Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
May 18September 10, 2021 , 2021
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Kristin Archick
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Specialist in European
Specialist in European
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Affairs
Affairs
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has
reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK
(
(
unionists). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish, and many desire a ). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish, and many desire a
united Ireland (united Ireland (
nationalists). ).
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In
recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, human rights, and addressing recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, human rights, and addressing
Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed
dealing with the past). Some Members also are concerned about how ). Some Members also are concerned about how
Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland. —the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement.
The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional
status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people instatus as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in
Northern Ireland (as well as with Northern Ireland (as well as with
the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from
London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK
security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners. security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, full implementation of the peace agreement has been difficult. For
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, full implementation of the peace agreement has been difficult. For
years, decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that generated instability in the devolved government. In years, decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that generated instability in the devolved government. In
2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated 2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated
with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however. In with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however. In
2017, the devolved government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed, prompting snap Assembly elections2017, the devolved government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed, prompting snap Assembly elections
amid several contentious regional issues and unease in Northern Ireland about Brexit. Negotiations to reestablish the devolved government repeatedly stalled. The DUP and Sinn Fein agreed to form a new devolved government in January 2020, but the long impasse renewed concerns about the fragility of the peace process. It took nearly three years to form a new devolved government. Northern Ireland also faces a number of broad issues in its search . Northern Ireland also faces a number of broad issues in its search
for peace and reconciliation, including reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering concerns for peace and reconciliation, including reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering concerns
about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development. In late March and early April 2021, about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development. In late March and early April 2021,
the outbreak of riots and unrest in parts of Northern Ireland—widely characterized as the worst violence in years—the outbreak of riots and unrest in parts of Northern Ireland—widely characterized as the worst violence in years—
highlighted many of the challenges and underlying fault lines that remain in Northern Ireland. highlighted many of the challenges and underlying fault lines that remain in Northern Ireland.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Preventing a Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Preventing a
hard border (with customs checks (with customs checks
and physical infrastructure) on the island of Ireland was a key imperative and a major stumbling block in the UK-EU and physical infrastructure) on the island of Ireland was a key imperative and a major stumbling block in the UK-EU
withdrawal negotiations. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and withdrawal negotiations. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and
because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping to promote peaceon the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping to promote peace
, reconciliation, and a dynamic cross-border and a dynamic cross-border
economy. Concerns about a hard border developing mostly receded in light of the post-Brexit economy. Concerns about a hard border developing mostly receded in light of the post-Brexit
trade and customs arrangements for Northern arrangements for Northern
Ireland agreed to by the UK and EU, but implementing these measures—which began on January 1, 2021—disrupted some Ireland agreed to by the UK and EU, but implementing these measures—which began on January 1, 2021—disrupted some
trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.
Combined with a dispute related to EU export controls on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines that could have impacted Northern Ireland, the DUP and other unionists argue that the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland are untenable. Such tensionsIn July 2021, the UK government called for significant changes to the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland; the EU rejects renegotiating the agreed framework but asserts it is committed to mitigating the trade disruptions. Tensions over Brexit have exacerbated a over Brexit have exacerbated a
sense among unionists that their British identity is under threatsense among unionists that their British identity is under threat
and, factored into factored into
thesome unrest in Northern Ireland in unrest in Northern Ireland in
early 2021. spring 2021, and have contributed to instability within the DUP. Brexit also has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others Brexit also has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others
for a for a
border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. , or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK.
In September 2021, the DUP warned that its concerns over the post-Brexit trade and customs rules for Northern Ireland could prompt the party to quit the devolved government, which could lead to new snap Assembly elections. Also see CRS Report R46730, Also see CRS Report R46730,
Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mix. , coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
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3212 Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
The 1998 Peace Agreement ............................................................................................................. 2
Key Elements ............................................................................................................................ 2 Implementation ......... 2
Implementation ................................................................................................................ 3
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions .............................................................................. 3
Decommissioning ........................................................................................................ 4
Policing ....... 4 Policing ............................................................................................................................... 4 4
Security Normalization ....................................................................................................... 5
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity ............................................................... 5
Initiatives to Further the Peace Process ........................................................................................... 6 Ongoing Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil 6
Recent Issues and Ongoing Chal enges............................................................................... 7
2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government ........................................................................ 7
March 2017 Snap Assembly Elections ............................................................................... 7
Reestablishing the Devolved Government .......................................................................... 8
Recent DUP Leadership Crisis .................................................................................................. 9 Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in March-April 2021 ..................................................... 10
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process ...................................................................................... 11
Sectarian Divisions ........... 8
Sectarian Divisions .................................................................................................. 10...... 11
Dealing with the Past .............................................................................................................. 13
Stormont House Agreement Provisions ....................... 11
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity ..................................................... 14 New UK Government Proposals 14
Paramilitary Concerns ......................................................................................... 14
The Dissident Threat 14
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity ........................................................... 16
Paramilitary Concerns ............................................................................................. 15
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity .................................. 16 The Dissident Threat ............................................................. 15
Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in March-April 2021............................................ 17
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity ............................................................ 17
Implications of Brexit ........ 18
Implications of Brexit ................................................................................................................... 18. 19
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement ................................................................... 19 18
Post-Brexit Arrangements for Northern Ireland ................................................................ 20 Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions 19
Ongoing Tensions and Chal enges..................................................... 21
Economic Concerns .................... 20
Economic Concerns ................................................................................................. 23 25
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects ..................................................................... 26 24
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests ........................................................................................ 27 25
Support for the Peace Process ................................................................................................. 27 25
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland .................................................................................... 29 26
International Fund for Ireland ................................................................................................. 30 27
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland ............................................ 2
Tables
Table 1. Northern Ireland: Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) .................................... 8
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 31 28
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Overview
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of politicalBetween 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political
violence in Northern violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the
Troubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map Troubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map
inin Figure 1).1 At its 1 At its
core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities.
Protestants in Northern Ireland (48% of the population) largely define themselves as British and Protestants in Northern Ireland (48% of the population) largely define themselves as British and
support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (
unionists). ).
Most Catholics in Northern Catholics in Northern
Ireland (45% of the population) consider themselves Irish, and many Catholics desire a united Ireland (45% of the population) consider themselves Irish, and many Catholics desire a united
Ireland (Ireland (
nationalists). In the past, more militant unionists (). In the past, more militant unionists (
loyalists) and more militant nationalists ) and more militant nationalists
((
republicans) were ) were
wil ingwilling to use force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2 to use force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights, Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights,
housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists, housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists,
loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans. loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans.
Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on
the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between
1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government). 1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government).
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political
settlement to settlement to
the conflict in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate the conflict in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate
Majority Leader George Majority Leader George
Mitchel Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President , who was serving as U.S. President
Bil Bill Clinton’s special Clinton’s special
adviser on Ireland. After many ups and downs, the UK and Irish governments and the Northern adviser on Ireland. After many ups and downs, the UK and Irish governments and the Northern
Ireland politicalIreland political
parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10, parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10,
1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was 1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was
concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.3 concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.3
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
implementation of the peace accord has been implementation of the peace accord has been
chal engingchallenging. Tensions persist among Northern . Tensions persist among Northern
Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more broadly. Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more broadly.
Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society and continues to grapple with a number of Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society and continues to grapple with a number of
issues in its search for peace and reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare issues in its search for peace and reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare
periodical yperiodically, and , and
addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed
dealing with the past) is ) is
particularly controversial. Many analysts assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is particularly controversial. Many analysts assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is
fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in January 2020—or fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in January 2020—or
Brexit—has —has
added to divisions within Northern Ireland, as highlighted by the riots and unrest that erupted in added to divisions within Northern Ireland, as highlighted by the riots and unrest that erupted in
parts of Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Brexit continues to pose parts of Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Brexit continues to pose
chal enges
challenges for Northern Ireland’s peace process and economy, has renewed questions about Northern 1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won 1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won
independen ceindependence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealththe establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth
. T he. The Irish government formally Irish government formally
declareddeclared
Ireland a republicIreland a republic
in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK.
T heThe Republic Republic
of Ireland, of Ireland,
with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of
Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the
remaining one-sixth of the island. remaining one-sixth of the island.
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as
Ulster..
T echnically Technically and and
historically, Ulster also includeshistorically, Ulster also includes
the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
3
3
T heThe text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/ text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs//agreement.htm. docs//agreement.htm.
T heThe unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name
GoodGood
Friday Agreement as biasedFriday Agreement as biased
in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the
peace accord ispeace accord is
referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, becausereferred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because
this isthis is
the name more widelythe name more widely
used used and recognized and recognized
in the United States. in the United States.
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for Northern Ireland’s peace process and economy and has renewed questions about
Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK, and is contributing to heightened political instability within Northern Ireland’s devolved government Northern
Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK. .
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the
Northern Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday Northern Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, as Agreement, as
wel well as subsequent accords and initiatives to further the peace process and promote as subsequent accords and initiatives to further the peace process and promote
long-term reconciliation. Some Members have been particularly interested in police reforms and long-term reconciliation. Some Members have been particularly interested in police reforms and
human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided development aid human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided development aid
through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development
and foster reconciliation. Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in how and foster reconciliation. Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in how
Brexit Brexit
wil will affect Northern Ireland in the years ahead. affect Northern Ireland in the years ahead.
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland
Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017). Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).
The 1998 Peace Agreement
Key Elements
The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political
settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the
UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the
consent principle——
that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority
of Northern Ireland’s people, as of Northern Ireland’s people, as
wel well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the
agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a
majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in
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Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding
obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for
future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant. future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and
cal edcalled for establishing a for establishing a
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power (known as power (known as
Strand One). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several ). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several
issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary
weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of
prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious. Experts assert prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious. Experts assert
that the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity” on such issues. that the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity” on such issues.
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
((
Strand Two and and
Strand Three, respectively). Among the key institutions , respectively). Among the key institutions
cal edcalled for in these two for in these two
strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to
al owallow leaders in the northern and leaders in the northern and
southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-
Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises
representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland,
Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Implementation
Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in
separate referendums on May 22, 1998. Although considerable progress has been made in separate referendums on May 22, 1998. Although considerable progress has been made in
implementing the agreement, the process has been arduous. For years, decommissioning and implementing the agreement, the process has been arduous. For years, decommissioning and
police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in Northern Ireland’s police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government. Sporadic violence from dissident republican and loyalist paramilitary devolved government. Sporadic violence from dissident republican and loyalist paramilitary
groups that refused to accept the peace process and sectarian strife also helped to feed mistrust groups that refused to accept the peace process and sectarian strife also helped to feed mistrust
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties. between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement
cal edcalled for establishing a new Northern Ireland for establishing a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive. To ensure that neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the Assembly and Executive. To ensure that neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the
108-member Assembly, the agreement specified that “key decisions” must receive cross-Assembly, the agreement specified that “key decisions” must receive cross-
community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly members)community support. .
The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other ministers The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other ministers
with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be
al ocated to
allocated to political parties according to party strength in the Assembly. political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.
The first elections to the new
The first elections to the new
108-member Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25,
1998. The devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, did not follow promptly 1998. The devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, did not follow promptly
because of unionist concerns about decommissioning, or the paramilitaries’ surrender of their because of unionist concerns about decommissioning, or the paramilitaries’ surrender of their
weapons. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority over local affairs was transferred weapons. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority over local affairs was transferred
to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December 1999. Over the next few years, the to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December 1999. Over the next few years, the
issue of decommissioning—issue of decommissioning—
especial yespecially by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—contributed to the by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—contributed to the
suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of direct rule from London several suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of direct rule from London several
times between 2000 and 2002. (See times between 2000 and 2002. (See
“Decommissioning,” below.) ” below.)
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In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was
restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which
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strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the
staunchly nationalist political party staunchly nationalist political party
traditional y traditionally associated with the IRA.4 The DUP and Sinn associated with the IRA.4 The DUP and Sinn
Fein have been the largest unionist and nationalist parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland since Fein have been the largest unionist and nationalist parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland since
2003. The 2007 DUP-Sinn Fein deal paved the way for greater stability in Northern Ireland’s 2003. The 2007 DUP-Sinn Fein deal paved the way for greater stability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government over the next decade. Regularly scheduled Assembly elections in 2011 and devolved government over the next decade. Regularly scheduled Assembly elections in 2011 and
2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led by the DUP and Sinn Fein. 2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led by the DUP and Sinn Fein.
At the same time, tensions persisted within the devolved government and between the unionist
At the same time, tensions persisted within the devolved government and between the unionist
and nationalist communities. Various incidents—including protests in 2012 and 2013 over the use and nationalist communities. Various incidents—including protests in 2012 and 2013 over the use
of flags and emblems, a 2014 dispute over welfare reform, and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein of flags and emblems, a 2014 dispute over welfare reform, and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein
leader in connection with the murder of a former IRA member—leader in connection with the murder of a former IRA member—
periodical yperiodically threatened the threatened the
devolved government’s stability. Following the collapse of the devolved government and snap devolved government’s stability. Following the collapse of the devolved government and snap
Assembly elections in 2017, Assembly elections in 2017,
heightened tensions due todivisions over Brexit and other contentious issues Brexit and other contentious issues
largely largely
stal ed stalled negotiations on forming a new devolved government for almost three years. negotiations on forming a new devolved government for almost three years.
This long impasse renewed concerns about political stability and highlighted divisions in Northern
Ireland politics and society. (See (See “2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government,” ” below.) below.)
Decommissioning
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent
chal engechallenge in the in the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold
office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded
or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its
weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as
tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such
cal scalls. .
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed
al all members to members to
pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”5 In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”5 In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had
put put
al all of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable
matched estimates provided by the security forces.6 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning matched estimates provided by the security forces.6 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning
by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011. by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.
Policing
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between
unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was
established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92% established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92%
Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and
human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in
fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent
commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers
4 Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps4 Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps
Cherished Prize,” Cherished Prize,”
Irish Times, March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI , March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI
Politics Moves AwayPolitics Moves Away
from Edge,” BBCfrom Edge,” BBC
News,News,
May 8, 2007. May 8, 2007.
5 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC5 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC
News,News,
July 25, 2005. July 25, 2005.
6 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News,6 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News,
September 26, 2005. September 26, 2005.
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(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help
(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help
fulfil fulfill this goal, the PSNI this goal, the PSNI
introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.7 introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.7
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI
and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007, and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007,
however, as part of the process to restore the devolved government, Sinn Fein members voted to however, as part of the process to restore the devolved government, Sinn Fein members voted to
support the police and join the Policing Board. Experts viewed Sinn Fein’s decision as historic, support the police and join the Policing Board. Experts viewed Sinn Fein’s decision as historic,
given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. In 2010, the DUP and Sinn given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. In 2010, the DUP and Sinn
Fein reached an accord (the Fein reached an accord (the
Hil sboroughHillsborough Agreement) to devolve policing and justice powers Agreement) to devolve policing and justice powers
from London to Belfast (on which the parties had been unable to agree at the time of the Good from London to Belfast (on which the parties had been unable to agree at the time of the Good
Friday Agreement’s signing). Friday Agreement’s signing).
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded.
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded.
Officials asserted that the 50-50 process Officials asserted that the 50-50 process
fulfil edfulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commission the goals set out by the Patten Commission
(including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).8 In recent years, concerns (including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).8 In recent years, concerns
resurfaced that not enough Catholics were seeking to join the PSNI; partly because of lingering resurfaced that not enough Catholics were seeking to join the PSNI; partly because of lingering
suspicions about the police within the Catholic/nationalist community but also because of fears suspicions about the police within the Catholic/nationalist community but also because of fears
that Catholic police recruits were key targets of dissident republicans. In 2017, the PSNI that Catholic police recruits were key targets of dissident republicans. In 2017, the PSNI
introduced a number of procedural changes to help attract more Catholics (and more women).9 introduced a number of procedural changes to help attract more Catholics (and more women).9
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement
cal edcalled for “as early a return as possible to normal security for “as early a return as possible to normal security
arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security
instal ationsinstallations. In February . In February
2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July 2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July
2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a 2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a
regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no
longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide. longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
the UKthe UK
government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern
Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission
for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area
of human rights and equality. They argue that Northern Ireland needs its own of human rights and equality. They argue that Northern Ireland needs its own
Bil Bill of Rights of Rights
(consideration of which is provided for in the Good Friday Agreement) and a stand-alone Irish (consideration of which is provided for in the Good Friday Agreement) and a stand-alone Irish
Language Act to give the Irish language the same official status as English in Northern Ireland. Language Act to give the Irish language the same official status as English in Northern Ireland.
The Good Friday Agreement The Good Friday Agreement
cal scalls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
support for the Irish language. The subsequent St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 provided for an support for the Irish language. The subsequent St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 provided for an
Irish Language Act, but this issue remains controversial. Irish Language Act, but this issue remains controversial.
7 See
7 See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern , Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern
Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf. Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
8 “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” BBC
8 “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” BBC
News,News,
March 28, 2011. March 28, 2011.
9 Deborah McAleese,9 Deborah McAleese,
“T op “Top Officer’s ‘Deep Concern’ at Lack of Catholics Signing Up for Police Career in Northern Officer’s ‘Deep Concern’ at Lack of Catholics Signing Up for Police Career in Northern
Ireland,” Ireland,”
Belfast Telegraph, October 23, 2015; Vincent Kearney, “PSNI Aims to Recruit 300 New, October 23, 2015; Vincent Kearney, “PSNI Aims to Recruit 300 New
Officers,” BBC Officers,” BBC
News,News,
October 23, 2017. October 23, 2017.
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Initiatives to Further the Peace Process
Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish
governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation. governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation.
Major endeavors include the following: Major endeavors include the following:
The 2013 Haass Initiative. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most
divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.10 In particular, Haass was tasked with divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.10 In particular, Haass was tasked with
making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of
parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass
released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was
unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.11 unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.11
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In 2014, financial pressures and In 2014, financial pressures and
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments
convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing
structures, as structures, as
wel well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative.as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative.
In the In the
resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland
political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating
measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the
public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive
departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included
measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements
over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however,
stal edstalled implementation of implementation of
al all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.12 aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.12
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. In November 2015, the UK and Irish In November 2015, the UK and Irish
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare
reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s
budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the
Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election
after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments, after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments,
and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start
Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the
parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to
deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing
concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein
official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.13 official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.13
10 Richard Haass10 Richard Haass
served as President Georgeserved as President George
W. Bush’sW. Bush’s
special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003; he is special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003; he is
currently president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. currently president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations.
11 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see
11 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf. http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf.
12
12
T heThe Stormont House Agreement is available Stormont House Agreement is available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-
agreementagreement
. .
13 The13 T he Fresh Start Agreement is available Fresh Start Agreement is available
at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,” at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,”
November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-startNovember 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start
-for-northern-ireland. -for-northern-ireland.
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Recent Issues and Ongoing Challenges
Ongoing Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns
lingerremain about the stability of the devolved government and the fragility of community relations about the stability of the devolved government and the fragility of community relations
. As noted previously in Northern Ireland. As noted, the devolved government collapsed in January 2017 amid heightened tensions , the devolved government collapsed in January 2017 amid heightened tensions
related to Brexit and other issues. It took nearly three years following the March 2017 snap related to Brexit and other issues. It took nearly three years following the March 2017 snap
Assembly elections to reestablish the devolved governmentAssembly elections to reestablish the devolved government
in January 2020. Since then, the
, led by former First Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Sinn Fein.
Since then, the devolved government has been tested by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19) pandemic and by challenges due to the implementation of the post-Brexit trade and customs rules for Northern Ireland, which many unionists view as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK (i.e., Great Britain). The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland also have prompted political turmoil within the DUP. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader at the end of May 2021 and as first minister in June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became the leader of the DUP in late June (the DUP’s second new leader in a month); Paul Givan, a DUP member of the Assembly, currently serves as first minister. (See “Recent DUP Leadership Crisis,” below.)
The next regularly scheduled Assembly elections are due in May 2022. In September 2021, new DUP leader Donaldson asserted that the DUP’s concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland could force the party to quit the devolved government. Should the DUP withdraw its ministers from the Executive (including the first minister), this could lead to early, snap Assembly elections. (See “Implications of Brexit,” below.)19) pandemic and implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland have further tested the devolved government, led by First
Minister Arlene Foster of the DUP and Deputy First Minister Michel e O’Neil of Sinn Fein.
In late April 2021, DUP dissatisfaction with First Minister Foster’s leadership over Brexit and other controversies prompted her to announce that she would step down as DUP party leader at the end of May and as first minister at the end of June. On May 14, 2021, the DUP chose Northern Ireland Agriculture Minister Edwin Poots as its new leader. The DUP is expected to nominate a replacement as first minister, who must then be approved by the Northern Ireland
Assembly. The next Assembly elections are due in May 2022, but some analysts suggest that the
DUP leadership changes could increase the likelihood of an early election.14
The search for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland remains chal enging. Difficult issues
include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especial y parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems); dealing with the past; addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity; and furthering economic development and equality. The 2013 Haass initiative, the 2014 Stormont House Agreement, and the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement attempted to tackle some aspects of these long-standing chal enges. Some
measures agreed in these successive accords were delayed amid the absence of a devolved
government between 2017 and 2020.
2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government
March 2017 Snap Assembly Elections
The immediate impetus for the devolved government’s January 2017 collapse was a scandal over
The immediate impetus for the devolved government’s January 2017 collapse was a scandal over
flaws in a renewable energy program flaws in a renewable energy program
initial y initially overseen by overseen by
then-First Minister Foster in her previous First Minister Foster in her previous
role as enterprise minister in 2012. Then-Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness of Sinn Fein role as enterprise minister in 2012. Then-Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness of Sinn Fein
cal edcalled for Foster to stand aside as first minister temporarily while the energy scheme was for Foster to stand aside as first minister temporarily while the energy scheme was
investigated; Foster refused, and McGuinness resigned as deputy first minister in protest. investigated; Foster refused, and McGuinness resigned as deputy first minister in protest.
McGuinness’s resignation McGuinness’s resignation
essential yin effect forced new elections to be forced new elections to be
cal edcalled for March 2, 2017 (under the rules governing Northern Ireland’s power-sharing arrangements, if either the first minister or the deputy first minister resigns without a replacement being nominated within seven days, the government cannot continue and new elections must be held). for March 2, 2017.15
Tensions on several issues other than the energy scandal contributed to Sinn Fein’s decision to
Tensions on several issues other than the energy scandal contributed to Sinn Fein’s decision to
force snap Assembly elections. The elections were force snap Assembly elections. The elections were
cal edcalled in the wake of the June 2016 UK in the wake of the June 2016 UK
referendum on EU membership and amid deep unease over Brexit’s implications for Northern referendum on EU membership and amid deep unease over Brexit’s implications for Northern
Ireland. Other points of contention included the introduction of a potential Irish Language Act Ireland. Other points of contention included the introduction of a potential Irish Language Act
and the legalizationand the legalization
of same-sex marriage; Sinn Fein supported both measures, whereas the DUP opposed them.14 Foster led the DUP’s election campaign, but Michelle O’Neill of same-sex marriage; Sinn Fein supported both measures, whereas the DUP
14 Enda McClafferty, “DUP Revolt Raises Political Stakes,” BBC News, April 27, 2021; “Arlene Foster Announces Resignation as DUP Leader and NI First Minister,” BBC News, April 28, 2021. 15 Under the rules governing Northern Ireland’s power-sharing arrangements, if either the first minister or the deputy first minister resigns (without a replacement being nominated), the government cannot continue and new elections must be held.
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opposed them.16 Foster led the DUP’s election campaign, but Michel e O’Neil succeeded succeeded
McGuinness as Sinn Fein’s leader in Northern Ireland and led Sinn Fein’s campaign McGuinness as Sinn Fein’s leader in Northern Ireland and led Sinn Fein’s campaign
(McGuinness was (McGuinness was
il ill and passed away a few weeks after the election). and passed away a few weeks after the election).
As seen
As seen
inin Table 1, the number of Assembly seats contested in 2017 was 90 rather than 108 the number of Assembly seats contested in 2017 was 90 rather than 108
because of a previously agreed reduction in (contested in the regularly scheduled 2016 elections) because of a previously agreed reduction in 14 Sinead O’Shea, “Northern Ireland, Forced by Sinn Fein, Sets Early Election in Shadow of Brexit,” New York Times, January 16, 2017; “NI Election: Everything You Need to Know About the 2017 Vote,” BBC News, March 4, 2017.
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the size of the Assembly. The DUP retained the the size of the Assembly. The DUP retained the
largest number of seats in largest number of seats in
the 2017 elections2017, but Sinn Fein , but Sinn Fein
was was widely regarded as the biggest regarded as the biggest
winner, given its success in reducing the previous gap between the two parties from 10 seats to 1winner, given its success in reducing the previous gap between the two parties from 10 seats to 1
seat. . A high voter turnout of almost 65%—fueled by anger over the energy scandal and a perceived A high voter turnout of almost 65%—fueled by anger over the energy scandal and a perceived
lack of concern from London about Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland—appears to have lack of concern from London about Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland—appears to have
favored Sinn Fein and the cross-community favored Sinn Fein and the cross-community
Al ianceAlliance Party. For the first time in the Assembly, Party. For the first time in the Assembly,
unionist parties unionist parties
dodid not not
have an overal win an overall majority (a largely symbolic status because of the power-majority (a largely symbolic status because of the power-
sharing rules but highly emblematic for the unionist community).sharing rules but highly emblematic for the unionist community).
1715
Table 1. Northern Ireland: Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
(2016 and 2017 election results2016 and 2017 election results
)
Political Party
2016
2017
Democratic
Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative) Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
38
38
28
28
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
28
28
27
27
Social Democratic
Social Democratic
and Labour Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-left) and Labour Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-left)
12
12
12
12
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
16
16
10
10
Al iance Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal) Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
8
8
8
8
Green Party (nonsectarian; left-wing)
Green Party (nonsectarian; left-wing)
2
2
2
2
People Before
People Before
Profit Profit
Al iance Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing) (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
2
2
1
1
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
1
1
1
1
Independent (unionist)
Independent (unionist)
1
1
1
1
Total
108
90
Sources: BBC, “NI Election 2016: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results,BBC, “NI Election 2016: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results,
and and
BBC, “NI Election 2017: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/ni2017/results. BBC, “NI Election 2017: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/ni2017/results.
Reestablishing the Devolved Government
Following the March 2017 snap Assembly elections, negotiations between the DUP, Sinn Fein,
Following the March 2017 snap Assembly elections, negotiations between the DUP, Sinn Fein,
and the other main politicaland the other main political
parties (see parties (see
text box) on forming a new devolved government ) on forming a new devolved government
repeatedly repeatedly
stal edstalled, primarily over a potential Irish Language Act. Divisions over Brexit , primarily over a potential Irish Language Act. Divisions over Brexit
exacerbated tensions. The DUP was the only major Northern Ireland political party to back exacerbated tensions. The DUP was the only major Northern Ireland political party to back
Brexit, which Sinn Fein and the other main Northern Ireland parties strongly opposed. Brexit, which Sinn Fein and the other main Northern Ireland parties strongly opposed.
Some analysts suggest theThe DUP’s support for the Conservative Party government in the UK Parliament DUP’s support for the Conservative Party government in the UK Parliament
following the UK’s June 2017 snap general election further heightened distrust between Sinn following the UK’s June 2017 snap general election further heightened distrust between Sinn
Fein and the DUPFein and the DUP
and made reaching a new power-sharing agreement more difficult.and made reaching a new power-sharing agreement more difficult.
18
16 Sinead O’Shea, “Northern Ireland, Forced by Sinn Fein, Sets Early Election in Shadow of Brexit,” New York Times, January 16, 2017; “NI Election: Everything You Need to Know About the 2017 Vote,” BBC News, March 4, 2017. 17 Harry McGee, “DUP Smarting from Close Encounter with Sinn Fein Crocodile,”
On December 16, 2019, the UK and Irish governments launched a new round of talks with the main political parties aimed at reestablishing the devolved government. These negotiations followed another UK snap general election on December 12, 2019, in which Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party won a convincing parliamentary majority. The 2019 election results negated the DUP’s influence in the UK Parliament and thus improved the prospects for restoring Northern Ireland’s devolved government.16
15 Harry McGee, “DUP Smarting from Close Encounter with Sinn Fein Crocodile,” Irish Times, March 3, 2017; Enda , March 3, 2017; Enda
McClafferty, “Assembly Election a Brutal ResultMcClafferty, “Assembly Election a Brutal Result
for Unionism,” BBCfor Unionism,” BBC
News,News,
March 4, 2017. 18 Peter Hain, “Deal with DUP Means London Is No Longer Honest Broker on North,” Irish Times, June 13, 2017;
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Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The party initial y opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtual y any compromise with Irish nationalists as a net loss for unionists. Social y conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. The DUP has been led by Arlene Foster since 2015, but is resigning as DUP leader, effective at the end of May 2021. Foster is to be succeeded as DUP leader by Edwin Poots. Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an al -island party and has a political presence in both Northern Ireland and Ireland (with members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historical y, Sinn Fein was the political party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditional y has received considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein, replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michel e O’Neil has led Sinn Fein in the Northern Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smal er, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. In May 2021, the UUP elected Doug Beattie as its leader. Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smal er, center-left Catholic party that supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015. Alliance Party. The Al iance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political orientation. The Al iance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
In April 2019, journalist Lyra McKee was shot and kil ed while covering riots in Londonderry (also known as Derry). The New IRA, a dissident republican group opposed to the peace process, claimed responsibility (but also apologized, asserting that it had been aiming to shoot a police officer but hit McKee by accident). McKee’s death sparked a significant public outcry and prompted the UK and Irish governments to intensify efforts to revive talks on forming a new
devolved government. Negotiations remained largely deadlocked, however, throughout the
summer and fal of 2019 amid ongoing uncertainty over Brexit.
On December 16, 2019, the UK and Irish governments launched a new round of talks with the main political parties aimed at reestablishing the devolved government. These negotiations followed the UK’s December 12, 2019, general election, in which Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party won a convincing parliamentary majority, thereby negating the DUP’s influence in the UK Parliament and improving the prospects for restoring Northern
Ireland’s devolved government.19
On January 10, 2020, the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the other parties agreed to a deal put forward by the UK and Irish governments to reestablish the devolved government. The new power-sharing
deal, known as New Decade, New Approach, is wide-ranging and addresses a number of key issues, including health and education concerns and measures to improve the sustainability of Northern Ireland’s political institutions. The deal does not include a stand-alone Irish Language Act, as initial y demanded by Sinn Fein, but essential y seeks to strike a compromise that promotes the use of the Irish (Gaelic) language while protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English) that many unionists consider important to their heritage.
The deal provides for the official recognition in Northern Ireland of both the Irish and the Ulster-
William Booth and Amanda Ferguson, “A Battle over Language Is at the Heart of Norther n Ireland Crisis,” Washington Post, February 9, 2018.
19 Padraic Halpin, “UK Election Clears Way for Northern Ireland Devolution, Dublin Says,” Reuters, December 13, 2019; Annabelle Dickson, “Northern Ireland’s Post -election Refocus,” Politico, December 16, 2019.
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Scots languages, al ows for their wider use in government settings, and establishes two new “language commissioners”—one for Irish and one for Ulster-Scots—to enhance, protect, and develop each language and associated cultural traditions. Both the UK and Irish governments
promised additional financial support for Northern Ireland as part of the deal.20
Sectarian Divisions
Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and Catholic communities existing largely in paral el. Schools and housing developments in Northern
Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities and in some areas, peace walls separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods.21 Estimates of the number of peace wal s vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s Department of Justice and Housing Executive have responsibility for the majority of peace wal s, but when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is estimated at over 100. Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to
remove the peace wal s since 2013, but a 2015 survey of public attitudes found that 30% of those interviewed wanted the wal s to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same 2015 survey also found that more than 4 in 10 people had never interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the nearest peace wal . A 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in support of removing the peace wal s and other barriers, especial y
among younger people.22
Some analysts contend that sectarian divisions are particularly evident March 4, 2017. 16 Padraic Halpin, “UK Election Clears Way for Northern Ireland Devolution, Dublin Says,” Reuters, December 13, 2019; Annabelle Dickson, “Northern Ireland’s Post-election Refocus,” Politico, December 16, 2019.
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On January 10, 2020, the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the other parties agreed to a deal put forward by the UK and Irish governments to reestablish the devolved government. The new power-sharing deal, known as New Decade, New Approach, is wide-ranging and addresses a number of key issues, including health and education concerns and measures to improve the sustainability of Northern Ireland’s political institutions. The deal did not include a stand-alone Irish Language Act, as initially demanded by Sinn Fein, but essentially sought to strike a compromise to promote the use of the Irish (Gaelic) language while protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English), which many unionists consider important to their heritage. The deal provided for the official recognition in Northern Ireland of both the Irish and the Ulster-Scots languages and allowed their wider use in government settings. The deal also called for establishing two new “language commissioners”—one for Irish and one for Ulster-Scots—to enhance, protect, and develop each language and associated cultural traditions. Both the UK and the Irish governments promised additional financial support for Northern Ireland as part of the deal.17
Recent DUP Leadership Crisis In late April 2021, DUP dissatisfaction with then-First Minister Foster’s leadership over Brexit and other controversies prompted her to announce that she would step down as DUP party leader at the end of May and as First Minister in June. In May 2021, the DUP chose Northern Ireland Agriculture Minister Edwin Poots as its new leader. Poots announced, however, that he did not intend to serve as first minister and chose a close ally, Paul Givan, to become first minister.
Foster officially resigned as first minister on June 14, 2021. Under the devolved government’s power-sharing rules, Foster’s resignation also forced Deputy First Minister O’Neill to step down. The first minister and deputy first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns, the other also ceases to hold office. Following these resignations, the DUP and Sinn Fein had seven days to nominate replacements for these positions. As noted, if either party fails to nominate a replacement by the end of the seven days, new Assembly elections must be called. These rules mean the first minister and deputy first minister posts essentially must have the support of both the DUP and Sinn Fein.
Sinn Fein indicated it would refuse to renominate O’Neill as deputy first minister following Foster’s resignation without progress in enacting into law measures on the Irish language and other cultural issues (previously agreed to in the 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal). On June 17, 2021, in order to avoid the prospect of a collapse in the devolved government and another snap Assembly election, the UK government and Sinn Fein agreed that the UK parliament would introduce the Irish language and culture legislation in October 2021 if the Northern Ireland Assembly failed to do so by then. Poots backed this UK-Sinn Fein deal and nominated Givan as first minister, despite concerns within the DUP about the language legislation agreement and resulting DUP opposition to proceeding with Givan’s nomination. Although Givan and O’Neill were confirmed as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively, on June 17, DUP unhappiness with Poots’s leadership forced him to announce his resignation as party leader.18
17 The text of the New Decade, New Approach deal is available at Government of the UK, “Deal to See Restored Government in Northern Ireland Tomorrow,” January 9, 2020, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deal-to-see-restored-government-in-northern-ireland-tomorrow.
18 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Midnight Breakthrough Saves Northern Ireland Power-sharing,” Politico, June 17, 2021; Colm Kelpie and Ciara Colhoun, “DUP Revolt over First Minister Confirmation,” BBC News, June 17, 2021.
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Sir Jeffrey Donaldson—a DUP member of the UK Parliament—replaced Poots as DUP party leader on June 30, 2021. Donaldson asserted that his priority as DUP leader would be to “right the wrong” imposed by the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.19 Givan remains first minister at present, but Donaldson hopes to assume the role in the future. To do so, Donaldson would need to resign his position as a member of Parliament and become a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Donaldson has signaled his intention to stand as a candidate in the next Assembly elections.20
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The
party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. From 2015 until May 2021, the DUP was led by Arlene Foster. In late June 2021, following a period of political turmoil within the party, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became the new leader of the DUP. Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in both Northern Ireland and Ireland (with members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the political party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has received considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn Fein, replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neill has led Sinn Fein in the Northern Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. In May 2021, the UUP elected Doug Beattie as its leader. Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015. Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political orientation. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in March-April 2021 In late March and early April 2021, sporadic violence and rioting erupted for roughly 12 days in several cities and towns in Northern Ireland, including Belfast and Londonderry (or Derry). The unrest began with gangs of youths in a predominantly unionist/loyalist area of Londonderry on March 29; rioting in Belfast on April 7—including attacks on police officers and a bus—was described as some of the worst violence seen in Northern Ireland in years. Almost 90 police officers were injured over the course of the violence.21
Much of the unrest was concentrated in economically disadvantaged communities where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence, but the violence also spread to interface areas between unionist and nationalist neighborhoods. Although initial assessments suggested loyalist paramilitaries could be orchestrating the riots and violence in some areas, Northern Ireland police authorities subsequently concluded that although individuals with ties to
19 Freya McClements, “Jeffrey Donaldson Ratified as DUP’s New Leader After Meeting of Executive,” Irish Times, June 30, 2021.
20 “Sir Jeffrey Donaldson to Run for Lagan Valley MLA Seat,” BBC News, August 24, 2021. 21 Jordan Kenny, “Timeline: How Northern Ireland’s Violence Unfolded,” BBC News, April 12, 2021; “Belfast: Rioting ‘Was Worst Seen in Northern Ireland in Years,’” BBC News, April 14, 2021.
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such loyalist groups may have been involved, the groups did not sanction or organize the unrest.22 (See “Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity,” below.) The Northern Ireland Assembly unanimously condemned the violence, as did the UK and Irish governments.23
A complex combination of factors lies behind the unrest. Considerable attention has focused on unionist unhappiness with the post-Brexit border and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland. Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit provisions appear to have exacerbated unionist concerns that their British identity is under threat and enhanced a sense of unionist disenfranchisement and abandonment. Some analysts suggest that strong rhetoric against the Brexit arrangements from unionist politicians may have further fueled tensions in unionist/loyalist communities and contributed to instigating the unrest. (See “Implications of Brexit,” below.)
At the same time, observers note that the immediate spark for the violence followed a decision in late March 2021 by Northern Ireland authorities not to prosecute violations of COVID-19 social distancing restrictions and public health protocols at a 2,000-person funeral in June 2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. The funeral was attended by Sinn Fein leadership, including Deputy First Minister O’Neill. For many unionists, this incident—and what they regarded as a lack of police enforcement of the COVID-19 restrictions on the funeral—reinforced their long-standing views of a double standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists and, more broadly, a sense that the 1998 peace accord has benefited nationalists and republicans more than the unionist and loyalist communities. Additional factors behind the rioting also may include frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people from economically deprived areas.24
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process The search for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland remains challenging. Difficult issues include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems); dealing with the past; addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity; and furthering economic development and equality. The 2013 Haass initiative, 2014 Stormont House Agreement, and 2015 Fresh Start Agreement attempted to tackle some aspects of these long-standing challenges. Some measures agreed to in these successive accords were delayed amid the absence of a devolved government between 2017 and 2020.
Sectarian Divisions Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and Catholic communities existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities and in some areas, peace walls separate
22 Lisa O’Carroll, “Northern Ireland Police Say Paramilitaries Not Behind Recent Violence,” Guardian, April 9, 2021; Laura Noonan, “Criminal Gangs Blamed for Stoking Northern Ireland Violence,” Financial Times, April 14, 2021. 23 Peter Foster and Jim Brunsden, “London and Dublin Call for Calm After Fresh Riots in Northern Ireland,” Financial Times, April 8, 2021; David Young, Rebecca Black, and James Ward, “Stormont Ministers Unite to Condemn Violence and Rioting,” Belfast Telegraph, April 8, 2021. 24 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,” Politico, April 7, 2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,” New York Times, April 8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021.
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Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods.25 Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s Department of Justice and Housing Executive have responsibility for the majority of peace walls, but when other types of structures are included—such as fences, gates, and closed roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is estimated at over 100. Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to remove the peace walls since 2013, but a 2015 survey of public attitudes found that 30% of those interviewed wanted the walls to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same 2015 survey also found that more than 4 in 10 people had never interacted with anyone from the community living on the other side of the nearest peace wall. A 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in support of removing the peace walls and other barriers, especially among younger people.26
Sectarian divisions are particularly apparent during the annual summer during the annual summer
marching season, when many unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades , when many unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades
commemorating Protestant history. Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not commemorating Protestant history. Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not
contentious, some are held through or close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of contentious, some are held through or close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of
whom perceive such unionist parades as triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the whom perceive such unionist parades as triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the
marching season often provoked fierce violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing marching season often provoked fierce violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing
Parades Commission, which arbitrates disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Parades Commission, which arbitrates disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of
Catholics and have repeatedly argued for abolishing the commission.Catholics and have repeatedly argued for abolishing the commission.
2327 Efforts over the years to Efforts over the years to
address the contentious issue of parading and related protests have address the contentious issue of parading and related protests have
stal edstalled repeatedly. Following the riots in spring 2021 and in light of ongoing tensions over Brexit, many officials and analysts worried the 2021 marching season could see increased violence. Parades and related events during the 2021 marching season, however, passed without any significant incidents.28
Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland. A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 repeatedly.
A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 highlighted frictions between the unionist and
nationalist communities. Protests began following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at Belfast following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at Belfast
City City
Hal Hall only on designated days only on designated days
(rather than year-roundrather than year-round
) highlighted frictions on such issues between the unionist and nationalist communities. The protests, mostly by unionists and . The protests, mostly by unionists and
loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent. loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent.
Northern Ireland leaders on both sides of the sectarian divide received death threats, and some Northern Ireland leaders on both sides of the sectarian divide received death threats, and some
political party offices were vandalized.political party offices were vandalized.
24
20 T he text of the New Decade, New Approach deal is available at Government of the UK, “Deal to See Restored Government in Northern Ireland T omorrow,” January 9, 2020, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deal-to-see-restored-government -in-northern-ireland-tomorrow. Also see Henry McDonald and Lisa O’Carroll, “ Northern Ireland Assembly to Sit on Saturday After T hree Years,” Guardian, January 10, 2020; and Charles Landow, “Brexit Still Looms over Northern Ireland’s New Government,” Foreign Policy, January 14, 2020. 21 Paul Nolan, “T wo T ribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated Education: DUP MLA Says All Schools Should Be Integrated,” BBC News, November 25, 2020. 22 “Northern Ireland Interfaces: More Residents Want Peace Walls to Stay,” BBC News, December 15, 2015; “Will NI’s Peace Walls Come Down by 2023 to Meet 10-Year T arget?,” BBC News, May 3, 2018; International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Program m e Attitudinal Survey: Sum mary of Results, November 2019.
23 T he Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to r ule on disputed parades. 24 “Q&A: Northern Ireland Flag Protests,” BBC News, December 8, 2012.
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In June 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess these contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. This commission consists of 15 members, with 7 appointed by Northern Ireland’s political parties and 8 drawn from outside the government; it was original y proposed by the Haass initiative and subsequently endorsed in the Stormont House Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement. Although this commission was supposed to produce a report with its recommendations within 18
months, its work was delayed by the size of its task and the collapse of the devolved government between 2017 and 2020. The commission delivered its report to the first minister and deputy first minister in July 2020, but the report has not yet been shared with the rest of the Northern Ireland Executive, the Assembly, or the public. In March 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a
motion cal ing for the Executive to publish the commission’s report.25
Dealing with the Past
Fully addressing the legacy of violence in Northern Ireland remains controversial. The Good
29
In June 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess these contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. This commission consisted of 15 members, with 7 appointed by Northern Ireland’s political parties and 8 drawn from outside the government; it was originally proposed by the Haass initiative and subsequently endorsed in the Stormont House Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement. Although this commission was supposed to produce a report with its recommendations within 18 months, its work was delayed by the size of its task and the collapse of the devolved government
25 Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated Education: DUP MLA Says All Schools Should Be Integrated,” BBC News, November 25, 2020.
26 “Northern Ireland Interfaces: More Residents Want Peace Walls to Stay,” BBC News, December 15, 2015; “Will NI’s Peace Walls Come Down by 2023 to Meet 10-Year Target?,” BBC News, May 3, 2018; International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019.
27 The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades. 28 Julian O’Neill, “Twelfth Parades Across Northern Ireland Passed Without Incident,” BBC News, July 12, 2021; Megan Specia, “Northern Ireland’s Marching Season Begins in a Fraught Year for Unionists,” New York Times, July 13, 2021.
29 “Q&A: Northern Ireland Flag Protests,” BBC News, December 8, 2012.
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between 2017 and 2020. The commission delivered its report to the first minister and deputy first minister in July 2020, but the report has not been shared with the rest of the Northern Ireland Executive, the Assembly, or the public. In March 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a motion calling for the Executive to publish the commission’s report.30
Dealing with the Past Fully addressing the legacy of violence in Northern Ireland remains controversial. The Good Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the
victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the Northern Ireland victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the Northern Ireland
Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors aimed at supporting victims and Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors aimed at supporting victims and
their families. Several legaltheir families. Several legal
processes for examining crimes stemming from the Troubles also processes for examining crimes stemming from the Troubles also
exist. These include investigations into deaths related to the conflict by a dedicated unit within the exist. These include investigations into deaths related to the conflict by a dedicated unit within the
PSNI; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of historical cases PSNI; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of historical cases
involving involving
al egationsallegations of police misconduct; and public inquiries, such as the of police misconduct; and public inquiries, such as the
Savil eSaville inquiry inquiry
(concluded in 2010) into the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident. (concluded in 2010) into the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident.
Critics argue these various legal processes represent a piecemeal approach and give some deaths
Critics argue these various legal processes represent a piecemeal approach and give some deaths
or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been
slow; as of 2019, there were roughly 1,700 conflict-related cases in total awaiting investigation by slow; as of 2019, there were roughly 1,700 conflict-related cases in total awaiting investigation by
the PSNI or the PONI.the PSNI or the PONI.
2631 Others point out the expense and time involved with some of these Others point out the expense and time involved with some of these
processes; for example, the Bloody Sunday inquiry cost £195 processes; for example, the Bloody Sunday inquiry cost £195
mil ionmillion (more than $300 (more than $300
mil ion)
million) and took 12 years to complete.and took 12 years to complete.
2732 Reaching consensus on the best way to address Northern Reaching consensus on the best way to address Northern
Ireland’s legacy of violence has been difficult, in large part because many unionists and Ireland’s legacy of violence has been difficult, in large part because many unionists and
nationalists continue to view the conflict differently and retain competing narratives. nationalists continue to view the conflict differently and retain competing narratives.
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement cal ed for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy
issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative):
Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). This body would take forward the work
of the PSNI and the PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the Troubles. The UK government pledged full disclosure to the HIU.
Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR). The ICIR would
enable victims and survivors to seek and privately receive information about conflict-related violence. It would be established by the UK and Irish governments but would be separate from the justice systems in each jurisdiction. Any information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible in criminal and
25 Jayne McCormack, “Dr. Dominic Bryan: NI Flags Commission’s Brief T oo Big,” BBC News, June 27, 2019; “Let Us See Flags and Culture Report Now,” Belfast Telegraph, February 26, 2021; Jayne McCormack, “Stormont Votes for Release of Completed Flags and Culture Report,” BBC News, March 22, 2021. 26Several recent events further highlighted questions about dealing with Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence and pursuing justice. In May 2021, a coroner’s inquest released its findings into 10 deaths in August 1971 in the Ballymurphy area of Belfast. The inquest concluded that all 10 people killed were “entirely innocent” and that 9 of the 10 were killed by the British Army (the inquest could not definitively determine who had shot the 10th victim).33 In July 2021, the Belfast High Court found that the August 1998 Omagh bombing (in which the dissident Real IRA killed 29 people) possibly could have been prevented and recommended that both the UK and the Irish governments undertake investigations into the pre-attack intelligence related to the bombing.34
The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the Troubles also remains contentious. During the 2019 UK general election, Prime Minister Johnson pledged to protect veterans from prosecutions related to their past service in Northern Ireland. In April 2021, the UK minister for veterans alleged the government was failing to shield former 30 Jayne McCormack, “Dr. Dominic Bryan: NI Flags Commission’s Brief Too Big,” BBC News, June 27, 2019; “Let Us See Flags and Culture Report Now,” Belfast Telegraph, February 26, 2021; Jayne McCormack, “Stormont Votes for Release of Completed Flags and Culture Report,” BBC News, March 22, 2021. 31 Commission for Victims and Survivors, Commission for Victims and Survivors,
Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, January 2019, p. 20, at , January 2019, p. 20, at
https://www.cvsni.org/media/1970/jan-2019-addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-ireland-s-past-policy-advice-paper.pdf. https://www.cvsni.org/media/1970/jan-2019-addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-ireland-s-past-policy-advice-paper.pdf.
27
32 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday
Report ValueReport Value
for Money?,” BBC News,for Money?,” BBC News,
June 14, 2010.June 14, 2010.
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33 A coroner’s inquest is a fact-finding exercise to determine the circumstances of a death; it is not a trial and the coroner does not decide questions of criminal or civil liability. For more information on the Ballymurphy inquest, see Colm Kelpie, “Ballymurphy Inquest: Coroner Finds 10 Victims Were Innocent,” BBC News, May 11, 2021. Also see UK House of Commons Library, Investigations of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland, February 22, 2021.
34 Rory Carroll, “Omagh Bombing Could Have Been Prevented, Says High Court Judge,” Guardian, July 23, 2021.
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soldiers from Troubles-era prosecutions (he was forced to resign his ministerial position subsequently). In May 2021, the trial of two former British soldiers accused of murdering a republican paramilitary in 1972 collapsed due to a lack of admissible evidence. In July 2021, prosecutors announced they would drop charges against two other former British soldiers accused of murdering Catholic civilians in 1972 (including during Bloody Sunday), also due to inadmissible evidence.35
Stormont House Agreement Provisions
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative):
Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). This body would take forward the work
of the PSNI and the PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the Troubles. The UK government pledged full disclosure to the HIU.
Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR). The ICIR would
enable victims and survivors to seek and privately receive information about conflict-related violence. It would be established by the UK and Irish governments but would be separate from the justice systems in each jurisdiction. Any information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible in criminal and civil proceedings, but individuals who provided information would not be civil proceedings, but individuals who provided information would not be
immune to prosecution should evidentiary requirements be met by other means. immune to prosecution should evidentiary requirements be met by other means.
Oral History Archive. This archive would provide a central place for people This archive would provide a central place for people
from
from
al all backgrounds to share experiences and narratives related to the Troubles. backgrounds to share experiences and narratives related to the Troubles.
Implementation and Reconciliation Group. This body would oversee work on This body would oversee work on
themes, archives, and information recovery in an effort to promote reconciliation
themes, archives, and information recovery in an effort to promote reconciliation
and reduce sectarianism. and reduce sectarianism.
Efforts to establish these four new
Efforts to establish these four new
legacy institutions in UK law, however, largely institutions in UK law, however, largely
stal edstalled due to due to
divisions between the UK government, on the one hand, and some nationalists and human rights divisions between the UK government, on the one hand, and some nationalists and human rights
advocates, on the other, over proposed “national security caveats” related to the disclosure of advocates, on the other, over proposed “national security caveats” related to the disclosure of
certain information. Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that “national security” certain information. Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that “national security”
could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists
voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police officersvoiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police officers
, and many argued that any measures to deal with the past in Northern Ireland should contain a statute of limitations or amnesty to prosecutions. . Successive government crises and the stalemate Successive government crises and the stalemate
in reestablishing the devolved government between 2017 and early 2020 also impeded work on in reestablishing the devolved government between 2017 and early 2020 also impeded work on
implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.
2836
New UK Government Proposals
In the January 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal to reestablish the devolved government,
In the January 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal to reestablish the devolved government,
the UKthe UK
government pledged to introduce legislation in the UK Parliament to set up the legacy government pledged to introduce legislation in the UK Parliament to set up the legacy
bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020, the UK government outlined its intentions for the new legacy mechanisms. UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis asserted that the UK government would “remain true to the principles of the Stormont House Agreement” but essential y suggested some significant changes in an effort to put “greater emphasis on gathering information for families” and “moving at a faster pace to
retrieve knowledge before it is lost” to the passage of time.29
Instead of the two separate HIU and ICIR bodies cal ed for in the Stormont House Agreement, Secretary of State Lewis proposed a single “independent body” to “oversee and manage both the
information recovery and investigative aspects of the legacy system” in order to ensure the investigations were “effective and thorough, but quick.”30 Under the UK government’s plan, the vast majority of cases stemming from the Troubles would not be expected to receive full police investigations or to be referred for prosecution (although victim’s families stil would receive reports). The UK government claims this approach would “end the cycle of reinvestigations that
has failed victims and veterans for too long”; once cases were considered and a decision reached,
there would be a “legal bar” on any future investigations.31
The UK’s March 2020 proposal was widely rejected by Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and many
human rights organizations as short-changing victims and families and as impeding due process and the delivery of justice. The Irish government also expressed substantial concerns and noted
28 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the T ruth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets U.S. Lawyers in Bid bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020, the UK government
35 “Johnny Mercer: Tory MP Resigns as Defense Minister,” BBC News, April 20,2021; David Young, “Trial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, May 4, 2021; Mike McBride, “Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021. 36 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,”
Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth , February 17, 2016; Gareth
Gordon, “Gordon, “
T roublesTroubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News,
May 11, 2018.
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Northern May 11, 2018. 29 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Statement to the UK Parliament, “Addressing Northern Ireland Legacy Issues,” March 18, 2020, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-03-18/HCWS168.
30 Ibid. 31 UK Government Press Release, “UK Government Sets Out Way Forward on the Legacy of the Past in Northern Ireland,” March 18, 2020.
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that any changes to the legacy approach as outlined in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement must be agreed between the UK and Irish governments. The UK House of Common’s Northern Ireland Affairs Committee initiated an investigation and issued an interim report in October 2020 that was highly critical of the government’s proposal. Some observers view the approach proposed by the government as backtracking on the commitments in the Stormont House Agreement in the interest of making concessions to unionists and some Members of Parliament who argue that
British soldiers should not be prosecuted for actions taken in service to the state in Northern Ireland. Those against prosecutions of British veterans also contend that doing so would reopen
old wounds in Northern Ireland and be detrimental to the peace process.32
The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the Troubles remains contentious. During the 2019 UK general election, Prime Minister Johnson pledged to protect veterans from prosecutions related to their past service in Northern Ireland. In April 2021, however, the UK minister for veterans essential y accused the government of failing to shield former soldiers from Troubles-era prosecutions (he was forced to resign his ministerial
position subsequently). In May 2021, the trial of two former British soldiers accused of murdering a republican paramilitary in 1972 collapsed due to a lack of admissible evidence. Four other soldiers who served in Northern Ireland continue to face prosecution for their actions during the Troubles.33 Questions about dealing with Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence and pursuing justice have been highlighted further by the May 2021 findings of a coroner’s inquest into ten
deaths in August 1971 in the Bal ymurphy area of Belfast; the inquest concluded that al ten people kil ed were “entirely innocent” and that nine of the ten were kil ed by the British Army
(the inquest could not definitively determine who had shot the tenth victim).34
The UK government did not introduce a bil on legacy issues in 2020, but is expected to bring forward legislation in 2021 to deal with past violence in Northern Ireland. The UK government asserts that the forthcoming legislation wil seek to address the needs of both victims and veterans.35 Media reports suggest that similar to the government’s March 2020 proposal, the new legislation is to focus on information recovery, but also may effectively ban Troubles-related
prosecutions of former soldiers and former republican and loyalist paramilitaries.
The Irish government and many nationalists have reacted largely negatively to a possible ban on prosecutions of former soldiers. Sinn Fein President Mary Lou McDonald, for example, asserted
that any such proposal would be “an attempt to put British soldiers above the law,” continue what many in the nationalist community view as the UK government’s “decades long cover-ups,” and further frustrate families “in their efforts to get truth and justice.”36 Meanwhile, the DUP and
32 Julian O’Neill, “New Plan for NI T roubles Cases to ‘Limit’ Investigations,” BBC News, March 18, 2020; Irish Government Press Release, “Statement by T anaiste on UK Government Legacy Announcement,” March 18, 2020; UK House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past: the
Government’s New Proposals (Interim Report), October 26, 2020, at https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3186/documents/29458/default/.
33 “Johnny Mercer: T ory MP Resigns as Defense Minister,” BBC News, April 20,2021; David Young, “ T rial of British Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, May 4, 2021. 34 A coroner’s inquest is a fact -finding exercise to determine the circumstances of a death; it is not a trial and the coroner does not decide questions of criminal or civil liability. For more information on the Ballymurphy inquest, see Colm Kelpie, “Ballymurphy Inquest: Coroner Finds 10 Victims Were Innocent,” BBC News, May 11, 2021. Also see UK House of Commons Library, Investigations of Form er Arm ed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland , February 22, 2021.
35 UK Government, Queen’s Speech 2021: Background Briefing Notes, May 11, 2021, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/queens-speech-2021-background-briefing-notes.
36 As quoted in BBC News, “T roubles: Unilateral Move by UK on Veterans Would ‘Breach T rust,’” May 6, 2021.
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other unionists regard former paramilitaries as “terrorists,” object to any “moral equivalency” between the actions of soldiers and paramilitaries, and oppose any potential ban on prosecuting
former paramilitaries.37
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist
outlined its intentions for the new legacy mechanisms. Instead of the two separate HIU and ICIR bodies agreed to in the Stormont House Agreement, the UK government said it would propose a single “independent body” to “oversee and manage both the information recovery and investigative aspects of the legacy system” in order to ensure the investigations were “effective and thorough, but quick.”37
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis asserted that the UK government would “remain true to the principles of the Stormont House Agreement” but that the proposed changes would seek to put “greater emphasis on gathering information for families” and “moving at a faster pace to retrieve knowledge before it is lost” to the passage of time.38 The UK’s March 2020 plan was widely rejected by Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and many human rights organizations as short-changing victims and families, as it would essentially curtail investigations and thus impede due process and the delivery of justice. The Irish government and some members of the UK Parliament also expressed concerns about the proposed changes to the Stormont House Agreement’s legacy mechanisms.39
In July 2021, the UK government announced its intent to bring forward legislation that essentially would end all Troubles-related prosecutions, inquests, and civil actions against former soldiers, security forces, and paramilitaries. The UK government plans to introduce a statute of limitations “to apply equally to all Troubles-related incidents, bringing an immediate end to the divisive cycle of criminal investigations and prosecutions, which is not working for anyone and has kept Northern Ireland hamstrung by its past.”40 Similar to its initial March 2020 proposal, the UK government confirmed it would establish a single “Information Recovery Body” (rather than the HIU and ICIR called for in the Stormont House Agreement). This body would be tasked with investigating deaths or serious injuries for the purpose of “genuine and robust information recovery, rather than to create a file for prosecution.” The 2021 proposal also includes plans to establish a “major oral history initiative” and asserts that the government would maintain “many of the vital aspects proposed for the Implementation and Reconciliation Group.”41
In announcing these new legacy plans, including the statute of limitations, Prime Minister Johnson asserted that the government’s proposals would allow Northern Ireland to “draw a line under the Troubles.”42 Secretary of State Lewis acknowledged that, “We know that the prospect of the end of criminal prosecutions will be difficult for some to accept, and this is not a position that we take lightly,” but argued that the focus on information recovery—for as many families and victims as possible—would be more effective than current litigation processes and “the best way to help Northern Ireland move further along the road to reconciliation.”43
37 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Statement to the UK Parliament, “Addressing Northern Ireland Legacy Issues,” March 18, 2020, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-03-18/HCWS168.
38 Ibid. Also see Government of the UK, “UK Government Sets Out Way Forward on the Legacy of the Past in Northern Ireland,” press release March 18, 2020. 39 Julian O’Neill, “New Plan for NI Troubles Cases to ‘Limit’ Investigations,” BBC News, March 18, 2020; Government of Ireland, “Statement by Tanaiste on UK Government Legacy Announcement,” press release, March 18, 2020; Rory Carroll, “Troubles Legacy: MPs Condemn Government Plan to Close Cases,” Guardian, October 26, 2020. 40 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
41 Ibid. 42 As quoted in, “Plan to End All NI Troubles Prosecutions Confirmed,” BBC News, July 14, 2021. 43 Ibid.
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The UK’s 2021 proposals have been heavily criticized by all main political parties in Northern Ireland. Nationalists contend that ending prosecutions and inquests would allow the UK government to cover up the truth about the state’s actions during the Troubles, and unionists object to what they view as establishing “moral equivalency” between the actions of soldiers and paramilitaries with a blanket statute of limitations. The Irish government, some Members of the UK parliament, and many human rights and victims groups have expressed serious concerns as well, including with respect to the planned changes to the legacy bodies envisioned by the Stormont House Agreement. On July 20, 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a motion (without dissent) opposing the UK government’s new legacy plans.44
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the paramilitary organizations active during the
Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. However, the Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. However, the
apparent continued existence of some groups and their engagement in criminality worries many apparent continued existence of some groups and their engagement in criminality worries many
in both the unionist and the nationalist communities. In response to heightened concerns about in both the unionist and the nationalist communities. In response to heightened concerns about
paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland in 2015, the UK government commissioned a study on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland in 2015, the UK government commissioned a study on
the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.
3845 This review found that This review found that
al all the main the main
paramilitary groups operating during the Troubles paramilitary groups operating during the Troubles
stil still exist, but they are on cease-fire and the exist, but they are on cease-fire and the
leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is “committed to peaceful means to achieve their leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is “committed to peaceful means to achieve their
political objectives.” At the same time, the review concluded that individual members of political objectives.” At the same time, the review concluded that individual members of
paramilitary groups paramilitary groups
stil still represent a threat to national security, including through their represent a threat to national security, including through their
involvement in organized crime, and “there is regular unsanctioned activity including behavior in involvement in organized crime, and “there is regular unsanctioned activity including behavior in
direct contravention of leadership instruction.”direct contravention of leadership instruction.”
3946
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement sought to address concerns about the main paramilitary groups
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement sought to address concerns about the main paramilitary groups
in Northern Ireland. Among other measures, it enumerated a set of principles that in Northern Ireland. Among other measures, it enumerated a set of principles that
cal call upon upon
members of the Assembly and the Executive to work toward disbanding members of the Assembly and the Executive to work toward disbanding
al all paramilitary paramilitary
organizations and to take no instructions from such groups. The agreement also organizations and to take no instructions from such groups. The agreement also
cal edcalled for for
establishing a new, four-member international body to monitor paramilitary activity and to report establishing a new, four-member international body to monitor paramilitary activity and to report
annual y annually on progress toward ending such activity. The resulting Independent Reporting on progress toward ending such activity. The resulting Independent Reporting
Commission (IRC) began work in 2017; the UK and Irish governments each named one Commission (IRC) began work in 2017; the UK and Irish governments each named one
representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland Executive named two.representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland Executive named two.
4047 In its third annual In its third annual
report, released in November 2020, the IRC asserted that paramilitarism “remains a reality of report, released in November 2020, the IRC asserted that paramilitarism “remains a reality of
Northern Ireland life” and urged tackling continued paramilitary activity with a “twin track” Northern Ireland life” and urged tackling continued paramilitary activity with a “twin track”
approach that combines policing and criminal justice responses with measures to address the
underlying socioeconomic chal enges facing communities in which paramilitaries operate.41
Concerns persist about the influence of paramilitaries in Northern Ireland society. In early March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing support for the Good Friday
Agreement temporarily due to concerns about the implementation of the post-Brexit trade
37 “T roubles Prosecutions Limit ‘Should Apply to All,’” BBC News, April 21, 2021; “Ballymurphy Inquest: Anger Over Manner of PM Apology,” BBC News, May 13, 2021. 38 T he 44 “Troubles: Political Reaction to PM’s Plan to End Prosecutions,” BBC News, July 14, 2021; Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs on UK Government Legacy Proposals,” press release, July 14, 2021; Eimear McGovern, “NI Assembly Rejects UK Government Troubles Amnesty Proposals,” Belfast Telegraph, July 20, 2021; “Victims’ Groups Voice Opposition to Troubles Plans,” BBC News, August 30, 2021.
45 The 2015 assessment focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); 2015 assessment focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF);
the Red Hand the Red Hand
Commando (RHC);Commando (RHC);
the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks under the name of the Ulster the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks under the name of the Ulster
Freedom Fighters, or UFF);Freedom Fighters, or UFF);
the South East Antrim (SEA) groupthe South East Antrim (SEA) group
of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish
RepublicanRepublican
Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican
Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA). Liberation Army (INLA).
39
46 Government of the UK, Government of the UK,
Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20, , October 20,
2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assessment2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assessment
-on-paramilitary-groups-in-northern-ireland. -on-paramilitary-groups-in-northern-ireland.
40 T he47 The UK government chose former U.S. Special UK government chose former U.S. Special
Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on
the IRC. Reissthe IRC. Reiss
served as specialserved as special
envoy in the George W. Bushenvoy in the George W. Bush
Administration from 2003 to 2007.Administration from 2003 to 2007.
41 Independent Reporting Commission Third Report, November 17, 2020, at https://www.ircommission.org/news-centre/irc-third-report.
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approach that combines policing and criminal justice responses with measures to address the underlying socioeconomic challenges facing communities in which paramilitaries operate.48
Concerns persist about the influence of paramilitaries in Northern Ireland society. In early March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing support for the Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about the implementation of the post-Brexit trade arrangements for Northern Ireland that they view as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the arrangements for Northern Ireland that they view as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the
UK and threatening the union. Although these loyalist groups remain on cease-fire, they also UK and threatening the union. Although these loyalist groups remain on cease-fire, they also
warn that the current Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to the “permanent warn that the current Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to the “permanent
destruction” of the peace accord (see “Implications of Brexit,” below).destruction” of the peace accord (see “Implications of Brexit,” below).
4249
The Dissident Threat
Security assessments indicate that dissident republican and loyalist groups not on cease-fire and
Security assessments indicate that dissident republican and loyalist groups not on cease-fire and
opposed to the 1998 peace accord continue to present serious threats. The aforementioned 2015 opposed to the 1998 peace accord continue to present serious threats. The aforementioned 2015
review of paramilitary groups maintained that the most significant terrorist threat in Northern review of paramilitary groups maintained that the most significant terrorist threat in Northern
Ireland was posed not by the groups evaluated in that report but rather by dissident republicans. Ireland was posed not by the groups evaluated in that report but rather by dissident republicans.
The review described dissident loyalist groups as posing another, albeit “The review described dissident loyalist groups as posing another, albeit “
smal ersmaller,” threat. ,” threat.
At the same time, experts note that dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a
At the same time, experts note that dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a
sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident
republican groups are republican groups are
smal small in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.
43
50 According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the
Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblachta (ANP), and the New Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblachta (ANP), and the New
IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers, IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers,
prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017, prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017,
dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers, dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers,
and two prison officers.and two prison officers.
4451
In January 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a
In January 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a
smal small splinter group formed in splinter group formed in
opposition to the cease-fire. The other groups remain active, and authorities warn the threat posed opposition to the cease-fire. The other groups remain active, and authorities warn the threat posed
by the New IRA in particular is severe. Police suspect the New IRA was responsible for a January by the New IRA in particular is severe. Police suspect the New IRA was responsible for a January
2019 car bomb that exploded in Londonderry2019 car bomb that exploded in Londonderry
(or Derry). As noted above, the. The New IRA New IRA
also claimed claimed
responsibility for kil ing journalist Lyra McKee in April 2019. Many observers noted a slight uptick in dissident republican activity in 2019, especial y in border regions, as the New IRA and the Continuity IRA sought to exploit the stalemates over both Northern Ireland’s devolved government and Brexit. Security services also responsibility for the April 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry.52 Security services report a “growing sophistication” in dissident report a “growing sophistication” in dissident
republican explosive devices and that the New IRA has attempted to obtain weapons overseas.republican explosive devices and that the New IRA has attempted to obtain weapons overseas.
45
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity
Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average
42 As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, 53
48 Independent Reporting Commission Third Report, November 17, 2020, at https://www.ircommission.org/news-centre/irc-third-report.
49 As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support
for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawnfor 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn
Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists
T hreateningThreatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,” to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,”
Politico, March 5, 2021. , March 5, 2021.
4350 David McKittrick, “Northern Ireland: David McKittrick, “Northern Ireland:
T heThe Peace Process and the Dissident Menace,” Peace Process and the Dissident Menace,”
The Independent, February 18, , February 18,
2014; Richard English, “Why Republican Dissidents Have Not2014; Richard English, “Why Republican Dissidents Have Not
—And Will Not—Go Away,” —And Will Not—Go Away,”
Irish Times, July 19, , July 19,
2017. 2017.
4451 MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland. MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland.
4552 The New IRA issued an apology for McKee’s death, asserting that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the riots, but hit McKee by accident.
53 Naomi O’Leary, “Northern Ireland Bomb Is a Warning We Can’t Ignore,” January 22, 2019; Julian O’Neill, “Q&A: Naomi O’Leary, “Northern Ireland Bomb Is a Warning We Can’t Ignore,” January 22, 2019; Julian O’Neill, “Q&A:
Why Is Dissident RepublicanWhy Is Dissident Republican
Activity on the Rise?,” BBCActivity on the Rise?,” BBC
News,News,
September 15, 2019; “Security Report Warns of September 15, 2019; “Security Report Warns of
Dissidents’ GrowingDissidents’ Growing
Sophistication,” BBCSophistication,” BBC
News,News,
April 30, 2020; Julian O’Neill, “New IRAApril 30, 2020; Julian O’Neill, “New IRA
‘Still Dangerous’ After ‘Still Dangerous’ After
MI5 and PSNI’sMI5 and PSNI’s
Operation Arbacia,” BBCOperation Arbacia,” BBC
News,News,
September 30, 2020. September 30, 2020.
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of 5.6% annual y (marginal y
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from
over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.
4654 The 2008-2009 global recession affected the region, The 2008-2009 global recession affected the region,
however, and economic recovery was slow and uneven over much of the last decade.however, and economic recovery was slow and uneven over much of the last decade.
As in the rest of the UK, Northern Ireland’s economy has been severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting restrictions on social and business activity. Northern Ireland’s economic output fel by 13.3% in the second quarter of 2020 (April to June) during
The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting restrictions on social and business activity have affected Northern Ireland’s economy. Both the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive implemented a range of measures to mitigate COVID-19’s adverse economic effects. These measures included financial support to enable businesses to retain workers, assistance for the self-employed, government-backed loans for businesses, and additional funding for public services.55 During the height of the height of
the first COVID-19 lockdownthe first COVID-19 lockdown
. Although economic output in Northern Ireland in the second quarter of 2020, Northern Ireland’s economic output fell by 13.3%, but it rebounded in the rebounded in the
third quarter of 2020 (July to September) to 15.1% growth, it decreased by 1.4% in the fourth
quarter (October to Decemberthird quarter of 2020 to 15.1% growth. Economic output has decreased in successive quarters by 1.4% (fourth quarter of 2020) and 1.6% (first quarter of 2021). Although Northern Ireland’s economy declined by ). Although Northern Ireland’s economy declined by
2.80.6% in real % in real
terms over the year to terms over the year to
December 2020March 2021, this was a slower rate of decline , this was a slower rate of decline
in comparison tothan the UK the UK
average decline average decline
of 6.1%. Northern Ireland’s unemployment rate for April-June 2021 was 3.8%, of 7.3%. As of early 2021, the unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was 3.7%, an increase of 1.2 percentage points over the previous year but lower than the UK average an increase of 1.2 percentage points over the previous year but lower than the UK average
unemployment rate of unemployment rate of
4.7%.56
Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities 4.9%.47
Both the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive have implemented a range of measures to mitigate COVID-19’s adverse economic effects. These measures include financial support to enable businesses to retain workers, assistance for the self-employed, government-
backed loans for businesses, and additional funding for public services.48 Some experts suggest Northern Ireland’s economic recovery could be slower than recovery in the rest of the UK, given the lingering effects of the 2008-2009 recession and the region’s relatively lower levels of
competitiveness.49
Other long-standing economic difficulties and disparities also persist in Northern Ireland. Income persist in Northern Ireland. Income
levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12 levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12
economic regions, Northern Ireland had the fifth-lowest gross value added per capita in 2018 economic regions, Northern Ireland had the fifth-lowest gross value added per capita in 2018
(£25,981, or about $33,900), below the UK’s average (£32,216, or about $42,032).(£25,981, or about $33,900), below the UK’s average (£32,216, or about $42,032).
5057 Northern Northern
Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (
2826%) and a high proportion of working-age %) and a high proportion of working-age
individualsindividuals
with no formal qualifications. Studies indicate with no formal qualifications. Studies indicate
that the historical ythe historically poorest areas in poorest areas in
Northern Ireland Northern Ireland
(many of whichremain so and note that many of these bore the brunt of the Troubles bore the brunt of the Troubles
) remain so and that . Although many of the many of the
areas consideredareas considered
to be the most deprived are predominantly Catholic.51
At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The gap in economic activity rates between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since 1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference) and has largely converged in the last few years. The most recent data available indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70%
46 the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, others are predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged areas in Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called peace dividend.58
54 Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News,
June June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic
Strategy, Strategy,
Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011. , January 2011.
47 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 4 2020, April 8, 2021; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, April 20, 2021.
48
55 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service, Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service,
Overview of COVID-19 Funding in NI and the
Econom ic Im plicationsEconomic Implications: An Update, December 16, 2020; UK , December 16, 2020; UK
T reasury, “ Treasury, “Extra £800 Million to Support Scotland, Extra £800 Million to Support Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland through Covid-19 Wales and Northern Ireland through Covid-19
T hisThis Year,” press release, December 24, 2020. Year,” press release, December 24, 2020.
49 Esmond Birnie and Graham Brownlow, “How Will Covid-19 Affect Northern Ireland’s Economy?,” EconomicsObservatory.com, May 28, 2020.
50 Gross value added (GVA) is
56 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 1 2021, July 8, 2021; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, August 17, 2021.
57 Gross value added (GVA) is similar, although not exactly equivalent, to gross domestic product; the UK government similar, although not exactly equivalent, to gross domestic product; the UK government
usesuses
GVA as GVA as the measure to compare regional economic performance. House of Commons Library the measure to compare regional economic performance. House of Commons Library
Brief ingBriefing Paper, Paper,
Regional and Country Econom icEconomic Indicators, February 21, 2021. , February 21, 2021.
5158 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,
Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November , November
2017; John Campbell, “Belfast Home to Half of NI’s 100 Most Deprived 2017; John Campbell, “Belfast Home to Half of NI’s 100 Most Deprived
Ar easAreas,” BBC,” BBC
News,News,
November 24, 2017; Duncan Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony of Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, The United States Role in Reaffirming the Good Friday Agreement, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 2021.
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At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The gap in economic activity rates between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since 1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference) and has largely converged in the last few years. The most recent data available indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70% for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.59
Over the past decade, efforts to improve Northern Ireland’s long-term economic performance have sought to promote export-led growth and to decrease Northern Ireland’s economic dependency on the public sector by growing the private sector. The public sector accounts for about 28% of total employment in the region.60 Northern Ireland policymakers also have focused on attracting more foreign investment. In February 2021, the Northern Ireland Executive proposed a £290 million (about $402 million) COVID-19 economic recovery action plan—called Rebuilding a Stronger Economy—centered on developing a higher skilled and more agile workforce; stimulating research and innovation; building a greener economy; and promoting investment, trade, and exports.61
Implications of Brexit62 In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall November 24, 2017.
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for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment
rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.52
Over the past decade, efforts to improve Northern Ireland’s long-term economic performance
have sought to promote export-led growth and to decrease Northern Ireland’s economic dependency on the public sector by growing the private sector. The public sector accounts for about 27% of total employment in the region.53 Northern Ireland policymakers also have focused on attracting more foreign investment. In February 2021, the Northern Ireland Executive proposed a £290 mil ion (about $402 mil ion) COVID-19 economic recovery action plan—cal ed
Rebuilding a Stronger Economy—centered on developing a higher skil ed and more agile workforce; stimulating research and innovation; building a greener economy; and promoting
investment, trade, and exports.54
Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in March-April 2021
In late March and early April 2021, sporadic violence and rioting erupted for roughly 12 days in several cities and towns in Northern Ireland, including Belfast and Londonderry. The unrest began with gangs of youths in a predominantly unionist/loyalist area of Londonderry on March
29; rioting in Belfast on April 7—including attacks on police officers and a bus—was described as some of the worst violence seen in Northern Ireland in years. Almost 90 police officers were
injured over the course of the violence.55
Much of the unrest was concentrated in economical y disadvantaged communities where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence, but the violence also spread to interface areas between unionist and nationalist neighborhoods. Although initial assessments suggested that loyalist paramilitaries could be orchestrating the riots and violence in some areas, Northern Ireland police authorities subsequently concluded that while individuals with ties to
such loyalist groups may have been involved, the unrest was not sanctioned or organized by the groups.56 The Northern Ireland Assembly unanimously condemned the violence, as did the UK
and Irish governments.57
A complex combination of factors lie behind the unrest. Considerable attention has focused on unionist unhappiness with the post-Brexit border and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland. Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit arrangements appear to have exacerbated unionist concerns that their British identity is under threat and enhanced a sense of unionist disenfranchisement and abandonment. Some analysts
suggest that strong rhetoric against the Brexit arrangements from unionist politicians may have
fueled tensions in unionist/loyalist communities further, and contributed to instigating the unrest.
52 Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019. 53 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Quarterly Employment Survey, December 15, 2020.
54 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Economic Recovery Action Plan, February 25, 2021, at https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/publications/economic-recovery-action-plan. 55 Jordan Kenny, “T imeline: How Northern Ireland’s Violence Unfolded,” BBC News, April 12, 2021; “Belfast: Rioting ‘Was Worst Seen in Northern Ireland in Years,’” BBC News, April 14, 2021. 56 Lisa O’Carroll, “Northern Ireland Police Say Paramilitaries Not Behind Recent Violence,” Guardian, April 9, 2021; Laura Noonan, “Criminal Gangs Blamed for Stoking Northern Ireland Violence,” Financial Times, April 14, 2021. 57 Peter Foster and Jim Brunsden, “London and Dublin Call for Calm After Fresh Riots in Northern Ireland,” Financial
Tim es, April 8, 2021; David Young, Rebecca Black, and James Ward, “ Stormont Ministers Unite to Condemn Violence and Rioting,” Belfast Telegraph, April 8, 2021.
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At the same time, observers note that the immediate spark for the violence followed a decision in late March 2021 by Northern Ireland authorities not to prosecute violations of COVID-19 social distancing restrictions and public health protocols at a 2,000-person funeral in June 2020 for a former high-ranking IRA official. The funeral was attended by Sinn Fein leadership, including Deputy First Minister O’Neil . For many unionists, this incident—and what they regarded as a lack of police enforcement of the COVID-19 restrictions on the funeral—reinforced their long-
standing views of a double-standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists, and more broadly, a sense that the 1998 peace accord has benefited nationalists and republicans more than the unionist and loyalist communities. Additional factors behind the rioting also may include frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especial y among young people from
economical y-deprived areas.58
Implications of Brexit59
In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overal voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The
UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020, but continued to apply EU rules and to UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020, but continued to apply EU rules and to
participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of an 11-month transition participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of an 11-month transition
period that concluded on December 31, 2020. Brexit has added to divisions within Northern period that concluded on December 31, 2020. Brexit has added to divisions within Northern
Ireland and poses considerable Ireland and poses considerable
chal engeschallenges, with potential implications for Northern Ireland’s , with potential implications for Northern Ireland’s
peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status. peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status.
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the
Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the politicalRepublic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political
settlement by settlement by
providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law
also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and
nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland
belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an
important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped
produce a dynamic cross-border economy. produce a dynamic cross-border economy.
Preventing a
Preventing a
hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland
was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with
the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-
Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets, endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would
threaten the region’s security and stability and potential y put the entire peace process at risk.
58 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ Amid Brexit T rade Deal T ensions,” Politico, April 7, 2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old T ensions Resurface,” New York Times, April 8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021. 59 For more information on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview,
59 Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019. 60 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Quarterly Employment Survey, June 15, 2021. 61 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Economic Recovery Action Plan, February 25, 2021, at https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/publications/economic-recovery-action-plan.
62 For more information on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, ,
coordinated by Derek E. Mix. coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
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Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets, endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would threaten the region’s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.63
Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
“frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People “frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People
in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across
the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300 the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300
public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a
fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and
bureaucratic hurdles were common.bureaucratic hurdles were common.
6064
Post-Brexit Arrangements for Northern Ireland
Devising a mechanism to maintain an open border was complicated by the UK government’s
Devising a mechanism to maintain an open border was complicated by the UK government’s
decision to keep the UK outside of the EU’s single market and customs union. In early 2019, the decision to keep the UK outside of the EU’s single market and customs union. In early 2019, the
UK Parliament rejected the initialUK Parliament rejected the initial
UK-EUUK-EU
withdrawal agreement three times, in large part withdrawal agreement three times, in large part
because of concerns about the because of concerns about the
backstop for the Irish border, which would have kept the UK inside for the Irish border, which would have kept the UK inside
the EU customs union until the UK and EU determined their future trade relationship. Some the EU customs union until the UK and EU determined their future trade relationship. Some
Brexit advocates contended that Ireland and the EU were exaggerating and exploiting the security Brexit advocates contended that Ireland and the EU were exaggerating and exploiting the security
concerns about the border to keep the UK close to the EU. Those of this view noted that, although concerns about the border to keep the UK close to the EU. Those of this view noted that, although
the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security arrangements—including the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security arrangements—including
the removal of security the removal of security
instal ationsinstallations “consistent with the level of threat”—it does not explicitly “consistent with the level of threat”—it does not explicitly
require an open border. The Irish government and many in Northern Ireland—as require an open border. The Irish government and many in Northern Ireland—as
wel well as most UK as most UK
officials—argued that an open border had become intrinsic to peace on the island of Ireland.officials—argued that an open border had become intrinsic to peace on the island of Ireland.
6165
In October 2019, EU and UK negotiators reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a
In October 2019, EU and UK negotiators reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a
renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of
Ireland while safeguarding the rules of the EU single market.Ireland while safeguarding the rules of the EU single market.
6266 Under the terms of the protocol, Under the terms of the protocol,
Northern Ireland remains Northern Ireland remains
legal ylegally in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment
with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for
al all practical purposes in the practical purposes in the
EU single market and customs union, thus eliminating the need for regulatory checks on trade in EU single market and customs union, thus eliminating the need for regulatory checks on trade in
goods between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but goods between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but
essential yessentially creating a customs creating a customs
border in the Irish Seaborder in the Irish Sea
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Any physical checks necessary to ensure customs compliance . Any physical checks necessary to ensure customs compliance
are towould be be
conducted at ports or points of entry away from the Northern Ireland-Ireland land border, with no conducted at ports or points of entry away from the Northern Ireland-Ireland land border, with no
checks or infrastructure at this border. checks or infrastructure at this border.
The DUP strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements, contending the effective
The DUP strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements, contending the effective
customs border in the Irish Sea would divide Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK and customs border in the Irish Sea would divide Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK and
threaten the UK’s constitutional integrity. In light of the large majority won by Prime Minister threaten the UK’s constitutional integrity. In light of the large majority won by Prime Minister
Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, however, the Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, however, the
DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal
agreement. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus
enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020.
60
63 Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,” Guardian, February 7, 2018.
64 Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries
T hatThat Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,”
New York Times, August, August
5,
2017; Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary T arget,” Guardian, February 7, 2018 5, 2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing
Points,” Points,”
Belfast Telegraph, December , December
17, 2018. 17, 2018.
6165 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule
Out a Hard Border?,” BBCOut a Hard Border?,” BBC
News,News,
January 30, 2019; January 30, 2019;
T om McT agueTom McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” , “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,”
Politico, June 12, 2019. , June 12, 2019.
6266 Department for Exiting the European Union, Department for Exiting the European Union,
New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19, , October 19,
2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement
-and-political-declaration. -and-political-declaration.
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agreement. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020.
Concerns about a hard border developing on the island of Ireland mostly receded following the Concerns about a hard border developing on the island of Ireland mostly receded following the
UK Parliament’s approval of the withdrawal agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol. UK Parliament’s approval of the withdrawal agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol.
In December 2020, the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials reached an agreement on In December 2020, the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials reached an agreement on
implementing the protocol after the end of the transition period. Among other issues, the Joint implementing the protocol after the end of the transition period. Among other issues, the Joint
Committee agreed on a process for checks on animals and plants and rules for the supply of Committee agreed on a process for checks on animals and plants and rules for the supply of
medicines and food products entering Northern Ireland from medicines and food products entering Northern Ireland from
the rest of the UKGreat Britain; the EU presence ; the EU presence
in Northern Ireland; export declaration requirements; and criteria for goods to be considered “not in Northern Ireland; export declaration requirements; and criteria for goods to be considered “not
at risk” of entering the EU (and thus not subject to tariffs).at risk” of entering the EU (and thus not subject to tariffs).
63 The UK government also withdrew controversial provisions in its draft Internal Market Bil (adopted in December 2020 as the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020) that would have al owed UK officials to override parts of the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol in the absence of a Joint Committee implementation agreement
and UK-EU trade deal.
Ongoing Tensions and Challenges67
Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit,
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit,
demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which the population gap between Protestants and demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which the population gap between Protestants and
Catholics is narrowing) and changes in societal attitudes (Catholics is narrowing) and changes in societal attitudes (
especial yespecially among young people, who among young people, who
may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities)may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities)
were causing some in the were causing some in the
unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The new post-Brexit unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The new post-Brexit
trade arrangements for Northern Ireland appear to be enhancing this sense of unionist trade arrangements for Northern Ireland appear to be enhancing this sense of unionist
disenfranchisement, partly by raising fears that Northern Ireland disenfranchisement, partly by raising fears that Northern Ireland
wil will be drawn closer to the be drawn closer to the
Republic of Ireland’s economic orbit post-Brexit and that this could be a precursor to a united Republic of Ireland’s economic orbit post-Brexit and that this could be a precursor to a united
Ireland. As discussed above, unionist and loyalist unease with the post-Brexit arrangements for
Northern Ireland contributed to the outbreak of violence and unrest in the region in early 2021.64
Meanwhile,Ireland.68 Meanwhile, Brexit also has heightened long-standing nationalist doubts about the long-standing nationalist doubts about the
trustworthiness of the UK government and eroded trusttrustworthiness of the UK government
were heightened by the controversy over the Internal Market Bil . Although many analysts believe the subsequently withdrawn provisions in the bil largely were an attempt by the UK government to gain leverage during the contentious UK-EU trade negotiations, the incident further eroded trust within Northern Ireland, as wel as between the UK and Irish governments. between the UK and Irish governments.
As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is
deemed essential to the deemed essential to the
accord’s continued functioning and implementationcontinued functioning and implementation
.65
Since the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol took effect on January 1, 2021, some chal enges have arisen in implementing the post-Brexit arrangements of the peace accord.69
Significant challenges have arisen in implementing the protocol, which took effect on January 1, 2021. The new customs and regulatory . The new customs and regulatory
requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from
the rest of the UKGreat Britain have posed trade and have posed trade and
administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland. Problems have administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland. Problems have
included shipping delays and product shortages, included shipping delays and product shortages,
especial yespecially for Northern Ireland supermarkets for Northern Ireland supermarkets
63 T he UK-EU T radedependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK (despite grace periods ranging from three months to a year for full implementation of the new rules).70
67 The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement concluded in December 2020 and Cooperation Agreement concluded in December 2020
iswas expected to further reduce concerns expected to further reduce concerns
about “at risk” goods as the deal provides for tariff-free and quota-free merchandise trade betweenabout “at risk” goods as the deal provides for tariff-free and quota-free merchandise trade between
the UK and the EU the UK and the EU
(if rules(if rules
of origin requirements are met). “of origin requirements are met). “
Brexit: UK and EU Reach Deal on Northern Ireland Border Checks,” BBC Brexit: UK and EU Reach Deal on Northern Ireland Border Checks,” BBC
News,News,
December 8, 2020; European Commission, “Questions and Answers:December 8, 2020; European Commission, “Questions and Answers:
Joint Committee Formally Adopts a Set of Joint Committee Formally Adopts a Set of
Implementation Measures Related to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement,” December 17, 2020. Implementation Measures Related to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement,” December 17, 2020.
64
68 Ceylan Yeginsu, Ceylan Yeginsu,
“In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,”
New York Times, October 24, 2019; , October 24, 2019;
Dieter Reinisch, “After Brexit, Will Northern Ireland Return to Violence?,” Washington Post, December 5, 2019; Simon Carswell, Simon Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,”
Irish Times, January 30, 2020; , January 30, 2020;
Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,”
Guardian, April 5, 2021. , April 5, 2021.
6569 Matthew O’ Matthew O’
T ooleToole, “Of Course the Internal Market Bill , “Of Course the Internal Market Bill
T hreatensThreatens Northern Ireland,” Northern Ireland,”
Politico, September 23, 2020; , September 23, 2020;
Etain Etain
T annamTannam and Mary C. Murphy, “ and Mary C. Murphy, “
T heThe Internal Market Bill May Further Erode Internal Market Bill May Further Erode
T rustTrust and Security and Security
in Ireland/Northern Ireland,” London School of Economics, September 24, 2020; Pat Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Irish Times, June 11, 2021.
70 Physical checks necessary to ensure customs compliance are now being conducted at ports or points of entry on the northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain. Conor Macauley, “Problems in First Week of Post-deal GB-NI Trade,” BBC News, January 6, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021; Arthur Sullivan, “Northern Ireland: The Brexit Problem That Will Not Go Away,” Deutsche Welle (dw.com), February 10, 2021.
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In late January 2021, the Northern in Ireland/Northern Ireland,” London School of Economics, September 24, 2020.
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dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK (despite grace periods ranging from three months to a year for full implementation of the new rules).66 In early February 2021, customs and regulatory checks at Northern Ireland ports were suspended temporarily amid reported loyalist threats to port workers and EU officials. Northern Ireland police officials subsequently determined there were no credible threats, but the incident sparked a dispute between nationalists and unionists within
Northern Ireland’s devolved government.67
In addition, in late January 2021, renewed UK-EU tensions arose after the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol became entangled in EU efforts to control the export of COVID-19 vaccines Ireland protocol became entangled in EU efforts to control the export of COVID-19 vaccines
outside the bloc. The EU outside the bloc. The EU
initial y initially planned to trigger Article 16 of the protocol—an emergency planned to trigger Article 16 of the protocol—an emergency
override mechanism available to either the UKoverride mechanism available to either the UK
or the EU—to prevent vaccines being exported or the EU—to prevent vaccines being exported
from Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK. Invoking Article 16 could have resulted in border from Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK. Invoking Article 16 could have resulted in border
checks between Northern Ireland and Ireland. checks between Northern Ireland and Ireland.
AlthoughAmid a diplomatic outcry from the UK, Irish, and Northern Ireland officials, the EU almost immediately the EU almost immediately
reversed reversed
itself on invoking Article 16itself on invoking Article 16
amid a diplomatic outcry from UK, Irish, and Northern Ireland officials, claiming it was a mistake made in haste. Nevertheless, the incident is widely viewed as , the incident is widely viewed as
cal ing calling into question Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit into question Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit
arrangements. The EU claimed that invoking Article 16 as part of the bloc ’s new vaccine export control regulation was a simple mistake made in haste, but this error has helpedarrangements and as helping to bolster the to bolster the
DUP’s claim that the protocol is “unworkable.”DUP’s claim that the protocol is “unworkable.”
6871
The DUP and other unionists subsequently began urging the UK government to abandon the
The DUP and other unionists subsequently began urging the UK government to abandon the
protocol by invoking Article 16 itself. protocol by invoking Article 16 itself.
Then-First Minister Foster asserted that the EU’s First Minister Foster asserted that the EU’s
wil ingnesswillingness to to
invoke Article 16 had “lowered the bar” for the UK to do the same.invoke Article 16 had “lowered the bar” for the UK to do the same.
6972 Among other steps in an Among other steps in an
escalating campaign against the protocol, escalating campaign against the protocol,
the DUP and other unionists DUP leaders asserted they would not cooperate with the Irish government in implementing the protocol and some began to boycott meetings of the North-South Ministerial Council.73 The DUP and other unionists also launched legal action to launched legal action to
chal engechallenge the protocol in judicial review proceedings the protocol in judicial review proceedings
. The DUP argues that the new customs and
regulatory arrangements for Northern Ireland violate , arguing the protocol violates the UK Act of Union, which guarantees the UK Act of Union, which guarantees
unfettered trade throughout the UK, and were imposed without the consent of the public (which it claims also violates provisions in the Good Friday Agreement). In addition, DUP leaders asserted that they would not cooperate with the Irish government in implementing the protocol, and some
have boycotted meetings of the North-South Ministerial Council.70
The UK government has been reluctant to discard the Northern Ireland protocol. UK officials have been seeking to resolve operational problems with the EU and have cal ed for additional implementation flexibilities, such as extending the grace periods that limit checks on agri-food
products, medicines, and other items until 2023. EU officials, however, have unfettered trade throughout the UK.74
The UK and the EU have been seeking to resolve the operational challenges related to the Northern Ireland protocol, but talks have been contentious and progress has been slow. UK officials have called repeatedly for additional implementation flexibilities, including prolonged extensions of the grace periods that limit checks on agri-food products, medicines, and other items. UK and Northern Ireland officials express concern that unhappiness with the post-Brexit arrangements could increasingly threaten stability in Northern Ireland and contend that the EU must take the need to preserve peace into greater consideration. EU officials consistently have raised concerns that the UK is not implementing raised concerns
about how the UK is implementing certain aspects of the protocol.71
66 Physical checks necessary to ensure customs compliance are now being conducted at ports or points of entry on the
northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from the UK. Conor Macauley, “Problems in First Week of Post-deal GB-NI T rade,” BBC News, January 6, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “ Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021. 67 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Inspectors Pulled from Brexit Checks at Northern Ireland Ports over T hreats,” Politico, February 2, 2021; Freya McClements, “ Brexit Checks to Resume at NI Ports Following T hreats,” Irish Tim es, February 9, 2021.
68 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2 021certain aspects of the protocol, including building and properly staffing UK border and custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs data, and properly declaring goods entering into Northern Ireland.75
In March 2021, with the end of the first grace period approaching and with UK-EU talks over an extension largely stalled, the UK government announced that it would unilaterally extend this first grace period, due to expire on April 1 (for parcels and certain agri-food products), for six months, until October 1, 2021. The UK government also unilaterally relaxed EU restrictions on the movement of plants and used agricultural machinery into Northern Ireland from the rest of the
71 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; David M. ; David M.
Herszenhorn and Jakob Hanke Vela, “EU Drops Irish Border Move in Plan to Curb VaccineHerszenhorn and Jakob Hanke Vela, “EU Drops Irish Border Move in Plan to Curb Vaccine
Exports,” Exports,”
Politico, January , January
30, 2021. 30, 2021.
69
72 As quoted As quoted
in Shawnin Shawn
Pogatchnik, “Brexit Protocol Row AddsPogatchnik, “Brexit Protocol Row Adds
Pressure to Northern Ireland Unionists,” Pressure to Northern Ireland Unionists,”
Politico, ,
February 4, 2021. February 4, 2021.
7073 “Brexit: DUP Vows “Brexit: DUP Vows
to Sendto Send
‘Strong Message’‘Strong Message’
to Irish Government over NI Protocol,” BBC News,to Irish Government over NI Protocol,” BBC News,
February 2, 2021; Brian Hutton, “DUP Plans Legal Challenge to Northern Ireland Protocol,” Irish Times, February 21, 2021. 71 February 2, 2021. 74 Unionists also argued that the protocol’s provisions were imposed without the consent of the public, which violates the Good Friday Agreement. In June 2021, the Belfast High Court ruled the protocol is lawful, but this decision likely will be appealed to the UK Supreme Court. Brian Hutton, “DUP Plans Legal Challenge to Northern Ireland Protocol,” Irish Times, February 21, 2021; John Campbell, “Brexit: NI Protocol is Lawful, High Court Rules,” BBC News, June 30, 2021.
75 Lisa O’Carroll, Heather Stewart, and Daniel Boffey, “UK in ‘Constructive’ Lisa O’Carroll, Heather Stewart, and Daniel Boffey, “UK in ‘Constructive’
T alksTalks with EU with EU
Overover Northern Ireland Protocol,” Guardian, February 3, 2021; “Brexit: Preserving NI Protocol Is ‘The Only Way Forward,’ Warns EU,” BBC News, February 10, 2021; “EU Not Interested in Protecting Belfast Peace Agreement – Northern Ireland First Minister,” Reuters, March 5, 2021; Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to Exert Brexit Pressure,” Financial Times, June 8, 2021.
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UK.76 EU officials claimed these steps would undermine trust between the EU and the UK. Sinn Fein and other nationalists contended that the UK was reneging on commitments made in the protocol and accused the government of pursuing a “reckless and partisan approach” to its implementation.77 In response to the UK’s unilateral extensions of the grace periods, the EU Northern Ireland Protocol,” Guardian, February 3, 2021; Denis Staunton and Naomi O’Leary, “UK and EU Appear to Harden Positions
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With the end of the first grace period approaching and with UK-EU talks over an extension largely stal ed, the UK government announced in early March 2021 that it would unilateral y extend the first grace period, due to expire on April 1 (for parcels and certain agri-food products), for six months, until October 1, 2021. The UK government also unilateral y relaxed EU restrictions on the movement of plants and used agricultural machinery into Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK.72 EU officials claimed these steps were in breach of international law and
would undermine trust between the UK and the EU. The EU has launched a legal infringement launched a legal infringement
process against the UK for breaching the process against the UK for breaching the
provisions of the Northern Ireland protocol. The infringement processterms of the protocol; this legal action could ultimately lead to the UK’s referral to the European Court of Justice, could ultimately lead to the UK’s referral to the European Court of Justice,
potential potential fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.78
Amid these ongoing tensions, in June 2021, the EU agreed to the UK’s request for a three-month delay in implementing a ban on shipping chilled meat products from the rest of the UK to Northern Ireland (EU rules generally do not permit the import of items such as fresh sausages from non-member states). EU officials stressed that this delay until October 1 was temporary—aimed at allowing Northern Ireland supermarkets more time to adapt their supply chains post-Brexit—and undertaken to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to “creative solutions … with the core purpose of benefitting people in Northern Ireland.”79 The EU also put forward measures to address a number of other UK concerns related to the operation of the protocol, including ensuring the continued supply of medicines for Northern Ireland.
UK officials maintain that the protocol is not sustainable and that substantial changes are necessary in order to decrease tensions in Northern Ireland, protect peace, and end market disruptions for businesses and consumers. In July 2021, the UK government essentially called for the protocol to be renegotiated, asserting that the EU approach to its implementation remains too rigid and that a “new balance” must be found so the protocol “can operate pragmatically” in accordance “with the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland.”80 UK officials asserted that the government would be justified in invoking Article 16 but would not do so for the time being in favor of finding a consensual solution through negotiations. Among other changes, the UK government called for largely removing customs checks on goods from Great Britain intended to remain in Northern Ireland, removing medicines from the scope of the protocol, and eliminating the role of the EU institutions in overseeing the protocol’s operation. Some analysts suggest the UK’s proposals for a revamped protocol would rely mostly on the EU trusting the UK to protect the EU’s single market rather than on abiding by EU rules.81
The EU rejects renegotiating the Northern Ireland protocol, reiterating that it represents a joint, already-agreed UK-EU solution to the challenges Brexit poses to the island of Ireland. The EU asserts that it has proposed several “flexible, practical solutions” to facilitate trade between Great
76fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK. Talks between
the UK and the EU to resolve the trade difficulties resulting from the protocol are ongoing.73
The difficulties with the protocol’s implementation have heightened tensions between the UK, the EU, and Ireland. They also have increased frictions between the unionist and nationalist communities, as seen by the riots and violence in late March and early April 2021. UK officials
express concern that growing unionist unhappiness with the post-Brexit arrangements could increasingly threaten stability in Northern Ireland. As noted above, in early March 2021, loyalist paramilitary groups withdrew support for the Good Friday Agreement temporarily due to concerns about the protocol and the effective customs border in the Irish Sea. Sinn Fein and other nationalists contend the UK government has reneged on commitments made in the Northern
Ireland protocol and accused the UK government of pursuing a “reckless and partisan approach”
to its implementation.74
Some analysts note that the DUP’s incoming new leader, Edwin Poots, is considered a hard-line
opponent of the post-Brexit arrangements. As Northern Ireland agriculture minister, for example, Poots has resisted constructing permanent border control posts at Northern Ireland ports to check products arriving from the rest of the UK and refused to take part in North-South Ministerial Council meetings. In his bid for DUP leader, Poots pledged to intensify opposition to the Northern Ireland protocol. News reports suggest concern in both London and Brussels that
Poots’s election as DUP leader could make UK-EU efforts to resolve problems with the protocol’s implementation more difficult. Other observers suggest that increased DUP action against the protocol could heighten tensions with Sinn Fein and could lead to the collapse of the
devolved government and early Assembly elections.75
on Implementing Northern Ireland Protocol,” Irish Times, February 11, 2021. 72 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Written Ministerial Statement to the UK House of Commons, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Written Ministerial Statement to the UK House of Commons,
March 3, 2021, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-03-03/hcws819. Also see March 3, 2021, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-03-03/hcws819. Also see
ShawnShawn
Pogatchnik, “Soiled Deal: UK DefiesPogatchnik, “Soiled Deal: UK Defies
EU Ban on British Dirt on Plants Shipped to Northern Ireland,” EU Ban on British Dirt on Plants Shipped to Northern Ireland,”
Politico, ,
March 5, 2021. March 5, 2021.
73 European Commission, “ Withdrawal Agreement: Commission Sends 77 As quoted in Ali Gordon, “Boris Johnson Visits Northern Ireland amid Unionist Tension,” BBC News, March 12, 2021. Also see, Guy Faulconbridge, “Britain Says Unionist Anger over Brexit Deal Could Put Northern Ireland ‘in Quite a Dangerous Place,’” Reuters, March 19, 2021. 78 European Commission, Withdrawal Agreement: Commission Sends Letter of Formal Notice to the United Kingdom Letter of Formal Notice to the United Kingdom
for Breach of its Obligationsfor Breach of its Obligations
Under the Protocol on Ireland and Northern IrelandUnder the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland
,,” March 15, 2021; Padraic Halpin, “Ireland Confident of Solution for Post -Brexit Northern Ireland T rade,” Reuters, April 27, 2021; John Campbell, “Brexit: UK Proposes New Irish Sea Food Checks from October,” BBC News, May 17, 2021. 74 As quoted in Ali Gordon, “Boris Johnson Visits Northern Ireland amid Unionist T ension,” BBC News, March 12, 2021. Also see Guy Faulconbridge, “ Britain Says Unionist Anger over Brexit Deal Could Put Northern Ireland ‘in Quite a Dangerous Place,’” Reuters, March 19, 2021. 75 Shawn Pogatchnik and Emilio Casalicchio, “Arlene Foster to Quit as Norther Irish First Minister and DUP Leader,” Politico, April 28, 2021; “ Brexit: Edwin Poots T hreatens Legal Action Over NI Protocol,” BBC News, May 4, 2021; Rory Carroll, “Edwin Poots: DUP’s New Creationist Leader Is a Savvy Politician,” Guardian, May 14, 2021.
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Economic Concerns
Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible
economic consequences for Northern Ireland. According to a UK parliamentary report, Northern Ireland depends more on the EU market (and especial y that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the UK.76 In 2018, approximately 59% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU,
including 37% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.77
Significant fears existed in particular that a no-deal Brexit (that is March 15, 2021.
79 European Commission, “EU-UK Relations: Solutions Found to Help Implementation of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland,” press release, June 30, 2021. 80 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, p. 15, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northern-ireland-protocol-next-steps.
81 See, for example, the analysis by John Campbell in “Brexit: Stormont Parties Divided on UK Call to Amend NI Protocol,” BBC News, July 21, 2021; and Jennifer Rankin, “UK’s Northern Ireland Protocol Demands Sap Brussels’ Goodwill,” Guardian, July 21, 2021.
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Britain and Northern Ireland and that it will continue to work with the UK to overcome difficulties but notes that any solutions must be found “within the framework” of the protocol.82 At the end of July 2021, the EU decided to pause its legal infringement action against the UK begun in March. Irish officials reportedly regarded this step as “a genuine goodwill gesture” by the EU to de-escalate tensions with the UK.83
Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish government maintain that the protocol is the only viable option to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland in light of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU and leave the EU single market and customs union. The EU contends that 80% of the regulatory and customs checks required by the protocol would be eliminated if the UK agreed to align with EU food and veterinary standards. The UK government rejects this approach, given that a key rationale for Brexit was to free the UK from EU rules and regulations and due to concerns that such alignment could impede new UK free trade deals with other countries, such as the United States.84
On September 6, 2021, the UK government announced that it would indefinitely extend the grace periods and easements related to the protocol’s trade rules that were due to expire at the end of the month in order to “provide space” for further discussions with the EU on the protocol’s future.85 The EU reiterated that it would not renegotiate the protocol but would “engage constructively” with the UK; the EU also said that it would not resume infringement proceedings (although it reserved the right to do so in the future).86 UK-EU talks on the protocol are expected to continue.
On September 9, 2021, DUP leader Donaldson warned that the DUP may withdraw its ministers from Northern Ireland’s Executive (including Givan as first minister) if concerns over the protocol are not resolved. Such a move by the DUP could collapse the devolved government and lead to snap Assembly elections. Donaldson also asserted that the DUP would end its engagement with the North-South bodies (except for cooperation on health matters) established under Strand Two of the Good Friday Agreement, would seek to block additional protocol-required customs checks at Northern Ireland ports, would examine the legality of the current customs checks, and would “seek to frustrate and prevent” the Northern Ireland Assembly from aligning legislation with laws passed by the EU.87
82 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021. 83 John Campbell, “Brexit: EU Pauses Legal Action Against UK Over NI Protocol Breaches,” BBC News, July 27, 2021; Hans von der Burchard, “EU Pauses Both Brexit Lawsuits Against the UK,” Politico, July 28, 2021. 84 Chris Morris, “Brexit: Can the UK and the EU Reach a Deal on Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, June 16, 2021; Mark Landler, “Britain and the EU Defer Action on Northern Ireland,” New York Times, June 30, 2021; “Donaldson and McDonald Hold ‘Constructive and Frank’ First In-Person Meeting,” Irish Times, July 5, 2021. 85 Minister of State in the Cabinet Office Lord Frost, Written Ministerial Statement to the UK House of Lords, September 6, 2021, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-09-06/hlws257.
86 European Commission, “Statement by the European Commission Following the UK Announcement Regarding the Operation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, September 6, 2021. 87 Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021, https://mydup.com/news/sir-jeffrey-donaldson-now-is-the-time-to-act. Also see, “NI Protocol: DUP Could Quit from Stormont Within Weeks,” BBC News, September 9, 2021.
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Economic Concerns Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible economic consequences for Northern Ireland. According to a UK parliamentary report, Northern Ireland depends more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the UK.88 In 2019, approximately 59% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU, including 38% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.89
Significant fears existed in particular that a no-deal Brexit (i.e., without a withdrawal , without a withdrawal
agreement in place) would have jeopardized labor markets and industries that operate on an agreement in place) would have jeopardized labor markets and industries that operate on an
al -all-island basis. Many manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply island basis. Many manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply
chains north and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, chains north and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk,
cheese, butter, and alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland cheese, butter, and alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland
several times for processing and packaging.several times for processing and packaging.
7890 The vast majority of cross-border transactions are The vast majority of cross-border transactions are
made by micro and made by micro and
smal small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.
7991
UK and DUP leaders
UK and DUP leaders
maintainedasserted that the rest of the UK is that the rest of the UK is
overal overall more important more important
economical y to economically to Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In
20182019, sales to other parts of the UK , sales to other parts of the UK
(£(£
10.6 bil ion11.3 billion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£4.) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£4.
2 bil ion) and roughly5 billion) and more than four times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.four times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.
5 bil ion).804 billion).92 Among the DUP’s Among the DUP’s
initial objections objections
to the renegotiated UK-EU withdrawal agreementto the post-Brexit arrangements agreed in 2019, the DUP argued that , the DUP argued that
the Northern Ireland
arrangementsthey would be detrimental to the region’s economy would be detrimental to the region’s economy
, especial y to trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct given the . The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct given the
supply problems and shipping delays affecting Northern Ireland since the new post-Brexit supply problems and shipping delays affecting Northern Ireland since the new post-Brexit
customs and regulatory requirements took effect.customs and regulatory requirements took effect.
81 Major UK supermarket chains warn that full implementation of the protocol could lead to increased costs for Northern Ireland consumers, while some drug manufacturers may cease to supply certain medicines produced in Great Britain to Northern Ireland due to the cost and complexity of meeting duplicate regulations for the Northern Ireland market. One study from the University of Ulster estimates that the costs of the protocol to Northern Ireland’s public and private sectors could be around £850 million (around $1.2 billion) per year.93
UK officials maintain that the government is determined to safeguard Northern Ireland’s interests
UK officials maintain that the government is determined to safeguard Northern Ireland’s interests
and “make a success of Brexit” for Northern Ireland.and “make a success of Brexit” for Northern Ireland.
8294 They insist that Brexit offers new They insist that Brexit offers new
economic opportunities for Northern Ireland outside the EU. Supporters of the post-Brexit economic opportunities for Northern Ireland outside the EU. Supporters of the post-Brexit
arrangements for Northern Ireland argue the arrangements arrangements for Northern Ireland argue the arrangements
wil will help to improve the region’s help to improve the region’s
economic prospects. Northern Ireland remains part of the UK customs union and thus economic prospects. Northern Ireland remains part of the UK customs union and thus
wil will be able be able
to participate in future UK trade deals, but it also retains privileged access to the EU single to participate in future UK trade deals, but it also retains privileged access to the EU single
market. These provisions may help increase competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make
the region a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment.83
76
88 Report of the UK House Report of the UK House
of Lords European Union Committee, of Lords European Union Committee,
Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016. , December 2016.
7789 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,
Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, ,
June 15, 2020. 78August 4, 2021. 90 Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,”
Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How , March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How
Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News,Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News,
September 22, 2019.September 22, 2019.
79
91 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,
Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, ,
June 15, 2020. 80 Ibid. 81August 4, 2021. 92 Ibid. 93 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could
Reduce Reduce Spending,Spending,
Investment, and Investment, and
T radeTrade in NI,” BBC in NI,” BBC
News,News,
October 22, 2019;
Peter Foster, Judith Evans, and Daniel T homas, “Brexit One Month On: What Has Changed?,” October 22, 2019; “Brexit: Supermarkets Warn of Rising Costs Due to NI Protocol,” BBC News, July 18, 2021; Sarah Neville, George Parker, and Mehreen Khan, “Northern Ireland Set to Lose Access to 2,000 Medicines,” Financial Times, July 22, 2021; Esmond Birnie, “The Irish Sea Border Is Costing Northern Ireland £850m a Year,” newsletter.co.uk, August 12, 2021. 94Financial Times, January 31, 2021.
82 UK Government Press Release, “Brokenshire Holds Inaugural Meeting of Northern Ireland Business UK Government Press Release, “Brokenshire Holds Inaugural Meeting of Northern Ireland Business
Advisory Advisory
Group,” September 1, 2016; Stephen Walker, “Brexit: Northern Ireland Can Be SuccessGroup,” September 1, 2016; Stephen Walker, “Brexit: Northern Ireland Can Be Success
Outside EU,” BBCOutside EU,” BBC
News, October 4, 2016.
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market. These provisions may help increase competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland business leaders report broad satisfaction with the protocol and note that it has a number of benefits, including keeping cross-border trade open.95News, October 4, 2016.
83 Clodagh Rice, “Brexit: My NI Business Now Has the Best of Both Worlds,” BBC News, February 5, 2021; Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique T rading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, 2021.
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Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein argues that Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein argues that
“Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.“Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.
8496 Since the Since the
2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly 2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly
cal edcalled for a for a
border poll (a referendum on (a referendum on
whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the
hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday
Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll in Northern Ireland, in lineAgreement provides for the possibility of a border poll in Northern Ireland, in line
with the with the
consent principle. consent principle.
Any decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the
Any decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, a UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, a
border poll must be border poll must be
cal edcalled if it “appears likely” that “a majority of those voting would express a if it “appears likely” that “a majority of those voting would express a
wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a
united Ireland.”united Ireland.”
8597 At present, experts believe there is not sufficient evidence to convince the UK At present, experts believe there is not sufficient evidence to convince the UK
government to government to
cal call a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Most opinion polls a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Most opinion polls
indicate that a majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to support the region’s position as indicate that a majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to support the region’s position as
part of the UK. Although a January 2021 survey found that 51% of people in Northern Ireland part of the UK. Although a January 2021 survey found that 51% of people in Northern Ireland
would support holding a border poll in the next five years (with 44% opposed and 5% having no would support holding a border poll in the next five years (with 44% opposed and 5% having no
opinion), it also found that 47% favored Northern Ireland remaining in the UK versus 42% in opinion), it also found that 47% favored Northern Ireland remaining in the UK versus 42% in
support of a united Ireland. An Aprilsupport of a united Ireland. An April
2021 survey found similar results, with 49% of those polled 2021 survey found similar results, with 49% of those polled
in Northern Ireland supporting the region’s continued position within the UK versus 43% for a in Northern Ireland supporting the region’s continued position within the UK versus 43% for a
united Ireland.united Ireland.
8698 Prime Minister Johnson reportedly has asserted that there Prime Minister Johnson reportedly has asserted that there
wil will be no referendum be no referendum
on Northern Ireland’s status for “a very, very long time to come.”on Northern Ireland’s status for “a very, very long time to come.”
8799
At the same time, experts note that several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and
At the same time, experts note that several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and
influence whether a border poll is influence whether a border poll is
cal edcalled in the years ahead. As discussed, Northern Ireland’s in the years ahead. As discussed, Northern Ireland’s
demographics are changing; many experts expect forthcoming census data demographics are changing; many experts expect forthcoming census data
wil will show that show that
Catholics equal or outnumber Protestants in Northern Ireland. The post-Brexit arrangements for Catholics equal or outnumber Protestants in Northern Ireland. The post-Brexit arrangements for
Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with the Republic of Ireland and greater Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with the Republic of Ireland and greater
economic integration (data economic integration (data
from early as of mid-2021 indicate a significant increase in cross-border trade 2021 indicate a significant increase in cross-border trade
since the Northern Ireland protocol took effect). Analysts suggest that nonaligned voters who do since the Northern Ireland protocol took effect). Analysts suggest that nonaligned voters who do
not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in any future border poll and not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in any future border poll and
that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish unification more by its that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish unification more by its
implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions than by identity politics. implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions than by identity politics.
Unification also may appeal to those in Northern Ireland who opposed Brexit and wish to regain EU citizenship. In addition, should Sinn Fein win the largest number of seats in the next
Assembly elections in Northern Ireland, this could increase pressure on the UK government to
cal a border poll.88
84 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016. 85 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998. 86 Gerry Moriarty, “Poll Finds Majority Favours Holding a Border Poll in Next Five Years,” Irish Times, January 24, 2021; BBC News, “NI 100: Majority Believe NI Will Leave UK Within 25 Years,” April 20, 2021. 87 As quoted in Brian Hutton, “Boris Johnson: No Border Poll for Very Long T ime to Come,” Irish Times, April 20, 2021.
88 T ony Barber, “Brexit Raises the Spectre of the UK’s Break-Up,” Financial Times, October 22, 2019; Alex Kane, “Unionists May Find Being Bounced into Border Poll Is Boris’s Preferred Op tion,” Irish Times, February 8, 2021; Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Financial Times, April 6, 2021; John Campbell, “Cross-border T rade in Ireland ‘Has Increased Dramatically’ in 2021,” BBC News, April 15 , 2021.
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In
95 Clodagh Rice, “Brexit: My NI Business Now Has the Best of Both Worlds,” BBC News, February 5, 2021; Sandra O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” Politico, July 9, 2021.
96 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016. 97 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998. 98 Gerry Moriarty, “Poll Finds Majority Favours Holding a Border Poll in Next Five Years,” Irish Times, January 24, 2021; BBC News, “NI 100: Majority Believe NI Will Leave UK Within 25 Years,” April 20, 2021. 99 As quoted in Brian Hutton, “Boris Johnson: No Border Poll for Very Long Time to Come,” Irish Times, April 20, 2021.
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addition, should Sinn Fein win the largest number of seats in the next Assembly elections in Northern Ireland, this could increase pressure on the UK government to call a border poll.100
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval. In Ireland’s February
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval. In Ireland’s February
2020 parliamentary election, Sinn Fein secured the largest percentage of the vote for the first time 2020 parliamentary election, Sinn Fein secured the largest percentage of the vote for the first time
in Ireland’s history, and some commentators suggest the party’s electoral success has helped push in Ireland’s history, and some commentators suggest the party’s electoral success has helped push
the question of unification higher on the politicalthe question of unification higher on the political
agenda in the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s agenda in the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s
three-party coalition government, consisting of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Green Party, has three-party coalition government, consisting of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Green Party, has
launched a “Shared Island” initiativelaunched a “Shared Island” initiative
to promote cross-border dialogue and research on common to promote cross-border dialogue and research on common
chal engeschallenges and the future of the island but has adopted what many view as a “go slow” approach and the future of the island but has adopted what many view as a “go slow” approach
to the question of Irish unification. The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and to the question of Irish unification. The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and
south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would
be accommodated be accommodated
political ypolitically—before any border poll is held.—before any border poll is held.
89101
Some experts question the current extent of support in Ireland for unification, given concerns that
Some experts question the current extent of support in Ireland for unification, given concerns that
unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland as unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland as
wel well as the potential as the potential
economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland
annual yannually with a roughly £10 with a roughly £10
bil ion billion (about (about
$14 $14
bil ion) billion) budget subsidy to make up the budget subsidy to make up the
shortfal shortfall in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of
this subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeablethis subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeable
defense defense
spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s
budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An
April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54% April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54%
reported they would be unwilling to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.reported they would be unwilling to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.
90102
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework
for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping
the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full
implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the
restoration of the devolved government in 2007. restoration of the devolved government in 2007.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Secretary of State
Hil aryHillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged
Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In
February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting
Hil sboroughHillsborough Agreement. In June 2013, Agreement. In June 2013,
President Obama visited Northern Ireland and noted that the United States would always “stand President Obama visited Northern Ireland and noted that the United States would always “stand
by” Northern Ireland.91 The Obama Administration welcomed the conclusion of both the
December 2014 Stormont House Agreement and the November 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson expressed regret at the impasse in discussions to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and asserted that
89 Naomi O’Leary, “Sinn Fein Surge Makes Irish Political History,” Politico, February 9, 2020; Shawn
100 Tony Barber, “Brexit Raises the Spectre of the UK’s Break-Up,” Financial Times, October 22, 2019; Alex Kane, “Unionists May Find Being Bounced into Border Poll Is Boris’s Preferred Option,” Irish Times, February 8, 2021; Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Financial Times, April 6, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy and Freya McClements, “Imports from NI to Republic Up 77% Since UK’s EU Exit,” Irish Times, August 17, 2021.
101 Naomi O’Leary, “Sinn Fein Surge Makes Irish Political History,” Politico, February 9, 2020; Shawn Pogatchnik and Pogatchnik and
Giovanna Coi, “Can Northern Ireland Survive Brexit?,” Giovanna Coi, “Can Northern Ireland Survive Brexit?,”
Politico, April 13, 2021. , April 13, 2021.
90102 Henry Farrell, “After Britain’s Elections, People Are Henry Farrell, “After Britain’s Elections, People Are
T alkingTalking About a United Ireland. Don’t Hold Your Breath,” About a United Ireland. Don’t Hold Your Breath,”
Washington Post, December 13, 2019; Fionnan Sheahan, “, December 13, 2019; Fionnan Sheahan, “
Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay
for It,” for It,”
Irish Independent, May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a , May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a
United Ireland?,” United Ireland?,”
Irish Times, May 7, 2021. , May 7, 2021.
91 As quoted in BBC News, “G8 Summit: U.S. Will Stand by Northern Ireland, Says Obama,” June 17, 2013.
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by” Northern Ireland.103 The Obama Administration welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson expressed regret at the impasse in discussions to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and asserted that the United States remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good the United States remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good
Friday Agreement and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”Friday Agreement and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”
92104 In March 2020, President In March 2020, President
Trump appointed his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy Trump appointed his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy
to to
Northern Ireland.Northern Ireland.
93105
President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
peace process. In March 2021, President Biden reiterated strong U.S. support for the Good Friday peace process. In March 2021, President Biden reiterated strong U.S. support for the Good Friday
Agreement during annual St. Patrick’s Day meetings with officials from the Republic of Ireland Agreement during annual St. Patrick’s Day meetings with officials from the Republic of Ireland
and Northern Ireland. A joint U.S.-Irish statement asserted that the two governments are and Northern Ireland. A joint U.S.-Irish statement asserted that the two governments are
“unequivocal y“unequivocally committed” to the 1998 accord, which has served as “the bedrock of peace, committed” to the 1998 accord, which has served as “the bedrock of peace,
stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.”stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.”
94106 President Biden also underlined the ongoing U.S. commitment to the Northern Ireland peace process during his visit to the United Kingdom in June 2021. A joint U.S.-UK statement noted, “It took a deep partnership between the UK, Ireland, and the U.S. to support the people of Northern Ireland in bringing the Troubles to an end, and it will take a continued and ongoing partnership to advance and safeguard Northern Ireland’s stability and prosperity into the future.”107
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
decades. Congressional hearings have focused on the implementation of the Good Friday decades. Congressional hearings have focused on the implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, policing reforms, and human rights in Northern Ireland. Some Members have been Agreement, policing reforms, and human rights in Northern Ireland. Some Members have been
interested in the status of public inquiries into several past murders in Northern Ireland in which interested in the status of public inquiries into several past murders in Northern Ireland in which
collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected—including the 1989 collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected—including the 1989
slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997
kil ing killing of Raymond of Raymond
Mc CordMcCord, Jr. Most , Jr. Most
recently, on May 5, 2021, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe, recently, on May 5, 2021, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe,
Energy, the Environment and Cyber held a hearing titled “Reaffirming the Good Friday Energy, the Environment and Cyber held a hearing titled “Reaffirming the Good Friday
Agreement.” Some Members of Congress have urged President Biden to appoint a new special Agreement.” Some Members of Congress have urged President Biden to appoint a new special
envoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process in light of recent tensions.envoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process in light of recent tensions.
95108
On the economic front, the United States is a key trading partner and an important source of
On the economic front, the United States is a key trading partner and an important source of
investment for Northern Ireland. According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive, in investment for Northern Ireland. According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive, in
2017, exports to the United States accounted for 17% of total Northern Ireland exports, and 2017, exports to the United States accounted for 17% of total Northern Ireland exports, and
imports from the United States accounted for 10% of total Northern Ireland imports. Foreign imports from the United States accounted for 10% of total Northern Ireland imports. Foreign
direct investment by U.S.-based companies totaled £1.8 direct investment by U.S.-based companies totaled £1.8
bil ionbillion (about $2.5 (about $2.5
bil ionbillion) between 2008
103 As quoted in BBC News, “G8 Summit: U.S. Will Stand by Northern Ireland, Says Obama,” June 17, 2013. 104 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,” November 1, 2017.
105 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021. 106 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Vitual Bilateral Meeting,” March 17, 2021; White House, “Joint Statement by President Joe Biden and Taoiseach Micheál Martin,” March 17, 2021.
107 White House, “Joint Statement on the Visit to the United Kingdom of the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States of America at the Invitation of the Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson, MP, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” June 10, 2021. 108 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Irish Times, May 13, 2021.
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) between 2008 and 2018.and 2018.
96109 Between 2009 and 2011, a special U.S. economic envoy to Northern Ireland worked Between 2009 and 2011, a special U.S. economic envoy to Northern Ireland worked
to further economic ties between the United States and Northern Ireland and to underpin the to further economic ties between the United States and Northern Ireland and to underpin the
peace process by promoting economic prosperity. peace process by promoting economic prosperity.
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland
In contrast to President Trump’s support for Brexit, President Biden has maintained a skeptical In contrast to President Trump’s support for Brexit, President Biden has maintained a skeptical
view of Brexit since his time as Vice President in the Obama Administration. During the 2020 view of Brexit since his time as Vice President in the Obama Administration. During the 2020
U.S. presidential election campaign, then-candidate Biden stressed that Brexit must not U.S. presidential election campaign, then-candidate Biden stressed that Brexit must not
undermine the Good Friday Agreement or jeopardize the open border between Northern Ireland undermine the Good Friday Agreement or jeopardize the open border between Northern Ireland
and Ireland. and Ireland.
President Biden raised these Biden raised these
concernsissues in a phone in a phone
cal call as President-elect with UK Prime Minister Johnson. Biden Administration officials subsequently have noted concerns about rising Brexit-related tensions in Northern Ireland and reiterated that the gains from the peace process must be protected.110
The Biden Administration also has conveyed U.S. support for the Northern Ireland protocol.111 U.S. officials note that the Administration views the protocol as “a way to manage the practical challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island of Ireland. At the same time, Administration officials assert that the current difficulties in implementing the protocol are trade issues for the UK and the EU to resolve and that President Biden “is interested in having strong relations with both the UK and the EU.”112 In early May 2021, during a visit to London, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged both the UK and the EU “to prioritize political and economic stability in Northern Ireland” in implementing the post-Brexit arrangements for the region.113
During President Biden’s June 2021 visit to the UK, news reports indicate he offered support for a possible way to ease some of the trade challenges posed by the Northern Ireland protocol. President Biden reportedly sought to assure Prime Minister Johnson and UK officials that a temporary UK-EU agreement on food standards—aimed at reducing protocol-related trade difficulties between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK—would not be a barrier to a separate U.S.-UK free trade deal in the future.114 Negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden Administration has not indicated whether it will continue with these talks. It would likely take several years to conclude any future U.S.-UK trade deal.115
109as President-elect with UK
92 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power -Sharing T alks,” November 1, 2017.
93 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021. 94 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Vitual Bilateral Meeting,” March 17, 2021; White House, “ Joint Statement by President Joe Biden and T aoiseach Micheál Martin ,” March 17, 2021.
95 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Irish Times, May 13, 2021. 96 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Northern Ireland Department for the Economy,
Trade in Goods Data Analysis Northern Ireland – USA (2015-2017), ,
June 2018; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, June 2018; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy,
Northern Ireland Trade and Investm entInvestment Patterns, October 2, 2018.
110 Patrick Wintour, “Biden and Pelosi Warn UK Over Risking Good Friday Agreement,” Guardian, September 16, 2020; George Parker and Katrina Manson, “Joe Biden Warns Boris Johnson Not to Let Brexit Upend Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Financial Times, November 9, 2020; “G7 Summit: Don’t Imperil NI Peace, Biden to Warn UK and EU,” BBC News, June 9, 2021; Jules Darmamin, Shawn Pogatchnik, and Emilio Casalicchio, “US Reprimands UK Over Northern Ireland Protocol Row,” Politico, June 10, 2021. 111 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of Vice President Kamala Harris Meeting with First Minister Arlene Foster and Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Northern Ireland,” March 17, 2021. 112 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
113 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab at a Joint Press Availability,” May 3, 2021.
114 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Ireland: UK-EU Food Safety Deal Wouldn’t Stop UK-US Trade Pact,” Politico, June 11, 2021. 115 Joe Mayes and Eric Martin, “U.K.-U.S. Trade Deal Is Likely Years Away as Biden Shifts Focus,” Bloomberg.com,
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Patterns, October 2, 2018.
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Prime Minister Johnson.97 It is unclear whether the Biden Administration wil continue with negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade agreement begun by the Trump Administration, but some observers doubt the Biden Administration wil prioritize a U.S.-UK trade deal amid
competing imperatives, including dealing with COVID-19 and economic recovery.98
The Biden Administration also has conveyed U.S. support for the Northern Ireland protocol.99 U.S. officials note that the Administration views the protocol as “a way to manage the practical chal enges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island of Ireland. At the same time, Administration officials assert that the current difficulties in
implementing the protocol are trade issues for the UK and the EU to resolve and that President Biden “is interested in having strong relations with both the UK and the EU.”100 In early May 2021, during a visit to London, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged the UK and the EU “to prioritize political and economic stability in Northern Ireland” in implementing the post-
Brexit arrangements for the region.101
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for
Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for
Northern Ireland. Although many Members back, in principle, a future U.S.-UK free trade Northern Ireland. Although many Members back, in principle, a future U.S.-UK free trade
agreement, some Members have tied their support to protecting the peace process. In April 2019, agreement, some Members have tied their support to protecting the peace process. In April 2019,
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated there would be “no chance whatsoever” for a U.S.-UK trade House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated there would be “no chance whatsoever” for a U.S.-UK trade
agreement if Brexit were to weaken the Northern Ireland peace process.agreement if Brexit were to weaken the Northern Ireland peace process.
102116 In December 2019, the In December 2019, the
House passed H.Res. 585, reaffirming support for the Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit House passed H.Res. 585, reaffirming support for the Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit
and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade agreement and other U.S.-UK bilateraland asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade agreement and other U.S.-UK bilateral
agreements agreements
must include conditions to uphold the peace accord. must include conditions to uphold the peace accord.
OnIn May May
17, 2021, the Senate passed S.Res. 2021, the Senate passed S.Res.
117, expressing support for the Good Friday Agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol 117, expressing support for the Good Friday Agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol
and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade or other bilateral agreements must “take into account” and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade or other bilateral agreements must “take into account”
whether obligations in the Good Friday Agreement are being met.whether obligations in the Good Friday Agreement are being met.
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments
established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an
independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas
most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of
Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States
has contributed more than $has contributed more than $
540 mil ion544 million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI
funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as
wel .
97 Patrick Wintour, “Biden and Pelosi Warn UK Over Risking Good Friday Agreement,” The Guardian, September 16,
2020; George Parker and Katrina Manson, “Joe Biden Warns Boris Johnson Not to Let Brexit Upend Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Financial Times, November 9, 2020. 98 Ryan Heath, “Britain Braces for Not -so-special Relationship with Biden,” Politico, December 31, 2020. 99 See, for example, the White House, “ Readout of Vice President Kamala Harris Meeting with First Minister Arlene Foster and Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Northern Ireland,” March 17, 2021. 100 White House, “ Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
101 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab at a Joint Press Availability,” May 3, 2021.
102 Simon Carswell, “Pelosi Warns No US-UK T rade Deal if Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit,” Irish Times, April 15, 2019.
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well. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23
mil ion annual y; in
million annually; in the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18
mil ionmillion each year. each year.
103117
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities, located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities,
and littleand little
private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and
the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as
tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus
toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions. toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support
for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland
traditional y traditionally has been strongest in has been strongest in
communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers
have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the
conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process. conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process.
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also
have encouraged the IFI to place greater focus on encouraged the IFI to place greater focus on
reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the same reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the same
time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as largely time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as largely
wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way. wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way.
March 26, 2021; Pan Pylas, “US Downplays Prospect of Post-Brexit Trade Deal with UK,” Associated Press, May 6, 2021.
116 Simon Carswell, “Pelosi Warns No US-UK Trade Deal if Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit,” Irish Times, April 15, 2019.
117 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland.
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In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to
cal call for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members
asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern
Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the
final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an
al ocation
allocation for the IFI (and has not done so in for the IFI (and has not done so in
successivesubsequent fiscal years). fiscal years).
Since FY2011,
Since FY2011,
however, the Obama and Trump Administrations continued to al ocatesuccessive Administrations have allocated funds from funds from
Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI
activities to support peace and reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 activities to support peace and reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5
mil ion million per year to the IFI from ESF funding between FY2011 and FY2014, per year to the IFI from ESF funding between FY2011 and FY2014,
and $750,000 per year since
FY2017.
Author Information
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
103 T he Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International Fund for Ireland.
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$750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million for FY2020, and $2.5 million for FY2021.
Author Information
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Disclaimer
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