Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from August 23, 2021 to December 17, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief ~~August 23~~December 17, 2021 , 2021
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment featuring U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment featuring
several bilateral, regional, and Turkish domestic considerations. several bilateral, regional, and Turkish domestic considerations. ~~Current~~Recent tensions have tensions have
raised questions Jim Zanotti
~~raised questions~~ about the future of bilateral relations and have led to U.S. actions about the future of bilateral relations and have led to U.S. actions
against Turkey, including Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
~~against Turkey, including~~ sanctions and informal congressional holds on major new sanctions and informal congressional holds on major new
~~Eastern Affairs~~
~~arms sales (such as upgrades to F-16 aircraft). Nevertheless, both~~ arms sales. Nevertheless, both Eastern Affairs countries’ officials countries’ officials

emphasize the importance of continued U.S.-Turkey cooperation and emphasize the importance of continued U.S.-Turkey cooperation and ~~Turkey’s~~
~~Clayton Thomas~~
~~membership in NATO.~~
Turkey’s membership in NATO. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Clayton Thomas Erdogan’s rule and Turkey’s Analyst in Middle Eastern Analyst in Middle Eastern
~~Observers~~currency crisis. Many observers voice concerns about the largely voice concerns about the largely Affairs authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. One of his biggest challenges is Turkey’s economy: an ongoing currency crisis that accelerated in late 2021 has exacerbated some existing structural economic problems, generating major domestic concern. As the country faces significant inflation, Erdogan has pressured Turkey’s central bank to lower interest rates—a response counter to conventional economic theory. Also, he is unlikely to respond to opposition politicians’ call for early elections (the next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 2023) to address growing public discontent about the spiraling cost of living. If economic turmoil fuels domestic instability, Erdogan’s cabinet could conceivably initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections. Additionally, some observers debate whether free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan or whether disgruntled Erdogan supporters would actually vote for opposition parties. Separately, some sources have questioned Erdogan’s health. ~~authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep~~
~~Affairs~~
~~Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey’s polarized electorate could affect Erdogan’s future leadership.~~

~~His biggest challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a~~

~~sharp decline in Turkey’s currency. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey~~
~~relationship.~~
Russian S-400 purchase and U.S. responses. Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense
system in July 2019 has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from system in July 2019 has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. In December 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. In December 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency for the S-400 transaction under the Countering America’s Adversaries Turkey’s defense procurement agency for the S-400 transaction under the Countering America’s Adversaries
~~Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44).~~
~~Bilateral discussions during the Biden Administration have not resolved U.S. concerns about the S-400. The~~
~~impasse could prevent major Western arms sales to Turkey. If Turkey transitions to Russian weapons platforms~~
~~with multi-decade lifespans, it is unclear how it can stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters. Future~~
~~U.S. actions regarding the S-400 and CAATSA also could affect U.S. arms sales and sanctions with respect to~~
~~other U.S. partners who have purchased or may purchase advanced weapons from Russia—including India,~~
~~Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.~~
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44). The continuing U.S.-Turkey impasse over the S-400 could prevent major Western arms sales to Turkey. In late 2021, Turkey requested some new U.S.-origin F-16s and upgrades to others in its aging fleet. Some Members of Congress oppose the F-16 transactions, partly due to the S-400 issue. If Turkey cannot partner with the United States to modernize its fighter aircraft, it could turn to Russia or other alternative suppliers. If Turkey transitions to Russian weapons platforms with multi-decade lifespans, it is unclear how it can stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters. Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United
States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for
energy imports. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles highlight the risks it faces in jeopardizing these ties. A energy imports. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles highlight the risks it faces in jeopardizing these ties. A
number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding region—including those involving Syria, Greece, number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding region—including those involving Syria, Greece,
~~Cyprus, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan)~~Cyprus, and Libya—affect its relationships —affect its relationships
with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent foreign policy. Additionally, with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent foreign policy. Additionally,
President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly
explain his actions in some of the situations mentioned above. explain his actions in some of the situations mentioned above.
In addition to the S-400 transaction, Turkey-Russia cooperation has grown in some areas in recent years. In addition to the S-400 transaction, Turkey-Russia cooperation has grown in some areas in recent years.
However, Turkish efforts (especially during 2020) to counter Russia in several theaters of conflict at relatively However, Turkish efforts (especially during 2020) to counter Russia in several theaters of conflict at relatively
low cost—using domesticallylow cost—using domestically- produced drone aircraft and Syrian mercenaries—suggest that Turkey-Russia produced drone aircraft and Syrian mercenaries—suggest that Turkey-Russia
cooperation is situational rather than comprehensive in scope. cooperation is situational rather than comprehensive in scope.
Turkey’s tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean with countries such as the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Greece Turkey’s tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean with countries such as the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Greece
have negatively influenced its relations with several countries in the region, some of whom (such as the ROC, have negatively influenced its relations with several countries in the region, some of whom (such as the ROC,
Greece, Israel, and Egypt) have grown closer as a result. In this context, some observers have advocated that the Greece, Israel, and Egypt) have grown closer as a result. In this context, some observers have advocated that the
United States explore alternative basing arrangements for U.S. and NATO military assets in TurkeyUnited States explore alternative basing arrangements for U.S. and NATO military assets in Turkey~~, and in 2020~~
~~the United States lifted some longtime restrictions on providing non-lethal defense articles and services to the~~
~~ROC.~~
. Turkey has made some headway in softening tensions with some Middle Eastern governments—most notably the United Arab Emirates—in late 2021. Outlook and U.S. options. Congressional and executive branch action on arms sales, sanctions, or military Congressional and executive branch action on arms sales, sanctions, or military
basing regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in basing regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in
the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. How closely to engage Erdogan’s the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. How closely to engage Erdogan’s
government could depend on U.S. perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to government could depend on U.S. perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to
which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations. which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics: This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics:
 Domestic Turkish political and economic developments under President Recep  Domestic Turkish political and economic developments under President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s largely authoritarian and polarizing rule Tayyip Erdogan’s largely authoritarian and polarizing rule, including an ongoing currency crisis and its implications; ;
 Turkey’s strategic orientation—including toward the United States and Russia—  Turkey’s strategic orientation—including toward the United States and Russia—
as affected by Turkey’s S-400 surface-to-air defense system acquisition from as affected by Turkey’s S-400 surface-to-air defense system acquisition from
Russia and U.S. responses (including sanctions), Turkey’s greater use and export Russia and U.S. responses (including sanctions), Turkey’s greater use and export
of drone aircraft, the continuing U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and regional of drone aircraft, the continuing U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and regional
disputes and conflicts (such as those involving Syria, Greece, Cyprus, and disputes and conflicts (such as those involving Syria, Greece, Cyprus, and
Libya); and Libya); and
 various U.S. options regarding Turkey, including  various U.S. options regarding Turkey, including ~~on arms sales~~a possible sale and upgrade of F-16 aircraft, sanctions, ~~, sanctions,~~
military basing, and balancing U.S. ties with Turkey and its regional rivals. military basing, and balancing U.S. ties with Turkey and its regional rivals.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by , by
Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and figures about for a map and key facts and figures about
Turkey. Turkey.
Domestic Turkish Developments
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003 and, during that time, President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003 and, during that time,
has deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became has deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became
president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a
mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he
cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some
allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in both elections.1 Since a failed July 2016 allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in both elections.1 Since a failed July 2016
coup attempt, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym coup attempt, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of
their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish acronym their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish acronym
MHP). MHP). ~~Since the onset of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, Erdogan has arguably~~
~~gravitated even more toward nationalistic policies in an effort to distract~~As Turkey’s currency has struggled in recent years, leading to broader negative economic effects (discussed below), some observers write that deflecting domestic political domestic political
attention from attention from ~~Turkey’s economic woes (discussed below)~~economic difficulties has partly motivated a more assertive, nationalistic turn by Erdogan in foreign policy.2 .2
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure,3 and elections have reflected roughly Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure,3 and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule. The AKP maintained the largest equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule. The AKP maintained the largest
~~share of votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to~~
~~opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym~~
~~CHP). It remains unclear to what extent, if at all, these losses pose a threat to Erdogan’s rule. The~~

1 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final 1 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). 2018 (published June 25, 2018).
2 Yasmeen Serhan, “The End of the Secular Republic,” theatlantic.com, August 13, 2020. 2 Yasmeen Serhan, “The End of the Secular Republic,” theatlantic.com, August 13, 2020.
3 Seren Selvin Korkmaz, “Facing a changing main opposition, Erdogan doubles down on polarization,” Middle East 3 Seren Selvin Korkmaz, “Facing a changing main opposition, Erdogan doubles down on polarization,” Middle East
Institute, January 8, 2021. Institute, January 8, 2021.
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~~next presidential and parliamentary elections are legally required~~share of votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP). The CHP and some other parties critical of Erdogan and the AKP have agreed on some steps toward a broad opposition platform for the next national elections—scheduled to take place to take place by June 2023—focused on strengthening legislative and judicial checks on executive power. These opposition party leaders include Erdogan’s former high-ranking cabinet officials Ahmet Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, who one observer has said could help the opposition appeal more to disgruntled Erdogan supporters.4 Additionally, some sources in late 2021 have questioned Erdogan’s health.5~~by June 2023.~~
~~Erdogan’s support has dipped in public opinion polling during 2021, perhaps because of~~
~~economic factors such as Turkey’s weakened currency and growing inflation.4~~
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.56 In the government’s massive In the government’s massive
response to the 2016 coup attempt, it detained tens of thousands, enacted sweeping changes to the response to the 2016 coup attempt, it detained tens of thousands, enacted sweeping changes to the
military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media
outlets.outlets.6
~~In 2021, much political attention has focused on the Erdogan government’s pursuit of a~~
7 In October 2021, President Erdogan threatened to expel 10 ambassadors from Western countries, including the United States, for a letter urging Turkey to abide by a European Court of Human Rights ruling calling for the release from prison of civil society figure Osman Kavala. The crisis ended after the ambassadors publicly agreed to respect Turkey’s sovereignty.8 In 2021, the Erdogan government has pursued a Constitutional Court ruling to close down the Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic Party Constitutional Court ruling to close down the Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic Party
(Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in Turkey’s parliament. The government is (Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in Turkey’s parliament. The government is
seeking to ban the HDP on the basis of claims that it has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party seeking to ban the HDP on the basis of claims that it has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).9~~organization). Pro-Kurdish parties have been~~
~~banned many times before (including before the Erdogan era), with the last instance occurring in~~
~~2009. Usually a new pro-Kurdish party emerges shortly after another one has been shut down, but~~
~~in this case the government is requesting that hundreds of HDP members and associated political~~
~~figures also be banned from politics, thus thinning the ranks of potential party leaders.7~~ In March In March
2021, the State Department said that banning the HDP “would unduly subvert the will of Turkish 2021, the State Department said that banning the HDP “would unduly subvert the will of Turkish
voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny millions of Turkish citizens their voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny millions of Turkish citizens their
chosen representation.”chosen representation.”810 How Kurds who feel politically marginalized might respond is unclear. How Kurds who feel politically marginalized might respond is unclear.
Major violence between Turkish authorities and PKK militants—which has taken place on and Major violence between Turkish authorities and PKK militants—which has taken place on and
off since the 1980s—wracked Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015 off since the 1980s—wracked Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015 and 2016. Currency Crisis and Its Domestic Implications Turkey is facing significant challenges as its currency, the lira, has depreciated in value around 50% against the dollar in 2021.11 By reducing its key interest rate from 19% to 14% between September and December, Turkey’s central bank may have accelerated rather than dampened inflation, which is officially estimated to be around 20% and unofficially estimated as high as 58%.12 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with the decline driven by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy (see Figure 1). 4 Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Opposition Joins Forces Against Erdogan,” New York Times, October 24, 2021. 5 “Rumors swirl over Erdogan’s declining health after G20 hobble,” Arab News, November 4, 2021. 6 Department of State, “Turkey,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020; European Commission, Turkey 2021 Report, October 19, 2021. 7 Department of State, “Turkey”; European Commission, Turkey 2021 Report. 8 Carlotta Gall, “Diplomacy Halts Erdogan’s Push to Expel Envoys,” New York Times, October 26, 2021. 9 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye, March 20, 2021. 10 Department of State, “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021. 11 Natasha Turak, “Turkish central bank cuts rates, sending lira to record low,” CNBC, December 16, 2021. 12 Caitlin Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall,” Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Figure 1. Turkey: Currency Exchange Rate and Central Bank Interest Rate Source: Reuters, November 2021. Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic theory that raising interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan appears to have sought to bring Turkish fiscal and monetary policy more in line with his views. In public statements, Erdogan has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.13 Erdogan also has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap between rich and poor.14 Legacy of the 1999-2001 Financial Crisis15 The Turkish financial crisis of 1999-2001—amid domestic political instability fueled by a recession and 69% inflation at its outset—was a formative experience for President Erdogan and many other Turkish leaders of his generation. During the time of the crisis, Erdogan and his moderately Islamist political allies were forming a party (the AKP, founded in 2001) to run competitively on the national stage. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-assisted response to the 1999-2001 crisis arguably placed Turkey on a better long-term footing, especial y with the restructuring of its banking system, Erdogan’s stated unwil ingness in 2021 to accept IMF intervention in 13 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. 14 Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021; Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey's Economy.” 15 Sources used for this textbox include Calum Miller, “Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Turkey,” Global Governance, vol. 12, o. no. 4, October-December 2006, pp. 449-464; Gokhan Capoglu, “Anatomy of a Failed IMF Program: The 1999 Program in Turkey,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, vol. 40, no. 3, May-June 2004, pp. 84-100; Koen Brinke, “The Turkish 2000-01 banking crisis,” Rabobank, September 4, 2013, at https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/september/the-turkish-2000-01-banking-crisis/; Emin Avundukluoglu, “Turkey will never submit its economic future to IMF: President Erdogan,” Anadolu Agency, December 1, 2021; “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013. Congressional Research Service 3 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief resolving Turkey’s current crisis may stem in part from (1) serious volatility shocks (including extreme fluctuations in interest rates and capital outflows) that occurred during the first 18 months of the Turkey-IMF program in 1999-2001, (2) the years of oversight that Turkey faced while paying off IMF loans, and (3) the decisive November 2002 electoral defeat of the coalition government that presided over the crisis. In that election, Turkish voters did not give any of the coalition parties enough votes to stay in parliament, and the AKP won a majority of parliamentary seats. Despite its criticism during the 2002 campaign that involving the IMF compromised Turkey’s sovereignty, the AKP continued implementing Turkey’s standing agreements with the IMF on economic reform, and the country benefitted from several years of strong economic growth—ful y paying off its IMF debt (some of which dated back to 1961) in 2013. The ongoing currency crisis has several implications for Turkey and its people. The cost of living for consumers and cost of international borrowing for banks and private sector companies have increased dramatically because Turkey relies heavily on imports for its population’s basic needs, including energy, and most foreign loans are denominated in dollars.16 A Turkish economist has expressed concern over a possible “brain drain” of highly educated Turks, while also stating that despite lower interest rates, economic contraction may be likelier than growth “as a result of the panic and uncertainty and escalating costs coming from this crisis.”17 In December, Erdogan announced a 50% increase in Turkey’s minimum wage.18 Though presumably intended to bolster Turks’ purchasing power given the weakened lira, higher wages could spark layoffs by employers.19 Turkish official sources have presented some information to support the current policy course. A central bank financial stability report from November 2021 stated that the Turkish banking sector is sufficiently strong and has enough liquid assets to manage risks related to the lira’s value.20 Other sources question the resilience of Turkey’s financial system. a December 2021 Wall Street Journal article said, “A sudden surge in requests among Turkish residents to withdraw dollars could force banks to draw down their foreign currency reserves or for the government to impose capital controls that limit what people can remove.”21 According to one source, almost 65% of Turkish bank deposits are in foreign currencies22—up from around 41% at the time of the 2016 coup attempt and 55% in January 2021.23 The central bank’s position became more precarious after its efforts in 2019 and 2020 to shore up the lira by selling a substantial amount of its foreign exchange reserves.24 As of November 2021, one source stated that the bank’s foreign exchange liabilities outweighed its assets by $15 billion when accounting for all transactions (including currency swaps).25 16 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press. 17 Ibid.; Ozge Ozdemir, “Why Turkey’s currency crash does not worry Erdogan,” BBC, December 3, 2021. 18 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2021. 19 Nazlan Ertan, “Turkish lira tumbles ahead of key decision on rate cuts, wages,” Al-Monitor, December 14, 2021. 20 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi), “Financial Stability Report,” November 2021, Volume 33. 21 Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall.” 22 Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut.” 23 Capital Economics graphic, from Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall.” 24 “‘Where is the $128B?’ Turkey’s opposition presses Erdogan,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2021; Mustafa Sonmez, “Where is the money? Erdogan feels the heat over foreign reserves drain,” Al-Monitor, February 24, 2021. 25 “Turkey’s lira dives back into crisis territory,” Reuters, November 18, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief There are also implications for domestic politics. Public opinion polls suggest that support for Erdogan and the AKP is at historic lows,26 leading to speculation that Erdogan and the current AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might fall short of a majority or lose outright in future elections.27 Given youth unemployment estimates of 25%,28 some observers speculate that the economic concerns of millions of young voters could negatively affect Erdogan’s prospects.29 Rivals from the CHP and other parties have called for early presidential and parliamentary elections to allow for a change in leadership, but Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and appears unwilling to do it. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.30 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,31 (2) disgruntled Erdogan supporters would actually vote for opposition parties,32 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.33~~and 2016.~~
~~Economic Assessment and Currency Problems~~
~~Since 2018, Turkey has confronted economic problems that have fueled speculation about~~
~~potential crises that could affect Erdogan’s status and domestic political stability. Concerns persist~~
~~about rule of law and problems with inflation and Turkey’s currency. Some observers have argued~~
~~that authoritarian governance has contributed to Turkey’s economic downturn and declining~~
~~foreign investment.9 U.S. actions on sanctions and other issues, and a pending U.S. federal court~~
~~case against Turkish state-owned Halkbank for allegedly disregarding U.S. sanctions on Iran,10~~
~~could further affect Turkey’s financial well-being.~~
~~Erdogan’s biggest challenge may be the Turkish lira’s continued decline in value (Figure A-2),~~
~~reflecting structural economic weaknesses that probably contributed to the AKP local election~~
~~losses in 2019. In 2019 and 2020, Turkey’s central bank sold substantial foreign exchange~~

~~4 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s image and Turkey’s economy are both taking a battering,” Economist, July 10, 2021;~~
~~“Erdogan rivals surge in polls ahead of 2023 Turkey election,” Arab News, May 17, 2021.~~
~~5 Department of State, “Turkey,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020; Department of State deputy~~
~~spokesperson, Osman Kavala Should Be Released, July 27, 2020; European Commission, Turkey 2020 Report, October~~
~~6, 2020.~~
~~6 Department of State, “Turkey”; European Commission, Turkey 2020 Report.~~
~~7 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye,~~
~~March 20, 2021.~~
~~8 Department of State, “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021.~~
~~9 Jonathan Spicer, “When Erdogan’s Turkish economic miracle began failing,” Reuters, July 15, 2021.~~
~~10 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, “Turkish Bank Charged In Manhattan~~
~~Federal Court For Its Participation In A Multibillion-Dollar Iranian Sanctions Evasion Scheme,” October 15, 2019.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~reserves in efforts to bolster the lira, but the depletion of those reserves did not end the lira’s~~
~~slide.11 International investor confidence has further declined in 2021, reportedly in response to~~
~~Erdogan’s change of central bank governors in March and the bank’s subsequent decisions to~~
~~hold, rather than raise, interest rates.12~~
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and
Military Involvement
General Assessment
Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to
Turkey’s overall strategic orientation, as it has sought greater independence of action as a Turkey’s overall strategic orientation, as it has sought greater independence of action as a
regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkey’s foreign policy course is regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkey’s foreign policy course is
arguably less oriented to the West now than at any time since it joined NATO in 1952. Turkish arguably less oriented to the West now than at any time since it joined NATO in 1952. Turkish
leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western
influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some
actions with Russia in Syria and purchase a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. actions with Russia in Syria and purchase a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system.
Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history
of discord—including over political outcomes in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region of discord—including over political outcomes in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region
disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan). disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan).
In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and
Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key actors. Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key actors.
U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter
~~Turkish actions. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on~~
~~regional security matters remains mutually important.13 In June 2021, U.S. and Turkish officials~~
~~agreed to have Turkish forces in Afghanistan (which have been an active part of NATO~~
~~operations there for two decades) secure Kabul airport after the withdrawal of U.S. forces,14 but~~
~~Turkey dropped these plans after the Taliban takeover of the country in August—reportedly~~
~~subject to reconsideration if the Taliban requests Turkey’s support.15~~
~~Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential~~
~~countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these~~
~~actors and maintain its leverage with them.16 Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the~~
~~United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment~~
~~(including a customs union with the EU since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy~~
~~imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s~~
~~military strength and economic well-being appear to remain largely dependent on these traditional~~

~~11 “‘Where is the $128B?’ Turkey’s opposition presses Erdogan,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2021; Mustafa Sonmez, “Where~~
~~is the money? Erdogan feels the heat over foreign reserves drain,” Al-Monitor, February 24, 2021.~~
~~12 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report, accessed August 11, 2021.~~
~~13 “Biden, Erdogan upbeat about ties but disclose no breakthrough,” Reuters, June 14, 2021; State Department, “U.S.~~
~~Relations with Turkey: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021.~~
~~14 Emre Caliskan, “Turkey displays inflexibility over Russian missile systems in bilateral presidential talks with United~~
~~States; continued sanctions likely,” IHS Markit Country Risk Daily Report, June 21, 2021.~~
~~15 “Turkey drops Kabul airport plans but will assist if Taliban ask - sources,” Reuters, August 16, 2021.~~
~~16 Stephen J. Flanagan, et al.,~~ ~~Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and~~
~~the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces~~
~~in jeopardizing these ties.17~~ 26 Jared Malsin, “Erdogan’s Support Sinks as Turkey’s Currency Collapses,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2021. 27 “Autumn of the patriarch,” Economist, October 30, 2021. 28 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tries to Ward Off Meltdown of Economy,” New York Times, December 15, 2021. 29 Ozdemir, “Why Turkey’s currency crash does not worry Erdogan.” 30 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14, 2021; Carlotta Gall, “Frustration Rises as Turkey’s Lira Continues Plunge,” New York Times, December 2, 2021. 31 Simon A. Waldman, “Why Erdogan Will Survive Turkey’s Horrifying Crash,” haaretz.com, December 17, 2021; Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. 32 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, November 1, 2021. 33 Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?”; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Congressional Research Service 5 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Turkish actions. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security matters remains mutually important.34 Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these actors and maintain its leverage with them.35 Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the EU since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to remain largely dependent on these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces in jeopardizing these ties.36
Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to
consolidate control domestically. Because Erdogan’s Islamist-friendly AKP maintains a consolidate control domestically. Because Erdogan’s Islamist-friendly AKP maintains a
parliamentary majority in partnership with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to parliamentary majority in partnership with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to
maintain the support of core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A maintain the support of core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A
largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment
with the West.with the West.1837 Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of great power Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of great power
aggression contributes to wide domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and aggression contributes to wide domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and
discourse, as well as sympathy for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish discourse, as well as sympathy for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish
regional prestige. regional prestige.
Turkish Hard Power: Using Drones and Proxy Forces in Regional Conflicts
During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region
(with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern (with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern
Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military
deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however, deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however,
Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especially the case after Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especially the case after
Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating
power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt. power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt.
Under this modified approach, Turkey now relies more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically, Under this modified approach, Turkey now relies more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically,
Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces
(particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in (particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in
theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.1938 Partly because the Partly because the
drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less constraint in drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less constraint in
deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less
mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-assisted forces in Syria, Libya, and mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-assisted forces in Syria, Libya, and
Nagorno-Karabakh).Nagorno-Karabakh).20
~~Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. The Biden~~
~~Administration arguably signaled a more distant approach to Erdogan than President Trump’s~~
~~with President Biden’s April 2021 statement recognizing as genocide actions by the Ottoman~~
~~Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state) against Armenians during World War I.21 The Biden~~
~~Administration also has been more outspoken on what it sees as threats to democracy, rule of law,~~
~~and human rights in Turkey. However, the Administration, along with the EU, has praised~~
~~Turkey’s approach to hosting refugees.22 Of the refugees currently residing in Turkey, according~~
~~to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 3.6 million refugees have~~

1739 34 “Biden, Erdogan upbeat about ties but disclose no breakthrough,” Reuters, June 14, 2021; State Department, “U.S. Relations with Turkey: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021. 35 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. 36 Diego Cupolo, “Turkish lira nears record lows as emerging markets struggle,” Diego Cupolo, “Turkish lira nears record lows as emerging markets struggle,” Al-Monitor, May 13, 2021. , May 13, 2021.
1837 Marc Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU in 2020?” Marc Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU in 2020?” Carnegie Europe, January 29, 2020. , January 29, 2020.
1938 See, e.g., Rich Outzen, See, e.g., Rich Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection, Washington , Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021. Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021.
2039 James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” Wall Street Journal, ,
June 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all yearJune 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year ~~— here'~~—here’s how he did it,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief How these efforts might influence political outcomes remains unclear (see “Regional Conflicts and Disputes” below for discussions of Syria and Libya). In December 2021, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced Turkey’s intention to move toward normalizing its relations with Armenia, a course of action reportedly suggested by President Biden to President Erdogan.40 Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. The Biden Administration arguably signaled a more distant approach to Erdogan than President Trump’s with President Biden’s April 2021 statement recognizing as genocide actions by the Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state) against Armenians during World War I.41 The Biden Administration also has been more outspoken on what it sees as threats to democracy, rule of law, and human rights in Turkey. However, the Administration, along with the EU, has praised Turkey’s approach to hosting refugees.42 Of the refugees currently residing in Turkey, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 3.6 million refugees have ~~s how he did it,”~~ ~~Business~~
~~Insider, October 22, 2020.~~
~~21 White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2021.~~
~~22 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield during a Press~~
~~Briefing at the Conclusion of Travel to Turkey,” June 4, 2021; Nazlan Ertan, “Amid Afghan influx, Turkey’s refugee~~
~~policy gets tested with fire,” Al-Monitor, July 28, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

come from Syria, and about 320,000 persons of concern from other countries (including come from Syria, and about 320,000 persons of concern from other countries (including
Afghanistan).Afghanistan).2343
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program ~~and~~, U.S.
Sanctions, and F-16 Request
Background
Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system, which Turkey ordered in Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system, which Turkey ordered in
2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,2444 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with
Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the
Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019,
and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.(CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.2545 In In
explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program, then-Under Secretary of explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program, then-Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian
intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35
program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth
capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of
the F-35 program.”the F-35 program.”26
~~Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby~~
~~bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision.~~
~~Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms~~
~~embargo over Cyprus.27 Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of~~
~~Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval~~
~~vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly does not feature technology~~
~~sharing,28 Turkish officials have expressed hope that a future deal with Russia involving~~
~~technology sharing and co-production might be possible to address Turkey’s longer-term air~~
~~defense needs, with another potential option being Turkish co-development of a system with~~
~~European partners.29 Lack of agreement between the United States and Turkey on technology~~
~~sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering non-~~

2346 40 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Moves to Normalize Armenia Ties in Bid to Please Biden,” Bloomberg, December 13, 2021. For more on Turkey-Armenia relations, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 41 White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2021. 42 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield during a Press Briefing at the Conclusion of Travel to Turkey,” June 4, 2021; Nazlan Ertan, “Amid Afghan influx, Turkey’s refugee policy gets tested with fire,” Al-Monitor, July 28, 2021. 43 UNHCR, “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey,” https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in- UNHCR, “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey,” https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-
turkey. turkey.
2444 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later. second system to come later.
2545 CRS Insight IN11557, CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas., by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
26 46 Department of Defense transcript, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Department of Defense transcript, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and
~~Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey~~
~~Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System, July 17, 2019.~~
~~27 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019.~~
~~28 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research~~
~~Institute, July 29, 2019.~~
~~29 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News,~~
~~January 10, 2020.~~
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~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a~~
~~Chinese system.30~~ Congressional Research Service 7 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision. Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo over Cyprus.47 Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly does not feature technology sharing,48 Turkish officials have expressed hope that a future deal with Russia involving technology sharing and co-production might be possible to address Turkey’s longer-term air defense needs, with another potential option being Turkish co-development of a system with European partners.49 Lack of agreement between the United States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.50
Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 instead of the Patriot. Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 instead of the Patriot.
One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.3151 Another is Turkish Another is Turkish
President President ~~Recep Tayyip~~ Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such
as those used by some Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.as those used by some Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.3252
Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally
operational. operational. ~~Turkish officials reportedly expect to receive a second S-400 system sometime in~~
~~2022,33 but the transfer has been delayed since 2020.~~President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expects to purchase a second S-400 system.53 Secretary of State Antony Blinken has Secretary of State Antony Blinken has
warned Turkey that acquiring an additional system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under warned Turkey that acquiring an additional system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under
~~CAATSA.34~~
~~According to a Turkish national security analyst, CAATSA sanctions do not prohibit Turkey’s~~
~~military from directly transacting some sales with the United States, but they may handicap~~
~~Turkish partnerships with Western countries to develop advanced weapons platforms.35 Turkey~~
~~has a need to upgrade or replace its aging fleet of U.S.-origin F-16 aircraft. If it wants U.S. or~~
~~European options for next-generation fighters, Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the~~
~~S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. Otherwise, it may turn to Russia or other~~
~~alternative suppliers; Turkish officials have expressed openness to acquiring Russia’s Su-35~~
~~aircraft.36~~
~~U.S. Policy Implications~~
~~How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects~~
~~Turkey’s partnerships with major powers. For decades, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin~~
~~equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military~~
~~strength.37 Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 and its exploration of possibly acquiring Russian~~
~~fighter aircraft may raise the question: If Turkey transitions to major Russian weapons platforms~~
~~with multi-decade lifespans, how can it stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters?~~
~~Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least~~
~~100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and~~
~~industrial production of the aircraft.38 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense~~

~~30 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.~~
~~31 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018.~~
32CAATSA.54 Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet. President Erdogan has called for the Biden Administration to apply $1.4 billion that Turkey paid toward F-35s to the approximate $6 billion cost for the F-16 package.55 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and notification process with Congress.56 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System, July 17, 2019. 47 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019. 48 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 29, 2019. 49 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News, January 10, 2020. 50 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course. 51 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018. 52 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United
States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So
Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019. Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019.
~~33 Emre Caliskan, “Turkey displays inflexibility over Russian missile systems in bilateral presidential talks with United~~
~~States; continued sanctions likely,” IHS Markit Country Risk Daily Report, June 21, 2021.~~
3453 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021. 54 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021. , April 28, 2021.
~~35 Sinan Ulgen, “After Trump’s Sanctions, Biden Can Reset with Turkey,” Bloomberg, December 16, 2020.~~
~~36 Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com,~~
~~March 15, 2021.~~
~~37 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany~~
~~(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).~~
~~38 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/~~
~~documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/~~
~~documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

55 Abraham Mahshie, “Turkey’s Erdogan and Biden to Face Off over F-16 and F-35 Debacle,” Air Force Magazine, October 29, 2021. 56 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For Congressional Research Service 8 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief U.S. Policy Implications How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects Turkey’s partnerships with major powers. For decades, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.57 Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 and its exploration of possibly acquiring Russian fighter aircraft (as discussed below) may raise the question: If Turkey transitions to major Russian weapons platforms with multi-decade lifespans, how can it stay closely integrated with the United States and NATO on defense matters? Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least 100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and industrial production of the aircraft.58 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless
the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400.the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400.
~~Additionally, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland stated in a Senate~~
~~Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 21, 2021, that the phase-out of F-35 component~~
~~production in Turkey that began in 2019 is expected to be complete “within the year, if not~~
~~sooner.”~~
An August 2020 An August 2020 Defense News article reported that some Members of Congress had “blocked” article reported that some Members of Congress had “blocked”
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. Such a major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. Such a
disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales has not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales has not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over
Cyprus.Cyprus.3959 Major sales (valued at $25 million or more) Major sales (valued at $25 million or more) on hold, according to the article, included on hold, according to the article, included
~~structural upgrades for Turkey’s F-16 aircraft~~F-16 upgrades and export licenses for engines involved in a and export licenses for engines involved in a
Turkish sale of attack helicopters to Pakistan. Sales already underway or for smaller items and Turkish sale of attack helicopters to Pakistan. Sales already underway or for smaller items and
services—such as spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance packages for older equipment—services—such as spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance packages for older equipment—
were not subject to these reported were not subject to these reported holds. Biden Administration discussions with Turkey~~holds.~~
~~U.S.-Turkey discussions in 2021~~ have sought to end the countries’ impasse over the S-400, in have sought to end the countries’ impasse over the S-400, in
hopes of halting CAATSA sanctions and bringing U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation closer to past hopes of halting CAATSA sanctions and bringing U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation closer to past
~~levels. Despite media speculation about possible Turkish willingness to allow some kind of U.S.~~
~~monitoring of the S-400 or otherwise limit the system’s use, President Erdogan reiterated his~~
~~unwillingness to give up the system in a June meeting with President Biden.40 In the July 2021~~
~~Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Under Secretary Nuland said that President Biden~~
~~is committed to keeping sanctions against Turkey in place if it continues to possess the S-400.~~
levels. President Erdogan reiterated his unwillingness to give up the S-400 in a June 2021 meeting with President Biden.60 Turkey’s request to purchase new F-16s and upgrade others faces some opposition in Congress, partly based on the S-400 issue.61 At a September 28, 2021, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Chairman Bob Menendez said, “I see no arms sales going to Turkey, unless there is a dramatic change around on the S-400.”62 If Turkey cannot partner with the United States to background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 57 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 58 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. 59 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020. 60 “Erdogan says he told Biden Turkey is not shifting on S-400s—state media,” Reuters, June 17, 2021. 61 The text of a letter from 42 Representatives to Secretary Blinken opposing the F-16 transaction is available at https://pappas.house.gov/media/press-releases/pappas-leads-colleagues-opposing-sale-f-16s-turkey-demands-information-state. 62 Congressional Quarterly Congressional Transcripts (requires paid subscription), available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6353520?5&search=s5LStXmK. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief modernize its fighter aircraft, it could turn to Russia or other alternative suppliers.63 Turkish officials have expressed openness to acquiring Russia’s Su-35 aircraft.64 Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components, and
Exports
Over the past decade, Turkey has built up a formidable arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles Over the past decade, Turkey has built up a formidable arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), or drone aircraft, to carry out armed attacks or perform target acquisition. Their primary (UAVs), or drone aircraft, to carry out armed attacks or perform target acquisition. Their primary
purpose has been to counter the PKK or PKK-linked militias in southeastern Turkey, Iraq, and purpose has been to counter the PKK or PKK-linked militias in southeastern Turkey, Iraq, and
Syria. Turkey and its allies also have reportedly used armed drones against other actors in Syria, Syria. Turkey and its allies also have reportedly used armed drones against other actors in Syria,
Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (see textbox above). Open source accounts have reported that the Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (see textbox above). Open source accounts have reported that the
drones have been effective in targeting adversaries, while also raising concerns about the legality drones have been effective in targeting adversaries, while also raising concerns about the legality
of their use in these settings and the danger they pose to civilians.of their use in these settings and the danger they pose to civilians.4165
Turkey has focused on producing drones domestically. This is partly due to its failure in the early Turkey has focused on producing drones domestically. This is partly due to its failure in the early
2010s to acquire U.S.-made armed MQ-9 Reapers—reportedly because of congressional 2010s to acquire U.S.-made armed MQ-9 Reapers—reportedly because of congressional
~~opposition42~~opposition66—and partly due to reported concerns that Israel may have deliberately delivered —and partly due to reported concerns that Israel may have deliberately delivered

35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
~~39 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,~~
~~August 12, 2020.~~
~~40 “Erdogan says he told Biden Turkey is not shifting on S-400s - state media,” Reuters, June 17, 2021.~~
41underperforming versions of its Heron reconnaissance drones to Turkey in 2010.67 Kale Group and Baykar Technologies have produced the Bayraktar TB2 (see Figure A-2), and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) has produced the Anka-S. Turkey anticipates adding both larger and smaller drones to its arsenal over the next decade.68 Selcuk Bayraktar, a son-in-law of President Erdogan, has played a key role in engineering the Bayraktar drones that dominate Turkey’s fleet.69 While Turkish companies have assembled the drones, they have apparently relied on Western countries for some key components, including engines, optical sensors, and camera systems.70 After a Canadian-produced camera system was reportedly found in a Bayraktar TB2 downed in Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020, Canada halted export permits for parts used in Turkish drones, concluding in April 2021 that their use was “not consistent with Canadian foreign policy, nor end-use assurances given by Turkey.”71 Also in October 2020, a Canadian company whose Austrian subsidiary had produced engines for Bayraktar TB2s announced that it would suspend 63 Aaron Stein, “Not a Divorce but a Defense Decoupling: What’s Next for the U.S.-Turkish Alliance,” War on the Rocks, October 18, 2021. 64 Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com, March 15, 2021. 65 Dan Gettinger, “Turkey’s military drones: an export product that’s disrupting NATO,” Dan Gettinger, “Turkey’s military drones: an export product that’s disrupting NATO,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, December 6, 2019. A panel of experts reporting in March 2021 on U.N. Security Council sanctions , December 6, 2019. A panel of experts reporting in March 2021 on U.N. Security Council sanctions
regarding Libya wrote that conflict during 2020 in Libya featured Turkish loitering munitions such as the Kargu-2 regarding Libya wrote that conflict during 2020 in Libya featured Turkish loitering munitions such as the Kargu-2
(produced by Turkish company STM) being programmed to fire autonomously on their targets without human (produced by Turkish company STM) being programmed to fire autonomously on their targets without human
involvement. U.N. Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established involvement. U.N. Security Council, “Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established
pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 8, 2021. pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2021/229, March 8, 2021.
42 66 Outzen, Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 20~~ ~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~underperforming versions of its Heron reconnaissance drones to Turkey in 2010.43 Kale Group~~
~~and Baykar Technologies have produced the Bayraktar TB2 (see Figure A-3), and Turkish~~
~~Aerospace Industries (TAI) has produced the Anka-S. Turkey anticipates adding both larger and~~
~~smaller drones to its arsenal over the next decade.44 Selcuk Bayraktar, a son-in-law of President~~
~~Erdogan, has played a key role in engineering the Bayraktar drones that dominate Turkey’s~~
~~fleet.45~~
~~While Turkish companies have assembled the drones, they have apparently relied on Western~~
~~countries for some key components, including engines, optical sensors, and camera systems.46~~
~~After a Canadian-produced camera system was reportedly found in a Bayraktar TB2 downed in~~
~~Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020, Canada halted export permits for parts used in Turkish~~
~~drones, concluding in April 2021 that their use was “not consistent with Canadian foreign policy,~~
~~nor end-use assurances given by Turkey.”47 Also in October 2020, a Canadian company whose~~
~~Austrian subsidiary had produced engines for Bayraktar TB2s announced that it would suspend~~
~~engine deliveries to “countries with unclear usage.”48 Additionally, Armenian sources raised~~
~~concerns about the possible use of some U.S.-origin components in Bayraktar TB2s.49~~. 67 Itamar Eichner, “Turkey accuses Israel of selling them defective drones,” Ynetnews, June 24, 2018. 68 Paul Iddon, “Turkey’s Drones Are Coming in All Sizes These Days,” forbes.com, October 4, 2020. 69 Umar Farooq, “The Second Drone Age: How Turkey Defied the U.S. and Became a Killer Drone Power,” The Intercept, May 14, 2019. 70 “Canadian decision to halt tech exports exposes key weakness in Turkish drone industry,” Turkish Minute, October 17, 2020. 71 “Canada scraps export permits for drone technology to Turkey, complains to Ankara,” Reuters, April 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief engine deliveries to “countries with unclear usage.”72 Additionally, Armenian sources raised concerns about the possible use of some U.S.-origin components in Bayraktar TB2s,73 and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Menendez proposed an amendment to the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act that would have required a report on recent Turkish drone exports and whether they contained U.S.-origin components and violated U.S. arms export control law.74
It is unclear how effective Turkish replacements for Western-origin drone components can be It is unclear how effective Turkish replacements for Western-origin drone components can be
going forward. Since 2018, TAI has reportedly been integrating domesticallygoing forward. Since 2018, TAI has reportedly been integrating domestically- produced engines produced engines
into its drones, including the Anka-S.into its drones, including the Anka-S.5075 In June 2021, Baykar Technologies officials said that In June 2021, Baykar Technologies officials said that a
~~Turkish camera has been integrated into their newly produced drones and that they expect to have~~
~~domestically-~~their newly produced drones featured Turkish cameras and anticipated having domestically produced engines by the end of the year.produced engines by the end of the year.51
76 Additionally, Ukraine is reportedly producing engines for some Turkish drones.77 Turkish drones’ apparent effectiveness to date—such as in destroying Russian-origin air defense Turkish drones’ apparent effectiveness to date—such as in destroying Russian-origin air defense
~~systems52~~systems78—may have boosted global demand for Turkish defense exports. In addition to —may have boosted global demand for Turkish defense exports. In addition to
Azerbaijan purchasing Bayraktar TB2s that it used in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Qatar, Azerbaijan purchasing Bayraktar TB2s that it used in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Qatar,
Ukraine, Poland, Ukraine, Poland, Morocco, and Ethiopia~~and Morocco~~ have reportedly purchased or agreed to purchase TB2s have reportedly purchased or agreed to purchase TB2s~~—with a~~
~~Ukraine deal calling for co-production.53~~ .79 Tunisia has signed a deal to purchase Anka-Ss.Tunisia has signed a deal to purchase Anka-Ss.5480 Some Some
~~other European and Asian countries~~other countries also have supposedly expressed interest in Turkish drones. have supposedly expressed interest in Turkish drones.81 It is It is
~~unclear whether a more combative Turkish foreign policy approach that helps market drones to~~
~~other countries~~ unclear whether the Turkish provision of drones to other countries—thus involving Turkey at some level in those countries’ political disputes and military conflicts—is a net plus or minus for Turkey’s fragile economy, in light of the potential is a net plus or minus for Turkey’s fragile economy, in light of the potential for Turkey’s actions to isolate it from major powers that represent key sources of trade and investment.82 U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key 72~~for~~

~~43 Itamar Eichner, “Turkey accuses Israel of selling them defective drones,” Ynetnews, June 24, 2018.~~
~~44 Paul Iddon, “Turkey’s Drones Are Coming in All Sizes These Days,” forbes.com, October 4, 2020.~~
~~45 Umar Farooq, “The Second Drone Age: How Turkey Defied the U.S. and Became a Killer Drone Power,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Intercept, May 14, 2019.~~
~~46 “Canadian decision to halt tech exports exposes key weakness in Turkish drone industry,” Turkish Minute, October~~
~~17, 2020.~~
~~47 “Canada scraps export permits for drone technology to Turkey, complains to Ankara,” Reuters, April 12, 2021.~~
48 Levon Sevunts, “Bombardier Recreational Products suspends delivery of aircraft engines used on military drones,” Levon Sevunts, “Bombardier Recreational Products suspends delivery of aircraft engines used on military drones,”
Radio Canada International, October 25, 2020. , October 25, 2020.
4973 “How much does the production of Turkish ‘local’ Bayraktar TB2 ATS depend on foreign supplies?” “How much does the production of Turkish ‘local’ Bayraktar TB2 ATS depend on foreign supplies?” Ermeni Haber
Ajansi (translated from Armenian), October 26, 2020. (translated from Armenian), October 26, 2020.
5074 Senator Bob Menendez website, “Chairman Menendez Announces NDAA Amendments to Hold Turkey and Azerbaijan Accountable,” November 4, 2021. 75 Beth Davidson, “IDEF’19: Anka Aksungur to Fly with Turkish Engine by Year-end,” Beth Davidson, “IDEF’19: Anka Aksungur to Fly with Turkish Engine by Year-end,” AIN Online, May 1, 2019. , May 1, 2019.
5176 Marson and Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics.” Marson and Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics.”
5277 Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2021. 78 Seth Frantzman, “Russian air defense systems outmatched by Turkish drones in Syria and Libya,” Seth Frantzman, “Russian air defense systems outmatched by Turkish drones in Syria and Libya,” Long War Journal
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies), June 10, 2020. (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), June 10, 2020.
5379 Aishwarya Rakesh, “How Turkey’s Bayraktar Drones Became an International Success,” defenseworld.net, May 27, Aishwarya Rakesh, “How Turkey’s Bayraktar Drones Became an International Success,” defenseworld.net, May 27,
20212021; “Turkey expands armed drone sales to Ethiopia and Morocco – sources,” Reuters, October 14, 2021. 80.
54 “After big wins, interest in Turkish combat drones soars,” “After big wins, interest in Turkish combat drones soars,” Agence France Presse, March 19, 2021. , March 19, 2021.
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~~Turkey’s actions to isolate it from major powers that represent key sources of trade and~~
~~investment.55~~
~~U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations~~
~~Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory~~
~~for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and~~
~~NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key~~
81 See, for example, “Armed with drones, Turkey explores African arms sales,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 15, 2021. 82 See, for example, Metin Gurcan, “Turkey’s foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 22, 2020; Sinan Ulgen, “A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy,” foreignpolicy.com, October 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 22 link to page 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO
ground forces command in Izmir (seeground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-43). .
From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns
about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World
War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem
from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement ~~on issues~~in places such as Syria such as Syria~~, Libya, and Nagorno-~~
~~Karabakh~~ and Ukraine, and may partly motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian , and may partly motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian
objectives in objectives in ~~these arenas.56~~various conflict arenas.83
As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the
safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated
exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.5784 Some reports suggest that expanded or Some reports suggest that expanded or
potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, ~~and Jordan~~Jordan and Romania might might
be connected with concerns about Turkey.be connected with concerns about Turkey.5885
Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the
Eastern Mediterranean (see Eastern Mediterranean (see “Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas” below)— below)—
particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among
those allies and partners.those allies and partners.5986 In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale
of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S. of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S.
arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.6087
Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries
bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish
defense cooperation with defense cooperation with ~~and~~or arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Azerbaijan may present and Azerbaijan may present
opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter
RussiaRussia~~, but alternatively could constitute steps toward an independent regional grouping that~~
~~checks~~.88 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions both U.S. and Russian ambitions~~. A~~ , or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.89 A case in point will be how Turkey regulates and case in point will be how Turkey regulates and
controls other countries’ maritime access to and from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted controls other countries’ maritime access to and from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted

~~55 See, e.g., Metin Gurcan, “Turkey's foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 22,~~
~~2020; Sinan Ulgen, “A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy,” foreignpolicy.com, October 6,~~
~~2020.~~
~~56 Prothero, “Turkey'~~to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936 (with provisions to give Turkey greater control when at war).90 83 Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.” s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.”
5784 See, See, ~~e.g.~~for example, Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” , Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures, April 19, 2019. , April 19, 2019.
5885 Marc Pierini and Francesco Siccardi, “Understanding Turkey’s Direction: Three Scenarios,” Carnegie Europe, December 9, 2021; “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph , September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019. , January 14, 2019.
5986 Rauf Baker, “The EastMed Gas and Philia Forums: Reimagining Cooperation in the Mediterranean,” Rauf Baker, “The EastMed Gas and Philia Forums: Reimagining Cooperation in the Mediterranean,” Fikra Forum, ,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 18, 2021. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 18, 2021.
6087 “Pompeo says US will lift arms embargo on Cyprus, Turkey furious,” “Pompeo says US will lift arms embargo on Cyprus, Turkey furious,” Reuters, September 2, 2020. , September 2, 2020.
88 See, for example, Gonul Tol and Yoruk Isik, “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot,” Middle East Institute, February 16, 2021. 89 See, for example, Stein, “From Ankara with Implications.” 90 Text of the convention available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf. Congressional Research Service 12 ~~Congressional Research Service~~

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link to page link to page 2223 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief

~~to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936 (with provisions to give Turkey greater control~~
~~when at war).61~~
Regional Conflicts and Disputes
~~Syria62~~Syria91
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has
severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.6392 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during
the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has
engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on
some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United
States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates
River where U.S. forces have been based. River where U.S. forces have been based.
Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)
from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s
government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD),
to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have
emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish
authorities.authorities.6493 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an
umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S.
ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October
2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have 2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have
U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action
against Turkey in Congress.against Turkey in Congress.6594
In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016 (see In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-54), Turkey has set , Turkey has set
up local councils. These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these up local councils. These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these
areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future
governance and Turkey’s overarching role. governance and Turkey’s overarching role.
The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future
of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups
(including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian (including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian
government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict
in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and produced casualties on many in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and produced casualties on many

~~61 Text of the convention available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-~~
~~Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf. The planned construction of Canal Istanbul, a waterway that would bypass~~
~~the Bosphorus Straits, has led to speculation on how Turkey might seek to circumvent the limits on its control over~~
~~other countries’ transit between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Melik Kaylan, “Turkey’s President Erdogan Wants~~
~~to Create Another Bosphorus Strait but Without International Rules: A Minefield for the Region and the World,”~~
~~forbes.com, May 17, 2021. However, Canal Istanbul’s impact could be limited by Turkey’s continued obligations under~~
~~the Montreux Convention regarding maritime traffic through the Dardanelles Straits. Amberin Zaman, “Turkey’s talk~~
~~of pulling out of the Montreux Convention part diversion, part ‘Ataturk envy,’” Al-Monitor, April 8, 2021.~~
62sides. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.95 Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) about Eastern Mediterranean exploration for natural gas reserves (see textbox below for broader 91 See CRS Report RL33487, See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. , coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
6392 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. , August 4, 2017.
6493 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019.
6594 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019. Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019.
95 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-idlib-revealed-1.771953. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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link to page 24 link to page 24 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief ~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

~~sides. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s~~
~~unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy~~
~~weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.66~~
~~Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas~~
~~A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) about~~
~~Eastern Mediterranean exploration for natural gas reserves (see textbox below for broader~~
historical context) has brought the ROC, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer together.historical context) has brought the ROC, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer together.6796 Turkey has Turkey has
objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector because they have not objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector because they have not
involved the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) that controls the northern involved the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) that controls the northern
one-third of the island. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims to an exclusive one-third of the island. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims to an exclusive
economic zone around part of the island. The ROC, Greece, and Israel have discussed possible economic zone around part of the island. The ROC, Greece, and Israel have discussed possible
cooperation to export gas finds to Europe via a pipeline bypassing Turkey,cooperation to export gas finds to Europe via a pipeline bypassing Turkey,6897 and an Eastern and an Eastern
Mediterranean Gas Forum officially established itself in 2021, with the ROC, Greece, Israel, and Mediterranean Gas Forum officially established itself in 2021, with the ROC, Greece, Israel, and
Egypt among the founding members (and the United States and EU as observers). Egypt among the founding members (and the United States and EU as observers).
Turkish Disputes Regarding Greece and Cyprus: Historical ~~Background69~~Background98
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, even bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, even bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders between each country’s territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), contested borders between each country’s territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and continental shelf. These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major and continental shelf. These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major
unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from a 1974 conflict. The unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from a 1974 conflict. The
internationallyinternationally- recognized ROC, which has close ties to Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its recognized ROC, which has close ties to Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its
effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority.
Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent
there since the 1974 conflict.there since the 1974 conflict.7099 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of the island the TRNC, In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of the island the TRNC,
although no country other than Turkey recognizes it. although no country other than Turkey recognizes it.
In late 2019, the Turkey-Cyprus dispute became intertwined with some longstanding Turkey-
Greece disagreements (discussed in the textbox above) when Turkey signed an agreement with
Libya’s then-Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries (~~see~~

~~66 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-~~
~~idlib-revealed-1.771953.~~
67see Figure A-5).100 The dispute increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions, especially after Greece and Egypt reached a maritime boundary agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal.101 Efforts by individual European governments, the EU, NATO, and the United States to de-escalate tensions have highlighted competing international interests and objectives.102 Greece and the ROC are EU members, but Turkey is not, and prospects for its accession are dim for the foreseeable future. Greece and Turkey are NATO members, but the ROC is not. Turkey-Greece talks on territorial disputes resumed in January 2021 after a five-year hiatus, but significant progress on the underlying issues of dispute remains elusive. Additionally, preliminary 96 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2020. , August 3, 2020.
6897 “Battling over boundaries,” “Battling over boundaries,” Economist, August 22, 2020. The feasibility of such a pipeline is unclear. Sue Surkes, , August 22, 2020. The feasibility of such a pipeline is unclear. Sue Surkes,
“Mistake to leave Turkey out of new East Med gas club – international expert,” “Mistake to leave Turkey out of new East Med gas club – international expert,” Times of Israel, September 27, 2020. , September 27, 2020.
6998 For more information, see CRS Report R41368, For more information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton
ThomasThomas; and CRS Report R41136, and CRS Report R41136, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, by Vincent L. Morelli. , by Vincent L. Morelli.
7099 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to 50,000 soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to 50,000
reserves. reserves. ~~"Cyprus - Army,"~~ ~~Jane'~~“Cyprus—Army,” Jane’s Group UK, October 2019. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission , October 2019. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission
(UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus(UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus'’s divided capital of Nicosia. s divided capital of Nicosia.
The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of
the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
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~~link to page 22~~ ~~Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief~~

Figure A-6).71 The dispute increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions, especially after Greece and
~~Egypt reached a maritime agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal.72~~
~~Tensions heightened in the summer of 2020 as Greece and the ROC objected to Turkish drilling~~
~~vessels exploring for natural gas in what they consider to be their EEZs; Turkey disputes some of~~
~~the Greek and ROC EEZ claims.73 Greek officials have at times indicated a willingness to settle~~
~~the maritime border dispute at an international court, but Turkish officials’ stated preference is to~~
~~settle the dispute via bilateral negotiations.~~
~~Efforts by individual European governments, the EU, NATO, and the United States to de-escalate~~
~~tensions have highlighted competing international interests and objectives~~100 See also “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org. 101 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?” foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020. 102 For example, The United States has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though it does recognize UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law. Greece and the ROC have ratified UNCLOS; Turkey has not. Congressional Research Service 14 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief United Nations-led talks on Cyprus stalled in April 2021.103~~. Greece and the ROC~~
~~are EU members, but Turkey is not, and prospects for its accession are dim for the foreseeable~~
~~future. Greece and Turkey are NATO members, but the ROC is not.~~
~~Turkey-Greece talks on territorial disputes resumed in January 2021 after a five-year hiatus.~~
~~While the diplomatic engagement suggests that both countries seek to deescalate the tensions that~~
~~spiked in 2020,74 significant progress on the underlying issues of dispute remains elusive.75~~
~~Preliminary United Nations-led talks on Cyprus in April 2021 did not lead to the two sides~~
~~restarting official reunification negotiations.76~~ ROC President Nicos Anastasiades has said he will ROC President Nicos Anastasiades has said he will
not negotiate as long as the TRNC’s leader Ersin Tatar, who assumed office in October 2020, not negotiate as long as the TRNC’s leader Ersin Tatar, who assumed office in October 2020,
advocates Turkish Cypriot independence and a “two-state solution.”advocates Turkish Cypriot independence and a “two-state solution.”77104 President Erdogan has President Erdogan has
echoed Tatar’s advocacy of a two-state solution.echoed Tatar’s advocacy of a two-state solution.78
105 Middle East Rivalries and Libya
In the Middle East, Sunni Arab governments that support traditional authoritarian governance In the Middle East, Sunni Arab governments that support traditional authoritarian governance
models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—
regard Turkey with suspicion, largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for regard Turkey with suspicion, largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for
Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.79106 Ties with Turkey have bolstered Qatar to the extent other Arab states have sought to isolate it, and while Qatar’s efforts to reintegrate with its Arab Gulf neighbors may somewhat limit its cooperation with Turkey, Qatari resources have helped Turkey strengthen its troubled financial position and support its regional military posture.107 Further signs of tension ~~Ties with Turkey bolster Qatar~~
~~amid its isolation from other Arab states, and Turkey has relied on Qatari resources to strengthen~~
~~its troubled financial position and support its regional military efforts.80 Further signs of tension~~

~~71 See also “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org.~~
~~72 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?”~~
~~foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020.~~
~~73 Panagiotis Kouparanis, “Turkey’s maritime claims in the Mediterranean Sea raise thorny legal questions,”~~ ~~Deutsche~~
~~Welle, July 21, 2020. The United States has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though~~
~~it does recognize UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law. Greece and the ROC have ratified~~
~~UNCLOS; Turkey has not.~~
~~74 Sean Matthews, “Turkey, Greece look for calm Eastern Mediterranean summer,” Al Jazeera, June 2, 2021; Yannis~~
~~Palaiologos, “Mitsotakis, Erdogan agree to calm summer,” Ekathimerini, June 15, 2021.~~
~~75 Nektaria Stamouli, “Greece, Turkey to Restart Talks this Month,” politico.eu, January 11, 2021; Greek National~~
~~Security Advisor Thanos Dokos, “Greek National Security: An Assessment and Challenges,” Ekathimerini, January 25,~~
~~2021.~~
~~76 John Psaropoulos, “Cyprus’ reunification: What next after failed talks?” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2021. The U.N. Security~~
~~Council reaffirmed its support for “an enduring, comprehensive, and just settlement based on a bicommunal, bizonal~~
~~federation with political equality” in a resolution adopted on January 29, 2021 (UNSC Resolution 2561/2021).~~
~~77 “After another Cyprus talks collapse, Anastasiades walking away,” National Herald, May 3, 2021.~~
~~78 Dorian Jones, “Erdogan Calls for Two-state Solution on Cyprus,” Voice of America, July 20, 2021.~~
~~79 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting~~
~~MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020.~~
~~80 Ibrahim Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar: Foul-Weather Friends!” Defence Turkey, Vol. 14, Issue 98, 2020, pp. 34-47;~~
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between Turkey and Sunni Arab states come from a Turkish military presence at bases in Qatar between Turkey and Sunni Arab states come from a Turkish military presence at bases in Qatar
and Somalia.and Somalia.81
108 Libya represents another aspect of Turkey’s rivalry with these states. Turkey has played a Libya represents another aspect of Turkey’s rivalry with these states. Turkey has played a
prominent role in conflict in Libya since late 2019, when Turkish officials reached maritime prominent role in conflict in Libya since late 2019, when Turkish officials reached maritime
boundary and security agreements with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), which boundary and security agreements with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), which
was recognized at that time by the United States and the U.N. Security Council. Turkish military was recognized at that time by the United States and the U.N. Security Council. Turkish military
personnel then began providing advice and material support (including drone aircraft and Syrian personnel then began providing advice and material support (including drone aircraft and Syrian
mercenaries) to Islamist-friendly western Libya-based forces fighting against Khalifa Haftar’s mercenaries) to Islamist-friendly western Libya-based forces fighting against Khalifa Haftar’s
Libyan National Army (LNA) movement.Libyan National Army (LNA) movement.82109 Egypt, the UAE, Russia, and others Egypt, the UAE, Russia, and others ~~back~~ have backed Haftar’s Haftar’s
LNA movement. After a U.N.-brokered cease-fire was reached in October 2020, Libyans LNA movement. After a U.N.-brokered cease-fire was reached in October 2020, Libyans
approved a new Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2021.approved a new Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2021.
~~The~~ While the terms of the terms of the ~~Libyan~~ cease-firecease-fire ~~agreement~~ and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2570 call for and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2570 call for
all mercenaries and foreign fighters all mercenaries and foreign fighters to be withdrawn from Libya, Turkey has reportedly delayed taking action, perhaps partly because of concerns about the possible outcome of Libya’s scheduled December 2021 presidential election.110 Turkey’s involvement in Libya ~~to be withdrawn from Libya. U.S. officials view this~~
~~requirement as applying to all foreign forces, though Turkey asserts that its forces remain present~~
~~under the terms of its agreement with the previously sovereign GNA.83 At a June 2021~~
~~international conference on Libya, Turkey and Russia reportedly agreed to the gradual removal of~~
~~some of their respective Syrian proxy forces. Turkey appears reluctant to end its military~~
~~presence—presumably because of concerns about losing leverage—and may seek enduring~~
~~access to military facilities in western Libya.84~~
~~Turkey’s involvement in Libya has~~ increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the
Eastern Mediterranean and its rivalry with other states in the region. In 2021, Turkey has made Eastern Mediterranean and its rivalry with other states in the region. In 2021, Turkey has made
~~some attempts to improve ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, but prospects for~~
~~rapprochement with these states remain unclear.85 Turkey maintains diplomatic ties and~~
~~significant levels of trade with Israel, but Turkey-Israel relations have deteriorated significantly~~
~~during Erdogan’s rule.86~~
~~Outlook and U.S. Options~~
~~The future of U.S.-Turkey relations could depend on a number of factors, including:~~
~~ whether Turkey makes its Russian S-400 system fully operational and purchases~~
~~additional Russian arms;~~
~~ how various regional crises (Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern~~
~~Mediterranean disputes with Greece and Cyprus) develop and influence Turkey’s~~
~~relationships with key actors (including the United States, Russia, China, the~~
~~European Union, Israel, Iran, and Sunni Arab states);~~

~~“Qatar boosts support for Turkey’s regional forays,” The Arab Weekly, July 5, 2020.~~
81some headway in softening tensions with Sunni Arab governments, highlighted by a November 2021 103 John Psaropoulos, “Cyprus’ reunification: What next after failed talks?” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2021. The U.N. Security Council reaffirmed its support for “an enduring, comprehensive, and just settlement based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality” in a resolution adopted on January 29, 2021 (UNSC Resolution 2561/2021). 104 “After another Cyprus talks collapse, Anastasiades walking away,” National Herald, May 3, 2021. 105 Dorian Jones, “Erdogan Calls for Two-state Solution on Cyprus,” Voice of America, July 20, 2021. 106 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020. 107 Fehim Tastekin, “Turkey’s good relations with Qatar may not be enough for Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, December 8, 2021; Ibrahim Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar: Foul-Weather Friends!” Defence Turkey, vol. 14, issue 98, 2020, pp. 34-47. 108 Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar”; “Turkey to train 1/3 of entire Somali military, envoy says,” Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar”; “Turkey to train 1/3 of entire Somali military, envoy says,” Daily Sabah, August 4, , August 4,
2020. 2020.
82109 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, North and West
Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-
March 30, 2020, July 16, 2020. , July 16, 2020.
83110 Fehim Tastekin, “ Fehim Tastekin, “~~Turkey stalls on withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya~~Libya’s elections could hinge on Turkey’s next move,” ,” Al-Monitor, , ~~June 30, 2021.~~
~~84 “‘Step by step’ withdrawal of foreign fighters from Libya agreed in Berlin,” Arab Weekly, June 24, 2021; Fehim~~
~~Tastekin, “Turkey stalls on withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya,” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2021.~~
~~85 Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Turkey’s Erdogan woos Egypt, Gulf states in push to repair ties,” Reuters, June 1, 2021.~~
~~86 CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
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~~ whether Turkey can project power and create its own sphere of influence using~~
~~military and economic cooperation (including defense exports); and~~
~~ whether President Erdogan is able to maintain control in the country given its~~
~~economic problems and human rights concerns.~~
November 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief visit to Ankara by UAE de facto leader Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan and accompanying Turkey-UAE agreements on economic cooperation and investment.111 Prospects for broader regional rapprochement remain unclear, including with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.112 Turkey maintains diplomatic ties and significant levels of trade with Israel, but Turkey-Israel relations have deteriorated significantly during Erdogan’s rule.113 Outlook and U.S. Options The future of U.S.-Turkey relations could depend on a number of factors, including the following:  whether President Erdogan is able to maintain control in the country given its currency crisis and various human rights and rule of law concerns.  whether Turkey makes its Russian S-400 system fully operational and purchases additional Russian arms;  how various regional crises (Syria, Libya, Eastern Mediterranean disputes with Greece and Cyprus) develop and influence Turkey’s relationships with key actors (including the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Israel, Iran, and Sunni Arab governments); and  whether Turkey can project power and create its own sphere of influence using military and economic cooperation (including defense exports). Administration and congressional actions regarding Turkey can have implications for bilateral Administration and congressional actions regarding Turkey can have implications for bilateral
ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial
well-being. These actions could include well-being. These actions could include ~~placing conditions on arms sales, whether and how to~~
~~impose~~responding to Turkey’s late 2021 request to purchase and upgrade F-16s, evaluating and possibly changing CAATSA sanctions, assessing U.S./NATO basing options, and balancing relations with CAATSA sanctions, assessing U.S./NATO basing options, and balancing relations with
Turkey and its regional rivals. U.S. actions related to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 also could Turkey and its regional rivals. U.S. actions related to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 also could
affect U.S. relations with respect to other key partners who have purchased or may purchase affect U.S. relations with respect to other key partners who have purchased or may purchase
advanced weapons from Russia—including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. advanced weapons from Russia—including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
How closely the U.S. government might engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S. How closely the U.S. government might engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S.
perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor
might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations. might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations.
Support for Erdogan relative to other key domestic figures may hinge partly on national security Support for Erdogan relative to other key domestic figures may hinge partly on national security
and economic conditions and developments, and partly on ideological or group identity and economic conditions and developments, and partly on ideological or group identity
considerations stemming from ethnicity, religion, gender, and class. considerations stemming from ethnicity, religion, gender, and class.
111 Orhan Coskun, “Turkey, UAE sign investment accords worth billions of dollars,” Reuters, November 24, 2021. 112 “Erdogan's visit to Qatar to yield deals but no MbS meeting,” Reuters, December 6, 2021; “Erdogan says Turkey seeking to mend troubled ties with Israel,” Agence France Presse and Times of Israel, November 29, 2021. 113 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Congressional Research Service 16 ~~Congressional Research Service~~

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Appendix. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 82,482,383. Most populous cities (2020): Istanbul 15.2 mil, Ankara 5.1 mil, Izmir 382,482,383. Most populous cities (2020): Istanbul 15.2 mil, Ankara 5.1 mil, Izmir 3.0
mil, Bursa 2.0 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.7 mil. mil, Bursa 2.0 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.7 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% 23.4%
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 7%-12% (2016) Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 7%-12% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96. 96.27% (male % (male ~~98.8~~99.1%, female %, female ~~93.5%) (2017~~94.4%) (2019) )
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $ $~~30,049~~31,080
Real GDP Growth: ~~5.6%~~8.0% (2021), 3.3% (2022 proj.)
Inflation: ~~16.6~~18.9% %
Unemployment: ~~12.3~~13.0% %
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: ~~2.8~~3.1% %
Public Debt as % of GDP: 39. 39.64% %
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 2. 2.7%
International currency reserves: $88.4 bil ion
4% Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2021 Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2021
estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. .
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Figure A-2. ~~Exchange Rate: U.S. Dollar to Turkish Lira~~

Source: Reuters, July 15, 2021.

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~~Figure A-3. Bayraktar TB2 Drone~~

Bayraktar TB2 Drone Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Figure A-43. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS. Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS.
~~Notes~~Note: All locations are approximate. All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-54. Syria-Turkey Border

Source: CRS, using area of influence data from IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor. All areas of influence approximate CRS, using area of influence data from IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor. All areas of influence approximate
and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports. and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports.
Note: This map does not depict all U.S. bases in Syria. This map does not depict all U.S. bases in Syria.

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Figure A-65. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. , with slight modifications by CRS.
Congressional Research Service 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

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