Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations
April 28, 2021
The crisis in Venezuela has deepenedDecember 6, 2022 Venezuela remains in a deep economic and humanitarian crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro,
who has consolidated power who has consolidated power despite presiding over a dire economic and humanitariansince his reelection in a 2018
Clare Ribando Seelke,
crisis worsened by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Maduro,
Coordinator
Seelke, presidential vote widely deemed fraudulent. Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the narrowly elected in 2013 after the Coordinator death of Hugo Chávez (president, 1999-2013), and thedeath of Hugo Chávez (president, 1999-2013), and the Specialist in Latin
United Socialist Party of United Socialist Party of Specialist in Latin Venezuela (PSUV) took de facto control of the National Venezuela (PSUV) took de facto control of the National
American Affairs
Assembly, the last independent Assembly, the last independent American Affairs branch of government, in January 2021. branch of government, in January 2021. Maduro has

From 2019 through 2021, Maduro resisted U.S. resisted U.S. and international pressure to and international pressure to step down and an oppositioncede power and allow a transition government led by Juan led by Juan
Rebecca M. Nelson
Guaidó, the National Assembly president elected in 2015 and once regarded as interim Guaidó, the National Assembly president elected in 2015 and once regarded as interim
Specialist in International Specialist in International
president by nearly 60 countries president by nearly 60 countries.
Trade and Finance


Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, severe
Rhoda Margesson
shortages of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that has further
Specialist in International
deteriorated as a result of gasoline shortages, COVID-19, and U.S. sanctions. Maduro
Humanitarian Policy

has blamed sanctions for the economic crisis, but many observers cite economic
mismanagement and corruption as the main factors. U.N. agencies estimate 5.6 mil ion
Phillip Brown
Venezuelans have fled the country as of April 2021.
Specialist in Energy Policy


U.S. Policy

The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. Although
the Administration of former President Donald Trump initial y discussed the possibility of using military force in
Venezuela, it ultimately sought to compel Maduro, to convene elections. Opposition parties, organized Trade and Finance under a Unitary Platform since 2021 that includes Guaidó’s party as one of many, resumed negotiations with Maduro officials in November 2022 to create better Rhoda Margesson conditions for presidential elections due in 2024. Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy Despite a nascent economy recovery, Venezuela’s economy contracted by roughly 75% from 2014 through 2021, exhibiting among the world’s highest rates of hyperinflation, Phillip Brown according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While hyperinflation may have Specialist in Energy Policy technically abated, food insecurity and a collapse of health and other social services have left 7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and led another 7.1 million Venezuelans to flee the country as of November 2022, according to U.N. agencies. U.S. Policy The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019, and the Trump Administration sought to compel him to leave office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure. The Biden Administration initially maintained a similar policy, although U.S. officials held direct talks with Maduro in March and June 2022 that led to a policy shift. In November 2022, the Biden Administration issued a license to allow Chevron to resume some operations in Venezuela after the Maduro government resumed negotiations with the opposition. Further sanctions relief may depend upon the results of the negotiations. From FY2017 through FY2022, the United States provided $1.94 billion in humanitarian aid to Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. U.S. democracy, development, and health support for the Venezuela crisis totaled $323 million through FY2021 (most recent year available). In July 2022, the Biden Administration announced an extension of Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelans to March 10, 2024. Congressional Action Congress has supported efforts to promote negotiations leading to a restoration of democracy in Venezuela through sanctions and other means, as well as to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans as authorized by the VERDAD Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-64, Division J, Title I). In March 2022, Congress enacted the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103), which included $40 million for democracy programs in Venezuela ($7 million more than the FY2021 allocation). The Biden Administration requested $55 million in FY2023 funds for Venezuela. The House Appropriations Committee’s reported version of the FY2023 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (H.R. 8282) would provide $50 million for Venezuela programs; the Senate-introduced version, S. 4662, would provide $40 million. Oversight has focused on the Administration’s approach to sanctions and negotiations. For example, some Members of Congress have expressed support for U.S. talks with Maduro, whereas others remain opposed to those talks and have introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil. S. 688, reported by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in March 2021, would prohibit contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro regime. Congressional Research Service link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 27 link to page 27 link to page 28 link to page 28 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 7 link to page 13 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 25 link to page 26 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 2 Background ............................................................................................................................... 2 Maduro’s First Term: 2013-2018 .............................................................................................. 2 May 2018 Presidential Election and Aftermath ........................................................................ 4 Maduro’s Second Term: 2019-Present ...................................................................................... 4 Human Rights .................................................................................................................................. 6 Economy: Prolonged Crisis and Nascent Recovery? ...................................................................... 8 Recent Developments and Outlook ......................................................................................... 10 Humanitarian Situation and Response ............................................................................................ 11 Situation Inside Venezuela ....................................................................................................... 11 Population Displacement in the Region .................................................................................. 12 International Actors in Venezuela’s Crisis ..................................................................................... 13 U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 16 U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela ................................................................................................... 18 Impact of Sanctions .......................................................................................................... 19 Petroleum Sector Concerns and U.S. Economic Sanctions ..................................................... 20 Oil Sector Sanctions and Evolving Petroleum Trade Relationships ................................. 20 Oil Market and Price Effects ............................................................................................. 22 Petroleum Sector Outlook ................................................................................................. 23 Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 23 Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela ....................................................................... 23 October 2022 Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants ................................................... 24 U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 24 Humanitarian Assistance (Including COVID-19 Assistance) ........................................... 24 Democracy, Development, and Global Health-Related Assistance .................................. 25 U.S. Efforts to Combat Illicit Revenue Sources ...................................................................... 26 Counternarcotics and U.S. Antidrug Prosecutions and Operations ................................... 27 Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture .......................................................................... 28 Illegal Mining ................................................................................................................... 29 Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 29 U.S. Concerns About Terrorism .............................................................................................. 30 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 31 Figures Figure 1. Map of Venezuela ............................................................................................................. 3 Figure 2. Venezuela GDP per Capita ............................................................................................... 9 Figure 3. Venezuela’s Economy: Recent Trends ............................................................................ 11 Figure 4. Venezuelan Migrants and Asylum Seekers: Flows to the Region and Beyond .............. 13 Figure 5. Venezuela Crude Oil Production, U.S. Imports, and Selected Sanction Events ............ 21 Figure 6. Observable Venezuela Crude Oil Exports by Destination.............................................. 22 Congressional Research Service link to page 29 link to page 36 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Tables Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Venezuela by Account: FY2018-FY2023 ............................. 25 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 32 Congressional Research Service Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Introduction Venezuela, long one of the most prosperous countries in South America with the world’s largest oil reserves, has experienced an unprecedented political, economic, and humanitarian crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Under Maduro, Venezuela has become a source of regional instability. Since 2014, millions of Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled to neighboring countries and to the United States; criminal and terrorist groups have operated with impunity; and Russia, China, and Iran have increased their footprints in the region. The possibility that renewed negotiations between Maduro and the opposition could lead to a gradual resolution of the prolonged political power struggle that has stymied efforts to restore democracy is of great interest to many in Congress. Congress may maintain a keen interest in assessing whether these negotiations can lead to improvements in political, human rights, and humanitarian conditions in Venezuela, or whether Maduro will use them as a delaying tactic as many argue he has in the past.1 U.S. relations with Venezuela, once a major oil Venezuela at a Glance supplier, deteriorated under the increasingly Population: 26.9 million (2022 est., IMF) authoritarian Hugo Chávez government (1999- Area: 912,050 km2 (slightly more than twice the size 2013). Tensions deepened as the Maduro of California) government has cracked down on the GDP: $82.1 billion (2022, current prices, IMF est.) opposition, media, and civil society; engaged GDP Growth: 6% (2022, IMF est.) in drug trafficking and corruption; convened GDP Per Capita: $3,050 (2022, current prices, IMF fraudulent elections; and impeded est.) humanitarian aid distribution. The Trump Poverty: 5.5% (2021, ENCOVI survey) Administration exerted diplomatic, economic, Key Trading Partners: Exports—China: 30%, EU: and legal pressure on Maduro, but Maduro 18%, Turkey: 17%. Imports—China: 30%, United States: 22%; Brazil: 15%, (2021, TDM)2 refused to leave office. The Biden Administration has maintained most sanctions, Unemployment: 45.0% (2021, EIU) and also implemented a policy shift towards Legislature: 2015 National Assembly (unicameral), with 167 members; 2021 National Assembly, with 277 supporting negotiations with Maduro. U.S. members (United States does not recognize) officials met with Maduro twice in 2022, Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); negotiated an October 2022 U.S.-Venezuela International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Survey on prisoner swap, and issued a license to allow Living Conditions (ENCOVI) Trade Data Monitor Chevron to restart some operations in the (TDM); U.N. Development Programme (UNDP). country.3 The United States and other donors have offered to review sanctions if Maduro officials make “meaningful progress” in talks with the opposition towards improving humanitarian conditions and restoring democracy.4 This report provides an overview of the overlapping political, human rights, economic, and humanitarian crises in Venezuela, followed by an overview of U.S. policy toward Venezuela and select issues of congressional interest. 1 David Smilde and Geoff Ramsey, “International Peace-Making and Venezuela’s Intractable Conflict,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, No. 109 (January-June 2020), pp. 157-179. 2 Estimation of trade, based on mirror statistics of other countries’ reported trade with Venezuela. 3 Julie Turkewitz, “As Venezuelan Antagonists Talk, the U.S. Softens Its Stance,” New York Times, November 25, 2022. 4 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Venezuela Negotiations,” November 26, 2022. Congressional Research Service 1 Venezuela: Background to leave office through diplomatic, economic, and legal
pressure. Officials in the Administration of President Joe Biden have stated that the Administration’s approach
toward the crisis in Venezuela wil focus on supporting the Venezuelan people and engaging in multilateral
diplomacy to press for a return to democracy and to hold Maduro officials and supporters accountable for their
actions. On March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration designated Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status (TPS),
after President Trump ended removals of Venezuelans eligible for Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) on January
19, 2021. Biden Administration officials also are reviewing the humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions.
Congressional Action
Congress supported the Trump Administration’s efforts to promote a restoration of democracy in Venezuela
without the use of military force and to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans, although some Members
expressed concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. In December 2019, Congress enacted the
Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019 (VERDAD Act; P.L. 116-94,
Division J) a comprehensive bil to address the crisis in Venezuela. In the FY2020 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-92), Congress prohibited the Department of Defense from contracting with persons who do
business with the Maduro government. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), provided not
less than $33 mil ion in Economic Support Funds for democracy programs in Venezuela and an unspecified level
of humanitarian support for countries sheltering Venezuelan refugees. The 117th Congress may examine policy
approaches by the Biden Administration and further legislative options, such as additional sanctions against the
Maduro government and its enablers or additional humanitarian assistance. S.Res. 44, reported by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, condemns the December legislative elections and cal s for free and
fair presidential and legislative elections in Venezuela.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Political Situation............................................................................................................ 1
Background .............................................................................................................. 1
Maduro’s Second Term: 2019-Present........................................................................... 4
Human Rights ................................................................................................................ 6
Economic Crisis.............................................................................................................. 8
Humanitarian Situation and Response .............................................................................. 11
Displacement .......................................................................................................... 11
COVID-19 Pandemic ............................................................................................... 13
U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan in Venezuela ........................................................... 14
International Humanitarian Regional Response Plan ..................................................... 14
International Actors in Venezuela’s Crisis ......................................................................... 14
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela ..................................................................................... 19
Petroleum Sector Concerns and U.S. Economic Sanctions ............................................. 21
Oil Sector Sanctions and Evolving Petroleum Trade Relationships ............................. 22
Oil Market and Price Effects ................................................................................ 24
Petroleum Sector Outlook.................................................................................... 25
Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela ................................................................... 25
U.S. Assistance ....................................................................................................... 26
Humanitarian Assistance (Including COVID-19 Assistance) ..................................... 26
Democracy, Development, and Global Health-Related Assistance .............................. 27
U.S. Efforts to Combat Il icit Revenue Sources ............................................................ 28
Counternarcotics and U.S. Antidrug Prosecutions and Operations .............................. 29
Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture ................................................................ 30
Il egal Mining .................................................................................................... 31
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................. 31
U.S. Concerns About Terrorism ................................................................................. 32
Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 33

Figures
Figure 1. Political Map of Venezuela .................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Venezuela’s Economic Crisis: Selected Trends ....................................................... 9
Figure 3. Venezuelan Migrants and Asylum Seekers: Flows to the Region and Beyond ............ 12
Figure 4. Venezuela Crude Oil Production, U.S. Imports, and Selected Sanction Events ........... 23
Figure 5. Observable Venezuela Crude Oil Exports by Destination ....................................... 24

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Venezuela by Account: FY2017-FY2021 ......................... 27

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link to page 39 link to page 38 link to page 39 link to page 39 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

Table B-1. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela ................................................... 35

Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislation Enacted in the 116th Congress....................................................... 34
Appendix B. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela ................................................ 35

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 35


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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction
Venezuela, long one of the most prosperous countries in South America, with the world’s largest
proven oil reserves, remains in the throes of a deep, multifaceted crisis under the authoritarian
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Despite international
pressure for Maduro to cede power and his mishandling of Venezuela’s dire economic and
humanitarian crisis, he has consolidated power. In January 2021, the PSUV took de facto control
of the National Assembly, effectively taking over the last independent branch of government and
chal enging the legitimacy of Juan Guaidó, president of the National Assembly elected in 2015.
Many of the nearly 60 countries that recognized Guaidó as Interim President of Venezuela in
2019 did so on the basis of his position as National Assembly president. Although the
Administration of President Joe Biden stil recognizes Guaidó as interim president, many U.S.
al ies, including European Union (EU) member states, do not.
U.S. relations with Venezuela, once a major
Venezuela at a Glance
oil supplier, deteriorated under the Hugo
Population: 28 mil ion (2020 est., IMF)
Chávez government (1999-2013), which
Area: 912,050 km2 (slightly more than twice the size
undermined human rights, the separation of
of California)
powers, and freedom of expression. U.S.
GDP: $47.3 bil ion (2020, current prices, IMF est.)
concerns have deepened as the Maduro
GDP Growth: -30% (2020, IMF est.)
government has cracked down on the
GDP Per Capita: $1,540 (2020, current prices, IMF
opposition, media, and civil society; engaged
est.)
in drug trafficking and corruption; convened
Key Trading Partners: Exports—Turkey: 36%,
Brazil: 22%, U.S.: 1.4%. Imports—U.S.: 16.8%, Brazil:
fraudulent elections, and impeded
10.8%, Turkey: 4.6%. (2020, TDM)
humanitarian aid distribution. The
Unemployment: 50.3% (2020, EIU)
Administration of former President Donald
Life Expectancy: 72.1 years (2019, UNDP)
Trump sought to exert diplomatic, economic,
and legal pressure on Maduro until he agreed
Legislature: 2015 National Assembly (unicameral),
with 167 members; 2021 National Assembly, with 277
to leave office so that a transition government
members (United States does not recognize)
could convene free and fair elections. The
Sources: Economist Intel igence Unit (EIU);
Biden Administration is focused on addressing
International Monetary Fund (IMF); Trade Data
the humanitarian situation, supporting the
Monitor (TDM); United Nations Development
Venezuelan people, and engaging in
Programme (UNDP).
multilateral diplomacy to hold corrupt and
abusive officials accountable and to press for a return to democracy.1
This report provides an overview of the overlapping political, economic, and humanitarian crises
in Venezuela, followed by an overview of U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
Political Situation
Background2
In the late 1990s, Hugo Chávez rose to power on a populist platform that promised to redistribute
Venezuela’s oil wealth and political power from corrupt elites to the people of Venezuela. Under

1 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela,” press briefing,
March 8, 2021.
2 CRS Report R42989, Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan; and
CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016, by Mark P. Sullivan.
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

and U.S. Relations Political Situation Background5 In the late 1990s, Hugo Chávez rose to power on a populist platform that promised to redistribute Venezuela’s oil wealth and political power from corrupt elites to the people of Venezuela. Under Chávez (1999-2013), Venezuela adopted a new constitution (ratified by plebiscite in 1999); a new Chávez (1999-2013), Venezuela adopted a new constitution (ratified by plebiscite in 1999); a new
unicameral legislature; and a new name for the country—the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, unicameral legislature; and a new name for the country—the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
named after the 19th-century South American liberator Simón Bolívar. Buoyed by named after the 19th-century South American liberator Simón Bolívar. Buoyed by windfal windfall profits profits
from high oil prices, the Chávez government expanded the state’s role in the economy. Chávez’s from high oil prices, the Chávez government expanded the state’s role in the economy. Chávez’s
charisma, use of oil revenue to fund social programs and provide subsidized oil to Cuba and other charisma, use of oil revenue to fund social programs and provide subsidized oil to Cuba and other
countries, and opposition to the United States captured global attention. countries, and opposition to the United States captured global attention.
Figure 1. Political Map of Venezuela

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Chávez’s legacy has been debated. President Chávez established an array of social programs and Chávez’s legacy has been debated. President Chávez established an array of social programs and
services that helped reduce poverty by some 20% and improve literacy and access to health care.services that helped reduce poverty by some 20% and improve literacy and access to health care.3
6 Nevertheless, his presidency was “characterized by a dramatic concentration of power and open Nevertheless, his presidency was “characterized by a dramatic concentration of power and open
disregard for basic human rights guarantees,” disregard for basic human rights guarantees,” especial yespecially after his brief ouster from power in after his brief ouster from power in
2002.2002.47 Declining oil production, combined with massive debt and high inflation, have shown the Declining oil production, combined with massive debt and high inflation, have shown the
costs of Chávez’s failure to save or invest past oil profits, tendency to take on debt and print costs of Chávez’s failure to save or invest past oil profits, tendency to take on debt and print
money, and decision to fire thousands of technocrats after an oil workers’ strike in 2002-2003. money, and decision to fire thousands of technocrats after an oil workers’ strike in 2002-2003.

3 Daniel Hellinger and Anthony Petros Spanakos, “T he Legacy of Hugo Chávez,” Latin American Perspectives, vol.
44, no. 1, January 2017, pp. 4-15.
4 Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy,” March 5, 2013.
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Maduro’s First Term: 2013-2018
After Chávez’s death in March 2013, Acting President Nicolás Maduro narrowly defeated After Chávez’s death in March 2013, Acting President Nicolás Maduro narrowly defeated
Henrique Capriles of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) of opposition parties in April Henrique Capriles of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) of opposition parties in April
elections. The opposition elections. The opposition al eged significant alleged significant Nicolás Maduro irregularities and protested; Maduro sought to irregularities and protested; Maduro sought to
consolidate his authority. Security forces and consolidate his authority. Security forces and al ied civilian groups violently suppressed protests
and restricted freedom of speech and assembly. In 2014, 43 people died and 800 were injured in
clashes between pro-Maduro forces and student-led protesters concerned about rising crime.
Maduro imprisoned opposition figures, including Leopoldo López, head of the Popular Wil (VP)
party, for al egedly inciting violence. In February 2015, the government again cracked down.
Nicolás Maduro
In the December 2015 legislative elections, the
A former trade unionist who served in Venezuela’s
MUD captured a two-thirds majority in the
legislature from 1998 until 2006, Nicolás Maduro
National Assembly—a major setback for Maduro.
held the position of National Assembly president
The PSUV-aligned Supreme Court blocked three
from 2005 to 2006, when he became President
MUD deputies from taking office, depriving the
Chávez’s foreign minister. Maduro retained that
position until mid-January 2013, concurrently
opposition of a two-thirds majority. From January
serving as vice president beginning in October
2016 to August 2017, the Supreme Court blocked
2012, when President Chávez tapped him to serve
laws and assumed the legislature’s functions. In
in that position fol owing his reelection. Maduro
2016, opposition efforts to recal President
often was described as a staunch Chávez loyalist.
Maduro in a national referendum were delayed
Maduro’s partner since 1992 is wel -known
Chávez supporter Cilia Flores, who served as the
and then suspended by the National Electoral
president of the National Assembly from 2006 to
Council (CNE). Most of the opposition (except the
2011; the two married in 2013.
allied A former trade unionist who served in Venezuela’s legislature from 1998 until 2006, civilian groups violently suppressed protests and Nicolás Maduro held the position of National restricted freedom of speech and assembly. In Assembly president from 2005 to 2006, when he 2014, 43 people died and 800 were injured in became President Chávez’s foreign minister. clashes between pro-Maduro forces and student-led Maduro retained that position until mid-January protesters concerned about rising crime. Maduro 2013, concurrently serving as vice president beginning in October 2012, when President imprisoned opposition figures, including Leopoldo Chávez tapped him to serve in that position López, head of the Popular Will (VP) party, for following his reelection. Maduro often was allegedly inciting violence. In February 2015, the described as a staunch Chávez loyalist. Maduro’s government again cracked down. partner since 1992 is well-known Chávez supporter Cilia Flores, who served as the In the December 2015 legislative elections, the president of the National Assembly from 2006 to MUD captured a two-thirds majority in the 2011; the two married in 2013. National Assembly—a major setback for Maduro. The PSUV-aligned Supreme Court blocked three MUD deputies from taking office, depriving the opposition of a two-thirds majority. From January 2016 to August 2017, the Supreme Court blocked laws and assumed the legislature’s functions. In 2016, the National Electoral Council (CNE) suspended opposition efforts to recall President Maduro in a national referendum. Most of 5 CRS Report R42989, Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan. 6 Daniel Hellinger and Anthony Petros Spanakos, “The Legacy of Hugo Chávez,” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 44, no. 1, January 2017, pp. 4-15. 7 Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Chávez’s Authoritarian Legacy,” March 5, 2013. Congressional Research Service 2 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations the opposition (except the VP party) entered talks with the government VP party) entered talks with the government
mediated by the Vatican and others. By December, mediated by the Vatican and others. By December,
the opposition had left the talksthe talks failed as the Maduro government failed to meet its commitments. as the Maduro government failed to meet its commitments.5
In early Figure 1. Map of Venezuela Source: Congressional Research Service. In 2017, President Maduro appointed a hard-line vice president, Tareck el Aissami, a U.S.- 2017, President Maduro appointed a hard-line vice president, Tareck el Aissami, a U.S.-
designated drug kingpin, and cracked down on freedom of assembly and expression. Despite designated drug kingpin, and cracked down on freedom of assembly and expression. Despite
these moves, the these moves, the MUD was reenergized after the Supreme Court’s March 2017 rulings to dissolve Supreme Court’s March 2017 rulings to dissolve
the legislaturethe legislature reenergized the MUD. After domestic protests and international criticism, President Maduro urged the . After domestic protests and international criticism, President Maduro urged the
court to revise those rulings, and it complied. In Aprilcourt to revise those rulings, and it complied. In April 2017, the government banned Capriles 2017, the government banned Capriles
from seeking office for 15 yearsfrom seeking office for 15 years, which fueled more protests. From March to. Through July 2017, the July 2017, the
opposition opposition conductedheld large protests large protests against the government. Clashes betweenand, as security security forces and armed civilian militias clashed with protesters, more than 130 people died.8forces
(backed by armed civilian militias) and protesters left more than 130 dead.6
In May 2017, President Maduro announced he would convene a constituent assembly to revise In May 2017, President Maduro announced he would convene a constituent assembly to revise
the constitution and scheduled July the constitution and scheduled July 30 elections to select delegates to that assembly. The Supreme elections to select delegates to that assembly. The Supreme
Court ruled that Maduro could convoke the assembly without first holding a popular referendum Court ruled that Maduro could convoke the assembly without first holding a popular referendum
8 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Protests in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from 1 April to 31 July 2017, August 30, 2017. Congressional Research Service 3 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations (as the constitution requires). The opposition boycotted, arguing the elections were (as the constitution requires). The opposition boycotted, arguing the elections were
unconstitutional, a position shared by international observers (including the United States). unconstitutional, a position shared by international observers (including the United States).
Despite an opposition boycott, the government orchestrated the July 2017 election of a 545-Despite an opposition boycott, the government orchestrated the July 2017 election of a 545-
member National Constituent Assembly (ANC), which served as a member National Constituent Assembly (ANC), which served as a paral elparallel legislative legislative body until body until
members of the PSUV-dominated National Assembly took their seats in January 2021. members of the PSUV-dominated National Assembly took their seats in January 2021.
In 2017, President Maduro gained the upper hand over the MUD despite international condemnationPresident Maduro gained the upper hand over the MUD despite international condemnation of his
actions. In October 2017, the PSUV won 18 of 23 gubernatorial elections. Although fraud . In October 2017, the PSUV won 18 of 23 gubernatorial elections. Although fraud likely occurred, the opposition could not prove that it was widespread. The MUD coalition initially rejected the election results, but four victorious MUD governors took their oaths of office in front of the ANC (rather than the National Assembly), a decision that fractured the coalition. likely
took place given the discrepancies between opinion polls and the election results, the opposition

5 T hose commitments included (1) releasing political prisoners, (2) announcing an electoral calendar, (3) respecting the
National Assembly’s decisions, and (4) addressing humanitarian needs.
6 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Violations and Abuses
in the Context of Protests in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from 1 April to 31 July 2017, August 30, 2017.
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could not prove that it was widespread. There is evidence that the PSUV linked receipt of future
government food assistance to votes for its candidates by placing food assistance card registration
centers next to polling stations, a practice also used in subsequent elections.7 The MUD coalition
initial y rejected the election results, but four victorious MUD governors took their oaths of office
in front of the ANC (rather than the National Assembly), a decision that fractured the coalition.
With the opposition in disarray, President Maduro moved to consolidate power and blamed U.S. With the opposition in disarray, President Maduro moved to consolidate power and blamed U.S.
sanctions for the country’s economic problems. Maduro fired and arrested the head of Petróleos sanctions for the country’s economic problems. Maduro fired and arrested the head of Petróleos
de Venezuela,de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) and the oil minister for corruptionS.A. (PdVSA) and the oil minister for corruption. He; he appointed a general with no appointed a general with no
experience in energy to experience in energy to fil both positions, consolidating military control over the economyfill both positions. The . The
ANC approved a law to ANC approved a law to further restrict add more restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. freedom of expression and assembly. Although most
Most opposition parties did not participate in municipal elections held in December 2017opposition parties did not participate in municipal elections held in December 2017, a few fielded
candidates. The; the PSUV won more than 300 of 335 mayoralties. PSUV won more than 300 of 335 mayoralties.
May 2018 Elections and Aftermath
The Venezuelan constitution established that the country’s presidential elections were to be heldPresidential Election and Aftermath In accordance with the Venezuelan constitution, presidential elections were due by December by December
2018. Although 2018. Although many prominent opposition politicians had been imprisonedprominent opposition politicians had been imprisoned (Leopoldo López(Leopoldo López , under house , under house
arrest), barred from seekingarrest), barred from seeking office (Henrique Capriles),office (Henrique Capriles), or in exile, some Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD)
leaders or in exile, some MUD leaders sought to unseat President Maduro through sought to unseat President Maduro through elections. an election. Those leadersThose leaders negotiated with the negotiated with the United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) PSUV to try to obtain guarantees, such as a reconstituted National Electoral Council (CNE)to try to obtain guarantees, such as a reconstituted National Electoral Council (CNE).
and international observers, to help ensure the elections would be as free and fair as possible. In January In January 2018, the ANC ignored those negotiations and scheduled a presidential election for2018, the
National Constituent Assembly (ANC) ignored those negotiations and cal ed for elections to be moved up from
December to May 2018, violating a constitutional requirement May 2018, violating a constitutional requirement that electionsthat elections be cal ed be called with at least six months with at least six months’
anticipation. The MUD anticipation. The MUD declared an election boycottboycotted, but Henri, but Henri Falcón broke with the coalition to run. Falcón broke with the coalition to run.
Venezuela’s presidentialVenezuela’s presidential election proved to be election proved to be minimal y competitive minimally competitive and took place within a and took place within a climate climate of state of state
repression.repression. There were no There were no international yinternationally accredited election monitors. accredited election monitors. The government coerced its workersThe government coerced its workers to to
vote and placed food assistance card distribution centers next to pol ing stations. The CNE reported that Mad uro
received 67.7% of the votes fol owed by Falcón (21%). Voter turnout was much lower in 2018 (46%) than in 20 13
(80vote and used chip-embedded government assistance cards to condition access to future food and other aid on how people voted.9 The CNE reported that Maduro received 67.7% of the votes followed by Falcón (21%) amidst low turnout (46%). After independent monitors%). After independent monitors reported widespread fraud, Falcón reported widespread fraud, Falcón cal edcalled for new elections. for new elections.
Fol owing Following the disputed election,the disputed election, Maduro faced Maduro faced mounting economic problems, coup attemptscoup attempts, and international and international
isolation.isolation. His government releasedHis government released some some political prisonerspolitical prisoners but also increased Maduro’s control over the judiciary but also increased Maduro’s control over the judiciary
and the and the intel igence intelligence services.services.
Maduro’s Second Term: 2019-Present
The United States, the The United States, the EUEuropean Union (EU), and many neighboring countries ceased to recognize Maduro as , and many neighboring countries ceased to recognize Maduro as
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019, following his Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019, following his fraudulent May 2018 reelection.
These countries also do not recognize the legitimacy of the legislature seated in January 2021,
following December 2020 elections that did not meet international standards.
reelection that had been widely deemed fraudulent. On January 5, 2019, the On January 5, 2019, the democratical ydemocratically elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly elected elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly elected
Juan Guaidó, a 35-year-old industrial engineer from the VP party, as its president. Guaidó then Juan Guaidó, a 35-year-old industrial engineer from the VP party, as its president. Guaidó then
9 Michael E. Penfold, Food, Technology, and Authoritarianism in Venezuela’s Elections, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Latin American Program, April 2018. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 10 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations announced he was willing announced he was wil ing to serve as interim president until new elections were held. Buoyed by to serve as interim president until new elections were held. Buoyed by
a huge turnout after a huge turnout after cal ingcalling for protests, Guaidó took the oath of office on January 23, 2019. The for protests, Guaidó took the oath of office on January 23, 2019. The
United States and nearly 60 countries recognized Guaidó as interim president.United States and nearly 60 countries recognized Guaidó as interim president.10 Over the past three years,
The United States continues to recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader and the
2015 National Assembly as the only democratic institution in the country, but Guaidó’s domestic Guaidó’s domestic
and internationaland international support has eroded support has eroded substantial y. substantially. In 2019, Guaidó’s supporters organized two high In 2019, Guaidó’s supporters organized two

7 Michael Penfold, Food, Technology, and Authoritarianism in Venezuela’s Elections, Woodrow Wilson Center, April
18, 2018.
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high-profile but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to encourage security forces to abandon Maduro. profile but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to encourage security forces to abandon Maduro.
Some observers then hoped talks mediated by Norway Some observers then hoped talks mediated by Norway in 2019 could lead to a negotiated solution that could lead to a negotiated solution that
would establish the conditions for would establish the conditions for international y monitored elections to be held.8 Hopes faded,
however, after Maduro stopped participating in negotiations in early the convening of internationally monitored elections.11 Maduro left negotiations in August 2019 following new August 2019 following new
U.S. sanctions. In 2020, restrictions on freedom of assembly prompted by the Coronavirus U.S. sanctions. In 2020, restrictions on freedom of assembly prompted by the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic impeded Guaidó’s abilityDisease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic impeded Guaidó’s ability to mobilize supporters. He lost to mobilize supporters. He lost
further support after reports surfaced that he had condoned a plan that ended in a botched raid further support after reports surfaced that he had condoned a plan that ended in a botched raid
against Maduro in May 2020.against Maduro in May 2020.9
12 Following those developments, some opposition parties and leaders, including Henriqe Capriles, began to question Guaidó’s approach. They urged opposition parties to compete in the November 2021 regional elections and to seek local and regional positions given that Maduro may remain in power for several years.13 A key to Maduro’s resilience has been the loyalty A key to Maduro’s resilience has been the loyalty he has retained among most Venezuelan he has retained among most Venezuelan
security forces. For years, military leaders and other officials have enriched themselves through security forces. For years, military leaders and other officials have enriched themselves through
corruption, drug trafficking, and other corruption, drug trafficking, and other il icitillicit industries. Some military leaders also may fear that, industries. Some military leaders also may fear that,
under a new government, they could face prosecution or extradition abroad for human rights under a new government, they could face prosecution or extradition abroad for human rights
abuses. The U.S. government has said it may remove sanctions on officials who abandon Maduroabuses. The U.S. government has said it may remove sanctions on officials who abandon Maduro
(as it did with Manuel Cristopher Figuera in May 2019), , but doing so could be difficultbut doing so could be difficult,
depending upon the individual and sanctions involved.10 Final y, Venezuelan intel igence
. Finally, Venezuelan intelligence officials, trained and supported by Cubans, have arrested dissidents within the military. In June officials, trained and supported by Cubans, have arrested dissidents within the military. In June
2019, a naval officer died after being tortured in custody. 2019, a naval officer died after being tortured in custody.
(See “Human Rights” below). In 2020, Maduro used the In 2020, Maduro used the COVID-19 pandemic to increase repression and secured control of the National pandemic to increase repression and secured control of the National
Assembly by convening Assembly by convening legislative elections that were due to be held by December elections that were due to be held by December 2020.142020.11 In June, the
Supreme Court ruled that, since efforts to select a CNE had stal ed in the National Assembly, it
would name new CNE rectors. After naming a new CNE, the Supreme Court disbanded the
leadership of three major opposition parties and named new leaders for each. The CNE held
The CNE held elections on December 6, 2020, but most opposition parties boycotted. With low voter turnout, elections on December 6, 2020, but most opposition parties boycotted. With low voter turnout,
the PSUV captured 255 of the 277 seats at stake in the newly expanded National Assembly.the PSUV captured 255 of the 277 seats at stake in the newly expanded National Assembly.
Guaidó and the broader opposition The Venezuelan opposition, unified under a Unitary Platform since 2021, continues to face a face a difficult future amidst internal divisions and government repression in a country with few civil liberties and a ranking of “not free” in Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom in the World index. Nevertheless, following years of electoral boycotts, the opposition held Norway-mediated talks with Maduro representatives in Mexico City in August-September 2021 that, among other topics, sought to obtain electoral guarantees and address humanitarian issues. Although Maduro suspended the talks after the arrest of his close ally, Alex Saab, in October 2021, they restarted in Mexico City on November 26, 2022. Negotiators announced an agreement to unfreeze some $3 10 Those countries included the United States, Canada, most of the member states of the EU, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and 16 Western Hemisphere countries led by Colombia. 11 David Smilde difficult future.12 Guaidó and other opposition
legislators are under investigation for seditious actions by a committee in the de facto National
Assembly.13 Guaidó’s position as head of the opposition also is tenuous. In mid-2020, former
presidential candidate Capriles, backed by the EU, broke with Guaidó to seek better conditions
and a postponement of the December legislative elections rather than the preemptive boycott that
Guaidó, with U.S. support, had declared.14 More recently, Capriles has negotiated with the
Maduro government to have two opposition rectors placed on the new CNE that the National

8 David Smilde and Geoff Ramsey, and Geoff Ramsey, International Peacemaking in Venezuela’s Intractable Conflict, Fundación Fundación
Carolina, 2020; and International Crisis Group,Carolina, 2020; and International Crisis Group, Peace in Venezuela: Is There Life after the Barbados Talks? , Briefing , Briefing
No. 41, December 11, 2019. No. 41, December 11, 2019.
912 Nick Schifrin, “Inside the Botched Venezuela Nick Schifrin, “Inside the Botched Venezuela Raid Raid that Maduro is that Maduro is T ryingTrying to Exploit,” to Exploit,” PBS News Hour, May 12, , May 12,
2020. 2020.
10 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury Removes Sanctions Imposed on Former High-Ranking Venezuelan
Intelligence Official After Public Break with Maduro and Dismissal,” May 7, 2019.
11 T his draws 13 “Venezuela’s Capriles Calls for Opposition to Join Regional Vote,” Reuters, August 11, 2021. 14 This draws from: International Crisis Group,from: International Crisis Group, Venezuela: What Lies Ahead after Election Clinches Maduro’s Clean Sweep, December 21, 2020. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 35 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations billion Venezuelan assets abroad as one source of funding for a U.N.-administered humanitarian fund for Venezuela.15 Separate efforts by civil society and parts of the opposition have led to some improvements in electoral conditions. In May 2021, the de facto National Assembly selected a reconstituted CNE with opposition representation and an invitation for the first EU electoral mission since 2006 to accompany the November 2021 gubernatorial and mayoral elections.16 Although the EU cited lingering concerns about the unfair advantages PSUV candidates had over their competitors and authorities’ bans on certain candidates, they also noted progress in some areas and issued recommendations on how to level the playing field for future elections.17 A surprise opposition win in Chávez’s home state of Barinas in the November 2021 gubernatorial contest and a January 2022 “re-do” election, after which the PSUV candidate conceded, have focused opposition efforts on uniting to compete in the 2024 presidential elections.18 In October 2022, 10 major parties announced that they would convene a primary election by June 2023 to select one candidate to compete against Maduro.19 (For prospects, see “Outlook,” below.) Human Rights International concern about human rights abuses and impunity for those abuses in Venezuela has captured the attention of numerous international organizations, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). According to a September 2022 report by the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on Venezuela (FFM), established by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2019, Maduro and top officials “stand out as the main architects…of a machinery with the purpose of repressing dissent” that committed crimes against humanity.20 The State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering 2021 cited hundreds of “extrajudicial killings by security forces” reported by nongovernmental organizations; U.N. reports assert that such killings peaked in 2019 and have since diminished. The State Department report identified those killings, along with “forced disappearances; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by security forces” as among the most serious human rights abuses in Venezuela. Venezuela has among the highest homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, with security forces accused of an increasing percentage of killings. According to the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, the overall homicide rate in Venezuela declined slightly in 2021 (40.9 homicides per 100,000 people, compared with 45.6 per 100,000 people in 2020), but remained the second highest rate in the region.21 The Special Action Force of Venezuela’s National Police 15 U.N. Secretary General, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Agreement Announced by the Government and the Unitary Platform of Venezuela,” November 26, 2022. Diego Oré, “Venezuelan’s Frozen Funds to be Gradually Released for Humanitarian Aid,” Reuters, November 26, 2022. 16 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Venezuela Weekly: A New Electoral Council (CNE) Announced in Venezuela,” May 7, 2021; European Union External Action (EEAS), “Venezuela: EU Deploys Election Observation Mission,” September 29, 2021. 17 EEAS, Electoral Observation Mission Venezuela 2021, Final Report – MOE UE Venezuela 2021, February 22, 2022; available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eom-venezuela-2021/final-report-moe-ue-venezuela-2021_en. 18 Catherine Osborn, “Venezuela’s Opposition Wins on Hugo Chávez’s Home Turf,” Foreign Policy, January 14, 2022. 19 “Venezuela Opposition to Hold Presidential Primary in June 2023, Reuters, October 14, 2022. 20 Ibid. 21 InSight Crime, “InSight Crime’s 2021 Homicide Round-Up,” February 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations (FAES), created in 2017, has been accused of hundreds of extrajudicial killings, including a January 2021 massacre.22 Human Rights Watch has documented killings and torture by Venezuelan armed forces during a March 2021 offensive they subsequently abandoned against Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents on the border with Colombia.23 Throughout his rule, Maduro has used security forces, buoyed by corrupt courts, to detain and abuse his critics, including military officers, opposition politicians, and civic leaders, as well as journalists and human rights defenders. As of November 2022, the government had imprisoned 257 political prisoners (139 soldiers), according to Foro PenalAhead after Election Clinches Maduro’s Clean
Sweep, December 21, 2020.
12 Anatoly Kurmanaev and Lara Jakes, “T o Fight or Adapt? Venezuela’s Fading Opposition Struggles to Keep Going,”
New York Tim es, March 8, 2021.
13 OHCHR, “Statement by Marta Valiñas, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact -Finding Mission on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the 46th session of the Human Rights Council,” March 10, 2021. Hereinafter,
OHCHR, “Statement by Marta Valiñas.”
14 Scott Smith, “ Venezuelan Opposition Leader, EU Urge Delay in Election,” AP, September 30, 2020.
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Assembly is selecting.15 Other opposition leaders, particularly those in exile, favor more
aggressive options, including military intervention in Venezuela.16 (For prospects, see “Outlook,”
below.)
Human Rights
Human rights organizations, international organizations, and U.S. officials have expressed
concerns about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of speech and
press in Venezuela; concerns have increased since 2014.17 The nongovernmental organization
(NGO) Reporters Without Borders has described an “extremely tense” environment for
journalists since 2016, with independent outlets harassed and journalists subject to arbitrary
detentions.18 DeJusticia, a Venezuelan human rights organization, has catalogued the dangers
facing human rights defenders in Venezuela.19 In 2017, Venezuelan security forces and al ied
armed civilian militias (colectivos) committed numerous human rights violations against
protesters. Since then, cases involving extrajudicial kil ings of protesters have remained
unpunished.20
Venezuela has among the highest homicide and crime victimization rates in Latin America and
the Caribbean, with security forces accused of an increasing percentage of kil ings and other
violent crimes. According to the Venezuelan Violence Observatory (OVV), the overal homicide
rate in Venezuela declined in 2020 (45.6 homicides per 100,000 people, compared with 60.3 per
100,000 people in 2019), but much of that decline was due to quarantine restrictions. Homicides
increased in six border states, according to Fundaredes, a group that tracks violence in those
states.21 Additional y, 2020 marked the first year in which the OVV attributed a higher percentage
of homicides to security forces than to criminal groups.22 The Special Action Force of
Venezuela’s National Police (FAES), which Maduro created in 2017, has been accused of
hundreds of extrajudicial kil ings, including a massacre that occurred in January 2021.23 Human
Rights Watch has documented kil ings and torture by Venezuelan armed forces involved in a
March 2021 offensive against Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents on
the border with Colombia.24
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michel e Bachelet visited Venezuela in June 2019.
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) then issued a report in

15 Joshua Goodman, “ U.S. Weighs Policy on Venezuela as Maduro Signals Flexibility,” AP, April 26, 2021.
16 International Crisis Group, The Exile Effect: Venezuela’s Overseas Opposition and Social Media, February 24, 2021.
17 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2020.
18 Reporters Without Borders, “Venezuela: Ever More Authoritarian,” at https://rsf.org/en/venezuela.
19 Ezekiel Monsalve et. al., Defender los Derechos Humanos en Venezuela, DeJusticia, 2021, at
https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DefenderDDHHenVenezuela_Web.pdf.
20 OHCHR, Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Protests in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
from 1 April to 31 July 2017, August 30, 2017.
21 Parker Asmann and Katie Jones, “InSight Crime’s 2020 Homicide Round-Up,” January 29, 2021 (hereinafter,
Asmann and Jones, “Homicide Round-Up”); and Fundaredes, Curva de la Violencia 2020, March 2021. T hus far in
2021, clashes between the Venezuelan government and illegally armed groups also have prompted thousands to fl ee
into Colombia. AP, “T housands Flee to Colombia After Clashes on Venezuela Border,” March 24, 2021.
22 Asmann and Jones, “Homicide Round-Up.”
23 Amnesty International, “International Criminal Court Prosecutor Must Include New Mass Extrajudicial Executions in
Preliminary Examination,” February 18, 2021.
24 Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Security Force Abuses at Colombia Border, April 26, 2021.
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July 2019 documenting a range of significant human rights abuses perpetrated by the Maduro
government, including evidence that security forces committed some 6,800 extrajudicial kil ings
from January 2018 to May 2019.25 In July 2020, the OHCHR issued two reports on Venezuela.26
The U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering 2020 cited
“extrajudicial kil ings by security forces;. . forced disappearances; torture and cases of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment by security forces” as among the most serious human rights
abuses in Venezuela. In September 2020, the OHCHR’s independent fact-finding mission on
Venezuela reported that some abuses committed by Venezuelan security forces since 2014,
including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture, amounted to crimes
against humanity.27 In a March 2021 update, the OHCHR mission said it was investigating some
200 al eged extrajudicial kil ings committed since January 2021 and monitoring new government
harassment of human rights and humanitarian organizations.28
Repression may continue in Venezuela as the Maduro government broadens the scope of those it
considers “internal threats,” surging cases of COVID-19 prompt crackdowns on civil liberties,
and the legislature considers a law that would require news outlets and NGOs receiving foreign
funds to register with the government.29 According to Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human rights
organization, there were an estimated 318 political prisoners (125 soldiers) in Venezuela as of
April 28, 2021. , a Venezuelan human rights group. The number of political prisoners has stayed The number of political prisoners has stayed relatively stable over time, as some stable over time, as some
political detainees have been released (but remain under political detainees have been released (but remain under surveil ancesurveillance) and others have been arrested.24 Dozens of legislators elected in 2015) and others have been
arrested.30 In 2020, security forces detained doctors and journalists critical of the government’s
pandemic response,31 and the Supreme Court further stripped opposition lawmakers’ immunity
from prosecution. Dozens of legislators have been detained in recent years (and, upon release, have been detained in recent years (and, upon release,
monitored by the Maduro government) or have fled into exile (including Leopoldo López in monitored by the Maduro government) or have fled into exile (including Leopoldo López in
2020). This trend may accelerate, as the Maduro-aligned judiciary asserts that Guaidó and al
other legislators elected in 2015 no longer have immunity from prosecution.
In addition, other prisoners have been detained2020). Others have been detained, held in inhumane conditions without access to counsel or contact with their families, and subjected to torture for crimes such as corruption, for crimes such as corruption, sometimesoften without without
evidence.evidence. Six former25 Venezuelan authorities imprisoned six Citgo executives, five with dual U.S. citizenship and one U.S. legal Citgo executives, five with dual U.S. citizenship and one U.S. legal
permanent residentpermanent resident, were imprisoned in 2017 in 2017, and then sentenced the five and convicted to multiyear sentences to multiyear sentences on

25 OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Annual Report no. A/HRC/41/18, July 5, 2019.
26 T he first report provided an updated assessment on the human rights situation in the country, including evidence that
security forces committed some 1,300 extrajudicial killings from January to May 2020. T he second report documented
labor exploitation and other serious human rights abuses committed by criminal groups in Venezuela’s mining regions.
OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Com m issioner for Hum an Rights on the Situation o f Hum an Rights in
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Annual Report no. A/HRC/44/20, July 2, 2020; and OHCHR, Independence of the
Justice System and Access to Justice in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela , July 15, 2020.
27 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, 14 Septem ber-2 October 2020.
28 OHCHR, “Statement by Marta Valiñas.”
29 OHCHR, “Statement by Marta Valiñas”; and Latin News Daily, “Venezuela: Maduro Announces New Lockdown as
Covid Cases Spike,” March 23, 2021; John Otis, “Proposed Venezuelan Foreign Funding Law Could Have ‘Huge
Impact’ on Independent Outlets,” Committee to Protect Journalists, April 19, 2021.
30in 2020.26 The Maduro government released one of those executives in March 2022. It released the other five in September 2022, along with two other unjustly detained Americans, when U.S. officials released two nephews of Maduro’s wife who were serving drug trafficking sentences.27 United Nations Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela. In July 2019, the OHCHR issued a report documenting a range of significant human rights abuses perpetrated by the Maduro government, including evidence that security forces committed some 6,800 extrajudicial killings from January 2018 to May 2019.28 In September 2019, the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) passed a resolution that condemned human rights abuses by the Maduro government and established an independent fact-finding mission (FFM) in Venezuela. The FFM has issued four reports:  September 2020: provides findings that some abuses committed by Venezuelan security forces since 2014, including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture, amounted to crimes against humanity.29 22 Amnesty International, “International Criminal Court Prosecutor Must Include New Mass Extrajudicial Executions in Preliminary Examination,” February 18, 2021. 23 Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Security Force Abuses at Colombia Border, April 26, 2021. 24 For more information, see Foro Penal, https://foropenal.com/presos-politicos/. For analysis on how the Maduro For more information, see Foro Penal, https://foropenal.com/presos-politicos/. For analysis on how the Maduro
government has relied on cycles of repression to maintain its grip on power,government has relied on cycles of repression to maintain its grip on power, see Alfredo Romero, see Alfredo Romero, The Repression
Clock: A Strategy Behind Autocratic Regim esRegimes, Woodrow Wilson Report on the Americas, #40, August 2020.Woodrow Wilson Report on the Americas, #40, August 2020.
31 Anatoly Kurmanaev, Isayen Herrera and Sheyla Urdaneta, “Venezuela Deploys Security Forces in Coronavirus
Crackdown,” New York Times, August 19, 2020.
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embezzlement charges in November 2020.32 Two Americans detained in May for participating in
a botched raid against Maduro have been sentenced to 20 years in prison.33
For other sources on human rights in Venezuela, see Appendix B.
International Investigations into Human Rights Abuses. In September 2019, the U.N. Human
Rights Council passed a resolution condemning human rights abuses by the Maduro government
and establishing an independent fact-finding mission in Venezuela with a mandate for one year.
The mission’s mandate has been extended through 2022. Venezuela’s October 2019 election to a
three-year seat on the Human Rights Council, which began in January 2020, thus far has not
impeded the mission’s ongoing reporting.
The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) 25 U.N. HRC, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, A/HRC/48/69, September 16, 2021, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMV/A.HRC.48.69_EN.pdf. Hereinafter: U.N. HRC, A/HRC/48/69, September 2021. 26 Jaclyn Diaz, “6 U.S. Citgo Executives Convicted And Sentenced In Venezuela,” NPR, November 27, 2020. 27 The White House, Statement from President Joe Biden on the Return of Americans Wrongfully Detained in Venezuela, October 1, 2022. 28 OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Annual Report no. A/HRC/41/18, July 5, 2019. 29 U.N. HRC, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, A/HRC/45/33, September 25, 2020. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 13 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations  September 2021: documents how the Venezuelan executive branch has used the judiciary to investigate “perceived and real opponents of the Government,” but also demonstrates the lack of progress made in investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses documented in the 2020 report.30  September 2022: describes how the intelligence services received orders from Maduro and other top officials to surveil, detain, torture, and otherwise abuse those suspected of “dissent” as part of government efforts to stay in power.31  September 2022: details human rights abuses committed by state forces and illegally armed groups engaged in illicit mining against indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups in the Orinoco region and other areas in Bolívar state.32 In October 2022, the HRC voted to extend the mission’s mandate through 2023 (as some Members of Congress sought in House-reported H.R. 8813). Although Venezuela won a three-year seat on the Human Rights Council in 2019, which is to conclude in January 2023, the Maduro government was not selected to continue on the HRC. Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR). The IACHR has issued annual reports has issued annual reports
documenting the situation of human rights in Venezuela.documenting the situation of human rights in Venezuela.3433 In October 2019, the IACHR created a In October 2019, the IACHR created a
Special Follow-Up Mechanism for Venezuela (MESEVE) to work with the U.N. to respond to Special Follow-Up Mechanism for Venezuela (MESEVE) to work with the U.N. to respond to
human rights violations within Venezuelahuman rights violations within Venezuela and in countries hosting Venezuelans. The MESEVE and in countries hosting Venezuelans. The MESEVE
receives and responds to requests for “precautionary measures” from those under serious threat receives and responds to requests for “precautionary measures” from those under serious threat
and supports litigation regarding Venezuelaand supports litigation regarding Venezuela before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.35
In addition, the34 The IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has condemned IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has condemned abuses
against journalists and media outlets in Venezuela, including a January 2021 Venezuelan Supreme
Court decision ordering El Nacional to pay $13 mil ion to a former legislator who the newspaper
reported was possibly tied to drug trafficking.36
public slander of journalists, the closure of four independent radio outlets, and the issuing of search and arrest warrants without causes against particular journalists and their families.35 International Criminal Court. In September 2018, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru submitted a joint In September 2018, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru submitted a joint
claim asking the International Criminalclaim asking the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate serious human rights abuses Court (ICC) to investigate serious human rights abuses
committed by the Maduro government. Former Venezuelan officials and the Organization of
American States (OAS) also have asked the ICC to investigate violations committed by the
Maduro government. The ICC prosecutor opened a preliminary investigation in February 2018. In
December 2020, she filed a report stating she had a “reasonable basis” to determine the Maduro
government had committed crimes against humanity and would determine whether to launch a
full investigation in 2021.37
Economic Crisis38
Venezuela is in the throes of a multiyear economic crisis, one of the worst economic crises in the
world since World War II:

32 Jaclyn Diaz, “ 6 U.S. Citgo Executives Convicted And Sentenced In Venezuela,” NPR, November 27, 2020.
33 AP, “2 Ex-Green Berets Sentenced to 20 Years for Venezuela Attack,” August 8, 2020.
34 IACHR, “Special Report: Venezuela,” in Annual Report 2020, at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/ia.asp?Year=
2020.
35 Organization of American States (OAS), IACHR, “Precautionary Measures,” at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
decisions/precautionary.asp.
36 OAS, IACHR, “T he IACHR and Its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Express Grave
Concern over Ruling Ordering the Newspaper El Nacional in Venezuela to Pay More T han $13 Million Dollars,” April
21, 2021.
37 Reuters, “ICC Prosecutor Sees ‘Reasonable Basis’ to Believe Venezuela Committed Crimes Against Humanity,”
December 14, 2020.
38 T his section was authored by Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International T rade and Finance. Data in this section,
unless otherwise noted, are from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Venezuela, accessed February
26, 2021.
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

 Its economy has contracted by more than 75% since 2014 (Figure 2), estimated
as the single largest economic collapse outside of war in at least 45 years and
more than twice the magnitude of the Great Depression in the United States.39
 Government finances are in dire straits; budget deficits have averaged 20% of
gross domestic product annual y since 2014 (Figure 2), and the government has
defaulted on its debt.
 The government has monetized its budget deficits (created new money to pay for
its deficits), leading to hyperinflation that has wiped out the value of citizens’
wages and savings and has created shortages of foreign exchange.
 Imports—which Venezuela relies on for most consumer goods—have fal en by
almost 95% since 2013 (Figure 2). The country faces shortages of critical food
and medicine, contributing to its ongoing humanitarian crisis (see “Humanitarian
Situation and Response,” below).
 According to a household survey, around 96% of Venezuelans live in poverty.40
Figure 2. Venezuela’s Economic Crisis: Selected Trends

Source: Economist Intel igence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Venezuela, accessed April 20, 2021.
The trigger for Venezuela’s economic crisis was the crash in world oil prices in 2014. Venezuela
has the world’s largest proven reserves of oil, and its economy is built on oil. Oil traditional y has
accounted for more than 90% of Venezuelan exports, and oil sales have funded the government
budget. When world oil prices fel committed by the Maduro government. Successive ICC prosecutors opened a preliminary investigation in February 2018 and a full investigation in November 2021, although the Maduro administration has sought to delay the investigation. Economy: Prolonged Crisis and Nascent Recovery?36 Venezuela has the world’s largest proven reserves of oil in the world, and for decades, was one of South America’s most prosperous countries (see Figure 2). However, decades regarded as economic mismanagement under the Chávez and Maduro governments, fluctuations in global oil prices, U.S. sanctions targeting the Venezuelan government and oil sector, and economic disruptions from the pandemic have contributed to a nearly decade-long economic crisis in the 30 U.N. HRC, A/HRC/48/69, September 2021. 31 U.N. HRC, FFM, A/HRC/51/43, September 2022. 32 Ibid. Abuses include “kidnappings; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; and sexual and gender-based violence, notably against residents and workers of the mining areas in Bolívar state.” 33 Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR), “Special Report: Venezuela,” in Annual Report 2021, available at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2021/Chapters/IA2021cap4B.Venezuela-en.pdf. 34 Organization of American States (OAS), IACHR, “Precautionary Measures,” at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp. 35 OAS, IACHR, “The Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses its Concern Regarding Stigmatizing Statements, Media Closures and Prosecution of Journalists in Venezuela,” Press Release 19/22, January 28, 2022. 36 This section was authored by Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. Congressional Research Service 8 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations country. The Maduro government has recently adopted some market-orientated reforms that may be stabilizing the economy; sanctions relief in the oil sector may also provide an economic boost. Figure 2. Venezuela GDP per Capita Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022. Notes: An international dollar would buy in the cited country an amount of goods and services comparable to what a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States. This term is used in conjunction with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) data. The immediate trigger for Venezuela’s economic crisis was the crash in world oil prices in 2014. Oil traditionally has accounted for more than 90% of Venezuelan exports and funded the government. When world oil prices fell by nearly 50% in 2014, the main industry in Venezuela, and by nearly 50% in 2014, the main industry in Venezuela, and
the main source of government revenue, was hit hard. However, the collapse in oil prices also the main source of government revenue, was hit hard. However, the collapse in oil prices also
exposed the damage to Venezuela’s economy from years of economic mismanagement. Under exposed the damage to Venezuela’s economy from years of economic mismanagement. Under
Chávez, the government engaged in widespread expropriations and nationalizations, implemented Chávez, the government engaged in widespread expropriations and nationalizations, implemented
price and currency controls, and borrowed heavily. Corruption also proliferated. These policies price and currency controls, and borrowed heavily. Corruption also proliferated. These policies
introduced market distortions, deterred foreign investment, and did not diversify the economy. introduced market distortions, deterred foreign investment, and did not diversify the economy.
Venezuela’s economy was buoyed in the 2000s by high oil prices, but government Venezuela’s economy was buoyed in the 2000s by high oil prices, but government
mismanagement made the economy vulnerable to the mismanagement made the economy vulnerable to the 2014oil2014 oil price shock. price shock.
The Maduro government The Maduro government’s policy to the economic crisis has been inadequate. The Maduro
government was initial y was initially slow to address the economic crisis or acknowledge the government’s slow to address the economic crisis or acknowledge the government’s
role in creating it. Instead, it role in creating it. Instead, it has largely blamed the country’s struggles on a foreign largely blamed the country’s struggles on a foreign “economic war,” a reference to U.S. sanctions.37“economic

39 EIU, Country Report: Venezuela, accessed February 26, 2021; Anatoly Kurmanaev, New York Times, “Venezuela’s
Collapse Is the Worst Outside of War in Decades, Economists Say,” May 17, 2019; Michael Stott, “Venezuela: T he
Political Stand-off Fueling an Economic Collapse,” Financial Tim es, August 4, 2019.
40 Reuters, “Venezuela Poverty Rate Surges Amid Economic Collapse, Inflation,” July 7, 2020.
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

war,” a reference to U.S. sanctions.41 Piecemeal efforts to address the crisis, including price Piecemeal efforts to address the crisis, including price
controls and the creation of a new digital currency, controls and the creation of a new digital currency, the petro, were ineffective. Some initiatives,
such as restructuring debt or bringing the government budget into balance, were pledged and then
abandoned. were ineffective. The government pledged to restructure debt and balance the budget, but never did so. The economy contracted, hyperinflation reduced the value of household savings, and imports of critical items, including food and medicine, fell. Meanwhile, continued mismanagement of the oil sector and U.S. sanctions targeting Meanwhile, continued mismanagement of the oil sector and U.S. sanctions targeting
Venezuela’s oil sectorVenezuela’s oil sector also likely contributed to a contributed to a fal fall in oil production, such that even as global in oil production, such that even as global
oil prices rebounded, Venezuela’s economy did not recover. Subsequent rounds of U.S. sanctions oil prices rebounded, Venezuela’s economy did not recover. Subsequent rounds of U.S. sanctions
targeting the government, central bank, and gold sectors, as targeting the government, central bank, and gold sectors, as wel well as limiting Venezuela’s access to as limiting Venezuela’s access to
the U.S. financial system, the U.S. financial system, likely exacerbated economic pressures in Venezuela. With private exacerbated economic pressures in Venezuela. With private
creditors unwil ing creditors unwilling 37 Rachelle Krygier, “After Years of Crisis, Venezuela’s Maduro Might Finally Be Ready to Accept Some Help,” Washington Post, December 12, 2018. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 15 link to page 15 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations and unable (due to sanctions) to purchase new Venezuelan debt, the Maduro and unable (due to sanctions) to purchase new Venezuelan debt, the Maduro
government routinely turned to its main international financial backers—China, government routinely turned to its main international financial backers—China, RussiaIran, and Russia, and more
recently, Iran—but China and Russia are increasingly reluctant to extend further assistance. .
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the economic chal enges facing the
Venezuelan government economic challenges. The government and economy were . The government and economy were il -ill prepared to address the prepared to address the pandemic’s health or health or
economic effectseconomic effects of COVID-19. . Social distancing mandates disrupted economic activities, even Social distancing mandates disrupted economic activities, even
as they as they arewere difficult for Venezuelans to obey; the majority of people must work in crowded, difficult for Venezuelans to obey; the majority of people must work in crowded,
informal sector jobsinformal sector jobs in order to survive. The government reimposed. Remittances, a major lifeline to the struggling economy, fell by an estimated 50% in the first part of 2020.38 The government re-imposed price controls on many basic price controls on many basic
food items; increased gas prices for the first time in two decades; and lifted long-standing bans on food items; increased gas prices for the first time in two decades; and lifted long-standing bans on
gold, diamond, and mining bans in rivers in the Amazon (where mining was already occurring gold, diamond, and mining bans in rivers in the Amazon (where mining was already occurring
il egal y). In late 2020 and early 2021, the government implemented new market-oriented
reforms.42
Despite these reforms, the economic outlook for Venezuela, which for decades was one of South
America’s most prosperous economies, remains bleak. The economic crisis, now exacerbated by
the pandemic, has been devastating for its citizens, with no clear or quick resolution on the
horizon in the absence of a resolution to the concurrent political crisis. The Maduro government
appears loathe to adopt policies widely viewed by economists as necessary to restoring the
economy: removing price controls, creating an independent central bank, entering an IMF
program that could unlock broader international assistance, and restructuring its debt with
bondholders. It is unclear how Venezuela’s economy can rebuild in the absence of a significant
reorientation of economic policies.
Venezuela’s Assets in the United States: Citgo
Many private investors and companies are pursuing legal channels to seize Venezuela’s assets in the United States,
in compensation for Venezuela’s default and/or in compensation for the expropriation of assets by the Venezuelan
government under President Chávez. Venezuela’s main asset in the United States is Citgo. Citgo is a U.S.-based
subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A (PdVSA). Citgo operates oil
refineries in Texas, Louisiana, and Il inois and owns 48 petroleum product terminals and a pipeline network that
delivers these products to various customers. The company that became Citgo was founded in 1910. PdVSA
bought about half of Citgo in 1986 and the other half in 1990.
Citgo is widely viewed as the most valuable overseas asset in PdVSA’s portfolio. Citgo is an attractive, and perhaps
the only, avenue for seeking compensation from the Maduro government given the severity of Venezuela ’s
financial situation. According to one analyst, “Everyone wants the Citgo assets because it’s the only way to get
paid. Although Citgo is valuable, its assets are unlikely large enough to compensate al potential claimants.
Some U.S. policymakers want to protect Citgo from seizure by private creditors and companies, in order to
preserve the asset for the interim government if it takes power. Some interest groups, however, expressed
concerns about interference with property rights involving U.S. investors and the free market.

41 Rachelle Krygier, “After Years of Crisis, Venezuela’s Maduro Might Finally Be Ready to Accept Some Help,”
Washington Post, December 12, 2018.
42 Gideon Long, “Venezuela T akes T entative Steps T owards Market Reform,” Financial Times, January 11, 2021;
Gideon Long, “Venezuela Seeks to Breathe Life into Moribund Bourse,” Financial Times, February 5, 2021.
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In October 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a
general license that shields the transfer of Citgo to potential claimants. It is a time-limited shield, but has been
extended several times, most recently through July 2021. President Maduro accuses the government’s opposition
of attempting to “steal” Citgo and the United States of trying to control Venezuela’s oil reserves.
Sources: Citgo, “Our Story,” at https://www.citgo.com/about/who-we-are/our-story; Fancisco Mondaldi, a fel ow
in Latin American energy policy at Rice University as quoted in Clifford Krauss, “’It’s the Only Way to Get Paid’: A
Struggle for Citgo, Venezuela’s U.S. Oil Company,” New York Times, October 17, 2019; and Andrew Scurria,
“Venezuela Can Afford Payment to Keep Control of Citgo, Creditor Lawyer Says,” Wal Street Journal, October
21, 2019.
Humanitarian Situation and Response43
The deteriorating humanitarian situation in Venezuela has elevated congressional concerns about
the country. Evenillegally). Recent Developments and Outlook After years of crisis, Venezuela’s economy has seen some positive developments. Since 2020, the government, including a new generation of officials, has advanced some market-oriented reforms.39 Reforms include, for example, dismantling currency controls, allowing more dollar transactions, reviving local stock markets, and partial divestment of state-owned enterprises.40 The reforms are having some positive impacts. Poverty has fallen to an estimated 50.5% in 2022, down from 65.2% in 2021, according to a university survey.41 The IMF estimates that Venezuela’s economy grew by 6% in 2022, and forecasts growth of 6.5% in 2023.42 The government has also narrowed budget deficits, from a peak of 30% of GDP in 2018 to 4.5% of GDP in 2021 (Figure 3).43 Fiscal reforms focused on cuts to public works spending and subsidies; an uptick in oil prices has also increased government revenues.44 There are some signs that inflation has improved, although on-the-ground estimates vary widely.45 The sanctions relief under discussion, which could revive Venezuela’s oil industry and reopen U.S. and European markets to Venezuelan oil exports, could also help boost the economy.46 The extent to which the economy has stabilized should not be overstated, however. Economic outputs and imports remain well below pre-crisis (2010-2014) levels (Figure 3). Half the country lives in poverty and economic liberalization reforms have been piecemeal. In Caracas, blackouts 38 Moises Rendon, “Covid-19 in Venezuela: How the Pandemic Deepened a Humanitarian Crisis,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 23, 2020. 39 Gideon Long, “Venezuela Takes Tentative Steps Towards Market Reform,” Financial Times, January 11, 2021; Gideon Long, “Venezuela Seeks to Breathe Life into Moribund Bourse,” Financial Times, February 5, 2021; Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Venezuela’s Leader Trades Old Guard for Slick Technocrats to Keep Power,” New York Times, March 2, 2022; “Venezuelan Government Offers Shares in State-Owned Firms,” Economist, June 1, 2022. 40 Gideon Long, “Venezuela Takes Tentative Steps Towards Market Reform,” Financial Times, January 11, 2021; Gideon Long, “Venezuela Seeks to Breathe Life into Moribund Bourse,” Financial Times, February 5, 2021; “Venezuelan Government Offers Shares in State-Owned Firms,” Economist, June 1, 2022; Alex Vasquez and Nicolle Yapur, “Venezuela Moves Closer to Dollarization with New Bank Rules,” Bloomberg, January 21, 2021. 41 Vivian Sequera, “Venezuela Poverty Rate Falls to 50.5% in 2022-Study,” Reuters, November 10, 2022. 42 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2022. 43 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2022. 44 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Venezuela, Accessed November 15, 2022. 45 Reuters, “Venezuela’s Monthly Inflation Slows to 6.2% in October,” November 4, 2022; Fabiola Zerpa, Ezra Fieser, and Andreina Itriago Acosta, “Inflation Soars over 300% in Venezuela in Blow to Maduro Rebound,” Bloomberg, November 1, 2022. 46 Patricia Garip, Vivian Salama, and Kejal Vyas, “U.S. Looks to Ease Venezuela Sanctions, Enabling Chevron to Pump Oil,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 10 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations remain common and running water is scarce.47 Investors holding defaulted Venezuelan bonds are engaged in a years-long legal battle to seize a controlling stake of Citgo, as are dozens of other creditors of Venezuela’s government.48 The Maduro government has shown no interest in working with the IMF on a financial assistance package; indeed, successive Venezuelan governments have not cooperated with the IMF on a regular assessment of its economy, as is required for all IMF members, since 2004. Figure 3. Venezuela’s Economy: Recent Trends Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Venezuela, accessed November 15, 2022. Notes: *2022 data is an estimate. Humanitarian Situation and Response49 Beginning in 2017, the humanitarian situation in Venezuela began to deteriorate and has since become a protracted humanitarian crisis in the country as well as in the region. Situation Inside Venezuela Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuelans were facing a lack of food, before the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuelans were facing a lack of food,
medicine and health care, and access to social services. Political persecution, hyperinflation, loss medicine and health care, and access to social services. Political persecution, hyperinflation, loss
of income, and poverty also contributed to a dire situation.of income, and poverty also contributed to a dire situation. According to household surveys, the
percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty increased from 48.4% in 2014 to 96% in 2019 (with
80% in extreme poverty).44
By the end of 2020, more than 7 mil ion people were estimated to require In 2022, an estimated 7.7 million Venezuelans required humanitarian humanitarian
assistance, with pregnant and nursing women, those with chronic assistance, with pregnant and nursing women, those with chronic il nessesillnesses, indigenous people, , indigenous people,
migrants, children under five, and people with disabilitiesmigrants, children under five, and people with disabilities particularly in need.particularly in need.4550 Food insecurity Food insecurity
is alsoremains a significant issue, mainly due to the price of food rather than its lack of availability. a significant issue, mainly due to the price of food rather than its lack of availability.46
51 Many households do not have reliable access to potable water and interruptions in electrical Many households do not have reliable access to potable water and interruptions in electrical
service and gas supplies are common. With a collapsed health system, service and gas supplies are common. With a collapsed health system, overal overall health indicators, health indicators,
particularly infant and maternal mortality rates, have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases particularly infant and maternal mortality rates, have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases
such as diphtheria and measles also have become a major concern, along with COVID-19. Fuel
shortages, exacerbated by the end of U.S.-licensed oil for diesel swaps in the fal of 2020,
reportedly have made food distribution and humanitarian aid delivery more chal enging.47
Displacement
As of April 5, 2021, U.N. agencies estimated more than 5.6 mil ion Venezuelans had fled the
country. Roughly 4.7 mil ion (about 85%) of the refugees and migrants were hosted in Latin
American and Caribbean countries, with more than 1.7 mil ion Venezuelans in Colombia (see
Figure 3.)48 Responses to the Venezuelan arrivals have varied by country and continue to evolve
with events on the ground. The displacement crisis has affected the entire region, as neighboring
countries strain to absorb arrivals often malnourished and in poor health. Although the U.N. High

43 T his section was authored by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist such as diphtheria and 47 “Venezuela Opposition Leader Juan Guaid Vows to Fight On,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2022. 48 Andrew Scurria, “Venezuela Bondholders’ Claim on Citgo to be Decided by New York’s Top Top Court,” Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2022. 49 This section was authored by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy. For background, in International Humanitarian Policy. For background,
see CRSsee CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11029, IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Hum anitarianHumanitarian Crisis and COVID-19, by Rhoda Margesson and , by Rhoda Margesson and
Clare RibandoClare Ribando Seelke.Seelke.
44 Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Encuesta Sobre Condiciones de Vida:Venezuela 2019-2020: Avance de
Resultados, July 2020.
45 USAID, 50 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Venezuela Regional“Venezuela Regional Crisis,” Crisis,” fact sheet #1, December 16, 2020.
46Fact Sheet #4, September 26, 2022. 51 World Food Program, “Venezuela Food Security Assessment: Main Findings,” World Food Program, “Venezuela Food Security Assessment: Main Findings,” February 23, 2020, and WFP, “Venezuela Country Brief,” August 2022. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 17 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations measles also have become a major concern, along with COVID-19. Fuel shortages, exacerbated by the end of U.S.-licensed oil for diesel swaps in the fall of 2020, reportedly have made food distribution and humanitarian aid delivery more challenging.52 After delays in negotiations to reach consensus with President Maduro’s government, the United Nations launched the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Venezuela on August 15 requesting $795 million in funding for the humanitarian response.53 Population Displacement in the Region As of October 12, 2022, U.N. agencies estimated that more than 7.1 million Venezuelans have fled the country. Approximately 5.9 million (about 83%) of the refugees and migrants are living in 17 host countries in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), of which nearly 2.5 million Venezuelans are in Colombia (see Figure 4).54 Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have also received larger numbers of Venezuelans. While the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does not consider most displaced Venezuelans to be refugees, it asserts that a significant number need humanitarian assistance, international protection, and opportunities to regularize their status.55 The displacement crisis has affected the entire region, as neighboring countries strain to absorb arrivals often malnourished and in poor health. Responses to the Venezuelan arrivals have varied by country and continue to evolve with events on the ground. Millions of Venezuelans lack identification documents, making them vulnerable to exploitation.56 Although countries in the region have granted residence permits or other options to just over 2.4 million Venezuelans,57 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) asserts that 4.3 million Venezuelan arrivals struggle to access food, shelter, and employment.58 52 Antonio Maria Delgado and Camille Rodríguez Montilla, “‘The Country’s Whole Food Supply Is at Risk’: Diesel Shortages Hit Venezuela’s Truckers,” Miami Herald, March 11, 2021. U.N. Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan: January-December 2022, December 2021. 53 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Response Plan: Venezuela: 2022-2023, August 15, 2022. See also USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis,” Fact Sheet #4, September 26, 2022. 54 U.N. Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, “Response for Venezuelans (RV4) Data Portal,” November 22, 2022. 55 UNHCR, “Guidance Note on the Outflow of Venezuelans,” March 2018; and UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM), Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela: RMRP 2022, December 2021. 56 The Venezuelan government has made it difficult for Venezuelans to obtain a valid passport, which makes it difficult to establish legal status outside the country. 57 U.N. Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, RV4 Data, August 5, 2022 (latest available). 58 IOM, “Three-Quarters of Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela Struggle to Access Basic Services in Latin America and the Caribbean,” October 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Since 2017, Venezuela’s exodus has become an unprecedented displacement crisis for the Figure 4. Venezuelan Migrants and Asylum Western Hemisphere, which has in place Seekers: Flows to the Region and Beyond some of the highest protection standards in the world for displaced and vulnerable persons. Countries in the region have been under pressure to examine their respective migration and asylum policies and to address, as a region, the legal status of Venezuelans who have fled their country. In a move welcomed in the region and by the international community, the Colombian government announced an initiative in February 2021 to provide 10-year temporary protection status to Venezuelan migrants in Colombia.59 More recently, as part of its new migrant regularization process, on September 1, 2022, the Government of Ecuador opened online registration to an estimated 120,000 Venezuelans, which is to provide a 180-day Source: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. residency permit, possible two-year temporary residency visa, and protection from deportation.60 Separately, Quito Member States61 – a coordination mechanism among 14 LAC countries established in 2018 to respond to the Venezuelan displacement crisis in the region - signed an eighth Quito Process Joint Declaration in July 2022 that reaffirmed their commitment to migrants and refugees.62 With separate global compacts on refugees and migration adopted in 2018, experts continue to urge timely and reliable funding from the international community to support efforts by host governments to assist Venezuelan refugees and migrants and their host communities.63 The United Nations’ 2022 Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan seeks $1.72 billion in humanitarian funding to support the international response across the region.64 International Actors in Venezuela’s Crisis Since Maduro’s fraudulent reelection in 2018, numerous international actors have been involved in Venezuela’s prolonged crisis—with the United States and many other countries initially focused on isolating Maduro, supporting Guaidó, and promoting political dialogue. More 59 Venezuelans living in Colombia without regular status affects their ability to access essential services, protection, and assistance. UNHCR-IOM Joint Press Release, “UNHCR and IOM Welcome Colombia’s Decision to Regularize Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants,” February 8, 2021. 60 USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis,” fact sheet #4, September 26, 2022. 61 The 14 Member States include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay. 62 USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis,” fact sheet #4, September 26, 2022. 63 Following U.N.-led international meetings to promote humanitarian action and policy development globally, in 2018, U.N. member states adopted two global compacts—a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). The compacts are separate documents and are a result of distinct processes, but both are designed to be coherent and complementary. 64 U.N. Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan: 2023-2024, December 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations recently, approaches to engage more directly with the Maduro government have gained traction. Other global factors (such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and global great power competition) have likely affected international approaches to Venezuela. In 2019, the United States, Canada, most of the member states of the EU, February 23, 2020.
47 Antonio Maria Delgado and Camille Rodríguez Montilla, “ T he Country’s Whole Food Supply Is at Risk.’ Diesel
Shortages Hit Venezuela’s T ruckers,” Miam i Herald, March 11, 2021.
48 U.N. Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, “Response for Venezuelans (RV4) Data
Portal,” February 5, 2021.
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does not consider most Venezuelans to be refugees, it
asserts that a significant number of displaced Venezuelans need humanitarian assistance,
international protection, and opportunities to regularize their status.49
Venezuela’s exodus has become an
unprecedented displacement crisis for the
Figure 3. Venezuelan Migrants and Asylum
Western Hemisphere, which has in place
Seekers: Flows to the Region and Beyond
some of the highest protection standards in
the world for displaced and vulnerable
persons. The countries in the region have
been under pressure to examine their
respective migration and asylum policies and
to address, as a region, the legal status of
Venezuelans who have fled their country.
More than 2.5 mil ion Venezuelans in
neighboring countries lack identification
documents, making them vulnerable to
exploitation.50 In a move welcomed in the
region and by the international community,
the Colombian government announced an
initiative in February 2021 to provide 10-year
temporary protection status to Venezuelan
migrants in Colombia.51 With separate global

compacts on refugees and migration adopted
Source: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
in 2018, experts urge timely and predictable
funding from the international community to support efforts by host governments to assist
Venezuelan refugees and migrants and the communities sheltering them.52
Since March 21, 2021, fighting between Venezuelan military forces and Colombian non-state
armed groups based in Venezuela’s Apure State has driven displacement in and around Apure,
Venezuela. Increased security concerns and existing COVID-19-related movement restrictions
have affected humanitarian access. As of April 14, the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) and the Venezuelan Red Cross were the only relief organizations providing assistance to
affected populations in the area. Approximately 5,800 people have fled across the border to
Colombia’s Arauca Department. Colombian authorities are providing humanitarian assistance and

49 UNHCR, “Guidance Note on the Outflow of Venezuelans,” March 2018; and UNHCR and International
Organization for Migration (IOM), Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants fro m
Venezuela: RMRP 2021, December 2020.
50 T he Venezuelan government has made it difficult for Venezuelans to obtain a valid passport and therefore legal
status outside the country. U.N. Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, Response for
Venezuelans (RV4), “Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2020,” as of July 5, 2020.
51 More than half the Venezuelans currently living in Colombia lack regular status, which affects their ability to access
essential services, protection, and assistance. UNHCR-IOM Joint Press Release, “ UNHCR and IOM Welcome
Colombia’s Decision to Regularize Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants,” February 8, 2021.
52 Following U.N.-led international meetings to promote humanitarian action and policy development globally, in 2018,
U.N. member states adopted two global compacts—a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)
and a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).52 T he compacts are separate documents and are a result of distinct
processes, but both are designed to be coherent and complementary. Prior to their adoption, the United States ended its
participation in the GCM in December 2017 and in the GCR in November 2018.
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protection to the recently displaced; however, this has raised concerns that cash assistance could
provide an incentive for displaced Venezuelans to remain in Colombia.53
COVID-19 Pandemic
As in much of the rest of the world, COVID-19 emerged in Venezuela in mid-March 2020 and
added a complicated layer to the country’s humanitarian crisis. In general, vulnerable populations
often live in crowded, unsanitary conditions that make them particularly susceptible to COVID-
19 and present significant chal enges to response and containment.54 PAHO and U.N. Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) have led the international COVID-19 response in Venezuela, prioritizing
capacity-building support for hospitals, as wel as health, water, and sanitation interventions for
vulnerable populations.55 PAHO has facilitated negotiations between Maduro and Guaidó to
obtain and distribute vaccines through the World Health Organization’s COVAX mechanism.56
Reportedly, on April 10, 2021, the Maduro government paid $64 mil ion to receive vaccines
through COVAX. On April 18, the Maduro government announced it had made a second payment
to the COVAX initiative to access approximately 11 mil ion COVID-19 vaccines.57
In neighboring countries, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and their
partners have sought to address the immediate public health needs of refugees and migrants, as
wel as the displaced prompted by the virus, while trying to reduce the spread and conduct
information and awareness campaigns. A year into the pandemic, transmission and deaths due to
the virus have not reached the levels anticipated across multiple humanitarian settings, including
the Venezuela crisis, although widespread reporting, testing, and data are lacking.58
The pandemic has impeded progress on existing humanitarian priorities, and its secondary
impacts (such as increased food insecurity, protection risks, and poverty) have exacerbated an
already chal enging humanitarian situation. COVID-19 prevention measures that restrict
movement (such as physical distancing, quarantine orders, and border closures) have disrupted
the informal economy, cross-border economic activity, and remittances, and loss of livelihoods
and economic decline have made it difficult for Venezuelans to meet their basic needs.59 The
pandemic has complicated many Venezuelans’ decisions about whether to stay, leave, or, in a
much smal er number of cases, return to Venezuela.60

53 UNHCR, “Arauquita Crisis, Colombia,” UNHCR Response #1, April 8, 2021.
54Jacob Kurtzer, “T he Impact of COVID-19 on Humanitarian Crises,” CSIS: Critical Questions, March 19, 2020;
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “T he Next Wave: U.N. and Relief Agencies Warn the Coronavirus Pandemic Could
Leave an Even Bigger Path of Destruction in the World’s Most Vulnerable and Conflict-Riven Countries,” Foreign
Policy, March 23, 2020; and Høvring Roald, “ T en T hings You Should Know About Coronavirus and Refugees,”
Norwegian Refugee Council, March 16, 2020.
55 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), Humanitarian Response Plan with
Hum anitarian Needs Overview: Venezuela, July 2020.
56 Maduro has rejected the Astra Zeneca vaccine, the main vaccine that COVAX has offered to other Latin American
governments. Reuters, “Venezuela’s Maduro Proposes Paying for Coronavirus Vaccines with Oil,” March 28, 2021.
57 Reuters, “Venezuela Paid $64 Million to Receive Vaccines through COVAX, April 10, 2021, and Reuters,
“Venezuela Makes Second COVAX Payment for Vaccines as U.N. Official Visits, “ April 18, 2021.
58 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2021, December 2020.
59 Ibid.
60 UNHCR, “Venezuelans Defy the Pandemic to Seek a Future in Colombia,” February 8, 2021.
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U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan in Venezuela
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) coordinates the
international humanitarian response in Venezuela. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in
Venezuela is a collective effort by UNOCHA and implementing partners to coordinate and scale
up a response across the country, with assistance in the areas of health, water, sanitation and
hygiene, food security, nutrition, protection, shelter and nonfood items, and education. The 2021
HRP has sought $762.5 mil ion in aid and targets assistance for 4.5 mil ion of the country’s most
vulnerable people.
Following lengthy negotiations that began in 2019, on April 19, 2021, the U.N. World Food
Program (WFP) and the Maduro government signed a memorandum of understanding that would
al ow WFP to establish a humanitarian presence inside Venezuela with full operational
independence from the Maduro regime. WFP plans to provide food assistance to 185,000 of the
most vulnerable children by the end of 2021 and to 1.5 mil ion children by the end of the 2022-
2023 school year. The estimated budget for this program is $190 mil ion, which wil be funded
through the Venezuela HRP.61
Humanitarian access inside Venezuela has been a chal enge for many humanitarian organizations.
As further indication, on April 14, 2021, the Maduro government mandated that NGOs operating
in Venezuela register with its Office Against Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing.62
International Humanitarian Regional Response Plan
UNHCR and IOM coordinate the international response to the needs of displaced Venezuelans
and host communities in the region, which includes governments, U.N. entities, NGOs (national
and international), the Red Cross Movement, faith-based organizations, and civil society. The
Regional Interagency Coordination Platform provides a common humanitarian framework for
assistance. The 2021 Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, launched in December 2020,
appealed for $1.4 bil ion to reach 3.3 mil ion of the most vulnerable across Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Protection and assistance needs are significant for arrivals and host communities, particularly in
border areas. Services provided vary by country but include reception centers and options for
shelter; emergency relief items, legal assistance with asylum applications and other matters;
protection from violence and exploitation; and temporary work programs and education
opportunities. The Quito Process, a regional coordinating mechanism, has helped harmonize
policies among host countries and donors and scale up the humanitarian response.
International Actors in Venezuela’s Crisis
The international community remains divided over how to respond to the crisis in Venezuela. In
2019, the United States, Canada, most of the member states of the European Union (EU),
Australia, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and 16 Western Hemisphere countries recognized Juan Australia, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and 16 Western Hemisphere countries recognized Juan
Guaidó as interim president and supported a peaceful transfer of power from Maduro to an

61 U.N. News, “World Food Programme Reaches Deal to Supply Food to 185,000 Children in Venezuela,” April 20,
2021.
62 Amnesty International, “Venezuela: Civil Society Organizations Declare their Resounding Rejection and Demand
the Repeal of the New Registration Measure for T errorism and Other Crimes, April 20, 2021 .
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elected government. Many of those countries stil support the Venezuelan opposition and the
National Assembly elected in 2015 but do not necessarily recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s
interim president.63 Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, Iran, and others support Maduro, his
government, and its claim to power. A third group of countries—including Mexico, Norway,
Uruguay, and some Caribbean nations—has remained neutral in the crisis. Divisions among
global powers may have undermined a Norway-facilitated dialogue in 2019. Without pressure
from their primary external al ies (China and Russia for Maduro, the United States and the EU for
Guaidó), some observers maintain that neither side viewed negotiations as the best option.64
Canada, Switzerland, and the EU have condemned antidemocratic actions by the Maduro
government and issued targeted sanctions against Maduro government officials, with the most
recent EU sanctions imposed in February 2021. In general, these countries oppose military
intervention in Venezuela and have expressed concerns about the humanitarian effects of broad
sanctions, including U.S. oil sanctions. Instead, they favor targeted sanctions on Maduro officials
and their supporters and a negotiated solution to the crisis.65 Since February 2019, the EU-backed
International Contact Group has sought to “establish necessary guarantees for a credible electoral
process, within the earliest time frame possible” and to hasten the delivery of humanitarian aid
into Venezuela.66 Norwegian representatives have maintained communication with Maduro and
opposition leaders.
The OAS under Secretary-General Luis Almagro has been active on Venezuela, but some member
states, including countries in the Caribbean Community, assert that Almagro has sided too
strongly with the opposition. Nevertheless, resolutions have garnered enough votes (19 of 34
member states) to declare Maduro’s 2018 reelection il egitimate (June 2018) and to not recognize
the legitimacy of his second term (January 2019).67 In June 2020, the OAS passed a resolution
condemning the Maduro-aligned Supreme Court’s election-related decisions.68 Thirteen OAS
members remain active in the Lima Group, which formed in August 2017 to hasten a return to
democracy in Venezuela.69 A January 5 Lima Group statement said the signatories “do not
recognize the legitimacy or legality of the National Assembly instal ed on January 5, 2021.”70 In

63 An EU statement from January 25, 2021, asserts that Juan Guaidó and other opposition legislators are “important
actors and privileged interlocutors” but does not recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Council of the
European Union, “Council Conclusions on Venezuela,” January 25, 2021.
64 Abraham F. Lowenthal and David Smilde, “Venezuela: Is T here a Way Out of T his T ragic Impasse?,” Woodrow
Wilson Center, July 2019.
65 T he U.S.-led coalition in support of Guaidó has gradually frayed, as Guaidó has proven unable to channel
international support into domestic political power and differences in U.S. and EU approaches to the crisis have
widened. Elliott Abrams, “ T he EU T ries and Fails Again on Venezuela,” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2021.
66 T hose “necessary guarantees” include naming a new electoral council, releasing political prisoners, and ending bans
on political parties and candidates. Members of the International Contact Group now include Argentina, Chile, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
67 T he OAS requires 18 votes to pass a resolution of the Permanent Council. In June 20 18, 19 of 34 member states
passed a resolution stating that the May 2018 presidential election in Venezuela lacked legitimacy and authorizing
countries to take measures, including sanctions, necessary to hasten a return to democracy. In January 2019, the same
19 states approved a resolution that refused to recognize the legitimacy of Maduro ’s second term; called for new
presidential elections; and urged all member states to adopt diplomatic, political, and financial measures to facilitate the
restoration of democracy in Venezuela.
68 OAS, “ Permanent Council Rejects “Illegitimate” Action of the Venezuelan Court of Justice,” June 27, 2020.
69 T hose countries include Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, and the Guaidó-led government of Venezuela.
70 Countries that signed that statement include Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
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addition, 11 OAS member states that are states parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance have imposed targeted sanctions and travel bans on Maduro officials.71 OAS member
states oppose military intervention in Venezuela
Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, Iran, and a few other countries support Maduro. Russia and China
have blocked U.S.-led efforts at the U.N. Security Council to recognize the Guaidó government.
Russia has served as the Maduro government’s primary political and military backer, even though
Venezuela’s economic collapse since 2014 has made the country unable to purchase the type of
weaponry purchased under Hugo Chávez.72 A February 2019 Defense Intel igence Agency report
to Congress stated that Russia’s defense cooperation with Venezuela focuses on equipment sales,
maintenance support, training, naval and air deployments, and probably intel igence
cooperation.73 In March 2019, Russia deployed military personnel to Venezuela, which it argued
was for maintenance of Russian-made military equipment. This deployment drew strong criticism
from President Trump.74 Russia, which has both economic and geostrategic interests in
Venezuela,75 has supported Venezuela’s struggling oil industry and has helped Venezuela evade
U.S. oil sanctions. In response, the Treasury Department sanctioned two subsidiaries of Russia’s
Rosneft oil company in 2020. Russia also has usedGuaidó as interim president. Led by the United States, some governments tried to put pressure on Maduro to step down and allow a transition government to convene elections. Canada, Switzerland, and the EU condemned authoritarian actions by the Maduro government and imposed targeted sanctions against Maduro officials. The Organization of American States (OAS) passed resolutions condemning the Maduro government’s antidemocratic actions and 11 OAS member states parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance imposed targeted sanctions on Maduro officials. In 2019, the OAS welcomed Guaidó’s representative to participate in the Permanent Council until new elections occur in Venezuela after the Maduro government quit the OAS.65 Peru and Colombia formed the “Lima Group” of Western Hemisphere countries that invited the Guaidó government into its efforts to resolve the crisis in 2019. As a U.S.-led coalition confronted Maduro following his reelection in 2018, Russia, China, Cuba, Turkey, Iran, and others supported Maduro, his government, and its claim to power. Russia and China blocked U.S.-led efforts at the U.N. Security Council to recognize the Guaidó government. Russia became, and has remained, the Maduro government’s primary political and military backer even though Venezuela’s economic collapse has made the country unable to purchase the type of weaponry bought under President Chávez.66 In return, Venezuela has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine even as sanctions on Russian banks have prevented the Maduro government’s ability to access currency in Russian accounts.67 Under Maduro, Russia has helped refurbish and service the equipment it sold and provided technical assistance and training. In December 2018, Russia deployed two nuclear capable bombers to Venezuela (the third such deployment since 2008). In March 2019, Russia deployed military personnel to Venezuela, which it argued was for maintenance of Russian-made military equipment.68 In April 2019, the Russian government announced that it had built a training center for Venezuelan pilots of Russian-made military helicopters.69 In 2019, Maduro also reportedly relied on Russian-linked contractors to bolster his personal security.70 After reports emerged of Russian advisors embedded with Venezuelan military units operating near Colombia, Russian officials dismissed Colombian assertions of “foreign interference” in support of Venezuela.71 Russia has both economic and geostrategic interests in Venezuela, but analysts point out that Russia, like China, has not provided new financing to back the Maduro government in several 65 OAS, “Permanent Council Accepts Appointment of Designated Permanent Representative of Venezuela’s National Assembly to the OAS,” April 9, 2019. 66 According to a 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, Russian defense sales to Venezuela totaled roughly $11 billion from 2001-2013. DIA), Russia: Defense Cooperation with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, February 4, 2019, report to Congress required by P.L. 115-232. 67 “Sanctions Against Russia to Also Hurt its Latin American Allies,” Miami Herald, March 1, 2022. 68 Tom Balmforth and Maxim Rodionov, “Russia Says It Sent ‘Specialists’ to Venezuela, Rebuffs Trump,” Reuters, March 28, 2019. 69 “Russia Says It Has Opened Helicopter Training Centre in Venezuela,” Reuters, April 2, 2019. 70 Andrew Roth, “Russian Mercenaries Reportedly in Venezuela to Protect Maduro,” The Guardian, January 25, 2019. 71 Tony Frangie Mawad, “Venezuela is Just one More Card in Russia’s Geopolitical Game,” Caracas Chronicles, March 4, 2022; and “Russia Rejects Colombian ‘Foreign Interference’ Claims,” AFP, April 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations years.72 Russia’s Rosneft oil company invested some $9 billion to support Venezuela’s struggling oil industry and initially helped Venezuela evade U.S. oil sanctions imposed in 2019 by transporting the majority of Venezuela’s oil deliveries.73 In response, the Treasury Department sanctioned two subsidiaries of Russia’s Rosneft oil company in 2020 and Rosneft sold its assets in country.74 While Russia’s role in Venezuela’s energy sector has somewhat diminished, Russia has continued to use Venezuela as a platform from which to spread Venezuela as a platform from which to spread
propaganda, disinformation, propaganda, disinformation, and Russianand Russia-related media.-related media.7675
China China and Cuba, Cuba, Turkey and Iran also support the Maduro government support the Maduro government for various reasons. Some observers maintain . Some observers maintain
that China’s interest in Venezuelathat China’s interest in Venezuela is primarily economic. Others argue that the Chinese have is primarily economic. Others argue that the Chinese have
exported technology to help the Maduro government surveil its citizens, block its critics on social exported technology to help the Maduro government surveil its citizens, block its critics on social
media and elsewhere, and deny food and services to those who do not vote in its favor.media and elsewhere, and deny food and services to those who do not vote in its favor.7776 Since Since
2000, Cuba has provided military and 2000, Cuba has provided military and intel igence intelligence support to the Chávez and later Maduro support to the Chávez and later Maduro
governments governments in exchange for subsidized oil.77 Over time, Cuban intelligence reportedly has helped its Venezuelan counterparts become particularly adept at detecting dissidents within the military.78 In addition, Turkey has purchased large quantities of Venezuelan gold, despite U.S. sanctions.79 Since May 2020, Iran has shipped gasoline to Venezuela in exchange for gold, and the countries signed a 20-year economic cooperation agreement in July 2022. A third group of countries—including Mexico, Norway, Uruguay, and some Caribbean nations—have sought to remain neutral in thein exchange for subsidized oil.78 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo maintained in

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Argentina withdrew from t he Lima Group in March 2021.
71 Within the Western Hemisphere, the United States has supported efforts by the OAS to hasten a return to democracy
in Venezuela and worked with OAS allies to invoke the Rio T reaty , enabling signatory countries to ban travel and
freeze assets of certain individuals and entities associated with the Maduro government. CRS Insight IN11116, The
Inter-Am erican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Crisis in Venezuela , by Peter J. Meyer.
72 Under Chávez, the value of Venezuela’s arms purchases signed in 2005 -2007 reached $3.6 billion. Sergey
Denisentsev, “ Russian-Venezuelan Defense Cooperation,” Center for Analysis of Strategy and T echnology, June 2019.
73 Defense Intelligence Agency, Report to Congress on Russia: Defense Cooperation with Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela, as required by the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), February 4, 2019.
74 Reuters, “Russian Military Specialists Arrive in Venezuela to Service Equipment,” September 25, 2019; and AP,
“US Condemns Russia T roop Deployment to T roubled Venezuela,” March 31, 2019.
75 See Vladimir Rouvinski, Russian-Venezuelan Relations at a Crossroads, Woodrow Wilson Center, February 5,
2019; and V. Rouvinski, Russia’s Continuing Engagem entcrisis, and may now have key roles to play in potential Maduro-opposition negotiations. Since February 2019, the EU-backed International Contact Group has sought to “establish necessary guarantees for a credible electoral process, within the earliest time frame possible” and to hasten the delivery of humanitarian aid into Venezuela.80 Norwegian representatives facilitated past dialogue efforts, including talks between Maduro and opposition leaders in August and September 2021. 72 Kristen Martinez-Gugerli, “Taking Stock of Chinese and Russian Relations with Venezuela,” Washington Office on Latin America, August 10, 2020. 73 Vladimir Rouvinski, Russia’s Continuing Engagement with Venezuela in 2019 and Beyond-An Update, Woodrow Wilson Center, February 18, 2020; Christian Lowe and Rinat Sagdiev, “How Russia Sank Billions of Dollars into Venezuelan Quicksand,” Reuters, March 14, 2019. 74 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Oil Brokerage Firm for Supporting Illegitimate Maduro Regime,: February 18, 2020. Russia’s Gazprom and Lukoil also are no longer invested in Venezuela. 75 U.S. Department of State, Global Engagement Center, Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem, August 2020. 76 Stephen Kaplan and Michael Penfold, “China-Venezuela Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan with Venezuela in 2019 and Beyond-An Update, Woodrow
Wilson Center, February 18, 2020.
76 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Threat Assessment of Russian-Venezuelan Security Cooperation as
required by Section 165(b)(2) of the VERDAD Act of 2019, contained within Div. J of P.L. 116-94, February 24, 2020;
and U.S. Department of State, Global Engagement Center , Pillars of Russia’s Disinform ation and Propaganda
Ecosystem , August 2020.
77 Stephen Kaplan and Michael Penfold, “ China-Venezuela Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Bets with
Chinese Characteristics,” Woodrow Wilson Center, February 20, 2019; Angus Berwick,Chinese Characteristics,” Woodrow Wilson Center, February 20, 2019; Angus Berwick, “ How ZT E “How ZTE Helps Venezuela Helps Venezuela
Create China-Style SocialCreate China-Style Social Control,” Reuters, November 14, 2018; Control,” Reuters, November 14, 2018; Freedom House, “ Freedom on the Net 2019:
Venezuela”; and U.S. and U.S. Congress,Congress, The New Big Brother: China and Digital Authoritarianism , democratic staff reportdemocratic staff report
prepared for the for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Foreign Relations, United StatesU.S. Senate, July 21, 2020. Senate, July 21, 2020.
78 77 Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Dr. Richard E. Feinberg, Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Dr. Richard E. Feinberg, Venezuela and Cuba: The Ties That Bind, ,
Woodrow Wilson Center, January 2020. Woodrow Wilson Center, January 2020.
78 Angus Berwick, “Special Report: How Cuba Taught Venezuela to Quash Military Dissent,” Reuters, August 22, 2019. 79 Mayela Armas and Corina Pons, “Exclusive: Venezuela Removed Six Tonnes of Central Bank Gold at Turn of Year—Sources,” Reuters, March 12, 2020. 80 Those “necessary guarantees” include naming a new electoral council, releasing political prisoners, and ending bans on political parties and candidates. Members of the International Contact Group now include Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. Congressional Research Service 15Congressional Research Service
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Beginning with the EU in January 2021, many of the countries that recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president still support the Venezuelan opposition, but do not regard Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president.81 Leftist leaders have taken office in many Latin America countries, most recently in Brazil. Governments have begun restoring relations with Maduro, who has rejoined the Andean Community. Colombia, long a staunch Guaidó supporter, has restored diplomatic relations with the Maduro government under leftist President Gustavo Petro, who took office in August 2022; the two leaders met in November and Venezuela is hosting peace talks between Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN).82 The Lima Group is defunct, and the OAS narrowly approved an October 2022 resolution for Guaidó’s representative to continue participating in the organization.83 These shifts may portend the possibility for global powers once divided on Venezuela to back recently restarted Venezuela-led negotiations as the UK, EU, and Canada did in a joint statement issued on November 26, 2022.84 U.S. support for such negotiations remains controversial, particularly among some Members of Congress.85 U.S. Policy Since the mid-2000s, successive Administration have expressed concern and U.S. Relations

2019 that there were some 2,300 Cuban security personnel in Venezuela involved in providing
security for Maduro and training Venezuela’s security forces in “torture tactics, domestic spying
techniques, and mechanisms of repression.”79 Over time, Cuban intel igence has helped its
Venezuelan counterparts become particularly adept at detecting dissidents within the military.80
Among the other countries that support the Maduro regime, Turkey has purchased large quantities
of Venezuelan gold, despite U.S. sanctions.81 Iran has sent tankers of gasoline in exchange for
gold, despite U.S. sanctions on both countries; provided humanitarian aid; helped rebuild a
refinery; and established a supermarket conglomerate in Venezuela.82 Iranian-Venezuelan fuel
swaps have begun to occur more frequently.83
U.S. Policy
The United States historical y had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. foreign oil
supplier, but friction in relations increased under the Chávez government and has intensified
under the Maduro government. For more than a decade, U.S. policymakers have had concerns
about the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuelaabout the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela, once a top U.S. oil supplier, and the lack and the lack of of
bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. During this time, Congress
has provided funding to support democratic civil society in Venezuela. As the Maduro As the Maduro
government government has becomebecame increasingly authoritarian, the Obama and Trump Administrations increasingly authoritarian, the Obama and Trump Administrations turned
to sanctions, first targeted’ used targeted sanctions on specific officials on specific officials. U.S. policy toward Venezuela toughened after and then aimed at broader sectors of the economy,
the Maduro government, and most recently, entities supporting that government.
U.S. policy has toughened since the U.S. government ceased to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s the U.S. government ceased to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s
legitimate president in January 2019. After recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019, legitimate president in January 2019. After recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019,
the Trump Administration coordinated most of its efforts with Interim President Guaidó. In early
2019, President Trump and other officials suggested that U.S. military intervention in Venezuela President Trump and other officials suggested that U.S. military intervention in Venezuela
was a possibility.was a possibility.84 After U.S. al ies, including in the EU and the Lima Group, and 86 After U.S. allies and Members of Members of
Congress expressed opposition to that prospect, such statements became less Congress expressed opposition to that prospect, such statements became less frequent.85
During the Trump Administration, U.S. strategyfrequent and the Trump Administration used other means to try to pressure Maduro to leave office.87 Under President Trump, U.S. policy towards Venezuela emphasized diplomatic efforts to bolster support emphasized diplomatic efforts to bolster support
for Guaidó and isolate Maduro; targeted sanctions and visa revocations on Maduro government for Guaidó and isolate Maduro; targeted sanctions and visa revocations on Maduro government
officials and their families, officials and their families, along with broader sanctions on the economy and government; broader sanctions on the economy and government;
assistance for the Venezuelan people; and actions to cut off the Maduro government’s assistance for the Venezuelan people; and actions to cut off the Maduro government’s il icit

79 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Interview with Margaret Brennan of CBS Face
the Nation,” May 5, 2019; and U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “ Remarks to the
Press,” March 11, 2019.
80 Angus Berwick, “ Special Report: How Cuba T aught Venezuela to Quash Military Dissent,” Reuters, August 22,
2019.
81 Mayela Armas and Corina Pons, “Exclusive: Venezuela Removed Six T onnes of Central Bank Gold at T urn of
Year—Sources,” Reuters, March 12, 2020.
82 Ian T alley and Benoit Falcon, “ Iranian Military-Owned Conglomerate Sets Up Shop in Venezuela,” Wall Street
Journal, July 5, 2020.
83 Deisy Buitrago, Marianna Parraga, “Exclusive: ‘Perfect T rips’ - Venezuela Ships Jet Fuel to Iran in Exchange for
Gasoline, Sources say,” Reuters, February 23, 2021.
84 T he White House, “ Remarks by President T rump to the Venezuelan American Community ,” February 18, 2019
85 T henillicit revenue sources.88 In March 2020, the Administration issued a “democratic transition framework” backed by Guaidó. The framework would have lifted certain sanctions in exchange for Maduro 81 An EU statement from January 25, 2021, asserts that Juan Guaidó and other opposition legislators are “important actors and privileged interlocutors” but does not recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Venezuela,” January 25, 2021. 82 Joe Parkin Daniels, “Latin America Moves to Bring Venezuela’s Maduro in From the Cold,” Financial Times, November 6, 2022; “Colombia, ELN Rebels set to Begin Peace Talks Next Week,” Reuters, November 17, 2022. 83 Manuel Rueda, “Support for Venezuela’s Opposition is Dwindling at OAS,” AP, October 6, 2022. 84 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media Note: Joint Statement on Venezuela Negotiations,” November 26, 2022. 85 Nahal Toosi, “Lawmakers cry foul as Biden mulls lifting some sanctions,” Político, October 20, 2022. 86 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump to the Venezuelan American Community,” February 18, 2019 87 Then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo denied any U.S. involvement in the botched raid against Maduro in May -Secretary of State Michael Pompeo denied any U.S. involvement in the botched raid against Maduro in May
2020. See Karen DeYoung,2020. See Karen DeYoung, Anthony Faiola, and Alex Horton. “Anthony Faiola, and Alex Horton. “ U.S. Denies Involvement in Alleged Venezuela U.S. Denies Involvement in Alleged Venezuela
Invasion Attempt as Details Remain Murky,” Invasion Attempt as Details Remain Murky,” Washington Post, May 6, 2020. , May 6, 2020.
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link to page 29 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

revenue sources.86 In March 2020, the Administration issued a “democratic transition framework”
backed by Guaidó. The framework would have lifted certain sanctions in exchange for Maduro
releasing political prisoners, having foreign security forces leave the country, and al owing the
88 Testimony of Elliott A. Abrams, Special Representative for Venezuela, U.S. Department of State, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 4, 2020. Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 27 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations releasing political prisoners and allowing the creation of a Council of State to carry out presidential duties until elections could be held. U.S. creation of a Council of State to carry out presidential duties until elections could be held. U.S.
insistence that Maduro leave office prior to the convening of new elections and reticence to insistence that Maduro leave office prior to the convening of new elections and reticence to bac k
negotiations eventual y drove a wedge betweenback negotiations reportedly strained U.S. and U.S. and EU policy unityEU positions on Venezuela.87
To date, U.S. efforts have failed to dislodge Maduro and enable the convening of free and fair
elections, raising questions for the Biden Administration on whether to intensify, roll back, or
otherwise change U.S. policy. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spoken with Interim
President Guaidó.88 Senior U.S. officials have said the Biden Administration aims to focus on
supporting the Venezuelan people and engaging in multilateral diplomacy to press for a return to
democracy and hold corrupt and abusive Maduro officials accountable for their actions.89 On
March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration designated Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) for 18 months (see “Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela,” below).90
Many analysts maintain that restoring a more unified position on Venezuela with al ied European
and Latin American nations wil be an important task for the Biden Administration.91 Biden
officials are reviewing existing sanctions and reportedly are assessing whether the Maduro
government is wil ing to al ow increased humanitarian access, the selection of a more balanced
electoral council, and a return to Norway-led talks.92 Some policy experts have urged the
Administration to offer sanctions relief in exchange for specific actions by the Maduro
government, such as the release of political prisoners.93 In exchange for an openness to review
sectoral sanctions, the Administration could seek more targeted sanctions from other countries on
Venezuelan officials and their families, asset forfeitures and indictments of Maduro officials and
enablers, and humanitarian assistance for U.N. appeals on Venezuela.94 The Biden Administration
has rejoined the U.N. Human Rights Council, in part to keep its attention on abuses in countries
such as Venezuela.95 Some experts have urged Biden officials to work with the EU-led
International Contact Group in backing a negotiated solution to the Venezuela crisis and to seek
areas of “mutual interest” on Venezuela with China and Russia.96

86 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Government Support for the Democratic Aspirations of the Venezuelan People,”
accessed August 17; 2020; and T estimony of Elliott A. Abrams, Special Representative for Venezuela, U.S.
Department of State, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Fo reign Relations, August 4, 2020.
87 Elliott Abrams, “ T he EU T ries and Fails Again on Venezuela,” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2021.
88 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Venezuelan Interim President
Guaidó,” March 2, 2021.
89 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela,” March 8, 2021.
90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Secretary Mayorkas Designates Venezuela for T emporary Protected
Status for 18 Months,” March 8, 2021.
91 Paul Angelo, Synchronizing with Europe on the Venezuela Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations, September 28,
2020.
92 Joshua Goodman, “US Weighs Policy on Venezuela as Maduro Signals Flexibility,” AP. April 27, 2021.
93 Christopher Sabatini, “Can Biden Succeed Where T rump’s Venezuela Policy Failed? World Politics Review, January
27, 2021.
94 Ryan C. Berg and Jorge González-Gallarza, Europe’s Last Chance: How the EU Can (and Should) Become the
Primary Actor in Venezuela’s Democratic Restoration, American Enterprise Institute, March 2021.
95 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Key Outcomes at the 46th Session of the U.N. Human Rights
Council,” March 23, 2021.
96 Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde, Recalibrating U.S. Policy in Venezuela: Learning from Failure and Seizing
Opportunities, Washington Office on Latin America, December 2020.
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The 116th Congress supported the Trump Administration’s efforts to promote a restoration of
democracy in Venezuela without the use of military force and to provide humanitarian assistance
to Venezuelans. Some Members expressed concerns about the humanitarian impact of broad U.S.
economic sanctions. Congress enacted legislation to guide U.S. policy on Venezuela, including
P.L. 116-94, which appropriated $30 mil ion in FY2020 for democracy programs in Venezuela
and incorporated the Senate-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive
bil to address the crisis in Venezuela (see Appendix A). Congress appropriated not less than $33
mil ion for democracy programs in Venezuela and an unspecified amount of humanitarian support
for countries sheltering Venezuelan refugees. Congress also conducted numerous oversight
hearings on U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
The 117th Congress is likely to provide input to the Biden Administration in sanctioning human
rights abuses, corruption, and antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its backers,
as wel as how to balance sectoral sanctions with humanitarian concerns. Congress may examine
new policy approaches by the Biden Administration and further legislative options, such as
additional sanctions against the Maduro government and its foreign enablers or humanitarian
assistance to Venezuelans.
U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela97
The United States has increasingly employed sanctions as a policy tool on Venezuela.89 The Biden Administration initially maintained a similar policy toward Venezuela, although U.S. talks with Maduro in March and June 2022, and the October prisoner releases to some extent signaled a policy shift. Biden officials considered, and then offered U.S. licensing changes, and potentially future sanctions relief in the energy sector to incentivize Maduro to negotiate a path toward free and fair elections in 2024.90 The United States continues to recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader; but some press reports indicate the United States may follow the opposition’s lead and abandon that recognition in January 2023 but still not recognize the Maduro government.91 Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols testified in September 2022, however, that U.S. patience with Maduro “is not limitless” and that the Administration could impose new sanctions if negotiations do not advance.92 In July 2022, the Administration announced an 18-month extension of the Temporary Protected Status designation for Venezuelans first announced in March 2021. U.S. officials announced new policies in October 2022 that aimed to address a significant rise in apprehensions of Venezuelans at the Southwest border. (See “Migration Issues” below.) The 116th Congress supported the Trump Administration’s efforts to promote a restoration of democracy in Venezuela using sanctions without the use of military force and to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans. Some Members expressed concerns about the humanitarian impact of broad U.S. economic sanctions. Congress enacted legislation to guide U.S. policy on Venezuela, including P.L. 116-94, which incorporated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive bill to address the crisis in Venezuela. Many in the 117th Congress have closely followed the Biden Administration’s gradually evolving approach to Venezuela. In March 2022, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103), which includes $40 million for democracy programs in Venezuela ($7 million more than the FY2021 allocation). Congress is considering the Administration’s FY2023 request of $55 million for Venezuela. The House Appropriations Committee-reported FY2023 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations (SFOPS) bill (H.R. 8282) would provide $50 million in funds for Venezuela, including democracy funding. The FY2023 SFOPS bill introduced in the Senate, S. 4662, would provide $40 million. Congressional oversight has focused on the Administration’s approach to sanctions and negotiations. While some in Congress support continued pressure on the Maduro government, others assert that broad sanctions have hurt the Venezuelan people. Whereas some Members of Congress expressed support for recent U.S. talks with Maduro that reportedly broached energy-related topics, others opposed those talks and introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil (H.R. 6942, H.R. 7012, H.R. 7023, H.R. 7207, S. 3798). Among other bills, S. 688 (reported by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in July 2021) would prohibit contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro regime. 89 Elliott Abrams, “The EU Tries and Fails Again on Venezuela,” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2021. 90 “Chevron Gets New U.S. License to Pump Oil in Venezuela Again,” Dow Jones Institutional News, November 27, 2022. 91 92 U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assessing U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., September 15, 2022 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2022). Congressional Research Service 17 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations H.R. 8813, reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in September 2022, would direct the Administration to support extending the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela beyond the expiration its mandate in September 2022. H.R. 6539 and S. 1417 would establish a fund to help repatriate frozen Venezuelan assets in the United States to the Venezuelan people. U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela93 For over 15 years, the United States has imposed sanctions in response to activities of in response to activities of
the Venezuelan the Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals.94 The earliest sanctions related to Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antidrug and counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration imposed targeted sanctions against individuals for human rights abuses, corruption, and antidemocratic actions. The Trump Administration expanded economic sanctions in response to the increasing authoritarianism of President Maduro. Since 2019, the broad aim of the sanctions has been to add economic pressure to diplomatic efforts underway to compel Maduro to allow for the convening of free and fair elections by cutting off his government’s access to key revenue sources. Three years later, Maduro, buoyed by illicit revenue, has quashed dissent and consolidated power.95  Visa Revocations and Sanctions on Individuals. From January 2019 through August 2020, the State Departmentgovernment and Venezuelan individuals. As the political and economic crisis in
Venezuela has deepened, the Trump Administration significantly expanded sanctions on
Venezuela, relying on both existing authorities and new executive orders. Beginning in August
2017, those executive orders established financial sanctions on the Maduro government
(including PdVSA), created economic sanctions on sectors of the economy, and prohibited
unlicensed transactions with the Maduro government. The Trump Administration cited the
Maduro government’s human rights abuses, usurpation of power from the National Assembly,
and rampant corruption as reasons for expanding U.S. sanctions.
 Visa Revocations and Sanctions on Individuals. Since January 2019, the State
Department has revoked more than 1,000 visas, including those of current and revoked more than 1,000 visas, including those of current and
former Venezuelan officials and their families.former Venezuelan officials and their families.9896 The Treasury Department has The Treasury Department has
imposed financial sanctions on imposed financial sanctions on a total of nearly 150 more than 160 Venezuela-linkedVenezuela-linked individualsindividuals
for terrorism (E.O. 13224); drug traffickingfor terrorism (E.O. 13224); drug trafficking (Foreign Narcotics Kingpin (Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act, P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.); and/or Designation Act, P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.); and/or
committing antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or corruption (see committing antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or corruption (see
E.O. 13692 in 2014 as codified in P.L. 113-278 and extended in P.L. 114-194 and, E.O. 13692 in 2014 as codified in P.L. 113-278 and extended in P.L. 114-194 and,
most recently, in P.L. 116-94).most recently, in P.L. 116-94).
  Financial sanctions restricting Maduro government and state oil company,restricting Maduro government and state oil company,
PdVSA, access to U.S. financial markets, with certain exceptions to minimize the PdVSA, access to U.S. financial markets, with certain exceptions to minimize the
impact on the Venezuelanimpact on the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests (E.O. 13808 in people and U.S. economic interests (E.O. 13808 in
August 2017);August 2017);9997 prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O. 13827 in prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O. 13827 in
March 2018);March 2018);10098 and barring and barring the purchasepurchases of Venezuelan debt or accounts of Venezuelan debt or accounts

97receivable with the Maduro government, including PdVSA (E.O. 13835 in May 2018).99 93 For more information, see CRS For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10715, IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando, by Clare Ribando Seelke. Seelke.
9894 See U.S. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/venezuela-related-sanctions. 95 International Crisis Group (ICG), Overcoming the Global Rift on Venezuela, Latin America & Caribbean Report N°93, February 17, 2022. 96 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Venezuela, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., August, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., August 4, 2020. 4, 2020.
9997 E.O. 13808, “Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” E.O. 13808, “Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” 82 82 Federal Register
41155-41156, August 24, 2017. 41155-41156, August 24, 2017.
100 98 E.O. 13827, “ E.O. 13827, “T akingTaking Additional Steps to Address Additional Steps to Address the Situation in Venezuela,”the Situation in Venezuela,” 8383 Federal Register 12469-12470, 12469-12470,
March 19, 2018. 99 E.O. 13835, “Prohibiting Certain Additional Transactions with Respect to Venezuela,” 83 Federal Register 24001-24002, May 21, 2018. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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receivable with the Venezuelan government, including PdVSA (E.O. 13835 in
May 2018).101
  Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting unlicensed transactions with blocking assets and prohibiting unlicensed transactions with
PdVSA, Venezuela’s central bank, and the state gold mining company, among PdVSA, Venezuela’s central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
other entities (E.O. 13850 in November 2018).other entities (E.O. 13850 in November 2018).102100
  Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets in the United States and blocking assets in the United States and
prohibiting transactions with that government unless authorized as part of efforts prohibiting transactions with that government unless authorized as part of efforts
to aid the Venezuelanto aid the Venezuelan people. E.O. 13884 also authorized financial sanctions and people. E.O. 13884 also authorized financial sanctions and
visa restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist or support the visa restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist or support the Maduro
government. To government. To al owallow continued humanitarian assistance, OFAC issued licenses continued humanitarian assistance, OFAC issued licenses
authorizing transactions involving the delivery of food, agricultural commodities, authorizing transactions involving the delivery of food, agricultural commodities,
and medicine; personal remittances; the work of international organizations; and and medicine; personal remittances; the work of international organizations; and
communications services (E.O. 13884 in August 2019).communications services (E.O. 13884 in August 2019).103
The U.S. government has coordinated its targeted sanctions policies with the EU and Canada. The
Rio Treaty has become the means for U.S. efforts to build capacity and wil in Latin America and
the Caribbean to sanction Maduro officials.104 The Trump Administration demonstrated some
flexibility in its sanctions policy with the lifting of sanctions against the former head of
Venezuela’s intel igence service, General Manuel Cristopher Figuera, in May 2019 after he broke
ranks with Maduro. Many have questioned how wil ing or able the U.S. government would be to
lift sanctions on others, particularly for those who face U.S. criminal indictments.
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has significantly ratcheted up economic pressure on
Venezuela and on Cuba for its support of Venezuela.105 In 2020, the Department of the Treasury
imposed sanctions on two subsidiaries of Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil and gas company,
for transporting Venezuelan oil and on a Chinese technology company for supplying the Maduro
government with digital surveil ance software. Treasury also has sanctioned individuals and
entities for shipping petroleum products to Venezuela in exchange for gold under the Iran
sanctions framework.
It is difficult to attribute precisely the extent of Venezuela’s economic collapse that is due to U.S.
sanctions versus broad economic mismanagement. A February 2021 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report asserted that “sanctions, particularly on the state oil company in 2019, likely
contributed to the steeper decline of the Venezuelan economy.”106 The Maduro government has
defaulted on al its bonds, and U.S. sanctions prohibit debt restructuring with creditors.

March 19, 2018.
101 E.O. 13835, “Prohibiting Certain Additional T ransactions with Respect to Venezuela,” 83 Federal Register 24001-
24002, May 21, 2018.
102 E.O. 13850, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,” 83 Federal
Register 55243-55245, November 1, 2018.
103 Executive Order 13884, “Blocking Property of the Government of Venezuela,” 84 Federal Register 38843- August
5, 2020.
104 U.S. Department of State, Report on Developing and Implementing a Coordinated Sanctions Strategy with Partners
in the Western Hem isphere and the European Union, February 24, 2020.
105 See CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration, by
Mark P. Sullivan.
106 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Venezuela: Additional Tracking Could Aid Treasury’s Efforts to
Mitigate Any Adverse Im pacts U.S. Sanctions Might Have on Hum anitarian Assistance, GAO 21-239, February 2021
(hereinafter, GAO 21-239).
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In terms of the sanctions’ political effects, the imposition of targeted sanctions on individuals in
the Maduro government has not encouraged many of those who were not yet sanctioned to
abandon Maduro or changed the behavior of the sanctioned individuals. Broader U.S. sanctions
adopted since 2017 have yet to compel Maduro to leave office. They also have provided a
scapegoat on which Maduro has blamed the country’s economic problems.
U.N. officials and some Members of Congress urged the Trump Administration to ease financial
and sectoral sanctions on Venezuela, even if Maduro remained in office, so the country could
address COVID-19.107 The Administration continued to impose sanctions during the pandemic
and maintained that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela included broad exemptions and licenses to al ow
the provision of humanitarian assistance and the export of food, medicine, and medical devices.108
Humanitarian organizations receiving U.S. funds told the GAO that sanctions had made financial
transactions more chal enging even for those with exemptions and licenses and likely had
exacerbated fuel shortages and power outages in the country.109 Some in Congress have asked the
Biden Administration to restart a sanctions exemption that had al owed foreign companies to
swap diesel for Venezuelan crude oil, which ended in November 2020.110
Petroleum Sector Concerns and U.S. Economic Sanctions
Commercial oil production in Venezuela 101 In 2017-2020, the Trump Administration ratcheted up economic pressure on Venezuela and on Cuba, Russia, China, and Iran for supporting Venezuela through various sanctions frameworks. Impact of Sanctions It is difficult to attribute precisely the extent of Venezuela’s economic collapse that is due to U.S. sanctions versus broad economic mismanagement. A February 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report asserted that “sanctions, particularly on the state oil company in 2019, likely contributed to the steeper decline of the Venezuelan economy.”102 The Maduro government has defaulted on all its bonds, and U.S. sanctions prohibit debt restructuring with creditors. The Trump Administration continued to impose sanctions during the pandemic and maintained that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela included broad exemptions and licenses to allow the provision of humanitarian assistance and the export of food, medicine, and medical devices.103 Humanitarian organizations receiving U.S. funds told the GAO that sanctions had made financial transactions more challenging even for those with exemptions and licenses.104 In terms of the sanctions’ political effects, the imposition of targeted sanctions on individuals in the Maduro government has not encouraged many of those not yet sanctioned to abandon Maduro or changed the behavior of the sanctioned individuals. Broader U.S. sanctions adopted since 2017 have yet to compel Maduro to leave office. They also have provided a scapegoat on which Maduro has blamed the country’s economic problems. Maduro has weathered U.S. sanctions, but remains deeply unpopular. Some economists assert that Maduro needs hard currency and may be motivated to negotiation in exchange for sanctions relief that could enable his government to restore infrastructure, provide basic services, and scale back austerity measures implemented to tame inflation.105 The limited scope and duration of the license 100 E.O. 13850, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,” 83 Federal Register 55243-55245, November 1, 2018. 101 Executive Order 13884, “Blocking Property of the Government of Venezuela,” 84 Federal Register 38843- August 5, 2020. 102 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Venezuela: Additional Tracking Could Aid Treasury’s Efforts to Mitigate Any Adverse Impacts U.S. Sanctions Might Have on Humanitarian Assistance, GAO 21-239, February 2021 (hereinafter, GAO 21-239). 103 Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19,” April 16, 2020; and U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, “Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People,” August 6, 2017. 104 GAO 21-239. 105 Claudia Curiel Léidenz, De las Sanciones a la Negociación: un Tema de Economía Política, Institute for Integrated Congressional Research Service 19 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations issued by the Treasury Department for Chevron in late November 2022 aims to keep the Maduro government negotiating in good faith in order to secure future sanctions relief.106 Petroleum Sector Concerns and U.S. Economic Sanctions107 A founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Venezuela generally has been a major oil producer. However, as of October 2022, oil production in Venezuela stood at roughly 720,000 barrels per day—one of the lowest volumes among OPEC members.108 Nevertheless, Venezuela’s petroleum sector, which includes the world’s largest proven oil reserves (more than 17% of global reserves), is a key element of the economy.109 Oil’s predominant role in Venezuela’s economy, combined with the United States having been a preferred oil export destination, resulted in this sector being a target of U.S. economic sanctions. Venezuela’s Oil Sector and the Role of U.S. Companies Commercial oil production in Venezuela began in 1914 and accelerated in the 1920s, following began in 1914 and accelerated in the 1920s, following
oil discoveries in Venezuela’s Maracaibo Basin.oil discoveries in Venezuela’s Maracaibo Basin.111110 Several U.S. companies established Several U.S. companies established
concession agreements with Venezuela’s government to invest in, explore, produce, and export concession agreements with Venezuela’s government to invest in, explore, produce, and export
the country’s petroleum resources. the country’s petroleum resources. ByIn 1970, oil production in Venezuela 1970, oil production in Venezuela was more than 3.7 was more than 3.7
mil ion million barrels per day, making Venezuelabarrels per day, making Venezuela one of the largest oil-producing countries by one of the largest oil-producing countries by
volume.volume.112111 Venezuela Venezuela began to take control of its petroleum assets in 1971, fully nationalizingbegan to take control of its petroleum assets in 1971, fully nationalizing the the
sector in 1976 with the creation of PdVSAsector in 1976 with the creation of PdVSA to manage the country’s petroleum resources. Oil
companies operating in Venezuela . After private companies were relegated to a service-based support were relegated to a service-based support role.
Oilrole, oil production in Venezuela production in Venezuela declined by more than 50% between 1971 and 1988.declined by more than 50% between 1971 and 1988.113 112 In an effort to In an effort to
reverse decliningreverse declining oil production, Venezuela embarked on a program that production, Venezuela embarked on a program that al owedallowed international oil international oil
companies—including U.S. firms Chevron, Exxon, and Conoco—to either control oil fields or companies—including U.S. firms Chevron, Exxon, and Conoco—to either control oil fields or
establish majority-owned joint ventures (JVs) with PdVSA.establish majority-owned joint ventures (JVs) with PdVSA.114113 Policies imposed by former Policies imposed by former
President President Chavez unilateral y Chávez unilaterally modified modified contract terms contained in the production and JV agreements. Some companies (e.g., Exxon, Conoco) ceased operations and filed lawsuits for contractual violations. Others (e.g., Chevron) continued operating in Venezuela. Oil Sector Sanctions and Evolving Petroleum Trade Relationships Sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector generally began in August 2017, with the issuance of an executive order that limits access to debt capital and prevents PdVSA from receiving cash distributions from Citgo, its U.S.-based oil-refining subsidiary.114 Oil sector sanctions expanded in January 2019, with PdVSA added to Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals list pursuant to Transitions, June 21, 2022. 106 “Chevron Gets New U.S. License to Pump Oil in Venezuela Again,” Dow Jones Institutional News, November 27, 2022. 107 This section was authored by Phillip Brown, Specialist in Energy Policy. 108 Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil Production, Venezuela, Monthly, at https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=1039874&sdid=STEO.COPR_VE.M, accessed April 9, 2021. 109 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020. 110 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 217-219. 111 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020. 112 Ibid. 113 For a complete list of PdVSA JV partners, see Energy Information Administration, Background Reference: Venezuela, Tablecontract terms contained in the production and JV

107 UN News, “Ease Sanctions Against Countries Fighting COVID-19: UN Human Rights Chief,” March 24, 2020;
Cynthia Arnson and Oriana van Praag, “ Venezuela and the Coronavirus: Another Path Is Possible,” Americas
Quarterly, March 30, 2020; and Jack Dietch, “ Democrats Push Back on Sanctions, Citing Coronavirus Fears,” Foreign
Policy, March 27, 2020.
108 Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian
Assistance and T rade to Combat COVID-19,” April 16, 2020; and U.S. Department of the T reasury, OFAC, “ Guidance
Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People,” August 6, 2017.
109 GAO 21-239.
110 Letter from Senator Chris Murphy to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, March 23, 2021.
111 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 217-
219.
112 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020.
113 Ibid.
114 For a complete list of PdVSA JV partners, see Energy Information Administration, Background Reference:
Venezuela, T able 1, January 7, 2019, available at https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/
Venezuela/venezuela_bkgd.pdf.
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agreements. Some companies (e.g., Exxon, Conoco) ceased operations and filed lawsuits for
contractual violations. Other companies (e.g., Chevron) continued operating in Venezuela.
A founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
Venezuela general y has been considered a major oil producer and supplier. However, as of
February 2021, oil production in Venezuela was approximately 500,000 barrels per day—less
than 1% of global petroleum supply and one of the lowest volumes among OPEC members.115
Nevertheless, Venezuela’s petroleum sector, which includes the world’s largest proven oil
reserves at more than 300 bil ion barrels (more than 17% of global reserves), is a critical element
of the country’s economy.116 During calendar year 2019, the value of Venezuela’s petroleum
exports represented more than 95% of the country’s total exports.117 Oil’s predominant role in
Venezuela’s economy, combined with the United States having been a preferred oil export
destination, resulted in this sector being a target of U.S. economic sanctions.
Oil Sector Sanctions and Evolving Petroleum Trade Relationships
Sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector general y began in August 2017, with the issuance of
an executive order that limited access to debt capital and prevented PdVSA from receiving cash
distributions from Citgo, its U.S.-based oil refining and marketing subsidiary.118 Oil sector
sanctions expanded in January 2019, with PdVSA added to Treasury’s Special y Designated
Nationals list.119 This action effectively prohibited 1, January 7, 2019, available at https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Venezuela/venezuela_bkgd.pdf. 114 E.O. 13808, “Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” 82 Federal Register 41155, August 29, 2017. Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 25 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations E.O. 13850. This action effectively prohibits U.S. persons and companies from transacting U.S. persons and companies from transacting
with PdVSA, unless Treasury with PdVSA, unless Treasury al ows transactions underissues them a general license. a general license.120115 The sanctions The sanctions
framework also prohibited non-U.S. entities from transacting with PdVSA in U.S. dollars and also prohibited non-U.S. entities from transacting with PdVSA in U.S. dollars and
made non-U.S. made non-U.S. entities subject to having their U.S. property blocked, should it be determined that they subject to having their U.S. property blocked, should it be determined that they
materially assisted PdVSA. PdVSA.121
Following an authorized 90-day wind-down period, U.S. oil refineries ceased importing crude oil Following an authorized 90-day wind-down period, U.S. oil refineries ceased importing crude oil
from Venezuela (from Venezuela (seesee Figure 4). 5). Under the sanctions framework, Treasury also has sanctioned Under the sanctions framework, Treasury also has sanctioned
numerous individuals, vessels, and companies involved in trading and shipping Venezuelannumerous individuals, vessels, and companies involved in trading and shipping Venezuelan oil. oil.
This progressive application of sanctionsThis progressive application of sanctions—designed to prevent export and sale of oil produced in
Venezuela— has made it more difficult, though not impossible, for PdVSA to complete petroleum has made it more difficult, though not impossible, for PdVSA to complete petroleum
sales and export transactions.

115 Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil Production, Venezuela, Monthly, at https://www.eia.gov/opendata/
qb.php?category=1039874&sdid=ST EO.COPR_VE.M, accessed April 9, 2021.
116 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020.
117 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Venezuela Facts and Figures, at https://www.opec.org/
opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm, accessed March 29, 2021.
118 E.O. 13808, “Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” 82 Federal Register
41155, August 29, 2017.
119 T reasury’s designation was pursuant to E.O. 13850. For additional information, see U.S. Department of the
T reasury, “Issuance of a New Venezuela-related Executive Order and General Licenses; Venezuela-related
Designation,” January 28, 2019.
120 T o date, T reasury global licenses permit Chevron and some oilfield service companies to continue limited activities
and transactions in with PdVSA for essential operations.
121 For additional information about U.S. economic sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector, see CRS Report R46213,
Oil Market Effects from U.S. Econom ic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela , by Phillip Brown
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Figure 4sales and export transactions. With the United States no longer an export destination, PdVSA sought to develop other trading relationships to monetize the value of Venezuelan oil. Russian oil trading companies (i.e., Rosneft Trading and TNK Trading International) were large purchasers of Venezuelan oil, which they mostly delivered to refineries in Asia. Treasury sanctioned these companies in early 2020. Rosneft—an oil company controlled by the Russian government—then reorganized its corporate ownership structure and operations in Venezuela to minimize its sanctions exposure risk. Figure 5. Venezuela Crude Oil Production, U.S. Imports, and
Selected Sanction Events
(January 2014- (January 2014-February 2021October 2022) )

Source: CRS, using CRS, using Venezuela crude oil production data from Bloomberg L.P. U.S. imports data from the Energy data from the Energy
Information Administration. Information Administration.
Notes: PdVSA = Petroleos PdVSA = Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.;de Venezuela S.A.; E.O. = executive order; bpd = barrels per day. E.O. = executive order; bpd = barrels per day.
E.O. 13808 imposed additional sanctions based on a national emergencyE.O. 13808 imposed additional sanctions based on a national emergency declared in March 2015 (E.O. 13692), declared in March 2015 (E.O. 13692),
including limitsincluding limits imposed imposed on PdVSA access to U.S. debt finance and a provisionon PdVSA access to U.S. debt finance and a provision preventing PdVSA from receiving preventing PdVSA from receiving
cash dividends fromcash dividends from its U.S.-based Citgo refining and marketing subsidiary. PdVSA has since employed other methods to facilitate oil transactions, including, among others, (1its U.S.-based Citgo refining and marketing subsidiary.
With the United States no longer a petroleum export destination, PdVSA sought to develop other
trading relationships to monetize the value of Venezuelan oil. Russian oil trading companies (i.e.,
Rosneft Trading and TNK Trading International) were large purchasers of Venezuelan oil, which
they mostly delivered to refineries in Asia. Treasury sanctioned these companies in early 2020.
This action motivated Rosneft—an oil company controlled by the Russian government—to
reorganize its corporate ownership structure and operations in Venezuela to minimize its
sanctions exposure risk.
PdVSA has since employed other methods to facilitate oil transactions, including (1) oil sales
through a Mexico-based trading company claiming to execute an oil-for-humanitarian-aid
program; (2) oil-for-diesel fuel swap trades—authorized by Treasury until late October 2020—) oil-for-diesel fuel swap trades—authorized by Treasury until late October 2020—
with refiners located in India and Spain; (with refiners located in India and Spain; (32) sales transactions through intermediate oil trading ) sales transactions through intermediate oil trading
companies; and companies; and (4(3) petroleum exchanges with Iran. Iran—also the target of numerous U.S. ) petroleum exchanges with Iran. Iran—also the target of numerous U.S.
economic sanctions—has supplied Venezuela with multiple shipments of petroleum products
(e.g., gasoline) following the imposition of sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector. Since January
2019, when exports to the United States ended, India and China have been the top two
destinations for Venezuela’s observable crude oil exports (see Figure 5).
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Venezuela: Background economic sanctions— 115 To date, Treasury global licenses permit Chevron and some oilfield service companies to continue limited activities and transactions in with PdVSA for essential operations. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 26 link to page 25 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations has supplied Venezuela with multiple shipments of petroleum products (e.g., gasoline). Since January 2019, when exports to the United States ended, India and China have been the top two destinations for Venezuela’s observable crude oil exports (see Figure 6), with China being the primary export destination between October 2020 and October 2022. Oil Market and Price Effects116and U.S. Relations

Figure 5. Observable Venezuela Crude Oil Exports by Destination
(January 2017-February 2021)

Source: CRS, using Bloomberg L.P. tanker tracking service data.
Notes: Export volumes represent crude oil volumes that were loaded onto tankers during each month .
Other research companies and news media organizations report higher export volumes than those reflected in
this figure. Oil exporting countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions employ various methods (i.e., ship -to-ship
transfers and disabling transponders) to conceal export volumes and destinations. Actual Venezuela crude oil
export volumes could differ from those reported by Bloomberg L.P.
Oil Market and Price Effects122
Notable sanctions-related effects on the global oil market include lower Venezuelan oil Notable sanctions-related effects on the global oil market include lower Venezuelan oil
production and the eliminationproduction and the elimination of U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil (seof U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil (see Figure 45). .
Attributing a precise volumetric effect on Venezuela’s oil production is difficult, as production in Attributing a precise volumetric effect on Venezuela’s oil production is difficult, as production in
the country was decliningthe country was declining —generally attributed to inadequate management of oil production assets—prior to the imposition of oil sector sanctions.prior to the imposition of oil sector sanctions.123 Nevertheless, data Nevertheless, data
suggest that production declines accelerated following sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector. suggest that production declines accelerated following sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil sector.
Lower global oil supply Lower global oil supply general ygenerally results in upward price pressure for crude oil and petroleum results in upward price pressure for crude oil and petroleum
products. Venezuela’s oil production decline of approximately 1.products. Venezuela’s oil production decline of approximately 1.5 mil ion2 million bpd (August 2017 to bpd (August 2017 to
February 2021October 2022) is large enough to ) is large enough to potential ypotentially affect prices. However, affect prices. However, numerousmany factors (e.g., factors (e.g.,
demand/supply balances, OPEC production decisions, and general economic conditions) can demand/supply balances, OPEC production decisions, and general economic conditions) can
influence oil and petroleum product prices. As a result, it is difficult to quantify effects on crude
oil and petroleum product (e.g., gasoline) prices directly attributable to U.S. economic sanctions.
influence oil prices. Figure 6. Observable Venezuela Crude Oil Exports by Destination (January 2017-October 2022) Source: CRS, using Bloomberg L.P. tanker tracking service data. Notes: Export volumes represent crude oil volumes that were loaded onto tankers during each month. Other research companies and news media organizations report higher export volumes than those reflected in this figure. Oil exporting countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions employ various methods (i.e., ship-to-ship transfers and disabling transponders) to conceal export volumes and destinations. Actual Venezuela crude oil export volumes could differ from those reported by Bloomberg L.P. Changes to U.S. refinery imports of Venezuelan crude oil are quantifiable. Prior to the start of oil Changes to U.S. refinery imports of Venezuelan crude oil are quantifiable. Prior to the start of oil
sector sanctions, U.S. refineries imported between 500,000 and 700,000 barrels per day of crude sector sanctions, U.S. refineries imported between 500,000 and 700,000 barrels per day of crude
oil from Venezuela. Crude oil imports from Venezuela ended in Apriloil from Venezuela. Crude oil imports from Venezuela ended in April 2019. Refineries that
previously purchased crude oil from PdVSA were required to source alternative crude oils from

122 2019. As the market 116 For additional information about how sanctions affect oil markets and prices, see CRS For additional information about how sanctions affect oil markets and prices, see CRS Report R46213, Report R46213, Oil Market
Effects from U.S. Econom ic U.S. Economic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela , by Phillip Brown.
123 For additional information about the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Venezuelan economy, see Government
Accountability Office, Venezuela: Additional Tracking Could Aid Treasury’s Efforts to Mitigate Any Adverse Im pacts
U.S. Sanctions Might Have on Hum anitarian Assistance, February 2021.
, by Phillip Brown. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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other suppliers. As the market adjusted to this sanctions-related supply constraint, elevated adjusted to this sanctions-related supply constraint, elevated
regional spot prices—relative to other crude oil prices—indicated that substitute crude oils were regional spot prices—relative to other crude oil prices—indicated that substitute crude oils were
temporarily in short supply.temporarily in short supply.124
Petroleum Sector Outlook
With proven oil resources and With proven oil resources and wel well-known geology, oil production in Venezuela-known geology, oil production in Venezuela could return to, could return to,
or possibly exceed, pre-sanctions levels of approximately 2 or possibly exceed, pre-sanctions levels of approximately 2 mil ion million bpd. However, the bpd. However, the condition
poor condition of Venezuela’s petroleum assets of Venezuela’s petroleum assets (e.g., oil reservoirs, upgrading facilities, pipelines, refineries, and
ports) could present chal enges for a completecould present challenges for a rapid sector recovery. sector recovery.125 117 President Maduro President Maduro aimshas aimed to to
increase oil production to 1.5 increase oil production to 1.5 mil ionmillion barrels per day with “new production, financing and barrels per day with “new production, financing and
marketing mechanisms,” according to a PdVSA announcement.marketing mechanisms,” according to a PdVSA announcement.126 118 Details of Maduro’s plan are Details of Maduro’s plan are
limited, though the plan may limited, though the plan may al owallow oil companies more control over oil companies more control over production activities. Theproduction activities. In
March 2021, Venezuela announced agreements with Russia to cooperate in several areas,
including the oil sector.127 However, International Energy Agency forecasts—assuming that International Energy Agency forecasts—assuming that
Maduro remains in power and U.S. sanctions continue—indicate that oil production may remain Maduro remains in power and U.S. sanctions continue—indicate that oil production may remain
near 500,000 bpd near 500,000 bpd until 2026.119 It is yet unclear howuntil 2026.128 Continuation and enforcement of U.S. sanctions U.S. sanctions relief could alter that prediction. The Biden Administration has offered licensing changes and potential sanctions relief in the petroleum sector as an incentive to urge Maduro to negotiate with the Venezuelan opposition. On November 26, 2022, Treasury issued a license allowing Chevron to resume production, import, and export of petroleum products at its existing joint ventures in Venezuela for an initial six-month period. 120 Petroleum production must be sold to Chevron and the United States can be the only export destination. Migration Issues Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela121 On March 8, 2021, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas designated Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for a period of 18 months based on extraordinary and temporary conditions.122 In the March 2021 Federal Register notice announcing a new TPS designation for Venezuela, Secretary Mayorkas cited many of those conditions, including “economic contraction; inflation and hyperinflation; deepening poverty; high levels of unemployment; reduced access to and shortages of food and medicine, ... among other factors.”123 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services estimates that approximately 323,000 individuals are eligible to file applications for TPS under the designation of Venezuela.124 In July 2022, the 117could affect the
sector’s future. Additional y, investment capital, technical expertise, and human resources may be
needed to support sector restoration.
Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela129
The 116th Congress considered legislation that would have designated Venezuela for TPS. In July
2019, the House passed H.R. 549, which would have al owed certain Venezuelan nationals
residing in the United States to qualify for TPS, which would have prevented their removal from
the United States and al owed them to obtain employment and travel authorization. In July 2020,
a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549 by unanimous consent failed. The Trump Administration did not
formal y support TPS for Venezuelans, though Trump Administration officials asserted that
Venezuelans were not being subject to removal.130 On January 19, 2021, President Trump granted
Deferred Enforced Departure to Venezuelans in the United States for 18 months, protecting them
from removal and making them eligible to apply for work authorization.131

124 For additional information about price differentials, see https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46213#_T oc31964656
125 For additional information about Venezuela’s oil sector, see Hernandez, I. & Monaldi, F., 2016. For additional information about Venezuela’s oil sector, see Hernandez, I. & Monaldi, F., 2016. Weathering
Collapse: An Assessm entAssessment of the Financial and Operational Situation of the Venezuelan Oil Industry .
126 PdVSA, Industry. 118 PdVSA, “Presidente Maduro: tenemos la meta de producir 1 millón 500 mil barriles“Presidente Maduro: tenemos la meta de producir 1 millón 500 mil barriles diarios,” January 15, 2021. 119 International Energy Agency, Oil 2021: Analysis and Forecast to 2026, March 2021. 120 Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control, “General License No. 41: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela,” November 26, 2022. 121 Congress created Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1990 (P.L. 101-649) to provide relief from removal and work authorizationdiarios,” January 15, 2021.
127 PdVSA, “Rusia y Venezuela suscriben instrumentos jurídicos para fortalecer cooperación estratégica,” March 31,
2021.
128 International Energy Agency, Oil 2021: Analysis and Forecast to 2026, March 2021.
129 Congress created T emporary Protected Status (T PS) in 1990 (P.L. 101-649) to provide work authorization and relief
from removal for foreign nationals in the United States from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or for foreign nationals in the United States from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or
other extraordinary conditions that prevent their safe return. H.R. 549 would have added Venezuela to the list of
countries designated for T PS. T his designation would have lasted for 18 months and could have been extended by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. Venezuelans who had been continuously present in the United States since the date of
enactment and who met certain other requirements would have been eligible to apply for T PS. See CRS Report
RS20844, Tem porary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson.
130 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Venezuela, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., August 4, 2020.
131 White House (President T rump), Office of the Press Secretary, “Deferred Enforced Departure for Certain
Venezuelans,” presidential memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, January
19, 2021.
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations

On March 8, 2021, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas designated Venezuela for
TPS for a period of 18 months on the basis of extraordinary and temporary conditions.132 In the
March 2021 Federal Register notice announcing a new TPS designation for Venezuela, Secretary
Mayorkas cited many of those conditions, including “economic contraction; inflation and
hyperinflation; deepening poverty; high levels of unemployment; reduced access to and shortages
of food and medicine,... among many others.”133 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
estimates that approximately 323,000 individuals are eligible to file applications for TPS under
the designation of Venezuela.134
U.S. Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance (Including COVID-19 Assistance)135
Since FY2017, the U.S. government has provided more than $1 bil ion in humanitarian and
emergency food assistance in response to the Venezuela regional crisis (as of December 2020).136
For FY2020, this included $528.5 mil ionother extraordinary conditions that prevent their safe return. See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson. 122 See Immigration and Nationality Act, §244(b)(1)(C) (8 U.S.C. §1254a(b)(1)(C)). 123 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Designation of Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status and Implementation of Employment Authorization for Venezuelans Covered by Deferred Enforced Departure,” 86 Federal Register 13574-13581, March 9, 2021. 124 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 23 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Administration announced an 18-month extension of TPS for Venezuela; this extension is scheduled to be in effect through March 10, 2024.125 October 2022 Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants126 On October 12, 2022, the Biden Administration announced new policies to address the record numbers of Venezuelans encountered at the U.S.-Mexico border in FY2022. Prior to these changes, the vast majority of Venezuelans encountered were processed for removal and released into the United States, where they could apply for asylum during immigration court proceedings. Now, Venezuelans apprehended between ports of entry are subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy, which allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico).127 At the same time, DHS made additional H-2B visas available for temporary nonagricultural workers.128 (Historically, the majority of H-2B visas have been issued to Mexican nationals.) The other major component of the policy changes is a new process to allow up to 24,000 Venezuelans who are outside the United States to travel by air to the U.S. interior and be paroled into the country.129 Venezuelans granted parole are to be allowed to stay for up to two years and apply for work authorization. Parole does not provide a dedicated pathway to U.S. lawful permanent residence. As of early November 2022, some 500 Venezuelans had reportedly entered the country through the parole program.130 U.S. Assistance Humanitarian Assistance (Including COVID-19 Assistance) Since FY2017, the U.S. government has provided more than $2.3 billion in humanitarian and emergency food assistance in response to the Venezuela regional crisis (as of September 2022). For FY2022, this included $656.1 million in humanitarian funds to support Venezuelan refugees and migrants who fled to support Venezuelan refugees and migrants who fled
to other countries (or for the communities hosting them)to other countries (or for the communities hosting them) and $94.3 mil ion for humanitarian relief
activities inside Venezuela.137.131 The U.S. military has twice deployed a naval hospital ship on The U.S. military has twice deployed a naval hospital ship on
medical support deployments. In addition, medical support deployments. In addition, as of December 2020, the United States the United States hadhas provided provided
nearly $13.7 mil ionat least $40.8 million for the COVID-19 response in Venezuela.132 125 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Extension of Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela,” press release, July 11, 2022. 126 See CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke. 127 On November 15, 2022, a federal judge struck down the use of Title 42 to expel arriving migrants. At the request of the Biden Administration, the judge agreed to allow the Administration until December 21, 2022, to transition to new policies. Micah Danney, “Judge Allows Biden 5 Weeks to Wind Down Title 42,” Law360, November 16, 2022. 128 For information on H-2B visas, see CRS Report R44849, H-2A and H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy and Related Issues, by Andorra Bruno. 129 Immigration parole is official permission to enter and remain temporarily in the United States. For more information, see CRS Report R46570, Immigration Parole, by Andorra Bruno. 130 Maria Sacchetti and Maria Luisa Paúl, “Nearly 500 Venezuelans Admitted to U.S., Thousands Approved Via new Plan,” Washington Post, November 3, 2022. 131 USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis,” fact sheet #2, March 25, 2021. 132 USAID, “COVID-19 Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Shet #5, FY2022, June 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations In keeping with international humanitarian standards, U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided based on need and on the principles of universality, impartiality, and independence.133 An April 221 USAID Office of Inspector General report assessed some of the challenges USAID has faced in responding to the Venezuela crisis, particularly in February 2019. At that time, the U.S. government pre-positioned emergency assistance for the COVID-19 response in Venezuela and $33.6 mil ion for COVID-19
in the region. U.S. officials and Members of Congress have praised the April 2021 agreement
al owing WFP to establish a humanitarian presence inside Venezuela.138
In keeping with international humanitarian standards, U.S. humanitarian assistance is general y
provided on the basis of need and according to principles of universality, impartiality, and
independence.139 However, a recent USAID Office of Inspector General report assesses some of
the chal enges USAID faces in responding to the Venezuela regional crisis, identifies areas of
fraud risk in the humanitarian response, and makes recommendations to strengthen and improve
USAID’s approach.140

132 See Immigration and Nationality Act, §244(b)(1)(C).
133 DHS, “Designation of Venezuela for T emporary Protected Status and Implementation of Employment Authorization
for Venezuelans Covered by Deferred Enforced Departure,” 86 Federal Register 13574-13581, March 9, 2021.
134 Ibid.
135 Written by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
136 As with international humanitarian standards, U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need and
according to principles of universality, impartiality, and indep endence.
137 USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis,” fact sheet #2, March 25, 2021.
138 USAID, “USAID Welcomes Agreement Allowing the U.N. World Food Program to Provide Food Assistance in
Venezuela,” April 29, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Chairman Menendez on WFP Agreement to Begin
Operating in Venezuela,” April 20, 2021.
139 USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Policy for Humanitarian Action, October 2015. In February 2019, at
the request of Interim President Guiadó, the U.S. government pre-positioned assistance (food, health, hygiene, and
nutrition commodities) for the Venezuelan people on the Colombia- and Brazil-Venezuela for the Venezuelan people on the Colombia- and Brazil-Venezuela borders borders the request of Interim President Guaidó. Security forces . Security forces
loyal to Maduro prevented the delivery of the loyal to Maduro prevented the delivery of the h umanitarian assistance. A broad range ofassistance and violence ensued. Many humanitarian organizations, humanitarian organizations,
including including U.N. entities, expressed concern U.N. entities, expressed concern not just about the many logistical and security problems in delivering
assistance to Venezuela but also about about the prospect of humanitarian aid being usedthe prospect of humanitarian aid being used as a tool in a political contest.134 In contrast, humanitarian experts praised the April 2021 agreement brokered between Maduro and Guaidó officials to allow the World Food Program to resume operating.135as a tool in a political contest.
140 USAID, Office of Inspector General, Enhanced Processes and Implementer Requirements Are Needed to Address
Challenges and Fraud Risks in USAID’s Venezuela Response, Audit Report 9-000-21-005-P, April 16, 2021.
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Democracy, Development, and Global Health-Related Assistance
For more almost two decades, the United States has provided democracy-related assistance to For more almost two decades, the United States has provided democracy-related assistance to
VenezuelanVenezuelan civil society through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and civil society through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
From FY2002 to FY2010, USAID supported From FY2002 to FY2010, USAID supported smal small-grant and technical assistance activities -grant and technical assistance activities
through its Office of Transition Initiatives to provide assistance monitoring democratic stability through its Office of Transition Initiatives to provide assistance monitoring democratic stability
and strengthening the county’s democratic institutions. USAID’s Latin America and Caribbean and strengthening the county’s democratic institutions. USAID’s Latin America and Caribbean
Bureau assumed control over those programs in FY2010. Since FY2010, USAID democracy Bureau assumed control over those programs in FY2010. Since FY2010, USAID democracy
programs in Venezuela have been funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs in Venezuela have been funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
account. U.S. democracy and human rights assistance appropriated to Venezuela amounted account. U.S. democracy and human rights assistance appropriated to Venezuela amounted to $30
mil ion in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94) and at least $33 mil ion in FY2021 (P.L. 116-260).
at least $33 million in FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) and $40 million in FY2022 (P.L. 117-103). Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Venezuela by Account: FY2017-FY2021FY2018-FY2023
(appropriations in (appropriations in mil ionsmillions of current U.S. of current U.S. dol ars)
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
Account
FY2017a
(estimate)a
(estimate)
(estimate)
(estimate)
Total
DA
9.0
93.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
102.1
ESF
7.0
19.0
18.0
30.0
33.0
74.0
ESDF
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
GHP
0.0
16.3
5.0
0.0
0.0
21.3
(USAID)
DF
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.0
Total
16.0a
132.4a
23.0ab
30.0a
33.0
234.4
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2017-FY2021; P.L.
116-260; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Congressional Notification (CN) #16, December
11, 2017; CN# 34, January 12, 2018; CN# 23, January 28, 2019; CN# 125, May 14, 2019; CN #156, July 11,
2019; CN#157, July 11, 2019; CN #219, September 5, 2019; CN #224, September 9, 2019; CN #229,
September 11, 2019; CN #233, September 11, 2019; CN #243, August 9, 2019; CN #20, February 28, 2020; CN
#165, April 24, 2020; CN $259, August 6, 2020.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; DF = Democracy Fund; ESF = Economic Support Fund; ESDF =
Economic Support and Development Fund; dollars) Account FY2018a FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 Request DA 93.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ESF 19.0 18.0 30.0 33.0 40.0 50.0 GHP 16.3 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 (USAID) GHP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 (State) DF 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 132.4a 23.0ab 30.0a 38.0a 48.6a 55.0a Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2020-FY2023; 133 USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Policy for Humanitarian Action, October 2015. 134 USAID, Office of Inspector General, Enhanced Processes and Implementer Requirements Are Needed to Address Challenges and Fraud Risks in USAID’s Venezuela Response, Audit Report 9-000-21-005-P, April 16, 2021. 135 “World Food Programme Reaches Deal to Supply Food to 185,000 Children in Venezuela,” UN News, April 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 29 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Notes: DA = Development Assistance; DF = Democracy Fund; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs.GHP = Global Health Programs.
a. These totals do not include economica. These totals do not include economic and development assistance funds that have been provided to support and development assistance funds that have been provided to support
countries that are sheltering Venezuelan refugees and migrants. countries that are sheltering Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
b. This total includes $450,000 in ESF notified on August 6, 2020, to combat b. This total includes $450,000 in ESF notified on August 6, 2020, to combat il egal y illegally armed groups in armed groups in
Venezuela. Venezuela.
USAID signed a bilateral USAID signed a bilateral agreement with the Guaidó government in October 2019 to expand its agreement with the Guaidó government in October 2019 to expand its
democracy and human rights-related programs in Venezuela and to start new health and democracy and human rights-related programs in Venezuela and to start new health and
agriculture programs. This expansion in programming supported the interim government’s goals agriculture programs. This expansion in programming supported the interim government’s goals
to facilitate a transition to democracy and to start rebuilding key sectors damaged by the to facilitate a transition to democracy and to start rebuilding key sectors damaged by the
economic crisis. Although most of the assistance supported programs in Venezuela, some also economic crisis. Although most of the assistance supported programs in Venezuela, some also
funded work-related travel, salaries, and secure communications systems for interim government funded work-related travel, salaries, and secure communications systems for interim government
officials and staff. In addition to the democracy-related ESF assistance appropriated by Congress, officials and staff. In addition to the democracy-related ESF assistance appropriated by Congress,
the Administrationthe Administration reprogrammed additional Development Assistance, Global Health Program, reprogrammed additional Development Assistance, Global Health Program,
and Democracy Fund assistance (and Democracy Fund assistance (seesee Table 1). The funding is being administered primarily . The funding is being administered primarily
through third-party contractors. Should a political transition occur, the State Department and through third-party contractors. Should a political transition occur, the State Department and
USAID have developed plans to support the interim government’s transition plan, USAID have developed plans to support the interim government’s transition plan, Plan País. .
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For FY2021For FY2023, the Administration requested $5 , the Administration requested $5 mil ionmillion in global health assistance for Venezuela and $50 million for democracy assistance. The FY2023 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 8282) would provide $50 million in funds for Venezuela, including democracy funding. The Senate-introduced version, S. 4662, would provide $40 million in global health assistance for Venezuela
and $200 mil ion to support a democratic transition in Venezuela, as wel as humanitarian
assistance for Venezuelans who have fled and the communities hosting them. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), provided not less than $33 mil ion in ESF assistance for
democracy programs in Venezuela and an unspecified level of humanitarian support for countries
sheltering Venezuelan refugees. .
The NED has funded democracy projects in Venezuela since 1992. U.S. funding for the NED is The NED has funded democracy projects in Venezuela since 1992. U.S. funding for the NED is
provided in the annual State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, but provided in the annual State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, but
country country al ocationsallocations for the NED are not specified in the legislation. In for the NED are not specified in the legislation. In 20192021, the NED funded , the NED funded 41
some 71 projects in Venezuelaprojects in Venezuela totaling more than $totaling more than $2.5 mil ion3.6 million. .
U.S. Efforts to Combat Illicit Revenue Sources
While financial sanctions have sought to limit Maduro’s licit revenue sources and punish those While financial sanctions have sought to limit Maduro’s licit revenue sources and punish those
who have stolen who have stolen bil ionsbillions from PdVSA and government programs, criminal investigations and from PdVSA and government programs, criminal investigations and
antidrug operations have targeted antidrug operations have targeted il icit illicit revenue earned by the Maduro government. Venezuela’s corruption, weak institutions, extensive 1,370-mile border with Colombia, and general lawlessness have attracted the presence of illegally armed groups. Venezuela is among the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 177th out of 180 countries covered in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. The country’s ability to address organized crime is among the weakest in the world (188th of 193 countries ranked), due to state complicity with criminals and weak criminal justice system, according to the Global Organized Crime Index.136 High-level Venezuelan officials, many from the military, reportedly formed a drug trafficking organization (the Cartel of the Suns) in the early 2000s; some have maintained criminal networks that reportedly have had linkages with U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations.137 Once 136 Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Global Organized Crime Index: Venezuela, 2022, available at https://ocindex.net/country/venezuela. 137 A May 2018 report by Insight Crime identified more than 120 high-level Venezuelan officials who had engaged in criminal activity. Insight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State? May 2018; U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/. For an update, see Venezuelan Investigative Unit, Beyond the Cartel of the Suns, May 2022, available at https://insightcrime.org/investigations/beyond-the-cartel- Congressional Research Service 26 link to page 34 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations aligned with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which demobilized in 2017, some Venezuelan officials now reportedly collude on a more ad-hoc basis with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents (FARC-D).138 In 2021, Venezuelan security forces reportedly worked with the ELN in an offensive againstrevenue earned by the Maduro government.
Venezuela is ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world. In 2020, Venezuela ranked
176th out of 180 countries covered in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
High-level officials, many from the military, reportedly formed a drug trafficking organization
(the Cartel of the Suns) in the early 2000s and have engaged in crimes such as il egal gold
mining, weapons trafficking, and money laundering.141 These criminal networks have linkages to
foreign terrorist organizations such as the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The
Maduro government al egedly also has ties to Hezbollah through various intermediaries (see
“U.S. Concerns About Terrorism”).142
U.S. Indictment of Top Venezuelan Officials
On March 26, 2020, then-Attorney General Wil iam Barr announced the indictment of Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás
Maduro, and 14 other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials. As charged, Maduro al egedly
participated in the Cartel of the Suns drug trafficking organization in conspiracy with the Colombian terrorist
organization the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to produce and traffic il icit drugs to the
United States. Some 12 of the 18 individuals also are subject to U.S. sanctions (related to the situation in
Venezuela, narcotics trafficking, or both). In addition to narcoterrorism conspiracy, the charges include drug
trafficking, money laundering, and weapons charges. The State Department is offering a total of up to $55 mil ion
for information leading to the arrest, conviction, or both of five of these individuals (including Maduro) .
Venezuela’s instability, weak institutions, extensive 1,370-mile border with Colombia, and
general lawlessness have attracted the attention of il egal y armed groups. The ELN, which is stil
engaged in armed conflict in Colombia, and its rival, the Popular Liberation Army (ELP),
reportedly recruit Venezuelans to cultivate coca, the plant component of cocaine.143 The ELN has
taken over much of Guajira state.144 The Rastrojos, a criminal group of former Colombian
paramilitaries, reportedly controls important gasoline smuggling routes between Venezuela and

141 A May 2018 report by Insight Crime identified more than 120 high-level Venezuelan officials who have engaged in
criminal activity. Insight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State? May 2018.
142 “Cape Verde Court Approves US Extradition of Maduro Financier for Money Laundering,” Jurist, August 6, 2020.
143 Helen Murphy and Luis Jaime Acosta, “Exclusive: Colombian Armed Groups Recruiting Desperate Venezuelans,
Army Says,” Reuters, June 20, 2019.
144 Anatoly Kurmanaev, “T errorist Group Steps into Venezuela as Lawlessness Grows,” New York Times, April 26,
2021.
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Colombia. A February 2020 International Crisis Group study maintains that both FARC dissidents
and ELN fighters are heavily involved in il egal gold mining.145 Violence among these groups has
escalated in recent years. In March 2021, Venezuelan security forces launched an operation,
which analysts maintain was intended to attack a dissident FARC faction that may have violated a a dissident FARC faction that may have violated a
drug trafficking arrangement, in Apure (see Figure 1). The forces reportedly committed human
rights abuses against civilians as ongoing clashes prompted thousands to flee into Arauca,
Colombia. Those clashes also may have resulted in soldiers’ deaths.146drug trafficking arrangement; the offensive resulted in casualties and human rights abuses in Apure and displaced thousands into Colombia.139 Maduro officials’ ties with the increasingly powerful ELN could complicate the Maduro government’s role in Colombia-ELN peace talks and the U.S. government’s support for future Maduro-opposition negotiations.140 The Maduro government allegedly also has ties to Hezbollah through various intermediaries (see “U.S. Concerns About Terrorism”).
Counternarcotics and U.S. Antidrug Prosecutions and Operations
Venezuela Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine destined for the United States. In 2005, Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine destined for the United States. In 2005, Venezuela
suspended its counternarcotics cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.suspended its counternarcotics cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.147141
Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated annual yannually as a country that has failed to adhere to its as a country that has failed to adhere to its
international antidrug obligations, pursuant to international drug-control certification procedures international antidrug obligations, pursuant to international drug-control certification procedures
in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228). in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228). Most recently, inIn September September
20202022, President , President TrumpBiden again designated Venezuela as a country not adhering to its antidrug again designated Venezuela as a country not adhering to its antidrug
obligations.obligations.148142 At the same time, President At the same time, President TrumpBiden waived economic sanctions that would have waived economic sanctions that would have
curtailed U.S. assistance curtailed U.S. assistance for the Venezuelan people (health, human rights, and democracy aid)for democracy programs. .
The State Department reported in its The State Department reported in its 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (INCSR)
covering 2020 that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking routes for the transit of il icit
drugs out of South America, especial y cocaine. According to the INCSR, Venezuelan authorities
“failed to make any efforts to combat il egal drug activity and prosecute corrupt officials or
suspected drug traffickers.”149 In March 2021 congressional testimony, Admiral Craig Fal er,
Commander of U.S. Southern Command, asserted that drug trafficking flowing out of Venezuela
increased 145% from 2015 to 2019.150
U.S. authorities have taken action against Maduro officials and their relativesthat illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, flowed from Venezuela by air through Mexico and Central America to the U.S. market and in maritime shipments through the Caribbean to the United States and Europe. The report described the increasing involvement of the ELN, FARC dissidents, and other groups in cocaine trafficking. The ELN, which is still engaged in armed conflict in Colombia, and its rival, the Popular Liberation Army (ELP), reportedly recruit Venezuelans to cultivate coca, the plant component of cocaine. According to the INCSR, Venezuelan authorities “failed to make any meaningful efforts to combat illegal drug activity or prosecute corrupt officials or suspected drug traffickers.”143 U.S. authorities have taken action against Maduro officials involved in drug involved in drug
trafficking and trafficking and related crimes. In March 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, and 14 other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials.144 As of-the-suns/. 138 Ibid. 139 Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Security Force Abuses at Colombia Border,” April 26, 2021. 140 Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Colombian President Gustavo Petro on the Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Nicolás Maduro Government,” October 24, 2022; Charles Larratt-Smith and Andrés Aponte González, “A Major Roadblock in Future U.S.-Venezuela Talks: the ELN,” Americas Quarterly, April 28, 2022. 141 The Venezuelan government ended cooperation after alleging that U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents were spying on the government, charges U.S. officials dismissed as baseless. related crimes.151 On March 2, 2020, the Spanish government approved the
extradition of Venezuela’s former intel igence chief, Hugo Carvajal, to the United States to stand
trial for drug and weapons trafficking. In March 2019, a U.S. court charged former Vice President
Tareck el Aissami with violating the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act. In December 2017, two

145 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms: Curbing the Threat to Venezuela from Violent Groups, February 2020.
146 Steven Grattan, Anthony Faiola, and Ana Vanessa Herrero, “Venezuelan Military Offensive Sends T housands
Fleeing, Recharging One of the World’s Worst Refugee Crises,” Washington Post, April 1, 2021; Latin News Daily,
“Venezuela: Soldiers Killed in Latest Apure Clashes,” April 27, 2021.
147 T he Venezuelan government ended cooperation after alleging that U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents
were spying on the government, charges U.S. officials dismissed as baseless. Prior to that time, the governments had Prior to that time, the governments had
negotiated an antidrug cooperation agreement (an addendum to a 1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics agreement) that negotiated an antidrug cooperation agreement (an addendum to a 1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics agreement) that
wouldwould have enhanced information-sharing and antidrug cooperation. Venezuela never approved that agreement.have enhanced information-sharing and antidrug cooperation. Venezuela never approved that agreement.
148 T he 142 The White House, “Presidential Determination—Major Drug White House, “Presidential Determination—Major Drug T ransitTransit or Major Illicit Drug Producing or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Countries for
FiscalFiscal Year 2021,” September Year 2021,” September 16, 2020.
149 U.S. 15, 2022. 143 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 20202022 INCSR, March , March
2021, vol. 1.
150 Statement of Admiral Craig Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 16, 2021.
151 Sources for this paragraph include Reuters, “Spain Approves Extradition of Venezuela’s Ex -spy Chief to the United
States,” March 3, 2020; and Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York,
“Venezuelan Minister And Former Vice President T areck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah Charged With Violations of the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act ,” March 8, 2019.2022, vol. 1. 144 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), “Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials
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Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations charged, Maduro allegedly participated in the Cartel of the Suns drug trafficking organization in conspiracy with the FARC (then a designated FTO) to produce and traffic illicit drugs to the United States. Some 12 of the 18 individuals also are subject to U.S. sanctions. In addition to narcoterrorism conspiracy, the charges include drug trafficking, money laundering, and weapons charges. The State Department offered a total of up to $55 million for information leading to the arrest, conviction, or both of five of these individuals (including Maduro).145and U.S. Relations

nephews of First Lady Cilia Flores were sentenced to 18 years in a U.S. federal prison for
conspiring to transport cocaine into the United States.
On April 1, 2020, additional U.S. naval counterdrug assets were deployed to the Caribbean. With
cooperation from partner governments, the operation aimed, in part, to curb drug trafficking
emanating from Venezuela. By August 2020, the operation had seized more than 100 metric tons
of cocaine and denied the Maduro government $3 bil ion in il icit revenue.152
Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture
In addition to drug trafficking, the INCSR discusses Venezuela’s high level of vulnerability In addition to drug trafficking, the INCSR discusses Venezuela’s high level of vulnerability to to
money laundering and other financial crimes. According to the report, money laundering is money laundering and other financial crimes. According to the report, money laundering is
widespread in the country and worsened in widespread in the country and worsened in 20202021 as the Maduro government as the Maduro government relaxedcontinued to relax its controls its controls
over foreign exchange, prices, and importsover foreign exchange, prices, and imports. This move resulted in a rapid dollarization and authorized the opening of dozens of casinos. Rapid dollarization of the of the
economy economy andhas created opportunities for corruption created opportunities for corruption for those with dollars. Venezuela revised its . Venezuela revised its
laws against organized crime and terrorist financing in 2014 but excluded the government and laws against organized crime and terrorist financing in 2014 but excluded the government and
state-owned industries from the scope of any investigations. The unit charged with investigating state-owned industries from the scope of any investigations. The unit charged with investigating
financial crimes has limited capabilities, and there is a lack of political financial crimes has limited capabilities, and there is a lack of political wil will in the judicial system in the judicial system
to combat money laundering and corruption. There has been no improvement since the Treasury to combat money laundering and corruption. There has been no improvement since the Treasury
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an alert to financial Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an alert to financial
institutions in 2019 on transactions involving public corruption in Venezuela.institutions in 2019 on transactions involving public corruption in Venezuela.153146
Revenue from Revenue from il icitillicit Venezuela-linked Venezuela-linked activities has been laundered into accounts, real estate, and activities has been laundered into accounts, real estate, and
other industries around the world. U.S. prosecutors estimate that some $300 other industries around the world. U.S. prosecutors estimate that some $300 bil ion il billion ill-gotten -gotten
VenezuelanVenezuelan wealth is held in south Florida alone, primarily in real estate.wealth is held in south Florida alone, primarily in real estate.154 The March 2020
indictments against senior Venezuelan officials continue DOJ’s decade-long effort to uncover
corruption involving Maduro and his associates.147 Since 2010, DOJ has charged several dozen Since 2010, DOJ has charged several dozen
current or former officials, including a former national treasurer, senior state economic current or former officials, including a former national treasurer, senior state economic
development bank official, military officer, judge, and officials from PdVSA and its subsidiariesdevelopment bank official, military officer, judge, and officials from PdVSA and its subsidiaries. with money laundering. The INCSR describes how DOJ charged two Venezuelans, including a former governor, and three Colombians in October 2021 with laundering $1.6 billion ($180 million through or to the United States) in proceeds from contracts to provide food and medicine to the Venezuelan people.148
According to the State Department, the U.S. government has coordinated its efforts to identify, According to the State Department, the U.S. government has coordinated its efforts to identify,
confiscate, forfeit, and repatriate confiscate, forfeit, and repatriate il icitillicit Venezuelan assets, including through the U.S. Venezuelan assets, including through the U.S.
Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security.Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security.155149 The Department of the The Department of the
Treasury’s FinCEN is the U.S. financial Treasury’s FinCEN is the U.S. financial intel igence intelligence unit and administrator of U.S. anti-money unit and administrator of U.S. anti-money
laundering laws pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. FinCEN collaborates with financial laundering laws pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. FinCEN collaborates with financial
intel igence intelligence units around the world. The Department of the Treasury’s Executive Office for Asset units around the world. The Department of the Treasury’s Executive Office for Asset
Forfeiture administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, a federal fund for forfeitures that are the Forfeiture administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, a federal fund for forfeitures that are the
result of actions by selected participating agencies, and DOJ administers a separate assets result of actions by selected participating agencies, and DOJ administers a separate assets
forfeiture fund.forfeiture fund.156150 Some observers have advocated for certain U.S. seizures of Venezuelan assets Some observers have advocated for certain U.S. seizures of Venezuelan assets
be redistributed to a charitable trust to benefit the Venezuelan people or placed in an account for

152 Abrams testimony, August 4, 2020.
153 U.S. Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges,” March 26, 2020. 145 U.S. Department of State, “Department of State Offers Rewards for Information To Bring Venezuelan Drug Traffickers to Justice,” March 26, 2020. 146 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 20202022 INCSR, March , March
20212022, vol. 2. , vol. 2.
154 147 Joshua Goodman, “U.S. Prosecutor in Miami Joshua Goodman, “U.S. Prosecutor in Miami T argeting Venezuela Targeting Venezuela Graft Is Leaving,” AP, AugustGraft Is Leaving,” AP, August 14, 2020. 14, 2020.
155 U.S. 148 2022 INCSR, op. cit. 149 U.S. Department of State, Department of State, Report on Recovering Assets Stolen from the Venezuelan People, Section 151 (b) of the , Section 151 (b) of the
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (Division J). 2020.Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (Division J). 2020.
156 T he T reasury 150 The Treasury Forfeiture Fund participating agencies are the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations Forfeiture Fund participating agencies are the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations
Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Secret Service, and
U.S. Coast Guard. For information on DOJ’s asset forfeiture fund, see https://www.justice.gov/afp/fund/.
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be redistributed to a charitable trust to benefit the Venezuelan people or placed in an account for use by a future democraticallyuse by a future democratical y elected government. elected government.157151 The Trump Administration reportedly The Trump Administration reportedly
permitted the Guaidó government to use $20 permitted the Guaidó government to use $20 mil ion million in forfeited assets to address the COVID-19 in forfeited assets to address the COVID-19
crisis by providing a monthly bonus to health care workers.crisis by providing a monthly bonus to health care workers.158
152 The Treasury Department has helped countries develop the legal and technical capacity to block The Treasury Department has helped countries develop the legal and technical capacity to block
transactions and seize assets. Analysts and U.S. officials have urged European countries and transactions and seize assets. Analysts and U.S. officials have urged European countries and
banks to intensify their efforts to detect and seize banks to intensify their efforts to detect and seize il icitillicit assets tied to Maduro government. assets tied to Maduro government.159
153 Illegal Mining
Gold mining, both licit and Gold mining, both licit and il icit, illicit, has accelerated as the Venezuelan economy has collapsed in the has accelerated as the Venezuelan economy has collapsed in the
face of low global oil prices and an ongoing political crisis. Over the past few years, a boom in face of low global oil prices and an ongoing political crisis. Over the past few years, a boom in
il egal illegal mining in Venezuelamining in Venezuela has reportedly contributed to deforestation and environmental has reportedly contributed to deforestation and environmental
degradation in indigenous areas, clashes between rival criminal gangs and violence committed by degradation in indigenous areas, clashes between rival criminal gangs and violence committed by
those gangs against miners whom they extort, and an outbreak of malaria (a disease that had been those gangs against miners whom they extort, and an outbreak of malaria (a disease that had been
eradicated).eradicated).160154 FARC dissidents and the ELN FARC dissidents and the ELN reportedly earn a majority of their income from reportedly earn a majority of their income from
il egal illegal gold mining; the Maduro government also has increased its involvement in the sector as gold mining; the Maduro government also has increased its involvement in the sector as
licit gold supplies have run out.licit gold supplies have run out.161 According to the INCSR, il egal exports of gold and other
metals worth hundreds of mil ions of dollars have occurred in recent years.162155 Numerous reports Numerous reports
suggest the suggest the il egal illegal mining industry also causes human rights violations, including the forcible mining industry also causes human rights violations, including the forcible
recruitment of child labor and abuses of indigenous groups, including the Yanomami tribe. recruitment of child labor and abuses of indigenous groups, including the Yanomami tribe.
The U.S. government has created an interagency gold working group, imposed sanctions on The U.S. government has created an interagency gold working group, imposed sanctions on
individualsindividuals for their involvement in the for their involvement in the il icit illicit gold industry, and stepped up border security efforts gold industry, and stepped up border security efforts
to detect to detect il icit illicit gold shipments out of Venezuela.gold shipments out of Venezuela.163
156 Introduced in November 2022, the U.S. Legal Gold and Mining Partnership Strategy Act (S. 5109) would require the President to develop a strategy to, among other measures, address illegal gold mining and its linkages to the Maduro government. Human Trafficking
Criminal groups, sometimes in collaboration with corrupt officials, have subjected men, women, Criminal groups, sometimes in collaboration with corrupt officials, have subjected men, women,
and children to human trafficking both within Venezuela and abroad, particularly in border and children to human trafficking both within Venezuela and abroad, particularly in border
regions and the Caribbean coast.regions and the Caribbean coast.164157 Within the country, victims are trafficked from rural to urban Within the country, victims are trafficked from rural to urban
areas to serve as prostitutes or domestic servants. Venezuelan women and girls are often areas to serve as prostitutes or domestic servants. Venezuelan women and girls are often
trafficked abroad for sexual exploitation, and children are trafficked for forced labor and/or are
forcibly recruited by FARC dissidents and the ELN. In 2019, researchers documented increasing

157 Michael J. Camilleri Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Coast Guard. For information on DOJ’s asset forfeiture fund, see https://www.justice.gov/afp/fund/. 151 Michael J. Camilleri and Fen Osler Hampson, “Seize the Money of Venezuelan Kleptocrats to Help the Country and and Fen Osler Hampson, “Seize the Money of Venezuelan Kleptocrats to Help the Country and
Its People,” Its People,” Washington Post, January 29, 2019. , January 29, 2019.
158152 Karen DeYoung Karen DeYoung and Anthony Faiola, “Venezuela: and Anthony Faiola, “Venezuela: T rump Administration T apsTrump Administration Taps Frozen Funds in Effort to Oust Frozen Funds in Effort to Oust
VenezuelanVenezuelan Leader,” Leader,” Washington Post, August, August 21, 2020. 21, 2020.
159153 Douglas Douglas Farah, Farah, The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin
Am ericaAmerica, Atlantic Council, August, Atlantic Council, August 13, 2020.
160 Bram Ebus, “Militarization and Mining a Dangerous Mix in Venezuelan Amazon,” Mongabay, December 7, 2017;
Maria Isabel Sanchez, “Inside the Deadly World of Venezuela’s Illegal Mines,” AFP, March 19, 2017; Stephanie
Nebehay, “Malaria on Rise in Crisis-Hit Venezuela, WHO Says,” Reuters, April 24, 2018.
161 International Crisis Group, 13, 2020. 154 Katie Jones, Javier Lizcano, and María Fernanda Ramírez, Beneath the Surface of Illegal Gold Mining in the Amazon, Insight Crime, November 8, 2022; Maria Eugenia Grillet et. al, “Malaria in Southern Venezuela: the Hottest Hot Spot In Latin America,” PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, January 25, 2021. 155 International Crisis Group, Gold and Grief in Venezuela’s Violent South, February 2019. , February 2019.
162 2020 INCSR, March 2021, vol. 2.
163156 Atlantic Council, “ Atlantic Council, “T ranscriptTranscript: Countering the Maduro Regime’s: Countering the Maduro Regime’s Global Global Web of Illicit Activities,” AugustWeb of Illicit Activities,” August 14, 2020. 14, 2020.
164157 U.S. U.S. Department of State, Department of State, 20202022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Venezuela, June 25, 2020. See also Devon Cone and , June 25, 2020. See also Devon Cone and
Melanie Melanie T effTeff, , Searching for Safety: Confronting Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Venezuelan Wom enWomen and Girls, ,
RefugeesRefugees International, August 2019. International, August 2019.
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sex and labor trafficking by sex and labor trafficking by il egal y illegally armed groups in mining regions.armed groups in mining regions.158 Venezuelan migrants who Venezuelan migrants who
have fled abroad lacking identity documents are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. have fled abroad lacking identity documents are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.
The U.S. Department of State ranked Venezuela as Tier 3 for the The U.S. Department of State ranked Venezuela as Tier 3 for the seventhninth consecutive year in its consecutive year in its
June June 20202022 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report. This ranking indicates that the country does not (TIP) report. This ranking indicates that the country does not
meet minimum standards for preventing human trafficking, nor is it making significant efforts to meet minimum standards for preventing human trafficking, nor is it making significant efforts to
do so. The Maduro government do so. The Maduro government reported that it had created a special prosecutor’s office for TIP
cases and initiated proceedings against three officials complicit in a case that ended with a
shipwreck at sea of a vessel reportedly carrying 90 people. The issued a decree for the creation of a national action plan against human trafficking, but did not dedicate specific funds for the plan’s implementation. The government did not provide any government did not provide any
data on TIP victims assisted, prosecutions, or convictions for human trafficking. In September data on TIP victims assisted, prosecutions, or convictions for human trafficking. In September
20192021, the , the TrumpBiden Administration waived TIP-related sanctions on assistance to Venezuela that Administration waived TIP-related sanctions on assistance to Venezuela that
would have been triggered by that Tier 3 ranking, determining that the continuation of U.S. would have been triggered by that Tier 3 ranking, determining that the continuation of U.S.
democracy and human rights assistance was in the U.S. national interest.democracy and human rights assistance was in the U.S. national interest. The State Department
also has notified Congress of its intention to provide $3 mil ion in FY2018 funds to help
strengthen human trafficking efforts in countries bordering Venezuela.165
U.S. Concerns About Terrorism
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has determined Since 2006, the Secretary of State has determined annual yannually that Venezuela has not been that Venezuela has not been
“cooperating fully with United“cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). Per the AECA, such a designation subjects Venezuela to a U.S. arms Export Control Act (AECA). Per the AECA, such a designation subjects Venezuela to a U.S. arms
embargo, which prohibits embargo, which prohibits al all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. The most U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. The most
recent determination was made in May 2020 and published on June 2, 2020.recent determination was made in May 2020 and published on June 2, 2020.166159
In 2008, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions (asset freezing and prohibitions on In 2008, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions (asset freezing and prohibitions on
transactions) on two individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuelatransactions) on two individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for providing financial for providing financial
support to Hezbollah, which the Department of State has designated a Foreign Terrorist support to Hezbollah, which the Department of State has designated a Foreign Terrorist
Organization. The action was taken pursuant to E.O. 13224, aimed at impeding terrorist funding. Organization. The action was taken pursuant to E.O. 13224, aimed at impeding terrorist funding.
According to the State Department’s According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 20192020, Venezuela has a , Venezuela has a
permissive environment for known terrorist groupspermissive environment for known terrorist groups, including FARC dissidents, the Colombian-
origin ELN, and sympathizers of Lebanese Hezbollah. In particular, the report maintained and the Maduro government has, at times, welcome terrorists into its territory.160 As an example, the report maintains that photos taken in May 2020 captured images of former FARC leader Seuxis Pausías Hernández (alias Jesús Santrich), in Caracas with security guards reportedly provided by Maduro. (Santrich was killed in 2021).161 The report also states that, in contrast to years past, the Venezuelan military clashed with FARC dissidents and killed a front commander in November 2020. In contrast, the Country Reports on Terrorism 2019 described how financial ties with FARC dissidents and the ELN facilitated the Maduro government’s corruption and graft.162 According to several DOJ indictments, there are alleged links between the Maduro government and Hezbollah that
financial ties with FARC dissidents and the ELN facilitated the Maduro government’s corruption
and graft schemes. The State Department noted reports of sporadic cooperation between FARC
dissidents and the ELN in the areas of road and border checkpoints, forced displacement of
vulnerable indigenous communities, and trafficking of il egal narcotics and gold.167
According to several DOJ indictments, there are al eged links between the Maduro government
and Hezbollah through a few key intermediaries. One of them, Alex Saab, a Colombian subject to through a few key intermediaries. One of them, Alex Saab, a Colombian subject to
U.S. sanctions, U.S. sanctions, is in the process of beingwas extradited from Cape Verde extradited from Cape Verde in 2021 to face U.S. money laundering 158 U.N. HRC, FFM, A/HRC/51/43, September 2022. 159 U.S. Department of State. Public Notice 11747to face U.S. money
laundering charges.168 The DOJ also has charged a former Venezuelan legislator, Adel el Zabayar,

165 U.S. Department of State, CN #218, August 15, 2019.
166 U.S. Department of State. Public Notice 11131, “Determination and Certification of Countries Not Cooperating , “Determination and Certification of Countries Not Cooperating
FullyFully with United States Antiterrorism Efforts,” with United States Antiterrorism Efforts,” Federal Register 2020-11858, June 2, 2020.
167 U.S. 2022-11747, May 11, 2022. 160 U.S. Department of State, Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020.
168 Cape Verde’s Supreme Court has approved Saab’s extradition to the United States. DOJ, “United States v. Alex
Nain Saab Moran, Docket No. 19-CR-20450-RNS,” July 25, 2019; Barry Hatton, “ West African Court Allows
Extradition to US of Venezuelan,” AP, March 17, 2021.
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with 2020, December 16, 2021. 161 Julie Turkewitz and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Colombia Rebel Commander ‘Jesus Santrich’ Killed, Venezuelan Officials Say,” New York Times, May 18, 2021. 162 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 30 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations charges.163 DOJ also has charged a former Venezuelan legislator, Adel el Zabayar, with involvement in weapons for cocaine negotiations between the FARC and Hezbollahinvolvement in weapons for cocaine negotiations between the FARC and Hezbollah and and
Hamas.Hamas.169164 Analysts have criticized the indictment for failing to provide conclusive evidence. Analysts have criticized the indictment for failing to provide conclusive evidence.170165
Some Members of Congress have Some Members of Congress have cal edcalled for Venezuela to be designated as a state sponsor of for Venezuela to be designated as a state sponsor of
terror. This designation would trigger an array of sanctions, including aid restrictions, terror. This designation would trigger an array of sanctions, including aid restrictions,
requirement for validated export licenses for dual-use items, and other financial restrictions. requirement for validated export licenses for dual-use items, and other financial restrictions.
Critics caution there is a lack of evidence to conclude that the Venezuelan government has Critics caution there is a lack of evidence to conclude that the Venezuelan government has
“repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” as required by law. “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” as required by law.
Outlook
The situation in VenezuelaThe situation in Venezuela continues to represent a continues to represent a majorsignificant foreign policy foreign policy chal engechallenge for the United for the United
States. States. TwoThree years after the United States ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate years after the United States ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate
president of Venezuela, Maduro president of Venezuela, Maduro stil appearsremains firmly entrenched in power even as poor economic and social conditions in the country are prompting record numbers of Venezuelans to seek entry into the United States. Meanwhile, the opposition—once united behind Juan Guaidó—has redirected its attention from trying to pressure Maduro to leave office to seeking to negotiate with Maduro officials in order to obtain the best conditions possible for the 2024 presidential and 2025 legislative elections firmly entrenched in power. Meanwhile, the
opposition—once united behind Juan Guaidó—has fractured. Although the Guaidó-led opposition
remains focused on obtaining adequate conditions for free and fair presidential and legislative
elections, Henrique Capriles and other opposition leaders appear to be focused on fielding
candidates in the 2021 regional and local elections. Venezuelan civil society has put forth a list of
potential candidates for a new electoral council, the first step in what may be a long process to
rebuild the institutions necessary to one day convene elections that are more free and fair. .
The failure to dislodge Maduro from power demonstrated the limits of U.S. and other The failure to dislodge Maduro from power demonstrated the limits of U.S. and other
internationalinternational efforts to prompt political change in Venezuela. efforts to prompt political change in Venezuela. Unilateral Certain unilateral U.S. policies, such as oil U.S. policies, such as oil
sanctions, arguably worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country and caused divisions within sanctions, arguably worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country and caused divisions within
the international coalition that once backed the international coalition that once backed GuaidoGuaidó. Despite these developments, some analysts . Despite these developments, some analysts
urgehave urged Biden officials to maintain Biden officials to maintain broad sanctions on the Maduro government and to increase U.S. broad sanctions on the Maduro government and to increase U.S.
and international efforts to hold Maduro officials and their enablers accountable. Others and international efforts to hold Maduro officials and their enablers accountable. Others cal on
have called on the Biden Administration to leverage potential sanctions relief as an incentive for Maduro to negotiate with the oppositionthe Biden Administration to consider the humanitarian effects of U.S. sanctions and to end any
sanctions that have unduly exacerbated the crisis. Neither policy approach is likely to prompt
immediate political change. In the meantime, ensuring humanitarian aid reaches the Venezuelan . In the meantime, ensuring humanitarian aid reaches the Venezuelan
people, both those within the country and those sheltering abroad, likely people, both those within the country and those sheltering abroad, likely wil will remain a key remain a key
priority for the United States and other donors. priority for the United States and other donors.
The 117th Congress is likely to continue close oversight of U.S. policy toward Venezuela, Congress is likely to continue close oversight of U.S. policy toward Venezuela,
including the Biden Administration’s actions including the Biden Administration’s actions to sanction human rights abuses, corruption, and
antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its backersregarding whether to maintain, relax, or potentially expand targeted and sectoral sanctions on Venezuela. Many Members of Congress . Many Members of Congress
have praised the March 2021 designation of TPS for Venezuelahave praised the March 2021 designation of TPS for Venezuela and the July 2022 extension of that designation through March 2024. Although some in Congress . Although some in Congress
support continued pressure on the Maduro government, others support a more targeted approach, support continued pressure on the Maduro government, others support a more targeted approach,
arguing that broad sanctions have not prompted political change but have hurt the Venezuelan arguing that broad sanctions have not prompted political change but have hurt the Venezuelan
people. As in the 116th Congress, some Members have advocated for an end to certain sanctions,
including a ban on oil-for-diesel swaps that has contributed to fuel shortages in the country.171
The 117th people. Congress may examine new Congress may examine new policy approaches by the Biden Administration, fund and oversee programs in Venezuela and in neighboring countries, and consider legislation to address discrete issues, or to update broad U.S. policy towards Venezuela similar to the VERDAD Act enacted as part of P.L. 116-94. 163 DOJ, “United States v. Alex Nain Saab Moran, Docket No. 19-CR-20450-RNS;” Joshua Goodman, “Venezuela Insider Seeks Dismissal of Criminal Charges,” AP, October 18, 2022. 164 DOJ, “Former Member Of Venezuelan National Assembly Charged With Narco-Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, And Weapons Offenses,” May 27, 2020. 165 “US Indictment Claims Venezuelan Politician Linked to Hezbollah, Hamas,” Insight Crime, May 29, 2020. Congressional Research Service 31 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Author Information Clare Ribando Seelke, Coordinator Rhoda Margesson Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy Rebecca M. Nelson Phillip Brown Specialist in International Trade and Finance Specialist in Energy Policy Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should notpolicy approaches by the Biden Administration and further
legislative options, such as additional sanctions against the Maduro government and its foreign
enablers or humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans.

169 DOJ, “ Former Member Of Venezuelan National Assembly Charged With Narco -T errorism, Drug T rafficking, And
Weapons Offenses,” May 27, 2020.
170 “US Indictment Claims Venezuelan Politician Linked to Hezbollah, Hamas,” Insight Crime, May 29, 2020.
171 T imothy Gardner, “Democratic Senator Urges Biden Admin to Allow Diesel Swap in Venezuela,” Reuters, March
23, 2021.
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Appendix A. Legislation Enacted in the
116th Congress
P.L. 116-6 (H.J.Res. 31), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019. The measure provided $17.5
mil ion for democracy and rule of law programs for civil society groups in Venezuela. The
conference report (H.Rept. 116-9) required a strategy of how U.S. agencies are supporting
communities that are sheltering Venezuelans throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
Introduced January 22, 2019. Signed into law February 15, 2019.
P.L. 116-92 (S. 1790) National Defense Authorization Act, 2020. Similar to H.R. 2204 and S.
1151, Section 880 of the measure prohibits federal contracting with persons who do business with
the Maduro government. Introduced June 11, 2019. Signed into law December 20, 2019.
P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865), Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. Introduced March
25, 2019, and subsequently became the legislative vehicle for eight FY2020 appropriations bil s.
Signed into law on December 20, 2019. The measure provides $30 mil ion in FY2020 assistance
for democracy programs in Venezuela. It also incorporated provisions described below from the
Senate-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), including authorizing $400 mil ion in
FY2020 humanitarian aid to Venezuela and $17.5 mil ion in FY2020 funds to help the OAS and
civil society organizations prepare for future elections in Venezuela. The act required, among
others, a short-term U.S. humanitarian assistance strategy to address the needs of the Venezuelan
people; a report within a year on the coordination and distribution of humanitarian assistance,
including future efforts; a U.S. strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela; a coordinated
sanctions strategy on Venezuela with partners in the Western Hemisphere and the European
Union; a strategy to support a democratic transition in Venezuela under different scenarios
(similar to S. 2583); and a report on accountability for human rights abuses committed by the
Maduro government.
P.L. 116-283 (H.R. 6395), the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2021. H.R. 6395
introduced March 26, 2020; House passed (295-125) July 21, 2020. S. 4049 introduced June 23,
2020; Senate passed (86-14) July 23, 2020. On November 16, 2020, the Senate approved H.R.
6395, amended, by voice vote, substituting the language of S. 4049. Conference report, H.Rept.
116-617, to H.R. 6395 filed December 3. House agreed (335-78) to the conference report
December 8. Senate agreed (84-13) to the conference on December 11, 2020. Vetoed by President
December 23. House passed (322-87) over veto December 28, 2020; Senate passed (81-13) over
veto, and the measure became public law, on January 1, 2021. H.Rept. 116-617 required a
briefing for certain committees on the contents of the report required by P.L. 116-94, as wel as an
update on the crisis in Venezuela and its regional implications.
P.L. 116-260 (H.R. 133), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. Original y introduced in
2019 as a measure to promote economic partnership and cooperation between the United States
and Mexico, H.R. 133 became the vehicle for the FY2021 omnibus appropriations measure and
other legislative acts in December 2020. Both the House and the Senate approved the final
measure on December 21, 2020, and the measure was signed into law December 27, 2020. As
approved, in Division K (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2021), Section 7045, provided not less than $33 mil ion in democracy
funding for programs in Venezuela, as wel as funding for countries including Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador, Curacao, and Trinidad and Tobago that are sheltering large numbers of Venezuelans.
The measure stipulated that such funds should be provided in addition to the assistance that
otherwise would be made available for those countries.
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Appendix B. Online Human Rights Reporting
on Venezuela
Table B-1. Online Human Rights Reporting on Venezuela
Organization
Document/Link
Amnesty International
The State of the World’s Human Rights,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/
venezuela/report-venezuela/
Committee to Protect Journalists
http://www.cpj.org/americas/venezuela/
Foro Penal Venezolano
http://foropenal.com/
Human Rights Watch
http://www.hrw.org/en/americas/venezuela
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
http://www.cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm;
(IACHR)
Annual Report of the IACHR 2018, 2019, chapter IV
includes a special report on Venezuela,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2018/TOC.asp
Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en
http://www.derechos.org.ve/
Derechos Humanos (PROVEA)
Reporters Without Borders
https://rsf.org/en/venezuela
U.S. State Department
Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018, March
13, 2019, https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-
reports-on-human-rights-practices/
Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights
Blog hosted by the Washington Office on Latin
America, http://venezuelablog.tumblr.com
Source: Congressional Research Service.



Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke, Coordinator
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy


Rebecca M. Nelson
Phillip Brown
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Energy Policy



Acknowledgments
Carla Davis-Castro, Research Librarian, contributed charts and background information for this report.
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