Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress

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Joint All-Domain Command and Control:
~~March 18~~May 24, 2021 , 2021
Background and Issues for Congress
John R. Hoehn
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of
Analyst in Military Analyst in Military
its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the
Capabilities and Programs Capabilities and Programs
department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of

the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is
DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine

Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network.
DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two
different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines
the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic
would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to
work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new
communications methods. communications methods.
Several agencies and organizations within DOD are involved in JADC2-related efforts. The following list highlights selected Several agencies and organizations within DOD are involved in JADC2-related efforts. The following list highlights selected
organizations and projects associated with JADC2 development: organizations and projects associated with JADC2 development:
  DOD Chief Information Officer: Fifth Generation (5G) Information Communications Technologies. Fifth Generation (5G) Information Communications Technologies.
  Office of the Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering): Fully Networked Command, Control, and Fully Networked Command, Control, and
Communications (FNC3). Communications (FNC3).
  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: Mosaic Warfare. Mosaic Warfare.
  Air Force: Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS).
  Army: Project Convergence. Project Convergence.
  Navy: Project Overmatch. Project Overmatch.
As DOD develops new methods to command and control military forces, Congress may consider several potential issues: As DOD develops new methods to command and control military forces, Congress may consider several potential issues:
 How can Congress consider JADC2-related activities in advance of validated requirements or cost  How can Congress consider JADC2-related activities in advance of validated requirements or cost
estimates? estimates?
 How can DOD ensure interoperability among each of the military services’ and allies’ communications  How can DOD ensure interoperability among each of the military services’ and allies’ communications
systems? systems?
 How should DOD prioritize competing communications requirements for its future network?  How should DOD prioritize competing communications requirements for its future network?
 What role will artificial intelligence play in future command and control decisionmaking systems?  What role will artificial intelligence play in future command and control decisionmaking systems?
 What potential force structure changes will be necessary to meet JADC2 requirements?  What potential force structure changes will be necessary to meet JADC2 requirements?
 How should DOD manage JADC2-related efforts?  How should DOD manage JADC2-related efforts?

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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 22 21

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Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress

What Is JADC2?1
Joint Joint Al All-Domain-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Command and Control (JADC2) is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)
concept to connect sensors from concept to connect sensors from al all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps,
Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. ~~Traditional y~~Traditionally, each of the military services , each of the military services
developed its own tactical network, which was incompatible with those of other services (e.g., developed its own tactical network, which was incompatible with those of other services (e.g.,
Army networks were unable to interface with Navy or Air Force networks). With JADC2, DOD Army networks were unable to interface with Navy or Air Force networks). With JADC2, DOD
envisions creating an “internet of things” network that would connect numerous sensors with envisions creating an “internet of things” network that would connect numerous sensors with
weapons systems, using artificial weapons systems, using artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence algorithms to help improve decisionmaking.2 algorithms to help improve decisionmaking.2
DOD officials have argued that future conflicts may require leaders to make decisions within DOD officials have argued that future conflicts may require leaders to make decisions within
hours, minutes, or hours, minutes, or ~~potential y~~potentially seconds, compared with the current multiday process for analyzing seconds, compared with the current multiday process for analyzing
the operating environment and issuing commands.3 The unclassified summary of the National the operating environment and issuing commands.3 The unclassified summary of the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission’s report states that current C2 systems have “deteriorated” Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission’s report states that current C2 systems have “deteriorated”
against potential peer competitors.4 Similarly, the NDS identifies command and control systems against potential peer competitors.4 Similarly, the NDS identifies command and control systems
as a modernization priority.5 Congress may be interested in the JADC2 concept because it is as a modernization priority.5 Congress may be interested in the JADC2 concept because it is
being used to develop many high-profile procurement programs, as being used to develop many high-profile procurement programs, as ~~wel~~ well as determining how as determining how
effective and competitive the U.S. military could be against potential adversaries. effective and competitive the U.S. military could be against potential adversaries.
Figure 1. Conceptual Vision of JADC2

Source: https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/ew-c4i-channel/7334-saic-and-usaf-partner-for-jadc2.html. https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/ew-c4i-channel/7334-saic-and-usaf-partner-for-jadc2.html.

1 For a summary of JADC2 see1 For a summary of JADC2 see ~~CRS~~ CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11493, IF11493, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), by John R. , by John R.
Hoehn. Hoehn.
2 Jim Garamone, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” 2 Jim Garamone, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” DOD News,, November November
30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint -all-domain-command-control--all-domain-command-control-
framework-belongs-to-warfighters/. For a broader discussionframework-belongs-to-warfighters/. For a broader discussion of DOD’s efforts for Artificial Intelligence, see CRS of DOD’s efforts for Artificial Intelligence, see CRS
Report R45178, Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. , by Kelley M. Sayler.
3 For example, according to joint operational doctrine, military commanders plan air operations between 72 and 96 3 For example, according to joint operational doctrine, military commanders plan air operations between 72 and 96
hours in advance. Seehours in advance. See Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Joint Air Operations, JP 3-30, Washington, JP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019, DC, July 25, 2019,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
4 See4 See Gary Roughead,Gary Roughead, Eric Edelman, et al., Eric Edelman, et al., Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy
~~Com m ission, The Assessm ent and Recom m endations~~Commission, The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy ~~Com m ission~~Commission, 2018 , p. 25, , p. 25,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
5 James Mattis, 5 James Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, Department of Defense, January 2018, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/, Department of Defense, January 2018, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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JADC2 envisions providing a cloud-like environment for the joint force to share JADC2 envisions providing a cloud-like environment for the joint force to share ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance~~intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to , and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to
enable faster decisionmaking (enable faster decisionmaking (seesee Figure 1).6 JADC2 intends to help commanders make better 6 JADC2 intends to help commanders make better
decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial
~~intel igence~~ intelligence algorithms to identify targets, and then recommending the optimal weapon—both algorithms to identify targets, and then recommending the optimal weapon—both
kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to engage the target. kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to engage the target.
DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end-state for DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end-state for
JADC2.7 Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the JADC2.7 Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the
respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance,
travel time, and passengers (among other variables). The application then provides directions for travel time, and passengers (among other variables). The application then provides directions for
drivers to follow to deliver passengers to their destination. Uber relies on drivers to follow to deliver passengers to their destination. Uber relies on ~~cel ular~~cellular and Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi
networks to transmit data to match riders and provide driving instructions. networks to transmit data to match riders and provide driving instructions.
Some analysts take a more skeptical approach to JADC2. They raise questions about its technical Some analysts take a more skeptical approach to JADC2. They raise questions about its technical
maturity and affordability, and whether it is possible to field a network that can securely and maturity and affordability, and whether it is possible to field a network that can securely and
reliably connect sensors to shooters and support command and control in a lethal, electronic reliably connect sensors to shooters and support command and control in a lethal, electronic
warfare-rich environment.8 Analysts also ask who would have decisionmaking authority across warfare-rich environment.8 Analysts also ask who would have decisionmaking authority across
domains, given that, domains, given that, ~~traditional y~~traditionally, command authorities are delegated within each domain rather , command authorities are delegated within each domain rather
than from an than from an ~~overal~~ overall campaign perspective.9 Some also question how much a human would be campaign perspective.9 Some also question how much a human would be
needed for JADC2 to make decisions in real time, and whether it is appropriate to reduce the needed for JADC2 to make decisions in real time, and whether it is appropriate to reduce the
amount of human involvement in military-related decisions. amount of human involvement in military-related decisions.
What Is Command and Control:
Dimensionality of C2 and Implications of Artificial Intelligence
One can view command and control through the context of the five questions: who, what, when, where, and how. One can view command and control through the context of the five questions: who, what, when, where, and how.
~~Traditional y,~~ Traditionally, Congress has focused on command and control through two different, yet related issues:Congress has focused on command and control through two different, yet related issues: authorities authorities
(the “who”) versus technology (the “how”). The first issue that Congress(the “who”) versus technology (the “how”). The first issue that Congress ~~has traditional y~~ has traditionally focused on reflects the focused on reflects the
authority a commander has to execute an operation.10 This lineauthority a commander has to execute an operation.10 This line of discussion focuses on the chain of command, of discussion focuses on the chain of command,
reflecting the differencesreflecting the differences between the militarybetween the military services—chargedservices—charged with organizing, training, and equipping U.S. with organizing, training, and equipping U.S.
forces—and the combatant commands, who have the authority to employ forcesforces—and the combatant commands, who have the authority to employ forces abroad. This issue can be abroad. This issue can be
summarizedsummarized by the question: “who commands forces?” by the question: “who commands forces?”
The second issueThe second issue represents the technical aspects that enable commandersrepresents the technical aspects that enable commanders to maketo make these decisionsthese decisions and transmit and transmit
them to the field. Termsthem to the field. Terms ~~like~~ like command, control, communications (C3), (C3), C3 plus computers (C4), and (C4), and ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance,~~ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) enter the discussion.11 This technical issue of command and control looks(ISR) enter the discussion.11 This technical issue of command and control looks at at
the data (and method of the data (and method of ~~col ection)~~ collection) that commandersthat commanders use to makeuse to make decisions (i.e.,decisions (i.e., ISR is the data to enable ISR is the data to enable
decisionmaking),decisionmaking), the processing power to transform data into information,the processing power to transform data into information, and the systemsand the systems ~~that enable~~

that enable 6 Sydney J. Freedberg6 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “BuildingJr., “Building JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2021, , January 13, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/.
7 Rachel S.7 Rachel S. Cohen, “Want to Understand MDC2? Cohen, “Want to Understand MDC2? ~~T hink~~Think About Uber, USAF About Uber, USAF Official Says,”Official Says,” Air Force Magazine, ,
September 23, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/wantSeptember 23, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/want -to-understand-mdc2-think-about-uber-usaf-official-says/. -to-understand-mdc2-think-about-uber-usaf-official-says/.
8 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built 8 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built ~~T o Fight T he~~To Fight The Wrong War,” Wrong War,” Breaking Defense, January 14, 2021, , January 14, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/.
9 See9 See Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Joint Operations, JP 3-0, Washington, DC, January 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1 , JP 3-0, Washington, DC, January 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1
October 22, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-October 22, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-
910. 910.
10 For more information, see CRS 10 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10542, IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, by , by
Kathleen J. McInnis. Kathleen J. McInnis.
11 For detailed 11 For detailed definitions of each of these terms, see Department of Defense, definitions of each of these terms, see Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated ~~Term s~~Terms, Washington, DC, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. , Washington, DC, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
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commanders commanders to communicate their decisionsto communicate their decisions ~~to geographical y~~ to geographically distributed forces. distributed forces. This technical approach to This technical approach to
command and control can be summarizedcommand and control can be summarized as, “how do you command forces?” as, “how do you command forces?”
Other dynamics of command and control answer other questions: which systemsOther dynamics of command and control answer other questions: which systems and units are being commanded and units are being commanded
(what), the temporal(what), the temporal aspect (when), and geography (where).aspect (when), and geography (where). Congress has Congress has ~~historical y~~ historically expressed interestexpressed interest in each in each
of these questions in the context of specific, rather than general, issues.of these questions in the context of specific, rather than general, issues. ~~For~~ For example, rather than considering example, rather than considering
general purpose forces,general purpose forces, Congress has focused on issuesCongress has focused on issues regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with
special operations.12special operations.12 Command and control topics associated with quick response to nuclear and cyber Command and control topics associated with quick response to nuclear and cyber
operations,13 and to a limitedoperations,13 and to a limited extent in terms of electromagneticextent in terms of electromagnetic spectrum operations,14 have been other areas spectrum operations,14 have been other areas
where the issue of timelinesswhere the issue of timeliness has drawn congressionalhas drawn congressional attention. attention.
Regarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interestRegarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interest in command and control associated with quick response in command and control associated with quick response
to nuclear and cyber operations,15to nuclear and cyber operations,15 and to a limitedand to a limited extent in termsextent in terms of electromagneticof electromagnetic spectrum operations.16 spectrum operations.16
However,However, the greatest sensitivity on “when” appears to be morethe greatest sensitivity on “when” appears to be more ~~tactical y~~ tactically focused (e.g., when to have aircraft on focused (e.g., when to have aircraft on
target, when an assault on a building should begin); these decisionstarget, when an assault on a building should begin); these decisions are often delegated to commanders.are often delegated to commanders. ~~Final y,~~ Finally, the the
geographic component presents unique geographic component presents unique ~~chal enges~~challenges for commanding U.S. forces; as long as both the executive for commanding U.S. forces; as long as both the executive
branch and Congressbranch and Congress continue to support a global national security strategy,17 geographic decisions largely continue to support a global national security strategy,17 geographic decisions largely
representrepresent tactical issues that are often delegated to individual commanders. tactical issues that are often delegated to individual commanders.

12 For more information, see CRS12 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10521, IF10521, Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, by , by
Amy F. Woolf, and CRSAmy F. Woolf, and CRS Report RS21048, Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for
Congress, by Andrew, by Andrew ~~Feickert .~~
Feickert. 13 For more 13 For more ~~informat ion~~information, see CRS, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10537, IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by, by Catherine A. Catherine A.
~~T heohary~~Theohary. .
14 Some analysts argue 14 Some analysts argue that spectrum management decisions willthat spectrum management decisions will ~~require~~ require increased speed to maintain communications increased speed to maintain communications
networks. networks. ~~T he~~The presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will require splitrequire split -second decisions to -second decisions to
allowallow bursts of communications to forces. bursts of communications to forces.
15 For more information, see CRS 15 For more information, see CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10537, IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by, by Catherine A. Catherine A.
~~T heohary.~~
Theohary. 16 Some analysts argue16 Some analysts argue that spectrum management decisions willthat spectrum management decisions will ~~require~~ require increased speed to maintain communications increased speed to maintain communications
networks. networks. ~~T he~~The presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will require splitrequire split -second decisions to -second decisions to
allowallow bursts of communications to forces. For example see U.S.bursts of communications to forces. For example see U.S. Army, “Artificial Intelligence Army, “Artificial Intelligence ~~impro ves~~improves Soldiers’ Soldiers’
electronic warfare userelectronic warfare user interface,” press release, October 8, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218705/interface,” press release, October 8, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218705/
artificial_intelligence_improves_soldiers_electronic_warfare_user_interface. artificial_intelligence_improves_soldiers_electronic_warfare_user_interface.
17 For a detailed discussion 17 For a detailed discussion on this issue,on this issue, ~~see CRS~~ see CRS Report R44891, Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
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Figure 2. Dimensionality of Command and Control and Implications of
Artificial Intelligence

Source: CongressionalCongressional Research Service. Research Service.
Figure 2 d~~epicts~~depicts how these issues how these issues are beginning to intersect through the introduction of artificial are beginning to intersect through the introduction of artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence (AI) (AI)
to optimize resultsto optimize results among the various dimensions.among the various dimensions. As formationsAs formations increase in complexity—particularlyincrease in complexity—particularly with with
formations designed for Joint formations designed for Joint Al All-Domain-Domain Operations—Operations—~~control ing~~ controlling these forces could these forces could ~~potential y~~potentially surpass the surpass the
ability of human cognition, with algorithmsability of human cognition, with algorithms used to help manage these forces.used to help manage these forces. The U.S. militaryThe U.S. military has stated that it has stated that it
intends to keep humans involved throughout the decisionmakingintends to keep humans involved throughout the decisionmaking process,18process,18 but as U.S. forces introduce more but as U.S. forces introduce more
artificialartificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence technologies technologies into their decisionmakinginto their decisionmaking apparatus, distinctions among the dimensionsapparatus, distinctions among the dimensions begin to begin to
blur. For example, the “who” and “how” begin to look similar,blur. For example, the “who” and “how” begin to look similar, particularly as computers or algorithms make particularly as computers or algorithms make
recommendationsrecommendations to commanders,to commanders, who may not understand the information orwho may not understand the information or the process that produced the the process that produced the
recommendation.recommendation.
AI could also affect other aspects of command and control, including the “what,” “when,” and “where.” Combining AI could also affect other aspects of command and control, including the “what,” “when,” and “where.” Combining
the “what” and “where” elementsthe “what” and “where” elements ~~can chal enge~~ can challenge adversaries’ adversaries’ ability to find and engage U.S.ability to find and engage U.S. forces; doing so can forces; doing so can
also also ~~chal enge~~challenge commanders’ commanders’ and their staffs’ ability to maintain control of forcesand their staffs’ ability to maintain control of forces without systemswithout systems helping to helping to
manage the complexity.manage the complexity. From a “when” perspective,From a “when” perspective, operations requiring quick decisionmaking,operations requiring quick decisionmaking, particularly particularly
electromagneticelectromagnetic spectrum and/or cyber operations, could surpass humans’ decisionmakingspectrum and/or cyber operations, could surpass humans’ decisionmaking ability. This raisesability. This raises a a
significant question of how much commanders can trust AI and how significant question of how much commanders can trust AI and how ~~wel~~ well human operators human operators ~~wil~~ will need to need to
understand why the AI systemunderstand why the AI system ~~recommends~~ recommends a particular action. a particular action.
Why Change Current C2 Structures?
DOD currently performs C2 using separate segments of the battle space—primarily along the DOD currently performs C2 using separate segments of the battle space—primarily along the
identified military domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. This structure exists because identified military domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. This structure exists because
traditional threats came from a single system, like aircraft and tank formations. In response, the traditional threats came from a single system, like aircraft and tank formations. In response, the
military developed highly sophisticated (but costly) sensors to military developed highly sophisticated (but costly) sensors to ~~surveil e~~surveille the battle space, the battle space,
providing information to a centralized command center (like an Air Operations Center or Army providing information to a centralized command center (like an Air Operations Center or Army
Command Post). Systems such as the E-3 Advanced Warning and Command System (AWACS) Command Post). Systems such as the E-3 Advanced Warning and Command System (AWACS)
and the E-8 Joint and the E-8 Joint ~~Surveil ance~~Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were optimized to provide Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were optimized to provide

18 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25, 18 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25,
2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-
intelligence-ethics/. intelligence-ethics/.
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situational awareness to commanders at these centralized outposts, where they could then direct situational awareness to commanders at these centralized outposts, where they could then direct
military forces.19 military forces.19
The future operating environment articulated by the NDS, the NDS Commission that reviewed it, The future operating environment articulated by the NDS, the NDS Commission that reviewed it,
and other sources describe how potential adversaries have developed sophisticated anti-and other sources describe how potential adversaries have developed sophisticated anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (seesee Figure 3).20 These capabilities include electronic 20 These capabilities include electronic
warfare, cyber weapons, long-range missiles, and advanced air defenses.21 U.S. competitors have warfare, cyber weapons, long-range missiles, and advanced air defenses.21 U.S. competitors have
pursued A2/AD capabilities as a means of countering traditional U.S. military advantages—such pursued A2/AD capabilities as a means of countering traditional U.S. military advantages—such
as the abilityas the ability to project power—and improving their ability to win quick, decisive engagements.22 to project power—and improving their ability to win quick, decisive engagements.22
Figure 3. Visualization of A2/AD Environment

Source: https://www.japcc.org/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/. https://www.japcc.org/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/.
Senior DOD leaders have stated that access to information Senior DOD leaders have stated that access to information ~~wil~~ will be critical in the future operating be critical in the future operating
environment.23 In addition, these leaders have stated that to environment.23 In addition, these leaders have stated that to ~~chal enge~~challenge potential peer adversaries, a potential peer adversaries, a
multidomain approach is required (in which U.S. forces would use ground, air, naval, space, and multidomain approach is required (in which U.S. forces would use ground, air, naval, space, and

19 Concepts like AirLand Battle emerged from this thinking. 19 Concepts like AirLand Battle emerged from this thinking. ~~T he~~The theory behind AirLand Battle was theory behind AirLand Battle was that the United that the United
States maintained an advantage in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities.States maintained an advantage in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities. DOD decidedDOD decided to invest in to invest in
platforms like AWACSplatforms like AWACS ~~and JST ARS~~ and JSTARS (along with the long-range Army (along with the long-range Army ~~T actical~~Tactical Missile System [ Missile System [~~AT ACMS~~ATACMS]) to engage ]) to engage
Soviet tank reinforcements. David E. Johnson, Soviet tank reinforcements. David E. Johnson, The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-~~Dom ain~~Domain
Battle, RAND, RAND Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html. Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html.
20 See 20 See Gary Roughead,Gary Roughead, Eric Edelman, et al., Eric Edelman, et al., Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy
~~Com m ission, The Assessm ent and Recom m endations~~Commission, The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy ~~Com m ission~~Commission,
2018, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. , https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
21 For more information on these systems, see CRS 21 For more information on these systems, see CRS In Focus IF11118, In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare,, by by John R. John R.
Hoehn; CRSHoehn; CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10537, IF10537, Defense ~~Prim er~~Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A. , by Catherine A. ~~T heohary~~Theohary; and CRS; and CRS In In
FocusFocus IF11353, IF11353, Defense ~~Prim er~~Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions, by John R. Hoehn. , by John R. Hoehn.
22 Jan van 22 Jan van ~~T ol~~Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, et al., F. Krepinevich, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/airsea-battle-concept. research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
23 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen Joseph Dunford, in U.S. Congress, 23 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen Joseph Dunford, in U.S. Congress, Senate Senate
Committee on Appropriations – Defense Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations – Defense Subcommittee, ~~Departm ent~~Department of Defense Budget Hearing , 115th Cong., 2nd sess., , 115th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 9, 2018. May 9, 2018.
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cyber forces to cyber forces to ~~chal enge~~challenge an adversary’s targeting calculus).24 The Joint an adversary’s targeting calculus).24 The Joint Al All-Domain Operations -Domain Operations
concept thus provides commanders access to information that can enable simultaneous and concept thus provides commanders access to information that can enable simultaneous and
sequential operations using surprise, and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities sequential operations using surprise, and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities
across across al all domains—thereby gaining physical and psychological advantages and influence and domains—thereby gaining physical and psychological advantages and influence and
control over the operational environment. control over the operational environment.
Technological advances since the development of the AirLand Battle Technological advances since the development of the AirLand Battle concept, which envisioned concept, which envisioned
combining the Air Force and Army’s efforts into a single plan to counter the Soviet Union in the combining the Air Force and Army’s efforts into a single plan to counter the Soviet Union in the
1980s, have enabled DOD to continue developing concepts for joint all-domain operations. Such 1980s, have enabled DOD to continue developing concepts for joint all-domain operations. Such
technological advances include an increased number of methods to engage a target (including technological advances include an increased number of methods to engage a target (including
electronic and cyber means), the proliferation of relatively low-cost sensors, and increased electronic and cyber means), the proliferation of relatively low-cost sensors, and increased
processing power to transform data from these sensors into information.25 This increased processing power to transform data from these sensors into information.25 This increased
complexity is designed to offer options for military commanders and complicate adversary complexity is designed to offer options for military commanders and complicate adversary
decisionmaking. The decisionmaking. The ~~chal enge~~challenge for maintaining control of for maintaining control of al all domain operations is that the U.S. domain operations is that the U.S.
military C2 apparatus is not organized to make these types of decisions,26 and the complexity and military C2 apparatus is not organized to make these types of decisions,26 and the complexity and
speed of the technology being used can exceed the ability of human cognition. speed of the technology being used can exceed the ability of human cognition.
How Has Command and Control Evolved?
The U.S. military’s The U.S. military’s traditional concept for command and control derives fromtraditional concept for command and control derives from the German military’s the German military’s
“auftragstaktik,” or mission-type orders.27“auftragstaktik,” or mission-type orders.27 Recognizing that disorder and the “fog of war” are inevitable in military Recognizing that disorder and the “fog of war” are inevitable in military
operations, subordinate commandersoperations, subordinate commanders were entrusted to operate semi-autonomouslywere entrusted to operate semi-autonomously to achieve their to achieve their
commander’scommander’s intent (i.e.,intent (i.e., the overarching goals of a mission) rather than having pre-scripted movements. the overarching goals of a mission) rather than having pre-scripted movements.
Information from Information from ~~intel igence~~ intelligence sources and reconnaissancesources and reconnaissance took a long time—hourstook a long time—hours ~~or potential y~~ or potentially days—to reach days—to reach
commanders.commanders. To maintain control of forces, commandersTo maintain control of forces, commanders ~~relied~~ relied on radio communicationson radio communications and paper and paper
correspondence.correspondence. The limitedThe limited amount of information available amount of information available ~~al owed~~allowed commanders commanders to direct forces across two to direct forces across two
dimensions—usingdimensions—using a single domain responding to adversary actions. a single domain responding to adversary actions.
At the height of the Cold War, Soviet forces presented a new problemAt the height of the Cold War, Soviet forces presented a new problem for militaryfor military forces: how to counter a forces: how to counter a
~~numerical y superior~~ numerically superior tank force.tank force. To counter this threat, the ArmyTo counter this threat, the Army and Airand Air Force proposed a novel approach that Force proposed a novel approach that
combined air and land power by developing new technologiescombined air and land power by developing new technologies to identify reinforcementto identify reinforcement locations.locations. This concept This concept
was known as AirLand Battle. This three-dimensionalwas known as AirLand Battle. This three-dimensional approach sought to use advantages in approach sought to use advantages in ~~intel igence,~~
~~surveil ance,~~ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to “see deep” to direct firepowerand reconnaissance to “see deep” to direct firepower on reinforcementson reinforcements (i.e.,(i.e., “strike“strike deep”).28 Deep deep”).28 Deep
~~strikes~~ strikes would complementwould complement the ground forces’ ability to concentrate firepowerthe ground forces’ ability to concentrate firepower at critical places, limitingat critical places, limiting the the
adversary’sadversary’s quantitative advantages. To support this vision of using deep strikesquantitative advantages. To support this vision of using deep strikes to prevent to prevent ~~fol ow~~follow-on forces,-on forces, the the
U.S. militaryU.S. military needed to improveneeded to improve command posts to increase the speed of decisionmakingcommand posts to increase the speed of decisionmaking to direct forces,to direct forces, while while
~~stil~~ still maintaining the tradition of maintaining the tradition of ~~fol owing~~following commander’s commander’s intent. This need resulted in the development of new intent. This need resulted in the development of new
systems,systems, ~~like~~ like the JSTARS and ATACMS.29 These systems enabled commandersthe JSTARS and ATACMS.29 These systems enabled commanders to gain a quicker understanding of to gain a quicker understanding of
the battle space and to improvethe battle space and to improve the responsethe response time to direct fires on enemytime to direct fires on enemy ~~forces.~~

~~24 CRS In Focus~~ forces. 24 CRS In Focus IF11409, IF11409, Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), by Andrew, by Andrew ~~Feickert~~ Feickert. .
25 For a discussion25 For a discussion on the needs to process data for Joint All-Domain Operations, see CRSon the needs to process data for Joint All-Domain Operations, see CRS Report R46389, Report R46389, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Design for Great ~~Power Com petition~~ Power Competition, coordinated by John R. Hoehn. , coordinated by John R. Hoehn.
26 For example, DOD doctrine states that military operations are controlled in each domain. 26 For example, DOD doctrine states that military operations are controlled in each domain. ~~T hus~~Thus, a land commander, , a land commander,
an air commander, and a maritime commander each develops their own operational plan based on of a Combatant an air commander, and a maritime commander each develops their own operational plan based on of a Combatant
Commander’s intent. Commander’s intent. ~~T hese~~These plans require substantial numbers of personnel, with minimal computer tools, and often plans require substantial numbers of personnel, with minimal computer tools, and often
requirerequire a person communicating via telephone to coordinate effects. See Department of Defense, a person communicating via telephone to coordinate effects. See Department of Defense, Joint Air Operations, ,
JP 3-30, Washington, DC, JulyJP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf. 25, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
27 Thomas~~27 T homas~~ J. Czerwinski, J. Czerwinski, “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, ,
vol. 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 121-132, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1788&vol. 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 121-132, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1788&
context=parameters. context=parameters.
28 Maj 28 Maj ~~T homas~~Thomas Gill, “ Gill, “~~T he~~The Air Land Battle - Air Land Battle - ~~T he~~The Right Doctrine For Right Doctrine For ~~T he~~The Next War,” Next War,” Global Security (1990), (1990),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/~~GT J~~GTJ.htm. .htm.
29 David E. Johnson, 29 David E. Johnson, The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle, RAND , RAND
Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html. Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html.
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Over the past 20 years, Over the past 20 years, China and Russia have observed the United States’ method of war, identifying asymmetric China and Russia have observed the United States’ method of war, identifying asymmetric
methods to methods to ~~chal enge~~challenge U.S. advantages. China’s military U.S. advantages. China’s military modernization, in particular, focuses on preventing the modernization, in particular, focuses on preventing the
United States fromUnited States from building large amounts of combat power (limiting logistics),building large amounts of combat power (limiting logistics), ~~increasing risks~~ increasing risks for high-valued for high-valued
aircraft (tankers, spy planes, command and control aircraft), and increasing its naval footprint (limiting U.S. naval aircraft (tankers, spy planes, command and control aircraft), and increasing its naval footprint (limiting U.S. naval
advantages).30 To counter these new threats, DOD advantages).30 To counter these new threats, DOD ~~initial y~~ initially proposed the idea of using multidomainproposed the idea of using multidomain operations operations
(which has since transitioned into the term (which has since transitioned into the term al all-domain operations).). ~~DOD~~ DOD contends that using one or even two contends that using one or even two
dimensionsdimensions to attack an adversary is insufficient, and that to attack an adversary is insufficient, and that ~~chal enging~~challenging an adversary’s an adversary’s targeting calculus thus requires targeting calculus thus requires
moremore complex formations (additional dimensions).complex formations (additional dimensions). The increasing complexity,The increasing complexity, combined with combined with ~~potential y~~potentially
decreasing timesdecreasing times to respond to threats from emergingto respond to threats from emerging technologies, DODtechnologies, DOD argues, requiresargues, requires new methods to new methods to
manage forces. manage forces.
Figure 4. Changes in Complexity of Command and Control

Source: CongressionalCongressional Research Service. Research Service.
JADC2-Enabling Technologies
As DOD develops the JADC2 concept, two types of technologies play an integral role in this As DOD develops the JADC2 concept, two types of technologies play an integral role in this
approach to command and control military forces: automation and communications. approach to command and control military forces: automation and communications.
Automation and Artificial Intelligence
Many senior DOD leaders have articulated that JADC2 is a concept (or perhaps a vision) rather Many senior DOD leaders have articulated that JADC2 is a concept (or perhaps a vision) rather
than any specific program. In a January 2021 article, LtGen Michael Groen, director of the Joint than any specific program. In a January 2021 article, LtGen Michael Groen, director of the Joint
ArtificialArtificial ~~Intel igence~~ Intelligence Center, stated that “JADC2 is not an IT [information technology] system .. Center, stated that “JADC2 is not an IT [information technology] system ..
. it is a warfighting system…. it is a warfighting system…. ~~Historical y~~Historically, you would have a large defense program, and you , you would have a large defense program, and you
would spend years refining the requirements, and you would gather big, big bags of money, and would spend years refining the requirements, and you would gather big, big bags of money, and
then you would go to a defense contractor and spend more years building, testing, and then then you would go to a defense contractor and spend more years building, testing, and then ~~final y~~finally
fielding something years and years later.”31 In this article, LtGen Groen described the role of fielding something years and years later.”31 In this article, LtGen Groen described the role of
artificial artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence (AI),32 and by extension the role of data and data structures, to enable these (AI),32 and by extension the role of data and data structures, to enable these
algorithms to inform commanders. According to LtGen Dennis algorithms to inform commanders. According to LtGen Dennis ~~Cral~~ Crall (director of the Joint Staff’s (director of the Joint Staff’s

~~30 Jan van T ol~~ 30 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, et al., F. Krepinevich, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/airsea-battle-concept. research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
31 Sydney J31 Sydney J ~~Freedberg~~ Freedberg Jr, “BuildingJr, “Building JADC2:JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2021, , January 13, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/.
32 32 ~~T his~~This report uses the terms report uses the terms artificial intelligence and and algorithm relatively interchangeably. Artificial intelligence relatively interchangeably. Artificial intelligence
combines many technologies—primarily databases, processors, and the algorithms themselves. In the context of combines many technologies—primarily databases, processors, and the algorithms themselves. In the context of
JADC2, the primary technological advancement of artificial intelligence, however, is its predictive nature, which is JADC2, the primary technological advancement of artificial intelligence, however, is its predictive nature, which is
derivedderived from the algorithm, or the approach to analyzing the data. from the algorithm, or the approach to analyzing the data.
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command, control, communications, and computers/cyber chief information officer [JS J6]), command, control, communications, and computers/cyber chief information officer [JS J6]),
artificial artificial ~~intel igence~~ intelligence and machine learning are essential to enable JADC2.33 LtGen and machine learning are essential to enable JADC2.33 LtGen ~~Kral stated:~~
~~JADC2 is about automating all of it…. It is about taking advantage of that sensor-rich~~
~~environment—looking at things like data standards; making sure that we can move~~ Krall stated JADC2 is about automating all of it…. It is about taking advantage of that sensor-rich environment—looking at things like data standards; making sure that we can move this this
information into an area that, again, we can process it properly; bringing on cloud; bringing information into an area that, again, we can process it properly; bringing on cloud; bringing
on artificial intelligence, predictive analytics; and then undergirding this with a network on artificial intelligence, predictive analytics; and then undergirding this with a network
that can handle this, all domains and partners.34 that can handle this, all domains and partners.34
Communications
According to DOD, developing JADC2 would require new communications methods. DOD’s According to DOD, developing JADC2 would require new communications methods. DOD’s
current communications network has been optimized for operations in the Middle East.35 As a current communications network has been optimized for operations in the Middle East.35 As a
result, DOD uses result, DOD uses ~~satel ites~~satellites as the primary method to communicate with forces abroad. These as the primary method to communicate with forces abroad. These
systems face latency (time delay) issues and are not designed to operate effectively in the systems face latency (time delay) issues and are not designed to operate effectively in the
presence of electronic warfare.36 These older architectures rely on presence of electronic warfare.36 These older architectures rely on ~~satel ites~~satellites in geosynchronous in geosynchronous
orbits, which orbit approximately 22,200 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the earth. New orbits, which orbit approximately 22,200 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the earth. New
applications, like AI, applications, like AI, ~~wil potential y~~ will potentially require additionalrequire additional data rates that current communications data rates that current communications
networks might not be able to support—particularly as DOD increases the number of sensors to networks might not be able to support—particularly as DOD increases the number of sensors to
provide additionalprovide additional data to improve algorithms. The introduction of autonomous systems, such as data to improve algorithms. The introduction of autonomous systems, such as
the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles and those resulting from the Army’s the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles and those resulting from the Army’s
growing interest in robotic vehicles,37 could need both secure communications and short latency growing interest in robotic vehicles,37 could need both secure communications and short latency
to maintain control of these systems. to maintain control of these systems.
Current JADC2 Efforts
The Joint Staff is the DOD organization responsible for developing the Joint The Joint Staff is the DOD organization responsible for developing the Joint Al All-Domain -Domain
Command and Control concept strategy. In addition, there are a number of ongoing studies and Command and Control concept strategy. In addition, there are a number of ongoing studies and
efforts connected to the JADC2 concept. Each of the military departments (Army, Navy, Air efforts connected to the JADC2 concept. Each of the military departments (Army, Navy, Air
Force), along with DOD agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Force), along with DOD agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and Office of the Undersecretary Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DARPA) and Office of the Undersecretary Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(OSD [R&E]), are developing technologies and concepts. The following sections briefly describe (OSD [R&E]), are developing technologies and concepts. The following sections briefly describe
selected organizations’ efforts. selected organizations’ efforts.

~~33 T heresa~~ 33 Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says ~~JADC2~~ JADC2 Is A Strategy; Service Posture ReviewsIs A Strategy; Service Posture Reviews Coming,” Coming,” Breaking Defense, ,
January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-
coming/. coming/.
34 Ibid. 34 Ibid.
35 U.S.35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to
~~Im prove Procurem ents~~Improve Procurements, GAO-15-459, July 17, 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671484.pdf. , GAO-15-459, July 17, 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671484.pdf.
36 Traditional~~36 T raditional~~ satellite communications rely on satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Having satellites stay in the same satellite communications rely on satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Having satellites stay in the same
spot in the sky (relative to earth) facilitates communications because the satellite location is known. However, these spot in the sky (relative to earth) facilitates communications because the satellite location is known. However, these
satellites orbit more than 22,000 miles above earth, increasing the amount of time (latency) for a radio transmission. satellites orbit more than 22,000 miles above earth, increasing the amount of time (latency) for a radio transmission.
MAJ AndrewMAJ Andrew H. Boyd, H. Boyd, Satellite and Ground ~~Com m unications System s~~Communications Systems: Space and Electronic Warfare Threats to the
United States ~~Arm y~~Army, Association of the U.S., Association of the U.S. Army, November 7, 2017, https://www.ausa.org/publications/satellite-and-Army, November 7, 2017, https://www.ausa.org/publications/satellite-and-
ground-communication-systems-space-and-electronic-warfare-threats-united. ground-communication-systems-space-and-electronic-warfare-threats-united.
37 For more information, see CRS 37 For more information, see CRS Report R45757, Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45392, Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics
and ~~Autonom ous System s~~Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew , coordinated by Andrew
FeickertFeickert . .
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Joint Staff J6: JADC2 Strategy
The The lead DOD organization tasked to develop a JADC2 strategy is the Joint Staff J6 directorate for command, control, communications, and computers/cyberJoint Staff J6 directorate for command, control, communications, and computers/cyber ~~has~~
~~been identified as the lead organization within DOD to develop a JADC2 strategy.38 The intent of~~
~~this strategy is to develop common data standards to enable joint operations~~.38 Originally envisioned to improve the joint force’s interoperability (e.g., making sure radio systems can communicate with one another), the JADC2 strategy expanded this focus, developing an information-sharing approach that enables joint operations by providing data for decisionmaking.39 In addition to .39 In addition to
developing a strategy, the J6 organizes a JADC2 cross-functional team, through which the developing a strategy, the J6 organizes a JADC2 cross-functional team, through which the
services and DOD services and DOD agencies coordinate their experiments and programs.40 This aligns with both the DOD Data Strategy and the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s efforts of creating a data advantage.41 The strategy has identified five lines of effort to enable the JADC2 framework:42 1. Data enterprise 2. Human enterprise 3. Technical enterprise 4. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications 5. Mission partner information sharing The Joint Staff J6 states that there will be no single program or line item for JADC2.43 OUSD Research and Engineering (R&E): Fully Networked Command, Control, and Communications (FNC3) According to OUSD R&E “FNC3 identifies, initiates, and coordinates research, development, and risk reduction activities for key enabling technologies [for command, control, and communications]. These activities will encompass distinct but interrelated efforts across the defense enterprise, monitored and synchronized by FNC3 staff in OUSD(R&E).”44 Dr. Michael Zatman, the Principal Director for FNC3, describes the overall vision of FNC3 consisting of three layers—physical, networking, and application—which provide a tailored approach to developing command, control and communications systems that aligns with the commercial sector’s best practices.45 Both the physical and networking layers provide the communications infrastructure, 38 Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says JADC2 Is A Strategy; Service Posture Reviews ~~agencies coordinate their experiments and programs.40~~
~~DOD CIO: 5G Technologies41~~
~~DOD has proposed that commercial advances in 5G wireless technologies provide the ability to~~
~~transfer more data (commonly cal ed data throughput) and lower latencies.42 DOD argues that it~~
~~requires these capabilities to process the increased amount of data from numerous sensors (e.g.,~~
~~satel ites, aircraft, ships, ground-based radars), and to process this information at the “edge” (at~~
~~the same site as the radio receiver). Another aspect of 5G technologies that could enable new~~
~~command and control concepts is dynamic spectrum sharing. As the electromagnetic spectrum~~
~~becomes more congested, the federal government has started al owing multiple users to operate~~
~~on the same frequency band (known as spectrum sharing). The DOD CIO argues that spectrum~~
~~sharing technology al ows for communications systems to transmit and receive data in the~~
~~presence of interference. In September 2020, DOD CIO issued a request for information to~~
~~industry, on how to approach dynamic spectrum sharing. On January 21, 2021, 67 responses to~~
~~the request for information had been posted.43~~
~~OUSD Research and Engineering (R&E): Fully Networked~~
~~Command, Control, and Communications (FNC3)~~
~~OUSD R&E has discussed its research efforts to enable JADC2 by providing protected beyond-~~
~~line-of-sight (BLOS) communications through its FNC3 concept. Michael Zatman, the assistant~~
~~director of FNC3, stated at a conference in July 2019 that~~
~~[t]he Army and the Air Force have adopted “Multi-Domain Operations” concepts for future~~
~~warfighting that both rely upon weapon systems across different domains being able to~~
~~communicate and interoperate in contested environments. However, the military services’~~

~~38 T heresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says JADC2 Is A St rategy; Service Posture Reviews~~ Coming,” Coming,” Breaking Defense, ,
January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-
coming/. coming/.
39 Theresa~~39 T heresa~~ Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: ‘Do-Or-Die’ JADC2 Summit Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: ‘Do-Or-Die’ JADC2 Summit ~~T o~~ To Crunch Common Data Standards,” Crunch Common Data Standards,” Breaking
Defense, January 12, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-do-or-die-jadc2-summit, January 12, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-do-or-die-jadc2-summit -to-crunch--to-crunch-
common-data-standards/. common-data-standards/.
40 40 ~~T heresa~~Theresa Hitchens, “OSD & Joint Staff Grapple With Joint All-Domain Command,” Hitchens, “OSD & Joint Staff Grapple With Joint All-Domain Command,” Breaking Defense, November 14, , November 14,
2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/osd-joint-staff-grapple-with-joint-all-domain-command/. 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/osd-joint-staff-grapple-with-joint-all-domain-command/.
41 Department of Defense, Data Strategy: Unleashing Data to Advance the National Defense, September 30, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks memorandum, Creating Data Advantage, May 5, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/10/2002638551/-1/-1/0/DEPUTY-SECRETARY-OF-DEFENSE-MEMORANDUM.PDF. 42 Telephone conversation between the author and Joint Staff J6, April 30, 2021. 43 Ibid. 44 OUSD R&E FNC3 Information Paper, April 28, 2021. 45 Telephone conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, Principal Director Fully Networked Command, Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021. For more information on commercial best practices, see Congressional Research Service 9 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress which connects a variety of applications. The physical layer represents the radios and transmitters themselves, while the networking layer manages the applications’ access to the physical layer by developing DOD-optimized versions of emerging commercial software defined networking techniques such as network slicing.46 All three layers are designed to increase interoperability and resiliency (i.e., the ability to prevent the network from being jammed or disrupted) and provide the appropriate quality of service for each application.47 Conceptually, example applications could be nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); ISR; a fire control mission; and logistics. According to Dr. Zatman, FNC3 serves as the mid- and long-term technical vision of JADC2,48 while each of the services (outlined in the following sections) have high-profile efforts focused on developing the near-term acquisition strategies. For example the Department of the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management program is designed to be deployed within the next three years by focusing on mature technologies. OUSD R&E leverages less mature technologies across its portfolio—including technologies developed by DARPA, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Strategic Capabilities Office, the services, and others—to provide the longer term technical means of implementing JADC2. DOD CIO: 5G Technologies49 DOD has proposed that commercial advances in 5G wireless technologies provide the ability to transfer more data (commonly called data throughput) and lower latencies.50 DOD argues that it requires these capabilities to process the increased amount of data from numerous sensors (e.g., satellites, aircraft, ships, ground-based radars), and to process this information at the “edge” (at the same site as the radio receiver). Another aspect of 5G technologies that could enable new command and control concepts is dynamic spectrum sharing. As the electromagnetic spectrum becomes more congested, the federal government has started allowing multiple users to operate on the same frequency band (known as spectrum sharing). The DOD CIO argues that spectrum sharing technology allows for communications systems to transmit and receive data in the presence of interference. In September 2020, DOD CIO issued a request for information to industry, on how to approach dynamic spectrum sharing. On January 21, 2021, 67 responses to the request for information had been posted.51 ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994 Information Technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model, at https://www.iso.org/standard/20269.html. 46 OUSD R&E FNC3 Information Paper, April 28, 2021. For more information on network splicing see Peter Rost et al., "Network Slicing to Enable Scalability and Flexibility in 5G Mobile Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, May 2017. Rost et al. define network splicing “as a concept for running multiple logical networks as independent business operations on a common physical infrastructure.” For DOD this represents being able to segment the network for different applications. 47 Quality of service refers to measures affecting a network’s performance. This includes metrics like packet loss, bit rate, throughput, transmission delay, and availability. For more information see International Telecommunication Union (ITU) “Series E: Overall Network Operation, Telephone Service, Service Operation, and Human Factors,” September 2008, at: https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.800-200809-I/en. 48 Telephone conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, Principal Director Fully Networked Command, Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021. 49 For an overview of DOD 5G initiatives, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler. 50 CRS Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jill C. Gallagher and Michael E. DeVine. 51 “Defense Spectrum Sharing Request for Information,” Defense Information System Agency, updated January 21, Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 15 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress ~~41 For an overview of DOD 5G initiatives, see CRS In Focus IF11251,~~ ~~National Security Implications of Fifth~~
~~Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~42 CRS Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jill C.~~
~~Gallagher and Michael E. DeVine.~~
~~43 “Defense Spectrum Sharing Request for Information,” Defense Information System Agency, updated January 21,~~
~~2021, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/8f3f0321da074e75a588c8833265791d/view.~~
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~~link to page 15~~ ~~Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~current C3 capabilities are fragmented ... as each service has independently developed and~~
~~acquired systems.44~~
~~Michael Griffin, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, stated in~~
~~testimony that “FNC3 represents the medium to long-term vision for JADC2, and is developing~~
~~technologies that wil become an integral part of JADC2 three years into the future and~~
~~beyond.”45 In March 2020, OSD R&E released a Broad Agency Announcement, seeking~~
~~information from industry on three components to enable FNC3: (1) protected radio frequency~~
~~(RF) BLOS communications, (2) multiuser/multipoint-high-data-rate laser communications, and~~
~~(3) communications with submerged assets.46 These activities are in partnership with the Space~~
~~Development Agency’s transportation layer research efforts.47 The Space Development Agency~~
~~intends to create a communications network in low-earth orbit (the transportation layer), which~~
~~provides fast (low latency) and resilient (anti-jam) communications.~~
DARPA: Mosaic Warfare
Mosaic Warfare represents a series of DARPA-sponsored projects designed to use AI to combine Mosaic Warfare represents a series of DARPA-sponsored projects designed to use AI to combine
systems and networks not systems and networks not ~~traditional y~~traditionally designed to interoperate. designed to interoperate. ~~Conceptual y (se~~eConceptually (see Figure 5), ),
these projects would be able to take raw these projects would be able to take raw ~~intel igence~~intelligence collected from a collected from a ~~satel ite~~satellite and turn that data and turn that data
into targetable information passed to a “shooter”—in this case, a cyber-weapon, electronic into targetable information passed to a “shooter”—in this case, a cyber-weapon, electronic
jammer, missile, aircraft, or any other weapon that might be able to affect the desired target.jammer, missile, aircraft, or any other weapon that might be able to affect the desired target.4852 A A
second aspect of this approach uses AI-generated software to enable different radios to second aspect of this approach uses AI-generated software to enable different radios to
communicate with each other within an hour.communicate with each other within an hour.4953 A third aspect is a project devoted to airspace de- A third aspect is a project devoted to airspace de-
confliction. Rather than relying on a number of specialized personnel to confliction. Rather than relying on a number of specialized personnel to ~~manual y~~manually identify the identify the
location and status of air assets, for example, DARPA software location and status of air assets, for example, DARPA software ~~automatical y~~automatically tracks this tracks this
information and relays it to commanders.information and relays it to commanders.5054 As analysts Bryan Clark and Dan Patt of the Hudson As analysts Bryan Clark and Dan Patt of the Hudson
Institute explain, Mosaic Warfare “seek[s] to impose multiple overlapping dilemmas on enemy Institute explain, Mosaic Warfare “seek[s] to impose multiple overlapping dilemmas on enemy
forces that disrupt their operations and thus prevent them from reaching their objectives in forces that disrupt their operations and thus prevent them from reaching their objectives in
time.”time.”51

~~44 Justin Doubleday, “Pentagon outlines strategy for ‘fully networked’ C3, plans meeting with industry,”~~ ~~Inside~~
~~Defense, July 17, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-outlines-strategy-fully-networked-c3-plans-~~
~~meeting-industry.~~
~~45 T estimony of Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee~~
~~for Intelligence, Emerging T hreats, and Capabilities, FY2020 Science and Technology Posture Hearing , 116th Cong.,~~
~~2nd sess., March 11, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110655/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-~~
~~GriffinM-20200311.pdf.~~
~~46 “OSD (R&E) Communications & Network Infrastructure (C&NI) Broad Agency Announcement,” Office of the~~
~~Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, March 3, 2020~~55 Figure 5. DARPA’s Vision of Mosaic Warfare Source: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac-warfare. 2021, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/8f3f0321da074e75a588c8833265791d/view. 52 Telephone conversation between the author and Timothy Grayson, Director, Strategic Technology Office, November 20, 2020. 53~~, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/~~
~~3d2512d1609847e9888359bf8ad05175/view.~~
~~47 T heresa Hitchens, “Pentagon Seeks New SatCom T ech For ‘Fully Networked C3,’” Breaking Defense, March 9,~~
~~2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/pentagon-seeks-new-satcom-tech-for-fully-networked-c3/.~~
~~48 T elephone conversation between the author and T imothy Grayson, Director, Strategic T echnology Office, November~~
~~20, 2020.~~
49 Currently, the only way for radio protocols not designed to communicate with one another to do so is to use Currently, the only way for radio protocols not designed to communicate with one another to do so is to use a radio a radio
gateway. gateway. ~~T his~~This new method would new method would replace physical infrastructure with replace physical infrastructure with ~~sof tware~~software. Sydney. Sydney J. FreedbergJ. Freedberg Jr, “Jr, “ DARPA AI DARPA AI
BuildsBuilds ~~New~~ New Networks On Networks On ~~T he~~The Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to- Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-
reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/. reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
5054 Sydney J. Freedberg Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI BuildsJr, “DARPA AI Builds ~~New~~ New Networks On Networks On ~~T he~~The Fly,” October 28, 2020, Fly,” October 28, 2020,
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
51 55 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built ~~T o Fight T he~~To Fight The Wrong War,” Wrong War,” Breaking Defense, January 14, 2021, , January 14, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/.
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~~Figure 5. DARPA’s Vision of Mosaic Warfare~~

~~Source:~~ ~~https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac-warfare.~~
Department of the Air Force: Advanced Battle Management
System (ABMS)
The Advanced BattleThe Advanced Battle Management System was Management System was ~~original y~~originally envisioned to replace the E-8 Joint envisioned to replace the E-8 Joint
~~Surveil ance~~Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).5256 The Air Force transitioned the ABMS The Air Force transitioned the ABMS
program in 2019 from developing things—like aircraft or radars—to a “Digital Network program in 2019 from developing things—like aircraft or radars—to a “Digital Network
Environment that connects warfighting capabilities across Environment that connects warfighting capabilities across al all domain, and every echelon, to domain, and every echelon, to
achieve global decision advantage.”achieve global decision advantage.”5357 In other words, the Air Force pivoted from building a In other words, the Air Force pivoted from building a
platform to support commanders and decisionmaking (like the E-8 JSTARS) to building a secure, platform to support commanders and decisionmaking (like the E-8 JSTARS) to building a secure,
“cloud-like” environment that provides commanders with near real-time data using AI and “cloud-like” environment that provides commanders with near real-time data using AI and
predictive analysis. According to the Air Force, the ABMS program predictive analysis. According to the Air Force, the ABMS program ~~wil~~ will develop capabilities develop capabilities
along six product lines: sensor integration, data, secure processing, connectivity, applications, and along six product lines: sensor integration, data, secure processing, connectivity, applications, and
effects integration.effects integration.
The Air Force has held three “on-ramps” (a term the Air Force uses to describe a demonstration) The Air Force has held three “on-ramps” (a term the Air Force uses to describe a demonstration)
to demonstrate its approach to ABMS.to demonstrate its approach to ABMS.5458 The first on-ramp, held in December 2019, demonstrated The first on-ramp, held in December 2019, demonstrated
the service’s ability to transmit data from secure communications used by F-22s to Army and the service’s ability to transmit data from secure communications used by F-22s to Army and
Navy systems. The second on-ramp enabled an Army howitzer to shoot down a surrogate cruise Navy systems. The second on-ramp enabled an Army howitzer to shoot down a surrogate cruise
missile. In addition, the Air Force provided this “cloud-like” Zero Trust tablet—a security feature missile. In addition, the Air Force provided this “cloud-like” Zero Trust tablet—a security feature
where no sensitive data are stored on a device—to U.S. Northern Command to assist in its where no sensitive data are stored on a device—to U.S. Northern Command to assist in its
response to the COVID pandemic during the spring of 2020. response to the COVID pandemic during the spring of 2020.

~~52 T he E-8 JST ARS was developed in the 1980s to counter Soviet tank threats, particularly the so -called second~~
~~echelon (i.e., Soviet reinforcements). T his~~ In November 2020, the Department of the Air Force identified the Chief Architect Office in charge of evaluating architecture on-ramps and integrating enterprise digital architecture. At the same time, the Air Force identified the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office as the ABMS Integrating Program Executive Office. The Rapid Capabilities Office focuses on quickly delivering programs to the field, and its involvement may be seen as moving ABMS from experimentation to system development. Department of the Army: Project Convergence59 According to the Army, “Project Convergence is the Army’s new campaign of learning organized around a continuous, structured series of demonstrations and experiments” designed to meet the challenges posed by JADC2.60 Project Convergence comprises five components: 1. ensuring the Army has the right people and talent; 2. linking current Army modernization efforts with Army Futures Command cross- functional teams aligned to the six Army modernization priorities;61 56 The E-8 JSTARS was developed in the 1980s to counter Soviet tank threats, particularly the so-called second echelon (i.e., Soviet reinforcements). This aircraft uses a synthetic aperture (with radar operators onboard) to identify aircraft uses a synthetic aperture (with radar operators onboard) to identify
potential targets. Operators onboard the aircraft then direct U.S. and alliedpotential targets. Operators onboard the aircraft then direct U.S. and allied aircraft to engage these targets.aircraft to engage these targets.
53 57 “Department of the Air Force Requirements Decision Memorandum for the Advance Battle Management System “Department of the Air Force Requirements Decision Memorandum for the Advance Battle Management System
Strategic Requirements Document,” Department of the Air Force, DAFRDM 09Strategic Requirements Document,” Department of the Air Force, DAFRDM 09 -20-02, signed October 14, 2020, by -20-02, signed October 14, 2020, by
General John W. Raymond, U.S.General John W. Raymond, U.S. ~~Space~~ Space Force, and General Charles Q. Brown, U.S.Force, and General Charles Q. Brown, U.S. Air Force.Air Force.
54 58 U.S. U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020. 59 For more information see CRS In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew Feickert. 60 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020. 61 For more information on Army modernization priorities see CRS Report R46216, The Army’s Modernization Strategy: Congressional Oversight Considerations, by Andrew Feickert and Brendan W. McGarry. Congressional Research Service 12 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress ~~Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020.~~
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~~Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~In November 2020, the Department of the Air Force identified the Chief Architect Office in~~
~~charge of evaluating architecture on-ramps and integrating enterprise digital architecture. At the~~
~~same time, the Air Force identified the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office as~~
~~the ABMS Integrating Program Executive Office. The Rapid Capabilities Office focuses on~~
~~quickly delivering programs to the field, and its involvement may be seen as moving ABMS from~~
~~experimentation to system development.~~
~~Department of the Army: Project Convergence55~~
~~According to the Army, “Project Convergence is the Army’s new campaign of learning organized~~
~~around a continuous, structured series of demonstrations and experiments” designed to meet the~~
~~chal enges posed by JADC2.56 Project Convergence comprises five components:~~
~~1. ensuring the Army has the right people and talent;~~
~~2. linking current Army modernization efforts with Army Futures Command cross -~~
~~functional teams aligned to the six Army modernization priorities;57~~
3. having the right command and control to meet increasingly fast-paced threats; 3. having the right command and control to meet increasingly fast-paced threats;
4. using AI to analyze and categorize information and transmitted across the Army 4. using AI to analyze and categorize information and transmitted across the Army
network; and network; and
5. testing capabilities 5. testing capabilities in the “most unforgiving terrain.” in the “most unforgiving terrain.”
Project Convergence 2020 utilized approximately 750 soldiers, civilians, and contractors across Project Convergence 2020 utilized approximately 750 soldiers, civilians, and contractors across
three military three military ~~instal ations~~installations, culminating in two live capstone demonstrations at Yuma Proving , culminating in two live capstone demonstrations at Yuma Proving
Ground, AZ.Ground, AZ.5862 During this exercise, the Army demonstrated several technologies, including During this exercise, the Army demonstrated several technologies, including
artificial artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence, autonomy, and robotics, to test new methods to command and control , autonomy, and robotics, to test new methods to command and control
~~geographical y~~geographically dispersed forces. dispersed forces.5963 The Army plans to integrate Air Force and Navy systems as The Army plans to integrate Air Force and Navy systems as
part of Project Convergence 2021, and intends to incorporate foreign militaries in Project part of Project Convergence 2021, and intends to incorporate foreign militaries in Project
Convergence 2022.Convergence 2022.6064
Department of the Navy: Project Overmatch
Project Overmatch is the Navy’s effort to create a “Naval Operational Architecture” to link ships Project Overmatch is the Navy’s effort to create a “Naval Operational Architecture” to link ships
to Army and Air Force assets. On October 1, 2020, Admiral Gilday, the Chief of Naval to Army and Air Force assets. On October 1, 2020, Admiral Gilday, the Chief of Naval
Operations, tasked a 2-star admiral to lead the Navy’s Project Overmatch effort.Operations, tasked a 2-star admiral to lead the Navy’s Project Overmatch effort.6165 In his In his
memorandum, Admiral Gilday directed that Project Overmatch take an engineering and memorandum, Admiral Gilday directed that Project Overmatch take an engineering and
development approach similar to the Navy’s effort to develop nuclear power and the AEGIS development approach similar to the Navy’s effort to develop nuclear power and the AEGIS
system. The primary goal is “to enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal system. The primary goal is “to enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal
and and ~~non-lethal~~nonlethal effects from near-and-far, every axis, and every domain. effects from near-and-far, every axis, and every domain. ~~Specifical y, you [RADM~~

~~55 For more information see CRS In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew Feickert~~
~~56 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020.~~
~~57 For more information on Army modernization priorities see CRS Report R46216,~~ ~~The Army’s Modernization~~
~~Strategy: Congressional Oversight Considerations, by Andrew Feickert and Brendan W. McGarry~~
~~58 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020.~~
~~59 Jen Judson, “Inside Project Convergence: How the US Army is~~ Specifically, you [RADM Small] are to develop the networks, infrastructure, data architecture tools, and analytics.” In a parallel effort, Admiral Gilday tasked Vice Admiral Kilby, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, to develop a plan to incorporate unmanned systems, including ships and aircraft,66 into the naval operational architecture.67 According to press statements, the Navy intends to reach initial operating capabilities (i.e., being capable to field the initial systems) in 2023.68 Potential Issues for Congress The following sections discuss potential issues for Congress, including requirements and cost estimates, interoperability challenges, balancing communications capabilities, the role of AI in decisionmaking, and potential force structure changes needed to implement JADC2. 62 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020. 63 Jen Judson, “Inside Project Convergence: How the US Army is preparing for war in the next decade,” preparing for war in the next decade,” Defense News, ,
September 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-September 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-
digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/. digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/.
6064 CRS CRS In FocusIn Focus IF11654, IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew, by Andrew Feickert. Feickert.
6165 Memorandum from Admiral Gilday Memorandum from Admiral Gilday to Read Admiralto Read Admiral ~~Douglas~~ Douglas Small,Small, Project Overmatch, October 1, 2020. 66 For more information on the Navy’s approach to unmanned ships, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 67 Memorandum from Admiral Michael Gilday to Vice Admiral James Kilby, “A Novel Force,” October 1, 2020. 68 Jason Sherman, “Navy eyes 2023 for initial delivery of Project Overmatch capability to fleet,” Inside Defense, January 29, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/navy-eyes-2023-initial-delivery-project-overmatch-capability-fleet. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 19 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress ~~Project Overmatch, October 1, 2020.~~
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~~Smal ] are to develop the networks, infrastructure, data architecture tools, and analytics.” In a~~
~~paral el effort, Admiral Gilday tasked Vice Admiral Kilby, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations~~
~~for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, to develop a plan to incorporate unmanned~~
~~systems, including ships and aircraft,62into the naval operational architecture.63 According to press~~
~~statements, the Navy intends to reach initial operating capabilities (i.e., being capable to field the~~
~~initial systems) in 2023.64~~
~~Potential Issues for Congress~~
~~The following sections discuss potential issues for Congress, including requirements and cost~~
~~estimates, interoperability chal enges, balancing communications capabilities, the role of AI in~~
~~decisionmaking, and potential force structure changes needed to implement JADC2.~~
Requirements and Cost Estimates
DOD has requested funding for JADC2-related efforts for several fiscal years, in particular during DOD has requested funding for JADC2-related efforts for several fiscal years, in particular during
the concept’s early stages of development. DOD is actively developing a JADC2 strategy, which the concept’s early stages of development. DOD is actively developing a JADC2 strategy, which
is expected to be released by the spring of 2021.is expected to be released by the spring of 2021.6569 Some in Congress have expressed concern that Some in Congress have expressed concern that
DOD has not provided cost estimates or validated requirements in the manner that a traditional DOD has not provided cost estimates or validated requirements in the manner that a traditional
acquisition program might.acquisition program might.6670 As a result, the armed services committees and the appropriations As a result, the armed services committees and the appropriations
committees have reduced the requested funding for these efforts, committees have reduced the requested funding for these efforts, ~~especial y~~especially for ABMS and 5G for ABMS and 5G
research and development.research and development.6771 The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required
DOD to produce requirements for JADC2 by April 2021.DOD to produce requirements for JADC2 by April 2021.6872
Interoperability Challenges
As DOD envisions using JADC2 to command forces in multiple domains simultaneously, the As DOD envisions using JADC2 to command forces in multiple domains simultaneously, the
need to connect different types of forces increases. DOD owns and operates many need to connect different types of forces increases. DOD owns and operates many
communications systems, each using different radio frequencies, standards, and datalinks.communications systems, each using different radio frequencies, standards, and datalinks.6973 These These
systems are often unable to “talk” with each other and therefore require a gateway to “translate” systems are often unable to “talk” with each other and therefore require a gateway to “translate”
from one radio protocol to another. The inclusion of from one radio protocol to another. The inclusion of ~~al ies~~allies and partners increases interoperability and partners increases interoperability
~~chal enges~~challenges. Former Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in his March 2020 testimony to . Former Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in his March 2020 testimony to
the House Armed Services Subcommittee on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on ~~Intel igence~~Intelligence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities, , Emerging Threats, and Capabilities,
identified this issue as justification to continue pursuing the OSD R&E efforts for FNC3.identified this issue as justification to continue pursuing the OSD R&E efforts for FNC3.70

~~62 For more information on the Navy’s approach to unmanned ships, see CRS Report R45757,~~ ~~Navy Large Unmanned~~
~~Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~63 Memorandum from Admiral Michael Gilday to Vice Admiral James Kilby, “ A Novel Force,” October 1, 2020.~~
~~64 Jason Sherman, “Navy eyes 2023 for initial delivery of Project Overmatch capability to fleet,” Inside Defense,~~
~~January 29, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/navy-eyes-2023-initial-delivery-project -overmatch-capability-~~
~~fleet.~~
~~65 T heresa Hitchens, “CJCS Gen. Milley Reviews JADC2 Strategy While Industry Jostles For Position,” ,~~ 74 The challenge of enabling DOD to share information from different services and units could be solved by three approaches to interoperability:  Procure gateways. Communications gateways (perhaps more aptly called “translators”) can receive multiple protocols, security levels, et cetera, and rebroadcast this information to the rest of the force.75 The ABMS program has developed such gateways (see Figure 6) to enable communications.76 This approach allows for information sharing, potentially reducing the cost of development because the gateway can be a subsystem of an aircraft/ship/ground system, potentially capable of being fielded relatively quickly. The challenge with this approach is that such gateways may not be using the most advanced, and therefore protected, waveforms to rebroadcast to the force. 69 Theresa Hitchens, “CJCS Gen. Milley Reviews JADC2 Strategy While Industry Jostles For Position,” February 24, February 24,
2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/cjcs-gen-milley-reviews-jadc2-strategy-while-industry-jostles-for-position/. 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/cjcs-gen-milley-reviews-jadc2-strategy-while-industry-jostles-for-position/.
6670 P.L. 116-283 §157. P.L. 116-283 §157.
6771 P.L. 116-283. P.L. 116-283.
6872 P.L. 116-283 §157. P.L. 116-283 §157.
6973 For more discussion For more discussion on this issue,on this issue, see CRSsee CRS Report R46564, Report R46564, Overview of Department of Defense Use of the
~~Electrom agnetic~~Electromagnetic Spectrum , by John R. Hoehn, Jill C. Gallagher,, by John R. Hoehn, Jill C. Gallagher, and Kelley M. Sayler.and Kelley M. Sayler.
~~70 T estimony~~ 74 Testimony of Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in U.S. of Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in U.S. Congress,Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee for Intelligence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities, FY2020 Science and Technology Posture Hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110655/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-GriffinM-20200311.pdf. 75 This capability is best demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force’s Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN). 76 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 23 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress ~~House Armed Services Subcommittee~~
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~~link to page 18 link to page 22~~

~~Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~The chal enge of enabling DOD to share information from different services and units could be~~
~~solved by three approaches to interoperability:~~
~~ Procure gateways. Communications gateways (perhaps more aptly cal ed~~
~~“translators”) can receive multiple protocols, security levels, et cetera, and~~
~~rebroadcast this information to the rest of the force.71 The ABMS program has~~
~~developed such gateways (see Figure 6) to enable communications.72 This~~
~~approach al ows for information sharing, potential y reducing the cost of~~
~~development because the gateway can be a subsystem of an aircraft/ship/ground~~
~~system, potential y capable of being fielded relatively quickly. The chal enge~~
~~with this approach is that such gateways may not be using the most advanced,~~
~~and therefore protected, waveforms to rebroadcast to the force.~~
Figure 6. E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN)

Source: https://www.janes.com/amp/usaf-to-buy-more-bacn/ZnlJK3dHVU9mZ28xajRJVkc5dVI5VFp1cVMwPQ2. https://www.janes.com/amp/usaf-to-buy-more-bacn/ZnlJK3dHVU9mZ28xajRJVkc5dVI5VFp1cVMwPQ2.
  Procure new communications equipment. This approach uses a “top-down” This approach uses a “top-down”
approach (i.e., where either OSD or the Joint Staff identifies the solution and then approach (i.e., where either OSD or the Joint Staff identifies the solution and then
requires the military services to adopt it). Using a similar model to the Joint requires the military services to adopt it). Using a similar model to the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) development,Tactical Radio System (JTRS) development,7377 this option would purchase a new this option would purchase a new
communications architecture focusing on interoperability. For example, the communications architecture focusing on interoperability. For example, the
FNC3 effort appears to use this approach. Although this approach could ensure FNC3 effort appears to use this approach. Although this approach could ensure
that the joint force develops communications systems that can share information that the joint force develops communications systems that can share information
seamlessly, and seamlessly, and ~~potential y~~ potentially in a secure fashion, it could require large investments in a secure fashion, it could require large investments
and might encounter schedule delays. Another possible disadvantage of this and might encounter schedule delays. Another possible disadvantage of this
approach is that as systems are fielded, they may not be as effective against approach is that as systems are fielded, they may not be as effective against
adversary technologies. adversary technologies.

~~for Intelligence, Emerging T hreats, and Capabilities, FY2020 Science and Technology Posture Hearing , 116th Cong.,~~
~~2nd sess., March 11, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110655/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-~~
~~GriffinM-20200311.pdf.~~
~~71 T his capability is best demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force’s Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN).~~
~~72 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020.~~
~~73 JT RS was a radio program intended to replace all of the radio systems used by the Department of Defense. For more~~
~~information, see the Appe ndix.~~
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~~link to page 20~~ ~~Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress~~

  Develop software to create networks. A third approach is to use software that A third approach is to use software that
enables users to create customized networks. DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare and enables users to create customized networks. DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare and
some aspects of the ABMS program are examples of this approach.some aspects of the ABMS program are examples of this approach.7478 More More
modular than other interoperability solutions, this approach enables units and modular than other interoperability solutions, this approach enables units and
systems tailored to a specific operation to communicate with one another. A systems tailored to a specific operation to communicate with one another. A
primary risk to this approach is the technical immaturity, primary risk to this approach is the technical immaturity, ~~specifical y~~specifically advances in advances in
software, used to create these networks. Another risk concerns the amount and software, used to create these networks. Another risk concerns the amount and
classification of information shared with different systems certified for different classification of information shared with different systems certified for different
levels of classification (e.g., Secret Releasable, Secret Nonreleasable, Top levels of classification (e.g., Secret Releasable, Secret Nonreleasable, Top
Secret).Secret).
DOD and Congress may select one or more of these approaches. One particular approach may DOD and Congress may select one or more of these approaches. One particular approach may
offer short-term benefits while DOD pursues a longer-term approach to solve the interoperability offer short-term benefits while DOD pursues a longer-term approach to solve the interoperability
~~chal enge.~~challenge. 77 JTRS was a radio program intended to replace all of the radio systems used by the Department of Defense. For more information, see the Appendix. 78 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020, and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI Builds New Networks On The Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 20 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress
Balancing Communications Capabilities in a Degraded
Environment
DOD’s approach to developing communications networks to meet JADC2 requirements DOD’s approach to developing communications networks to meet JADC2 requirements
incorporates three competing capabilities: incorporates three competing capabilities:
 data throughput (i.e., the rate at which data can be transported),  data throughput (i.e., the rate at which data can be transported),
 latency (i.e., the time delay in receiving a message/data), and  latency (i.e., the time delay in receiving a message/data), and
 resiliency (the ability to maintain resiliency (the ability to maintain a communications signal in the event of a communications signal in the event of
disruption by natural or intentional sources). disruption by natural or intentional sources).7579
The rise of new technologies for military operations, such as artificial The rise of new technologies for military operations, such as artificial ~~intel igence~~intelligence, tactical , tactical
datalinks (like Link 16 and Multifunction Advanced Data Link [MADL]), and adversary datalinks (like Link 16 and Multifunction Advanced Data Link [MADL]), and adversary
electronic warfare capabilities, presents distinct electronic warfare capabilities, presents distinct ~~chal enges~~challenges in balancing these capabilities for in balancing these capabilities for
future communications systems like 5G and FNC3. AI and information operations could future communications systems like 5G and FNC3. AI and information operations could
~~potential y~~potentially require substantial data to enable predictive analytics and give commanders an require substantial data to enable predictive analytics and give commanders an
accurate picture of the battle space. Datalinks, which share data with accurate picture of the battle space. Datalinks, which share data with ~~al available~~ all available users, do not users, do not
necessarily require high data rates; however, datalinks do need low latency to ensure that sensors necessarily require high data rates; however, datalinks do need low latency to ensure that sensors
can prove “target-level data,” particularly for fast-moving systems like cruise missiles and can prove “target-level data,” particularly for fast-moving systems like cruise missiles and
aircraft. aircraft. ~~Final y~~Finally, the proliferation of electronic jammers requires resilience (or anti-jam properties) , the proliferation of electronic jammers requires resilience (or anti-jam properties)
to maintain communications while being actively jammed.to maintain communications while being actively jammed. Figure 7 ~~il ustrates~~illustrates how these three how these three
competing requirements must be balanced to develop a new waveform (regardless if the competing requirements must be balanced to develop a new waveform (regardless if the
waveform is designed for civilian or military applications).waveform is designed for civilian or military applications).7680 Radio signals are able to offer each Radio signals are able to offer each
capability; however, prioritizing one requirement means that the other two requirements may capability; however, prioritizing one requirement means that the other two requirements may

~~74 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020, and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI~~
~~Builds New Networks On T he Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-~~
~~reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.~~
75suffer, potentially creating a dilemma for policymakers in terms of which capabilities to prioritize in acquisition. Figure 7. Balancing Communications Requirements Source: Congressional Research Service. 79 For example, see Department of Homeland Security, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” press release, For example, see Department of Homeland Security, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” press release,
2017, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/first-responder-electronic-jamming-exercise#:~:text=2017, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/first-responder-electronic-jamming-exercise#:~:text=
DHS%20S%26TDHS%20S%26T %20works%20to%20combat,jamming%20threats%20and%20reporting%20channels; Youness %20works%20to%20combat,jamming%20threats%20and%20reporting%20channels; Youness
Arjoune and SalehArjoune and Saleh Faruque,Faruque, “Smart Jamming Attacks in 5G New“Smart Jamming Attacks in 5G New Radio:Radio: A Review,”A Review,” Las Vegas,Las Vegas, ~~NV,~~ NV, January 8, 2020, January 8, 2020,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9031175; and Hossein Pirayesh and Huachenghttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9031175; and Hossein Pirayesh and Huacheng Zeng, “Zeng, “ Jamming Attacks and Anti-Jamming Attacks and Anti-
Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” January 1, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” January 1, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/
2101.00292. 2101.00292.
76 80 Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of the radio from the user Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of the radio from the user ’s ’s
perspective. perspective.
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~~suffer, potential y creating a dilemma for policymakers in terms of which capabilities to prioritize~~
~~in acquisition.~~
~~Figure 7. Balancing Communications Requirements~~

~~Source:~~ ~~Congressional Research Service.~~
As DOD modernizes its communications systems, it may consider technology features and As DOD modernizes its communications systems, it may consider technology features and
limitationslimitations to select requirements that advance mission goals while protecting the security of its to select requirements that advance mission goals while protecting the security of its
networks. For example, technologies like 5G can offer high data capacity and low latency, but it networks. For example, technologies like 5G can offer high data capacity and low latency, but it
is unclear how these signals may be affected by adversary jamming. FNC3, on the other hand, is unclear how these signals may be affected by adversary jamming. FNC3, on the other hand,
appears to be designed to provide resiliency with high data rates; however, because it relies on appears to be designed to provide resiliency with high data rates; however, because it relies on
~~satel ites~~satellites, latency , latency ~~wil~~ will increase. increase.
Role of Artificial Intelligence in ~~Decisionmaking77~~Decisionmaking81
AI represents a AI represents a ~~potential y~~potentially critical component to enabling JADC2. As AI is introduced into critical component to enabling JADC2. As AI is introduced into
military decisionmaking, several potential issues arise. First, to what degree should artificial military decisionmaking, several potential issues arise. First, to what degree should artificial
~~intel igence~~ intelligence play in decisionmaking? At what appropriate level is human judgement required play in decisionmaking? At what appropriate level is human judgement required
when using lethal weapons?when using lethal weapons?7882
Second, how does DOD ensure the security of the data being used for AI algorithms to assist Second, how does DOD ensure the security of the data being used for AI algorithms to assist
decisionmaking? Although DOD has focused on the data structures,decisionmaking? Although DOD has focused on the data structures,7983 it has not discussed how it it has not discussed how it
plans to ensure data validity and security for JADC2 plans to ensure data validity and security for JADC2 ~~specifical y~~specifically. Erroneous data could cause . Erroneous data could cause
commanders to select options that compromise mission objectives (such as algorithms commanders to select options that compromise mission objectives (such as algorithms
recommending targets that might waste high-value munitions). Relatedly, how does DOD intend recommending targets that might waste high-value munitions). Relatedly, how does DOD intend
to secure these data in cloud environments to prevent adversaries from manipulating them? Are to secure these data in cloud environments to prevent adversaries from manipulating them? Are
~~these security plans sufficient to prevent adversary manipulation?~~

~~77 For a broader discussion of artificial intelligence and its role in national security, see CRS Report R45178,~~ ~~Artificial~~
~~Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.~~
~~78 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, Fe bruary 25,~~
~~2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-~~
~~intelligence-ethics/.~~
~~79 T heresa Hitchens, “OSD, Joint Staff Double Down On DoD-Wide Data Standards,” Breaking Defense, February 10,~~
~~2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/exclusive-jadc2-data-summits-will-drive-dod-standards-requirements/.~~
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these security plans sufficient to prevent adversary manipulation? Potential Force Structure Changes
Because JADC2 Because JADC2 ~~potential y~~ potentially requires different types of forces and weapons systems, each of the requires different types of forces and weapons systems, each of the
military services may look to change how it trains, organizes, and equips its forces. For example, military services may look to change how it trains, organizes, and equips its forces. For example,
the Marine Corps, in its force redesign, announced that it would eliminate units it determines are the Marine Corps, in its force redesign, announced that it would eliminate units it determines are
not aligned with National Defense Strategy guidance, and would reinvest the funding into other not aligned with National Defense Strategy guidance, and would reinvest the funding into other
programs that better fit the future operating environment.programs that better fit the future operating environment.8084 Similarly, the Navy’s Project Similarly, the Navy’s Project
Overmatch looks to Overmatch looks to ~~potential y~~potentially change the number and types of ships the service fields. change the number and types of ships the service fields.
The balance of capabilities that reside in the active and reserve components is another aspect of The balance of capabilities that reside in the active and reserve components is another aspect of
force structure changes. For instance, the Army force structure changes. For instance, the Army ~~historical y~~historically has decided to transfer logistics has decided to transfer logistics
capabilities from the active component to the reserve components.capabilities from the active component to the reserve components.8185 Thus, if the United States Thus, if the United States
were to go to war, the Army would presumably need to activate reserve forces to enable were to go to war, the Army would presumably need to activate reserve forces to enable
operations. As DOD and military services prepare to meet the operations. As DOD and military services prepare to meet the ~~chal enges~~challenges presented by JADC2, presented by JADC2,
how would these organizations choose to balance capabilities and force structures between active how would these organizations choose to balance capabilities and force structures between active
~~and reserve components?~~
and reserve components? 81 For a broader discussion of artificial intelligence and its role in national security, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler. 82 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics/. 83 Theresa Hitchens, “OSD, Joint Staff Double Down On DoD-Wide Data Standards,” Breaking Defense, February 10, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/exclusive-jadc2-data-summits-will-drive-dod-standards-requirements/. 84 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. 85 CRS Report R43808, Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp. Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 23 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress Management of JADC2 Efforts
The Joint Staff J6 is the lead coordinator for DOD’s JADC2 efforts, with each of the services and The Joint Staff J6 is the lead coordinator for DOD’s JADC2 efforts, with each of the services and
a number of DOD agencies performing various activities. Some in Congress, in the past, have a number of DOD agencies performing various activities. Some in Congress, in the past, have
expressed an interest in creating DOD-wide program offices (such as the F-35 Joint Program expressed an interest in creating DOD-wide program offices (such as the F-35 Joint Program
Office) to centralize management of large-scale efforts.Office) to centralize management of large-scale efforts.8286 It appears that DOD research and It appears that DOD research and
development efforts development efforts ~~wil~~ will increase over time, and that, as a result, managing these efforts may increase over time, and that, as a result, managing these efforts may
become more become more ~~chal enging~~challenging. Congress may, in the future, seek to identify or create an organization . Congress may, in the future, seek to identify or create an organization
charged with program management, development of network architecture, and financial charged with program management, development of network architecture, and financial
~~management.~~

~~80 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert .~~
~~81 CRS Report R43808,~~ ~~Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and~~
~~Options for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp .~~
82management. 86 For more information on the background of the F-35 program, see CRS For more information on the background of the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) Program , by Jeremiah Gertler. For an example of a joint communications program intended to achieve similar , by Jeremiah Gertler. For an example of a joint communications program intended to achieve similar
results to JADC2, see thresults to JADC2, see the ~~Appe ndix~~Appendix. .
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Appendix. Historical Example of Joint
Interoperability: Joint Tactical Radio ~~System83~~System87
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was a communications program intended to improve The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was a communications program intended to improve
communications interoperability by fielding radios across communications interoperability by fielding radios across al all of the military services. The of the military services. The
program was started in the mid-1990s and was ultimately canceled in 2011 by former Under program was started in the mid-1990s and was ultimately canceled in 2011 by former Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall.Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall.8488 In his In his
justification notification, Under Secretary justification notification, Under Secretary ~~Kendal~~ Kendall noted that “the technical noted that “the technical ~~chal enges~~challenges of mobile of mobile
ad hoc networks and scalability were not ad hoc networks and scalability were not ~~wel~~ well understood due to the immaturity of technology at understood due to the immaturity of technology at
the time ... it is unlikely that products resulting from the JTRS GMR [Ground Mobile Radio] the time ... it is unlikely that products resulting from the JTRS GMR [Ground Mobile Radio]
development program affordably meet Service requirements.” Over the course of the 15-year development program affordably meet Service requirements.” Over the course of the 15-year
development effort, DOD spent approximately $15 development effort, DOD spent approximately $15 ~~bil ion,~~ billion, requiring an additionalrequiring an additional ~~$13 bil ion at~~
$13 billion at termination.termination.8589
The JTRS program was intended to replace the 25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the The JTRS program was intended to replace the 25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the
military—many of which could not communicate with each other—with software-based radios military—many of which could not communicate with each other—with software-based radios
that could operate across much of the radio frequency spectrum.that could operate across much of the radio frequency spectrum.8690 JTRS was envisioned to enable JTRS was envisioned to enable
the services to operate together, along with selected the services to operate together, along with selected ~~al ied~~allied nations, in a “seamless” manner via nations, in a “seamless” manner via
wireless voice, video, and data communications through wireless voice, video, and data communications through al all levels of command, including direct levels of command, including direct
access to near real-time information from airborne and battlefield sensors.access to near real-time information from airborne and battlefield sensors.8791 Described as a Described as a
“software-defined radio,” JTRS would have functioned more like a computer than a conventional “software-defined radio,” JTRS would have functioned more like a computer than a conventional
radio; for example, it would have been upgraded and modified to operate with other radio; for example, it would have been upgraded and modified to operate with other
communications systems by the addition of software, as opposed to redesigning hardware—a communications systems by the addition of software, as opposed to redesigning hardware—a
more costly and time-consuming process. DOD asserted that in “many cases, a single JTRS radio more costly and time-consuming process. DOD asserted that in “many cases, a single JTRS radio
with multiple waveforms can replace many separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that with multiple waveforms can replace many separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that
because JTRS is “software programmable, they because JTRS is “software programmable, they ~~wil~~ will also provide a longer functional life,” with also provide a longer functional life,” with
both features offering potential long-term cost savings.both features offering potential long-term cost savings.8892 The JTRS program was The JTRS program was ~~original y~~originally
broken into five “clusters,” with each cluster having a particular service “lead” (broken into five “clusters,” with each cluster having a particular service “lead” (seesee Table A-1)
and a Joint Program Office managing the and a Joint Program Office managing the ~~overal architecture.~~

~~83 T his~~overall architecture. 87 This section is derived from CRS section is derived from CRS Report RL33161, Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future
~~Com bat~~Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew, by Andrew ~~Feickert .~~
84 Feickert. 88 Memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendell Memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendell to Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, to Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, JTRS
Cancellation Notification, October 13, 2011, https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/101411bb1.pdf. , October 13, 2011, https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/101411bb1.pdf.
8589 Bob Brewin, Bob Brewin, “Pentagon shutters Joint “Pentagon shutters Joint ~~T actical~~Tactical Radio System program office,” Radio System program office,” Nextgov, August, August 1, 2012, 1, 2012,
https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2012/08/pentagon-shutters-joint-tactical-radio-system-program-office/https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2012/08/pentagon-shutters-joint-tactical-radio-system-program-office/
57173/. 57173/.
8690 Peter A. Buxbaum, Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over “Jitters Over ~~JT RS~~JTRS,” ,” Armed Forces Journal, July, July 2005, p. 31. 2005, p. 31.
~~87 United States~~91 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
~~House~~ House of Representatives, “of Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: ResolvingDefense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the ArmyDevelopmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked ’s Networked
~~Communicat ions~~ Communications Capabilities isCapabilities is Key to FieldingKey to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9. Peter A. Buxbaum, Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9. Peter A. Buxbaum,
“Jitters Over “Jitters Over ~~JT RS~~JTRS,” ,” Armed Forces Journal, July, July 2005, pp. 31-332005, pp. 31-33. 92
88 DOD pamphlet on DOD pamphlet on ~~JT RS~~JTRS published published by the by the ~~JT RS~~ JTRS Joint Program Office, undated. Joint Program Office, undated.
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Table A-1. JTRS Clusters
Cluster
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Description
Ground Ground
Hand-held Hand-held
Fixed-site Fixed-site
High- High-
Handheld, Handheld,
vehicle and vehicle and
radios radios
and maritime and maritime
performance performance
dismounted, dismounted,
helicopter helicopter
radios radios
aircraft (fixed and aircraft (fixed and ~~Smal~~
Small radios radios
wing) radios wing) radios
Form Form Factora Factora
radios radios
Service
U.S. Army U.S. Army
U.S. Special U.S. Special
U.S. Navy U.S. Navy
U.S. Air U.S. Air
U.S. Army U.S. Army
Lead
Operations Operations
Force Force
Command Command
(USSOCOM) (USSOCOM)
Source: Reproduced from CRS Report RL33161, Reproduced from CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future
Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. , by Andrew Feickert.
Note: FormForm factor radios are factor radios are ~~essential y~~ essentially miniaturized radios that soldiersminiaturized radios that soldiers would carry, as would carry, as ~~wel~~ well as radios for as radios for
weight- and power-constrained platforms. weight- and power-constrained platforms.
As discussed below, JTRS experienced a number of difficulties during development. These issues As discussed below, JTRS experienced a number of difficulties during development. These issues
may be relevant for future JADC2 development. may be relevant for future JADC2 development.
Size and Weight Constraints and Limited Range
According to a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) reportAccording to a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report:
To realize the full capabilities To realize the full capabilities of the Widebandof the Wideband ~~Networking~~ Networking Waveform,Waveform,8993 including including
transmissiontransmission ~~range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amounts of memory~~ range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amounts of memory and and
processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The
added size and weight are the results of efforts to ensure the electronic parts in the radio added size and weight are the results of efforts to ensure the electronic parts in the radio
are not overheatedare not overheated by the electricity neededby the electricity needed to power the additionalto power the additional memory and memory and
processing.processing. ~~Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet~~ Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size, size,
weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three
kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking
Waveform…. The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power consumption exceeds Waveform…. The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power consumption exceeds
helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 percent.helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 percent.9094
The inability The inability to meet these fundamental design and performance standards raised concerns that to meet these fundamental design and performance standards raised concerns that
Cluster One may not have been able to accommodate additional waveforms as intended (the plan Cluster One may not have been able to accommodate additional waveforms as intended (the plan
was for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms) and that it may be too bulky or was for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms) and that it may be too bulky or
heavy to fit into the stringently weight- and size-constrained Future Combat System (FCS) heavy to fit into the stringently weight- and size-constrained Future Combat System (FCS)
Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs),Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs),~~91 as wel~~ 95 as well as the Army’s helicopter fleet. Some observers were as the Army’s helicopter fleet. Some observers were
concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the Army would significantly “dumb down” concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the Army would significantly “dumb down”

~~89 T he~~ 93 The Wideband Networking Waveform is described Wideband Networking Waveform is described as the core of the as the core of the ~~JT RS~~JTRS networking capability and is intended to networking capability and is intended to
operate across a wideoperate across a wide range of the radio frequency spectrumrange of the radio frequency spectrum , from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz),, from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz), and and
wouldwould provide increased routing and networking capability—as much asprovide increased routing and networking capability—as much as a hundreda hundred times more than existing times more than existing
communications systems. communications systems.
~~90 United States~~ 94 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
~~House~~ House of Representatives, “of Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: ResolvingDefense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked
Communications Capabilities isCommunications Capabilities is Key to FieldingKey to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15. Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.
9195 FCS FCS Manned GroundManned Ground ~~Vehicles (MGVs)~~ Vehicles (MGVs) are envisioned as a family of eight different combat vehicles—with some are envisioned as a family of eight different combat vehicles—with some
having more than one variation—based on a common platform and designedhaving more than one variation—based on a common platform and designed to be transported by U.S. Air Force to be transported by U.S. Air Force
transport aircraft and deployed directly into combat with little or no posttransport aircraft and deployed directly into combat with little or no post -flight reconfiguration. MGVs would-flight reconfiguration. MGVs would be be
equippedequipped with various passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same with various passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same
survivability as the current heavy armor force. survivability as the current heavy armor force.
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Cluster One performance specifications. Cluster One performance specifications.9296 According to the Army, however, it made progress in According to the Army, however, it made progress in
terms of reducing Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range; terms of reducing Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range;
however, incorporating however, incorporating al all of the desired waveforms into Cluster One proved to be difficult.of the desired waveforms into Cluster One proved to be difficult.9397
Cluster Five radios also reportedly experienced similar size, weight, and power difficulties; these Cluster Five radios also reportedly experienced similar size, weight, and power difficulties; these
difficulties were more pronounced because some Cluster Five versions were supposed to weigh difficulties were more pronounced because some Cluster Five versions were supposed to weigh
no more than 1 pound.no more than 1 pound.94
98 Security
Security for JTRS emerged as a significant developmental difficulty. According to one expert, one Security for JTRS emerged as a significant developmental difficulty. According to one expert, one
of the program’s biggest problems was security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is of the program’s biggest problems was security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is
software-based and is, therefore, vulnerable to hacking.”software-based and is, therefore, vulnerable to hacking.”9599 Computer security experts Computer security experts ~~general y~~generally
agree that software used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security agree that software used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security
offers absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS required applications offers absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS required applications
to operate at multipleto operate at multiple levels of security; in order to meet this requirement, developers had to levels of security; in order to meet this requirement, developers had to
account not only for traditional radio security measures but also for computer and network account not only for traditional radio security measures but also for computer and network
security measures.security measures.96100 In addition, National Security Agency (NSA) In addition, National Security Agency (NSA)97101 security concerns about JTRS security concerns about JTRS
interface with radio systems of U.S. interface with radio systems of U.S. ~~al ies~~allies posed developmental posed developmental ~~chal enges.98~~
challenges.102 Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems
Some analysts expressed concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with Some analysts expressed concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with
legacy radios may have been legacy radios may have been ~~technological y~~technologically infeasible. infeasible.99103 Reportedly, early program attempts at Reportedly, early program attempts at
cross-cross-~~banding100~~banding104 to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex. to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex.
Current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform to link with Current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform to link with
legacy radio frequencies.legacy radio frequencies.~~101~~105 One report suggested that while the Wideband Networking Waveform One report suggested that while the Wideband Networking Waveform
could receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot receive signals from JTRS. To could receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot receive signals from JTRS. To
rectify this situation, the Army considered using 19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS rectify this situation, the Army considered using 19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS

~~92 Sandra~~ 96 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious GoalsI. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for Newfor New ~~T actical~~ Tactical Radio,” Radio,” National Defense, National Defense , National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, AugustIndustrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005. 2005.
93 97 Meeting between CRS Meeting between CRS ~~and~~ and the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of Integration FCS the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of Integration FCS
Office, September 15, 2005. Office, September 15, 2005.
~~94 United States~~98 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
~~House~~ House of Representatives, “of Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: ResolvingDefense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the ArmyDevelopmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked ’s Networked
Communications Capabilities isCommunications Capabilities is Key to FieldingKey to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19. Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19.
9599 Buxbaum, Buxbaum, p. 32. p. 32.
96100 Buxbaum, Buxbaum, p. 32. p. 32.
~~97 T he~~101 The National Security Agency is the U.S. government National Security Agency is the U.S. government ’s cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, and ’s cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, and
performs highly specializedperforms highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce ~~forei gn~~foreign signals signals
intelligence information. intelligence information.
98102 Buxbaum, Buxbaum, p. 32. p. 32.
99103 Sandra Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious GoalsI. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for Newfor New ~~T actical~~ Tactical Radio,” Radio,” National Defense, National Defense , National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, AugustIndustrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005. 2005.
~~100~~104 Cross-banding Cross-banding is is a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then retransmitting them on a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then retransmitting them on
previously designatedpreviously designated channels, thereby allowingchannels, thereby allowing communications systems operating on different bands to communications systems operating on different bands to
communicate with one another. communicate with one another.
~~101~~ 105 Sandra Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious GoalsI. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for Newfor New ~~T actical~~ Tactical Radio,” Radio,” National Defense, National Defense , National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, AugustIndustrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005. 2005.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2021

Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress

transmissions to legacy systems. transmissions to legacy systems.~~102~~106 Incorporating this number of different waveforms into a JTRS Incorporating this number of different waveforms into a JTRS
radio would have significantly increased memory and processing power requirements which, in radio would have significantly increased memory and processing power requirements which, in
turn, would have increased JTRS size, weight, and power requirements.turn, would have increased JTRS size, weight, and power requirements.

Author Information

John R. Hoehn John R. Hoehn

Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs

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~~102 Jen DiMascio, “JT RS Cluster~~ 106 Jen DiMascio, “JTRS Cluster One to Play Role, Execs Say:One to Play Role, Execs Say: Exercise to Exercise to ~~T est~~Test Mettle of Early FCS Mettle of Early FCS ~~T echnologies~~Technologies Will Will
BeginBegin this Year,” this Year,” Inside the ~~Arm y~~Army, vol. 17, no. 25, June 27, 2005, p. 7. , vol. 17, no. 25, June 27, 2005, p. 7.
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