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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
July 15, 2021April 14, 2022
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a key U.S. partner in the Middle The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East, and the two East, and the two
countries have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues. Jordan countries have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues. Jordan
Jeremy M. Sharp
remains at peace with Israel and is a remains at peace with Israel and is a keyprimary interlocutor with the Palestinians. interlocutor with the Palestinians. Jordan’sOngoing
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
strategic importance to the United States is evident given ongoing instability in
Eastern Affairs
neighboring Syria and Iraqinstability in neighboring Syria and Iraq magnifies Jordan’s strategic importance to the Eastern Affairs United States. Jordan also is a longtime U.S. partner in global . Jordan also is a longtime U.S. partner in global
counterterrorism
counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, intel igenceintelligence, and diplomatic , and diplomatic

cooperation seeks to cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and
eliminate eliminate terrorist threats.terrorist threats.
U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. supportassistance has helped Jordan address serious has helped Jordan address serious
vulnerabilities,vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s both internal and external. Jordan’s smal sizesmall size, refugee burden, and lack of major economic resources have made it and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. The Biden Administrationdependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. The Biden Administration has acknowledged Jordan’s has acknowledged Jordan’s
role as a key U.S. partner in promoting role as a key U.S. partner in promoting Middle EastIsraeli-Palestinian peace, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued peace, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued
robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom.robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom.
Annual Jordan also hosts over 3,000 U.S. troops. Annual U.S. aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has U.S. aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has
provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen
by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2018FY2019 amounted to approximately $ amounted to approximately $22 bil ion.
Jordan also hosts nearly 3,000 U.S. troops. On June 18, 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) announced
that several missile defense assets would be withdrawn from the Central Command (CENTCOM) region.
Presumably, that may include the Patriot Missile Battery that has been stationed at Jordan’s Shaheed Muwaffaq
al-Salti Air Base since the height of the Syrian Civil War.
23.8 billion. The President’s FY2023 budget request includes $1.45 billion for Jordan. The current five-year U.S.-Jordanian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on assistance expires at the end of FY2022, and the two countries are negotiating a new agreement. To date, the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on Jordan has been significant in terms of human To date, the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on Jordan has been significant in terms of human
and economic costs. As of early and economic costs. As of early July 2021April 2022, Jordan has had over , Jordan has had over 750,0001.6 million cases and cases and nearly 10over 14,000 deaths according ,000 deaths according
to the World Health Organization. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and to the World Health Organization. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and is expected to grow by only 1grew by 2% in % in
2021. Losses in government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are 2021. Losses in government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are
expected to expected to widen the budget deficit in the years ahead. In the 117th Congress, P.L. 117-103, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, provides $1.65 billion in total bilateral foreign assistance to Jordan. This includes over $1.2 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), of which $845 million is specified as a direct cash transfer to the Jordanian government. The Act also provides $425 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Since the current MOU on assistance between the United States and Jordan commits the United States to provide “no less than $1.275 billion per year in U.S. bilateral foreign assistance,” Congress has appropriated nearly $400 million for Jordan above and beyond what was agreed upon in the MOU for FY2022. In the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 117-103, appropriators note that the Act “supports critical economic assistance needed this fiscal year to help ensure Jordan’s ongoing stability, including to strengthen Jordan's borders and to help mitigate the impact of hosting millions of refugees.” They also direct the Secretary of State to “continue to support the Government of Jordan's efforts to implement economic and democratic reforms” and to “consult with the Committees on Appropriations on prospective policy proposals aimed at assisting Jordan achieve additional and long-lasting reforms, including in its water and public sectors.” Beyond assistance from the State and Foreign Operations appropriations accounts, P.L. 117-103 also provides Jordan with security assistance from Defense Department appropriations accounts. The Act specifies that Jordan receive “not less than” $150 million from the Defense Department’s Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide account for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to reimburse Jordan for border security. Starting in FY2016 (Section 1226 of P.L. 114-92), successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) have authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide support, on a reimbursement Congressional Research Service Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations basis, to Jordan (among other countries) for the purpose of supporting and enhancing its military’s efforts to increase security along the border with Iraq and Syria. P.L. 117-103 also includes “up to” $500 million in Defense Department assistance to support “the armed forces of Jordan and to enhance security along its borders.” The Act also includes authority for loan guarantees for Jordan. Congressional Research Service link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 14 link to page 16 link to page 18 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 22 link to page 27 link to page 28widen the budget deficit in the years ahead. As of July 12, 2021, just over 26% of Jordanians had
received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.
The President’s FY2022 budget request includes $1.275 bil ion for Jordan, which is in line with the current five-
year U.S.-Jordanian Memorandum of Understanding on Assistance. FY2022 marks the final year of the MOU,
and the Administration is expected to negotiate a new deal with the Jordanian government over the upcoming
months.
Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. In the 117th Congress, the draft House
Foreign Operations appropriations bil would provide “not less than” $1.65 bil ion for assistance to Jordan,
including not less than $845.1 mil ion for budget support for the Government of Jordan, $425 mil ion in military
aid, and $1.2 bil ion in economic assistance. The act also includes authority for loan guarantees for Jordan and
authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) direct loans for Jordan, not to exceed $4 bil ion. The draft House
Defense Appropriations bil would provide “not less than” $150 mil ion for border security in Jordan. S.Res. 154
and H.Res. 305 would congratulate the people of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the centennial of the
founding of the Jordanian state.

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link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 6 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 16 link to page 21 link to page 21 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1
COVID-19 and the Economic Crisis in Jordan .................. 1 Country Background .................................................................................................. 2
Country Background ....................... 1 The Hashemite Royal Family ..................................................................................................... 2

The Hashemite 3 Dispute within the Royal Family ........................................................................................ 4 International Investigations ..................... 4
Dispute Within the Royal Family ............................................................................ 45
Political System and Key Institutions ............................................................................... 6
2020 Parliamentary Elections ........ 5 Political Reform and Popular Unrest .................................................................................. 8
6 Economy .......................................................................................................................................... 9 Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians ................................................................................................ 10 Water Scarcity ............................................................................................................................... 12 Syria and Lebanon 8
Water Scarcity and the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Water Deal ..................................... 10
Syria ........................................................................................................................... 11 14
U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 15 12
The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi ................................................................................................. 16 12
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ................................................................................................. 17 13
U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance ......................................................... 13
Economic Assistance......... 17 Economic Assistance ......................................................................................................... 14
...... 18 Humanitarian Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Jordan ...................................................... 16.. 20
Military Assistance .................................................................................................................. 21 17
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance ................................... 21 17
Excess Defense Articles .................................................................................................... 22 18

Figures
Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance ............................................................................................................ 3 Figure 2. King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein ..................................................................................... 3 Figure 3. Jordan’s Projected National Debt .................................................................................... 9 Figure 4. King Abdullah II meets Israel’s President ...................................................................... 11 Figure 5. Jordan’s Water Vulnerability .......................................................................................... 13 Figure 6. 3
Figure 2. State Department and USAID Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2021 ......................... 18 14
Figure 37. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan ........................................................................................ 19 15
Figure 4.8. U.S., Jordan Sign Aid Agreement .................................................................................. 20 16
Figure 59. U.S.-Supplied Black Hawk Helicopters for Jordan ....................................................... 21 17

Tables
Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan ..................................................................................................... 17 13
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Jordan: 1946-2018 2019 ..................................................... 18

.. 22 Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 23 18

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Overview
In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as “Jordan”), economic hardship In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as “Jordan”), economic hardship
exacerbated by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic exacerbated by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is furtherand the rise of global commodities prices as a result of war in Ukraine are straining the straining the
political system.political system. In recent months1 Over the past year, the reign of , the reign of 5960-year-old -year-old monarch King Abdullah II bin Al King Abdullah II bin Al
Hussein (hereinafter King AbdullahHussein (hereinafter King Abdullah II), has II), has been challengedbeen chal enged both from within the royal family from within the royal family
and by tribal elites that have formed the bedrock of the kingdom since its establishment a century
ago (, as the king’s half-brother Hamzah voiced rare public criticism of the monarch (see belowsee below). Public infighting ). While as of July 2021 there is no imminent crisis endangering King Abdullah’s
rule, public infighting from within the royal family, periodic protests from within the royal family, periodic protests from economical y
economically disaffected Jordanians, and disaffected Jordanians, and a recentthe spring 2022 resumption in Israeli-Palestinian violence may be cause for resumption in Israeli-Palestinian violence may be cause for
concern among some U.S. policymakers.concern among some U.S. policymakers.1 The United States considers Jordan a key partner in The United States considers Jordan a key partner in
promoting promoting Middle EastIsraeli-Palestinian peace, countering terrorism, and promoting interfaith cooperation in a peace, countering terrorism, and promoting interfaith cooperation in a
volatile volatile region. No other country in the world receives as much direct U.S. economic budgetary region. No other country in the world receives as much direct U.S. economic budgetary
aid on an annual basis as Jordanaid on an annual basis as Jordan (see below). .
Before the pandemic, Jordan had already faced numerous Before the pandemic, Jordan had already faced numerous systemic and regional chal enges not
entirely of its own making. Demographical y, the population has doubled since King Abdullah II
domestic challenges that have been aggravated by regional and global developments. Demographically, the population has doubled from 5.5 million to nearly 11 million since King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999.2 Since 2011, Syrian refugees (ascended the throne in 1999.2 Since 2011, Syrian refugees (666674,000 registered with the United ,000 registered with the United
Nations as of Nations as of mid-2021April 2022) have resided in Jordan, where the kingdom and international aid ) have resided in Jordan, where the kingdom and international aid
agencies have provided them with basic services. Water availability is approaching crisis levels; agencies have provided them with basic services. Water availability is approaching crisis levels;
according to the World Resources Institute, Jordan ranks as the fifth most water-stressed country according to the World Resources Institute, Jordan ranks as the fifth most water-stressed country
in the world.3 in the world.3 Economical y, Economically, Jordan has endured a decade of stagnation, in which per capita Jordan has endured a decade of stagnation, in which per capita
incomes have declinedincomes have declined, youth unemployment has grown and social unrest among young, educated and social unrest among young, educated workersJordanians has grown.4 has grown.4
International y, Jordan also finds itself more isolated. Its relationship with Israel has been
repeatedly characterized as strained throughout Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent 12 consecutive
years as prime minister (see below). Bilateral trade with the neighboring war-torn countries of
Syria and Iraq has declined, as the threat of infiltration from Islamic State terrorists has forced the
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to strengthen their border security. Jordan’s relationships with
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also have been more distant. The kingdom broke
ranks with the Saudi and Emirati blockade of Qatar (2017-2021) by reestablishing diplomatic
relations in 2019. Final y, while Jordan did not publicly reject President Trump’s 2020 Middle
East peace plan, it quietly opposed it; Jordanian officials also may feel isolated by the Abraham
Accords for encouraging Israeli-Arab normalization without regard to a final settlement with the
Palestinians.5
One policy dilemma for the Biden Administration is how to strengthen Jordan in a regional
environment in which Israel and the Palestinians just endured another round of violence; the
Administration itself U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace, upholding U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world, both in its regional outlook and internal politics.5 Many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the past 15 years. One policy dilemma for the Biden Administration is how to strengthen Jordan when violence between Israel and the Palestinians continues to flare. The Administration has not committed to has not committed to restarting direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. With Israeli-Palestinian tensions high after several killings in Israel in spring 2022, the Administration is relying on Jordan to play an active diplomatic role in deescalating tensions (see below). Country Background Jordan is arguably one of the closest U.S. Arab partners in the Middle East. The kingdom depends on its strong relations with global powers and its standing in the international community, where 1 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Jordan’s Reforms hit by Global Economic Shocks of War in Ukraine,” The National (UAE), March 22, 2022. 2 For demographic estimates, see The United Nations, 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects. 3 Hannah Dormido, “Theserestarting direct negotiations between Israel and the

1 According to the readout of a recent call between Vice President Kamala Harris and King Abdullah II, “ T he Vice
President and the King also discussed the economic challenges that Jordan faces, which have been exacerbated by the
COVID-19 pandemic, and the Vice President highlighted the importance of impactful, high -quality economic reforms.”
See White House, Readout of Vice President Harris Call with King Abdullah II of Jordan, May 20, 2021.
2 For demographic estimates, see T he United Nations, 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects.
3 Hannah Dormido, “T hese Countries are the Most at Risk from a Water Crisis,” Countries are the Most at Risk from a Water Crisis,” Bloomberg, August 6, 2019. , August 6, 2019.
4 See4 See United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Jordan, Economic Development, available at https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/economic-growth-and-trade. 5 U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Secretary of State Blinken’s Meeting with His Majesty King Abdullah II, May 26, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations it has played an outsized role in leading international organizations.6 Jordan’s small United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Jordan, Economic Development, available at
https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/economic-growth-and-trade.
5 Nicolai Due-Gundersen, “How the Israel-UAE Deal Could Leave Jordan Out in the Cold,” Middle East Eye,
September 2, 2020.
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Palestinians. With Israeli-Arab tensions stil lingering over East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, the
Administration could rely on Jordan to play a more active diplomatic role in the months ahead.
COVID-19 and the Economic Crisis in Jordan
To date, the impact of COVID-19 on Jordan has been significant in terms of the human and
economic costs. As of early July 2021, Jordan has had over 750,000 cases and nearly 10,000
deaths, peaking in March 2021, according to the World Health Organization.6 In late May 2021,
the Jordanian government announced plans to return to normal activity as the kingdom recovers
from the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, the kingdom is in the second phase of reopening,
which includes shortened curfew hours and measures to stimulate the tourism sector. By
September, al curfew restrictions wil be lifted, and schools wil resume lessons in classrooms.
As of July 12, 2021, just over 26% of Jordanians had received at least one dose of a COVID-19
vaccine.
Jordan’s fiscal situation is extremely difficult. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and is
expected to grow by only 1% in 2021. The official unemployment rate is close to 25%, but
probably much higher amongst youth and particularly women (see textbox below).7 In November
2020, Minister of Finance Mohamad al-Ississ projected a $2.89 bil ion annual budget deficit, with
public debt forecast to be 117% of GDP. Of the government’s FY2021 budget of $11.1 bil ion,
65% wil be al ocated for salaries and pensions, including for retired military personnel.8
In May 2021, the World Bank approved additional financing of more than $1.1 bil ion for Jordan
to cope with the pandemic. In July, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made available
another $206 mil ion in lending to Jordan, bringing total IMF disbursements to Jordan since the
start of 2020 to $900 mil ion.9 According to the IMF, “successive COVID-19 waves and the sharp
decline in tourism have taken a significant human and economic toll, with unemployment
reaching record high levels, and the recovery delayed.”10
Country Background
Jordan is arguably one of the closest U.S. Arab partners in the Middle East. The kingdom depends
on its strong relations with global powers and its standing in the international community, where
it has played an outsized role in leading international organizations.11 Jordan’s smal size and lack size and lack
of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab
sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position—wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position—wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia—has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors but has Saudi Arabia—has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors but has

6 Available online at https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/jo.
7 “Data Reveal Soaring Unemployment in Jordan in 2020,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2, 2021.
8 Osama Al Sharif, “Jordan’s 2021 Budget is a Harbinger of Worse T hings to Come,” Al Monitor, December 7, 2020.
9 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes Second Review Under Jordan’s Extended
Arrangement and Request for Augmentation of Access to Address the Impact of COVID-19, July 1, 2021.
10 Op. cit.
11 For example, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al Hussein, a member of the Hashemite dynasty (from the branch of the royal
family that had ruled Iraq), served as the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2014 to
2018.
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also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial
relations with one another. relations with one another.
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initial yinitially consisted of desert or semidesert consisted of desert or semidesert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background, the territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background, the
originaloriginal “East Bank” Jordanians.“East Bank” Jordanians.127 The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilateral yunilaterally annexed a Palestinian annexed a Palestinian
enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bankenclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank.13—later captured by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.8 The “East Bank” Jordanians, though The “East Bank” Jordanians, though
probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and
military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians
of Palestinian origin make up an estimated 55% to 70% of the population. They tend to gravitate of Palestinian origin make up an estimated 55% to 70% of the population. They tend to gravitate
toward employment in the private sector, most likely due to their toward employment in the private sector, most likely due to their al egedalleged general exclusion from general exclusion from
certain public-sector and military positions.certain public-sector and military positions.14
Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance

Area: 89,342 sq. km. (34,495 sq. mi., slightly smal er than Indiana).
Population: 10,458,413 (July 2018); Amman (capital): 4.008 mil ion (2015).
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 97%; other 2.6% (includes Armenians, Circassians) (2015).
Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2.2%; Buddhist 0.4%; Hindu 0.1%.
Percent of Population Under Age 25: 54% (2018).

12 For historical background, see Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Jordan, September
2006.
13 T hough9 6 For example, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al Hussein, a member of the Hashemite dynasty (from the branch of the royal family that had ruled Iraq), served as the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2014 to 2018. In September 2021, Ms. Sima Sami Bahous became Executive Director of UN Women and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations. 7 For historical background, see Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Jordan, September 2006. 8 Though there was little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control there was little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control
of it (includingof it (including East Jerusalem)East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and
maintained its claim to it until relinquishingmaintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
14 9 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948and immigrants since 1948 and their descendants) )
in Jordanian society is a sensitive domestic issue.in Jordanian society is a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2015, and it isJordan last conducted a national census in 2015, and it is unclear unclear
whether or not the government maintains such national-origin statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more whether or not the government maintains such national-origin statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more
difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist. difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
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Literacy: 95.4% (2015).
Youth Unemployment (ages 15-24): 40.1% (2019).
Source: Graphic created by CRS; facts from CIA World Factbook and World BankFigure 1. Jordan at a Glance Area: 89,342 sq. km. (34,495 sq. mi., slightly smaller than Indiana). Population: 10,998,531 (2022); Amman (capital): 2.2 million (2022). Country of Origin: Jordanian 69.3%, Syrian 13.3%, Palestinian 6.7%, Egyptian 6.7%, Iraqi 1.4%, other 2.6% (includes Armenian, Circassian) (2015 est.) note: data represent population by self-identified nationality Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2.2%; Buddhist 0.4%; Hindu 0.1%. Percent of Population Under Age 25: 54% (2018). Literacy: 98.2% (2018). Youth Unemployment (ages 15-24): 37.3.1% (2019). Source: Graphic created by CRS; figures from CIA World Factbook. .
The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, Figure 2. King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein which which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullahclaims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age II (age 5960) has ruled the country ) has ruled the country
since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein,
who had ruled for 47 years. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II who had ruled for 47 years. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II
had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special
Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Source: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com Congressional Research Service 3 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Abdullah Abdullah
(born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.(born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.1510
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers
(cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are (cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are
dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints al all judges and is commander of the armed judges and is commander of the armed
forces. forces.
Dispute Withinwithin the Royal Family
In early April 2021, Jordan was thrown into disarray after reports surfaced Over the past two years, King Abdullah II has been embroiled in political and familial tensions and controversies. In April 2021, reports of a plot to overthrow of a plot to overthrow
King AbdullahKing Abdullah II. On April 3, 2021, II jolted Jordan’s domestic political scene. On April 3, Jordanian authorities detained 41-year-old Prince Hamzah Jordanian authorities detained 41-year-old Prince Hamzah
bin Hussein, the king’s half-brother and bin Hussein, the king’s half-brother and the country’s former crown prince, former crown prince, and accusedaccusing him of conspiring him of conspiring
against the throne. In his defense, Prince Hamzah released two videotaped statements (one in against the throne. In his defense, Prince Hamzah released two videotaped statements (one in
English and the other in Arabic)English and the other in Arabic), filmed on the day of his arrest filmed on the day of his arrest, denying any participation denying any participation in a conspiracyin a
conspiracy, while criticizing the country’s ruling system for its corruption, nepotism, and lack of while criticizing the country’s ruling system for its corruption, nepotism, and lack of
reform. The Jordanian government then claimed that Prince Hamzah had collaborated with reform. The Jordanian government then claimed that Prince Hamzah had collaborated with
former Chief of the Royal Court Bassem former Chief of the Royal Court Bassem Awadal ahAwadallah and unnamed “foreign entities” to destabilize and unnamed “foreign entities” to destabilize
the kingdom.the kingdom.16 Awadal ah, who was11 Awadallah, at the time serving as an advisor to Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, an advisor to Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman,
was arrested along with 17 other prominent Jordanians on April 3.17 On April 4, Prince Hamzah
escalated his confrontation with the government, vowing to disobey orders to remain silent.
On April 5, King Abdullah II entrusted his uncle, Prince Hassan bin Abdullah, to serve as
mediator between the Royal Court and Prince Hamzah, who subsequently signed a letter that
same day pledging support for the king. A day later, a new audio recording surfaced, in which the
Jordanian Military’s Chief of Staff, General Yousef Huneiti, told Prince Hamzah that he had been
detained for meeting with government critics, who “started talking more than they should.”
Weeks earlier, Prince Hamzah had attended several tribal meetings where grievances against the

15 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his son, Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. T he position had
been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half -brother, Prince Hamzah. Crown Prince
al Hussein bin Abdullah II, now 27, is a graduate of Georgetown University and the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst (UK). He holds the rank of second lieutenant in the Jordan Armed Forces.
16 Jassar al T ahat and Richard Spencer, “Family Feud and Jealousy behind Split in Arab Royal Family Loved by the
West,” The Times (UK), April 14, 2021.
17 On April 5, the Washington Post reported that during a surprise Saudi delegation visit to Amman led by Foreign
Minister Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi government requested the release of Bassem Awadallah. Shira Rubin, Sarah
Dadouch, and Joby Warrick, “Jordan’s Prince Hamzeh, under House Arrest after Alleged Coup Attempt, Appears to
Affirm Loyalty to the King,” Washington Post, April 5, 2021. Originally born in east Jerusalem, Bassem Awadallah
was a former minister of international cooperation and planning and finance. He also served as h ead of the King’s royal
court. He later worked for was arrested along with 17 other prominent Jordanians on April 3.12 While the king and his half-brother eventually formally reconciled, Awadallah (who holds U.S., Saudi, and Jordanian citizenship) and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid al Nasser (a distant member of the royal family with business ties to Saudi Arabia) stood trial for sedition. On July 12, the court pronounced them guilty and sentenced Awadallah and Sharif Hassan to 15 years each in prison. In September, Jordan’s Court of Cassation upheld the July 2021 sentence of Awadallah and bin Zaid. In April 2022, just weeks after releasing an apology letter to King Abdullah II, Prince Hamzah unilaterally renounced his royal title as “prince.”13 As of mid-April, the Royal Court has not responded to Hamzah’s actions. Article 37 of Jordan’s constitution confers the creation and withdrawal of honorific titles to the king. At this point, it is unclear whether Prince Hamzah’s move will be accepted by King Abdullah II and, if so, what Hamzah’s political future in or outside of Jordan may be. 10 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his son, Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. The position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah. Crown Prince al Hussein bin Abdullah II, now 27, is a graduate of Georgetown University and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (UK). He holds the rank of second lieutenant in the Jordan Armed Forces. 11 Jassar al Tahat and Richard Spencer, “Family Feud and Jealousy behind Split in Arab Royal Family Loved by the West,” The Times (UK), April 14, 2021. 12 On April 5, the Washington Post reported that during a surprise Saudi delegation visit to Amman led by Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi government requested the release of Bassem Awadallah. Shira Rubin, Sarah Dadouch, and Joby Warrick, “Jordan’s Prince Hamzeh, under House Arrest after Alleged Coup Attempt, Appears to Affirm Loyalty to the King,” Washington Post, April 5, 2021. Originally born in East Jerusalem, Bassem Awadallah was a former minister of international cooperation and planning and finance. As mentioned in the text, he had also served as chief of the king’s Royal Court. He later worked for the Arab Bank and served on the board of a banking Arab Bank and served on the board of a banking group in Bahrain. 13 The prince’s letter is written in Arabic and was posted on Twitter at https://twitter.com/HamzahHKJ/status/1510619201827917827?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1510619201827917827%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Farabic%2Flive%2F60934210 Congressional Research Service 4 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations International Investigations In early October 2021, an international consortium of investigative journalists and news companies, including The Washington Post, published a series of articles referred to as the Pandora Papers in which King Abdullah II featured prominently. The reports allege that over a ten-year period, King Abdullah II personally spent $106 million on various properties, including luxury residences in Malibu, California.14 The Royal Court denied any impropriety, claiming that the transactions were hidden for security reasons, that no public funds were used, and that the properties were often used to host officials and foreign dignitaries.15 The Washington Post coverage of the Pandora Papers release focused on how the king’s personal financial transactions have roughly coincided with “a 10-year stretch that has been marked by mounting economic hardship in Jordan, rising public frustration with suspected corruption surrounding the king, and growing political instability that culminated this year in an alleged coup plot.”16 In February 2022, another international consortium of investigative journalists published findings derived from 70 years of leaked bank account information at the Swiss bank Credit Suisse. In the last decade, King Abdullah II and Queen Rania were found to have maintained multiple accounts between them, with one previously active account holding a balance of $224 million.17 The Royal Hashemite Court issued a press statement following news of the investigation, claiming that some of the funds in Credit Suisse accounts were from sales of aircraft used “to cover the private expenses of the Hashemite family” and that “all international assistance is subject to professional audits, and their allocations are fully accounted for by the government and donor entities.”18 Political System and Key Institutions The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2022, gives the king broad executive powers.19 The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the constitutional court, and all 75 members of the senate, as well as cabinet ministers. The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.20 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows the cabinet to issue provisional legislation when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.21 The king also must approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal 14 Greg Miller, “While His Country Struggles, Jordan’s King Abdullah Secretly Splurges,” Washington Post, October 3, 2021. 15 Jon Sharman and Daniel Keane, “Pandora Papers News – Live: World Leaders Deny Wrongdoing after Huge Leak of Financial Documents Trove of Secret Files Lays Bare Offshore Schemes Used by World’s Richest to Hide Their Fortunes,” The Independent (UK), October 4, 2021. 16 op.cit., Washington Post, October 3, 2021. 17 Jesse Drucker and Ben Hubbard, “Vast Leak Exposes How Credit Suisse Served Strongmen and Spies,” New York Times, February 20, 2022. 18 Twitter, Statement from the Royal Hashemite Court, February 21, 2022. 19 In the last decade, Jordan’s constitution has been amended three times (2011, 2016, and 2022). 20 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.” 21 Amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue temporary laws. Congressional Research Service 5 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison. Article 38 of the constitution grants the king the power to issue pardons. Successive Jordanian parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative branch’s independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities with each new election.22 Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas, parliamentary elections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by representatives of prominent tribal families.23 In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as a means to access patronage jobs.24 Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other group in Bahrain.
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king and his government had been expressed. He also had met with relatives of victims of an
oxygen outage at a coronavirus ward in a Jordanian hospital, an incident that had brought
widespread public condemnation of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.18
Prince Hamzah: Anti-Corruption Champion or Disgruntled Prince?
Prince Hamzah, who is 41 years old, is one of King Abdul ah’s half-brothers. He is the oldest son of Queen Noor,
the late King Hussein’s fourth wife. In 1999, when King Hussein named Abdul ah crown prince just a few weeks
before his death, he asked that Abdul ah appoint Hamzah as his crown prince. Prince Hamzah served in this role
until King Abdul ah II rescinded it in 2004. Five years later, King Abdul ah II appointed his own son, Hussein, as
crown prince. According to one account, the decision to strip the title of crown prince devastated Hamzah, who
had been considered “a favorite of King Hussein’s, a more polished orator with a more academic mind than King
Abdul ah II, and had been groomed as a teenager for the throne. Suddenly he [Hamzah] was ejected from the
circle of influence, and cast around for a new role.”19 In 2013, King Abdul ah II rejected Prince Hamzah’s proposal
to consolidate the kingdom’s intel igence agencies into one and make the prince intel igence chief.20
Lacking a prominent role in government, in recent years, Prince Hamzah cultivated close ties to the various heads
of Jordan’s elite tribal families, the core constituency of the Jordanian state. Some of these families had become
disil usioned with Jordan’s unspoken social compact, in which the state provides wel -paying jobs in the civil
service, military, and state-owned enterprises to “East Bank” Jordanians (see above) in return for their continued
loyalty. According to one account, “Hamzah, with a physical likeness to his father, has since grown into a
romanticized figure by tribal Jordanians pining for the ‘golden years’ of Hussein’s patriarchal reign, when the state
was the main provider and employer, life was affordable, and inequality minimal.”21
As discontent simmered within certain East Bank political circles and youth tribal protest movements, Prince
Hamzah received attention for publicly speaking out against government corruption.22 As previously mentioned,
Prince Hamzah’s March 2021 visit to a hospital where nine Jordanians infected with COVID-19 died from a lack of
oxygen—a visit that occurred just hours after King Abdul ah II met with the bereaved families and days before the
crown prince visited—had been perceived by the king as a major slight to the crown prince.23
On April 11, King Abdullah II and Prince Hamzah appeared side-by-side at a public ceremony
marking the kingdom’s independence centennial. A day later, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher al
Khasawneh told a closed session of parliament that Prince Hamzah would not stand trial for
sedition and that there had been no attempt to overthrow the king, only one to destabilize the
country. On April 14, the government announced that the other prominent Jordanians who were
arrested wil stand trial for sedition before Jordan’s State Security Court.24
Since then, 16 of the original 18 individuals who were arrested in April have been released;
Awadal ah (who holds U.S., Saudi, and Jordanian citizenship) and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid al
Nasser (a distant member of the royal family with business ties to Saudi Arabia) stood trial for
sedition. The trial, though it was closed to the public, became a major source of speculation inside
Jordan, which some analysts warned may be further dividing society between those who support

18 Patrick Kingsley, Rana F. Sweis and Eric Schmitt , “Royal Rivalry Bares Social T ensions Behind Jordan’s Stable
Veneer,” New York Tim es, April 10, 2021.
19 Ibid.
20 Mehul Srivastava and Andrew England, “Inside Jordan’s Royal Crisis: Why the Prince T urned to T ribal Leaders for
Support ,” Financial Tim es, April 18, 2021.
21 T aylor Luck, “It Doesn’t Happen Here: Why ‘coup plot’ in Jordan sent Shock Waves,” Christian Science Monitor,
April 5, 2021.
22 “Leading Jordanian Royal blasts Kingdom’s Corruption Problem,” The New Arab, September 26, 2018.
23 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “T he Sudden Visit to COVID Victims’ Families that Sparked Jordan’s Royal Rift,” Reuters,
April 8, 2021.
24 T he State Security Court has jurisdiction over the crimes of treason and espionage. George Sadek, “Jordan: Former
Crown Prince and Others Accused of Destabilizing State Security to Be Referred to State Security Court,” Global
Legal Monitor, Law Library, Library of Congress, April 12, 2021.
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the king and those who are sympathetic to Prince Hamzah.25 Both defendants pleaded not guilty.
On July 12, the court pronounced them guilty and sentenced Awadal ah and Sharif Hassan to 15
years in prison; a higher court has 30 days to confirm or overturn the verdict. Awadal ah’s
attorney in the United States, Michael J. Sullivan, issued a statement after the verdict claiming
that his client had been mistreated while in custody.26
Political System and Key Institutions
The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, gives the king broad executive
powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He
also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the
constitutional court, and al 75 members of the senate, as wel as cabinet ministers. The
constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house
elections for two years.27 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism
that al ows the cabinet to issue provisional legislation when parliament is not sitting or has been
dissolved.28 The king also must approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds
majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal
decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces,
declares war, and ratifies treaties. Final y, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits
insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in
prison.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. State security courts administered which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. State security courts administered
by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public
officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.”officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.”2925
Religious courts for both Muslims and Christians adjudicate matters of personal status, including Religious courts for both Muslims and Christians adjudicate matters of personal status, including
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.3026 The king may appoint and dismiss judges by The king may appoint and dismiss judges by
decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court
appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements. appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.
Political Reform and Popular Unrest Since his ascension to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II has at timesKing Abdullah II in 2013 laid out a vision of Jordan’s gradual transition from a constitutional laid out a vision of Jordan’s gradual transition from a constitutional
monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy,31 but in reality, successive Jordanian

25 T aylor Luck, “In Jordan, Coup T rial Shakes Public Confidence in Royal Family,” Christian Science Monitor, June
23, 2021.
26 Karin Laub and Omar Akour, “In Jordan Sedition T rial, U.S. Defendant Alleges T orture,” Associated Press, July 11,
2021.
27 T he king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “ In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
28 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws.
29 See U.S. monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy.27 During periods of domestic unrest, Jordanian leaders have taken limited steps to liberalize the political system without fundamentally altering the monarchical power structure. In times of crisis, the government also often appeals for Jordanian unity,28 while calling the opposition divisive or even disloyal.29 22 “How Jordan’s Election Revealed Enduring Weaknesses in Its Political System,” Washington Post, October 3, 2016. 23 Rachel Bessette, “Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections: Why They Do (and Don’t) Matter for the Kingdom’s Future,” Lawfare, September 29, 2016. 24 Sean L. Yom, “Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the Hirak Movement,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 229-247. 25 See U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Jordanian Legal System, available at https://jo.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/Embassy in Jordan, Jordanian Legal System, available at https://jo.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/
local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/jordanian-legal-system/. local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/jordanian-legal-system/.
3026 In sharia courts, the testimony of one man equals that of two women, with exceptions in certain cases. U.S. In sharia courts, the testimony of one man equals that of two women, with exceptions in certain cases. U.S.
Department of State, Department of State, 2020 Country reports on Hum anReports on Human Rights Practices: Jordan , March 30, 2021., March 30, 2021.
3127 See See “Making Our Democratic System Work for All Jordanians,” Abdullah“Making Our Democratic System Work for All Jordanians,” Abdullah II ibnII ibn Al Hussein,Al Hussein, January 16, 2013. Also, see Curtis R. Ryan, “The King’s Speech,” Foreign Policy, June 17, 2011. 28 In 2002, just a few years into his reign and after a Palestinian uprising in the neighboring West Bank, King Abdullah II launched a nation-wide campaign known as “Jordan First,” in which he called on citizens to reaffirm their “loyalty to the homeland.” See, Sana Abdallah, “Jordan's King Launches Identity Campaign,” UPI, October 31, 2002. 29 “Jordan’s Solid National Unity is what makes it Special — King,” Jordan Times, September 16, 2015. Congressional Research Service 6 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Some notable examples of how the state has dealt with political unrest throughout Jordan’s history include:  In 1989, Jordan suffered a recession, and the state, in compliance with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, lifted subsidies on basic goods. Protests ensued and, in response, the government lifted martial law (which had been in place since 1957). The government also permitted the resumption of parliamentary elections after a near 30-year absence.30 In the 1989 election, Muslim Brotherhood candidates won 22 out of 80 seats in the lower house, and combined with other allied groups, controlled 34 seats total, a historic high. In 1990, King Hussein commissioned a 60-member royal committee to draft a “National Charter” which outlined an expanded role for political parties.31  In 1996, in order to deal with a recession and IMF-supported austerity measures, the government again lifted subsidies on grains and other goods, leading to weeks-long popular protests in southern Jordan. In response, King Hussein dispatched additional security forces to the town of Karak and other nearby areas, vowing to quell additional unrest with an “iron fist.”32 A year later, parliament amended the Press and Publications Law, an act widely considered as restrictive of free speech.33  During the so-called Arab Spring between 2011 and 2013, Jordan experienced periodic social unrest, but not nearly at the same level as some of its neighbors. In 2011 as part of a broad package of reforms, the king promised to permanently amend the electoral law in order to guarantee fairness and transparency of the electoral process. In 2012, parliament passed a new electoral law, which provided voters with two ballots, one for geographical district representatives under the old system and another for a nation-wide closed proportional list system. It also increased the total number of seats in parliament from 120 to 150 and created a new independent electoral commission to oversee elections rather than the generally mistrusted Interior Ministry. Despite these changes, January 16, 2013.
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parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative
branch’s independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in
the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities
with each new election.32 Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are
drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas,
parliamentary parliamentary elections in January 2013 produced another overwhelmingly pro-palace parliament. In 2012, at the height of unrest in the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries pledged $5 billion to Jordan.  In 2018, Jordan once again was in the throes of economic difficulties and turned to the IMF for additional financing. To comply with IMF-mandated reforms, the Jordanian government drafted a new tax bill to increase personal income taxes and thus raise government revenue and ease the public debt burden. Large-scale demonstrations ensued, and the government was forced to revise its tax legislation. To bolster Jordan’s finances, the Gulf Arab states of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia collectively pledged $2.5 billion for Jordan. 30 After losing control of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, Jordan did not conduct a new election until after it renounced its claim to the West Bank in 1988. 31 A copy of the 1990 National Charter is available at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/charter-national.html 32 Scott Peterson, “Bread Riots in Jordan Force King to Wield an 'Iron Fist,'” Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1996. 33 Russell E. Lucas, “Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, Oct., 2003, pp. 81-98. Congressional Research Service 7 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Unlike in neighboring Egypt, the kingdom tolerates Muslim Brotherhood political activity, and Brotherhood candidates sometimes compete in parliamentary elections. (The Brotherhood also has boycotted previous elections in protest.) The Brotherhood is currently divided between Islamists who are willing to participate in the political system and those who reject it. In 2020, Brotherhood candidates ran together on a list called the National Alliance Reform and won 10 seats (down from 16 in the 2016 election); of those 10, 6 belonged to actual Islamist-leaning candidates.34 Gender Issueselections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by
representatives of prominent tribal families.33 In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher
in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as
a means to access patronage jobs.34
Gender Equality in Jordan
Jordan has consistently ranked among the bottom performers Jordan has consistently ranked among the bottom performers of the Worldof the World Economic Forum’sEconomic Forum’s Global Gender Global Gender
Gap index (Gap index (138 of 153131 of 156 countries in countries in 20202021). Some have pointed to “traditional attitudes, discriminatory). Some have pointed to “traditional attitudes, discriminatory legislation,legislation, a a
lack of access to public transportation and pay disparities”lack of access to public transportation and pay disparities” as barriersas barriers to women’s advancement in Jordan.35 Despite having one of the highest rates of female literacy in the Middle East, Jordan’s female labor force participation rate is considered low (15% as of 2021).36 The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this trend, as female unemployment increased between 2019 and 2020.37 Unequal pay also is an issue in Jordan, where the gender wage gap (as of 2018) is estimated at 18% in the public sector and 14% in the private sector.38 In 2022, Jordan amended the title of Chapter Two of the constitution, which guarantees equal rights of all citizens. The title now reads, “The Rights and Duties of Jordanian Men and Women”; previously, it had been “Rights and Duties of Jordanians.” During parliamentary debate over this change, an altercation broke out, as some Jordanian lawmakers opposed granting women greater equality, especial y on matters of inheritance and citizenship.39 Jordan has received funding through the USAID-administered Women’s to women’s advancement in Jordan.35
Despite cal s from women and activists during the Arab Spring, amendments to the country’s constitution in 2011
did not include a provision for gender equality. Women’s involvement in the labor force and in politics is limited,
though female educational attainment in the country is high.
Effects of COVID-19. Before the pandemic, Jordan had the lowest rate of female labor force participation
among MENA countries not experiencing conflict (14.4% compared to the global average of 48%), and some
worry that the pandemic wil have further negative effects on women’s employment in Jordan.36 The pandemic has
increased the already substantial amount of unpaid work for women in Jordan, where “women spend 17.1 times
more time than men on unpaid work (vs. a global average of 3.2), while men spend 6.5 more time on paid work
than women (vs. a global average of 1.8).”37 As in other MENA countries, domestic violence reports have
increased during the pandemic: a recent Arab Barometer survey found the perceived increase of gender-based
violence in Jordan to be 27%.38
U.S. Assistance. Jordan has received funding through the USAID-administered Women’s Global Development Global Development
and Prosperityand Prosperity (W-GDP) Fund, launched in 2019, (W-GDP) Fund, launched in 2019, specifical y specifically to support government efforts to amend the to support government efforts to amend the
country’s labor code to country’s labor code to prohibit gender discrimination.40 USAID allocates U.S. bilateral economic assistance to support programs that protect victims of gender-based violence, improve women’s access to jobs and leadership opportunities in the private sector, and support the advancement of women to decision-making positions. In addition to partnering with various government ministries, USAID also partners with the Jordanian National Commission for Women headed by Princess Basma Bint Talal, paternal aunt to King Abdul ah II. More recently, there has been some international concern that political life in Jordan has become more restrictive. While Jordan is generally considered to be somewhat more tolerant of dissent than Egypt or the Gulf Arab monarchies, the international democracy watchdog organization Freedom House changed Jordan’s rating in 2021 from “partially free to “not free,” asserting that Jordan’s status declined due to harsh new restrictions on freedom of assembly, among other things.41 Internet freedom is a particularly sensitive issue in Jordan, where journalists have decried the ambiguity of cybercrime legislation, such as Article 11 of the 2015 Cybercrime Law.42 The law states that “anyone who on purpose posts or reposts statements or information on the 34 Suha Ma’ayeh and Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan’s 2020 Parliamentary Election: Settling for the Status Quo,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2021. 35 Rana F. Sweis, “Women, 86 Percent Absent from Jordan’s Work Force, are Left Behind,” New York Times, April 3, 2021. 36 Holly Welborn Benner and Anders Pedersen, “Want Jordan to prosper? Engage Women!” World Bank Blog, December 22, 2021. 37 World Bank, “Jordan: US$112 million to Finance National Employment Program in the Private Sector, Focused on Jobs for Youth and Women,” December 22, 2021. 38 International Labour Organization, Gender Equality and Decent Work in Jordan, April 30, 2021. 39 Celine Alkhaldi, “Jordanian Lawmakers Trade Punches in Parliament amid Heated Discussion on Women’s Rights,” CNN, December 29, 2021. 40 U.S. Department of State, Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Annual Report 2020-2021, January 2021. 41 Freedom House, Jordan, Freedom in the World 2021. 42 Mustafa Abu Sneineh, “Jordan: Prominent Palestinian journalist detained at airport under Cybercrime Law,” Middle East Eye, March 8, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 prohibit gender discrimination.39 The Biden Administration has requested $24 mil ion in
FY2022 for gender programs in Jordan, and its ESF funding request aims to “support the adoption of positive
social norms for gender equality and positive youth engagement and strengthen regulatory and institutional
frameworks to mitigate barriers to increase economic and political participation.”40

32 “How Jordan’s Election Revealed Enduring Weaknesses in Its Political System,” Washington Post, October 3, 2016.
33 Rachel Bessette, “Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections: Why T hey Do (and Don’t) Matter for the Kingdom’s Future,”
Lawfare, September 29, 2016.
34 Sean L. Yom, “T ribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: T he Case of the Hirak Movement,” Middle East Journal,
Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 229 -247.
35 Rana F. Sweis, “Women, 86 Percent Absent From Jordan’s Work Force, Are Left Behind,” New York Times, April 3,
2021.
36 CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R.
Collins; Valentine M. Moghadam, “ COVID-19 and Female Labor in the MENA Region ,” Middle East Institute, June 8,
2021.
37 U.N. Women, “ COVID-19 and Women’s Economic Empowerment: Policy Recommendations for Strengthening
Jordan’s Recovery,” September 1, 2020.
38 Aseel Alayli, “COVID-19 Magnifies Pre-Existing Gender Inequalities in MENA,” Arab Barometer, December 1,
2020.
39 U.S. Department of State, Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Annual Report 2020 -2021, January 2021.
40 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Rela ted
Program s, FY2022, Appendix 2,
June 2021, p. 249.
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2020 Parliamentary Elections
In November 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the kingdom held parliamentary elections
for the 130-seat House of Deputies (lower chamber) without permitting either early or remote
voting. Due to the pandemic, the government curtailed campaign events, which usual y feature
festive public gatherings in smal towns and rural areas.41 Overal turnout (official y 30%) was
slightly lower than usual and noticeably lower in urban areas. Out of the 1,700 candidates (368 of
whom were women) who ran, no female candidate won a seat in any of the competitive races
under the open list proportional representation system.42 Jordan’s electoral system does reserve 15
parliamentary seats for women under its quota system.
Unlike in neighboring Egypt, the kingdom tolerates Muslim Brotherhood political activity, and
Brotherhood candidates sometimes compete in parliamentary elections. (The Brotherhood also
has boycotted previous elections in protest.) The Brotherhood is currently divided between
Islamists who are wil ing to participate in the political system and those who reject it. In 2020,
Brotherhood candidates ran together on a list cal ed the National Al iance Reform and won 10
seats (down from 16 in 2016 election), though of those 10, only 6 belonged to actual Islamist-
leaning candidates.43 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations internet, that include tort and slander, or the denigration of anyone, faces no less than three months in jail and a fine of no less than JD100 ($140) and not more than JD1,000 ($1,400). In 2022, a report alleged that the Jordanian government may have used “Pegasus” software made by the Israeli company NSO Group to spy on Jordanian activists and lawyers.43 Economy For 2022, Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to grow by a modest 2.7%; however, rising food and fuel prices stemming largely from war in Ukraine and continued global supply-chain shortages stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic may strain government finances and consumer spending. Jordanian GDP grew 2% in 2021 after contracting 1.5% in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the start of the pandemic, the IMF has disbursed $1.2 billion in financing to Jordan.44 Figure 3. Jordan’s Projected National Debt Source: Statista Notes: Based on figures from the World Economic Outlook Database October 2021 Servicing Jordan’s growing national debt (see Figure 3), nearly 100% of GDP in 2022, continues to constrain government spending, increasing the possibility that without external assistance, costs in the form of increased taxes and reduced subsidies may be passed on to Jordanian 43 Josef Federman, “Israeli Firm’s Spyware used on Jordan Activists, Report says,” Associated Press, March 5, 2022. 44 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes Third Review Under Jordan’s Extended Arrangement, January 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations consumers. During Jordan’s last fiscal budgetary cycle, the government claims it received $4 billion in foreign aid.45 With unemployment hovering around 24% and 70% of the population under the age of 35, Jordanian workers face difficult prospects in seeking private and public sector employment.46 According to Arab Barometer, a quantitative research organization that conducts public opinion polling in the Middle East: An overwhelming majority (four-in-five) of Jordanians evaluated their current economic situation poorly, and a minority (one-in-three) predicted economic relief in the next 2-3 years. Youth ages 18-29 were the least optimistic towards the economy in the near future, driving a substantial proportion - almost half - of them to consider emigrating.47
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians
The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace
treaty.treaty.4448 Nearly Nearly 2728 years after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the persistence of years after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the persistence of
Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major chal engechallenge for Jordan, as the issue of for Jordan, as the issue of
Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, and the conflict has soured attempts to Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, and the conflict has soured attempts to
improve Jordanian-Israeli people-to-people relations. improve Jordanian-Israeli people-to-people relations.
With the recentSince the 2021 formation of a formation of a new coalition government in Israel, Jordan and Israel may be
looking to turn the page in their bilateral relationship after an era of strained ties between the
King and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.45 Over the past decade, there have
been numerous irritants and incidents both between the two leaders and in broader diplomatic

41 T aylor Luck, “Pandemic Politics? In Jordan, it has Leveled the Playing Field,” Christian Science Monitor, November
2, 2020.
42 According to one analysis of Jordan’s electoral system, “ Candidates must enter into joint electoral lists with a
minimum of three candidates on the ballot. Voters then select a list and their preferred candidates within this list. T he
2016 elections showed that this system makes it difficult for any single list to win more than one seat per district. Since
only the top candidate is likely to win, list members have incentives to discourage their voters from supporting their li st
allies.” See, Kristen Kao and E.J. Karmel, “ T he Pandemic Compromised Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections,”
Washington Post, November 20, 2020.
43 Suha Ma’ayeh and Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan’s 2020 Parliamentary Election: Settling for the Status Quo,” Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, February 2021.
44 Jordan and Israel signed coalition government in Israel, Jordanian-Israeli relations have markedly improved. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s first trip abroad was to Amman to meet with King Abdullah II. Soon thereafter, Prime Minister Bennett announced that Israel had agreed to sell Jordan 50 million cubic meters of additional water annually from the Sea of Galilee; in October 2021, Israel and Jordan formalized the agreement. The Biden Administration praised the deal, including Israel’s additional approval of an increase in the value of Jordanian exports (cement, construction materials, rugs, clothing and electronics) to the West Bank from $160 million to $700 million per year. 49 During a fall 2021 aerial multi-national military exercise in Israel (Blue Flag), Jordan quietly participated, sending several of its F-16s to fly outside of Israel’s Ovda airbase north of Eilat, according to media reports.50 During the two-week drill, the commander of the United Arab Emirates Air Force visited Israel to observe. While there had been speculation surrounding 45 “Jordan Receives $300 Million in Foreign Aid in 2021,” Jordan News Agency (Petra), August 1, 2021. 46 Taylor Luck, “For Jordan’s Unemployed Youth, a Career Opportunity: Local Politics,” Christian Science Monitor, March 23, 2022. 47 Arab Barometer VI, Jordan Country Report, 2021. 48 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors, the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors,
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan, Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan, theJordan’s parliament repealed laws parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel, and the two countries signedbanning contacts with Israel, and the two countries signed a numbera number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and culturalnormalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake T iberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year —a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty). See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs statement on Water Agreement with Jordan, May 27, 1997.
45 “Lapid Vows to Rebuild International T ies after ‘Reckless’ Last Government,” The Times of Israel, June 14, 2021.
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ties.46 The Biden Administration has attempted to heal the rift by encouraging smal steps toward
improved relations. In spring 2021, Israel approved a Jordanian request for additional water
supplies. Israel had initial y denied this request in retaliation over a dispute with Jordan centered
around a royal visit to holy sites in Jerusalem; however, after some intervention by the U.S. State
Department, Israel acceded to the request, which it had customarily approved in previous years.47
Jordan played several different roles during spring 2021 clashes in and around Jerusalem and the
May 2021 conflict in Gaza. On the one hand, Jordan has tried to portray itself as a defender of
Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and a supporter of the Palestinian national cause. After a violent
standoff between Israeli police and Palestinian protestors who had encamped at the Al Aqsa
Mosque compound on the Temple Mount, the Jordanian government issued an official statement
saying, “What the Israeli police and special forces are doing, from violations against the mosque
to attacks on worshippers, is barbaric (behavior) that is rejected and condemned.”48 Days later,
after further hostilities erupted between Israel and Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Jordan
attempted to play a supportive role in joining Egypt, France, the United States, and others in
cal ing for a cease-fire.49 During the outbreak of violence, U.S. and Jordanian officials spoke and
agreed on the “urgency of de-escalation and the importance of preserving the historic status quo
at the holy sites in Jerusalem as wel as Jordan’s role there.”50
Holy Sites in Jerusalem51
Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 (when the Israeli military seized East Jerusalem—including its
Old City—from Jordan) and then subsequently confirmed in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, Israel
acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines.52 A Jordanian waqf (or
Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or
Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal
family’s rule.53 Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that
appear to circumscribe King Abdul ah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political
problem for the King. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing “status quo”
arrangement that dates back to the era of Ottoman control before World War I.

46 David Schenker and Ghaith al-Omari, “Getting the Israel-Jordan Relationship back on T rack,” Policy Alert, T he
Washington Institut e for Near East Policy, March 12, 2021.
47 Barak Ravid, “Israel Agrees to Send More Water to Jordan after Push from Biden,” Axios, April 12, 2021.
48 “Jordan Warns Israel against ‘Barbaric’ Attacks on Mosque,” Reuters, May 9, 2021.
49 “France’s Macron Says to Work with Jordan, Egypt Leaders on Israel-Gaza Ceasefire,” Reuters, May 17, 2021.
50 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi, May 10, 2021.
51 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S.
Relations
, by Jim Zanotti.
52 Article 9, Clause 2, of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. is delineated in Annex II of the treaty and coordinated by the Joint Water Committee comprised of Israeli and Jordanian officials. According to the 1994 treaty, in exchange for certain Jordanian concessions to Israel, Israel agreed to supply Jordan with 50 million cubic meters of water a year from the northern part of Israel (in a separate agreement, Israel agreed to sell Jordan another 10 million cubic meters in 2010). The Annex also states that “Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of (50) MCM/year [million cubic meters] of water of drinkable standards.” 49 U.S. Department of State, United States Welcomes Announcement of Israel and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Agreements on Water and West Bank Trade, July 8, 2021. 50 Judah Ari Gross, “German Photographer Spills the Beans: Jordan Flew in IDF Aerial Drill,” Times of Israel, October 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Jordanian participation in previous Blue Flag exercises, this exercise appears to have been the first confirmed involvement. In November 2021, Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reached a trilateral energy-for-water agreement, whereby the UAE is to finance additional solar production capacity in Jordan to be exported to Israel (600 megawatts) in exchange for 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water. On November 22, 2021, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry traveled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the signing ceremony for the energy-for-water deal, dubbed “Project Prosperity.” Holy Sites in Jerusalem51 Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 (when the Israeli military seized East Jerusalem—including its Old City—from Jordan) and then subsequently confirmed in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, Israel acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines.52 A Jordanian waqf (or Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal family’s rule. Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that appear to circumscribe King Abdul ah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political problem for the king. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing “status quo” arrangement that dates back to the era of Ottoman control before World War I. In spring 2022, amidst a wave of attacks resulting in the death of 14 people in Israel, Figure 4. King Abdullah II meets Israel’s Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority President have attempted to deescalate tensions, March 2022 particularly around the convergence of the holidays of Ramadan, Easter, and Passover. In meetings with Israeli officials, King Abdullah II has urged them to avoid measures that could hinder worship on the Temple Mount. During Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s March 2022 visit to Jordan, King Abdullah II told the president that nothing should harm the “legal and historical status quo of Jerusalem and [its] holy sites” and that “You and I are going to work as Israel’s Isaac Herzog (left); Jordan’s King Abdul ah II hard as we can with all our colleagues to bin Al-Hussein (right). maintain calm, and make sure we do not Source: Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs move into any unilateral measures that undermine the process of peace.”53 King Abdullah II also visited the West Bank for the first time 51 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 52 Article 9, Clause 2, of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will
give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan willreaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to continue to
serve as the “serve as the “ Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,”Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have useda title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since 1924 (see footnote below). 53 Greer Fay Cashman and Tovah Lazaroff, “Jordan's King Abdullah Condemns Acts of Terrorism in Israel,” Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations in five years in late March 2022; his visit coincided with the historic “Negev Summit,” in which the foreign ministers of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Bahrain, and Egypt convened in Israel to further advance Israel-Arab normalization in the wake of the 2020 “Abraham Accords.” In addition to seeking calm, King Abdullah’s outreach to the Palestinians may also have been an attempt to draw international attention toward the Palestinians. On April 1, 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in which both officials “discussed the need for calm in Jerusalem during April as Muslims, Jews, and Christians celebrate Ramadan, Passover, and Easter.”54 Water Scarcity Jordan is a water-poor nation and, according to the World Resources Institute, is one of the top-five most water-stressed countries in the world.55since
1924 (see footnote below).
53 After the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which
had long been under the custodianship of the Hashemite family, became nominally part of the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman leaders also assumed the title of “ Caliph,” or leader of the Muslim world. In practice, successive Ottoman
Caliphs recognized the role of the Hashemite family in sharing custodianship over Mecca and Medina. T his dual
arrangement lasted until 1924, when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the nascent republic of T urkey. Hussei n
bin Ali, then Sharif of Mecca and head of the Hashemite family, declared himself Caliph over all Muslims, but his
claim was not universally recognized, and the Hashemites soon lost control over Mecca and Medina to Ibn Saud,
founder of modern Saudi Arabia. However, in 1924 Arab religious authorities (the Grand Muftī of Jerusalem and
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Water Scarcity and the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Water Deal
Jordan is a water-poor nation and, according to the World Resources Institute, is one of the top-
five most water-stressed countries in the world.54 Jordan’s increase in water scarcity over the past Jordan’s increase in water scarcity over the past
75 years is attributable to population growth, a decrease in the flow of the Yarmouk River due to 75 years is attributable to population growth, a decrease in the flow of the Yarmouk River due to
the buildingthe building of dams upstream in Syria, gradual declines in of dams upstream in Syria, gradual declines in rainfal rainfall, and depleting groundwater , and depleting groundwater
resources due to overuse.resources due to overuse.55 The il egal56 The illegal construction of thousands of private construction of thousands of private wel s also has led to
wells has also contributed to unsustainable groundwater extraction. The large influx of Syrian refugees has heightened water unsustainable groundwater extraction. The large influx of Syrian refugees has heightened water
demand in the north. A Stanford University study predicts that dwindling water supplies and demand in the north. A Stanford University study predicts that dwindling water supplies and
continued population growth continued population growth wil will, without intervention, halve per capita water use in Jordan by , without intervention, halve per capita water use in Jordan by
the end of this century. 56
As of July 2021, Jordan is experiencing a severe drought. During the last rainy season (October
2020-April 2021), the kingdom received 60% of normal rainfal .57 In the spring of 2021, water
authorities announced that the state would reduce water availability hours for specific regions of
the country during the summer. An infestation of desert locusts also has plagued Jordan this
spring, leading to significant crop losses in certain regions.58
To secure new sources of fresh water, Jordan has pursued cooperative water projects with its
neighbors. In 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water
agreement (official y known as the Memorandum of Understanding on the Red-Dead Sea
Conveyance Project) to pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multibil ion-dollar project to
address declining water levels in the Dead Sea and provide desalinated water to the parties to the
agreement.59 Congress had supported the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project. P.L. 114-113, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, specified that $100 mil ion in Economic Support Funds
(ESF) was to be set aside for water sector support for Jordan, to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea
water project. However, after several years of delays, financing concerns, and Israeli uncertainty
owing both to environmentalist objections and lack of a functioning government, Jordan decided

Supreme Muslim Council) in British-controlled mandatory Palestine, did recognize Hussein bin Ali’s custodianship
over holy sites in Jerusalem, which is considered the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina. Reflecting
military and political ties developed between the United Kingdom and the Hashemites during World War 1, Hussein’s
son Abdullah ruled Jordan after its creation (as T ransjordan under British mandatory con trol) in the 1920s under the
post -Ottoman settlement of World War I. When Abdullah became Jordan’s first king (Abdullah I) in 1946, the West
Bank remained under the British Mandate for Palestine. During Abdullah’s kingship, Jordan invaded the West Bank
and gained control of East Jerusalem and its holy sites in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. King Abdullah I was assassinated
in 1951 on the Mount/Haram (during a visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque for Friday prayers) by a Palestinian supposedly
concerned about possible Jordan-Israel peace talks. For background, see Victor Kattan, “ T he Special Role of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem,” Arab Law Quarterly, July 13, 2020.
54 Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s
Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress,” World Resources Institute, August 6, 2019.
55 Deepthi Rajsekhar and Steven M. Gorelick, “Increasing drought in Jordan: Climate Change and Cascading Syrian
Land-Use Impacts on Reducing T ransboundary Flow,” Science Advances, August 30, 2017: vol. 3, no. 8.
56 Josie Garthwaite, “Stanford Study Reveals a Deepening Water Crisis in Jordan – and a Way Forward,” Stanford
University News, March 29, 2021.
57 “Jordan Facing ‘One of the most Severe’ Droughts in its History,” Al Jazeera, May 6, 2021.
58 Jack Kennedy, “Jordan’s Drought and Locust Infestation expected to Increase Unrest, but Protests unlikely to
Remove Prime Minister, Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, May 27, 2021.
59 On February 26, 2015, Israel and Jordan signed a bilateral agreement (“Seas Canal” Agreement) on the
implementation of the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project, specifically on the construction of a desalination plant north
of Aqaba that would supply water to the Aravah region in Israel and to Aqaba in Jordan.
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in the summer of 2021 to cancel the project and wil instead build its own desalination plant along
the Red Sea.60
Syria
Jordanian-Syrian relations have been strained since 2011.the end of this century.57 54 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Call with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi, Readout, Office of the Spokesperson, April 1, 2022. 55 Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress,” World Resources Institute, August 6, 2019. 56 Deepthi Rajsekhar and Steven M. Gorelick, “Increasing drought in Jordan: Climate Change and Cascading Syrian Land-Use Impacts on Reducing Transboundary Flow,” Science Advances, August 30, 2017: vol. 3, no. 8. 57 Josie Garthwaite, “Stanford Study Reveals a Deepening Water Crisis in Jordan – and a Way Forward,” Stanford University News, March 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 12 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 5. Jordan’s Water Vulnerability Source: Government of Jordan, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) To secure new sources of water, Jordan is not only increasing regional cooperation (see above), but also pursuing domestic water development projects. In July 2021, after years of delays in evaluating the now-defunct trilateral project (Israel-Jordan-Palestinian Authority) known as the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project, Jordan has moved ahead with plans to build its own desalination plant in Aqaba, along with a water treatment facility, pumping station, and a 280-mile pipeline to carry water to Amman and elsewhere. The aim of the Aqaba-Amman Water Desalination and Conveyance Project (AAWDCP) is to bring 300 million cubic meters of potable water annually to water-stressed areas. USAID and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have provided funding to conduct feasibility studies.58 The Jordanian government is currently evaluating private company bids for the $2.5 billion project. According to USAID, the U.S. Government has provided over $10 million in technical support to the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation to study the feasibility of the AAWDCP; over the next five years, the United States government has pledged $700 million, with $300 million in grant funding from USAID, subject to the availability of funds, and up to $400 million in loans to the project company from the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, subject to bankability requirements.59 58 USAID, Jordan Water Infrastructure, Annual Progress Report, Period 12th – July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021. 59 CRS Correspondence with USAID, April 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Syria and Lebanon Jordanian-Syrian relations had been strained for the last decade, but over the past year have begun to normalize. In 2011, King Abdullah II was the first Arab King Abdullah II was the first Arab
leader to leader to call openly openly cal for Syrian President Bashar al Asad’s resignationfor Syrian President Bashar al Asad’s resignation in November 2011, and , and
Jordan supported moderate Syrian rebel groups operating in southwestern Syria until the Asad Jordan supported moderate Syrian rebel groups operating in southwestern Syria until the Asad
government largely defeated these groups in 2018.government largely defeated these groups in 2018.6160 Since the Asad regime Since the Asad regime mostly reclaimed control of reclaimed control of
southern Syria (with the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), Jordan has sought to return to southern Syria (with the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), Jordan has sought to return to
normal bilateralnormal bilateral ties. Along the kingdom’s northern border with Syria, many Jordanian residents
share familial ties with Syrian families. While Jordan and Syria opened the Nasib/Jaber border
crossing to facilitate greater bilateral trade, economic relations have not returned to pre-2011
levels, arguably because of trade barriers, sanctions, and security impediments.62
Syria remains a primary problem for Jordan’s security. The kingdom shares security concerns
with Israel over the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces operating near Jordan’s borders.
According to one account, “Former Free Syrian Army rebels who have returned to their
hometowns in southern Syria after an amnesty agreement with the regime say Hezbollah is
effectively ‘governing’ several towns and vil ages. Hezbollah and Shiite militias patrol areas
dressed as uniformed Syrian regime forces in order to avoid being hit by Israeli airstrikes, they
say, or, more frequently, deploy former rebel fighters to patrol areas and provide intel igence
directly to the Iran-backed paramilitary group ties. In September 2021, Syria’s defense minister visited Jordan, and the main border crossing between Jordan and Syria has reopened (it had been closed due to COVID-19). In October 2021, King Abdullah II reportedly spoke over the phone with President Asad, though unlike Asad’s 2022 visit to the UAE, there have been no official visits between heads of state. Syria continues to be a source of narcotics production, as Syrian-based drug smugglers routinely attempt to penetrate Jordan’s borders. Jordanian military leaders claimed that in January and February 2022, the armed forces had killed 30 smugglers and intercepted 16 million Captagon pills, which refers to the drug compound fenethylline hydrochloride.61 According to one report, in 2020 Captagon exports from Syria reached a market value of at least $3.46 billion.62 Jordanian officials are not only concerned about narcotics smuggling across Jordan’s borders, but also worry that domestic drug consumption is increasing. According to one report, “as much as one-fifth of the drugs smuggled in from Syria are now consumed in Jordan.”63 .”63
The kingdom also continues to host hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom are The kingdom also continues to host hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom are
reluctant to return to their homes for fear of Syrian regime retribution against them.64 As of reluctant to return to their homes for fear of Syrian regime retribution against them.64 As of June
2021March 2022, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are , the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are
668,332674,268 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees has placed registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees has placed
tremendous strain on Jordan’s government and local economies, tremendous strain on Jordan’s government and local economies, especial yespecially in the northern in the northern
governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa.
Due to the Syrian civil war and the continued presence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq,
Jordan has had to more carefully monitor its borders and its citizens, some of whom may have
joined terrorist groups abroad. According to the State Department, “There were many Jordanian
nationals among FTFs [foreign terrorist fighters] in Iraq and Syria, and the threat of domestic
radicalization, especial y online, remains. Returning FTFs are an ongoing concern for Jordan’s
security services.”65 Congress has contributed funding to Jordan’s border security efforts in recent
defense appropriations legislation (see below).

60 “After Years of Delays, Jordan Said to Nix Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal with Israel, PA,” The Times of Israel, June 17,
2021.
61 Steven Simon and James Fromson, “Jordan’s Pragmatism in Syria, How It Became a Reliable Partner to
Washington,” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2016.
62 Nabih Bulos, “Sanctions on Syria Also Felt By U.S. Allies,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2019.
63 T aylor Luck, “What Russian Deal? Israel and Jordan Cast Wary Eye T oward Syria,” Christian Science Monitor,
August 12, 2019.
64 “T rapped in Jordan, Syrian Refugees See No Way Home,” Associated Press, September 11, 2019.
65 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Jordan, June 24, 2020.
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governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa. In Lebanon, which remains in the throes of a crippling economic and energy crisis, Jordan and Egypt are seeking to ease energy shortages by planning to ship natural gas and electricity into Lebanon through Jordan and Syria. These countries may need to receive a waiver from the United States in order to comply with the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXIV). According to Barbara Leaf, the President's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, “This is a project that, as I understand, it is endorsed by the World Bank, so that the State Department is looking at it carefully within the framework of US law and sanctions policy. But it shows some promise on the face of it. And of course, the department will consult thoroughly with Treasury on the way forward.”65 In October 2021, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland stated, “one of the energy solutions that we are working on with 60 Steven Simon and James Fromson, “Jordan’s Pragmatism in Syria, How It Became a Reliable Partner to Washington,” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2016. “Syrian Defence Minister Visits Jordan to Discuss Deraa crisis,” The National, September 20, 2021 61 “Jordan says Drug Trafficking from Syria is 'Organised,' Agence France Presse, February 17, 2022. 62 Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), “The Syrian Economy at War Captagon, Hashish, and the Syrian Narco-State,” April 2021. 63 Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, “On Syria’s Ruins, a Drug Empire Flourishes,” New York Times, December 5, 2021. 64 “Trapped in Jordan, Syrian Refugees See No Way Home,” Associated Press, September 11, 2019. 65 "Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pending Nominations," Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Transcripts, September 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Lebanese authorities, which could provide relief in weeks and months, would involve the World Bank and would involve humanitarian relief. So because it falls under the humanitarian category, no sanctions waiver would be required in this instance.”66 Lebanese officials in late October reported that U.S. officials had issued a letter of comfort that would “make this deal possible without any ramifications vis-a-vis the sanctions.”67 In January 2022, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea stated that the United States has helped to facilitate and encourage the deal, and had provided additional assurances to the Lebanese government regarding U.S. sanctions legislation.68 In April 2022, Lebanon’s energy minister stated that World Bank financing was “the remaining essential step” before natural gas imports from Egypt and electricity imports from Jordan—both transiting Syria—could begin.69 The deal has faced opposition from some Members of Congress. In a February 2022 letter to Secretary of State Blinken, the ranking Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee argued that the deal would “undoubtedly enrich the Assad regime and trigger U.S. sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.”70 U.S. Relations
U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in promoting Middle East U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in promoting Middle East
peace, upholding U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world, peace, upholding U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world,
both in its regional outlook and internal politics.both in its regional outlook and internal politics.6671 Many U.S. policymakers advocate for Many U.S. policymakers advocate for
continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in
historical terms over the past 15 yearshistorical terms over the past 15 years (see below). According to the U.S. State Department, the . According to the U.S. State Department, the
United States and Jordan have a 1996 Status of Forces Agreement, a 2006 Acquisition and Cross-United States and Jordan have a 1996 Status of Forces Agreement, a 2006 Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement, and a 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement.Servicing Agreement, and a 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement.67
Jordan also hosts U.S. troops. According to President Biden’s June 2021 War Powers Resolution
Report to Congress, “At the request of the Government of Jordan, approximately 2,976 United
72 The 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement formalizes years of U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation, which became more visible at the start of Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL/ISIS) in 2014. Jordanian air bases have been particularly important for the U.S. conduct of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in Syria and Iraq. U.S. forces have operated out of various Jordanian air bases, such as Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan.73 While the United States never officially acknowledged its presence at Muwaffaq Salit Air Base prior to the 2021 agreement, according to 66 U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, “Media Availability with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland,” October 14, 2021. 67 Sunniva Rose, “Lebanon to get six more Hours of Power a Day in Syria-Egypt Gas Deal, says Minister,” The National, October 21, 2021. 68 U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, “Ambassador Dorothy C. Shea Statement at the Grand Serail,” January 14, 2022. 69 “Energy Minister Walid Fayad says World Bank financing is the "remaining essential step" for unlocking Egyptian and Jordanian power supply,” L’Orient Today, April 9, 2022. 70 “Risch, McCaul Express Concern over Biden Administration’s Engagement in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt Energy Deals,” February 1, 2022. 71 U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Secretary of State Blinken’s Meeting with His Majesty King Abdullah II, May 26, 2021. 72 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan, Fact Sheet, May 21, 2021. 73 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (P.L. 115-91) authorized $143 million in Air Force construction funds to expand the ramp space at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. Congressional Research Service 15 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations one report, “satellite imagery shows it has hosted US Air Force (USAF) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and fast jets since at least 2016.”74 As of December 2021, approximately 3,147 United States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support Defeat“counter-ISIS operations, enhance -ISIS operations, enhance
Jordan’s security, and promote regional stability.”Jordan’s security, and promote regional stability.”6875 According to the 2021 agreement: Jordan shall provide unimpeded access to and use of Agreed Facilities and Areas to U.S. forces, U.S. personnel, U.S. contractors, and others as mutually agreed, for activities including-visits; training; exercises; maneuvers; transit; support and related activities; refueling of aircraft; landing and recovery of aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; accommodation of personnel; communications; staging and deploying of forces and materiel; pre-positioning of equipment, supplies, and materiel; security assistance and cooperation activities; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief; contingency operations; and other activities as mutually agreed by the Parties or their Executive Agents.76 Beyond the need to use Jordanian facilities to counter IS throughout the region, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) may seek to partner more closely with Jordan in order to position U.S. materiel to counter Iran. In summer 2021, the U.S. Department of In summer 2021, the U.S. Department of
Defense announced that equipment and materiel previously stored at a now-closed U.S. base in Defense announced that equipment and materiel previously stored at a now-closed U.S. base in
Qatar would be moved to Jordan.Qatar would be moved to Jordan.69
77 The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi
Ahlam al Tamimi is a Jordanian national who participated in the 2001 suicide bombing of a Ahlam al Tamimi is a Jordanian national who participated in the 2001 suicide bombing of a
Jerusalem pizza restaurant that Jerusalem pizza restaurant that kil edkilled 15 people, including two Americans. In Israel, she had been 15 people, including two Americans. In Israel, she had been
sentenced to life in prison but was released and returned to Jordan in 2011 as part of a prisoner sentenced to life in prison but was released and returned to Jordan in 2011 as part of a prisoner
exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. The U.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. The U.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges
against Al Tamimi in 2013, and those charges were unsealed in early 2017. Al Tamimi is on the against Al Tamimi in 2013, and those charges were unsealed in early 2017. Al Tamimi is on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted Terrorist List.Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted Terrorist List.7078 The United States and Jordan The United States and Jordan
have an extradition treaty, which, according to the U.S. State Department, entered into force on have an extradition treaty, which, according to the U.S. State Department, entered into force on
July 29, 1995.July 29, 1995.7179 The United States requested Al Tamimi’s extradition in 2017, but Jordan’s Court The United States requested Al Tamimi’s extradition in 2017, but Jordan’s Court
of Cassation ruled that the extradition treaty was invalid. In November 2019, the State of Cassation ruled that the extradition treaty was invalid. In November 2019, the State
Department,Department said that “the United States regards the extradition treaty as valid.” said that “the United States regards the extradition treaty as valid.”
According to one According to one recentApril 2021 report, one reason why the U.S. and Israeli governments have not applied report, one reason why the U.S. and Israeli governments have not applied
further pressure on the government of Jordan to extradite Tamimi is concern for the stability of further pressure on the government of Jordan to extradite Tamimi is concern for the stability of
Jordan.Jordan.7280 One unnamed U.S. State Department official noted that “while [King] One unnamed U.S. State Department official noted that “while [King] Abdullah has no
love for Tamimi, giving her up to America would put the king in a very difficult position with his
own people.”73

66 U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Secretary of State Blinken’s Meeting with His Majesty King Abdullah II, May 26, 2021.
67 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Jordan, Fact Sheet, May 21, 2021.
68 T he 74 “Jeremy Binnie, “US Carrying out Major Upgrade to Jordanian Airbase,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 1, 2021. 75 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, T extText of a Letter from the President to the of a Letter from the President to the Spe akerSpeaker of the House of of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Representatives and the President Pro T emporeTempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Report of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Report , June 8, 2021.
69, December 7, 2021. 76 U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 21-317, Agreement between the United States of America and Jordan with Exchange of Notes, Signed at Amman January 31, 2021, Entered into force March 17, 2021. 77 J.P. Lawrence, “US Military Shifts Army Basing J.P. Lawrence, “US Military Shifts Army Basing from Qatar to Jordan in Move that Could Provide Leverage against from Qatar to Jordan in Move that Could Provide Leverage against
Iran,” Iran,” Stars and Stripes, July, July 1, 2021. 1, 2021.
7078 https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ahlam-ahmad-al-tamimi/@@download.pdf. https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ahlam-ahmad-al-tamimi/@@download.pdf.
T heThe kingdom’s courts have ruled kingdom’s courts have ruled that Al that Al T amimiTamimi cannot be extradited until such a treaty is endorsed by the Jordanian cannot be extradited until such a treaty is endorsed by the Jordanian
parliament. parliament.
7280 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Justice Ignored,” Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Justice Ignored,” Jerusalem Post, April 30, 2021. , April 30, 2021.
73 Op. cit.
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Abdullah has no love for Tamimi, giving her up to America would put the king in a very difficult position with his own people.”81 On March 23, 2022, six lawmakers sent a letter to Secretary of State Blinken requesting responses to questions over why Jordan has not extradited Tamimi.82 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957,
respectively. Total bilateralrespectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to
Jordan through Jordan through FY2018FY2019 amounted to approximately $ amounted to approximately $22 bil ion. 23.8 billion. Jordan also has received over Jordan also has received over 1
bil ion dollars$1.5 billion in additional in additional military aid since military aid since FY2014FY2015, channeled through the Defense , channeled through the Defense
Department’s various security assistance accounts. Department’s various security assistance accounts. Currently, Jordan is the thirdFor FY2023, the Biden Administration is requesting $1.45 billion in total bilateral assistance, which would make Jordan, after Israel, the second-largest targeted -largest recipient recipient
of annual U.S. foreign aid of annual U.S. foreign aid global y, after Afghanistan and Israel.
in the President’s congressional budget justification. Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan
current U.S. current U.S. dol ars in mil ions
FY2017
dollars in millions FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
actual
actual
actual
actual
enacted
request
DA
— —
— —
— —

85.0085.00 —
— —
ESF
832.35
1,082.40 1,082.40 1,082.40
1,082.40 1,082.40
1, 1,082122.40 .40
1, 1,122207.40 .40
9101,035.80 .80
FMF
470.00
425.00 425.00 425.00
425.00 425.00
425.00 425.00
425.00 425.00
350400.00 .00
IMET
3.88
4.01 4.01
3.99 3.99
4.00 4.00
4.00 4.00
4.00 3.80 3.80
NADR
13.60 13.60
13.60 13.60
13.60 13.60
13.60 13.60
13.60 13.60
10.40 10.40
Total
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,525525.01 1,524.99 1,525.00 1,650.00
1,650.00
1,275450.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications Budget Justifications
((FY2019-FY2022), P.L. 116-260FY2020-FY2023), P.L. 117-103, and CRS calculations and rounding., and CRS calculations and rounding.
Notes:
Prior-year Prior-year funds not included in this table: $125 mil ionfunds not included in this table: $125 mil ion in ESF in FY2020 (P.L. 116-93in ESF in FY2020 (P.L. 116-93 ); $50 mil ion); $50 mil ion in in
Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6). Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6).
U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance
On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the (MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the
United United States and Jordan, commits the United States to providing $1.275 and Jordan, commits the United States to providing $1.275 bil ionbillion per year in bilateral per year in bilateral
foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 bil ion billion (FY2018-FY2022).(FY2018-FY2022).83 This This
latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous
iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements
had each been in effect for three years.
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Figure 2had each been in effect for three years. As fiscal year 2023 approaches, the Biden Administration and Jordan are negotiating a new five-year MOU on assistance. Given the economic and environmental challenges the kingdom faces, both sides may be discussing ways to incentivize reform as well as how to best allocate U.S. economic aid between USAID projects and budget support. 81 Op. cit. 82 Twitter, Congressman Greg Steube, March 24, 2022. 83 Previous MOUs spanned FYs 2010-2014 and FYs 2015-2017. Congressional Research Service 17 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 6. State Department and USAID Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2021
Executive branch requests vs. actual Executive branch requests vs. actual al ocations in mil ionsallocations in millions of current of current dol arsdollars

Source: Created by CRS using data from annual State Department Congressional Created by CRS using data from annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, Budget Justifications,
legislation,legislation, and explanatory statements. and explanatory statements.
Notes: Economic aid from the fol owing accounts: Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Food for Peace Act, Title Economic aid from the fol owing accounts: Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Food for Peace Act, Title
II (P.L.II (P.L. 480). Military aid from the fol owing accounts: Foreign480). Military aid from the fol owing accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Military Financing (FMF), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and
Nonproliferation,Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related ProgramsDemining and Related Programs (NADR). (NADR).
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2) The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2)
USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic
assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid
recipient worldwide.recipient worldwide.7484 U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt
payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs. (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs. (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on
imports for its domestic energy needs.) According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are imports for its domestic energy needs.) According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are
deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not
commingled with other funds.commingled with other funds.75

74 Other budget 85 U.S. budget support (excluding military aid) to Jordan represents 6% of the kingdom’s entire annual budget ($15 billion for 2022). 84 Other budget support aid recipients include the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. support aid recipients include the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
7585 USAID USAID Congressional Notification, May 15, 2020. Congressional Notification, May 15, 2020.
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Figure 37. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan
Obligated funds since 2011 in Obligated funds since 2011 in mil ions of dol arsmillions of dollars

Source: Created by CRS with data from USAID Foreign Aid ExplorerCreated by CRS with data from USAID Foreign Aid Explorer.
USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors, including democracy assistance, water USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors, including democracy assistance, water
conservation, decentralization, health, and education (particularly building and renovating public conservation, decentralization, health, and education (particularly building and renovating public
schools). schools).
 In the  In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building
programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the
Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Ministry of Justice. Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Ministry of Justice.
The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also
have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the Jordanian have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the Jordanian
Independent Election Commission (IEC),Independent Election Commission (IEC),7686 Jordanian political parties, and Jordanian political parties, and
members of parliament.members of parliament.
 In the  In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to
optimizing the management of scarce water resources. USAID helps improve the optimizing the management of scarce water resources. USAID helps improve the
capacity of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, as capacity of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, as wel well as local water utilities, as local water utilities,
such as Miyahuna, Aqaba Water Company, the Yarmouk Water Companies, the such as Miyahuna, Aqaba Water Company, the Yarmouk Water Companies, the
Water Authority of Jordan, and the Jordan Water Authority of Jordan, and the Jordan Val eyValley Authority. Authority.
 In the area of  In the area of decentralization, Chemonics International is USAID’s primary , Chemonics International is USAID’s primary
U.S. partner in implementing U.S. partner in implementing the Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative, the Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative,
and Effective Solutions (CITIES) project, which aims to improve how Jordanian and Effective Solutions (CITIES) project, which aims to improve how Jordanian
municipalities deliver core services.municipalities deliver core services.7787 USAID also uses ESF to fund USAID also uses ESF to fund

76 USAID infrastructure development in Jordanian municipalities in order to help create jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanians. 86 USAID also has provided grant assistance to the IEC to improve the transparency of elections administration. also has provided grant assistance to the IEC to improve the transparency of elections administration.
7787 Chemonics International, Strengthening Municipal Governance in Jordan, at https://chemonics.com/projects/ Chemonics International, Strengthening Municipal Governance in Jordan, at https://chemonics.com/projects/
strengthening-municipal-governance-jordan/. strengthening-municipal-governance-jordan/.
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infrastructure development in Jordanian municipalities in order to help create
jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.
 In the  In the health sector, USAID grants support the Jordanian Ministry of Health in sector, USAID grants support the Jordanian Ministry of Health in
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, in conjunction with responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, in conjunction with
implementing partners, such as Family Health International (FHI), Management implementing partners, such as Family Health International (FHI), Management
Systems International (MSI), and Abt Associates, USAID provides funding to Systems International (MSI), and Abt Associates, USAID provides funding to
deliverydeliver improved reproductive, maternal, neonatal, and child health services. improved reproductive, maternal, neonatal, and child health services.7888
 In the  In the education sector, USAID has supported the Jordan Compact Education sector, USAID has supported the Jordan Compact Education
Fund, a Fund, a multidonormulti-donor funding mechanism that has enabled 134,121 Syrian children funding mechanism that has enabled 134,121 Syrian children
to enroll in Jordanian schools.to enroll in Jordanian schools.7989
U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) al owallow recipient governments (in this case, Jordan) to recipient governments (in this case, Jordan) to
issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital
markets,markets,8090 effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013, effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013,
Congress has Congress has authorized81authorized91 LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 mil ionmillion in ESF (the “subsidy in ESF (the “subsidy
cost”) to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 cost”) to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 bil ionbillion at at
concessional lending rates.concessional lending rates.82
92 Humanitarian Assistance for
Figure 4.8. U.S., Jordan Sign Aid Agreement
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
($340 ($340 mil ionmillion assistance agreement signed May 2020) assistance agreement signed May 2020)
The U.S. State Department estimates that, The U.S. State Department estimates that,
since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees
began in FY2012, it has began in FY2012, it has al ocated more than
$1.8 bil ion allocated nearly $2 billion in humanitarian assistance from in humanitarian assistance from
global accounts for programs in Jordan to global accounts for programs in Jordan to
meet the needs of Syrian refugees and, meet the needs of Syrian refugees and,
indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan.indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan.83
93 U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both
as cash assistance to refugees and through as cash assistance to refugees and through
programs to meet their basic needs, such as programs to meet their basic needs, such as

child health care, education, water, and child health care, education, water, and
Source: U.S. Embassy Amman. U.S. Embassy Amman.
sanitation. To help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Jordan, the United States has provided sanitation. To help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Jordan, the United States has provided
$8.4 mil ion $8.4 million in aid, most of which is targeted toward Syrian refugees living in Jordan.in aid, most of which is targeted toward Syrian refugees living in Jordan.84

78 USAID, 94 88 USAID, Congressional Notification #59, FY2020 – Country Narrative, December 3, 2020. Congressional Notification #59, FY2020 – Country Narrative, December 3, 2020.
79 Op. cit.89 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on , Country Reports on T errorismTerrorism, 2019. 2019.
8090 “A Helping Hand,” “A Helping Hand,” International Financial Law Review, April 2014. , April 2014.
8191 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2013, specified that such assistance should2013, specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706(j) of the same act also take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706(j) of the same act also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan
guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034 in each of the past guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034 in each of the past seveneight consolidated appropriations acts (FY2015 consolidated appropriations acts (FY2015 -FY2021).
82-FY2022). 92 For the latest Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States and Jordan, see For the latest Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States and Jordan, see T reaties and otherTreaties and Other International International
Acts SeriesActs Series 15-624, Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States 15-624, Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States o fof America and Jordan, Signed America and Jordan, Signed at Amman at Amman
May 31, 2015. May 31, 2015.
8393 CRS CRS Correspondence with Correspondence with the U.S. State Department, June 2021.
84 USAID, “ USAID, April 2022. 94 USAID, “State Department: Update: State Department: Update: T heThe United States Continues to Lead the Global United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” Response to COVID-19,”
available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/coronavirus/fact-sheets/may-29-2020-update-united-states-available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/coronavirus/fact-sheets/may-29-2020-update-united-states-
continues-lead-global-response-covid-19. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Military Assistance
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military
assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain
U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems.U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems.85 U.S. and Jordanian officials have conducted 42 meetings of the U.S.-Jordan Joint Military Commission (JMC) in which high-level officers from both countries engage in discussions on enhancing cooperation and future procurement. Annual U.S. military aid represents at least 20% of Jordan’s total military defense budget.95 According to the State Department, Jordan receives According to the State Department, Jordan receives
one of the largest one of the largest al ocationsallocations of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding
worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include “King worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include “King Abdullah Abdullah II, the Chairman of the Joint II, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and
numerous other commanders.”numerous other commanders.”8696
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance
FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces’ FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces’
multiyear (multiyear (usual yusually five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance
supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF
may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to
sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF
grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter
aircraft and a fleet of 31 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.aircraft and a fleet of 31 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.8797
Figure 59. U.S.-Supplied Black Hawk Helicopters for Jordan

Source: Jane’s Defence Weekly. Jane’s Defence Weekly.
As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State, As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State,
the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through
DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan stil still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the
FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border
security. U.S. assistance has helped finance the creation of the Jordan Border Security System, an

continues-lead-global-response-covid-19.
85 95 According to According to Jane’s Defence Procurement Budgets, Jordan’s , Jordan’s 20202022 defense budget defense budget is $2.is $2.0717 billion. See billion. See Jane’s
Defence Budgets
, Jordan, , Jordan, February 2, 2021.
86 U.S. April 5, 2022. 96 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan,” Fact Sheet, October 26, 2018.Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan,” Fact Sheet, October 26, 2018.
87 97 Gareth Jennings, “US Contracts Black Hawk Gareth Jennings, “US Contracts Black Hawk for Jordan’s Royal Squadron,”for Jordan’s Royal Squadron,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,, October 21, October 21,
2020. 2020.
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FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border security. U.S. assistance has helped finance the creation of the Jordan Border Security System, an integrated network of guard towers, integrated network of guard towers, surveil ancesurveillance cameras, and radar to guard the kingdom’s cameras, and radar to guard the kingdom’s
borders with Syria and Iraq.borders with Syria and Iraq.8898 Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan
has amounted to has amounted to at least $1.5 billion$1.5 bil ion dollars. dollars.89
Excess Defense Articles
In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Al y (MNNA) status, a designation
99 In December 2021, the United States Air Force, under C-130 Ramp-to-Ramp (R2R) transfer program, donated three C-130 transport aircraft to the Royal Jordanian Air Force. According to the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, “The transfer of the USAF C-130 aircraft boosts RJAF fixed wing tactical airlift capability by nearly 50% and saves RJAF approximately $30 million in equipment renovation costs.”100 In February 2022, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale to Jordan estimated at $4.21 billion.101 The sale includes the transfer of new planes to Jordan, including twelve F-16 C Block 70 aircraft and four F-16 D Block 70 aircraft. It also includes weapons systems to arm the fighters and engines and other parts to refurbish older F-16 models currently maintained by the Royal Jordanian Air Force. It is unclear whether the Biden Administration has granted Jordan the ability to finance the purchase over multiple years, which may be necessary given the cost of the proposed sale.102 Excess Defense Articles In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training,
and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.90103 In the past decade, the In the past decade, the
United States has provided $83United States has provided $83 mil ion.3 million (current $ value) in excess U.S. defense articles to Jordan, (current $ value) in excess U.S. defense articles to Jordan,
including three AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, 45 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles including three AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, 45 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPs), and M577A3 Tracked Command Post Carriers.(MRAPs), and M577A3 Tracked Command Post Carriers.91104
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Jordan: 1946-20182019
(in (in mil ionsmillions of current of current dol arsdollars) )
Total Economic Assistance
Total Military Assistance
Total
$ $13,846.400
$8,252.900
$22,099.30015,110.700 $8,748.900 $23,859.600
Source: USAID OverseasUSAID Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-September 30, Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2018.


Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
2019. 98 According to the U.S. State Department, “The United States has supported the Jordan Border Security Program, an integrated border security surveillance, detection, and interdiction system along 350 miles of Jordan’s land borders since 2009, at a cost of over $234 million.” See, U.S. State Department, U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan, Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, May 21, 2021. 99 DOD congressional notifications to Congress. 100 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Jordan, United States Air Force Transfers Three C-130 Aircraft to Royal Jordanian Air Force, December 9, 2021. 101 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Transmittal No. 22-06, February 3, 2022. 102 Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §276351) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” 103 See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NATO Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97-4, November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809. 104 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, EDA DataBase Tool, accessed April 2022. Congressional Research Service 22 Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Author Information Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


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88 Jeremy Binnie, “Jordan Planning Border Security Upgrade,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 17, 2019.
89 DOD congressional notifications to Congress.
90 See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NAT O Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97 -4,
November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.
91 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, EDA DataBase T ool, accessed July 2021.
Congressional Research Service
RL33546 · VERSION 80 · UPDATED
18 Congressional Research Service RL33546 · VERSION 83 · UPDATED 23