Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Changes from June 1, 2021 to June 21, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance
June June 121, 2021 , 2021
with International Obligations
Paul K. Kerr
Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran Specialist in Specialist in
to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)
Nonproliferation Nonproliferation
investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend

its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional

Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the
resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with
additional information about, additional information about, ~~its~~the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, al all of the previous of the previous
resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing
~~Iran’s nuclear program.~~
~~Iran and the IAEA~~ Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s
nuclear program. The IAEA had nuclear program. The IAEA had ~~essential y~~essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency ~~stil~~
still had questions concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015, had questions concerning “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” A December 2, 2015,
report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s
“final assessment on the resolution” of the outstanding issues. A June 2020 IAEA Board of Governors resolution “final assessment on the resolution” of the outstanding issues. A June 2020 IAEA Board of Governors resolution
~~cal s~~calls on Iran to satisfy on Iran to satisfy ~~the agency’s~~more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. This requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. This
resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken
by the IAEAby the IAEA board and the Security Council. It board and the Security Council. It ~~wil~~ will be updated as events warrant. be updated as events warrant.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Introduction
Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires
nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency nonnuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in
1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating 1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating ~~al egations~~allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine that Iran had conducted clandestine
nuclear activities; the IAEAnuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of
Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the Governors reported the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the
council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to ~~al eviate~~alleviate international concerns international concerns
about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and
describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.
For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint , by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report
R43333, R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement~~, by Kenneth Katzman and~~ and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. .
Background
Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear
weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main
source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride
gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can
produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and
highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear
weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a
uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several compounds, uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium ore concentrate into several compounds,
including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and
future power reactors. future power reactors.
Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern. Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern.
Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the
production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel
would have contained plutonium would have contained plutonium ~~wel~~ well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in -suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in
nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure ~~cal ed~~called
“reprocessing.” Iran has said that it “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it ~~wil~~ will not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France, Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”), Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the “P5+1”),
Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to ~~fulfil~~ fulfill a a
JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the
P5+1 so that it P5+1 so that it ~~wil~~ will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to
export the spent fuel from this reactor and export the spent fuel from this reactor and al all other nuclear reactors.other nuclear reactors.

~~1 T he NPT~~ 1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. ~~T hese~~These states are China, France, Russia, states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom, and
the United States. the United States.
2 INFCIRC/214. 2 INFCIRC/214.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
1 1

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Iran and the IAEA Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions
regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Most of these questions, which had contributed to regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Most of these questions, which had contributed to
suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program, were subsequently resolved. suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program, were subsequently resolved.
Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei,Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEAhowever, told the IAEA board June 2, 2008, board June 2, 2008,
that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions regarding that there was “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions regarding
“possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”4 The IAEA agency did not make any “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”4 The IAEA agency did not make any
substantive progress on these matters for some time. substantive progress on these matters for some time.
Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns
and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.5 Iran also expressed concern to and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.5 Iran also expressed concern to
the IAEAthe IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access to
sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The
IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its ~~wil ingness~~willingness to discuss to discuss
with Iran with Iran
modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in
thethe ~~documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting~~ documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive sensitive
information related to its conventional military activities.6 information related to its conventional military activities.6
Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested
information.7information.7
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is
essential” for Iran and the IAEAessential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of al
all outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012 outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012
and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a “structured approach to the clarification of al
all outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”8 However, during an October 2013 outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”8 However, during an October 2013
meeting, IAEAmeeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to
resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013,
describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA describing a “Framework for Cooperation.” According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA
agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of al all outstanding issues that have not outstanding issues that have not
already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information already been resolved by the IAEA.” Iran subsequently provided the agency with information
about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to
the IAEAthe IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additionalby August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including issues, including ~~al eged~~alleged Iranian research on Iranian research on
high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport high explosives and “studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport

~~3 T he~~ 3 The text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf. text is available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
4 4 Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei,, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008. June 2, 2008.
5 See,5 See, for example, for example, Communication Dated 7 January 2016 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the ~~Fin al Assessm ent~~Final Assessment on Past and
Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016. , INFCIRC/893, January 8, 2016.
6 6 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008. GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008.
7 See,7 See, for example, for example, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012., Report by the Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012.
8 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations 8 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations
with with ~~T ehran~~Tehran, and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues , and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues
is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme.”programme.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2 2

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

and associated and associated ~~model ing~~modelling and calculations and their and calculations and their ~~al eged~~alleged application to compressed materials.” application to compressed materials.”
Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.9Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.9
Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran was to “complete” a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran was to “complete” a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA
“Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.” According to then-IAEA
Director General Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013, Director General Yukiya Amano, this road map set out “a process” under a November 24, 2013,
Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1, “to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of
Iran, to make an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear Iran, to make an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme.”10 According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of programme.”10 According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of
Governors, “[a]Governors, “[a]l ll the activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with
the agreed schedule.”11 The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the the agreed schedule.”11 The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the
agency’s “final assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues. agency’s “final assessment on the resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues.
In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran’s cooperation In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran’s cooperation
with the road map and “further notes that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the with the road map and “further notes that this closes the Board’s consideration” of the
“outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”12 Since the IAEA has verified that Iran “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”12 Since the IAEA has verified that Iran
has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused
on Iran’s compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran’s on Iran’s compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran’s
safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA
implementationimplementation “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the “in light of” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the
Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General “to
undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the
full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.”
The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to
the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the the board regarding Iran’s “implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the
full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of full duration of those commitments.” The Director General is also to report to the Board of
Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds Governors and the Security Council “at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds
to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or to believe there is an issue of concern” regarding Tehran’s compliance with its JCPOA or
safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting
provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency’s Director General
to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel appropriate, in parallel
to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and
also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at
anyany ~~time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue~~ time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of of
concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments. concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments.
Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s
investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its
construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its
IAEAIAEA safeguards agreement.13 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. safeguards agreement.13 Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.
Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, contains these requirements and also Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, contains these requirements and also

9 9 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015., Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015.
10 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS10 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action and the JCPOA, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Report R43333, Iran Nuclear
Agreement and U.S.Agreement and U.S. ~~Exit~~ Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman . .
11 11 Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme , GOV/2015/68, , GOV/2015/68,
December 2, 2015. December 2, 2015.
12 12 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Implementation and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran
in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015. , GOV/2015/72, December 15, 2015.
13 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water. 13 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
3 3

link to page link to page 1213 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles capable of delivering missiles capable of delivering
nuclear weapons.” Iran has also continued its extensive nuclear weapons.” Iran has also continued its extensive ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile program. Resolution missile program. Resolution
1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements. 1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements.
(See (See “Potential Noncompliance After September 2005.”) Iran did not take any of these steps prior ”) Iran did not take any of these steps prior
to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some aspects of its nuclear program since the to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some aspects of its nuclear program since the
government began implementing the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to government began implementing the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to
the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some
information to the agency required by the modified Code 3.1. information to the agency required by the modified Code 3.1.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran ~~has implemented~~applied additional restrictions on its uranium additional restrictions on its uranium
enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program, as enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program, as ~~wel as begun~~well as began implementing its implementing its
additional protocol and the modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took additional protocol and the modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took
place on January 16, 2016, place on January 16, 2016, al all of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were of the previous Security Council resolutions’ requirements were
terminated pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, whichterminated pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which, along with the NPT, along with the NPT,
composes the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.14 composes the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.14 ~~Although the~~The IAEA IAEA
reports findings of its inspection and monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint reports findings of its inspection and monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint
Commission monitors the parties’ implementation of the agreementCommission monitors the parties’ implementation of the agreement. However, compliance determinations , compliance determinations
are national decisions. Until July 2019, are national decisions. Until July 2019, al all official reports and statements from the United official reports and statements from the United
Nations, European Union, the IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that Nations, European Union, the IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments indicated that
Iran had Iran had ~~fulfil ed~~ fulfilled its JCPOA and related Resolution 2231 requirements.15 16 its JCPOA and related Resolution 2231 requirements.15 16
Beginning Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding
JCPOA-mandated limits; the government has since increased the number of such activities.17 JCPOA-mandated limits; the government has since increased the number of such activities.17

14 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” January 14 “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” January
16, 2016. 16, 2016.
15 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded 15 Iran’s stock of heavy water exceeded the JCPOA-requiredthe JCPOA-required limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1 limit of 130 metric tons on two occasions since the P5+1
beganbegan implementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue wasimplementing the agreement. “In both instances, this issue was resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts resolved after Iran shipped out sufficient amounts
of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 (of material to get back under the limit,” the State Department reported in April 2017 ( Adherence to and Compliance
with ~~Arm s~~Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and ~~Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments~~Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department ofDepartment of State, April State, April
2017). For more information, see CRS2017). For more information, see CRS Report R43333, Report R43333, Iran Nuclear ~~Agreem ent~~ ~~and CRS~~ Agreement and U.S. Exit and CRS Report RL34544, Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program : Status, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
16 According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and 16 According to a May 31, 2019, report from then-IAEA Director General Amano, Iran had conducted research and
development using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceededdevelopment using advanced centrifuges; the number of these centrifuges may have exceeded the number permitted by the number permitted by
the JCPOA (the JCPOA (Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in ~~Ligh t~~Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31, , Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2019/21, May 31,
2019; GOV/2019/32). In a June2019; GOV/2019/32). In a June 11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S.11, 2019, speech to the IAEA Board of Governors, U.S. ~~Ambassador Jackie Wolc ott~~ Ambassador Jackie Wolcott
stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued stated that this activity has violated the JCPOA. However, no JCPOA participating government appears to have issued
a similar publica similar public finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17 press conference that finding. Moreover, EU High Representative Mogherini stated during a June 17 press conference that
“Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the “Iran is still compliant” with the JCPOA (Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the
press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019). press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, June 17, 2019).
17 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based 17 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on the following sources:on the following sources: GOV/2019/32; GOV/2019/32; Verification and
Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report Report
by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8,by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/8, July 1, 2019; July 1, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in
Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9, , Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2019/9,
JulyJuly 8, 2019; 8, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019; Report by the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/55, November 11, 2019; Verification and
Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report , Report
by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019; by the Acting Director General, GOV/INF/2019/17, November 18, 2019; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) ~~, Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020;~~ ~~Verification and Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations~~
~~Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020;~~ ~~Verification~~
~~and Monitoring in the Islam ic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (201 5)~~,
, Report by the Director General, Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
4 4

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of According to IAEA reports, Iran’s number of ~~instal ed~~installed centrifuges, LEU stockpile, enriched centrifuges, LEU stockpile, enriched
uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceed JCPOA-mandated
limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D) activities, limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development (R&D) activities,
~~as wel~~ as well as centrifuge manufacturing.18 as centrifuge manufacturing.18
In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as In a May 8, 2019, speech, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani cited JCPOA Paragraph 26 as
grounds for reducing the government’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to grounds for reducing the government’s performance of some Iranian commitments pursuant to
the agreement. 19According to that paragraph, the agreement. 19According to that paragraph,
Iran Iran ~~has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the~~ has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions sanctions
specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part. to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known However, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known
as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and as the “E3,” stated on January 14, 2020, that “Iran is not meeting its [JCPOA] commitments” and
announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the agreement’s dispute
resolution mechanism.20 The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for resolution mechanism.20 The E3 sent a letter on January 14, 2020, to EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep ~~Borrel~~ Borrell, who oversees the mechanism’s process.21 It , who oversees the mechanism’s process.21 It
does not appear that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With regard to does not appear that any government has taken action under the mechanism. With regard to
Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that those Iranian compliance issues, the E3 explained in a November 19, 2020, statement that those
governments “remain committed to working with governments “remain committed to working with al all JCPOA participants to find a diplomatic way JCPOA participants to find a diplomatic way
forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the JCPOA. The E3 forward … we intend to pursue these discussions within the framework” of the JCPOA. The E3
did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.22 did not explicitly mention the dispute resolution mechanism.22
The The E3 November 2020 statement explains that statement explains that ~~the E3~~those governments “do not accept the argument that Iran is entitled to reduce “do not accept the argument that Iran is entitled to reduce
compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never triggered” the agreement’s dispute compliance” with the JCPOA, and adds that “Iran has never triggered” the agreement’s dispute
resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease implementing the provisions of the resolution mechanism “and has no legal grounds to cease implementing the provisions of the
agreement.”23 Nevertheless, according to the U.S. government, “under the terms of the JCPOA, agreement.”23 Nevertheless, according to the U.S. government, “under the terms of the JCPOA,
Iran may cease performing commitments in whole or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of Iran may cease performing commitments in whole or in part following the U.S. re-imposition of
sanctions.”24sanctions.”24
A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA has A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA has
continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA, continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA,
~~which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.25 The agreement, as noted,~~
~~describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian sites, including military~~
~~sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the IAEA has concerns regarding~~

GOV/2020/5, March 3, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/26, June 5, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/41, September 4, 2020; Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic
Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; GOV/2020/51, November 11, 2020; ~~and~~ Verification and Monitoring in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February, Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/10, February 23, 202123, 2021.
~~18 See also “IAEA Chief Sounds~~ ; and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/28, May 31, 2021. 18 See also “IAEA Chief Sounds Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Alarm over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Financial Times, May 26, 2021. , May 26, 2021.
19 See19 See also also Communication Dated 29 January 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Agency, INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021. , INFCIRC/953, February 2, 2021.
20 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020. 20 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers,” January 14, 2020.
21 “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 21 “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020. of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,” January 14, 2020.
22 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020. 22 “E3 Statement on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors,” November 19, 2020.
23 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,”23 “Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,” January 14, 2020.January 14, 2020.
24 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January 24 Email from State Department official, July 17, 2019. A State Department official reiterated this position in a January
31, 2020, interview with a CRS31, 2020, interview with a CRS analyst. analyst.
~~25 GOV/2021/10.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
5 5

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities.25 Grossi’s May 2021 report, however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake the verification and monitoring activities concerning Section T since his February 2021 report.26 The JCPOA, as noted, describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, “if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with” the JCPOA. The undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with” the JCPOA. The
agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns. The IAEA has not agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify such concerns. The IAEA has not
reported whether it has requested JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military facilities, but the reported whether it has requested JCPOA-related access to any Iranian military facilities, but the
agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-source agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-source
information and receiving information and receiving ~~intel igence~~ intelligence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian
compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April 2018 State compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to an April 2018 State
Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and nonproliferation Department report regarding states’ compliance with arms control and nonproliferation
~~agreements,~~
~~[t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-~~
~~relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding~~
agreements, [t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,
Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained
in the JCPOA.in the JCPOA.2627
The June 2020 version of the same report states that “the IAEA continues to monitor and verify The June 2020 version of the same report states that “the IAEA continues to monitor and verify
Iran’s compliance with its obligations under its [comprehensive safeguards agreement], and the Iran’s compliance with its obligations under its [comprehensive safeguards agreement], and the
~~Additional~~ Additional Protocol as Protocol as ~~wel~~ well as Iran’s adherence to its JCPOA commitments.”as Iran’s adherence to its JCPOA commitments.”2728 According to According to
Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the level of Grossi’s November 2020 report, the IAEA had “not observed any change in the level of
cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the cooperation by Iran in relation to Agency verification and monitoring activities under the
JCPOA.”JCPOA.”28
29 However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, as of However, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, as of
February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures” February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA “voluntary transparency measures”
described above, including implementation of the Additionaldescribed above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.Protocol.2930 Nevertheless, on Nevertheless, on
February 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding … February 21, 2021, Iran and the IAEA “reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding …
~~whereby the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for~~
~~up to three months, as set out in a technical annex.”30 Grossi explained during a February 21,~~
~~2021, press conference that this arrangement “is not a replacement for what we used to have”~~
~~under the Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that al ows us to continue to give the~~
~~world assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”31~~

26 25 GOV/2021/10. 26 GOV/2021/28. 27 Department of State, April 2018. Department of State, April 2018. ~~T he~~The August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015, August 2019 version of the same report notes that the December 15, 2015,
IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues”IAEA Board of Governors resolution that closed the board’s “consideration” of the “outstanding issues” concerning the concerning the
possiblepossible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program,military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program,
does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any information that is new or inconsistent with its
previous assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weaponsprevious assessment of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program, or where it has concerns regarding program, or where it has concerns regarding
the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (the potential existence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. (Adherence to and ~~Com pliance~~
~~with Arm s~~Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and ~~Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments, 2019).~~
27Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 2019). 28 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and ~~Disarm ament~~Disarmament Agreements and
~~Com m itm ents~~Commitments, Department of State, June 2020. An April 2021 version of the report contains similar language , Department of State, June 2020. An April 2021 version of the report contains similar language
((Adherence to and ~~Com pliance with Arm s Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments~~,
~~Department of Stat e, April 2021).~~
~~28 GOV/2020/51.~~
~~29 GOV/2021/10. T he~~Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, April 2021). 29 GOV/2020/51. 30 GOV/2021/10. The letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code letter names the following measures: provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol; modified Code
3.1 of the subsidiary3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to Iran’s safeguardsarrangements to Iran’s safeguards agreement; IAEA useagreement; IAEA use of modern safeguardsof modern safeguards technologies in technologies in
Iran; the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium Iran; the long term in-country presence of IAEA inspectors; transparency measures concerning Iranian uranium
enrichment, uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access enrichment, uranium ore concentrate production, and centrifuge component manufacturing; unspecified IAEA access
“pursuant to provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified“pursuant to provisions of the JCPOA”; and unspecified monitoring and verification of monitoring and verification of ~~T ehran~~Tehran’s implementation of ’s implementation of
JCPOA-mandated “JCPOA-mandated “ ~~voluntary measures.”~~
~~30 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~31 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouT ube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021,~~
~~https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU.~~
voluntary measures.” Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
6 6

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

whereby the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to three months, as set out in a technical annex.”31 Grossi explained during a February 21, 2021, press conference that this arrangement “is not a replacement for what we used to have” under the Additional Protocol but “is a temporary solution that allows us to continue to give the world assurances of what is going on there in the hope that we can return to a fuller picture”32 Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without Iran agreed to continue implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreement “without
limitation.”limitation.”3233 Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN in
Vienna, stated on March 4 that Vienna, stated on March 4 that ~~Iran wil~~ Tehran will resume “full implementation of the Additionalresume “full implementation of the Additional Protocol” Protocol”
when the other JCPOA participants resume implementing their obligations pursuant to the when the other JCPOA participants resume implementing their obligations pursuant to the
agreement.agreement.3334 The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24 that the parties The IAEA and Iran announced on May 24 that the parties agreed to extend this arrangement to extend this arrangement
~~until June 24.34~~
~~Iran and the IAEA~~
~~As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement~~
~~with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are~~
~~designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to~~
~~nuclear weapons uses, as wel as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.35 Safeguards~~
~~include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although~~
~~comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of~~
~~undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such~~
~~agreements, are limited” according to the agency.36~~
~~As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as wel as~~
~~obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive~~
~~safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the~~
~~government.37 Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the~~
~~agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the~~
~~IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from~~
~~member states.38 Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the~~
~~agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.39~~
~~The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director~~
~~General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an al -~~
~~encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to~~

~~32 GOV/2021/10.~~
~~33 “Iranian Envoy Hails IAEA Members’ Vigilance to Prevent Escalating T ensions,” Fars News Agency, March 4,~~
~~2021.~~
~~34 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran, ” May 24, 2021; “Iran~~
~~Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 24, 2021; “Envoy~~
~~Confirms Iran Nuclear Chief's Letter to IAEA,” Islamic Republic News Agency, June 1, 2021.~~
~~35 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-~~
~~Glossary-2001-Edition.) Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153,~~
~~available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According to Amano’s May~~
~~2013 report, the IAEA Board of Governors “ has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992,” that this~~
~~model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non -diversion of nuclear material from~~
~~declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness).”~~
~~36 Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services~~
~~Series 21, May 2016.~~
37 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary.
~~38 Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol~~
~~(INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.~~
~~39 Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a~~
~~resolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N.~~
~~Security Council. Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
7

~~link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 22~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~make sure that al nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”40 Similarly, a February 2006~~
~~report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the~~
~~agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is~~
~~limited.”41 There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the~~
~~IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states~~
~~regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect~~
~~the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA Board is~~
~~required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (se~~e ~~Appendix~~
B)~~. Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the~~
until June 24.35 This latter agreement “is to enable the Agency to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge,” according to Grossi’s May report.36 The IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s implementation of the government’s JCPOA commitments has diminished since February 23; a European Union statement asserts that “Iran’s decision substantially restricts IAEA’s ability to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran remain for exclusively peaceful purposes.”37 Grossi’s report provides examples of lapses in Iranian cooperation.38 For instance, Tehran since February 23 has neither informed the IAEA about Iran’s inventory of heavy water nor allowed the agency to monitor Tehran’s heavy water production. The government has also withheld from the IAEA similar information and access concerning the government’s production and inventory of certain centrifuge components. In addition, Iran’s refusal to implement the government’s Additional Protocol obligations has deprived the IAEA of still more information concerning aspects of Tehran’s nuclear program, as well as access to certain nuclear-related facilities.39 Iran and the IAEA As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. Such agreements, which are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.40 Safeguards 31 GOV/2021/10. 32 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, 6:13, posted by Sputnik, February 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsDUXCQNVAU. 33 GOV/2021/10. 34 “Iranian Envoy Hails IAEA Members’ Vigilance to Prevent Escalating Tensions,” Fars News Agency, March 4, 2021. 35 “IAEA Director General Says Agreement Reached on Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” May 24, 2021; “Iran Extends Agreement with IAEA for One More Month,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 24, 2021; “Envoy Confirms Iran Nuclear Chief’s Letter to IAEA,” Islamic Republic News Agency, June 1, 2021. 36 GOV/2021/28. 37 “EU Statement on Agenda Item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” IAEA Board of Governors, June 7-11, 2021. 38 GOV/2021/28. 39 Ibid. 40 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-Glossary-2001-Edition.) Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According to Amano’s May 2013 report, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992,” that this model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 25 link to page 25 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such agreements, are limited” according to the agency.41 As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government.42 Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from member states.43 Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.44 The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then-Director General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an all-encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”45 Similarly, a February 2006 report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited.”46 There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA Board is required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (see Appendix B). Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the more likely the Board would be to approve such an inspection. more likely the Board would be to approve such an inspection.
The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the
National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information
during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built
nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware
of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.4247 Prior to the Prior to the
NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the
~~agency with al relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in~~
~~violation of its safeguards agreement.~~
~~In fal~~ declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness).” 41 Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Services Series 21, May 2016. 42 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. 43 Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. 44 Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a resolution in February 2006 that reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N. Security Council. Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA. 45 “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei. 46 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006. 47 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council, personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 23 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in violation of its safeguards agreement. In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the
NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the
matter in September 2003, the IAEA board matter in September 2003, the IAEA board ~~cal ed~~called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the
agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “~~unconditional y~~unconditionally sign, sign,
ratify and fully implement” an Additionalratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.Protocol.4348
In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with the E3 to suspend its enrichment
activities, sign and implement an Additionalactivities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and
comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation.4449 As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain
from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional from reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional
Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.4550
Ultimately, Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as the IAEA’s investigation, as ~~wel~~ well as information Iran provided after the October 2003 as information Iran provided after the October 2003
agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities,
some of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (sesome of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (see Appendix A). After October ). After October
2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in
November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.4651 However, Iran resumed uranium conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had been elected two months earlier. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77)52 ~~However, Iran resumed uranium~~

~~40 “T ackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005,~~
~~available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei.~~
~~41 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.~~
~~42 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council,~~
~~personal communication June 5, 2008; then -Director of Central Intelligence George J. T enet, “ DCI Remarks on Iraq’s~~
~~WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/~~
~~tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html.~~
~~43 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.~~
~~44 T he text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.~~
~~45 Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA.~~
~~46 T he text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
8

~~link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 16~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who~~
~~had been elected two months earlier.~~
~~On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77)47~~
that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
The board, however, did not report Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran The board, however, did not report Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran
additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran
 to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,  to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,
documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military
owned workshops, and research and development locations; owned workshops, and research and development locations;
 to reestablish full and sustained suspension of  to reestablish full and sustained suspension of al all enrichment-related activity; enrichment-related activity;
 to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;  to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;
 to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and Protocol; and
 to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.  to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.
No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September
2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the 2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the
IAEAIAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran.” nuclear material and activities in Iran.”
Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges
at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N. at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran’s case to the U.N.
48 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. 49 The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. 50 Iran has been implementing the protocol pursuant to the JCPOA. 51 The text of the agreement is available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/uk2005.pdf. 52 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 17 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Security Council.53~~Security Council.48~~ Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional
Protocol. (For details, see Protocol. (For details, see “Iran and the U.N. Security Council” below.) below.)
Potential Noncompliance After September 2005
Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told
the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its
IAEAIAEA safeguards agreement.safeguards agreement.4954 That provision ( That provision (~~cal ed~~called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed
in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as
soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken,
whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere whichever is earlier.” Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere
to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to
provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material into provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material into
~~it.50~~it.55
This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide
the IAEAthe IAEA with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had
refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at

~~47 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.~~
~~48 For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see~~ ~~“ Iran and the U.N.~~
~~Security Council.”~~
~~49 According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and~~
~~administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.”~~
~~50 During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s~~
~~Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “ merely a suggestion” by the IAEA~~
~~Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Tehran Times,~~
~~November 9, 2011.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
9

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Arak.51~~Arak.56 As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the
IAEAIAEA on February 12, 2014.on February 12, 2014.5257 Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design
information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the
agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22, agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22,
2009, letter, the IAEA2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information, requested Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information,
according to a November 2009 report.according to a November 2009 report.5358 Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had
“provided only limited“provided only limited design information with respect to” the reactor.design information with respect to” the reactor.5459 IAEA reports since 2012 IAEA reports since 2012
~~do not appear to address this issue.~~
~~Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before~~
~~September 2009 that it has been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, cal ed~~
~~the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government’s safeguards~~
~~obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May~~
~~2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction~~
~~decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s November 2015 report, has not yet provided al of~~
~~this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue.~~
~~Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to~~
~~provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards~~
~~obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary~~
~~arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the~~
~~agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those~~
~~arrangements.55 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 statement56 that~~
~~Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s~~
~~obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to~~
~~conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance~~
~~with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from~~
~~ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin~~
~~constructing the Fordow facility, as wel as to provide the relevant design information in a timely~~
~~fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s~~

~~51 T his~~do not appear to address this issue. 53 For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see “Iran and the U.N. Security Council.” 54 According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” 55 During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Tehran Times, November 9, 2011. 56 This lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the
designdesign of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to a May 22, 2013, report from of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to a May 22, 2013, report from
Amano (Amano (~~Im plem entation~~Implementation of the NPT Safeguards ~~Agreem ent~~Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in
the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013). A November 2013 report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013). A November 2013 report
from Amano explains that the IAEA “from Amano explains that the IAEA “ needs updated designneeds updated design information as early as possibleinformation as early as possible in order ... to ensure that in order ... to ensure that
all possibleall possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards measuresdiversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards measures and customized safeguardsand customized safeguards equipment equipment
are put in place.” (are put in place.” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013 .) Iran .) Iran
has concludedhas concluded “ “a safeguardsa safeguards approach for the reactor” (approach for the reactor” (Status of Iran’s Nuclear ~~Program m e~~Programme in Relation to the Joint
Plan of Action, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8,, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8, April 20, 2015). April 20, 2015).
52 57 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014. Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014.
5358 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008. GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008.
54 59 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010., Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010.
~~55 See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.~~
~~Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilater ally.”~~
~~56 “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
10

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. As noted, Iran notified the IAEA~~
~~on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.57~~
~~Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it decided to construct other new nuclear~~
Congressional Research Service 10 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before September 2009 that it has been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government’s safeguards obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May 2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s November 2015 report, has not yet provided all of this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue. Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those arrangements.60 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 statement61 that Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes noncompliance with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor. As noted, Iran notified the IAEA on February 15, 2021, that it would cease implementing modified Code 3.1.62 Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it decided to construct other new nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has made such facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has made such
decisions. For example, the IAEA has asked the government for information about Iranian decisions. For example, the IAEA has asked the government for information about Iranian
statements that the government is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is statements that the government is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is
designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for
four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors.
Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this
~~information to the agency.~~
information to the agency. According to a May 2021 report from Director General Grossi, “Iran has informed” the IAEA that Tehran “does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in the near future.”63 Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA Iran’s March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the also formed the
basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to ~~al ow~~allow agency inspectors to verify design agency inspectors to verify design
information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA “may send inspectors to
facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”; in fact, the agency has a
“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.“continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei.~~58 Moreover,~~
~~the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to al ow~~64 Moreover, 60 See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.” 61 “Statement by the Legal Adviser,” Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 2009. 62 In a February 16, 2021, letter to Tehran, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” See GOV/2021/10. 63 GOV/2021/28. 64 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement. Congressional Research Service 11 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify the IAEA inspectors to verify the
Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s obligations under its
safeguards agreement.safeguards agreement.5965 IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify
design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month.design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month.6066 Inspectors have Inspectors have
visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano. visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano.
In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to
produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency
inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from
Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.6167 Article 45 of that agreement requires Article 45 of that agreement requires
that Tehran notify the IAEAthat Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for
safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when
necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly
relevant for safeguards purposes.” relevant for safeguards purposes.”
The IAEA The IAEA board has neither board has neither ~~formal y~~formally found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in
noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N. noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor reported these issues to the U.N.
Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described
Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary Iran’s failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary
arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal

~~57 In a February 16 letter to T ehran, Grossi “reminded Iran that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 is a legal~~
~~obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangemen ts to its Safeguards Agreement which cannot be modified~~
~~unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of~~
~~provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” See GOV/2021/10.~~
~~58 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement.~~
~~59 Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given T ehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary~~
~~arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified.~~
60finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but that resolution did not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.68 More recently, a March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board of Governors states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three undeclared Iranian locations.69 Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as well as access to two suspected sites.70 Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected “natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin” and also “isotopically altered” LEU particles at one Iranian location.71 Then-acting IAEA Director 65 Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Tehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified. 66 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General, , Report by the Director General,
GOV/2009/55, AugustGOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009. 28, 2009.
6167 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the ~~Islam ic~~Islamic Republic of Iran , ~~Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
11

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious~~
~~concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of~~
~~Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but the September resolution did not contain a~~
~~formal finding of noncompliance.62~~
~~More recently, a March 3, 2020, report from IAEA Director General Grossi to the agency’s Board~~
~~of Governors states that the IAEA has “identified a number of questions related to possible~~
~~undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” that had taken place at three~~
~~undeclared Iranian locations.63 Pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and~~
~~additional protocol, the agency has requested information about these activities, as wel as access~~
~~to two suspected sites.64 Iran has begun to comply with these requests.~~
~~Specifical y, IAEA inspectors have detected “natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin”~~
~~and also “isotopical y altered” LEU particles at one Iranian location.65 Then-acting IAEA Director~~
~~General Cornel Feruta reported the uranium detection in a November 2019 report.66~~, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010. 68 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012. 69 According to Grossi’s February 2021 report, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no verification value in conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted undeclared nuclear activities. The agency made this choice because the location “had undergone extensive sanitization and levelling in 2003 and 2004,” the report explains (NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March 3, 2020. 70 GOV/2021/15. 71 GOV/2021/15. Congressional Research Service 12 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations General Cornel Feruta reported the uranium detection in a November 2019 report.72 In a March 4, In a March 4,
2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of uranium) is very 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that “[t]he fact that we found traces (of uranium) is very
important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material that are not under important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material that are not under
international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the intent.”international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the intent.”6773 Iran has Iran has
provided IAEAprovided IAEA inspectors access to this facility and inspectors access to this facility and also provided the agency with some relevant provided the agency with some relevant
information. However, the IAEA has judged Iran’s explanations “to be not information. However, the IAEA has judged Iran’s explanations “to be not ~~technical y~~technically credible.” credible.”6874
Following a June 5, 2020, report from Grossi explaining that Tehran’s lack of cooperation was Following a June 5, 2020, report from Grossi explaining that Tehran’s lack of cooperation was
“adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and thereby to “adversely affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and thereby to
provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at these provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at these
locations in Iran.”locations in Iran.”6975 The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on June 19, 2020, The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on June 19, 2020, ~~cal ing~~calling
on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further on Iran “to fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further
delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency.”delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency.”7076 This This
resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. According to the June 2020 State resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance. According to the June 2020 State
Department compliance report, “Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to Department compliance report, “Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to
IAEAIAEA safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s [comprehensive safeguards safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s [comprehensive safeguards
agreement] required by the NPT and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT agreement] required by the NPT and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT
~~itself.”71~~

62 ~~Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council~~
~~Resolutions in the Islam ic Republic of Iran~~ ~~, GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012.~~
~~63 According to Grossi’s February 2021 report, the IAEA has “assessed that there would be no verification value in~~
~~conducting a complementary access” at a fourth location where Iran may have conducted undeclared nuclear activities.~~
~~T he agency made this choice because the location “had undergone extensive sanitization and levelling in 2003 and~~
~~2004,” the report explains (NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director~~
~~General, GOV/2021/15, February 23, 2021). NPT Safeguards Agreem ent with the Islam ic Republic of Iran , Report by~~
~~the Director General, GOV/2020/15, March 3, 2020.~~
~~64 GOV/2021/15.~~
~~65 GOV/2021/15.~~
~~66 GOV/2019/55.~~
~~67 Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands 'Clarifications' on Iran's Nuclear Program,”~~ ~~Agence~~
~~France Presse, March 4, 2020.~~
~~68 2021/15.~~
~~69 GOV/2020/30.~~
~~70 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran , GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020.~~
~~71 Department of State, June 2020. T he April 2021 version of the report contains similar language (Department of State,~~
~~April 2021).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
12

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~Grossi and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) President Ali Akbar Salehi issued a joint~~
~~statement on August 26, 2020, explaining that “Iran is voluntarily providing the IAEA with access~~
~~to the two locations specified by the IAEA and facilitating the IAEA verification activities to~~
~~resolve these issues.”72 IAEA inspectors have since conducted an additional inspection of the first~~
~~location and inspected the other two above-mentioned locations.73 During the latter inspections,~~
~~agency inspectors detected “anthropogenic uranium particles” requiring “explanation by Iran.”74~~
~~Tehran has not responded to January 2021 IAEA letters concerning the inspection results.75~~
~~Grossi told reporters during a March 4, 2021, press conference that Iran and the IAEA had agreed~~
~~to bilateral meetings meant to address these outstanding issues.76 According to Iranian and IAEA~~
~~officials, the discussions began in April and are stil ongoing.77~~itself.”77 Grossi and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) President Ali Akbar Salehi issued a joint statement on August 26, 2020, explaining that “Iran is voluntarily providing the IAEA with access to the two locations specified by the IAEA and facilitating the IAEA verification activities to resolve these issues.”78 IAEA inspectors have since conducted an additional inspection of the first location and inspected the other two above-mentioned locations.79 During the latter inspections, agency inspectors detected “anthropogenic uranium particles” requiring “explanation by Iran.”80 Tehran has not responded to January 2021 IAEA letters concerning the inspection results.81 Grossi told reporters during a March 4, 2021, press conference that Iran and the IAEA had agreed to bilateral meetings meant to address these outstanding issues.82 The two sides subsequently held one meeting in April and a second meeting in May.83 However, Iran did not provide any new information or evidence concerning the outstanding issues described above, Grossi told the IAEA 72 GOV/2019/55. 73 Didier Lauras and Jastinder Khera, “IAEA Chief Demands ‘Clarifications’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Agence France Presse, March 4, 2020. 74 2021/15. 75 GOV/2020/30. 76 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2020/34, June 19, 2020. 77 Department of State, June 2020. The April 2021 version of the report contains similar language (Department of State, April 2021). 78 “Joint Statement by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the AEOI,” August 26, 2020. 31/2020. 79 2021/15. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouTube video, posted by IAEAvideo, March 4, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sq4A0qHqe-M. 83 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2021/29, May 31, 2021. Congressional Research Service 13 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Board of Governors on June 7, adding that the “lack of progress … seriously affects the ability of the Agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”84
Iran and the U.N. Security Council
As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its
centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)7885 on on
February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its February 4, 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its ~~cal~~ call for Iran to for Iran to
take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it
would stop implementing its Additionalwould stop implementing its Additional Protocol. Protocol.
On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not
~~legal y~~ legally binding, that binding, that ~~cal ed~~called on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board
resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program: resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program:
1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835
(September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed
a variety of restrictions on Iran.a variety of restrictions on Iran.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. That article empowers the council to “Charter. That article empowers the council to “~~cal~~ call upon” governments “to comply with such upon” governments “to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before the council decides upon or
recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of recommends responses addressing threats “to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as aggression.” Except for Resolution 1835, the council adopted the remaining resolutions, as ~~wel~~
well as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to as Resolution 2231, under Article 41 of Chapter VII. This article enables the Security Council to
adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its adopt “measures not involving the use of armed force,” including sanctions, “to give effect to its
decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” decisions” concerning “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”
Resolution 1696 was the first to place Resolution 1696 was the first to place ~~legal y~~legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with binding Security Council requirements on Iran with
respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension
and and ~~cal ed~~called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures on Tehran to implement the transparency measures ~~cal ed~~called for by the IAEA board’s for by the IAEA board’s
February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the
suspension’s scope to include “work on suspension’s scope to include “work on al all heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that
the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under

~~72 “Joint Statement by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and~~
~~Head of the AEOI,” August 26, 2020. 31/2020.~~
~~73 2021/15.~~
~~74 Ibid.~~
~~75 Ibid.~~
~~76 “Press Conference with IAEA DG Rafael Grossi,” YouT ube video, posted by IAEAvideo, March 4, 2021,~~
~~https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sq4A0qHqe-M.~~
~~77 Francois Murphy, “Iran, IAEA Start T alks on Unexplained Uranium T races,” Reuters, April 20, 2021; “Extension of~~
~~agreement with IAEA signifies Iran's goodwill: Rabiei,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 25, 2021.~~
~~78 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
13

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted, develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.” As noted,
Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its
subsidiary arrangement. subsidiary arrangement.
Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that al all of the of the
previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from previous resolutions’ requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from
the IAEAthe IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day, stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day,
as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation
Day took place on January 16, 2016. Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran Day took place on January 16, 2016. Resolution 2231 also “reaffirms that Iran ~~shal~~ shall cooperate cooperate
fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve al all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA
reports.” The IAEA Board of Governors’ December 2015 resolution noted that the board had reports.” The IAEA Board of Governors’ December 2015 resolution noted that the board had
closed its consideration of the “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.” closed its consideration of the “outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”
The JCPOA The JCPOA ~~spel s~~spells out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over ~~al eged~~alleged breaches of breaches of
their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231
84 “IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” June 7, 2021. 85 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006. Congressional Research Service 14 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a contain a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a
P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any
permanent UN Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution that permanent UN Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution that
would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA specifies would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA specifies
that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be re-that, in such a case, “the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be re-
imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.” imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.”
The other P5+1 states are able to invoke the snapback mechanism, but whether the United States The other P5+1 states are able to invoke the snapback mechanism, but whether the United States
may do so is unclear because Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state” may do so is unclear because Resolution 2231 provides that only a “JCPOA participant state”
may bring a noncompliance finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the may bring a noncompliance finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the
United States is no longer participating in the agreement.United States is no longer participating in the agreement.7986 In an August 20 letter to Security In an August 20 letter to Security
Council President Indonesian Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael Council President Indonesian Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo initiated the snapback process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-Pompeo initiated the snapback process by notifying the council that Iran “is in significant non-
performance” of its JCPOA commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the performance” of its JCPOA commitments. However, Djani explained in an August 21 letter to the
council that the “United States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has council that the “United States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism … because it has
withdrawn from” the JCPOA.withdrawn from” the JCPOA.8087 Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal Consequently, he added, the August 20 letter “has no legal
effect.” UN Secretary General António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that the effect.” UN Secretary General António Guterres wrote in a September 19 letter that the
“majority” of Security Council members have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the “majority” of Security Council members have argued that Pompeo’s letter did not constitute the
notification necessary for snapback. The resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to notification necessary for snapback. The resulting uncertainty, he added, required the Secretary to
refrain from proceeding on the matter. refrain from proceeding on the matter.
On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard On February 18, 2021, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard ~~Mil s~~ Mills sent a letter to Security sent a letter to Security
Council President UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s Council President UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward “reversing the previous administration’s
position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on position on the ... sanctions snapback issue,” a State Department official told reporters on
February 18, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full February 18, adding that “the United States is affirming that” Resolution 2231 “remains in full
~~effect.”81~~

~~79 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by~~
~~Paul K. Kerr.~~
80 ~~Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the~~
~~President of the Security Council, S/2020/824~~
~~81 Ibid.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
14

~~link to page 22~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~
effect.”88
Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security
Council Actions
The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security
Council is found in both the IAEACouncil is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss
the relevant portions of those documents. the relevant portions of those documents.
IAEA ~~Statute82~~Statute89
Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.8390 Article III B. 4. of the statute states Article III B. 4. of the statute states
that the IAEAthat the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when appropriate,” is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when appropriate,”
to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the competence of to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the competence of
86 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by Paul K. Kerr. 87 Letter Dated 21 August 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2020/824 88 Ibid. 89 The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153. 90 The text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 23 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall ~~the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shal~~ notify the Security Council, as the organ notify the Security Council, as the organ
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
~~Additional y,~~ Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the
agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The agency’s Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The
board is then to “board is then to “~~cal~~ call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance
which it finds to have occurred,” as which it finds to have occurred,” as ~~wel~~ well as “report the non-compliance to as “report the non-compliance to al all members and to the members and to the
Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”
In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the
~~board~~
~~found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its~~ board found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT NPT
Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-[a November 2003 report from then-
Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute; the Agency’s Statute;
According to the resolution, the board also found According to the resolution, the board also found
that that ~~the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director~~
the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report [GOV/2003/75],General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in
the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002
and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peacefulpeaceful purposes have given risepurposes have given rise ~~to questions that are within the competence of the~~
~~Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance~~ to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of of
international peace and security. international peace and security.
ElBaradei ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.8491 It It
described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed idescribed a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed in Appendix A, ~~that~~ that violated violated
Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective
measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution ~~cal ed~~called on Iran on Iran
to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not ~~legal y~~legally required to implement. ~~required to implement.~~

~~82 T he IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual~~
~~governments and certain regional organizations. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model~~
~~described in INFCIRC 153.~~
~~83 T he text of the IAEA Statute is available at https://www.iaea.org/about/statute.~~
~~84 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran , Report by the Director General,~~
~~GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
15

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

U.N. Charter and the Security Council
Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to
impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.8592 Article 24 confers on the council “primary Article 24 confers on the council “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that
the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that
the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.” aggression.”
Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council
resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program
invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council
shall shall ~~determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act~~ determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of of
aggression and shallaggression and shall make recommendations, or decidemake recommendations, or decide ~~what~~ what measures shall be taken in measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
91 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003. 92 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/. Congressional Research Service 16 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension
required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40 required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40
states that states that
the the ~~Security Council~~ Security Council may, beforemay, before ~~making the recommendations or deciding upon~~ making the recommendations or deciding upon the the
measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of
Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. severance of diplomatic relations.
As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the
previous resolutions and previous resolutions and ~~cal ed~~called on Iran to comply with them. on Iran to comply with them.
It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that
[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations [i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligationsunder the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its
Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”8693 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231 As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231
requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of requests the IAEA Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of
Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the
~~JCPOA.”~~

~~85 T he text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.~~
~~86 GOV/2013/27. T he agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
16

~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

JCPOA.” Has Iran Violated the NPT?8794
Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for
determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a
formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however, formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however,
be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination. be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.
The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the of the NPT; neither the
council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations. council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.
However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently
had littlehad little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA
Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement. Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which
requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with requires NPT nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with
the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the ~~fulfil ment~~fulfillment of its obligations of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
93 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11. 94 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 26 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states- Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that nonnuclear-weapon states-
parties parties ~~shal~~ shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.” nuclear explosive devices.”
As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradeiElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”
Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above. Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above.
Moreover, a November 2007 National Moreover, a November 2007 National ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that “until Estimate (NIE) stated that “until ~~fal~~ fall 2003, 2003,
Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”8895
This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not provide any This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not provide any
detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has attempted to detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has attempted to
develop nuclear weapons.develop nuclear weapons.
Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states ’ ’
compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had
violated Article II of the NPT: violated Article II of the NPT:
The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which
they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement
channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and
to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification
for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear
weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of
the NPT.the NPT.8996
The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared
nuclear activities, as nuclear activities, as ~~wel~~ well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist, as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist,
including those that may be run solely by the military.” including those that may be run solely by the military.”

~~87 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials.~~
88 The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The 2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such noncompliance.97 The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.98 Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a 95 Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S., National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Subsequent U.S. official official
statements have been consistent statements have been consistent ~~wit h~~with the NIE. the NIE.
89 96 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
~~Com m itm ents~~Commitments, Department of State, August 2005. , Department of State, August 2005.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
17

~~link to page 25~~ ~~Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations~~

~~The State Department’s 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT~~
~~which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The~~
~~2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of~~
~~the facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities~~
~~in question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such~~
~~noncompliance.90~~
~~The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament~~
~~Agency Director Wil iam Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.91~~
~~Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a~~
97 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes. 98 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July 10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appendix C. Congressional Research Service 18 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two
examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the
production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster
also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United
States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.” States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.”
It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the
notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to
determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by al all experts.experts.9299 The 2005 The 2005
report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.” Whether the
State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the
report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through
December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion regarding
Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”93100 Subsequent versions of the report reiterated Subsequent versions of the report reiterated
the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous the 2010 report’s assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that “previous
issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved.”94101 As noted, As noted,
the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S. the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S.
official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear
weapons.weapons.95102 The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary The United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary ~~Wil iam~~William Hague would not say whether Hague would not say whether
~~Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.96~~

~~90 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement~~
~~patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use~~
~~of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what~~
~~would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations~~
~~suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts~~
~~aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for~~
~~peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes.~~
~~91 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July~~
~~10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). T he complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appe ndix C .~~
92Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.103 99 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, ~~T raining~~Training and and
Information Centre. Information Centre.
93100 Quotations are from Quotations are from Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
~~Agreem ents and Com m itm ents~~Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, July 2010. , Department of State, July 2010.
94 101 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
~~Com m itm ents~~Commitments, Department of State, April 2016. , Department of State, April 2016.
95102 See, See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, U.S. Intelligence
~~Com m unity~~Community Worldwide Threat ~~Assessm ent~~Assessment, February 26, 2015. February 26, 2015. ~~T he~~The State Department compliance report covering 2019 State Department compliance report covering 2019
states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities states that the U.S. intelligence community “continued to assess that Iran is not currently engaged in key activities
associated with the designassociated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.” (and development of a nuclear weapon.” (Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and ~~Disarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itments~~Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, June 2020.) , Department of State, June 2020.)
96 103 Developments in UK Foreign Policy, House of Commons: Oral Evidence , House of Commons: Oral Evidence ~~T aken~~Taken Before the Foreign Affairs Before the Foreign Affairs
Committee, March 8, 2012. Committee, March 8, 2012.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
1819

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement
The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradeiThe November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from then-IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the to the
agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as
“Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.” “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.”
The report stated that The report stated that
Iran Iran ~~has~~ has failed in a numberfailed in a number of instances overof instances over ~~an extended period~~ an extended period of time to meetof time to meet ~~its~~
~~obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear~~
~~material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where~~ its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such such
material has been processed and stored. material has been processed and stored.
The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier
reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEAreports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.board.97
104 According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency: According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency:
 The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further  The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further
processing. processing.
 The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production  The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production
and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste. and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.
~~Additional y,~~ Additionally, Iran failed to Iran failed to
 declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,  declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,
stored, and processed; stored, and processed;
 provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor  provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor
located in Tehran; as located in Tehran; as ~~wel~~ well as as
 provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.  provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.
GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA. GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA.
According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA: According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA:
 The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,  The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,
as as ~~wel~~ well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium. as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium.
 The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in  The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in
laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the
loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer
of resulting waste. of resulting waste.
 The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different  The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different
imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes. imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes.
 The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research  The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research
Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of
plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of
unprocessed irradiated targets. unprocessed irradiated targets.

~~97 T hose~~ 104 Those reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
1920

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related
facilities, according to the report. These included the following: facilities, according to the report. These included the following:
 A centrifuge testing facility.  A centrifuge testing facility.
 Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.  Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.
 Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.  Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.
 The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),  The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),
the hot the hot ~~cel~~ cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as facility where the plutonium separation took place, as ~~wel~~ well as the as the
relevant waste handling facility. relevant waste handling facility.
In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the In addition, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the
implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2021

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Appendix B. IAEA Special Inspections
As noted, Iran’s obligations under its AdditionalAs noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations Protocol to provide access to certain locations
are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the
IAEAIAEA Director General could Director General could ~~cal~~ call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval
from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be
special when it is in addition to IAEAspecial when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or “involves access to information or routine inspections or “involves access to information or
locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of
safeguards in that country.safeguards in that country.98105 Such inspections “are foreseen in Such inspections “are foreseen in al all Agency safeguards agreements, Agency safeguards agreements,
~~principal y~~principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to
a 1991 IAEA document.a 1991 IAEA document.99106 Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153, states Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153, states
that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make
special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency special inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency
considers considers ~~that information made available by the State, including explanations from~~ that information made available by the State, including explanations from the the
State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to
fulfillfulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.its responsibilities under the Agreement.
According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of
“plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by “plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by
other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of
IAEAIAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to
report to the agency. report to the agency.
The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the
carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.~~100~~107 In the event that In the event that
the IAEAthe IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold
immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection
request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153. request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153.
However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that
if the if the ~~Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is~~
~~essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to~~
~~safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other~~ Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear nuclear
explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action
without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been
invoked. invoked.
If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to
paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.~~101~~

98108 105 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used. According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used “to verify the “to verify the
information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguardsinformation contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are requiredagreements are required to submit a to submit a
special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specifiedspecial report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and limits” or if “containment and
surveillance measuressurveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiaryhave been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary ~~Arrangem ents~~ Arrangements.” .”
SubsidiarySubsidiary arrangements describearrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid
downdown in a safeguardsin a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” agreement are to be applied.” ~~T he~~The IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if
alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes. alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes.
99106 GOV/INF/613, GOV/INF/613, May 29, 1991. May 29, 1991.
~~100~~107 GOV/2554, November 12, 1991. GOV/2554, November 12, 1991.
~~101~~108 Ibid. Ibid.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2122

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster
Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations
On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director ~~Wil iam~~William Foster testified Foster testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question
regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the
following statement: following statement:
Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive
Devices Devices
The treaty articles in question The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weaponare Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon ~~parties~~
~~undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear~~
~~explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to~~ parties undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be be
interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of
this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives
were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon
oror ~~other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was~~ other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as as
follows: follows:
“While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as “While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as
those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is
not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There
areare ~~many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that~~ many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any any
general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily
deal with all such situations. deal with all such situations.
“Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a “Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a
specific activity constitutesspecific activity constitutes ~~prohibited manufacture~~ prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For under the proposed treaty. For
example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a
nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of
anan experimental orexperimental or prototype nuclearprototype nuclear ~~explosive device would be covered by the term~~
explosive device would be covered by the term ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance
toto a nucleara nuclear ~~explosive~~ explosive device.)device.) ~~Again, while the placing of a particular activity~~ Again, while the placing of a particular activity under under
safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in
compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-
compliance. compliance.
“It may be useful to point out, for “It may be useful to point out, for ~~il ustrative~~illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States purposes, several activities which the United States
would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium
enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program
would violate Articlewould violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly
permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors,
including research on the properties of including research on the properties of ~~metal ic~~metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the
development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.” development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.”

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2223

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Author Information

Paul K. Kerr Paul K. Kerr

Specialist in Nonproliferation Specialist in Nonproliferation

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should ~~n ot~~not be relied upon for purposes other be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R40094 R40094 · VERSION ~~115~~116 · UPDATED
2324