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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy
May 19, 2021
The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic partner of the United States since 1980, when it
became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its
Kenneth Katzman
facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since
Specialist in Middle
then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and other regional threats. In
Eastern Affairs
January 2020, Oman’s longtime leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was

succeeded by Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected by Oman’s royal family immediately
upon Qaboos’s death. Sultan Haythim espouses policies similar to those of Qaboos and has not

altered U.S.-Oman ties or Oman’s regional policies.
During Qaboos’s reign (1970-2020), OmanJune 1, 2022 In January 2020, the Sultanate of Oman’s long-time leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was succeeded by Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected by Oman’s Kenneth Katzman royal family immediately upon Qaboos’s death. Sultan Haythim espouses policies similar to Specialist in Middle those of Qaboos and has not altered U.S.-Oman ties or Oman’s regional policies. Oman, a Eastern Affairs longtime U.S. strategic partner, was the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it assists U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and other regional threats. Oman has generally avoided joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: generally avoided joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC:
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions, instead seeking Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions, instead seeking
to mediate their resolution. Oman joined but did not contribute forces to the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State
organization, nor did it arm groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s regime. It opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE-
led isolation of Qatar and had urged resolution of that rift before its resolution in January 2021.
Oman’s leaders have consistently asserted that engaging Iran is preferable to confrontationto mediate their resolution. Oman’s leaders have consistently asserted that engaging Iran is preferable to confrontation. Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi visited Oman on May 23, 2022 to sign economic agreements and discuss regional issues with Sultan Haythim. Oman’s ties to Iran have enabled . Oman’s ties to Iran have enabled
it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran for the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran for the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran
direct talks that direct talks that later producedled to the July 14, 2015, the July 14, 2015, Iran nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). At Iran nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). At
the same time, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing re-imposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran’s the same time, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing re-imposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran’s
efforts to ship weapons across Oman’s borders to Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. efforts to ship weapons across Oman’s borders to Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Oman hosts some Houthi representatives to facilitate their ability to undertake discussions with international and regional mediators. Oman publicly supported but did not contribute forces to the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, nor has it provided support to groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s regime. Oman opposed the June 2017-January 2021 Saudi/UAE-led isolation of Qatar. During his reign, Sultan Qaboos drew consistent U.S. praise for gradually opening the political process in the absence of During his reign, Sultan Qaboos drew consistent U.S. praise for gradually opening the political process in the absence of
evident public pressure to do so, and for promoting the role of women in society. The liberalization allowed Omanis a evident public pressure to do so, and for promoting the role of women in society. The liberalization allowed Omanis a
measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but did not significantly limit the measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but did not significantly limit the
Sultan’s role as paramount Sultan’s role as paramount decisionmakerdecision-maker. Public clamor for faster and more extensive political reform, and resentment of . Public clamor for faster and more extensive political reform, and resentment of
inadequate employment opportunities, produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and inadequate employment opportunities, produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeksagain briefly in in
January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs apparently helped calm unrest in each instance. Oman has January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs apparently helped calm unrest in each instance. Oman has
increased press censorship and arrested some critics who use social media, as have the other GCC statesincreased press censorship and arrested some critics who use social media, as have the other GCC states, since the 2011 Arab since the 2011 Arab
uprisings. uprisings.
The periodic unrest may demonstrate that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since
mid-2014. Oman is assessed by international economic observers as Oman is assessed by international economic observers as particularly economically vulnerable to the economically vulnerable to the economic
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a further dip in oil prices as well as an interruption of tourism and other
sources of government revenue. As of mid-May, 2021, Oman has reported over 200,000 COVID-19 cases and over 2,200
deaths from the disease; nearly 275,000 vaccine doses have been administered. effects of price fluctuations for its energy exports and food imports, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and other global economic factors. Oman’s economy and workforce has always Oman’s economy and workforce has always
been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, as Oman has only modest energy resources. The country been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, as Oman has only modest energy resources. The country
has sought to attract foreign investment, including has sought to attract foreign investment, including to fund the development of Al Duqm port , which Oman and several
partner countries are building into what Oman hopes will be a major trading hubfrom China, Iran, the United Kingdom, the United States and other sources, to fund the development of Al Duqm port and other economic initiatives. The 2006 U.S.-Oman free trade agreement . The 2006 U.S.-Oman free trade agreement
(FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman’s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman’s efforts to diversify. Oman (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman’s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman’s efforts to diversify. Oman
receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance focused primarily on building capacity of Oman’s counterterrorism and receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance focused primarily on building capacity of Oman’s counterterrorism and
border and maritime security authorities. border and maritime security authorities.

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Contents
Historical Background and U.S. Relations ...................................................................................... 1
Democratization, Human Rights, and Unrest .................................................................................. 3
Representative Institutions, Election History, and Unrest ......................................................... 4
Unrest Casts Doubt on Satisfaction with Pace of Political Reform .................................... 5
Recent Elections ................................................................................................................. 5 6
Broader Human Rights Issues ....................................................................................... 7............ 6
Freedom of Expression, Media, and Association ................................................................ 6 7
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Rights ............................................................................ 7
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 7 8
Advancement of Women ..................................................................................................... 8

Foreign Policy/Regional Issues ................................................................................................. 8 9
Iran .................................................................................................................... 9
Cooperation against the Islamic State Organization (ISIS) and on Syria and Iraq .................. 128
Israeli-Palestinian Dispute and Related Issues ................................................................... 11 13
Defense and Security Issues ..................................................................................................... 14
Oman’s Defense Relations with other Militaries ......... 11 U.S. Arms Sales and Other Security Assistance to Oman ........................................................ 15
U.S. Arms Sales and Other Security Assistance to Oman 12 Defense Relations with other Militaries ................................................ 15
.................................. 14 U.S.-Oman Cooperation against Terrorism and Terrorism Financing ................................................ 17 14
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing (AML/CFT) ................. 18.. 15
Countering Violent Extremism ......................................................................................... 15 18

Economic and Trade Issues ........................................................................................................... 1815
U.S.-Oman Economic Relations ....................................................................................... 16 19

Figures
Figure 1. Oman ................................................................................................................................ 2
Figure 2. The new Sultan Haythim bin Tariq Al Said ..................................................................... 4

Tables
Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman ................................................................................................ 14 17

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 17 21


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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Historical Background and U.S. Relations
Oman is located along the Arabian Sea, on the southern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz, Oman is located along the Arabian Sea, on the southern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz,
across from Iran. Except for a brief period of Persian rule, Omanis have remained independent across from Iran. Except for a brief period of Persian rule, Omanis have remained independent
since since expel ingexpelling the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Said monarchy began in 1744, extending Omani the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Said monarchy began in 1744, extending Omani
influence into Zanzibar and other parts of East Africa until 1861. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Alinfluence into Zanzibar and other parts of East Africa until 1861. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said Said
was the eighth in the line of the monarchy; he became sultan in July 1970 when, with British was the eighth in the line of the monarchy; he became sultan in July 1970 when, with British
military and politicalmilitary and political support, he support, he compel edcompelled his father, Sultan Said bin Taymur Al Said, to his father, Sultan Said bin Taymur Al Said, to
abdicateabdicate. During his father’s reign, Omanis needed the sultan’s approval even to wear spectacles
or to import cement. Upon Qaboos’s death, Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin of Qaboos, . Upon Qaboos’s death, Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin of Qaboos,
became the ninth Al Said monarch on January 11, 2020. became the ninth Al Said monarch on January 11, 2020.
The United States has had relations with Oman since the early days of American independence. The United States has had relations with Oman since the early days of American independence.
The U.S. merchant ship The U.S. merchant ship Rambler made a port visit to Muscat in made a port visit to Muscat in September 1790. The United 1790. The United
States signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Oman in 1833, one of the first of its kind States signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Oman in 1833, one of the first of its kind
with an Arab state. This treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and with an Arab state. This treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights signed at Salalah on December 20, 1958. Oman sent an official envoy to the Consular Rights signed at Salalah on December 20, 1958. Oman sent an official envoy to the
United States in 1840. A U.S. consulate was maintained in Muscat during 1880-1915, a U.S. United States in 1840. A U.S. consulate was maintained in Muscat during 1880-1915, a U.S.
embassy was opened in 1972, and the first resident U.S. Ambassador arrived in July 1974. Oman embassy was opened in 1972, and the first resident U.S. Ambassador arrived in July 1974. Oman
opened its embassy in Washington, DC, in 1973. Sultan Qaboos was accorded formal state visits opened its embassy in Washington, DC, in 1973. Sultan Qaboos was accorded formal state visits
in 1974, by President Gerald Ford, andin 1974, by President Gerald Ford, and, in 1983, by President Ronald Reagan. President in 1983, by President Ronald Reagan. President Bil
Bill Clinton visited Oman in March 2000. Career diplomat Leslie Tsou took up her duties as Clinton visited Oman in March 2000. Career diplomat Leslie Tsou took up her duties as
Ambassador on January 10, 2020. Ambassador on January 10, 2020.
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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Oman

People
 Population: 3.6 mil ion,  Population: 3.6 mil ion, of which about 46% are expatriates (2019 est.) of which about 46% are expatriates (2019 est.)
 Religions: Religions: Muslim Muslim (of which Ibadhis and Sunnis are over 90%, and 5% are(of which Ibadhis and Sunnis are over 90%, and 5% are Shia) 86%; Christian Shia) 86%; Christian
6.5%; Hindu 5.5%; Buddhist 0.8% (2010 est.) 6.5%; Hindu 5.5%; Buddhist 0.8% (2010 est.)
Economy  GDP purchasing power parity (PPP): $137  GDP: $85 bil ion bil ion
(2021)  GDP per capita: $38,000 (2021)  GDP real growth rate: 3% (2021  GDP per capita (PPP): $31,101 (2020)
 GDP real growth rate: -0.5% (2019): -6.2% (2020)
 Inflation Rate: -0.9% (2020) )
 Unemployment Rate: 3% Youth Unemployment: Unemployment Rate: 3% Youth Unemployment: 15.6%; Female15.6%; Female Unemployment:Unemployment: 10.2% (2021) 10.2% (2021)
 Foreign Exchange/Gold Reserves: Foreign Exchange/Gold Reserves: $15 $19 bil ion ( bil ion (20202021) )
 External Debt: $ External Debt: $75.493 bil ion bil ion (2020 (2021) )
Energy
 Oil  Oil Production: 951Exports: 720,000 barrels per day,000 barrels per day (2020);.  Oil Reserves: 4.8 bil ion barrels Reserves: 4.8 bil ion barrels; Exports: 722,000
barrels per day (bpd)
 Natural Gas  Natural Gas Production: 875 bil ion cubic feet per year; 875 bil ion cubic feet per year; Reserves: 30 tril ion 30 tril ion cubic feet; cubic feet; Exports: 407 407
bil ion cubic feet per year bil ion cubic feet per year
 Energy Sector Structure: Petroleum Development  Energy Sector Structure: Petroleum Development Oman (PDO)—a partnership between the Oman (PDO)—a partnership between the
Omani government (60%), Royal Dutch Omani government (60%), Royal Dutch Shel , Shell, Total, and Partx (2%) controls most oilTotal, and Partx (2%) controls most oil and natural and natural
gas resources gas resources
Trade
 Major Partners: China (mostly oil), UAE, South Korea,  Major Partners: China (mostly oil), UAE, South Korea, Japan, India, United States,Japan, India, United States, Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
Source: Graphic created by CRS with information from CIA, Graphic created by CRS with information from CIA, The World Factbook; World Bank: Oman’s
Economic Update—May 2021; Economic Intel igence Unit report March 2021; S&P Global; U.S. Department of
State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Oman, May 12, 2021.
Factbook; Economist Intelligence Unit
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Democratization, Human Rights, and Unrest
Oman remains a monarchy in which Oman remains a monarchy in which decisionmakingdecision-making has been concentrated with the Sultan. The has been concentrated with the Sultan. The
government reflects the diverse backgrounds of the Omani population; many officials have long-government reflects the diverse backgrounds of the Omani population; many officials have long-
standing family connections to parts of East Africa that Oman once controlled, and to the Indian standing family connections to parts of East Africa that Oman once controlled, and to the Indian
subcontinent. subcontinent.
Along with political reform issues, the question of succession has long been central to observers Along with political reform issues, the question of succession has long been central to observers
of Oman. Sultan Qaboos’s brief marriage in the 1970s produced no children, and the Sultan, who of Oman. Sultan Qaboos’s brief marriage in the 1970s produced no children, and the Sultan, who
was born in November 1940, had no heir apparent when he passed away on January 11, 2020, was born in November 1940, had no heir apparent when he passed away on January 11, 2020,
after a long after a long il nessillness. According to Omani officials, succession would be decided by a “Ruling . According to Omani officials, succession would be decided by a “Ruling
Family Council” of his relatively Family Council” of his relatively smal small Al Said family (about 50 male members) and, if the Al Said family (about 50 male members) and, if the
family council could not reach agreement within three days, it was to select the successor family council could not reach agreement within three days, it was to select the successor
recommended by Qaboos in a sealed letter to be opened upon his death.1 Upon his death, the recommended by Qaboos in a sealed letter to be opened upon his death.1 Upon his death, the
Family Council and a separate Defense Council, in a televised ceremony, opened Qaboos’s letter Family Council and a separate Defense Council, in a televised ceremony, opened Qaboos’s letter
and named his choice, Haythim bin Tariq Aland named his choice, Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, as the new Sultan. Said, as the new Sultan.
Haythim, an Oxford-educated cousin of Qaboos, is Haythim, an Oxford-educated cousin of Qaboos, is about 6567 years of age (born October 13, years of age (born October 13,
1954). He had served since 2002 as Minister of Heritage and Culture and previously served in 1954). He had served since 2002 as Minister of Heritage and Culture and previously served in
senior positions in Oman’s foreign ministry. Haythim’s selection bypassed his two older senior positions in Oman’s foreign ministry. Haythim’s selection bypassed his two older
brothers—Asad bin Tariq and Shihab bin Tariq—who many experts considered were more likely brothers—Asad bin Tariq and Shihab bin Tariq—who many experts considered were more likely
successors than Haythim. Upon assuming the leadership, Sultan Haythim indicated a commitment successors than Haythim. Upon assuming the leadership, Sultan Haythim indicated a commitment
to continue Qaboos’s policies.2 to continue Qaboos’s policies.2

1 “Explainer: How Oman’s succession works to determine the next Sultan ,” In late January 2021, the new Sultan appointed his son, Theyazin bin Haythim, who was born in August 1990, as Crown Prince. The appointment represented a contrast with the Qaboos era in which the succession was unclear. Theyazin serves in government as Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports. 1 “Explainer: How Oman’s succession works to determine the next Sultan,” Al Arabiya, January 11, 2020.Al Arabiya, January 11, 2020.
2 “Meet Oman’s New Sultan.2 “Meet Oman’s New Sultan. How Will He Navigate the Region’s How Will He Navigate the Region’s T urmoilTurmoil?” ?” Washington Post, January 15, 2020. , January 15, 2020.
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Figure 2. The new Sultan Haythim bin Tariq Al Said

Source: Times of Oman. : Times of Oman.
Representative Institutions, Election History, and Unrest
Many Omanis, U.S. officials, and international observers credited Sultan Qaboos for establishing Many Omanis, U.S. officials, and international observers credited Sultan Qaboos for establishing
consultative institutions and electoral processes before there was evident public pressure to do so. consultative institutions and electoral processes before there was evident public pressure to do so.
Under a 1996 “Basic Law,” Qaboos created a bicameral “legislature” Under a 1996 “Basic Law,” Qaboos created a bicameral “legislature” cal edcalled the Oman Council, the Oman Council,
consisting of the existing Consultative Council (consisting of the existing Consultative Council (Majlis As Shura) and an appointed State Council ) and an appointed State Council
((Majlis Ad Dawla).3 The Consultative Council was formed in 1991 to replace a 10-year-old ).3 The Consultative Council was formed in 1991 to replace a 10-year-old al all-appointed advisory council. As in the other GCC states, formal political parties are not allowed. Unlike in Bahrain or Kuwait, well-defined “political societies” (de-facto parties) have not developed in Oman. 3 Basic -
appointed advisory council. A March 2011 decree expanded the Oman Council’s powers to
include questioning ministers, selecting its own leadership, and reviewing government-drafted
legislation, but it stil does not have the power to draft legislation or to overturn the Sultan’s
decrees or government regulations. As in the other GCC states, formal political parties are not

3 Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman, November 6, 1996. Law of the Sultanate of Oman, November 6, 1996.
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al owed but, unlike Bahrain or Kuwait, wel -defined “political societies” (de-facto parties) have
not developed in Oman. In 2011, Qaboos instituted elections for municipal councils.
Elected Consultative Council. The size, scope of authority, and the electorate for Oman’s elected The size, scope of authority, and the electorate for Oman’s elected
legislature have gradual y legislative body have gradually expanded. When it was formed in 1991, the Consultative Council had expanded. When it was formed in 1991, the Consultative Council had
59 seats, and it 59 seats, and it has been gradual y expanded since to its current size ofnow has 86 seats. In the 1994 and 86 seats. In the 1994 and
1997 selection cycles for the council, “notables” in each of Oman’s districts nominated three 1997 selection cycles for the council, “notables” in each of Oman’s districts nominated three
persons and Qaboos selected one of them to occupy that district’s seat. The first direct elections persons and Qaboos selected one of them to occupy that district’s seat. The first direct elections
were held in September 2000; holders of a high school or university degree, businessmen, and were held in September 2000; holders of a high school or university degree, businessmen, and
notables could vote—an electorate of about 25% of the population over 21 years of age. notables could vote—an electorate of about 25% of the population over 21 years of age. ForSince the the
October October 4, 2003, election, voting rights 2003, election, voting rights werehave been extended to extended to al all citizens, male and female, over 21 citizens, male and female, over 21
years of age. years of age. Prior to 2011, the Sultan selected the Consultative Council chairman; since then, the
chairman and a deputy chairman have been elected by the Council membership. The more recent
Consultative Council elections are discussed below.
The State Council remains an al The more recent Consultative Council elections are discussed below. A March 2011 decree expanded the Oman Council’s powers to include questioning ministers, selecting its own leadership, and reviewing government-drafted legislation, but it still does not have the power to draft legislation or to overturn the Sultan’s decrees or government regulations. The State Council remains an all-appointed body, and arguably acts as a counterweight to the -appointed body, and arguably acts as a counterweight to the
Consultative Council by being able to block legislativeConsultative Council by being able to block legislative initiatives of the Consultative Council. Its initiatives of the Consultative Council. Its
size has expanded from 53 members at inception to 86 members—equal to the Consultative size has expanded from 53 members at inception to 86 members—equal to the Consultative
Council. Appointees are Council. Appointees are usual yusually former high-ranking government officials, military officials, former high-ranking government officials, military officials,
tribal leaders, and other notables. tribal leaders, and other notables.
Unrest Casts Doubt on Satisfaction with Pace of Political Reform
Despite the gradual reforms, In 2010, some prominent Omanis petitioned Sultan Qaboos prominent Omanis petitioned Sultan Qaboos in 2010 for a for a
“contractual constitution” that would provide for a fully elected legislature. In February 2011, “contractual constitution” that would provide for a fully elected legislature. In February 2011,
afteras pro-democracy protests swept through several Arab countries, protests broke out in Oman as pro-democracy protests swept through several Arab countries, protests broke out in Oman as
wel well. Many protesters . Many protesters cal edcalled for more job opportunities for more job opportunities for Omani citizens, whereas others whereas others cal edcalled for a fully elected for a fully elected
legislature, but there were no evident legislature, but there were no evident cal scalls for the Sultan to resign. The government calmed the for the Sultan to resign. The government calmed the
unrest—which spanned most of 2011—through a combination of reforms and punishments, unrest—which spanned most of 2011—through a combination of reforms and punishments,
including expanding the powers of the Oman Council and creating additional public sector jobs. including expanding the powers of the Oman Council and creating additional public sector jobs.
The Those journalists, bloggers, and other activists journalists, bloggers, and other activists thatwho were arrested during the unrest for “defaming were arrested during the unrest for “defaming
the Sultan,” “the Sultan,” “il egal illegal gathering,” or violating the country’s cyber laws were pardonedgathering,” or violating the country’s cyber laws were pardoned and those
who were dismissed from public and private sector jobs for participating in unrest were
reinstated.4
Smal .4 Small demonstrations occurred again for two weeks in January 2018. demonstrations occurred again for two weeks in January 2018. Protesters general y cited
what they describe as a lack of job opportunities rather than demanding political reform. In
In response, the government reiterated response, the government reiterated an Octobera 2017 plan to create 25,000 jobs for Omani 2017 plan to create 25,000 jobs for Omani
citizens and banned the issuance of new visas for expatriate workers in 87 private sector citizens and banned the issuance of new visas for expatriate workers in 87 private sector
professions. The government has also taken steps to increase the number of Omani nationals in professions. The government has also taken steps to increase the number of Omani nationals in
private sector jobs by increasing the fees for sponsoring expatriate employees and reserving private sector jobs by increasing the fees for sponsoring expatriate employees and reserving
certain professions for citizens. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government
encouraged companies to replace foreign workers with nationals, and urged private firms to ask
some expatriates to leave the country permanently.5 The World Bank reports that between January
of 2020 and 2021, the number of expatriates employed in the private sector decreased 14%,
compared to just 3.1% for nationals over the same period.6 The government certain professions for citizens.5 The government instituted its first-instituted its first-
ever unemployment insurance ever unemployment insurance schemeprogram in November 2020 to cover in November 2020 to cover al all Omani Omani workers in the workers in the

4 James Worrall. “ Oman: T he ‘Forgotten’ Corner of the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy, September 2012.
5 “Oman tells state firms to fire expats, hire locals: ONA,” Al Jazeera, April 29, 2020.
6 World Bank, “Oman,” Macro Poverty Outlook, April 2021.
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public, private, military and security sectors who have lost their employment involuntarily, a public, private, military and security sectors who have lost their employment involuntarily, a
measure that measure that analysts expect wil helphelped the country respond to the economic shocks caused by the country respond to the economic shocks caused by
COVID-19.7the COVID-19 pandemic.6
Recent Elections
The October 15, 2011, Consultative Council elections went forward amidst the unrest. Perhaps The October 15, 2011, Consultative Council elections went forward amidst the unrest. Perhaps
because of the enhancement of the Oman Council’s powersbecause of the enhancement of the Oman Council’s powers and the overall clamor for political reform, about 1,330 candidates applied to , about 1,330 candidates applied to
run—a 70% increase from the 2007 vote. run—a 70% increase from the 2007 vote. A record 77 candidates were women; one woman was
elected. Some reformists were heartened by the victory of two political activists, Salim bin Some reformists were heartened by the victory of two political activists, Salim bin
Abdullah AlAbdullah Al Oufi, and Talib Al Maamari, and the selection of a relatively young entrepreneur as
speaker of the Consultative Council (Khalid al-Mawali). In the State Council appointments, the
Sultan appointed 15 women, bringing the total female participation in the Oman Council to 16—
over 10%.8
In 2012, the government also initiated elections for 11 municipal councils, bodies that make
recommendations to the government on development projects, but do not make final funding
decisions. The chairman and deputy chairman of each municipal council are appointed by the
government. In the December 22, 2012 municipal elections, there were 192 seats up for election.
There were more than 1,600 candidates, including 48 women. About 546,000 citizens voted. Four
women were elected.
Another election to the Consultative Council was held on October 25, 2015. A total of 674
candidates applied to run, although 75 candidates were barred, apparently based on their
participation Oufi, 4 James Worrall. “Oman: The ‘Forgotten’ Corner of the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy, September 2012. 5 World Bank, “Oman,” Macro Poverty Outlook, April 2021. 6 International Labour Organization, “Oman institutes its first unemployment insurance scheme,” news, October 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 5 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy and Talib Al Maamari, and the selection of a relatively young entrepreneur as speaker of the Consultative Council (Khalid al-Mawali). In the October 25, 2015 Consultative Council elections, 674 candidates applied to run, although 75 candidates were barred for participating in the 2011 unrest. There were 20 women candidates. The one incumbent woman in the 2011 unrest. There were 20 women candidates. The one incumbent woman
was reelected but no other woman was elected.was reelected but no other woman was elected.
In December 2012, the government also initiated elections for 11 municipal councils, bodies that make recommendations to the government on development projects. On December 25, 2016, the second municipal elections were held to choose 202 councilors—an On December 25, 2016, the second municipal elections were held to choose 202 councilors—an
expanded number from the expanded number from the 2012 municipal elections. The most recent Consultative Council elections were held on October 27, 2019. A total of 637 candidates were approved to run, of which 40 were women. Two women won seats. Khalid bin Hilal 2012 municipal elections. There were 731 candidates, of whom 23
were women. Seven women were elected.
2019 Elections9
The most recent Consultative Council elections were held on October 27, 2019. On July 7, 2019,
the government issued a preliminary list of 767 candidates, including 43 women, but the final
approved list contained 637 candidates, of which 40 were women. There were 713,000 eligible
voters. Turnout was described as high, and two women won seats in the final results, which were
announced October 29, 2019. Khalid bin Hilal al-Mawali was elected to a third term as speaker of al-Mawali was elected to a third term as speaker of
the Consultative Council, and the Consultative Council, and overal overall the Council appeared to represent continuity in Oman’s the Council appeared to represent continuity in Oman’s
political process rather than dramatic change. political process rather than dramatic change. OnIn November November 8, 2019, Qaboos appointed the 2019, Qaboos appointed the
members of the State Council, including 15 members of the State Council, including 15 women. The next elections for Consultative Council are to take place in the fall of 2023. Broader Human Rights Issues7women. The next elections for Consultative Council
are scheduled for 2023.

7 International Labour Organization, “ Oman institutes its first unemployment insurance scheme,” news, October 16,
2020.
8 “15 Women in New Omani State Council,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, November 8, 2019.
9 See “15 Women in New Omani State Council,” Op. cit.
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Broader Human Rights Issues10
According to the most recent State Department report on human rights, the principal human rights According to the most recent State Department report on human rights, the principal human rights
issues in Oman are: “restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including
censorship, site blocking, and criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the rights of
peaceful assembly and freedom of association; required exit permits for foreign workers;
restrictions on political participation; and criminalization of issues in Oman are: arbitrary arrest or detention; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including censorship and criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on the internet, including site blocking; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; serious restrictions on political participation; criminalization of consensual lesbian, gay, bisexual, consensual lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgendertransgender, queer, and intersex conduct, and intersex conduct.”
; and labor exploitation of foreign migrants. The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the Sultan chairs the country’s highest legal The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the Sultan chairs the country’s highest legal
body, the Supreme Judicial Council, which can review judicial decisions. The Oman Human body, the Supreme Judicial Council, which can review judicial decisions. The Oman Human
Rights Commission, a quasi-independent but government-sanctioned body, investigates and Rights Commission, a quasi-independent but government-sanctioned body, investigates and
monitors prison and detention center conditions through site visits. monitors prison and detention center conditions through site visits.
Freedom of Expression, Media, and Association
Omani law provides for limited freedom of speech and press, but the State Department assesses Omani law provides for limited freedom of speech and press, but the State Department assesses
that the government that the government general y does not does not always respect these rights. In October 2015, Oman followed the respect these rights. In October 2015, Oman followed the
lead of many of the other GCC states in issuing a decree prohibiting disseminating information lead of many of the other GCC states in issuing a decree prohibiting disseminating information
that targets “the prestige of the State’s authorities or aimed to weaken confidence in them.” The that targets “the prestige of the State’s authorities or aimed to weaken confidence in them.” The
government has prosecuted dissident bloggers and cyber-activists under that and other laws.government has prosecuted dissident bloggers and cyber-activists under that and other laws.11
Omani law provides for freedom of association for “legitimate objectives and in a proper Omani law provides for freedom of association for “legitimate objectives and in a proper
manner,” enabling the government to restrict such rights in practice. Associations must register manner,” enabling the government to restrict such rights in practice. Associations must register
with the Ministry of Social Development. with the Ministry of Social Development.
Private ownership of radio and television stations is not prohibited, but there are few privately Private ownership of radio and television stations is not prohibited, but there are few privately
owned stations. owned stations. Satel iteSatellite dishes have made foreign broadcasts accessible to the public. dishes have made foreign broadcasts accessible to the public. Stil Still, ,
according to the State Department report, according to the State Department report, there are “Media did not operate freely” in Oman and there are 7 Much of this section is derived from the following State Department reports (latest available): 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; 2020 International Religious Freedom report; and 2021 Trafficking in Persons report. Congressional Research Service 6 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy some legal and practical restrictions to some legal and practical restrictions to
Internet usage, and many Internet sites are blocked for content the government decides is Internet usage, and many Internet sites are blocked for content the government decides is
objectionable. objectionable.
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Rights
According to theEach State Department Trafficking in Persons report since 2018 has rated Oman as “Tier 2,” on the grounds that the government does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The 2021 report states that Oman demonstrated increasing efforts against trafficking compared to the previous reporting period. These efforts included establishing dedicated counter-trafficking units within the Ministry of Labor (MOL) and Royal Oman Police (ROP), identifying and referring more victims to care, and employing standardized screening procedures to identify potential trafficking victims among those arrested for immigration violations or engaging in commercial sex.8 State Department Trafficking in Persons reports, Oman is a destination and
transit country for men and women primarily from South Asia and East Africa who are subjected
to forced labor and, to a lesser extent, sex trafficking. The 2018, 2019, and 2020 Trafficking in
Persons reports rated Oman as Tier 2, based on the government’s investigating, prosecuting, and
convicting more suspected traffickers than in previous years and in standing up a specialized anti-
trafficking prosecutorial unit.12 The government also developed, funded, and began implementing
a new five-year national action plan to combat trafficking in persons.
On broad labor rights, Omani workers have the right to form unions and to strike (except in the On broad labor rights, Omani workers have the right to form unions and to strike (except in the
oil and gas industry), however no independent organized labor unions exist. One government-oil and gas industry), however no independent organized labor unions exist. One government-
backed federation of trade unions exists—the General Federation of Oman Trade Unions. The backed federation of trade unions exists—the General Federation of Oman Trade Unions. The
cal ingcalling of a strike requires an absolute majority of workers in an enterprise. The labor laws permit of a strike requires an absolute majority of workers in an enterprise. The labor laws permit

10 Much of this section, including its subsections, is derived from the State Department’s country report on human
rights practices for 2020; on international religious freedom (2020) and on trafficking in persons (2020).
11 “Omani authorities restrict free expression through censorship and arrests of activists,” Monitor: T racking Civic
Space, September 6, 2017.
12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 T rafficking in Persons Report: Oman, June 25, 2020.
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collective bargaining and prohibit employers from firing or penalizing workers for union activity.
Labor rights are regulated by the Ministry of Manpower.
collective bargaining and prohibit employers from firing or penalizing workers for union activity. Labor rights are regulated by the Ministry of Manpower. The government has been credited with expanding its efforts to protect the rights of expatriate laborers, who are about 80% of the workforce. Some measures to reform the Some measures to reform the kafala or visa-sponsorship employment system have been or visa-sponsorship employment system have been
implemented, such as the June 2020 removal of a requirement for migrant workers to obtain a implemented, such as the June 2020 removal of a requirement for migrant workers to obtain a
“no-objection” certificate from their current employer before changing jobs. However, the State “no-objection” certificate from their current employer before changing jobs. However, the State
Department reports that “migrant workers, employed as domestic workers or as low-skil ed
workers in the construction, agriculture, and service sectors,Department reports that some expatriate laborers have faced working conditions indicative faced working conditions indicative
of forced labor, including withholding of passports, restrictions on movement, usurious of forced labor, including withholding of passports, restrictions on movement, usurious
recruitment fees, nonpayment of wages, long working hours without food or rest, threats, and recruitment fees, nonpayment of wages, long working hours without food or rest, threats, and
physical or sexual abuse.physical or sexual abuse.”13 Migrant laborers constitute approximately 80 percent of the labor
force in Oman.
9 Religious Freedom14Freedom10
Oman has Oman has historical yhistorically had a high degree of religious tolerance had a high degree of religious tolerance, particularly compared to some of
the other GCC states such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. An estimated 45%-75% (government . An estimated 45%-75% (government
figure) of Omanis adhere to the Ibadhi sect, a relatively moderate school of Islam centered mostly figure) of Omanis adhere to the Ibadhi sect, a relatively moderate school of Islam centered mostly
in Oman, East Africa, and in parts of Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia.in Oman, East Africa, and in parts of Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia.1511 About 5% of Oman’s citizens About 5% of Oman’s citizens
are Shia Muslims, and they are are Shia Muslims, and they are al owedallowed to adjudicate family and personal status cases according to adjudicate family and personal status cases according
to Shia jurisprudenceto Shia jurisprudence, - outside the civil court system. outside the civil court system.
The State Department religious freedom report notes no known instances of societal abuses or
discrimination based on religious affiliation or practice. Non-Muslims, who are mostly Non-Muslims, who are mostly
expatriates working in Oman, are free to worship at temples and churches built on land donated expatriates working in Oman, are free to worship at temples and churches built on land donated
by the governmentby the government, but but, according to law, offending Islam or any Abrahamic religion is a criminal offending Islam or any Abrahamic religion is a criminal
offense. offense. In JanuaryA 2018, 2018, a new penal code penal code revision significantly increased penalties for blasphemy and significantly increased penalties for blasphemy and
for promoting a religion other than Islam. for promoting a religion other than Islam.
Al All religious organizations must be registered with the Ministry of religious organizations must be registered with the Ministry of Endow mentsEndowments and Religious and Religious
Affairs (MERA). Among non-Muslim sponsors recognized by MERA are the Protestant Church Affairs (MERA). Among non-Muslim sponsors recognized by MERA are the Protestant Church
of Oman; the Catholic Diocese of Oman; the al Amana Center (interdenominational Christian); of Oman; the Catholic Diocese of Oman; the al Amana Center (interdenominational Christian);
and the Hindu Mahajan Temple. Buddhists are able to worship in private spaces, but have not
been able to build separate places of worship. Members of al religions and sects are free to
maintain links with coreligionists abroad and travel outside Oman for religious purposes. MERA
has al owed construction of a new building for Orthodox Christians, with separate hal s for
Syrian, 8 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Oman 9 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman. 10 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Oman. 11 Whereas Ibadhi religious and political dogma generally resembles basic Sunni doctrine, Ibadhis are neither Sunni nor Shia. Ibadhis argue that religious leaders should be chosen by community leaders for their knowledge and piety, without regard to race or lineage. A rebellion led by the Imam of Oman, leader of the Ibadhi sect, ended in 1959. Congressional Research Service 7 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy and the Hindu Mahajan Temple. Buddhists are able to worship in private spaces. MERA has allowed construction of a new building for Orthodox Christians, with separate halls for Syrian, Coptic, and Greek Orthodox Christians, and it has approved worship space for Baptists. A Coptic, and Greek Orthodox Christians, and it has approved worship space for Baptists. A
new Catholic church was inaugurated in Salalah in September 2019. The Church of Jesus Christ new Catholic church was inaugurated in Salalah in September 2019. The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) has not received approval to establish an independent place of of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) has not received approval to establish an independent place of
worship. There is no indigenous Jewish population, and private media have worship. There is no indigenous Jewish population, and private media have occasional y
occasionally published anti-Semitic editorial cartoons. published anti-Semitic editorial cartoons.
Advancement of Women
During his reign, Sultan Qaboos emphasized that Omani women are vital to national
development. Women now constitute over 30% of the workforce. The first woman of ministerial

13 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman, March 30, 2021.
14 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Oman, May 12, 2021.
15 Whereas Ibadhi religious and political dogma generally resembles basic Sunni doctrine, Ibadhis are neither Sunni nor
Shia. Ibadhis argue that religious leaders should be chosen by community leaders for their knowledge and piety,
without regard to race or lineage. A rebellion led by the Imam of Oman, leader of the Ibadhi sect, ended in 1959 .
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Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links with coreligionists abroad. Advancement of Women During his reign, Sultan Qaboos emphasized that Omani women are vital to national development and sought to promote their advancement. As of 2022, women (citizens and expatriates) constitute over 30% of the workforce. The first woman of ministerial rank in Oman was appointed in March 2003, and, since then, there have consistently been several rank in Oman was appointed in March 2003, and, since then, there have consistently been several
female ministers. Oman’s ambassador to the United States, Hunaina al-Mughairy, is a woman.
The number of women in Oman’s elected institutions was discussed above, but campaigns by
Omani women’s groups failed to establish a quota for women elected to the Consultative Council.
female ministers in each cabinet. The 2021 Global Gender Gap Report notes that Oman scores particularly poorly due to the The 2021 Global Gender Gap Report notes that Oman scores particularly poorly due to the
country’s lack of female political representation. country’s lack of female political representation. The country ranks 13th within the MENA region
for gender equality on the index, and 145th global y.
More broadly, Omani women continue to face social discrimination, often as a result of the More broadly, Omani women continue to face social discrimination, often as a result of the
interpretation of Islamic law. interpretation of Islamic law. Al egationsAllegations of spousal abuse and domestic violence are fairly of spousal abuse and domestic violence are fairly
common, with women relying on their families, rather than legal institutions, for their protection.common, with women relying on their families, rather than legal institutions, for their protection.
The World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law 2021 index scores Oman 35.6 out of 100, lower
than the regional MENA average, due in part to constraints on freedom of movement for women.
Foreign Policy/Regional Issues
During Sultan Qaboos’s reign, Oman pursued a Foreign Policy/Regional Issues Oman’s foreign policy foreign policy that sometimes sometimes divergeddiverges from that from that
of some of of some of Oman’sits GCC partners, particularly GCC partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Oman has had border disputes with the UAE; the two finalized their borders in 2008, nearly a decade after a tentative border settlement in 1999. Oman has generally sought to mediate resolution of regional conflicts and refrained from direct military involvement in them. In 2014, Saudi Arabia. Sultan Haythim has said he wil
largely continue Qaboos’s foreign policy, in which Oman has general y sought to mediate
resolution of regional conflicts and refrained from direct military involvement in them. However,
some observers have speculated that Oman’s weak financial position and Haythim’s inexperience
in a leadership role could open Oman to pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to support their
foreign policy initiatives.16
Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, but did not participate in the Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, but did not participate in the
coalition’s airstrikes or ground operations against the group. Oman did not coalition’s airstrikes or ground operations against the group. Oman did not join the Saudi-led
Arab coalition assembled in 2015 to fight the Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen and has instead
sought to mediate a resolution of that conflict. In 2013, Oman opposed a Saudi proposal for
political unity among the GCC states, even threatening to withdraw from the GCC if the plan was
adopted.17 Oman also provide material support to any armed groups fighting the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, nor did it join the Saudi-led Arab coalition assembled in 2015 to fight the Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen. Oman opposed the Saudi-led move in June 2017 to isolate Qatar over a number of opposed the Saudi-led move in June 2017 to isolate Qatar over a number of
policy disagreements. Lingering border disputes also have plagued Oman-UAE relations; the two
finalized their borders in 2008, nearly a decade after a tentative border settlement in 1999.
Iran18policy disagreements. Iran12
Omani leaders, including Sultan Haythim, have consistently asserted that engagement with Iran Omani leaders, including Sultan Haythim, have consistently asserted that engagement with Iran
better mitigates the potential threat from that country than confrontation—a stance that has better mitigates the potential threat from that country than confrontation—a stance that has
positioned Oman as a mediator in regional conflicts in which Iran or its proxies are involved. In positioned Oman as a mediator in regional conflicts in which Iran or its proxies are involved. In
explaining Oman’s positive relations with Iran, Omani leaders often cite the Shah of Iran’s explaining Oman’s positive relations with Iran, Omani leaders often cite the Shah of Iran’s
support for Qaboos’s 1970 takeover and Iran’s deployment of troops to help Oman end the leftist support for Qaboos’s 1970 takeover and Iran’s deployment of troops to help Oman end the leftist
revolt in Oman’s Dhofar Province during 1962-1975, a conflict in which 700 Iranian soldiers revolt in Oman’s Dhofar Province during 1962-1975, a conflict in which 700 Iranian soldiers
died.19
Sultan Qaboos demonstrated his commitment to relations with his visit to Tehran in August 2009,
at the time of massive Iranian protests over al eged fraud in the reelection of President Mahmoud

16 Anne Sheline, “ Oman’s Smooth T ransition Doesn’t Mean Its Neighbors Won’t Stir Up T rouble,” Foreign Policy,
January 23, 2020.
17 “Omani rejection of GCC union adds insult to injury for Saudi Arabia,” Al Monitor, December 9, 2013.
18died.13 At the same time, Oman has supported U.S. efforts to deter Iran strategically. As noted below, it has hosted U.S. forces since 1980s, it has supported U.S. operations to deter Iran, and it regularly participates in U.S.-led exercises in the Gulf. In January 9, 2019, Oman hosted meetings 12 For information on Iran’s regional policies, see CRS For information on Iran’s regional policies, see CRS Report R44017, Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by , by
Kenneth Katzman. Kenneth Katzman.
19 13 Faramarz Davar, “ Faramarz Davar, “ Why is Oman So Loyal to Iran?” Iranwire, AugustWhy is Oman So Loyal to Iran?” Iranwire, August 9, 2018.9, 2018.
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Ahmadinejad. He visited again in August 2013, after Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani took office.
Rouhani visited Oman in 2014 and 2017; the latter trip was part of an unsuccessful Iranian effort
on the “economic and energy pillars of the Middle East Strategic Alliance,” a planned U.S.-backed partnership with the GCC countries and other Arab states to counter Iran.14 Sultan Qaboos demonstrated his commitment to relations with his visit to Tehran in August 2009, at the time of massive Iranian protests against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rouhani visited Oman in 2014 and 2017 as part of Iranian efforts to begin a political dialogue with the GCC. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade to begin a political dialogue with the GCC. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade
relations with Iran in January 2016 in solidarity with Saudi Arabia when the Kingdom broke relations with Iran in January 2016 in solidarity with Saudi Arabia when the Kingdom broke
relations with Iran in connection with the dispute over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia relations with Iran in connection with the dispute over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia
cleric. In 2009, Iran and Oman agreed to cooperate against smuggling across the Gulf of Oman.
In cleric. In August 2010, Oman signed a pact with Iran to cooperate in patrolling the Strait of Hormuz, an August 2010, Oman signed a pact with Iran to cooperate in patrolling the Strait of Hormuz, an
agreement that reportedly committed the two to hold joint military exercises. The two countries agreement that reportedly committed the two to hold joint military exercises. The two countries
expanded that agreement by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation in expanded that agreement by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation in
2013, and they have held some joint exercises under these agreements.2013, and they have held some joint exercises under these agreements.2015 Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi visited Oman in late May 2022 to discuss regional issues and sign a series of agreements to expand bilateral trade and move forward on long delayed joint energy development projects, including to develop the Hengham oil field in the Persian Gulf.16
Iran and Oman conduct significant volumes of civilian trade, but Oman has sought to ensure that Iran and Oman conduct significant volumes of civilian trade, but Oman has sought to ensure that
its projects with Iran would not violate any of the wide array of U.S. sanctions in effect on its projects with Iran would not violate any of the wide array of U.S. sanctions in effect on
transactions with Iran. transactions with Iran. Most notably, Oman has permitted Iran to invest in the expansion of Oman has permitted Iran to invest in the expansion of
Oman’s port of Al Duqm, which Tehran might Oman’s port of Al Duqm, which Tehran might eventual yeventually use as a hub to interact with the global use as a hub to interact with the global
economy. Oman and Iran are jointly developing a $200 mil ion car production plant there.21 Iran
and Oman have jointly developed the Hengham oilfield in the Persian Gulf.22 In economy.17 In 2014, the two 2014, the two
countries signed a deal to build a $1 countries signed a deal to build a $1 bil ion billion undersea pipeline to bring Iranian natural gas from undersea pipeline to bring Iranian natural gas from
Iran’s Hormuzegan Province to Sohar in Oman, from where it would be exported, but the Iran’s Hormuzegan Province to Sohar in Oman, from where it would be exported, but the
reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 derailed the concept.reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 derailed the concept.2318 If the U.S. and Iran were to If the U.S. and Iran were to
reinstate the nuclear agreement, Oman is reportedly prepared to resume work on the Iran-Oman reinstate the nuclear agreement, Oman is reportedly prepared to resume work on the Iran-Oman
pipeline project.24
pipeline project.19 The two countries recommitted to the pipeline project during President Raisi’s visit to Oman in late May 2022. Oman as a Go-Between for the United States and Iran
Oman’s relations with Iran have often helped U.S. officials negotiate with Iranian officials. U.S. Oman’s relations with Iran have often helped U.S. officials negotiate with Iranian officials. U.S.
officials’ meetings with Iranian officials in Oman that began in early 2013 set the stage for officials’ meetings with Iranian officials in Oman that began in early 2013 set the stage for
negotiations that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran nuclear negotiations that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran nuclear
agreement that was finalized in July 2015.agreement that was finalized in July 2015.2520 Omani banks, including Bank Muscat that held about Omani banks, including Bank Muscat that held about
$5.7 $5.7 bil ion billion in Iranian funds, were used to implement some of the in Iranian funds, were used to implement some of the financial arrangements of the
JCPOA.26
Oman also has been an intermediary through which the United States and Iran have exchanged
captives. Oman brokered a U.S. hand-over of Iranians captured during U.S.-Iran skirmishes in the

20 Giorgio Cafiero and Adam Yefet. “Oman and the GCC: A Solid Relationship?” Middle East Policy, 2016.
21 “In post-oil economy, Oman turns sleepy fishing port to bustling trading hub,” National, February 7, 2017; “Car
Production Plan Back on Iran-Oman Agenda,” Financial Tribune, January 24, 2017.
22 “Hengam Gas Processing to Help Earn $300m Annually,” Financial Tribune, March 3, 2018.
23 Dana El Baltaji, “Oman Fights Saudi Bid for Gulf pact’s financial arrangements.21 14 U.S. Department of State,” “Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id,” press statement, January 15, 2019. 15 Giorgio Cafiero and Adam Yefet, “Oman and the GCC: A Solid Relationship?” Middle East Policy, 2016. 16 Iran, Oman to jointly develop oil field, Al Monitor, May 23, 2022. 17 “In post-oil economy, Oman turns sleepy fishing port to bustling trading hub,” National, February 7, 2017. 18 Dana El Baltaji, “Oman Fights Saudi Bid for Gulf Hegemony with Iran Pipeline Plan,” Hegemony with Iran Pipeline Plan,” Bloomberg, April 21, 2014; , April 21, 2014;
“Oman to Invite Bids to Build“Oman to Invite Bids to Build Gas Gas Pipeline,” Pipeline,” Financial Tribune, April 23, 2018. , April 23, 2018.
2419 Katie McQue, “ Katie McQue, “ INT ERVIEWINTERVIEW: Oman wants to extend gas pipeline network to Iran and Yemen: Oman wants to extend gas pipeline network to Iran and Yemen : minister,” S&P : minister,” S&P
Global,Global, May 17, 2021. May 17, 2021.
25 20 David Ignatius, “Opinions: David Ignatius, “Opinions: T heThe Omani ‘back channel’ to Iran and the secrecy surrounding Omani ‘back channel’ to Iran and the secrecy surrounding the nuclear deal,” the nuclear deal,”
Washington Post, June, June 7, 2016. 7, 2016.
2621 Omani banks had a waiver Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions lawsfrom U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring to permit transferring t hosethose funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in
accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ( P.L. 112-81). For P.L. 112-81). For
text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Juliatext of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield Frifield to to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.” See also Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.” See also
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report, “ Review of U.S. T reasury
Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System,” May 2018.
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Persian Gulf in 1987-1988. In 2007, Oman helped broker Iran’s release of 15 British sailors, who
Iran had captured in the Shatt al Arab waterway. U.S. State Department officials publicly
confirmed that Oman helped broker the 2010-2011 releases from Iran of three U.S. hikers (Sara
Shourd, Josh Fattal, and Shane Bauer), in part by paying their $500,000 per person bail to Iran.27
In April 2013, Omani mediation obtained the release to Iran of an Iranian scientist imprisoned in
the United States in 2011 for procuring nuclear equipment for Iran.
The Trump Administration did not criticize Oman’s relations with Iran, even though Omani
policy conflicted to some extent with U.S. efforts to isolate Iran. During a January 2019 regional
trip, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo praised Oman for enforcing the sanctions that the Trump
Administration re-imposed on Iran.28 Since November 2016, Iran had been exporting heavy water
to Oman, helping Iran reduce its stockpile to a level that comports with its commitments under
the JCPOA. However, in May 2019, the United States ended waivers that enabled countries to
buy Iranian heavy water without U.S. penalty, a decision that caused Oman to stop importing
Iranian heavy water. In May 2019, Secretary Pompeo discussed escalating U.S.-Iran tensions with
Sultan Qaboos, suggesting that the United States sought Oman’s help to de-escalate tensions.29
However, it is not clear that any Omani mediation resulted from the conversation.
With the resumption of negotiations between the Biden Administration and Tehran in early 2021,
it remains unclear whether there is a diplomatic role for Oman to play. In February 2021, Omani
Foreign Minister, Badr al-Busaidi, expressed his country’s desire to see a return to the nuclear
deal, but noted that lines of communication appear to be directly open between Washington and
Tehran, obviating the need for Oman to serve as intermediary.30
Oman, Iran, and Yemen31
In neighboring Yemen, Oman and Iran’s interests conflict, insofar as Iran is widely reported,
including by U.N. investigators, to be arming and advising the Zaidi During 2016-2019, Iran was exporting heavy water to Oman in order to maintain its stockpile at levels that comport with its commitments under the JCPOA. However, in May 2019, the United States ended waivers that enabled countries to buy Iranian heavy water without U.S. penalty, a decision that caused Oman to stop importing Iranian heavy water. 22 Oman has supported negotiations between the Biden Administration and Tehran to restore full compliance with the JCPOA, and Omani officials, including during the visit to Oman of Iranian President Raisi in May 2022, have reportedly encouraged Iran to compromise in those talks in the interests of achieving an accord. In prior years, Oman was an intermediary through which the United States and Iran have exchanged captives. Oman brokered a U.S. hand-over of Iranians captured during U.S.-Iran skirmishes in the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988. U.S. State Department officials publicly confirmed that Oman helped broker the 2010-2011 releases from Iran of three U.S. hikers (Sara Shourd, Josh Fattal, and Shane Bauer), in part by paying their $500,000 per person bail to Iran.23 In April 2013, Omani mediation obtained the release to Iran of an Iranian scientist imprisoned in the United States in 2011 for procuring nuclear equipment for Iran. Oman, Iran, and Yemen24 In neighboring Yemen, Oman’s and Iran’s interests conflict, insofar as U.N. investigators have cited Iran as arming and advising the Zaidi Shia “Houthi” movement Shia “Houthi” movement
that drove the Republic of that drove the Republic of Yemen government out of the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. In an effort to help mediate a resolution of the conflict, which Omani officials are concerned could spill over into Oman, Muscat has hosted talks between U.S. diplomats and Houthi representatives, some of whom Oman allows to operate openly in Oman. Oman reportedly was instrumental in helping broker the two month ceasefire between the Yemen government and the Houthis, and Omani officials are attempting to achieve an extension of that truce, in the hopes that a longer truce could lay the groundwork for a permanent settlement of the war.25 Some U.S. officials and reports indicated that Iran was usingYemen government out of the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Oman did not
join the Saudi-led Arab coalition fighting to restore the Yemen government and has instead sought
to use its ties to Iran to mediate the Yemen conflict. The U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen in 2018
described Oman as “playing a pivotal role in al our efforts to help people in Yemen.”32 Oman
hosted talks between U.S. diplomats and Houthi representatives, and brokered the Houthis’
release of several of their captives.33 Oman also has sought to prevent spil over of the Yemen
conflict into Oman by increasing patrols along the border with Yemen. The Oman government
also has built ties with tribes and residents just over the border, and it has provided some
humanitarian aid to the Yemeni people.34

27 Dennis Hevesi, “Philo Dibble, Diplomat and Iran Expert, Dies at 60,” New York Times, October 13, 2011.
28 U.S. Department of State, “A Force for Good: America Reinvigorated in the Middle East,” Speech by Secretary of
State Michael Pompeo, January 10, 2019.
29 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Sa’id,” readout. May
16, 2019.
30 “A conversation with H.E. Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of Oman ,” The Atlantic Council, February 11,
2021.
31 For information, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
32 Madiha Asif, “Oman playing key role in helping Yemeni citizens,” Times of Oman, April 8, 2018.
33 Adam Goldman, “Marine Veteran, Held a Year by Yemeni Rebels, is Freed,” New York Times, November 7, 2016.
34 “Oman’s humanitarian aid to Yemen also pragmatic,” Al Monitor, January 9, 2020.
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In 2016, media reports indicated that Iran has used Omani territory to smuggle weapons into Omani territory to smuggle weapons into
Yemen, taking advantage of the porous and sparsely populated 179-mile border between the two Yemen, taking advantage of the porous and sparsely populated 179-mile border between the two
countries.countries.3526 Smuggled materiel Smuggled materiel al egedly allegedly included anti-ship missiles,included anti-ship missiles,3627 surface-to-surface short- surface-to-surface short-
range missiles, range missiles, smal arms, and explosives. Some reports indicate that Iranian-madesmall arms, explosives, and unmanned unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) used by Houthi forces in Yemen may have transited through Oman.37 U.N.
reports from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) identified land
routes that stretch from the Omani border to Houthi-controlled areas in the west and Omani ports
with road access to Yemen as possible channels for weapons smuggling.38 Omani officials denied
the al egations.”39 Since the March 2018 visit of then-Defense Secretary James Mattis to discuss
ways to secure the Oman-Yemen border, Omani officials asserted in 2018 that the “file” of Iran
smuggling weaponry to the Houthis via Omani territory was “closed,” suggesting that Oman has
stopped any such trafficking through it.40
Theaerial vehicles (UAVs).28 Since the March 2018 visit of then-Defense Secretary James Mattis to discuss ways to secure the Oman-Yemen border, Omani officials asserted in 2018 that the “file” of Iran smuggling weaponry to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report, “Review of U.S. Treasury Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System,” May 2018. 22 “A conversation with H.E. Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of Oman,” The Atlantic Council, February 11, 2021. 23 Dennis Hevesi, “Philo Dibble, Diplomat and Iran Expert, Dies at 60,” New York Times, October 13, 2011. 24The current instability adds to a long record of difficulty in Oman-Yemen relations. The former current instability adds to a long record of difficulty in Oman-Yemen relations. The former
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), considered Marxist and pro-Soviet, supported People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), considered Marxist and pro-Soviet, supported
Oman’s Dhofar Oman’s Dhofar rebel ionrebellion (see above). Oman-PDRY relations were normalized in 1983, but the (see above). Oman-PDRY relations were normalized in 1983, but the
two engaged in border clashes later in that decade. Relations improved after 1990, when PDRY two engaged in border clashes later in that decade. Relations improved after 1990, when PDRY
merged with North Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen.
Related U.S. Assistance Issues. The United States obligates Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,
Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds for counterterrorism programming, some of
which is used for the Oman Border Security Enhancement Program that is “focused on
developing and enhancing Omani border security capabilities along the Oman-Yemen border.”41
The FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260H.R. 5515, P.L. 115-232)
appropriated funds to Oman in accordance with Section 1226 of the FY2016 NDAA (22 U.S.C.
2151) to secure the border with Yemen. U.S. assistance to Oman for counter-terrorism and border
security is discussed in greater detail below.
Cooperation against the Islamic State Organization (ISIS) and on Syria
and Iraq

Oman, along with the other GCC states, joined the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in
2014. Oman offered the use of its air bases for the coalition but, unlike several other GCC states,
Oman did not conduct airstrikes against the group. Oman also was not reported to have backed
any rebel groups fighting Iran’s close al y, Syrian President Bashar Al Asad, and instead focused
on mediating the Syria internal conflict. Oman joined other Arab states in 2011 in suspending
Syria’s membership in the Arab League, but Oman did not suspend its relations with the Syrian

35 Yara Bayoumy and Phil Steward, merged with North Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen. For information, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 25 “UN hails roles of Saudi Arabia, Oman in reaching Yemen truce,” Arab Weekly, April 15, 2022. 26 Yara Bayoumy and Phil Steward, “Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen’s Houthis via Oman“Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen’s Houthis via Oman ——
officials,” Reuters, October 20 2016. officials,” Reuters, October 20 2016.
3627 “U.S. warship targeted in failed missile “U.S. warship targeted in failed missile attack from Yemen: official,” attack from Yemen: official,” Reuters, October 15, 2016. , October 15, 2016.
3728 “Iranian “Iranian T echnology T ransfersTechnology Transfers to Yemen,” Conflict Armament Research to Yemen,” Conflict Armament Research, March 2017. Congressional Research Service 10 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy Houthis via Omani territory was “closed,” suggesting that Oman had stopped any such trafficking through it.29 The United States obligates Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds for counterterrorism programming, some of which is used for the Oman Border Security Enhancement Program that is “focused on developing and enhancing Omani border security capabilities along the Oman-Yemen border.”30 Israeli-Palestinian Dispute and Related Issues Oman has consistently sought an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute as a means of calming regional tensions. , March 2017.
38 See, for example, S/2018/68, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, January 26, 2018.
39 “Oman denies arms smuggled through border to Houthis,” Middle East Eye, October 21, 2016.
40 U.S. Department of Defense, “Press Gaggle En Route to Oman,” March 10, 2018; CRS conversations with Oman
Embassy in Washington, DC, June 2018.
41 State Department CN 18-090, transmitted May 3, 2018.
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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

government.42 In July 2019, Oman’s de-facto Foreign Minister Yusuf Alawi visited Damascus
reportedly to convey a U.S. message to Asad and to discuss regional stability.43
On Iraq, no GCC state undertook air strikes against the Islamic State fighters there. The GCC
states general y have not assisted the Shia-dominated government in post-Saddam Iraq. Oman
opened an embassy in Iraq after the 2003 ousting of Saddam but then closed it for several years
following a shooting outside it in November 2005 that wounded four, including an embassy
employee. The embassy reopened in 2007, and Oman provided $3 mil ion for Iraq’s stabilization
and reconstruction.44
Israeli-Palestinian Dispute and Related Issues
Oman was the one of the few Arab countries not to break relations with Egypt after the signing of Oman was the one of the few Arab countries not to break relations with Egypt after the signing of
the U.S.-brokered the U.S.-brokered Egyptian-IsraeliEgypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979. The GCC states peace treaty in 1979. The GCC states all participated in participated in the multilateral the
multilateral peace talks established by the peace talks established by the 1991 U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace processU.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process that was established in 1991. As a . As a
result of the multilateralresult of the multilateral working group sessions of that process, Oman hosts a Middle East working group sessions of that process, Oman hosts a Middle East
Desalination Research Center. In September 1994, Oman and the other GCC states renounced the Desalination Research Center. In September 1994, Oman and the other GCC states renounced the
secondary and tertiary Arab boycott of Israel.secondary and tertiary Arab boycott of Israel.45
31 In December 1994, Oman became the first Gulf state to In December 1994, Oman became the first Gulf state to official yofficially host a visit by an Israeli prime host a visit by an Israeli prime
minister (Yitzhak Rabin), and it hosted then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. In minister (Yitzhak Rabin), and it hosted then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. In
October 1995, Oman exchanged trade offices with Israel, but diplomatic relations were not October 1995, Oman exchanged trade offices with Israel, but diplomatic relations were not
established. The trade offices closed following the September 2000 Palestinian uprising and have established. The trade offices closed following the September 2000 Palestinian uprising and have
remained closed.remained closed.4632 On October 25, 2018, On October 25, 2018, Israeli Israel’s then-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu visited Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu visited
Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos to discuss regional issues, a visit widely seen as evidence of
improving ties between Israel and some of the GCC states. The visit was followed up by a
November 2018 visit to Oman by Israel’s Minister of Transportation and Minister of Intel igence
Yisrael Katz to present a concept for a railway between Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states.47 On
July 2, 2019, an Israeli intel igence official stated at a public conference that Israel had
established a representative office in Oman. Israeli Foreign Ministry officials did not confirm or
deny that assertion.48
Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos to discuss regional issues. On July 2, 2019, an Israeli intelligence official stated at a public conference that Israel had established a representative office in Oman. Israeli Foreign Ministry officials did not confirm or deny that assertion.33 Oman’s ties to Israel have prompted speculation among experts that Oman would follow the UAE and Bahrain in normalizing relations with Israel, but Omani officials have not given any indication that doing so is currently under consideration. Oman publicly supports the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its diplomatic initiatives Oman publicly supports the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its diplomatic initiatives
and its claims of Palestinian statehood. In 2018, Oman’s and its claims of Palestinian statehood. In 2018, Oman’s then-Foreign Minister Foreign Minister Yusuf Alawi visited the Al Alawi visited the Al
Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, and he also met Palestinian officials in Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, and he also met Palestinian officials in Ramal ah. Ramallah. In June 2019, Oman’s Foreign Ministry announced on Twitter: "In continuation of Oman's support for the Palestinian people, the Sultanate of Oman has decided to open a diplomatic mission at the level of embassy in the State of Palestine." In February 2021, Oman’s Foreign Minister reiterated a commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians.34 Defense and Security Issues35 As threats to the region mounted after Iran’s 1979 revolution, Sultan Qaboos, a Sandhurst-educated defense strategist, consistently asserted that the United States was the security guarantor 29 U.S. Department of Defense, “Press Gaggle En Route to Oman,” March 10, 2018; CRS conversations with Oman Embassy in Washington, DC, June 2018. 30 State Department CN 18-090, transmitted May 3, 2018. 31 See CRS Report RL33961, Arab League Boycott of Israel, by Martin A. Weiss. 32 See CRS In Focus IF11237, Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti. 33 “Mossad Chief Declares Israel Renewing Oman Ties; Foreign Ministry Won’t Comment,” Times of Israel, July 2, 2019. 34 “Oman content with current Israel relationship, foreign minister says,” Middle East Eye, February 12, 2021. 35 Much of this section is derived from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Oman,” June 15, Congressional Research Service 11 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy of the region. On April 21, 1980, Oman signed a “facilities access agreement” that allows U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities and, days later, U.S. forces used an air base on Oman’s In June 2019,
Oman announced plans to open an embassy to the Palestinians in the West Bank.49 The
announcement coincided with the U.S.-led workshop in Bahrain intended to promote investment
in the region as part of a Middle East peace initiative. Neither Palestinian nor Omani officials

42 “T he growing strength of Russian-Omani ties,” T he Middle East Institute, March 10, 2020.
43 Sigurd Neubauer, “Oman: the Gulf’s Go-Between,” T he Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 4, 2016;
“Omani foreign minister makes rare visit to Syria,” Washington Post, July 7, 2019.
44 U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Iraq’s Transition: the Way Ahead: Part I, hearing, 108th Cong.,
2nd sess., May 18, 2004, S.Hrg. 108-645 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005).
45 See CRS Report RL33961, Arab League Boycott of Israel, by Martin A. Weiss.
46 See CRS In Focus IF11237, Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
47 “Israeli minister in Oman to attend transport conference,” Al Jazeera, November 7, 2018.
48 “Mossad Chief Declares Israel Renewing Oman T ies; Foreign Ministry Won’t Comment,” Times of Israel, July 2,
2019.
49 “Oman says to open embassy in Palestinian territories,” AFP, June 26, 2019.
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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

attended the workshop. Oman has publicly rejected Israel’s announced plans to annex parts of the
West Bank.50
Unlike its Gulf neighbors, Oman has not indicated active consideration of normalizing relations
with Israel and joining onto the Abraham Accords alongside the UAE and Bahrain. In February
2021, the Omani Foreign Minister noted contentment with the current level of relations and
dialogue with Israel, and reiterated a commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and the
Palestinians.51
Defense and Security Issues52
As threats to the region mounted after Iran’s 1979 revolution, Sultan Qaboos, a Sandhurst-
educated defense strategist, consistently asserted that the United States was the security guarantor
of the region. On April 21, 1980, Oman signed a “facilities access agreement” that al ows U.S.
forces access to Omani military facilities and, days later, U.S. forces used Oman’s Masirah Island
air base to launch the failed attempt to rescueMasirah Island to launch an attempted rescue of the U.S. Embassy hostages in Iran. Under the the U.S. Embassy hostages in Iran. Under the
agreement, which agreement, which the State Department fact sheet cited above says was revised and renewed in
2010remains in force, the United States reportedly has access to Oman’s military airfields in Muscat (the capital), , the United States reportedly has access to Oman’s military airfields in Muscat (the capital),
Thumrait, Masirah Island, and Musnanah. U.S. forces used these facilities for major combat Thumrait, Masirah Island, and Musnanah. U.S. forces used these facilities for major combat
operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) and, to a lesser extent, Iraq operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) and, to a lesser extent, Iraq
(Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). Oman did not contribute forces either to OEF or OIF. After (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). Oman did not contribute forces either to OEF or OIF. After
2004, Omani facilities2004, Omani facilities were not used for U.S. air operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. A few hundred U.S. military personnel, mostly Air Force, are stationed in Oman.36 On were not used for U.S. air operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
According to February 2018 testimony of then-CENTCOM commander General Joseph Votel,
each year Omani military forces participate in several exercises, and Oman al ows 5,000
overflights and 600 landings by U.S. military aircraft and hosts 80 port cal s by U.S. naval
vessels.53 A few hundred U.S. military personnel, mostly Air Force, are stationed in Oman.54
Omani leaders have expressed wil ingness to join a U.S.-backed “Middle East Strategic Al iance”
(MESA) among al six GCC states and other Sunni Arab states that would counter Iran. The
Trump Administration reportedly planned to formalize that coalition at a U.S.-GCC summit in the
United States, but the intra-GCC rift repeatedly delayed a summit and the finalization of the
MESA. On January 9, 2019, Oman hosted meetings on the “economic and energy pil ars of the
Middle East Strategic Al iance,” according to the readout of Secretary Pompeo‘s meeting with
Qaboos on January 15, 2019.55
On March 24, 2019, Oman and the United States signed a “Strategic Framework Agreement” that March 24, 2019, Oman and the United States signed a “Strategic Framework Agreement” that
expands the U.S.-Oman facilities access agreements by expands the U.S.-Oman facilities access agreements by al owingallowing U.S. forces to use the ports of Al Duqm, which is large enough to handle U.S. aircraft carriers, and Salalah.37 U.S. Arms Sales and Other Security Assistance to Oman38 Oman’s approximately 45,000-person armed force—collectively called the “Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces”—is widely considered one of the best trained in the region. However, in large part because of Oman’s limited funds, it is one of the least well equipped of the GCC countries. Oman’s annual defense budget is about $9 billion out of a total $30 billion budget. Oman is trying to expand and modernize its arsenal primarily with purchases from the United States, assisted by relatively small amounts of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Since 2015, the United States has provided Oman with over $13 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). As of June U.S. forces to use the ports of Al

50 “Updated: Oman Rejects Israeli Plan as Netanyahu Moves to Annex 75% of Area C,” International Middle East
Media Center
, September 15, 2019.
51 “Oman content with current Israel relationship, foreign minister says,” Middle East Eye, February 12, 2021.
52 Much of this section is derived from U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Security Cooperation with Oman,” January 20,
2021; author conversation with U.S. and Omani officials (1990 -2020), and various press reports.
53 T estimony of Gen. Joseph Votel, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Terrorism and Iran:
Defense Challenges in the Middle East
, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2018, H.Hrg. 115-74 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 2019).
54 Contingency T racking System Deployment File, provided to CRS by the Department of Defense.
55 U.S. Department of State,” “ Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id,” press statement,
January 15, 2019.
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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Duqm (see above) and Salalah.56 Al Duqm is large enough to handle U.S. aircraft carriers, and
U.S. officials viewed the agreement as improving the U.S. ability to counter Iran.
Oman’s Defense Relations with other Militaries
In part because of his historic ties to the British military, Sultan Qaboos relied on seconded
British officers to command Omani military services early in his reign and bought British
weaponry. Over the past two decades, Oman has shifted its arsenal mostly to U.S.-made major
combat systems. Stil , as a signal of the continuing close defense relationship, Britain and Oman
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2016 to build a base near Al Duqm port, at a
cost of about $110 mil ion, to support the stationing of British naval and other forces in Oman on
a permanent basis.57 In February 2018, India reportedly signed an agreement with Oman granting
the Indian navy the use of the port as wel .58
U.S. Arms Sales and Other Security Assistance to Oman59
Oman’s approximately 43,000-person armed force—collectively cal ed the “Sultan of Oman’s
Armed Forces”—is widely considered one of the best trained in the region. However, in large part
because of Oman’s limited funds, it is one of the least wel equipped of the GCC countries.
Oman’s annual defense budget is about $9 bil ion out of a total $30 bil ion budget.
Oman is trying to expand and modernize its arsenal primarily with purchases from the United
States, assisted by relatively smal amounts of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Oman
also is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act. Since 2014, the United States has provided Oman with over $14 mil ion in
Foreign Military Financing. None is requested for FY2021. As of January 2021, the United States 2021, the United States
has 72 active cases valued at $2.has 72 active cases valued at $2.86 bil ion 7 billion with Oman under the government-to-government with Oman under the government-to-government
Foreign MilitaryForeign Military Sales (FMS) system. Since Sales (FMS) system. Since 20142016, the U.S. has also authorized the permanent , the U.S. has also authorized the permanent
export of over $export of over $730 mil ion613 million in defense articles to Oman via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) in defense articles to Oman via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
process. The top categories of DCS to Oman include gas turbine engines, military electronics, and
firearms.
process. Oman also is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. The most significant FMS cases, current and past, are discussed below. The most significant FMS cases, current and past, are discussed below.
  F-16s. In October 2001, Oman purchased 12 U.S.-made F-16 C/D aircraft and In October 2001, Oman purchased 12 U.S.-made F-16 C/D aircraft and
associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles) at an estimated value of $825 associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles) at an estimated value of $825
mil ion. million. Deliveries were completed in 2006. In 2010, the United States approved Deliveries were completed in 2006. In 2010, the United States approved
a sale to Oman of 18 additional F-16s and associated support, and a sale to Oman of 18 additional F-16s and associated support, and Oman signed a
contract with Lockheed Martin for 12 of the aircraft in December 2011, with
deliveries deliveries were completed in 2016.completed in 2016.6039 Oman’s Air Force also possesses 12 Eurofighter Oman’s Air Force also possesses 12 Eurofighter
“Typhoon” “Typhoon” fighter aircraft. Oman has bought U.S. munitions for its F-16s fleet, including “AIM” advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AIM-120C-7, AIM-9X Sidewinder), and 162 GBU laser-guided bombs.  Surface-to-Air and Air-to-Air Missiles. Oman has bought AVENGER and Stinger air defense systems to help Oman develop a layered air defense system. 2021. 36 Contingency Tracking System Deployment File, provided to CRS by the Department of Defense. 37 U.S. Embassy in Oman, “U.S. Statement on the Signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement” March 24, 2019. 38fighter aircraft.

56 U.S. Embassy in Oman, “U.S. Statement on the Signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement” March 24, 2019.
57 “UK to Have Permanent Naval Base in Oman, MoU Signed,” Middle East Confidential, April 1, 2016 .
58 Shubhajit Roy, “India gets access to strategic Oman port Duqm for military use, Chabahar -Gwadar in sight,” Indian
Express
, February 13, 2018.
59 Much of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Much of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with
Oman,” fact sheet, Oman,” fact sheet, January 20June 15, 2021. Section 564 of , 2021. Section 564 of T itleTitle V, Part C of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for V, Part C of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) banned U.S. arms transfers to countries that maintain the Arab boycott of Israel FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) banned U.S. arms transfers to countries that maintain the Arab boycott of Israel
duringduring those fiscal years. Asthose fiscal years. As applied to the GCCapplied to the GCC states, this provision was waivedstates, this provision was waived on the groundson the grounds that doing so wasthat doing so was in in
the national interest. the national interest.
60 39 “Oman to Upgrade Fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcons,” “Oman to Upgrade Fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcons,” The National Interest, January 7, 2018. , January 7, 2018.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1512 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy Missile Defense. In May 2013, Oman signed a tentative agreement to buy the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system

Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Precision-Guided Munitions. Oman has bought U.S. munitions for its F-16s,
including “AIM” advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AIM-120C-7,
AIM-9X Sidewinder), 162 GBU laser-guided bombs, and other equipment.
Surface-to-Air and Air-to-Air Missiles. Oman has bought AVENGER and Stinger
air defense systems to help Oman develop a layered air defense system.
Missile Defense. In May 2013, then-Secretary of State John Kerry visited Oman
reportedly in part to help finalize a sale to Oman of the THAAD (Theater High
Altitude Area Defense system), the most sophisticated land-based missile defense , the most sophisticated land-based missile defense
system the U.S. exports. A tentative agreement by Oman to purchase the system,
made by Raytheon, was announced in May 2013, withsystem that the United States exports, at an estimated an estimated valuecost of $2.1 of $2.1
bil ion, butbillion. However, no sale of the system no sale of the system to Oman has been completed.has been completed.61 Several other GCC states
have bought or are in discussions to buy the THAAD.
  Tanks as Excess Defense Articles. Oman received 30 U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks in . Oman received 30 U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks in
September 1996 on a “no rent” lease basis (later receiving title outright). In 2004, 1996 on a “no rent” lease basis (later receiving title outright). In 2004,
it turned down a U.S. offer of EDA U.S.-made M1A1 tanks, but Oman asserts it turned down a U.S. offer of EDA U.S.-made M1A1 tanks, but Oman asserts
that it that it stil requiresstill requires additional armor to supplement the armor to supplement the 38 British-made British-made Chal enger 2 tanks tanks
and 80 British-made Piranha and armored personnel carriers it bought in the 1990s.armored personnel carriers it bought in the 1990s.
  Patrol Boats/Maritime Security. EDA grants since 2000 have gone primarily to help Oman monitor its borders and waters and to improve interoperability with U.S. forces. Oman has bought U.S.-made coastal patrol boats Oman has bought U.S.-made coastal patrol boats
(“Mark V”) for (“Mark V”) for counternarcotics, antismuggling, and antipiracy missions, as wel
counter-narcotics, anti-smuggling, and anti-piracy missions, as well as aircraft munitions, night-vision goggles, upgrades to coastal as aircraft munitions, night-vision goggles, upgrades to coastal surveil ance
surveillance systems, communications equipment, and de-mining equipmentsystems, communications equipment, and de-mining equipment. EDA grants
since 2000 have gone primarily to help Oman monitor its borders and waters and
to improve interoperability with U.S. forces. The United States has sold Oman . The United States has sold Oman
the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile. Oman the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile. Oman also has has bought some British-made some British-made
patrol boats. patrol boats.
  Antitank Weaponry. The United States has sold Oman . The United States has sold Oman antitankanti-tank weaponry to help weaponry to help
it protect itself from ground attack and fromdefend against attacks on its critical infrastructure. attacks on its critical infrastructure.
The systems sold include TOW (tube-launched, The systems sold include TOW (tube-launched, optical yoptically tracked, wire-guided) tracked, wire-guided)
antitank systems, with an estimated value of $51 antitank systems, with an estimated value of $51 mil ion and 400million and “Javelin” “Javelin”
antitank guided missiles.antitank guided missiles.62
40 Professionalizing Oman’s Forces: IMET Program and Other Programs63
Programs41 The International MilitaryThe International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides professional Education and Training (IMET) program provides professional
military education and training to military students and is key to establishing lasting relationships military education and training to military students and is key to establishing lasting relationships
with future leaders. IMET courses increase military professionalization, enhance interoperability with future leaders. IMET courses increase military professionalization, enhance interoperability
with U.S. forces, offer instruction on the law of armed conflict and human rights, provide with U.S. forces, offer instruction on the law of armed conflict and human rights, provide
technical and operational training, and create a deeper understanding of the United States. Since technical and operational training, and create a deeper understanding of the United States. Since
20142015, the United States has provided Oman with , the United States has provided Oman with $10.746 mil ion over $12.9 million in IMET which has funded over in IMET which has funded over
900 members of the Omani Armed Forces for training in the United States900 members of the Omani Armed Forces for training in the United States, including 47 members
in FY2018.

61 “Pentagon confirms Saudi $1 billion payment for T HAAD missile system ,” The National, March 5, 2019.
62. 40 State Department security cooperation factsheet, op. State Department security cooperation factsheet, op. cit. cit.
6341 Ibid. Ibid.
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link to page link to page 2017 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman
($ in ($ in mil ions)
FY20
FY21

FY17
FY18
FY19
(req.)
(req.)
millions) FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 IMET IMET
1.94 1.94
1.85 1.85
1.42 1.42
.80 1.70 1.70
1.702.0
FMF FMF
2.00 2.00
- -
- -
- -
- -
NADR Total NADR Total
2.0 2.0
1.90 1.90
1.70 1.70
1.70 1.70
1.00 1.00 1.0
NADR

.90

1.00

ATA
NADR

1.00

.70

EXBS
Total
3.94
3.75
3.12
3.402.5
2.70 3.0
Source: State Department Congressional State Department Congressional Budget Justifications. Budget Justifications. FY2020 and FY2021FY2021 and FY2022 are requests. are requests.
Notes: IMET is International Military Education and Training; FMF is ForeignIMET is International Military Education and Training; FMF is Foreign Military Financing; NADR is Military Financing; NADR is
Nonproliferation,Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs,De-Mining and Related Programs, and includes ATA (Anti-Terrorism and includes ATA (Anti-Terrorism
Assistance) and EXBS (Export Control and Related BorderAssistance) and EXBS (Export Control and Related Border Security). Defense Relations with other Militaries In part because of his historic ties to the British military, Sultan Qaboos relied on seconded British officers to command Omani military services early in his reign and bought mostly British-made weaponry. As a signal of that continuing close defense relationship, Britain and Oman signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2016 to build a base near Al Duqm port, at a cost of about $110 million, to support the stationing of British naval and other forces in Oman on a permanent basis.42 In 2018, India reportedly signed an agreement with Oman granting the Indian navy the use of the port as well.43 U.S.-Oman Security).
Cooperation against Terrorism and Terrorism Financing
Oman cooperates with U.S. legal, Oman cooperates with U.S. legal, intel igenceintelligence, and financial efforts against various cross-border , and financial efforts against various cross-border
threats, threats, particularlyincluding those posed by those posed by terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, AlAl Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP, Peninsula (AQAP, headquarteredbased in neighboring Yemen), and the Islamic State in neighboring Yemen), and the Islamic State (ISIS) organization. No organization. No
Omani nationals were part of the September 11, 2001, attacks and no Omanis have been publicly Omani nationals were part of the September 11, 2001, attacks and no Omanis have been publicly
identified as senior members of any of those groups. The State Department assesses that Oman identified as senior members of any of those groups. The State Department assesses that Oman
actively tries to deny terrorist actively tries to deny terrorist safehavensafe-haven in or transit, but that its effectiveness is limited by local in or transit, but that its effectiveness is limited by local
capacity and a capacity and a chal enging challenging operating environment because of Oman’s extensive coastline and operating environment because of Oman’s extensive coastline and
long, remote borders with Saudi Arabia and Yemen.long, remote borders with Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 6444
The United States provides funding (se The United States provides funding (see Table 1Table 1)—primarily through Nonproliferation, —primarily through Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) and other programs—to help Oman counter Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) and other programs—to help Oman counter
terrorist and related threats. NADR funding—Export Control and Related Border Security terrorist and related threats. NADR funding—Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS), Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), and Terrorism Interdiction Program—enhance the (EXBS), Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), and Terrorism Interdiction Program—enhance the
capabilities of the Royal Oman Police (ROP), the ROP Coast Guard, the Directorate General of capabilities of the Royal Oman Police (ROP), the ROP Coast Guard, the Directorate General of
Customs, the Ministry of Defense, and several civilian agencies to interdict weapons of mass Customs, the Ministry of Defense, and several civilian agencies to interdict weapons of mass
42 “UK to Have Permanent Naval Base in Oman, MoU Signed,” Middle East Confidential, April 1, 2016. 43 Shubhajit Roy, “India gets access to strategic Oman port Duqm for military use, Chabahar-Gwadar in sight,” Indian Express, February 13, 2018. 44 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Oman, December 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy destruction (WMD), advanced conventional weapons, or illegaldestruction (WMD), advanced conventional weapons, or il egal drugs at land and sea borders. drugs at land and sea borders.
The funding is also used to train Omani law enforcement agencies on investigative techniques The funding is also used to train Omani law enforcement agencies on investigative techniques
and border security. and border security.
In 2005, Oman joined the U.S. “Container Security Initiative,” agreeing to pre-screening of U.S.- In 2005, Oman joined the U.S. “Container Security Initiative,” agreeing to pre-screening of U.S.-
bound cargo from its bound cargo from its port of Salalahports to prevent smuggling of nuclear material, terrorists, and to prevent smuggling of nuclear material, terrorists, and
weapons. However, the effect of some U.S. programs on Omani performance is sometimes weapons. However, the effect of some U.S. programs on Omani performance is sometimes
hindered by the lack of clear delineationhindered by the lack of clear delineation between the roles between the roles and responsibilities of Oman’s armed
forcesof Oman’s military and law enforcement agencies. and law enforcement agencies.
There are no Omani nationals currently held in the U.S. prison for suspected terrorists in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. During 2015-17, Oman accepted the transfer of 23 non-Omani nationals
from Guantanamo Bay as part of an effort to support U.S. efforts to close the facility.

64 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Oman, June 24, 2020.
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Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing (AML/CFT)
Oman is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Oman is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENAFATF), a regional body to exchange information and best practices to curb money (MENAFATF), a regional body to exchange information and best practices to curb money
laundering and the financing of terrorism.laundering and the financing of terrorism.6545 A Royal Decree in 2016 requires financial institutions A Royal Decree in 2016 requires financial institutions
to screen transactions for money laundering or terrorism financingto screen transactions for money laundering or terrorism financing. In May , and the State Department report on country efforts against terrorism for 2020 states that: “Oman made progress on the implementation and execution of its countering the finance of terrorism law...” In 2017, Oman joined 2017, Oman joined
with the other GCC states and the United States to form a Riyadh-based “Terrorist Finance with the other GCC states and the United States to form a Riyadh-based “Terrorist Finance Target Center (TFTC).” In July 2021, collaboration with other TFTC member states, Oman sanctioned six individuals and entities affiliated with ISIS terror-support networks in the region. Countering Violent Extremism Target
Center.” However, numerous perceived gaps in Oman’s performance remain, including
implementation of certification procedures for AML and CFT, issuing directives for the
immediate freezing and seizure of the assets of persons and entities on various U.N. sanctions
lists, and designating wire transfer amounts for customer due diligence procedures.
Countering Violent Extremism
The State Department characterizes Oman’s initiatives to address domestic radicalization and The State Department characterizes Oman’s initiatives to address domestic radicalization and
recruitment to violence as “opaque.” Oman’s government, through the Ministry of Endowments recruitment to violence as “opaque.” Oman’s government, through the Ministry of Endowments
and Religious Affairs (MERA), has conducted advocacy campaigns designed to encourage and Religious Affairs (MERA), has conducted advocacy campaigns designed to encourage
tolerant and inclusive Islamic practices, including through an advocacy campaign titled “Islam in tolerant and inclusive Islamic practices, including through an advocacy campaign titled “Islam in
Oman.” The Grand Mufti of Oman, Shaykh Ahmad al-Khalili,Oman.” The Grand Mufti of Oman, Shaykh Ahmad al-Khalili, has cal ed has called on Muslims to reject on Muslims to reject
terrorism. A 2015 study found that no Omanis had traveled to fight alongside the 20,000 foreign terrorism. A 2015 study found that no Omanis had traveled to fight alongside the 20,000 foreign
fighters joining the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.fighters joining the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.66 The Global Terrorism Index 2020 ranks
Oman among the countries “least impacted by terrorism.”
46 Economic and Trade Issues
Oman has been in a difficult economic situation since at least 2014, Oman has been in a difficult economic situation since at least 2014, whendespite a recovery in world world oil prices since the downturn that year. Over the past several years, Oman has incurred oil prices fel
precipitously and stil have not recovered. Oman’s financial situation has been characterized by
budget budget deficits of well over $5 billion per year. Itsdeficits of approximately $10 bil ion per year over the past three years, and its financial
system financial condition was made worse in 2020 by the was made worse in 2020 by the economic effects of the COVID-19 outbreak. Oman has sought to avoid drawing down its estimated $17 billion in sovereign wealth reserves - a figure far lower than the reserve funds of most of the other GCC states. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait each have reserve assets well in excess of $500 billion. Oman has also sought to borrow funds and to encourage foreign investment. A $2.2 billion sovereign loan in March 2021 allayed some concerns over the financing of the 2021 fiscal deficit (estimated at $5.82 billion).47 The government also has cut subsidies substantially and has 45 Information on the MENAFATF can be found at its home page, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/menafatf.html 46 Peter Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s, International Center for the Study of Radicalization, January 26, 2015. 47 Davide Barbuscia and Yousef Saba, “Oman agrees $2.2 billion loan with large group of banks – sources,” Reuters, March 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy economic effects of the COVID-19 outbreak. Oman acted
early to try to contain the pandemic by barring entry to travelers from China, South Korea, Iran,
and Italy, and by mandating closure of some schools and retail outlets and banning some public
gatherings.67 As of mid-May, 2021, Oman has reported over 200,000 COVID-19 cases and over
2,200 deaths from the disease; nearly 275,000 vaccine doses have been administered.68 The
Ministry of Health plans to vaccinate 1.5 mil ion by the end of June 2021 with doses from
PfizerbioNTech, AstraZeneca, and the multilateral COVAX initiative. Analysts expect that the
rollout of vaccines wil boost sectors most affected by the pandemic, namely tourism and retail,
both of which rely heavily on foreign tourists.69
Oman has sought to avoid drawing down its estimated $17 bil ion in sovereign wealth reserves,
and it is searching for ways to financial y cope with the COVID-19 outbreak without doing so. In
June 2020, it reportedly has sought financial aid from some of the wealthier Gulf states,

65 Information on the MENAFAT F can be found at its home page, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/menafatf.html
66 Peter Neumann, “ Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,
International Center for the Study of Radicalization, January 26, 2015.
67 Marc Sievers, “ Oman’s handling of the coronavirus,” Atlantic Council, April 3, 2020.
68 World Health Organization, “ WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard,” May 17, 2021.
69 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Oman, accessed March 29, 2021.
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particularly Qatar.70 A $2.2 bil ion sovereign loan in March 2021 has al ayed some concerns over
the financing of the 2021 fiscal deficit (estimated at $5.82 bil ion).71 The government also has cut
subsidies substantial y and has reduced the number of public sector employees. The government’s reduced the number of public sector employees. The government’s
Medium-Term Fiscal Plan 2020-24 hopes to trim the fiscal budget to less than 2% of Medium-Term Fiscal Plan 2020-24 hopes to trim the fiscal budget to less than 2% of GDPgross domestic product (GDP) by by
2024, from an estimated 19.1% of GDP in 2020, and introduce a personal income tax on high 2024, from an estimated 19.1% of GDP in 2020, and introduce a personal income tax on high
earners in 2022 (the first such tax in the GCC).earners in 2022 (the first such tax in the GCC).7248 A value-added tax (VAT) of 5% implemented A value-added tax (VAT) of 5% implemented on
in April April 16, 2021, is expected to raise $1 bil ion annual y.732021, is providing an additional $1 billion in government revenue annually.49
In order to better position In order to better position its economy over the longer termitself, Oman has been diversifying its , Oman has been diversifying its
economy; in the first half of 2019, noneconomy. Non-oil sectors -oil sectors contributednow contribute twice as much to Oman’s twice as much to Oman’s gross
domestic product (GDP) as didGDP as does the energy sector. the energy sector.7450 Oman has announced a “Vision 2020” Oman has announced a “Vision 2020”
strategy. Its cornerstonestrategy, the cornerstone of which is to attract foreign investment to is to attract foreign investment to positioning Oman as a trading hub,
centered on the $60 bil ion project to build up Al Duqm port. Thatbuild up Al Duqm port as a trading hub. To date, the $60 billion project has attracted project has attracted
investment from Iran, Kuwait, China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the investment from Iran, Kuwait, China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Oman’s plans for United States. Oman’s plans for the portAl Duqm include a refinery, a container port, a dry dock, and include a refinery, a container port, a dry dock, and
facilities for transportation of petrochemicals, with a rail link to the other GCC states that enables facilities for transportation of petrochemicals, with a rail link to the other GCC states that enables
them to access the Indian Ocean directly.them to access the Indian Ocean directly.7551 China’s $11 China’s $11 bil ionbillion investment in Al Duqm, part of its investment in Al Duqm, part of its
“Belt and Road Initiative” to assemble a trade link between China and Europe, “Belt and Road Initiative” to assemble a trade link between China and Europe, wil will fund a “Sino-fund a “Sino-
Oman Industrial City.” Oman Industrial City.”
Yet, the energy sector Yet, the energy sector wil will remain significant in Oman for at least several more years. Oman has a remain significant in Oman for at least several more years. Oman has a
relatively relatively smal 4.8 bil ion small 4.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, enough for about 25-30 years at current barrels of proven oil reserves, enough for about 25-30 years at current
production rates.production rates.7652 Under a supply agreement reached with Under a supply agreement reached with OPEC and 10 al ies to cope with the
impact of COVID-19 on oil demandthe Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Oman is not a member, Oman is exporting approximately 722,000 barrels of crude , Oman is exporting approximately 722,000 barrels of crude
oil per day, mostly to China. oil per day, mostly to China. In part because it is a smal producer, Oman is not a member of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Oman has in recent years expanded Oman has in recent years expanded
its liquefied its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, primarily to Asian countries. Oman is part of the natural gas (LNG) exports, primarily to Asian countries. Oman is part of the
“Dolphin project,” operating since 2007, under which Qatar exports natural gas to UAE and “Dolphin project,” operating since 2007, under which Qatar exports natural gas to UAE and
Oman, freeing Oman, freeing up Omani gas for export. As noted above, Oman plans to import natural gas from Iran after the completion of their planned undersea pipeline, although that project could yet be far in the future. up Omani gas for export.
U.S.-Oman Economic Relations
The United States is one of Oman’s largest trading partners. In The United States is one of Oman’s largest trading partners. In both 2018 and 20192020, the United , the United
States exported about $States exported about $2 bil ion1.1 billion in goods to Oman in goods to Oman, and imported about $ and imported about $1.1 bil ion in goods from
it. In 2020, the U.S. exported about $1.1 bil ion in goods to Oman and imported about $816
mil ion.77816 million. In 2021, the United States increased exports to Oman to $1.4 billion, and imports from Oman more than doubled over the prior year to about $1.86 billion.53 The largest U.S. export categories to Oman are automobiles, aircraft (including The largest U.S. export categories to Oman are automobiles, aircraft (including
military)military) and related parts, and related parts, dril ingdrilling and other oilfield and other oilfield equipment, and other machinery. Of the equipment, and other machinery. Of the
imports, the largest product categories are fertilizers, industrial supplies, and oil by-products such imports, the largest product categories are fertilizers, industrial supplies, and oil by-products such
as plastics. The United States imports almost no Omani oil.

70 “Oman Weighs Seeking Financial Aid From Gulf Countries,” Bloomberg, June 11, 2020.
71 Davide Barbuscia and Yousef Saba, “ Oman agrees $2.2 billion loan with large group of banks – sources,” Reuters,
March 3, 2021.
72 Economist Intelligence Unit, Oman Country Report, generated March 29, 2021.
73 Ibid.
74 “Non-Oil Sector’s Contributions to Oman’s GDP T wice the Oil Earnings,” Times of Oman, December 18, 2019.
75 Hugh Eakin, “In the Heart of Mysterious Oman,” New York Review of Books, August 14, 2014.
76 Katie McQue, “ Oman says may struggle to grow oil reserves and production,” S&P Global, October 19, 2020.
77 U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign T rade Statistics.
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Oman was admitted to the WTO in September 2000. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was
signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress (P.L. 109-283, signed September 26, 2006).
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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

According to the U.S. Embassy in Muscat, the FTA has led to increased partnerships between
Omani and U.S. companies in a broad range of industries, not limited to energy.


Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


Acknowledgments
as plastics. The United States imports only small amounts of Omani oil. Oman was admitted to the WTO in September 2000. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress (P.L. 109-283, signed September 26, 2006). According to the U.S. Embassy in Muscat, the FTA has led to increased partnerships between Omani and U.S. companies in a broad range of industries, not limited to energy. 48 Economist Intelligence Unit, Oman Country Report, March 29, 2021. 49 Ibid. 50 “Non-Oil Sector’s Contributions to Oman’s GDP Twice the Oil Earnings,” Times of Oman, December 18, 2019. 51 Hugh Eakin, “In the Heart of Mysterious Oman,” New York Review of Books, August 14, 2014. 52 Katie McQue, “Oman says may struggle to grow oil reserves and production,” S&P Global, October 19, 2020. 53 U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign Trade Statistics. Congressional Research Service 16 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy Author Information Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Acknowledgments This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins. Research Assistant, Middle East and North This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins. Research Assistant, Middle East and North
Africa Section. Africa Section.

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