatar has worked closely with the United States to assist in the evacuations of~~ U.S. and Afghan U.S. and Afghan
citizens from Kabul. citizens from Kabul. A In addition to other support, a Qatari diplomat to Afghanistan Qatari diplomat to Afghanistan ~~was~~ reportedly reportedly ~~escorting~~escorted smal groups of smal groups of
Americans into the Kabul Americans into the Kabul airport for evacuation.53 After the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, several Qatar Airways charter flights evacuated U.S. and other nationals, facilitated by Qatari technical support that enabled Kabul airport to reopen. Senior U.S. officials, including in visits to Doha in September 2021 by Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin, thanked Qatar for its help in the evacuation operation, as wel as for its hosting, in Doha, of a temporary U.S. embassy to Afghanistan. U.S. Embassy Kabul was closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats were transferred to Doha. Also in September, Qatar’s Foreign Minister became the first senior foreign official to visit Kabul for official meetings with Taliban government leaders; he also met with senior figures from the ousted government, 50 “Eliot Engel Weakens Hamas Sanctions Bill After Lobbying from Qatar,” New York Post, September 21, 2019. 51 Mjuab Mashal, “~~airport for evacuation.58 Following a meeting in Washington on August~~
~~19, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin “offered deep gratitude to Minister Al-Attiyah for~~
~~Qatar’s help in facilitating the transit of U.S. citizens and Embassy Kabul personnel out of~~
~~Afghanistan through Qatar.”59~~
~~By August 26, over 40,000 evacuees had been processed through Qatar’s Al Udeid air base, many~~
~~bound for the United States or a third country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all~~
~~evacuees who do not immediately transit have been provided a PCR test for COVID-19, a~~
~~COVID-19 vaccine (if requested), transportation, temporary accommodation, health care, meals,~~
~~and basic necessities.60 Reports from the first week of evacuations found that evacuees were~~
~~facing unsanitary and crowded conditions at Al Udeid. DOD and Department of State officials~~
~~told news outlets that they were working to reduce bottlenecks and deploy extra staff to al eviate~~
~~the “dire conditions” at Al Udeid; as of August 24, the situation was “improving” but stil~~
~~overwhelmed by the number of arrivals.61~~
~~Security screening processes at Al Udeid have detected at least one Afghan evacuee with potential~~
~~ties to ISIS, and at least 100 others have been flagged through the biometric system intended to~~
~~identify individuals with potential matches to intel igence agency watch lists. In most of those~~
~~cases, the individuals were ultimately cleared by follow-on screening.62~~
~~Doha has remained a locus of negotiations between parties to the conflict. U.S. military~~
~~commanders have met face-to-face with Taliban leaders in Doha to negotiate evacuation efforts,63~~

~~56 Mjuab Mashal, “~~ Afghanistan Peace T alks Open in Qatar, Seeking End to Decades of War ,” Afghanistan Peace T alks Open in Qatar, Seeking End to Decades of War ,” New York Times,
September 12, 2020. See also CRS Report R45122, September 12, 2020. See also CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, by Clayton , by Clayton
T homas. T homas.
5752 “Afghan Government Releases Militants In Apparent Exchange For American, Australian Captives,” “Afghan Government Releases Militants In Apparent Exchange For American, Australian Captives,” RFE/RL, ,
November 11, 2019. November 11, 2019.
58 53 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,” “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,”
Washington Post,, August 22, 2021. August 22, 2021.
~~59 Department of Defense, “ Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's Meeting with Qatar Deputy Prime Minister~~
~~and Minister of State for Defense Affairs, His Excellency Dr. Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah,” press release,~~
~~August 19, 2021.~~
~~60 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Qatar Evacuates More than 40,000 people Safely Out of Kabul,” press release,~~
~~August 26, 2021.~~
~~61 Jordan Williams, “ Afghan refugees living in ‘dire conditions’ at US air base: report,” T he Hill, August 24, 2021.~~
~~62 T ara Copp, “ Kabul Evacuee With Potential ISIS T ies Detained at Qatar Base,” Defense One, August 24, 2021.~~
~~63 Eric Schmitt, “ T he top U.S. officer in Afghanistan talks with the T aliban almost every day ,”~~ ~~The New York Times,~~
~~August 23, 2021.~~
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~~Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy~~

~~as have European diplomats.64 Qatari officials also have attempted to use their diplomatic~~
~~relations with the Taliban to pressure the group to respect rights and protect civilians, and to~~
~~achieve a comprehensive political settlement and peaceful transfer of power.65 Cal s from Qatari~~
~~officials for the Taliban to adopt a ceasefire went unheeded as recently as August 14.66 The head~~
~~of the Taliban’s political office, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, whom many expect to play a~~
~~leadership role in a future Taliban-led government, returned to Afghanistan on August 17 from his~~
~~residence in Qatar.67~~
~~Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts~~
~~Elsewhere in the region~~
~~ Reports in March 2021 suggest that Qatar, along with Turkey and Russia, have~~
~~launched a new trilateral consultation process~~ Congressional Research Service 12 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy including former president Hamid Karzai and former chief executive officer Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who sought unsuccessfully to broker a broad-based Afghan government. He and other Qatari officials have sought to pressure the Taliban to respect rights and protect civilians.54 Qatar also came in for some criticism for its difficulties handling the large number of evacuees sent to Al Udeid Air Base in a short period of time. About 40,000 evacuees were processed at that base by the time the last U.S. soldier left Kabul on August 30. Reports from the first week of evacuations found that evacuees were facing unsanitary and crowded conditions at Al Udeid. DOD and Department of State officials told news outlets that they were working to reduce bottlenecks and deploy extra staff to al eviate the “dire conditions” at Al Udeid.55 Security screening processes at Al Udeid detected at least one Afghan evacuee with potential ties to ISIS, and at least 100 others were flagged for potential matches to intel igence agency watch lists. In most of those cases, the individuals were ultimately cleared by follow-on screening.56 Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts Elsewhere in the region  In March 2021, Qatar, along with Turkey and Russia, launched new consultations to reach a political settlement to to reach a political settlement to
the Syrian civil war, in line with U.N. resolutions, as wel as to discuss the Syrian civil war, in line with U.N. resolutions, as wel as to discuss
mechanisms to deliver humanitarian aid.mechanisms to deliver humanitarian aid.6857
 In Sudan, Qatar provided funds and promises of investment to achieve a series of  In Sudan, Qatar provided funds and promises of investment to achieve a series of
agreements between the government and various rebel factions in Darfur. agreements between the government and various rebel factions in Darfur.6958
Qatar’s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of the ouster of longtime President Qatar’s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of the ouster of longtime President
Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is uncertain, amid competition with other GCC Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is uncertain, amid competition with other GCC
states for influence there. states for influence there.
~~ Qatar has forged relationships with several countries in Central Asia.70 Amir~~
~~Tamim exchanged visits with the President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly~~
~~Berdymukhamedov, in 2016 and 2017. The two countries are major world gas~~
~~suppliers. The leader of Tajikistan, Imamali Rahmonov, visited Doha in February~~
~~2017 to reportedly discuss Qatari investment and other joint projects. Qatar~~
~~funded a large portion of a $100 mil ion mosque in Tajikistan’s capital,~~
~~Dushanbe, which purports to be the largest mosque in Central Asia.~~
~~U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation71~~U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation59
U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are extensiveU.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are extensive~~. The two countries established a~~
, including through a “Strategic Dialogue” that first convened in January 2018“Strategic Dialogue” that first convened in January 2018 ~~and senior U.S. officials have praised~~
~~Qatar as a longtime friend and military partner for peace and stability in the region. The U.S-~~
. The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged after the six Gulf monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 to Qatar defense relationship emerged after the six Gulf monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 to
back Iraq against the threat posed by Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In the latter stages of that back Iraq against the threat posed by Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In the latter stages of that
war, Iran attacked international shipping in the war, Iran attacked international shipping in the Gulf and some Gulf state oil loading facilities, but Gulf and some Gulf state oil loading facilities, but
none in Qatar. GCC forces participated in the U.S.-led military coalition that expel ed Iraq from none in Qatar. GCC forces participated in the U.S.-led military coalition that expel ed Iraq from

~~64 “Afghans with legal papers will be able to travel beyond Aug. 31, T aliban tell Germany ,” Reuters, August 25, 2021.~~
~~65 “Qatar calls on T aliban to protect civilians,” AFP, August 17, 2021.~~
~~66 “Qatar urges T aliban to cease fire at meeting in Doha,” Reuters, August 14, 2021.~~
~~67 “Qatar’s T aliban efforts position Doha as a key mediator: Analysts,” Al Jazeera, August 20, 2021.~~
~~68 “T urkey, Russia, Qatar to push for political resolution in Syria,” Reuters, March 11, 2021.~~
~~69 UNAMID, “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,” May 31, 2011.~~
~~70 See Natalie Koch, “Qatar and Central Asia,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 484, 2017.~~
71Kuwait in February 1991, and Qatari armored forces helped defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji in January 1991. Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (the Islamic State organization). In 2014, Qatar flew some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions. However, by the end of 2014, the coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition strikes inside Syria. In 2019, Qatar indicated it would join the U.S.-led maritime security mission (Operation Sentinel) intended to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the 54 “Qatar calls on T aliban to protect civilians,” AFP, August 17, 2021. 55 Jordan Williams, “Afghan refugees living in ‘dire conditions’ at US air base: report,” T he Hill, August 24, 2021. 56 T ara Copp, “ Kabul Evacuee With Potential ISIS T ies Detained at Qatar Base,” Defense One, August 24, 2021. 57 “T urkey, Russia, Qatar to push for political resolution in Syria,” Reuters, March 11, 2021. 58 UNAMID, “ Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,” May 31, 2011. 59 Much of this section is derived from: U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Security Cooperation With Qatar,” fact sheet, Much of this section is derived from: U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Security Cooperation With Qatar,” fact sheet,
January 20, 2021. January 20, 2021.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

~~Kuwait in February 1991, and Qatari armored forces helped defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi~~
~~town of Khafji in January 1991. U.S.-Qatar defense relations subsequently expanded.~~
~~Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (the Islamic State~~
~~organization). In 2014, Qatar flew some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions.~~
~~However, by the end of 2014, the coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition~~
~~strikes inside Syria. In 2019, Qatar indicated it would join the U.S.-led maritime security mission~~
~~(Operation Sentinel) intended to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the~~
~~Gulf, which includes Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.72~~Gulf, which includes Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.60 The Qatar government has not The Qatar government has not
announced whether it is participating in that mission, which began operations in late 2019. announced whether it is participating in that mission, which began operations in late 2019.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The United States and Qatar signed a formal DCA on June 23, 1992, and it was renewed for 10 The United States and Qatar signed a formal DCA on June 23, 1992, and it was renewed for 10
years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. The text of the pact is classified, years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. The text of the pact is classified,
but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, prepositioning of U.S. but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, prepositioning of U.S.
armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar’s military forces.armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar’s military forces.7361 More than More than
8,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid 8,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid
Air Base, discussed further below. Air Base, discussed further below.7462
Qatar’s force of about 16,500 is the smal est in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about Qatar’s force of about 16,500 is the smal est in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about
12,000 are ground forces, 2,500 are naval forces, and 2,000 are air forces. Qatar has sought to 12,000 are ground forces, 2,500 are naval forces, and 2,000 are air forces. Qatar has sought to
compensate for the smal size of its force with purchases of advanced weaponry such as U.S.-compensate for the smal size of its force with purchases of advanced weaponry such as U.S.-
made combat aircraft and German-made Leopard tanks, made combat aircraft and German-made Leopard tanks,7563 as discussed further below. as discussed further below.
Al Udeid Air Base (Air Force/CENTCOM)7664
Most of the U.S. military personnel in Qatar are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al Most of the U.S. military personnel in Qatar are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al
Udeid air base southwest of Doha.Udeid air base southwest of Doha.7765 Al Udeid Base also hosts the forward headquarters for Al Udeid Base also hosts the forward headquarters for
CENTCOM. U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation CENTCOM. U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organizationInherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization ~~and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel~~
~~in Afghanistan~~, and they provide a substantial capability against Iran. In conjunction with U.S.-, and they provide a substantial capability against Iran. In conjunction with U.S.-
Iran tensions since mid-2019, the United States Iran tensions since mid-2019, the United States deployed F-22 combat aircraft to Al Udeid. deployed F-22 combat aircraft to Al Udeid.
The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue has produced agreements to expand defense and security The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue has produced agreements to expand defense and security
cooperation, including the possibility of “permanent” U.S. basing there, centered on the cooperation, including the possibility of “permanent” U.S. basing there, centered on the
expansion and improvements of Al Udeid over the next two decades. In January 2019, during the expansion and improvements of Al Udeid over the next two decades. In January 2019, during the
second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of
Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred to as a “positive step towards Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred to as a “positive step towards
the eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”66Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced with Qatari funding (over $8 bil ion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since 2003) and about $500 mil ion in U.S. military construction funding since 2003.67 Qatar reportedly 60
72 “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will join naval coalition, official says,” “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will join naval coalition, official says,” Reuters, November 25, 2019. November 25, 2019.
7361 U.S. Library of Congress, U.S. Library of Congress, Country Studies: Persian Gulf States, 1994. Some provisions of DCA’s with other GCC 1994. Some provisions of DCA’s with other GCC
states are discussed in Sami Hajjar, states are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War (U.S. Army War
College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27. College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.
7462 U.S. Department of State, “ Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales T ravels to Qatar,” media U.S. Department of State, “ Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales T ravels to Qatar,” media
note, August 12, 2020. note, August 12, 2020.
75 63 “Qatar is now one of the most well-equipped military forces in the Middle East ,” “Qatar is now one of the most well-equipped military forces in the Middle East ,” Army Recognition, July 20, 2020. , July 20, 2020.
7664 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note,
January 30, 2018. January 30, 2018.
7765 Adam T aylor, “ As T rump tries to end ‘endless wars,’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” Adam T aylor, “ As T rump tries to end ‘endless wars,’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” The
Washington Post, August 21, 2019. , August 21, 2019.
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~~the eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future~~
~~infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”78Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced~~
~~with Qatari funding (over $8 bil ion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since~~
~~2003) and about $500 mil ion in U.S. military construction funding since 2003.79 Qatar reportedly~~
66 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” press release, January 14, 2019. 67 Figures compiled by CRS. Congressional Research Service 14 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy is providing another $1.8 bil ion for the Al Udeid expansion plan.is providing another $1.8 bil ion for the Al Udeid expansion plan.8068 The FY2021 National The FY2021 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) authorized $790 mil ion for military construction Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) authorized $790 mil ion for military construction
projects for Al Udeid, pursuant to an agreement with the State of Qatar for required in-kind projects for Al Udeid, pursuant to an agreement with the State of Qatar for required in-kind
contributions. In 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of equipment, with an contributions. In 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of equipment, with an
estimated value of about $200 mil ion, to upgrade its Air Operation Center. estimated value of about $200 mil ion, to upgrade its Air Operation Center.
As Saliyah Facility (Army) and Hamad Port
~~The~~From 1992 until 2021, the U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command prepositions armor (enough to outfit one U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command prepositions armor (enough to outfit one
brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha. U.S. armor stationed in Qatar was deployed in brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha. U.S. armor stationed in Qatar was deployed in
Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003. Because the Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003. Because the
ground force threat to the Gulf from Iraq has largely ended since the 2003 Iraq ground force threat to the Gulf from Iraq has largely ended since the 2003 Iraq war, ~~war, it is likely~~
~~that~~ the Defense Department the Defense Department ~~wil de-emphasize~~has de-emphasized prepositioning armor in Qatar. prepositioning armor in Qatar. The As Sayliyah facility was closed in June 2021.69 By contrast, the naval threat in the Gulf has increased, and Qatar has been ~~Qatar has been~~
expanding the Hamad Port to be able to potential yexpanding the Hamad Port to be able to potential y accommodate larger U.S. accommodate larger U.S. Navy operations.Navy operations.
U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar
Over the past two decades, Qatar has shifted its weaponry mix Over the past two decades, Qatar has shifted its weaponry mix ~~more~~from European sources toward U.S.-made toward U.S.-made
equipment.equipment.8170 According to the State Department military cooperation factsheet cited above, the According to the State Department military cooperation factsheet cited above, the
United States has $25 bil ion dollars in active government-to-government sales cases United States has $25 bil ion dollars in active government-to-government sales cases with Qatar with Qatar
under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and, since 2014, the United States has authorized under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and, since 2014, the United States has authorized
the permanent export of over $2.8 bil ion in defense articles to Qatar via the Direct Commercial the permanent export of over $2.8 bil ion in defense articles to Qatar via the Direct Commercial
Sales (DCS) process. Qatar has a 100% favorable rate on Blue Lantern end-use monitoring Sales (DCS) process. Qatar has a 100% favorable rate on Blue Lantern end-use monitoring
(EUM) checks for direct commercial sales and a “satisfactory” rating for the FMS (EUM) checks for direct commercial sales and a “satisfactory” rating for the FMS Golden Sentry Golden Sentry
EUM monitoring program. EUM monitoring program.
  Tanks. Qatar fields 30 French-made AMX-30s main battle tanks and, since 2016, Qatar fields 30 French-made AMX-30s main battle tanks and, since 2016,
Germany has delivered 62 “Leopard 2” tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased Germany has delivered 62 “Leopard 2” tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased
U.S.-made tanks, to date. U.S.-made tanks, to date.
  Combat Aircraft. On November 17, 2016, based on a Qatari request in 2013, the On November 17, 2016, based on a Qatari request in 2013, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential
sale to Qatar of up to 72 U.S.-made F-15s, with an estimated value of $21 sale to Qatar of up to 72 U.S.-made F-15s, with an estimated value of $21
bil ion.bil ion.8271 The approval came after an evaluation of the sale with respect to the The approval came after an evaluation of the sale with respect to the
U.S. legal requirement to preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME).U.S. legal requirement to preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME).83

~~78 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S.~~
~~Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” press release, January 14, 2019.~~
~~79 Figures compiled by CRS.~~
~~80 “’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” op. cit.~~
8172 During June-December 2017, the United States and Qatar signed agreements for Qatar to purchase of al 72 of them, with deliveries to be completed by 2023. Qatar signed a $7 bil ion agreement in May 2015 to buy 24 French-made Rafale 68 “’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” op. cit. 69 “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar after three decades supporting readiness, resilience.” News: First T heater Sustainment Command, June 24, 2021. 70 Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived from T he International Institute for Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived from T he International Institute for
Strategic Studies, “T he Military Balance: T he Middle East and North Africa.” Strategic Studies, “T he Military Balance: T he Middle East and North Africa.”
8271 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) T ransmittal Number 16-58. T he FY2016 National Defense Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) T ransmittal Number 16-58. T he FY2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect
on Israel’s QME. on Israel’s QME.
8372 For information on the QME requirement, see CRS Report RL33222, For information on the QME requirement, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. , by Jeremy M.
Sharp. Sharp.
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~~During June-December 2017, the United States and Qatar signed agreements for~~
~~Qatar to purchase of al 72 of them, with deliveries to be completed by 2023.~~
~~Qatar signed a $7 bil ion agreement in May 2015 to buy 24 French-made Rafale~~
~~aircraft,84~~aircraft,73 and deliveries began in early 2019. In September 2017, Qatar signed a and deliveries began in early 2019. In September 2017, Qatar signed a
“Statement of Intent” with the United Kingdom to purchase 24 Typhoon combat “Statement of Intent” with the United Kingdom to purchase 24 Typhoon combat
aircraft. aircraft.
  Attack Helicopters. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache, UH-. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache, UH-
60 M Blackhawk, and MH-60 helicopters, with an estimated value of about $6.6 60 M Blackhawk, and MH-60 helicopters, with an estimated value of about $6.6
bil ion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA announced that the State Department had bil ion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA announced that the State Department had
approved a sale to Qatar of 5,000 Advanced Precision Kil Weapons Systems II approved a sale to Qatar of 5,000 Advanced Precision Kil Weapons Systems II
Guidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of $300 Guidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of $300
mil ion. On May 9, 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another mil ion. On May 9, 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another
24 AH-64E Apaches to help Qatar defend its oil and gas platforms, at an 24 AH-64E Apaches to help Qatar defend its oil and gas platforms, at an
estimated cost of $3 bil ion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to estimated cost of $3 bil ion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to
prohibit the sale but, after the Administration stated an intent to veto the bil , a prohibit the sale but, after the Administration stated an intent to veto the bil , a
motion to discharge the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from further motion to discharge the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from further
consideration of the bil failed 42-57.consideration of the bil failed 42-57.8574
  Short-Range Missile and Rocket Systems. During 2012-2016, the United During 2012-2016, the United
States sold Qatar Hel fire air-to-ground missiles, Javelin guided missiles, the States sold Qatar Hel fire air-to-ground missiles, Javelin guided missiles, the
M142 High Mobility Artil ery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical M142 High Mobility Artil ery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Missile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System (GMLRS). System (GMLRS). ~~The total value of the sales was about $665 mil ion.~~ On April On April
22, 2016, DSCA notified to Congress a potential 22, 2016, DSCA notified to Congress a potential sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C
Rolling Airframe Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM 116C-2 Rolling Airframe Rolling Airframe Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM 116C-2 Rolling Airframe
Telemetry Missiles, at an estimated cost of $260 Telemetry Missiles, at an estimated cost of $260 mil ion.75 A July 2019, joint U.S.-Qatar~~mil ion.86 The July 9, 2019 joint~~
~~Trump-Tamim~~ statement said that Qatar had recommitted to a 2018 agreement to statement said that Qatar had recommitted to a 2018 agreement to
buy 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAM) at an buy 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAM) at an
estimated value of $215 mil ion.estimated value of $215 mil ion. On July 10, On July 10, 2019, Raytheon announced that 2019, Raytheon announced that
Qatar wil be the first country to purchases its Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Qatar wil be the first country to purchases its Advanced Medium Range Air-to-
Air Missile – Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER)Air Missile – Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER) weapon.weapon.8776
  Ballistic Missiles. At its national day parade in December 2017, the Qatari At its national day parade in December 2017, the Qatari
military displayed a newly-purchased SY 400-BP-12A bal istic missile, which military displayed a newly-purchased SY 400-BP-12A bal istic missile, which
has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.8877
  Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Qatar has purchased various U.S.-made BMD Qatar has purchased various U.S.-made BMD
systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf missile systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf missile
defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United States sold defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United States sold
Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units and missiles Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units and missiles
at an estimated value of nearly $10 bil ion. Also that year, the United States at an estimated value of nearly $10 bil ion. Also that year, the United States
agreed to sel Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD), the agreed to sel Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD), the
most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the United States has made available for sale.78 No THAAD purchase has been finalized.
8473 T om Hussain, “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” McClatchy, T om Hussain, “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” McClatchy, ~~May~~M ay 1, 2015; Awad Mustafa 1, 2015; Awad Mustafa
and Joe Gould, “ Senators Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait, Qatar,” Defense News, January 22, 2016. and Joe Gould, “ Senators Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait, Qatar,” Defense News, January 22, 2016.
8574 Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to block arms sales to Bahrain and Qatar,” Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to block arms sales to Bahrain and Qatar,” Politico, June 13, 2019. June 13, 2019.
8675 DSCA T ransmittal Number 16-07. DSCA T ransmittal Number 16-07.
8776 Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019. Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019.
8877 “Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short -Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” “Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short -Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” Al Arabiya English, December 20, , December 20,
2017. 2017.
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~~most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the United States has~~
~~made available for sale.89 No THAAD purchase has been finalized.~~78 DSCA announcement, November 5, 2012, http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad. Congressional Research Service 16 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
  Naval Vessels. In 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an In 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an
unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other
equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 mil ion. In August 2017, equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 mil ion. In August 2017,
Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast
patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, estimated at $5 bil ion.patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, estimated at $5 bil ion.9079
Other Defense Partnerships
Qatar has developed defense relations with several other partners. Qatar has developed defense relations with several other partners.
  NATO. Qatar established relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation Qatar established relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative” (ICI). Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with Initiative” (ICI). Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with
NATO, the headquarters of which is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’s NATO, the headquarters of which is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’s
Defense Minister said that his country’s long-term “ambition” is to join NATO.Defense Minister said that his country’s long-term “ambition” is to join NATO.9180
  France. Prior to 2000, Qatar bought most of its major combat systems from . Prior to 2000, Qatar bought most of its major combat systems from
France. In March 2019, France and Qatar signed agreements on defense France. In March 2019, France and Qatar signed agreements on defense
information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and ~~culture and~~
education.education.9281
  Turkey. Turkey helped Qatar cope with the intra-GCC rift by increasing food . Turkey helped Qatar cope with the intra-GCC rift by increasing food
exports to Qatar. Turkey also added more than 1,500 troops to its Tariq bin Ziyad exports to Qatar. Turkey also added more than 1,500 troops to its Tariq bin Ziyad
base in Qatar, which was established in 2014, and it opened a second military base in Qatar, which was established in 2014, and it opened a second military
base in Qatar in September 2019.base in Qatar in September 2019.~~93 Given Turkey’s support for Qatari regional~~
~~policies, one of the “13 demands” of the Saudi-led bloc has been~~82 To limit Turkey’s influence in the Gulf, the Saudi-led boycotting states demanded that Qatar close that Qatar close
the Turkish bases.the Turkish bases.9483
  Russia. Since 2016, Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia, including Since 2016, Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia, including
with several visits to Russia by Amir Tamim, apparently in recognition of with several visits to Russia by Amir Tamim, apparently in recognition of
Russia’s heightened role in the region. One of Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds has Russia’s heightened role in the region. One of Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds has
increased its investments in Russia, particularly in the Rosneft energy firm increased its investments in Russia, particularly in the Rosneft energy firm~~, and~~
~~Qatar Airways has bought a 25% stake in a Moscow’s airport~~. Qatar is reportedly . Qatar is reportedly
considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system,considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system,9584 but U.S. but U.S.
opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale apparently has opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale apparently has
contributed to Qatar’s lack of movement to complete the purchase. Section 231 contributed to Qatar’s lack of movement to complete the purchase. Section 231
of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L.
115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s 115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s
defense or intel igence sector. defense or intel igence sector.

~~89 DSCA announcement, November 5, 2012, http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-~~
~~defense-thaad.~~
90 Counter-terrorism Cooperation85 According to the State Department, “The United States and Qatar continued to increase CT [counter-terrorism] cooperation in 2019, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of State and Qatari Foreign Minister signed a CT MOU [memorandum of understanding] in July 79 “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees T hree Ship T ypes to Be Delivered,” “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees T hree Ship T ypes to Be Delivered,” IHS Jane’s Navy
International, June 17, 2016. , June 17, 2016.
9180 Benas Gerdziunas, “NAT O dashes membership hopes of Qatar,” Benas Gerdziunas, “NAT O dashes membership hopes of Qatar,” Politico, June 6, 2018. , June 6, 2018.
9281 “Qatar, France sign 5 defense, security deals,” Xinhua, March 28, 2019. “Qatar, France sign 5 defense, security deals,” Xinhua, March 28, 2019.
9382 Stasa Salacanin, “T urkey expands its military base and influence in Qatar,” Stasa Salacanin, “T urkey expands its military base and influence in Qatar,” The New Arab, September 10, 2019. , September 10, 2019.
9483 “UAE official says T urkish base in Qatar destabilises region,” “UAE official says T urkish base in Qatar destabilises region,” Reuters, October 10, 2020; “ How Qatar and T urkey October 10, 2020; “ How Qatar and T urkey
came together,” came together,” The Econom ist, January 21, 2021. January 21, 2021.
9584 “Qatar still studying Russian defense system, minister says,” “Qatar still studying Russian defense system, minister says,” Reuters, March 4, 2019. , March 4, 2019.
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~~Counter-terrorism Cooperation96~~
~~According to the State Department report on international terrorism for 2019, released in June~~
~~2020:~~
~~The United States and Qatar continued to increase CT [counter-terrorism] cooperation in~~
~~2019, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of State and Qatari Foreign~~
~~Minister signed a CT MOU [memorandum of understanding] in July 2017. At the U.S.-~~
~~Qatar Counterterrorism Dialogue in November 2019, the two governments declared their~~
~~fulfillment of the MOU largely complete and committed to set shared priorities for 2020.~~
~~The State Department report adds that~~
85 Much of the information in this section is taken from: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on T errorism 2019: Qatar,” released June 2020 (latest available). Congressional Research Service 17 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 2017.” The State Department’s recent reports on international terrorism state that U.S. technical assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies U.S. technical assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies ~~increased during~~
~~2019. The U.S. Departments of Justice, State, and the Treasury, as well as the FBI, led or~~
~~participated in several capacity-building initiatives involving [the Ministry of Interior, the~~
~~Central Bank, and several other Qatari agencies]. A [~~have increased. A Department of JusticeDepartment of Justice] resident legal resident legal
advisor has been stationed in Qatar since Apriladvisor has been stationed in Qatar since April 2018,2018, providing technical assistance to providing technical assistance to
Qatar’s CT efforts and building prosecutorial capacity. In November 2018, Qatar began Qatar’s CT efforts and building prosecutorial capacity. In November 2018, Qatar began
using its own fundsusing its own funds to pay for ato pay for a three-year U.S.three-year U.S. Department of State Anti-Terrorism Department of State Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) training program, including training pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to Assistance (ATA) training program, including training pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to
host host the FIFA World Cup in 2022. There were no terrorist incidents in Qatar in 2019 or 2020. At the same time, Qatar’s efforts to prevent the movement of terrorists in or through Qatar were at times said to be lacking. At ~~the FIFA World Cup in 2022; the primary recipients are [Ministry of Interior and~~
~~Internal Security Force] officers.~~
~~U.S. and Qatari officials sometimes differ over the threat posed to the region by some groups,~~
~~such as Hamas. In an effort to implement the U.S.-Qatar MoU, in 2018, the Qatar Ministry of~~
~~Interior issued a list of 19 individuals and eight entities that it considers as “terrorists.” The list~~
~~includes 10 persons who are also are also named as terrorists by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At~~
least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda figures residing in or least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda figures residing in or
transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks mastermind Khalid Shaykh mastermind Khalid Shaykh
~~Mohammad.97 None of the September 11 hijackers was a Qatari national. There were no terrorist~~
~~incidents in Qatar in 2019 or 2020.~~
~~Terrorism Financing Issues~~
~~The State Department 2019 report on terrorism states that Qatar is~~Mohammad.86 Terrorism Financing Issues U.S. officials credit Qatar with taking steps to prevent taking steps to prevent
terrorism financing and the movement of terrorism financing and the movement of suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. According to suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. According to
~~the report~~
~~The~~the State Department, the Qatari government passed a new AML/CFT Qatari government passed a new AML/CFT [(anti-money laundering/countering the anti-money laundering/countering the
financing of financing of ~~terrorism]~~terrorism) law in 2019 and sought feedback from the International Monetary law in 2019 and sought feedback from the International Monetary
Fund and the U.S. government during the drafting process. Qatar continued to maintain Fund and the U.S. government during the drafting process. Qatar continued to maintain
restrictions, imposed in 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring al restrictions, imposed in 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring al
such activity to be conducted through one of two approved charities in an effort to better such activity to be conducted through one of two approved charities in an effort to better
~~monitor charitable giving for terrorist financing abuse.~~
~~The State Department announced on August 12, 2020 that then-Coordinator for Counterterrorism,~~
~~Ambassador Nathan Sales, met in Doha with Qatar’s Attorney General and other senior~~

~~96 Much of the information in this section is taken from: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for~~
~~Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on T errorism 2019: Qatar,” released June 2020.~~
~~97 Final Report of the National Commission on T errorist Attacks upon the United St ates.~~
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~~government officials to discuss Qatar’s role as a partner in combating the financing of terrorism,~~
~~including implementation of its new AML/CFT legislation.98~~
monitor charitable giving for terrorist financing abuse. The country is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force The country is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENAFATF), a regional body that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and (MENAFATF), a regional body that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and
terrorism financing. In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the “Egmont Group” consisting terrorism financing. In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the “Egmont Group” consisting
of 152 country Financial Intel igence Units. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist Financing of 152 country Financial Intel igence Units. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist Financing
Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced in May 2017 and Qatar joined the Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced in May 2017 and Qatar joined the
United States and other TFTC countries in designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and IS United States and other TFTC countries in designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and IS
~~later in 2017.~~
~~Countering Violent Extremism~~
~~According to the 2019 State Department report on terrorism~~later in 2017. In September 2021, the United States and Qatar conducted a joint operation to uncover and sanction a Gulf-based financing network used by Lebanese Hezbollah, a designated FTO that is extensively linked to Iran.87 Countering Violent Extremism State Department officials maintain that: “Qatar has made significant strides : “Qatar has made significant strides
in addressing state-in addressing state- sourced internal and external support for educational and religious content sourced internal and external support for educational and religious content
espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples are stil espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples are stil
found in textbooks and disseminated through satel ite television and other media.” Qatar has found in textbooks and disseminated through satel ite television and other media.” Qatar has
hosted workshops and hosted workshops and participated in regional meetings on the issue. participated in regional meetings on the issue.
Economic Issues amid COVID-19 and the GCC Rift
Qatar has been wrestling with Qatar has been wrestling with ~~a decline~~ volatility in world energy prices since mid-2014, and the economic in world energy prices since mid-2014, and the economic
effects of the intra-GCC rift and the COVID-19 pandemic. effects of the intra-GCC rift and the COVID-19 pandemic. ~~As of late August 2021, Qatar has~~
~~reported about 231,600 COVID-19 cases and 600 deaths from the disease. After an initial spike of~~
About 40% of Qatar’s food was 86 Final Report of the National Commission on T errorist Attacks upon the United States. 87 Department of the Treasury. “ The United States and Qatar T ake Coordinated Action against Hizballah Financiers.” September 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 24 link to page 5 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy imported from Saudi Arabia prior to the intra-GCC crisis, and there were reports of runs on stocks of food when the blockade began in June 2017. However, Qatar’s main sovereign wealth fund, run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as wel as funds held by the Central Bank, total about $350 bil ion, according to Qatar’s Central Bank, giving the country a substantial ability to weather financial demands.88 The government was able to procure similar goods from Turkey, Iran, and India. After an initial spike of COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, government- ~~COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, government-~~mandated lockdowns, social distancing, and mandated lockdowns, social distancing, and
travel restrictions resulted in a relatively low number travel restrictions resulted in a relatively low number of deaths through the end of 2020, and a total of about 600 deaths from the disease to date. Over 75% of the population (including expatriates) have been fully vaccinated to date, using both the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.89~~of deaths through the end of 2020. An~~
~~increase in cases led the government to announce new measures in February 2021 to reduce~~
~~communal spread.99 Close to 4.3 mil ion doses of the COVID-19 vaccine have been administered,~~
~~fully vaccinating approximately 72% of the population; both the Pfizer and BioNTech, and~~
~~Moderna vaccines have been approved for emergency use.100~~ Qatar’s 2020 budget, announced in Qatar’s 2020 budget, announced in
December 2019, anticipated a surplus of about $1.2 bil ion,December 2019, anticipated a surplus of about $1.2 bil ion,~~101~~90 but the economic effects of but the economic effects of
~~COVID-19 and an expected oil price of $40 per barrel~~ COVID-19 are expected are expected to put the country’s budget to put the country’s budget
into deficit into deficit ~~in 2021.102~~for al of 2021.91 As a public health crisis, observers have noted that the infection spread As a public health crisis, observers have noted that the infection spread
most rapidly among Qatar’s expatriate labor population that often most rapidly among Qatar’s expatriate labor population that often live in crowded conditions.live in crowded conditions.~~103~~92
Large oil and gas reserves and its smal citizen population have combined to make Qatar the Large oil and gas reserves and its smal citizen population have combined to make Qatar the
country with the world’s highest per capita income. Oil and gas stil account for over 90% of country with the world’s highest per capita income. Oil and gas stil account for over 90% of
Qatar’s export earnings, and over half of government revenues. Proven oil reserves of about 25 Qatar’s export earnings, and over half of government revenues. Proven oil reserves of about 25
bil ion barrels enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels bil ion barrels enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels
per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas are about 13% of the world’s total per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas are about 13% of the world’s total

~~98 U.S. Department of State, “ Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales T ravels to Qatar,” media~~
~~note, August 12, 2020.~~
~~99 World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook for Middle East and North Africa: Qatar, April 2, 2021.~~
~~100 World Health Organization, “Qatar,” Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, accessed April 2, 2021; State of~~
~~Qatar, Ministry of Public Health, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” 2021.~~
~~101 “Qatar Announces 2020 Budget, its Biggest in Five Years,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2019.~~
~~102 David Barbuscia, “ Qatar expects $9.5 billion deficit next year on lower revenues,” Reuters, December 11, 2020.~~
~~103 “Coronavirus spreads “exponentially” in Qatar’s labor camps,” CBS News, March 15, 2020.~~
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~~and it is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world. 104~~ and it is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world. 93 In 2018, Qatar withdrew from In 2018, Qatar withdrew from
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its more the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its more
high-priority natural gas exports. Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas high-priority natural gas exports. Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas
Project established by the UAE in 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project Project established by the UAE in 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project
involves production and processing of natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which is involves production and processing of natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which is
connected to Iran’s South Pars Field (seconnected to Iran’s South Pars Field (see Figure 2), and transportation of the processed gas by ), and transportation of the processed gas by
subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.~~105~~94 Qatar Petroleum announced in early 2021 that it wil boost LNG output by about 40% by 2026 through expansion projects at its North Field.95 Qatar did not reduced its gas supplies to the other GCC Qatar did not reduced its gas supplies to the other GCC
states as retaliation for the blockade. states as retaliation for the blockade.
Some economic data is presented in Figure 1. U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an FTA. However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to 88 “Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says,” Istanbul Sabah Online, July 10, 2017; Arwa Ibrahim, “ Beating the blockade: How Qatar prevailed over a siege,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2020. 89 World Health Organization, “Qatar,” Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, accessed April 2, 2021; State of Qatar, Ministry of Public Health, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” 2021. 90 “Qatar Announces 2020 Budget, its Biggest in Five Years,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2019. 91 David Barbuscia, “ Qatar expects $9.5 billion deficit next year on lower revenues,” Reuters, December 11, 2020. 92 “Coronavirus spreads “exponentially” in Qatar’s labor camps,” CBS News, March 15, 2020. 93 CIA, The World Factbook. 94 Dolphin Energy website, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us. 95 Jessica Jaganathan, “Analysis: Qatar tightens global gas market grip with bold expansion moves,” Reuters, March 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 19 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy ~~Qatar’s main sovereign wealth fund, run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as wel as~~
~~funds held by the Central Bank, total about $350 bil ion, according to Qatar’s Central Bank,~~
~~giving the country a substantial cushion to weather financial demands.106 The joint statement of~~
~~the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” QIA’s commitment of $45 bil ion~~
~~in future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.~~
~~About 40% of Qatar’s food was imported from Saudi Arabia pre-crisis, and there were reports of~~
~~runs on stocks of food when the blockade began in June 2017. The government’s ample financial~~
~~resources enabled it to procure similar goods from Turkey, Iran, and India. The effects of the rift~~
~~on Qatar’s international air carrier, Qatar Airways, have been significant because of the~~
~~prohibition on its overflying the blockading states. In July 2020, the International Court of Justice~~
~~decided in Qatar’s favor on its complaint that the denial of air overflight rights is a violation of~~
~~international civil aviation conventions.107 Some economic data is presented in Figure 1.~~
~~U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations~~
~~In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade~~
~~agreements (FTAs) with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an~~
~~FTA. However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment~~
~~Framework Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to~~
undertake large investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington, undertake large investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington,
DC. Also, several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornel University, Carnegie DC. Also, several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornel University, Carnegie
Mel on University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have Mel on University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have
established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha.established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha.
The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” QIA’s commitment of $45 bil ion in future investments in U.S. companies and real estate. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Foreign Trade Statistics” compilation, in 2020, U.S. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Foreign Trade Statistics” compilation, in 2020, U.S.
exports to Qatar were about $3.4 bil ion, and U.S. imports from Qatar were about $1.2 bil ion. exports to Qatar were about $3.4 bil ion, and U.S. imports from Qatar were about $1.2 bil ion.
U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S.
imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or
natural gas have declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in natural gas have declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in
U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S. U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S.
LNG export market.96 Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft, although the ~~LNG export market.108 The White House statement after the meeting between President Trump~~
~~and Amir Tamim on July 9, 2019 stated that the Chevron-Phil ips Chemical Company and Qatar~~
~~Petroleum had agreed to develop a petrochemical complex in Qatar. Qatar Petroleum announced~~

~~104 CIA, The World Factbook.~~
~~105 Dolphin Energy website, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us.~~
~~106 “Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says,”~~ ~~Istanbul Sabah~~
~~Online, July 10, 2017; Arwa Ibrahim, “ Beating the blockade: How Qatar prevailed over a siege,” Al Jazeera, June 5,~~
~~2020.~~
~~107 “Qatar Airways Statement on Judgment of the International Court of Justice,” press release, July 15, 2020.~~
~~108 Adam Schreck, “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price,” Associated Press, May 24, 2016.~~
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~~in early 2021 that it wil boost LNG output by about 40% by 2026 through expansion projects at~~
~~its North Field.109~~
~~Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft, although the~~
status of additional planned purchases of U.S. aircraft is unclear in light of the effects of the status of additional planned purchases of U.S. aircraft is unclear in light of the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic on air travel.COVID-19 pandemic on air travel.~~110~~97 Some U.S. airlines have chal enged Qatar Airways’ benefits Some U.S. airlines have chal enged Qatar Airways’ benefits
under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges
under that agreement should be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by under that agreement should be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by
Qatar’s government, giving it an unfair competitive advantage.Qatar’s government, giving it an unfair competitive advantage.~~111~~98 The United States and Qatar The United States and Qatar
reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar
Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick
up passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. Some assert that Qatar Airway’s 2018 up passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. Some assert that Qatar Airway’s 2018
purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations. purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations.
U.S. Assistance
~~Qatar, one of the wealthiest states in the world on a per capita gross domestic product (GDP)~~
~~basis,~~In large part because of its wealth, Qatar receives virtual y no U.S. assistance. At times, smal amounts of U.S. aid have been receives virtual y no U.S. assistance. At times, smal amounts of U.S. aid have been
provided to help Qatar develop capabilitiesprovided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling of arms and narcotics, and the to prevent smuggling of arms and narcotics, and the
movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or around its waterways. In around its waterways. In
FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar, about two-thirds of which FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar, about two-thirds of which
was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States provided a total of $78,000 was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States provided a total of $78,000
in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatar’s counter-narcotics in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatar’s counter-narcotics
capabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs. Virtual ycapabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs. Virtual y no U.S. aid of no U.S. aid of
any kind was provided for Qatar programs in FY2019, the last fiscal year any kind was provided for Qatar programs in FY2019, the last fiscal year for which precise data for which precise data
is available. is available.

~~109 Jessica Jaganathan, “Analysis: Qatar tightens global gas market grip with bold expansion moves,” Reuters, March~~
~~16, 2021.~~
~~110~~96 Adam Schreck, “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price,” Associated Press, May 24, 2016. 97 T he White House announced after the July 9 T rump-T amim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five Boeing T he White House announced after the July 9 T rump-T amim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five Boeing
777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and services to power its 787 and 777 777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and services to power its 787 and 777
aircraft. White House, “U.S.-Qatar Joint Statement,” July 9, 2019.aircraft. White House, “U.S.-Qatar Joint Statement,” July 9, 2019.
~~111~~ 98 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016. , January 30, 2016.
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Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS. U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa
Section.Section.
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Disclaimer
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