Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress

Changes from August 12, 2021 to January 21, 2022

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Joint All-Domain Command and Control:
~~August 12, 2021~~January 21, 2022
Background and Issues for Congress
John R. Hoehn
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of
Analyst in Military Analyst in Military
its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the
Capabilities and Programs Capabilities and Programs
department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of

the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is
DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine

Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network.
DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two
different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines
the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic
would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to
work effectively, DOD is pursuing three new or emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, cloud work effectively, DOD is pursuing three new or emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, cloud
environments, and new communications methods. environments, and new communications methods.
Several agencies and organizations within DOD are involved in JADC2-related efforts. The following list highlights selected Several agencies and organizations within DOD are involved in JADC2-related efforts. The following list highlights selected
organizations and projects associated with JADC2 development: organizations and projects associated with JADC2 development:
  DOD Chief Information Officer: Fifth Generation (5G) Information Communications Technologies. Fifth Generation (5G) Information Communications Technologies.
  Office of the Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering): Fully Networked Command, Control, and Fully Networked Command, Control, and
Communications (FNC3). Communications (FNC3).
  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: Mosaic Warfare. Mosaic Warfare.
  Air Force: Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS).
  Army: Project Convergence. Project Convergence.
  Navy: Project Overmatch. Project Overmatch.
As DOD develops new methods to command and control military forces, Congress may consider several potential issues: As DOD develops new methods to command and control military forces, Congress may consider several potential issues:
 How can Congress consider JADC2-related activities in advance of validated requirements or cost  How can Congress consider JADC2-related activities in advance of validated requirements or cost
estimates? estimates?
  Without an official program or budget request, how much does DOD budget for JADC2?  What are JADC2 spending priorities, and are there initiatives DOD might not be investing in?  How can DOD ensure interoperability among each of the military services’ and allies’ communications How can DOD ensure interoperability among each of the military services’ and allies’ communications
systems? systems?
 How should DOD prioritize competing communications requirements for its future network?  How should DOD prioritize competing communications requirements for its future network?
 What role will artificial intelligence play in future command and control decisionmaking systems?  What role will artificial intelligence play in future command and control decisionmaking systems?
 What potential force structure changes will be necessary to meet JADC2 requirements?  What potential force structure changes will be necessary to meet JADC2 requirements?
 How should DOD manage JADC2-related efforts?  How should DOD manage JADC2-related efforts?

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Appendixes Appendix. Historical Example of Joint Interoperability: Joint Tactical Radio System ................. 22
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 23................. 25

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What Is JADC2?1
Joint Joint Al All-Domain-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Command and Control (JADC2) is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)
concept to connect sensors from concept to connect sensors from al all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps,
Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. ~~Traditional y~~Traditionally, each of the military services , each of the military services
developed its own tactical network, which was incompatible with those of other services (e.g., developed its own tactical network, which was incompatible with those of other services (e.g.,
Army networks were unable to interface with Navy or Air Force networks). With JADC2, DOD Army networks were unable to interface with Navy or Air Force networks). With JADC2, DOD
envisions creating an “internet of things” network that would connect numerous sensors with envisions creating an “internet of things” network that would connect numerous sensors with
weapons systems, using artificial weapons systems, using artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence algorithms to help improve decisionmaking.2 algorithms to help improve decisionmaking.2
DOD officials have argued that future conflicts may require leaders to make decisions within DOD officials have argued that future conflicts may require leaders to make decisions within
hours, minutes, or hours, minutes, or ~~potential y~~potentially seconds, compared with the current multiday process for analyzing seconds, compared with the current multiday process for analyzing
the operating environment and issuing commands.3 The unclassified summary of the National the operating environment and issuing commands.3 The unclassified summary of the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission’s report states that current C2 systems have “deteriorated” Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission’s report states that current C2 systems have “deteriorated”
against potential peer competitors.4 Similarly, the NDS identifies command and control systems against potential peer competitors.4 Similarly, the NDS identifies command and control systems
as a modernization priority.5 Congress may be interested in the JADC2 concept because it is as a modernization priority.5 Congress may be interested in the JADC2 concept because it is
being used to develop many high-profile procurement programs, as being used to develop many high-profile procurement programs, as ~~wel~~ well as determining how as determining how
effective and competitive the U.S. military could be against potential adversaries. effective and competitive the U.S. military could be against potential adversaries.
Figure 1. Conceptual Vision of JADC2

Source: https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/ew-c4i-channel/7334-saic-and-usaf-partner-for-jadc2.html. https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/ew-c4i-channel/7334-saic-and-usaf-partner-for-jadc2.html.

1 For a summary of JADC2 see1 For a summary of JADC2 see ~~CRS~~ CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11493, IF11493, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), by John R. , by John R.
Hoehn. Hoehn.
2 Jim Garamone, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” 2 Jim Garamone, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” DOD News,, November November
30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint -all-domain-command-control--all-domain-command-control-
framework-belongs-to-warfighters/. For a broader discussionframework-belongs-to-warfighters/. For a broader discussion of DOD’s efforts for Artificial Intelligence, see CRS of DOD’s efforts for Artificial Intelligence, see CRS
Report R45178, Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
3 For example, according to joint operational doctrine, military commanders plan air operations between 72 and 96 3 For example, according to joint operational doctrine, military commanders plan air operations between 72 and 96
hours in advance. Seehours in advance. See Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Joint Air Operations, JP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019, , JP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
4 See4 See Gary Roughead,Gary Roughead, Eric Edelman, et al., Eric Edelman, et al., Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy
~~Com m ission, The Assessm ent and Recom m endations~~Commission, The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy ~~Com m ission~~Commission, 2018 , p. 25, , p. 25,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
5 James Mattis, 5 James Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, Department of Defense, January 2018, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/, Department of Defense, January 2018, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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JADC2 envisions providing a cloud-like environment for the joint force to share JADC2 envisions providing a cloud-like environment for the joint force to share ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance~~intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to , and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to
enable faster decisionmaking (enable faster decisionmaking (seesee Figure 1).6 JADC2 intends to help commanders make better 6 JADC2 intends to help commanders make better
decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial
~~intel igence~~ intelligence algorithms to identify targets, and then recommending the optimal weapon—both algorithms to identify targets, and then recommending the optimal weapon—both
kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to engage the target. kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to engage the target.
DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end-state for DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end-state for
JADC2.7 Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the JADC2.7 Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the
respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance,
travel time, and passengers (among other variables). The application then provides directions for travel time, and passengers (among other variables). The application then provides directions for
drivers to follow to deliver passengers to their destination. Uber relies on drivers to follow to deliver passengers to their destination. Uber relies on ~~cel ular~~cellular and Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi
networks to transmit data to match riders and provide driving instructions. networks to transmit data to match riders and provide driving instructions.
Some analysts take a more skeptical approach to JADC2. They raise questions about its technical Some analysts take a more skeptical approach to JADC2. They raise questions about its technical
maturity and affordability, and whether it is possible to field a network that can securely and maturity and affordability, and whether it is possible to field a network that can securely and
reliably connect sensors to shooters and support command and control in a lethal, electronic reliably connect sensors to shooters and support command and control in a lethal, electronic
warfare-rich environment.8 Analysts also ask who would have decisionmaking authority across warfare-rich environment.8 Analysts also ask who would have decisionmaking authority across
domains, given that, domains, given that, ~~traditional y~~traditionally, command authorities are delegated within each domain rather , command authorities are delegated within each domain rather
than from an than from an ~~overal~~ overall campaign perspective.9 Some also question how much a human would be campaign perspective.9 Some also question how much a human would be
needed for JADC2 to make decisions in real time, and whether it is appropriate to reduce the needed for JADC2 to make decisions in real time, and whether it is appropriate to reduce the
amount of human involvement in military-related decisions. amount of human involvement in military-related decisions.
What Is Command and Control:
Dimensionality of C2 and Implications of Artificial Intelligence
One can view command and control through the context of the five questions: who, what, when, where, and how. One can view command and control through the context of the five questions: who, what, when, where, and how.
~~Traditional y,~~ Traditionally, Congress has focused on command and control through two different, yet related issues:Congress has focused on command and control through two different, yet related issues: authorities authorities
(the “who”) versus technology (the “how”). The first issue that Congress(the “who”) versus technology (the “how”). The first issue that Congress ~~has traditional y~~ has traditionally focused on reflects the focused on reflects the
authority a commander has to execute an operation.10 This lineauthority a commander has to execute an operation.10 This line of discussion focuses on the chain of command, of discussion focuses on the chain of command,
reflecting the differencesreflecting the differences between the militarybetween the military services—chargedservices—charged with organizing, training, and equipping U.S. with organizing, training, and equipping U.S.
forces—and the combatant commands, who have the authority to employ forcesforces—and the combatant commands, who have the authority to employ forces abroad. This issue can be abroad. This issue can be
summarizedsummarized by the question: “who commands forces?” by the question: “who commands forces?”
The second issueThe second issue represents the technical aspects that enable commandersrepresents the technical aspects that enable commanders to maketo make these decisionsthese decisions and transmit and transmit
them to the field. Termsthem to the field. Terms ~~like~~ like command, control, communications (C3), (C3), C3 plus computers (C4), and (C4), and ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance,~~ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) enter the discussion.11 This technical issue of command and control looks(ISR) enter the discussion.11 This technical issue of command and control looks at at
the data (and method of col ection)the data (and method of col ection) that commandersthat commanders use to makeuse to make decisions (i.e.,decisions (i.e., ISR is the data to enable ISR is the data to enable
decisionmaking),decisionmaking), the processing power to transform data into information,the processing power to transform data into information, and the systemsand the systems ~~that enable~~

that enable 6 Sydney J. Freedberg6 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “BuildingJr., “Building JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2021, , January 13, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/.
7 Rachel S.7 Rachel S. Cohen, “Want to Understand MDC2? Cohen, “Want to Understand MDC2? ~~T hink~~Think About Uber, USAF About Uber, USAF Official Says,”Official Says,” Air Force Magazine, ,
September 23, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/wantSeptember 23, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/want -to-understand-mdc2-think-about-uber-usaf-official-says/. -to-understand-mdc2-think-about-uber-usaf-official-says/.
8 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built 8 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built ~~T o Fight T he~~To Fight The Wrong War,” Wrong War,” Breaking Defense, January 14, 2021, , January 14, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/.
9 See9 See Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Joint Operations, JP 3-0, Washington, DC, January 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1 , JP 3-0, Washington, DC, January 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1
October 22, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-October 22, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-
910. 910.
10 For more information, see CRS 10 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10542, IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, by , by
Kathleen J. McInnis. Kathleen J. McInnis.
11 For detailed 11 For detailed definitions of each of these terms, see Department of Defense, definitions of each of these terms, see Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated ~~Term s~~Terms, Washington, DC, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. , Washington, DC, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
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commanders commanders to communicate their decisionsto communicate their decisions ~~to geographical y~~ to geographically distributed forces. distributed forces. This technical approach to This technical approach to
command and control can be summarizedcommand and control can be summarized as, “how do you command forces?” as, “how do you command forces?”
Other dynamics of command and control answer other questions: which systemsOther dynamics of command and control answer other questions: which systems and units are being commanded and units are being commanded
(what), the temporal(what), the temporal aspect (when), and geography (where).aspect (when), and geography (where). Congress has Congress has ~~historical y~~ historically expressed interestexpressed interest in each in each
of these questions in the context of specific, rather than general, issues.of these questions in the context of specific, rather than general, issues. ~~For~~ For example, rather than considering example, rather than considering
general purpose forces,general purpose forces, Congress has focused on issuesCongress has focused on issues regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with
special operations.12special operations.12 Command and control topics associated with quick response to nuclear and cyber Command and control topics associated with quick response to nuclear and cyber
operations,13 and to a limitedoperations,13 and to a limited extent in terms of electromagneticextent in terms of electromagnetic spectrum operations,14 have been other areas spectrum operations,14 have been other areas
where the issue of timelinesswhere the issue of timeliness has drawn congressionalhas drawn congressional attention. attention.
Regarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interestRegarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interest in command and control associated with quick response in command and control associated with quick response
to nuclear and cyber operations,15to nuclear and cyber operations,15 and to a limitedand to a limited extent in termsextent in terms of electromagneticof electromagnetic spectrum operations.16 spectrum operations.16
However,However, the greatest sensitivity on “when” appears to be morethe greatest sensitivity on “when” appears to be more ~~tactical y~~ tactically focused (e.g., when to have aircraft on focused (e.g., when to have aircraft on
target, when an assault on a building should begin); these decisionstarget, when an assault on a building should begin); these decisions are often delegated to commanders.are often delegated to commanders. ~~Final y,~~ Finally, the the
geographic component presents unique geographic component presents unique ~~chal enges~~challenges for commanding U.S. forces; as long as both the executive for commanding U.S. forces; as long as both the executive
branch and Congressbranch and Congress continue to support a global national security strategy,17 geographic decisions largely continue to support a global national security strategy,17 geographic decisions largely
representrepresent tactical issues that are often delegated to individual commanders. tactical issues that are often delegated to individual commanders.

12 For more information, see CRS12 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10521, IF10521, Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, by , by
Amy F. Woolf, and CRSAmy F. Woolf, and CRS Report RS21048, Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for
Congress, by Andrew, by Andrew ~~Feickert .~~
Feickert. 13 For more information, see CRS13 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10537, IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by, by Catherine A. Catherine A.
~~T heohary~~Theohary. .
14 Some analysts argue 14 Some analysts argue that spectrum management decisions willthat spectrum management decisions will ~~require~~ require increased speed to maintain communications increased speed to maintain communications
networks. networks. ~~T he~~The presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will require splitrequire split -second decisions to -second decisions to
allowallow bursts of communications to forces. bursts of communications to forces.
15 For more information, see CRS 15 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10537, IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by, by Catherine A. Catherine A.
~~T heohary.~~
Theohary. 16 Some analysts argue16 Some analysts argue that spectrum management decisions willthat spectrum management decisions will ~~require~~ require increased speed to maintain communications increased speed to maintain communications
networks. networks. ~~T he~~The presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will require splitrequire split -second decisions to -second decisions to
allowallow bursts of communications to forces. For example see U.S.bursts of communications to forces. For example see U.S. Army, “Artificial Intelligence Army, “Artificial Intelligence ~~impro ves~~improves Soldiers’ Soldiers’
electronic warfare userelectronic warfare user interface,” press release, October 8, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218705/interface,” press release, October 8, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218705/
artificial_intelligence_improves_soldiers_electronic_warfare_user_interface. artificial_intelligence_improves_soldiers_electronic_warfare_user_interface.
17 For a detailed discussion 17 For a detailed discussion on this issue,on this issue, ~~see CRS~~ see CRS Report R44891, Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
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Figure 2. Dimensionality of Command and Control and Implications of
Artificial Intelligence

Source: CongressionalCongressional Research Service. Research Service.
Figure 2 d~~epicts~~depicts how these issues how these issues are beginning to intersect through the introduction of artificial are beginning to intersect through the introduction of artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence (AI) (AI)
to optimize resultsto optimize results among the various dimensions.among the various dimensions. As formationsAs formations increase in increase in ~~complex ity~~complexity—particularly—particularly with with
formations designed for Joint formations designed for Joint Al All-Domain-Domain Operations—control ingOperations—control ing these forces could these forces could ~~potential y~~potentially surpass the surpass the
ability of human cognition, with algorithmsability of human cognition, with algorithms used to help manage these forces.used to help manage these forces. The U.S. militaryThe U.S. military has stated that it has stated that it
intends to keep humans involved throughout the decisionmakingintends to keep humans involved throughout the decisionmaking process,18process,18 but as U.S. forces introduce more but as U.S. forces introduce more
artificialartificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence technologies technologies into their decisionmakinginto their decisionmaking apparatus, distinctions among the dimensionsapparatus, distinctions among the dimensions begin to begin to
blur. For example, the “who” and “how” begin to look similar,blur. For example, the “who” and “how” begin to look similar, particularly as computers or algorithms make particularly as computers or algorithms make
recommendationsrecommendations to commanders,to commanders, who may not understand the information orwho may not understand the information or the process that produced the the process that produced the
recommendation.recommendation.
AI could also affect other aspects of command and control, including the “what,” “when,” and “where.” Combining AI could also affect other aspects of command and control, including the “what,” “when,” and “where.” Combining
the “what” and “where” elementsthe “what” and “where” elements ~~can chal enge~~ can challenge adversaries’ adversaries’ ability to find and engage U.S.ability to find and engage U.S. forces; doing so can forces; doing so can
also also ~~chal enge~~challenge commanders’ commanders’ and their staffs’ ability to maintain control of forcesand their staffs’ ability to maintain control of forces without systemswithout systems helping to helping to
manage the complexity.manage the complexity. From a “when” perspective,From a “when” perspective, operations requiring quick decisionmaking,operations requiring quick decisionmaking, particularly particularly
electromagneticelectromagnetic spectrum and/or cyber operations, could surpass humans’ decisionmakingspectrum and/or cyber operations, could surpass humans’ decisionmaking ability. This raisesability. This raises a a
significant question of how much commanders can trust AI and how significant question of how much commanders can trust AI and how ~~wel~~ well human operators wilhuman operators wil need to need to
understand why the AI systemunderstand why the AI system ~~recommends~~ recommends a particular action. a particular action.
Why Change Current C2 Structures?
DOD currently performs C2 using separate segments of the battle space—primarily along the DOD currently performs C2 using separate segments of the battle space—primarily along the
identified military domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. This structure exists because identified military domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. This structure exists because
traditional threats came from a single system, like aircraft and tank formations. In response, the traditional threats came from a single system, like aircraft and tank formations. In response, the
military developed highly sophisticated (but costly) sensors to military developed highly sophisticated (but costly) sensors to ~~surveil e~~surveille the battle space, the battle space,
providing information to a centralized command center (like an Air Operations Center or Army providing information to a centralized command center (like an Air Operations Center or Army
Command Post). Systems such as the E-3 Advanced Warning and Command System (AWACS) Command Post). Systems such as the E-3 Advanced Warning and Command System (AWACS)
and the E-8 Joint and the E-8 Joint ~~Surveil ance~~Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were optimized to provide Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were optimized to provide

18 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25, 18 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25,
2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-
intelligence-ethics/. intelligence-ethics/.
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situational awareness to commanders at these centralized outposts, where they could then direct situational awareness to commanders at these centralized outposts, where they could then direct
military forces.19 military forces.19
The future operating environment articulated by the NDS, the NDS Commission that reviewed it, The future operating environment articulated by the NDS, the NDS Commission that reviewed it,
and other sources describe how potential adversaries have developed sophisticated anti-and other sources describe how potential adversaries have developed sophisticated anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (seesee Figure 3).20 These capabilities include electronic 20 These capabilities include electronic
warfare, cyber weapons, long-range missiles, and advanced air defenses.21 U.S. competitors have warfare, cyber weapons, long-range missiles, and advanced air defenses.21 U.S. competitors have
pursued A2/AD capabilities as a means of countering traditional U.S. military advantages—such pursued A2/AD capabilities as a means of countering traditional U.S. military advantages—such
as the abilityas the ability to project power—and improving their ability to win quick, decisive engagements.22 to project power—and improving their ability to win quick, decisive engagements.22
Figure 3. Visualization of A2/AD Environment

Source: https://www.japcc.org/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/. https://www.japcc.org/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/.
Senior DOD leaders have stated that access to information Senior DOD leaders have stated that access to information ~~wil~~ will be critical in the future operating be critical in the future operating
environment.23 In addition, these leaders have stated that to environment.23 In addition, these leaders have stated that to ~~chal enge~~challenge potential peer adversaries, a potential peer adversaries, a
multidomain approach is required (in which U.S. forces would use ground, air, naval, space, and multidomain approach is required (in which U.S. forces would use ground, air, naval, space, and

19 Concepts like AirLand Battle emerged from this thinking. 19 Concepts like AirLand Battle emerged from this thinking. ~~T he~~The theory behind AirLand Battle was theory behind AirLand Battle was that the that the ~~Unite d~~United
States maintained an advantage in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities. DOD decidedStates maintained an advantage in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities. DOD decided to invest in to invest in
platforms like AWACSplatforms like AWACS ~~and JST ARS~~ and JSTARS (along with the long-range Army (along with the long-range Army ~~T actical~~Tactical Missile System [ Missile System [~~AT ACMS~~ATACMS]) to engage ]) to engage
Soviet tank reinforcements. David E. Johnson, Soviet tank reinforcements. David E. Johnson, The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-~~Dom ain~~Domain
Battle, RAND, RAND Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html. Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html.
20 See 20 See Gary Roughead,Gary Roughead, Eric Edelman, et al., Eric Edelman, et al., Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy
~~Com m ission, The Assessm ent and Recom m endations~~Commission, The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy ~~Com m ission~~Commission, 2018 , ,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
21 For more information on these systems, see CRS 21 For more information on these systems, see CRS In Focus IF11118, In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare,, by by John R. John R.
Hoehn; CRSHoehn; CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10537, IF10537, Defense ~~Prim er~~Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A. ~~T heohary~~Theohary; and CRS; and CRS In In
FocusFocus IF11353, IF11353, Defense ~~Prim er~~Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions, by John R. Hoehn. , by John R. Hoehn.
22 Jan van 22 Jan van ~~T ol~~Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, et al., F. Krepinevich, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/airsea-battle-concept. research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
23 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen Joseph Dunford, in U.S. Congress, 23 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen Joseph Dunford, in U.S. Congress, Senate Senate
Committee on Appropriations—Defense Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations—Defense Subcommittee, ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Budget Hearing , 115th Cong., 2nd sess., , 115th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 9, 2018. May 9, 2018.
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cyber forces to cyber forces to ~~chal enge~~challenge an adversary’s targeting calculus).24 The Joint an adversary’s targeting calculus).24 The Joint Al All-Domain Operations -Domain Operations
concept thus provides commanders access to information that can enable simultaneous and concept thus provides commanders access to information that can enable simultaneous and
sequential operations using surprise, and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities sequential operations using surprise, and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities
across across al all domains—thereby gaining physical and psychological advantages and influence and domains—thereby gaining physical and psychological advantages and influence and
control over the operational environment. control over the operational environment.
Technological advances since the development of the AirLand Battle Technological advances since the development of the AirLand Battle concept, which envisioned concept, which envisioned
combining the Air Force and Army’s efforts into a single plan to counter the Soviet Union in the combining the Air Force and Army’s efforts into a single plan to counter the Soviet Union in the
1980s, have enabled DOD to continue developing concepts for joint all-domain operations. Such 1980s, have enabled DOD to continue developing concepts for joint all-domain operations. Such
technological advances include an increased number of methods to engage a target (including technological advances include an increased number of methods to engage a target (including
electronic and cyber means), the proliferation of relatively low-cost sensors, and increased electronic and cyber means), the proliferation of relatively low-cost sensors, and increased
processing power to transform data from these sensors into information.25 This increased processing power to transform data from these sensors into information.25 This increased
complexity is designed to offer options for military commanders and complicate adversary complexity is designed to offer options for military commanders and complicate adversary
decisionmaking. The decisionmaking. The ~~chal enge~~challenge for maintaining control of for maintaining control of al all domain operations is that the U.S. domain operations is that the U.S.
military C2 apparatus is not organized to make these types of decisions,26 and the complexity and military C2 apparatus is not organized to make these types of decisions,26 and the complexity and
speed of the technology being used can exceed the ability of human cognition. speed of the technology being used can exceed the ability of human cognition.
How Has Command and Control Evolved?
The U.S. military’s The U.S. military’s traditional concept for command and control derives fromtraditional concept for command and control derives from the German military’s the German military’s
“auftragstaktik,” or mission-type orders.27“auftragstaktik,” or mission-type orders.27 Recognizing that disorder and the “fog of war” are inevitable in military Recognizing that disorder and the “fog of war” are inevitable in military
operations, subordinate commandersoperations, subordinate commanders were entrusted to operate semi-autonomouslywere entrusted to operate semi-autonomously to achieve their to achieve their
commander’scommander’s intent (i.e.,intent (i.e., the overarching goals of a mission) rather than having pre-scripted movements. the overarching goals of a mission) rather than having pre-scripted movements.
Information from Information from ~~intel igence~~ intelligence sources and reconnaissancesources and reconnaissance took a long time—hourstook a long time—hours ~~or potential y~~ or potentially days—to reach days—to reach
commanders.commanders. To maintain control of forces, commandersTo maintain control of forces, commanders ~~relied~~ relied on radio communicationson radio communications and paper and paper
correspondence.correspondence. The limitedThe limited amount of information available amount of information available ~~al owed~~allowed commanders commanders to direct forces across two to direct forces across two
dimensions—usingdimensions—using a single domain responding to adversary actions. a single domain responding to adversary actions.
At the height of the Cold War, Soviet forces presented a new problemAt the height of the Cold War, Soviet forces presented a new problem for militaryfor military forces: how to counter a forces: how to counter a
~~numerical y superior~~ numerically superior tank force.tank force. To counter this threat, the ArmyTo counter this threat, the Army and Airand Air Force proposed a novel approach that Force proposed a novel approach that
combined air and land power by developing new technologiescombined air and land power by developing new technologies to identify reinforcementto identify reinforcement locations.locations. This concept This concept
was known as AirLand Battle. This three-dimensionalwas known as AirLand Battle. This three-dimensional approach sought to use advantages in approach sought to use advantages in ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance,~~ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to “see deep” to direct firepowerand reconnaissance to “see deep” to direct firepower on reinforcementson reinforcements (i.e.,(i.e., “strike“strike deep”).28 Deep deep”).28 Deep
strikesstrikes would complementwould complement the ground forces’ ability to concentrate firepowerthe ground forces’ ability to concentrate firepower at critical places, limitingat critical places, limiting the the
adversary’sadversary’s quantitative advantages. To support this vision of using deep strikesquantitative advantages. To support this vision of using deep strikes to prevent fol ow-on forces,to prevent fol ow-on forces, the the
U.S. militaryU.S. military needed to improveneeded to improve command posts to increase the speed of decisionmakingcommand posts to increase the speed of decisionmaking to direct forces,to direct forces, while while
stilstil maintaining the tradition of fol owing commander’smaintaining the tradition of fol owing commander’s intent. This need resulted in the development of new intent. This need resulted in the development of new
systems,systems, ~~like~~ like the JSTARS and ATACMS.29 These systems enabled commandersthe JSTARS and ATACMS.29 These systems enabled commanders to gain a quicker understanding of to gain a quicker understanding of
the battle space and to improvethe battle space and to improve the responsethe response time to direct fires on enemytime to direct fires on enemy ~~forces.~~

~~24 CRS In Focus~~ forces. 24 CRS In Focus IF11409, IF11409, Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), by Andrew, by Andrew ~~Feickert~~ Feickert. .
25 For a discussion25 For a discussion on the needs to process data for Joint All-Domain Operations, see CRSon the needs to process data for Joint All-Domain Operations, see CRS Report R46389, Report R46389, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Design for Great ~~Power Com petition~~ Power Competition, coordinated by John R. Hoehn. , coordinated by John R. Hoehn.
26 For example, DOD doctrine states that military operations are controlled in each domain. 26 For example, DOD doctrine states that military operations are controlled in each domain. ~~T hus~~Thus, a land commander, , a land commander,
an air commander, and a maritime commander each develops their own operational plan based on of a Combatant an air commander, and a maritime commander each develops their own operational plan based on of a Combatant
Commander’s intent. Commander’s intent. ~~T hese~~These plans require substantial numbers of personnel, with minimal computer tools, and often plans require substantial numbers of personnel, with minimal computer tools, and often
requirerequire a person communicating via telephone to coordinate effects. See Department of Defense, a person communicating via telephone to coordinate effects. See Department of Defense, Joint Air Operations, ,
JP 3-30, Washington, DC, JulyJP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf. 25, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
27 Thomas~~27 T homas~~ J. Czerwinski, J. Czerwinski, “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, ,
vol. 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 121vol. 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 121 -132, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1788&-132, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1788&
context=parameters. context=parameters.
28 Maj 28 Maj ~~T homas~~Thomas Gill, “ Gill, “~~T he~~The Air Land Battle— Air Land Battle—~~T he~~The Right Doctrine For Right Doctrine For ~~T he~~The Next War,” Next War,” Global Security (1990), (1990),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/~~GT J~~GTJ.htm. .htm.
29 David E. Johnson, 29 David E. Johnson, The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle, RAND , RAND
Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html. Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html.
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Over the past 20 years, Over the past 20 years, China and Russia have observed the United States’ method of war, identifying asymmetric China and Russia have observed the United States’ method of war, identifying asymmetric
methods to methods to ~~chal enge~~challenge U.S. advantages. China’s military U.S. advantages. China’s military modernization, in particular, focuses on preventing the modernization, in particular, focuses on preventing the
United States fromUnited States from building large amounts of combat power (limiting logistics),building large amounts of combat power (limiting logistics), increasing risksincreasing risks for high-valued for high-valued
aircraft (tankers, spy planes, command and control aircraft), and increasing its naval footprint (limiting U.S. naval aircraft (tankers, spy planes, command and control aircraft), and increasing its naval footprint (limiting U.S. naval
advantages).30 To counter these new threats, DOD advantages).30 To counter these new threats, DOD ~~initial y~~ initially proposed the idea of using multidomainproposed the idea of using multidomain operations operations
(which has since transitioned into the term (which has since transitioned into the term al all-domain operations).). ~~DOD~~ DOD contends that using one or even two contends that using one or even two
dimensionsdimensions to attack an adversary is insufficient, and that to attack an adversary is insufficient, and that ~~chal enging~~challenging an adversary’s an adversary’s targeting calculus thus requires targeting calculus thus requires
moremore complex formations (additional dimensions).complex formations (additional dimensions). The increasing complexity,The increasing complexity, combined with combined with ~~potential y~~potentially
decreasing timesdecreasing times to respond to threats from emergingto respond to threats from emerging technologies, DODtechnologies, DOD argues, requiresargues, requires new methods to new methods to
manage forces. manage forces.
Figure 4. Changes in Complexity of Command and Control

Source: CongressionalCongressional Research Service. Research Service.
JADC2-Enabling Technologies
As DOD develops the JADC2 concept, three types of technologies play an integral role in this As DOD develops the JADC2 concept, three types of technologies play an integral role in this
approach to command and control military forces: automation, cloud environments, and approach to command and control military forces: automation, cloud environments, and
communications. communications.
Automation and Artificial Intelligence
Many senior DOD leaders have articulated that JADC2 is a concept (or perhaps a vision) rather Many senior DOD leaders have articulated that JADC2 is a concept (or perhaps a vision) rather
than any specific program. In a January 2021 article, Lieutenant General Michaelthan any specific program. In a January 2021 article, Lieutenant General Michael Groen, director Groen, director
of the Joint Artificial of the Joint Artificial ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence Center, stated that “JADC2 is not an IT [information Center, stated that “JADC2 is not an IT [information
technology] system ... it is a warfighting system…. technology] system ... it is a warfighting system…. ~~Historical y~~Historically, you would have a large defense , you would have a large defense
program, and you would spend years refining the requirements, and you would gather big, big program, and you would spend years refining the requirements, and you would gather big, big
bags of money, and then you would go to a defense contractor and spend more years building, bags of money, and then you would go to a defense contractor and spend more years building,
testing, and then testing, and then ~~final y~~finally fielding something years and years later.”31 In this article, Lieutenant fielding something years and years later.”31 In this article, Lieutenant
General Groen described the role of artificial General Groen described the role of artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence (AI),32 and by extension the role of data (AI),32 and by extension the role of data
and data structures, to enable these algorithms to inform commanders. According to Lieutenant and data structures, to enable these algorithms to inform commanders. According to Lieutenant
General Dennis General Dennis ~~Cral~~ Crall (director of the Joint Staff’s command, control, communications, and (director of the Joint Staff’s command, control, communications, and

~~30 Jan van T ol~~ 30 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich et al., F. Krepinevich et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/airsea-battle-concept. research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
31 Sydney J31 Sydney J ~~Freedberg~~ Freedberg Jr, “BuildingJr, “Building JADC2:JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2021, , January 13, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/.
32 32 ~~T his~~This report uses the terms report uses the terms artificial intelligence and and algorithm relatively interchangeably. Artificial intelligence relatively interchangeably. Artificial intelligence
combines many technologies—primarily databases, processors, and the algorithms themselves. In the context of combines many technologies—primarily databases, processors, and the algorithms themselves. In the context of
JADC2, the primary technological advancement of artificial intelligence, however, is its predictive nature, which is JADC2, the primary technological advancement of artificial intelligence, however, is its predictive nature, which is
derivedderived from the algorithm, or the approach to analyzing the data. from the algorithm, or the approach to analyzing the data.
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computers/cyber chief information officer [JS J6]), artificial computers/cyber chief information officer [JS J6]), artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence and machine learning are and machine learning are
essential to enable JADC2.33 Lieutenant General essential to enable JADC2.33 Lieutenant General ~~Kral stated~~
~~JADC2 is about automating all of it…. It is about taking advantage of that sensor-rich~~
~~environment—looking at things like data standards; making sure that we can move~~ Krall stated JADC2 is about automating all of it…. It is about taking advantage of that sensor-rich environment—looking at things like data standards; making sure that we can move this this
information into an area that, again, we can process it properly; bringing on cloud; bringing information into an area that, again, we can process it properly; bringing on cloud; bringing
on artificial intelligence, predictive analytics; and then undergirding thison artificial intelligence, predictive analytics; and then undergirding this with a network with a network
that can handle this, all domains and partners.34 that can handle this, all domains and partners.34
Cloud Environments
DOD has stated that having multiclassification cloud environments is necessary to enable DOD has stated that having multiclassification cloud environments is necessary to enable
JADC2. DOD envisions users being able to access information at different classifications based JADC2. DOD envisions users being able to access information at different classifications based
on their need to know and information requirements. At a June 2021 press conference, Lieutenant on their need to know and information requirements. At a June 2021 press conference, Lieutenant
General General ~~Kral~~ Krall said that cloud capabilities at the “tactical edge” are for data storage and said that cloud capabilities at the “tactical edge” are for data storage and
processing, enabling artificial processing, enabling artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence algorithms.35 As an example, the Air Force discusses algorithms.35 As an example, the Air Force discusses
the need for cloud environments for its Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) the need for cloud environments for its Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)
program—the Department of the Air Force’s contribution to JADC2, discussed below. According program—the Department of the Air Force’s contribution to JADC2, discussed below. According
to Air Force budget justifications the service states ABSM to Air Force budget justifications the service states ABSM ~~wil~~ will require a suite of cloud systems, require a suite of cloud systems,
applications (i.e., software), and networks (both commercial and government owned), which applications (i.e., software), and networks (both commercial and government owned), which
would “make sense of the environment and apply advanced algorithms aided by artificial would “make sense of the environment and apply advanced algorithms aided by artificial
~~intel igence~~ intelligence and machine learning.”36 and machine learning.”36
Communications
According to DOD, developing JADC2 would require new communications methods. DOD’s According to DOD, developing JADC2 would require new communications methods. DOD’s
current communications network has been optimized for operations in the Middle East.37 As a current communications network has been optimized for operations in the Middle East.37 As a
result, DOD uses result, DOD uses ~~satel ites~~satellites as the primary method to communicate with forces abroad. These as the primary method to communicate with forces abroad. These
systems face latency (time delay) issues and are not designed to operate effectively in the systems face latency (time delay) issues and are not designed to operate effectively in the
presence of electronic warfare.38 These older architectures rely on presence of electronic warfare.38 These older architectures rely on ~~satel ites~~satellites in geosynchronous in geosynchronous
orbits, which orbit approximately 22,200 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the earth. New orbits, which orbit approximately 22,200 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the earth. New
applications, like AI, applications, like AI, ~~wil potential y~~ will potentially require additionalrequire additional data rates that current communications data rates that current communications
networks might not be able to support—particularly as DOD increases the number of sensors to networks might not be able to support—particularly as DOD increases the number of sensors to
provide additionalprovide additional data to improve algorithms. The introduction of autonomous systems, such as data to improve algorithms. The introduction of autonomous systems, such as

~~33 T heresa~~ 33 Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says ~~JADC2~~ JADC2 Is A Strategy; Service Posture ReviewsIs A Strategy; Service Posture Reviews Coming,” Coming,” Breaking Defense, ,
January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-
coming/. coming/.
34 Ibid.34 Ibid.
35 Lauren C.35 Lauren C. Williams, “Williams, “ JEDI remains key to PentagonJEDI remains key to Pentagon'’s JADC2 dreams,” s JADC2 dreams,” FCW,, June 7, 2021, June 7, 2021,
https://fcw.com/articles/2021/06/07/jadc2-jedi-cloud-crall.aspx. https://fcw.com/articles/2021/06/07/jadc2-jedi-cloud-crall.aspx.
36 Air Force FY2022 Research, Development, 36 Air Force FY2022 Research, Development, ~~T est~~Test and Evaluation Budget Justification Volume and Evaluation Budget Justification Volume II, pII, p . 93, . 93,
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/~~RDT E_~~RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-
%20AF%20RDT%20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d#page=185%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d#page=185 . .
37 U.S.37 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to
~~Im prove Procurem ents~~Improve Procurements, GAO-15-459, July 17, 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671484.pdf. , GAO-15-459, July 17, 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671484.pdf.
38 38 ~~T raditional~~Traditional satellite communications rely on satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Having satellites stay in the same satellite communications rely on satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Having satellites stay in the same
spot in the sky (relative to earth) facilitates communications because the satellite location is known. However, these spot in the sky (relative to earth) facilitates communications because the satellite location is known. However, these
satellites orbit more than 22,000 miles above earth, increasing the amount of time (latency) for a radio transmission. satellites orbit more than 22,000 miles above earth, increasing the amount of time (latency) for a radio transmission.
MAJ AndrewMAJ Andrew H. Boyd, H. Boyd, Satellite and Ground ~~Com m unications System s~~Communications Systems: Space and Electronic Warfare Threats to the
United States ~~Arm y~~Army, Association of the U.S., Association of the U.S. Army, November 7, 2017, https://www.ausa.org/publications/satellite-and-Army, November 7, 2017, https://www.ausa.org/publications/satellite-and-
ground-communication-systems-space-and-electronic-warfare-threats-united. ground-communication-systems-space-and-electronic-warfare-threats-united.
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the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles and those resulting from the Army’s the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles and those resulting from the Army’s
growing interest in robotic vehicles,39 could need both secure communications and short latency growing interest in robotic vehicles,39 could need both secure communications and short latency
to maintain control of these systems. to maintain control of these systems.
Current JADC2 Efforts
The Joint Staff is the DOD organization responsible for developing the Joint The Joint Staff is the DOD organization responsible for developing the Joint Al All-Domain -Domain
Command and Control concept strategy. In addition, there are a number of ongoing studies and Command and Control concept strategy. In addition, there are a number of ongoing studies and
efforts connected to the JADC2 concept. Each of the military departments (Army, Navy, Air efforts connected to the JADC2 concept. Each of the military departments (Army, Navy, Air
Force), along with DOD agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Force), along with DOD agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and Office of the Undersecretary Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DARPA) and Office of the Undersecretary Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(OSD [R&E]), are developing technologies and concepts. The following sections briefly describe (OSD [R&E]), are developing technologies and concepts. The following sections briefly describe
selected organizations’ efforts. selected organizations’ efforts.
Joint Staff J6: JADC2 Strategy
The lead DOD organization tasked to develop a JADC2 strategy is the Joint Staff J6 directorate The lead DOD organization tasked to develop a JADC2 strategy is the Joint Staff J6 directorate
for command, control, communications, and computers/cyber.40 for command, control, communications, and computers/cyber.40 ~~Original y~~Originally envisioned to improve envisioned to improve
the joint force’s interoperability (e.g., making sure radio systems can communicate with one the joint force’s interoperability (e.g., making sure radio systems can communicate with one
another), the JADC2 strategy expanded this focus, developing an information-sharing approach another), the JADC2 strategy expanded this focus, developing an information-sharing approach
that enables joint operations by providing data for decisionmaking.41 In addition to developing a that enables joint operations by providing data for decisionmaking.41 In addition to developing a
strategy, the J6 organizes a JADC2 cross-functional team, through which the services and DOD strategy, the J6 organizes a JADC2 cross-functional team, through which the services and DOD
agencies coordinate their experiments and programs.42 This aligns with both the DOD Data agencies coordinate their experiments and programs.42 This aligns with both the DOD Data
Strategy and the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s efforts of creating a data advantage.43 The Strategy and the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s efforts of creating a data advantage.43 The
strategy has identified five lines of effort to enable the JADC2 framework:44 strategy has identified five lines of effort to enable the JADC2 framework:44
1. Data enterprise 1. Data enterprise
2. Human enterprise 2. Human enterprise
3. Technical enterprise 3. Technical enterprise
4. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) 4. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
5. Mission partner information sharing 5. Mission partner information sharing

39 For more information, see CRS39 For more information, see CRS Report R45757, Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45392, Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics
and ~~Autonom ous System s~~Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew , coordinated by Andrew
FeickertFeickert . .
40 Theresa~~40 T heresa~~ Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says ~~JADC2~~ JADC2 Is A Strategy; Service Posture ReviewsIs A Strategy; Service Posture Reviews Coming,” Coming,” Breaking Defense, ,
January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-
coming/. coming/.
41 41 ~~T heresa~~Theresa Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: ‘Do-Or-Die’ JADC2 Summit Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: ‘Do-Or-Die’ JADC2 Summit ~~T o~~ To Crunch Common Data Standards,” Crunch Common Data Standards,” Breaking
Defense, January 12, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-do-or-die-jadc2-summit, January 12, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-do-or-die-jadc2-summit -to-crunch--to-crunch-
common-data-standards/. common-data-standards/.
42 Theresa~~42 T heresa~~ Hitchens, “OSD & Joint Staff Grapple With Joint All-Domain Command,” Hitchens, “OSD & Joint Staff Grapple With Joint All-Domain Command,” Breaking Defense, November 14, , November 14,
2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/osd-joint-staff-grapple-with-joint-all-domain-command/. 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/osd-joint-staff-grapple-with-joint-all-domain-command/.
43 Department of Defense, 43 Department of Defense, Data Strategy: Unleashing Data to Advance the National Defense, September 30, 2020, at Defense, September 30, 2020, at
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-~~ST RAT EGY~~STRATEGY.PDF, and Deputy Secretary of .PDF, and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Kathleen Hicks memorandum, Defense Kathleen Hicks memorandum, Creating Data Advantage, May 5, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/, May 5, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/
May/10/2002638551/-1/-1/0/DEPUTY-May/10/2002638551/-1/-1/0/DEPUTY-~~SECRET ARY~~SECRETARY-OF-DEFENSE-MEMORANDUM.-OF-DEFENSE-MEMORANDUM.~~P DF~~PDF. .
44 44 ~~T elephone~~Telephone conversation between the author and Joint Staff J6, April 30, 2021. conversation between the author and Joint Staff J6, April 30, 2021.
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The Joint Staff J6 states that there The Joint Staff J6 states that there ~~wil~~ will be no single program or line item for JADC2.45 At a press be no single program or line item for JADC2.45 At a press
briefing on June 4, 2021, Lieutenant General briefing on June 4, 2021, Lieutenant General ~~Cral~~ Crall stated Secretary of Defense Austin had stated Secretary of Defense Austin had
approved the JADC2 strategy.46 approved the JADC2 strategy.46
OUSD Research and Engineering (R&E): Fully Networked
Command, Control, and Communications (FNC3)
According to OUSD R&E “FNC3 identifies, initiates, and coordinates research, development, According to OUSD R&E “FNC3 identifies, initiates, and coordinates research, development,
and risk reduction activities for key enabling technologies [for command, control, and and risk reduction activities for key enabling technologies [for command, control, and
communications]. These activities communications]. These activities ~~wil~~ will encompass distinct but interrelated efforts across the encompass distinct but interrelated efforts across the
defense enterprise, monitored and synchronized by FNC3 staff in OUSD(R&E).”47 Dr. Michael defense enterprise, monitored and synchronized by FNC3 staff in OUSD(R&E).”47 Dr. Michael
Zatman, the Principal Director for FNC3, describes the Zatman, the Principal Director for FNC3, describes the ~~overal~~ overall vision of FNC3 consisting of three vision of FNC3 consisting of three
layers—physical, networking, and application—which provide a tailored approach to developing layers—physical, networking, and application—which provide a tailored approach to developing
command, control and communications systems that aligns with the commercial sector’s best command, control and communications systems that aligns with the commercial sector’s best
practices.48 Both the physical and networking layers provide the communications infrastructure, practices.48 Both the physical and networking layers provide the communications infrastructure,
which connects a variety of applications. The physical layer represents the radios and transmitters which connects a variety of applications. The physical layer represents the radios and transmitters
themselves, while the networking layer manages the applications’ access to the physical layer by themselves, while the networking layer manages the applications’ access to the physical layer by
developing DOD-optimized versions of emerging commercial software defined networking developing DOD-optimized versions of emerging commercial software defined networking
techniques such as network slicing.49 techniques such as network slicing.49 Al All three layers are designed to increase interoperability and three layers are designed to increase interoperability and
resiliency (i.e., the ability to prevent the network from being jammed or disrupted) and provide resiliency (i.e., the ability to prevent the network from being jammed or disrupted) and provide
the appropriate quality of service for each application.50 the appropriate quality of service for each application.50 ~~Conceptual y~~Conceptually, example applications could , example applications could
be nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); ISR; a fire control mission; and be nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); ISR; a fire control mission; and
logistics. logistics.
According to Dr. Zatman, FNC3 serves as the mid- and long-term technical vision of JADC2,51 According to Dr. Zatman, FNC3 serves as the mid- and long-term technical vision of JADC2,51
while each of the services (outlined in the following sections) have high-profile efforts focused on while each of the services (outlined in the following sections) have high-profile efforts focused on
developing the near-term acquisition strategies. For example the Department of the Air Force’s developing the near-term acquisition strategies. For example the Department of the Air Force’s
Advanced Battle Management program is designed to be deployed within the next three years by Advanced Battle Management program is designed to be deployed within the next three years by
focusing on mature technologies. OUSD R&E leverages less mature technologies across its focusing on mature technologies. OUSD R&E leverages less mature technologies across its
portfolio—including technologies developed by DARPA, the Defense Innovation Unit, the portfolio—including technologies developed by DARPA, the Defense Innovation Unit, the

45 Ibid. 45 Ibid.
46 Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds46 Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” press release, June 4, a Press Briefing,” press release, June 4,
2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/~~T ranscripts/T ranscript~~Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2647056/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-/Article/2647056/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-
kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/. kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/.
47 OUSD 47 OUSD R&E FNC3R&E FNC3 Information Paper, April 28, 2021. Information Paper, April 28, 2021.
48 48 ~~T elephone~~Telephone conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, Principal Director Fully Networked Command, conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, Principal Director Fully Networked Command,
Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021. For more information on commercial best practices, see Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021. For more information on commercial best practices, see
ISO/IECISO/IEC 7498-1:1994 7498-1:1994 Information Technology–Open ~~System s~~Systems Interconnection–Basic Reference Model: The Basic
Model, at https://www.iso.org/standard/20269.html. , at https://www.iso.org/standard/20269.html.
49 OUSD 49 OUSD R&E FNC3R&E FNC3 Information Paper, April 28, 2021. For more information on network splicing see Peter Rost et Information Paper, April 28, 2021. For more information on network splicing see Peter Rost et
al., “Network Slicing to Enable Scalabilityal., “Network Slicing to Enable Scalability and Flexibility in 5Gand Flexibility in 5G Mobile Networks,” Mobile Networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, ,
May 2017. Rost et al. define network splicing “May 2017. Rost et al. define network splicing “ as a concept for running multiple logical networks as independent as a concept for running multiple logical networks as independent
businessbusiness operations on a common physical infrastructure.” For DOD this represents being ableoperations on a common physical infrastructure.” For DOD this represents being able to segment the network to segment the network
for different applications. for different applications.
50 Quality of service refers to measures affecting a network’s performance. 50 Quality of service refers to measures affecting a network’s performance. ~~T his~~This includes metrics like packet loss, bit includes metrics like packet loss, bit
rate, throughput, transmission delay, and availability. For more information see International rate, throughput, transmission delay, and availability. For more information see International ~~T elecommunication~~Telecommunication
Union (Union (~~IT U~~ITU) “Series E: Overall Network Operation, ) “Series E: Overall Network Operation, ~~T elephone~~Telephone Service, Service Operation, and Human Factors,” Service, Service Operation, and Human Factors,”
September 2008, at https://www.itu.int/rec/TSeptember 2008, at https://www.itu.int/rec/T -REC-E.800-200809-I/en. -REC-E.800-200809-I/en.
51 51 ~~T elephone~~Telephone conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, ~~P rincipal~~Principal Director Fully Networked Command, Director Fully Networked Command,
Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021. Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021.
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Strategic Capabilities Office, the services, and others—to provide the longer term technical Strategic Capabilities Office, the services, and others—to provide the longer term technical
means of implementing JADC2. means of implementing JADC2.
DOD CIO: 5G Technologies52
DOD has proposed that commercial advances in 5G wireless technologies provide the ability to DOD has proposed that commercial advances in 5G wireless technologies provide the ability to
transfer more data (commonly transfer more data (commonly ~~cal ed~~called data throughput) and lower latencies.53 DOD argues that it ) and lower latencies.53 DOD argues that it
requires these capabilities to process the increased amount of data from numerous sensors (e.g., requires these capabilities to process the increased amount of data from numerous sensors (e.g.,
~~satel ites~~satellites, aircraft, ships, ground-based radars), and to process this information at the “edge” (at , aircraft, ships, ground-based radars), and to process this information at the “edge” (at
the same site as the radio receiver). Another aspect of 5G technologies that could enable new the same site as the radio receiver). Another aspect of 5G technologies that could enable new
command and control concepts is dynamic spectrum sharing. As the electromagnetic spectrum command and control concepts is dynamic spectrum sharing. As the electromagnetic spectrum
becomes more congested, the federal government has started becomes more congested, the federal government has started ~~al owing~~allowing multiple users to operate multiple users to operate
on the same frequency band (known as spectrum sharing). The DOD CIO argues that spectrum on the same frequency band (known as spectrum sharing). The DOD CIO argues that spectrum
sharing technology sharing technology ~~al ows~~allows for communications systems to transmit and receive data in the for communications systems to transmit and receive data in the
presence of interference. In September 2020, DOD CIO issued a request for information to presence of interference. In September 2020, DOD CIO issued a request for information to
industry, on how to approach dynamic spectrum sharing. On January 21, 2021, 67 responses to industry, on how to approach dynamic spectrum sharing. On January 21, 2021, 67 responses to
the request for information had been posted.54 the request for information had been posted.54
DARPA: Mosaic Warfare
Mosaic Warfare represents a series of DARPA-sponsored projects designed to use AI to combine Mosaic Warfare represents a series of DARPA-sponsored projects designed to use AI to combine
systems and networks not systems and networks not ~~traditional y~~traditionally designed to interoperate. designed to interoperate. ~~Conceptual y~~Conceptually (se (see Figure 5), ),
these projects would be able to take raw these projects would be able to take raw ~~intel igence~~intelligence collected from a collected from a ~~satel ite~~satellite and turn that data and turn that data
into targetable information passed to a “shooter”—in this case, a cyber-weapon, electronic into targetable information passed to a “shooter”—in this case, a cyber-weapon, electronic
jammer, missile, aircraft, or any other weapon that might be able to affect the desired target.55 A jammer, missile, aircraft, or any other weapon that might be able to affect the desired target.55 A
second aspect of this approach uses AI-generated software to enable different radios to second aspect of this approach uses AI-generated software to enable different radios to
communicate with each other within an hour.56 A third aspect is a project devoted to airspace de-communicate with each other within an hour.56 A third aspect is a project devoted to airspace de-
confliction. Rather than relying on a number of specialized personnel to confliction. Rather than relying on a number of specialized personnel to ~~manual y~~manually identify the identify the
location and status of air assets, for example, DARPA software location and status of air assets, for example, DARPA software ~~automatical y~~automatically tracks this tracks this
information and relays it to commanders.57 As analysts Bryan Clark and Dan Patt of the Hudson information and relays it to commanders.57 As analysts Bryan Clark and Dan Patt of the Hudson
Institute explain, Mosaic Warfare “seek[s] to impose multiple overlapping dilemmas on enemy Institute explain, Mosaic Warfare “seek[s] to impose multiple overlapping dilemmas on enemy
forces that disrupt their operations and thus prevent them from reaching their objectives in forces that disrupt their operations and thus prevent them from reaching their objectives in
~~time.”58~~

time.”58 52 For an overview of DOD 5G initiatives, see CRS52 For an overview of DOD 5G initiatives, see CRS In Focus IF11251, In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth
Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. , by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
53 CRS53 CRS Report R45485, Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jill, by Jill C. C.
GallagherGallagher and Michael E. DeVine.and Michael E. DeVine.
54 “Defense Spectrum Sharing 54 “Defense Spectrum Sharing ~~Request~~ Request for Information,” Defense Information System Agency, updated January 21, for Information,” Defense Information System Agency, updated January 21,
2021, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/8f3f0321da074e75a588c8833265791d/view. 2021, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/8f3f0321da074e75a588c8833265791d/view.
55 55 ~~T elephone~~Telephone conversation between the author and conversation between the author and ~~T imothy~~Timothy Grayson, Director, Strategic Grayson, Director, Strategic ~~T echnology~~Technology Office, November Office, November
20, 2020. 20, 2020.
56 Currently, the only way for radio protocols not designed to communicate with one another to do so is to use56 Currently, the only way for radio protocols not designed to communicate with one another to do so is to use ~~a ra dio~~ a radio
gateway. gateway. ~~T his~~This new method would new method would replace physical infrastructure with software. Sydneyreplace physical infrastructure with software. Sydney J. FreedbergJ. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI Jr, “DARPA AI
BuildsBuilds ~~New~~ New Networks On Networks On ~~T he~~The Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to- Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-
reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/. reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
57 Sydney J. Freedberg 57 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI BuildsJr, “DARPA AI Builds ~~New~~ New Networks On Networks On ~~T he~~The Fly,” October 28, 2020, Fly,” October 28, 2020,
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
58 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built 58 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built ~~T o Fight T he~~To Fight The Wrong War,” Wrong War,” Breaking Defense, January 14, 2021, , January 14, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/.
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Figure 5. DARPA’s Vision of Mosaic Warfare

Source: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac-warfare. https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac-warfare.
One of DARPA’s MOSAIC programs, One of DARPA’s MOSAIC programs, ~~cal ed~~called the System-of-Systems Technology Integration Tool the System-of-Systems Technology Integration Tool
Chain for Heterogeneous Electronics Systems (STITCHES), has been used in Air Force and Chain for Heterogeneous Electronics Systems (STITCHES), has been used in Air Force and
Army experimentations. According to DARPA, STITCHES is software designed to rapidly Army experimentations. According to DARPA, STITCHES is software designed to rapidly
integrate communications systems across any domain by autonomously creating software integrate communications systems across any domain by autonomously creating software
~~al owing~~allowing for low latency and high throughput without upgrading hardware or modifying existing for low latency and high throughput without upgrading hardware or modifying existing
system software.59 According to an Air Force press release, the service has tested the technology system software.59 According to an Air Force press release, the service has tested the technology
in several Advanced Battle Management System “on-ramps” and has begun transitioning the in several Advanced Battle Management System “on-ramps” and has begun transitioning the
program from DARPA to the Department of the Air Force.60 program from DARPA to the Department of the Air Force.60
Department of the Air Force: Advanced Battle Management
System (ABMS)61
The Advanced BattleThe Advanced Battle Management System was Management System was ~~original y~~originally envisioned to replace the E-8 Joint envisioned to replace the E-8 Joint
~~Surveil ance~~Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).62 The Air Force transitioned the ABMS and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).62 The Air Force transitioned the ABMS
program in 2019 from developing things—like aircraft or radars—to a “Digital Network program in 2019 from developing things—like aircraft or radars—to a “Digital Network
Environment that connects warfighting capabilities across Environment that connects warfighting capabilities across al all domain, and every echelon, to domain, and every echelon, to

59 Defense Advanced59 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Research Projects Agency, “ Creating Cross-Domain Kill Webs in Real Creating Cross-Domain Kill Webs in Real ~~T ime~~Time: DARPA decision-: DARPA decision-
aidaid software, integration tool key to recent Advanced Battle Management System demo,software, integration tool key to recent Advanced Battle Management System demo, ” press release, September 18, ” press release, September 18,
2020, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-09-18a. 2020, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-09-18a.
60 Secretary of the Air Force Public 60 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Affairs, “ DAF completes Architecture Demonstration and Evaluation 5,” press DAF completes Architecture Demonstration and Evaluation 5,” press
release, July 28, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2711472/daf-completes-architecture-release, July 28, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2711472/daf-completes-architecture-
demonstration-and-evaluation-5/. demonstration-and-evaluation-5/.
61 For more information on ABMS, see CRS 61 For more information on ABMS, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11866, IF11866, Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), by John , by John
R. Hoehn. R. Hoehn.
62 62 ~~T he E-8 JST ARS was~~ The E-8 JSTARS was developed in the 1980s to counter Soviet tank threats, particularly the sodeveloped in the 1980s to counter Soviet tank threats, particularly the so -called second -called second
echelon (i.e., Soviet reinforcements). echelon (i.e., Soviet reinforcements). ~~T his~~This aircraft uses a synthetic aperture (with radar operators onboard) to identify aircraft uses a synthetic aperture (with radar operators onboard) to identify
potential targets. Operators onboard the aircraft then direct U.S. and alliedpotential targets. Operators onboard the aircraft then direct U.S. and allied aircraft to engage these targets.aircraft to engage these targets.
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achieve global decision advantage.”63 In other words, the Air Force pivoted from building a achieve global decision advantage.”63 In other words, the Air Force pivoted from building a
platform to support commanders and decisionmaking (like the E-8 JSTARS) to building a secure, platform to support commanders and decisionmaking (like the E-8 JSTARS) to building a secure,
“cloud-like” environment that provides commanders with near real-time data using AI and “cloud-like” environment that provides commanders with near real-time data using AI and
predictive analysis. According to the Air Force, the ABMS program predictive analysis. According to the Air Force, the ABMS program ~~wil~~ will develop capabilities develop capabilities
along six product lines: sensor integration, data, secure processing, connectivity, applications, and along six product lines: sensor integration, data, secure processing, connectivity, applications, and
effects integration.effects integration.
The Air Force has held three “on-ramps” (a term the Air Force uses to describe a demonstration) The Air Force has held three “on-ramps” (a term the Air Force uses to describe a demonstration)
to demonstrate its approach to ABMS.64 The first on-ramp, held in December 2019, demonstrated to demonstrate its approach to ABMS.64 The first on-ramp, held in December 2019, demonstrated
the service’s ability to transmit data from secure communications used by F-22s to Army and the service’s ability to transmit data from secure communications used by F-22s to Army and
Navy systems. The second on-ramp enabled an Army howitzer to shoot down a surrogate cruise Navy systems. The second on-ramp enabled an Army howitzer to shoot down a surrogate cruise
missile. In addition, the Air Force provided this “cloud-like” Zero Trust tablet—a security feature missile. In addition, the Air Force provided this “cloud-like” Zero Trust tablet—a security feature
where no sensitive data are stored on a device—to U.S. Northern Command to assist in its where no sensitive data are stored on a device—to U.S. Northern Command to assist in its
response to the COVID pandemic during the spring of 2020. response to the COVID pandemic during the spring of 2020.
In November 2020, the Department of the Air Force identified the Chief Architect Office in In November 2020, the Department of the Air Force identified the Chief Architect Office in
charge of evaluating architecture on-ramps and integrating enterprise digital architecture. At the charge of evaluating architecture on-ramps and integrating enterprise digital architecture. At the
same time, the Air Force identified the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilitiessame time, the Air Force identified the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office as Office as
the ABMSthe ABMS Integrating Program Executive Office. The Rapid Capabilities Office focuses on Integrating Program Executive Office. The Rapid Capabilities Office focuses on
quickly delivering programs to the field, and its involvement may be seen as moving ABMS from quickly delivering programs to the field, and its involvement may be seen as moving ABMS from
experimentation to system development. experimentation to system development.
Department of the Army: Project Convergence65
According to the Army, “Project Convergence is the Army’s new campaign of learning organized According to the Army, “Project Convergence is the Army’s new campaign of learning organized
around a continuous, structured series of demonstrations and experiments” designed to meet the around a continuous, structured series of demonstrations and experiments” designed to meet the
~~chal enges~~challenges posed by JADC2.66 Project Convergence comprises five components: posed by JADC2.66 Project Convergence comprises five components:
1. ensuring the Army has the right people and talent; 1. ensuring the Army has the right people and talent;
2. linking 2. linking current Army modernization efforts with Army Futures Command crosscurrent Army modernization efforts with Army Futures Command cross --
functional teams aligned to the six Army modernization priorities;67 functional teams aligned to the six Army modernization priorities;67
3. having the right command and control to meet increasingly fast-paced threats; 3. having the right command and control to meet increasingly fast-paced threats;
4. using AI to analyze and categorize information and transmitted across the Army 4. using AI to analyze and categorize information and transmitted across the Army
network; and network; and
5. testing capabilities 5. testing capabilities in the “most unforgiving terrain.” in the “most unforgiving terrain.”
Project Convergence 2020 utilized approximately 750 soldiers, civilians, and contractors across Project Convergence 2020 utilized approximately 750 soldiers, civilians, and contractors across
three military three military ~~instal ations~~installations, culminating in two live capstone demonstrations at Yuma Proving , culminating in two live capstone demonstrations at Yuma Proving
Ground, AZ.68 During this exercise, the Army demonstrated several technologies, including Ground, AZ.68 During this exercise, the Army demonstrated several technologies, including
artificial artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence, autonomy, and robotics, to test new methods to command and control , autonomy, and robotics, to test new methods to command and control

63 “Department of the Air Force Requirements Decision Memorandum for the Advance Battle Management System 63 “Department of the Air Force Requirements Decision Memorandum for the Advance Battle Management System
Strategic Requirements Document,” Department of the Air Force, DAFRDM 09Strategic Requirements Document,” Department of the Air Force, DAFRDM 09 -20-02, signed October 14, 2020, by -20-02, signed October 14, 2020, by
General John W. Raymond, U.S.General John W. Raymond, U.S. ~~Space~~ Space Force, and General Charles Q. Brown, U.S.Force, and General Charles Q. Brown, U.S. Air Force.Air Force.
64 U.S. 64 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020.
65 For more information see CRS65 For more information see CRS In Focus IF11654, In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew, by Andrew Feickert. Feickert.
66 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS66 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020.on October 15, 2020.
67 For more information on Army modernization priorities see CRS67 For more information on Army modernization priorities see CRS Report R46216, Report R46216, The Army’s Modernization
Strategy: Congressional Oversight Considerations, by Andrew, by Andrew Feickert and Brendan W. McGarryFeickert and Brendan W. McGarry . .
68 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS 68 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020. on October 15, 2020.
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~~geographical y~~ geographically dispersed forces.69 The Army plans to integrate Air Force and Navy systems as dispersed forces.69 The Army plans to integrate Air Force and Navy systems as
part of Project Convergence 2021, and intends to incorporate foreign militaries in Project part of Project Convergence 2021, and intends to incorporate foreign militaries in Project
Convergence 2022.70 The Army has requested a total of $106.8 Convergence 2022.70 The Army has requested a total of $106.8 ~~mil ion~~million for Project Convergence for Project Convergence
activities in FY2022.71 This breaks down to $33.7 activities in FY2022.71 This breaks down to $33.7 ~~mil ion~~million requested for Operations and requested for Operations and
Maintenance, Army appropriations, and $73.1 Maintenance, Army appropriations, and $73.1 ~~mil ion~~million for Research, Development, Test and for Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Army appropriations.72 Evaluation, Army appropriations.72
Department of the Navy: Project Overmatch
Project Overmatch is the Navy’s effort to create a “Naval Operational Architecture” to link ships Project Overmatch is the Navy’s effort to create a “Naval Operational Architecture” to link ships
to Army and Air Force assets. On October 1, 2020, Admiral Gilday, the Chief of Naval to Army and Air Force assets. On October 1, 2020, Admiral Gilday, the Chief of Naval
Operations, tasked a 2-star admiral to lead the Navy’s Project Overmatch effort.73 In his Operations, tasked a 2-star admiral to lead the Navy’s Project Overmatch effort.73 In his
memorandum, Admiral Gilday directed that Project Overmatch take an engineering and memorandum, Admiral Gilday directed that Project Overmatch take an engineering and
development approach similar to the Navy’s effort to develop nuclear power and the AEGIS development approach similar to the Navy’s effort to develop nuclear power and the AEGIS
system. The primary goal is “to enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal system. The primary goal is “to enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal
and nonlethal effects from near-and-far, every axis, and every domain. and nonlethal effects from near-and-far, every axis, and every domain. ~~Specifical y~~Specifically, you [RADM , you [RADM
~~Smal~~ Small] are to develop the networks, infrastructure, data architecture tools, and analytics.” In a ] are to develop the networks, infrastructure, data architecture tools, and analytics.” In a
~~paral el~~ parallel effort, Admiral Gilday tasked Vice Admiraleffort, Admiral Gilday tasked Vice Admiral Kilby, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Kilby, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, to develop a plan to incorporate unmanned for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, to develop a plan to incorporate unmanned
systems, including ships and aircraft,74 into the naval operational architecture.75 According to systems, including ships and aircraft,74 into the naval operational architecture.75 According to
press statements, the Navy intends to reach initial operating capabilities (i.e., being capable to press statements, the Navy intends to reach initial operating capabilities (i.e., being capable to
field the initialfield the initial systems) in 2023.76 The Navy requested funding for Project Overmatch in three systems) in 2023.76 The Navy requested funding for Project Overmatch in three
classified program elements in FY2022.77 classified program elements in FY2022.77
At the AFCEA At the AFCEA West Conference 2021 in June 2021, Admiral Gilday discussed Project West Conference 2021 in June 2021, Admiral Gilday discussed Project
Overmatch’s current efforts. At the event, Gilday stated that Project Overmatch had completed Overmatch’s current efforts. At the event, Gilday stated that Project Overmatch had completed
three spiral development cycles since the program’s inception in October 2020.78 Gilday further three spiral development cycles since the program’s inception in October 2020.78 Gilday further
explainedexplained “[w]e’re “[w]e’re ~~actual y~~actually experimenting in a way that experimenting in a way that ~~al ows us to essential y~~allows us to essentially pass any data on pass any data on
any network to the warfighter...any network to the warfighter... . It’s a software-defined communication system that It’s a software-defined communication system that ~~al ows us to~~

~~69 Jen Judson,~~ allows us to 69 Jen Judson, “Inside Project Convergence: How the US“Inside Project Convergence: How the US Army isArmy is preparing for war in the next decade,” preparing for war in the next decade,” Defense News, ,
September 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-September 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-
digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/. digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/.
70 CRS 70 CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11654, IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew, by Andrew Feickert. Feickert.
71 Email correspondence between the author and Army Futures71 Email correspondence between the author and Army Futures Command, JuneCommand, June 3, 2021.3, 2021.
72 $43.7 million of the RDT72 $43.7 million of the RDT &E request is&E request is allocated for All Domain Convergence Applied Research (Program Element allocated for All Domain Convergence Applied Research (Program Element
0602181A) and All Domain Convergence Advanced 0602181A) and All Domain Convergence Advanced ~~T echnology~~ Technology (Program Element 0603041A). Email correspondence (Program Element 0603041A). Email correspondence
between the author and Army Futures Command, July 7, 2021.between the author and Army Futures Command, July 7, 2021.
73 Memorandum from Admiral Gilday 73 Memorandum from Admiral Gilday to Read Admiralto Read Admiral ~~Douglas~~ Douglas Small,Small, Project Overmatch, October 1, 2020. , October 1, 2020.
74 For more information on the Navy’s approach 74 For more information on the Navy’s approach ~~t o~~to unmanned ships, see CRS unmanned ships, see CRS Report R45757, Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned
Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
75 Memorandum from Admiral Michael Gilday 75 Memorandum from Admiral Michael Gilday to Viceto Vice Admiral JamesAdmiral James Kilby, “Kilby, “ A Novel Force,” October 1, 2020. A Novel Force,” October 1, 2020.
76 Jason Sherman, “Navy eyes 2023 for initial delivery of Project Overmatch capability to fleet,” 76 Jason Sherman, “Navy eyes 2023 for initial delivery of Project Overmatch capability to fleet,” Inside Defense, ,
January 29, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/navy-eyes-2023-initial-delivery-projectJanuary 29, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/navy-eyes-2023-initial-delivery-project -overmatch-capability--overmatch-capability-
fleet. fleet.
77 Mark Pomerleau, “Classified 77 Mark Pomerleau, “Classified Navy JADC2 budgetNavy JADC2 budget plan has a few spendingplan has a few spending hints,” hints,” C4ISRNet, June 15, 2021, , June 15, 2021,
https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2021/06/15/part-4-classified-navy-jadc2-budget-plan-has-a-few-spending-hints/. https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2021/06/15/part-4-classified-navy-jadc2-budget-plan-has-a-few-spending-hints/.
78 Aidan Quigley, 78 Aidan Quigley, “Gilday:“Gilday: Project Overmatch progressing well towardProject Overmatch progressing well toward strike group testing,” strike group testing,” Inside Defense, June, June 30, 30,
2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gilday-project2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gilday-project -overmatch-progressing-well-toward-strike-group-testing. -overmatch-progressing-well-toward-strike-group-testing.
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~~essential y unpack al~~ essentially unpack all of our networks in a way we never have before.”79 According to news of our networks in a way we never have before.”79 According to news
coverage, Gilday stated that he anticipated scaling Project Overmatch testing to a carrier strike coverage, Gilday stated that he anticipated scaling Project Overmatch testing to a carrier strike
group either in late 2022 or early 2023.80 group either in late 2022 or early 2023.80
Potential Issues for Congress
The following sections discuss potential issues for Congress, including requirements and cost The following sections discuss potential issues for Congress, including requirements and cost
estimates, interoperability estimates, interoperability ~~chal enges~~challenges, balancing communications capabilities, the role of AI in , balancing communications capabilities, the role of AI in
decisionmaking, and potential force structure changes needed to implement JADC2. decisionmaking, and potential force structure changes needed to implement JADC2.
Requirements and Cost Estimates
DOD has requested funding for JADC2-related efforts for several fiscal years, in particular during DOD has requested funding for JADC2-related efforts for several fiscal years, in particular during
the concept’s early stages of development. DOD is actively developing a JADC2 strategy, which the concept’s early stages of development. DOD is actively developing a JADC2 strategy, which
is expected to be released by the spring of 2021.81 Some in Congress have expressed concern that is expected to be released by the spring of 2021.81 Some in Congress have expressed concern that
DOD has not provided cost estimates or validated requirements in the manner that a traditional DOD has not provided cost estimates or validated requirements in the manner that a traditional
acquisition program might.82 As a result, the armed services committees and the appropriations acquisition program might.82 As a result, the armed services committees and the appropriations
committees have reduced the requested funding for these efforts, committees have reduced the requested funding for these efforts, ~~especial y~~especially for ABMS and 5G for ABMS and 5G
research and development.83 The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required research and development.83 The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required
DOD to produce requirements for JADC2 by April 2021.84 DOD to produce requirements for JADC2 by April 2021.84
~~Interoperability Challenges~~
~~As DOD envisions using JADC2 to command forces in multiple domains simultaneously, the~~
~~need to connect different types of forces increases. DOD owns and operates many~~
~~communications systems, each using different radio frequencies, standards, and datalinks.85 These~~
~~systems are often unable to “talk” with each other and therefore require a gateway to “translate”~~
~~from one radio protocol to another. The inclusion of al ies and partners increases interoperability~~
~~chal enges. Former Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in his March 2020 testimony to~~
~~the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intel igence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities,~~
~~identified this issue as justification to continue pursuing the OSD R&E efforts for FNC3.86~~
~~The chal enge of enabling DOD to share information from different services and units could be~~
~~solved by three approaches to interoperability:~~

~~79 Ibid.~~
~~80 Adian Quigley, “Gilday: Project Overmatch progressing well toward strike group testing,” Inside Defense, June 30,~~
~~2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gilday-project -overmatch-progressing-well-toward-strike-group-testing.~~
~~81 T heresa Hitchens, “CJCS Gen. Milley Reviews JADC2~~ Potential DOD Funding Levels of JADC2 DOD has not officially released budgetary data regarding how much it spends on JADC2, which is funded in a number of programs across the military services and defense agencies. According to the Joint Staff J6 (JS J6), JADC2 is not a program of record, nor does the JS J6 intend to transition to a program of record. It therefore may be unlikely that DOD will provide a detailed overview of JADC2 funding unless Congress requires the department to do so.85 Some analysts have speculated on the annual cost for the totality of JADC2-related programs. One analyst has estimated that DOD budgeted approximately $1.2 billion in FY2022 for programs directly related to JADC2.86 Govini has estimated that DOD has spent approximately $22.5 billion on JADC2 since FY2017;87 this averages to approximately $4.5 billion annually. 79 Ibid. 80 Adian Quigley, “Gilday: Project Overmatch progressing well toward strike group testing,” Inside Defense, June 30, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gilday-project-overmatch-progressing-well-toward-strike-group-testing. 81 Theresa Hitchens, “CJCS Gen. Milley Reviews JADC2 Strategy While Industry Jostles For Position,” February 24, Strategy While Industry Jostles For Position,” February 24,
2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/cjcs-gen-milley-reviews-jadc2-strategy-while-industry-jostles-for-position/. 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/cjcs-gen-milley-reviews-jadc2-strategy-while-industry-jostles-for-position/.
82 P.L. 116-283 §157. 82 P.L. 116-283 §157.
83 P.L. 116-283. 83 P.L. 116-283.
84 P.L. 116-283 §157. 84 P.L. 116-283 §157.
85 85 ~~For more discussion on this issue, see CRS Report R46564,~~ ~~Overview of Department of Defense Use of the~~
~~Electrom agnetic Spectrum~~ ~~, by John R. Hoehn, Jill C. Gallagher, and Kelley M. Sayler .~~
~~86 T estimony of Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee~~
~~for Intelligence, Emerging T hreats, and Capabilities, FY2020 Science and Technology Posture Hearing , 116th Cong.,~~
~~2nd sess., March 11, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110655/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-~~
~~GriffinM-20200311.pdf.~~
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~~ Procure gateways. Communications gateways (perhaps more aptly cal ed~~
~~“translators”) can receive multiple protocols, security levels, et cetera, and~~
~~rebroadcast this information to the rest of the force.87 The ABMS program has~~
~~developed such gateways (see Figure 6) to enable communications.88 This~~
~~approach al ows for information sharing, potential y reducing the cost of~~
~~development because the gateway can be a subsystem of an aircraft/ship/ground~~
~~system, potential y capable of being fielded relatively quickly. The chal enge~~
~~with this approach is that such gateways may not be using the most advanced,~~
~~and therefore protected, waveforms to rebroadcast to the force.~~
~~Figure 6. E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN)~~

Source: https://www.janes.com/amp/usaf-to-buy-more-bacn/ZnlJK3dHVU9mZ28xajRJVkc5dVI5VFp1cVMwPQ2.
~~ Procure new communications equipment. This approach uses a “top-down”~~
~~approach (i.e., where either OSD or the Joint Staff identifies the solution and then~~
~~requires the military services to adopt it). Using a similar model to the Joint~~
~~Tactical Radio System (JTRS) development,89 this option would purchase a new~~
~~communications architecture focusing on interoperability. For example, the~~
~~FNC3 effort appears to use this approach. Although this approach could ensure~~
~~that the joint force develops communications systems that can share information~~
~~seamlessly, and potential y in a secure fashion, it could require large investments~~
~~and might encounter schedule delays. Another possible disadvantage of this~~
~~approach is that as systems are fielded, they may not be as effective against~~
~~adversary technologies.~~
~~ Develop software to create networks. A third approach is to use software that~~
~~enables users to create customized networks. DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare and~~
~~some aspects of the ABMS program are examples of this approach.90 More~~

~~87 T his capability is best demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force’s Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN).~~
~~88 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020.~~
~~89 JT RS was a radio program intended to replace all of the radio systems used by the Department of Defense. For more~~
~~information, see the Appe ndix.~~
~~90 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020, and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI~~
~~Builds New Networks On T he Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-~~
~~reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.~~
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~~modular than other interoperability solutions, this approach enables units and~~
~~systems tailored to a specific operation to communicate with one another. A~~
~~primary risk to this approach is the technical immaturity, specifical y advances in~~
~~software, used to create these networks. Another risk concerns the amount and~~
~~classification of information shared with different systems certified for different~~
~~levels of classification (e.g., Secret Releasable, Secret Nonreleasable, Top~~
~~Secret).~~
~~DOD and Congress may select one or more of these approaches. One particular approach may~~
~~offer short-term benefits while DOD pursues a longer-term approach to solve the interoperability~~
~~chal enge.~~
~~Balancing Communications Capabilities in a Degraded~~
~~Environment~~
~~DOD’s approach to developing communications networks to meet JADC2 requirements~~
~~incorporates three competing capabilities:~~
~~ data throughput (i.e., the rate at which data can be transported),~~
~~ latency (i.e., the time delay in receiving a message/data), and~~
~~ resiliency (the ability to maintain a communications signal in the event of~~
~~disruption by natural or intentional sources).91~~
~~The rise of new technologies for military operations, such as artificial intel igence, tactical~~
~~datalinks (like Link 16 and Multifunction Advanced Data Link [MADL]), and adversary~~
~~electronic warfare capabilities, presents distinct chal enges in balancing these capabilities for~~
~~future communications systems like 5G and FNC3. AI and information operations could~~
~~potential y require substantial data to enable predictive analytics and give commanders an~~
~~accurate picture of the battle space. Datalinks, which share data with al available users, do not~~
~~necessarily require high data rates; however, datalinks do need low latency to ensure that sensors~~
~~can prove “target-level data,” particularly for fast-moving systems like cruise missiles and~~
~~aircraft. Final y, the proliferation of electronic jammers requires resilience (or anti-jam properties)~~
~~to maintain communications while being actively jammed. Figure 7 il ustrates how these three~~
~~competing requirements must be balanced to develop a new waveform (regardless if the~~
~~waveform is designed for civilian or military applications).92 Radio signals are able to offer each~~
~~capability; however, prioritizing one requirement means that the other two requirements may~~
~~suffer, potential y creating a dilemma for policymakers in terms of which capabilities to prioritize~~
~~in acquisition.~~

~~91 For example, see Department of Homeland Security, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” press release,~~
~~2017, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/first-responder-electronic-jamming-exercise#:~:text=~~
~~DHS%20S%26T %20works%20to%20combat,jamming%20threats%20and%20reporting%20channels; Youness~~
~~Arjoune and Saleh Faruque, “Smart Jamming Attacks in 5G New Radio: A Review,” Las Vegas, NV, January 8, 2020,~~
~~https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9031175; and Hossein Pirayesh and Huacheng Zeng, “ Jamming Attacks and Anti-~~
~~Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” January 1, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/~~
~~2101.00292.~~
~~92 Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of the radio from the user ’s~~
~~perspective.~~
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~~Figure 7. Balancing Communications Requirements~~

Source: Congressional Research Service.
~~As DOD modernizes its communications systems, it may consider technology features and~~
~~limitations to select requirements that advance mission goals while protecting the security of its~~
~~networks. For example, technologies like 5G can offer high data capacity and low latency, but it~~
~~is unclear how these signals may be affected by adversary jamming. FNC3, on the other hand,~~
~~appears to be designed to provide resiliency with high data rates; however, because it relies on~~
~~satel ites, latency wil increase.~~
~~Role of Artificial Intelligence in Decisionmaking93~~
~~AI represents a potential y critical component to enabling JADC2. As AI is introduced into~~
~~military decisionmaking, several potential issues arise. First, to what degree should artificial~~
~~intel igence play in decisionmaking? At what appropriate level is human judgement required~~
~~when using lethal weapons?94~~
~~Second, how does DOD ensure the security of the data being used for AI algorithms to assist~~
~~decisionmaking? Although DOD has focused on the data structures,95 it has not discussed how it~~
~~plans to ensure data validity and security for JADC2 specifical y. Erroneous data could cause~~
~~commanders to select options that compromise mission objectives (such as algorithms~~
~~recommending targets that might waste high-value munitions). Relatedly, how does DOD intend~~
~~to secure these data in cloud environments to prevent adversaries from manipulating them? Are~~
~~these security plans sufficient to prevent adversary manipulation?~~
~~Potential Force Structure Changes~~
~~Because JADC2 potential y requires different types of forces and weapons systems, each of the~~
~~military services may look to change how it trains, organizes, and equips its forces. For example,~~
~~the Marine Corps, in its force redesign, announced that it would eliminate units it determines are~~
~~not aligned with National Defense Strategy guidance, and would reinvest the funding into other~~

~~93 For a broader discussion of artificial intelligence and its role in national security, see CRS Report R45178,~~ ~~Artificial~~
~~Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~94 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25,~~
~~2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-~~
~~intelligence-ethics/.~~
~~95 T heresa Hitchens, “OSD, Joint Staff Double Down On DoD-Wide Data Standards,” Breaking Defense, February 10,~~
~~2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/exclusive-jadc2-data-summits-will-drive-dod-standards-requirements/.~~
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~~programs that better fit the future operating environment.96 Similarly, the Navy’s Project~~
~~Overmatch looks to potential y change the number and types of ships the service fields.~~
~~The balance of capabilities that reside in the active and reserve components is another aspect of~~
~~force structure changes. For instance, the Army historical y has decided to transfer logistics~~
~~capabilities from the active component to the reserve components.97 Thus, if the United States~~
~~were to go to war, the Army would presumably need to activate reserve forces to enable~~
~~operations. As DOD and military services prepare to meet the chal enges presented by JADC2,~~
~~how would these organizations choose to balance capabilities and force structures between active~~
~~and reserve components?~~
~~Management of JADC2 Efforts~~
~~The Joint Staff J6 is the lead coordinator for DOD’s JADC2 efforts, with each of the services and~~
~~a number of DOD agencies performing various activities. Some in Congress, in the past, have~~
~~expressed an interest in creating DOD-wide program offices (such as the F-35 Joint Program~~
~~Office) to centralize management of large-scale efforts.98 It appears that DOD research and~~
~~development efforts wil increase over time, and that, as a result, managing these efforts may~~
~~become more chal enging. Congress may, in the future, seek to identify or create an organization~~
~~charged with program management, development of network architecture, and financial~~
~~management.~~

~~96 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert .~~
~~97 CRS Report R43808,~~ ~~Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Co nsiderations and~~
~~Options for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp .~~
~~98 For more information on the background of the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563,~~ ~~F-35 Joint Strike Fighter~~
~~(JSF) Program~~ ~~, by Jeremiah Gertler. For an example of a joint communications program intended to achieve similar~~
~~results to JADC2, see the Appe ndix.~~
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~~Appendix. Historical Example of Joint~~
~~Interoperability: Joint Tactical Radio System99~~
~~The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was a communications program intended to improve~~
~~communications interoperability by fielding radios across al of the military services. The~~
~~program was started in the mid-1990s and was ultimately canceled in 2011 by former Under~~
~~Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall.100 In his~~
~~justification notification, Under Secretary Kendall noted that “the technical chal enges of mobile~~
~~ad hoc networks and scalability were not wel understood due to the immaturity of technology at~~
~~the time ... it is unlikely that products resulting from the JTRS GMR [Ground Mobile Radio]~~
~~development program affordably meet Service requirements.” Over the course of the 15-year~~
~~development effort, DOD spent approximately $15 bil ion, requiring an additional $13 bil ion at~~
~~termination.101~~
~~The JTRS program was intended to replace the 25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the~~
~~military—many of which could not communicate with each other—with software-based radios~~
~~that could operate across much of the radio frequency spectrum.102 JTRS was envisioned to~~
~~enable the services to operate together, along with selected allied nations, in a “seamless” manner~~
~~via wireless voice, video, and data communications through al levels of command, including~~
~~direct access to near real-time information from airborne and battlefield sensors.103 Described as a~~
~~“software-defined radio,” JTRS would have functioned more like a computer than a conventional~~
~~radio; for example, it would have been upgraded and modified to operate with other~~
~~communications systems by the addition of software, as opposed to redesigning hardware—a~~
~~more costly and time-consuming process. DOD asserted that in “many cases, a single JTRS radio~~
~~with multiple waveforms can replace many separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that~~
~~because JTRS is “software programmable, they wil also provide a longer functional life,” with~~
~~both features offering potential long-term cost savings.104 The JTRS program was original y~~
~~broken into five “clusters,” with each cluster having a particular service “lead” (see Table A-1)~~
~~and a Joint Program Office managing the overal architecture.~~

~~99 T his section is derived from CRS Report RL33161,~~ ~~The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future~~
~~Com bat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert .~~
~~100 Memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendell to Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon,~~ ~~JTRS~~
~~Cancellation Notification, October 13, 2011, https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/101411bb1.pdf.~~
~~101 Bob Brewin, “Pentagon shutters Joint T actical Radio System program office,” Nextgov, August 1, 2012,~~
~~https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2012/08/pentagon-shutters-joint-tactical-radio-system-program-office/~~
~~57173/.~~
~~102 Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JT RS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31.~~
~~103 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of~~
~~Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked Communications~~
~~Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9. Peter A. Buxbaum, “ Jitters Over JT RS,”~~
Arm ed Forces Journal, July 2005, pp. 31-33.
~~104 DOD pamphlet on JT RS published by the JT RS Joint Program Office, undated.~~
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~~Table A-1. JTRS Clusters~~
~~Cluster~~
~~One~~
~~Two~~
~~Three~~
~~Four~~
~~Five~~
~~Description~~
~~Ground~~
~~Hand-held~~
~~Fixed-site~~
~~High-~~
~~Handheld,~~
~~vehicle and~~
~~radios~~
~~and maritime~~
~~performance~~
~~dismounted,~~
~~helicopter~~
~~radios~~
~~aircraft (fixed and Smal~~
~~radios~~
~~wing) radios~~
~~Form Factora~~
~~radios~~
~~Service~~
~~U.S. Army~~
~~U.S. Special~~
~~U.S. Navy~~
~~U.S. Air~~
~~U.S. Army~~
~~Lead~~
~~Operations~~
~~Force~~
~~Command~~
~~(USSOCOM)~~
Source: Reproduced from CRS Report RL33161, ~~The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future~~
~~Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.~~
Note: Form factor radios are essential y miniaturized radios that soldiers would carry, as wel as radios for
~~weight- and power-constrained platforms.~~
~~As discussed below, JTRS experienced a number of difficulties during development. These issues~~
~~may be relevant for future JADC2 development.~~
~~Size and Weight Constraints and Limited Range~~
~~According to a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report~~
~~To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,105 including~~
~~transmission range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amoun ts of memory and~~
~~processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The~~
~~added size and weight are the results of efforts to ensure the electronic parts in the radio~~
~~are not overheated by the electricity needed to power the additional memory and~~
~~processing. Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size,~~
~~weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three~~
~~kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking~~
~~Waveform…. The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power consumption exceeds~~
~~helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 percent.106~~
~~The inability to meet these fundamental design and performance standards raised concerns that~~
~~Cluster One may not have been able to accommodate additional waveforms as intended (the plan~~
~~was for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms) and that it may be too bulky or~~
~~heavy to fit into the stringently weight- and size-constrained Future Combat System (FCS)~~
~~Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs),107 as wel as the Army’s helicopter fleet. Some observers were~~
~~concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the Army would significantly “dumb down”~~

~~105 T he Wideband Networking Waveform is described as the core of the JT RS networking capability and is intended to~~
~~operate across a wide range of the radio frequency spectrum, from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz), and~~
~~would provide increased routing and networking capability —as much as a hundred times more than existing~~
~~communications systems.~~
~~106 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of~~
~~Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked Communications~~
~~Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.~~
~~107 FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs) are envisioned as a family of eight different combat vehicles—with some~~
~~having more than one variation—based on a common platform and designed to be transported by U.S. Air Force~~
~~transport aircraft and deployed directly into combat with little or no post -flight reconfiguration. MGVs would be~~
~~equipped with various passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same~~
~~survivability as the current heavy armor force.~~
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~~Cluster One performance specifications.108 According to the Army, however, it made progress in~~
~~terms of reducing Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range;~~
~~however, incorporating al of the desired waveforms into Cluster One proved to be difficult.109~~
~~Cluster Five radios also reportedly experienced similar size, weight, and power difficulties; these~~
~~difficulties were more pronounced because some Cluster Five versions were supposed to weigh~~
~~no more than 1 pound.110~~
~~Security~~
~~Security for JTRS emerged as a significant developmental difficulty. According to one expert, one~~
~~of the program’s biggest problems was security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is~~
~~software-based and is, therefore, vulnerable to hacking.”111 Computer security experts general y~~
~~agree that software used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security~~
~~offers absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS required applications~~
~~to operate at multiple levels of security; in order to meet this requirement, developers had to~~
~~account not only for traditional radio security measures but also for computer and network~~
~~security measures.112 In addition, National Security Agency (NSA)113 security concerns about~~
~~JTRS interface with radio systems of U.S. al ies posed developmental chal enges.114~~
~~Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems~~
~~Some analysts expressed concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with~~
~~legacy radios may have been technological y infeasible.115 Reportedly, early program attempts at~~
~~cross-banding116 to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex.~~
~~Current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform to link with~~
~~legacy radio frequencies.117 One report suggested that while the Wideband Networking Waveform~~
~~could receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot receive signals from JTRS. To~~
~~rectify this situation, the Army considered using 19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS~~

~~108 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New T actical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense~~
~~Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.~~
~~109 Meeting between CRS and the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of Integration FCS~~
~~Office, September 15, 2005.~~
~~110 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of~~
~~Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked Communications~~
~~Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19.~~
~~111 Buxbaum, p. 32.~~
~~112 Buxbaum, p. 32.~~
~~113 T he National Security Agency is the U.S. government ’s cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, and~~
~~performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce foreign signals~~
~~intelligence information.~~
~~114 Buxbaum, p. 32.~~
~~115 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New T actical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense~~
~~Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.~~
~~116 Cross-banding is a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then retransmitting them on~~
~~previously designated channels, thereby allowing communications systems operating o n different bands to~~
~~communicate with one another.~~
~~117 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New T actical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense~~
~~Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.~~
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~~transmissions to legacy systems.118 Incorporating this number of different waveforms into a JTRS~~
~~radio would have significantly increased memory and processing power requirements which, in~~
~~turn, would have increased JTRS size, weight, and power requirements.~~

~~Author Information~~

~~John R. Hoehn~~

~~Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs~~

~~Disclaimer~~
~~This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan~~
~~shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and~~
~~under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other~~
~~than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in~~
~~connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not~~
~~subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in~~
~~its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or~~
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~~118 Jen DiMascio, “JT RS Cluster One to Play Role, Execs Say: Exercise to T est Mettle of Early FCS T echnologies Will~~
~~Begin this Year,” Inside the Arm y, vol. 17, no. 25, June 27, 2005, p. 7.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~R46725 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED~~
23Telephone conversation between the author and Joint Staff J6, April 30, 2021. 86 Travis Sharp, a research fellow with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, used a key word search to identify JADC2-related programs, and therefore may underestimate the total cost of JADC2, particularly regarding Navy-specific programs which are classified. Sharp’s work is cited in Andrew Everson, “What the budget reveals—and leaves unclear—about the cost of JADC2,” C4ISR Net, June 15, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2021/06/15/part-1-what-the-budget-reveals-and-leaves-unclear-about-the-cost-of-jadc2/. 87 Govini is a defense-focused business intelligence company. Govini, Department of Defense Investments in Joint All Domain Command and Control Taxonomy, Arlington, VA, September 2021, p. 4, https://govini.com/wp-content/ Congressional Research Service 15 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Govini’s estimate included funding for other federal agencies—such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as technologies DOD may not consider related to JADC2, and therefore may overestimate the total amount of funding JADC2 received. JADC2 Spending Priorities According to the JS J6, there are five lines of effort associated with JADC2:  the data enterprise;  the human enterprise;  the technical enterprise;  nuclear command, control, and communications; and  mission partner information sharing.88 Regarding these lines of effort, the JS J6 stated that the JADC2 strategy follows a data-centric approach to achieve a common data framework (rather than a standards approach DOD followed for more than a decade to ensure interoperability).89 A data-centric approach focuses on the types and structure of data required for DOD systems to transmit, creating a common data framework that provides an agreed standard for how data should be structured when it is sent and received.90 In other words, the way data is formatted, organized, and structured affects how efficiently and seamlessly it moves from sensors to decisionmakers to weapons. Net centricity and interoperability, on the other hand, focus on communications standards, such as the radio frequency, waveform, communication encryption, etc., to make sure one radio can talk to another.91 It appears that by adopting this approach, the JS J6 is focused on developing software applications to improve command and control. Potentially lacking from the strategy, however, are several aspects, including  the role of the hardware and software of communications systems,  the amount of data the network is required to transmit,  the role of adversary actions on the network, and  modularity in commanding and controlling forces. As DOD continues to reform its JADC2 concepts and requirements, other observers also note that there are different areas not identified in the JADC2 strategy where DOD should primarily focus its spending on research and development. One observer argues that DOD should focus its research and development spending on improving network interoperability.92 This approach uploads/2021/09/DoD-Investments-in-JADC2-Taxonomy.pdf. 88 Telephone conversation between the author and Joint Staff J6, April 30, 2021. 89 The JADC2 strategy and its associated implementation plan are classified. CRS has not reviewed these documents and has not reviewed the details of what is entailed with each line of effort. However, the following discussion is based on analysis of senior DOD official statements, including from Lieutenant General Dennis Crall, the Joint Staff Chief Information Officer. 90 Department of Defense, Data Strategy: Unleashing Data to Advance the National Defense, September 30, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks memorandum, Creating Data Advantage, May 5, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/10/2002638551/-1/-1/0/DEPUTY-SECRETARY-OF-DEFENSE-MEMORANDUM.PDF. 91 AcqNotes, “Net Ready Key Performance Parameter,” press release, July 20, 2021, https://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/net-ready-key-performance-parameter-nr-kpp. 92 Todd Harrison, Battle Networks and the Future Force: Part 1: A Framework for Debate, Center for Strategic and Congressional Research Service 16 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress supports prioritizing upgrades to military communications systems in order to transmit data across the joint force. It recommends DOD spend more in software and hardware to improve interoperability across all types of datalinks and networks (e.g., Link 16, Multifunction Advanced Datalink, Situational Awareness Datalink, and Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services).93 A network interoperability approach focuses on the fact that creating networks is difficult; however, utilizing software-defined networking and common electronics (such as similar chip architectures) can enable each of the military services to seamlessly share information. In other words, this approach focuses more on the way that communications networks are built than on the way data sent within those networks is organized. Software-defined radios and networking allow radios to be programmed easily and, as a result, communicate more easily with one another.94 Microelectronics (i.e., the physical hardware) ultimately define the physical and software capabilities of a radio. Other analysts argue that JADC2 spending should be more focused on changing how decisions are made.95 This argument highlights the need for automating decisionmaking processes by utilizing artificial intelligence (AI), as envisioned by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) MOSAIC Warfare concept. In this approach, prioritizing spending on utilizing AI systems (e.g., Air Force’s STiTCHES program)96 can build ad hoc networks focusing primarily on the data and data structures that need to be transmitted. This argument assumes that AI can also analyze intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data to identify trends a human might miss, and therefore make potentially better recommendations to a military commander. Other observers argue that decisions prioritizing spending on how to use and manage the electromagnetic spectrum are critical to support JADC2.97 These observers posit that programs like the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Electromagnetic Battle Management program—designed to evaluate the electromagnetic spectrum environment using intelligence methods, then automating decisions on how to use the spectrum to mitigate adversary electronic warfare effects—are necessary to achieve all domain command and control. These observers also argue that adversary electronic warfare effects will need to be mitigated near-instantaneously and therefore need a robust segment of the electromagnetic environment (as well as automation) to manage DOD networks during potential attacks to the network. International Security, Washington, DC, August 5, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-networks-and-future-force, and Todd Harrison, Battle Networks and the Future Force: Part 2: Operational Challenges and Acquisition Opportunities, Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington, DC, November 2, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-networks-and-future-force-0. 93 Interoperability refers to the capability of one radio or communications system to transmit data to another. Communications systems may not be able to communicate with one another due to difference in radio frequencies, data structures, waveforms, frequency hopping algorithms, etc. 94 Software-defined networking was one of the primary rationales for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). For more information, see CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. 95 Bryan Clark, Dan Pratt, and Timothy Walton, Advancing Decision-Centric Warfare: Gaining Advantage Through Force Design and Mission Integration, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, June 29, 2021, https://www.hudson.org/research/17055-advancing-decision-centric-warfare-gaining-advantage-through-force-design-and-mission-integration. 96 Colin Clark, “ACK, STITCHES And The Air Force’s Networking Hopes,” Breaking Defense, July 20, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/ack-stitches-and-the-air-force-networking-hopes/. 97 Association of the Old Crows, “US Air Force Releases EMS Superiority Strategy,” press release, June 11, 2021, https://www.jedonline.com/2021/06/11/us-air-force-releases-ems-superiority-strategy/. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 22 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Interoperability Challenges As DOD envisions using JADC2 to command forces in multiple domains simultaneously, the need to connect different types of forces increases. DOD owns and operates many communications systems, each using different radio frequencies, standards, and datalinks.98 These systems are often unable to “talk” with each other and therefore require a gateway to “translate” from one radio protocol to another. The inclusion of allies and partners increases interoperability challenges. Former Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in his March 2020 testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities, identified this issue as justification to continue pursuing the OSD R&E efforts for FNC3.99 The challenge of enabling DOD to share information from different services and units could be solved by three approaches to interoperability:  Procure gateways. Communications gateways (perhaps more aptly called “translators”) can receive multiple protocols, security levels, et cetera, and rebroadcast this information to the rest of the force.100 The ABMS program has developed such gateways (see Figure 6) to enable communications.101 This approach allows for information sharing, potentially reducing the cost of development because the gateway can be a subsystem of an aircraft/ship/ground system, potentially capable of being fielded relatively quickly. The challenge with this approach is that such gateways may not be using the most advanced, and therefore protected, waveforms to rebroadcast to the force. Figure 6. E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) Source: https://www.janes.com/amp/usaf-to-buy-more-bacn/ZnlJK3dHVU9mZ28xajRJVkc5dVI5VFp1cVMwPQ2. 98 For more discussion on this issue, see CRS Report R46564, Overview of Department of Defense Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum, by John R. Hoehn, Jill C. Gallagher, and Kelley M. Sayler. 99 Testimony of Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee for Intelligence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities, FY2020 Science and Technology Posture Hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110655/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-GriffinM-20200311.pdf. 100 This capability is best demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force’s Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN). 101 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 26 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress  Procure new communications equipment. This approach uses a “top-down” approach (i.e., where either OSD or the Joint Staff identifies the solution and then requires the military services to adopt it). Using a similar model to the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) development,102 this option would purchase a new communications architecture focusing on interoperability. For example, the FNC3 effort appears to use this approach. Although this approach could ensure that the joint force develops communications systems that can share information seamlessly, and potentially in a secure fashion, it could require large investments and might encounter schedule delays. Another possible disadvantage of this approach is that as systems are fielded, they may not be as effective against adversary technologies.  Develop software to create networks. A third approach is to use software that enables users to create customized networks. DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare and some aspects of the ABMS program are examples of this approach.103 More modular than other interoperability solutions, this approach enables units and systems tailored to a specific operation to communicate with one another. A primary risk to this approach is the technical immaturity, specifically advances in software, used to create these networks. Another risk concerns the amount and classification of information shared with different systems certified for different levels of classification (e.g., Secret Releasable, Secret Nonreleasable, Top Secret). DOD and Congress may select one or more of these approaches. One particular approach may offer short-term benefits while DOD pursues a longer-term approach to solve the interoperability challenge. Balancing Communications Capabilities in a Degraded Environment DOD’s approach to developing communications networks to meet JADC2 requirements incorporates three competing capabilities:  data throughput (i.e., the rate at which data can be transported),  latency (i.e., the time delay in receiving a message/data), and  resiliency (the ability to maintain a communications signal in the event of disruption by natural or intentional sources).104 102 JTRS was a radio program intended to replace all of the radio systems used by the Department of Defense. For more information, see the Appendix. 103 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020, and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI Builds New Networks On The Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/. 104 For example, see Department of Homeland Security, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” press release, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/first-responder-electronic-jamming-exercise#:~:text=DHS%20S%26T%20works%20to%20combat,jamming%20threats%20and%20reporting%20channels; Youness Arjoune and Saleh Faruque, “Smart Jamming Attacks in 5G New Radio: A Review,” Las Vegas, NV, January 8, 2020, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9031175; and Hossein Pirayesh and Huacheng Zeng, “Jamming Attacks and Anti-Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” January 1, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.00292. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 24 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress The rise of new technologies for military operations, such as artificial intelligence, tactical datalinks (like Link 16 and Multifunction Advanced Data Link [MADL]), and adversary electronic warfare capabilities, presents distinct challenges in balancing these capabilities for future communications systems like 5G and FNC3. AI and information operations could potentially require substantial data to enable predictive analytics and give commanders an accurate picture of the battle space. Datalinks, which share data with all available users, do not necessarily require high data rates; however, datalinks do need low latency to ensure that sensors can prove “target-level data,” particularly for fast-moving systems like cruise missiles and aircraft. Finally, the proliferation of electronic jammers requires resilience (or anti-jam properties) to maintain communications while being actively jammed. Figure 7 illustrates how these three competing requirements must be balanced to develop a new waveform (regardless if the waveform is designed for civilian or military applications).105 Radio signals are able to offer each capability; however, prioritizing one requirement means that the other two requirements may suffer, potentially creating a dilemma for policymakers in terms of which capabilities to prioritize in acquisition. Figure 7. Balancing Communications Requirements Source: Congressional Research Service. As DOD modernizes its communications systems, it may consider technology features and limitations to select requirements that advance mission goals while protecting the security of its networks. For example, technologies like 5G can offer high data capacity and low latency, but it is unclear how these signals may be affected by adversary jamming. FNC3, on the other hand, appears to be designed to provide resiliency with high data rates; however, because it relies on satellites, latency will increase. Role of Artificial Intelligence in Decisionmaking106 AI represents a potentially critical component to enabling JADC2. As AI is introduced into military decisionmaking, several potential issues arise. First, to what degree should artificial intelligence play in decisionmaking? At what appropriate level is human judgement required when using lethal weapons?107 105 Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of the radio from the user’s perspective. 106 For a broader discussion of artificial intelligence and its role in national security, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. 107 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25, Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 26 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Second, how does DOD ensure the security of the data being used for AI algorithms to assist decisionmaking? Although DOD has focused on the data structures,108 it has not discussed how it plans to ensure data validity and security for JADC2 specifically. Erroneous data could cause commanders to select options that compromise mission objectives (such as algorithms recommending targets that might waste high-value munitions). Relatedly, how does DOD intend to secure these data in cloud environments to prevent adversaries from manipulating them? Are these security plans sufficient to prevent adversary manipulation? Potential Force Structure Changes Because JADC2 potentially requires different types of forces and weapons systems, each of the military services may look to change how it trains, organizes, and equips its forces. For example, the Marine Corps, in its force redesign, announced that it would eliminate units it determines are not aligned with National Defense Strategy guidance, and would reinvest the funding into other programs that better fit the future operating environment.109 Similarly, the Navy’s Project Overmatch looks to potentially change the number and types of ships the service fields. The balance of capabilities that reside in the active and reserve components is another aspect of force structure changes. For instance, the Army historically has decided to transfer logistics capabilities from the active component to the reserve components.110 Thus, if the United States were to go to war, the Army would presumably need to activate reserve forces to enable operations. As DOD and military services prepare to meet the challenges presented by JADC2, how would these organizations choose to balance capabilities and force structures between active and reserve components? Management of JADC2 Efforts The Joint Staff J6 is the lead coordinator for DOD’s JADC2 efforts, with each of the services and a number of DOD agencies performing various activities. Some in Congress, in the past, have expressed an interest in creating DOD-wide program offices (such as the F-35 Joint Program Office) to centralize management of large-scale efforts.111 It appears that DOD research and development efforts will increase over time, and that, as a result, managing these efforts may become more challenging. Congress may, in the future, seek to identify or create an organization charged with program management, development of network architecture, and financial management. 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics/. 108 Theresa Hitchens, “OSD, Joint Staff Double Down On DoD-Wide Data Standards,” Breaking Defense, February 10, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/exclusive-jadc2-data-summits-will-drive-dod-standards-requirements/. 109 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. 110 CRS Report R43808, Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp. 111 For more information on the background of the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. For an example of a joint communications program intended to achieve similar results to JADC2, see the Appendix. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 27 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Appendix. Historical Example of Joint Interoperability: Joint Tactical Radio System112 The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was a communications program intended to improve communications interoperability by fielding radios across all of the military services. The program was started in the mid-1990s and was ultimately canceled in 2011 by former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall.113 In his justification notification, Under Secretary Kendall noted that “the technical challenges of mobile ad hoc networks and scalability were not well understood due to the immaturity of technology at the time ... it is unlikely that products resulting from the JTRS GMR [Ground Mobile Radio] development program affordably meet Service requirements.” Over the course of the 15-year development effort, DOD spent approximately $15 billion, requiring an additional $13 billion at termination.114 The JTRS program was intended to replace the 25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the military—many of which could not communicate with each other—with software-based radios that could operate across much of the radio frequency spectrum.115 JTRS was envisioned to enable the services to operate together, along with selected allied nations, in a “seamless” manner via wireless voice, video, and data communications through all levels of command, including direct access to near real-time information from airborne and battlefield sensors.116 Described as a “software-defined radio,” JTRS would have functioned more like a computer than a conventional radio; for example, it would have been upgraded and modified to operate with other communications systems by the addition of software, as opposed to redesigning hardware—a more costly and time-consuming process. DOD asserted that in “many cases, a single JTRS radio with multiple waveforms can replace many separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that because JTRS is “software programmable, they will also provide a longer functional life,” with both features offering potential long-term cost savings.117 The JTRS program was originally broken into five “clusters,” with each cluster having a particular service “lead” (see Table A-1) and a Joint Program Office managing the overall architecture. 112 This section is derived from CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. 113 Memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendell to Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, JTRS Cancellation Notification, October 13, 2011, https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/101411bb1.pdf. 114 Bob Brewin, “Pentagon shutters Joint Tactical Radio System program office,” Nextgov, August 1, 2012, https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2012/08/pentagon-shutters-joint-tactical-radio-system-program-office/57173/. 115 Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JTRS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31. 116 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9. Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JTRS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, pp. 31-33. 117 DOD pamphlet on JTRS published by the JTRS Joint Program Office, undated. Congressional Research Service 22 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Table A-1. JTRS Clusters Cluster One Two Three Four Five Description Ground Hand-held Fixed-site High- Handheld, vehicle and radios and maritime performance dismounted, helicopter radios aircraft (fixed and Small radios wing) radios Form Factora radios Service U.S. Army U.S. Special U.S. Navy U.S. Air U.S. Army Lead Operations Force Command (USSOCOM) Source: Reproduced from CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. Note: Form factor radios are essentially miniaturized radios that soldiers would carry, as well as radios for weight- and power-constrained platforms. As discussed below, JTRS experienced a number of difficulties during development. These issues may be relevant for future JADC2 development. Size and Weight Constraints and Limited Range According to a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,118 including transmission range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the results of efforts to ensure the electronic parts in the radio are not overheated by the electricity needed to power the additional memory and processing. Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size, weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking Waveform…. The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 percent.119 The inability to meet these fundamental design and performance standards raised concerns that Cluster One may not have been able to accommodate additional waveforms as intended (the plan was for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms) and that it may be too bulky or heavy to fit into the stringently weight- and size-constrained Future Combat System (FCS) Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs),120 as well as the Army’s helicopter fleet. Some observers were concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the Army would significantly “dumb down” 118 The Wideband Networking Waveform is described as the core of the JTRS networking capability and is intended to operate across a wide range of the radio frequency spectrum, from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz), and would provide increased routing and networking capability—as much as a hundred times more than existing communications systems. 119 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15. 120 FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs) are envisioned as a family of eight different combat vehicles—with some having more than one variation—based on a common platform and designed to be transported by U.S. Air Force transport aircraft and deployed directly into combat with little or no post-flight reconfiguration. MGVs would be equipped with various passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same survivability as the current heavy armor force. Congressional Research Service 23 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Cluster One performance specifications.121 According to the Army, however, it made progress in terms of reducing Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range; however, incorporating all of the desired waveforms into Cluster One proved to be difficult.122 Cluster Five radios also reportedly experienced similar size, weight, and power difficulties; these difficulties were more pronounced because some Cluster Five versions were supposed to weigh no more than 1 pound.123 Security Security for JTRS emerged as a significant developmental difficulty. According to one expert, one of the program’s biggest problems was security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is software-based and is, therefore, vulnerable to hacking.”124 Computer security experts generally agree that software used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security offers absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS required applications to operate at multiple levels of security; in order to meet this requirement, developers had to account not only for traditional radio security measures but also for computer and network security measures.125 In addition, National Security Agency (NSA)126 security concerns about JTRS interface with radio systems of U.S. allies posed developmental challenges.127 Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems Some analysts expressed concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with legacy radios may have been technologically infeasible.128 Reportedly, early program attempts at cross-banding129 to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex. Current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform to link with legacy radio frequencies.130 One report suggested that while the Wideband Networking Waveform could receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot receive signals from JTRS. To rectify this situation, the Army considered using 19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS 121 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005. 122 Meeting between CRS and the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of Integration FCS Office, September 15, 2005. 123 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19. 124 Buxbaum, p. 32. 125 Buxbaum, p. 32. 126 The National Security Agency is the U.S. government’s cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information. 127 Buxbaum, p. 32. 128 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005. 129 Cross-banding is a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then retransmitting them on previously designated channels, thereby allowing communications systems operating on different bands to communicate with one another. 130 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005. Congressional Research Service 24 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress transmissions to legacy systems.131 Incorporating this number of different waveforms into a JTRS radio would have significantly increased memory and processing power requirements which, in turn, would have increased JTRS size, weight, and power requirements. Author Information John R. Hoehn Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 131 Jen DiMascio, “JTRS Cluster One to Play Role, Execs Say: Exercise to Test Mettle of Early FCS Technologies Will Begin this Year,” Inside the Army, vol. 17, no. 25, June 27, 2005, p. 7. Congressional Research Service R46725 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED 25