The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Changes from March 18, 2021 to October 26, 2021

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The Palestinians: ~~Background and U.S.~~
~~March 18, 2021~~
October 26, 2021 Background and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West ~~Bank, and~~
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and ~~oversight—to the ongoing~~
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
oversight—to the ongoing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel.conflict between the Palestinians and Israel.

The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel ~~agreed~~

agreed with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to
exercise limited rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration exercise limited rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration
that dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. that dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
After the PA’s establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to the Israeli- After the PA’s establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance and economic Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance and economic
development. Since then, Congress has appropriated more than $5 development. Since then, Congress has appropriated more than $5 ~~billion~~bil ion in bilateral in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, who rely heavily aid to the Palestinians, who rely heavily
on external donor assistance. on external donor assistance.
Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented ~~challenges~~chal enges for several Administrations and Congresses. The United for several Administrations and Congresses. The United
States has States has ~~historically~~historical y sought to bolster PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas vis sought to bolster PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas vis -à-vis Hamas (a U.S.--à-vis Hamas (a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto control within Gaza, making designated terrorist organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto control within Gaza, making
the security, political, and humanitarian situation there particularly fraught. The Abbas-led PA the security, political, and humanitarian situation there particularly fraught. The Abbas-led PA ~~still~~ stil exercises limited self-rule exercises limited self-rule
over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas’s advanced age (he was born in 1935)over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas’s advanced age (he was born in 1935) ~~and questionable health~~, observers , observers
speculate about who speculate about who ~~will~~ wil succeed him and implications for the current situation succeed him and implications for the current situation of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza.
~~PA legislative and~~ In April 2021, Abbas controversial y postponed PA legislative and presidential elections presidential elections ~~are~~that had been scheduled for May and July scheduled for May and July ~~2021, respectively, but the divided rule situation~~
~~could lead to their postponement as has happened with past efforts to hold elections since 2007.~~
, respectively. Domestic and international criticism of corruption and authoritarian practices within the PA have since intensified amid PA authorities ’ repression of dissenting voices and public protests. Lack of progress toward peace with Israel has led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause more assertively in Lack of progress toward peace with Israel has led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause more assertively in international international
fora. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution changed the non-member observer status of “Palestine” at the United fora. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution changed the non-member observer status of “Palestine” at the United
Nations from an entity to a “state.” Palestinians also have applied international legal pressure on Israel. The Palestinians Nations from an entity to a “state.” Palestinians also have applied international legal pressure on Israel. The Palestinians
acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015, and the ICC opened an investigation in acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015, and the ICC opened an investigation in
March 2021 that could conceivably bring charges against Israeli, Palestinian, or other individualsMarch 2021 that could conceivably bring charges against Israeli, Palestinian, or other individuals ~~for alleged~~ for al eged war crimes war crimes
committed in the West Bank and Gaza.committed in the West Bank and Gaza.
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy shifted in a direction that more explicitly Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy shifted in a direction that more explicitly favored Israel over the Palestinians. favored Israel over the Palestinians.
Actions of note included suspending U.S. Actions of note included suspending U.S. ~~funding~~aid for the Palestinians, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and opening for the Palestinians, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and opening
an embassy there, and an embassy there, and ~~adopting measures to treat~~affording more favorable treatment to Israeli settlements in the West Israeli settlements in the West Bank~~Bank more like areas in Israel proper~~. In late . In late
2020, the Administration brokered agreements to help Israel move toward more formal relations with the United Arab 2020, the Administration brokered agreements to help Israel move toward more formal relations with the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. PLO/PA leaders voiced opposition to the Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. PLO/PA leaders voiced opposition to the agreements insofar as they signaled a agreements insofar as they signaled a
change to Arab states’ previous stance that Israel should address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition to change to Arab states’ previous stance that Israel should address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition to
improved ties. improved ties.
Biden Administration officials have Biden Administration officials have ~~stated their intention~~taken steps to improve U.S.-Palestinian ties, to improve U.S.-Palestinian ties, ~~and probably plan to resume~~
~~humanitarian, security, and economic development aid for Palestinians~~including through the resumption of aid and a renewed emphasis on support for an eventual two-state solution. The Administration and Congress face a number of . The Administration and Congress face a number of
~~issues with implications for bilateral ties~~key issues, including, including~~: (1) how to resume~~ (1) the future of aid; (2) the feasibility of reopening certain diplomatic aid; (2) the feasibility of reopening certain diplomatic
offices in offices in ~~Washington, DC, and Jerusalem; (3) how to respond to Palestinian initiatives in international fora (including the~~
~~ICC); and (4) whether to revisit some Trump-era actions that gave more favorable treatment under U.S. policy to Israeli~~
~~settlements in the West Bank~~Jerusalem and Washington, DC; (3) reconstruction in Gaza following a May 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict; (4) controversies over Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and (5) how to respond to Palestinian actions in international fora (including the ICC). The trajectory of some of these issues may depend on a significant PLO/PA change to welfare . The trajectory of some of these issues may depend on a significant PLO/PA change to welfare
payments to or on behalf of individuals payments to or on behalf of individuals ~~allegedly~~al egedly involved in acts of terrorism involved in acts of terrorism~~, and whether elections (if held) lead to a~~
~~greater Hamas role in the PA.~~
. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Introduction
Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during
the 1990s, Congress has played a significant role in shaping U.S. policymaking toward the the 1990s, Congress has played a significant role in shaping U.S. policymaking toward the
Palestinians. As successive Administrations have sought to facilitate a negotiated solution to the Palestinians. As successive Administrations have sought to facilitate a negotiated solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and increase or decrease Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and increase or decrease
assistance to Palestinians, congressional action has often influenced executive branch decisions. assistance to Palestinians, congressional action has often influenced executive branch decisions.
After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has appropriated After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has appropriated
more than $5 more than $5 ~~billion~~ bil ion in bilateralin bilateral aid to the Palestinians, while placing a number of restrictions and aid to the Palestinians, while placing a number of restrictions and
other conditions on certain types of aid. For other conditions on certain types of aid. For ~~more~~background information, see CRS Report RS22967, information, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti., by Jim Zanotti.
Palestinian Overview and National Aspirations
The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. An estimated West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. An estimated
5.2 5.2 ~~million~~ mil ion Palestinians (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Palestinians (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and East Jerusalem (seand East Jerusalem (see Table 1).1 Of these, about 2.2 1 Of these, about 2.2 ~~million~~mil ion are registered as refugees in their are registered as refugees in their
own right or as descendants of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition, own right or as descendants of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition,
approximately 635,000 Jewish Israeli citizens live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.2 Of the approximately 635,000 Jewish Israeli citizens live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.2 Of the
more than 6 more than 6 ~~million~~ mil ion diaspora Palestinians livingdiaspora Palestinians living outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, most outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, most
are in Arab states—with more than 3 are in Arab states—with more than 3 ~~million~~mil ion registered as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and registered as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria.3 For more information on Palestinian refugees, Syria.3 For more information on Palestinian refugees, seesee Appendix A.
Table 1. Basic Facts for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Statistic
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Combined
Population Population
3.1 3.1 ~~million~~mil ion
2.1 2.1 ~~million~~mil ion
5.2 5.2 ~~million~~mil ion
Refugees Refugees
828,000 828,000
1,386,000 1,386,000
2,214,000 2,214,000
Median age Median age
21.9 (2019 est.) 21.9 (2019 est.)
18.0 (2020 est.) 18.0 (2020 est.)
- -
Literacy rate (2018 est.) Literacy rate (2018 est.)
- -
- -
97.2% 97.2%
Population growth rate Population growth rate
1.7% 1.7%
2.0% 2.0%
- -
Real GDP growth rate Real GDP growth rate
- -
- -
-11.5% (2020 est.) -11.5% (2020 est.)

~~3.5~~2.9% (2021 proj.) % (2021 proj.)
GDP per capita at PPP GDP per capita at PPP
- -
- -
$5,316 (2020 est.) $5,316 (2020 est.)

$5,742 (2021 proj.) $5,742 (2021 proj.)
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate
15.0% (2020 est.) 15.0% (2020 est.)
43.0% (2020 est.) 43.0% (2020 est.)
25.9% (2020 est.) 25.9% (2020 est.)

24.9% (2021 proj.) 24.9% (2021 proj.)
Export partners Export partners
- -
- -
Israel 84.2%, Israel 84.2%,
(2017 est.) (2017 est.)
Arab states 16.6% Arab states 16.6%

1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) projections for 2021. PCBS estimated as of 2017 that an additional projections for 2021. PCBS estimated as of 2017 that an additional
1.47 million Palestinians were Arab citizens of Israel. 1.47 million Palestinians were Arab citizens of Israel. ~~Religious affiliation information comes from the State~~
~~Department International Religious Freedom Report for 2019, West Bank and Gaza.~~
2 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, West Bank. Figures 2 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, West Bank. Figures for West Bank as of 2018, and East Jerusalem as of for West Bank as of 2018, and East Jerusalem as of
2017. 2017.
3 See3 See the portal of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugeesthe portal of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) at in the Near East (UNRWA) at
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work.
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Statistic
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Combined
Import partners Import partners
Israel 58.1%, Israel 58.1%,
(2017 est.) (2017 est.)
~~European Union~~-
- -
-European Union
12.4%, Arab States 12.4%, Arab States
6.2% 6.2%
Sources: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Central Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Central ~~Intelligence~~ Intel igence Agency WorldAgency World Factbook, WorldFactbook, World Bank, Bank,
Economist Economist ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence Unit, International Monetary Fund World Unit, International Monetary Fund World Outlook Database, U.N. Relief and Works Outlook Database, U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Notes: Figures are 2021 estimatesFigures are 2021 estimates or projections unless otherwiseor projections unless otherwise noted. Population figures exclude Israeli noted. Population figures exclude Israeli
settlers. settlers.
Since the early 20th century, the dominant Palestinian national goal Since the early 20th century, the dominant Palestinian national goal has been to establish an has been to establish an
independent state in historic Palestine (the area covered by the British Mandate until the British independent state in historic Palestine (the area covered by the British Mandate until the British
withdrawal in 1948). Over time, Palestinians have debated among themselves, with Israelis, and withdrawal in 1948). Over time, Palestinians have debated among themselves, with Israelis, and
with others over the nature and extent of such a state and how to achieve it. For more historical with others over the nature and extent of such a state and how to achieve it. For more historical
background, background, ~~see~~see Appendix B and CRS Report RL33476, and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Jim Zanotti. by Jim Zanotti.
Today, Fatah and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) are the largest Palestinian Today, Fatah and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) are the largest Palestinian
political movements (political movements (seesee Appendix A for profiles of both groups).4 The positions that their for profiles of both groups).4 The positions that their
leaders express reflect two basic cleavages in Palestinian society: leaders express reflect two basic cleavages in Palestinian society:
1. Between those ( 1. Between those (~~several in~~including many members of Fatah, including its leader Mahmoud Fatah, including its leader Mahmoud Abbas) who seek Abbas) who seek
to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza by nonviolent means—to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza by nonviolent means—
negotiations, international diplomacy, civil disobedience—and those negotiations, international diplomacy, civil disobedience—and those ((including Hamas) Hamas)
who insist on maintaining violence against Israel as an option;5 and who insist on maintaining violence against Israel as an option;5 and
2. Between those (Fatah) who favor a secular model of governance and those 2. Between those (Fatah) who favor a secular model of governance and those
(Hamas) who (Hamas) who ~~call~~ cal for a society governed more by Islamic norms. for a society governed more by Islamic norms.
The differences between these two factions are reflected in Palestinian governance (see The differences between these two factions are reflected in Palestinian governance (see
Appendix C). . Since Hamas forcibly seized control of Gaza in 2007, it has exercised de facto rule Since Hamas forcibly seized control of Gaza in 2007, it has exercised de facto rule
there, while Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—elected as president of the Palestinian Authority there, while Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—elected as president of the Palestinian Authority
(PA) in 2005—has headed the PA government based in the West Bank. (PA) in 2005—has headed the PA government based in the West Bank.
Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who
speaks for the Palestinians both speaks for the Palestinians both ~~domestically and internationally~~domestical y and international y. In the West Bank, the PA . In the West Bank, the PA
exercises limited self-rule in specified urban areas (Areas A and B, as identified in a 1995 Israel-exercises limited self-rule in specified urban areas (Areas A and B, as identified in a 1995 Israel-
PLO agreement) where Israel maintains overarching control.6 Both territories face socioeconomic PLO agreement) where Israel maintains overarching control.6 Both territories face socioeconomic
~~challenges~~chal enges based on Israeli military measures such as property confiscation and demolition, based on Israeli military measures such as property confiscation and demolition,
~~Israeli movement and access restrictions, political uncertainty, longtime Palestinian dependence~~

4 Hamas has been designated4 Hamas has been designated a Foreign a Foreign ~~Terrorist~~T errorist Organization ( Organization (~~FTO~~FT O), a Specially Designated ), a Specially Designated ~~Terrorist (SDT~~T errorist (SDT ), and a ), and a
SpeciallySpecially Designated GlobalDesignated Global ~~Terrorist (SDGT~~ T errorist (SDGT ) by the U.S.) by the U.S. government.government.
5 ~~See~~ 5 See Appendix A for a discussionfor a discussion of different schools of thought within Fatah about maintaining violence against of different schools of thought within Fatah about maintaining violence against
Israel as an option. Israel as an option.
6 6 ~~The~~T he PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Various Israel-PLO agreements PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Various Israel-PLO agreements
duringduring the Oslo process in the 1990s created the PA as the organ of governance for limited Palestinian selfthe Oslo process in the 1990s created the PA as the organ of governance for limited Palestinian self -rule in the -rule in the
West Bank andWest Bank and Gaza Strip. Officially, the PLO represents the Palestinian national movement in international bodies, Gaza Strip. Officially, the PLO represents the Palestinian national movement in international bodies,
includingincluding the United Nations, often the United Nations, often ~~using the moniker “~~identified as “ Palestine” or “Palestine” or “ State of Palestine.” Because Mahmoud AbbasState of Palestine.” Because Mahmoud Abbas is is
both PLO chairman and PA president, U.S.both PLO chairman and PA president, U.S. officials and other international actors sometimes conflate his roles. For officials and other international actors sometimes conflate his roles. For
more information on the two entities, more information on the two entities, ~~see Appendix A, Appendix C,~~ see Appe ndix A, Appe ndix C , and the European Council on Foreign Relations’ and the European Council on Foreign Relations’
online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions. online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions.
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Israeli movement and access restrictions, political uncertainty, longtime Palestinian dependence on foreign aid, and domestic on foreign aid, and domestic ~~corruption and inefficiency~~governance problems—with Gaza’s economic —with Gaza’s economic ~~challenges and~~
~~overall~~ chal enges and overal isolation more acute (see isolation more acute (see “Gaza’s ~~Challenges,” Appendix C, an~~dChal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” “PA West Bank Leadership Concerns,” Appendix C, and Appendix D). See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for maps of both territories. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the West Bank and Gaza With its global reach, COVID-19 has significantly affected the West Bank and Gaza. As of October 7, the World Health Organization identifies 441,882 confirmed cases and 4,465 deaths since March 2020, with Gaza accounting for about 75% of active cases. Over 1,439,000 people have been vaccinated, representing around 48% of the target population (age 16 and older), with approximately four-fifths of those people ful y vaccinated.7 During early 2021, disparities between Israeli residents with speedy access to vaccines and West Bank/Gaza residents with little or no access led PA officials and some observers—including the World Bank—to cal for greater efforts by Israel to share vaccines with Palestinians, and to assist the PA in procuring additional vaccines more expeditiously.8 Additional y, some observers criticized PA officials for al egedly directing vaccines to “the senior ranks of the governing party, al ies in the media and even to family members of top dignitaries.”9 Israel agreed in June to advance up to 1.4 mil ion doses to the PA, but the PA canceled the deal amid popular concern about the initial shipment approaching its expiration date.10 By the end of the summer, the PA had received sufficient vaccine doses to inoculate most eligible West Bank/Gaza residents, but some vaccine hesitancy has been reported.11 7 T he source for the data in this paragraph is World Health Organization (occupied Palestinian territory), “Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report 82,” October 7, 2021. 8 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, pp. 26-27. For differing views on Israel’s responsibility for assisting Palestinians with vaccines, see Eyal Benvenisti, “ Israel is Legally Obligated to Ensure the Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Are Vaccinated,” Just Security, January 7, 2021; Alan Baker, “ Israel, the Palestinians, and the COVID-19 Vaccines: T he New Blood-Libel,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 14, 2021. 9 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines. Many Don't Want to T ake Them ,” New York Times, August 30, 2021. 10 Maayan Lubell, “ Israel says COVID-19 vaccines rejected by Palestinians were safe,” Reuters, June 19, 2021. 11 Rasgon, “Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines.” Congressional Research Service 3 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 1. Map of West Bank Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2018, adapted by CRS. Note: Al boundaries and depictions are approximate. Congressional Research Service 4.
~~Additionally, the State Department and some NGOs have raised concerns about some possible PA~~
~~and Hamas violations of the rule of law and civil liberties.7 See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for maps~~
~~of both territories.~~
~~Figure 1. Map of West Bank~~

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2018, adapted
~~by CRS.~~
Notes: All boundaries and depictions are approximate.

~~7 State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza; Amnesty~~
~~International, Palestine (State of) 2019.~~
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The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 2. Map of Gaza Strip

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory,occupied Palestinian territory, 2020. 2020.
~~Notes:~~ ~~All~~ Note: Al boundaries and depictions are approximate. boundaries and depictions are approximate.
International diplomacy aimed at resolving Israeli-Palestinian disputes and advancing Palestinian International diplomacy aimed at resolving Israeli-Palestinian disputes and advancing Palestinian
national goals has national goals has ~~stalled~~stal ed, with no direct Israel-PLO negotiations since 2014. Palestinians , with no direct Israel-PLO negotiations since 2014. Palestinians
routinely assert that U.S. policy reflects a pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to PLO routinely assert that U.S. policy reflects a pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to PLO
Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s domestic political rivalry with Hamas.Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s domestic political rivalry with Hamas.~~8 Since a~~
~~wave of unrest (commonly known as the Arab Spring) that started in 2011 presented~~12 In light of the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, Arab leaders Arab leaders
with a range of domestic and other regional with a range of domestic and other regional ~~concerns, Arab states that had traditionally~~
~~championed the Palestinian cause have focused on it less~~concerns have focused less on championing the Palestinian cause. Many have built or strengthened . Many have built or strengthened
informal ties with Israel based on common concerns regarding Iran and other perceived regional informal ties with Israel based on common concerns regarding Iran and other perceived regional
threats. In 2020, four countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and threats. In 2020, four countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and
Morocco—agreed to take steps toward formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Morocco—agreed to take steps toward formal diplomatic relations with Israel.
Their agreements with Israel are known as the Abraham Accords.13 Citing the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel, Abbas and other PLO/PA leaders have Citing the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel, Abbas and other PLO/PA leaders have
sought support for Palestinian national aspirations and grievances in the United Nations and other sought support for Palestinian national aspirations and grievances in the United Nations and other
international fora. Some international fora. Some ~~Palestinian and international intellectuals~~Palestinians advocate the idea of a advocate the idea of a
~~binational~~ binational or one-state idea as an 12 “FULL T EXT ~~or one-state idea as an alternative to a negotiated two-state solution with Israel. In a~~

~~8 “FULL TEXT~~: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ 2018 UN General Assembly2018 UN General Assembly Speech,” haaretz.com, Speech,” haaretz.com,
September 27, 2018September 27, 2018. 13 For more information, see CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti. .
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~~December 2020 poll, 40% of Palestinians supported a two-state solution, but 62% expressed~~
~~belief that Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank has made this outcome impractical. In~~
~~the same poll, 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a “one-state~~
~~solution.”9~~alternative to a negotiated two-state solution with Israel (see Figure 3). In a September 2021 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Abbas said: I warn that undermining the two-State solution based on international law and UN resolutions will open the way for other alternatives imposed on us by the situation on the ground as a result of the continuation of the Israeli occupation of our State…. If the Israeli occupation authorities continue to entrench the reality of one apartheid state as is happening today, our Palestinian people and the entire world will not tolerate such a situation and circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one State.14 Figure 3. Public Opinion Polling: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying pol ing data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but also to the United States and many other countries and actors around the world for neighbors, but also to the United States and many other countries and actors around the world for
a variety of religious, cultural, and politicala variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. For at least 75 years, the issue has been one reasons. For at least 75 years, the issue has been one
of the most provocative in the international arena. of the most provocative in the international arena.
Key U.S. Policy Considerations and Issues
Major U.S. policy priorities with the Palestinians over successive Administrations have included Major U.S. policy priorities with the Palestinians over successive Administrations have included
facilitating or seeking a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process, helping the West Bank-based PA facilitating or seeking a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process, helping the West Bank-based PA
counter Hamas and other terrorist groups, and using aid to encourage Palestinian governance counter Hamas and other terrorist groups, and using aid to encourage Palestinian governance
reform and economic development. reform and economic development.
During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions that favored During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions that favored
Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and also suspended aid to the Palestinians, as set forth Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and also suspended aid to the Palestinians, as set forth
below.below.
Selected Trump Administration ~~Actions Impacting~~Policy Changes on Israeli-Palestinian Issues
December December 2017 2017
President Trump recognizes President Trump recognizes ~~Jerusalem~~ Jerusalem as Israel’sas Israel’s capital, prompting the capital, prompting the ~~Palestine~~
~~Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA)~~ PLO/PA to cut off high-level to cut off high-level
~~diplomatic~~ diplomatic relations with the United States. relations with the United States.
May 2018 May 2018
The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem. The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem.
14 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021) available at https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210924/7gIp44D6mxWV/8xz66G7sjKRg_en.pdf . Congressional Research Service 6 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations August 2018 The Administration ~~August 2018~~
~~The Administration~~ ends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Reliefends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
September September 2018 2018
The Administration The Administration ~~reprograms~~ reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and
Gaza to other locations,Gaza to other locations, and announces the closureand announces the closure of the PLO office in of the PLO office in
Washington, DC. Washington, DC.
January 2019 January 2019
As a result of the Anti-Terrorism As a result of the Anti-Terrorism ~~Clarification~~ Clarification Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the
AdministrationAdministration ends ends ~~all~~ al bilateral U.S.bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians. aid to the Palestinians.
March 2019 March 2019
The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic an independent diplomatic
missionmission to the Palestinians—isto the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U.S. embassy subsumed under the authority of the U.S. embassy
to Israel.to Israel. President Trump recognizesPresident Trump recognizes ~~Israeli~~ Israeli sovereignty claimssovereignty claims in the Golan in the Golan
Heights. Heights.
November November 2019 2019
Then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the AdministrationSecretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration disagrees with a disagrees with a
1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli settlements in the West settlements in the West
Bank are inconsistent with international law. Bank are inconsistent with international law.
~~January 2020~~
~~President Trump releases Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal that largely favors~~
~~Israeli positions and contemplates possible U.S. recognition of Israeli annexation of~~
~~some West Bank areas.~~
~~August 2020~~
~~Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announce the first of four cases in~~
~~which the Trump Administration facilitates some normalization of Israel’s relations~~
~~with Arab states (Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco follow later in the year). Israel~~

~~9 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Public Opinion Poll No. 78, December 15, 2020 (poll~~
~~conducted December 8-11, 2020). Most scenarios envisioning a binational Israeli-Palestinian state would apparently~~
~~fundamentally change or abrogate the Zionist nature of Israel’s institutional and societal makeup. Such developments~~
~~would by almost all accounts be unacceptable to a large majority of Israelis.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~suspends consideration of West Bank annexation in connection with the UAE~~
~~deal.~~
~~October 2020~~
~~The United States and Israel sign agreements removing restrictions on three~~
~~binational foundations from funding projects in areas administered by Israel after~~
~~the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (namely, the West Bank and the Golan Heights). The~~
~~foundations are the Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation~~
~~(BIRD), the Binational Science Foundation (BSF), and the Binational Agricultural~~
~~Research and Development Foundation (BARD).~~
~~November 2020~~
~~Secretary Pompeo announces a change in U.S. product labeling regulations,~~
~~requiring products from Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be identified as~~
~~coming from Israel.~~
~~In the second half of 2020, the Trump Administration’s diplomatic focus pivoted from its January~~
~~2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach agreements on normalization with~~
~~the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. These agreements, known as the Abraham Accords,~~
November 2020 Secretary Pompeo announces that products imported to the United States from Area C of the West Bank (where Israeli settlements and some Palestinian residential areas are located) are to be marked as coming from Israel rather than the West Bank. The Abraham Accords signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—as expressed in in the 2002 Arab Peace the 2002 Arab Peace ~~Initiative10~~Initiative15—that —that
Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.precondition for improved ties.1116 Although Although
~~Israel~~Israel reportedly agreed to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank as part of the UAE deal, agreed to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank as part of the UAE deal,1217 PLO/PA PLO/PA
officials denounced the deal as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, claiming that officials denounced the deal as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, claiming that
the UAEthe UAE had acquiesced to a West had acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto
annexation.”annexation.”1318
Biden Administration ~~Statements and Reported Proposal~~
~~Amid the longtime difficulties involved with Israeli-Palestinian relations, the~~Policies The Biden Biden
Administration has Administration has ~~voiced interest in improving U.S.~~made efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, including by ties with the Palestinians, including by
revisiting some Trump-era actions. U.S. officials have resumed some types of aid to the Palestinians, along with diplomatic engagement with Palestinian leaders. In a March 10, 2021, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the United States has an obligation to seek to advance the prospects for a two-state solution, saying that it “is ultimately the only way that Israel wil truly be secure as a Jewish and democratic state and the Palestinians wil have the state to which they are entitled.”19 15 T he Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw ~~revisiting some Trump-era actions. In January 2021, Ambassador Richard Mills, then-Acting U.S.~~
~~Representative to the United Nations, announced in a U.N. Security Council meeting that the~~
~~Biden Administration would seek to reengage with Palestinian leaders and people, resume~~
~~economic development and humanitarian aid, and preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state~~
~~solution. Ambassador Mills also stated:~~
~~In this vein, the United States will urge Israel’s government and the Palestinian Authority~~
~~to avoid unilateral steps that make a two-state solution more difficult, such as annexation~~
~~of territory, settlement activity, demolitions, incitement to violence, and providing~~
~~compensation for individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. We hope it will be possible~~
~~to start working to slowly build confidence on both sides to create an environment in which~~
~~we might once again be able to help advance a solution.14~~

~~10 The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw~~ fully from the fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem,territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and and
provide for the “provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
AssemblyAssembly Resolution 194.” Resolution 194.” ~~The~~T he initiative was proposed by Saudi initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 --
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. ~~The~~T he text of the initiative is available at text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
1116 Annelle Sheline, Annelle Sheline, ~~“Trump~~ “ T rump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East,” East,” Politico Magazine, August, August 14, 2020. 14, 2020.
1217 Jacob Magid, Jacob Magid, “ “US assuredUS assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, ~~ToI~~T oI told,” told,” Times of Israel, ,
September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, seeSeptember 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see ~~CRS~~ CRS Report R46433, Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of
West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
1318 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
~~14 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on~~19 T ext of hearing transcript available at
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

67 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 20 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Regarding the U.S. position on Jerusalem, a spokesperson for President Biden confirmed in February 2021 that “our embassy wil remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel’s capital. The ultimate status of Jerusalem is a final status issue which wil need to be resolved by the parties in the context of direct negotiations.”20 May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants led by Hamas.21 The fol owing were key aspects of the conflict:  Overview. Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from Gaza into central Israel. The Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel conducted sustained air and artil ery strikes in Gaza. Additional y, intercommunal protests and violence took place within Israel and Jerusalem—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.  Political context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and trajectory of conflict included tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of PA elections).  Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel (including 2 Thai nationals) and more than 250 people in Gaza (including more than 60 children) were kil ed.22 Amid unrest in the West Bank during that same timeframe (May 10-21), a U.N. source estimates that Israeli security forces kil ed 27 Palestinians.23 In the conflict’s aftermath, President Biden committed to “working with the United Nations and other international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”24 With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to international y-supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 (see “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”).25 Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction. The following are key issues for the Biden Administration and Congress. U.S. Aid The Biden Administration has resumed some economic development, security, and humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see also “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”). As noted earlier, in 2019 the Trump Administration suspended al U.S. aid to the Palestinians,26 after a number of measures by the Administration and Congress in 2018 https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/475423704?3&deliveryId=72574526&uid=congressionaltranscripts-6155787. 20 Niels Lesniewski, “ White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. 21 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza. 22 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “ Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,” Los Angeles Tim es, May 23, 2021; “ 2 T hai workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombards southern Israel,” Tim es of Israel, May 18, 2021. 23 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian T erritory, “ West Bank: Escalation of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021. 24 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East ,” May 20, 2021. 25 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a T ough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. 26 For more information on this development and subsequent legislative amendments that facilitated renewed congressional appropriations of bilateral aid for the West Bank and Gaza starting in FY2020, see CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Am endm ents to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction , by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 14 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations to halt or limit various types of aid.27 Some of these measures reflected Trump Administration policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel Palestinian leaders to resume dialogue with U.S. officials and accept U.S. and Israeli negotiating demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141, and discussed further below), attracted bipartisan support. In its FY2022 congressional budget justification, the State Department said: U.S. foreign assistance for the West Bank and Gaza serves important U.S. interests, including providing critical relief to those in great need and fostering economic development and the conditions needed for a sustainable two-state solution.28  Past Administrations have used similar rationales to justify U.S. aid to the Palestinians. After the peace process began between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported U.S. efforts to incline the newly established PA toward better governance and economic development, and away from violence against Israel. Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to aid to the Palestinians in annual appropriations language.29 For background information on U.S. aid to the Palestinians, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. Bilateral Economic and Security Assistance Nearly al bilateral aid appropriated by Congress for the Palestinians comes from the following accounts (see Figure 4):  Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid is the main channel for economic development and humanitarian assistance through NGO implementing partners in the West Bank and Gaza. The FY2022 congressional budget justification reads: “Economic and humanitarian assistance programs improve the lives of mil ions of Palestinians by providing immediate relief and advancing development across sectors such as health, appropriate infrastructure, economic growth, and civil society.”30  International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding goes toward nonlethal assistance programs that the United States started for the PA’s security forces and justice sector in the West Bank in 2008. According to the FY2022 congressional budget justification: “Security assistance supports the PA’s efforts to build professional and effective security and criminal justice institutions that maintain security and stability in the West Bank, uphold the rule of law, and contribute directly to regional security.”31 27 CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. 28 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254. 29 See, for example, sections 7037-7040, and 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). 30 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254. 31 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 308. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 15 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2022 Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS. Notes: Al amounts are approximate. Some amounts (including al amounts for FY2021) have been appropriated but not obligated. Amounts for FY2022 have been requested but not appropriated. NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations. The Biden Administration ended the two-year moratorium on bilateral aid to the Palestinians by notifying Congress (in March and April 2021, respectively) of its intent to obligate $75 mil ion in FY2020 ESF and $40 mil ion in INCLE (about $37 mil ion from FY2016 appropriations and $3 mil ion from FY2017). According to a June 15, 2021, letter from Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member James Risch to Representative Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member Risch and some other Members placed an informal congressional hold on a portion of the FY2020 ESF because of potential y differing views between the Members and the Administration about whether the funds would directly benefit the PA.32 As mentioned below, the Taylor Force Act (Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141) prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA unless Palestinian leaders curtail domestical y popular payments that arguably incentivize acts of terror. In September 2021, a media report said that Ranking Member Risch released the hold after the Biden Administration real ocated $20 mil ion slated for infrastructure projects toward food assistance (see Table 2).33 32 See the text of the letter at https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210615-TO-House-of-Representatives-Jamie-Raskin-Response-to-Israel-Gaza-Letter-1.pdf. 33 Jacob Magid, “ T op Republican releases remaining Palestinian aid he held up for months,” Times of Israel, September 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 16 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Table 2. Details Regarding $75 Million in FY2020 ESF Initial March 2021 Budget Final September 2021 Budget  $5.4 mil ion for civil society organizations and  $5.4 mil ion for civil society organizations and independent media outlets. independent media outlets in the West Bank.  $10 mil ion for operating costs for the East  $10 mil ion for operating costs for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network. Jerusalem Hospital Network.  $24.5 mil ion for water supply and sanitation needs  $4.3 mil ion for water supply and sanitation needs and related general services. for vulnerable households in Gaza.  $4.2 mil ion for community engagement, job  $8.2 mil ion for community engagement, training, placement, and psychosocial support for and job placement for Palestinian youth. Palestinian youth.  $15.5 mil ion in economic development assistance.  $8 mil ion in economic development assistance.  $11.4 mil ion for rapid response for vulnerable  $16.5 mil ion for municipal infrastructure in populations in Gaza. Bethlehem.  $20.2 in food assistance through the World Food  $6.4 mil ion for rapid response for vulnerable Programme. populations in Gaza. Source: USAID. U.S. Contributions to UNRWA Additional y, the Administration has resumed voluntary contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA provides education, health care, and other social services to more than 5 mil ion registered Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. It is funded almost entirely through voluntary contributions from governments and other donors. During FY2021, the Biden Administration provided $318.8 mil ion in contributions to UNRWA (see Table 3). U.S. contributions come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account, which is administered through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). Some Members of Congress and Israeli officials want U.S. officials to pressure UNRWA to reform some of its practices.34 While many supporters of the organization may agree with the need for reform, some also argue that UNRWA provides critical humanitarian support to the Palestinian refugee population.35 UNRWA Contributions: Conditions and Oversight U.S. contributions to UNRWA are subject to various legislative conditions and oversight measures. Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States shal be made to [UNRWA] except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] al possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shal be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-cal ed Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerril a type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.” 34 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, McCaul: Biden Administration should have secured concessions before resuming assistance to Palestinians,” April 7, 2021; Israeli Ambassador to the United States Gilad Erdan, quoted in Pranshu Verma and Rick Gladstone, “ Reversing T rump, Biden Restores Aid to Palestinians,” New York Times, April 7, 2021. 35 See, for example, Better World Campaign, “Better World Campaign says UNRWA funding critical to U.S. interests in the Middle East,” January 9, 2018. Congressional Research Service 11 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Additional y, since FY2015, annual appropriations legislation (for example, Section 7048(d) of P.L. 116-260) has included a provision requiring the State Department to report to Congress on whether UNRWA is  using Operations Support Officers to inspect UNRWA instal ations and reporting any inappropriate use;  acting promptly to address any staff or beneficiary violations of Section 301(c) or UNRWA internal policies;  implementing procedures to maintain its facilities’ neutrality, and conducting regular inspections;  taking necessary and appropriate measures to ensure Section 301(c) compliance and related reporting;  taking steps to ensure the content of educational materials taught in UNRWA-administered schools and summer camps is consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance and does not induce incitement;  not engaging in financial violations of U.S. law, and taking steps to improve financial transparency; and  in compliance with U.N. audit requirements. The State Department (specifical y PRM) and UNRWA have a nonbinding “Framework for Cooperation” in place for calendar years 2021 and 2022,36 patterned after similar framework documents from before the Trump Administration’s suspension of contributions in 2018. In the framework document, UNRWA has agreed to submit a report to PRM semiannual y—alongside its annual operational report—as a way to evaluate UNRWA’s compliance with U.S. legislative requirements. In a September 2021 SFRC hearing on the nomination of Julieta Val s Noyes to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Noyes said that the Biden Administration shares concerns expressed by some Members via their summer 2021 introduction of an UNRWA Transparency and Accountability Act (S. 2479 and H.R. 4721) that would further condition U.S. contributions to UNRWA.37 However, Noyes asserted that the PRM-UNRWA framework document (see textbox above) “accounts for the need to make changes and to redouble efforts to ensure efficiency, the effectiveness and the neutrality of UNWRA.” Noyes also stated, “UNRWA is a force for stability in the region by providing vital services to Palestinians in need, education for school children, health care for people, and the only viable alternative to UNRWA in those areas would be Hamas.”38 Table 3. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA (in $ mil ions, non-inflation adjusted) Fiscal Year(s) Amount Fiscal Year(s) Amount 1950-1989 1,473.3 2006 137.0 1990 57.0 2007 154.2 1991 75.6 2008 184.7 1992 69.0 2009 268.0 1993 73.8 2010 237.8 1994 78.2 2011 249.4 1995 74.8 2012 233.3 1996 77.0 2013 294.0 1997 79.2 2014 398.7 1998 78.3 2015 390.5 36 T ext available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021-2022-US-UNRWA-Framework-Signed.pdf. 37 T ext of hearing transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6341064?1. 38 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 12 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Fiscal Year(s) Amount Fiscal Year(s) Amount 1999 80.5 2016 359.5 2000 89.0 2017 359.3 2001 123.0 2018 65.0 2002 119.3 2019 -0- 2003 134.0 2020 -0- 2004 127.4 2021 318.8 2005 108.0 TOTAL 6,567.6 Sources: U.S. State Department and UNRWA. Note: Al amounts are approximate. Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Programs In the current Israeli-Palestinian context, where U.S. officials support the concept of negotiating a permanent resolution but do not anticipate imminent progress on that point,39 the Administration and Congress have pursued programs fostering Israeli-Palestinian cooperative action. USAID Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization Since 2002, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided a U.S. government vehicle for using foreign assistance to support people-to-people reconciliation activities and counteracting sources of instability and violent conflict. Congress began funding CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians in FY2004.40 According to Section 7060(g) of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), CMM funding (which comes from either the Economic Support Fund (ESF) or the Development Assistance (DA) accounts) is intended to “support people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war.” Through FY2012, Congress annual y designated $10 mil ion from CMM amounts for initiatives in the Middle East. Starting in FY2013, Congress removed the directive. Nevertheless, the executive branch continued al ocating a portion of the CMM funds appropriated for global use for Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people initiatives. CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians have been administered through USAID, the U.S. Embassy to Israel, and the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem (before it was subsumed into the embassy in 2019). In September 2018, the Trump Administration changed the CMM program by halting new grants for initiatives involving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. New people-to-people projects were limited to including Arab citizens of Israel as the counterparts to Israeli Jews.41 This change took place as part of the Trump Administration’s general suspension in 2018 and 2019 of most U.S. aid benefitting Palestinians. 39 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,” September 21, 2021. 40 Edward Wong, “ U.S. Is Eliminating the Final Source of Aid for Palestinian Civilians,” New York Times, September 15, 2018. 41 Ibid. A 2020 USAID factsheet describing ongoing CMM grants for Israeli Jews and Arabs is available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL_2020_WBG_CMM_Fact_sheet.pdf . Congressional Research Service 13 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations In April 2021, the Biden Administration announced a resumption of many types of U.S. aid for the Palestinians, including $10 mil ion for people-to-people programs involving Israelis and Palestinians.42 On May 13, 2021, USAID sent formal notification to Congress of its intent to obligate $10 mil ion in DA funding for these programs, rebranded as Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization (CMS).43 The notification states: In the West Bank and Gaza and Israel, people-to-people reconciliation activities and associated capacity building technical assistance will be carried out to address issues of common concern for Israelis and Palestinians. Consistent with other Reconciliation Fund Programs managed by USAID, activities may include but are not limited to: programs that facilitate cooperation and inclusion in the areas of general education, including for people with disabilities; mental health; information and communications technology; agriculture and trade; joint sports programs; peacebuilding skills development; and programs that promote greater understanding and opportunities for peace between Israelis and Palestinians through dialogue. Activities will be focused on “cross-border” projects implemented through local and U.S. organizations, but may also include activities between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.44 Funds Under Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act

~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~While Administration officials have stated their desires to build on the Abraham Accords, the~~
~~State Department spokesperson has said that continued efforts at Arab-Israeli normalization~~
~~should “contribute to tangible progress towards the goal of advancing a negotiated peace between~~
~~Israelis and Palestinians.”15 In his January speech before the U.N. Security Council, Ambassador~~
~~Mills said:~~
~~[Israeli and Palestinian leaders] are far apart on final-status issues, Israeli and Palestinian~~
~~politics are fraught, and trust between the two sides is at a nadir. However, these realities~~
~~do not relieve Member States of the responsibility of trying to preserve the viability of a~~
~~two-state solution. Nor should they distract from the imperative of improving conditions~~
~~on the ground, particularly the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.16~~
~~In a March 10, 2021, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State~~
~~Antony Blinken stated that the United States has an obligation to seek to advance the prospects~~
~~for a two-state solution, saying that it “is ultimately the only way that Israel will truly be secure as~~
~~a Jewish and democratic state and the Palestinians will have the state to which they are entitled.”~~
~~One news outlet reportedly obtained an internal State Department proposal entitled “The US~~
~~Palestinian Reset and the Path Forward” in March 2021.17 According to the source, the~~
~~proposal—which is reportedly still subject to interagency review—recommends various steps for~~
~~the Administration in line with the above statements, including:~~
~~ Going back to the pre-Trump U.S. position on a negotiated two-state solution,~~
~~based on “the 1967 lines with mutually agreed equivalent swaps.”18~~
~~ Reversing “certain steps by the prior administration that bring into question our~~
~~commitment or pose real barriers to a two-state solution,” such as the product~~
~~labeling changes mentioned above under then-Secretary Pompeo in November~~
~~2020.~~
~~ Resuming diplomatic contacts with PLO/PA leaders.~~
~~ $15 million in Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)-related humanitarian~~
~~assistance for the Palestinians as early as March 2021.~~
~~ Restarting U.S. economic, security, and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in~~
~~late March or early April, including via contributions to the U.N. Relief and~~
~~Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).~~
~~Regarding the U.S. position on Jerusalem, a spokesperson for President Biden confirmed in~~
~~February that “our embassy will remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel’s capital. The~~
~~ultimate status of Jerusalem is a final status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in~~
~~the context of direct negotiations.”19~~

~~the Situation in the Middle East (via VTC), January 26, 2021.~~
~~15 Ned Price, State Department Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing – February 2, 2021.~~
~~16 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills.~~
~~17 Joyce Karam, “‘The National’ obtains US official document for Palestinian ‘reset,’” The National (UAE), March 17,~~
~~2021.~~
~~18 This was the formula articulated by then-Secretary of State John Kerry in December 2016. Secretary of State John~~
~~Kerry, Remarks on Middle East Peace, Washington, DC, December 28, 2016. The “1967 lines” refer to the 1949-1967~~
~~Israel-Jordan armistice line for the West Bank (commonly known as the Green Line) and the 1950-1967 Israel-Egypt~~
~~armistice line for the Gaza Strip.~~
~~19 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~link to page 29 link to page 23~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~COVID-19 Vaccinations for Palestinians~~
~~Israel has been vaccinating its population against Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) at one of the fastest rates~~
~~in the world. Vaccinations for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have proceeded at a significantly slower~~
~~pace, partly due to Israel having more wealth and international bargaining power than the PA.~~
~~In early 2021, this disparity has led PA officials and some observers—including the World Bank—to call for~~
~~greater efforts by Israel to share vaccines with Palestinians, and to assist the PA in procuring additional vaccines~~
~~more expeditiously.20 The PA anticipates purchasing or receiving additional vaccines from other countries and~~
~~international programs to cover a majority of West Bank and Gaza residents, but questions surround how and~~
~~when this might happen.21~~
~~Debate is ongoing regarding Israel’s legal responsibility for the emergency health care needs of West Bank and~~
~~Gaza residents, given Israel’s control over many aspects of Palestinian life.22 Israel has transferred some vaccines to~~
~~the PA, and has started efforts to vaccinate Palestinians working in Israel or Israeli settlements in the West Bank.23~~
~~However, reports that Israel has sent or plans to send vaccines to other countries while Palestinians are in need~~
~~of them has increased the criticism Israel faces from human rights organizations.24 The State Department~~
~~spokesperson has said that increased Palestinian access to COVID-19 vaccines is important for Israel’s health and~~
~~security as well.25~~
~~The following are key issues that the Biden Administration and Congress are addressing or likely~~
~~to address.~~
~~Resuming U.S. Aid~~
~~As mentioned above, the Biden Administration apparently may resume economic development,~~
~~security, and humanitarian aid programs for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see also~~
~~“Gaza’s Challenges” below) as early as March or April 2021. As noted earlier, in 2019 the Trump~~
~~Administration suspended all U.S. aid to the Palestinians,26 after a number of measures by the~~
~~Administration and Congress in 2018 to halt or limit various types of aid.27 Some of these~~

~~20 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, pp. 26-27.~~
~~21 Ibid., pp. 22-23.~~
~~22 Eyal Benvenisti, “Israel is Legally Obligated to Ensure the Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Are~~
~~Vaccinated,” Just Security, January 7, 2021; Alan Baker, “Israel, the Palestinians, and the COVID-19 Vaccines: The~~
~~New Blood-Libel,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 14, 2021. Israeli claims that the PA is primarily~~
~~responsible for health care in the West Bank and Gaza appear to be based on Article 17 of Annex III to the 1995 Israel-~~
~~Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While Article 17 transfers general responsibility~~
~~for health care to the PA, it also calls for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in combating epidemics and mutual assistance~~
~~in cases of emergency. Claims that Israel bears primary responsibility for emergency health care appear to stem from~~
~~Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that an occupying power has a duty to take measures to~~
~~combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. While a number of U.N. Security Council Resolutions~~
~~(spanning from Resolution 242 of 1967 to Resolution 2334 of 2016) describe Israel as the occupying power in the West~~
~~Bank and Gaza, Israel disputes this characterization. Regarding the West Bank, see footnote 79. Regarding Gaza, Israel~~
~~claims that it ceded responsibility when it withdrew its troops and settlers from Gaza’s urban areas in 2005, while some~~
~~observers argue that its responsibility continues because Israel maintains effective control over most of the territory’s~~
~~access points.~~
~~23 “Israel begins vaccinating Palestinian workers after delays,” Associated Press, March 8, 2021.~~
~~24 Patrick Kingsley, et al., “Israel Secretly Agrees to Fund Vaccines for Syria as Part of Prisoner Swap,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, February 20, 2021; Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Vaccines Go to Far-Off Allies Before Palestinians,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, February 24, 2021.~~
~~25 Ned Price, State Department Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing – February 23, 2021.~~
~~26 CRS Report R46274,~~ ~~The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal~~
~~Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.~~
~~27 CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.~~
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~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~measures reflected Trump Administration policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel~~
~~Palestinian leaders to resume dialogue with U.S. officials and accept U.S. and Israeli negotiating~~
~~demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S,~~
~~Title X of P.L. 115-141, and discussed further below), attracted bipartisan support.~~
~~In his January speech, Ambassador Mills asserted, “U.S. assistance benefits millions of ordinary~~
~~Palestinians and helps to preserve a stable environment that benefits both Palestinians and~~
~~Israelis.”28 Past Administrations have used similar rationales to justify U.S. aid to the Palestinians.~~
~~After the peace process began between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, U.S. bilateral aid to the~~
~~Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported U.S. efforts to incline the newly~~
~~established PA toward better governance and economic development, and away from violence~~
~~against Israel. Accordingly, Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to aid to the~~
~~Palestinians in annual appropriations language.29~~
~~Types of Aid~~
~~Aid appropriated by Congress for the Palestinians for FY2020 and FY2021 is available for~~
~~obligation from the following accounts (see Figure 3):~~
~~ Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid would be the main channel for economic~~
~~development and humanitarian assistance through NGO implementing partners in the~~
~~West Bank and Gaza.~~
~~ International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) aid funding would~~
~~go toward non-lethal assistance programs that the United States started for the PA’s~~
~~security forces and justice sector in the West Bank in 2008.~~
~~Figure 3. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2021~~

Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS.
Notes: All amounts are approximate. Amounts for FY2020 and FY2021 have been appropriated but not
~~obligated. NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International~~
~~Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency~~
~~Operations.~~

~~28 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills.~~
~~29 See, for example, sections 7037-7040, and 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).~~
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~~Additionally, the Administration could resume humanitarian assistance contributions to UNRWA~~
~~for more than 5 million registered refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria~~
~~(see Table 2). Such contributions have come in the past from the Migration and Refugee~~
~~Assistance account. Since the suspension of U.S. contributions in 2018, UNRWA has relied on~~
~~contributions from other international donors, and adjusted its provision of education, health care,~~
~~and other social services to help reduce expenses—sometimes delaying payment of salaries to its~~
~~employees.30 Total donor pledges to UNRWA for calendar year 2020 were $940 million,~~
~~compared with $1.121 billion for calendar year 2017 (the last year to date featuring regular U.S.~~
~~contributions).31 UNRWA is seeking $1.5 billion in pledges for calendar year 2021.32 When asked~~
~~about a possible resumption of U.S. contributions to UNRWA in a March 1, 2021, press briefing,~~
~~the State Department spokesperson said “we intend to provide assistance that will benefit all~~
~~Palestinians, including refugees. We are in the process of determining how to move forward on~~
~~resuming all forms of that assistance consistent with U.S. law.” As mentioned above, the reported~~
~~State Department proposal anticipates providing U.S. contributions to UNRWA.33~~
~~For background information on the above-mentioned types of U.S. aid to the Palestinians, see~~
~~CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.~~

~~30 With the exception of 158 international staff posts funded by the United Nations General Assembly through the UN~~
~~regular budget, UNRWA operations are supported through voluntary contributions. UNRWA,~~ ~~Annual Operational~~
~~Report 2019, p. 21.~~
~~31 See, for example, UNRWA’s Funding Trends portal at https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-~~
~~partners/funding-trends; UNRWA, Annual Operational Report 2019.~~
~~32 UNRWA press statement, UNRWA Appeals for US$1.5 Billion to Support Palestine Refugees in 2021, February 11,~~
~~2021. The appeal is intended to cover $806 million for core services, $231 million for emergency humanitarian~~
~~assistance, $318 million to address the effects of the Syria conflict on Palestinian refugees, and $170 million for~~
~~priority facilities construction and core services improvement projects.~~
~~33 Karam, “‘The National’ obtains US official document for Palestinian ‘reset.’”~~
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~~Table 2. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA~~
~~(in $ millions, non-inflation adjusted)~~
~~Fiscal Year(s)~~
~~Amount~~
~~Fiscal Year(s)~~
~~Amount~~
~~1950-1989~~
~~1,473.3~~
~~2005~~
~~108.0~~
~~1990~~
~~57.0~~
~~2006~~
~~137.0~~
~~1991~~
~~75.6~~
~~2007~~
~~154.2~~
~~1992~~
~~69.0~~
~~2008~~
~~184.7~~
~~1993~~
~~73.8~~
~~2009~~
~~268.0~~
~~1994~~
~~78.2~~
~~2010~~
~~237.8~~
~~1995~~
~~74.8~~
~~2011~~
~~249.4~~
~~1996~~
~~77.0~~
~~2012~~
~~233.3~~
~~1997~~
~~79.2~~
~~2013~~
~~294.0~~
~~1998~~
~~78.3~~
~~2014~~
~~398.7~~
~~1999~~
~~80.5~~
~~2015~~
~~390.5~~
~~2000~~
~~89.0~~
~~2016~~
~~359.5~~
~~2001~~
~~123.0~~
~~2017~~
~~359.3~~
~~2002~~
~~119.3~~
~~2018~~
~~65.0~~
~~2003~~
~~134.0~~
~~2019~~
~~-0-~~
~~2004~~
~~127.4~~
~~2020~~
~~-0-~~

~~TOTAL~~
~~6,248.8~~
Source: U.S. State Department.
Note: All amounts are approximate.
~~Potential New U.S. Funds for Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation~~
As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle
East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the establishment of the Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the establishment of the
following two funds, as following two funds, as ~~well~~ wel as $50 as $50 ~~million~~mil ion (Congress (Congress can specify how to can specify how to ~~allocate~~al ocate any future appropriations among any future appropriations among
the two authorized funds) for each the two authorized funds) for each of the next five years (FY2022-FY2026): of the next five years (FY2022-FY2026):
The People-to-People Partnership for Peace Fund is authorized to be established by the is authorized to be established by the Administrator of USAID near the end of~~Administrator of the~~
~~U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as early as~~ December 2021. If established, the fund would December 2021. If established, the fund would
support dialogue and reconciliation programs, as support dialogue and reconciliation programs, as ~~well~~ wel as other projects designedas other projects designed, as stated in MEPPA, “to help build the foundation for “to help build the foundation for
peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a sustainable two-state solution and an initiative to peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a sustainable two-state solution and an initiative to
promote Israeli-Palestinian economic promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.” Section 8004 of P.L. 116-260 provided authorizing language for the fund by adding Section 535 at the end of Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.). This section provides that the fund:  could work through Israeli, Palestinian, or international organizations committed to its purposes, including those that promote reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Arabs;  could receive contributions, such as from foreign governments and international organizations; and  would have an advisory board of experts appointed in a bipartisan fashion. The ~~cooperation.”~~
Joint Investment for Peace Initiative iswas authorized to be established by the Chief authorized to be established by the Chief Executive of the U.S. Executive of the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) ~~as early as June 2021. If established, the initiative would~~
any time after June 42 State Department, “ The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” April 7, 2021. 43 USAID underwent an organizational restructuring under the T rump Administration. For more, see the relevant section in CRS Report R46656, Selected Trum p Adm inistration Foreign Aid Priorities: A Wrap -Up, coordinated by Emily M. Morgenstern. 44 USAID FY2021 Congressional Notification #153, May 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 40 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations 2021. If established, the initiative would, as stated in MEPPA, “provide investments in, and support to, entities that carry out projects that contribute to the development of the “provide investments in, and support to, entities that carry out projects that contribute to the development of the
Palestinian private sector economy in the West Bank and Gaza,” and would “prioritize support to projects that Palestinian private sector economy in the West Bank and Gaza,” and would “prioritize support to projects that
increase economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.” A former PLO adviser has raised concerns that increase economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.” A former PLO adviser has raised concerns that
the authorizing legislation does not explicitly preclude Israeli settlers in the the authorizing legislation does not explicitly preclude Israeli settlers in the West Bank from receiving funding West Bank from receiving funding
from the initiative.from the initiative.34

~~34 Zaha Hassan, “How a Proposed New Fund to Bolster the Palestinian Economy Stands to Benefit Israeli Settlers,”~~
Responsible Statecraft, September 2, 2020.
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45 Any appropriations for the two funds would be subject to the same mission directives and vetting practices that USAID applies to bilateral economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza. If both funds are established, Section 8006(d) of P.L. 116-260 requires that USAID and DFC submit a joint report to Congress no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year describing lessons learned and best practices from their respective projects and investments, and how those projects and investments have contributed to the funds’ purposes. The congressional budget justification for FY2022 anticipates a total of $50 mil ion in appropriations to be al ocated between the two funds.46
Taylor Force Act (TFA) and PLO/PA Payments “for Acts of Terrorism”
The Biden Administration has said that any resumption of aid to the Palestinians would comply The Biden Administration has said that any resumption of aid to the Palestinians would comply
with the TFA. The TFA with the TFA. The TFA ~~discourages~~seeks to discourage certain PLO/PA payments “for acts of terrorism” by certain PLO/PA payments “for acts of terrorism” by
prohibiting most Economic Support Fund aid (ESF) that “directly benefits” the PA. prohibiting most Economic Support Fund aid (ESF) that “directly benefits” the PA. The TFA does not further define what constitutes a direct benefit. During the legislative ~~During the~~
~~legislative~~ process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA
payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of
terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more
information on violence and terrorism by Palestinians, information on violence and terrorism by Palestinians, ~~see~~see Appendix A.
Palestinian Payments for “Martyrs” and Prisoners
The Palestinian practice of compensating families The Palestinian practice of compensating families who lost a memberwho lost a member (combatant or civilian) in connection with (combatant or civilian) in connection with
Israeli-PalestinianIsraeli-Palestinian violence reportedlyviolence reportedly dates back to the 1960s.dates back to the 1960s.3547 Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners or or
decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second intifada [uprising] of 2000 to [uprising] of 2000 to
2005.”2005.”3648 Various PA laws and decrees Various PA laws and decrees since 2004 have established parameterssince 2004 have established parameters for payments.for payments.~~37 U.S. lawmakers~~ 49 U.S. lawmakers and and
executive branch officials have condemned the practice to the extent it might incentivize violence,executive branch officials have condemned the practice to the extent it might incentivize violence, focusing focusing
particular criticismparticular criticism on an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levelson an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levels of compensation for prisonersof compensation for prisoners who who
receivereceive longer sentences.longer sentences.38
50 45 Zaha Hassan, “ How a Proposed New Fund to Bolster the Palestinian Economy Stands to Benefit Israeli Settlers,” Responsible Statecraft, September 2, 2020. 46 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, pp. 258 -259. 47 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy T heory’ T hat Proved T rue—but Also More Complicated,” theatlantic.com, April 27, 2018. 48 Eli Lake, “T he Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016. 49 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing T errorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to T errorists and their Families,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, at http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-intentions/. 50 See, for example, Corker Opening Statement at Hearing on T aylor Force Act, July 12, 2017, https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-list?ID=CFA1D96C-2FF8-4A70-9C29-49451ADD90AE; Joel Gehrke, “ House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,” Washington Exam iner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley T elhami, “ Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’ families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 9 link to page 46 link to page 49 link to page 49 link to page 52 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations As mentioned above, the TFA prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA, with specific As mentioned above, the TFA prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA, with specific
exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, and a certain amount for wastewater projects exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, and a certain amount for wastewater projects
and vaccination programs. Thus, and vaccination programs. Thus, ~~any new~~ U.S. aid for economic development and humanitarian U.S. aid for economic development and humanitarian
~~purposes presumably either would come~~purposes either is required to fit under those exceptions, or under those exceptions, or ~~would~~ be deemed by be deemed by ~~the~~
an Administration not to directly benefit the PA. Administration not to directly benefit the PA. ~~The~~As mentioned above, the Biden Administration modified its spending plan for FY2020 ESF after some Members of Congress differed with the Administration on whether some items in the initial plan would directly benefit the PA. An Administration can only lift the TFA’s Administration can only lift the TFA’s
restrictions if it certifies that the PLO/PA has ended or significantly changed the payments in restrictions if it certifies that the PLO/PA has ended or significantly changed the payments in
question in such a way that they do not incentivize acts of terrorism, and also certifies that the question in such a way that they do not incentivize acts of terrorism, and also certifies that the
PLO/PA is taking additionalPLO/PA is taking additional steps to oppose violence against steps to oppose violence against Israelis and Americans. The prospect of the PLO/PA~~Israelis and Americans. It appears~~
~~unlikely that bilateral aid would return to pre-Trump Administration levels absent such~~
~~certifications.39~~
~~The prospect of~~ significantly changing these payments may encounter strong domestic opposition significantly changing these payments may encounter strong domestic opposition
among Palestinians. Media reports in late 2020 suggested that the PA might among Palestinians. Media reports in late 2020 suggested that the PA might ~~be considering~~
consider changes—if it changes—if it ~~can~~could make them make them ~~domestically~~domestical y palatable—in hopes of removing obstacles to U.S. palatable—in hopes of removing obstacles to U.S.
aid.aid.4051 PA officials may also PA officials may also ~~be focused~~focus on recouping the full amount of taxes that Israel collects on recouping the full amount of taxes that Israel collects
on the PA’s behalf. After Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the TFA, Israel enacted on the PA’s behalf. After Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the TFA, Israel enacted

~~35 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy Theory’ That Proved True—but Also More Complicated,” theatlantic.com, April~~
~~27, 2018.~~
~~36 Eli Lake, “The Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016.~~
~~37 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families,”~~
~~Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, at http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-~~
~~intentions/.~~
~~38 See, for example, Corker Opening Statement at Hearing on Taylor Force Act, July 12, 2017,~~
~~https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-list?ID=CFA1D96C-2FF8-4A70-9C29-49451ADD90AE; Joel~~
~~Gehrke, “House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,”~~
Washington Examiner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary
~~drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley Telhami, “Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’~~
~~families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020.~~
~~39 David Makovsky, Building Bridges for Peace: U.S. Policy Toward Arab States, Palestinians, and Israel, Washington~~
~~Institute for Near East Policy, January 2021.~~
~~40 Adam Rasgon and David M. Halbfinger, “Seeking Restart with Biden, Palestinians Eye End to Prisoner Payments,”~~
New York Times, November 19, 2020.
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~~a law in 2018 by which it withholds the transfer of these taxes by the amount of PLO/PA~~
~~payments Israel estimates to be for acts of terrorism.41 A past adviser to Palestinian negotiating~~
~~teams has said to CRS that major changes to the PLO/PA payments are implausible—given a~~
~~heightened focus on catering to domestic sentiment—in the context of possible elections in 2021~~
~~(see “PA Elections and Leadership Succession” below).42~~
~~Diplomatic Offices~~
~~As part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to reengage with the Palestinians, it intends to “take~~
~~steps to re-open diplomatic missions that were closed by the last U.S. administration.”43 This~~
~~statement apparently refers to the PLO representative office in Washington, DC, that the Trump~~
~~Administration caused to close in 2018, and the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—which had~~
~~operated for decades as an independent diplomatic mission engaging the Palestinians—that the~~
~~Trump Administration merged into the U.S. embassy to Israel in 2019.~~
~~PLO Office in Washington, DC~~
~~In September 2018, the State Department announced that the office maintained by the PLO in~~
~~Washington, DC, would cease operating. Though not diplomatically accredited, the office had~~
~~functioned since the 1990s as a focal point for U.S.-Palestinian relations.~~
~~PLO Office in Washington, DC: Timeline of Key Events~~
~~1978~~
~~PLO opens office in Washington, DC, to disseminate information about itself and the Palestinian cause.~~
~~1987~~
~~Congress passes the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Title X of P.L. 100-204), which (under Section 1003)~~
~~prohibits the PLO from maintaining an office in the United States. President Reagan signs P.L. 100-204 in~~
~~December but adds a signing statement saying that “the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if~~
~~any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President's authority under the Constitution,~~
~~including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors.”44 The State~~
~~Department instructs the PLO to close its office.~~
~~1994~~
~~As the Oslo peace process gets underway, the PLO opens a representative office in Washington, DC.~~
~~Despite the prohibition of a PLO office in P.L. 100-204, Congress provides waiver authority to the~~
~~executive branch.~~
~~1997~~
~~The PLO office briefly closes after a lapse in waiver authority, and reopens after Congress reinstitutes~~
~~the waiver and the executive branch exercises it.~~
~~2017~~
~~The State Department announces in November that it cannot renew the waiver (required every six~~
~~months in annual appropriations legislation) because of statements made by Palestinian leaders about~~
~~the International Criminal Court (ICC),45 but allows the PLO office to remain open so long as its~~
~~activities are limited “to those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between the Israelis~~
~~and Palestinians.”46 A State Department spokesperson justifies the actions by saying that they “are~~
~~consistent with the president's authorities to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”47~~

~~41 Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, “Israel: Law on Freezing Revenues Designated for Palestinian Authority,”~~
~~Updated December 30, 2020.~~
~~42 CRS email interview with Ghaith al-Omari,~~
~~43 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills.~~
~~44 President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and~~
~~1989, December 22, 1987, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-foreign-~~
~~relations-authorization-act-fiscal-years-1988-and-1989.~~
~~45 State Department Press Briefing, November 21, 2017.~~
~~46 Josh Lederman, “US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24,~~
~~2017.~~
~~47 State Department spokesperson Edgar Vasquez, quoted in “US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in~~
~~DC,” Associated Press, November 24, 2017.~~
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~~2018~~
~~The State Department announces the closure of the PLO office in September.~~
~~It is unclear whether the Administration can legally authorize the PLO to reopen its Washington~~
~~office. Under the annual appropriations language found in Section 7041(k) of the Consolidated~~
~~Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), the general prohibition in Section 1003 of P.L. 100-204~~
~~on a PLO office can only be waived by the President if he can certify that the Palestinians have~~
~~not “actively supported an ICC investigation against Israeli nationals for alleged crimes against~~
~~Palestinians.” This is the same waiver requirement that the State Department determined in~~
~~November 2017 could not be met because of Palestinian statements regarding ICC proceedings~~
~~relating to Israelis. However, in September 2018, the Justice Department issued a memorandum~~
~~opinion for the State Department’s legal adviser stating that Congress cannot dictate State~~
~~Department actions regarding the status of the PLO office—via P.L. 100-204 or other~~
~~legislation—because the President has exclusive constitutional authority “to receive foreign~~
~~diplomatic agents in the United States and to determine the conditions under which they may~~
~~operate.”48~~
~~A separate question is whether the PLO would be willing to reopen its Washington office. Under~~
~~the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA, Section 903~~
~~of P.L. 116-94), which became law in December 2019, the PLO’s establishment of an office in the~~
~~United States could subject it to liability in U.S. courts for terrorism-related lawsuits. The extent~~
~~to which Congress can provide by statute that a foreign entity is deemed to consent to personal~~
~~jurisdiction by establishing or maintaining facilities in the United States appears to be untested in~~
~~the U.S. legal system.49 However, the PSJVTA provision has reportedly given Palestinian officials~~
~~and advisers pause about reopening the PLO office, and has led them to engage with the~~
~~Administration and Congress about a possible amendment to the PSJVTA to facilitate the office’s~~
~~reopening.50~~
~~U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem~~
~~Since the 2019 merger of the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem into the U.S. embassy to Israel,~~
~~U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem have conducted relations with the Palestinians via the embassy’s~~
~~Palestinian Affairs Unit. Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate~~
~~general as an independent diplomatic mission that would work in parallel with, rather than as a~~
~~part of, the embassy. Practically, however, reestablishing the consulate general would probably~~
~~require Israel’s approval given the need for cooperation from Israeli authorities to issue visas to~~
~~and help protect U.S. diplomats.51 Given Israel’s insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality~~
~~is its capital, the U.S. opening of an embassy there in 2018, and political considerations~~
~~associated with Israel’s upcoming March 23 election and government formation process, Israeli~~
~~approval for a separate U.S. diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could~~
~~be politically fraught. The reported State Department proposal mentioned above indicates that the~~
~~Administration is reviewing options on this issue.52~~

~~48 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Statutory Restrictions on the PLO’s Washington Office,~~
~~September 11, 2018, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2021/01/19/2018-09-~~
~~11-plo-office.pdf.~~
~~49 For background information on PSJVTA and this issue, see CRS Report R46274,~~ ~~The Palestinians and Amendments~~
~~to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.~~
~~50 “Biden pledge to reopen PLO mission in Washington faces legal hurdles,” Reuters, January 29, 2021.~~
~~51 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Israeli Discretion?”~~
~~Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021.~~
~~52 Karam, “‘The National’ obtains US official document for Palestinian ‘reset.’”~~
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~~link to page 44~~ a law in 2018 by which it withholds the transfer of these taxes by the amount of PLO/PA payments Israel estimates to be for acts of terrorism.52 Yet, President Abbas made the following statement at his speech before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2021: Why should we have to clarify and justify providing assistance to families of prisoners and martyrs who are the victims of the occupation and its oppressive policies? We cannot abandon our people and we will continue striving to free all our prisoners.53 According to a June 2021 public opinion poll, 70% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza oppose significant changes to the PLO/PA payments.54 Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction The Gaza Strip (see Figure 2) presents complicated chal enges for U.S. policy. Hamas, Israel, the PA, and several outside actors affect Gaza’s difficult security, political, and humanitarian situations. Since Hamas seized de facto control within Gaza in 2007 (for more information on Hamas and Gaza, see Appendix B and Appendix C), these situations have fueled periodic violence between Israel and Hamas (along with other Palestinian militants based in Gaza) that could recur in the future. The precarious security situation in Gaza is linked to humanitarian conditions, and because Gaza does not have a self-sufficient economy (see Appendix C and Appendix D), external assistance largely drives humanitarian welfare. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of electricity and safe drinking water.55 Large transfers of aid to the PA (particularly from Western 51 Adam Rasgon and David M. Halbfinger, “Seeking Restart with Biden, Palestinians Eye End to Prisoner Payments,” New York Tim es, November 19, 2020. 52 Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, “ Israel: Law on Freezing Revenues Designated for Palestinian Authority ,” Updated December 30, 2020. 53 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). 54 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Public Opinion Poll No. 80, published June 15, 2021 (poll taken June 9-12, 2021). 55 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, at https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip- Congressional Research Service 16 link to page 46 link to page 53 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations countries, Arab states, and international organizations) have historical y been critical inputs for the economy in the West Bank and Gaza, but according to the World Bank the PA received $488 mil ion in aid in 2020, 20% less than in 2019 and the lowest level in decades.56 According to PA financial statements, the PA has received only around $100 mil ion in foreign aid for 2021 through August.57 The possibility that humanitarian crisis could destabilize Gaza has prompted some efforts aimed at improving living conditions and reducing spil over threats. In fal 2018, Israel started al owing shipments of Qatari fuel and cash into Gaza to partial y alleviate the electricity and funding shortages.58 In early 2021, Qatar announced that it would increase its annual contribution to Gaza by around 50% to $360 mil ion, and also pledged $60 mil ion to ease Gaza’s energy crisis by helping build a natural gas pipeline to Gaza from Israel.59 Four large-scale conflicts took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021. In each of these conflicts, the militants fired rockets into Israel, while Israel conducted airstrikes in Gaza targeting militants (for more information on threats to Israel from Palestinian violence, see the textbox in Appendix B). Israel also launched some ground operations in the 2008-2009 and 2014 conflicts. In the aftermath of each conflict, significant international attention focused on the stil largely unfulfil ed tasks of:  improving humanitarian conditions and economic opportunities for Palestinians in Gaza; and  preventing Hamas and other militants from reconstituting arsenals and military infrastructure. No significant breakthrough has occurred to reconcile civilian infrastructure needs with security considerations. Officials in Gaza responsible for post-conflict reconstruction estimate that rebuilding costs from the May 2021 conflict would be $479 mil ion, while remaining damages from past conflicts would cost another $600 mil ion to repair.60 Although some countries, including Qatar and Egypt, have pledged in 2021 to assist with reconstruction, international actors only implemented around 15% of the rebuilding assistance pledged after the 2014 conflict, due partly to the security concerns mentioned above.61 Major progress in reconstruction might require one or more of the following: (1) a political reunification of Gaza with the West Bank, (2) reduced Israeli and Egyptian restrictions on access and commerce, and/or (3) a long-term Hamas-Israel cease-fire. Egypt plays a key role in both Israel-Hamas and Hamas-Fatah mediation.62 critical-humanitarian-indicators. 56 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, p. 14. Also see Figure D-1. 57 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php. 58 Oren Liebermann, et al., “ Suitcases of $15M in cash from Qatar bring relief for Gaza,” CNN, November 11, 2018. 59 Aaron Boxerman, “ Qatar raises annual aid to Gaza to $360 million,” Times of Israel, January 31, 2021; “ Qatar says to fund $60 million pipeline from Israel to Gaza,” Reuters, February 25, 2021. 60 Entsar Abu Jahal, “As reconstruction nears, Gaza fears donors won’t deliver on promises,” Al-Monitor, September 26, 2021. 61 Ibid. 62 Maged Mandour, “ Egypt’s Shifting Hamas Policies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 26, 2021. Congressional Research Service 17 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Political reunification would appear to depend on Hamas’s wil ingness to cede control of security in Gaza to the PA. In the past, PA President Abbas has insisted that he wil not accept a situation where PA control is undermined by Hamas’s militia.63 The May 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict disrupted the Qatari fuel shipments and cash payments to Gaza that (as mentioned above) Israel had al owed since 2018. The fuel shipments resumed in June 2021.64 Due to Israeli concerns about the potential for Hamas to divert money to its militia or for other purposes, Qatar began an arrangement in October 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.65 However, this mechanism does not address the unresolved issue of providing salaries to Gaza’s civil servants.66 Other Israel-Hamas disputes have continued and could conceivably escalate, including over what Israel al ows into Gaza, and Israelis in Hamas custody.67 PA West Bank Leadership Concerns Uncertainty surrounds the future of Palestinian democracy and leadership. Questions include:  Are future elections likely and what factors might influence their being held?  Who might eventual y succeed Mahmoud Abbas (see textbox below for his biography) as leader of the national movement?  What chal enges exist to rule of law and civil liberties in the West Bank? 63 “Abbas: If PA not handed control of Gaza, Hamas must take full responsibility ,” Times of Israel, August 18, 2018. 64 “Israel allows fuel tankers into Gaza for first time since clashes,” jpost.com, June 28, 2021. 65 “Palestinians in Gaza receive $100 handouts from Qatar via UN scheme,” Agence France Presse, October 14, 2021. 66 Amos Harel, “ Hamas Is Eyeing a Prisoner Swap, While Israel Is Buying T ime with Limited Gestures,” haaretz.com, October 11, 2021. 67 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 18 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Mahmoud Abbas: Biography Abbas (also known by his Arabic kunya as “Abu Mazen” or “the father of Mazen”—Abbas’s oldest son) is general y regarded as the leader of the Palestinian national movement, given his status as the current PLO chairman, PA president, and head of Fatah—having succeeded Yasser Arafat upon his death in 2004. Abbas was elected as PA president in 2005 popular elections, and when his four-year term expired in 2009, the PLO Central Council voted to extend his term indefinitely until new elections could take place. Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel. Abbas and his family left for Syria as refugees in 1948 when Israel was founded. He earned a B.A. in law from Damascus University and a Ph.D. in history from Moscow’s Oriental Institute.68 Abbas was an early member of Fatah, joining in Qatar. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abbas became a top deputy to Arafat when he headed Fatah and the PLO.69 Abbas played an important role in negotiating the various Israeli-PLO agreements of the 1990s, and returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1995 . In March 2003, Abbas was named as the first PA prime minister, but was not given ful authority because Arafat (then the PA president) insisted on retaining ultimate decision-making authority and control over security services. Abbas resigned as prime minister in September 2003, apparently as a result of frustration with Arafat, the United States, and Israel.70 Since Abbas assumed the leadership of the Palestinian national movement after Arafat’s death in 2004, he has been a part of the contentious negotiations and disputes that have largely characterized Palestinian relations with the United States and Israel, while also cooperating closely with both countries on security matters. While Abbas praises “martyrs” for the Palestinian cause, he also has made repeated public cal s for nonviolent approaches to resolving Palestinian disputes with Israel. Abbas appears motivated by a complex combination of factors that include safeguarding his personal authority and legacy, preventing destabilization and violence, and protecting his family members.71 Some observers have argued that Abbas’s rule became more authoritarian and corrupt after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 limited his authority there, and left the PA without a functioning legislature or realistic prospects for future elections.72 Elections Since divided rule took hold in 2007—with the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza—no PA presidential or legislative elections for the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem have occurred, and the Palestinian Legislative Council has ceased to function. During the 14-year West Bank-Gaza split, Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered agreements aimed at ending the split and al owing elections to take place, but have general y not implemented these agreements. Municipal elections for some West Bank cities and towns occurred in 2012 and 2017. 68 Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled The Other Side: The Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism ) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “T he Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News, November 29, 2012. 69 One of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11 Israeli athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “ didn’t know what the money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “T he Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002. 70 James Bennet, “T he Mideast T urmoil: T he Leadership; Abbas Steps Down, Dealing Big Blow to U.S. Peace Plan,” New York Tim es, September 7, 2003. 71 See, for example, Daoud Kuttab, “Abbas bids adieu,” Al-Monitor, August 1, 2018. 72 Ibid.; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.” Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 24 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations In January 2021, the PA announced plans to hold legislative and presidential elections later in the year. In April, however, President Abbas postponed the elections, claiming that he did so because Israel was unwil ing to al ow East Jerusalem residents to vote. Some observers argue that Abbas may have been more concerned that Fatah could fare poorly in elections because of two breakaway electoral lists headed by former Fatah members, and the possibility that these lists might coordinate with Hamas to marginalize him and Fatah.73 After Hamas’s May 2021 conflict with Israel, Hamas’s favorability with Palestinians surpassed Fatah’s in a June 2021 public opinion poll (see Figure 5). The poll suggested that many Palestinians viewed Hamas as defending Jerusalem for them, while also viewing Abbas as largely self-interested in postponing elections.74 Hamas lost some of its advantage over Fatah in another poll in September 2021. Figure 5. Public Opinion Polling: Support for Domestic Political Factions (Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying pol ing data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. In his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, Abbas claimed that the PA stil plans to hold elections as soon as Israel al ows the participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. He said that in the meantime, he would continue pursuing efforts to forge a unity government that would end the West Bank-Gaza split, and that additional municipal elections would occur in coming months.75 The historical memory of Hamas’s surprise victory in the last PA elections to be held—the legislative elections of 2006—could affect various actors’ views on whether and how to hold future PA elections. After Hamas assumed control over PA ministries with its legislative majority, the United States and other Western actors significantly restructured assistance for the PA to prevent its use by those ministries. Changes made to U.S. law and annual appropriations legislation (see textbox below) remain possible constraints on aid to PA governments with Hamas 73 Daoud Kuttab, “ Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021. 74 Joseph Krauss, “ Poll finds dramatic rise in Palestinian support for Hamas,” Associated Press, June 15, 2021. 75 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). Congressional Research Service 20 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations participation or influence. The ensuing 2006-2007 struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA—fueled in part by external actors—contributed to the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split that created the divided rule of today. Fatah-Hamas “Unity Government” Scenario and U.S. Aid Per regular annual appropriations provisions, U.S. aid is general y not permitted for a power-sharing PA government that includes Hamas as a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which Hamas exercises “undue influence.” This general restriction is only lifted if the President certifies that the PA government, including al ministers, has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the fol owing two principles embodied in Section 620K of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446): (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.76 If the PA government is “Hamas-control ed,” PATA applies additional conditions, limitations, and restrictions on aid. If future elections happen, it is unclear what implications they wil have for Palestinian governance and international relationships. Open questions include whether elections can take place in a free and fair manner, include international observers, and garner acceptance from both Fatah and Hamas in the event of adverse outcomes for either.77 Succession Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA, PLO, and Fatah upon the end of Abbas’s tenure— whether via elections or otherwise. Marwan Barghouti—a major Fatah leader who has supported negotiating with Israel at times, and armed resistance against Israel at other times—is more popular than Abbas in public opinion polls.78 Barghouti joined one of the breakaway electoral lists during the abortive campaign in early 2021. Other Palestinian leaders who could be involved in succeeding Abbas include  Mohammed Dahlan was a top security figure in Gaza under Arafat who is based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His apparent involvement with Israel-UAE normalization has fueled some speculation about regional and international support for him in future PLO/PA leadership.79 While Dahlan has some political support in the West Bank and Gaza, he remains a pariah within Fatah leadership. The faction expel ed him in 2011 after he and Abbas had a fal ing out, and in 2014 a PA court convicted him in absentia of libel, slander, and contempt of Palestinian institutions.  Majid Faraj (arguably Abbas’s most trusted security figure) and Salam Fayyad (a previous PA prime minister) are prominent international y, but have little domestic popular support.  Mohammed Shtayyeh (PA prime minister since 2019) is an international y visible Fatah insider. 76 P.L. 116-260, §7040(f). 77 “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2021. 78 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 81, published September 21, 2021 (poll taken September 15-18, 2021). 79 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “T he T alented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 49 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations  Nasser al Qudwa (a former PLO diplomat and Arafat’s nephew) is another international y visible figure who was expel ed from Fatah in March 2021 for forming a breakaway electoral list (which Barghouti later joined).  Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril Rajoub have political heft within Fatah, but relatively less international experience. Governance and Human Rights Concerns The PA has executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance (see Appendix C for an overview), but in practical terms, President Abbas has few domestic checks on his power. The West Bank-Gaza split rendered the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) inoperative in 2007. Since then, Abbas has appointed prime ministers and other cabinet officials without legislative approval and has governed by presidential decree. He dissolved the PLC in 2018 pending future elections. Some Palestinian judges and other observers have protested President Abbas’s heightened control over the judiciary.80 In 2016, he created a new Constitutional Court made up of his appointees, and in 2019 he restructured the High Judicial Council that supervises the judicial system and nominates judges.81 In March 2021, President Abbas issued a decree that requires non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to submit their yearly plans of action and budgets to the PA.82 Because of the new layer of requirements that the decree adds to existing regulations on NGOs, some observers interpret it as giving the PA significant control over the civil society sector in the West Bank.83 Within this governing context, Abbas and the PA routinely face al egations of corruption and non- transparency.84 The State Department has noted continuing claims of corruption among Fatah officials, “particularly related to favoritism and nepotism in public-sector appointments.”85 Some developments in 2021 have highlighted domestic and international concerns about PA governance. PA authorities reportedly increased repressive measures against public dissent after Abbas postponed 2021 PA legislative and presidential elections.86 These measures, which continued in the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian violence in May 2021, have included the reported arrest of dozens of people for political activity criticizing the PA.87 In June 2021, Nizar Banat, a prominent activist from Hebron who also had been a candidate in the postponed legislative elections, died shortly after PA forces detained him for posting online critiques of PA policies. Claims from Banat’s family and other evidence suggest that the authorities may have beaten him to death.88 80 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.” 81 European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Palestinian Politics website, https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/justice_system/. 82 Isabel Kershner and Adam Rasgon, “ Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism ,” New York Tim es, July 7, 2021; Qassam Muaddi, “ Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab,” Middle East Eye, March 3, 2021. 83 Muaddi, “Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab.” 84 “Criticism of Palestinian security forces raises pressure on Abbas,” Reuters, June 30, 2021. 85 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza. 86 Patrick Kingsley, “Palestinian Vote Postponed, Prolonging T ensions,” New York Times, April 30, 2021. 87 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinian Authority Critic Dies While Under Arrest, Igniting a Demonstration,” New York Times, June 25, 2021. 88 Joseph Krauss, “ Critic of Palestinian Authority dies after violent arrest ,” Associated Press, June 24, 2021. Congressional Research Service 22 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations The State Department spokesperson expressed deep disturbance over Banat’s death and its reported circumstances. He further said: We urge the Palestinian Authority to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation and to ensure full accountability in this case. We have serious concerns about Palestinian Authority restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression by Palestinians and harassment of civil society activists and organizations.89 In September, the PA charged 14 security personnel in a military court in connection with Banat’s death, but some observers expressed skepticism that the proceedings would significantly change the PA’s approaches to dissent.90 Heightened concerns regarding PA human rights abuses create a dilemma for U.S. officials who resumed security assistance for the PA in 2021 and general y seek to strengthen the PA relative to Hamas.91 A U.S. embassy spokesperson was quoted in July 2021 as saying that U.S. security assistance for the PA is intended to “to assist in the development of credible institutions of governance” in addition to strengthening Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.92 Additional concerns expressed by governments and human rights monitors regarding PA practices on rule of law and civil liberties include:  Internet restrictions. In 2017, President Abbas issued the Electronic Crimes Law, prescribing heavy fines and lengthy prison terms for a range of vaguely defined offenses, including the publication or dissemination of material that is critical of the state, disturbs public order or national unity, or harms family and religious values.93  Criminal justice. Some reports persist of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial or charges, torture, abuse, and isolation.94  Treatment of women. Some reports persist of employment discrimination and repressive work conditions for women. Additional y, while the PA has taken some steps toward greater legal protection for women, stronger laws or enforcement of the laws may be possible in preventing forms of discrimination or il -treatment, including rape and harassment. In a climate where domestic violence may be underreported, one in five married women claim that their spouse has abused them.95 Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy and Diplomatic Offices Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. At his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Biden said: 89 State Department, “ Death of Palestinian Activist Nizar Banat ,” June 24, 2021. 90 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinian Authority Indicts 14 Security Force Members in Activist’s Death ,” New York Times, September 6, 2021. 91 Michael J. Koplow, “Holding Your Nose with the Palestinian Authority,” Israel Policy Forum, July 1, 2021. 92 Kershner and Rasgon, “ Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism .” 93 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.” 94 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza. 95 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 23 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations But I continue to believe that a two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel—Israel’s future as a Jewish, democratic state living in peace alongside a viable, sovereign, and democratic Palestinian state. We’re a long way from that goal at this moment, but we must never allow ourselves to give up on the possibility of progress.96 Previously, in May 2021, Secretary Blinken spoke out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payment to terrorists.97 During his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Abbas said that the Palestinians are “ready to work throughout this year on the delineation of borders and solving al final status issues under the auspices of the international Quartet and in accordance with United Nations resolutions.”98 Abbas also stated that if Israel does not withdraw from the territory it occupied in 1967 within a year, the Palestinians would pursue a ruling on the legality of the occupation at the International Court of Justice, while also implying that the PLO may revisit its recognition of Israel’s right to exist that took place alongside the 1993 Declaration of Principles. In August 2021, Abbas had met Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz—his first meeting with an Israeli cabinet minister since 2010. Gantz said that the two agreed on steps to improve security coordination and assist the PA financial y, including a $155 mil ion Israeli loan.99 Shortly after that meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said that while Israel is open to helping the PA economical y, Israel has no intention of engaging in a diplomatic process at the time.100 In addition to the loan mentioned above, Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ circumstances, “including issuing 15,000 new work permits inside Israel for [West Bank] Palestinians… re-establishing Joint Economic Committees to discuss future projects, al owing reunification (i.e. legal status) for Palestinian spouses in the West Bank, and tentatively approving 2,000 new housing units for Palestinians in the part of the West Bank under full Israeli control.”101 In October 2021, Israeli authorities announced an additional 3,000 work permits inside Israel for Gazans.102 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilateral y rather than responsively address its causes through dialogue and negotiation with Palestinians.103 Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups In October 2021, Defense Minister Gantz—apparently acting with the approval of the state prosecutor, but without consulting Prime Minister Bennett or other key cabinet ministers—announced the designation of six 96 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,” September 21, 2021. 97 State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021. 98 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). T he international Quartet includes the United States, European Union, Russia, and the U.N. Secretary-General’s office. 99 Yaniv Kubovich, “Gantz Says Agreed with Abbas on Confidence-building Measures, Including $155m Loan,” haaretz.com, August 30, 2021. 100 Ibid. 101 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN, September 16, 2021. 102 “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021. 103 Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.” Congressional Research Service 24 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).104 According to the New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, as wel as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women, farmworkers and children.”105 The designations, which have sparked some domestic and international criticism, could significantly curtail these groups’ funding and activities, and subject their supporters to Israeli criminal prosecution. Some of the groups receive funding from the European Union and other international actors. In response to a U.S. request for clarification, Israeli officials were preparing as of late October to share evidence that they claim supports the terrorist designations.106 As part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to reengage with the Palestinians, then-Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations Richard Mil s said in January 2021 that the Administration would “take steps to re-open diplomatic missions that were closed by the last U.S. administration.”107 This statement apparently refers to (1) the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—which had operated for decades as an independent diplomatic mission engaging the Palestinians—that the Trump Administration merged into the U.S. embassy to Israel in 2019; and (2) the PLO representative office in Washington, DC, which the Trump Administration caused to close in 2018. U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem Since Ambassador Mil s’s January statement, Biden Administration officials have repeated their intention to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, without specifying the timing. One media report says that the Administration has agreed to delay the consulate’s reopening until sometime after a critical budget deadline for Israel’s new government in mid-November 2021.108 However, Israeli Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar said in October that Israel would continue to oppose the consulate’s reopening after this deadline. In previously stating his opposition to the reopening, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid voiced concerns that it could destabilize Israel’s government and insisted that “Jerusalem is the sovereign capital of Israel and Israel alone.”109 Additional y, Prime Minister Bennett revealed that he expressed displeasure about the proposed reopening in his August White House visit with President Biden.110 Since the 2019 merger of the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem into the U.S. embassy to Israel, U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem have conducted relations with the Palestinians via the embassy’s Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU). Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate as an independent diplomatic mission that would work in paral el with, rather than as a part of, the embassy. A senior Palestinian official was quoted in October 2021 as saying that reopening the consulate is more important to Palestinians than the PLO office in Washington, DC, because “the consulate is 104 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24, 2021. 105 Patrick Kingsley, “ Palestine Rights Groups Called T errorists by Israel,” New York Times, October 23, 2021. 106 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US.” 107 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, “ Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Situation in the Middle East (via VT C),” January 26, 2021. 108 Shalom Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate in Ramallah or Abu Dis, US said no ,” Times of Israel, September 28, 2021. 109 “Israel opposes Biden plan to reopen U.S. Palestinian mission in Jerusalem ,” Reuters, September 1, 2021. 110 Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate.” Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 33 link to page 31 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations the seed of the American Embassy to the future Palestinian state and a statement about everything related to the administration’s position on Jerusalem.”111 As Israelis and Palestinians continue to vie for U.S. and international validation of Jerusalem’s role in their respective national narratives,112 Israeli-Palestinian tensions over Jerusalem persist, including on issues such as:  Access to, worship at, and Israeli security measures at holy sites, especial y the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif “status quo.”113  East Jerusalem property issues, particularly actions by Israeli officials toward building new Jewish settlements and neighborhoods (see “Israeli Settlements in the West Bank”), or favoring Jewish residents or claimed historical sites over Palestinian ones.114 PA officials are unsure whether the U.S. consulate, if reopened, would be located at the West Jerusalem (Agron Road) location of the former consulate general (and current PAU) or the East Jerusalem (Nablus Road) location currently known as “America House”—the educational and cultural arm of the PAU (see Figure 6).115 Reportedly, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett was unsuccessful in August in an effort to convince President Biden to open a consulate somewhere in the West Bank near (but not within) Jerusalem, such as Ramal ah or the town of Abu Dis.116 111 Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves Budget ,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021. 112 For background information see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. 113 Patrick Kingsley and Adam Rasgon, “ Quietly Allowing Jewish Prayer on T emple Mount ,” New York Times, August 24, 2021. For a description of the “status quo,” see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 114 “Sheikh Jarrah: Why could Palestinians lose their homes in Jerusalem?” BBC News, August 3, 2021; Stefanie Glinski, “A Razed Building and Another Possible Flash Point in East Jerusalem,” foreignpolicy.com, July 1, 2021. 115 Khoury and Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate.” 116 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 26 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 6. Jerusalem: Key Sites (including various facilities of the U.S. Embassy to Israel) Notes: Al boundaries are approximate. Reestablishing the consulate would probably require Israel’s approval given the need for cooperation from Israeli authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.117 Given Israel’s insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality is its capital and the tenuous nature of the current multi-party Israeli government coalition, Israeli approval for a separate U.S. diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could be political y fraught. Members in both Houses have written letters to President Biden sharing varying opinions on a possible consulate reopening.118 It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S. consulate reopening is essential y a practical matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is also founded on law such as the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.119 President Trump’s December 2017 proclamation on Jerusalem recognized it as Israel’s capital, but did not delineate specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem.120 After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the U.S. consulate general continued to operate independently until it was subsumed into the embassy 117 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Isra eli Discretion?” Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021. 118 See one letter from Senators at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/6bac9328-6a10-4228-bbcb-c2af5e37c891/1B79ECA7429EFB5EA32C8B67826E7BA8.06.07.21 -letter-to-biden-on-palestinian-diplomatic-relations.pdf; and one letter from Representatives at https://jstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Letter-to-POTUS-on-T rump-Israel-Policy-Rollback.pdf. 119 For varying views, see Efron and Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate”; Alan Baker, “ A U.S. Consulate for the Palestinians Should Be on Palestinian T erritory – Not in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 15, 2021. T he text of the Vienna Convention is available at https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf . 120 Presidential Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017, “Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem,” available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-11/pdf/2017-26832.pdf. Congressional Research Service 27 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations in March 2019. Several other countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem for decades and continue to do so, including the United Kingdom and France. PLO Office in Washington, DC In September 2018, the State Department announced that the office maintained by the PLO in Washington, DC, would cease operating. Though not diplomatical y accredited, the office had functioned since the 1990s as a focal point for U.S.-Palestinian relations. PLO Office in Washington, DC: Timeline of Key Events 1978 PLO opens office in Washington, DC, to disseminate information about itself and the Palestinian cause. 1987 Congress passes the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Title X of P.L. 100-204), which determines that “the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization” and (under Section 1003) prohibits the PLO from maintaining an office in the United States. President Reagan signs P.L. 100-204 in December but adds a signing statement saying that “the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States wil maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors.”121 The State Department instructs the PLO to close its office. 1994 As the Oslo peace process gets underway, the PLO opens a representative office in Washington , DC. Despite the prohibition of a PLO office in P.L. 100-204, Congress provides waiver authority to the executive branch. 1997 The PLO office briefly closes after a lapse in waiver authority, and reopens after Congress reinstitutes the waiver and the executive branch exercises it. 2017 The State Department announces in November that it cannot renew the waiver (required every six months in annual appropriations legislation) because of statements made by Palestinian leaders about the International Criminal Court (ICC),122 but al ows the PLO office to remain open so long as its activities are limited “to those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.”123 A State Department spokesperson justifies the actions by saying that they “are consistent with the president's authorities to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”124 2018 The State Department announces the closure of the PLO office in September. It is unclear whether the Administration can legal y authorize the PLO to reopen its Washington office. Under the annual appropriations language found in Section 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), the general prohibition in Section 1003 of the Anti- Terrorism Act (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) on a PLO office can general y only be waived by the President if he can certify that Palestinian leaders have not “actively supported an ICC investigation against Israeli nationals for al eged crimes against Palestinians.” The State Department determined in November 2017 that this waiver requirement had not been met because of Palestinian statements regarding ICC proceedings relating to Israelis. However, in September 121 President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, December 22, 1987, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement -signing-the-foreign-relations-authorization-act-fiscal-years-1988-and-1989. 122 State Department Press Briefing, November 21, 2017. 123 Josh Lederman, “ US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24, 2017. 124 T hen-State Department spokesperson Edgar Vasquez, quoted in “ US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24, 2017. Congressional Research Service 28 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations 2018, the Justice Department issued a memorandum opinion for the State Department’s legal adviser stating that Congress cannot dictate State Department actions regarding the status of the PLO office—via the ATA or other legislation—because the President has exclusive constitutional authority “to receive foreign diplomatic agents in the United States and to determine the conditions under which they may operate.”125 A separate question is whether the PLO would be wil ing to reopen its Washington office. Under the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA, Section 903 of P.L. 116-94), which became law in December 2019, the PLO’s establishment of an office in the United States could subject it to liability in U.S. courts for terrorism-related lawsuits. The extent to which Congress can provide by statute that a foreign entity is deemed to consent to personal jurisdiction by establishing or maintaining facilities in the United States appears to be untested in the U.S. legal system.126 However, the PSJVTA provision has reportedly given Palestinian officials and advisers pause about reopening the PLO office, and has led them to engage with the Administration and Congress about a possible amendment to the PSJVTA to facilitate the office’s reopening.127 The Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), introduced by some Members of Congress in September 2021, would, among other things, amend the ATA to provide the President with a standing option to waive the prohibition on a PLO office in the United States for national security reasons (renewable every six months). The bil also would make it easier to terminate the ATA completely if the PLO/PA discontinues payments targeted by the TFA “for acts of terrorism.” Israeli Settlements in the West Bank Israeli settlements in the West Bank have presented longstanding policy chal enges for U.S. officials and lawmakers.128 As mentioned above, the Trump Administration took a number of actions apparently aimed at providing greater legitimacy to Israeli settlements in the West Bank.129 Biden Administration officials have not announced whether they intend to reverse or otherwise address these Trump Administration actions, but have specified that the United States would urge Israel to avoid settlement activity or annexation of territory.130 Near the end of the Obama Administration in December 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2334, with the United States abstaining and al other Security Council members in favor. Resolution 2334 reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) violate international law, and cal ed upon states to “distinguish, in their relevant dealings,” between the territory of Israel and of the West Bank.131 125 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Statutory Restrictions on the PLO’s Washington Office, September 11, 2018, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2021/01/19/2018-09-11-plo-office.pdf. 126 For background information on PSJVT A and this issue, see CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction , by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea. 127 “Biden pledge to reopen PLO mission in Washington faces legal hurdles,” Reuters, January 29, 2021. 128 CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 129 Abigail Williams and Saphora Smith, “ Pompeo becomes first secretary of state to visit Israeli settlement,” NBC News, November 19, 2020. 130 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills; State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability.” 131 T he most-cited international law pertaining to Israeli settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention, Part III, Section Congressional Research Service 29 link to page 34 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Israeli officials have continued construction-related announcements regarding settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In January 2021, the planning authority that operates under Israeli military jurisdiction approved plans for hundreds of additional homes in settlements whose expansion deep within the West Bank could increase the difficulty of negotiating borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state.132 Some observers say that construction plans moving forward in certain areas of East Jerusalem and its West Bank vicinity could present major obstacles to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state (see Figure 7).133 Figure 7. Selected Planned Settlement Construction Areas in the West Bank and East Jerusalem Source: Ha’aretz. III, Article 49 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tim e of War, August 12, 1949, which states in its last sentence, “ T he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Israel maintains that the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) does not fall under the international law definition of “occupied territory,” but is rather “disputed territory” because the previous occupying power (Jordan) did not have an internationally recognized claim t o it (only a few countries recognized Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the West Bank). Israel claims that given the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the end of the British Mandate in 1948, Israel claims that no international actor has superior legal claim to the West Bank. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, November 30, 2015. Jordan renounced its claims to the West Bank in 1988 in favor of the PLO. While Israel applies civilian law to East Jer usalem, it considers the rest of the West Bank to be “disputed territory.” 132 Peace Now, “ 780 Settlement Housing Units Approved Ahead of US Presidential T ransition ,” January 17, 2021. See also David Makovsky, Building Bridges for Peace: U.S. Policy Toward Arab States, Palestinians, and Israel, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2021, pp. 9 -10. 133 Jonathan Lis and Nir Hasson, “ Israel Advances T housands of Housing Units in East Jerusalem as Biden Remains Silent,” haaretz.com, October 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 30 link to page 54 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced U.S. concern about prospective Israeli actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and cal ed upon Israel and the PA to “refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement activity, as wel as retroactive legalization of settlement outposts.”134 International Organizations In General The PLO has pursued a number of initiatives—either directly or with the help of supportive countries—in international organizations to advance its claims to statehood and other positions it takes vis-à-vis Israel. The United States and Israel general y oppose these initiatives and criticize international organizations for negative treatment of Israel. In February 2021, Secretary of State Blinken announced that the United States would reengage with the U.N. Human Rights Council—from which the Trump Administration withdrew in June 2018—as an observer.135 As part of his announcement, Secretary Blinken said We recognize that the Human Rights Council is a flawed body, in need of reform to its agenda, membership, and focus, including its disproportionate focus on Israel. However, our withdrawal in June 2018 did nothing to encourage meaningful change, but instead created a vacuum of U.S. leadership, which countries with authoritarian agendas have used to their advantage.136 For more on Palestinian initiatives in international fora, see Appendix E. International Criminal Court (ICC) Actions137 Background The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in the early stages of an investigation into possible crimes committed by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip since June 13, 2014. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over al eged genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (“ICC crimes”) that occur on the territory of or are perpetrated by nationals of an entity deemed to be a State  after the Rome Statute enters into force for a State Party;  during a period of time in which a nonparty State accepts jurisdiction; or  pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in a State to the ICC. The following actions by Palestinian leaders have influenced the overal context in which the ICC’s actions have taken place:  In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the “State of Palestine” to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after 134 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021. 135 In October 2021, the United States regained its membership seat on the Council. 136 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “ U.S. Decision T o Reengage with the UN Human Rights Council,” February 8, 2021. 137 Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, assisted in preparing this subsection. Congressional Research Service 31 link to page 54 ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~International Organizations~~
~~In General~~
~~The PLO has pursued a number of initiatives—either directly or with the help of supportive~~
~~countries—in international organizations to advance its claims to statehood and other positions it~~
~~takes vis-à-vis Israel. The United States and Israel generally oppose these initiatives and criticize~~
~~international organizations for negative treatment of Israel.~~
~~In February 2021, Secretary of State Blinken announced that the United States would reengage~~
~~with the U.N. Human Rights Council—from which the Trump Administration withdrew in June~~
~~2018—as an observer. Secretary Blinken said:~~
~~We recognize that the Human Rights Council is a flawed body, in need of reform to its~~
~~agenda, membership, and focus, including its disproportionate focus on Israel. However,~~
~~our withdrawal in June 2018 did nothing to encourage meaningful change, but instead~~
~~created a vacuum of U.S. leadership, which countries with authoritarian agendas have used~~
~~to their advantage.53~~
~~For more on Palestinian initiatives in international fora, see Appendix E.~~
~~International Criminal Court (ICC) Actions54~~
~~Background~~
~~The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in the early stages of an investigation into possible~~
~~crimes committed by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and~~
~~the Gaza Strip since June 13, 2014. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over alleged genocide, war~~
~~crimes, and crimes against humanity (“ICC crimes”) that occur on the territory of or are~~
~~perpetrated by nationals of an entity deemed to be a State~~
~~ after the Rome Statute enters into force for a State Party;~~
~~ during a period of time in which a nonparty State accepts jurisdiction; or~~
~~ pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in a State to~~
~~the ICC.~~
~~The following actions by Palestinian leaders have influenced the overall context in which the~~
~~ICC’s actions have taken place:~~
~~ In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the~~
~~“State of Palestine” to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after~~
~~declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes allegedly~~
~~“committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since~~
~~June 13, 2014.”~~
~~ Later in January 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as depositary, stated~~
~~that the Rome Statute would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on April~~
~~1, 2015.55~~

~~53 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Decision To Reengage with the UN Human Rights Council, February 8,~~
~~2021.~~
~~54 Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, assisted in preparing this subsection.~~
~~55 U.N. Secretary-General Rome Statute Depositary Notification for the State of Palestine, January 6, 2015,~~
~~https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-Eng.pdf.~~
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~~ Later that same month, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination~~
~~into the “situation in Palestine” to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis~~
~~to proceed with an investigation” against Israelis, Palestinians, or others, having~~
~~found that the Palestinians had the proper capacity to accept ICC jurisdiction in~~
~~light of the November 2012 adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution~~
~~67/19.56 As mentioned in Appendix E, Resolution 67/19 had changed the~~
~~permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (aka “State of Palestine”) from an~~
~~“entity” to a “non-member state.”~~
~~ Palestinian leaders provided information to the ICC on alleged Israeli crimes~~
~~regarding both the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict and settlement activity in~~
~~the West Bank. In May 2018, Palestinian leaders made a formal referral of the~~
~~“situation in Palestine” to the Prosecutor.57~~
~~As referenced above, the State Department cited Palestinian actions relating to the ICC in~~
~~connection with the 2018 closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC. Various U.S. and Israeli~~
~~officials have denounced Palestinian efforts that could subject Israelis to ICC investigation or~~
~~prosecution.58 Neither the United States nor Israel is a State Party to the Rome Statute.~~
~~Palestinian accession and acceptance of jurisdiction grant the ICC Prosecutor authority to~~
~~investigate all alleged ICC crimes committed after June 13, 2014, by any individual—Israeli,~~
~~Palestinian, or otherwise—on “occupied Palestinian territory.” However, Palestinian actions do~~
~~not ensure any formal ICC prosecution of alleged ICC crimes. A party to the Rome Statute can~~
~~refer a situation to the Court and is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor on investigations,~~
~~but it is the role of the Prosecutor to determine whether to bring charges against and prosecute an~~
~~individual. In addition, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the~~
~~subject of “genuine” legal proceedings (as described in Article 17 of the Statute) brought by a~~
~~state with jurisdiction, including a state (such as Israel) that is not party to the Statute.~~
~~The ICC Prosecutor is required to notify all states with jurisdiction over a potential case, and such~~
~~states are afforded the opportunity to challenge ICC jurisdiction over a case on inadmissibility~~
~~grounds.~~
~~Investigation of Possible Crimes in West Bank and Gaza~~
~~On March 3, 2021, current ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she was opening an~~
~~investigation of possible ICC crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.59 She had previously sought a~~
~~ruling from a pre-trial chamber to confirm her determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the~~
~~situation generally, and to determine the extent of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction specifically.60~~
~~In a 2-1 decision, the chamber ruled in February 2021 that the ICC has jurisdiction in the West~~
~~Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem), based on the Palestinians’ status as a State Party to the~~

~~56 ICC Press Release, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary~~
~~examination of the situation in Palestine,” January 16, 2015.~~
~~57 ICC Statement, “Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the referral submitted by Palestine,” May~~
~~22, 2018.~~
~~58 See, for example, “Bolton warns ICC not to go after Israel, confirms closure of PLO’s DC office,” Times of Israel,~~
~~September 10, 2018.~~
~~59 ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine, March~~
~~3, 2021.~~
~~60 ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the~~
~~Situation in Palestine, and seeking a ruling on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, December 20, 2019.~~
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~~Rome Statute.61 Israel had argued that the ICC should not have jurisdiction in those territories~~
~~because Palestinians do not have sovereign control there.62~~
~~Broader Impact of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Ruling?~~
~~The ICC pre-trial chamber’s February 2021 decision stated that because the ICC exercises jurisdiction over~~
~~natural persons rather than states, its decision “is strictly limited to the question of jurisdiction set forth in the~~
~~Prosecutor’s Request and does not entail any determination on the border disputes between Palestine and Israel.”~~
~~Yet, Palestinians and other international actors could use the decision to support for Palestinian statehood and~~
~~territorial claims.63~~
~~In response to the opening of an ICC investigation, Secretary of State Blinken said on March 3:~~
~~The United States firmly opposes and is deeply disappointed by this decision. The ICC has~~
~~no jurisdiction over this matter. Israel is not a party to the ICC and has not consented to the~~
~~Court’s jurisdiction, and we have serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its~~
~~jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. The Palestinians do not qualify as a sovereign state and~~
~~therefore, are not qualified to obtain membership as a state in, participate as a state in, or~~
~~delegate jurisdiction to the ICC.…~~
~~Moreover, the United States believes a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future for the~~
~~people of the Middle East depends on building bridges and creating new avenues for~~
~~dialogue and exchange, not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut~~
~~efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.~~
~~We will continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, including by~~
~~opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.64~~
~~On March 11, 54 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken commending his statements, and~~
~~urging him to work with like-minded international partners to “steer the ICC away from further~~
~~actions that could damage the Court’s credibility by giving the appearance of political bias.”65~~
~~While Palestinian leaders (from both the PLO/PA and Hamas) welcomed the news of an ICC~~
~~investigation,66 leading Israeli political figures roundly denounced it, with Prime Minister~~
~~Binyamin Netanyahu calling the decision to investigate biased and anti-Semitic.67~~

~~61 ICC, Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction~~
~~in Palestine,’ February 5, 2021. In a partly dissenting opinion (available at https://www.icc-~~
~~cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2021_01167.PDF), Judge Péter Kovács argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction in the West Bank~~
~~should be limited to the competences transferred to the PA in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the~~
~~West Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to an interpretation that might require Israel’s consent to ICC investigations of~~
~~Israeli nationals.~~
~~62 Israeli Attorney General,~~ ~~The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So-Called “Situation in~~
~~Palestine,”~~ ~~December 20, 2019. Germany, Brazil, Australia, Uganda, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary had~~
~~filed amicus curiae briefs with the pre-trial chamber offering arguments in line with Israel’s objections to territorial,~~
~~while the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation had filed briefs in support of territorial~~
~~jurisdiction.~~
~~63 Tovah Lazaroff, “Eight things to know about the ICC war crimes suits against Israel,” jpost.com, February 7, 2021.~~
~~64 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, The United States Opposes the ICC Investigation into the Palestinian Situation,~~
~~March 3, 2021.~~
~~65 Text of letter available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-cardin-lead-bipartisan-~~
~~senate-call-secretary-blinken-continue.~~
~~66 “ICC prosecutor opens war crimes probe in Palestinian territories,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2021.~~
~~67 “Netanyahu: ICC war crimes probe is ‘pure antisemitism,’” jpost.com, March 4, 2021.~~
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~~It is unclear how far the investigation might proceed before Prosecutor Bensouda’s term ends in~~
~~June, and how her successor, Karim Khan (currently serving as a U.N. Assistant Secretary-~~
~~General),68 might choose to handle it.69 The investigation could focus on a number of possible~~
~~war crimes from Israeli and Palestinian actions, including:~~
~~ actions by Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian militant groups during their 2014 conflict~~
~~in Gaza;~~
~~ lethal force used by Israeli soldiers in 2018-2019 against some Palestinian protestors in~~
~~Gaza seeking to breach or approach the administrative boundary with Israel;~~
~~ other Israeli actions in and around the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement activity;~~
~~and~~
~~ possible PA (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) human rights abuses.~~
~~An investigation could take months or years before the Prosecutor makes decisions on bringing~~
~~specific charges against individuals. As mentioned above, if an ICC investigation produces any~~
~~case against Israelis or Palestinians concerning conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal~~
~~proceedings by a state having jurisdiction, it would be inadmissible. In Bensouda’s March 3~~
~~announcement of the investigation, she said:~~
~~As a first step, the Office [of the Prosecutor] is required to notify all States Parties and~~
~~those States which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned about~~
~~its investigation. This permits any such State to request the Office to defer to the State's~~
~~relevant investigation of its own nationals or others within its jurisdiction in relation to~~
~~Rome Statute crimes referred to in the notification (subject to possible Pre-Trial Chamber~~
~~review).70~~
~~One Israeli journalist, citing a legal expert, has written that “Israeli probes or potential probes into~~
~~criminal activity by its soldiers in Gaza could sway Bensouda not to move forward on war crimes~~
~~allegations with regard to Gaza.”71 In the same article, the journalist has written, “Israel has not~~
~~simultaneously held criminal investigations into settlement activity – which it considers to be~~
~~legal – and thus Bensouda is likely to move the matter of settlements forward to the phase of~~
~~individual criminal charges.”72~~
~~Possible U.S. Responses~~
~~It is unclear what diplomatic or other measures the Biden Administration might take to counter an~~
~~ICC investigation focused on the West Bank and Gaza, including sanctions authorized by the~~
~~Trump Administration. Under Executive Order 13928 from June 2020, President Trump~~
~~authorized sanctions against foreign persons or entities involved in or supporting ICC~~
~~investigations or actions targeting U.S. personnel or personnel of U.S. allies without the consent~~
~~of the home government of those personnel.73 In September 2020, the Trump Administration~~

~~68 Since 2017, Assistant Secretary-General Khan has served as the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team~~
~~established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2379 (2017) to promote accountability efforts for genocide,~~
~~crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq.~~
~~69 “ICC opens ‘war crimes’ investigation in West Bank and Gaza,” BBC News, March 3, 2021.~~
~~70 ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine, March~~
~~3, 2021.~~
~~71 Lazaroff, “Eight things to know.”~~
~~72 Ibid.~~
~~73 Executive Order 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court, June~~
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~~imposed sanctions under E.O. 13928 against Prosecutor Bensouda and another top ICC official in~~
~~connection with an investigation regarding Afghanistan that could subject U.S. personnel to~~
~~prosecution.74 The Biden Administration has pledged to review these sanctions.75~~
~~Israeli Settlements in the West Bank~~
~~Israeli settlements in the West Bank have presented longstanding policy challenges for U.S.~~
~~officials and lawmakers.76 As mentioned above, the Trump Administration took a number of~~
~~actions apparently aimed at providing greater legitimacy to Israeli settlements in the West Bank,~~
~~including on product labeling and on funding for three U.S.-Israel binational foundations. Biden~~
~~Administration officials have not announced whether they intend to reverse or otherwise address~~
~~these Trump Administration actions, but have specified that the United States would urge Israel to~~
~~avoid settlement activity or annexation of territory.77 The reported State Department proposal~~
~~mentioned above anticipates reversing the Trump Administration product labeling decision.78~~
~~Near the end of the Obama Administration in December 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted~~
~~Resolution 2334, with the United States abstaining and all other Security Council members in~~
~~favor. Resolution 2334 reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including East~~
~~Jerusalem) violate international law, and called upon states to “distinguish, in their relevant~~
~~dealings,” between the territory of Israel and of the West Bank.79~~
~~Israeli officials have continued construction-related announcements regarding settlements in the~~
~~West Bank and East Jerusalem. In January 2021, the planning authority that operates under Israeli~~
~~military jurisdiction approved plans for hundreds of additional homes in settlements whose~~
~~expansion deep within the West Bank could increase the difficulty of negotiating borders between~~

~~11, 2020. Prior to E.O. 13928, 67 Senators and 262 Representatives sent letters to then-Secretary of State Michael~~
~~Pompeo asserting that ICC jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza would be improper, and urging him to support Israel~~
~~in challenging it. The text of the Senators’ letter is available at https://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/~~
~~cardin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-for-pompeo-to-defend-israel-against-politically-motivated-investigations-~~
~~by-the-international-criminal-court, and the text of the Representatives’ letter is available at https://luria.house.gov/~~
~~sites/luria.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/~~
~~2020.05.12%20Luria%20Gallagher%20letter%20to%20Sec%20Pompeo%20on%20ICC.pdf.~~
~~74 Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the~~
~~International Criminal Court Designations, September 2, 2020. For background information, see CRS Insight IN11428,~~
International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew
~~C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.~~
~~75 “Biden administration to review sanctions on International Criminal Court officials,” Reuters, January 26, 2021.~~
~~76 CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti;~~
~~CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~77 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills.~~
~~78 Karam, “‘The National’ obtains US official document for Palestinian ‘reset.’”~~
~~79 The most-cited international law pertaining to Israeli settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention, Part III, Section~~
~~III, Article 49 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, which states in its last~~
~~sentence, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it~~
~~occupies.” Israel insists that the West Bank does not fall under the international law definition of “occupied territory,”~~
~~but is rather “disputed territory” because the previous occupying power (Jordan) did not have an internationally~~
~~recognized claim to it (only a few countries recognized Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the West Bank), and given the~~
~~demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the end of the British Mandate in 1948, Israel claims that~~
~~no international actor has superior legal claim to it. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and~~
~~International Law, November 30, 2015. Jordan renounced its claims to the West Bank in 1988 in favor of the PLO.~~
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~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~

~~Israel and a future Palestinian state.80 Some observers say that construction in certain areas could~~
~~present major obstacles to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state (see Figure 4).~~
~~Figure 4. Selected Planned Settlement Construction Areas in the West Bank and~~
~~East Jerusalem~~

Source: Peace Now.
~~PA Elections and Leadership Succession~~
~~Uncertainty surrounds the future of Palestinian democracy and leadership, with questions about~~
~~whether future elections are possible and who might eventually succeed Mahmoud Abbas (see~~
~~textbox below for his biography) as leader of the national movement. Since divided rule took hold~~
~~in 2007—with the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza—periodic PA presidential~~
~~or legislative elections for the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem have been on hold, and the~~
~~Palestinian Legislative Council has ceased to function. Municipal elections for some West Bank~~
~~cities and towns occurred in 2012 and 2017.~~

~~80 Peace Now, “780 Settlement Housing Units Approved Ahead of US Presidential Transition,” January 17, 2021. See~~
~~also David Makovsky, Building Bridges for Peace: U.S. Policy Toward Arab States, Palestinians, and Israel,~~
~~Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2021, pp. 9-10.~~
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~~Mahmoud Abbas: Biography~~
~~Abbas (also known by his Arabic kunya as “Abu Mazen” or “the father of~~
~~Mazen”—Abbas’s oldest son) is generally regarded as the leader of the Palestinian~~
~~national movement, given his status as the current PLO chairman, PA president,~~
~~and head of Fatah—having succeeded Yasser Arafat upon his death in 2004. Abbas~~
~~was elected as PA president in 2005 popular elections, and when his four-year~~
~~term expired in 2009, the PLO Central Council voted to extend his term~~
~~indefinitely until new elections could take place.~~
~~Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel. Abbas and his~~
~~family left for Syria as refugees in 1948 when Israel was founded. He earned a B.A.~~
~~in law from Damascus University and a Ph.D. in history from Moscow’s Oriental~~
~~Institute.81~~
~~Abbas was an early member of Fatah, joining in Qatar. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abbas became a top deputy to~~
~~Arafat when he headed Fatah and the PLO.82 Abbas played an important role in negotiating the various Israeli-PLO~~
~~agreements of the 1990s, and returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1995.~~
~~In March 2003, Abbas was named as the first PA prime minister, but was not given full authority because Arafat~~
~~(then the PA president) insisted on retaining ultimate decisionmaking authority and control over security services.~~
~~Abbas resigned as prime minister in September 2003, apparently as a result of frustration with Arafat, the United~~
~~States, and Israel.83~~
~~Since Abbas assumed the leadership of the Palestinian national movement after Arafat’s death in 2004, he has been~~
~~a part of the contentious negotiations and disputes that have largely characterized Palestinian relations with the~~
~~United States and Israel, while also cooperating closely with both countries on security matters. While Abbas~~
~~praises “martyrs” for the Palestinian cause, he also has made repeated public calls for nonviolent approaches to~~
~~resolving Palestinian disputes with Israel.~~
~~Abbas appears motivated by a complex combination of factors that include safeguarding his personal authority and~~
~~legacy, preventing destabilization and violence, and protecting his family members.84 Some observers have argued~~
~~that Abbas’s rule became more authoritarian and corrupt after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 limited his~~
~~authority there, and left the PA without a functioning legislature or realistic prospects for future elections.85~~
~~In January 2021, the PA announced plans for legislative elections on May 22 and presidential~~
~~elections on July 31.86 Whether elections take place may depend on various factors,87 including:~~
~~ Fatah and Hamas agreement on electoral lists, processes, adjudication, and security; and~~

~~81 Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled~~ ~~The Other Side: The~~
~~Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of~~
~~collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on~~
~~Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “The Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish~~
~~nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News,~~
~~November 29, 2012.~~
~~82 One of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11 Israeli~~
~~athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “didn’t know what the~~
~~money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “The Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002.~~
~~83 James Bennet, “The Mideast Turmoil: The Leadership; Abbas Steps Down, Dealing Big Blow to U.S. Peace Plan,”~~
New York Times, September 7, 2003.
~~84 See, for example, Daoud Kuttab, “Abbas bids adieu,” Al-Monitor, August 1, 2018.~~
~~85 Ibid.; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020, “West Bank.”~~
~~86 As part of these plans, Palestinian leaders also anticipate that a selection process for members of the Palestinian~~
~~National Council (the PLO’s legislature) would take place by the end of August 2021, with some inclusion of Hamas in~~
~~the process. European Council on Foreign Relations, “Mapping Palestinian Politics.”~~
~~87 “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2021.~~
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~~ Israeli cooperation, especially on the question of permitting Palestinians in East~~
~~Jerusalem to vote.~~
~~During the 14-year West Bank-Gaza split, Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-~~
~~brokered agreements aimed at ending the split and allowing elections to take place, but have~~
~~generally not implemented these agreements. While Egyptian officials continue mediating Fatah-~~
~~Hamas discussions, some observers remain skeptical about the likelihood of elections.88 Some~~
~~others raise the possibility of an arrangement where the two factions agree on a joint list of~~
~~candidates for legislative elections, and Hamas refrains from running a presidential candidate.89~~
~~The potential for various figures from Fatah to form separate electoral lists, if it does not spur~~
~~reconciliation or reform within the faction, could undermine Fatah’s prospects vis-à-vis Hamas.90~~
~~The historical memory of Hamas’s surprise victory in the last PA elections to be held—the~~
~~legislative elections of 2006—is likely to influence the various parties’ calculations. After Hamas~~
~~assumed control over PA ministries with its legislative majority, the United States and other~~
~~Western actors significantly restructured assistance for the PA to prevent its use by those~~
~~ministries. Changes made to U.S. law and annual appropriations legislation (see textbox below)~~
~~remain possible constraints on aid to PA governments with Hamas participation or influence. The~~
~~ensuing 2006-2007 struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA—fueled in part by~~
~~external actors—contributed to the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split that created the divided rule of~~
~~today.~~
~~Fatah-Hamas “Unity Government” Scenario and U.S. Aid~~
~~Per regular annual appropriations provisions, U.S. aid is generally not permitted for a power-sharing PA~~
~~government that includes Hamas as a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which~~
~~Hamas exercises “undue influence.” This general restriction is only lifted if the President certifies that the PA~~
~~government, including all ministers, has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the following two principles~~
~~embodied in Section 620K of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism~~
~~Act of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446): (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance~~
~~of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.91 If the PA government is “Hamas-controlled,” PATA applies additional~~
~~conditions, limitations, and restrictions on aid.~~
~~It is unclear what implications the scheduled elections—whether or not they happen—will have~~
~~for Palestinian governance and international relationships. Many observers assert that Abbas~~
~~announced elections largely to show his commitment to democracy and Palestinian unity in a way~~
~~that can build credibility and goodwill with the Biden Administration and other key international~~
~~actors.92 Passages from the reported State Department proposal mentioned above suggest that the~~
~~Administration is proceeding cautiously regarding PA elections, in light of the 2006 elections’~~
~~aftermath.93 Open questions include whether elections can take place in a free and fair manner,~~

~~88 Ghaith al-Omari, “Will the Palestinian Election Decree Produce Actual Elections?” Washington Institute for Near~~
~~East Policy, PolicyWatch 3424, January 27, 2021.~~
~~89 Dalia Hatuqa, “The New Palestinian Elections Are All Talk and No Action,” foreignpolicy.com, February 2, 2021.~~
~~90 Aziza Nofal, “Fatah sacks senior member, highlighting split ahead of elections,” Al-Monitor, March 11, 2021.~~
~~91 P.L. 116-260, §7040(f).~~
~~92 Isabel Kershner and Adam Rasgon, “Abbas Announces Palestinian Elections After Years of Paralysis,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, January 15, 2021.~~
~~93 Karam, “‘The National’ obtains US official document for Palestinian ‘reset.’”~~
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~~include international observers, and garner acceptance from both Fatah and Hamas in the event of~~
~~adverse outcomes for either.94~~
~~Speculation surrounds who may run for PA president. Abbas’s advanced age and reports of health~~
~~problems have fed public conjecture for several years about who might lead the PA, PLO, and~~
~~Fatah upon the end of his tenure—whether via elections or otherwise. In past years, Abbas has~~
~~said that he would not run again, and some Fatah Central Committee members have expressed~~
~~that the committee is ultimately responsible for nominating a candidate.95 However, some key~~
~~Fatah leaders have proclaimed that Abbas will be the candidate.96~~
Marwan Barghouti—a major Fatah leader who has supported negotiating with Israel at times,
~~and armed resistance against Israel at other times—is more popular than Abbas in public opinion~~
~~polls.97 He has announced his plans to run for PA president in the July election. It is unclear~~
~~whether Abbas and/or Barghouti will stand as candidates, and whether Israel would consider~~
~~releasing Barghouti from prison; an Israeli court convicted him of murder in 2004 in connection~~
~~with terrorist attacks during the second Palestinian intifada. Some Palestinian leaders are~~
~~reportedly considering creating the position of vice president to allow Abbas to run again and~~
~~have Barghouti or someone else in position to succeed him.98~~
~~Other Palestinian leaders who could be involved in succeeding Abbas include:~~
~~ Mohammed Dahlan was a top security figure in Gaza under Arafat who is based~~
~~in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His apparent involvement with Israel-UAE~~
~~normalization has fueled some speculation about regional and international~~
~~support for him in future PLO/PA leadership.99 While Dahlan has some political~~
~~support in the West Bank and Gaza, he remains a pariah within Fatah leadership.~~
~~The faction expelled him in 2011 after he and Abbas had a falling out, and in~~
~~2014 the PA convicted him in absentia of libel, slander, and contempt of~~
~~Palestinian institutions.~~
 Majid Faraj (arguably Abbas’s most trusted security figure) and Salam Fayyad
~~(a previous PA prime minister) are prominent internationally, but have little~~
~~domestic popular support.~~
~~ Mohammed Shtayyeh (PA prime minister since 2019) is an internationally~~
~~visible Fatah insider.~~
~~ Nasser al Qudwa (a former PLO diplomat and Arafat’s nephew) is another~~
~~internationally visible figure who was expelled from Fatah in March 2021 for his~~
~~efforts to form a separate list of candidates for the planned legislative elections.~~
~~ Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril Rajoub have political heft within Fatah, but~~
~~relatively less international experience.~~

94 “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” Al Jazeera.
95 Aaron Boxerman, “PA premier: Abbas to run as Fatah candidate in Palestinian presidential election,” Times of Israel,
~~January 21, 2021.~~
~~96 Daoud Kuttab, “Does Abbas intend to run for president after all?” Arab News, February 18, 2021.~~
~~97 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 78.~~
~~98 Daoud Kuttab, “Marwan Barghouti insists on running for president in Palestinian elections,” Al-Monitor, February~~
~~17, 2021.~~
~~99 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “The Talented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020.~~
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~~Israeli Normalization with Arab States~~
~~Israel’s ongoing normalization of relations with Arab states could have political and economic~~
~~implications for the Palestinians.~~
~~Questions surround the impact that Arab states with open relations with Israel might have on~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Will these states influence Israeli positions regarding the~~
~~Palestinians, due to their closer access to Israeli leaders and Israeli interests in maintaining and~~
~~improving ties with these countries? Or will these states—having decided to normalize relations~~
~~with Israel before a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—possess less leverage with~~
~~Israel, or possibly even support efforts to have Palestinians compromise their traditional~~
~~demands?~~
~~To the extent that Arab states increase trade and investment with Israel in connection with~~
~~normalization, how it affects Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza could depend on various~~
~~factors. If increased commercial ties are strictly bilateral, they may not provide much benefit to~~
~~the Palestinians. However, efforts by Arab state leaders to improve Palestinians’ economic well-~~
~~being could increase their populations’ acceptance of political normalization with Israel. Such~~
~~efforts could include expanded Arab state commercial ties with or aid to the Palestinians, or~~
~~regional economic projects that involve or benefit the Palestinians in addition to increasing Israel-~~
~~Arab state commercial ties.~~
~~Examples of regional projects could include:~~
~~ Boosting support for Israeli natural gas exports to Arab neighbors, including the~~
~~Palestinians.100~~
~~ Developing Gaza’s potential offshore natural gas deposits.101~~
~~ Boosting support for regional cooperation on water sharing and environmental~~
~~issues, such as a proposed Red Sea-Dead Sea project involving Israel, Jordan,~~
~~and the PA.102~~
~~ Regional infrastructure projects such as the Tracks for Regional Peace project~~
~~mentioned in the Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020.103~~
~~Additionally, it is possible that Arab states could encourage Israel to ease movement and access~~
~~restrictions affecting Palestinian economic activity. For example, there are conflicting claims~~
~~about whether the UAE might have influenced Israel in its December 2020 decision to allow~~
~~some Palestinians to reclaim the use of their farms in the Jordan Valley region of the West~~
~~Bank.104~~

~~100 Zvi Bar’el, “After Countless Failures, Could Natural Gas Power a Breakthrough in Israel-Palestine Relations?”~~
~~haaretz.com, December 22, 2020.~~
~~101 Ibid.~~
~~102 For information on the proposed Red Sea-Dead Sea project, see David Schenker and Ghaith al-Omari, “Getting the~~
~~Israel-Jordan Relationship Back on Track,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 12, 2021; Osama Al~~
~~Sharif, “Project to save Dead Sea going nowhere,” Al-Monitor, December 30, 2020.~~
~~103 In August 2019, the Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for Tracks for Regional Peace, which would build a~~
~~rail line from Israel to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan. A major part of its appeal would be~~
~~allowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab~~
~~al-Mandab (Red Sea). See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tracks for regional peace - regional land bridge and hub~~
~~initiative, August 5, 2019.~~
~~104 “PA denies claims UAE returned Jordan Valley farms to Palestinians,” Middle East Monitor, January 5, 2021.~~
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~~Gaza’s Challenges~~
~~The Gaza Strip (see Figure 2) presents complicated challenges for U.S. policy. Hamas, Israel, the~~
~~PA, and several outside actors affect Gaza’s difficult security, political, and humanitarian~~
~~situations. Since Hamas seized de facto control within Gaza in 2007 (for more information on~~
~~Hamas and Gaza, see Appendix B and Appendix C), these situations have fueled periodic~~
~~violence between Israel and Hamas (along with other Palestinian militants based in Gaza) that~~
~~could recur in the future.~~
~~Three large-scale conflicts took place in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. In each of these conflicts,~~
~~Palestinian militants fired rockets into Israel, while Israel conducted airstrikes targeting militants~~
~~in Gaza (for more information on threats to Israel from Palestinian violence, see the textbox in~~
Appendix B). Israel also launched some ground operations, particularly in the 2008-2009 and
~~2014 conflicts. In the aftermath of each conflict, significant international attention focused on the~~
~~still largely elusive tasks of~~
~~ improving humanitarian conditions and economic opportunities for Palestinians~~
~~in Gaza; and~~
~~ preventing Hamas and other militants from reconstituting arsenals and military~~
~~infrastructure.~~
~~No significant breakthrough has occurred to reconcile civilian infrastructure needs with security~~
~~considerations. Such a breakthrough could include one or more of the following: (1) a political~~
~~reunification of Gaza with the West Bank, (2) reducing restrictions on access and commerce, (3) a~~
~~long-term Hamas-Israel cease-fire. Political reunification appears to depend on Hamas’s~~
~~willingness to cede control of security in Gaza to the PA. In the past, PA President Abbas has~~
~~insisted that he will not accept a situation where PA control is undermined by Hamas’s militia.105~~
~~The precarious security situation in Gaza is linked to humanitarian conditions, and because Gaza~~
~~does not have a self-sufficient economy (see Appendix C and Appendix D), external assistance~~
~~largely drives humanitarian welfare. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of~~
~~electricity and safe drinking water.106 Large transfers of aid to the PA have historically been~~
~~critical inputs for the economy in the West Bank and Gaza, but according to the World Bank aid~~
~~received by the PA in 2020 was 20 percent lower than in 2019 and the lowest in decades.107~~
~~The possibility that humanitarian crisis could destabilize Gaza has prompted some efforts aimed~~
~~at improving living conditions and reducing spillover threats. In fall 2018, Israel started allowing~~
~~shipments of Qatari fuel and cash into Gaza to partially alleviate the electricity and funding~~
~~shortages.108 In early 2021, Qatar announced that it would increase its annual contribution to~~
~~Gaza by around 50% to $360 million, and also pledged $60 million to ease Gaza’s energy crisis~~
~~by helping build a natural gas pipeline to Gaza from Israel.109~~

~~105 “Abbas: If PA not handed control of Gaza, Hamas must take full responsibility,” Times of Israel, August 18, 2018.~~
~~106 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian~~
~~territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, at https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-~~
~~critical-humanitarian-indicators.~~
~~107 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, p. 14. Also see~~
Figure D-1.
~~108 Oren Liebermann, et al., “Suitcases of $15M in cash from Qatar bring relief for Gaza,” CNN, November 11, 2018.~~
~~109 Aaron Boxerman, “Qatar raises annual aid to Gaza to $360 million,” Times of Israel, January 31, 2021; “Qatar says~~
~~to fund $60 million pipeline from Israel to Gaza,” Reuters, February 25, 2021.~~
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~~Role of Congress~~
~~As Congress exercises oversight over U.S. policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian developments, and~~
~~considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians, Members~~
~~may consider a number of issues, including the following:~~
~~ various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations, including foreign aid and the~~
~~possible reopening of diplomatic offices;~~
~~ the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and how it relates to Israel’s~~
~~normalization of relations with some Arab states;~~
~~ Palestinian international initiatives and the ICC’s investigation into possible~~
~~Israeli and Palestinian war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza;~~
~~ human rights, humanitarian, and economic development concerns, especially in~~
~~Gaza;110~~
~~ countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups;~~
~~ the surrounding region’s effects on the West Bank and Gaza, and vice versa; and~~
~~ Palestinian domestic leadership and civil society.~~
~~Some key factors could influence issues for Congress in 2021~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes al egedly “committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014.”  Later in January 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as depositary, stated that the Rome Statute would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on April 1, 2015.138  Later that same month, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination into the “situation in Palestine” to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation” against Israelis, Palestinians, or others, having found that the Palestinians had the proper capacity to accept ICC jurisdiction in light of the November 2012 adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 67/19.139 As mentioned in Appendix E, Resolution 67/19 had changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (aka “State of Palestine”) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”  Palestinian leaders provided information to the ICC on al eged Israeli crimes regarding both the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict and settlement activity in the West Bank. In May 2018, Palestinian leaders made a formal referral of the “situation in Palestine” to the Prosecutor.140 As referenced above, the State Department cited Palestinian actions relating to the ICC in connection with the 2018 closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC. Various U.S. and Israeli officials have denounced Palestinian efforts that could subject Israelis to ICC investigation or prosecution.141 Neither the United States nor Israel is a State Party to the Rome Statute. Palestinian accession and acceptance of jurisdiction grant the ICC Prosecutor authority to investigate al al eged ICC crimes committed after June 13, 2014, by any individual—Israeli, Palestinian, or otherwise—on “occupied Palestinian territory.” However, Palestinian actions do not ensure any formal ICC prosecution of al eged ICC crimes. A party to the Rome Statute can refer a situation to the Court and is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor on investigations, but it is the role of the Prosecutor to determine whether to bring charges against and prosecute an individual. In addition, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings (as described in Article 17 of the Statute) brought by a state with jurisdiction, including a state (such as Israel) that is not party to the Statute. The ICC Prosecutor is required to notify al states with jurisdiction over a potential cas e, and such states are afforded the opportunity to chal enge ICC jurisdiction over a case on inadmissibility grounds. 138 U.N. Secretary-General Rome Statute Depositary Notification for the State of Palestine, January 6, 2015, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-Eng.pdf. 139 ICC Press Release, “ T he Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine,” January 16, 2015. 140 ICC Statement, “ Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the referral submitted by Palestine,” May 22, 2018. 141 See, for example, “ Bolton warns ICC not to go after Israel, confirms closure of PLO’s DC office,” Times of Israel, September 10, 2018. Congressional Research Service 32 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Investigation of Possible Crimes in West Bank and Gaza On March 3, 2021, then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she was opening an investigation of possible ICC crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.142 She had previously sought a ruling from a pre-trial chamber to confirm her determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the situation general y, and to determine the extent of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction specifical y.143 In a 2-1 decision, the chamber ruled in February 2021 that the ICC has jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem), based on the Palestinians’ status as a State Party to the Rome Statute.144 Israel had argued that the ICC should not have jurisdiction in those territories because Palestinians do not have sovereign control there.145 Broader Impact of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Ruling? The ICC pre-trial chamber’s February 2021 decision stated that because the ICC exercises jurisdiction over natural persons rather than states, its decision “is strictly limited to the question of jurisdiction set forth in the Prosecutor’s Request and does not entail any determination on the border disputes between Palestine and Israel.” According to one commentator, Palestinians and other international actors could use the decision to support for Palestinian statehood and territorial claims.146 In response to the opening of an ICC investigation, Secretary of State Blinken said on March 3: The United States firmly opposes and is deeply disappointed by this decision. The ICC has no jurisdiction over this matter. Israel is not a party to the ICC and has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction, and we have serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. The Palestinians do not qualify as a sovereign state and therefore, are not qualified to obtain membership as a state in, participate as a state in, or delegate jurisdiction to the ICC.… Moreover, the United States believes a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future for the people of the Middle East depends on building bridges and creating new avenues for dialogue and exchange, not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution. We will continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, including by opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.147 142 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine ,” March 3, 2021. 143 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the Situation in Palestine, and seeking a ruling on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction ,” December 20, 2019. 144 ICC, “ Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine,’” February 5, 2021. In a partly dissenting opinion (available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2021_01167.PDF), Judge Péter Kovács argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction in the West Bank should be limited to the competences transferred to the PA in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to an interpretation that might require Israel’s consent to ICC investigations of Israeli nationals. 145 Israeli Attorney General, The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So -Called “Situation in Palestine,” December 20, 2019. Germany, Brazil, Australia, Uganda, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary had filed am icus curiae briefs with the pre-trial chamber offering arguments in line with Israel’s objections to territorial, while the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation had filed briefs in support of territorial jurisdiction. 146 T ovah Lazaroff, “ Eight things to know about the ICC war crimes suits against Israel,” jpost.com, February 7, 2021. 147 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, T he United States Opposes the ICC Investigation into the Palestinian Situation, March 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 33 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations On March 11, 54 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken commending his statements, and urging him to work with like-minded international partners to “steer the ICC away from further actions that could damage the Court’s credibility by giving the appearance of political bias.”148 While Palestinian leaders (from both the PLO/PA and Hamas) welcomed the news of an ICC investigation,149 leading Israeli political figures roundly denounced it, with then-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu cal ing the decision to investigate biased and anti-Semitic.150 It is unclear how the current Prosecutor, Karim Khan,151 might choose to handle the investigation. The investigation could focus on a number of possible war crimes from Israeli and Palestinian actions, including:  actions by Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian militant groups during their 2014 and 2021 Gaza conflicts;  lethal force used by Israeli soldiers in 2018-2019 against some Palestinian protestors in Gaza seeking to breach or approach the administrative boundary with Israel;  other Israeli actions in and around the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement activity; and  possible PA (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) human rights abuses. An investigation could take months or years before the Prosecutor makes decisions on bringing specific charges against individuals. As mentioned above, if an ICC investigation produces any case against Israelis or Palestinians concerning conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings by a state having jurisdiction, it would be inadmissible. In Bensouda’s March 3 announcement of the investigation, she said: As a first step, the Office [of the Prosecutor] is required to notify all States Parties and those States which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned about its investigation. This permits any such State to request the Office to defer to the State’s relevant investigation of its own nationals or others within its jurisdiction in relation to Rome Statute crimes referred to in the notification (subject to possible Pre-Trial Chamber review).152 Possible U.S. Responses It is unclear what diplomatic or other measures the Biden Administration might take to counter an ICC investigation focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Under Executive Order 13928 from June 2020, President Trump authorized sanctions against foreign persons or entities involved in or supporting ICC investigations or actions targeting U.S. personnel or personnel of U.S. al ies 148 T ext of letter available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-cardin-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-secretary-blinken-continue. 149 “ICC prosecutor opens war crimes probe in Palestinian territories,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2021. 150 “Netanyahu: ICC war crimes probe is ‘pure antisemitism,’” jpost.com, March 4, 2021. 151 Before becoming the ICC Prosecutor in June 2021, Khan served as the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative T eam established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2379 (2017) to promote accountability efforts for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq. 152 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine ,” March 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 34 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations without the consent of the home government of those personnel.153 In September 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions under E.O. 13928 against Prosecutor Bensouda and another top ICC official in connection with an investigation regarding Afghanistan that could subject U.S. personnel to prosecution.154 President Biden lifted these sanctions in April 2021 while stating continued U.S. objections to ICC assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. and al ied personnel.155 Role of Congress As Congress exercises oversight over U.S. policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian developments, and considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians, Members may consider a number of issues, including the following:  various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations, including foreign aid and the possible reopening of diplomatic offices;  the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and how it relates to Israel’s normalization of relations with some Arab states;  Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank;  Palestinian international initiatives and the ICC’s investigation into possible Israeli and Palestinian war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza;  human rights, humanitarian, and economic development concerns;  countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups;  the surrounding region’s effects on the West Bank and Gaza, and vice versa; and  Palestinian domestic leadership and civil society. Some key factors could influence issues for Congress. These factors include whether the . These factors include whether the
PLO/PA significantly changes welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals PLO/PA significantly changes welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals ~~allegedly~~ al egedly involved involved
in acts of terrorism, the extent to which Israeli legal institutions and proceedings might preclude in acts of terrorism, the extent to which Israeli legal institutions and proceedings might preclude
the ICC the ICC from prosecuting cases against Israeli personnel, and how from prosecuting cases against Israeli personnel, and how ~~developments unfold on PA~~
~~elections and leadership succession~~various PA domestic developments (elections, leadership succession, and governance concerns) unfold. Consideration of these factors takes place within the context . Consideration of these factors takes place within the context
of Biden Administration efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, existing legislation such as of Biden Administration efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, existing legislation such as
~~the TFA, and more visible Israel-Arab state relations. Also, given existing legislation and~~
~~longtime U.S. concerns about a direct Hamas involvement in PA leadership, a greater Hamas role~~
~~in the PA or PLO could affect U.S. aid for and actions toward the Palestinians.111~~

~~110 A March 12, 2021, letter from 12 Representatives urged Secretary Blinken to take more assertive stances in support~~
~~of Palestinian human rights. Text of letter~~the TFA, ongoing debate regarding various unilateral Israeli and Palestinian actions, and more visible Israel-Arab state relations. 153 Executive Order 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with t he International Criminal Court , June 11, 2020. Prior to E.O. 13928, 67 Senators and 262 Representatives sent letters to then -Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asserting that ICC jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza would be improper, and urging him to suppo rt Israel in challenging it. T he text of the Senators’ letter is available at https://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-for-pompeo-to-defend-israel-against -politically-motivated-investigations-by-the-international-criminal-court, and the text of the Representatives’ letter is available at available at
https://https://~~tlaib~~luria.house.gov/sites/.house.gov/sites/~~tlaib~~luria.house.gov/files/.house.gov/files/~~Palestine%20State%20Dept.%20Letter.pdf.~~
~~111 CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

26wysiwyg_uploaded/2020.05.12%20Luria%20Gallagher%20letter%20to%20Sec%20Pompeo%20on%20ICC.pdf . 154 T reasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “ Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court Designations,” September 2, 2020. For background information, see CRS Insight IN11428, International Crim inal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crim es in Afghanistan , by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack. 155 White House, “ Executive Order on the T ermination of Emergency With Respect to the International Criminal Court ,” April 1, 2021. Congressional Research Service 35

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Appendix A. Key Palestinian Factions and Groups
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
The PLO is recognized by the United Nations (including Israel since 1993) as the sole legitimate The PLO is recognized by the United Nations (including Israel since 1993) as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may reside. It is an representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may reside. It is an ~~umbrella~~umbrel a organization organization
that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other Islamist groups). The PLO was that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other Islamist groups). The PLO was
founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah movement. founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah movement.
~~Organizationally~~Organizational y, the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council , the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council
(or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.(or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.~~112~~
156 After waging After waging ~~guerrilla~~guerril a warfare against Israel under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the PNC warfare against Israel under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the PNC
declared Palestinian independence and statehood in 1988. This came at a point roughly coinciding declared Palestinian independence and statehood in 1988. This came at a point roughly coinciding
with the PLO’s decision to publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security with the PLO’s decision to publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 242 and to contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had Council Resolution 242 and to contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had
littlelittle practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the
territorial scope of its state.territorial scope of its state.~~113~~157 The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993 upon the The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993 upon the
signing of the Declaration of Principles between the two parties. signing of the Declaration of Principles between the two parties.
While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the
West Bank, as West Bank, as ~~well~~ wel as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas’s security presence,as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas’s security presence,~~114~~158
the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international
actors. Under the name “State of Palestine,” the PLO maintains a permanent observer mission to actors. Under the name “State of Palestine,” the PLO maintains a permanent observer mission to
the United Nations in New York and in Geneva as a “non-member state,” and has missions and the United Nations in New York and in Geneva as a “non-member state,” and has missions and
embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. The PLO also is a full member of embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. The PLO also is a full member of
both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Fatah
Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and
most prominent faction in the PLO for decades. Since the establishment of the PA and limited most prominent faction in the PLO for decades. Since the establishment of the PA and limited
self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except during the self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except during the
period of partial Hamas rule in 2006-2007. Yet, popular period of partial Hamas rule in 2006-2007. Yet, popular ~~disillusionment~~disil usionment has come from the failure has come from the failure
to establish a Palestinian state, internecine violence, corruption, and poor governance. Arafat’s to establish a Palestinian state, internecine violence, corruption, and poor governance. Arafat’s

~~112 The~~ 156 T he PNC consists of more than 700 members, a majority of whom are from the diaspora. PNC consists of more than 700 members, a majority of whom are from the diaspora. ~~The~~T he Central Council is Central Council is
chaired by the PNC president and has 124 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus (among chaired by the PNC president and has 124 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus (among
others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and prominent interest others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and prominent interest
groups and professions. groups and professions. ~~The~~T he Central Council functions as a link between the Executive Committee and the PNC. Central Council functions as a link between the Executive Committee and the PNC. Either Either
the PNC or the Central Council reportedly can electthe PNC or the Central Council reportedly can elect the 18 members of the Executive Committee, which functions as a the 18 members of the Executive Committee, which functions as a
cabinetcabinet —with each member assuming—with each member assuming discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee elects its own discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee elects its own
chairperson. chairperson. ~~The~~T he European Council on Foreign Relations’ online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at European Council on Foreign Relations’ online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at
https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions is a source for much of the PLO organizational https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions is a source for much of the PLO organizational
information in this paragraph. information in this paragraph.
~~113 The~~157 T he declaration included the phrase: “ declaration included the phrase: “~~The~~ T he State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” ~~The~~T he
text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm. text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm.
~~114 The~~158 T he PA’s legal claim to self-rule over Gaza is PA’s legal claim to self-rule over Gaza is subject to the original Oslo-era agreements of the 1990s, the subject to the original Oslo-era agreements of the 1990s, the
agreements between Israel and the PA regardingagreements between Israel and the PA regarding movement and access that were formalized in November 2005 shortly movement and access that were formalized in November 2005 shortly
after Israel’s withdrawalafter Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and the June 2014 formation of a PA government with formal sway over both the from Gaza, and the June 2014 formation of a PA government with formal sway over both the
self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza.self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza.
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2004 death removed a major unifying symbol, further eroding Fatah’s support under Mahmoud 2004 death removed a major unifying symbol, further eroding Fatah’s support under Mahmoud
Abbas.Abbas.
~~Fatah’s 1960s charter continues to include clauses calling~~ Fatah’s charter, dating back to the 1960s, stil includes clauses cal ing for the destruction of the for the destruction of the Zionist state Zionist state
and its economic, political, military, and cultural supportsand its economic, political, military, and cultural supports~~.115~~, despite the PLO’s 1993 acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.159 Abbas routinely expresses support Abbas routinely expresses support
for “legitimate peaceful resistance” to Israeli occupation under international law, complemented for “legitimate peaceful resistance” to Israeli occupation under international law, complemented
by negotiations. However, some of the other Fatah Central Committee members are either less by negotiations. However, some of the other Fatah Central Committee members are either less
outspoken in their advocacy of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or reportedly explicitly insist on outspoken in their advocacy of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or reportedly explicitly insist on
the need to the need to preserve the option of armed struggle.preserve the option of armed struggle.~~116~~
160 Other PLO Factions and Leaders
Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. ~~All~~ Al of these factions have minor of these factions have minor
political support relative to Fatah and Hamas. political support relative to Fatah and Hamas.
A number of Palestinian politicians and other leaders without traditional factional affiliation have A number of Palestinian politicians and other leaders without traditional factional affiliation have
successfully gained followings successfully gained followings ~~domestically~~domestical y and in the international community under the PLO’s and in the international community under the PLO’s
~~umbrella~~ umbrel a, even some who are not , even some who are not ~~formally~~formal y affiliated with the PLO. These figures—such as Salam affiliated with the PLO. These figures—such as Salam
Fayyad, Hanan Ashrawi (a female Christian), and Mustafa Barghouti—often have competing Fayyad, Hanan Ashrawi (a female Christian), and Mustafa Barghouti—often have competing
agendas. Several of them support a negotiated two-state solution, agendas. Several of them support a negotiated two-state solution, ~~generally~~general y oppose violence, and oppose violence, and
appeal to the Palestinian appeal to the Palestinian ~~intellectual~~ intel ectual elite and to prominent Western governments and elite and to prominent Western governments and
organizations. organizations.
Non-PLO Factions
Hamas
Overview
Hamas (an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a U.S.-designated terrorist Hamas (an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization and Fatah’s main rival for leadership of the Palestinian national movement. organization and Fatah’s main rival for leadership of the Palestinian national movement.
Countering Hamas is a focal point for Israel and the United States. Countering Hamas is a focal point for Israel and the United States.
Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in
Egypt in 1928 with affiliates and sympathizers throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s emergence as Egypt in 1928 with affiliates and sympathizers throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s emergence as
a major politicala major political and military group can be traced to the first Palestinian and military group can be traced to the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising), (or uprising),
which began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to what Hamas terms the Israeli occupation of which began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to what Hamas terms the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian-populated lands. The group presented an alternative to Yasser Arafat and his secular Palestinian-populated lands. The group presented an alternative to Yasser Arafat and his secular
Fatah movement by using violence against Israeli civilianFatah movement by using violence against Israeli civilian and military targets just as Arafat began and military targets just as Arafat began
~~negotiating with Israel. Hamas took a leading role in attacks against Israelis—including suicide~~

~~115 This is the case even though~~ 159 Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized
Israel’s right to exist pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy Israel’s right to exist pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy
remains over whether the PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognitionremains over whether the PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition ). ).
~~116 The~~160 T he Al Aqsa Al Aqsa Martyrs’ BrigadesMartyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank early in the (AAMB) is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank early in the
second intifada and later begansecond intifada and later began operating in Gazaoperating in Gaza as well.as well. It wasIt was ~~added~~ added to the State Department’s list of Foreign to the State Department’s list of Foreign
~~Terrorist~~T errorist Organizations in March 2002. In line with the Abbas-led Organizations in March 2002. In line with the Abbas-led PA’s effort to centralize control, the Brigades PA’s effort to centralize control, the Brigades
loweredlowered its profile in the West Bank after 2007. However, some observers have noted that militant elements remain its profile in the West Bank after 2007. However, some observers have noted that militant elements remain
within Fatah, including some members of the AAMB, and are generally known as the within Fatah, including some members of the AAMB, and are generally known as the ~~Tanzim~~T anzim. See, . See, ~~for~~f or example, example,
Michael Milshtein, “Michael Milshtein, “~~Fateh`s ‘Tanzim~~ Fateh’s ‘T anzim’ Formations: a potential challenge that is liable to intensify in the face of ’ Formations: a potential challenge that is liable to intensify in the face of
scenarios of deterioration in the Palestinian arena,” IDC Herzliya Institute for Policy and Strategy, June 2020. scenarios of deterioration in the Palestinian arena,” IDC Herzliya Institute for Policy and Strategy, June 2020.
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negotiating with Israel. Hamas took a leading role in attacks against Israelis—including suicide bombings targeting civilians—during the second intifada (between 2000 and 2005—see bombings targeting civilians—during the second intifada (between 2000 and 2005—see
Appendix B for more information on the two intifadas and Palestinian violence and terrorism). for more information on the two intifadas and Palestinian violence and terrorism).
Shortly after Arafat’s death in 2004, the group decided to directly involve itself in politics. In Shortly after Arafat’s death in 2004, the group decided to directly involve itself in politics. In
2006, a year after the election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, and just a few months 2006, a year after the election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, and just a few months
after Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestinian after Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestinian
~~Legislative~~ Legislative Council elections. Subsequently, Israel, the United States, and others in the Council elections. Subsequently, Israel, the United States, and others in the
international community have sought to neutralize or marginalize Hamas. As discussed in international community have sought to neutralize or marginalize Hamas. As discussed in
Appendix C, Ha~~mas~~ Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007 and has exercised de facto rule there since seized control of Gaza in 2007 and has exercised de facto rule there since
then. then.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, Hamas “comprises According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, Hamas “comprises
several thousand Gaza-based operatives.” several thousand Gaza-based operatives.”
Ideology, Organization, and Leadership
Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s
founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an
Islamic state in Islamic state in ~~all~~ al of historic Palestine.of historic Palestine.~~117~~161 A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding
principles. It clarified that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than the Jews, and principles. It clarified that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than the Jews, and
expressed expressed ~~willingness~~wil ingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it
results from “national consensus.”results from “national consensus.”~~118~~
162 Since Hamas’s inception during the first intifada in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of Since Hamas’s inception during the first intifada in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of
support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip. It also has a significant presence in the support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip. It also has a significant presence in the
West Bank and in various Arab countries. West Bank and in various Arab countries.
The leadership structure of Hamas is opaque, and much of the open source reporting available on The leadership structure of Hamas is opaque, and much of the open source reporting available on
it cannot be independently verified. It is unclear who controls strategy, policy, and financial it cannot be independently verified. It is unclear who controls strategy, policy, and financial
decisions. In previous years, some external leaders reportedly sought to move toward a less decisions. In previous years, some external leaders reportedly sought to move toward a less
militant stance in exchange for Hamas obtaining a significant role in the PLO, which represents militant stance in exchange for Hamas obtaining a significant role in the PLO, which represents
Palestinians internationally. Palestinians internationally.
~~Overall~~ Overal policy guidance comes from a Shura (or consultative) Council, with reported policy guidance comes from a Shura (or consultative) Council, with reported
representation from the West Bank, Gaza, and other places. Qatar-based representation from the West Bank, Gaza, and other places. Qatar-based Ismail Haniyeh is the is the
~~overall~~ overal leader of Hamas’s political bureau (politburo). leader of Hamas’s political bureau (politburo). Yahya Sinwar, previously a top , previously a top
commander from Hamas’s military wing, is the movement’s leader for Gaza.commander from Hamas’s military wing, is the movement’s leader for Gaza.~~119~~163 The militia, The militia,
known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,~~120~~164 is led by is led by Muhammad Deif,,~~121~~165 and may seek to and may seek to
drive political decisions via its control over security. Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Deif have drive political decisions via its control over security. Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Deif have ~~all~~ al been been
named by the Treasury Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. named by the Treasury Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

~~117~~ 161 For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp. For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
~~118~~162 “Hamas in 2017: “Hamas in 2017: ~~The~~T he document in full,” document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. , May 1, 2017. ~~This~~T his document, unlike the 1988 charter, document, unlike the 1988 charter,
does not identify Hamas with the Muslimdoes not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood. 163 Yaniv Kubovich, “ T here’s Something New About Hamas’ Leader in Gaza Since the War – and Israel Is Concerned,” haaretz.com, July 20, 2021. 164~~Brotherhood.~~
~~119 “Gaza’s ruthless pragmatist,” Economist, May 26, 2018.~~
~~120~~ Izz al Din al Qassam was Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslima Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anticolonialistBrotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anticolonialist
resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He wasresistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces on killed by British forces on
November 19, 1935. November 19, 1935.
~~121~~165 For a profile of Deif, see For a profile of Deif, see ~~Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Maayan Lubell, “Has Hamas military chief, Mohammed Deif,~~
escaped death again?” Reuters~~, August 20, 2014~~Joshua Nevett, “ Mohammed Deif: T he one-eyed Hamas chief in Israel's crosshairs” BBC News, May 31, 2021. .
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External Support
Hamas reportedly receives support from a number of sources, including some states. Along with Hamas reportedly receives support from a number of sources, including some states. Along with
some other non-PLO factions, Hamas has some other non-PLO factions, Hamas has ~~historically~~historical y received much of its political and material received much of its political and material
support (including funding, weapons, and training) from Iran. Hamas became distant from Iran support (including funding, weapons, and training) from Iran. Hamas became distant from Iran
when it broke with Syria’s government in the early years of the country’s civil war. However, the when it broke with Syria’s government in the early years of the country’s civil war. However, the
Hamas-Iran relationship reportedly revived—including Hamas-Iran relationship reportedly revived—including ~~financially~~financial y—around 2017.—around 2017.~~122~~
166 In 2014, a Treasury Department official stated publicly that Qatar “has for many years openly In 2014, a Treasury Department official stated publicly that Qatar “has for many years openly
financed Hamas.”financed Hamas.”~~123~~167 Qatari officials have denied that their government supported Hamas Qatari officials have denied that their government supported Hamas
~~financially~~ financial y and have argued that their policy is to support the Palestinian people. and have argued that their policy is to support the Palestinian people.
In addition to external assistance from states, Hamas has other sources of support. According to In addition to external assistance from states, Hamas has other sources of support. According to
the State Department’s profile of Hamas in its Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, the group the State Department’s profile of Hamas in its Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, the group
“raises funds in Gulf countries” and “receives donations from some Palestinian and other “raises funds in Gulf countries” and “receives donations from some Palestinian and other
expatriates as expatriates as ~~well~~ wel as from its own charity organizations.” as from its own charity organizations.”
Some reports claim that Hamas officials use Turkey as a base of operations. Some reports claim that Hamas officials use Turkey as a base of operations.~~124~~168 Turkish President Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan Recep Tayyip Erdogan ~~periodically~~periodical y hosts top Hamas officials and expresses support for the hosts top Hamas officials and expresses support for the
group’s political aims. group’s political aims.
On January 11, 2021, Representative Brian Mast introduced the Palestinian International On January 11, 2021, Representative Brian Mast introduced the Palestinian International
Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2021 (H.R. 261). The Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2021 (H.R. 261). The ~~bill~~bil , which is , which is ~~virtually~~virtual y identical to a identical to a
~~bill~~ bil introduced during the 116th Congress (H.R. 1850), would require the President to report to introduced during the 116th Congress (H.R. 1850), would require the President to report to
Congress on foreign sources of support for Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and impose Congress on foreign sources of support for Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and impose
sanctions on these sources as specified, subject to a waiver for national security reasons. sanctions on these sources as specified, subject to a waiver for national security reasons.
Other Rejectionist Groups
Several other Several other ~~small~~ smal Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s
right to exist and to conduct negotiations. They remain active in the West Bank and Gaza and right to exist and to conduct negotiations. They remain active in the West Bank and Gaza and
retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts
at cooperation and conciliation. In Gaza, some observers speculate that Hamas permits or even at cooperation and conciliation. In Gaza, some observers speculate that Hamas permits or even
supports the operations of some of these groups, including those with a presence in Egypt’s Sinai supports the operations of some of these groups, including those with a presence in Egypt’s Sinai
Peninsula, without avowing ties to them. Such groups provide Hamas opportunities to tacitly Peninsula, without avowing ties to them. Such groups provide Hamas opportunities to tacitly
acquiesce to attacks against Israel while avoiding direct responsibility. acquiesce to attacks against Israel while avoiding direct responsibility.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
The largest of these other groups is Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a U.S.-designated terrorist The largest of these other groups is Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support
from Iran. PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas. from Iran. PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas.
Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings), Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings),
~~killing~~ kil ing scores of Israelis.scores of Israelis.~~125~~169 PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into

~~122 See,~~ 166 See, for example, Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas turns to Iran,” for example, Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas turns to Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 6, 2017. , July 6, 2017.
~~123~~167 Remarks of Under Secretary for Remarks of Under Secretary for ~~Terrorism~~T errorism and Financial Intelligence David and Financial Intelligence David Cohen Cohen ~~before~~bef ore the Center for a New the Center for a New
American Security on “American Security on “ Confronting New Confronting New ~~Threats in Terrorist~~T hreats in T errorist Financing,” March 4, 2014. Financing,” March 4, 2014.
~~124~~168 “Israel dismantles money transfer channel between Hamas operatives in “Israel dismantles money transfer channel between Hamas operatives in ~~Turkey~~T urkey and West Bank and West Bank ,” ,” i24News, ,
February 15, 2021; “February 15, 2021; “ Revealed: How a bank in Revealed: How a bank in ~~Turkey~~T urkey funded funded Hamas terror operations,” Hamas terror operations,” Arab News, October 20, 2020. , October 20, 2020.
~~125 Suicide bombing figures culled~~ 169 Suicide bombing figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs websitefrom Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
~~Terrorism~~T errorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/
Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since. Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.
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Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its
credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters. credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters.
PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite
revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of ~~all~~ al of historic of historic
Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has
not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in
elections. Perhaps largely for these reasons, PIJ has not approached the same level of support elections. Perhaps largely for these reasons, PIJ has not approached the same level of support
among Palestinians as Hamas. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states. among Palestinians as Hamas. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, “PIJ has close to According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, “PIJ has close to
1,000 members.” 1,000 members.”
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Another—though Another—though ~~smaller~~smal er—Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an FTO is the Popular —Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an FTO is the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLP-GC is a splinter group Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLP-GC is a splinter group
from the PFLP. According to the State Department’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, PFLP-from the PFLP. According to the State Department’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, PFLP-
GC’s operates in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has several hundred members. GC’s operates in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has several hundred members.
Its founder, Ahmed Jibril, died in Damascus (presumably of natural causes) in July 2021. His longtime deputy, Talal Naji, was elected to replace him.170 Salafist Militant ~~Salafist Militant~~ Groups
A number of A number of ~~small~~ smal Palestinian Salafist-Jihadist militant groups evincing affinities toward groups Palestinian Salafist-Jihadist militant groups evincing affinities toward groups
such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State have arisen in the Gaza Strip. Some Salafist groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State have arisen in the Gaza Strip. Some Salafist groups
reportedly include former Hamas militiareportedly include former Hamas militia commanders who became disaffected by actions from commanders who became disaffected by actions from
Hamas that they deemed to be overly moderate. Salafist groups do not currently appear to Hamas that they deemed to be overly moderate. Salafist groups do not currently appear to
threaten Hamas’s rule in Gaza. threaten Hamas’s rule in Gaza.
Palestinian Refugees
Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced before and during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, about Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced before and during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, about
one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third in neighboring one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third in neighboring
Arab countries. According to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Arab countries. According to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), there are more than 5 Near East (UNRWA), there are more than 5 ~~million~~ mil ion registered refugees (comprising original registered refugees (comprising original
refugees and their descendants) in UNRWA’s areas of operation—the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, refugees and their descendants) in UNRWA’s areas of operation—the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon. Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, partly owing to its previous Syria, and Lebanon. Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, partly owing to its previous
unilateral annexation of the West Bank (which ended in 1988), but the other refugees in the unilateral annexation of the West Bank (which ended in 1988), but the other refugees in the
region are region are ~~generally~~general y stateless and therefore limited in their ability stateless and therefore limited in their ability to travel. Many of the refugees to travel. Many of the refugees
remain reliant on UNRWAremain reliant on UNRWA for food, health care, and education.for food, health care, and education.
For political and economic reasons, Arab host governments For political and economic reasons, Arab host governments ~~generally~~general y have not actively supported have not actively supported
the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many
Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or
possibly to a future Palestinian state. Many assert a sense of dispossession and betrayal over possibly to a future Palestinian state. Many assert a sense of dispossession and betrayal over
never having been never having been ~~allowed~~al owed to return to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions to return to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions
have organized followings among refugee populations, and militiashave organized followings among refugee populations, and militias have proliferated at various have proliferated at various
times in some refugee areas. The refugees seek to influence both their host governments and the times in some refugee areas. The refugees seek to influence both their host governments and the
PLO/PA to pursue a solution to their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel. PLO/PA to pursue a solution to their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel.
170 Albert Aji, “ Syria-based breakaway Palestinian faction elects new leader,” Associated Press, July 18, 2021. Congressional Research Service 40 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations For additional information on Palestinian refugees and UNRWA, see CRS Report RS22967, For additional information on Palestinian refugees and UNRWA, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
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Appendix B. Historical Background
~~Palestinian political identity emerged during the British Mandate period (1923-1948), began to~~
~~crystallize with the 1947 United Nations partition plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), and~~
~~grew stronger following Israel’s conquest and occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in~~
~~1967~~Various perspectives exist on the nature of Palestinian political identity while the area of historic Palestine was a part of the province of Greater Syria within the Ottoman Empire.171 This identity developed further during the British Mandate period (1923-1948). Although in 1947 the United Nations intended to create two states in Palestine—one Jewish . Although in 1947 the United Nations intended to create two states in Palestine—one Jewish
~~and one Arab—~~and one Arab—with its partition plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), only the Jewish state came into being. Varying only the Jewish state came into being. Varying explanations for the failure to explanations for the failure to
found an Arab state alongside a Jewish state in mandatory Palestine place blame on the British, found an Arab state alongside a Jewish state in mandatory Palestine place blame on the British,
the Zionists, neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians themselves, or the Zionists, neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians themselves, or some combination of these some combination of these
groups.groups.~~126~~
172 As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1948, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1948, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were
driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians ~~call~~ cal the the nakba (“catastrophe”). Many (“catastrophe”). Many
ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Arab Gulf states such as ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Arab Gulf states such as
Kuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens. Those who were in the West Kuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens. Those who were in the West
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian
administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure
or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states that or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states that
had conflicting interests. had conflicting interests.
1967 was a watershed year for the Palestinians. In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively 1967 was a watershed year for the Palestinians. In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively
defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as ~~well~~ wel as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the
Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted
Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between
Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer
zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day. zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day.
After the 1967 war, Israel only effectively annexed East Jerusalem (as After the 1967 war, Israel only effectively annexed East Jerusalem (as ~~well~~ wel as the Golan Heights), as the Golan Heights),
leaving the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. However, both territories became leaving the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. However, both territories became
increasingly increasingly ~~economically~~economical y linked with Israel. Furthermore, Israel presided over the settlement of linked with Israel. Furthermore, Israel presided over the settlement of
thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than
Gaza)—Gaza)—~~officially~~official y initiating initiating some of these projects and assuming security responsibility for some of these projects and assuming security responsibility for ~~all~~ al of of
them. Settlement of the West Bank increased markedly once the Likud Party, with its vision of a them. Settlement of the West Bank increased markedly once the Likud Party, with its vision of a
“Greater Israel” extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977. “Greater Israel” extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977.
Having Israelis settle in the West Bank presented some economic and cultural opportunities for Having Israelis settle in the West Bank presented some economic and cultural opportunities for
Palestinians, but also new Palestinians, but also new ~~challenges~~chal enges to their identity and cohesion, civil rights, and territorial to their identity and cohesion, civil rights, and territorial
contiguity. These contiguity. These ~~challenges~~chal enges persist and have since intensified. persist and have since intensified.
The Arab states’ defeat in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, The Arab states’ defeat in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza,
~~allowed~~al owed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the representative of
Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an ~~umbrella~~umbrel a organization of Palestinian organization of Palestinian
factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States (Arab League), the PLO factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States (Arab League), the PLO
asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by staging asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by staging ~~guerrilla~~guerril a raids against Israel from raids against Israel from
Jordanian territory. The late Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO Jordanian territory. The late Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO
in 1969, and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the in 1969, and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the
~~Palestinian national cause—representing both the refugees and those under Israeli rule in the West~~
~~Bank and Gaza. Often this prominence came infamously from acts of terrorism and militancy.~~

~~126 See, for example, Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, New York: Times Books, 1979; Barry Rubin,~~ 171 See, for example, Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997; James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 172 See, for example, Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, New York: T imes Books, 1979; Barry Rubin, Israel: An
Introduction, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. , New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
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Palestinian national cause—representing both the refugees and those under Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Often this prominence came infamously from acts of terrorism and militancy. Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to
move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its influence survived. In 1987, move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its influence survived. In 1987,
Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first
intifada, or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the , or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the
Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with
the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and
accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.~~127~~173
Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel may have been partly motivated by Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel may have been partly motivated by
concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from exile, its legitimacy with concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from exile, its legitimacy with
Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (which Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (which
included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much of his Arab state support included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much of his Arab state support
following his politicalfollowing his political backing for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. backing for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right
to exist in 1993, and through the “Oslo agreements” gained limited self-rule for Palestinians in to exist in 1993, and through the “Oslo agreements” gained limited self-rule for Palestinians in
Gaza and parts of the West Bank—via the creation of the PA. The agreements were Gaza and parts of the West Bank—via the creation of the PA. The agreements were ~~gradually and~~
~~partially~~gradual y and partial y implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that they would lead to a final-status implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that they would lead to a final-status
peace agreement has not been realized. peace agreement has not been realized.
Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since the Oslo Agreements
Various Palestinian groups have engaged in a variety of methods of violence Various Palestinian groups have engaged in a variety of methods of violence since the Israel-PLOsince the Israel-PLO ~~agreements~~ agreements of of
the 1990s, the 1990s, ~~killing~~ kil ing hundreds of Israelis—bothhundreds of Israelis—both ~~military~~ military and civilian.and civilian.~~128~~ 174 Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in
asymmetricasymmetric warfare with a strongerwarfare with a stronger enemy point to the thousands of deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis enemy point to the thousands of deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis
since 1993,since 1993,~~129~~175 some some through acts of terrorismthrough acts of terrorism aimed at civilians.aimed at civilians.~~130~~176
Palestinian militants in Gaza Palestinian militants in Gaza ~~periodically~~ periodical y fire rocketsfire rockets and mortarsand mortars into Israel indiscriminately.into Israel indiscriminately. The possibility that a The possibility that a
rocket threat could emergerocket threat could emerge ~~from~~ from the West Bank is one factor that Israelisthe West Bank is one factor that Israelis have cited in explaining their reluctance have cited in explaining their reluctance
to consider a to consider a ~~full~~ ful withdrawal from there.withdrawal from there.~~131~~ 177 Although Palestinian militants maintain rocket and mortarAlthough Palestinian militants maintain rocket and mortar arsenals, arsenals,
Israel’sIsrael’s Iron DomeIron Dome defense systemdefense system ~~reportedly~~ reportedly has decreased the threat to Israel fromhas decreased the threat to Israel from these projectiles.these projectiles.~~132~~
~~Additionally,~~ 178 Additional y, tunnels that Palestinian militantstunnels that Palestinian militants in Gaza used somewhat effectively in a 2014 conflict have been in Gaza used somewhat effectively in a 2014 conflict have been
~~neutralized to some extent by systematic Israeli efforts, with some financial and technological assistance from the~~
~~United States.133~~

~~127 UNSCR~~ 173 UNSCR 242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and lasting peace in the Middlelasting peace in the Middle East” East”
basedbased on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2) on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2)
““~~Termination~~T ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundariesrecognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” free from threats or acts of force.”
~~128~~174 Statistics available Statistics available from B’from B’~~Tselem (The~~T selem (T he Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied ~~Territories~~ T erritories) )
websitewebsite at http://www.btselem.org/statistics. at http://www.btselem.org/statistics.
~~129~~175 Ibid. Ibid.
~~130 The~~176 T he most prominent attack by an Israeli civilian against Palestinians since 1993 was the killing of at least 29 most prominent attack by an Israeli civilian against Palestinians since 1993 was the killing of at least 29
Palestinians (and possiblyPalestinians (and possibly between 10 to 23 more) and the woundingbetween 10 to 23 more) and the wounding of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch
GoldsteinGoldstein (a Brooklyn-born former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque(a Brooklyn-born former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque of Abraham) in the Cave of the of Abraham) in the Cave of the
Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) whilePatriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) while the victims were at prayer. Seethe victims were at prayer. See George George
J. Church, “When Fury Rules,”J. Church, “When Fury Rules,” Time, March 7, 1994. , March 7, 1994. ~~This~~T his incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation
for the Palestinian suicide bombingfor the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign that followed. campaign that followed.
~~131~~177 See, See, for example, Hirsh Goodman, “for example, Hirsh Goodman, “~~The~~ T he Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank and Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank and
Eastern Jerusalem,” JerusalemEastern Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2017. Center for Public Affairs, 2017.
132 Neri Zilber, “Israel and Hamas: Negotiating With Rockets and Bombs,” Daily Beast~~, May 31, 2018~~178 Sebastien Roblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gaza War o f May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. For more on . For more on
~~Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
~~133 CRS~~ Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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neutralized to some extent by systematic Israeli efforts, with some financial and technological assistance from the United States.179 Since 2018, some ~~Since 2018, some~~ Palestinians—with reported encouragement fromPalestinians—with reported encouragement from Hamas—have tried to breach fences dividing Hamas—have tried to breach fences dividing
Gaza from Israel,Gaza from Israel, or have used incendiary kitesor have used incendiary kites ~~or balloons~~ or bal oons to set fires to set fires to arable land in southern Israel.to arable land in southern Israel.~~134~~ 180 The The
purpose of these tactics may be to provokepurpose of these tactics may be to provoke ~~Israeli responses~~ Israeli responses that evoke international sympathy for Palestinians that evoke international sympathy for Palestinians
and criticismand criticism of Israel—a dynamic that bolstered Palestinian national aspirations in the late 1980s during the first of Israel—a dynamic that bolstered Palestinian national aspirations in the late 1980s during the first
intifada.intifada.~~135~~181
Isolated attacks Isolated attacks ~~still~~ stil occur within Israeloccur within Israel and the West Bank. Someand the West Bank. Some are perpetrated by Palestinians who are are perpetrated by Palestinians who are
unaffiliated with terroristunaffiliated with terrorist groups and who use groups and who use ~~small arms~~ smal arms or vehiclesor vehicles as weapons. Antipathy between Jewish as weapons. Antipathy between Jewish
settlerssettlers and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on both sides.and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on both sides. Some militantsSome militants have have
staged attacks at or near Gaza border crossingsstaged attacks at or near Gaza border crossings and attempted to capture Israeliand attempted to capture Israeli ~~soldiers~~ soldiers there. there.
Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process. A second Palestinian Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process. A second Palestinian
intifada from 2000 to 2005 was marked by intense terrorist violence inside Israel. In response, intifada from 2000 to 2005 was marked by intense terrorist violence inside Israel. In response,
Israel took actions that it asserted were necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security, rendering Israel took actions that it asserted were necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security, rendering
unusable much of the PA infrastructure built over the preceding decade. During the second unusable much of the PA infrastructure built over the preceding decade. During the second
intifada, U.S.- and intifada, U.S.- and ~~internationally~~international y supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various
auspices failed to gain traction.auspices failed to gain traction.
After Arafat’s death in 2004 and his succession by Mahmoud Abbas, Israel After Arafat’s death in 2004 and his succession by Mahmoud Abbas, Israel ~~unilaterally~~unilateral y withdrew withdrew
its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005. Despite forswearing responsibility for Gaza, its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005. Despite forswearing responsibility for Gaza,
Israel has continued to control most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and even Israel has continued to control most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and even
various buffer zones within the territory. The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined various buffer zones within the territory. The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined
further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006, and its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Having further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006, and its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Having
different Palestinian leaders controlling the West Bank and Gaza since then has complicated the different Palestinian leaders controlling the West Bank and Gaza since then has complicated the
question of who speaks for the Palestinians both question of who speaks for the Palestinians both ~~domestically and internationally (see~~ domestical y and international y (see Appendix
C).

~~134 Mark Landler, “As Violence Flares, Kushner Threatens to Abandon Plan to Rebuild Gaza,” New York Times, July~~
~~23, 2018.~~
~~135 See, for example, Hussein Ibish, “The~~C). 179 CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 180 Mark Landler, “ As Violence Flares, Kushner T hreatens to Abandon Plan to Rebuild Gaza,” New York Times, July 23, 2018. 181 See, for example, Hussein Ibish, “ T he Nonviolent Violence of Hamas,” foreignpolicy.com, April 6, 2018. Nonviolent Violence of Hamas,” foreignpolicy.com, April 6, 2018.
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Appendix C. Palestinian Governance
Achieving effective and transparent governance over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing Achieving effective and transparent governance over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing
Israeli-Palestinian violence has proven elusive for Palestinian leaders since their limitedIsraeli-Palestinian violence has proven elusive for Palestinian leaders since their limited self-rule self-rule
experiment began in 1994. The split established in 2007 between the Abbas-led PA in the West experiment began in 1994. The split established in 2007 between the Abbas-led PA in the West
Bank and Hamas in Gaza exacerbated these difficulties. Bank and Hamas in Gaza exacerbated these difficulties.
Palestinian Authority (PA)
The Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereafter PA) was granted limited The Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereafter PA) was granted limited
rule under Israeli occupational authority in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in the mid-rule under Israeli occupational authority in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in the mid-
1990s, pursuant to the Oslo agreements.1990s, pursuant to the Oslo agreements.~~136~~182 One of the PLO’s options is to restructure or dissolve One of the PLO’s options is to restructure or dissolve
the PA (either in concert with Israel or the PA (either in concert with Israel or ~~unilaterally~~unilateral y) pursuant to the ) pursuant to the ~~claim~~c laim that the PA is a that the PA is a
constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel.constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel.~~137~~
183 Although not a state, the PA is organized like one—complete with executive, legislative, and Although not a state, the PA is organized like one—complete with executive, legislative, and
judicialjudicial organs of governance, as organs of governance, as ~~well~~ wel as security forces. as security forces. ~~Ramallah~~Ramal ah is its de facto seat, but is not is its de facto seat, but is not
considered to be the PA capital because of Palestinian politicalconsidered to be the PA capital because of Palestinian political consensus that Jerusalem (or at consensus that Jerusalem (or at
least the part east of the 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, or “Green Line”) should be the least the part east of the 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, or “Green Line”) should be the
capital of a Palestinian state. capital of a Palestinian state.
The executive branch has both a president and a prime minister-led cabinet, and the Palestinian The executive branch has both a president and a prime minister-led cabinet, and the Palestinian
LegislativeLegislative Council (PLC) is the PA’s legislature (sidelined since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in Council (PLC) is the PA’s legislature (sidelined since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in
2007). The judicial branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle 2007). The judicial branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle
controversies regarding Palestinian basic lawcontroversies regarding Palestinian basic law~~. There are also~~, and also includes a High Judicial Council and separate a High Judicial Council and separate
~~security courts~~security courts. As mentioned above, President Abbas created and appointed justices to a new Constitutional Court in 2016. The electoral base of the PA is composed of Palestinians from . The electoral base of the PA is composed of Palestinians from the West Bank, the West Bank,
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
Leadership succession within the PA after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office could present Hamas Leadership succession within the PA after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office could present Hamas
with opportunities to increase its influence, with opportunities to increase its influence, ~~especially~~especial y if the process does not definitively if the process does not definitively
concentrate power around one or more non-Hamas figures. Though Hamas members have not run concentrate power around one or more non-Hamas figures. Though Hamas members have not run
in past presidential elections, one or more could in past presidential elections, one or more could ~~potentially~~potential y run in future elections. run in future elections.
Under Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic Law, Under Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic Law,~~138~~184 it appears that if Abbas were to leave office, the it appears that if Abbas were to leave office, the
speaker of the Palestinian Legislativespeaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (currently Aziz Dweik, a member of Hamas) would Council (currently Aziz Dweik, a member of Hamas) would
take over duties as president for a period not to exceed 60 days, by which time elections for a take over duties as president for a period not to exceed 60 days, by which time elections for a
more permanent successor are supposed to take place. more permanent successor are supposed to take place.
Succession to the PA presidency could be determined by elections or under the Palestinian Basic Succession to the PA presidency could be determined by elections or under the Palestinian Basic
Law. Abbas’s term of office was supposed to be four years, with a new round of elections initially Law. Abbas’s term of office was supposed to be four years, with a new round of elections initially
planned for 2009 that would have planned for 2009 that would have ~~allowed~~al owed Abbas to run for a second and final term. However, the Abbas to run for a second and final term. However, the
split between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza has indefinitely postponed split between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza has indefinitely postponed
PA elections, with the last presidential election having taken place in 2005 and the last legislative PA elections, with the last presidential election having taken place in 2005 and the last legislative
~~election in 2006. In December 2009, the PLO’s Central Council voted to extend the terms of both~~

~~136 The~~ 182 T he relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the
GazaGaza Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gazaand the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995. Strip, dated September 28, 1995.
~~137 The~~183 T he PA was PA was originally intended to be a temporary, transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for originally intended to be a temporary, transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for
final-status negotiations, not an indefinite administrative authority. final-status negotiations, not an indefinite administrative authority.
~~138 The~~184 T he Palestinian Basic Law Palestinian Basic Law is the set of lawsis the set of laws that govern the PA. that govern the PA. ~~The~~T he Palestinian Legislative Council originally Palestinian Legislative Council originally
passedpassed it in 1997, and PA President Yasser Arafat ratified it in 2002. Some amendments have occurred since.it in 1997, and PA President Yasser Arafat ratified it in 2002. Some amendments have occurred since.
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election in 2006. In December 2009, the PLO’s Central Council voted to extend the terms of both Abbas and the current PLC until elections can be held. This precedent could lead to PLO action in Abbas and the current PLC until elections can be held. This precedent could lead to PLO action in
selecting or attempting to select a successor to Abbas as PA president. selecting or attempting to select a successor to Abbas as PA president.
West Bank
The PA administers densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank subject to supervening The PA administers densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank subject to supervening
Israeli control under the Oslo agreementsIsraeli control under the Oslo agreements ~~(see~~ (see Figure 1 for map).for map).~~139~~185 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots. soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots.
They maintain permanent posts throughout the West Bank and along the West Bank’s They maintain permanent posts throughout the West Bank and along the West Bank’s
administrative borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers and broader security administrative borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers and broader security
interests. The IDF sometimes takes measures that involve the expropriation of West Bank land or interests. The IDF sometimes takes measures that involve the expropriation of West Bank land or
dispossession of Palestinians from their homes and communities. dispossession of Palestinians from their homes and communities.
Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities ~~generally~~general y takes place discreetly, given the takes place discreetly, given the
political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. In 2002, at political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. In 2002, at
the height of the second intifada, Israel demonstrated its ability to reoccupy PA-controlled areas the height of the second intifada, Israel demonstrated its ability to reoccupy PA-controlled areas
of the West Bank in what it of the West Bank in what it ~~called~~cal ed Operation Defensive Shield. The IDF demolished many official Operation Defensive Shield. The IDF demolished many official
PA buildings, Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure.PA buildings, Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure.~~140~~
~~Since 2007, when the West Bank-Gaza split took place and Western efforts to bolster PA security~~
~~forces in the West Bank resumed, some observers have noted signs of progress with PA security~~
~~capabilities and West Bank economic development.141 It is less clear whether the progress they~~
~~cite can be self-sustaining absent a broader political solution with Israel.~~
186 Gaza
Hamas’s security control of Gaza ( Hamas’s security control of Gaza (~~see~~see Figure 2 for map) presents a conundrum for the Abbas-led for map) presents a conundrum for the Abbas-led
PA, Israel, and the internationalPA, Israel, and the international community. They have been unable to establish a durable community. They have been unable to establish a durable
political-security framework for Gaza that assists Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas. political-security framework for Gaza that assists Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas.
For more information, see For more information, see “Gaza’s ~~Challenges.”~~Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
Hamas’s preeminence in Gaza can be traced to 2006-2007. After victory in the 2006 PA Hamas’s preeminence in Gaza can be traced to 2006-2007. After victory in the 2006 PA
legislativelegislative elections, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza—while losing it in the West Bank—elections, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza—while losing it in the West Bank—
through violent struggle with Fatah in June 2007. Hamas’s security forces have maintained power through violent struggle with Fatah in June 2007. Hamas’s security forces have maintained power
in Gaza ever since, even after its de facto government relinquished nominal responsibility to the in Gaza ever since, even after its de facto government relinquished nominal responsibility to the
PA in June 2014.PA in June 2014.
The State Department and some NGOs have raised concerns about possible Hamas violations of the rule of law and civil liberties.187 Since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian authorities have maintained strict Since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian authorities have maintained strict
control over Gaza’s border crossings.control over Gaza’s border crossings.~~142~~188 Israel justifies the restrictions it imposes as a way to deny Israel justifies the restrictions it imposes as a way to deny

~~139 The~~ Hamas materials to reconstitute its military capabilities. However, the restrictions also limit 185 T he two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) the Israeli-Palestinian Interim the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995; and (2) the Protocol Concerning the Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995; and (2) the Protocol Concerning the
Redeployment in Hebron, datedRedeployment in Hebron, dated January 17, 1997January 17, 1997 . East Jerusalem is. East Jerusalem is ~~excluded~~ excluded from these agreements, as Israel has from these agreements, as Israel has
effectively annexed it. effectively annexed it.
~~140~~186 Anna Ahronheim, “Fifteen years after Op. Defensive Shield, situation on the ground completely different,” Anna Ahronheim, “Fifteen years after Op. Defensive Shield, situation on the ground completely different,”
jpost.com, April 24, 2017. jpost.com, April 24, 2017.
~~141 See, for example, Neri Zilber and Ghaith al-Omari,~~ ~~State with No Army, Army with No State: Evolution of the~~
~~Palestinian Authority Security Forces: 1994-2018, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2018.~~
~~142~~187 State Department, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza; Amnesty International, Palestine (State of) 2020/21. 188 In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S.an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S. and European and European
Union participation in the travel and commerce regime that was supposedUnion participation in the travel and commerce regime that was supposed to emerge postto emerge post -Gaza disengagement,-Gaza disengagement, but this but this
agreement wasagreement was never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure
regime wasregime was further formalized when Israel declaredfurther formalized when Israel declared ~~Gaza~~ Gaza to be a “hostile entity.” Depending on circumstances since to be a “hostile entity.” Depending on circumstances since
then, Israel has eased and re-tightened restrictions on various imports and exports. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of then, Israel has eased and re-tightened restrictions on various imports and exports. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of
Movement, Gaza Up Close, September 1, 2021. Widespread unemployment and poverty persist. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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~~Hamas materials to reconstitute its military capabilities. However, the restrictions also limit~~
commerce, affect the entire economy, and delay humanitarian assistance.commerce, affect the entire economy, and delay humanitarian assistance.~~143~~189 For several years, For several years,
Hamas compensated somewhat for these restrictions by routinely smuggling goods into Gaza Hamas compensated somewhat for these restrictions by routinely smuggling goods into Gaza
from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula through a network of tunnels. However, after Egypt’s military from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula through a network of tunnels. However, after Egypt’s military
regained political control in July 2013, it disrupted the tunnel system.regained political control in July 2013, it disrupted the tunnel system.
Observers routinely voice concerns that if current arrangements continue, the dispiriting living Observers routinely voice concerns that if current arrangements continue, the dispiriting living
conditions that have persisted since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could feed radicalization within conditions that have persisted since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could feed radicalization within
Gaza and pressure its leaders to increase violence against Israel for political ends.Gaza and pressure its leaders to increase violence against Israel for political ends.~~144~~190 Israel Israel
disputes the level of legal responsibility for Gaza’s residents that some international actors claim disputes the level of legal responsibility for Gaza’s residents that some international actors claim
it retains—given its continued control of most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and it retains—given its continued control of most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and
various buffer zones within the territory. various buffer zones within the territory.
Within limited parameters amid Gaza’s political uncertainties and access restrictions, UNRWA Within limited parameters amid Gaza’s political uncertainties and access restrictions, UNRWA
and other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations take care of many and other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations take care of many
Gazans’ day-to-day humanitarian needs. These groups play significant roles in providing various Gazans’ day-to-day humanitarian needs. These groups play significant roles in providing various
forms of assistance and trying to facilitate reconstruction from previous conflicts. For more forms of assistance and trying to facilitate reconstruction from previous conflicts. For more
information on Palestinian refugees, seinformation on Palestinian refugees, see Appendix A.

~~Movement, Gaza Up Close, September 1, 2020. Widespread unemployment and poverty persist.~~
~~143~~ 189 World Bank, World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 2, 2020, p. 24. , June 2, 2020, p. 24.
~~144~~190 U.N. OCHA-oPt, U.N. OCHA-oPt, Humanitarian Needs Overview OPT 2021, December 2020. , December 2020.
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Appendix D. Palestinian Economy
The economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip faces structural difficulties—with Gaza’s real per The economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip faces structural difficulties—with Gaza’s real per
capita income about half that of the West Bank’s.capita income about half that of the West Bank’s.~~145~~191 Palestinians’ livelihoods Palestinians’ livelihoods largely depend on largely depend on
their ties to Israel’s relatively strong economy. Israel is the market for about 84% of West their ties to Israel’s relatively strong economy. Israel is the market for about 84% of West
Bank/Gaza exports, and the source for about 56% of West Bank/Gaza imports.Bank/Gaza exports, and the source for about 56% of West Bank/Gaza imports.~~146~~192 Palestinians are Palestinians are
constrained from developing other external ties because of the layers of control that Israel has put constrained from developing other external ties because of the layers of control that Israel has put
in place to enforce security. ~~in place to enforce security. The Coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) pandemic and its impact~~
~~on economic and social activity has exacerbated these difficulties for the West Bank and Gaza.147~~
Because the PA has been unable to become self-sufficient, it has been acutely dependent on Because the PA has been unable to become self-sufficient, it has been acutely dependent on
foreign assistance. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of over $1 foreign assistance. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of over $1 ~~billion (and more than~~
~~double~~bil ion (and wel beyond that ~~that~~ amount for 2020 amount for 2020 and 2021 given COVID-19), PA officials have given COVID-19), PA officials have ~~traditionally~~ traditional y sought aid from sought aid from
international sources to meet the PA’s financial commitments (international sources to meet the PA’s financial commitments (~~see~~see Figure D-1).~~148 Part of the~~
~~problem is a PA~~ As of August 2021, external donor funding for the calendar year (including from Arab states and European governments) was at a historical y low level of $100 mil ion.193 Part of the PA’s financial problems stem from a payroll that has become increasingly bloated over the PA’s 27-year existence. payroll that has become increasingly bloated over the PA’s 27-year existence.
Domestic corruption and inefficiency also appear to pose difficulties.Domestic corruption and inefficiency also appear to pose difficulties.~~149~~194 Absent fundamental Absent fundamental
changes in revenue and expenses, the PA’s fiscal dependence changes in revenue and expenses, the PA’s fiscal dependence on external sources is likely to on external sources is likely to
~~continue.~~

~~145~~continue. 191 World Bank, World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, March 19, 2018, pp. 22-23. , March 19, 2018, pp. 22-23.
~~146~~192 Economist Intelligence Unit, Palestine Country Report (accessed March 12, 2021), based on 2019 figures. Economist Intelligence Unit, Palestine Country Report (accessed March 12, 2021), based on 2019 figures.
~~147 World Bank, February 23, 2021.~~
~~148~~193 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php. Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php.
~~149~~194 See, See, e.g., Elliott Abrams, “Corruption in the Palestinian Authority,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 5, 2018. e.g., Elliott Abrams, “Corruption in the Palestinian Authority,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 5, 2018.
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Figure D-1. International Donor Funding to the Palestinian Authority

Source: Hugh Lovatt, “The end of Oslo:Hugh Lovatt, “The end of Oslo: A new European strategy on Israel-Palestine,”A new European strategy on Israel-Palestine,” European Council on European Council on
Foreign Relations,Foreign Relations, ~~December~~ December 9, 2020. 9, 2020.
Lacking sufficient private sector employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, many Lacking sufficient private sector employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, many
Palestinians have Palestinians have ~~historically~~historical y depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their jobs and depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their jobs and
goods. Yet, the second intifada that began in 2000 reduced this access considerably. Israel goods. Yet, the second intifada that began in 2000 reduced this access considerably. Israel
constructed a West Bank separation barrier and increased security at crossing points, and constructed a West Bank separation barrier and increased security at crossing points, and
~~unilaterally~~ unilateral y “disengaged” (withdrew its settlements and official military contingent) from Gaza in “disengaged” (withdrew its settlements and official military contingent) from Gaza in
2005. Israel now issues permits to control access. Its security forces significantly limit the flow of 2005. Israel now issues permits to control access. Its security forces significantly limit the flow of
people and goods to flow between Israel and Gaza, while people and goods to flow between Israel and Gaza, while ~~periodically~~ periodical y halting these flows halting these flows
between Israel and the West Bank. between Israel and the West Bank.
The Palestinians’ alternatives to functional dependence on Israel’s economy includeThe Palestinians’ alternatives to functional dependence on Israel’s economy include
 attracting investment and building a self-sufficient economy;  attracting investment and building a self-sufficient economy;
 looking to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own political  looking to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own political
and economic problems) for economic integration; or and economic problems) for economic integration; or
 depending indefinitely  depending indefinitely on external assistance. on external assistance.
For the West Bank and Gaza to attract enough long-term investment to become more self- For the West Bank and Gaza to attract enough long-term investment to become more self-
sufficient, most observers agree that uncertainties regarding the political and security situation sufficient, most observers agree that uncertainties regarding the political and security situation
and Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital would need to be and Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital would need to be
significantly reduced.significantly reduced.~~150~~195 Such changes may be untenable absent an Such changes may be untenable absent an ~~overall~~ overal resolution of Israeli-resolution of Israeli-
Palestinian disputes. In the meantime, donors and lenders Palestinian disputes. In the meantime, donors and lenders ~~occasionally~~occasional y provide emergency provide emergency
funding to stave off fiscal crisis.funding to stave off fiscal crisis.

~~150~~ 195 World Bank, June 2, 2020. World Bank, June 2, 2020.
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Appendix E. Palestinian Initiatives in International
Fora
The PLO has pursued a number of international initiatives—opposed by the United States and The PLO has pursued a number of international initiatives—opposed by the United States and
Israel—that are part of a broader effort to obtain greater international recognition of Palestinian Israel—that are part of a broader effort to obtain greater international recognition of Palestinian
statehood. Some statehood. Some ~~137~~139 out of 193 U.N. member states reportedly have out of 193 U.N. member states reportedly have ~~formally~~formal y recognized the recognized the
state of Palestine that the PLO declared in 1988.state of Palestine that the PLO declared in 1988.196 ~~These do not include the most politically and~~
~~economically influential Western countries.~~
The PLO’s international initiatives The PLO’s international initiatives are centered on the United Nations. In September 2011, PLO are centered on the United Nations. In September 2011, PLO
Chairman Abbas applied for Palestinian membership in the United Nations. Chairman Abbas applied for Palestinian membership in the United Nations. ~~Officially~~Official y, the , the
application remains pending in the Security Council’s membership committee, whose members application remains pending in the Security Council’s membership committee, whose members
did not achieve consensus during 2011 deliberations.did not achieve consensus during 2011 deliberations.~~151~~197 The application for Palestinian The application for Palestinian
membership would likely face a U.S. veto if it came to a future vote in the Security Council. In membership would likely face a U.S. veto if it came to a future vote in the Security Council. In
~~fall~~ fal 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).Organization (UNESCO).~~152~~
198 Under U.S. laws passed in 1990 and 1994, Under U.S. laws passed in 1990 and 1994,~~153~~199 Palestinian admission to membership in UNESCO Palestinian admission to membership in UNESCO
in 2011 triggered the withholding of U.S. assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the in 2011 triggered the withholding of U.S. assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the
organization. If the Palestinians were to obtain membership in other U.N. entities, the 1990 and organization. If the Palestinians were to obtain membership in other U.N. entities, the 1990 and
1994 U.S. laws might trigger withholdings of U.S. financial contributions to these entities.1994 U.S. laws might trigger withholdings of U.S. financial contributions to these entities.~~154~~200
Such withholdings could adversely affect these entities’ budgets and complicate the conduct of Such withholdings could adversely affect these entities’ budgets and complicate the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy within the U.N. system and other multilateral settings. U.S. foreign policy within the U.N. system and other multilateral settings.
The following are The following are some other significant steps for the PLO in international fora: some other significant steps for the PLO in international fora:
~~ On November 29, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19.~~
~~The resolution changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO~~
~~(recognized before as “Palestine” and now as “State of Palestine” within the U.N.~~
~~system) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”155~~

~~151 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Committee on the Admission of New~~ 196 A list from the PLO’s observer mission to the United Nations is available at https://palestineun.org/about -palestine/diplomatic-relations/. It does not include the United States, Canada, Japan, or most Western European countries, but does include China, India, and Russia. 197 United Nations Security Council, “ Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the Members concerning the
application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,” S/2011/705, November 11, 2011. application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,” S/2011/705, November 11, 2011.
Paragraph 19 of this report provides a summary of the varying views that committee members advanced Paragraph 19 of this report provides a summary of the varying views that committee members advanced ~~regarding~~r egarding
Palestinian membership: “Palestinian membership: “~~The~~ T he view was view was expressed that the Committee should recommend to the Council that Palestine expressed that the Committee should recommend to the Council that Palestine
be admitted to membership in the United Nations. A different view wasbe admitted to membership in the United Nations. A different view was expressed that the membership application expressed that the membership application
couldcould not be supported at this time and an abstention was envisagednot be supported at this time and an abstention was envisaged in the event of a vote. Yet another view expressed in the event of a vote. Yet another view expressed
waswas that there were seriousthat there were serious questions about the application, questions about the application, ~~that~~t hat the applicant did not meet the applicant did not meet ~~the~~t he requirements for requirements for
membership and that a favourable membership and that a favourable ~~recommendation~~recommendat ion to the General Assembly would to the General Assembly would not be supported.” not be supported.”
~~152~~198 For more information, see CRS For more information, see CRS Report R42999, Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), by Luisa, by Luisa Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne. Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne.
~~153~~199 P.L. 101-246 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991) and P.L. 103-236 (Foreign P.L. 101-246 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991) and P.L. 103-236 (Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995). Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995).
~~154~~200 In May 2018, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but In May 2018, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but
~~there are no~~without consequences consequences under U.S.under U.S. ~~law because~~ law because the United States isthe United States is not a member of or donor to UNIDO. not a member of or donor to UNIDO.
~~155 The PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. Following the adoption of~~Congressional Research Service 50 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations  On November 29, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution Resolution
~~67/19, the “State of Palestine” maintains many of the capacities it had as an observer entity—including participation in~~
~~General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on~~
~~Palestinian and Middle East issues. Despite its designation as a state, the “State of Palestine” is not a member of the~~
~~United Nations, and therefore does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly on~~
~~resolutions. However, in November 2013, the “State of Palestine” participated in the balloting for a judge for the~~
~~International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 13, Section 2(d) of the Statute for the Tribunal (Annex to~~
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~~ In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate~~
~~Change (UNFCCC).156 Some Members of Congress called for U.S. funding of~~
~~UNFCCC to be cut off under the 1994 law,157 but the State Department replied~~
~~that no cutoff was required because UNFCCC is a treaty and the Palestinians had~~
~~not joined an international organization.158~~
~~ In September~~ 67/19. The resolution changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (recognized before as “Palestine” and now as “State of Palestine” within the U.N. system) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”201  In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).202  In 2017, the Palestinians obtained membership in Interpol. 2017, the Palestinians obtained membership in Interpol.
~~In May~~ In 2018, the Palestinians applied to join the U.N. Conference on Trade and 2018, the Palestinians applied to join the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development Development
(UNCTAD)(UNCTAD)~~159~~203 and deposited an instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and deposited an instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention
~~(CWC) with the U.N. Secretary General.160 A U.S. official was quoted as saying that the Trump~~
~~Administration would “review the application of US legislative restrictions related to Palestinian~~
~~membership in certain UN agencies and organizations,” presumably referring to both UNCTAD~~
~~and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (which implements the CWC).161~~
~~No specific U.S. action has been announced to date.~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Jim Zanotti~~

~~Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~U.N. Doc. S/25704, adopted pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), as subsequently amended)~~
~~includes “non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters” in the~~
~~election of the tribunal’s judges.~~
~~156 UNFCCC website, State of Palestine Joins Convention, March 15, 2016.~~
~~157 Timothy Cama, “GOP targets UN climate agency funding over Palestine,” The Hill, April 18, 2016.~~
~~158 Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield, partially quoted in Patrick~~
~~Goodenough, “State Dept.--Ignoring Law--Won't Defund U.N. Climate Agency for Admitting ‘State of Palestine,’”~~
~~CNS News, April 28, 2016.~~
~~159 UNCTAD website, State of Palestine expresses intent to join UNCTAD, May 24, 2018.~~
~~160 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) website, State of Palestine Accedes to the Chemical~~
~~Weapons Convention, May 23, 2018. The OPCW later announced that the “State of Palestine” had become a State~~
~~Party to the CWC and an OPCW Member State. OPCW website, State of Palestine Joins the Organisation for the~~
~~Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 21, 2018.~~
~~161 “US weighs UN funding cuts after Palestinians join agencies,” Agence France Presse, May 23, 2018. Also in May,~~
~~the Palestinians acceded to the constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but because the~~
~~United States does not belong to or fund UNIDO, it does not present an issue under the 1990 or 1994 law.~~
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~~Disclaimer~~
~~This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan~~
~~shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and~~
~~under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other~~
~~than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in~~
~~connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not~~
~~subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in~~
~~its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or~~
~~material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to~~
~~copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~
~~RL34074 · VERSION 48 · UPDATED~~
42(CWC) with the U.N. Secretary General.204 Author Information Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 201 T he PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. Following the adoption of Resolution 67/19, the “State of Palestine” maintains many of the capacities it had as an observ er entity—including participation in General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Despite its designation as a state, the “State of Palestine” is not a member of the United Nations, and therefore does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly on resolutions. However, in November 2013, the “State of Palestine” participated in the balloting for a judge for the International T ribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 13, Section 2(d) of the Statute for the T ribunal (Annex to U.N. Doc. S/25704, adopted pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), as subsequently amended) includes “non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters” in the election of the tribunal’s judges. 202 UNFCCC website, State of Palestine Joins Convention, March 15, 2016. 203 UNCT AD website, State of Palestine expresses intent to join UNCT AD, May 24, 2018. 204 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) website, State of Palestine Accedes to the Chemical Weapons Convention, May 23, 2018. T he OPCW later announced that the “State of Palestine” had become a State Party to the CWC and an OPCW Member State. OPCW website, State of Palestine Joins the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 21, 2018. Congressional Research Service RL34074 · VERSION 52 · UPDATED 51