Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance
~~June 21~~August 18, 2021 , 2021
with International Obligations
Paul K. Kerr
Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran
to Specialist in Specialist in
to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)
~~Nonproliferation~~
investigation of its investigation of its Nonproliferation nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend

its construction of a heavyits construction of a heavy- - water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional
Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the

resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with
additional information about, additional information about, the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the and the United States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the
previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security
Council Council ~~Resolution~~Res olution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework
governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to reimpose sanctions on Iran via a governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to reimpose sanctions on Iran via a
mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so. mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s
nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still
had questions concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015, had questions concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015,
report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s
“final assessment on the resolution” of the outstanding issues. A June 2020 IAEA Board of Governors resolution “final assessment on the resolution” of the outstanding issues. A June 2020 IAEA Board of Governors resolution
calls on Iran to satisfy more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. This calls on Iran to satisfy more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. This
resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken
by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant. by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Introduction
Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires
nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in
1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating 1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating ~~allegations~~al egations that Iran had conducted clandestine that Iran had conducted clandestine
nuclear activities; the IAEAnuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of
Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the
council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to ~~alleviate~~al eviate international concerns international concerns
about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and
describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.
For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint , by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report
R43333, R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. , by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman.
Background
Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear
weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main
source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride
gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can
produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and
highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear
weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a
uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several compounds, uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several compounds,
including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and
future power reactors. future power reactors.
Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern. Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern.
Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the
production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel
would have contained plutonium would have contained plutonium ~~well~~wel -suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in -suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in
nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure ~~called~~cal ed
“reprocessing.” Iran has said that it “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it ~~will~~ wil not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France, Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”), Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”),
Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to ~~fulfill~~ fulfil a a
JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the
P5+1 so that it P5+1 so that it ~~will~~ wil not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to
export the spent fuel from this reactor and export the spent fuel from this reactor and ~~all~~ al other nuclear reactors. other nuclear reactors.

~~1 The NPT~~ 1 T he NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. ~~These~~T hese states are China, France, Russia, states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom, and
the United States. the United States.
2 INFCIRC/214. 2 INFCIRC/214.
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Iran and the IAEA Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions
regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 ~~Most~~Iran and the agency subsequently resolved most of these questions, which had contributed to of these questions, which had contributed to
suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons ~~program, were subsequently resolved.~~
program.4 Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei,Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEAhowever, told the IAEA board June 2, 2008, board June 2, 2008,
that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions regarding that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions regarding
“possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”“possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”45 The IAEA agency did not The IAEA agency did not make any make any
substantive progress on these matters for some time. substantive progress on these matters for some time.
Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns
and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.56 Iran also expressed concern to Iran also expressed concern to
the IAEAthe IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to
sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The
IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its ~~willingness~~wil ingness to discuss to discuss
with Iran with Iran
modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in
thethe ~~documentation are not nuclear related, as~~ documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts,Iran asserts, while while ~~protecting~~ prote cting sensitive sensitive
information related to its conventional military activities.information related to its conventional military activities.67
Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested
information.information.7
8 The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is
essential” for Iran and the IAEAessential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of ~~all~~
al outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012 outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012
and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of ~~all~~
al outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”89 However, during an October 2013 However, during an October 2013
meeting, IAEAmeeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to
resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013,
describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA
agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of ~~all~~ al outstanding issues that have not outstanding issues that have not
already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information
~~about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to~~
~~the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on~~
~~high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport~~

~~3 The text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.~~
4 3 T he text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf. 4 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran President Ali Akbar Salehi explained in a 2009 interview that T ehran “decided to solve these problems within the context of our [safeguards] commitments and not accept anything beyond our legal obligations,” adding that there had previously been “debates about the decreasing of the level of our cooperation” with the IAEA. (“ Interview: Dr. Salehi on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” published in Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2, Fall 2009-Winter 2010, p. 1. 5 Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei,, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008. June 2, 2008.
56 See, See, for example, for example, Communication Dated 7 January 2016 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Final ~~Assessment~~Assessm ent on Past and
Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016. , INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016.
67 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008. GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008.
78 See, See, for example, for example, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012., Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012.
8 9 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations
with with ~~Tehran~~T ehran, and stated that “, and stated that “ Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues
is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme.”programme.”
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~~and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.”~~
about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including al eged Iranian research on high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated model ing and calculations and their al eged application to compressed materials.” Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.9
10 Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran was to “complete” a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran was to “complete” a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA
“Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA
Director General Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013, Director General Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013,
Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of
Iran, to make an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear Iran, to make an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme.”programme.”1011 According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of
Governors, “[a]Governors, “[a]ll l the activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with
the agreed schedule.”the agreed schedule.”1112 The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the
agency’s “final assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues. agency’s “final assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues.
In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran’s cooperation In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran’s cooperation
with the road map and “further notes that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the with the road map and “further notes that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the
“outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”“outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”1213 Since the IAEA has verified that Iran Since the IAEA has verified that Iran
has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused
on Iran’s compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran’s on Iran’s compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran’s
safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA
implementationimplementation “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the
Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to
undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the
full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.”
The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to
the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the
full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of
Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds
to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or
safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting
provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General
to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel
to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and
also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at
anyany ~~time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue~~ time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of of
concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments. concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments.
Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s
investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its
~~construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its~~
~~IAEA safeguards agreement.13 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.~~
~~Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, contains these requirements and also~~

9 10 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015., Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015.
10 11 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, Report R43333, Iran Nuclear
~~Agreement~~Agreem ent and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman . .
1112 Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme , GOV/2015/68, , GOV/2015/68,
December 2, 2015. December 2, 2015.
1213 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Implementation and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran
in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015. , GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015.
~~13 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water.~~
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~~required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic~~ construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.14 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, required Iran to comply with these provisions, as wel as to refrain from “any activity related to bal istic missiles capable of delivering missiles capable of delivering
nuclear weapons.” nuclear weapons.” ~~Iran has also continued its extensive ballistic missile program.~~ Resolution Resolution
1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements. 1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements.
(See (See “Potential Noncompliance After September 2005..”) ”) Iran did not take any of these steps prior Iran did not take any of these steps prior
to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some aspects of its nuclear program since the to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some aspects of its nuclear program since the
government began implementing the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to government began implementing the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to
the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some
information to the agency required by the information to the agency required by the modified Code 3.1. modified Code 3.1.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran applied additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran applied additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program
and heavy-water reactor program, as and heavy-water reactor program, as ~~well~~ wel as began implementing its additionalas began implementing its additional protocol and the protocol and the
modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016,
~~all~~ al of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N. of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, composes the current legal Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, composes the current legal
framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.1415 The IAEA reports findings of its inspection and The IAEA reports findings of its inspection and
monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties’ monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties’
implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations are national decisions. implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations are national decisions.
UntilUntil July 2019, July 2019, ~~all~~ al official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the
IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Iran had IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Iran had ~~fulfilled~~fulfil ed its JCPOA and its JCPOA and
related Resolution 2231 requirements.related Resolution 2231 requirements.~~15 16~~16 17
Beginning Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding
JCPOA-mandated limits; the government has since increased the number of such activities.JCPOA-mandated limits; the government has since increased the number of such activities.17

14 18 14 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water. 15 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif“Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif ,” January ,” January
16, 2016. 16, 2016.
1516 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-requiredthe JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1 limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1
beganbegan implementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue wasimplementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue was resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts
of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 (of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 ( Adherence to and ~~Compliance~~
~~with Arms~~Com pliance with Arm s Control, Nonproliferation, and ~~Disarmament Agreements and Commitments~~Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments, Department ofDepartment of State, April State, April
2017). For more information, see CRS2017). For more information, see CRS Report R43333, Report R43333, Iran Nuclear ~~Agreement~~Agreem ent and U.S. Exit and CRS and CRS Report Report
RL34544, RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program : Status, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
16Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports hav e noted that Iran has on several occasions exceeded the JCPOA-required limit. T ehran since February 23, 2021, has neither informed the IAEA about Iran’s inventory of heavy water nor allowed the agency to monitor T ehran’s heavy water production. 17 According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and
development using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceededdevelopment using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceeded the number permitted by the number permitted by
the JCPOA (the JCPOA (Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran in ~~Light~~Lig ht of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; GOV/2019/32). In a June2019; GOV/2019/32). In a June 11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S.11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S. ~~Ambassador Jackie Wolcott~~ Ambassador Jackie Wol cott
stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued
a similar publica similar public finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17 press conference that finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17 press conference that
“Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the “Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the
press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019). press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019).
1718 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on the following sources:on the following sources: GOV/2019/32; GOV/2019/32; Verification ~~and~~
~~Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),~~ ~~Report~~
~~by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in~~
~~Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9,~~
July 8, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic ~~Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council~~
~~Resolution 2231 (2015),~~ ~~Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019;~~ ~~Verification and~~
~~Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of~~ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report
~~by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic~~
~~Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General,~~
and Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
4 4

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

According to IAEA According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of reports, Iran’s number of ~~installed~~instal ed centrifuges, LEU stockpile, enriched centrifuges, LEU stockpile, enriched
uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated
limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D) activities, limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D) activities,
as wel ~~as well~~ as centrifuge manufacturing.as centrifuge manufacturing.1819
In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as
grounds for reducing the government’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to grounds for reducing the government’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to
the agreement.the agreement. ~~19According~~20According to that paragraph, to that paragraph,
Iran Iran ~~has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the~~ has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions sanctions
specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part. to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known
as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and
announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute
resolution mechanism.resolution mechanism.2021 The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep ~~Borrell~~Borrel , who oversees the mechanism’s process., who oversees the mechanism’s process.2122 It It
does not appear that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With regard to does not appear that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With regard to
Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that those Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that those
governments “remain committed to working with governments “remain committed to working with ~~all~~ al JCPOA participants to find a diplomatic way JCPOA participants to find a diplomatic way
forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the JCPOA. The E3 forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the JCPOA. The E3
did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.2223
The E3 November 2020 statement explains that those governments “do not accept the argument The E3 November 2020 statement explains that those governments “do not accept the argument
that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never
triggered” the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease triggered” the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease
implementing the provisions of the agreement.”implementing the provisions of the agreement.”2324 Nevertheless, according to the U.S. Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9, July 8, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report by the Director General, ~~Nevertheless, according to the U.S.~~
~~government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran may cease performing commitments in whole~~
~~or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions.”24~~
~~A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA has~~
~~continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA,~~

GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020; GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020; , Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020; Verification
and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (~~2015~~201 5), ,
Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February, Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 2021; 23, 2021;
and and Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of ~~Iran~~I ran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution
2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021. , Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021.
1819 See See also “IAEA Chief Soundsalso “IAEA Chief Sounds Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Financial Times, May 26, 2021. , May 26, 2021.
1920 See See also also Communication Dated 29 January 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Agency, INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021. , INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021.
2021 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020. “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020.
2122 “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020. of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020.
2223 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020. “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020.
2324 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,” “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,” January 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service 5 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran may cease performing commitments in whole or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions.”25 A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA has continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA, ~~January 14, 2020.~~
~~24 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January~~
~~31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
5

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.2526 Grossi’s May 2021 report, Grossi’s May 2021 report,
however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake the verification and monitoring however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake the verification and monitoring
activities concerning Section T since his February 2021 report.activities concerning Section T since his February 2021 report.26
27 The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian
sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the
IAEAIAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent
with” the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns. with” the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns.
The IAEA has not reported whether it has requested JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military The IAEA has not reported whether it has requested JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military
facilities, but the agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-facilities, but the agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-
source information and receiving source information and receiving ~~intelligence~~intel igence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian
compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April 2018 State compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April 2018 State
Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and nonproliferation Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and nonproliferation
agreements, [t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns ~~agreements,~~
~~[t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-~~
~~relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns~~ regarding regarding
weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,
Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained
in the JCPOA.in the JCPOA.2728
The June 2020 version of the same report states that “the IAEA continues to monitor and verify The June 2020 version of the same report states that “the IAEA continues to monitor and verify
Iran’s compliance with its obligations under its [comprehensive safeguards agreement], and the Iran’s compliance with its obligations under its [comprehensive safeguards agreement], and the
AdditionalAdditional Protocol as Protocol as ~~well~~ wel as Iran’s adherence to its JCPOA commitments.”as Iran’s adherence to its JCPOA commitments.”2829 According to According to
Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the level of Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the level of
cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the
JCPOA.”JCPOA.”29
30 However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, as of However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, as of
February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures” February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures”
~~described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.30 Nevertheless, on~~
~~February 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding …~~

~~25 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~26 GOV/2021/28.~~
~~27 Department of State, April 2018. The~~ 25 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January 31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst. 26 GOV/2021/10. 27 GOV/2021/28. 28 Department of State, April 2018. T he August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015, August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015,
IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues”IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues” ~~concerning~~ concer ning the the
possiblepossible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program,
does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its
previous assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weaponsprevious assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program, or where it has concerns regarding program, or where it has concerns regarding
the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. ( Adherence to and ~~Compliance~~
~~with Arms~~Com pliance with Arm s Control, Nonproliferation, and ~~Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 2019).~~
28Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments, 2019). 29 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, ~~Nonproliferation~~Nonproliferatio n, and Disarmament Agreements and
~~Commitments~~Com m itm ents, Department of State, June 2020. An April 2021 version of the report contains similar language , Department of State, June 2020. An April 2021 version of the report contains similar language
((Adherence to and ~~Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments~~Com pliance with Arm s Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments, ,
Department of State, April 2021). Department of State, April 2021).
~~29 GOV/2020/51.~~
~~30 GOV/2021/10. The letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code 3.1~~
~~of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA use of modern safeguards technologies in Iran;~~
~~the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium enrichment,~~
~~uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access “pursuant to~~
~~provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of Tehran’s implementation of JCPOA-~~
~~mandated “voluntary measures.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
6

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

30 GOV/2020/51. Congressional Research Service 6 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.31 Nevertheless, on February 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding … whereby the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for whereby the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for
up to three months, as set out in a technical annex.”up to three months, as set out in a technical annex.”3132 Grossi explained during a February 21, Grossi explained during a February 21,
2021, press conference that this arrangement “is not a replacement for what we used to have” 2021, press conference that this arrangement “is not a replacement for what we used to have”
under the Additionalunder the Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that Protocol but “is a temporary solution that ~~allows~~al ows us to continue to give the us to continue to give the
world assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”world assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”3233
Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without
limitation.”limitation.”3334 Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN in
Vienna, stated on March 4 that Tehran Vienna, stated on March 4 that Tehran ~~will~~ wil resume “full implementation of the Additional resume “full implementation of the Additional
Protocol” when the other JCPOA participants resume implementing their obligations pursuant to Protocol” when the other JCPOA participants resume implementing their obligations pursuant to
the agreement.the agreement.3435 The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24 that the parties agreed to extend this The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24 that the parties agreed to extend this
arrangement until June 24.arrangement until June 24.3536 This latter agreement “is to enable the Agency to recover and re- This latter agreement “is to enable the Agency to recover and re-
establish the necessary continuity of knowledge,” according to Grossi’s May report.establish the necessary continuity of knowledge,” according to Grossi’s May report.3637Since June 24, Iran has not agreed to continue the arrangement.
The IAEA’s ability The IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments
has diminished since February 23; a European Union statement asserts that “Iran’s decision has diminished since February 23; a European Union statement asserts that “Iran’s decision
~~substantially~~substantial y restricts IAEA’s ability to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran remain restricts IAEA’s ability to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran remain
for exclusively peaceful purposes.”for exclusively peaceful purposes.”3738 Grossi’s report provides examples of lapses in Iranian Grossi’s report provides examples of lapses in Iranian
cooperation.cooperation.3839 For instance, Tehran since February 23 has neither informed the IAEA about Iran’s For instance, Tehran since February 23 has neither informed the IAEA about Iran’s
inventory of heavy water nor inventory of heavy water nor ~~allowed~~al owed the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water production. the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water production.
The government has also withheld from the IAEA similar information and access concerning the The government has also withheld from the IAEA similar information and access concerning the
government’s production and inventory of certain centrifuge components. In addition, Iran’s government’s production and inventory of certain centrifuge components. In addition, Iran’s
refusal to implement the government’s Additional Protocol obligations has deprived the IAEArefusal to implement the government’s Additional Protocol obligations has deprived the IAEA of
~~still~~ of stil more information concerning aspects of Tehran’s nuclear program, as more information concerning aspects of Tehran’s nuclear program, as ~~well~~ wel as access to as access to
certain nuclear-related facilities.certain nuclear-related facilities.39
~~Iran and the IAEA~~
~~As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement~~
~~with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are~~
~~designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to~~
~~nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.40 Safeguards~~

~~31 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~32 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021,~~
~~https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU.~~
~~33 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~34 “Iranian Envoy Hails IAEA Members’ Vigilance to Prevent Escalating Tensions,” Fars News Agency, March 4,~~
~~2021.~~
~~35 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached~~ 40 31 GOV/2021/10. T he letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA use of modern safeguards t echnologies in Iran; the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium enrichment, uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access “pursuant to provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of T ehran’s implementation of JCPOA -mandated “voluntary measures.” 32 GOV/2021/10. 33 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouT ube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU. 34 GOV/2021/10. 35 “Iranian Envoy Hails IAEA Members’ Vigilance to Prevent Escalating T ensions,” Fars News Agency, March 4, 2021. 36 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran
Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 24, 2021; “Envoy , May 24, 2021; “Envoy
Confirms Iran NuclearConfirms Iran Nuclear Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic News Agency, June 1, 2021. , June 1, 2021.
3637 GOV/2021/28. GOV/2021/28.
3738 “EU Statement on Agenda Item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic “EU Statement on Agenda Item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United of Iran in light of United
Nations Security CouncilNations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” IAEA Board of Governors, JuneResolution 2231 (2015),” IAEA Board of Governors, June 7-11, 2021. 7-11, 2021.
3839 GOV/2021/28. For a complete list of JCPOA activities impacted by Iran’s decreased cooperation, see Annex I of GOV/2021/28. 40 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 25 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Iran and the IAEA As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the ~~GOV/2021/28.~~
~~39 Ibid.~~
~~40 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-~~
~~Glossary-2001-Edition.) Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153,~~
~~available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According to Amano’s May~~
~~2013 report, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992,” that this~~
~~model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
7

~~link to page 25 link to page 25~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as wel as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.41 Safeguards include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although
comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools availableundeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such to it to do so, under such
agreements, are limited” according to the agency.agreements, are limited” according to the agency.41
42 As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as ~~well as~~
wel as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive
safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the
government.government.4243 Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the
agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the
IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from
member states.member states.4344 Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the
agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additionalagreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.Protocol in 2006.4445
The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director
General ElBaradeiGeneral ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an ~~all~~al --
encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to
make sure that make sure that ~~all~~ al nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”4546 Similarly, a February 2006 Similarly, a February 2006
report from ElBaradei to the IAEAreport from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the
agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is
limited.”limited.”4647 There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the
IAEAIAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states
regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect
the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEAthe presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA Board is Board is
required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (~~see~~se e Appendix 41 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-Glossary-2001-Edition.) Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According to Amano’s May 2013 report, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992,” that t his model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non -diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness).” 42 ~~Appendix~~
B)~~. Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the~~
~~more likely the Board would be to approve such an inspection.~~
~~The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the~~
~~National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information~~
~~during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built~~
~~nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware~~
~~of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.47 Prior to the~~
~~NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the~~

~~declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness).”~~
41 Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services IAEA Services
SeriesSeries 21, May 2016. 21, May 2016.
4243 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary.
4344 Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additionalon the agency’s Model Additional Protocol Protocol
(INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. (INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
4445 Iran announced that it would Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a
resolution in Februaryresolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N. agreement to the U.N.
Security Council.Security Council. Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA. Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA.
~~45 “Tackling~~46 “T ackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005, February 4, 2005,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei. available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei.
4647 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006. GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.
~~47 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council,~~
~~personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s~~
~~WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/~~
~~tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html.~~
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~~agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in~~
~~violation of its safeguards agreement.~~
~~In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the~~
Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 25 link to page 23 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations B). Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the more likely the Board would be to approve such an inspection. The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.48 Prior to the NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the agency with al relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in violation of its safeguards agreement. In fal 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the
matter in September 2003, the IAEA board matter in September 2003, the IAEA board ~~called~~cal ed on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the
agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “~~unconditionally~~unconditional y sign, sign,
ratify and fully implement” an Additionalratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.Protocol.4849
In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment
activities, sign and implement an Additionalactivities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and
comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.4950 As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain
from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional
Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.5051
Ultimately, Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as the IAEA’s investigation, as ~~well~~ wel as information Iran provided after the October 2003 as information Iran provided after the October 2003
agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities,
some of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (sesome of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (see Appendix A). After October . After October
2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in
November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.5152 However, Iran resumed uranium However, Iran resumed uranium
conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who
had been elected two months earlier. had been elected two months earlier.
On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77) On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77)5253
that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
The board, however, did not report Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran The board, however, did not report Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran
additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran
 to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,  to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,
documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military
owned workshops, and research and development locations; owned workshops, and research and development locations;
 to reestablish full and sustained suspension of  to reestablish full and sustained suspension of ~~all~~ al enrichment-related activity; enrichment-related activity;
 to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;  to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;
~~ to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and~~
~~ to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.~~
~~No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September~~
~~2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the~~
~~IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared~~
~~nuclear material and activities in Iran.”~~
~~Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges~~
~~at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N.~~

48 48 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Cont rols on the National Security Council, personal communication June 5, 2008; then -Director of Central Intelligence George J. T enet, “ DCI Remarks on Iraq’s WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html. 49 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.
~~49 The~~50 T he text of the agreement is available at text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.
5051 Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA. Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA.
~~51 The~~52 T he text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.
5253 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
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~~Security Council.53 Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional~~
 to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and  to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol. No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September 2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.” Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N. Security Council.54 Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional Protocol. (For details, see Protocol. (For details, see “Iran and the U.N. Security Council” below.) below.)
Potential Noncompliance After September 2005
Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told
the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its
IAEAIAEA safeguards agreement.safeguards agreement.5455 That provision ( That provision (~~called~~cal ed the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed
in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as
soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken,
whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere
to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to
provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material into provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material into
it.56~~it.55~~
This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide
the IAEAthe IAEA with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had
refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at
Arak.Arak.5657 As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the
IAEAIAEA on February 12, 2014.on February 12, 2014.5758 Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design
information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the
agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22, agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22,
~~2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information,~~
~~according to a November 2009 report.58 Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had~~
~~“provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.59 IAEA reports since 2012~~
~~do not appear to address this issue.~~

53 54 For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see “ Iran and the U.N.
Security Council.”
5455 According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary,Glossary, ~~subsidiary~~ subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and arrangements describe the “technical and
administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid downadministrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid down in a safeguardsin a safeguards agreement are to be applied.”agreement are to be applied.”
55 56 During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s
Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 asPermanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “ “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA merely a suggestion” by the IAEA
Board of Governors. SeeBoard of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities“Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” about Its Nuclear Program,” Tehran Times, ,
November 9, 2011. November 9, 2011.
~~56 This~~57 T his lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the
~~design~~ design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to a May 22, 2013, report from of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to a May 22, 2013, report from
Amano (Amano (~~Implementation~~Im plem entation of the NPT Safeguards ~~Agreement~~Agreem ent and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in
the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran, Report Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013). A November 2013 report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013). A November 2013 report
from Amano explains that the IAEA “from Amano explains that the IAEA “ needs updated designneeds updated design information as early as possibleinformation as early as possible in order ... to in order ... to ~~ensure~~en sure that that
all possibleall possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards measuresdiversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards measures and customized safeguardsand customized safeguards equipment equipment
are put in place.” (are put in place.” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013 .) Iran .) Iran
has concludedhas concluded “ “a safeguardsa safeguards approach for the reactor” (approach for the reactor” (Status of Iran’s Nuclear ~~Programme~~Program m e in Relation to the Joint
Plan of Action, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8,, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8, April 20, 2015). April 20, 2015).
5758 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014. Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014.
58 ~~Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737~~
~~(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,~~ ~~Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008.~~
59 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in ~~Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the~~
~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010.~~
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~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~
Congressional Research Service 10 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations 2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information, according to a November 2009 report.59 Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had “provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.60 IAEA reports since 2012 do not appear to address this issue.
Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before
September 2009 that it has been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, September 2009 that it has been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, ~~called~~cal ed
the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government’s safeguards the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May
2012 that the IAEA2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction
decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s November 2015 report, has not yet provided decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s November 2015 report, has not yet provided ~~all~~ al of of
this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue. this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue.
Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to
provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary
arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the
agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those
arrangements.arrangements.6061 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 ~~statement61~~statement62 that that
Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s
obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to
conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance
with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from
ElBaradeiElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin
constructing the Fordow facility, as constructing the Fordow facility, as ~~well~~ wel as to provide the relevant design information in a timely as to provide the relevant design information in a timely
fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s
delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. As noted, Iran notified the IAEA delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. As noted, Iran notified the IAEA
on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.6263
Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it decided to construct other new nuclear Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it decided to construct other new nuclear
facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has made such facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has made such
decisions. For example, the IAEA has asked the government for information about Iranian decisions. For example, the IAEA has asked the government for information about Iranian
statements that the government is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is statements that the government is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is
designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for
four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors.
Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this
information to the agency. According to a May 2021 report from Director General Grossi, “Iran information to the agency. According to a May 2021 report from Director General Grossi, “Iran
~~has informed” the IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in~~
~~the near future.”63~~
~~Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the~~
~~basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to allow agency inspectors to verify design~~
~~information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s~~
~~safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to~~
~~facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a~~
~~“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.64 Moreover,~~

~~60 See~~ 59 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islam ic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008. 60 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islam ic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010. 61 See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf. also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.
Security CouncilSecurity Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspendedResolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.”unilaterally.”
61 62 “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009. “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009.
6263 In a February 16, 2021, letter to In a February 16, 2021, letter to ~~Tehran~~T ehran, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is a a
legallegal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiaryobligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its SafeguardsArrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified Agreement which cannot be modified
unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguardsunilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of Agreement for the suspension of implementation of
provisions agreed to in the Subsidiaryprovisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” SeeArrangements.” See GOV/2021/10. ~~GOV/2021/10.~~
~~63 GOV/2021/28.~~
~~64 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement.~~
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~~the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow~~ has informed” the IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in the near future.”64 Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to al ow agency inspectors to verify design information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a “continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.65 Moreover, the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to al ow IAEA inspectors to verify the IAEA inspectors to verify the
Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its
safeguards agreement.safeguards agreement.6566 IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify
design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month.design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month.6667 Inspectors have Inspectors have
visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano. visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano.
In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to
produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency
inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from
Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.6768 Article 45 of that agreement requires Article 45 of that agreement requires
that Tehran notify the IAEAthat Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for
safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when
necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly
relevant for safeguards purposes.” relevant for safeguards purposes.”
The IAEA board has neither The IAEA board has neither ~~formally~~formal y found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in
noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N. noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N.
Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described
Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary
arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal
finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious
concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of
Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution did not contain a formal Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution did not contain a formal
finding of noncompliance.finding of noncompliance.6869
More recently, a March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board More recently, a March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board
of Governors states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible of Governors states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible
undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three
undeclared Iranian locations.undeclared Iranian locations.6970 Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and
~~additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as well as access~~
~~to two suspected sites.70~~
~~Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected “natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin”~~
~~and also “isotopically altered” LEU particles at one Iranian location.71 Then-acting IAEA Director~~

65 64 GOV/2021/28. 65 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement. 66 Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given ~~Tehran~~T ehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary ’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary
arrangements to its safeguardsarrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified. agreement, such visits were unjustified.
6667 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2009/55, AugustGOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009. 28, 2009.
6768 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions ~~1737~~17 37
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010. GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010.
6869 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions in the ~~Islamic~~Islam ic Republic of Iran , GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012. , GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012.
6970 According to Grossi’s According to Grossi’s February 2021 report, the IAEA has “assessed that there would beFebruary 2021 report, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no verification value in Congressional Research Service 12 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as wel as access to two suspected sites.71 Specifical y, IAEA inspectors have detected “natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin” and also “isotopical y altered” LEU particles at one Iranian location.72 Then-acting IAEA Director General Cornel Feruta reported the uranium detection in a November 2019 report.73~~no verification value in~~
~~conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted undeclared nuclear activities.~~
~~The agency made this choice because the location “had undergone extensive sanitization and levelling in 2003 and~~
~~2004,” the report explains (NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director~~
~~General, GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by~~
~~the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March 3, 2020.~~
~~70 GOV/2021/15.~~
~~71 GOV/2021/15.~~
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~~General Cornel Feruta reported the uranium detection in a November 2019 report.72~~ In a March 4, In a March 4,
2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of uranium) is very 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of uranium) is very
important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material that are not under important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material that are not under
international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the intent.”international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the intent.”7374 Iran has Iran has
provided IAEAprovided IAEA inspectors access to this facility and also provided the agency with some relevant inspectors access to this facility and also provided the agency with some relevant
information. However, the IAEA has judged Iran’s explanations “to be not information. However, the IAEA has judged Iran’s explanations “to be not ~~technically~~technical y credible.” credible.”7475
Following a June 5, 2020, report from Grossi explaining that Tehran’s lack of cooperation was Following a June 5, 2020, report from Grossi explaining that Tehran’s lack of cooperation was
“adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and thereby to “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and thereby to
provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at these provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at these
locations in Iran.”locations in Iran.”7576 The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on June 19, 2020, The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on June 19, 2020, ~~calling~~cal ing
on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further
delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency.”delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency.”7677 This This
resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. According to the June 2020 State resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. According to the June 2020 State
Department compliance report, “Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to Department compliance report, “Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to
IAEAIAEA safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s [comprehensive safeguards safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s [comprehensive safeguards
agreement] required by the NPT and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT agreement] required by the NPT and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT
itself.”itself.”77
78 Grossi and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) President Ali Akbar Salehi issued a joint Grossi and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) President Ali Akbar Salehi issued a joint
statement on August 26, 2020, explaining that “Iran is voluntarily providing the IAEAstatement on August 26, 2020, explaining that “Iran is voluntarily providing the IAEA with access with access
to the two locations specified by the IAEAto the two locations specified by the IAEA and facilitating the IAEAand facilitating the IAEA verification activities to verification activities to
resolve these issues.”resolve these issues.”7879 IAEA inspectors have since conducted an additional inspection of the first IAEA inspectors have since conducted an additional inspection of the first
location and inspected the other two above-mentioned locations.location and inspected the other two above-mentioned locations.7980 During the latter inspections, conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted undeclared nuclear activities. T he agency made this choice because the location “had undergone extensive sanitization and levelling in 2003 and 2004,” the report explains (NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021). NPT Safeguards Agreem ent with the Islam ic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March 3, 2020. 71 GOV/2021/15. 72 GOV/2021/15. 73 GOV/2019/55. 74 Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Agence France Presse, March 4, 2020. 75 2021/15. Iran has suggested that these agency investigations are based on “fabricated information” from foreign intelligence services (Com m unication dated 8 June 2020 received from the Perm anent Mission of the Islam ic Republic of Iran to the Agency, INFCIRC/936, June 9, 2020). 76 GOV/2020/30. 77 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran , GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020. 78 Department of State, June 2020. T he April 2021 version of the report contains similar language (Department of State, April 2021). 79 “Joint Statement by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the AEOI,” August 26, 2020. 31/2020. 80 2021/15. Congressional Research Service 13 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations agency inspectors detected “anthropogenic uranium particles” requiring “explanation by Iran.”81 Tehran has not responded to January 2021 IAEA letters concerning the inspection results.82 Grossi told reporters during a March 4, 2021, press conference that Iran and the IAEA had agreed to bilateral meetings meant to address these outstanding issues.83 The two sides subsequently held one meeting in April and a second meeting in May.84 However, Iran did not provide any new information or evidence concerning the outstanding issues described above, Grossi told the IAEA ~~During the latter inspections,~~
~~agency inspectors detected “anthropogenic uranium particles” requiring “explanation by Iran.”80~~
~~Tehran has not responded to January 2021 IAEA letters concerning the inspection results.81~~
~~Grossi told reporters during a March 4, 2021, press conference that Iran and the IAEA had agreed~~
~~to bilateral meetings meant to address these outstanding issues.82 The two sides subsequently held~~
~~one meeting in April and a second meeting in May.83 However, Iran did not provide any new~~
~~information or evidence concerning the outstanding issues described above, Grossi told the IAEA~~

~~72 GOV/2019/55.~~
~~73 Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,”~~ ~~Agence~~
~~France Presse, March 4, 2020.~~
~~74 2021/15.~~
~~75 GOV/2020/30.~~
~~76 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020.~~
~~77 Department of State, June 2020. The April 2021 version of the report contains similar language (Department of State,~~
~~April 2021).~~
~~78 “Joint Statement by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and~~
~~Head of the AEOI,” August 26, 2020. 31/2020.~~
~~79 2021/15.~~
~~80 Ibid.~~
~~81 Ibid.~~
~~82 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, posted by IAEAvideo, March 4, 2021,~~
~~https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sq4A0qHqe-M.~~
~~83 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2021/29, May 31, 2021.~~
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Board of Governors on June 7, adding that the “lack of progress … seriously affects the ability of Board of Governors on June 7, adding that the “lack of progress … seriously affects the ability of
the Agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”the Agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”8485 During a July 19 interview, Grossi explained that “but there is no real engagement” between Iran and the IAEA on the matter.86
Iran and the U.N. Security Council
As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its
centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)8587 on on
February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its ~~call~~ cal for Iran to for Iran to
take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it
would stop implementing its Additionalwould stop implementing its Additional Protocol. Protocol.
On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not
~~legally~~ legal y binding, that binding, that ~~called~~cal ed on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board
resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program: resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program:
1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835
(September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed
a variety of restrictions on Iran.a variety of restrictions on Iran.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. That article empowers the council to “Charter. That article empowers the council to “~~call~~ cal upon” governments “to comply with such upon” governments “to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or
recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as ~~well~~
wel as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to
adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its
decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”
Resolution 1696 was the first to place Resolution 1696 was the first to place ~~legally~~legal y binding Security Council requirements on Iran with binding Security Council requirements on Iran with
respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension
and and ~~called~~cal ed on Tehran to implement the transparency measures on Tehran to implement the transparency measures ~~called~~cal ed for by the IAEA board’s for by the IAEA board’s
February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the
suspension’s scope to include “work on suspension’s scope to include “work on ~~all~~ al heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that
the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under
Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to
81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouT ube video, posted by IAEAvideo, March 4, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sq4A0qHqe-M. 84 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran , GOV/2021/29, May 31, 2021. 85 “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” June 7, 2021. 86 Peter Millard and Jonathan T irone, “Alarm Grows Over Iran Nuclear Program Among Sidelined Monitors,” Bloom berg News Enterprise, July 199, 2021. 87 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006. Congressional Research Service 14 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted, develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted,
Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ~~ballistic~~bal istic missiles missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its
subsidiary arrangement. subsidiary arrangement.
Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that ~~all~~ al of the of the
previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from
the IAEAthe IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day, stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day,
as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation
Day took place on January 16, 2016. Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran Day took place on January 16, 2016. Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran ~~shall~~ shal cooperate cooperate
fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve ~~all~~ al outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA
reports.” The IAEA Board of Governors’ December 2015 resolution noted that the board had reports.” The IAEA Board of Governors’ December 2015 resolution noted that the board had
closed its consideration of the “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.” closed its consideration of the “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”
The JCPOA The JCPOA ~~spells~~spel s out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over ~~alleged~~al eged breaches of breaches of
their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231

~~84 “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” June 7, 2021.~~
~~85 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006.~~
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contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a
P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any
permanent UN Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution that permanent UN Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution that
would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA specifies would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA specifies
that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be re-that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be re-
imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.”imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.”
The other P5+1 states are able to invoke the snapback mechanism, but whether the United States The other P5+1 states are able to invoke the snapback mechanism, but whether the United States
may do so is unclear because Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state” may do so is unclear because Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state”
may bring a noncompliance finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the may bring a noncompliance finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the
United States is no longer participating in the agreement.United States is no longer participating in the agreement.8688 In an August 20 letter to Security In an August 20 letter to Security
Council President Indonesian Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael Council President Indonesian Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo initiated the snapback process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-Pompeo initiated the snapback process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-
performance” of its JCPOA commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the performance” of its JCPOA commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the
council that the “United States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has council that the “United States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has
withdrawn from” the JCPOA.withdrawn from” the JCPOA.8789 Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal
effect.” UN Secretary General António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that the effect.” UN Secretary General António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that the
“majority” of Security Council members have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the “majority” of Security Council members have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the
notification necessary for snapback. The resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to notification necessary for snapback. The resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to
refrain from proceeding on the matter. refrain from proceeding on the matter.
On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard ~~Mills~~ Mil s sent a letter to Security sent a letter to Security
Council President UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s Council President UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s
position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on
February 18, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full February 18, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full
effect.”effect.”8890 88 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition , by Paul K. Kerr. 89 Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2020/824 90 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 23 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security
Council Actions
The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security
Council is found in both the IAEACouncil is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss
the relevant portions of those documents. the relevant portions of those documents.
IAEA ~~Statute89~~Statute91
Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.9092 Article III B. 4. of the statute states Article III B. 4. of the statute states
that the IAEAthat the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when appropriate,” is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when appropriate,”
to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the competence of to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the competence of

~~86 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by~~
~~Paul K. Kerr.~~
87 ~~Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the~~
~~President of the Security Council, S/2020/824~~
~~88 Ibid.~~
~~89 The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual~~
~~governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model~~
~~described in INFCIRC 153.~~
~~90 The text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute.~~
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~~link to page 23~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall~~ the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shal notify the Security Council, as the organ notify the Security Council, as the organ
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
~~Additionally,~~ Additional y, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the
agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The
board is then to “board is then to “~~call~~ cal upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance
which it finds to have occurred,” as which it finds to have occurred,” as ~~well~~ wel as “report the non-compliance to as “report the non-compliance to ~~all~~ al members and to the members and to the
Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”
In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the
board found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its ~~board~~
~~found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its~~ NPT NPT
Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-[a November 2003 report from then-
Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute; the Agency’s Statute;
According to the resolution, the board also found According to the resolution, the board also found
that that ~~the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director~~
the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report [GOV/2003/75],General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in
the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002
and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peacefulpeaceful purposes have given risepurposes have given rise ~~to questions that are within the competence of the~~
~~Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance~~ to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of of
international peace and security. international peace and security.
ElBaradei ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.9193 It It
described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed idescribed a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed in Appendix A, t~~hat~~ that violated violated
Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective
measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution ~~called~~cal ed on Iran on Iran
to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not ~~legally~~legal y required to implement. 91 T he IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153. 92 T he text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute. 93 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. Congressional Research Service 16 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations ~~required to implement.~~
U.N. Charter and the Security Council
Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to
impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.9294 Article 24 confers on the council “primary Article 24 confers on the council “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that
the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that
the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.” aggression.”
Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council
resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program
invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council
shall shall ~~determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act~~ determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of of
aggression and shallaggression and shall make recommendations, or decidemake recommendations, or decide ~~what~~ what measures shall be taken in measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

~~91 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.~~
~~92 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.~~
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Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension
required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40 required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40
states that states that
the the ~~Security Council~~ Security Council may, beforemay, before ~~making the recommendations or deciding upon~~ making the recommendations or deciding upon the the
measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of
Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. severance of diplomatic relations.
As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the
previous resolutions and previous resolutions and ~~called~~cal ed on Iran to comply with them. on Iran to comply with them.
It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that
[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations [i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligationsunder the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its
Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”9395 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231
requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of
Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the
JCPOA.” 94 T he text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/. 95 GOV/2013/27. T he agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11. Congressional Research Service 17 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations ~~JCPOA.”~~
Has Iran Violated the NPT?9496
Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for
determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a
formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however, formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however,
be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination. be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.
The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the of the NPT; neither the
council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations. council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.
However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently
had littlehad little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA
Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement. Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which
requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with
the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the ~~fulfillment~~fulfil ment of its obligations of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

~~93 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11.~~
~~94 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials.~~
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Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states- Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states-
parties parties ~~shall~~ shal not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.” nuclear explosive devices.”
As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradeiElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”
Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above. Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above.
Moreover, a November 2007 National Moreover, a November 2007 National ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence Estimate (NIE) stated that “until Estimate (NIE) stated that “until ~~fall~~ fal 2003, 2003,
Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”9597
This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not provide any This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not provide any
detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has attempted to detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has attempted to
develop nuclear weapons. develop nuclear weapons.
Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states’ Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states’
compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had
violated Article II of the NPT: violated Article II of the NPT:
The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which
they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement
channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and
to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification
for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear
weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of
the NPT.the NPT.9698
The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared
nuclear activities, as nuclear activities, as ~~well~~ wel as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist, as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist,
including those that may be run solely by the military.” 96 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials. 97~~including those that may be run solely by the military.”~~
~~The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT~~
~~which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The~~
~~2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of~~
~~the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities~~
~~in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such~~
~~noncompliance.97~~
~~The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament~~
~~Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.98~~
~~Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a~~

95 Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S., National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S. official official
statements have been consistent with the NIE. statements have been consistent with the NIE.
9698 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
~~Commitments~~Com m itm ents, Department of State, August 2005. Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 26 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The 2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such noncompliance.99 The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Wil iam Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.100 Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a ~~, Department of State, August 2005.~~
~~97 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement~~
~~patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use~~
~~of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what~~
~~would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations~~
~~suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts~~
~~aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for~~
~~peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes.~~
~~98 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July~~
~~10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appendix C.~~
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nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two
examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the
production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster
also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United
States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.” States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.”
It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the
notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to
determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by ~~all~~ al experts.experts.99101 The 2005 The 2005
report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the
State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the
report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through
December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding
Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”~~100~~102 Subsequent versions of the report reiterated Subsequent versions of the report reiterated
the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous
issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”~~101~~103 As noted, As noted,
the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S. the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S.
official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear
weapons.weapons.~~102~~104 The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary ~~William~~Wil iam Hague would not say Hague would not say
whether Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.whether Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.~~103~~

~~99 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Training and~~
~~Information Centre.~~
~~100 Quotations are from~~ ~~Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament~~
~~Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, July 2010.~~
~~101~~ ~~Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and~~
~~Commitments, Department of State, April 2016.~~
102 See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, U.S. Intelligence
Community Worldwide Threat Assessment, February 26, 2015. The State Department compliance report covering 2019
~~states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities~~
~~associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (~~~~Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,~~
~~Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, June 2020.)~~
103 Developments in UK Foreign Policy~~, House of Commons: Oral Evidence Taken~~105 99 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine pr ocurement networks, possibly including the use of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safe guards violations suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes. 100 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July 10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). T he complete statement regarding Article II vio lations is in Appe ndix C . 101 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, T raining and Information Centre. 102 Quotations are from Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreem ents and Com m itm ents, Department of State, July 2010. 103 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Com m itm ents, Department of State, April 2016. 104 See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, U.S. Intelligence Com m unity Worldwide Threat Assessm ent, February 26, 2015. T he State Department compliance report covering 2020 states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments, Department of State, April 2021.) 105 Developments in UK Foreign Policy, House of Commons: Oral Evidence T aken Before the Foreign Affairs Before the Foreign Affairs
Committee, March 8, 2012. Committee, March 8, 2012.
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Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement
The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradeiThe November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the to the
agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as
“Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.” “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.”
The report stated that The report stated that
Iran Iran ~~has~~ has failed in a numberfailed in a number of instances overof instances over ~~an extended period~~ an extended period of time to meetof time to meet ~~its~~
~~obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear~~
~~material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where~~ its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such such
material has been processed and stored. material has been processed and stored.
The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier
reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEAreports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.board.~~104~~
106 According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency: According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency:
 The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further  The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further
processing. processing.
 The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production  The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production
and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste. and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.
~~Additionally,~~ Additional y, Iran failed to Iran failed to
 declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,  declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,
stored, and processed; stored, and processed;
 provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor  provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor
located in Tehran; as located in Tehran; as ~~well~~ wel as as
 provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.  provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.
GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA. GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA.
According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA: According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA:
 The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,  The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,
as as ~~well~~ wel as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium. as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium.
 The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in  The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in
laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the
loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer
of resulting waste. of resulting waste.
 The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different  The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different
imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes. imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes.
 The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research  The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research
Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of
plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of
unprocessed irradiated targets. unprocessed irradiated targets.

~~104 Those~~ 106 T hose reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.
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Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related
facilities, according to the report. These included the following: facilities, according to the report. These included the following:
 A centrifuge testing facility.  A centrifuge testing facility.
 Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.  Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.
 Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.  Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.
 The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),  The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),
the hot the hot ~~cell~~ cel facility where the plutonium separation took place, as facility where the plutonium separation took place, as ~~well~~ wel as the as the
relevant waste handling facility. relevant waste handling facility.
In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the
implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.
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Appendix B. IAEA Special Inspections
As noted, Iran’s obligations under its AdditionalAs noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations Protocol to provide access to certain locations
are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the
IAEAIAEA Director General could Director General could ~~call~~ cal for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval
from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be
special when it is in addition to IAEAspecial when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or “involves access to information or routine inspections or “involves access to information or
locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of
safeguards in that country.safeguards in that country.~~105~~107 Such inspections “are foreseen in Such inspections “are foreseen in ~~all~~ al Agency safeguards agreements, Agency safeguards agreements,
~~principally~~principal y as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to
a 1991 IAEA document.a 1991 IAEA document.~~106~~108 Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153, Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153,
states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make
special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency
considers considers ~~that information made available by the State, including explanations from~~ that information made available by the State, including explanations from the the
State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to
fulfillfulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.its responsibilities under the Agreement.
According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of
“plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by “plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by
other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of
IAEAIAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to
report to the agency. report to the agency.
The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the
carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.~~107~~109 In the event that In the event that
the IAEAthe IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold
immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection
request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153. request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153.
However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that
if the if the ~~Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is~~
~~essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to~~
~~safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other~~ Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear nuclear
explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action
without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been
invoked. invoked.
If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to
paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.~~108~~

~~105~~110 107 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used. According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used “to verify the “to verify the
information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguardsinformation contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are requiredagreements are required to submit a to submit a
special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specifiedspecial report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and limits” or if “containment and
surveillance measuressurveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiaryhave been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” Arrangements.”
SubsidiarySubsidiary arrangements describearrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid
downdown in a safeguardsin a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” agreement are to be applied.” ~~The~~T he IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if
alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes. alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes.
~~106~~108 GOV/INF/613, GOV/INF/613, May 29, 1991. May 29, 1991.
~~107~~109 GOV/2554, November 12, 1991. GOV/2554, November 12, 1991.
~~108~~110 Ibid. Ibid.
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Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster
Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations
On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director ~~William~~Wil iam Foster testified Foster testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question
regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the
following statement: following statement:
Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive
Devices Devices
The treaty articles in question The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which nonare Article II, in which non -nuclear-weapon-nuclear-weapon ~~parties~~
~~undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear~~
~~explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be~~
parties undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of
this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives
were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon
oror ~~other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was~~ other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as as
follows: follows:
“While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as “While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as
those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is
not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There
areare ~~many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that~~ many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any any
general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily
deal with all such situations. deal with all such situations.
“Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a “Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a
specific activity constitutesspecific activity constitutes ~~prohibited manufacture~~ prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For under the proposed treaty. For
example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a
nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of
anan experimental orexperimental or prototype nuclearprototype nuclear ~~explosive device would be covered by the term~~
explosive device would be covered by the term ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance
toto a nucleara nuclear ~~explosive~~ explosive device.)device.) ~~Again, while the placing of a particular activity~~ Again, while the placing of a particular activity under under
safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in
compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-
compliance. compliance.
“It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States “It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States
would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither ~~uranium~~
uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable materialenrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in in connection with a peaceful program connection with a peaceful program
would violate Article IIwould violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III.so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly Also clearly
permitted would be the permitted would be the ~~development~~elopment, under safeguards, of , under safeguards, of ~~plutonium fueled power reactors,~~
~~including research on the properties of~~ plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article IImetallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the interfere with the
development or use of fast breeder development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.” reactors under safeguards.”

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
Appendix D. Iranian Adherence to JCPOA Commitments111 Iran’s number of instal ed centrifuges, low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile, LEU uranium-235 (u-235) concentration, and enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D), as wel as centrifuge manufacturing and uranium metal production. 112 Operating Centrifuges Under the JCPOA, Iran is to use only its commercial-scale facility at Natanz for enriching uranium. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for this purpose. In addition to retaining these centrifuges, Iran has instal ed JCPOA-prohibited IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges in the facility and has begun to use these centrifuges for enriching uranium. Iran is also producing enriched uranium at Tehran’s pilot-scale and Fordow centrifuge facilities. The JCPOA prohibits any nuclear material in the latter facility, but Iran is using IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium there. Iran has also instal ed IR-6 centrifuges in the facility that are not yet enriching uranium. Enriched Uranium Limits113 The JCPOA requires that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile not exceed 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride containing 3.67% u-235 “or the equivalent in other chemical forms.” This quantity of uranium hexafluoride “corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.” Iran has been producing uranium containing up to 5% u-235, up to 20% u-235, and up to 60% u-235. Tehran’s total LEU stockpile is 3,241 kilograms of uranium. Most of this uranium is in the form of uranium hexafluoride; the remainder is in other chemical forms. Centrifuge Manufacturing Iran has manufactured centrifuges for prohibited R&D activities and also manufactured centrifuge components using carbon fiber that has not received the required approval from the JCPOA-established Joint Commission. Research and Development The JCPOA permits R&D with uranium using only several specified types of centrifuges and al ows Iran to operate only one test cascade containing a maximum of 10 IR-4 centrifuges.114 Iran’s current enrichment R&D activities include JCPOA-prohibited centrifuge types and configurations. 111 Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is based on IAEA reports and the JCPOA text. 112 As noted, Iran’s February 2021 decision to stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures” has impeded the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the agreement. 113 Grossi’s May 31 report states that the IAEA “has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile” since February 23. 114 IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades for producing enriched uranium in quantity. Congressional Research Service 24 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Uranium Metal The JCPOA prohibits Iran from “producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their al oys” and “conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their al oys) metal urgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.” Producing uranium or plutonium metals is a key step in producing fissile material nuclear weapons. These prohibitions’ duration is 15 years. Iran has produced natural uranium metal and has also begun the process of producing enriched uranium metal.115 Heavy Water As noted, Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1 began implementing the agreement. Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have noted that Iran has on several additional occasions exceeded this limit. Since February 23, 2021, Iran has neither informed the IAEA about its heavy water inventory “nor al owed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water.”116

Author Information

Paul K. Kerr Paul K. Kerr

Specialist in Nonproliferation Specialist in Nonproliferation

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115 GOV/2021/28; “IAEA Report on Iran Producing Enriched Uranium Metal: E3 Statement,” UK Foreign, Com m onwealth & Developm ent Office, July 6, 2021; Francois Murphy, Humeyra Pamuk, Arshad Mohammed, “ Iran Begins Process of Making Enriched Uranium Metal; U.S., E3 Dismayed,” Reuters, July 6, 2021. 116 GOV/2021/28. Congressional Research Service R40094 · VERSION 118 · UPDATED 25 ~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~R40094 · VERSION 116 · UPDATED~~
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