Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:
June 11, 2021February 17, 2022
In Brief
Clayton Thomas
Afghanistan emerged as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Even by the standards of Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, 2021 marked a major watershed for Analyst in Middle Eastern the country. In 2021, U.S. and international forces departed after nearly two decades of Affairs operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed Afghan government and its military forces collapsed; and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from 1996 to 2001, retook power. The aftershocks of these events continue to reverberate within Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States as publics and policymakers alike grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule. The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military
Affairs
campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored and and

supported it. In the supported it. In the intervening 19subsequent 20 years, the United States years, the United States has suffered over 22,000 suffered over 22,000
military casualties (including military casualties (including aroundabout 2,400 fatalities) in Afghanistan 2,400 fatalities) in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the robust and growing Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated and Congress has

appropriated approximately $144 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. approximately $144 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. In thatAt the same time, an elected time, an elected
Afghan government Afghan government has replaced the Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made limited improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries. After over a year of negotiations initiated by the Trump Administration in 2018, U.S. officials signedreplaced the Taliban; improvement in most measures of human development is limited;
and future prospects of gains remain mixed.
The United States and its international partners are removing their military forces from Afghanistan as part of a
withdrawal announced by President Biden on April 14, 2021, heralding a possible end to the nearly two-decade
U.S. military presence in the country. In a February 2020 agreement with the Taliban a February 2020 agreement with the Taliban, the Trump Administration
had committed to withdrawing military forces in which the United States committed to the withdrawal of all international military forces and contractors by May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to by May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to
preventingtake unspecified action to prevent other groups other groups, (including Al Qaedaincluding Al Qaeda,) from using Afghan soil to from using Afghan soil to recruit, train, or fundraise toward
activities that threaten the United States threaten the United States orand its allies. its allies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, U.S. officials U.S. officials contendcontended that the Taliban that the Taliban have not fulfilledwere not fulfilling their their
commitments, commitments, asgiven increased violence between the Taliban and Afghan government violence between the Taliban and Afghan government has increased andand continuing Taliban links with Al Qaeda, even as the Trump Administration drew down U.S. forces, which reached a low of 2,500 in January 2021. Afghan officials sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. Taliban links with Al
Qaeda remain in place, according to United Nations sanctions monitors.
Afghan government representatives were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to
conclude that the United States would prioritize a military military withdrawal on their own forces’ capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicated that the withdrawal could lead to gains by the Taliban, who already controlled or contested half of the country by 2020. In 2021, President Joseph Biden announced that the United States would withdraw its troops, though several months later than the date to which it agreed in the U.S.-Taliban accord. On August 15, 2021, two weeks before that withdrawal was to conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that shocked many inwithdrawal over securing a political settlement that
preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001. After months of delays, on
September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in Doha, Qatar, to begin their
first direct peace negotiations toward such a settlement, a significant moment with potentially dramatic
implications for the course of the ongoing Afghan conflict. Talks between the two sides continue but have not
made substantial progress and remain complicated by a number of factors.
In light of the stalling of intra-Afghan talks, the United the United States and Afghanistan. In the last two weeks of August, U.S. military forces oversaw the evacuation of over 120,000 individuals, including U.S. and international diplomatic personnel and Afghan partners, from Kabul’s international airport, before departing on August 30, 2021. No U.S. military or diplomatic personnel are in Afghanistan as of February 2022. The Taliban announced the formation of a new government dominated by Taliban loyalists on September 7, 2021. The composition of that government and the Taliban’s suppression of peaceful protests against its rule indicate the group has prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures that might be welcomed by the United States and other countries. Other than a regional Islamic State affiliate, no armed opposition to the Taliban appears to exist as of February 2022, although some anti-Taliban Afghan leaders have sought U.S. support. The Taliban’s renewed rule has been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a longstanding U.S. policy interest. The status of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to leave the country, also remain closely scrutinized. Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both old (such as droughts, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). The Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate these crises, but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicated. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 16 link to page 18States appears to have intensified its efforts to broker an
intra-Afghan agreement. The United States reportedly produced a draft peace agreement to “jumpstart”
negotiations that includes a variety of options, including the establishment of an interim “transitional”
government, which Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has rejected. The culmination of these efforts was to be a
senior-level Afghan conference in Turkey planned for April 2021, but the Taliban refused to attend and continue
to reject participating in such a meeting. Observers speculate about what kind of political arrangement, if any,
could satisfy both the elected Afghan government and the Taliban, who have not specified in detail their vision for
Afghanistan’s future beyond creating an “Islamic government.”
Afghan officials have sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. military withdrawal on their own forces’
capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicate that the withdrawal could lead to Taliban gains on the
battlefield. By many measures, the Taliban are in a stronger position now than at any point since 2001, controlling
as much as half of the country, though many once-public U.S. government metrics related to the conflict have
been classified or are no longer produced. Future changes in political arrangements and/or in the security
environment may in turn influence U.S. policymakers’ consideration of future levels and conditions of
development assistance. It is unclear to what extent, if at all, the prospect of continued U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan (which remains one of the world’s poorest countries) represents leverage over the Taliban.

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link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 7 link to page 16 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement Taliban Takeover .............................................................................................. 1
U.S. Military Drawdown .......... 1 Taliban Government ........................................................................................................................ 2 Current and Potential Opposition 2
Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Afghan Forces and Security Dynamics ........................... 3
Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Democracy and Human Rights in Afghanistan ............... 6
Intra-Afghan Talks and Efforts to Achieve a Settlement .............................................................................................. 3 Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power ....................................................................... 8
Accelerated U.S. Diplomatic Efforts .......... 5 Counterterrorism ................................................................................................................. 9
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors5 Human Rights: Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities ............................................ 6 Ongoing Relocations of American Citizens and Certain Afghans ................................. 10
Economy and U.S. Aid..... 8 Humanitarian and Economic Crisis ............................................................................................... 10 Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors ........................................ 11
Outlook and Issues for Congress .................................................. 11 Congressional Action and Outlook ................................................. 12

Figures
Figure 1. Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts in Afghanistan ............................................... 4

13 Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 1315

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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, with a
focus on the ongoing U.S. military withdrawal and its implications for a number of factors,
including:
 security dynamics and the ongoing conflict between the Afghan government and
the Taliban;
 the social and political gains made in Afghanistan since 2001; and
 intra-Afghan negotiations, which began in Doha, Qatar, in September 2020, but
appear to have since stalled.
The report also provides information on questions about the future of U.S. development and
security aid to Afghanistan (which has totaled approximately $144 billion since 2001).
Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement
After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral
agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of
all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other
groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies.1
In the months after the agreement, several U.S. officials asserted that the Taliban were not
fulfilling their commitments under the accord, especially with regard to Al Qaeda (see text box
below).2 U.S. officials also described increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the
agreement.3 Although no provisions in the publicly available agreement address Taliban attacks
on U.S. or Afghan forces, the Taliban reportedly committed not to attack U.S. forces in non-
public annexes accompanying the accord.4 Some lawmakers have raised questions about the
executive branch’s decision to classify these annexes.5 In Section 1217 of the FY2021 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-283), Congress directed the Administration to,
among other requirements, submit within 90 days after enactment and not less than every 120
days thereafter, a report verifying that the Taliban is upholding its commitments under the
February 2020 accord.
Al Qaeda and the Taliban
Al Qaeda (AQ) is stil assessed to have a presence in Afghanistan and its decades-long ties with the Taliban appear
to have remained strong in recent years. In May 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors reported that Al Qaeda “has

1The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in Afghanistan and the United States alike. This report provides background information and analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including  the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;  regional dynamics; and  the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country. The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule. Background: Taliban Takeover At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner, the result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance. President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. forces, the lowest U.S. force level since 2001, in advance of the full troop withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 Still, U.S. officials committed to continue to provide critical financial support to Afghan forces and expressed optimism about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban, emphasizing the Taliban’s failure to capture any of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals. At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.2 Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: some northern areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s, 1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For- The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-
Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Non-publicNonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement. 2 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, January 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.3 The speed of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with one commander saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the scheduled departure of U.S. forces.4 The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were taken with minimal fighting.5 In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.6 The Taliban captured their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and its security forces accelerated. Within a week, the Taliban were nearing Kabul, which they entered on August 15, 2021. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, factional infighting, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country that same day and remains, as of February 2022, in the United Arab Emirates. Taliban Government On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The Taliban refer to their new government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom members of this government might be replaced going forward and why, or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions.7 One Taliban spokesman reportedly said in September 2021 that the group intends to temporarily “implement” the 1964 constitution of the former Afghan monarchy “without any content that contradicts Islamic law and the principles of the Islamic Emirate,” with another speculating that the group might draft a new constitution in 2022.8 Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances and only one verified photograph reportedly exists.9 Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as governor of Kandahar and foreign minister in the 1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime Minister. One analyst has described Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure 3 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021. 4 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021. 5 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021. 6 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15, 2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 18, 2021. 7 One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021. 8 S. K. Khan, “Taliban to implement monarch-era Constitution in Afghanistan,” Anadolu Ajansi, September 28, 2021; “Taliban plans to form ‘commission’ in 2022 to draft new constitution,” ANI, September 23, 2021. 9 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Mysterious Public Appearances of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader,” Newlines, December 20, 2021; “Haibatullah Akhundzada: Shadowy Taliban supreme leader whose son was suicide bomber,” Reuters, September 7, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief whose selection forestalls competition among more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban.10 Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led Taliban negotiations with the United States from 2018 to 2021, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister. The composition of the Taliban government is overwhelmingly homogeneous. Nearly all members of the “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists. All are male, and the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality though not a majority of the population), and most are from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Some argue the role of Haqqani Network-associated figures in the Taliban caretaker government is a reflection of their outsized military import and could make U.S. cooperation with the Taliban more difficult.11 Some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials (such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held some meetings with senior Taliban figures after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from outside the movement as part of their promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The Taliban have not, however, reached beyond their own ranks to fill senior positions.12 The Taliban are reportedly staffing government positions with military and/or religious figures with little relevant experience, including some long resident in neighboring Pakistan, exacerbating the group’s administrative challenges.13 In the immediate wake of the Taliban’s takeover, some reports indicated dissension in the Taliban ranks, largely between the group’s political wing (which reportedly advocates for greater inclusion of diverse elements from within Afghan society, with an eye toward international recognition, e.g., Baradar) and its military wing (which opposes such compromises, e.g., the Haqqanis).14 Other analysts emphasize the Taliban’s history of effectively managing internal disputes.15 Even if the Taliban succeed in limiting factional infighting, their exclusive approach to governing may carry its own risks of inspiring opposition or insurgency against its rule. Central governance has often proved challenging throughout Afghan history, though the Taliban’s current position appears relatively secure. Current and Potential Opposition While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, does not reflect massive popular support for the movement but rather a lack of support for the former government.16 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to 10 Martine van Bijlert, “The Focus of the Taleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021. 11 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times, September 10, 2021. 12 “Who Will Run the Taliban Government?” op. cit. 13 Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,” New York Times, January 13, 2022. 14 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: Taliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September 15, 2021; Ali Latifi, “How deep are divisions among the Taliban?” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2021. 15 Andrew Watkins, “An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months,” CTC Sentinel, November 2021. 16 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid, Congressional Research Service 3 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility.17 Sporadic protests against the group’s rule, and the Taliban’s uncompromising response to them, point to a potential for future unrest as well as future repression. One initial effort to form an armed resistance to the Taliban was short-lived and evidently collapsed in September 2021. That brief armed resistance attempted to form a base in the central province of Panjshir, which was never conquered by the Taliban during their prior rule, but Taliban forces quickly quelled the resistance. The Taliban appear to effectively control the entire country, unlike in the 1990s when Taliban foes (the former Northern Alliance) represented significant armed opposition and held roughly 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also have stronger ties with regional powers, including some that once supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, such as Russia and Iran. Still, if they were to emerge, the existence of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a rallying point or galvanize Taliban opponents in the country, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or other international assistance. It is not clear how likely this prospect is. Formerly Panjshir-based opposition leaders (including Ahmad Massoud, son of famed Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud) formed the National Resistance Front (NRF) in the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover; the location of its leaders, who have retained Washington, D.C.-based representation, is unclear.18 In a January 2022 visit to Tehran, Taliban leaders reportedly met with an NRF delegation including Massoud.19 An armed threat to the Taliban does exist in the form of the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. The group has escalated its attacks against both Afghan civilians and Taliban forces, challenging the Taliban’s legitimacy. Experts disagree about the potency of the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the group without external assistance.20 Some Afghans, including former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), have reportedly taken up arms with ISKP, purportedly attracted by ISKP cash payments and by the group’s status as the sole active armed opposition to the Taliban.21 In the weeks after the takeover, some Afghans demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban. Protests by hundreds of women in Kabul in September gained international attention, and some Afghans demonstrated in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and other cities as well to protest Taliban actions.22 The Taliban monitored most protests, and violently dispersed some. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on September 8, 2021, banning unapproved demonstrations though some sporadic, small-scale “Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021. 17 Loveday Morris and Ruby Mellen, “Portraits of fear and loss,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022. 18 Trevor Filseth, “After Renegade Province’s Fall, Panjshir Resistance Leaders Surface in Tajikistan,” National Interest, September 23, 2021; Lachlan Markey, “Taliban resistance ramps up U.S. lobbying efforts,” Axios, October 27, 2021. 19 “Shirshah Rasooli, “Resistance Front Proposed Transitional Govt to Islamic Emirate,” TOLOnews, January 11, 2022. 20 Samya Kullab, “Islamic State attacks test Taliban’s control in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 2021; Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “The Taliban can’t take on the Islamic State alone,” War on the Rocks, October 14, 2021. 21 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers Turn to Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2021. 22 Susannah George and Ezzatullah Mehrdad, “Space for dissent opened in Afghanistan after the Taliban was ousted 20 years ago. Now the militants are trying to slam it shut,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021; “Thousands protest against Taliban in Kandahar over evictions,” Reuters, September 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief protests have continued.23 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on September 13 that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against protesters and journalists.”24 The Taliban have publicized demonstrations in favor of Taliban rule, in which some reportedly participated under duress.25 Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may create opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in Afghanistan, and complicates (if not rendering obsolete) original U.S. plans to partner with Afghan authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; those rights appear at risk with the Taliban back in power. Looming over these and other developments is the critical humanitarian and economic crisis that Afghanistan now faces. Counterterrorism For decades, a variety of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISKP are two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect them differently. Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, AQ ties with the Taliban, which go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong.26 In October 2020, Afghan forces killed a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he reportedly was living and working with Taliban forces, underscoring the close and interrelated connections between the groups and their operatives.27 In May 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors reported that Al Qaeda “minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to ‘lay low’ and not jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”28 Estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect AQ capabilities differ. According to media accounts, U.S. officials reportedly told some Senators in August 2021, “terror groups like al-Qaida may be able to grow much faster than expected” in Afghanistan under the Taliban.29 Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Frank McKenzie, said in a December 2021 interview that the AQ presence in Afghanistan had “probably slightly increased” since August 2021. 30 On the other hand, some analysts argued in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban 23 “Afghan women call for rights, protest alleged Taliban killings,” Al Jazeera, December 28, 2021. 24 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48th Session of the Human Rights Council, September 13, 2021. 25 “Were Afghan women forced to attend the pro-Taliban rally?” TRT World, September 15, 2021. 26 Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557 (2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2021/486, released May 27, 2020. 27 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26, 2020. 28 U.N. Document S/2021/486, op. cit. 29 Michael Balsamo, et al., “Concerns over US Terror Threat Rising as Taliban hold Grows,” Associated Press, August 15, 2021. 30 Robert Burns and Lolita Baldor, “US commander: Al-Qaida numbers in Afghanistan up ‘slightly,’” Associated Press, December 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief takeover that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S. counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential Taliban constraints.31 U.N. sanctions monitors reported in February 2021 that the Taliban’s takeover had given Al Qaeda “a significant boost” and that Al Qaeda has since “maintained a strategic silence, likely an effort not to compromise Taliban efforts to gain international recognition and legitimacy.”32 The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, and the two groups have often clashed. ISKP (with 1,500-2,200 fighters, per U.N. sanctions monitors) views the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as counter to its own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The Taliban have deployed hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan, where ISKP attacks appear most frequent, and have been accused of extra-judicial killings of suspected ISKP members.33 Under the former U.S.-backed government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.34 At a September 1, 2021, press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General Milley said, “It’s possible.”35 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected such cooperation in October 2021, saying, “We are able to tackle [ISKP] independently.”36 From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as AQ and ISKP without a military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.37 With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, the United States will have had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. Cooperation with Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too diplomatically or politically fraught. Collaboration with non-Taliban-affiliated Afghans via clandestine or covert action authorities could yield counterterrorism gains, but would also carry risks. Incoming CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as “extremely difficult but not impossible” in February 2022 testimony.38 Human Rights: Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities Present-day Afghanistan is in many ways a different country than the one the Taliban last ruled in 2001. Women have been active participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them, and ethnic and religious minorities, were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution. Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to 31 Ahmad Siddiqi, “The West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman, “Will Afghanistan Become a Terrorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021. 32 Twenty-ninth annexes accompanied the agreement.
2 “Taliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020.
3 “Violence ‘Not Consistent’ with US-Taliban Deal: US Envoy,” TOLOnews, October 13, 2020.
4 In March 2020 testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told a Senate Armed Services
Committee panel that committee members “have all the documents associated with this agreement” and that, in them,
the Taliban pledged not to attack U.S. or international forces, as well as Afghan provincial capitals and other high
profile targets. “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Defense Budget Posture,” CQ Congressional
Transcripts, March 4, 2020.
5 Josh Rogin, “Pompeo under pressure to release Taliban deal ‘secret annexes’” (opinion), Washington Post, March 4,
2020.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

minimized over communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to ‘lay low’ and not jeopardize the Taliban’s
diplomatic position.”6 In October 2020, Afghan forces kil ed a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni
province, where he reportedly was living and working with Taliban forces, further underscoring questions about
AQ-Taliban links and Taliban intentions with regard to Al Qaeda.7
In general, U.S. government assessments indicate that the Taliban are not fulfil ing their counterterrorism
commitments concerning Al Qaeda. For example, in its report on the final quarter of 2020, the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Defense relayed an assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) that the Taliban maintain ties to Al Qaeda and that some AQ members are “integrated into the Taliban’s
forces and command structure.”8 In a semiannual report released in April 2021, the Department of Defense
stated, “The Taliban have maintained mutually beneficial relations with AQ-related organizations and are unlikely
to take substantive action against these groups.”9 The U.S.-Taliban accord is silent on what verification
mechanisms might be in place to ensure Taliban compliance, and to what extent (if at all) the U.S. withdrawal
might be paused or reversed based on Taliban action (or inaction) with regard to Al Qaeda.
U.S. Military Drawdown10
The United States began withdrawing forces before the February 2020 agreement was reached
and continued to do so afterwards, despite U.S. assertions that Taliban violence and other actions
were inconsistent with the agreement.11 On January 15, 2021, then-Acting Secretary of Defense
Christopher Miller announced that the number of U.S. forces had reached 2,500, the lowest level
since 2001, completing a drawdown ordered by President Donald Trump in November 2020.
On April 14, 2021, President Joe Biden announced that the United States would begin a “final
withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021.12 In a written response, the
Taliban accused the United States of breaching the February 2020 agreement and stated that the
U.S. decision to stay beyond May 1 “in principle opens the way for [Taliban forces] to take every
necessary countermeasure, hence the American side will be held responsible for all future
consequences.”13 A senior Administration official said after the withdrawal announcement, “We
have communicated to the Taliban in no uncertain terms that if they do conduct attacks against
U.S. or allied forces…we will hit back hard.”14 Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump also
expressed an intention to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan, sometimes by specified dates,
but did not do so during their terms in office. Alongside the U.S. withdrawal, NATO and other

6 Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557
(2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2021/486, released May 27, 2020.
7 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26,
2020.
8 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 -
December 31, 2020, released February 17, 2021.
9 U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2020, released April 23,
2021.
10 See CRS Report R46670, U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by
Clayton Thomas.
11 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan,” New York
Times, October 21, 2019; Kylie Atwood and Ryan Browne, “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of
schedule,” CNN, April 30, 2020.
12 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” April 14, 2021.
13 “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding recent announcement by US President Joe Biden,” Voice of Jihad, April 15,
2021.
14 White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021.
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partner countries (whose forces outnumber those of the United States in Afghanistan) also are
executing a full withdrawal.
Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Afghan Forces and Security
Dynamics
In general, Trump Administration officials maintained that the troop reduction would not result in
any major changes to the two complementary U.S. missions in Afghanistan: counterterrorism and
training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces. However, some military officials implied at the
time that the reduced troop level ordered by President Trump might result in some adjustments to
U.S. operations and limits to U.S. capabilities. Many outside observers, including the
congressionally mandated Afghanistan Study Group, questioned the extent to which the United
States could perform both the training and counterterrorism missions at acceptable risk levels
with 2,500 forces.15
The Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
The effectiveness of the ANDSF is considered key to the security of Afghanistan, and U.S. and international
support has been widely viewed as critical to supporting the ANDSF. President Ghani has said, “[W]e wil not be
able to support our army for six months without U.S. [financial] support.”16 Since 2014, the United States
generally has provided around 75% of the estimated $5 bil ion to $6 bil ion a year required to fund the ANDSF,
with the balance coming from U.S. partners and the Afghan government. For FY2021, Congress appropriated just
over $3 bil ion for the ANDSF, the lowest annual appropriation since FY2008.17
It remains unclear how the U.S. military withdrawal might impact congressional wil ingness to continue providing
this assistance, which some may view as insufficient, in and of itself, to maintain the viability of Afghan forces. In a
reported letter to President Ghani (more below), Secretary Blinken stated, “Even with the continuation of
financial assistance from the United States to your forces after an American military withdrawal, I am concerned
that the security situation wil worsen and the Taliban could make rapid territorial gains.” In any case, continued
international assistance wil likely be necessary for the foreseeable future: the Pentagon reported in June 2020 that
“ful [financial] self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF
force structure, reduce significantly.”18
Total ANDSF strength was reported at more than 307,000 as of January 2021. Other metrics related to ANDSF
strength and performance, including casualty and attrition rates, have been classified by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) starting with the October 2017 SIGAR quarterly report, citing a request from the Afghan government,
although SIGAR had previously published those metrics as part of its quarterly reports.19
Under the Biden Administration, U.S. officials have expressed an intention to continue “over-the-
horizon” counterterrorism efforts after U.S. troops depart Afghanistan. In his April 14 address,
President Biden said, “We’ll reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial
assets in the region to prevent reemergence of terrorists” in Afghanistan.20 Questions remain as to
what such an effort might look like in practice, and what the potential logistical, political,
financial challenges might be, including establishing new arrangements with Afghan partners and
new basing options outside of Afghanistan.

15 Afghanistan Study Group Final Report, United States Institute of Peace, February 2021.
16 Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn, January 18, 2018.
17 Congress also rescinded $1.1 billion in FY2020 ASFF funding. For more, see CRS Report R45329, Afghanistan:
Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017-2020.
18 Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2020.
19 “Report: US Officials Classify Crucial Metrics on Afghan Casualties, Readiness,” Military Times, October 30, 2017.
20 White House, “Remarks by President Biden,” op. cit.
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Afghan officials have sought to downplay the detrimental impact of the U.S. troop withdrawal
while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance to Afghan forces.21 In a May
2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said “bad
outcomes” are not “inevitable,” given
what he characterized as the strengths of
the Afghan government and military.
Figure 1. Taliban Controlled and Contested
22
Some other U.S. government assessments
Districts in Afghanistan
are less positive: in its 2021 annual threat
As of October 2020
assessment, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence reported that “the
Afghan Government will struggle to hold
the Taliban at bay if the Coalition
withdraws support.”23 U.S. military
officials have said various options,
including remote training (which has
largely been in place since the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic) or training
Afghan personnel in third countries, are
under consideration to continue
supporting Afghan forces.24 The
departure of U.S. contractors may also
pose short term threats to Afghan
capabilities, given Afghan forces’
reliance on contractor support for most
maintenance work. For example, in a
February 2021 report, the U.S. military

assessed that without DOD-funded
Source: The Economist (using data and analysis from Long
contractor support, no Afghan airframes
War Journal)
“can be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months.”25 U.S. military officials are
reportedly considering seeking authorization for airstrikes (likely launched from U.S. bases in the
Persian Gulf) against the Taliban in the event that Kabul or other major cities are at risk.26
Beyond the immediate effects on Afghan forces and their capabilities, a full U.S. military
withdrawal may have second- or third-order effects on the fragile Afghan state, especially when it
comes to local perceptions of U.S. intentions and of the impact of U.S. withdrawal on Afghan
forces. Some Afghans, recalling the complex, multi-sided civil war of the 1990s, have suggested
that their communities (and, often, their associated militias) may pursue more independent
courses of action if the Afghan government is unable to provide security in the context of the U.S

21 Zahra Rahimi, “ANDSF Showcases Air Force as Country Braces for US Pullout,” TOLOnews, April 26, 2021.
22 Transcript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing,
Department of Defense, May 6, 2021.
23 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April
19, 2021.
24 Transcript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing,
Department of Defense, May 6, 2021.
25 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, op. cit.
26 Helene Cooper, et al., “U.S. Weighs Possibility of Airstrikes if Afghan Forces Face Crisis,” New York Times, June 9,
2021.
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link to page 7 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

withdrawal.27 Some Afghan leaders have suggested that continued infighting among Afghan elites
may pose as much of a threat to the Afghan political system as the Taliban.28
Operations by the Taliban, whose strength has been estimated at 60,000 full-time fighters, against
Afghan government forces continue, including numerous attacks nationwide after the U.S.
withdrawal began on May 1. A major offensive by the Taliban in May 2021 prompted the United
States to launch airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces in southern Afghanistan’s
Helmand Province. The group controls or contexts more territory in 2021 than at any point since
2001 by many measures (see Figure 1).29
The United Nations mission in Afghanistan reported that while the number of civilian casualties
in 2020 fell below 10,000 for the first time since 2013, violence against civilians increased in the
months following the start of intra-Afghan negotiations in September 2020.30 Targeted attacks
have risen in recent months. The Taliban denied involvement in the January 2021 assassination of
female Supreme Court judges in Kabul and other attacks, but the United States and other
countries released a joint statement on January 31, 2021, charging that “the Taliban bears
responsibility for the majority of this targeted violence.”31 The Taliban also denied responsibility
for a May 8, 2021, attack targeting schoolgirls in a Kabul neighborhood populated mostly by
Hazaras (an ethnoreligious Shia minority); the attack killed more than 80 and wounded nearly
150. That attack was not claimed by the regional Islamic State affiliate, though that group has
often targeted Afghan Hazaras (see textbox).
Islamic State-Khorasan Province
Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations have been aimed at the local Islamic State affiliate, known
as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K). Estimates of ISKP strength generally ranged from
2,000 to 4,000 fighters until ISKP “col apsed” in late 2019 due to offensives by U.S. and Afghan forces and,
separately, the Taliban.32 ISKP and Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of
political or other differences.33 A number of ISKP leaders have been kil ed in U.S. strikes since 2016, and Afghan
forces arrested and captured two successive ISKP leaders in the spring of 2020. U.S. officials caution that ISKP
remains a threat, pointing to several high profile attacks attributed to the group in 2020. The United Nations
reports that casualties from ISKP attacks in 2020 decreased 45% from 2019.34 Some suggest that the Taliban’s

27 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghanistan Braces for the Worst as U.S. Troop Withdrawal
Accelerates,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2020; “Atta Noor threatens to ‘take action’ against security situation,”
Ariana News, December 24, 2020.
28 Anisa Shaneed, “Abdullah: Political Division Will Cause Collapse,” TOLOnews, June 3, 2021.
29 See also Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution
2557 (2020) concerning the Taliban and other report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. Document S/2022/83, released February 3, 2022. 33 Susannah George, “Taliban sends hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan to wage war against Islamic State,” Washington Post, November 22, 2021. 34 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020. 35 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021. 36 Kathy Gannon, “Taliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021. 37 See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021. 38 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx. Congressional Research Service 6 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief protecting women’s rights “within the framework of sharia,”39 and their early actions suggest at least some moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule. Nonetheless, their return to power has ushered in “immediate and dramatic reversals on women’s rights and fundamental freedoms,” according to the United Nations.40 The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Some observers have noted, however, that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of women’s rights, particularly in rural areas, where 76% of the population resides.41 For some Afghans, including some women, the Taliban takeover may represent an improvement over high levels of violence that characterized the Taliban’s insurgency.42 This may be particularly so for those in rural areas more affected by conflict. For other Afghans, particularly in urban areas, the Taliban’s takeover has increased fears of repression, and has created longer-term concerns over the future of women’s rights under a Taliban government.43 The Taliban have closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and have reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the 1990s.44 Guidance issued by that ministry in late December 2021 seeks to impose new restrictions on Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel long distances without a male guardian.45 The disappearance of several women activists (some of whom were involved in protests mentioned above) in January 2022 attracted considerable international attention and raised fears of a broader Taliban crackdown on women’s rights.46 Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for Afghan girls. Some signs suggest that the Taliban may permit education for women and girls in at least some cases, with secondary public schools for girls having reopened in some provinces.47 In many other provinces, however, a de facto ban on girls’ education, at least above the primary level, remains in place. For months, Taliban officials have said that they intend to create “a safe learning environment” in which girls’ schools can reopen,48 but many women’s rights advocates are skeptical of these claims and fearful that the group never intends to officially allow such education. In the 1990s, the Taliban did not formally ban secondary or higher education for girls, but similarly prohibited it on an ostensibly temporary basis due to unspecified security concerns, 39 “Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021. Sharia refers broadly to concepts and principles of Islamic religious jurisprudence that vary in their interpretation under different schools of practice. For more, see Matthew Nelson, “The Taliban’s (Islamic) Isolation,” Chatham House, October 21, 2020. 40 “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: Where Are We Now?” United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, December 2021. 41 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, September 2020. 42 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021. 43 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,” New York Times, December 15, 2021. 44 Rachel Pannett, “Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the Taliban’s top officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021. 45 “No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2021. 46 Patricia Grossman, “Afghan women’s rights activists forcibly disappeared,” Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2022; Sudarsan Raghavan, “Faced with disappearances, beatings and intimidation, Afghanistan’s women’s rights activists go quiet on the streets,” Washington Post, February 8, 2022. 47 Kate Clark, “Who gets to go to school? (1): What people told us about education since the Taleban took over,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 26, 2022. 48 “Girls to return to secondary school ‘soon as possible’: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief a de facto ban that lasted the entirety of the group’s five-year rule.49 A Taliban spokesman said in a January 2022 interview that the group intended to reopen girls’ schools across the country by March 2022, describing the delay as a “question of capacity.”50 Public universities reopened in February 2022 with women permitted to attend but only when separated from men.51 Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities have also received scrutiny. Many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who comprise 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population and represent one of the country’s largest ethnoreligious minorities) previously expressed fear about the Taliban’s possible return.52 Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, even as reports emerge of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan.53 Surveying these mixed messages, one observer speculated in early September 2021 that “the Taliban political leadership’s more pragmatic approach toward the Hazara is necessary to maintain its fragile control over all of Afghanistan,” but that persecution could increase in the absence of international attention.54 Ongoing Relocations of American Citizens and Certain Afghans The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15 triggered the mass evacuation of tens of thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. That effort largely came to a close with the final departure of U.S. military forces on August 30. U.S. officials say that they intend to secure the relocation of all remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country, but some Members of Congress and other observers express concern about the pace of relocations. U.S. officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, which General Milley described as “the largest air evacuation in US history.”55 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the State Department said that as of December 13, 2021, it has assisted in the departure of 479 U.S. citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and over 2,200 Afghans.56 It is not clear how many of those departed via overland routes or via the U.S.-backed Qatar Airways charter flights that periodically left Kabul, despite issues with the international airport there (see textbox). The number of U.S. citizens remaining in Afghanistan appears to be in flux. The Department said on December 13 that it was in contact with “fewer than a dozen U.S. citizens” who wanted and 49 Margot Buff, “‘Our Futures Will Be Ruined’: Afghan Girls Fear Denial of Education Under Taliban,” Gandhara, September 21, 2021; Rasmussen and Nazari, op. cit. 50 Kathy Gannon, “The AP Interview: Taliban pledge all girls in school soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022. 51 Ehsan Popalzai and Hande Atay Alam, “Afghan universities reopen to female students but with strict rules on mixing,” CNN, February 3, 2022. 52 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,” New York Times, March 27, 2019. 53 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence under Taliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021. 54 Tom Mutch, “Afghanistan’s Hazaras Get Mixed Messages From the Taliban,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2021. 55 Statement available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf. 56 U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” December 13, 2021. On January 11, 2022, a State Department spokesperson similarly noted that the State Department had directly assisted with the departure of 479 U.S. citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and approximately 2,000 Afghans. Congressional Research Service 8 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief were prepared to leave Afghanistan; a spokesperson said on January 11, 2022, “We are working currently with a few dozen U.S. citizens and their families who have identified themselves as prepared to depart and who have the necessary travel documents to do so.”57 That spokesperson added that there were “probably fewer than 200” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, leaving “about 150 other U.S. citizens who don’t want to leave Afghanistan at this point or [are] otherwise not ready to depart.”58 One December 2021 press report, citing a State Department official, stated that around 62,000 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain in Afghanistan.59 This figure excludes the tens of thousands of Afghans at risk who are not eligible for an SIV. Status of Kabul Airport Relocation efforts are complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. Since the final departure of U.S. forces, Qatar and Turkey have been working to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar system, and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. Domestic flights restarted in early September 2021, but international flights have been mostly limited to charter Qatar Airways flights as carriers cite high insurance charges as well as security and logistical concerns as impediments to regular commercial air travel.60 In late December 2021, Qatar and Turkey reportedly signed an agreement to operate the Kabul airport jointly, along with four other airports in Afghanistan.61 The United Arab Emirates reportedly has also held talks with the Taliban about operating the Kabul airport, possibly in a bid to diminish the influence of Qatar, its regional rival.62 The foreign minister of Turkey, which in 2022 improved relations with the UAE, raised the prospect of a trilateral arrangement as talks with the Taliban continue.63 Beyond logistical problems at Kabul airport, another impediment to continued relocations has been the issue of travel documentation, particularly passports, without which Afghans cannot leave the country. The Taliban began re-issuing passports several weeks after taking control of the country, but the operations of passport offices have been sporadic and hamstrung by delays, long lines, and administrative challenges.64 Additionally, some Afghans who seek to relocate remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution against individuals who worked for the former Afghan government and/or with the United States. The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reportedly stated in January 2022 that the United Nations has received “credible allegations” of Taliban reprisals against those individuals, including dozens of killings.65 In mid-December 2021, reports emerged that the Taliban had halted evacuation flights from Afghanistan after Qatar ceased providing seats on chartered Qatar Airways flights for Taliban-designated individuals to work abroad and earn money to be remitted back to Afghanistan amid 57 Ibid; Department Press Briefing – January 11, 2022, U.S. Department of State, January 11, 2022. 58 Department Press Briefing – January 11, 2022, op. cit. 59 Jessica Donati, “More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2021. 60 Aftab Khan, “PIA prepared to run regular flights to Kabul: CEO,” Express Tribune, November 13, 2021. 61 “Turkey, Qatar Await Taliban Green Light to Run Afghan Airports,” Voice of America, December 28, 2021. 62 Alexander Cornwell, “EXCLUSIVE: UAE holds talks with Taliban to run Kabul airport – foreign diplomats,” Reuters, November 24, 2021. 63 “Kabul Airport May be Run Jointly by Turkey, Qatar, UAE,” TOLOnews, December 28, 2021. 64 Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing travel documents,” Washington Post, October 6, 2021; “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January 16, 2022. 65 “UN chief accuses Taliban of scores of revenge killings since seizing control in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace and
stability of Afghanistan, United Nations Security Council, (S/2021/486), released June 1, 2021, which relays an
assessment from unspecified Member States that the Taliban “contest or control an estimated 50 to 70 per cent of
Afghan territory outside of urban centers, while also exerting direct control over 57 per cent of district administrative
centers.”
30 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February 2021.
31 U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnapping, and Destruction of Vital
Infrastructure,” January 31, 2021.
32 “ISIS Is Losing Afghan Territory. That Means Little for Its Victims,” New York Times, December 2, 2019.
33 See, for example, Shawn Snow, “ISIS loses more than half its fighters from US airstrikes and Taliban ground
operations,” Military Times, February 27, 2020.
34 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, op. cit.
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participation in peace talks or a putative political settlement could prompt disaffected (or newly unemployed)
fighters to join ISKP.35
The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected,
though they have in recent years conducted three limited truces during religious holidays
(including in mid-May 2021). Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to abandon
violence, arguably their main source of leverage, before an intra-Afghan political settlement,
though targeted reductions in violence could pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.36
Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Democracy and Human Rights
in Afghanistan
By all accounts, Afghanistan has made progress on recognizing and protecting Afghans’ rights
since Taliban rule ended in 2001. The scale of that progress is disputed, however, and
government-aligned entities are alleged to participate in a range of human rights abuses. Experts
differ over the extent to which the Taliban have changed since 2001, if at all. The Taliban have
not described in detail their plans for Afghan governance, but many expect social and political
gains to be reversed if the Taliban come back into power in some fashion following a U.S.
military withdrawal.
The 2004 Afghan constitution establishes a democratic political system in which basic freedoms,
including of religion, expression, assembly, and association, are guaranteed. In practice, elections
have regularly been fraught with accusations of fraud, and governing institutions are often weak
and ineffective. The constitution arguably creates an overly powerful executive branch,
disincentivizing compromise as various factions vie for the all-important presidency in a zero-
sum game. Endemic corruption in particular has long been identified as a potent threat that
undermines Afghan state institutions, delegitimizes the Afghan government in the eyes of many
of its citizens, and discourages private sector investment and development.37
Successive State Department annual reports on human rights practices indicate widespread
human rights abuses in government-held areas.38 Respect for human rights, including for the
equal rights of women, appears even more limited in areas outside of the government’s control.
The State Department reports that the Taliban conduct public executions, forced confessions, and
other abuses under their parallel justice system; that the group strictly polices expression and
routinely attacks journalists; and that it restricts girls’ access to education.39
There appear to be some changes to the Taliban’s rhetoric and actions since 2001, though experts
disagree about the extent and significance of such changes.40 One Afghan journalist’s April 2021
report from Taliban-controlled areas of Helmand Province indicates that, at least in some areas,

35 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Zabihullah Ghazi, “Foes in Afghan War See Common Threat of Islamic State’s Return,”
New York Times, March 22, 2021.
36 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “Fight and talk: Facing negotiations, Taliban almost took key Afghan city,” Reuters, September
14, 2020.
37 See “The State of Corruption in Afghanistan and the Role of Independent Institutions,” Prepared remarks of John
Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Integrity Watch Afghanistan Webinar Event, June
24, 2020.
38 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 30, 2021.
39 Ibid.
40 Thomas Ruttig, “Have the Taliban Changed?” CTC Sentinel, March 2021.
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the group does not have either the inclination, willingness, and/or ability to enforce the kinds of
societal controls that it attempted to implement until 2001.41 Politically, some analysts posit the
Taliban are likely to push for clerical oversight of executive and legislative decision-making as a
“hybrid” of their 1996-2001 emirate and a more Western-style state.42
The Taliban, who have focused on securing the withdrawal of foreign forces, have not detailed
their proposals on governance issues. In remarks at the opening of intra-Afghan talks in
September 2020, Taliban deputy political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said, “We seek an
Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and free—an Afghanistan with an
Islamic system in which all people of the nation can participate without discrimination.”43 In
February 2021, Baradar wrote that the group is committed to protecting certain rights with
conditions, such as “all rights of women afforded to them by Islamic law” and “freedom of
speech within the framework of Islamic principles and national interests.”44 In a June 2021
interview, a Taliban spokesman referred to establishing an “Islamic government” as the group’s
“second goal” (after the departure of foreign forces from Afghanistan), adding that “if this second
goal is not reached, we will be compelled to continue our war to achieve our goal.”45
Afghan leaders express a determination to preserve Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and its
constitution, which establishes Islam as the state religion but does not necessarily tie legislation
and national policymaking to religious jurisprudence. In a September 2020 interview, High
Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah said, “For me, one person, one
vote—I don’t call anything a red line—but that’s critical ... and compromises on these things will
not get us to peace.”46 President Ashraf Ghani has stated that his government will not conclude
any agreement that limits Afghans’ rights, adding that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that
did not include Kabul’s participation could lead to “catastrophe,” pointing to the 1990s-era civil
strife following the fall of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.47
Some Afghans and other international observers have proposed the formation of an interim
government, arguing that the Taliban’s continued refusal to recognize the Afghan government
might make such a step necessary.48 President Ghani and other Afghan officials have rejected
such proposals, including from the United States (see below).49
Press reports suggest that Afghans who have benefitted from the socio-political reforms of the
past two decades view the U.S. troop drawdown warily.50 In remarks announcing the withdrawal

41 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “After America: Inside the Taliban’s New Emirate,” Newlines, April 14, 2021.
42 Frud Bezhan, “Are the Taliban Seeking A ‘Sunni Afghan Version’ of Iran?” RFE/RL, October 2, 2020.
43 Ayaz Gul, “Afghan Rivals Begin Historic Peace Talks; US Cautiously Optimistic,” Voice of America, September 12,
2020.
44 Open letter to the people of the United States of America, February 16, 2021. Available at
http://alemarahenglish.net/?p=42767.
45 Lynne O’Donnell, “Taliban Map Out Future Vision for Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, June 8, 2021.
46 Susannah George, “The Taliban and the Afghan government are finally talking peace: What they’re negotiating and
what to expect,” Washington Post, September 12, 2020.
47 Philip Walter Wellman, “Ghani tells Afghan peace deal with Taliban will not compromise basic rights,” Stars and
Stripes, January 28, 2019; “Afghans Worry as US Makes Progress in Taliban Talks,” Voice of America, January 29,
2019.
48 Frud Bezhan, “Would an Afghan Interim Government Help or Hinder Peace Efforts?” Gandhara, January 14, 2021.
49 Pamela Constable, “Peace talks are faltering, violence has surged, and U.S. troops are pulling out. Can the Afghan
government withstand the pressure?” Washington Post, January 13, 2021.
50 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Afghans wonder ‘What about us?’ as U.S. troops prepare to withdraw,” New York Times,
April 14, 2021.
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plan, President Biden said that “we’ll continue to support the rights of Afghan women and girls
by maintaining significant humanitarian and development assistance.”51 It is unclear to what
extent, if at all, U.S. assistance might be able to shape the trajectory of respect for human rights in
Afghanistan if the broader political and governance context becomes less hospitable, or whether
such assistance might represent a strong enough incentive to shape Taliban approaches to human
rights or democracy (see “Outlook and Issues for Congress,” below).
Intra-Afghan Talks and Efforts to Achieve a
Settlement
Intra-Afghan talks aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace settlement began in Doha, Qatar, in
September 2020, representing a major step toward resolving the conflict. The two sides have met
sporadically in recent months, but appear to remain far apart on the two key issues that appear to
be central to talks—reducing violence and determining the future structure and orientation of the
Afghan state.52
The U.S.-Taliban agreement committed the Taliban to entering talks with the Afghan government
by March, but negotiations remained unscheduled for months amid complications including
gridlock in Kabul due to the disputed September 2019 presidential election, delays to a prisoner
exchange between Taliban and the Afghan government, and ongoing violence. Afghan President
Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s electoral opponent and former partner in a unity
government, agreed in May 2020 to end their political impasse and appoint Abdullah as chairman
of the newly-created High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) to oversee talks with the
Taliban.53 The prisoner exchange was completed in early September 2020, removing the main
obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which began in Doha that month. The two sides have met
intermittently in recent months, with some describing the talks as stalled.54
Some doubt the Taliban’s trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of U.S.
military pressure, the group will have little incentive to comply with the terms of any agreement
reached with Kabul.55 Some Afghan officials reportedly suspect the Taliban of trying to “run out
the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,” remaining in negotiations long enough to
secure a full U.S. withdrawal, after which they will capitalize on their advantage on the battlefield
to seize control of the country by force.56 Still, at least some Afghans reportedly support “peace at
any cost” given the decades of conflict through which the country has suffered.57

51 “President Biden Delivers Remarks on Afghanistan Strategy,” C-SPAN, April 14, 2021.
52 Kathy Gannon, “Afghan Peace Talks Resume, but Path is Anything but Certain,” Associated Press, February 23,
2021.
53 Ali Yawar Adili, “End of the Post-Election Impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 20, 2020. For more on Afghanistan’s political system, and accusations that it is
overcentralized and fuels conflict, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton
Thomas.
54 Alexander Cornwell, “Afghan peace talks should rotate among countries, envoy says amid stall,” Reuters, March 15,
2021.
55 Deb Riechmann, “Critics of US-Taliban Deal Say Militants Can’t Be Trusted,” Associated Press, July 4, 2020.
56 Mujib Mashal, “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2020.
57 Susannah George and Sharif Hassan, “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re
willing to concede,” Washington Post, June 7, 2020.
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Accelerated U.S. Diplomatic Efforts
In spring 2021, with talks in Doha having made no evident progress, the Biden Administration
launched an intensified U.S. diplomatic push to broker an intra-Afghan agreement. On March 7,
2021, the Afghan media outlet TOLOnews published an undated letter reportedly from U.S.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken to President Ghani.58 In the letter, Secretary Blinken reportedly
asked President Ghani to exercise “urgent leadership” in forming a “united front” with other
Afghan political leaders.59
The United States also reportedly prepared a draft peace proposal for consideration by Afghan
negotiators (the text of which was also published by TOLOnews). The document, which is
described as “intended to jumpstart” talks by providing concrete power-sharing alternatives,
proposes the formation of a “transitional peace government,” including the selection of a new
president “acceptable to both sides.”60 The document also proposes possible changes to the
Afghan parliament and provincial councils (in both cases by either adding Taliban members to the
current bodies or suspending them during the transitional government); the creation of a new
High Council for Islamic Jurisprudence to “review” legislation “to ensure compliance” with
Islam; and the writing of a new Constitution by a 21-member commission.
The culmination of these U.S. efforts was to be a “senior-level meeting” in Istanbul, Turkey in
late April “to finalize an agreement,” per Secretary Blinken’s letter. On April 13, shortly after the
publication of reports about President Biden’s decision to maintain U.S. troops in Afghanistan
beyond May 1, a Taliban spokesman wrote on Twitter that “[u]ntil all foreign forces completely
withdraw from our homeland….[the Taliban] will not participate in any conference that shall
make decisions about Afghanistan.”61 Turkey has postponed the meeting indefinitely, and the
Taliban reportedly have refused to attend unless the meeting is short and comprised of low-level
delegations who will not make decisions on critical issues.62
For his part, President Ghani has proposed a presidential election within six months in which he
would not run, per a top advisor; in response to those reports, the Taliban rejected such a plan,
arguing that previous elections had “pushed the country to the verge of crisis.”63 President Ghani
is widely viewed as severely weakened and isolated, and U.S. officials have reportedly “lost
patience” with him and his refusal to consider stepping down.64

58 When asked about the accuracy of reports about the letter and draft peace proposal on March 8, 2021, State
Department Spokesman Ned Price said, “I’m not going to be able to comment on any reported private
correspondence.” U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, March 8, 2021.
59 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, David Zucchino, and Lara Jakes, “U.S. Pushes U.N.-led Conference in Letter to Afghan
Leader,” New York Times, March 7, 2021. Text of the letter available at https://tolonews.com/pdf/02.pdf.
60 “Exclusive: Details of Proposed Draft for Afghan Peace,” TOLOnews, March 7, 2021.
61 Muhammad Naeem (@IeaOffice), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 3:59PM.
62 Tahir Khan, “VOA Exclusive: Taliban Attach Conditions to Istanbul Conference Participation,” VOA, May 25, 2021.
63 Hamid Shalizi, “Exclusive: Afghan president, rejecting US peace plan, to offer election in six months, officials say,”
Reuters, March 23, 2021; “Taliban slam Afghan president’s proposal for new election,” France24, March 24, 2021;
“Ghani will not run in any eventual election,” Afghanistan Times, April 3, 2021.
64 Adam Nossiter, “Afghan President in ‘Desperate Situation’ as His Power Is Undermined,” New York Times, April
10, 2021.
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Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors
Regional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, directly affect the conflict in
Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
which has played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades.
Pakistan’s security services maintain ties to Afghan insurgent Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief the country’s severe economic difficulties. While some suggest Qatar forced the Taliban to cease this practice at the behest of the United States, others have stated that this dispute is entirely between the Taliban and Qatar.66 Qatar, Turkey, and the Taliban have had negotiations on resuming airport operations, and reportedly reached a preliminary agreement on airport security in January 2022.67 The first relocation flight in several months, a Qatar Airways charter paid for by the U.S. State Department, reportedly left Kabul in late January 2022.68 Humanitarian and Economic Crisis69 The Taliban’s return to power has triggered what U.N. officials describe as potentially the worst humanitarian crisis in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries.70 A number of interrelated factors, including the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, have all contributed to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis. Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions have worsened significantly since August 2021: the World Food Program reported in December 2021 that the proportion of Afghans with insufficient food had increased from 80% to 98% since the Taliban’s takeover.71 In October 2021, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that “at least 1 million” Afghan children are “at risk of dying due to severe acute malnutrition without immediate treatment.”72 The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars each year to support the former Afghan government, financing over half of the government’s $6 billion annual budget and as much as 80% of total public expenditures.73 That development assistance halted with the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, plunging the country into what U.N. officials describe as economic “free fall” as the country’s economy has contracted as much as 40% since August 2021 as of December 2021.74 The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) warned in November 2021 that, under various scenarios, poverty rates could reach as high as 97% by July 2022.75 66 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021. 67 Callie Patteson, “Turkey, Qatar in talks to restart Afghan evacuation flights,” New York Post, December 28, 2021; Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Turkey, Qatar reached preliminary deal on Kabul airport security- Turkish sources,” Reuters, January 20, 2022. 68 Courntey Kube et al., “First flight of American evacuees in months leaves Kabul airport for Qatar,” NBC News, January 27, 2022. 69 See CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions. 70 “Get the facts: What’s happening now in Afghanistan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), January 18, 2022. 71 “Afghanistan Food Security Update,” World Food Program, December 8, 2021. 72 “Half of Afghanistan’s children under five expected to suffer from acute malnutrition as hunger takes root for millions,” UNICEF Afghanistan, October 5, 2021. 73 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021. 74 Yaroslav Trofimov, “For a Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan, and the Rest of the World, a Crisis Looms,” Wall Street Journal December 13, 2021. 75 “Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022,” UNDP Afghanistan, November 30, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan; the head of the Norwegian Refugee Council said in January 2021 that sanctions have “held back” their operations.76 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.77 In at least some parts of the country, food is available but many Afghans do not have money with which to pay for it, illustrating the impact of the country’s economic crisis on humanitarian conditions. Afghanistan is a highly cash-dependent society, but shipments of dollars halted with the U.S. freeze on Afghan central bank assets in August 2021 and Afghanistan does not have the ability to print its own currency. The result is a severe liquidity crisis that threatens to destroy the country’s banking system. In October 2021, Secretary-General Guterres urged “the world to take action and inject liquidity into the Afghan economy to avoid collapse,” and Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in December 2021 that the United States was “looking intensely at ways to put more liquidity into the Afghan economy, to get more money into people’s pockets...in a way that doesn’t directly benefit the Taliban.” 78 The World Bank in December 2021 decided to release $280 million in Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) monies to U.N. agencies to support Afghan health and education workers’ salaries, injecting much-needed money into the Afghan economy; the United States has reportedly “encouraged” the World Bank to release additional ARTF funds.79 Additionally, the Asian Development Bank approved $405 million in grants to four U.N. agencies to provide food, health care, and education to millions of Afghans.80 Both the Taliban and some foreign leaders (including Secretary-General Guterres) have urged the United States to release the hold on Afghan central bank assets, which total around $7 billion. On February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it will “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets]...for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.81 Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers. Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors. 76 See interview at https://twitter.com/nrc_norway/status/1486778209387565058. 77 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf. 78 Jonathan Landay, “U.N. chief: Liquidity needed to stem Afghanistan economic, humanitarian crises,” Reuters, October 11, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” December 21, 2021. 79 David Ignatius, “How the U.S. is helping vulnerable Afghans without recognizing the Taliban,” Washington Post, January 18, 2022. 80 “$405 million in ADB grants to support food security, health, and education in Afghanistan through United Nations,” Asian Development Bank, January 25, 2022. 81 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf and briefing at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-on-u-s-support-for-the-people-of-afghanistan/. Congressional Research Service 11 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule. Pakistan’s security services maintain ties to Afghan armed groups, most notably the Haqqani groups, most notably the Haqqani
Network.Network.65 82 Former Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, have attributed much of the attributed much of the
insurgency’s power and longevity Taliban’s strength either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support.either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support.6683 The Trump The Trump
Administration sought Islamabad’s assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban Administration sought Islamabad’s assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban afterin 2018, and U.S. 2018, and U.S.
assessments of assessments of Taliban’s role have generally been more positive since. For example, Khalilzad
thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October 2018 and for facilitating the
travel of Taliban figures to talks in Doha, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “expressed
gratitude” to his Pakistani counterpart in March 2021 for Pakistan’s “continued support for the
Afghan peace process.”67 Pakistani leaders assert, however, that their country will not host U.S.
bases after the military withdrawal from Afghanistan.68
Despite official Pakistani leadership’s statements to the contrary, Islamabad may view a weak and
destabilized Afghanistan as preferable to a strong, unified Afghan state (particularly one led by an
ethnic Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul; Pakistan has a large and restive Pashtun
minority).69Pakistan’s role were generally more positive thereafter.84 Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to Pakistan’s long history of support for the Taliban and statement of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and others.85 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021. However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose serious challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek an Afghan Taliban-mediated ceasefire with the TTP that ended in December 2021.86 Moreover, state-run Pakistan International Airlines ended its flights to Kabul in October 2021 due to the Taliban’s “unprofessional attitude.”87 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over one Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over one
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over
their shared 1,600-mile border.70 Pakistan’s security establishment, fearful of strategic
encirclement by India, apparently continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a relatively friendly
and reliably anti-India element in Afghanistan. India’s diplomatic and commercial presence in
Afghanistan—and U.S. rhetorical support for it—exacerbates Pakistani fears of encirclement.
India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction, but New Delhi has not
shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defense relationship with Kabul and, according to one
June 2021 media report, has “opened channels of communication” with Taliban leaders.71
Afghanistan maintains mostly cordial ties with its other neighbors, notably the post-Soviet states
of Central Asia, whose role in Afghanistan has been relatively limited but could increase.72 In the
past two years, multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of support for the

65 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.
66their shared 1,600-mile border.88 Taliban and Pakistani government forces reportedly clashed at the border in December 2021 and January 2022.89 Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule but has maintained relations with the group in recent years while emphasizing the need for representation for Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Official Taliban visits to Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover, and have continued since then, including with the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022. Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover, including the only regional rejection of 82 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. 83 White House, White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. Some , August 21, 2017. Some
Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself. Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself.
Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018. Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018.
6784 “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had , February 9, 2019. Baradar had
been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010. Baqir Sajjad Syed, been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010. Baqir Sajjad Syed,
“Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” “Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” Dawn, March 23, 2021., March 23, 2021.
68 “Pakistan refused to give military bases to US: FM,” Pakistan Today, June 8, 2021.
69 Pashtuns are an ethnic group that makes up about 40% of Afghanistan’s 35 million people and 15% of Pakistan’s 215
million; they thus represent a plurality in Afghanistan but are a relatively small minority in Pakistan, though Pakistan’s
Pashtun population is considerably larger than Afghanistan’s.
7085 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani, “Pakista’'s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021. 86 “Pakistani Taliban ends ceasefire, future of peace talks uncertain,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021; Abdul Sayed, “The Evolution and Future of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2021. 87 Aftab Khan, “PIA prepared to run regular flights to Kabul: CEO,” Express Tribune, November 13, 2021. 88 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but
Afghanistan doessuccessive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,”
Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
71 Rezaul Laskar, “In a huge shift, India opens channels with Afghan Taliban factions and leaders,” Hindustan Times,
June 9, 2021.
72 Humayun Hamidzada and Richard Ponzio, Central Asia’s Growing Role in Building Peace and Regional
Connectivity with Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, August 2019Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017. 89 Asfandyar Mir et al., “Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Dispute Heats Up,” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 12, 2022. .
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1012 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief the group’s government. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had official engagements with the Taliban (such as a visit to Kabul by the Uzbek foreign minister in October 2021 and a visit to Turkmenistan by the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022).90 Tajikistan, on the other hand, has rejected the Taliban’s government and emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s own historical struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ethnolinguistic ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule. Tajikistan has reportedly offered refuge to prominent anti-Taliban Afghan leaders, and its officials have criticized the Taliban government, prompting the Taliban to warn Tajikistan against interfering in Afghan affairs.91 China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.92 China, which played a relatively limited role in Afghanistan under the former government, has made some economic investments in Afghanistan (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and other limitations.93 China initially signaled support for the Taliban but has not formally recognized the group to date, and may be reluctant to pursue closer relations due to concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups.94 Congressional Action and Outlook President Biden’s April 2021 announcement of his intention to fully withdraw U.S. forces by September 11, 2021, drew both praise and criticism across partisan lines from some Members of Congress who for years had debated the relative costs and benefits of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Some welcomed the announcement, citing what they characterize as U.S. counterterrorism successes or a need to reprioritize U.S. global interests.95 Other Members urged President Biden to reconsider in favor of a conditions-based approach.96 The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public attention. Many Members characterized the August 2021 withdrawal as chaotic and damaging to U.S. interest and global standing; some said they supported the removal of U.S. troops but not the way in which it was carried out.97 In the months since the Taliban entered Kabul, U.S. public attention appears to have decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of significant congressional interest as some 90 Bruce Pannier, “For the Turkmen and Uzbek leaders, a meeting of minds on Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, October 9, 2021; Orkhan Jalilov, “Turkmen, Afghan Officials Discuss Energy and Transport Projects,” Caspian News, January 18, 2022. 91 Vinay Kaura, “Tajikistan’s evolving relations with the Taliban 2.0,” Middle East Institute, December 1, 2021. 92 See, for example, H.R. 5404 and S. 2826. 93 Matthew Funaiole and Brian Hart, “Afghanistan Is No Treasure Trove for China,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2021. 94 Atal Ahmadzai, “Why China Is Slow-Rolling Taliban Cooperation,” Foreign Policy, January 27, 2022. 95 Representative Andy Kim, “Congressman Kim Statement on Announcement of U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021; Senator Ed Markey (@SenMarkey), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:29PM. 96 Senator Jim Inhofe (@JimInhofe), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:26PM. 97 Barbara Sprunt, “There’s a bipartisan backlash to how Biden handled the withdrawal from Afghanistan,” NPR, August 17, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule. At least six congressional committees held hearings on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.98 Some of these hearings focused on contemporaneous U.S. policy actions, whereas others sought to examine the two decades of U.S. policy decisions that preceded the Taliban’s takeover. Perhaps the most comprehensive effort to investigate U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is Congress’s establishment of the Afghanistan War Commission (Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81). The Commission’s 16 members are to be appointed by the chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House armed services, foreign affairs, and intelligence committees, as well as by House and Senate majority and minority leaders, within 60 days of enactment. They are charged with examining “the key strategic, diplomatic, and operation decisions that pertain to the war in Afghanistan” and developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within three years. In the meantime, some Members express an intent to remain focused on developments in Afghanistan. Some of these Members argue that a U.S. failure to remain engaged in Afghanistan may lead to a broader societal collapse and civil war akin to the environment in which Al Qaeda thrived and planned the September 11, 2001, attacks after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.99 How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is one issue on which Members might engage, especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as competing U.S. policy priorities.100 The Biden Administration initially framed and has since defended the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as helping to make the United States more prepared to confront other, and ostensibly more strategically important, challenges, such as those posed by Russia and China.101 Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, will be influenced and likely constrained by a number of factors, including:  a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S. diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on journalists; and 98 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by: House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former U.S. officials). 99 Letter available at https://crow.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-crow-malinowski-meijer-press-president-biden-release. 100 See, for example, CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 101 See for example “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” White House, April 14, 2021; “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” White House, August 31, 2021; Department Press Briefing – January 24, 2022, U.S. Department of State. Congressional Research Service 14 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief  the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically difficult. Changes in dynamics in Afghanistan, such as further deterioration of the humanitarian situation or actions by the Taliban (including the planned March 2022 reopening of public education for Afghan girls), could prompt some Members to initiate or call for new U.S. policy measures. In addition to direct congressional action (including appropriating, authorizing, or limiting funding for various purposes), congressional options for overseeing the Administration’s approach to Afghanistan include continued hearings, letters to executive branch officials, public statements, reporting requirements, requesting assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and legislation pertaining to sanctions policy or other issues. The Administration’s February 2022 announcement on the disposition of U.S.-based Afghan central bank assets may be one policy area for congressional engagement and oversight. Beyond the challenges of how to formulate U.S. policy toward the new situation in Afghanistan, Members may seek to articulate and shape what U.S. goals in Afghanistan should be. Many Members express an interest in minimizing humanitarian suffering, containing regionally based terrorist groups, and continuing support for Afghan women and girls. At the same time, many Members (with the evident support of the Biden Administration) evidently seek to avoid any actions, including the provision of development assistance, that might have the effect of benefiting the Taliban or improving the group’s position in power.102 Some of these priorities may come into tension: providing purely humanitarian aid may be sufficient to stave off mass casualties, but is unlikely to boost the Afghan economy. Financial assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but comes with the risk of diversion of some funds to the Taliban. Going forward, Members may weigh the financial and social costs of providing humanitarian assistance indefinitely with the political and moral costs of boosting (or at least refraining from undermining) the Taliban’s rule. Author Information Clayton Thomas Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs 102 See S. 2863. Congressional Research Service 15 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

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Taliban from Russia and Iran, both of which have cited the Islamic State affiliate presence in
Afghanistan to justify their activities. Both were reported in 2020 to have been more directly
involved, including possibly supporting Taliban attacks against U.S. forces.73 Both nations were
opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful
point of leverage vis-à-vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority
for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.74
Economy and U.S. Aid
In addition to its long-standing military presence, the United States has provided considerable
development assistance to Afghanistan. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated approximately
$144 billion in overall aid for Afghanistan, with about 61% for security and 25% for governance
and development (with the remaining 14% for civilian operations and humanitarian aid).75 DOD’s
quarterly Cost of War report estimated the cost of U.S. combat operations (including related
regional support activities and support for Afghan forces) as of December 2020 at $824.9 billion
since FY2002.
The U.S. military withdrawal could affect the level and types of assistance the United States may
provide to Afghanistan. Some Members have raised concerns that a withdrawal might impair the
United States’ ability to monitor the distribution and effectiveness of U.S. aid, a long-standing
U.S. concern.76 Additionally, the number of personnel present in Afghanistan under Chief of
Mission authority (mostly State Department or USAID personnel) declined steadily during the
Trump Administration and significantly after the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic began.
Furthermore, U.S. assistance may affect, and in turn be affected by, intra-Afghan talks and a
potential settlement. Special Representative Khalilzad said in September 2020 congressional
testimony that “we are committed for the long term in terms of providing assistance to
Afghanistan,” but that U.S. decisions would depend on the outcome of Afghan negotiations, as
other U.S. officials have emphasized.77 The appropriation of assistance funding remains a
congressional prerogative. It is unclear to what extent (if at all) the prospect of changes to U.S.
and international financial assistance might put pressure on or create U.S. leverage over the
behavior and policies of the Taliban or the Afghan government.78
U.S. and international development assistance could become more critical if a U.S. and allied
military withdrawal further weakens Afghanistan’s economy, already among the world’s smallest.

73 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S.
Troops, Intelligence Says,” New York Times, June 26, 2020. Additionally, in October 2018, the Trump Administration
sanctioned several Iranian military officials for providing support to the Taliban. U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sanction Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian
Supporters, October 23, 2018.
74 See, for example, Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the
Table?” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020.
75 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020.
76 See Senator Reed’s remarks at Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Central Command, February 5,
2019.
77 House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Afghanistan Strategy,
September 22, 2020. For example, Secretary Pompeo told intra-Afghan negotiators in Doha that their “choices and
conduct will affect both the size and scope of United States future assistance.”
78 For more, see Live Event: What Does the Taliban Want?, Wilson Center, October 6, 2020.
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Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown an average of 7% per year since 2003,
but growth rates averaged between 2% and 3% in recent years and decades of war have stunted
the development of most domestic industries. President Ghani said in July 2020 that 90% of
Afghans live below the government-determined poverty level of two dollars a day.79 The
withdrawal of a U.S. force much smaller than that of a decade ago would seem to have less
dramatic second-order economic effects for Afghanistan than did the post-2012 drawdown, which
helped spur a “drastic economic decline.”80 Still, the proposed withdrawal could pose risks for an
Afghan economy suffering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has infected tens of
thousands of Afghans (a figure likely understates the scale of the virus in Afghanistan due to
extremely limited testing).81
Afghanistan’s largely underdeveloped natural resources and/or geographic position at the
crossroads of future global trade routes could improve the economic life of the country, and, by
extension, its social and political dynamics. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s economic outlook
remains uncertain, if not negative, in light of the prospective decrease in U.S. and international
investment and engagement.
Outlook and Issues for Congress
President Biden’s April 2021 announcement of his intention to fully withdraw U.S. forces by
September 11, 2021, drew praise and criticism from some Members of Congress, who have long
debated the relative costs and benefits of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Some
welcomed the announcement, citing what they characterize as U.S. counterterrorism successes or
a need to reprioritize U.S. global interests.82 Other Members urged President Biden to reconsider
in favor of a conditions-based approach.83 Longstanding competing desires among some in
Congress to both end “forever wars” and preserve the gains in Afghanistan achieved in part by
considerable U.S. sacrifice could shape congressional oversight of Biden Administration policy as
the Administration plans to end the nearly two-decade-long U.S. military presence later in 2021.
Going forward, congressional attention on Afghanistan may center on U.S. assistance,
specifically what levels and conditions can best achieve U.S. policy priorities. In the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), Congress makes certain funds available for a range of
activities in Afghanistan, including programs that combat corruption, support higher education,
and protect the rights of Afghan women and girls. It also prohibits the use of funds pursuant to
limits first imposed in the FY2019 appropriations act, including limits on funding for projects that
the Afghan government cannot sustain or that are inaccessible for effective oversight. These
conditions may become more challenging if security conditions deteriorate after a U.S.
withdrawal. Congress has also appropriated considerable funds for Afghan security forces.
More broadly, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, U.S. foreign assistance might encourage the
Taliban to accept key elements of Afghanistan’s constitution and post-2001 governance; many
U.S. policymakers view Afghanistan’s democratic system, even with its considerable flaws, as a

79 Anisa Shaheed, “Ghani’s Afghan Poverty Estimate ‘Catastrophic’: Analysts,” TOLOnews, July 20, 2020.
80 “The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistan’s Mounting Human Crisis,” International Crisis Group, October 3,
2016.
81 World Health Organization, “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard,” June 9, 2021.
82 Representative Andy Kim, “Congressman Kim Statement on Announcement of U.S. Troop Withdrawal from
Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021; Senator Ed Markey (@SenMarkey), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:29PM.
83 Senator Jim Inhofe (@JimInhofe), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:26PM.
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success of U.S. and international efforts. Official views of the Taliban’s stance vary. Some
Administration officials assert the Taliban say that they want international assistance.84 In
contrast, a recently declassified National Intelligence Council (NIC) assessment stated that while
the “Taliban’s desires for foreign aid and legitimacy might marginally moderate its conduct over
time,” at least initially “the Taliban probably would focus on extending control on its own
terms.”85 The NIC assessed that Taliban control would “roll back much of the two decades’ of
progress” given the Taliban’s “restrictive approach to women’s rights.” Some Members of
Congress have expressed an intention not to support assistance for Afghanistan if the Taliban re-
enter power and roll back women’s rights.86 Conversely, Congress might also consider sanctions
as possible leverage, given the potential for U.S. sanctions to deny needed foreign investment to a
potential future Afghan government that includes or is dominated by the Taliban. How
Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is another issue on which Members might engage,
especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as
competing U.S. policy priorities.87

Author Information

Clayton Thomas

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs



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84 Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Press Availability, Department of State, April 15, 2021.
85 NIC, Afghanistan: Women’s Economic, Political, Social Status Driven by Cultural Norms, April 2, 2021.
86 Rachel Oswald, “U.S. foreign aid will be cut off it Taliban take power, senators say,” Roll Call, April 27, 2021.
87 See, for example, CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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