Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy
June 10, 2021July 3, 2023
Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states that Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states that
gained their independence after the gained their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. WithSoviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. Building on a a
Cory Welt
history of strong history of strong economicdevelopment aid and security cooperation, the United States aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened deepened
Specialist in Russian and Specialist in Russian and
its strategic partnership with Georgia its strategic partnership with Georgia sinceafter Russia’s Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia invasion of Georgia and 2014in 2008 and
European Affairs European Affairs
initial invasion of Ukraineinvasion of Ukraine in 2014. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia’s sovereignty . U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial

integrity within its international y recognized borders, and Georgia is and territorial integrity against Russian occupation of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition, Georgia has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and security assistance in Europe and Eurasia. Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense since the last years of the Soviet Union. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates. Russia maintains its occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in part to preserve influence over Georgia and prevent it from joining NATO. The pursuit of NATO and European Union (EU) membership is a goal enshrined in Georgia’s constitution. The originally center-left but increasingly national-conservative a leading recipient

of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia.
Many observers consider Georgia to have a “hybrid” political system, containing both democratic and
nondemocratic elements. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) party has governed Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) party has governed Georgia
since 2012. Controversy over the October 2020 parliamentary elections, an opposition boycott of parliament, and
the February 2021 arrest of opposition leader Nika Melia led to heightened political tensions. European Union
(EU) efforts to mediate Georgia’s political crisis led to a negotiated agreement in April 2021 that included
opposition parties’ entry into parliament and Melia’s release.
Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy entered a period of relatively
strong growth in 2017. In 2020, due to the impact of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by an estimated 6%. Georgia’s GDP is expected to grow 3.5%
to 4% in 2021.
Since the 1990s, Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense. Georgian authorities accuse Moscow of
obstructing Georgia’s Western integration. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian government
from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in
the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates. Many observers believe Russia supports the secession
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Georgia from joining NATO. The Georgian government has long made
closer integration with NATO and the EU a priority.
Over many yearssince 2012. Since 2021, some political developments have contributed to domestic tensions and U.S. and EU expressions of concern; these developments include the collapse of an April 2021 EU-brokered agreement on political and judicial reforms, the imprisonment of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and other opposition figures, and newly strident criticism of U.S. and EU policies by some senior government officials. EU concerns were reflected in a June 2022 decision to defer granting Georgia EU candidate status. In the decision, the EU “recognized the European perspective” of Georgia, together with that of Ukraine and Moldova, but did not name Georgia a candidate country as it did the other two. The EU said it would grant candidate status to Georgia after the country addresses a set of 12 governance priorities. Georgia’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022-2023 has been the subject of some debate. Polls indicate widespread support for Ukraine among the Georgian population, and the Georgian government officially condemns Russia’s invasion. At the same time, the Georgian government has maintained a measured approach in criticizing Russia, stating that it seeks to avoid possible reprisals or economic losses. The government has promoted increased trade and travel with Russia and permitted an influx of Russian nationals in the wake of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022. Since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and , Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since FY2017, annual foreign operations appropriations have prohibited foreign assistance to governments that recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia and have restricted funds from supporting Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (most recently, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023; P.L. 117-328, §7047(c)). Some Members of the 118thterritorial integrity. In the
117th Congress, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923) was introduced on February 8, 2021. The act cal s for
enhanced U.S. assistance to Georgia. If enacted, the act would require the President to impose sanctions on those
responsible for serious human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The House passed similar bil s (H.R.
6219, H.R. 598) during the 115th and 116th Congresses. Members of the 117th Congress and previous Congresses
also Congress and previous Congresses have have expressed support for Georgia’s democracy and governance reforms and the deepening of its ties with Europe and the United States. Since FY2018, Georgia has been one of two countries in Europe and Eurasia (the other country is Ukraine) for which Congress has specified that funds be made available for assistance—most recently, in P.L. 117-328, Section 7046(a)(1). For FY2022, planned State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance for Georgia totaled $153 million in regular and supplemental funding. FY2023 appropriations include not less than $132 million in assistance for Georgia. For FY2024expressed views on domestic developments in Georgia, including the state of its democracy. On April
22, 2021, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced S.Res. 176, cal ing for Georgia’s political parties to
implement the April 2021 political agreement and for the Georgian government to institute systemic reforms.
Since FY2017, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bilateral aid
al ocations to Georgia have totaled $123 mil ion a year on average ($131 mil ion in FY2020, including $40
mil ion in Foreign Military Financing, or FMF). For FY2021, Congress appropriated $132 mil ion in bilateral aid
to Georgia, including $35 mil ion in FMF. For FY2022, the State Department/USAID budget request , the State Department/USAID budget request includes $121 million in assistance. The United States also provides assistance to Georgia through Department of Defense programsincludes
$120.6 mil ion in bilateral aid to Georgia. Since FY2010, Georgia has received U.S. military aid primarily through
FMF, Department of Defense capacity-building programs, and Coalition Support Funds. .
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Politics and Governance .................................................................................................................. 1 Recent Parliamentary and Local Elections . 1
October 2020 Election Controversy .............................................................................. 4
Arrest of Opposition Leader . 3 Political Tensions Since 2021 ............................................................................................. 5
EU-Brokered Political Dialogue...... 5 Economy ........................................................................................................ 6
Judicial Reform Chal enges................................ 10 Relations with the European Union and NATO ......................................................... 7
Economy ..................... 11 European Union ...................................................................................................................... 8
Relations with the European Union and 12 NATO .................................................................. 10
Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions ................................................................. 12
Abkhazia and South Ossetia ............. 13 Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions ............................................................................ 12
2008 Russia-Georgia War 13 Economic Relations with Russia ............................................................................................ 13
Conflict Resolution. 15 Russian Occupation in Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia ................................................ 16 U.S.-Georgia Relations .................................................. 14
After the 2008 War and Recent Developments ................................................................ 14
U.S.-Georgia Relations 18 Congressional Action ....................................................................................................... 15
Congressional Action ......... 20 Foreign and Security Assistance ............................................................................................. 17
Foreign Aid 21 Trade .................................................................................................................................. 18
Trade ...... 23 Figures Figure 1. Georgia .................................................................................................................... 20

Figures......... 2
Figure 1. Georgia 2. October 2020 Parliamentary Elections............................................................................. 4 Figure 3. Parliamentary Factions or Groups ...................................................................... 11

.............. 4 Tables
Table 1. October 2020 Parliamentary Elections Status of EU Candidacy Priorities ......................................................................... 3

............ 8 Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 23 21

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Introduction
Historical y situated at the edge of empires, Georgia is locatedGeorgia is one of three countries in the South Caucasus, a region in the South Caucasus, a region
between the Black and Caspian Seas separated from Russia by the Greater Caucasus mountain between the Black and Caspian Seas separated from Russia by the Greater Caucasus mountain
range and bordering Iran and Turkey (range and bordering Iran and Turkey (seesee Figure 1).). Various1 Historically situated between rival empires, various Georgian kingdoms and Georgian kingdoms and
principalities were incorporated into the Russian Empire beginning in the early 19th century. principalities were incorporated into the Russian Empire beginning in the early 19th century.
Georgia enjoyed a brief period of independence from 1918 until its forcible incorporation into the Georgia enjoyed a brief period of independence from 1918 until its forcible incorporation into the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) in 1921-1922. Georgia gained Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) in 1921-1922. Georgia gained
independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.2
Since 1991, Georgia has Since 1991, Georgia has coped with two
Georgia at a Glance
territorial faced two territorial conflicts over the Russian-occupied conflicts over the Russian-occupied
regions of regions of Georgia at a Glance Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These
regions, in Population: 3.72 3.74 mil ion mil ion (2020 (2023 est.) est.)
regions, in addition to being home to ethnic addition to being home to ethnic
Georgians, Comparative Area: slightly larger than West Virginia
Georgians, are home to minority ethnic groups
Capital: Tbilisi
that more closely identify with ethnic kin in
Ethnic Composition: 87% Georgian, 6% Azerbaijani,
Russia’s North Caucasus. After a short war
5% Armenian (2014 census)
with Georgia in 2008, Russia unilateral y
Religion: 83% Georgian Orthodox, 11% Muslim, 3%
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
Armenian 69,700 sq km., slightly larger are also home to ethnic groups that more than West Virginia closely identify with ethnic kin in Russia’s Capital: Tbilisi North Caucasus. After a short war with Ethnic Composition: 87% Georgian, 6% Azerbaijani, Georgia in 2008, Russia unilaterally 5% Armenian (2014 census) recognized the independence of Abkhazia and Religion: 83% Georgian Orthodox, 11% Muslim, 3% Armenian Apostolic (2014 census) Apostolic (2014 census)
South Ossetia and stationed military forces in South Ossetia and stationed military forces in
these regions. GDP/GDP per capita: $ $15.924.6 bil ion/$ bil ion/$4,275 (2020
these regions.
6,672 (2022 est.) est.)
1Georgians speak and write a distinct
Top Exports: copper ores,copper ores, beverages, motor vehicles, motor vehicles,
Georgians speak and write a distinctbeverages, Caucasian language, with a written literary
iron and steel iron and steel (2020)
Caucasian language, with a written literary
Leadership: Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili,
form that emerged at least as early as the fifth
President Salome Zurabishvili, Defense Minister
century. The Georgian Orthodox Church, to (2022) form that emerged at least as early as the fifth Leadership: Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, century. The Georgian Orthodox Church, to President Salome Zourabichvili, Defense Minister which most Georgians belong, is Juansher Burchuladze, Foreign Minister Ilia Darchiashvili, Parliamentary Chairman Shalva autocephalous (independent), with roots that Papuashvili date back to the fourth century. Source
Juansher Burchuladze, Foreign Minister David
Zalkaliani, Parliamentary Chairman Kakha Kuchava
which most Georgians belong, is
Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia National Statistics Office of Georgia (does
autocephalous (independent), with roots that
. Data Since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, does not include the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetianot include the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
date back to the fourth century.
Politics and Governance
In almost thirty years of Georgia’s independence, many observers have considered the country to
have a “hybrid” political system, containing both democratic and nondemocratic elements. The
U.S.-based nongovernmental organization Freedom House currently assigns Georgia a “global
freedom” score of 60 out of 100 (“partly free”), one of the highest ratings among the post-Soviet
states that gained their independence upon the dissolution of the USSR.2

1 Georgia’s South Caucasus neighbors, Azerbaijan and Armenia, fought a six -week war in autumn 2020 over the
predominantly Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh (also known in Armenian as Artsakh) and
surrounding territories internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. T he war resulted in Azerbaijani control over a
portion of Nagorno-Karabakh and most of the surrounding territories it lost during a previous conflict in the 1990s, as
well as the deployment of Russian forces as peacekeepers in Nagorno -Karabakh. For more, see CRS Report R46651,
Azerbaijan and Arm enia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, by Cory Welt and Andrew S. Bowen.
2 Freedom House ranks all countries in the world by a “global freedom” score, which includes measures of political
rights and civil liberties. Freedom House also ranks post -Communist states by a “ democracy” . Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Some Members of the 118th Congress and previous Congresses also have expressed support for Georgia’s democracy and governance reforms and the deepening of its ties with Europe and the United States. Politics and Governance Over the course of more than three decades of Georgia’s independence, observers generally have characterized the country as having a “hybrid” political system, containing both democratic and 1 The other two countries in the South Caucasus are Armenia and Azerbaijan. Historical surveys of the Caucasus include Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 2 Historical surveys of Georgia include Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London: Reaktion Books, 2012); and Stephen Jones, Georgia: A Political History Since Independence (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013). Congressional Research Service 1 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy nondemocratic elements.3 The U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House considers Georgia to be one of four “partly free” post-Soviet states which gained their independence after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.4 Georgia has a parliamentary system of governance. The ruling Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) was founded as a center-left party but in recent years has evolved in a more national-conservative direction. GD first came to power in 2012 as the leading party in an electoral bloc and governed alone from 2016 to 2022.5 In 2019, GD lost about one-fifth of its parliamentary deputies, following disputes about judicial and electoral reforms.6 GD currently retains a governing majority with the support of the small People’s Power parliamentary group, which is openly critical of European and U.S. policy toward Georgia.7 Figure 1. Georgia Sources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated using data from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, DeLorme, Department of State, and Esri. 3 The U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House ranks postcommunist states by a “democracy” score that ranges score that ranges
between 1 (least democratic) and 7 (most democratic). Georgia’s “democracy score” between 1 (least democratic) and 7 (most democratic). Georgia’s “democracy score” in 2023 is 3.04 is 3.18 (transitional or hybrid (transitional or hybrid
regime). Scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of regime). Scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of t hethe year. Freedom House, year. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021; and
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2021.
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Georgia has a parliamentary system of governance, shaped by constitutional reforms that came
into effect over the last decade. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) came
to power in 2012 as the leading party in an electoral bloc. In 2016, GD campaigned alone and
2023. 4 The other three are Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Freedom House ranks all countries in the world by a “global freedom” score, which includes measures of political rights and civil liberties. Georgia’s “freedom score” in 2023 is 58 out of 100 (down from 64 between 2015 and 2018). Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023. 5 In 2016, Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) won reelection with a supermajority of more than 75% of won reelection with a supermajority of more than 75% of parliamentary seats. 6 OC Media, “Georgian Dream Loses Constitutional Majority as MPs Leave Party,” February 22, 2019; and Nika Gamtsemlidze, “Several MPs Leave Ruling Team as Parliament Rejects Bill on Electoral Amendments,” Messenger Online, November 15, 2019. 7 Kornely Kakachia and Nino Samkharadze, People’s Power or Populist Pawns? Examining Georgia’s New Anti-Western Political Movement, Georgian Institute of Politics, December 2022; and Rusudan Machaidze, “‘People’s Power’: Anti-Western Movement in the Service of the Ruling Party of Georgia,” JAM News, March 2, 2023. Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 7 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy Officially, Georgia’s most powerful executive is the prime minister. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili assumed office in February 2021 (Garibashvili also served as prime minister from 2013 to 2015 and as minister of defense from 2019 to 2021). Garibashvili is a longtime associate of billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, former GD party chairman and a former prime minister, who is widely believed to exert an influential behind-the-scenes role in Georgia’s politics.8 Georgia’s head of state, President Salome Zourabichvili (or Zurabishvili), was elected in 2018.9 The Georgianparliamentary seats. In 2019, GD lost
about one-fifth of its parliamentary deputies, following party disputes about judicial appointments
and the party’s backtracking from a commitment to hold fully proportional parliamentary
elections in 2020.
Many observers believe bil ionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, former GD party chairman and a former
prime minister, exerts a dominant behind-the-scenes role in policymaking and personnel
appointments.3 Ivanishvili resigned from the position of GD party chairman in January 2021. He
retired from politics once before, in 2013, after serving as prime minister for 13 months. He
formal y returned to politics as GD chairman in 2018.4
Official y, Georgia’s most powerful executive is the prime minister. The current prime minister,
Irakli Garibashvili, assumed office in February 2021. Garibashvili previously served as GD party
secretary from March 2019 and as minister of defense from September 2019. Garibashvili served
as prime minister once before (2013-2015) and as minister of internal affairs (2012-2013).
Georgia’s president, elected in 2018, is Salome Zurabishvili, a former independent Member of
Parliament (MP) and minister of foreign affairs.5 Georgia’s president is commander in chief of president is commander in chief of
the armed forces and has the power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament under certain the armed forces and has the power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament under certain
circumstances. circumstances. ZurabishviliZourabichvili is to be Georgia’s last directly elected president; is to be Georgia’s last directly elected president; from 2023, Georgia
is to have a president chosen by MPs her term ends in 2024. Due to constitutional reforms that entered into force in 2018, the president is to be elected subsequently by members of parliament (MPs) and local government representatives. and local government representatives.
Georgia’s unicameral parliament has 150 members. Georgia’s unicameral parliament has 150 members. Constitutional reforms adopted in 2018
The 2018 constitutional reforms established a fully proportional (established a fully proportional (i.e., party list) system beginning in 2024party list) system beginning in 2024, with a threshold for entering parliament of 5% of the vote. For the 2020 . For the 2020
parliamentary elections, the parliament established a transitional election system by which 120 parliamentary elections, the parliament established a transitional election system by which 120
seats were elected by party list and 30 seats by majoritarian district. The threshold for entering seats were elected by party list and 30 seats by majoritarian district. The threshold for entering
parliament was parliament was set temporarily at 1% of the vote.1% of the vote.6
The October 2020 parliamentary elections were mired in controversy (see “October 2020 Election
Controversy,” below). According to official results, GD placed first, with 48% of the proportional
vote. GD party candidates also10 Recent Parliamentary and Local Elections According to official results, GD won 60% of seats (90 out of 150) in 2020 parliamentary elections. GD placed first in the party list vote (with 48%), and GD candidates won 13 of 30 majoritarian seats in the first round. Opposition won 13 of 30 majoritarian seats in the first round. Opposition
parties boycotted parties boycotted thea second round, helping GD second round, helping GD secure victory in all of the majoritarian racessecure victory in the remaining majoritarian
races. In al , GD received 60% of parliamentary seats. .
GD’s main competitor was the opposition bloc Strength in Unity, led by the center-right United GD’s main competitor was the opposition bloc Strength in Unity, led by the center-right United
National Movement (UNM), National Movement (UNM), thea former ruling party once led by ex-President Mikheil former ruling party once led by ex-President Mikheil
Saakashvili (2004-2013).Saakashvili (2004-2013).7 The party is led currently by Nika Melia, who became party chairman

3 Iulian Ernst and Will Conroy, “Hard to Conclude Otherwise? Report Paints Oligarch Ivanishvili as Georgia’s De
Facto Ruler,” bne IntelliNews, February 25, 2019; and David Segal, “High in His ‘Glassle,’ Georgia’s Richest Man
Looms over Country’s T op Project,” New York Times, July 2, 2019.
4 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia’s Billionaire Boss Quits … Again,” Eurasianet, January 11, 2021; and Isabelle
Khurshudyan and Inna Lazareva, “ The UNM officially received 27% of the party list vote and 36 seats total (24%). UNM splinter party European Georgia-Movement for Liberty came in third, with 4% of the vote (and five seats). Six other opposition parties were elected to parliament, each with four seats or fewer (see Figure 2). The 2020 elections were mired in controversy. Opposition parties accused the authorities of electoral fraud and for months refused to enter parliament. International observers characterized the election results as “competitive” and stated that “overall, fundamental freedoms were respected.” At the same time, observers expressed concerns about various shortcomings, including an appeals process that was a central focus of opposition complaints.11 After the elections, opposition parties organized several protests, including a demonstration outside the Central Election Commission that police dispersed with the use of anti-riot equipment, including 8 Bidzina Ivanishvili first formally retired from politics in 2013, after serving as prime minister for 13 months. He returned as GD chairman from 2018 to 2021. Isabelle Khurshudyan and Inna Lazareva, “In Georgia, an Oligarch with Echoes of In Georgia, an Oligarch with Echoes of T rumpTrump Says Says He’s Leaving Politics. Many He’s Leaving Politics. Many
Don’t Believe Him,” Don’t Believe Him,” Washington Post, January 15, 2021, January 15, 2021; and Khatia Ghoghoberidze, “How Does Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili De Facto Rule Georgia?,” JAM News, June 27, 2022. 9.
5 Prior to Prior to first entering the Georgian governmententering the Georgian government as a minister of foreign affairs in 2004, Zourabichvili was , Zurabishvili was a French national and diplomat.a French national and diplomat.
6 Giorgi 10 The shift to a more proportional election system in 2020 resulted from a March 2020 interparty agreement facilitated by the United States, Germany, the European Union (EU), and the Council of Europe. OC Media, “Georgian Government Reaches Agreement with Opposition over 2020 Election,” March 9, 2020; and Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Adopts Landmark Election Reform,” Lomsadze, “Georgia Adopts Landmark Election Reform,” Eurasianet, June 29, 2020. , June 29, 2020.
7 Mikheil Saakashvili has Ukrainian citizenship and currently serves as head of the executive committee of Ukraine’s
National Council of Reforms, a presidential advisory body. In 2015, Saakashvili lost his Georgian citizenship, allegedly
due to restrictions against dual citizenship. Georgia Today, “ Former President Saakashvili Loses Georgian
Citizenship,” December 4, 2015.
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in December 2020. The UNM official y received 27% of the proportional vote and 36 seats
(24%). UNM splinter party European Georgia-Movement for Liberty came in third with 4% of
the vote (and five seats).8 Six other opposition parties were elected to parliament, each with four
seats or less (see Table 1).
Due to their claims of electoral fraud, most opposition parties boycotted parliament until a
political agreement was reached via EU mediation in April 2021. Before the agreement, only 96
MPs out of 150 were seated: 90 from GD and 6 from opposition parties. By early June 2021, most
opposition MPs had entered parliament. The parliament’s composition has undergone some
changes, however. Some elected MPs have renounced their mandates and have not entered
parliament. Others, including most European Georgia MPs and six ex-GD MPs affiliated with
former Prime Minister Gakharia, have left their parties or electoral blocs. Final y, several MPs
from various opposition parties have united to create new interparty factions in parliament.
Table 1. October 2020 Parliamentary Elections
Party List
Percentage of
Total
Percentage of
Party
Seats
Party List Vote
Seats
Total Seats
Georgian Dream
60
48.2%
90
60.0%
UNM - Strength in Unity
36
27.2%
36
24.0%
European Georgia
5
3.8%
5
3.3%
Lelo
4
3.2%
4
2.7%
Strategy Aghmashenebeli
4
3.2%
4
2.7%
Al iance of Patriots
4
3.1%
4
2.7%
Girchi
4
2.9%
4
2.7%
Citizens
2
1.3%
2
1.3%
Labor Party
1
1.0%
1
0.7%
Total
120
100%
150
100%
Source: Election Administration of Georgia, “The Central Election Commission Summarized Results of the 31
October Parliamentary Elections of Georgia,” December 3, 2020
The shift to a more proportional election system in 2020 was the result of a March 2020
interparty agreement facilitated by the United States, Germany, the European Union (EU), and the
Council of Europe and widely praised by domestic and international stakeholders.9 Leading
opposition parties did not support the relevant amendments in parliament, however, in response to
what they said was GD’s failure to uphold the agreement in full. In particular, opposition parties
claimed the agreement required authorities to amnesty three opposition-linked figures the
opposition considered political prisoners. President Zurabishvili pardoned two of the individuals
but not a third, Giorgi Rurua, who then was sentenced to four years in prison on il egal firearm

8 T he United National Movement (UNM) split in 2017 after months of infighting concerning party tactics and relations
with ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili, who is under indictment and living abroad. T hose who left the UNM sought to
build a rebranded party without Saakashvili. T hose who stayed in the UNM sought to adhere to Saakashvili’s legacy
and, in part, direction.
9 OC Media, “Georgian Government Reaches Agreement with Opposition over 2020 Election,” March 9, 2020; and
Council of Europe Office in Georgia, “ Statement of the Political Dialogue Facilitators on Agreement,” March 8, 2020.
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Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

charges the opposition said were political y motivated (Rurua eventual y was pardoned in April
2021).10
October 2020 Election Controversy
GD’s popularity declined prior to the emergence of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. However, international y lauded efforts to contain the pandemic by then-Prime
Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s government and a relatively low spread of COVID-19 through the
summer appeared to boost GD’s election prospects.11 At the same time, a COVID-19-related
economic decline and a dramatic rise in COVID-19 case numbers from September 2020 may
have countered GD’s rising popularity somewhat.12
International observers appeared to view the October 2020 election results as legitimate overal ,
although they expressed concerns about various shortcomings. A mission led by the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assessed the elections as “competitive” and
stated that “overal , fundamental freedoms were respected.”13 The OSCE mission, however,
expressed concerns about an appeals process that was a central focus of opposition complaints
after the election. The mission also raised concerns about “al egations of pressure on voters and
blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state.”14
Opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) focused their claims on certain
irregularities, including poll book imbalances and the election commissions’ rejection of most
complaints.15 Opposition parties cal ed for new elections, accusing authorities of electoral fraud
on a scale that was sufficient to grant GD a majority in parliament.16 Some domestic CSOs said
the elections were the most poorly conducted since GD came to power in 2012 but cal ed for
recounts only in specific precincts.17

10 One individual pardoned was former T bilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava, who received a 38 -month prison sentence in
February 2020, ostensibly for crimes during his time in office prior to 2012 (Ugulava previously served 15 months in
prison from 2015 to 2017 on similar charges). T he second was former Minister of Defense Irakly Okruashvili, who was
sentenced to five years in prison in April 2020 on charges relating to June 2019 protests. Civil Georgia, “ President
Zurabishvili Pardons Gigi Ugulava, Irakli Okruashvili,” May 15, 2020; and Civil Georgia, “ President Zurabishvili
Pardons Giorgi Rurua,” April 27, 2021.
11 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Gets Rare Plaudits for Coronavirus Response,” Eurasianet, March 20, 2020; Rayhan
Demytrie, “ Coronavirus: How ‘T hree Musketeers’ Helped Georgia Fight Virus,” BBC News, July 6, 2020; and Giorgi
Lomsadze, “ Georgia’s Epidemiological Elections,” Eurasianet, July 23, 2020.
12 Giorgi Lomsadze, “New Wave of COVID Complicates Georgian Ruling Party’s Election Strategy,” Eurasianet,
September 25, 2020.
13 T he observation mission was limited in size due to the COVID-19 pandemic. OSCE/Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Georgia Parliam entary Elections, 31 October 2020 , March 5, 2021, p. 2
(hereinafter, OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia Parliam entary Elections).
14 Other concerns included “the dominance of the ruling party” in election commissions, campaign finance rules that
“disadvantaged smaller and new parties,” the widespread and intimidating “presence of party coordinators and activists,
often acting on behalf of the ruling party, outside of most observed polling stations,” and an “excessive number of party
representatives and party-affiliated citizen observer groups [that] at times interfered in the election process or actively
determined who should enter the voting premises.” OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia Parliamentary Elections, p. 3-4, 29.
15 More than 2,000 complaints were submitted on or after election day, and more than half were dismissed on technical
grounds. Central Election Commission of Georgia (CEC), “ Statement on the So -Called Misbalance in PEC Summary
Protocols,” December 16, 2020; CEC, “Statistics on Dispute Resolution of Electoral Subjects and Observer
Organizations,” January 12, 2021; and Internat ional Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), “ISFED
Explains About Summary Protocols of PVT Polling Stations,” January 29, 2021.
16 Civil Georgia, “T housands Rally T oward CEC, Demand Snap Elections,” November 8, 2020.
17 Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association et al., “NGOs’ Assessment of the 2020 Parliamentary Elections,” November
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Georgian authorities made some efforts to address complaints, but opposition parties and CSOs
contended these efforts were limited or flawed. Election commissions reportedly conducted 39
recounts (out of about 450 requested), issued a relatively high number of corrected protocols, and
upheld or partial y upheld about 13% of complaints.18 Authorities attributed many discrepancies
to human error and COVID-19-related staffing issues. One of the most commonly cited
discrepancies was later found to stem from an error in how a leading CSO reported results from a
paral el vote tabulation (PVT), an election monitoring tool.19
After the elections, opposition parties organized several protests, including a demonstration
outside the Central Election Commission that was dispersed with the use of anti-riot equipment,
including water cannons.20 Opposition parties boycotted the second round of elections, and most
opposition MPs refused to take their seats in parliament. Members of the diplomatic community,
including the U.S. and EU ambassadors, sought to negotiate a resolution to the dispute.21
Arrest of Opposition Leader
Georgia’s tense political climate deteriorated further in February 2021, when authorities arrested
UNM party chairman Nika Melia, who had been elected to the position in December 2020. The
arrest was the culmination of a lengthy official confrontation with Melia (see text box, below).
After the October 2020 elections, Melia demonstratively removed an ankle monitoring bracelet
he was required to wear pending trial in connection with charges lodged against him in 2019.
Authorities ordered Melia to wear the bracelet or pay increased bail; he refused to do either,
maintaining his prosecution was political y motivated.22
In February 2021, the GD majority in parliament voted to remove Melia’s immunity as an MP,
and he was ordered into pretrial detention for violating court orders. Then-Prime Minister
Gakharia resigned, stating he opposed Melia’s detention given its political overtones, risk of
violence, and potential y destabilizing effects.23 A special police operation raided UNM
headquarters, arrested Melia, and temporarily detained about 20 others. Melia’s arrest was
condemned by CSOs and Georgia’s public defender (ombudswoman) and was criticized
international y.24
June 2019 Protest and Prosecution of Nika Melia
In June 2019, the Georgian government faced a political crisis after police used tear gas and rubber bul ets against
demonstrators, some of whom had confronted riot police in an attempt to forcibly enter the Georgian parliament.
Demonstrators were protesting the decision to al ow a Russian Member of Parliament (MP) to deliver a speech
from the parliamentary speaker’s chair in his capacity as chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly on

4, 2020.
18 In Georgia, election commissions and courts have discretion to order recounts. OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia
Parliam entary Elections, pp. 28-30, 31-33; and CEC, “ Statistics on Dispute Resolution of Electoral Subjects and
Observer Organizations,” January 12, 2021.
19 ISFED, “Updated Information on ISFED’s PVT Results,” December 11, 2020.
20 Civil Georgia, “19 Detained as Police Used Water Cannons Against Election Rally in T bilisi,” November 9, 2020.
21 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Statement by the United States Embassy and the Delegation of the European Union to
Georgia,” December 11, 2020.
22 Civil Georgia, “Court Increases Bail for UNM’s Melia, Bans Him from Leaving Country,” Nov ember 4, 2020.
23 JAM News, “Georgian Opposition Leader Faces Arrest After Parliament Revokes MP Status,” February 16, 2021;
and OC Media, “ Gakharia Resigns as Georgian PM over Melia Arrest,” February 18, 2021.
24 Isabelle Khurshudyan, “ Georgian Opposition Leader Arrested, Deepening the Political Crisis in the South Caucasus
Country,” Washington Post, February 23, 202111 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observation mission was limited in size due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic. OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Georgia Parliamentary Elections, 31 October 2020, March 5, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 7 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy water cannons.12 Members of the diplomatic community, including the U.S. and European Union (EU) ambassadors, sought to negotiate a resolution to the dispute.13 Figure 2. October 2020 Parliamentary Elections Source: Election Administration of Georgia, “The Central Election Commission Summarized Results of the 31 October Parliamentary Elections of Georgia,” December 3, 2020. Note: UNM = United National Movement. The parliament’s composition has changed since the 2020 elections (see Figure 3). Several MPs have left their parties or blocs and created new factions or become independent MPs. Fifteen MPs have left GD. Although their defection in principle threatened to unravel GD’s parliamentary majority, nine former GD MPs that established the People’s Power parliamentary group continue to support the ruling party. Figure 3. Parliamentary Factions or Groups (as of June 29, 2023) Source: Parliament of Georgia. Notes: UNM = United National Movement. Ten of 150 seats were vacant as of June 29, 2023. 12 Civil Georgia, “19 Detained as Police Used Water Cannons Against Election Rally in Tbilisi,” November 9, 2020. 13 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Statement by the United States Embassy and the Delegation of the European Union to Georgia,” December 11, 2020. Congressional Research Service 4 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy In Georgia’s October 2021 local elections, GD candidates won mayoral elections in 63 out of 64 races and majorities in 57 of 64 local councils. International observers said elections were “marred by widespread and consistent allegations of intimidation, vote-buying, pressure on candidates and votes, and an unlevel playing field.”14 The UNM and some other opposition parties rejected the results.15 Political Tensions Since 2021 Georgian politics are characterized by a high degree of political polarization. Since 2021, developments that have contributed to both domestic tensions and U.S. and EU expressions of concern include the collapse of an April 2021 EU-brokered agreement between the ruling party and opposition parties on political and judicial reform; the imprisonment of former President Saakashvili and other opposition figures; and some senior government officials’ newly strident criticism of U.S. and EU policy. Reform Challenges In 2021, Georgian authorities agreed to launch a political dialogue with opposition parties after facing international criticism for arresting Nika Melia—the then-leader of the UNM, Georgia’s largest opposition party—for violating court orders related to charges from 2019 (see below, “Imprisonments”). The dialogue was mediated by the EU and supported by the United States. It led to a negotiated agreement in April 2021 that resulted in the end of a boycott of parliament by most opposition parties and Melia’s release from prison. The agreement also provided for political and judicial reforms.16 The agreement was short-lived. The parliament implemented some of the agreement’s provisions, including the amnesty of Melia and others and changes to the process of selecting members of election commissions. In July 2021, however, GD leaders stated that the party no longer considered the agreement binding, citing the UNM’s refusal to officially sign the agreement.17 Subsequently, EU officials said the Georgian government reversed course on several of its commitments, including by dropping its advance pledge to hold snap parliamentary elections in the event that the party received less than 43% of the popular vote in October 2021 local elections (GD officially received 47%).18 Although the UNM agreed to return to parliament and eventually signed the agreement, its members continued to boycott the parliament periodically and limit themselves to a restricted set of legislative activities until February 2022.19 14 GD officially received 47% of the proportional vote. The United National Movement (UNM) placed second, with 31% of the proportional vote, followed by For Georgia, with 8%. GD candidates won about 88% of majoritarian races (about one-third of total seats). OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia, Local Elections, 2 and 30 October 2021, April 8, 2022, pp. 1, 38-40. 15 Joshua Kucera, “Ruling Party Dominates Georgian Local Elections, Sparking Protest,” Eurasianet, November 1, 2021. 16 European External Action Service (EEAS), “President of the European Council Charles Michel Publishes New Proposal Made Today to Georgian Political Parties,” April 18, 2021; and JAM News, “Georgia Gov’t, Opposition Standoff at an End? What’s in the Newly Signed Agreement,” April 20, 2021. 17 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgian Ruling Party Walks Out on Critical Political Agreement,” Eurasianet, July 28, 2021; and Agenda.ge, “Int’l Community Criticizes Ruling Party’s Withdrawal from EU-Mediated Agreement,” July 29, 2021. 18 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgian Ruling Party Walks Out on Critical Political Agreement,” Eurasianet, July 28, 2021; and Delegation of the EU to Georgia, “Remarks by EU Ambassador Carl Hartzell Following Today’s Parliamentary Vote in First Reading on the Post-19 April Agreement Constitutional Amendments,” September 7, 2021. 19 Civil Georgia, “UNM to Enter Parliament, Refuses to Sign EU-Brokered Deal,” May 30, 2021; Agenda.ge, “UNM to (continued...) Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 11 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy According to the April 2021 agreement, long-awaited judicial appointments were to be paused and the application process reopened pending passage of several judicial reforms. In subsequent months, the parliament moved forward with dozens of appointments, including 11 to the Supreme Court (which has 28 sitting judges). Opposition parties, some NGOs, and some U.S. and EU officials said the appointments and other adopted measures contradicted the agreement and undermined transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.20 In May 2022, then-EU Ambassador to Georgia Carl Hartzell praised Georgia for past reform progress but expressed concerns about newer developments. Referring to Georgia’s application for EU membership (see “European Union,” below), Hartzell stated that Georgia could have been better prepared for this historic moment, as it comes at a time when the EU is increasingly concerned about the country’s current trajectory. Following an effective slow-down of the reform pace over recent years—partly due to consecutive political crises for which all sides bear their part of responsibility—over these past months, questions have been raised about where Georgia is heading.21 Since June 2022, Georgia’s reform efforts have been structured around a set of 12 governance “priorities” that the EU established as conditions for Georgia to receive EU candidate status (see “European Union,” below).22 Georgian officials state that the government has addressed these priorities. In January 2023, parliamentary majority leader Irakli Kobakhidze said the government had “meticulously followed each [of the EU’s recommendations] and the relevant requirements were satisfied.”23 In February 2023, GD officials noted that a recent EU analysis concluded that Georgia and Ukraine had a similar overall capacity to adhere to EU legislation and policy.24 According to the EU, however, several of the 12 governance priorities remain partially achieved or not achieved. As of June 2023, EU officials assessed that Georgia had “completed” three priorities, achieved “some progress” on seven, achieved “limited progress” on one, and achieved “no progress” on one (see Table 1).25 Some reforms that remain pending, according to observers, include the following: Sign EU-Mediated Agreement After Months of Refusal to Do So, Ruling Party Calls Step ‘Funny,’” September 2, 2021; and Civil Georgia, “UNM Calls off Parliamentary Boycott,” January 31, 2022. 20 See, for example, OSCE, Final Report on the Nomination and Appointment of Supreme Court Judges in Georgia, August 23, 2021; EEAS, “Georgia: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Appointment of Supreme Court Judges,” December 2, 2021; and U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on the Ruling Party’s Rushed, End-of-Year Legislation,” January 3, 2022. 21 Delegation of the EU to Georgia, “Key Note Speech by Ambassador Hartzell at the Conference ‘New Security Architecture in Europe and Its Impact on Georgia,’” May 30, 2022. 22 European Commission, Opinion on Georgia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, June 17, 2022, pp 17-18. 23 Civil Georgia, “GD Chair Kobakhidze Talks ‘Second Front,’ ‘Radical Opposition,’ Lavrov’s Remarks,” January 19, 2023. 24 Civil Georgia, “EC Publishes Analytical Reports on Alignment with the Acquis,” February 6, 2023; and Georgian Dream Chronicle, “EU Report Positive, Georgia Also Progresses in All Polls and Rankings,” February 6, 2023. 25 European Commission, “Press Remarks by Neighbourhood and Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi, Following the Informal General Affairs Council,” June 22, 2023. Also see Open Society Georgia Foundation, EU Candidacy Check: State of Implementation of 12 Priorities, 16 January-31 March, 2023, April 20, 2023; and Sasha Stone et al., Reform and Resistance: Georgia’s Path to EU Candidacy, Center for European Policy Analysis, April 6, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy • More effective efforts to combat high-level corruption, including potentially by providing investigative powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, which was legislatively established in December 202226 • Judicial reform legislation that would provide “holistic reform,” would not be “limited in scope,” and would incorporate long-standing international recommendations27 • A more systemic approach to “eliminating or at least significantly reducing the influence of ‘oligarchs’ in political, economic, and public life” than would be provided for via draft legislation on “de-oligarchization” introduced in November 2022 and amended in April 202328 • Continued electoral reforms, including potentially lowering the electoral threshold and ensuring inclusive means of selecting members of the Central Election Commission29 • Reversing a deterioration in media freedom30 Imprisonments In 2018, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was convicted twice in absentia and sentenced to a total of six years in prison for alleged crimes related to abuse of power during his term in office. His supporters consider the charges to be politically motivated. Saakashvili returned to Georgia on the eve of October 2021 local elections, seemingly to support the opposition. He was detained on the basis of his existing convictions and charged with crossing the border illegally; in addition, two outstanding investigations against him were revived.31 Some U.S. and European officials, together with Saakashvili supporters and human rights organizations, have called on Georgian officials to ensure Saakashvili’s appropriate medical care.32 In May 2022, he was transferred to a civilian medical clinic. In February 2023, the 26 Transparency International (TI) Georgia, “Analysis of the Law on the Fight Against Corruption,” April 21, 2023; and TI Georgia, “Alleged Cases of the High-Level Corruption—A Periodically Updated List,” April 24, 2023. 27 Council of Europe European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Georgia: Follow-Up Opinion to Four Previous Opinions Concerning the Organic Law on Common Courts, March 14, 2023. 28 Nini Gabritchidze, “Georgia Advances Anti-oligarchy Laws While It Debates Who, Exactly, Is an Oligarch,” Eurasianet, November 8, 2022; and Venice Commission, Georgia: Final Opinion on the Draft Law “On De-Oligarchization,” June 12, 2023. 29 International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and TI Georgia, Joint Opinion on the December 2022 Amendments to the Election Legislation, January 2023; and Civil Georgia, “Parliament Passes Amendments to Electoral Code Altering CEC Election Process,” June 13, 2023. 30 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on the Continued Imprisonment of Nika Gvaramia,” November 2, 2022; Delegation of the EU to Georgia, “Georgia: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Verdict by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, in the Case of Mr. Gvaramia,” November 2, 2022; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “CPJ, Rights Groups Call on Georgia President to Release Journalist Nika Gvaramia,” April 20, 2023; and TI Georgia, “Media Environment from May 3 to May 3: Chronology of Backsliding,” May 4, 2023. 31 After leaving office in 2013, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili departed Georgia, adopted Ukrainian citizenship, and served as a Ukrainian official. In 2015, Saakashvili was stripped of his Georgian citizenship (Georgia prohibits dual citizenship, although the law provides for exceptions). Civil Georgia, “Complicated: Guide to Saakashvili’s Jail Controversy,” October 25, 2021. 32 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “Treatment of Former President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili,” November 18, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” December 20, 2022; EEAS, “EP Plenary: The Situation of Former President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili,” February 2, 2023; and Amnesty International, ; and Amnesty International, “Georgia: Authorities Should Reconsider Mikheil Saakashvili’s Release on Medical Grounds,” March 2, 2023“ Georgia: Police Storm Opposition
Headquarters to Arrest Leader Nika Melia,” February 23, 2021. .
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Orthodoxy, which the Georgian parliament was hosting. Many protestors considered the decision a national
affront, given Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and occupation of parts of its territory.
After the crackdown, the government made some concessions but maintained the police response was largely
appropriate. The chairman of parliament resigned, although he did not take direct responsibility for the incident.
The government did not meet the protestors’ main demand that then-Minister of Internal Affairs, Giorgi Gakharia,
resign; instead, he was appointed prime minister. About 20 protestors were charged with participating in mass
violence and resisting police.
Melia, then an MP and former Tbilisi mayoral candidate, was charged with inciting and leading an attempt to storm
the Georgian parliament. Opposition supporters considered the charges to be political y motivated. The
parliamentary majority voted to remove Melia’s MP immunity from charges; he paid bail and was ordered to wear
a monitoring bracelet. In December 2019, in a second case that supporters considered political y motivated, Melia
was found guilty of abuse of office for actions taken in 2012 against a bank founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, before his
Georgian Dream party won elections that year. As part of an April 2021 political agreement, Georgia’s parliament
is considering a bil that would provide amnesty for crimes related to the June 2019 events.
Sources: RFE/RL, “Furious Anti-Russia Protesters in Tbilisi Demand Speaker’s Resignation, Clash with Police,”
June 21, 2019; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Violent Crackdown Throws Georgian Ruling Party’s Survival into Question,”
Eurasianet, June 21, 2019; Civil Georgia, “Two More Arrested for ‘Group Violence,’” July 27, 2019; Civil Georgia,
“Parliament Terminates UNM MP Nika Melia’s Mandate,” December 12, 2019; and OC Media, “Nika Melia Elected
New UNM Head,” December 26, 2020.
EU-Brokered Political Dialogue
After Georgian authorities faced widespread criticism for the February 2021 arrest of Melia, they
agreed to launch a political dialogue with opposition parties mediated by the EU and supported
by the United States. The dialogue was launched in March 2021, via the facilitation of European
Council President Charles Michel, who mandated an EU mediator to assist with the dialogue.25 At
the same time, a parliamentary working group on electoral reform, co-led by an opposition MP
who entered parliament, proposed amendments to the election code to address, among other
things, the composition of election commissions and the appeals process.26 A group of domestic
CSOs issued recommendations on how to reach a political compromise and implement needed
reforms.27
The EU-brokered dialogue led to a negotiated agreement in April 2021 that resulted in opposition
parties’ entry to parliament and the release from prison of UNM chairman Melia. On April 18,
2021, European Council President Michel released the text of the proposed political agreement,
after parties did not agree to an earlier proposal.28 Most of the boycotting opposition parties and
some individual MPs signed the agreement; the UNM said it would defer signing until after
Melia’s release from prison. The agreement includes a provision on holding early parliamentary
elections if GD receives less than 43% of the party list vote in fal 2021 local elections. The
agreement also provides for electoral and judicial reforms, which are ongoing, as wel as
committee leadership positions for opposition MPs.
Melia was freed from pretrial detention in May 2021, after the EU volunteered to pay his bail.
The parliament is considering an amnesty law for criminal charges relating to the June 2019

25 David M. Herszenhorn, “Charles Michel Presides over Crisis T alks in Georgia,” Politico, March 1, 2021; and
Agenda,ge, “ EU Mediator Christian Danielsson Meets with Georgian Political Parties,” March 13, 2021.
26 Civil Georgia, “Electoral Reform Working Group Introduces Draft Amendments,” March 3, 2021.
27 T ransparency International Georgia (T I Georgia) et al., “Letter to Politicians Involved in the Mediation Process,”
March 27, 2021.
28 European Union (EU) External Action Service, “ President of the European Council Charles Michel Publishes New
Proposal Made T oday to Georgian Political Parties,” April 18, 2021; and JAM News, “ Georgia Gov’t, Opposition
Standoff at an End? What ’s in the Newly Signed Agreement ,” April 20, 2021.
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protest and police response. In addition, the agreement led President Zurabishvili to amnesty
Giorgi Rurua, whom opposition parties also considered a political prisoner. UNM MPs entered
parliament after Melia’s release, although the UNM ultimately did not agree to sign the April
2021 political agreement.
Judicial Reform Challenges
In recent years, Georgia has adopted a series of judicial reforms that have restructured its judicial
institutions. As part of these reforms, a High Council of Justice oversees the appointment and
dismissal of judges. The council has 15 members, a majority of whom are selected by the
Conference of Judges, the judiciary’s self-governing body.
In late 2018, some GD members of parliament criticized the High Council’s nomination of
several judges to the Supreme Court whom they considered tainted by association with the UNM.
The dispute sparked debate within the ruling party, as wel as with some CSOs and legal
professionals who expressed concern that some of the nominated judges could be susceptible to
corruption.29
Although the government agreed to alter the rules of appointment, the new judicial selection
process remained controversial. The High Council of Justice submitted a revised (and expanded)
list of 20 candidates to parliament. In 2019, the parliament approved the lifetime appointment of
14 new Supreme Court justices. Domestic and international stakeholders criticized the process as
nontransparent and counter to the intent of long-awaited judicial reforms; they also said the
process did not lead to the appointment of a fully qualified and independent roster of judges.30
Domestic and international stakeholders continue to cal on Georgian authorities to reform the
judiciary. In March 2021, several CSOs proposed a set of reforms to address “institutional and
functional problems which obstruct judicial independence and the ability of judges to exercise
their professional authority competently and with integrity.”31 In March 2021 testimony to
Congress, a U.S. State Department official said Georgia’s judicial reforms should address “the
undue influence of powerful judges on other judges, and use of the disciplinary, promotion, and
appointment system to exert influence on judges.”32 Subsequently, Georgian CSOs criticized GD-
sponsored legislation to reform the justice system as “completely detached” from reality and
unable “to improve the process … increase public confidence [or] address important
chal enges.”33 In May 2021, four judges were elected to the High Council of Justice, despite cal s

29 Civil Georgia, “Ruling Party MPs Divided Over Supreme Court Appointments,” January 9, 2019; and T I Georgia et
al., “Open Letter to the Diplomatic Missions,” February 21, 2019.
30 Andy Heil, “Supreme Court Power Play ‘Raises Stakes’ on T ense Georgian Landscape,” RFE/RL, December 13,
2019; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “ U.S. Embassy’s Statement on Supreme Court Nominees,” December 12, 2019; and
EU External Action Service, “Statement by the Spokesperson on the Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of
Georgia,” December 13, 2019.
31 T I Georgia et al., “Judicial Reform Concept,” March 17, 2021. Also see T I Georgia, The State of the Judicial System
2016-2020, October 30, 2020.
32 T estimony of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Kara McDonald, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation,
Bolstering Dem ocracy in Georgia, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2021.
33 Coalition for an Independent and T ransparent Judiciary, “T he Coalition Is Responding to the Announced Changes in
the Composition of the Supreme Court,” March 29, 2021.
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by U.S. and EU diplomats to delay judicial appointments until after the implementation of
judicial reforms.34
Economy
For three decades, Georgia has been recovering from the severe economic decline it experienced
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.35 In 2019, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was
around $17.5 bil ion (approximately 11 times less than that of Oklahoma, which has a similar
population size). Georgia’s per capita GDP ($4,698 in 2019) is midsized in comparison to the per
capita GDP of Russia and other post-Soviet states.
From 2017 to 2019, Georgia’s GDP grew by about 5% a year, following average growth of about
3% a year from 2013 to 2016. In 2020, Georgia’s GDP declined by an estimated 6% due to the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.36 Georgia’s GDP is expected to grow 3.5% to 4% in 2021.
Prior to the onset of the pandemic, the IMF characterized Georgia as having “resilient” economic
growth, a historical y low current account deficit, strong revenue growth, and a healthy banking
sector.37 In 2020, the IMF stated that Georgia “faces a pronounced economic slowdown” but that
the government’s “policy response helped limit the human toll of the pandemic and rightly
focused on protecting the vulnerable.”38
Poverty in Georgia has declined in recent years. According to official data, 21% of the population
lived in poverty in 2020 (down from 37 and U.S. Policy European Parliament passed a resolution calling on Georgian officials to release and pardon Saakashvili.33 Table 1. Status of EU Candidacy Priorities (European Commission update to the European Council, June 2023) (9) Consolidate efforts to enhance gender equality and fight violence against women (11) Adopt legislation so that Georgian courts proactively take into account European Court of Human Rights judgments in their deliberations Implemented Fully (12) Ensure that an independent person is given preference in the process of nominating a new Public Defender (Ombudsperson) and that this process is conducted in a transparent manner; ensure the Office’s effective institutional independence (1) Address the issue of political polarization, through ensuring cooperation across political parties in the spirit of the April 19, 2021, agreement (2) Guarantee the ful functioning of all state institutions, strengthening their independence and effective accountability as well as their democratic oversight functions, and further improve the electoral framework (3) Implement a transparent and effective judicial reform strategy and action plan based on a broad, inclusive, and cross-party consultation process, ensuring a judiciary that is ful y independent, accountable, and impartial and safeguarding the separation of powers (4) Strengthen the independence of the Anti-Corruption Agency, in particular to Implemented Partially address high-level corruption cases; equip the new Special Investigative Service and Personal Data Protection Service with resources commensurate to their mandates and ensure their independence (6) Strengthen the fight against organized crime, notably by ensuring rigorous investigations, prosecutions, and a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions; guarantee accountability and oversight of law enforcement agencies (8) Move swiftly to strengthen the protection of human rights of vulnerable groups, including by bringing perpetrators and instigators of violence to justice more effectively (10) Ensure the involvement of civil society in decisionmaking processes at all levels (5) Implement the commitment to “de-oligarchization” by eliminating the Implementation Limited excessive influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life (7) Undertake stronger efforts to guarantee a free, professional, pluralistic and independent media environment, notably by ensuring that criminal procedures Yet to be Implemented brought against media owners fulfil the highest legal standards and by launching impartial, effective, and timely investigations in cases of threats against the safety of journalists. Source: Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “The Twelve Priorities,” September 20, 2022; and European Commission, “Press Remarks by Neighbourhood and Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi, Fol owing the Informal General Affairs Council,” June 22, 2023. Past imprisonments also have raised concerns. In May 2022, Nika Gvaramia, the director of an independent television station, was sentenced to 3½ years in prison on charges of abuse of power that some observers and Western officials suggested were potentially without legal foundation.34 33 European Parliament Resolution of 15 February 2023 on the Situation of the Former President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0046_EN.html. 34 Civil Georgia, “Critical TV Boss Sentencing Unlawful, Watchdog Says,” May 17, 2022; Reporters Without Borders, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 8 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy In June 2023, Georgia’s Supreme Court upheld Gvaramia’s conviction; three days later, President Zourabichvili pardoned Gvaramia.35 In February 2021, authorities also arrested then-UNM party chairman Nika Melia. The arrest was the culmination of a lengthy judicial confrontation with Melia stemming from his role in a 2019 clash between protesters and police, when Melia was charged for allegedly inciting violence and leading an attempt to storm the Georgian parliament (see “June 2019 Protest” box, below). Then-Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia resigned, stating he opposed Melia’s detention given its political overtones, risk of violence, and potentially destabilizing effects. Gakharia subsequently entered the opposition as head of a new political party, For Georgia.36 June 2019 Protest In June 2019, the Georgian government faced a political crisis after police used tear gas and rubber bul ets against demonstrators, some of whom had confronted riot police in an attempt to forcibly enter the Georgian parliament. Demonstrators were protesting the decision to allow a Member of Parliament (MP) from Russia to deliver a speech from the parliamentary speaker’s chair in his capacity as chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, which the Georgian parliament was hosting. Many protesters called the decision a national affront, given Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and occupation of parts of its territory. After the crackdown, the government made some concessions but maintained the police response was largely appropriate. Then-parliamentary chairman Irakli Kobakhidze resigned, although he subsequently became leader of the parliamentary majority. The government did not meet the protesters’ main demand that then-Minister of Internal Affairs Giorgi Gakharia resign; instead, Gakharia was appointed prime minister. About 20 protesters were charged with participating in mass violence and resisting police. Sources: RFE/RL, “Furious Anti-Russia Protesters in Tbilisi Demand Speaker’s Resignation, Clash with Police,” June 21, 2019; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Violent Crackdown Throws Georgian Ruling Party’s Survival into Question,” Eurasianet, June 21, 2019; and Civil Georgia, “Two More Arrested for ‘Group Violence,’” July 27, 2019. Anti-Western Criticism Since 2022, some senior GD party and government officials have exhibited increasingly national-conservative leanings. This has included branding domestic opponents as “liberal fascists” or “pseudo-liberalists” and asserting that Georgian national and sovereign interests do not necessarily align with EU and U.S. preferences.37 They also claim that Western criticisms of democracy and governance reforms in Georgia are unfounded; some have alleged the EU and the United States have improperly interfered in Georgia’s domestic politics and have exhibited bias against the ruling party.38 Some also have criticized leading NGOs, many of which have received support from Western governments and foundations for years, alleging that they seek to “delegitimize the government” and undermine Georgia’s prospects for European integration.39 “Georgia: RSF Seeks Review of Opposition TV Chief’s Conviction, Jail Sentence,” May 24, 2022; and U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Nika Gvaramia’s Imprisonment,” June 20, 2023. 35 Gabriel Gavin, “Georgian President Pardons Jailed Journalist After EU, US Outcry,” Politico, June 23, 2023. 36 JAM News, “Georgian Opposition Leader Faces Arrest After Parliament Revokes MP Status,” February 16, 2021; and OC Media, “Gakharia Resigns as Georgian PM over Melia Arrest,” February 18, 2021. 37 See, for example, Nini Gabritchidze, “Georgian Leaders Come After ‘Liberal Fascists’ Following Foreign Agent Bill’s Defeat,” Eurasianet, March 17, 2023; and Shota Kincha, “Georgian Dream Renounces Affiliation with Centre-Left EU Parliament Group,” OC Media, May 11, 2023. 38 Civil Georgia, “Judges Accuse EU, U.S. Embassies of Meddling in Georgia’s Internal Affairs,” November 4, 2021; Ana Dumbadze, “GD Chairman on U.S. Embassy Statement: Shakes Public Confidence in Western Partners,” Georgia Today, January 4, 2022; and Civil Georgia, “Criticism Towards U.S. Not in Georgia’s Interests Says PM,” September 2, 2022. 39 Civil Georgia, “Ruling Party Contests Civic Space,” September 19, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 18 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy In 2023, criticism of Western policies culminated in the parliamentary majority’s effort to enact foreign agent legislation that international and domestic stakeholders said was antidemocratic and inspired by similar Russian legislation. GD withdrew the legislation in early March after domestic protests and objections from President Zourabichvili and U.S. and European officials.40 These developments—together with the government’s willingness to improve relations with Moscow amid Russia’s war against Ukraine (see “Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions,” below)—have led some observers to question whether Georgia’s political environment and increased economic ties with Russia may jeopardize the country’s European trajectory.41 President Zourabichvili, several opposition parties, and some NGOs have urged the government to adopt more consistently pro-European policies and rhetoric.42 Economy For three decades, Georgia has been recovering from the severe economic decline it experienced after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.43 In 2022, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was about $24.6 billion (approximately 10 times less than that of Oklahoma, which has a slightly larger population size). Georgia’s per capita GDP ($6,672 in 2022) is midsized in comparison with the per capita GDP of Russia and other post-Soviet states. Georgia’s economy entered a period of growth starting in 2017. From 2017 to 2019, GDP grew by about 5% a year. In 2020, the first year of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Georgia’s GDP declined by almost 7%. In 2021, GDP rebounded by 10.5%; in 2022, it grew by another 10%, at least in part due to an influx of Russian nationals who fled Russia after the latter invaded Ukraine (see “Economic Relations with Russia,” below).44 At the same time, Georgia continues to contend with unemployment, underemployment, and inflation. According to official data, 16% of the population lived in poverty in 2022 (down from 30% a decade before). The official unemployment rate in 2022 was 17% a decade before). The official unemployment rate in
2020 was 19% (down from 27% in % (down from 27% in 2010).392012). About About 2018% of Georgian laborers work in agriculture, % of Georgian laborers work in agriculture,
a sector of the economy that accounts for a sector of the economy that accounts for less than 10about 7% of GDP. Inflation has grown in recent years: from 5% a year in 2019-2020 to 10% in 2021 and 12% in 2022.45 40 Nini Gabritchidze, “International Pressure Grows on Georgia to Reject Foreign Agents Bill,” Eurasianet, February 28, 2023; Sophiko Megrelidze and Dasha Litvinova, “Georgia to Drop Foreign Agents Law After Massive Protests,” Associated Press, March 9, 2023; and Lela Kunchulia and Andy Heil, “Why the Georgian Government Climbed Down on the ‘Foreign Agents’ Law,” RFE/RL, March 9, 2023. 41 See, for example, Sergi Kapanadze, “Anatomy of Georgia’s U-Turn Towards Russia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 28, 2023; Francis Fukuyama and Nino Evgenidze, “Russia Is Winning in Georgia: America Needs to Get Tough on Tbilisi,” Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2023; Joshua Kucera, “Georgia’s Diplomatic Balancing Act Is Getting Harder to Pull Off,” RFE/RL, May 22, 2023; and Jamie Dettmer, “Georgia Hedges Its Bets on the EU—and Russia,” Politico, May 31, 2023. 42 See, for example, President of Georgia, “2023 Address to Parliament,” March 31, 2023; and President of Georgia, “Independence Day Speech,” May 26, 2023. 43 According to World Bank estimates, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 45% in 1992, 29% in 1993, and 10% in 1994. 44 Rezo Bitsadze, “Strong Economic Performance in Caucasus amid Geopolitical Turmoil,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, September 28, 2022; International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on First Review for Georgia’s Stand-By Arrangement,” press release, November 7, 2022; and Nini Gabritchidze, “Russian Influx Boosts Georgian Economy, But Not Everyone Is Feeling the Boom,” Eurasianet, November 17, 2022. 45 National Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat), at https://www.geostat.ge/en. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 18 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy Georgia’s economy relies in part on migrant remittances. From 2017 to 2021, remittances on average were equivalent to about 10% of Georgia’s GDP. Russia is the largest source of remittances to Georgia, followed by Italy, the United States, Greece, and Israel. In 2022, money transfers from Russia quintupled, as Russian nationals visiting or currently residing in Georgia relocated funds there (see “Economic Relations with Russia,” below).46 Tourism, a steadily growing sector in Georgia prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, began to recover in 2021 after coming to a “virtual standstill” in 2020.47 From 2011 to 2019, annual travel-related income more than tripled; in 2019, international travel to Georgia was responsible for about 8% of Georgia’s GDP. Most international travelers to Georgia come from Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Israel, and Ukraine.48 Georgia’s energy supply includes natural gas, oil, hydropower, biofuels, and coal. Most of Georgia’s natural gas supplies come from neighboring Azerbaijan. In 2019, Georgia’s natural gas imports from Russia began to rise; in 2022, they amounted to 24% of Georgia’s total gas imports. Georgia purchases oil and petroleum products mainly from Russia, Romania, Turkmenistan, Bulgaria, and Azerbaijan. In 2022, Georgia’s oil imports from Russia rose substantially, amounting to 47% of its total oil imports (up from 16% in 2021).49% of GDP.40
Georgia’s economy depends in part on migrant remittances. From 2016 to 2020, remittances were
equivalent to about 9% of Georgia’s GDP. In 2020, the National Bank of Georgia reported that
Russia was the largest source of remittances, followed by Italy, Greece, the United States, and
Israel.41
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, tourism was a steadily growing sector in Georgia. Most tourists
to Georgia come from neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, and Turkey. From
2011 to 2019, annual tourism-related income more than tripled; in 2019, tourism was responsible

34 Civil Georgia, “Parliament Speaker Refuses Diplomats’ Appeal to Suspend Judiciary App ointments,” May 24, 2021.
35 According to World Bank estimates, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 45% in 1992, 29% in
1993, and 10% in 1994. In the three years before the 2008 global financial crisis, Georgia achieved annual growth rates
of 9% or higher. After a 4% decline in 2009, Georgia achieved growth of 6%-7% from 2010 to 2012.
36 Geostat, Rapid Estimates of Economic Growth 2020 (December), January 29, 2021.
37 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Fifth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility for Georgia,” press release, December 17, 2019; IMF, Country Report No. 19/372, December 2019, pp. 4-7.
38 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Eighth Review under the Extended Fund Facility for Georgia,” press
release, April 12, 2021.
39 In 2020, Geostat, Georgia’s national statistics office, introduced a new standard for measuring employment that
excludes subsistence farming and, as a result, recalculated historical employment and unemployment data. Geostat, at
https://www.geostat.ge/en. Also see Geostat, “ Indicators of Employment and Unemployment Calculated Based on New
Standards of the International Labour Organization,” December 28, 2020.
40 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en.
41 National Bank of Georgia, at https://nbg.gov.ge.
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for about 8% of GDP.42 In 2020, the IMF noted that “tourism revenues came to a virtual
standstil ” due to the COVID-19 pandemic.43
In 2017, the IMF approved a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement to provide
Georgia with about $285 mil ion in loans to support economic reforms focusing, among other
things, on financial stability and infrastructure investment. The IMF noted the need for Georgia to
increase its agricultural productivity, improve its business environment, and reform its education
system.44 To help Georgia address the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF expanded Georgia’s lending
program and, by April 2021, had disbursed about $687 mil ion to Georgia since 2017.45
Georgia has improved its energy security in recent years. Almost al of Georgia’s natural gas
supplies come from neighboring Azerbaijan. Georgia has rehabilitated hydropower plants and Georgia has rehabilitated hydropower plants and
constructed new ones, although some constructed new ones, although some key hydropower development plans have engendered local hydropower development plans have engendered local and
CSOcommunity and NGO opposition. opposition.46
50 In In 20202022, Georgia’s largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about , Georgia’s largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about
2221% of total trade ($3.8 billion). Georgia’s largest bilateral% of total trade ($2.5 bil ion, down from $3 bil ion in 2019). Individual y, Georgia’s four
largest trading partners were Turkey ($ trading partners were Turkey ($1.6 bil ion, or 142.8 billion, or 15% of Georgia’s trade), Russia ($% of Georgia’s trade), Russia ($1.3
bil ion, 12%), China ($1.2 bil ion, 10%), and Azerbaijan ($934 mil ion, 8%). Half2.5 billion, 13%), China ($1.9 billion, 10%), Azerbaijan ($1.3 billion, 7%), Armenia ($1.2 billion, 6%), and the United States ($930 million, 5%). Almost half of Georgia’s of Georgia’s
merchandise exports went to four countries: China, Azerbaijan, Russia, and merchandise exports went to four countries: China, Azerbaijan, Russia, and BulgariaArmenia. Georgia’s . Georgia’s
main exports were copper ores, main exports were copper ores, motor vehicles, beverages (wine, water, and spirits), beverages (wine, water, and spirits), motor vehicles, and iron and
steel.47and ferroalloys.51 Georgia has free Georgia has free -trade agreements with the EU and China. trade agreements with the EU and China.
From 2015 to 2019, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Georgia averaged $1.6 From 2015 to 2019, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Georgia averaged $1.6 bil ionbillion a year. FDI declined to $590 million in 2020, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, but recovered to $1.2 billion in 2021 and, according to preliminary data, $2 billion in 2022. Top sources of FDI in 2022 were the United Kingdom, Spain, the United States, and the Netherlands.52 Relations with the European Union and NATO Successive Georgian administrations have made closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority. A constitutional amendment that came into effect in 2018 states that Georgia’s “constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the 46 National Bank of Georgia, at https://nbg.gov.ge. Also see TI Georgia, “Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War,” August 3, 2022. 47 IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Review Mission to Georgia,” press release, November 10, 2020. 48 Georgian National Tourism Administration (GNTA), at https://gnta.ge/statistics. 49 Geostat, as reported by Trade Data Monitor. 50 Christian Mamo, “In Georgia, A Grassroots Protest Movement Campaigns to Halt a Hydroelectric Power Plant,” Emerging Europe, May 26, 2021; Josef Gassman, “Untapped Potential: What’s Behind Georgia’s Hydropower Slowdown?,” Investor.ge, December 12, 2021; and Nini Gabritchidze, “Georgia Seeks $3 Billion to Expand Power Generation,” EurasiaNet, January 6, 2023. 51 Geostat, as reported in Trade Data Monitor. 52 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 8 link to page 8 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy full integration of Georgia into [the EU and NATO].”53 In polls conducted since 2020, about 75% to 90% of respondents have supported EU membership and 70% to 80% have supported NATO membership.54 European Union One week after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgia joined Ukraine and Moldova in applying for EU membership. On March 15, 2022, the Georgian Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the government “to strengthen its efforts towards Georgia’s European integration” and on the EU “to take all necessary steps to accelerate Georgia’s accession.”55 EU accession is a long, complex process that can take years or decades to complete and requires prospective members to adopt and implement a large body of EU laws. Aspiring EU members also must meet core political and economic criteria, including stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for minority protection; a functioning market economy; and administrative capacity to take on the obligations of membership.56 Alongside Georgia’s application for membership, EU-Georgia relations have been marked by some tensions. EU officials and some European politicians have expressed concerns about the state of democracy and governance reforms in Georgia.57 EU concerns were reflected in a European Council decision of June 2022 to defer granting Georgia EU candidate status.58 In the decision, the Council “recognized the European perspective” of Georgia, together with that of Ukraine and Moldova, but did not name Georgia a candidate country as it did the other two. The Council said the EU would grant candidate status to Georgia after the country addresses a set of 12 governance priorities, including remedying political polarization; promoting democratic oversight; and implementing electoral, judicial, and anti-corruption reforms (see “Reform Challenges,” above). Georgia’s pursuit of EU membership follows years of increased economic and social integration with the EU. In 2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU that included a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and encouraged harmonization with EU laws and regulations.59 In 2017, the EU granted Georgian citizens visa-free entry to the EU’s Schengen 53 Constitution of Georgia, Article 78, available at https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/30346?publication=36. 54 Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia,” September 2022; and National Democratic Institute (conducted by CRRC Georgia), “Taking Georgians’ Pulse: Findings from December 2022 Face to Face Survey,” February 2023. 55 Civil Georgia, “Parliament Unanimously Backs Resolution on Georgia’s EU Integration,” March 16, 2022. 56 For more on the EU accession process, see CRS Report RS21344, European Union Enlargement, by Kristin Archick and Sarah E. Garding. 57 Civil Georgia, “PM Complains to EC President over European Parliament ‘Falsehoods,’” July 18, 2022; Civil Georgia, “GD Chair Doubles Down on Criticizing EU, U.S. Ambassadors,” July 22, 2022; Delegation of the EU to Georgia, “Joint Press Statement Following the 7th Association Council Meeting Between the EU and Georgia,” September 7, 2022; and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “PACE Rapporteurs: Georgia Is at a Crossroads on Its Path to European Integration,” April 3, 2023. 58 The European Council is an institution composed of the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states, the European Council President, and the President of the European Commission. European Council, European Council Meeting (23 and 24 June 2022) – Conclusions, June 24, 2022; and European Commission, Opinion on Georgia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, June 17, 2022, pp. 17-18. 59 The free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in 2014 and entered into force in 2016. The text of the association agreement and the corresponding agenda for 2017-2020 are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/9740/eugeorgia-association-agreement_en. More information on the free-trade agreement is available from the Georgian government at https://dcfta.gov.ge/en/home. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 21 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy area of free movement, which allows a year.
About 60% of the total amount came from Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Turkey. During this period, most FDI was in transport (24%); other leading sectors were finance
(15%), energy (12%), and construction (9%).48 In 2017, the IMF noted that attracting FDI to
sectors with high export potential, including tourism and agriculture, is “crucial to ensure growth
in foreign markets.”49 In 2020, FDI declined to an estimated $617 mil ion.
Cancellation of Anaklia Port Project
Georgia has aspired to be a key transit hub for the growing East-West overland trade route between China and
Europe. In January 2020, however, the Georgian government canceled a contract to develop a major new
deepwater port and free industrial zone in Anaklia, located on Georgia’s Black Sea coast near the Russian-
occupied region of Abkhazia. The port project was considered Georgia’s largest-ever infrastructure investment
and was to be accompanied by major government investments in Georgia’s road and rail infrastructure. Officials
said project consortium partners, who are contesting the cancel ation in international arbitration court, failed to
raise the necessary funds for the project. In March 2021, Georgian officials said a process to select a new port
developer would commence soon.

42 Georgian National T ourism Administration, at https://gnta.ge/statistics.
43 IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Review Mission to Georgia,” press release, November 10, 2020.
44 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves US$285.3 Million Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility
for Georgia,” press release, April 12, 2017; and IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017.
45 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Eighth Review under the Extended Fund Facility for Georgia,” press
release, April 12, 2021.
46 Giorgi Lomsadze, “T roubled Dams on Georgia’s Waters,” Eurasianet, February 19, 2020; Andrew Barry and
Evelina Gambino, “Unsustainable T ransition? Hydropower and the Post -Covid Recovery in Georgia,” openDemocracy,
July 30, 2020; and JAM News, “Namakhvani HPP – ‘Dam of Death’ or Critical Energy Security?,” March 5, 2021.
47 Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
48 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en.
49 IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017, p. 45.
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Many observers have speculated about the government’s motives for canceling the contract and its level of
commitment to the port project. In 2019, Mamuka Khazaradze, the head of the project consortium’s principal
Georgian partner (TBC Holding, an affiliate of Georgia’s largest bank) and his deputy were charged with money
laundering, in connection with what officials al eged were improper financial transactions from more than a decade
before. Subsequently, a U.S. partner in the consortium withdrew from the project.
Observers raised questions about the case against Khazaradze. The U.S. government stated concerns “about the
context and timing of [the] charges.” In January 2020, the Georgian public defender ( ombudsperson) filed an
amicus curiae brief that stated, “the case materials do not contain the elements necessary for assessing an action as
a crime of money laundering.”
Sources: Civil Georgia, “Key Points: TBC Bank Affair,” March 9, 2019; Transparency International Georgia,
“Charges Against the Founders of TBC Bank Raise Many Questions about the Investigation,” July 25, 2019; U.S.
Embassy Georgia, “The U.S. Embassy Statement on Criminal Charges Against TBC Bank Co-founders Mamuka
Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze,” July 25, 2019; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Cancels Contract for Black Sea
Megaport,” Eurasianet, January 9, 2020; Public Defender of Georgia, “Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to Mamuka
Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze’s Case,” January 15, 2020; and Giorgi Menabde, “The ‘Big Game’ Around Georgia’s
Deep-Water Ports,” Jamestown Foundation, May 18, 2021.
Relations with the European Union and NATO
The Georgian government has long made closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority.
According to recent pol s, more than 80% of the Georgian population supports membership in the
EU and more than 70% supports membership in NATO.50
In 2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU that included a Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area and encouraged harmonization with EU laws and regulations.51
In 2017, the EU granted Georgian citizens visa-free entry to the EU’s Schengen area of free
movement, which al ows individuals to travel without passport checks between most European individuals to travel without passport checks between most European
countriescountries. In 2022, Georgia’s largest merchandise trading partner was the EU. The EU also is a major . The EU also is a major providersource of foreign of foreign aidassistance to Georgia, providing to Georgia, providing more thanabout €100 million ($109 million) a year in aid.60 NATO In 2008, NATO members agreed Georgia would become a member of NATO, together with Ukraine.61 Neither state, however, has been granted a clear path to or timeline for membership, in part reflecting concern that membership could lead to a heightened risk of war between NATO and Russia. Nonetheless, €100
mil ion (about $120 mil ion) a year and additional pandemic-related aid.52
NATO considers Georgia NATO considers Georgia to be “one of “one of the Al ianceNATO’s closest partners.”’s closest partners.”5362 A NATO-Georgia A NATO-Georgia
Commission was Commission was first established in 2008, after Russia invaded Georgia (see “2008 Russia-Georgia War,” below)established in 2008. At the NATO 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders . At the NATO 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders
established a established a “Substantial NATO-Georgia PackageSubstantial NATO-Georgia Package” to help Georgia bolster its defense to help Georgia bolster its defense
capabilities. capabilities. Georgia is one of NATO’sSince 2014, Georgia has been a NATO Enhanced Opportunity Enhanced Opportunity PartnersPartner, a cooperative status , a cooperative status
currently granted currently granted to six countries (including Ukraine).63to six of NATO’s close strategic partners.54 In 2015, Georgia joined the NATO In 2015, Georgia joined the NATO
Response Force, a Response Force, a multinational rapid reaction force.rapid reaction force.
Georgia has been Also in 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to enhance interoperability and operational readiness. The center has hosted three joint NATO-Georgia exercises. Some NATO member states also participate in two sets of regular military exercises led by the United States and Georgia: Agile Spirit and Noble Partner (see “U.S.-Georgia Relations,” below). Georgia was one of the top troop contributors (and the top non-NATO contributor) to the one of the top troop contributors (and the top non-NATO contributor) to the
NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which is endingended in 2021. At its height, Georgia’s deployment to NATO’s previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan exceeded 1,500 troops, who served with no operational caveats.64 Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense since the last years of the Soviet Union, when Georgia’s independence movement flourished. Observers generally assess that since then, Russia has sustained the secession of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 60 From 2014 to 2020, the EU provided more than $1 billion (€938 million) in aid to Georgia. Delegation of the EU to Georgia, “EU-Georgia Relations – Factsheet,” updated November 11, 2022; and European Commission, Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Georgia, 2014-2020, September 19, 2022. 61 In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NATO member countries declared that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.” NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3, 2008. 62 NATO, “Relations with Georgia,” updated April 12, 2023. 63 NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. NATO, “Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” updated November 3, 2020. 64 Georgia also contributed more than 2,250 troops to the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, between 1999 and 2008. NATO, Deepening Relations with Georgia, August 2013; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020; and NATO, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” updated February 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy maintain influence over Georgia and prevent it from joining NATO.65 Georgia’s relations with Russia worsened after Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought to power ex-President Saakashvili, who sought to deepen Georgia’s integration with the West and restore Georgian sovereignty over the breakaway regions.66 After first coming to power in 2012, the GD government made efforts to stabilize the Georgia-Russia relationship. In 2013, Moscow lifted an embargo on popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) that had been in place since 2006. As a result, Russia again became one of Georgia’s top trading partners. Russian tourism to Georgia grew under the GD government; between 2012 and 2019, the number of Russians visiting Georgia more than tripled.67 Russia suspended direct passenger flights to Georgia in 2019, however, alleging that protests against a visiting Russian MP posed a threat to the security of Russian nationals (see “June 2019 Protest” box, above).68 Subsequently, the COVID-19 pandemic diminished Russian and other international travel to Georgia for two years.69 Georgia’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022-2023 has been the subject of some debate. Polls indicate widespread support among Georgians for Ukraine, and the Georgian government officially condemns Russia’s invasion. At the same time, the Georgian government has maintained a measured approach in criticizing Russia, stating that it seeks to avoid possible reprisals or economic losses.70 The government has promoted increased trade and travel with Russia and permitted an influx of Russian nationals in the wake of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022.71 In May 2023, the Georgian government accepted a Russian offer to resume direct air travel. Russian authorities also announced the introduction of a visa-free regime for Georgians, reciprocating a visa-free regime for Russians that Georgia instituted in 2012 under ex-President Saakashvili.72 The government of Georgia does not support the imposition of direct sanctions on Russia, although officials assert that Georgia strictly complies with U.S., EU, and other international 65 An official 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement stated that “resolution of [ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes] would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.” NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, September 3, 1995. Also see Christian Lowe, “Russia Warns Against Georgia NATO Membership,” Reuters, March 11, 2008; and Michael Kofman, “The August War, Ten Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War,” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018. 66 Lincoln A. Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and Cory Welt, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse,” in Valerie Bunce, Michael A. McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, eds., Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post-Communist World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 155-188. 67 GNTA, at https://gnta.ge/statistics. 68 Andrew Roth, “Putin Bans Russian Airlines from Flying to Georgia,” Guardian, June 21, 2019. 69 Margarita Antidze, “Coronavirus Hits Georgia’s Booming Tourism Industry,” Reuters, March 20, 2020; and Manana Vardiashvili, “Georgian Tourism Struggles to Recover,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 14, 2021. 70 OC Media, “Georgians Want Their Government to Support Ukraine,” March 15, 2022; Economist, “Georgians Back Ukraine, But Their Government Is More Hesitant,” April 23, 2022; and Nadia Beard, “How the War in Ukraine Has Exposed Georgia’s Fault Lines,” RFE/RL, December 27, 2022. 71 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Flood of Russians Alters Life for Countries That Took Them In,” New York Times, March 14, 2023; Maradia Tsaava, “One Year After Emigration: Russians in Georgia,” JAM News, March 29, 2023; and Alexander Atasuntsev, “How Far Will the Thaw in Russia-Georgia Relations Extend?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 19, 2023. 72 RFE/RL, “Russian Lifting of Visas, Flight Ban Highlight Georgia’s Precarious Relations with Moscow,” May 11, 2023; and Nini Gabritchidze, “Georgia: Uncertainty Looms as First Carriers Authorized for Russia Flights,” Eurasianet, May 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy sanctions.73 Some senior officials have accused members of the political opposition, Western-funded NGOs, and U.S. and European officials of pressuring Georgia to impose direct sanctions on Russia or to take other actions that could lead Georgia into war. U.S. and European officials reject these claims.74 Economic Relations with Russia The Georgian government seeks to improve economic relations with Russia, including since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Between 2012 and 2022, the share of Georgia’s merchandise exports to Russia as a percentage of its total exports increased from 2% to 12%, making Russia Georgia’s fourth top export market after the EU, China, and Azerbaijan. In 2022, the value of Georgian exports to Russia rose by about 7% (but made up a smaller share of Georgia’s total exports than in the previous five years). The increase in exports to Russia was due mainly to growth in intermediate trade (re-exports) of third-country goods via Georgia, including for trade that previously transited Ukraine; domestic exports to Russia declined by 3%.75 The share of Georgia’s imports from Russia also has grown over the last decade: from 6% in 2012 to 14% in 2022, behind imports from the EU and Turkey. In 2022, the value of imports from Russia rose by about 78%. In particular, Georgia tripled its imports (by volume) of Russian oil and oil products; the value of Russian imports as a share of Georgia’s total oil imports increased from 16% to 47%, in part replacing imports from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.76 After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Georgia retained its decade-long visa-free regime for Russian nationals. The post-pandemic recovery of tourism and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contributed to the official arrival of almost 1.1 million Russians to Georgia in 2022 (about 25% less than in 2019).77 Among these, more than 110,000 are estimated to have remained in Georgia.78 Along with an influx of Russian nationals, official data indicates a relatively high level of Russian-origin financial activity since the start of the Ukraine war. In 2022, Georgia recorded more than $2 billion in money transfers from Russia, about five times the average amount of annual remittances from Russia over the previous seven years (and almost half of all remittances to Georgia in 2022). At the end of 2022, Georgian banks recorded about $1 billion of deposits belonging to Russian residents (37% of all non-resident deposits). In 2022, almost 15,000 new 73 Nino Narimanishvili, “‘Lack of Political Will’ – Why Georgia Does Not Join Anti-Russian Sanctions?,” JAM News, June 3, 2022; Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), Georgia’s Implementation of the International Sanctions Imposed Against Russia, November 7, 2022; Civil Georgia, “Finance Minister Says Georgia Leading in Enforcing Sanctions against Russia,” January 23, 2023; and Civil Georgia, “Ministry of Finance ‘Categorically’ Denies Sanctions Evasion,” May 1, 2023. 74 Civil Georgia, “Georgian PM Upholds ‘War Blackmail’ Narrative, Backs Dissident MPs, Slams Opposition,” July 29, 2022; and Interpressnews, “Kelly Degnan: The Georgian Government Knows Very Well That We Have Never Pressured Georgia to Be Involved in This War,” February 9, 2023. 75 Geostat, as reported in Trade Data Monitor; and TI Georgia, Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, February 22, 2023. Also see Nini Gabritchidze, “Ukraine War Leads to Traffic Jams in Georgia,” Eurasianet, October 6, 2022; and Ivan Nechepurenko, “How Western Goods Reach Russia: A Long Line of Trucks Through Georgia,” New York Times, January 13, 2023. 76 Geostat, as reported in Trade Data Monitor; and TI Georgia, Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, February 22, 2023. 77 GNTA, at https://gnta.ge/statistics/; and TI Georgia, Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, February 22, 2023. 78 Evan Gershkovich, “Russians Who Fled Putin Seek Shelter and Redemption in Georgia,” Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2022; Jake Cordell, “From Russia with Cash: Georgia Booms as Russians Flee Putin’s War,” Reuters, November 8, 2022; and Civil.ge, “Report: Russian Capital in Georgian Business,” June 15, 2023. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 5 link to page 20 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy Russian-owned companies were registered in Georgia (about two-thirds the total number of Russian-owned companies in Georgia).79 Russian Occupation in Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia Ethnic Abkhazians and South Ossetians—both related to minority populations in Russia’s North Caucasus region—sought to separate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and remain with Russia in 2021. As of February
2021, Georgia was the fourth-largest contributor to the Resolute Support Mission, with 860

50 Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of
Georgia,” February 2021.
51 T he free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in 2014 and entered into force in 2016. T he text of the
association agreement and the corresponding agenda for 2017-2020 are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
georgia/9740/eugeorgia-association-agreement_en. More information on the free-trade agreement is available from the
Georgian government at http://www.dcfta.gov.ge/en/home.
52 European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Staff Working Document: Association
Im plem entation Report on Georgia, February 5, 2021, p. 2.
53 NAT O, “Relations with Georgia,” updated April 12, 2021.
54 NAT O’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. NAT O,
“Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” updated November 3, 2020.
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troops.55 At its height, Georgia’s deployment to NATO’s previous International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan reached over 1,500 troops, who served with no
operational caveats.
Figure 1. Georgia

Sources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated using data from the National Geospatial Intel igence
Agency, DeLorme, Department of State, and Esri.
In 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to enhance
interoperability and operational readiness. The center has hosted two joint NATO-Georgia
exercises. Some NATO member states participate in two sets of regular U.S.-Georgia led military
exercises: Agile Spirit and Noble Partner (see “Military Aid” below).
Closer integration with the EU and NATO does not appear to have enabled Georgia to improve its
near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. The EU is unlikely to consider
Georgia a candidate for membership soon, given the EU’s internal chal enges and a lack of
support for enlargement among many members. In 2008, NATO members agreed Georgia and
Ukraine would become members of NATO, but neither state has been granted a clear path to or
timeline for membership.56
Many observers attribute Georgia’s lack of a clear path to NATO membership to some members’
concerns that Georgia’s membership could lead to a heightened risk of war with Russia. Many

55 Georgia also contributed more than 2,250 troops to the NAT O-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, between 1999 and 2008.
NAT O, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” updated August 2020; U.S. Department of State,
“U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020.
56 In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NAT O member countries
declared that “NAT O welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NAT O. We
agreed today that these countries will become members of NAT O.” NAT O, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3,
2008.
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believe NATO wil not move forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Georgian
territory and the conflict remains unresolved.
Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions
Since the 1990s, Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense. Georgian authorities accuse
Moscow of obstructing Georgia’s Western integration. Many observers believe Russia supports
the secession of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Georgia
from joining NATO.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia original y sought to secede from Georgia in the early 1990s, during in the early 1990s, during
and after Georgia’s pursuit of independence from the Soviet Union.and after Georgia’s pursuit of independence from the Soviet Union.57 At the time, At the time, manysome observers asserted that Soviet authorities had instigated the conflicts to halt Georgia’s efforts to secede from the Soviet Union, whereas others viewed the secessionist movements as homegrown but facilitated by Moscow.80 observers
believed Soviet and, later, Russian authorities instigated the conflicts, assisted local forces to halt
Georgia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia, or both. After the conflicts ended, Russian forces After the conflicts ended, Russian forces
remained in both regionsremained in both regions to serve, officially as peacekeepers. as peacekeepers.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are smal but strategical yare small but strategically located regions of Georgia that make up located regions of Georgia that make up
almost 20% of Georgia’s territory (almost 20% of Georgia’s territory (seesee Figure 1). Abkhazia accounts for more than half of ). Abkhazia accounts for more than half of
Georgia’s Black Sea coastline. South Ossetia is located Georgia’s Black Sea coastline. South Ossetia is located astridealong a major transportation route to a major transportation route to
Russia and close to Georgia’s main east-west highway. Russia and close to Georgia’s main east-west highway.
According to local authorities in Abkhazia, the region’s population in 2011 was about 240,000 (50% Abkhazian, 19% Georgian, 17% Armenian, and 9% Russian). Most Georgians—who were previously the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia—were forced to flee Most Georgians—who were previously the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia—were forced to flee
Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war and became Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war and became internal yinternally displaced persons displaced persons, or IDPs.
(IDPs). Abkhazia’s population in the 1989 Soviet census was about 525,000, of which 46% were ethnic Abkhazia’s population in the 1989 Soviet census was about 525,000, of which 46% were ethnic
Georgians and 17% were ethnic Georgians and 17% were ethnic Abkhaz. Authorities in Abkhazia al ege the region’s population in
2011 was about 240,000 (50% Abkhaz, 19% Georgian, 17% Armenian, and 9% Russian).
Abkhazians. The Georgian government has estimated that about 40,000 ethnic Georgians The Georgian government has estimated that about 40,000 ethnic Georgians stil still live in Abkhazia, live in Abkhazia,
primarily in the southeastern district of Galiprimarily in the southeastern district of Gali. Many observers note these Georgians from the Gali
district face chal enges, and face challenges regarding freedom of movement, political rights, and native-language regarding freedom of movement, political rights, and native-language
education.58 In 2020, a new local government came to power in Abkhazia and suggested it might
be more attentive to the rights of the region’s ethnic Georgian population.59
education.81 Authorities in South Ossetia Authorities in South Ossetia al egestated that the region’s population in 2015 was about 54,000 (90% the region’s population in 2015 was about 54,000 (90%
Ossetian, 7% Georgian). In the 1989 Soviet census, the region’s population was about 98,000 Ossetian, 7% Georgian). In the 1989 Soviet census, the region’s population was about 98,000
(66% Ossetian, 29% Georgian)(66% Ossetian, 29% Georgian). Most; most of South Ossetia’s Georgian population was forced to flee in the 1990s conflict and again in the 2008 war. The few thousand ethnic Georgians who remained in ethnic Georgians who remained in the regionSouth Ossetia after the 2008 after the 2008
war are war are mainly residents of the easternmost Akhalgori region, which was under Georgia’s direct control residents of the easternmost Akhalgori region, which was under Georgia’s direct control
until the war (see until the war (see “2008 Russia-Georgia War,” ,” below). As in occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has provided citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Observers note that Russia justified its 2008 invasion of Georgia in part by alleging the need to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.82 79 TI Georgia, Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, February 22, 2023; Giorgi Menabde, “Russians Keep Nearly $1 Billion in Georgian Banks,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, May 15, 2023; and IDFI, “Russian Capital and Russian Connections in Georgian Business,” June 6, 2023. 80 The South Ossetia conflict occurred in 1991-1992; the Abkhazia conflict occurred in 1992-1993. See, for example, Svetlana Chervonnaya, Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow (Glastonbury, UK: Gothic Image Publications, 1994); Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2004); and Bruno Coppietiers, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996). 81 Olesya Vartanyan, “Easing Travel Between Georgia and Breakaway Abkhazia,” International Crisis Group, September 5, 2019; U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Joint Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia,” September 2, 2022; and Lana Kokaia, “Abkhazia: Erasing the Georgian Language,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 24, 2022. 82 Yuri Zoria, “Is Russia’s Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia?” (continued...) Congressional Research Service 16 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy 2008 Russia-Georgia War Under then-Presidentbelow).

57 T he South Ossetia conflict occurred in 1991-1992; the Abkhazia conflict occurred in 1992-1993.
58 Giorgi Menabde, “Georgians in Abkhazia: A Choice Between Assimilation and Emigration,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
August 6, 2019; Olesya Vartanyan, “Easing T ravel Between Geo rgia and Breakaway Abkhazia,” International Crisis
Group, September 5, 2019.
59 OC Media, “Abkhazian HR Commissioner Condemns T orture, Ethnic Discrimination, and Domestic Violence,” June
30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “Abkhazia’s Ankvab: ‘Gali Georgians Are Our Citizens,’” August 14, 2020.
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As in occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has provided citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Observers note that Russia justified its 2008 invasion of Georgia in part by
al eging the need to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.60
2008 Russia-Georgia War
Georgia’s relations with Russia worsened after Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought
ex-President Saakashvili to power.61 Under Saakashvili, the Georgian government sought to Saakashvili, the Georgian government sought to
accelerate Georgia’s integration with the West and accelerate Georgia’s integration with the West and reintegraterestore Georgia’s sovereignty over the breakaway regions. the breakaway regions. Authorities
Georgian authorities established greater control over Georgian-populated established greater control over Georgian-populated vil agesvillages in South Ossetia and the remote and in South Ossetia and the remote and
thinly-thinly populated Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In 2004, new clashes occurred in South Ossetia populated Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In 2004, new clashes occurred in South Ossetia
between Georgian and local forces.between Georgian and local forces.6283 In 2006, Russian authorities imposed an embargo on In 2006, Russian authorities imposed an embargo on
popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) and forcibly deported more than popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) and forcibly deported more than
2,000 Georgian migrant workers from Russia, seemingly in response to Georgia’s arrest of four 2,000 Georgian migrant workers from Russia, seemingly in response to Georgia’s arrest of four
Russian military officers on espionage-related charges.Russian military officers on espionage-related charges.6384
After another round of escalation in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian After another round of escalation in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian
government from reestablishing control over South Ossetia. A five-day war in August 2008 led to government from reestablishing control over South Ossetia. A five-day war in August 2008 led to
the deaths of more than 800 civilians and military personnel, the expulsion of some 20,000 the deaths of more than 800 civilians and military personnel, the expulsion of some 20,000
Georgian residents from South Ossetia, the destruction of Georgian residents from South Ossetia, the destruction of vil agesvillages, and Georgian loss of control , and Georgian loss of control
over the Akhalgoriover the Akhalgori region.region.6485 In Abkhazia, local forces took control of the Kodori Gorge. Russian In Abkhazia, local forces took control of the Kodori Gorge. Russian
forces temporarily occupied Georgian territory outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia and forces temporarily occupied Georgian territory outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
recognized the latter as independent states. recognized the latter as independent states.
In In February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled Russiathat Russia had violated several articles of violated several articles of
the European Convention the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to Russian actions in Georgia in 2008,
on Human Rights during the 2008 war, including “through its responsibility for the arbitrary detention of civilians, the … treatment, including “through its responsibility for the arbitrary detention of civilians, the … treatment,
torture, and other torture, and other il -ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and the denial of Georgian citizens’ right to treatment of prisoners of war, and the denial of Georgian citizens’ right to
return to their homes.”return to their homes.”65

60 Yuri Zoria, “Is Russia’s Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia?”
Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019; and T oru Nagashima, “ Russia’s Passportization Policy T oward Unrecognized
Republics: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and T ransnistria,” Problem s of Post-Com m unism, vol. 66, no. 3 (2019), pp. 186-
199.
61 Lincoln A. Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia ’s Rose Revolution (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and Cory Welt, “ Georgia’s Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to
Regime Collapse,” in Valerie Bunce, Michael A. McFaul and Kathryn Stoner -Weiss, eds., Dem ocracy and
Authoritarianism in the Post-Com m unist World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 155-188.
62 Cory Welt, “T he T hawing of a Frozen Conflict: T he Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to the Russo -
Georgian War,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, 1 (2010), pp. 63-97.
63 In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled the deportation violated the European Convention of
Human Rights but did not make a ruling regarding compensation. In 2019, the ECHR ruled that Russia should pay €10
million (almost $12 million) in compensation ; as of April 2021, Russia had not complied with t he86 After the 2008 War The 2008 war ended with a six-point cease-fire plan and a follow-on implementation plan brokered by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The six-point plan included a nonuse of force pledge and the return of Russia’s armed forces to the positions they held prior to the start of hostilities.87 Regular Russian forces withdrew from areas they had occupied outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but within the two regions Russia deployed military forces in greater numbers and Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019; and Toru Nagashima, “Russia’s Passportization Policy Toward Unrecognized Republics: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 66, no. 3 (2019), pp. 186-199. 83 Cory Welt, “The Thawing of a Frozen Conflict: The Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, no. 1 (2010), pp. 63-97. 84 In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled the deportations violated the European Convention on Human Rights but did not make a ruling regarding compensation. In 2019, the ECHR ruled that Russia should pay €10 million (almost $12 million) in compensation; Russia has not complied with the ruling. ruling. Civil
Georgia, “, “ CoE Concerned with Russia’sCoE Concerned with Russia’s Failure Failure to Pay to Deportation Victims,” September 5, 2020; and to Pay to Deportation Victims,” September 5, 2020; and Agenda.ge, ,
“Russia Ready to Discuss €10 Mln ECHR Fine over 2006 Deportations of Georgian Citizens,” February 8, 2021.
64“Council of Europe ‘Deeply Deplores’ Russia for not Paying €10 Mln Compensation to Georgia After Ruling,” September 23, 2022. 85 Council of the EU, Council of the EU, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (3 (3
vols.), September 2009; Ruslan Pukhov, ed., vols.), September 2009; Ruslan Pukhov, ed., The Tanks of August (Moscow: (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Centre for Analysis of Strategies and
T echnologiesTechnologies, 2010); and Gerard, 2010); and Gerard T oal Toal, , Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
65 86 U.S. U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Mission to the OSCE, “ On the ECHR JudgmentOn the ECHR Judgment in the Case Concerning the Armed Conflict Between Georgia in the Case Concerning the Armed Conflict Between Georgia
and the Russianand the Russian Federation,” January 28, 2021. Also see Helen Duffy, “Federation,” January 28, 2021. Also see Helen Duffy, “ Georgia v. Russia:Georgia v. Russia: Jurisdiction, Chaos and Jurisdiction, Chaos and
Conflict at the European Court of Human Rights,” Conflict at the European Court of Human Rights,” Just Security, February 2, 2021; and Natia Seskuria,, February 2, 2021; and Natia Seskuria, “Georgia’s Historic Victory: Implications of the ECHR Ruling,” February 11, 2021. 87 Council of the EU, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. 3, pp. 587-594. Congressional Research Service 17 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy “Georgia’s
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Conflict Resolution
The 2008 war ended with a six-point cease-fire plan and a follow-on implementation plan
brokered by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The six-point plan included a nonuse of
force pledge and the return of Russia’s armed forces to the positions they held prior to the start of
hostilities.66 Regular Russian forces withdrew from areas they had occupied outside South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but within the two regions Russia deployed new forces in greater numbers and
outside prior peacekeeping formats. As a result, U.S. officials and others consider Russia to be in outside prior peacekeeping formats. As a result, U.S. officials and others consider Russia to be in
noncompliance with the six-point plan.noncompliance with the six-point plan.67
Al parties to the conflict, together with the United States, the EU, the United Nations, and the
OSCE, participate in the Geneva International Discussions, convened quarterly to address issues
related to the conflict. Parties to the conflict, together with the United Nations and the OSCE, also
participate in joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) to address local
security issues and build confidence. Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives frequently
suspend participation in the IPRMs.68 The EU leads an unarmed civilian monitoring mission in
Georgia that monitors compliance with the cease-fire; Russian authorities do not permit the
mission to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.69
After the 2008 War and Recent Developments
Since 2008, Moscow has tightened control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In these regions,
Russia established military bases and border guard outposts that reportedly each house around
3,500-5,000 military and border guard personnel.70 Russian and local authorities constructed
boundary fences, imposed transit restrictions, and frequently detain Georgian citizens for “il egal”
crossings. Since 2015, at least four Georgian citizens have been kil ed or have died under
suspicious circumstances while in detention or in incidents involving local armed forces.71
In recent years, new tensions have arisen around South Ossetia. In 2019, Russian and local
authorities hardened and extended the boundary line. Georgian authorities responded by

Historic Victory: Implications of the ECHR Ruling,” February 11, 2021.
66 Council of the EU, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. 3,
pp. 587-594.
67 U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Joint Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia,” December 4, 2020.
68 T he Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) for Abkhazia also did not convene from 2012 to 2016.
T amar Svanidze, “ Breakaway Abkhazia to Resume IPRM Borderline Meetings after 4 Year Break ,” Georgia Today,
March 24, 2016; EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), “ Positive Atmosphere as 96th Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism Meeting T akes Place in Ergneti,” press release, July 30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “ Geneva T alks Co-Chairs
Hold Meetings in T bilisi, T skhinvali, Sokhumi,” September 17, 2020; and OSCE, “98th Incident Prevention and
Response Mechanism Meeting T akes Place in Ergneti,” March 5, 2021.
69 For more, see the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia website, at https://eumm.eu.
70 T he 7th Military Base in Abkhazia is in Gudauta; the 4th Military Base in South Ossetia is in T skhinvali. T he
estimated number of armed forces does not include local military formations. Abkhazia maintains local forces under
the command of the Russian military; some local South Ossetian forces hav e been absorbed into the Russian military.
International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2020, p. 208; and Margarete Klein, Russia’s Military
Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: Aim s, Instrum ents, and Perspectives, SWP, January 2019.
71 In 2018, the Georgian government compiled a list of human rights offenders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
called for international sanctions. Civil Georgia, “ Government Unveils T atunashvili-Otkhozoria List,” June 27, 2018;
Agenda.ge, “ 327 Detained Illegally By Occupying Forces in Georgia Between 2017 -19,” February 26, 2019; and
Agenda.ge, “ Tbilisi Demands Release of Illegally Detained Citizens at Meeting with De Facto T skhinvali ‘Officials,’”
March 5, 2021.
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establishing a new police checkpoint nearby, after which local authorities closed the crossing
point for the Akhalgori region (with a remaining population of under 2,000). The closure
reportedly contributed to the deaths of at least 16 residents who were unable to be transported for
medical care.72 In 2020, authorities in both regions enacted new crossing point closures,
ostensibly related to COVID-19 concerns, although authorities in Abkhazia occasional y have
opened humanitarian corridors across the boundary line.73 In April 2021, Georgian authorities
reported the drowning deaths of four Georgian residents of Abkhazia who attempted to bypass
closed crossing points by swimming across the boundary line.74
The Georgian government has sought to improve economic relations with Russia. In 2013,
Moscow lifted an embargo on popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) that
had been in place since 2006. As a result, Russia again became one of Georgia’s main trading
partners. The share of Georgia’s merchandise exports to Russia as a percentage of its total exports
rose from 2% in 2012 to 13% in 2020.75 The annual number of Russians visiting Georgia more
than tripled from 2012 to 2019.76 At the same time, disputes between Georgia and Russia persist;
since 2019, for example, Russian authorities have banned passenger flights to and from Georgia,
a measure they imposed in response to Georgian protests against a visiting Russian MP (see “June
2019 Protest and Prosecution of Nika Melia” text box, above).
U.S.-Georgia Relations
Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states. With a history
of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic
partnership with Georgia since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
A U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in 2009, provides the framework for
much of the two countries’ bilateral engagement. A Strategic Partnership 88 Since the 2008 war, Moscow has tightened control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In these regions, Russia established military bases and border guard outposts that reportedly each house around 3,500-5,000 personnel.89 Russian and local authorities have constructed boundary fences, imposed transit restrictions, and frequently detained Georgian citizens for “illegal” crossings.90 Since 2008, the U.N. General Assembly annually has passed a resolution recognizing “the right of return of all internally displaced persons and refugees and their descendants … to their homes throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia.”91 The most recent such resolution passed by a vote of 100-9 (with 59 abstentions) in June 2023. Georgia, Russia, and representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, together with the United States, the EU, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), participate in the Geneva International Discussions, convened to address issues related to the conflict (the discussions were suspended temporarily after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine). Georgia, Russia, and representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, together with the United Nations and the OSCE, also participate in joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) to address local security issues and build confidence; the IPRM for Abkhazia has not convened since 2018 due to a lack of engagement by Abkhaz representatives (it also did not convene from 2012 to 2016).92 The EU leads an unarmed civilian monitoring mission in Georgia that monitors compliance with the 2008 cease-fire. Russian authorities do not permit the mission to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.93 U.S.-Georgia Relations Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states. Building on a history of strong development aid and security cooperation, the United States deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. A U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in 2009, provides the framework for much of the two countries’ bilateral engagement. A Strategic Partnership 88 See, for example, U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Joint Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia,” September 2, 2022. 89 The 7th Military Base in Abkhazia is in Gudauta; the 4th Military Base in South Ossetia is in Tskhinvali. The estimated number of armed forces does not include local military formations. Abkhazia maintains local forces under the command of the Russian military; some local South Ossetian forces have been absorbed into the Russian military. International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2022, p. 188. 90 Mariusz Rzeszutko, The Borderization of Georgia’s Breakaways as a Tool of Russia’s Long-term Struggle with the EU and NATO, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, May 2022; and Arsen Araqelov, “Border” Checkpoints in the Occupied Region of Abkhazia: Anatomy of the Movement on the Occupation Line, Rondeli Foundation, November 24, 2022. 91 A/RES/77/293. See United Nations, “Adopting Resolution Recognizing Right of Return for Georgia’s Displaced Persons, Refugees, General Assembly Underlines Implementation Timetable Needed,” June 7, 2023. 92 Civil Georgia, “Sokhumi Hints at Resuming Gali IPRM,” October 18, 2022; U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “The 57th Geneva International Discussions on the Conflict in Georgia,” April 20, 2023; and EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, “112th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism Meeting Takes Place in Ergneti,” April 27, 2023. 93 For more, see the EUMM website, at https://eumm.eu; and Civil Georgia, “Head of EUMM Georgia Talks Abkhazia, S. Ossetia,” May 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 18 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy Commission convenes Commission convenes
annual plenary sessions and working groups to annual plenary sessions and working groups to addressdevelop political, economic, security, and people- political, economic, security, and people-
to-people issues.77
U.S. officials frequently express support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within
its international y recognized borders. Successive U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress
on a bipartisan basisto-people ties.94 On a bipartisan basis, Members of Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have condemned Russia’s occupation of territory in Georgia. The have condemned Russia’s occupation of territory in Georgia. The
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253)
states the United States “supports the policy known as the ‘Stimson Doctrine’ and thus does not states the United States “supports the policy known as the ‘Stimson Doctrine’ and thus does not
recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegalrecognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations” of invasions and occupations” of
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia.78

72 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Russia Advances Its Great Wall of Georgia,” Eurasianet, August 15, 2019; Human Rights Center
(Georgia), State of Hum an Rights Along the Dividing Lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia , 2019; Georgia Today,
“Occupied Akhalgori Faces Humanitarian Crisis,” January 16, 2020; and Civil Georgia, “Akhalgori Patient Dies After
Delayed T ransfer to Georgia Proper, T bilisi Says,” November 16, 2020.
73 Georgia Today, “Occupied T skhinvali, Abkhazia Close Entrances to Rest of Georgia,” February 28, 2020; and U.S.
Mission to the OSCE, “ Statement on the 51st Round of the Geneva International Discussions (Conflict in Georgia),”
December 17, 2020.
74 Civil Georgia, “Georgian President, MFA Say Russia Responsible for Drownings in Enguri,” April 7, 2021.
75 T he share of Georgian merchandise imports from Russia also increased, from 6% in 2012 to 11% in 2020. Geostat,
as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
76 Georgian National T ourism Administration, at https://gnta.ge/statistics/gnta.
77 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission.
78 As noted in a proposed concurrent resolution introduced in September 2008 ( H.Con.Res. 430), the Stimson Doctrine
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The United States has cal edAbkhazia, South Ossetia, and the territories of other countries occupied by Russia.95 The United States calls on Russia to comply with the terms of the cease-fire agreement that on Russia to comply with the terms of the cease-fire agreement that
ended its 2008 war against Georgia, including withdrawal of its forces to prewar positions, and to ended its 2008 war against Georgia, including withdrawal of its forces to prewar positions, and to
reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. U.S. officials have reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. U.S. officials have
criticized Russian efforts at hardening and extending the boundary lines of Abkhazia and South criticized Russian efforts at hardening and extending the boundary lines of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.Ossetia.79 The U.S. government has expressed support for Georgia’s “commitment to dialogue
and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.”80
Before the 2008 war, the United States supported granting Georgia a NATO Membership Action
Plan and backed NATO’s April 2008 pledge that Georgia eventual y would become a member of
NATO. In 2017, then-Vice President Michael Pence said in Tbilisi that the United States “stand[s]
by the 2008 NATO Bucharest statement, which made it clear that Georgia wil one day become a
member of NATO.”81
The United States has criticized cyberattacks against Georgia. In 2020, then-Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo condemned a cyberattack he attributed to Russian military intel igence that
“disrupted operations of several thousand Georgian government and privately-run websites and
interrupted the broadcast of at least two major television stations.”82 Also that year, the U.S.
Embassy in Georgia said it was “appal ed” by reports of an unattributed cyberattack that
“attempted to il egal y access [COVID-19] pandemic management information,” including from
Georgia’s Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research (see “Foreign Aid” below).83
The United States continues to strongly support democracy and governance reforms in Georgia.
96 Since 2022, some U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the risks of Georgia’s increased engagement with and dependence on Russia during Russia’s war against Ukraine. In March 2023, the White House reported that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan “underscored the need for Georgia to avoid becoming an avenue for [sanctions] evasion or backfill” in a meeting with Georgian President Zourabichvili.97 In May 2023, in response to the resumption of direct flights between Russia and Georgia, U.S. officials noted the potential risk of engaging in activities involving sanctioned Russian aircraft.98 Successive U.S. administrations have strongly supported democracy and governance reforms in Georgia and the country’s EU and NATO membership aspirations. With regard to Georgia’s 2020 parliamentary elections, U.S. officialsWith regard to Georgia’s 2020 parliamentary elections, U.S. officials generally shared the assessment of the shared the assessment of the
international observation mission that the elections “were competitive and, international observation mission that the elections “were competitive and, overal overall, fundamental , fundamental
freedoms were respected.” However, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia expressed concern about freedoms were respected.” However, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia expressed concern about
irregularities and allegations of abuse that “while not sufficient to invalidate the results, continue irregularities and allegations of abuse that “while not sufficient to invalidate the results, continue
to mar to mar Georgia’s electoral process and are unacceptable.”99 The State Department welcomed Georgia’s April 2021 interparty political agreement and, in July 2021, cautioned that “failure to [implement the agreement] would further undermine the Georgian public’s and international community’s confidence in Georgia’s judiciary and risk undermining Georgia’s democratic development. [It] could also weaken investor confidence and diminish the resilience of Georgia’s political and social institutions.”100 U.S. officials have called further 94 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission,” n.d. 95 As noted in a proposed concurrent resolution introduced in September 2008 (H.Con.Res. 430), the Stimson Doctrine Georgia’s electoral process and are unacceptable.”84
In February 2021, the U.S. Department of State said the United States was “deeply troubled” by
the arrest of UNM chairman Melia and cal ed on the Georgian government to ensure “its judicial
and prosecutorial system is free of political bias.”85 In April 2021, the State Department
welcomed Georgia’s interparty political agreement and stated that the United States was

is named for Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who “declared in 1932 that the United States wouldis named for Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who “declared in 1932 that the United States would not recognize not recognize
territorial changes effected by force followingterritorial changes effected by force following th e the seizure of Manchuria by Japan.” seizure of Manchuria by Japan.”
79 U.S. Department of State, “ Military Buildup in the Russian-occupied Georgian Region of South Ossetia,” August 30,
2019;96 See, for example, U.S. Embassy U.S. Embassy of Georgia,of Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Shooting/Detention Along South Ossetia Administrative “U.S. Embassy Statement on Shooting/Detention Along South Ossetia Administrative
Boundary Line,” JulyBoundary Line,” July 12, 2020;12, 2020; and U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “ Statement on the 51st Round of the Geneva
International Discussions (Conflict in Georgia),” December 17, 2020.
80 U.S. Department of State, “United States Welcomes Georgia Peace Initiative,” April 4, 2018.
81 White House, “ Remarks by the Vice President and Georgian Prime Minister in a Joint Press Conference,” August 1,
2017.
82 U.S. Department of State, “The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia,”
February 20, 2020.
83 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on September 1, 2020 Cyberattack Against Georgian Ministry
of Health,” September 3, 2020.
84 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections,” November 1, 2020.
85 U.S. Department of State, “Political Developments in Georgia,” February 18, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Anniversary of the Russian Invasion of Georgia,” August 7, 2022; and U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “The 57th Geneva International Discussions on the Conflict in Georgia,” April 20, 2023. 97 White House, “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with President Salome Zourabichvili of Georgia,” March 10, 2023. 98 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Ambassador Degnan’s Remarks at CDC Graduation,” May 11, 2023; and U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” May 11, 2023. 99 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections,” November 1, 2020. 100 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” April 20, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “Recent Judicial Appointments in Georgia,” July 15 U.S. Department of State,
“Arrest of Opposition Members in Georgia,” February 23, 2021; and U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy
Statement,” February 23, 2021. , 2021.
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“committed to assisting the Georgian parliament to ensure this agreement achieves its
aspirations.”86
Congressional Action
Members of the 117th Congress and previous Congresses have expressed support for Georgia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since FY2017, foreign operations appropriations prohibit
foreign assistance to governments that recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia
and restrict funds from supporting Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (P.L. 116-
260, §7047(c)).87 The 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act (P.L. 113-272) provides for sanctions
against Russian entities that transfer weapons il egal y to the territory of Georgia and other states.
In the 117th Congress, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923) was introduced on February 8, 2021.
The House passed similar bil s (H.R. 6219, H.R. 598) during the 115th and 116th Congresses. The
Georgia Support Act cal s for enhanced U.S. assistance to Georgia and would require the
Secretary of State to submit to Congress reports on U.S. security assistance to Georgia, U.S. -
Georgia cybersecurity cooperation, and a strategy to enhance Georgia’s capabilities to combat
Russian disinformation and propaganda. If enacted, it also would require the President to impose
sanctions on those responsible for serious human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Members of the 117th Congress and previous Congresses also have expressed views on domestic
developments in Georgia, including the state of its democracy.88attention to perceived shortcomings in Georgia’s judicial reforms. In addition, they have sought to counter domestic disinformation regarding U.S. and European policy toward Georgia.101 In 2021, the U.S. Department of State issued statements regarding the arrests of opposition UNM chairman Melia and former President Saakashvili. The State Department said the United States was “deeply troubled” by Melia’s arrest and called on the Georgian government to ensure “its judicial and prosecutorial system is free of political bias.” With respect to Saakashvili, the State Department “urged the Government of Georgia to treat Mr. Saakashvili fairly and with dignity, as well as to heed the Public Defender’s recommendations about appropriate treatment.”102 In March 2023, the State Department expressed concern “about the potential implications of [Georgia’s proposed foreign agent] law for freedom of speech and democracy in Georgia” and stated that it “encouraged Georgia’s political leaders to work together in earnest on the reforms urgently needed to obtain the EU candidate status that Georgia’s citizens overwhelmingly desire.”103 In April 2023, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa bans on four Georgian judges for corruption and underlined the significance to Georgia of continued judicial and rule of law reforms.104 Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilia Darchiashvili called the decision “completely incomprehensible and unacceptable.”105 Congressional Action Since FY2017, foreign operations appropriations have prohibited foreign assistance to governments that recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and restricted funds from supporting Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (most recently, in P.L. 117-328, §7047(c)).106 The 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act (P.L. 113-272) provides for sanctions against Russian entities that transfer weapons illegally to the territory of Georgia and other states. Some Members of the 118th Congress and previous Congresses have expressed support for Georgia’s democracy and governance reforms and the deepening of its ties with Europe and the United States. The FY2021 Consolidated The FY2021 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260, §7046) Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260, §7046) requiresrequired the Secretary of State to submit a report on the Secretary of State to submit a report on
actions taken by the Georgian government since January 1, 2020, to “(1) strengthen democratic actions taken by the Georgian government since January 1, 2020, to “(1) strengthen democratic
institutions, including through recent elections; (2) combat corruption; and (3) ensure that rule of institutions, including through recent elections; (2) combat corruption; and (3) ensure that rule of
law in the private-sector and the foreign investment climate law in the private-sector and the foreign investment climate meet international standards.”107 The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated 101 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Ambassador Degnan’s Remarks to Media at UN Women Meeting on Enhancing Access to Justice for Sexual Violence Victims,” December 2, 2021; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Ambassador Degnan’s Remarks to Media at USAID’s Digital Day in the Life,” July 8, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” July 20, 2022. 102 U.S. Department of State, “Arrest of Opposition Members in Georgia,” February 23, 2021; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement,” February 23, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “Treatment of Former President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili,” November 18, 2021. 103 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” March 2, 2023, and March 9, 2023. 104 U.S. Department of State, “Public Designations of Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Shengelia, and Valerian Tsertsvadze, Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption,” April 5, 2023; and U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Fact Sheet: 7031C Designations of Georgian Officials,” April 5, 2023. 105 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, “The Letter of Ilia Darchiashvili to the U.S. Secretary of State,” April 6, 2023. Also see Joshua Kucera, “Georgia-U.S. Relations Under Strain After Judicial Sanctions,” Eurasianet, April 14, 2023. 106 In addition to Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. 107 Explanatory Statement regarding H.R. 133 (P.L. 116-260), Congressional Record, December 21, 2020, p. H8794. Congressional Research Service 20 Georgia: Background meet international standards.”89 On
April 22, 2021, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced S.Res. 176, cal ing for Georgia’s
political parties to implement the April 2021 political agreement and for the Georgian
government to institute systemic reforms.
The Senate and the House have passed several resolutions in support of Georgia’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity: in 2016 (H.Res. 660), in 2011-2012 (S.Res. 175, H.Res. 526), in
September 2008 (S.Res. 690), and, before the conflict that year, in May-June 2008 (H.Res. 1166,
S.Res. 550) and December 2007 (S.Res. 391).

86 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” April 20, 2021.
87 Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria have joined Russia in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states. In 2014, T uvalu retracted its earlier recognition of these regions’ independence. Vanuatu, which
recognized the independence of Abkhazia but not South Ossetia, appears to have changed its policy over time.
88 A list of congressional letters sent to Georgian leadership from November 2019 to February 2020 is available at Civil
Georgia, “U.S. Congressman Weber Concerned Over Georgia’s ‘Backsliding from Democratic Values,’” February 12,
2020. For responses to the arrest of UNM chairman Nika Melia, see U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “ House
Foreign Affairs Committee and Georgia Caucus Call for Deescalation of Political Situation in Republic of Georgia,”
February 23, 2021; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Risch, Shaheen, Kinzinger, Connolly on
Developments in Georgian Political Crisis,” February 23, 2021; U.S. Helsinki Commission, “Helsinki Commission
Leaders Slam Detention of Georgian Opposition Leader Nika Melia,” February 23, 2021; and U.S. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, “Chairman Menendez and European Allies on Political Situation in Georgia,” February 26, 2021.
89 Explanatory Statement regarding H.R. 133 (P.L. 116-260), Congressional Record, December 21, 2020, p. H8794.
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Foreign Aid
Since independence, Georgia has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in
Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government al ocated more than
$860 mil ion in total aid to Georgia ($96 mil ion a year, on average).90
In the 2000s, Georgia became the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia.
From FY2001 to FY2007, foreign aid al ocations to Georgia totaled more than $945 mil ion
($135 mil ion a year, on average).91 In 2005, Georgia also was awarded an initial five-year (2006-
2011) $295 mil ion grant from the U.S. Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) for road,
pipeline, and municipal infrastructure rehabilitation, as wel as for agribusiness development.92
After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the United States substantial y increased its assistance to
Georgia. The U.S. government immediately provided over $38 mil ion in humanitarian aid and
emergency relief, using U.S. aircraft and naval and coast guard ships.93 In September 2008, then-
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a total aid package worth at least $1 bil ion.94
Total U.S. assistance al ocated to Georgia for FY2008-FY2009 totaled $1.04 bil ion, including
$634 mil ion in supplemental funds.95 Georgia also received another $100 mil ion in MCC
funds.96
After the 2008 war, Georgia continued to be a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the Europe
and Eurasia region. From FY2010 to FY2016, State Department and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) bilateral aid al ocations to Georgia amounted to $77 mil ion
a year on average (including Foreign Military Financing, or FMF). Georgia also received a
second five-year (2014-2019) MCC grant of $140 mil ion to support educational infrastructure
and training, and to improve the study of science and technology.97
Since FY2017, bilateral State Department and USAID assistance to Georgia has increased to
$123 mil ion a year on average ($131 mil ion in FY2020, including $40 mil ion in FMF).98 For
FY2021, Congress appropriated $132 mil ion in bilateral aid to Georgia, including $35 mil ion in
FMF.99 For FY2022, the State Department/USAID budget request includes $120.6 mil ion in
bilateral aid to Georgia.

90 Foreign aid totals from FY1992 to FY2000 include all agencies and accounts. Over 40% of this total was for
humanitarian food assistance. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Governm ent Assistance to and Cooperative Activities
with the New Independent States of the Form er Soviet Union, FY2000 Annual Report (Appendix).
91 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s U.S. Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2001 to FY2007.
92 U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), “Georgia Compact.”
93 T estimony of Daniel Fried, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Georgia and Implications for
U.S. Policy, hearings, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., September 9, 2008.
94 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on U.S. Economic Support Package for Georgia,” September 3, 2008.
95 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s U.S. Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2008 and FY2009. Also see and U.S. Policy Appropriations Act, 2023, directed the Secretary of State to submit an updated version of this report to the Committees on Appropriations.108 In 2023, some Members of Congress issued statements and letters calling on the Georgian government to reconsider its proposed foreign agent legislation and to avoid political prosecutions.109 In April 2023, the co-chairs of the Congressional Georgia Caucus said that they supported the U.S. decision to issue visa bans on judicial officials and “continue to advocate for a strong U.S.-Georgia partnership and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations based on democratic institutions, the rule of law, accountability for those who engage in corruption, and an independent and impartial judiciary.”110 In the 117th Congress, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923) passed the House on April 27, 2022, by a vote of 406-20. The House passed similar bills (H.R. 6219, H.R. 598) during the 115th and 116th Congresses. The Georgia Support Act would have called for enhanced U.S. assistance to Georgia and required the President to impose sanctions on those responsible for serious human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In previous Congresses, the Senate and the House have passed resolutions in support of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity: in 2016 (H.Res. 660, 114th Congress); in 2011-2012 (S.Res. 175 and H.Res. 526, 112th Congress); in September 2008 (S.Res. 690, 110th Congress); and, before the 2008 war, in May-June 2008 (H.Res. 1166 and S.Res. 550, 110th Congress) and December 2007 (S.Res. 391, 110th Congress). Foreign and Security Assistance Georgia has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and security assistance in Europe and Eurasia: obligated assistance from FY1992 through FY2020 totaled more than $4.44 billion (unadjusted for inflation).111 Of this amount, about $1 billion in assistance was committed in FY2008-FY2009 after Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia.112 U.S. assistance to Georgia has included two five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compacts totaling $535 million (2006-2011, 2014-2019).113 Since FY2018, Georgia is one of two countries in Europe and Eurasia for which Congress has specified that funds be made available for assistance (the other country is Ukraine).114 For FY2021 and FY2022, planned State Department and USAID assistance for Georgia totaled, respectively, $137 million and $153 million in regular and supplemental funding (including $35 million a year in Foreign Military Financing, or FMF). FY2023 appropriations include not less 108 Explanatory Statement regarding H.R. 2617 (P.L. 117-328), Congressional Record, December 20, 2022, p. S9300. 109 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Shaheen, Risch, Durbin & Ricketts Release Joint Statement on Georgian Parliament’s ‘Foreign Influence’ Legislation,” March 9, 2023; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, “Helsinki Commission Sends Appeal to Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili,” April 28, 2023. 110 Congressman Gerry Connolly, “Georgia Caucus Co-Chairs Issue Statement on New Visa Restrictions on Georgian Officials,” April 6, 2023. 111 Data available at ForeignAssistance.gov. 112 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on U.S. Economic Support Package for Georgia,” September 3, 2008; and testimony of S. Ken Yamashita, in U.S. testimony of S. Ken Yamashita, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Georgia: One Year After the August War,, hearings, 111th Congress, hearings, 111th Congress,
1st sess.,1st sess., August 4, 2009.
96 MCC, “Georgia Compact.”
97 MCC, “Georgia Compact II.”
98 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020.
99 Explanatory Statement regarding H.R. 133 (P.L. 116-260), Congressional Record, December 21, 2020, p. H8794.
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Separate nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance administered by the Department of
Defense has totaled more than $266 mil ion in obligated funds since FY2011.100 Such assistance
has supported the establishment of the Lugar Center for Public Health Research. The Lugar
Center is a government laboratory that houses the Georgian National Center for Disease Control
and Public Health, as wel as the U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate-Georgia, an “overseas
infectious disease laboratory of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.”101
Military Aid
The provision of U.S. military aid to Georgia predates Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the
late 1990s, the United States began to provide Georgia with increased aid to improve border and
maritime security and to combat transnational crime, including through the development of
Georgia’s Coast Guard.102 U.S. military aid increased after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. The George W. Bush Administration considered Georgia part of a “second stage” in the
“war on terror,” together with Yemen and the Philippines, and supported Georgia with a two-year
Train and Equip Program.103 This program was fol owed by a Sustainment and Stability
Operations Program through 2007 that supported a Georgian troop deployment to Iraq in
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Since FY2010, Georgia has received U.S. military aid through FMF and International Military
Education and Training (IMET), as wel as the Department of Defense’s Section 333 (Building
Partner Capacity) account and other train-and-equip programs. The Georgia Defense Readiness
Program, a three-year initiative scheduled to conclude in 2021, has sought to “[enhance]
Georgia’s interoperability and [strengthen its] territorial defense capabilities.”104 FMF assistance
is provided on a bilateral basis, as wel as through the Europe and Eurasia Regional account and
the Countering Russian Influence Fund. In 2017, the Department of Defense notified Congress of
a Foreign Military Sale to Georgia of over 400 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as wel as
launchers, associated equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $75 mil ion.105 U.S.
military assistance totaling more than $200 mil ion also has supported Georgia’s deployments to
Afghanistan in ISAF and the follow-on Resolute Support Mission.106
In 2016, the United States and Georgia concluded a three-year framework agreement on security
cooperation focusing on “improving Georgia’s defense capabilities, establishing [an] effective

100 Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Cooperative T hreat Reduction
(CT R) account, as reported by USAID. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/. On the Lugar
Center support, see U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Lugar Center Supports Georgian NCDC on COVID-19 Response,”
April 9, 2020.
101 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Lugar Center Supports Georgian NCDC on COVID-19 Response,” April 9, 2020.
102 In total, the United States provided about $166 million for the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
program, which existed from FY1998 to FY2011. Another $34 million in border security assistance was provided to
Georgia through the Export and Border Security program. International Business and T echnical Consultants, Maritim e
Security Special Them atic Report, Georgia Monitoring Project, submitted to U.S. Department of State, April 2012, p. 3.
103 In March 2002, President George W. Bush said: “Now that the T aliban are gone and al Qaeda has lost its home base
for terrorism [in Afghanistan], we have entered the second stage of the war on terror —a sustained campaign to deny
sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world.” White House, “President Bush
T hanks the World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” March 11, 2002.
104 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Joint Statement of U.S. Army Europe and Africa and the Georgian Ministry of Defense,”
March 17, 2021.
105 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Georgia—Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” T ransmittal No.
17-59, November 20, 2017; and Civil Georgia, “ Javelin Missiles Arrive in Georgia,” January 23, 2018.
106 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020.
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and sustainable system of defense, enhancing interoperability of the Georgian Armed Forces with
NATO, and ensuring effective military management.”107 In 2019, the United States and Georgia
signed a new three-year Security Cooperation Framework “that reaffirmed the importance of the
U.S.-Georgia strategic relationship and prioritized bilateral security cooperation focused on
Georgian defense readiness and interoperability.”108
The United States and Georgia have held regular joint military exercises in Georgia since 2011.
Initial exercises, dubbed Agile Spirit, began as a counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations
training exercise and shifted to a “conventional warfare focus” in 2015, the year after Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine.109 That year, Agile Spirit began to include other NATO partners. A second
bilateral exercise, Noble Partner, was launched in 2015 and designed “to enhance regional
partnerships and increase U.S. force readiness and interoperability in a realistic, multinational
training environment.”110
Trade
In 2020, the United States was Georgia’s 4th-largest source of merchandise imports and 10th-
August 4, 2009. 113 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provides assistance on a competitive basis to countries “committed to good governance, economic freedom and investing in their citizens.” See the MCC website, at https://www.mcc.gov/; and CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown. 114 See, most recently, P.L. 117-328, §7046(a)(1). Congressional Research Service 21 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy than $132 million in assistance for Georgia. For FY2024, the State Department/USAID budget request includes $121 million in assistance for Georgia (including $25 million in FMF).115 Georgia receives security assistance through FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET), as well as the Department of Defense’s Section 333 (Building Partner Capacity) account. From FY2015 to FY2022, Georgia received about $300 million in FMF assistance “to purchase U.S.-manufactured defense articles, training, and services in support of its national defense needs.”116 Since 2018, the Department of Defense (DOD) has provided assistance to the Georgian armed forces through a Georgia Defense Readiness Program and a follow-on Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative, as well as support for special operation forces, Black Sea maritime domain awareness, and other needs.117 The United States has twice provided Javelin portable anti-tank missile systems to Georgia, in 2017 and in 2021.118 Georgia has received separate nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance administered by DOD.119 Such assistance has supported the establishment of the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research. The Lugar Center is “a state of the art biosafety level 3 research facility constructed by [DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency] and handed over to the Georgian National Center for Disease Control for operation and ownership in 2013.” The Lugar Center also houses the U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate-Georgia.120 The United States and Georgia have held regular joint military exercises in Georgia since 2011. Initial exercises, dubbed Agile Spirit, began as a counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations training exercise and shifted to a “conventional warfare focus” in 2015, the year after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine.121 That year, Agile Spirit began to include other NATO partners. A second bilateral exercise, Noble Partner, was launched in 2015 and designed “to enhance regional partnerships and increase U.S. force readiness and interoperability in a realistic, multinational training environment.”122 Georgia’s armed forces are partnered with the Georgia National Guard through DOD’s State Partnership Program, administered by the National Guard Bureau. 115 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS), Congressional Budget Justifications for Fiscal Year 2023 and 2024. 116 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020; and annual SFOPS budget justifications. 117 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020; and U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative,” October 18, 2021. 118 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Georgia—Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” Transmittal No. 17-59, November 20, 2017; and DSCA, “Georgia—Javelin Missiles,” Transmittal No. 21-48, August 3, 2021. 119 Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) account, as reported by ForeignAssistance.gov. 120 U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate-Georgia is part of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research laboratory network and “build[s] research collaborations and infectious disease surveillance partnerships within the Balkans, the Baltics and across the European area of responsibility to support U.S. Department of Defense priorities in infectious disease and vector surveillance.” U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency”; and USARMD-G, “Medical Research and Development Command.” 121 U.S. Marine Corps, “Exercise Agile Spirit Ends with Bang,” July 27, 2015. 122 U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Exercise Announcement for Noble Partner,” August 25, 2022. Congressional Research Service 22 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy The provision of U.S. security assistance to Georgia predates Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the late 1990s, the United States began to provide Georgia with increased aid to improve border and maritime security and to combat transnational crime, including through the development of Georgia’s Coast Guard.123 U.S. security assistance increased after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The George W. Bush Administration considered Georgia part of a “second stage” in the “war on terror,” together with Yemen and the Philippines, and supported Georgia with a two-year Train and Equip Program (the Administration said that Al Qaeda-linked fighters had entered Georgia via the neighboring Russian republic of Chechnya).124 This program was followed by a Sustainment and Stability Operations Program through 2007 that supported a Georgian troop deployment to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. military assistance totaling more than $200 million also supported Georgia’s deployments to Afghanistan in ISAF and the follow-on Resolute Support Mission.125 Trade In 2022, the United States was Georgia’s fourth-largest source of merchandise imports and seventh-largest destination for exports. The value of Georgia’s merchandise imports from the United largest destination for exports. The value of Georgia’s merchandise imports from the United
States—mainly States—mainly motor vehicles—was $664 million in 2022vehicles—was $537 mil ion in 2020 (up from $389 mil ion in 2019). The value of . The value of
merchandise exports to the United States—mainly iron and steel—was $merchandise exports to the United States—mainly iron and steel—was $80 mil ion in 2020
(down from $132 mil ion in 2019).111
Since 2012, the United States and Georgia periodical y265 million in 2022.126 U.S. and Georgian officials periodically have discussed the possibility of a free- have discussed the possibility of a free-
trade agreement. The Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923), if enacted, would express the sense of
Congress that “the United States Trade Representative should make progress toward negotiations
with Georgia” on a free trade agreement. trade agreement. The United States and Georgia have signed a bilateral The United States and Georgia have signed a bilateral
investment treaty and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. They also have established investment treaty and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. They also have established
a High-Level Dialogue on Trade a High-Level Dialogue on Trade and Investment. Author Information Cory Welt Specialist in Russian and European Affairs 123 For more, see International Business and Technical Consultants, Maritime Security Special Thematic Report, Georgia Monitoring Project, submitted to U.S. Department of State, April 2012. 124 In March 2002, President George W. Bush said: “Now that the Taliban are gone and al Qaeda has lost its home base for terrorism [in Afghanistan], we have entered the second stage of the war on terror—a sustained campaign to deny sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world.” White House, “President Bush Thanks the World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” March 11, 2002. 125 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020. 126 Trade data from Geostat, as reported in Trade Data Monitor. Congressional Research Service 23 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy and Investment.
U.S. officials expressed support for Georgia’s deepwater port project in Anaklia prior to the
Georgian government’s cancel ation of the project contract in 2020. Then-Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic and Business Affairs Manisha Singh said the port would “grow Georgia’s
economy, make Georgia an even stronger trading partner to the United States, and provide greater
connectivity between Europe and the entire Caspian region.”112 Then-Secretary Pompeo said the
port would “enhance Georgia’s relationship with free economies and prevent Georgia from
fal ing prey to Russian or Chinese economic influence.”113

107 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, “ Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Security Sector Concluded Between the
U.S. and Georgia,” December 7, 2016.
108 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Georgia Security Working Group,” December 6, 2019.
109 U.S. Marine Corps, “Exercise Agile Spirit Ends with Bang,” July 27, 2015.
110 U.S. Army, “Exercise Noble Partner 2015 Demonstrates Bilateral Cooperation,” May 1, 2015; U.S. Army Europe,
“Exercise Noble Partner 2020 Begins,” August 26, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing on Exercise Noble
Partner 2020,” September 15, 2020.
111 T rade data from Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monit or.
112 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Fourth Annual T rans-Caspian Forum,” May 23, 2019.
113 U.S. Department of State, “ Statements to the Press with Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze as Part of the
U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission,” June 11, 2019.
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Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy


Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs



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