Navy Large Unmanned   Surface and Undersea 
March 25July 6, 2021 , 2021 
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress 
Ronald O'Rourke 
The Navy 
The Navy 
in FY2021  and beyond wants to develop and procure three types of large unmanned wants to develop and procure three types of large unmanned 
vehicles (UVs) called 
Specialist in Naval Affairs 
Specialist in Naval Affairs 
vehicles (UVs). These large UVs are called Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs), Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs), 
  
Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), 
  
and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
(XLUUVs). The Navy(XLUUVs). The Navy
 requested $579.9 million  in FY2021  ’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $374.1 million in research and development funding research and development funding 
 
for these large UVs and for these large UVs and 
 
their enabling technologies. their enabling technologies. 
As part of its action on the Navy’s proposed FY2021  budget, Congress provided $238.9 million. 
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture. 
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture. 
Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more distributed architecture is to include Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more distributed architecture is to include 
proportionately fewer large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers), proportionately more small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat Ships), and the addition of significant numbers of large UVs. The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring these large UVs, so as to get them into service more quickly. The Navy’s desire to employ these accelerated acquisition strategies can be viewed as an expression of the urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large UVs for meeting future military challenges from countries such as Chinaa smaller proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships), a larger proportion of smaller ships (such as frigates, corvettes, smaller amphibious ships, and smaller resupply ships), and a new third tier of large UVs. . 
The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 
The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 
tonstons
, which would make them the size of a corvette. (i.e., a ship larger than a patrol craft and smaller than a frigate). The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on commercial ship designs, with . The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on commercial ship designs, with 
ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, 
meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Although referred to as UVs, LUSVs might be more accurately meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Although referred to as UVs, LUSVs might be more accurately 
described as optionally or lightly manned ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members, described as optionally or lightly manned ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members, 
particularly in the nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational particularly in the nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational 
co nceptsconcepts. . 
The Navy defines MUSVs as being 45 feet to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 tons 
The Navy defines MUSVs as being 45 feet to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 tons 
, which would make them the size of a patrol craft. The Navy wants . The Navy wants 
MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate various payloads. Initial MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate various payloads. Initial 
payloads for MUSVs are to be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) payloads for MUSVs are to be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) 
systems. The Navy is pursuing the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804 acquisition authority. The first MUSV prototype was funded in FY2019 and the Navy wants fund the second prototype in FY2023.  On July 13, 2020,  the Navy announced that it had awarded “a $34,999,948 contract to L3 Technologies, Inc. for the development of a single Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV) prototype, with options to procure up to eight additional MUSVs.” 
The first five XLUUVs were funded in FY2019; they are being built by Boeing. The Navy wants procure additional XLUUVs at a rate of two per year starting in FY2023. The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission did not request funding for the procurement of additional XLUUVs in FY2021  or FY2022systems. 
The first five XLUUVs were funded in FY2019; they are being built by Boeing and are roughly the size of a subway car. The Navy wants procure additional XLUUVs starting in FY2024. The Navy wants to use XLUUVs to, among other things, covertly deploy the Hammerhead mine, a planned mine that would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, broadly similar to the Navy’s Cold War-era CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine. . 
The Navy’s large UV programs pose a number of oversight issues for Congress, including issues relating to the analytical 
The Navy’s large UV programs pose a number of oversight issues for Congress, including issues relating to the analytical 
basis for the more distributed fleet architecture; the Navy’s basis for the more distributed fleet architecture; the Navy’s 
accelerated acquisition strategies for these programs; technical, acquisition strategies for these programs; technical, 
schedule, and cost risk in the programs; the proposed annual procurement rates for the programs; the industrial base schedule, and cost risk in the programs; the proposed annual procurement rates for the programs; the industrial base 
implications of the programs; potential implications for miscalculation or escalation at sea; the personnel implications of the implications of the programs; potential implications for miscalculation or escalation at sea; the personnel implications of the 
programs; and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do on the programsprograms; and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do on the programs
 for the fiscal year in question. . 
In marking up the Navy’s proposed FY2020 and FY2021 budgets, 
In marking up the Navy’s proposed FY2020 and FY2021 budgets, 
some of the congressional defense committees expressed the congressional defense committees expressed 
concerns concerns 
over whether the Navy’s over whether the Navy’s 
accelerated acquisition strategies provided enough time to adequately develop concepts of acquisition strategies provided enough time to adequately develop concepts of 
operations and key technologies for these large UVs, particularly the LUSVoperations and key technologies for these large UVs, particularly the LUSV
. In response to the markups to its FY2020 
budget, the Navy’s FY2021 budget proposed modifying the, and included legislative provisions intended to address these concerns.  In response to these markups, the Navy has restructured its acquisition strategy for the LUSV program so as to  acquisition strategy for the LUSV program so as to 
comply with these legislative provisions and provide more provide more 
time for developing operational concepts and key technologies before entering into serial production of time for developing operational concepts and key technologies before entering into serial production of 
d eployabledeployable units.  units. 
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1123  Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
Background.................................................................................................................... 1 
Navy USVs and UUVs in General................................................................................ 1 
UVs in the Navy .................................................................................................. 1 
March 2021 Campaign Framework Document for UVs .............................................. 2 
Navy USV and UUV Categories ............................................................................. 2 
Large UVs and Navy Ship Count ............................................................................ 4 
Part of More Distributed Navy Fleet Architecture ...................................................... 4 
Accelerated Acquisition Strategies and Enabling Technologies ..................................................... 5 6 
LUSV, MUSV, and LXUUV Programs in Brief .............................................................. 87 
Navy Vision and Schedule for USVs and UUVs ........................................................ 87 
LUSV Program .................................................................................................... 9 
MUSV Program ................................................................................................. 1614 
XLUUV Program ............................................................................................... 18 
FY2021-FY2025 Funding.................................................................................... 2015 
Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 2119 
Analytical Basis for More Distributed Fleet Architecture ............................................... 2119 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) ............................................................................. 21 
Accelerated 20 Acquisition Strategies and Funding Method................................................................. 21 23 
Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk ............................................................................ 2321 
Annual Procurement Rates ........................................................................................ 25 
26 Industrial Base Implications ...................................................................................... 26 
Potential Implications for Miscalculation or Escalation at Sea ........................................ 26 
Personnel Implications ............................................................................................. 2728 
Annual Funding ...................................................................................................... 28 
Legislative Activity for FY2022 ...................................................................................... 28 
Legislative Activity for FY2021 ...................................................................................... 28 
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2021FY2022 Funding Request..................................... 28 Funding Request..................................... 28 
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/S. 4049/P.L. 116-283) ................ 29 
House ............................................................................................................... 29 
Senate .............................................................................................................. 30 
Conference ........................................................................................................ 36 
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 7617/S. XXXX/Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 
116-260) .............................................................................................................. 40 
House ............................................................................................................... 40 
Senate .............................................................................................................. 40 
Conference ........................................................................................................ 41 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Navy USV Systems Vision .................................................................................. 3 
Figure 2. Navy UUV Systems Vision ................................................................................. 3 
Figure 3. Enabling Technologies for USVs and UUVs  .......................................................... 76 
Figure 4. Sea Hunter Prototype Medium Displacement USV.................................................. 7 
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Figure 5. Navy USV Systems Vision .......................Figure 5. Navy USV Systems Vision as of March 2021 ........................................................... 8 
Figure 6. Navy UUV Systems Vision ........................as of March 2021 ......................................................... 9 
Figure 7. Prototype and Notional LUSVs and MUSVs ........................................................ 10 
Figure 8. LUSV Prototype .............................................................................................. 10 
Figure 9. LUSV prototype .............................................................................................. 11 
Figure 10. Rendering of L3Harris Design Concept for MUSV.............................................. 1715 
Figure 11. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV ............................................................................. 1918 
Figure 12. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV ............................................................................. 2018 
Figure 13. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV ............................................................................. 2019  
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Tables Table 1 
 
Tables 
Table 1. FY2021-FY2025 Requested and Programmed Funding for Large UVs ...................... 21 
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2021FY2022 Large UV Funding Request.................................. 2829 
  
Contacts 
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 4229 
  
Congressional Research Service 
Congressional Research Service 
Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
Introduction 
This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress for three types of This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress for three types of 
large unmanned vehicles (UVs) that the Navy wants to develop and procure in large unmanned vehicles (UVs) that the Navy wants to develop and procure in 
FY2021FY2022 and  and 
beyond: 
beyond: 
  Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs); 
  Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs); 
  Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs); and   Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs); and 
  Extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs).   Extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). 
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a new fleet 
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a new fleet 
architecture (i.e., a new combination of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed 
architecture (i.e., a new combination of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed 
than the Navy’s current fleet architecture. The Navythan the Navy’s current fleet architecture. The Navy
 requested $579.9 mil ion in FY2021’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $374.1 
mil ion  in research  research 
and development funding for these large UVs and their enabling technologies. and development funding for these large UVs and their enabling technologies. 
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s acquisition strategies 
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s acquisition strategies 
and funding requests for these large UVs. The Navy’s proposals for developing and procuring and funding requests for these large UVs. The Navy’s proposals for developing and procuring 
them pose a number of oversight issues for Congress. Congress’s decisions on these issues could them pose a number of oversight issues for Congress. Congress’s decisions on these issues could 
substantial y affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding and UV substantial y affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding and UV 
industrial bases. 
industrial bases. 
In addition to the large UVs covered in this report, the Navy also wants to develop and procure 
In addition to the large UVs covered in this report, the Navy also wants to develop and procure 
smal er USVs and UUVs,  as wel  as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various sizes. Other smal er USVs and UUVs,  as wel  as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various sizes. Other 
U.S. military services are developing, procuring, and operating their own types of UVs. Separate U.S. military services are developing, procuring, and operating their own types of UVs. Separate 
CRS reports address some of these efforts.1 
CRS reports address some of these efforts.1 
Background 
Navy USVs and UUVs in General 
UVs in the Navy 
UVs are one of several new capabilities—along with directed-energy weapons, hypersonic 
UVs are one of several new capabilities—along with directed-energy weapons, hypersonic 
weapons, artificial intel igence,  weapons, artificial intel igence,  
and cyber capabilities—that the Navy says it iscyber capabilities, and quantum technologies—that the Navy and other U.S. military services are pursuing to meet  pursuing to meet 
emerging military chal enges, particularly from emerging military chal enges, particularly from 
China.2 UVs can be equipped with sensors, China.2 UVs can be equipped with sensors, 
weapons, or other payloads, and can be operated remotely, semi-autonomously, or (with weapons, or other payloads, and can be operated remotely, semi-autonomously, or (with 
technological advancements) autonomously.technological advancements) autonomously.
3 They can be individual y They can be individual y
   less expensive to procure than manned ships and aircraft because their designs do not need to incorporate spaces and support equipment for onboard human operators. UVs can be particularly suitable for long-duration missions that might tax the physical endurance of onboard 
human operators, or missions that pose a high risk of injury, death, or capture of onboard human 
operators—so-cal ed “three D” missions, meaning missions that are dull, dirty, or dangerous.3 
                                              1 See,  for example, CRS  Report R45519, The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew  Feickert , and CRS  In Focus IF11150, Defense Prim er: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonom ous Weapon System s, by Kelley M. Sayler. 
2less expensive to procure 
                                              1 See,  for example, CRS  Report R45519, The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew  Feickert , and CRS  Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and 
Autonom ous System s (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress,  coordinated by Andrew Feickert .  2 See,  for example, Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget, inside front cover (“T he Bottom Line”). For a CRS  report on Navy lasers, electromagnetic railguns, an d the gun-launched  guided projectile (also known as  the hypervelocity projectile), see CRS  Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-
Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a CRS  report on  For a CRS  report on 
advanced military technologies, see CRS  In Focus IF11105, advanced military technologies, see CRS  In Focus IF11105, 
Defense Prim er: Em erging Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. , by Kelley M. 
Sayler. Sayler. 
3 For more on autonomous UVs,  see CRS  In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapon System s, by Kelley M. Sayler.3 See,  for example, Ann Diab, “ Drones Perform the Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous Work,” T ech.co, November 12, 2014;  
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Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
than manned ships and aircraft because their designs do not need to incorporate spaces and support equipment for onboard human operators. UVs can be particularly suitable for long-duration missions that might tax the physical endurance of onboard human operators, or missions that pose a high risk of injury, death, or capture of onboard human operators. Consequently UVs are sometimes said to be particularly suitable for so-cal ed “three D” missions, meaning missions 
that are “dull, dirty, or dangerous.”4 
The Navy has been developing and experimenting with various types of UVs for many years, and has transitioned some of these efforts (particularly those for UAVs) into procurement programs. 
The Department of the Navy states, for example, that its inventory of 4,094 aircraft at the end of FY2019 included 99 UAVs,  that its projected inventory of 3,912 aircraft at the end of FY2020 wil  include 45 UVs, and that its projected inventory of 4,075 aircraft at the end of FY2021 wil  include 57 UVs.5 The Navy has been developing and experimenting with various types of UVs for many years, and has transitioned some of these efforts (particularly those for UAVs) into procurement programs. Even so, some observers have occasional y expressed dissatisfaction with what Even so, some observers have occasional y expressed dissatisfaction with what 
they view as the Navy’s slow pace in transitioning UV development efforts into programs for they view as the Navy’s slow pace in transitioning UV development efforts into programs for 
procuring UVs in procuring UVs in 
quantity and integrating them into the operational fleet. quantity and integrating them into the operational fleet. 
March 2021 Campaign Framework Document for UVs 
On March 16, 2021, the Department of the Navy released a “campaign framework” (i.e., overal  
On March 16, 2021, the Department of the Navy released a “campaign framework” (i.e., overal  
strategy) document for developing and acquiring Navy and Marine UVs of various types and strategy) document for developing and acquiring Navy and Marine UVs of various types and 
integrating them into U.S. naval operations.
integrating them into U.S. naval operations.
64  
Navy USV and UUV Categories 
As shown i
As shown i
n Figure 1 aa
nd Figure 2, the Navy organizes its USV acquisition programs into four , the Navy organizes its USV acquisition programs into four 
size-based categories that the Navy cal s large, medium, smal , and very smal , and its UUV size-based categories that the Navy cal s large, medium, smal , and very smal , and its UUV 
acquisition programs similarly into four size-based categories that the Navy cal s extra-large, acquisition programs similarly into four size-based categories that the Navy cal s extra-large, 
large, medium, and smal . The large UVs discussed in this CRS report fal  into the top two USV large, medium, and smal . The large UVs discussed in this CRS report fal  into the top two USV 
categories i
categories i
n Figure 1 and the top UUV  category iand the top UUV  category i
n Figure 2.  
The smal er UVs shown in the other categories 
The smal er UVs shown in the other categories 
of Figure 1 a a
nd Figure 2, which are not covered , which are not covered 
in this report, can be deployed from manned Navy ships and submarines to extend the operational in this report, can be deployed from manned Navy ships and submarines to extend the operational 
reach of those ships and submarines. The large UVs covered in this CRS report, in contrast, are reach of those ships and submarines. The large UVs covered in this CRS report, in contrast, are 
more likely to be deployed directly from pier to perform missions that might otherwise be more likely to be deployed directly from pier to perform missions that might otherwise be 
assigned to manned ships and submarines. 
assigned to manned ships and submarines. 
                                              
                                              
4 See,  for example, Ann Diab, “ Drones Perform the Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous Work,” T ech.co, November 12, 2014; Bonnie Robinson, “ Dull, Dirty, Dangerous Mission? Send  in the Robot Vehicle,” U.S.  Army, August  20, 2015; Bonnie Robinson, “ Dull, Dirty, Dangerous Mission? Send  in the Robot Vehicle,” U.S.  Army, August  20, 2015; 
Bernard Marr, “ T he 4 Ds Of Robotization: Dull, Dirty, Dangerous And  Dear,” Bernard Marr, “ T he 4 Ds Of Robotization: Dull, Dirty, Dangerous And  Dear,” 
Forbes, October 16, 2017. , October 16, 2017. 
5 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget, Figure 3.7 on page 3-7. 64 Department of the Navy,  Department of the Navy, 
Department of the Navy Unmanned Campaign Framework, March 16, 2021, 37 pp. See also , March 16, 2021, 37 pp. See also 
Megan Eckstein, “ Navy, Marines Unveil How T hey Will Buy and  Operate Future Pilotless Aircraft and Crewless Megan Eckstein, “ Navy, Marines Unveil How T hey Will Buy and  Operate Future Pilotless Aircraft and Crewless 
Ships,”  Ships,”  
USNI News,  March 16, 2021; Gina Harkins, “ Why You Should  T rust Drone Ships  and Unmanned T ech, ,  March 16, 2021; Gina Harkins, “ Why You Should  T rust Drone Ships  and Unmanned T ech, 
According to the Navy,” According to the Navy,” 
Military.com , March 16, 2021; Stew Magnuson, “ Just In: Navy, Marine Corps Unmanned , March 16, 2021; Stew Magnuson, “ Just In: Navy, Marine Corps Unmanned 
Framework Calls  For ‘Capabilities’ Over Platforms,” Framework Calls  For ‘Capabilities’ Over Platforms,” 
National Defense, March 16, 2021; Seapower Staff, “ Navy, , March 16, 2021; Seapower Staff, “ Navy, 
Marine Corps Release  Unmanned Campaign Plan ,” Marine Corps Release  Unmanned Campaign Plan ,” 
Seapower, March 16, 2021; Jordan Wolman, “ Looking to the , March 16, 2021; Jordan Wolman, “ Looking to the 
Future of Combat and Competition, Navy Releases Much-Anticipated Campaign Plan on Unmanned Systems,”  Future of Combat and Competition, Navy Releases Much-Anticipated Campaign Plan on Unmanned Systems,”  
Inside 
Defense, March 16, 2021. , March 16, 2021. 
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Figure 1. Navy USV Systems Vision 
 
 
Source: Slide 3 of briefing by Captain Pete Smal ,  Program  Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems  (PMS 406), Slide 3 of briefing by Captain Pete Smal ,  Program  Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems  (PMS 406), 
entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems  Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems  Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at 
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Smal .pdf?ver=https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Smal .pdf?ver=
2019-01-15-165105-297. 2019-01-15-165105-297. 
Figure 2. Navy UUV Systems Vision 
 
 
Source: Slide 2 of briefing by Captain Pete Smal ,  Program  Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems  (PMS 406), Slide 2 of briefing by Captain Pete Smal ,  Program  Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems  (PMS 406), 
entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems  Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems  Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at 
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Smal .pdf?ver=https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Smal .pdf?ver=
2019-01-15-165105-297. 2019-01-15-165105-297. 
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Large UVs and Navy Ship Count 
Because the large UVs covered in this report can be deployed directly from pier to perform 
Because the large UVs covered in this report can be deployed directly from pier to perform 
missions that might otherwise be assigned to manned ships and submarines, some observers have missions that might otherwise be assigned to manned ships and submarines, some observers have 
a raised a question as to whether the large UVs covered in this report should be included in the raised a question as to whether the large UVs covered in this report should be included in the 
top-top-
level count of the number of ships in the Navy. level count of the number of ships in the Navy. 
Department of Defense (DOD) officials since 
late 2019 have sent mixed signals on this question, but most recently have indicated that a new Navy force-level goal that wil  replace the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal (see next 
section) wil  include large unmanned vehicles (UVs).7 
Part of More Distributed Navy Fleet Architecture 
The Navy and DOD 
The Navy and DOD 
since 2019 have been working have been working 
since 2019 to develop a new Navy force-level goal to to develop a new Navy force-level goal to 
replace the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. This new Navy force-level goal is expected replace the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. This new Navy force-level goal is expected 
to introduce a change in fleet architecture, meaning basic the types of ships that make up the to introduce a change in fleet architecture, meaning basic the types of ships that make up the 
Navy and how these ships are used in combination with one another to perform Navy missions. Navy and how these ships are used in combination with one another to perform Navy missions. 
This new fleet architecture is expected to be more distributed than the fleet architecture reflected This new fleet architecture is expected to be more distributed than the fleet architecture reflected 
in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy force-level goals. In particular, the new fleet architecture is in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy force-level goals. In particular, the new fleet architecture is 
expected to feature 
expected to feature 
  a smal er proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers, 
  a smal er proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers, 
destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships)
destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships)
;,  
  a larger proportion of smal er ships (such as frigates, corvettes, smal er 
  a larger proportion of smal er ships (such as frigates, corvettes, smal er 
amphibious ships, 
amphibious ships, 
and smal er resupply shipssmal er resupply ships
), and 
  a new third tier of large UVs. 
Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is 
  operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;5 
  technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for 
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers of UVs; and 
  affordable—no more expensive than the current fleet architecture for generating 
a given amount of naval capability. 
Shifting to a more distributed force architecture, Navy and Marine Corps officials have suggested, wil  support the implementation of the Navy and Marine Corps’ new overarching                                               5 See,  for example, David B. Larter, “With China Gunning for Aircraft Carriers, US  Navy Says  It Must Change How  It Fights,” Defense News,  December 6, 2019; Arthur H. Barber, “Redesign  the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2019. Some observers have long urged  the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number of individually  larger and more expensive surface ships—is  increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential adversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributed  architecture, these observers have argued,  would 
• 
complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger number  of Navy units to detect, identify, and track; 
• 
reduce  the loss in aggregate  Navy capability that would  result from the destruction of an individual  Navy platform; 
• 
give U.S.  leaders  the option of deploying USVs  and  UUVs  in wartime to sea locations that would be tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and 
• 
increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing mission needs.  
For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see  CRS  Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Im plications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 
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operational concept, cal ed Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and a supporting Marine Corps operational concept cal ed Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). While Navy officials have provided few details in public about DMO,6 the Navy did, and perhaps smal er aircraft carriers); and 
  a new third tier of surface vessels about as large as corvettes or large patrol craft 
that wil  be either lightly manned, optional y manned, or unmanned, as wel  as large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). 
Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is 
                                              7 In December 2019, it was  reported that the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) had directed the Navy to include  in its FY2021 budget  submission  a legislative proposal to formally change the  definition of which ships count toward the quoted size of the Navy (known as the number of battle force ships) to include not only manned ships, but also large UVs  that operate essentially as unmanned ships. (See  Justin Katz, “ OMB: Pentagon Must Submit  Proposal to ‘Redefine’ Battleforce Ships to Include Unmanned Vehicles,”  Inside Defense, December 20, 2019; Joseph T revithick, “White House Asks Navy T o Include New  Unmanned Vessels  In Its Ambitious 355 Ship Fleet Plan,” The Drive, December 20, 2019; Paul McCleary, “ Navy T o Slash 24 Ships in 2021 Plan, Bolster Unmanned Effort,” Breaking 
Defense, December 20, 2019, David B. Larter, “ Pentagon Proposes Big Cuts to US  Navy Destroyer Construction, Retiring 13 Cruisers,”  Defense News,  December 24, 2019.) 
In January 2020, Admiral Michael Gilday,  the Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the top-level expression of the ship force-level goal resulting from the Navy’s next FSA  would  not include UVs.  (See,  for example, Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday  Calls  for Budget  Increase t o Reach 355 Ship Fleet; New  Battle Force Count Won’t Include Unmanned Ships,”  USNI News,  January 14, 2020; Rich Abott, “CNO: Ship Count Will Not Include Unmanned; Bigger  T opline Needed  For Fleet Goal,” Defense Daily, January 15, 2020; John M. Doyle, “CNO W ants Larger Slice  of Defense Budget  to Modernize, Meet China T hreat,” Seapower, January 15, 2020; Rich Abott, “CNO: Ship Count Will Not Include  Unmanned; Bigger  T opline Needed For Fleet Goal,” Defense  Daily, January 15, 2020.) 
In September 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper signaled  that the stated ship-force level goal will  include  large UVs.  (See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “ Esper: Unmanned Vessels  Will Allow  the Navy to Reach 355 -Ship Fleet ,” USNI News,  September 18, 2020.) 
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  operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;8 
  technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for 
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers of UVs; and 
  affordable—no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current 
fleet architecture, so as to fit within expected future Navy budgets. 
Shifting to a more distributed force architecture, Navy and Marine Corps officials have suggested, wil  support the implementation of the Navy and Marine Corps’ new overarching operational concept, cal ed Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and a supporting Marine Corps operational concept cal ed Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). While Navy 
officials have provided few details in public about DMO,9 the Navy does state in its FY2021  state in its FY2021 
budget submission that 
budget submission that 
MUSV and LUSV are key enablers of the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) 
MUSV and LUSV are key enablers of the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) 
concept, which includes being able to forward deploy and team with individual manned concept, which includes being able to forward deploy and team with individual manned 
combatants or augment battle groups. Fielding of MUSV and LUSV willcombatants or augment battle groups. Fielding of MUSV and LUSV will
   provide the Navy provide the Navy 
increased capability and necessary capacity at lower procurement and sustainment costs, increased capability and necessary capacity at lower procurement and sustainment costs, 
reduced risk to  sailors and increased readiness by offloading missions from  manned reduced risk to  sailors and increased readiness by offloading missions from  manned 
combatants.combatants.
10 
                                              8 See,  for example, David B. Larter, “With China Gunning for Aircraft Carriers, US  Navy Says  It Must Change How  It Fights,” Defense News,  December 6, 2019; Arthur H. Barber, “Redesign  the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2019. Some observers have long urged  the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number of individually  larger and more expensive surface ships—is  increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential adversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributed  architecture, these observers have argued,  would 
• 
complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger number  of Navy units to detect, identify, and track; 
• 
reduce  the loss in aggregate  Navy capability that would  result from the destruction of an individual  Navy platform; 
• 
give U.S.  leaders  the option of deploying USVs  and  UUVs  in wartime to sea locations that would be tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and 
• 
increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapt ing to changing mission needs. 
For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see  CRS  Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: 
Im plications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 97 
On December 9, 2020, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that presented the Trump Administration’s emerging successor to the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal, which cal s for a fleet of 355 manned ships. The document cal ed for a Navy with a 
more distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446 manned ships, 119 to 166 LUSVs and 
MUSVs, and 24 to 76 XLUUVs.8 
On June 17, 2021, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that presents the 
Biden Administration’s emerging successor to the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. The document cal s for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 
manned ships, 59 to 89 LUSVs and MUSVs, and 24 to 76 XLUUVs.9 
Acquisition Strategies and Enabling Technologies 
The LUSV and MUSV  programs are building on USV development work done by the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). SCO’s effort to develop USVs is cal ed Ghost Fleet, and its LUSV development effort within Ghost Fleet is cal ed 
Overlord. 
As shown in Figure 3, Navy in 2019 identified five key enabling groups of technologies for its USV and UUV  programs.10 Given limitations on underwater communications (most radio-                                              6 T hen-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, in explaining DMO, stated in December 2018 that “Our  T hen-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, in explaining DMO, stated in December 2018 that “Our 
fundamental force element right now in many instances is the [individual]  carrier strike group. We’re going to scale up fundamental force element right now in many instances is the [individual]  carrier strike group. We’re going to scale up 
so our fundamental force element for fighting is at the fleet[ -wide] level, and the [individual] strike groups plug  into so our fundamental force element for fighting is at the fleet[ -wide] level, and the [individual] strike groups plug  into 
those [larger] numbered  fleets. And they will  be, the strike groups and the fleet together, will be operating in a those [larger] numbered  fleets. And they will  be, the strike groups and the fleet together, will be operating in a 
distributed  maritime operations way.” (Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, as quoted  in Megan distributed  maritime operations way.” (Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, as quoted  in Megan 
Eckstein, “ Navy Planning for Gray-Zone Conflict; Finalizing Distributed Maritime Operations for High-End Fight,” Eckstein, “ Navy Planning for Gray-Zone Conflict; Finalizing Distributed Maritime Operations for High-End Fight,” 
USNI News,  December 19, 2018.) ,  December 19, 2018.) 
107 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume  2 of 5, Research,  Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume  2 of 5, Research, 
Development, T est & Evaluation, February 2020, PDF page 90 of 1,538. T he statement also appears on PDF page 324 Development, T est & Evaluation, February 2020, PDF page 90 of 1,538. T he statement also appears on PDF page 324 
of 1,538. For more on the more distributed force architecture, DMO, and EABO, seeof 1,538. For more on the more distributed force architecture, DMO, and EABO, see
   CRS  Report RL32665, CRS  Report RL32665, 
Navy 
Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald  O'Rourke. See  also Kevin , by Ronald  O'Rourke. See  also Kevin 
Eyer and Steve McJessy, “ Operationalizing Distributed Maritime Operations,” Center for International Maritime Eyer and Steve McJessy, “ Operationalizing Distributed Maritime Operations,” Center for International Maritime 
Security (CIMSEC),  March 5, 2019; Christopher H. Popa et al., Security (CIMSEC),  March 5, 2019; Christopher H. Popa et al., 
Distributed Maritim e Operations and Unm anned 
System s Tactical Em ploym ent, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2018, 171 pp. (, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2018, 171 pp. (
Sy stemsSystems Engineering Capstone Report);  Engineering Capstone Report); 
Lyla Englehorn, Lyla Englehorn, 
Distributed Maritim e Operations (DMO) Warfare  Innovation Continuum  ( WIC) Workshop Septem ber 2017 After Action Report, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2017, 99 pp. 8 U.S.  Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels,  December 2020, 23 pp. 
9 U.S.  Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels  for Fiscal Year 2022, June 2021, 16 pp.  
10 For additional discussion  of some of the enabling technologies shown in Figure 3, see Pete Small, “Empowering the Unmanned Maritime Revolution,” Undersea Warfare, Spring 2019: 12 -13. 
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frequency electromagnetic waves do not travel far underwater), technologies for autonomous operations (such as artificial intel igence) wil  be particularly important for the XLUUV  program 
(and other UUV  programs).11 
Figure 3. Enabling Technologies for USVs and UUVs 
 
Source: Slide 4 of briefing by Captain Pete Smal ,  Program  Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems  (PMS 406), entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems  Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Smal .pdf?ver=2019-01-15-165105-297. 
In May 2019, the Navy established a surface development squadron to help develop operational concepts for LUSVs and MUSVs. The squadron was initial y to WIC) Workshop Septem ber 
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On December 9, 2020, the outgoing Trump Administration released a document that can be viewed as its own vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding  plan. The document presents an envisioned Navy force-level goal for achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446 manned ships, 119 to 166 LUSVs and MUSVs, and 24 to 76 XLUUVs. In establishing its force-level goals and shipbuilding plans for the Navy, the Biden Administration can choose to adopt, revise, 
or set aside this document.11 
Accelerated Acquisition Strategies and Enabling Technologies 
The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring large UVs, so as to get them into service more quickly. The Navy’s desire to employ these accelerated acquisition strategies can be viewed as an expression of the urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large 
UVs for meeting future military chal enges from countries such as China.12 
The LUSV and MUSV programs are building on USV development work done by the Strategic 
Capabilities  Office (SCO) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). SCO’s effort to develop USVs is cal ed Ghost Fleet, and its LUSV development effort within Ghost Fleet is 
cal ed Overlord. 
As shown in Figure 3, the Navy has identified five key enabling groups of technologies for its USV and UUV  programs.13 Given limitations on underwater communications (most radio-frequency electromagnetic waves do not travel far underwater), technologies for autonomous operations (such as artificial intel igence) wil  be particularly important for the XLUUV  program 
(and other UUV  programs).14 
In May 2019, the Navy established a surface development squadron to help develop operational concepts for LUSVs and MUSVs. The squadron wil  initial y  consist of a Zumwalt (DDG-1000) consist of a Zumwalt (DDG-1000) 
class destroyer and one Sea Hunter prototype medium displacement USV class destroyer and one Sea Hunter prototype medium displacement USV 
(Figure 4). A second ). A second 
Sea Hunter prototype Sea Hunter prototype 
wil  reportedlywas reportedly to be added around the end of FY2020, and LUSVs  be added around the end of FY2020, and LUSVs 
and 
MUSVs wil  
and MUSVs would then be added as they become available.12 
 
                                              11then be added as they become available.15 
                                              2017 After Action Report, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2017, 99 pp. 
11 For more on the December 9, 2020, document, see CRS  Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding 
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 
12 A number of other DOD acquisition programs are also employing rapid or accelerated acquisition strategies of one kind or another, in some cases using  special acquisition authorities that Congress has granted to DOD. For additional discussion,  see CRS  Report R45068, Acquisition Reform  in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts 
(NDAAs), by Moshe Schwartz  and Heidi  M. Peters. 13 For additional discussion  of some of the enabling technologies shown in Figure 3, see Pete Small, “Empowering the Unmanned Maritime Revolution,” Undersea Warfare, Spring 2019: 12 -13. 14 For more on the use  of artificial intelligence in defense programs, see CRS  Report R45178,  For more on the use  of artificial intelligence in defense programs, see CRS  Report R45178, 
Artificial Intelligence 
and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler. 
1512 See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Stands Up Surface  Development Squadron  for DDG-1000, Unmanned  See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Stands Up Surface  Development Squadron  for DDG-1000, Unmanned 
Experimentation,” Experimentation,” 
USNI News, May 22, 2019; David B.  Larter, “With Billions Planned in Funding,  the US  Navy , May 22, 2019; David B.  Larter, “With Billions Planned in Funding,  the US  Navy 
Charts Its Unmanned Future,” Charts Its Unmanned Future,” 
Defense News,  May 6, 2019. See also Michael Fabey, “USN Seeks  Path for Unmanned ,  May 6, 2019. See also Michael Fabey, “USN Seeks  Path for Unmanned 
Systems Operational Concepts,” Systems Operational Concepts,” 
Jane’s Navy International, May 16, 2019. , May 16, 2019. 
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Figure 3. Enabling Technologies for USVs and UUVs 
 
Source: Slide 4 of briefing by Captain Pete Smal ,  Program  Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems  (PMS 406), entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems  Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed  May 22, 2019, at https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Smal .pdf?ver=2019-01-15-165105-297.  
Figure 4. Sea Hunter Prototype Medium Displacement USV 
 
 
Source: Photograph credited to U.S. Navy accompanying John Grady, “Panel: Unmanned Surface Vessels  Wil   be Photograph credited to U.S. Navy accompanying John Grady, “Panel: Unmanned Surface Vessels  Wil   be 
Significant Part of Future U.S. Fleet,”  Significant Part of Future U.S. Fleet,”  
USNI News, April  15, 2019. , April  15, 2019. 
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LUSV, MUSV, and LXUUV Programs in Brief 
Navy Vision and Schedule for USVs and UUVs 
Figure 5 aa
nd Figure 6 show the Navy’s vision and schedule show the Navy’s vision and schedule 
as of March 2021 for building, for building, 
testing, and conducting testing, and conducting 
fleet experiments with USVs and UUVs, including the LUSV, the MUSV, and the XLUUV,  along fleet experiments with USVs and UUVs, including the LUSV, the MUSV, and the XLUUV,  along 
with supporting efforts such as the Overlord and Sea Hunter prototype USVs, as wel  as smal er with supporting efforts such as the Overlord and Sea Hunter prototype USVs, as wel  as smal er 
USVs and UUVs  that are not covered in this report. USVs and UUVs  that are not covered in this report. 
In the two figures, the numbers inside the smal  green triangles represent quantities of the systems in question, a downward-pointing green triangle indicates the start of construction, and an upward-pointing triangle indicates the completion of construction. For example, Figure 5 shows that under the Navy’s USV vision, a single MUSV would start construction in 2020 and complete construction near the end of 2022, 
and that the next MUSV would start construction in 2023 and complete construction in 2025. 
Figure 5. Navy USV Systems Vision Under the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, the schedules shown in these two figures may have changed, particularly so as to provide more time for maturing technologies prior to initiating larger-scale 
procurement of USVs and UUVs. 
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Figure 5. Navy USV Systems Vision as of March 2021 
 
 
Source: Captain Pete Smal ,  “PMS 406 Unmanned Maritime  Systems,”  briefing at NDIA Undersea Warfare Captain Pete Smal ,  “PMS 406 Unmanned Maritime  Systems,”  briefing at NDIA Undersea Warfare 
Conference, March 24, 2021, slide  3. Conference, March 24, 2021, slide  3. 
Notes: GFE means government-furnished equipment, meaning equipment that the government wil   provide to  GFE means government-furnished equipment, meaning equipment that the government wil   provide to 
the firm that is building the USV, for incorporation into the USV. the firm that is building the USV, for incorporation into the USV. 
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14  link to page 15 15 
Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
Figure 6. Navy UUV Systems Vision as of March 2021 
 
 
Source: Captain Pete Smal ,  “PMS 406 Unmanned Maritime  Systems,”  briefing at NDIA Undersea Warfare Captain Pete Smal ,  “PMS 406 Unmanned Maritime  Systems,”  briefing at NDIA Undersea Warfare 
Conference, March 24, 2021, slide  4. Conference, March 24, 2021, slide  4. 
Notes: DDS is dry deck shelter,  which is a module that can be attached to the top surface of a submarine  for  DDS is dry deck shelter,  which is a module that can be attached to the top surface of a submarine  for 
the purpose of carrying a special payload. PHS is payload handling system.  IPOE is intel igence  preparation of the the purpose of carrying a special payload. PHS is payload handling system.  IPOE is intel igence  preparation of the 
operational environment.  MCM is mine countermeasures.  TTL&R is torpedo tube launch and recovery.  INC is operational environment.  MCM is mine countermeasures.  TTL&R is torpedo tube launch and recovery.  INC is 
increment (i.e.,  version).  DIU is Defense  Innovation Unit, which is a DOD organization.  NSW is naval special increment (i.e.,  version).  DIU is Defense  Innovation Unit, which is a DOD organization.  NSW is naval special 
warfare. warfare. 
LUSV Program 
Overview 
The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load 
displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size of a corvettedisplacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size of a corvette
 (i.e., a ship larger than a patrol craft and smal er than a frigate). Figure 
7 shows a detail from a Navy briefing slide showing images of prototype LUSVs and silhouettes shows a detail from a Navy briefing slide showing images of prototype LUSVs and silhouettes 
of a notional LUSV and a notional MUSV.of a notional LUSV and a notional MUSV.
   Figure 8 aa
nd Figure 9 show ships that have been used show ships that have been used 
as LUSV prototypes. In unclassified presentations on the program, the Navy has used images of as LUSV prototypes. In unclassified presentations on the program, the Navy has used images of 
offshore support ships offshore support ships 
used by the oil and gas industry to il ustrate the kinds of ships that might used by the oil and gas industry to il ustrate the kinds of ships that might 
be used as the basis for be used as the basis for 
LUSVs.16  
 
LUSVs.13  
                                              
                                              1613 Sam  LaGrone, “Navy Wants 10-Ship Unmanned ‘Ghost Fleet’ to Supplement Manned Force,”  Sam  LaGrone, “Navy Wants 10-Ship Unmanned ‘Ghost Fleet’ to Supplement Manned Force,” 
USNI News,  March ,  March 
13, 2019. 13, 2019. 
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Figure 7. Prototype and Notional LUSVs and MUSVs 
 
 
Source: Detail  from Navy briefing slide  entitled Unmanned Maritime  Systems,  slide 5 in a Navy briefing entitled Detail  from Navy briefing slide  entitled Unmanned Maritime  Systems,  slide 5 in a Navy briefing entitled 
“Designing & Building the Surface Fleet:  Unmanned and Smal  Combatants,” by Rear Admiral  Casey Moton at a “Designing & Building the Surface Fleet:  Unmanned and Smal  Combatants,” by Rear Admiral  Casey Moton at a 
June 20, 2019, conference of the American  Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE). June 20, 2019, conference of the American  Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE). 
Figure 8. LUSV Prototype 
 
 
Source: Cropped version  of photograph accompanying Mal ory Shelbourne,  “6 Companies Awarded Contracts Cropped version  of photograph accompanying Mal ory Shelbourne,  “6 Companies Awarded Contracts 
to Start Work  on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle,”  to Start Work  on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle,”  
USNI News, September  4, 2020. The caption to the , September  4, 2020. The caption to the 
photograph states in part: “A Ghost Fleet Overlord  test vessel  takes part in a capstone demonstration during the photograph states in part: “A Ghost Fleet Overlord  test vessel  takes part in a capstone demonstration during the 
conclusion of Phase I of the program in September.”  The photo is credited to the U.S. Navy. conclusion of Phase I of the program in September.”  The photo is credited to the U.S. Navy. 
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Figure 9. LUSV prototype 
 
 
Source: Cropped version  of photograph accompanying Mal ory Shelbourne,  “6 Companies Awarded Contracts Cropped version  of photograph accompanying Mal ory Shelbourne,  “6 Companies Awarded Contracts 
to Start Work  on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle,”  to Start Work  on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle,”  
USNI News, September  4, 2020. The caption to the , September  4, 2020. The caption to the 
photograph states in part: “A Ghost Fleet Overlord  test vessel  takes part in a capstone demonstration during the photograph states in part: “A Ghost Fleet Overlord  test vessel  takes part in a capstone demonstration during the 
conclusion of Phase I of the program in September.”  The photo is credited to the U.S. Navy. conclusion of Phase I of the program in September.”  The photo is credited to the U.S. Navy. 
The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on 
The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on 
commercial ship designs, with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—commercial ship designs, with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—
particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principal y anti-ship and particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principal y anti-ship and 
land-attack missiles.land-attack missiles.
1714 The Navy testified in June 2021 that each LUSV is to have 64 vertical 
launch system (VLS) missile-launching tubes.15  
The Navy wants LUSVs to be capable of operating with human operators in the loop,
The Navy wants LUSVs to be capable of operating with human operators in the loop,
1816 or semi- or semi-
autonomously (with human operators on the loop),autonomously (with human operators on the loop),
1917 or fully autonomously, and to be capable of  or fully autonomously, and to be capable of 
operating either independently or in conjunction with manned surface combatants. Although operating either independently or in conjunction with manned surface combatants. Although 
referred to as UVs, LUSVsreferred to as UVs, LUSVs
   might be more accurately described as optional y or lightly  manned might be more accurately described as optional y or lightly  manned 
ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members, particularly in the ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members, particularly in the 
nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational concepts.nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational concepts.
2018  LUSVs are to feature both built-in capabilities  and an ability  to accept modular payloads, and are LUSVs are to feature both built-in capabilities  and an ability  to accept modular payloads, and are 
to use existing Navy sensors and weapon launchers. The Navy states
to use existing Navy sensors and weapon launchers. The Navy states
: 
Building upon the Department of Defense that 
The Navy’s LUSV builds upon work funded by DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) ’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) 
funded and Navy executed experimentation withand experimentation executed by the Navy USVs in Project Overlord. LUSV will  be a USVs in Project Overlord, the Navy’s LUSV will be a  high-endurance vessel based on commercial specifications, capable of weeks -long deployments and trans-oceanic transits. With a large payload capacity, the LUSV will be designed to conduct a variety of warfare operations initially in conjunction with manned  
                                              
                                              1714 T he Navy states that the LUSV “provides distributed fires” and will  include  an “offensive missile capability.” See  T he Navy states that the LUSV “provides distributed fires” and will  include  an “offensive missile capability.” See 
slide  5 of briefing by slide  5 of briefing by 
CaptainCapt ain Pete Small, Program Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems (PMS 406), entitled  Pete Small, Program Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems (PMS 406), entitled 
“Unmanned Maritime Systems Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at https://www.navsea.navy.mil/“Unmanned Maritime Systems Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at https://www.navsea.navy.mil/
Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Small.pdf?ver=2019-01-15-165105-297. Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Small.pdf?ver=2019-01-15-165105-297. 
1815 See  Rich Abott, “ Officials Defend Cost Balancing In Cruiser  Retirement Plans,” Defense Daily, June 17, 2021; Richard R.  Burgess,  “ Kilby: LUSV’s  Missile  Cells  Would  Replace Cells  Lost with Decommissioned Cruisers,” Seapower, Jnue 17, 2021. 16 T he Navy states that having the operator in the loop can be understood as referring to T he Navy states that having the operator in the loop can be understood as referring to
  continuous continuo us or near-continuous  or near-continuous 
observation and/or control of the UV by the operator. (Source: Navy email to CRS  dated June 4, 2019.)  observation and/or control of the UV by the operator. (Source: Navy email to CRS  dated June 4, 2019.)  
19
17 T he Navy states that having the operator on the loop can be understood as referring to a UV  that is operating semi - T he Navy states that having the operator on the loop can be understood as referring to a UV  that is operating semi -
autonomously, with the UV  controlling its own actions much of the time, but with a human operator potentially autonomously, with the UV  controlling its own actions much of the time, but with a human operator potentially 
intervening from time to time in response to either a prompt from the UV or data sent from the UV or other sources. intervening from time to time in response to either a prompt from the UV or data sent from the UV or other sources. 
(Source:  Navy email to CRS  dated June 4, 2019(Source:  Navy email to CRS  dated June 4, 2019
 .) .) 
2018 See,  for example, David B. Larter, “US Navy Looks to Ease into Using Unmanned Robot Ships  with a Manned  See,  for example, David B. Larter, “US Navy Looks to Ease into Using Unmanned Robot Ships  with a Manned 
Crew,”  Crew,”  
Defense News,  January 29, 2019. ,  January 29, 2019. 
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Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
high-endurance  vessel  bas ed  on  commercial  specifications,  capable  of  weeks -long deployments and trans-oceanic transits. With a large payload capacity, the LUSV will be designed to conduct a variety of warfare operations initially in conjunction with manned surface combatants while under the positive control of a man-in-the-loop for employment surface combatants while under the positive control of a man-in-the-loop for employment 
of weapons systems. of weapons systems. 
The Navy is taking an iterative, systems engineering approach to obtaining this technology The Navy is taking an iterative, systems engineering approach to obtaining this technology 
and has designed an integration and experimentation plan that will validate high reliability and has designed an integration and experimentation plan that will validate high reliability 
mechanical and electrical systems, autonomous navigation and mechanical and electrical systems, autonomous navigation and 
maneuvering,  integration  of  combat  system,  and  platform  command  and  maneuvering, integration of combat system, and platform command and control capabilities prior to employment control capabilities prior to employment 
opportunities. opportunities. 
LUSV  Design Studies contracts were awarded in September 2020 to six Industry teams to 
LUSV  Design Studies contracts were awarded in September 2020 to six Industry teams to 
provide robust collaboration with government and industry to assist in maturation of provide robust collaboration with government and industry to assist in maturation of 
platform specifications, and ensure achievable technical requirements are in place for a platform specifications, and ensure achievable technical requirements are in place for a 
follow on development contract. Both Industry and the Navy are using these collaborative follow on development contract. Both Industry and the Navy are using these collaborative 
interactions to significantly advance the knowledge base that will  feed into the  LUSV interactions to significantly advance the knowledge base that will  feed into the  LUSV 
program.21 
FY2020 Legislative Activity 
In marking up the Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget, some of the congressional defense committees expressed concerns over whether the Navy’s accelerated acquisition strategies provided enough time to adequately develop concepts of operations and key technologies for large UVs, particularly the LUSV. In its report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11, 2019) on the FY2020 
National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790), the Senate Armed Services Committee stated 
The committee  is  concerned that the budget request’s concurrent approach to LUSV design, technology development, and integration as well as a limited understandin g of the LUSV  concept of employment, requirements, and reliability for envisioned missions pose excessive acquisition risk for  additional LUSV  procurement in fiscal  year 2020.  The committee is also concerned by the unclear policy implications of LUSVs, including ill-defined international unmanned surface vessel standards and the legal status of armed or potentially armed LUSVs. 
Additionally, the committee notes that the Navy’s “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020” acknowledges similar  issues: “Unmanned and optionally-manned systems are not accounted for in the overall battle force[.] ... The physical challenges of extended operations at sea across the spectrum of competition and conflict, the concepts of operations for these platforms, and the policy challenges associated with employing deadly force from autonomous vehicles 
must be well understood prior to replacing accountable battle force ships.” 
The committee believes that further procurement of LUSVs should occur only after the lessons  learned  from the current SCO  initiative have been incorporated  into  the next solicitation to enable incremental risk reduction. 
In addition, the committee believes that the LUSV program, which appears likely  to exceed the Major Defense Acquisition Program cost threshold, would benefit from a more rigorous requirements  definition  process,  analysis  of  alternatives,  and  deliberate  acquisition strategy.22 
S.Rept. 116-48 also stated 
                                              21 Statement of Fredrick J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Develop ment and Acquisition (ASN  [RD&A]) and Vice  Admiral James W. Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems and Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the House Armed Services  Committee Subcommittee on Seapower  and Projection Forces, on Department of the Navy Unm anned Systems, March 18, 2021, p. 14. 22 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 80. 
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While recognizing the need for prototypes to reduce acquisition risk, the committee is concerned that the acquisition strategies for the Large USV,  Medium USV, Orca UUV, and Snakehead UUV could lead to procurement of an excessive number of systems before the Navy is able to determine if the USVs and UUVs meet operational needs. 
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of  the Navy to  submit a  rep ort to the congressional  defense committees,  not  later  than  November  1,  2019,  that  provides acquisition roadmaps for the Large  USV,  Medium USV,  Orca  UUV,  and Snakehead UUV.23 
In its report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September 12, 2019) on the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act 
(S. 2474), the Senate Appropriations Committee stated that 
the Committee is concerned that for several unmanned programs the Navy is pursuing acquisition strategies that would  limit  future  competitive opportunities by awarding system-level prototypes early in the acquisition process and failing to articulate capability, requirements or technology roadmaps to encourage industrial innovation. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees with the fiscal year 2021 President’s budget request such acquisition roadmaps for each unmanned acquisition program that include no less than mission requirements, program requirements for each increment, key technologies, acquisition strategies, test strategies, sub-system and system-level prototyping plans, and cost estimates.24 
S.Rept. 116-103 also stated 
The  Committee  fully  supports  additional investments  in unmanned and autonomous technologies,  systems  and  sub-systems,  including  surface  and  sub-surface  vessels. However, the Committee is concerned with the proposed acquisition and funding strategies for the MUSV and LUSV  in this budget request, to include the Future Years Defense Program.  Therefore,  the  Committee  recommends  several  adjustme nts,  as  detailed elsewhere in  this report, and  directs the Assistant Secretary of the  Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) to review the acquisition strategies for these programs to address congressional concerns, as appropriately balanced with warfighter needs. (Page 194)25 
                                              23 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 106. T he report stated further on pages 106-107 that 
Each roadmap shall:  (1) Identify the applicable requirements document (e.g., T op Level Requirements); (2) Describe  the threshold and objective values  for each characteristic, key performance parameter (KPP), or other measure in the applicable requirements document; (3) Identify increments of vessels in each program; (4) For each such  increment, identify specific entrance and exit criteria that build toward the specified requirements (e.g., characteristic, KPP,  or other measure), including  demonstrated hardware and software functionality; (5) Identify the quantity of vessels  needed in each increment to perform the required testing or meet operational needs;  (6) Describe the concept of operations for each increment; (7) Identify the key pieces of hardware  and software needed  for each increment, including communications security material, off-board line-of-sight and satellite communications, and military datalinks; (8) Describe the extent to which each increment of vessels will  be  equipped  with weapons, enumerate such weapons, and describe  the associated target detect -to-engage sequence of events for each such  weapon; (9) Provide the subsystem-level prototyping plan for each increment, including for each such effort  the planned cost, schedule,  and performance; and (10) Provide the acquisition plan for each increment, including  the planned cost, schedule,  and performance. 
24 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 191. 25 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 194. 
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The explanatory statement for the final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division 
A of H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2020) stated 
The Secretary of the Navy is directed to comply with the full funding policy for LUSVs in future budget submissions. Further, the agreement recommends $50,000,000 for the design of future LUSVs without a vertical launch system [VLS]  capability in fiscal year 2020. Incremental upgrade capability for a vertical launch system may be addressed in future fiscal years. It is directed that no funds may be awarded for the conceptual design of future LUSVs until the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) briefs  the  congressional defense  committees  on  the  updated  acquisition strategy for unmanned surface vessels.26 
FY2021 Budget Submission 
In response to the markups from the congressional defense committees, the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission proposed modifying the
program…. 
The Navy has benefited through its prototyping and experimenting with Sea Hunter and Overlord  unmanned  surface  vessel  prototypes  accumulating  over  3,100  hours  of autonomous operations  to include teaming with  other manned ships. The Navy  will continue experimentation and reliability demonstration efforts in FY 2021 and FY 2022 on the two SCO-funded Overlord vessels as ownership shifts to the Navy. The Navy is also building two additional Overlord prototypes that will  deliver in  FY  2022  to  support continued experimentation, and future mission CONOPS. The Navy is evaluating other DMO applications to include logistics supply and refueling, Marine Corps expeditionary options, and enhancements to other surface platform missions. As part of this evaluation, the Navy is collaborating with Military Sealift Command and the Marine Corps to modify a  T-EPF  [expeditionary fast transport  ship] with  autonomy to  gain  more  autonomy knowledge and reliability on a class of ship equipped with V-22 [tilt-rotor aircraft] landing capability, a large logistic and personnel size, weight and power capability, and the ability to operate at high speeds.19 
In marking up the Navy’s proposed FY2020 and FY2021 budgets, the congressional defense committees expressed concerns over whether the Navy’s acquisition strategies provided enough 
time to adequately develop concepts of operations and key technologies for these large UVs, particularly the LUSV, and included legislative  provisions intended to address these concerns.20  In response to these markups, the Navy has restructured its acquisition strategy for the LUSV program so as to  acquisition strategy for the LUSV program so as to 
comply with these legislative provisions and provide more time for developing operational concepts and key technologies before entering into provide more time for developing operational concepts and key technologies before entering into 
serial production of deployable serial production of deployable 
units. 
September 4, 2020 Contract Award 
On September 4, 2020, DOD announced the following six contract awards for industry studies on 
the LUSV: 
                                              19 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN  (RD&A)) and Vice  Admiral James  W. Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities  (OPNAV N9) and Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower  of the Senate Armed Services  Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2022 Budget  Request  for Seapower,  June  8, 2021, pp. 14 -15. 20 In the William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (H.R. 6395 /P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021), these provisions included Sections 122 and 227.  
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units. Under the Navy’s proposed modified LUSV acquisition strategy, the Navy proposed using research and development funding to acquire two additional 
prototypes in FY2021 and one more additional prototype in FY2022 before shifting in FY2023 to the use of procurement funding for the procurement of deployable LUSVs at annual procurement 
rates in FY2023-FY2025 of 2-2-3. The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission states 
Major changes [in the LUSV program] from [the] FY  2020 President’s Budget request to [the] FY 2021 President’s Budget request [include the following]: 
(1)  The program will  award Conceptual Design (CD) contracts to multiple  vendors in FY20.  The CD effort will  support refinement of a LUSV Performance Specification that does not include the Vertical Launch System (VLS).  The final Performance Specification will  define a LUSV  with reservations in the design to support integration of a variety of capabilities and payloads. This effort, which was originally planned to award in Q2 [the second quarter of] FY 2020 will  be delayed until early Q4 [the fourth quarter of] FY 2020 in  order to support  amendment of the CD  Request for Proposals (RFP),  Performance Specification, and associated artifacts. 
(2)  The delay in  award of  the LUSV  CD  effort will  delay follow-on activities (RFP [Request for Proposals], [and] source selection) leading up to the award of the LUSV Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) contract. DD&C award will  be delayed one year, from FY  2021  to FY 2022.  The DD&C award will  deliver a non-VLS LUSV  prototype based on the Performance Specification developed during the CD effort. 
(3) In lieu of the FY 2020 President’s Budget request plan of awarding the LUSV DD&C contract in FY21, the Navy is planning to procure up to two additional Overlord prototypes, building on the lessons learned through the Ghost Fleet program and advances in C4I and combat system prototyping efforts. 
(4) The Navy plans to transition LUSV to a program of record in FY  2023 and align [the 
program’s]  procurement funding to  the  Shipbuilding and  Conversion, Navy  (SCN) account.27 
                                              26 Explanatory statement for Division A of H.R. 1158, PDF page 274 of 414. 27 See  also Justin Katz, “Navy Says It Will Adjust  to LUSV  Restrictions; New  Plan Will Be  Part of Next Budget,” Inside Defense, January 16, 2020; Vivienne Machi, “ FY ’21 Budget  Request  to Include ‘Adjustment’ to LUSV Procurement Schedule, PEO Says,”  Defense Daily, January 16, 2020. 
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A January 13, 2020, press report stated that the Navy planned to submit a report on the Navy’s 
concepts of operations for LUSVs and MUSVs in April  2020.28 
September 4, 2020 Contract Award 
On September 4, 2020, DOD announced the following six contract awards for industry studies on 
the LUSV: 
Huntington Ingalls Inc., Pascagoula, Mississippi (N00024-20-C-6319);  Lockheed Martin Huntington Ingalls Inc., Pascagoula, Mississippi (N00024-20-C-6319);  Lockheed Martin 
Corp.,  Baltimore,  Maryland  (N00024-20-C-6320);  Bollinger  Shipyards Lockport LLC, Corp.,  Baltimore,  Maryland  (N00024-20-C-6320);  Bollinger  Shipyards Lockport LLC, 
Lockport, Louisiana (N00024-20-C-6316);  Marinette Marine Corp., Marinette, Wisconsin Lockport, Louisiana (N00024-20-C-6316);  Marinette Marine Corp., Marinette, Wisconsin 
(N00024-20-C-6317);  Gibbs  &  Cox  Inc.,  Arlington, Virginia  (N0002420C6318);  and (N00024-20-C-6317);  Gibbs  &  Cox  Inc.,  Arlington, Virginia  (N0002420C6318);  and 
Austal USA LLC, Mobile, Alabama (N00024-20-C-6315),  are each being awarded a firm-Austal USA LLC, Mobile, Alabama (N00024-20-C-6315),  are each being awarded a firm-
fixed price contract for studies of a Large Unmanned Surface Vessel with a combined value fixed price contract for studies of a Large Unmanned Surface Vessel with a combined value 
across all awards of $41,985,112. across all awards of $41,985,112. 
Each contract includes an option for engineering support, that if exercised, would bring the 
Each contract includes an option for engineering support, that if exercised, would bring the 
cumulative value for all awards to $59,476,146. cumulative value for all awards to $59,476,146. 
 
 
The contract awarded to Huntington Ingal s Inc. is $7,000,000; 
The contract awarded to Huntington Ingal s Inc. is $7,000,000; 
 
 
the contract awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp. is $6,999,978; 
the contract awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp. is $6,999,978; 
 
 
the contract awarded to Bol inger  Shipyards Lockport LLC,  is $6,996,832; 
the contract awarded to Bol inger  Shipyards Lockport LLC,  is $6,996,832; 
 
 
the contract awarded to Marinette Marine Corp. is $6,999,783; 
the contract awarded to Marinette Marine Corp. is $6,999,783; 
 
 
the contract awarded to Gibbs & Cox Inc. is $6,989,499; and 
the contract awarded to Gibbs & Cox Inc. is $6,989,499; and 
 
 
the contract awarded to Austal USA LLC is $6,999,020. 
the contract awarded to Austal USA LLC is $6,999,020. 
Work will  be performed in various locations in the contiguous U.S. in accordance with 
Work will  be performed in various locations in the contiguous U.S. in accordance with 
each contract and is expected to be complete by August 2021, and if option(s) are exercised, each contract and is expected to be complete by August 2021, and if option(s) are exercised, 
work is expected to be complete by May 2022. work is expected to be complete by May 2022. 
Fiscal  2020  research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds in  the  amount 
Fiscal  2020  research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds in  the  amount 
$41,985,112  will  be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current $41,985,112  will  be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current 
fiscal year. fiscal year. 
These contracts were competitively procured via Federal Business 
These contracts were competitively procured via Federal Business 
Oppo rtunitiesOpportunities (now  (now 
beta.SAM.gov)  with  eight  offers  received.  The  Naval  Sea  Systems  Command, beta.SAM.gov)  with  eight  offers  received.  The  Naval  Sea  Systems  Command, 
Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.
2921  
A September 4, 2020, press report about the contract awards stated 
A September 4, 2020, press report about the contract awards stated 
“These contracts were established in order to refine specifications and requirements for a 
“These contracts were established in order to refine specifications and requirements for a 
Large  Unmanned  Surface Vessel and conduct  reliability studies  informed by industry Large  Unmanned  Surface Vessel and conduct  reliability studies  informed by industry 
partners  with potential solutions prior to release of  a  Detail  Design and Construction partners  with potential solutions prior to release of  a  Detail  Design and Construction 
contract,” Navy spokesman Capt. Danny Hernandez told USNI News in a statement. 
contract,” Navy spokesman Capt. Danny Hernandez told USNI News in a statement. 
                                              28 Mallory Shelbourne,  “Navy to Submit Report in April on Unmanned CONOPS  Development,” Inside Defense, January 13, 2020. See also David B. Larter, “Fleet Commander Directs US  Navy’s Surface  Force to Develop Conce pts for Unmanned Ships,”  Defense News,  January 2, 2020; David B. Larter, “ Unclear on Unmanned: T he US Navy’s Plans for Robot Ships  Are on the Rocks,” Defense News,  January 10, 2021; David B. Larter, “ Unclear on Unmanned, Part 2: On Capitol Hill, the US Navy Has a Credibility Problem,” Defense News,  January 11, 2021; David B.  Larter, “ Unclear on Unmanned, Part 3: A New  Year’s Resolution to Slow  Down,”  Defense News,  January 11, 2021. 
29
“The studies effort is designed to provide robust collaboration with government and industry to assist in maturation of platform specifications, and ensure achievable technical requirements are in place for a separate LUSV DD&C competition.”… 
“The  LUSV  studies  will  support  efforts  that  facilitate  requirements  refinement, development of an affordable and effective platform; provide opportunities to continue maturing  the  performance specifications and  conduct  analysis of  alternative design approaches;  facilitate  reliability  improvements  and  plans  for  government -furnished equipment and mechanical and  electrical  systems; and support  development of  cost 
reduction and other affordability initiatives,” Hernandez s aid.22 
                                              21 Department of Defense, “ Contracts For Sept. 4, 2020,” accessed September 8, 2020. T he announcement is posted as  Department of Defense, “ Contracts For Sept. 4, 2020,” accessed September 8, 2020. T he announcement is posted as 
a single, unbroken paragraph. In reprinting the text of the announcement, CRS broke the announcement into the smaller a single, unbroken paragraph. In reprinting the text of the announcement, CRS broke the announcement into the smaller 
paragraphs shown here to make the announcement easier toparagraphs shown here to make the announcement easier to
  read.  
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“The studies effort is designed to provide robust collaboration with government and industry to assist in maturation of platform specifications, and ensure achievable technical requirements are in place for a separate LUSV DD&C competition.”… 
“The  LUSV  studies  will  support  efforts  that  facilitate  requirements  refinement, development of an affordable and effective platform; provide opportunities to continue maturing  the  performance specifications and  conduct  analysis of  alternative design approaches;  facilitate  reliability  improvements  and  plans  for  government -furnished equipment and mechanical and  electrical  systems; and support  development of  cost 
reduction and other affordability initiatives,” Hernandez said.30 read.  
22 Mallory Shelbourne,  “6 Companies Awarded  Contracts to Start Work on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle,”  USNI News,  September 4, 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “ Navy Awards  Study  Contracts On Large Unmanned Ship —As Congress  Watches Closely,” Breaking Defense, September 4, 2020. 
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MUSV Program 
The Navy defines MUSVs as being 45 feet to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 
The Navy defines MUSVs as being 45 feet to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 
tonstons
, which would make them the size of a patrol craft. The Navy wants MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships . The Navy wants MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships 
that can accommodate various payloads. Initial payloads for MUSVs are to be intel igence, that can accommodate various payloads. Initial payloads for MUSVs are to be intel igence, 
surveil ance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and surveil ance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and 
electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Navy electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Navy 
is pursuing the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804 is pursuing the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804 
middle tier acquisition authority.middle tier acquisition authority.
3123 The  The 
first MUSV prototype was funded in FY2019first MUSV prototype was funded in FY2019
 and the 
Navy wants fund the second prototype in FY2023. . 
The MUSV program is building on development work by the Defense Advanced Research 
The MUSV program is building on development work by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) under its Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel Projects Agency (DARPA) under its Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel 
(ACTUV)  effort and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) under its Medium Displacement USV (ACTUV)  effort and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) under its Medium Displacement USV 
effort. As shown ieffort. As shown i
n Figure 1, this work led to the design, construction, and testing of the , this work led to the design, construction, and testing of the 
prototype Sea Hunter medium displacement USV, which has a reported length of 132 feet (about prototype Sea Hunter medium displacement USV, which has a reported length of 132 feet (about 
40.2 meters) and a displacement of about 140 tons.
40.2 meters) and a displacement of about 140 tons.
3224 The Navy’s MUSV program is also to  The Navy’s MUSV program is also to 
employ a fleet-ready command and control (C2) solution for USVs that was developed by the employ a fleet-ready command and control (C2) solution for USVs that was developed by the 
Strategic Capabilities Office for the LUSV program. The Navy states that 
Strategic Capabilities Office for the LUSV program. The Navy states that 
MUSVMedium unmanned surface vehicle (MUSV) is an unmanned sensor-ship, built to carry  is an unmanned sensor-ship, built to carry 
modular modular  payloads, and standardized forpayloads, and standardized for
   easy integration witheasy integration with
   current Navy systems. Inexpensive compared to manned combatants, current Navy systems. Inexpensive compared to manned combatants, 
theyMUSVs can be built in can be built in
   numbers, quickly adding capacitynumbers, quickly adding capacity
  to   to the Fleet. MUSVthe Fleet. MUSV
   delivers a delivers a 
distributed sensor network that can navigate and operate withdistributed sensor network that can navigate and operate with
 man   man  in/on thein/on the
 loop   loop  oversight, oversight, 
and will  be  capable ofand will  be  capable of
   weeks -long weeks -long 
deployments  deployments and trans -oceanic transits. The Navy and trans -oceanic transits. The Navy 
awarded aawarded a
 design   design  and fabrication contract to and fabrication contract to 
L3Harris to develop the first MUSV prototype develop the first MUSV prototype 
in  accordance with Interim  Top  Level  Requirements approved in  2019.  The  MUSV prototypewhich is targeted for delivery in FY 2023. is targeted for delivery in FY 2023.
33 
                                              30 Mallory Shelbourne,  “6 Companies Awarded  Contracts to Start Work on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle,”  USNI 
News,  September 4, 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “ Navy Awards  Study  Contracts On Large Unmanned Ship —As Congress  Watches Closely,” Breaking Defense, September 4, 2020. 
3125 
On July 13, 2020, the Navy announced that it had awarded “a $34,999,948 contract to L3[Harris] 
Technologies, Inc. for the development of a single Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV) prototype, with options to procure up to eight additional MUSVs. The award follows a full and open competitive procurement process. Funding is in place on this contract for the initial prototype. With al  options exercised, the contract is valued at $281,435,446 if additional funding is provided in future budget years.”26 The Navy reportedly stated that there were five competitors 
                                              23 T his is a reference to Section 804 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( T his is a reference to Section 804 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (
 S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of 
November 25, 2015). T he rapid prototyping authority provided by that section is now codified at 10 U.S.C.  2302 note. November 25, 2015). T he rapid prototyping authority provided by that section is now codified at 10 U.S.C.  2302 note. 
For more on this authority, see “ Middle T ier Acquisition (Section 804),” MIT RE, undated, accessed  May 24, 2019, at For more on this authority, see “ Middle T ier Acquisition (Section 804),” MIT RE, undated, accessed  May 24, 2019, at 
https://aida.mitre.org/middle-tier/; and “ Acquisition Process, Middle  T ier Acquisition (Section 804),” AcqNotes, https://aida.mitre.org/middle-tier/; and “ Acquisition Process, Middle  T ier Acquisition (Section 804),” AcqNotes, 
updated March 26, 2019, accessed May 24, 2019, at http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/middle-tier-acquisitions. updated March 26, 2019, accessed May 24, 2019, at http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/middle-tier-acquisitions. 
3224 See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “ Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy T esting as NAVSEA  Moves  See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “ Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy T esting as NAVSEA  Moves 
Forward  with Draft RFP ,” Forward  with Draft RFP ,” 
USNI News,  April 29, 2019; Evan Milberg, “ DARPA “ Sea Hunter,” World’s Largest ,  April 29, 2019; Evan Milberg, “ DARPA “ Sea Hunter,” World’s Largest 
Autonomous Ship, T ransferred to U.S. Navy ,” Autonomous Ship, T ransferred to U.S. Navy ,” 
Com posites Manufacturing Magazine, February 12, 2018; Sydney J. , February 12, 2018; Sydney J. 
Freedberg  Jr., “ DSD [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Work Embraces DARPA’s  Robot Boat, Sea  Hunter,” Freedberg  Jr., “ DSD [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Work Embraces DARPA’s  Robot Boat, Sea  Hunter,” 
Breaking 
Defense, April 7, 2016. , April 7, 2016. 
3325 Statement of  Statement of 
FredrickFrederick J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,  J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Develop mentDevelopment and Acquisition  and Acquisition 
(ASN  (ASN  
[(RD&ARD&A
])) and Vice  Admiral James) and Vice  Admiral James
   W. Kilby, Deputy W. Kilby, Deputy 
Ch iefChief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities  (OPNAV N9) and Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower  of the Senate Armed Services  Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal  Year 2022 Budget  Request  for Seapower,  June  8, 2021, pp. 14 -15. 
26 PEO Unmanned and Small  Combatants Public Affairs, “ Navy Awards  Contract for Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle  Prototype,” Naval Sea Systems Command, July 13, 2020. 
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for the contract, but did not identify the other four.27 of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems and 
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On July 13, 2020, the Navy announced that it had awarded “a $34,999,948 contract to L3[Harris] Technologies, Inc. for the development of a single Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV) prototype, with options to procure up to eight additional MUSVs. The award follows a full and open competitive procurement process. Funding is in place on this contract for the initial prototype. With al  options exercised, the contract is valued at $281,435,446 if additional funding is provided in future budget years.”34 The Navy reportedly stated that there were five competitors 
for the contract, but did not identify the other four.35 Figure 10 shows a rendering of L3Harris’s  shows a rendering of L3Harris’s 
design concept.  
design concept.  
Figure 10. Rendering of L3Harris Design Concept for MUSV 
 
 
Source: L3Harris  Technologies,  “L3Harris  TechnologiesL3Harris  Technologies,  “L3Harris  Technologies
   Awarded Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle  Program Awarded Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle  Program 
from US Navy,” August 18, 2020. See also Richard R. Burgess,  “Navy’s Medium USV to Be Based on Commercial from US Navy,” August 18, 2020. See also Richard R. Burgess,  “Navy’s Medium USV to Be Based on Commercial 
Vehicle,” Vehicle,” 
Seapower,  August 19, 2020. ,  August 19, 2020. 
L3Harris states that 
L3Harris states that 
will  integrate the company’s ASView™ autonomy technology into a purpose-built 195-
will  integrate the company’s ASView™ autonomy technology into a purpose-built 195-
foot commercially derived vehicle from a facility along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana. The foot commercially derived vehicle from a facility along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana. The 
MUSV  will  provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to  MUSV  will  provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to  
t hethe fleet  while  fleet  while 
maneuvering autonomously and complying with international Collision Regulations, even maneuvering autonomously and complying with international Collision Regulations, even 
in operational environments.… 
in operational environments.… 
L3Harris will  be the systems integrator and provide the mission autonomy and perception 
L3Harris will  be the systems integrator and provide the mission autonomy and perception 
technology as the prime contractor on the program. The program team includes Gibbs & technology as the prime contractor on the program. The program team includes Gibbs & 
Cox and Incat Crowther who will provide the ship design and Swiftships will complete the Cox and Incat Crowther who will provide the ship design and Swiftships will complete the 
construction of the vehicle. construction of the vehicle. 
L3Harris is a world leader in actively powered Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) systems, 
L3Harris is a world leader in actively powered Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) systems, 
with over 115 USVs delivered worldwide. L3Harris’ USVs are actively serving the Navy, with over 115 USVs delivered worldwide. L3Harris’ USVs are actively serving the Navy, 
universities, research institutions and commercial businesses.universities, research institutions and commercial businesses.
36 
                                              Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the House Armed Services  Committee Subcommittee on Seapower  and Projection Forces, on Department of the Navy Unmanned Systems, March 18, 2021, p. 15.  34 PEO Unmanned and Small  Combatants Public Affairs, “ Navy Awards  Contract for Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle  Prototype,” Naval Sea Systems Command, July 13, 2020. 
3528 
XLUUV Program 
The XLUUV  program, also known as the Orca program, was established to address a Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON). As shown in Figure 2, the Navy defines XLUUVs as UUVs 
with a diameter of more than 84 inches, meaning that XLUUVs  are to be too large to be launched from a manned Navy submarine.29 Consequently, XLUUVs instead wil   transported to a forward operating port and then launched from pier. The Department of the Navy’s March 16, 2021, unmanned campaign framework document states that the XLUUV wil  be designed “to                                               27 Rich Abott, “ L3Harris Wins $35 Million MUSV  Prototype Contract,”  Rich Abott, “ L3Harris Wins $35 Million MUSV  Prototype Contract,” 
Defense Daily, July 13, 2020. See also Sam , July 13, 2020. See also Sam 
LaGrone, “ Navy Awards  Contract for First Vessel In Its Family of Unmanned Surface  Vehicles,”  LaGrone, “ Navy Awards  Contract for First Vessel In Its Family of Unmanned Surface  Vehicles,”  
USNI News,  July 14 ,  July 14 
(updated July  15), 2020; Paul McLeary, “ Navy Inks Deal For New  Unmanned Fleet(updated July  15), 2020; Paul McLeary, “ Navy Inks Deal For New  Unmanned Fleet
 ,” ,” 
Breaking Defense, July 13, 2020. , July 13, 2020. 
3628 L3Harris T echnologies, “L3Harris T echnologies Awarded  Medium  Unmanned Surface  Vehicle Program from US  L3Harris T echnologies, “L3Harris T echnologies Awarded  Medium  Unmanned Surface  Vehicle Program from US 
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XLUUV Program 
The XLUUV  program, also known as the Orca program, was established to address a Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON). As shown in Figure 2, the Navy defines XLUUVs as UUVs with a diameter of more than 84 inches, meaning that XLUUVs  are to be too large to be launched from a manned Navy submarine.37 Consequently, XLUUVs instead wil   transported to a forward 
operating port and then launched from pier. The Department of the Navy’s March 16, 2021, unmanned campaign framework document states that the XLUUV wil  be designed “to accommodate a variety of large payloads….”38 The Navy testified on March 18, 2021, that mines 
wil  be the initial  payload for XLUUVs.39Navy,” August  18, 2020. 
29 Navy submarines  equipped  with large-diameter vertical launch tubes can launch missiles  or other payloads with diameters of up to about 83 inches. 
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accommodate a variety of large payloads….”30 The Navy testified on March 18, 2021, that mines wil  be the initial  payload for XLUUVs.31 More specifical y, the Navy wants to use XLUUVs to, among other things, covertly deploy the Hammerhead mine, a planned mine that would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, broadly similar to the Navy’s 
Cold War-era CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine.32  
The first five XLUUVs  were funded in FY2019 through the Navy’s research and development 
The first five XLUUVs  were funded in FY2019 through the Navy’s research and development 
appropriation account. The Navy conducted a competition for the design of the XLUUV, and appropriation account. The Navy conducted a competition for the design of the XLUUV, and 
announced on February 13, 2019, that it had selected Boeing to fabricate, test, and deliver the first announced on February 13, 2019, that it had selected Boeing to fabricate, test, and deliver the first 
four Orca XLUUVs and associated support elements.four Orca XLUUVs and associated support elements.
4033 (The other bidder was a team led by  (The other bidder was a team led by 
Lockheed Martin.) On March 27, 2019, the Navy announced that the award to Boeing had been Lockheed Martin.) On March 27, 2019, the Navy announced that the award to Boeing had been 
expanded to include the fifth Orca.expanded to include the fifth Orca.
4134 Boeing has partnered with the Technical Solutions division  Boeing has partnered with the Technical Solutions division 
of Huntington Ingal s Industries (HII) to build Orca XLUUVs.of Huntington Ingal s Industries (HII) to build Orca XLUUVs.
4235 (A separate division of HII— (A separate division of HII—
Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) of Newport News, VA—is one of the Navy’s two submarine Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) of Newport News, VA—is one of the Navy’s two submarine 
builders.) 
builders.) 
The Navy wants procure additional XLUUVs  at a rate of two per year starting in FY2023. The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission does not include funding for the procurement of additional XLUUVs  in FY2021 or FY2022. The Navy is proposing to fund the procurement of XLUUVs in 
FY2023 and subsequent years through the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) appropriation 
account. 
In June 2020, it was reported that a study of future Navy force-level requirements led by the Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) recommended a future Navy with, among other things, up to 50 XLUUVs.43 
Boeing’s Orca XLUUV  design wil  be informed by (but wil  differ in certain respects from) the 
design of Boeing’s Echo Voyager UUV  (Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13).44 Echo Voyager is 51 feet long and has a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet by 8.5 feet, a weight in the air of 50 tons, and a range of up to 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a modular payload section up to 34 feet in length, increasing its length to as much as 85 feet. A 34-foot modular payload section provides about 2,000 cubic feet of internal payload volume; a shorter (14-foot) section provides                                               Navy,” August  18, 2020. 
37 Navy submarines  equipped  with large-diameter vertical launch tubes can launch missiles  or other payloads with diameters of up to about 83 inches. 
38 Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Unmanned Campaign Framework, March 16, 2021, p. 16. 39 Richard R. Burgess,  “ Navy’s Orca XLUUV  to Have Mine-Laying Mission, Adm. Kilby Says,”  Seapower, March 18, 2021. 
40 Department of Defense, Contracts for Feb. 13, 2019. 41 Department of Defense, Contracts for March 27, 2019. 42 See,  for example, Hugh Lessig,  “Shipbuilder  Lends  a Hand with Rise of Robot Submarines,”  Defense News,  May 26, 2019. 
43 David B. Larter, “ T o Compete with China, An Internal Pentagon Study Looks to Pour Money into Robot Submarines,”  Defense News,  June 1, 2020. 
44 See,  for example, Hugh Lessig,  “Shipbuilder  Lends  a Hand with Rise of Robot Submarines,”  Defense News,  May 26, 2019. 
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The Navy states: 
Orca XLUUV  is a multi-phased accelerated acquisition effort using [Title 10] USC Sec. 2358  [acquisition] authorities [for research and development projects] to rapidly deliver capability to the Fleet. 
Phase 1 was a competitively sourced design effort. Two design contracts were awarded to Industry in FY 2017. 
Phase 2 commenced with a down select in FY  2019  to one of the Phase 1 vendors for fabrication and testing of  the vehicle  and support  elements. Five  (5)  Orca  XLUUV operationally relevant  prototype systems  (vehicles, mobile C2  equipment, and support equipment) are  being fabricated for  demonstration and use by the  Fleet.  Additional XLUUV  technologies/capabilities risk reduction will  occur in  parallel,  leveraging the competitive Industrial base.36 
Phase 3 provides the option to fabricate up to four (4) additional systems from the vendor who fabricated vehicles in Phase 2. Fabrication award of these additional Orca XLUUV systems is planned to be no earlier  than FY24.  Transition to an Acquisition Category (ACAT)  Program  and  production may  occur as  early  as  FY24,  pending successful completion of Government testing.37 
                                              30 Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Unmanned Campaign Framework, March 16, 2021, p. 16. 31 Richard R. Burgess,  “ Navy’s Orca XLUUV  to Have Mine-Laying Mission, Adm. Kilby Says,”  Seapower, March 18, 2021. 
32 For a discussion  of the Hammerhead mine, see, for example, David Hambling,  “ With Hammerhead Mine, U.S. Navy Plots New Style Of Warfare T o T ip Balance In South China Sea,”  Forbes, October 22, 2020. 33 Department of Defense, Contracts for Feb. 13, 2019. 34 Department of Defense, Contracts for March 27, 2019. 35 See,  for example, Hugh Lessig,  “Shipbuilder  Lends  a Hand with Rise of Robot Submarines,”  Defense News,  May 26, 2019. 36 T he Navy states: “ T esting and delivery of the vehicles and support elements has been delayed  to FY22 due  to contractor challenges and supplier issues.  T he Navy is working with Boeing  to mitigate schedule delays  and execute risk reduction testing under prototyping effort.” (Departm ent of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estim ates, Navy Justification Book Volum e 2 of 5, Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy , May 2021, p. 1301.) 
37 T he Navy states: “ Fabrication awards of additional Orca XLUUV  systems are planned for FY24 and out, gradually ramping up quantities in future fiscal years, depending on the progress from the first five systems. ” (Departm ent of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estim ates, Navy Justification Book Volum e 2 of 5, Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, May 2021, p. 1301.) 
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XLUUV  will  have a modular payload bay, including a universal payload module, with defined interfaces that current and future payloads must adhere to for employment from the vehicle. The Hammerhead [mine] payload is the next payload for integration with Orca XLUUV.  Other  potential future payloads, advanced  energy solutions, and enhanced autonomy and command and control will  be developed and evaluated  under the Core Technologies  PE [program element in  the Navy’s research  and development account] 0604029N,  and/or by other Science and technology organizations, and integrated into Orca XLUUV  when ready. 
The Navy is concurrently updating facilities at the Naval Base Ventura County site for XLUUV  testing, training, and work-ups, in coordination with large unmanned surface vessel testing for cost efficiencies. In parallel, the Navy is evaluating options for future far-forward basing locations.38 
Boeing’s Orca XLUUV  design wil  be informed by (but wil  differ in certain respects from) the design of Boeing’s Echo Voyager UUV  (Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13).39 Echo Voyager is roughly the size of a subway car—it is 51 feet long and has a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet 
by 8.5 feet, a weight in the air of 50 tons, and a range of up to 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a modular payload section up to 34 feet in length, increasing its length to as much as 85 feet. A 34-foot modular payload section provides about 2,000 cubic feet of internal payload volume; a shorter (14-foot) section provides about 900 cubic feet. Echo Voyager can also 
about 900 cubic feet. Echo Voyager can also accommodate external payloads.accommodate external payloads.
4540 The Navy states  The Navy states 
that the XLUUV that the XLUUV 
is  based off Boeing’s Echo Voyager, but incorporates significant changes to support 
is  based off Boeing’s Echo Voyager, but incorporates significant changes to support 
military  mission  requirements.  This  has  resulted  in  challenges  in  establishing  the military  mission  requirements.  This  has  resulted  in  challenges  in  establishing  the 
manufacturing process, building up the industrial base, and aligning material purchases to manufacturing process, building up the industrial base, and aligning material purchases to 
produce the  first  group of  prototype vehicles. Orca  represents the  leading edge  of produce the  first  group of  prototype vehicles. Orca  represents the  leading edge  of 
autonomous  maritime  vehicle  technology  and  will  have  extended  range  and  a autonomous  maritime  vehicle  technology  and  will  have  extended  range  and  a 
reconfigurable, modular  payload  bay  to  support multiple  payloads and a  variety  of reconfigurable, modular  payload  bay  to  support multiple  payloads and a  variety  of 
missions.missions.
46 
Figure 11. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV 
 
Source: Boeing photograph posted at https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/index.page#/gal ery. 
                                              4541 
                                              38 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, May 2021, p. 1306. 39 See,  for example, Hugh Lessig,  “Shipbuilder  Lends  a Hand with Rise of Robot Submarines,”  Defense News,  May 26, 2019. 
40 Source:  Boeing product sheet on Echo Voyager,  accessed  May 31, 2019, at https://www.boeing.com/resources/ Source:  Boeing product sheet on Echo Voyager,  accessed  May 31, 2019, at https://www.boeing.com/resources/
boeingdotcom/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/echo_voyager_product_sheet.pdf. boeingdotcom/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/echo_voyager_product_sheet.pdf. 
4641 Statement of Fredrick J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and  Statement of Fredrick J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
AcquisitionAcquisi tion  (ASN  [RD&A]) and Vice  Admiral James W. Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems and (ASN  [RD&A]) and Vice  Admiral James W. Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems and 
Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration & Commanding Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration & Commanding 
General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the House Armed Services  Committee Subcommittee General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the House Armed Services  Committee Subcommittee 
on Seapower  and Projection Forces, on Department of the Navy Unmanned Systems, March 18,on Seapower  and Projection Forces, on Department of the Navy Unmanned Systems, March 18,
   2021, p. 12.2021, p. 12.
   
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Figure 1211. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV 
 
 
Source: Boeing photograph posted at https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/Boeing photograph posted at https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/
index.page#/gal ery. index.page#/gal ery. 
Figure 1312. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV 
 
Source: Boeing photograph posted at https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/index.page#/gal ery. 
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Figure 13. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV 
 
Source: Navy briefing entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems,”  Howard Berkof,  Deputy Program Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems,  PMS 406, Distribution A: Approved for public release;  distribution unlimited, October 23, 2019, slide 5. 
Issues for Congress The Navy’s proposals for developing and procuring the large UVs covered in this report pose a 
number of oversight issues for Congress, including those discussed below. 
Analytical Basis for More Distributed Fleet Architecture One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the analytical basis for the Navy’s desire to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture featuring a significant contribution from large UVs. 
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
  What Navy analyses led to the Navy’s decision to shift toward a more distributed 
architecture?  
  What did these analyses show regarding the relative costs, capabilities, and risks 
of the Navy’s current architecture and the more distributed architecture? 
  How wel  developed, and how wel  tested, are the operational concepts 
associated with the more distributed architecture? 
The Navy states: 
As directed in the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act,42 the Navy is conducting a  Distributed Offensive Surface Fires  AoA [analysis of  alternatives] to compare the currently planned large unmanned surface vessel (LUSV)  with  an integrated  missile launcher payload against a broad range of alternative surface platforms and capabilities to determine the most appropriate vessel to deliver additional missile capability and capacity to  the surface force. We expect to complete this analysis and report our findings to Congress before the end of this calendar year.43 
                                              42 Section 227(e) of H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021. 43 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
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Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s concept of operations 
(CONOPS) for these large UVs, meaning the Navy’s understanding at a detailed level of how it wil  operate these UVs in conjunction with manned Navy ships in various operational scenarios, . Boeing Echo Voyager UUV 
 
Source: Navy briefing entitled “Unmanned Maritime  Systems,”  Howard Berkof,  Deputy Program Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems,  PMS 406, Distribution A: Approved for public release;  distribution unlimited, October 23, 2019, slide 5. 
FY2021-FY2025 Funding 
Table 1 shows FY2021-FY2025 requested and programmed funding for the large UV programs 
covered in this report. 
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Table 1. FY2021-FY2025 Requested and Programmed Funding for Large UVs 
Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to nearest tenth 
FY21-
FY25 
Program 
FY21 
FY22 
FY23 
FY24 
FY25 
total 
LUSV research and development  funding 
238.6 
377.2 
144.5 
198.7 
134.9 
1,093.9 
(Quantity—prototype  LUSVs) 
(2) 
(1) 
(0) 
(0) 
(0) 
(3) 
LUSV (procurement funding 
0 
0 
455.0 
373.6 
536.6 
1,365.2 
(Quantity—deployable  LUSVs) 
(0) 
(0) 
(2) 
(2) 
(3) 
(7) 
MUSV research and development funding 
26.3 
30.0 
43.0 
43.9 
44.7 
187.9 
(Quantity—prototype  MUSVs) 
(0) 
(0) 
(1) 
(0) 
(0) 
(1) 
LUSV and MUSV enabling technologies 
199.1 
122.8 
192.8 
77.9 
80.9 
673.9 
research and development funding 
XLUUV research  and development funding 
115.9 
43.0 
78.5 
77.0 
7.7 
322.1 
(Quantity) 
(0) 
(0) 
(0) 
(0) 
(0) 
(0) 
XLUUV procurement  funding 
0 
0 
158.5 
162.6 
232.8 
552.9 
(Quantity) 
(0) 
(0) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(6) 
Source: Navy FY2021 budget submission.  LUSV is Project 3066 within PE (Program Element) 0603178N (line 27 in the Navy’s FY2021 research  and development account). MUSV is  Project 3428 within PE 0603178N (line 27). LUSV and MUSV enabling technologies  is Project 3067 within PE 0603178N (line 27). XLUUV is Project 3394 within PE 0604536N (line 89). Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 
Issues for Congress 
The Navy’s proposals for developing and procuring the large UVs covered in this report pose a 
number of oversight issues for Congress, including those discussed below. 
Analytical Basis for More Distributed Fleet Architecture 
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the analytical basis for the Navy’s desire to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture featuring a significant contribution from large UVs. 
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
  What Navy analyses led to the Navy’s decision to shift toward a more distributed 
architecture?  
  What did these analyses show regarding the relative costs, capabilities, and risks 
of the Navy’s current architecture and the more distributed architecture? 
  How wel  developed, and how wel  tested, are the operational concepts 
associated with the more distributed architecture? 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s concept of operations (CONOPS) for these large UVs, meaning the Navy’s understanding at a detailed level of how it wil   operate these UVs in conjunction with manned Navy ships in various operational scenarios, 
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and consequently how, exactly, these UVs wil  fit into the Navy’s overal  force structure and and consequently how, exactly, these UVs wil  fit into the Navy’s overal  force structure and 
operations. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
operations. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
  How fully has the Navy developed its CONOPS for these large UVs? What 
  How fully has the Navy developed its CONOPS for these large UVs? What 
activities is the Navy undertaking to develop its CONOPS for them? 
activities is the Navy undertaking to develop its CONOPS for them? 
  What is the Navy’s CONOPS for using these large UVs in day-to-day, 
  What is the Navy’s CONOPS for using these large UVs in day-to-day, 
noncombat operations? 
noncombat operations? 
  How sensitive are the performance requirements that the Navy has established 
  How sensitive are the performance requirements that the Navy has established 
for these large UVs to potential changes in their CONOPS that may occur as the 
for these large UVs to potential changes in their CONOPS that may occur as the 
Navy continues to develop the CONOPS? How likely is it, if at al , that the Navy Navy continues to develop the CONOPS? How likely is it, if at al , that the Navy 
wil  have to change the performance requirements for these large UVs as a wil  have to change the performance requirements for these large UVs as a 
consequence of more fully developing their CONOPS? consequence of more fully developing their CONOPS? 
As mentioned earlier,  in May 2019, the Navy established a surface development squadron to help 
As mentioned earlier,  in May 2019, the Navy established a surface development squadron to help 
develop operational concepts for LUSVs and MUSVs. The squadron develop operational concepts for LUSVs and MUSVs. The squadron 
wil  was initial y  initial y  
to consist of a consist of a 
Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer and one Sea Hunter prototype medium displacement USV Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer and one Sea Hunter prototype medium displacement USV 
(Figure 4). A second Sea Hunter prototype . A second Sea Hunter prototype 
wil  reportedlyreportedly was to be added around the end of FY2020,  be added around the end of FY2020, 
and LUSVs and MUSVsand LUSVs and MUSVs
 wil    would then be added as they become available.then be added as they become available.
4744 A September 9, 2020,  A September 9, 2020, 
press report states: 
press report states: 
Development  squadrons working with  unmanned underwater and surface vehicles are 
Development  squadrons working with  unmanned underwater and surface vehicles are 
moving out quickly to develop concepts of operations and human-machine interfaces, even moving out quickly to develop concepts of operations and human-machine interfaces, even 
as they’re still using prototypes ahead of the delivery of fleet USVs and UUVs, officials as they’re still using prototypes ahead of the delivery of fleet USVs and UUVs, officials 
said this week. said this week. 
Capt.  Hank  Adams,  the  commodore  of  Surface  Development  Squadron  One 
Capt.  Hank  Adams,  the  commodore  of  Surface  Development  Squadron  One 
(SURFDEVRON),  is planning an upcoming weeks -long experiment with  sailors in an (SURFDEVRON),  is planning an upcoming weeks -long experiment with  sailors in an 
unmanned operations center (UOC) ashore commanding and controlling an Overlord USV unmanned operations center (UOC) ashore commanding and controlling an Overlord USV 
that the Navy hasn’t even taken ownership of from the Pentagon, in a bid to get a head start that the Navy hasn’t even taken ownership of from the Pentagon, in a bid to get a head start 
on figuring out what the command and control process looks like and what the supervisory on figuring out what the command and control process looks like and what the supervisory 
control system must allow sailors to do. control system must allow sailors to do. 
And Cmdr. Rob Patchin, commanding officer of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron 
And Cmdr. Rob Patchin, commanding officer of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron 
One (UUVRON-1),  is pushing the limits of his test vehicles to send the program office a One (UUVRON-1),  is pushing the limits of his test vehicles to send the program office a 
list of vehicle behaviors that his operators need their UUVs to have that the commercial list of vehicle behaviors that his operators need their UUVs to have that the commercial 
prototypes today don’t have. 
The  two  spoke during  a  panel  at  the  Association for  Unmanned Vehicle  Systems International (AUVSI) annual defense conference on Tuesday, and made clear that they want to have the fleet trained and ready to start using UUVs and USVs when industry is ready to deliver them.48 
An October 30, 2020, press report stated: 
The Navy is set to complete and release a concept of operations for the medium and large unmanned  surface vehicles  in “the next  few  months,” a  Navy spokesman told Inside Defense. 
                                              47 See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Stands Up Surface  Development Squadron  for DDG-1000, Unmanned Experimentation,” USNI News, May 22, 2019; David B.  Larter, “With Billions Planned in Funding,  the US  Navy Charts Its Unmanned Future,” Defense News,  May 6, 2019. See also Michael Fabey, “USN Seeks  Path for Unmanned Systems Operational Concepts,” Jane’s Navy International, May 16, 2019. 48 Megan Eckstein, “ USV, UUV  Squadrons  T esting Out Concepts Ahead of Delivery of T heir Vehicles,”  USNI News, September 9, 2020. 
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prototypes today don’t have. 
                                              Acquisition (ASN  (RD&A)) and Vice  Admiral James  W. Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities  (OPNAV N9) and Lieutenant General Eric M. Smith, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Dev elopment Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower  of the Senate Armed Services  Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2022 Budget  Request  for Seapower,  June  8, 2021, p. 14. See also Jason Sherman, “ Navy considering alternatives to LUSV, packing amphibs, commercial designs  more with long-range missiles,”  Inside Defense, April 9, 2021. 
44 See,  for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Stands Up Surface  Development Squadron  for DDG-1000, Unmanned Experimentation,” USNI News, May 22, 2019; David B.  Larter, “With Billions Planned in Funding,  the US  Navy Charts Its Unmanned Future,” Defense News,  May 6, 2019. See also Michael Fabey, “USN Seeks  Path for Unmanned Systems Operational Concepts,” Jane’s Navy International, May 16, 2019. 
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The  two  spoke during  a  panel  at  the  Association for  Unmanned Vehicle  Systems International (AUVSI) annual defense conference on Tuesday, and made clear that they want to have the fleet trained and ready to start using UUVs and USVs when industry is ready to deliver them.45 
An October 30, 2020, press report stated: 
The Navy is set to complete and release a concept of operations for the medium and large unmanned  surface vehicles  in “the next  few  months,” a  Navy spokesman told Inside Defense. 
Alan Baribeau, a spokesman for Naval Sea Systems Command, said the Navy extended 
Alan Baribeau, a spokesman for Naval Sea Systems Command, said the Navy extended 
the due date to allow for more flexibility  during the COVID-19 pandemic and allow for the due date to allow for more flexibility  during the COVID-19 pandemic and allow for 
sufficient time for review and staffing…. 
sufficient time for review and staffing…. 
The CONOPS is currently undergoing flag-level review after completing action officer-
The CONOPS is currently undergoing flag-level review after completing action officer-
level review as well as O6-level review, Baribeau said.level review as well as O6-level review, Baribeau said.
49 
Accelerated 46 
Acquisition Strategies and Funding Method 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the 
accelerated acquisition strategies that acquisition strategies that 
the Navy wants to use for these large UV programs. Potential oversight questions for Congress the Navy wants to use for these large UV programs. Potential oversight questions for Congress 
include the include the 
following: 
  Are the Navy’s proposed changes to the LUSV’s acquisition strategy appropriate 
and sufficient in terms of complying with Congress’s legislative provisions and 
providing enough time to develop operational concepts and key technologies before entering into serial production of deployable units? following: 
  What are the potential costs, benefits, and risks of pursuing these accelerated 
strategies rather than a more traditional acquisition approach that would spend more time developing the technologies and operational concepts for these UVs 
prior to putting them into serial production? How are those considerations affected by the shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to the new era of renewed major power competition?50 
  Are the Navy’s proposed changes to the LUSV’s accelerated acquisition strategy 
appropriate and sufficient?  
  To what degree, if any, can these large UV programs contribute to new 
  To what degree, if any, can these large UV programs contribute to new 
approaches for defense acquisition that are intended to respond to the new 
approaches for defense acquisition that are intended to respond to the new 
internationalinternational
   security environment? security environment? 
Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the amount of technical, schedule, and Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the amount of technical, schedule, and 
cost risk in these programs, particularly given that these platforms potential y are to operate at sea cost risk in these programs, particularly given that these platforms potential y are to operate at sea 
unmanned and semi-autonomously or autonomously for extended periods of time. Potential unmanned and semi-autonomously or autonomously for extended periods of time. Potential 
oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
  How much risk of this kind do these programs pose, particularly given the 
  How much risk of this kind do these programs pose, particularly given the 
enabling technologies that need to be developed for them?  
enabling technologies that need to be developed for them?  
  In addition to the Navy’s proposed changes to the LUSV’s acquisition strategy, 
  In addition to the Navy’s proposed changes to the LUSV’s acquisition strategy, 
what is the Navy doing to mitigate or manage cost, schedule, and technical risks 
what is the Navy doing to mitigate or manage cost, schedule, and technical risks 
while it seeks to deploy these UVswhile it seeks to deploy these UVs
 on an accelerated acquisition timeline? Are ? Are 
these risk-mitigation and risk-management efforts appropriate and sufficient?  these risk-mitigation and risk-management efforts appropriate and sufficient?  
  At what point would technical problems, schedule delays, or cost growth in these 
  At what point would technical problems, schedule delays, or cost growth in these 
programs require a reassessment of the Navy’s plan to shift from the current fleet 
programs require a reassessment of the Navy’s plan to shift from the current fleet 
architecture to a more distributed architecture? architecture to a more distributed architecture? 
A June 1, 2020, press report states 
The U.S.  military  is banking on unmanned surface and subsurface vessels to boost its capacity in the face of a tsunami of Chinese naval spending. But before it can field the systems, it must answer some basic questions. 
                                              49 Aidan Quigley,  “ Navy Finishing Unmanned Surface  Vehicles  Concept of Operations ‘in Next Few Months,’” Inside 
Defense, October 30, 2020. 50 For more on this shift, see CRS  Report R43838, Renewed Great Power  Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald  O'Rourke. 
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                                              45 Megan Eckstein, “ USV, UUV  Squadrons  T esting Out Concepts Ahead of Delivery of T heir Vehicles,”  USNI News, September 9, 2020. 46 Aidan Quigley,  “ Navy Finishing Unmanned Surface  Vehicles  Concept of Operations ‘in Next Few Months,’” Inside Defense, October 30, 2020. 
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A June 1, 2020, press report states 
The U.S.  military  is banking on unmanned surface and subsurface vessels to boost its capacity in the face of a tsunami of Chinese naval spending. But before it can field the systems, it must answer some basic questions. 
How will  these systems deploy? How will they be supported overseas? Who will support 
How will  these systems deploy? How will they be supported overseas? Who will support 
them? Can the systems be made sufficiently reliable to operate alone and unafraid on the them? Can the systems be made sufficiently reliable to operate alone and unafraid on the 
open ocean for weeks at a  time?  Will  the systems be able to communicate in  denied open ocean for weeks at a  time?  Will  the systems be able to communicate in  denied 
environments? environments? 
As the Navy goes all-in on its unmanned future, with billions of dollars of investments 
As the Navy goes all-in on its unmanned future, with billions of dollars of investments 
planed, how the service answers those questions will be crucial to the success or failure of planed, how the service answers those questions will be crucial to the success or failure of 
its unmanned pivot.its unmanned pivot.
5147  
A June 23, 2020, press report states 
A June 23, 2020, press report states 
The Navy’s transition from prototype to program of record for its portfolio of unmanned 
The Navy’s transition from prototype to program of record for its portfolio of unmanned 
surface and undersea  systems  is being aided by  industry, international partners and surface and undersea  systems  is being aided by  industry, international partners and 
developmental squadrons, even as thedevelopmental squadrons, even as the
   program office seeks to ease concerns  that the program office seeks to ease concerns  that the 
transition is happening too fast, the program executive officer for unmanned and smal  transition is happening too fast, the program executive officer for unmanned and smal  
combatants said today. combatants said today. 
Rear Adm. Casey Moton said he’s aware of concerns regarding how unmanned systems – 
Rear Adm. Casey Moton said he’s aware of concerns regarding how unmanned systems – 
particularly the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel – will be developed and used by the fleet, particularly the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel – will be developed and used by the fleet, 
but he’s confident in his team’s path forward. but he’s confident in his team’s path forward. 
“From my standpoint we are making a lot of great progress in working out the technical 
“From my standpoint we are making a lot of great progress in working out the technical 
maturity, answering those kinds of questions (about how to employ and sustain the vessels) maturity, answering those kinds of questions (about how to employ and sustain the vessels) 
and getting the requirements right before we move into production,” he said in a virtual 
and getting the requirements right before we move into production,” he said in a virtual 
event today co-hosted by the  U.S.  Naval  Institute  and the Center for  Strategic and event today co-hosted by the  U.S.  Naval  Institute  and the Center for  Strategic and 
International Studies.International Studies.
5248  
An August 17, 2020, press report states 
An August 17, 2020, press report states 
As the U.S.  Navy pushes forward with developing its large unmanned surface vessel, 
As the U.S.  Navy pushes forward with developing its large unmanned surface vessel, 
envisioned as a kind of external missile magazine that will tag along with larger manned envisioned as a kind of external missile magazine that will tag along with larger manned 
surface combatants, a growing consensus  is forming  that the surface combatants, a growing consensus  is forming  that the 
service need ss ervice needs  to get its   to get its 
requirements and systems right before making a big investment.… requirements and systems right before making a big investment.… 
In an exclusive July 16 interview with Defense News, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. 
In an exclusive July 16 interview with Defense News, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. 
Michael  Gilday  said  that  while  the  [congressional]  marks  [on  the  program]  were Michael  Gilday  said  that  while  the  [congressional]  marks  [on  the  program]  were 
frustrating, he agreed with Congress that requirements must be concrete right up front. frustrating, he agreed with Congress that requirements must be concrete right up front. 
“The approach has to be deliberate,” Gilday said. “We have to make sure that the systems 
“The approach has to be deliberate,” Gilday said. “We have to make sure that the systems 
that are on those unmanned systems with respect to the [hull, mechanical and electrical that are on those unmanned systems with respect to the [hull, mechanical and electrical 
system], that they are designed to requirement, and perform to requirement. And most system], that they are designed to requirement, and perform to requirement. And most 
importantly, are those requirements sound? importantly, are those requirements sound? 
“I go back to [a question from years ago relating to the development of the Navy’s Littoral 
“I go back to [a question from years ago relating to the development of the Navy’s Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS)]:  Do I really need a littoral combat ship to go 40 knots? That’s going Combat Ship (LCS)]:  Do I really need a littoral combat ship to go 40 knots? That’s going 
to drive the entire design of the ship, not just the engineering plant but how it’s built. That to drive the entire design of the ship, not just the engineering plant but how it’s built. That 
becomes a critical factor. If you take your eye off the ball with respect to requirements, you becomes a critical factor. If you take your eye off the ball with respect to requirements, you 
can find yourself drifting. That has to be deliberate.” can find yourself drifting. That has to be deliberate.” 
Gilday has called for the Navy to pursue a comprehensive “Unmanned Campaign Plan” that creates a path forward for developing and fielding unmanned systems in the air, on the sea and under the water. Right now, the effort exists in a number of different programs that may not all be pulling in the same direction, he said. 
                                              51
                                              47 David B. Larter, “ David B. Larter, “
 US Navy Embraces Robot Ships,  But Some Unresolved Issues  Are Holding  T hem Back,” US Navy Embraces Robot Ships,  But Some Unresolved Issues  Are Holding  T hem Back,” 
Defense 
News,  June 1, 2020. See also Bryan Clark, “ Pentagon Needs T o Go Faster—And Slower—On  Unmanned Systems,” ,  June 1, 2020. See also Bryan Clark, “ Pentagon Needs T o Go Faster—And Slower—On  Unmanned Systems,” 
Forbes, June  11, 2020. , June  11, 2020. 
5248 Megan Eckstein, “ Program Office Maturing USVs,  UUVs  With Help From Industry, International Partners,”  Megan Eckstein, “ Program Office Maturing USVs,  UUVs  With Help From Industry, International Partners,” 
USNI 
News,  June 23, 2020. ,  June 23, 2020. 
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Gilday has called for the Navy to pursue a comprehensive “Unmanned Campaign Plan” that creates a path forward for developing and fielding unmanned systems in the air, on the sea and under the water. Right now, the effort exists in a number of different programs that may not all be pulling in the same direction, he said. 
“What I’ve found is that we didn’t necessarily have the rigor that’s required across a “What I’ve found is that we didn’t necessarily have the rigor that’s required across a 
number of  programs that would bring those  together in  a  way  that’snumber of  programs that would bring those  together in  a  way  that’s
   driven toward driven toward 
objectives with milestones,” Gilday told Defense News. “If you took a look at [all  the 
objectives with milestones,” Gilday told Defense News. “If you took a look at [all  the 
programs], where are  there similarities  and where are  there differences? Where  am I programs], where are  there similarities  and where are  there differences? Where  am I 
making progress in meeting conditions and meeting milestones that we can leverage in making progress in meeting conditions and meeting milestones that we can leverage in 
other experiments? other experiments? 
“At what point do I reach a decision point where I drop a program and double down on a 
“At what point do I reach a decision point where I drop a program and double down on a 
program that I can accelerate?”program that I can accelerate?”
5349  
A September 8, 2020, press report states: 
A September 8, 2020, press report states: 
Several Navy program officials and resource sponsors today outlined how they’ll spend 
Several Navy program officials and resource sponsors today outlined how they’ll spend 
the next  couple years giving Congress enough confidence in  unmanned surface and the next  couple years giving Congress enough confidence in  unmanned surface and 
underwater vehicles to allow the service to move from prototyping into programs of record. underwater vehicles to allow the service to move from prototyping into programs of record. 
Across the entire family of USVs and UUVs, the Navy has 
Across the entire family of USVs and UUVs, the Navy has 
pro totypesprototypes in the water today  in the water today 
for experimentation and in tandem is making plans to design and buy the next better vehicle for experimentation and in tandem is making plans to design and buy the next better vehicle 
or more advanced payloads, with the idea that the service will iterate its way to achieve or more advanced payloads, with the idea that the service will iterate its way to achieve 
congressional confidence and authorization to move forward on buying these unmanned congressional confidence and authorization to move forward on buying these unmanned 
systems in bulk. systems in bulk. 
Rear  Adm.  Casey  Moton, the  program  executive  officer  for  unmanned  and small 
Rear  Adm.  Casey  Moton, the  program  executive  officer  for  unmanned  and small 
combatants, spoke today at the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International combatants, spoke today at the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International 
(AUVSI) annual defense conference and provided an update on the status of his portfolio (AUVSI) annual defense conference and provided an update on the status of his portfolio 
of UUVs and USVs, some of which have run into trouble with lawmakers not convinced of UUVs and USVs, some of which have run into trouble with lawmakers not convinced 
of their technical maturity and their tactical utility. of their technical maturity and their tactical utility. 
Anticipating audience questions, he said in his speech, “what about Congress? What about 
Anticipating audience questions, he said in his speech, “what about Congress? What about 
the marks and the report language and the questions? So I’m going to put some of that into the marks and the report language and the questions? So I’m going to put some of that into 
context from my perspective. I believe the discussion with Congress has not been about if context from my perspective. I believe the discussion with Congress has not been about if 
unmanned vessels will be part of the Navy. ‘If’ has not been the focus. I don’t even believe 
unmanned vessels will be part of the Navy. ‘If’ has not been the focus. I don’t even believe 
right now that ‘if’ is a major question. The focus has been on ‘how,’ with a healthy dose right now that ‘if’ is a major question. The focus has been on ‘how,’ with a healthy dose 
of ‘what,’ in  terms of requirements and mission type. And of course, ‘how many’ is a 
of ‘what,’ in  terms of requirements and mission type. And of course, ‘how many’ is a 
question. How many, I will  not focus on today. How many is dependent on Navy and question. How many, I will  not focus on today. How many is dependent on Navy and 
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] force structure work. But for PEO USC, how many is [Office of the Secretary of Defense] force structure work. But for PEO USC, how many is 
ultimately important, but our focus now in this prototyping and experimentation and ultimately important, but our focus now in this prototyping and experimentation and 
development phase is on the how, and working with our requirements sponsors and the development phase is on the how, and working with our requirements sponsors and the 
fleet on the what.” 
fleet on the what.” 
The most ambitious part of the Navy’s current plan calls for the start of a Large  USV 
The most ambitious part of the Navy’s current plan calls for the start of a Large  USV 
program of record in Fiscal Year 2023, despite the LUSV being the piece of the family of program of record in Fiscal Year 2023, despite the LUSV being the piece of the family of 
USVs that Congress takes issue with the most. The Navy intends for these ships to be USVs that Congress takes issue with the most. The Navy intends for these ships to be 
armed with vertical launch system cells to fire off defensive and offensive missiles—with armed with vertical launch system cells to fire off defensive and offensive missiles—with 
sailors onboard manned ships overseeing targeting and firing decisions, since there would sailors onboard manned ships overseeing targeting and firing decisions, since there would 
be no personnel on the LUSV.be no personnel on the LUSV.
54 
Annual Procurement Rates 
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s planned annual procurement rates for the LUSV and XLUUV  programs during the period FY2021-FY2025. Potential oversight50  
                                              
                                              5349 David B. Larter, “ In Developing Robot Warships, US Navy Wants to Avoid Another Littoral Combat Ship,”  David B. Larter, “ In Developing Robot Warships, US Navy Wants to Avoid Another Littoral Combat Ship,” 
Defense 
News,  August  17, 2020. See also Loren T hompson, “ U.S. Navy Mounts Campaign T o Convince Congress T hat ,  August  17, 2020. See also Loren T hompson, “ U.S. Navy Mounts Campaign T o Convince Congress T hat 
Unmanned Vessels  Are Critical T o Winning Future Wars,” Unmanned Vessels  Are Critical T o Winning Future Wars,” 
Forbes, August  17, 2020. , August  17, 2020. 
5450 Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Pushing to Maintain 2023 USV Program of Record T imeline,”  Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Pushing to Maintain 2023 USV Program of Record T imeline,” 
USNI News,  September 8, ,  September 8, 
2020. 2020. 
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questions for Congress include, What factors did the Navy consider in arriving at them, and in 
light of these factors, are these rates too high, too low, or about right? 
Industrial Base Implications 
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial base implications of these large UV programs as part of a shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, particularly since UVs like these can be built and maintained  by facilities other than the shipyards that currently build the Navy’s major combatant ships. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the 
following: 
  What implications would the more distributed architecture have for required 
numbers, annual procurement rates, and maintenance workloads for large surface 
combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers) and smal  surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat Ships)?  
  What portion of these UVs might be built or maintained by facilities other than 
shipyards that currently build the Navy’s major combatant ships?55 
  To what degree, if any, might the more distributed architecture and these large 
UV programs change the current distribution of Navy shipbuilding and maintenance work, and what implications might that have for workloads and employment levels at various production and maintenance facilities?  
Potential Implications for Miscalculation or Escalation at Sea 
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential implications of large UVs, particularly large USVs, for the chance of miscalculation or escalation in when U.S. Navy forces are operating in waters near potential adversaries. Some observers have expressed concern about 
this issue. A June 28, 2019, opinion column, for example, states 
The immediate danger from militarized artificial intelligence isn't hordes of killer robots, nor the exponential pace of a new arms race. 
As recent events in the Strait of Hormuz indicate, the bigger risk is the fact that autonomous military craft make for temping targets—and increase the potential for miscalculation on and above the high seas. 
While less provocative than planes, vehicles, or ships with human crew or troops aboard, unmanned systems are also perceived as relatively expendable. Danger arises when they lower the threshold for military action. 
It is a development with serious implications in volatile regions far beyond the Gulf—not least the South China Sea, where the U.S. has recently confronted both China and Russia…. 
As autonomous systems proliferate in  the air  and on the  ocean,  [opposing] military commanders may feel emboldened to strike these platforms, expecting lower repercussions by avoiding the loss of human life. 
Consider when Chinese naval personnel in a small boat seized an unmanned American underwater survey glider56 in the sea approximately 100 kilometers off the Philippines in 
                                              55 For an opinion piece addressing  this issue,  see Collin Fox, “ Distributed Manufacturing for Distributed Lethality,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), February 26, 2021.  56 A glider  is a type of UUV. T he glider  in question was  a few  feet in length and resembled  a small torpedo with a pair of wings.  For a press report about the seizure of th e glider, see, for example, Sam  LaGrone, “ Updated: Chinese Seize U.S.  Navy Unmanned Vehicle,”  USNI News,  December 16, 2016. 
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December 2016. The winged, torpedo-shaped unit was within sight of its handlers aboard the U.S.  Navy oceanographic vessel Bowditch, who gaped in  astonishment as it  was summarily  hoisted aboard a Chinese warship less than a kilometer  distant. The U.S. responded with a diplomatic demarche and congressional opprobrium, and the glider was returned within the week…. 
In  coming years, the Chinese military  will  find  increasingly plentiful opportunities to intercept American autonomous systems. The 40-meter prototype trimaran Sea Hunter, an experimental submarine-tracking vessel, recently transited between Hawaii and San Diego without human intervention. It has yet to be used operationally, but it is only a matter of time before such vessels are deployed…. 
China’s navy may find intercepting such unmanned and unchaperoned surface vessels or mini-submarines too tantalizing to pass up, especially if Washington’s meek retort to the 2016 glider incident is seen as an indication of American permissiveness or timidity. 
With a captive vessel, persevering Chinese technicians could attempt to bypass anti-tamper mechanisms, and if successful, proceed to siphon off communication codes or proprietary artificial  intelligence software, download navigational data or pre-programmed rules of engagement, or  probe for cyber vulnerabilities that could be exploited against similar vehicles…. 
Nearly 100,000  ships transit the strategically vital Singapore Strait annually, where more than 75 collisions or groundings occurred last year alone. In such congested international sea lanes, declaring a foreign navy’s autonomous vessel wayward or unresponsive would easily serve as convenient rationale for towing it into territorial waters for impo undment, or for boarding it straightaway…. 
A memorandum of understanding signed five years ago by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese defense ministry, as well as the collaborative code of naval conduct created at the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium, should be updated with an expanded right-of-way hierarchy and non-interference standards to clarify how manned ships and aircraft should interact with their autonomous counterparts. Without such guidance, the risk of miscalculation increases. 
An incident without any immediate human presence or losses could nonetheless trigger unexpected escalation and spark the next conflict.57 
Personnel Implications 
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential personnel implications of incorporating a significant number of large UVs into the Navy’s fleet architecture. Potential 
questions for Congress include the following:  
  What implications might these large UVs have for the required skil s, training, 
and career paths of Navy personnel?  
  Within the Navy, what wil  be the relationship between personnel who crew 
manned ships and those who operate these large UVs? 
                                              57 Evan Karlik, “US-China T ensions—Unmanned Military Craft Raise Risk  of War,” Nikkei  Asian Review, June  28, 2019. See also David B.  Larter, “ T he US Navy Says  It’s Doing Its Best to Avoid a ‘T erminator’ Scenario in Quest for Autonomous Weapons,” Defense News,  September 12, 2019; David Axe, “ Autonomous Navies Could  Make War More Likely,” National Interest, August  17, 2020. 
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 link to page 32 Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
Annual Funding 
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the funding amounts for these programs that the 
Navy has requested for these programs for FY2021. Potential oversight questions for Congress 
include the following: 
  Has the Navy accurately priced the work on these programs that it is proposing to 
do in FY2021?  
  To what degree, if any, has funding been requested ahead of need? To what 
degree, if any, is the Navy insufficiently funding elements of the work to be done in FY2021?  
  How might the timelines for these programs be affected by a decision to reduce 
(or add to) the Navy’s requested amounts for these programs? 
Legislative Activity for FY2022 
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget wil  be submitted to Congress later this year. 
Legislative Activity for FY2021 
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request 
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2021 funding request for the LUSV, 
MUSV, and XLUUV  programs and their enabling technologies. 
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2021 Large UV Funding Request 
Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to the nearest tenth 
 
 
Authorization 
Appropriation 
 
Request 
HASC 
SASC 
Conf. 
HAC 
SAC 
Conf. 
Navy research and development  account 
MUSVs and LUSVs (Line 27, Projects 3066, 3067, 3428) 
464.0 
270.4 
0 
259.2 
259.2 
91.2 
93.7 
MUSVs (Line 27A) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55.4 
55.4 
XLUUV (Line 89, Project 3394) 
115.9 
105.9 
95.9 
92.6 
80.2 
115.9 
89.8 
TOTAL 
579.9 
376.3 
95.9 
351.8 
339.4 
262.5 
238.9 
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2021 Navy budget submission,  committee  and conference reports, and explanatory statements on the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act and the FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act. Notes: LUSV is Project 3066 within PE (Program Element) 0603178N (line 27 in the Navy’s FY2021 research and development  account). MUSV is Project 3428 within PE 0603178N (line 27). LUSV and MUSV enabling technologies is Project 3067 within PE 0603178N (line 27). XLUUV is Project 3394 within PE 0604536N (line 89). HASC is House Armed  Services  Committee;  SASC is Senate Armed  Services  Committee;  HAC is House Appropriations Committee;  SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee;  Conf. is conference agreement. 
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 link to page 32 A March 26, 2021, press report about a March 18, 2021, hearing on Department of the Navy unmanned vehicle programs before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the 
House Armed Services Committee stated: 
On the unmanned underwater vehicle side, the Navy’s largest vehicle in development is hitting some snags, though [Vice Adm. Jim Kilby, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfighting requirements and capabilities (OPNAV N9)]  said it was a production issue more than a fundamental issue with the service’s requirements. 
Kilby said the Navy wanted the Orca Extra Large UUV to lay mines in the water, among other clandestine operations. But building a UUV that can do that is more complex than it sounds, he told lawmakers. 
“I’ve got to avoid fishing nets and sea mounts and currents and all the things. I’ve got to be able to communicate with it, sustain it. I’ve got to maybe be able to tell it to abort a mission,  which  means  it  has  to  come  up  to  the  surface and  communicate, or  get 
communications from its current depth. Those are all  complexities we’ve got to work through with the [concept of operations] of this vehicle,” he said. 
“In its development, though, there have been delays with the contractor that we’re working through, and we want to aggressively work with them to pursue, to get this vehicle down to Port Hueneme so we can start testing it and understand its capabilities. And to me the challenges will be all those things – the C2, the endurance, the delivery of the payload, the ability to change mission potentially – those are all things we have to deliver to meet the 
needs of the combatant commander.” 
Boeing is on contract to build five XLUUVs, which were supposed to be delivered by 2022. Construction on the first  vessel didn’t begin until  late  last  year,  though, and Kilby categorized the program as alive but delayed. 
Asked by seapower subcommittee chairman Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) if  Orca was proving to be a program that had failed and the Navy needed to cut its losses on, Kilby said, “I think we’re going to get these first five vessels, and in the spirit of the committee, 
we want to make sure we’ve got it right before we go build something else. I think it’s 
scoped out ideally, we’ve got to get through those technical and operational challenges to go deliver on the capability we’re trying to close on.” 
He  said earlier  in  the hearing that “we are pursuing that vehicle because  we have an operational need from a combatant commander to go solve this specific problem. That 
vessel really hasn’t operated – the XLUUV is, as you know, a migration from the Echo Voyager from Boeing with a mission module placed in the middle of it to initially carry mines. We need to get that initial prototype built and start employing it start seeing if we can achieve the requirements to go do that mission set. And I think, to the point so far made 
several times, if we can’t meet our milestones, we need to critically look at that and decide if  we have to pursue another model or another methodology to get after that combatant need. But in the case of the XLUUV, we haven’t even had enough run time with that vessel 
to make that determination yet. Certainly, there’s challenges with that vehicle, though.”51 
An April  13, 2021, press report states: 
The Navy is making arrangements for land-based testing of its Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel prototype and eyeing similar plans for its Large USV, as the sea service tries to get Congress on board with its plans to rapidly field unmanned vehicles in all domains to create a hybrid manned-unmanned force. 
Rear  Adm.  Casey  Moton, the  program  executive  officer  for  unmanned  and small combatants, said today at an event hosted by AUVSI [Association for Unmanned Vehicle 
                                              51 Megan Eckstein, “ Status Report: Navy Unmanned Aerial, Subsurface  Platforms,” USNI News, March 26, 2021. 
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Systems International] that the Navy and Pentagon already have four medium and large USV prototypes in the water today and will have three more delivered in the next few years. 
“The testing we’re doing at sea on those systems is very important for [hull, mechanical and electrical  systems], and we’re  going to continue that. Where we  have definitely expanded our plans is on the land-based side,” he said. 
The Navy’s pitch was to begin buying prototype vessels in numbers so the service could learn a lot about both HM&E [hull, mechanical, and electrical] component reliability and USV  concepts of operations before beginning a program of record to buy new vessels in bulk. Lawmakers  had concerns that the Navy wouldn’t be able to collect enough data before beginning the programs of record and have insisted the Navy invest in land-based testing to wring out components that will have to be able to operate for weeks or months at sea without sailors around to perform routine maintenance or to take corrective action if something fails. 
Moton said during the event that he appreciates that leadership, including House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee chairman Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) and ranking member Rep. Rob Wittman (Va.), have expressed support for the idea of an unmanned fleet in general, and Moton promised that they’d see the Navy showing engineering rigor  in  every step along the way —including HM&E  reliability  testing, command and control testing, adjusting combat systems to operate on unmanned vehicles, developing common control stations, maturing autonomy software and more. 
On land-based testing, Moton said, “on the Medium USV, we are right now in the process of executing funding that we received from Congress to go do our work on Medium USV. We are going to have representative equipment that we are buying” that can be tested ashore, where the gear can be run without human preventative or corrective maintenance to see how reliable it would be on an unmanned vehicle operating independently. 
“We are buying equipment, and some of the plans specifically about where it’s going to go 
and the testing are still in the work, so I won’t say too much, but we are working on Medium USV land-based testing.” 
LUSV  land-based testing is a little farther down the road, he said, but some of the lessons from MUSV will apply directly to LUSV. 
“It is true that propulsion plants are not all the same, but a lot of the things that we’re doing – the ability to control machinery plants autonomously, the ability to improve the timeline between [planned maintenance], to do things that are relatively straightforward like shift a lube oil strainer without a human having to do it—those things scale between medium and 
large, so a lot of what we’re doing in Medium is going to scale directly to Large,” he said. 
“Where we are now going to add to our plan for Large is kind of at the big pieces of equipment, and some of this was in the [National Defense Authorization Act] for last year: the propulsion equipment, the electrical equipment. We’re still kind of working plans out, 
but our plan is to take representative pieces of equipment and to test them. I don’t want to 
get quite yet into specifics on where that’s going to happen or how that’s going to happen, because we’re kind of working that out right now, but we are going to go down that path.” 
Among the challenges is that neither the MUSV nor the LUSV has been designed yet—L3Harris  was selected last year to build an MUSV  prototype, and six  companies are working on LUSV  design trade studies—so there isn’t a specific propulsion system or electrical distribution system yet that needs to be tested for reliability. 
Moton said that the “representative pieces of equipment” that prove themselves in land-
based testing will  create  a  pool  of  “equipment that’s essentially been  through our 
qualification process to go on an LUSV, but we are also trying to come up with a way that’s flexible”  for  industry  to prove  that their components  meet Navy systems  engineering standards and congressional intent. He said the Navy is working with the American Bureau 
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of Shipping to develop a framework for qualifying HM&E components as reliable enough for use in USVs. 
Moton said much still remains to be determined on MUSV and LUSV—and that’s by design. Neither program has a formal capability development document (CDD) yet and are instead working off a less specific top-level requirement (TLR) document for now. Moton said that was done on purpose, to give industry more space to look at cost and capability tradeoffs between potential designs and potential Defense Department requirements. Al  the at-sea testing happening with the prototypes today, as well as the six LUSV  industry 
studies, will inform the path forward from today’s top-level requirements to more specific requirements that will shape what the vessels look like and what capabilities they have. 
To keep cost down and to open up opportunities to more shipyards, “we are working our best not to take just a typically manned combatant [specifications] and dial it back down; we are trying to start where we can the other way, kind of a clean sheet and only add requirements back in if they are necessary for the support of the functions of the ship,” Moton said.52 
Annual Procurement Rates Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s planned annual procurement rates for the LUSV and XLUUV  programs. Potential oversight questions for Congress include, What factors did the Navy consider in arriving at them, and in light of these factors, are these rates too 
high, too low, or about right? 
Industrial Base Implications Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial base implications of these 
large UV programs as part of a shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, particularly since UVs like these can be built and maintained  by facilities other than the shipyards that currently build the Navy’s major combatant ships. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the 
following: 
  What implications would the more distributed architecture have for required 
numbers, annual procurement rates, and maintenance workloads for large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers) and smal  surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat Ships)?  
  What portion of these UVs might be built or maintained by facilities other than 
shipyards that currently build the Navy’s major combatant ships?53 
  To what degree, if any, might the more distributed architecture and these large 
UV programs change the current distribution of Navy shipbuilding and maintenance work, and what implications might that have for workloads and employment levels at various production and maintenance facilities?  
Potential Implications for Miscalculation or Escalation at Sea Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential implications of large UVs, particularly large USVs, for the chance of miscalculation or escalation in when U.S. Navy forces                                               52 Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Developing Land-Based Unmanned Vehicle  T esting Sites as Early Design  Work Continues,” USNI News,  April 13, 2021. 53 For an opinion piece addressing  this issue,  see Collin Fox, “ Distributed Manufacturing for Distributed Lethality,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), February 26, 2021.  
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are operating in waters near potential adversaries. Some observers have expressed concern about 
this issue. A June 28, 2019, opinion column, for example, states 
The immediate danger from militarized artificial intelligence isn't hordes of killer robots, nor the exponential pace of a new arms race. 
As recent events in the Strait of Hormuz indicate, the bigger risk is the fact that autonomous military craft make for temping targets—and increase the potential for miscalculation on and above the high seas. 
While less provocative than planes, vehicles, or ships with human crew or troops aboard, unmanned systems are also perceived as relatively expendable. Danger arises when they lower the threshold for military action. 
It is a development with serious implications in volatile regions far beyond the Gulf—not least the South China Sea, where the U.S. has recently confronted both China and Russia…. 
As autonomous systems proliferate in  the air  and on the  ocean,  [opposing] military commanders may feel emboldened to strike these platforms, expecting lower repercussions by avoiding the loss of human life. 
Consider when Chinese naval personnel in a small boat seized an unmanned American underwater survey glider54 in the sea approximately 100 kilometers off the Philippines in December 2016. The winged, torpedo-shaped unit was within sight of its handlers aboard the U.S.  Navy oceanographic vessel Bowditch, who gaped in  astonishment as it  was summarily  hoisted aboard a Chinese warship less than a kilometer  distant. The U.S. responded with a diplomatic demarche and congressional opprobrium, and the glider was returned within the week…. 
In  coming years, the Chinese military  will  find  increasingly plentiful opportunities to intercept American autonomous systems. The 40-meter prototype trimaran Sea Hunter, an experimental submarine-tracking vessel, recently transited between Hawaii and San Diego without human intervention. It has yet to be used operationally, but it is only a matter of time before such vessels are deployed…. 
China’s navy may find intercepting such unmanned and unchaperoned surface vessels or mini-submarines too tantalizing to pass up, especially if Washington’s meek retort to the 2016 glider incident is seen as an indication of American permissiveness or timidity. 
With a captive vessel, persevering Chinese technicians could attempt to bypass anti-tamper mechanisms, and if successful, proceed to siphon off communication codes or proprietary artificial  intelligence software, download navigational data or pre-programmed rules of engagement, or  probe for cyber vulnerabilities that could be exploited against similar vehicles…. 
Nearly 100,000  ships transit the strategically vital Singapore Strait annually, where more than 75 collisions or groundings occurred last year alone. In such congested international sea lanes, declaring a foreign navy’s autonomous vessel wayward or unresponsive would easily serve as convenient rationale for towing it into territorial waters for impoundment, or for boarding it straightaway…. 
A memorandum of understanding signed five years ago by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese defense ministry, as well as the collaborative code of naval conduct created at the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium, should be updated with an expanded right-of-way hierarchy and non-interference standards to clarify how manned ships and aircraft 
                                              54 A glider  is a type of UUV. T he glider  in question was  a few  feet in length and resembled  a small torpedo with a pair of wings.  For a press report about the seizure of the glider, see, for example, Sam  LaGrone, “ Updated: Chinese Seize U.S.  Navy Unmanned Vehicle,”  USNI News,  December 16, 2016. 
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should interact with their autonomous counterparts. Without such guidance, the risk of miscalculation increases. 
An incident without any immediate human presence or losses could nonetheless trigger unexpected escalation and spark the next conflict.55 
Personnel Implications Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential personnel implications of 
incorporating a significant number of large UVs into the Navy’s fleet architecture. Potential 
questions for Congress include the following:  
  What implications might these large UVs have for the required skil s, training, 
and career paths of Navy personnel?  
  Within the Navy, what wil  be the relationship between personnel who crew 
manned ships and those who operate these large UVs? 
Annual Funding Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the funding amounts for these programs that the 
Navy has requested for these programs for FY2022. Potential oversight questions for Congress 
include the following: 
  Has the Navy accurately priced the work on these programs that it is proposing to 
do in FY2022?  
  To what degree, if any, has funding been requested ahead of need? To what 
degree, if any, is the Navy insufficiently funding elements of the work to be done in FY2022?  
  How might the timelines for these programs be affected by a decision to reduce 
(or add to) the Navy’s requested amounts for these programs? 
Legislative Activity for FY2022 
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2022 Funding Request 
                                              55 Evan Karlik, “US-China T ensions—Unmanned Military Craft Raise Risk  of War,” Nikkei  Asian Review, June  28, 2019. See also David B.  Larter, “T he US Navy Says  It’s Doing Its Best to Avoid a ‘T erminator’ Scenario in Quest for Autonomous Weapons,” Defense News,  September 12, 2019; David Axe, “ Autonomous Navies Could  Make War More Likely,” National Interest, August  17, 2020. 
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Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2022 funding request for the LUSV, MUSV, and XLUUV  programs and their enabling technologies. 
 
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Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2022 Large UV Funding Request 
Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to the nearest tenth 
 
 
Authorization 
Appropriation 
Navy research and development  account 
Request  HASC 
SASC 
Conf. 
HAC 
SAC 
Conf. 
PE 0603178N, Medium and Large Unmanned Surface 
144.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vessels  (USVs) (line 28) 
     Project 3066: Large Unmanned  Surface  Vessel (LUSV) 
(144.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PE 0605513N, Unmanned Surface Vehicle Enabling 
170.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capabilities (line 96) 
     Project 3067: Unmanned  Surface Vehicle Enabling 
(170.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capabilities 
PE 0604536N, Advanced Undersea Prototyping (line 90) 
58.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Project 3394: Advanced Undersea  Prototyping-Vehicles, 
(58.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propulsion,  and & Navigation 
TOTAL 
374.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2022 Navy budget submission,  committee  and conference reports, and explanatory statements on the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act and the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act. Notes: PE is program  element (i.e.,  a line item  in a DOD research  and development  account). HASC is House Armed  Services  Committee;  SASC is Senate Armed  Services  Committee;  HAC is House Appropriations Committee;  SAC is Senate Appropriations  Committee;  Conf. is conference agreement. 
 
 
 
Author Information 
 Ronald O'Rourke 
   
Specialist in Naval Affairs      
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
 
Congressional Research Service  
R45757 · VERSION 35 · UPDATED 
2Navy Large Unmanned  Surface and Undersea Vehicles  
 
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/S. 4049/P.L. 
116-283) 
House 
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-442 of July 9, 2020) on H.R. 6395, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 2. A recommended reduction of $238.6 mil ion (the entire requested amount) for LUSV is for “Two additional Overlord vessels [being] excess to need.” A recommended increase of $45.0 mil ion is for converting two Navy Expeditionary Fast Transport ships (EPF) into LUSV prototypes. (Page 391) A recommended reduction of $10 mil ion for XLUUV  is for “XLUUV  late test and 
evaluation award.” (Page 393) 
Regarding the recommended funding for converting two EPFs into LUSV prototypes, H.Rept. 
116-442 states 
Expeditionary Fast Transport conversion to an unmanned surface vessel 
The committee recognizes that unmanned surface vessels will  play an essential role in future fleets of the Navy and supports the development of this  capability in a manner that responsibly fields this new capability. The committee continues to believe that the Navy’s current acquisition strategy incorporates an excessive amount of concurrency and is overly focused on the  hull.  The desire  to  move  immed iately  from  development into serial production will only yield similar misfortunes as past shipbuilding programs with similar strategies. The committee believes the Navy should be primarily focused on the autonomy piece of this capability and ensuring that technologies that will need to be developed to support autonomous operations are mature before being incorporated on a purpose built vessel. A strategy that includes prototyping and test-of-ship systems such as propulsion, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, and other major Hull, Mechanical and Engineering systems prior to hull form decisions is a more prudent strategy that may actually field this capability sooner. The committee is also concerned with what level of manning if any will be required for these vessels. In briefings, the Navy has stated that initially these vessels will need to be minimally manned rather than fully unmanned in order  to  maximize  Concept of  Operations (CONOPS)  development. The  committee believes that the Navy should modify existing mature manned ships to support autonomous operations in order to develop CONOPS rather than procuring new ships that will need to support manned operations, but will eventually be fully unmanned. 
Therefore, the committee recommends $45.0 million  in PE 0603178N  for the conversion of two Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) ships to support autonomous operations and accelerate CONOPS development. (Pages 43-44) 
Section 230 of H.R. 6395 as reported by the committee states 
SEC. 230. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO LARGE UNMANNED SURFACE VESSELS AND ASSOCIATED OFFEN SIVE  WEAPON SYSTEMS. 
(a) LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR LUSV.— 
(1)  LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021  for the Department of the Navy for  the procurement of a large unmanned surface vessel may be obligated or expended until a period of 60  days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees the certification described in paragraph (2). 
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(2)  CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—The  certification described in this paragraph is a written statement of  the Secretary of  the Navy  certifying, with  respect to any large unmanned surface vessel to be procured by the Secretary, the following: 
(A) A hull system, a mechanical system, and an electrical system have been developed for the vessel and each system— 
(i) has attained a technology readiness level of seven or greater; and 
(ii) can be operated autonomously for a minimum of 30 days. 
(B) A command control system has been developed for the vessel and the system— 
(i) can be operated autonomously; 
(ii) includes autonomous detection; and 
(iii)  has attained a technology readiness level of seven or greater. 
(C) A detailed plan has been developed for measuring and demonstrating the reliability of 
the vessel. 
(D) All payloads expected to be carried on the vessel have attained a technology readiness 
level of seven or greater. 
(b) LIMITATION ON LUSV WEAPON INTEGRATION.— 
The Secretary of the Navy may not integrate any offensive weapon system into a large unmanned surface vessel until the date on which the Secretary of the Defense certifies  to the congressional defense committees that any large unmanned surface vessel that employs offensive weapons will  comply with the law  of armed conflict. Such certification  shal  include a detailed explanation of how such compliance will be achieved. 
Senate 
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-236 of June 24, 2020) on S. 
4049, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 2. The recommended reductions to zero funding line 27 is for “Excess procurement ahead of satisfactory testing.” (Page 504) The recommended reduction of $20 mil ion for line 89 is for “Orca UUV [XLUUV]  testing delay and uncertified test strategy” ($10.0 mil ion) and “Snakehead UUV 
uncertified test strategy” ($10 mil ion). (Page 507) Section 122 of S. 4049 as reported by the committee states 
SEC. 122. LIMITATION ON NAVY MEDIUM AND LARGE UNMANNED SURFACE VESSELS. 
(a) MILESTONE B APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS.—Milestone B approval may not be granted for a covered program unless such program accomplishes prior to and incorporates into such approval— 
(1) qualification by the Senior Technical Authority of— 
(A) at least two different main propulsion engines and ancillary equipment, including the fuel and lube oil systems; and 
(B) at least two different electrical genera tors and ancillary equipment; 
(2)  final  results of test programs of engineering development models or prototypes for critical systems specified by the Senior Technical Authority in their final form, fit,  and function and in a realistic environment; and 
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(3) a determination by the milestone decision authority of the minimum number of vessels, discrete test events, performance parameters to  be  tested, and schedule require d to complete initial operational test and evaluation and demonstrate operational suitability and operational effectiveness. 
 (b)  QUALIFICATION  REQUIREMENTS.—The  qualification required in  subsection (a)(1)  shall include a  land-based operational demonstration of such equipment in the vessel-representative form,  fit,  and function for not less than 1,080  continuous hours without preventative maintenance, corrective maintenance, emergent repair, or any other form of repair or maintenance. 
(c)  REQUIREMENT  TO  USE  QUALIFIED  ENGINES  AND  GENERATORS.—The Secretary of the Navy shall require that covered programs use only main  propulsion engines and electrical generators that are qualified under sub section (a)(1). 
(d)  LIMITATION.—The Secretary  of the  Navy may  not  release a  detail  design or construction request for proposals or obligate funds from  a procurement account for a covered program until such program receives Milestone B approval and the milestone decision authority notifies the congressional defense committees, in writing, of the actions taken to comply with the requirements under this section. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘covered program’’ means a program for— 
(A) medium unmanned surface vessels; or 
(B) large unmanned surface vessels. 
(2) The term ‘‘Milestone B approval’’ has the meaning given the term in section 2366(e)(7) of title 10, United States Code. 
(3) The term ‘‘milestone decision authority’’ means the official within the Department of Defense designated with the overall responsibility and authority for acquisition decisions for the program, including authority to approve entry of the program into the next phase of the acquisition process. 
(4)  The term  ‘‘Senior Technical Authority’’ has the meaning given the term in section 8669b of title 10, United States Code. 
Regarding Section 122, S.Rept. 116-236 states 
Limitation on Navy  medium and large unmanned surface vessels (sec. 122) 
The committee recommends a provision that would require that certain technical conditions be met prior to Milestone B approval for medium and large unmanned surface vessels. 
The committee notes that the budget request provides for the prototyping and testing of Medium  and  Large  Unmanned  Surface  Vessels  (MUSVs  and  LUSVs),  including procurement of up to two additional LUSVs in conjunction with a Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) initiative. The committee understands that the four LUSVs procured by the SCO beginning in fiscal year 2018, at a cost of more than $510 million, are sufficient to achieve the objectives of the SCO initiative, which is scheduled to be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021. 
The committee further notes that the budget request includes plans to award the LUSV Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) contract in fiscal year 2022 and transition LUSV to a program of record in fiscal year 2023. 
The committee remains concerned that the budget request’s concurrent approach to LUSV design, technology development, and integration as well as a limited understanding of the LUSV  concept of employment, requirements, and reliability for envisioned missions pose excessive acquisition risk for  additional LUSV  procurement in fiscal  year 2021.  The 
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committee is also concerned by the unclear policy implications of LUSVs, including ill-defined international unmanned surface vessel standards and the legal status of armed or potentially armed LUSVs. 
Additionally, the committee notes that the Navy’s most recent shipbuilding plan, ‘‘Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 
Year  2020,’’  acknowledges similar issues: ‘‘Unmanned and optionally-manned systems are not accounted for in the overall battle force[.] ... The physical challenges of extended operations at  sea across the  spectrum of  competition and  conflict,  the  concepts of operations for these platforms, and the policy challenges associated with employing deadly force from autonomous vehicles must be well understood prior to replacing accountable 
battle force ships.’’ 
The committee believes that further procurement of MUSVs and LUSVs should occur only after the lessons learned from the current SCO initiative have been incorporated into the system specification and additional risk reduction actions are taken. 
A specific area of technical concern for the committee is the Navy requirement for MUSVs and LUSVs  to  operate continuously at sea for  at  least 30  days without preventative maintenance, corrective maintenance, or emergent repairs. The committee is unaware of any unmanned vessel of the size or complexity envisioned for MUSV or LUSV  that has demonstrated at least 30 days of such operation. 
The committee understands that the SCO prototype vessels that are intended to provide risk  reduction for this program have demonstrated between 2  to 3  days of continuous operation. The committee also understands that the SCO vessels are approximately 25 percent the size by tonnage of a LUSV, which may limit the applicability  of lessons learned and risk reduction from the SCO vessels to the MUSV and LUSV programs. Among other critical subsystems, the committee views the main engines and electrical generators as key USV  mechanical  and  electrical  subsystems whose reliability   is  critical  to  ensuring successful operations at sea for at least 30 continuous days. 
Accordingly, this  provision would  require  at  least  two  main  engines  and electrical generators, including ancillary equipment, to be formally qualified by the Navy, including a successful demonstration of at least 30 days of continuous operation prior to the LUSV or MUSV Milestone B approval and would require the use of such engines and generators in  future USVs.  The provision would also require the Senior Technical Authority and Milestone Decision Authority to take additional actions related to reducing the technical risk of these programs prior to a Milestone B approval. 
The  committee  views  the  qualification of  these critical  subsystems  as  an  essential prototyping step necessary  to provide a solid technical foundation  for the MUSV  and LUSV  programs. Rather  than delaying these  programs, the committee  believes that  qualified  engines and  generators will  enable  the  delivery  of  capable, reliable,  and sustainable USVs that meet the needs of fleet commanders faster than the plan contained in the budget request. (Pages 9-10) 
Section 237 of S. 4049 as reported by the committee states 
SEC.  237.  LIMITATION ON CONTRACT AWARDS FOR CERTAIN  UNMANNED VESSELS. 
 (a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2021 by section 201 for research, development, test, and evaluation may be used for the award of a contract for a covered vessel until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering submits to the congressional defense committees a report and certification described in subsection (c) for such contract and covered vessel. 
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(b) COVERED  VESSELS.—For  purposes of this section, a covered vessel is one of the following: 
(1) A large unmanned surface vessel (LUSV). 
(2) A medium unmanned surface vehicle (MUSV). 
(3) A large displacement unmanned undersea vehicle (LDUUV). 
(4) An extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV). 
(c)  REPORT  AND  CERTIFICATION  DESCRIBED.—A  report  and  certification described in this subsection regarding a contract for a covered vessel is — 
(1) a report— 
(A) submitted to the congressional defense committees not later than 60 days after the date of the completion of an independent technical risk assessment for such covered vessel;  and 
(B) on the findings of the Under Secretary with respect to such assessment; and 
(2)  a  certification, submitted  to the congressional defense  committees  with the report described in paragraph (1), that certifies that— 
(A)  the  Under  Secretary has  determined, in  conjunction with  the  Senior  Technical Authority designated under section 8669b(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, for the class of naval vessels that includes the covered vessel, that the critical mission, hull, mechanical, and electrical subsystems of the covered vessel— 
(i) have been demonstrated in vessel representative form, fit, and function; and 
(ii)  have achieved performance levels equal to or greater than applicable Department of Defense threshold requirements for such class of vessels; and 
(B)  such contract  is necessary to meet  Department research, development, test, and evaluation objectives for such covered vessel that cannot otherwise be met through further land-based subsystem prototyping or other demonstration approaches. 
(d) 
CRITICAL 
MISSION, 
HULL, 
MECHANICAL, 
AND 
ELECTRICA L 
SUBSYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘critical mission, hull, mechanical, and electrical  subsystems’’, with  respect to a  covered vessel, includes the following subsystems: 
(1)  Command,  control,  communications,  computers,  intelligence,  surveillance,  and reconnaissance. 
(2)  Autonomous vessel navigation, vessel control, contact management, and contact avoidance. 
(3) Communications security, including cryptopgraphy, encryption, and decryption. 
(4) Main engines, including the lube oil, fuel oil, and other supporting systems. 
(5) Electrical generation and distribution, including supporting systems. 
(6) Military payloads. 
(7) Any other subsystem identified as critical by the Senior Technical Authority designated under section 8669b(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, for the class of naval vessels that includes the cov red vessel. 
Regarding Section 237, S.Rept. 116-236 states 
Limitation on contract awards for certain unmanned vessels (sec. 237) 
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The  committee  recommends  a  provision  that  would  require  the  submission  of  a certification by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to the 
congressional defense committees prior to the Department of Defense’s contracting for certain vessels. 
The committee is concerned that an excessive number of unmanned surface an d undersea vessels (USVs and UUVs) are being acquired prematurely using Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funds and that these vessels may  include subsystems that lack sufficient technical reliability  and technological maturity to allow  the vesse ls  to  meet threshold requirements. 
The  committee  seeks to avoid contracting  for USVs  and UUVs  when the  technical reliability and technological maturity of subsystems critical to propulsion and electrical distribution or the military  purposes of the vessels are either unknown or known to be insufficient. For example,  the committee notes the Navy requirement for Medium and Large USVs (MUSV and LUSV) to operate continuously at sea for at least 30 days without preventative maintenance, corrective maintenance, or emergent repairs. The committee is unaware of any unmanned vessel of the size or complexity envisioned for MUSV or LUSV that has demonstrated at least 30 days of such operation. 
The committee understands that the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) proto type vessels 
intended to provide risk reduction for the Navy’s LUSV  program have demonstrated a maximum  of 2 to 3 days of continuous operation. The committee also understands that the SCO  vessels are approximately 25  percent the size by tonnage of a Navy LUSV.  As a result, the  committee  is  concerned that the applicability of  lessons learned and risk reduction from the SCO vessels to the Navy MUSV and LUSV programs will be limited. 
The committee views prior and successful land-based prototyping of individual critical subsystems as essential to  providing  a solid technical foundation for  USV  and  UUV programs. Rather than delaying these programs, the committee believes that a deliberate engineering-based subsystem prototyping approach will  enable the delivery of capable, reliable, and sustainable USVs and UUVs that meet the needs of fleet commanders faster than the plan contained in the budget request, which assumes that several unproven or nonexistent subsystems will rapidly materialize to meet the Navy’s requirements for these vessels. (Pages 76-77) 
S.Rept. 116-236 also states 
Testbed for autonomous ship systems  
The  budget request included  $122.3  million  in  Research,  Development,  Test,  and Evaluation (RDT&E), Navy, for PE 62123N Force Protection Applied Research. 
The  committee  notes  that a  key  technology  gap for  long -duration  autonomous ship operation lies in  the robustness and resiliency of the hull  and machinery plant. The committee  also notes that autonomous ships will  be  expected to operate for months between human-assisted maintenance and that autonomous machinery must be robust and resilient in  order to avoid failure, repair damage, or  redirect platforms as needed. The committee notes the development of digital-twin technologies that allow for predictive or automated maintenance and improved operations and logistics and help fill a critical gap that has been identified in autonomous systems.  
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $3.0 million, in RDT&E, Navy, for PE 62123N for the development of a testbed for autonomous ship systems. (Page 95) 
S.Rept. 116-236 also states 
Unmanned  surface vessel development 
The budget request included $21.5 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E),  Navy,  of  which  $464.0  million  was for  PE  63178N  Medium and  Large 
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Unmanned Surface Vehicles and $38.4  million  was for  PE  63573N  Advanced Surface Machinery Systems. 
The committee notes that the budget request provides for the prototyping and testing of Medium  and  Large  Unmanned  Surface  Vessels  (MUSVs  and  LUSVs),  including procurement of up to two additional LUSVs in conjunction with a Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) initiative. The committee understands that the 4 LUSVs procured by the SCO beginning in fiscal year 2018, at a cost of more than $510 million, are sufficient to achieve the objectives of the SCO  initiative, which is  scheduled to be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021. 
The committee believes that further procurement of MUSVs and LUSVs should occur only after the lessons learned from the current SCO initiative have been incorporated into the system specification and additional risk reduction actions are taken. 
A specific area of technical concern for the committee is the Navy requirement for MUSVs and LUSVs  to  operate continuously at sea for  at  least 30  days without preventative maintenance, corrective maintenance, or emergent repairs. The committee is unaware of any unmanned vessel of the size or complexity envisioned for MUSV or LUSV  that has demonstrated at least 30 days of such operation. 
The committee understands that the SCO prototype vessels that are intended to provide risk reduction for these programs have demonstrated between 2 to 3 days of continuous operation. The committee also understands that the SCO vessels are approximately 25 percent the size by tonnage of a LUSV, which may limit the applicability of lessons learned and risk reduction from the SCO vessels to the MUSV and LUSV programs. Among other critical  subsystems, the committee views the main  engines and electrical generators in particular as key USV mechanical and electrical subsystems whose reliability is critical to ensuring successful operations at sea for at least 30 continuous days. 
The committee also notes that additional funding is necessary to accelerate completion of the Integrated Power and Energy Systems test facility (ITF) to achieve full test capability in fiscal year 2023, consistent with section 131 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020  (Public Law 116–92),  as well as the qualification of silicon carbide power modules. 
Accordingly, the committee recommends a decrease of $464.0 million, for a total of $0, in RDT&E, Navy, for PE  63178N,  and an increase of $200.0 million,  for a total of $238.4 million in RDT&E, Navy, for PE 63573N. 
The committee’s intent is that the increased funding in PE 63178N be used for: the USV main engine and electrical generator qualification testing directed elsewhere in this Act ($70.0  million);  USV autonomy development, which may include conversion of existing vessels ($45.0  million);  accelerating ITF testing ($75.0  million);  and accelerating the qualification of silicon carbide power modules ($10.0 million).  (Pages 97-98) 
S.Rept. 116-236 also states 
Advanced  undersea prototyping 
The budget request included $21.5 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E),  Navy, of  which  $115.9  million  was  for  PE  64536N  advanced undersea prototyping. 
The committee notes that the Snakehead and Orca [XLUUV] test strategies require updates to enable certification by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in accordance with  the Senate report accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020,  incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (S. Rept. 116–103). Additionally, the committee is aware of Orca testing delays. 
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Accordingly, the committee recommends a decrease of $20.0 million, for a total of $95.9 million, in RDT&E, Navy, for PE 64536N. (Page 100) 
A September 14, 2020, letter and enclosure from the Office of Budget Management (OMB) to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee about 
concerns that the Administration has with certain provisions in S. 4049 stated in part: 
The Administration strongly objects to the absence of authorization language and funding to procure critical prototype vessels. The Administration believes that rigorous land-and sea-based testing is needed for a successful Large Unmanned  Surface Vessel Program (LUSV),  providing a lethal, distributed new capability to the fleet. These funds are critical to reduce risk and conduct integration and testing to ensure DOD is postured to transition LUSV  to a program of record in FY  2023.  The Administration urges Congress to fuly support this critical capability at the levels in the FY 2021 President’s Budget Request.58 
Conference 
The conference report (H.Rept. 116-617 of December 3, 2020) on H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021, recommends the funding levels shown in the authorization conference column of Table 2. The recommended reduction of $204.8 mil ion for line 27 is for “LUSV additional 
prototypes’ ($159.3 mil ion) and “Unmanned surface vehicle enabling capabilities—payload program reduction” ($45.5 mil ion). (PDF pages 4322-4323 of 4517) The recommended reduction of $23.256 mil ion for line 89 is for “Excess scope adjustments.” (PDF page 4326 of 
4517) Section 122 of the conference version of H.R. 6395 states: 
SEC.  122.  LIMITATIONS  ON  NAVY  MEDIUM  AND  LARGE  UNMANNED SURFACE VESSELS. 
(a) MILESTONE B APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS.—Milestone B approval may not be granted for a covered program unless such program accomplishes prior to and incorporates into such approval— 
(1) qualification by the Senior Technical Authority of— 
(A) at least one representative main propulsion system, including the fuel and lube oil systems; and 
(B) at least one representative electrical generation and distribution system; 
(2) final results of test programs of engineering development models or prototypes showing that critical systems designated pursuant to subparagraph (C) of section 8669b(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, are demonstrated as required by subparagraph (I) of that section; and (3) a determination by the milestone decision authority of the minimum number of vessels, discrete test events, performance parameters to be tested, and schedule required to complete initial operational test and evaluation and demonstrate operational suitability and operational effectiveness. 
(b)  QUALIFICATION  REQUIRES  OPERATIONAL  DEMONSTRATION.—The qualification  required  in  subsection  (a)(1)  shall  include  a  land-based  operational demonstration of the systems concerned in the vessel-representative form, fit, and function 
                                              58 Letter dated September 14, 2020, from Russell T . Vought, Director, Office of Management and Budget,  to Senator James M. Inhofe, Senator Jack Reed,  Representative Adam Smith, and Representative Mac T hornberry with respect to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2021, PDF page 9 of 14, accessed  September 17, 2020, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/letters/. 
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for  not less than 720  continuous hours without preventative  maintenance, corrective maintenance, emergent repair, or any other form of repair or maintenance. 
(c)  USE  OF  QUALIFIED  SYSTEMS.—The Secretary of  the Navy shall require that covered programs use  only  main  propulsion systems and  electrical  generation and distribution systems that are qualified under subsection (a)(1). 
(d) LIMITATION ON CONTRACT AWARD OR FUNDING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may not award a detail design or construction contract, or obligate funds from a procurement account, for a covered program until such program receives  Milestone  B  approval  and  the  milestone  decision  authority  notifies  the congressional defense committees, in writing, of the actions taken to comply with  the requirements under this section. 
(2)  EXCEPTION.—The  limitation  in  paragraph  (1)  does  not  apply  to  advanced procurement for government-furnished equipment. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) COVERED  PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘covered program’’ means a program for— 
(A) medium unmanned surface vessels; or 
(B) large unmanned surface vessels. 
(2) MILESTONE  B APPROVAL.—The term ‘‘Milestone B approval’’ has the meaning given the term in section 2366(e)(7) of title 10, United States Code. 
(3) MILESTONE DECISION  AUTHORITY.—The term ‘‘milestone decision authority’’ means  the  official  within  the  Department  of  Defense  designated  with the  overal  responsibility and authority for acquisition decisions for an acquisition program, including authority to approve entry of the program into the next phase of the acquisition process. 
(4) SENIOR TECHNICAL AUTHORITY.—The term ‘‘Senior Technical Authority’’ has the meaning provided for in section 8669b of title 10, United States Code. 
Regarding Section 122, H.Rept. 116-617 states: 
Limitations on Navy medium and large unmanned surface vessels (sec. 122) 
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 122) that would require that certain technical conditions be met prior to Milestone B approval for medium and large unmanned surface vessels. 
The House bill contained no similar provision. 
The House recedes with an amendment that would reduce the minimum number of certain systems to be qualified and the period of continuous operation of such systems to satisfy qualification requirements, as well as allow the Secretary of the Navy to release certain requests for proposals and contract for certain government furnished equipment prior to Milestone B approval for medium and large unmanned surface vessels. (PDF page 3730 of 4517) 
Section 227 of the conference version of H.R. 6395 states: 
SEC.  227.  LIMITATION ON CONTRACT AWARDS FOR CERTAIN  UNMANNED VESSELS. 
(a) LIMITATION.—Not less than 30 days before awarding a contract using any funds from the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy account for the purchase of a covered vessel, the Secretary of the Navy shall  submit to  the congressional defense committees a report and certification described in subsection (c) for such contract and covered vessel. 
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(b) COVERED  VESSELS.—For  purposes of this section, a covered vessel is one of the following: 
(1) A large unmanned surface vessel (LUSV). 
(2) A medium unmanned surface vehicle (MUSV). 
(c)  REPORT  AND  CERTIFICATION  DESCRIBED.—A  report  and  certification described in this subsection regarding a contract for a covered vessel is — 
(1) a report— 
(A) submitted to the congressional defense committees not later than 60 days after the date of the completion of an independent technical risk assessment for such covered vessel; 
(B) on the findings and recommendations of the Senior Technical Authority for the class of naval vessels that includes the covered vessel with respect to such assessment; and 
(C) that includes such assessment; and 
(2)  a  certification, submitted  to the congressional defense  committees  with the report described in paragraph (1), that certifies that— 
(A) the Secretary has determined, in conjunction with the Senior Technical Authority  for the class of naval vessels that includes the covered vessel, that the critical mission, hul, mechanical, and electrical subsystems of the covered vessel— 
(i) have been demonstrated in vessel representative form, fit, and function; and 
(ii) have achieved performance levels equal to or greater than applicable Depart 
ment of Defense threshold requirements for such class of vessels or have maturation plans in place to achieve such performance levels prior to transition to a program of record, including a detailed description of such achieved performance or maturation plans; and 
(B)  such contract  is necessary to meet  Department research, development, test, and evaluation objectives for such covered vessel that cannot otherwise be met through further land based subsystem prototyping or other demonstration approaches. 
(d) LIMITATION ON WEAPON INTEGRATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may not integrate any offensive weapon system into a covered vessel until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of the Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that such covered vessel— 
(A) will comply with applicable laws, including the law of armed conflict, with a detailed explanation of how such compliance will be achieved; and 
(B)  has been determined to be the most appropriate surface vessel to meet applicable of fensive military requirements. 
(2)  COMPLETION  OF  ANALYSIS  OF  ALTERNATIVES  REQUIRED.—A  determination under paragraph (1)(B)  shall  be made  only after  the completion  of an analysis of alternatives that— 
(A) is described in subsection (e)(1); and 
(B) supports such determination. 
(e) SUBMITTAL OF ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONGRESS.— 
(1)  ANALYSIS OF  ALTERNATIVES  REQUIRED.—Not  later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall s ubmit to the congressional defense committees an  analysis of  alternatives regarding  covered  vessels  with an  integrated offensive weapon system and the most appropriate surface vessels to meet  applicable offensive military requirements. 
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(2)  CONTENTS.—The  analysis  submitted under  paragraph  (1)  shall  include,  at  a minimum,  the following elements: 
(A)  Identification of  capability  needs applicable to  such covered vessels, including offensive strike capability and capacity from the Mark–41 vertical launch system. 
(B) Projected threats. 
(C) Projected operational environments. 
(D) Projected operational concepts. 
(E) Projected operational requirements. 
(F) Status quo (baseline) and surface vessel alternatives able to meet the capability  needs identified in subparagraph (A), including— 
(i)  modified  naval  vessel  designs,  including  amphibious  ships,  expeditionary   fast transports, and expeditionary sea bases; 
(ii) modified commercial vessel designs, including container ships and bulk carriers; 
(iii)  new naval vessel designs; and 
(iv) new commercial vessel designs. 
(G)  Vessel design, performance, and measures of effectiveness of the baseline and each alternative, including  a description of critical  mission, hull,  mechanical, and electrical subsystems. 
(H)  Estimated  research, development, test, and evaluation cost of  baseline and each alternative. 
(I) Estimated lead vessel and average follow-on vessel procurement costs of baseline and 
each alternative. 
(J) Life-cycle costs of baseline and each alternative. 
(K) Life-cycle cost per baseline vessel and each alternative vessel. 
(L) Life-cycle cost per specified quantity of baseline vessels and alternative vessels. 
(M) Technology readiness assessment of baseline and each alternative. 
(N) Analysis of alternatives, including relative cost and capability performance of base line and alternative vessels. 
(O) Trade-off analysis. 
(P) Sensitivity analysis. 
(Q)  Conclusions and recommendations, which  if  the Secretary of  Defense deems it appropriate, shall include the determination required under subsection (d)(1)(B). 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘critical mission, hull, mechanical, and electrical subsystems’’, with respect to a covered vessel, includes the following subsystems: 
(A)  Command,  control,  communications,  computers,  intelligence,  surveillance,  and reconnaissance. 
(B)  Autonomous  vessel navigation, vessel control, contact management, and contact avoidance. 
(C) Communications security, including cryptopgraphy, encryption, and decryption. 
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(D) Main engines, including the lube oil, fuel oil, and other supporting systems. 
(E) Electrical generation and distribution, including supporting systems. 
(F) Military payloads. 
(G)  Any other subsystem identified as critical by the Senior Technical Authority for the class of naval vessels that includes the covered vessel. 
(2) The term ‘‘Senior Technical Authority’’ means, with respect to a class of naval vessels, the Senior Technical Authority designated for that class  of naval vessels under section 8669b of title 10, United States Code. 
Regarding Section 227, H.Rept. 116-617 states: 
Limitation on contract awards for certain unmanned vessels (sec. 227) 
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 230) that would prohibit the procurement of any large  unmanned  surface vessels in  fiscal  year  2021  until  a  certification  regarding technology maturity has been submitted to the Congress, as well as prohibit the inclusion of offensive weapons systems in such vessels until the Secretary of Defense certifies how these systems will comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. 
The Senate amendment contained a similar  provision (sec. 237) that would require the submission of  a  certification by  the  Under  Secretary of  Defense for  Research and Engineering prior to contracting for certain vessels. 
The House recedes with an amendment that would change the submitter of the certification to the Secretary of the Navy, remove unmanned underwater vehicles as covered vessels, and add a limitation on the integration of offensive weapons into covered vessels until an analysis of alternatives is conducted and a Secretary of Defense certification is made. (PDF page 3763 of 4517) 
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 7617/S. XXXX/Division C of 
H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260) 
House 
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-453 of July 16, 2020) on H.R. 7617, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 2. A recommended reduction of $159.3 mil ion for LUSV is for “LUSV additional prototypes.” (Page 266) A 
recommended reduction of $45.5 mil ion for LUSV and MUSV enabling technologies is for “Unmanned surface vehicle enabling capabilities—payload program reduction.” (Page 266) The recommended reduction of $35.626 mil ion for line 89 is for “Test and evaluation delays.” (Page 
268) 
Senate 
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement for S. XXXX that the committee released on November 10, 2020, recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 2. The recommended reduction of $372.842 mil ion to line 27 reflects a restructuring of funding for the LUSV and MUSV programs and their enabling technologies involving seven changes to requested funding levels, including three transfers of funding totaling 
$55.402 mil ion to a newly created line 27A for MUSVs. (Pages 185-186) The committee recommended a reduction of $23.256 mil ion to line 89 for “Restoring acquisition accountability: 
Excess scope adjustments.” (Page 187). 
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The committee’s explanatory statement states: 
Unmanned Surface Vessels.—The fiscal year 2021  President’s budget request includes $437,740,000  for the procurement of two Large Unmanned Surface Vessels [LUSVs] and containerized payloads, as well as for the development of a modified combat system and enabling capabilities to prototype and demonstrate technologies in support o f a  LUSV program of record in fiscal year 2023 that includes an integrated Vertical Launch System [VLS]  payload. Additionally, the fiscal  year 2021  President’s  budget request includes $26,302,000  to complete detailed design and oversight of a prototype Med ium Unmanned Surface Vessel [MUSV]  that carries non-kinetic payloads, and the Navy has budgeted funds for the procurement of an additional MUSV in fiscal year 2023. Subsequent to the budget submission, the Navy revised its fiscal year 2021 acquisition and budget requests for both the LUSV and MUSV programs and requested that funds be appropriated for the first year of a two-year Comprehensive Reliability Plan [CRP] for both programs in lieu of additional LUSV  platforms  and  payloads, while  maintaining  the  Na vy’s previously planned fiscal year 2023 establishment of a LUSV program of record with an integrated VLS. 
The Committee notes that the mission requirements and concepts of operations for the LUSV  and MUSV  programs remain an evolving work in  progress, and that concerns previously expressed by the appropriations committees with respect to a VLS payload on a LUSV  have not been sufficiently addressed. However, the Committee does believe that demonstrating the reliability of  some key technologies of unmanned su rface vessels is critical to acquisition success of any such platforms. 
As such, the Committee recommends fully funding the MUSV program in fiscal year 2021, 
to include the Navy’s requested realignment of $29,100,000 from LUSV  to the MUSV program in support of a MUSV CRP. The Committee also recommends full funding for the development of enabling capabilities such as autonomy, command and control, sensors, and experimentation. The Committee recommends no funding for additional LUSVs, a LUSV  combat system, combat system modifications, or LUSV  payloads in fiscal year 2021.  The Committee notes that the Navy will take possession of two prototype LUSVs from the Strategic Capabilities Office at the end of fiscal year 2021 and that in fiscal year 2020,  Congress appropriated funding for two additional LUSVs to the Navy that are also scheduled to deliver to the Navy at the end of fiscal year 2021. The Committee believes that the Navy has sufficient prototypes on-hand to define LUSV  and MUSV missions, program requirements, and concepts of operations in alignment with key stakeholders. Finally, Congress in fiscal year 2020 appropriated funding for concept design studies to inform future detail design and construction of a LUSV  and recommends an additional $10,000,000,  as requested by the Navy, in fiscal year 2021 for these efforts. The Committee notes that this does not constitute endorsement of integrating VLS on LUSVs. (Pages 191-192) 
Conference 
The explanatory statement for the final version of the FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260 of December 26, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021) 
provides the funding levels shown in the appropriation conference column of Table 2. The reduction of $370.342 mil ion to line 27 reflects a restructuring of funding for the LUSV and MUSV programs and their enabling technologies involving  eight changes to requested funding levels, including two transfers of funding totaling $55.402 mil ion to a newly created line 27A for MUSVs. (PDF page 310 of 469) The reduction of $26.046 mil ion to line 89 is for “Test and 
evaluation delays.” (PDF page 313 of 469) 
 
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Author Information 
 Ronald O'Rourke 
   
Specialist in Naval Affairs      
 
 
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Congressional Research Service  
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