NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress

NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress
MarchJune 3, 2021 3, 2021
Heads of state and government from the 30 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Heads of state and government from the 30 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) are due to meet in Organization (NATO) are due to meet in May or June 2021Brussels, Belgium, on June 14, 2021, to discuss security to discuss security
Paul Belkin
chal engeschallenges and consider proposals to bolster political cohesion within the and consider proposals to bolster political cohesion within the al iance. When
alliance. When allied Analyst in European Affairs Analyst in European Affairs
al ied leaders last met in London, United Kingdom, in December 2019, deliberations leaders last met in London, United Kingdom, in December 2019, deliberations
exposed
exposed heightened politicalheightened political tension and divergent views on a number of issues. Former tension and divergent views on a number of issues. Former
President Trump’s criticisms of NATO and individualPresident Trump’s criticisms of NATO and individual European European al iesallies and his and his

Administration’s perceived Administration’s perceived lack of consultation with lack of consultation with al iesallies on key foreign policy issues were points of contention. on key foreign policy issues were points of contention.
Despite these tensions, the United States has continued to play a key role in advancing NATO’s Despite these tensions, the United States has continued to play a key role in advancing NATO’s respondresponse to a range to a range
of security of security chal engeschallenges. In the seven years since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine, the United . In the seven years since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine, the United
States has been an architect of NATO’s increased focus on deterring Russian aggression, including through the States has been an architect of NATO’s increased focus on deterring Russian aggression, including through the
deployment of an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of about 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States and Poland. deployment of an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of about 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States and Poland.
NATO also has bolstered its response to terrorist threats and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, NATO also has bolstered its response to terrorist threats and instability in the Middle East and North Africa,
primarily through partnerships and training activities. In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to primarily through partnerships and training activities. In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to
expand NATO’s training mission in Iraq, from its current level of about 500 trainers to expand NATO’s training mission in Iraq, from its current level of about 500 trainers to potential y potentially as many as as many as
4,000. In the coming months, the al ies4,000. The allies also are expected to also are expected to decide on the futurediscuss the end of NATO’s of NATO’s ongoing “train and “train and
assist” mission of about 10,000 troops assist” in Afghanistan; to address the potential security implications of Chinese in Afghanistan; to address the potential security implications of Chinese
investment and engagement in Europe; and to bolster resilience to nonmilitary investment and engagement in Europe; and to bolster resilience to nonmilitary security threats, ranging from pandemics to threats, ranging from pandemics to
climate change. climate change.
In response to recent transatlantic tensions and questions about NATO’s longer-term relevance, NATO Secretary In response to recent transatlantic tensions and questions about NATO’s longer-term relevance, NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to advance proposals to strengthen the General Jens Stoltenberg launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to advance proposals to strengthen the al iancealliance, both militarily and politically. At the June 14 summit, the allies are expected to consider Stoltenberg’s, both
militarily and political y. In 2021, he plans to present al ied leaders with recommendations to reinforce recommendations to reinforce al iancealliance
unity, broaden NATO’s approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order. Recommendations unity, broaden NATO’s approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order. Recommendations
could include updating NATO’s strategic concept, last updated in 2010, to better reflect today’s security could include updating NATO’s strategic concept, last updated in 2010, to better reflect today’s security
environment, environment, especial yespecially with respect to Russia and China; enhancing NATO’s capacity to counter nonmilitary with respect to Russia and China; enhancing NATO’s capacity to counter nonmilitary
threats; and strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-threats; and strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-
minded partners across the globe. minded partners across the globe.
President Biden has signaled support for Stoltenberg’s proposals and, more broadly, has pledged renewed U.S. President Biden has signaled support for Stoltenberg’s proposals and, more broadly, has pledged renewed U.S.
support for NATO and increased cooperation and consultation with NATO support for NATO and increased cooperation and consultation with NATO al iesallies. Although these statements have . Although these statements have
been welcomed across NATO, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its been welcomed across NATO, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its al ies allies could could
persist, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-standing concerns about defense persist, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-standing concerns about defense
spending and burden-sharing. U.S. spending and burden-sharing. U.S. al iesallies also may continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals also may continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals
experienced during the Trump Administration and concerns about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as experienced during the Trump Administration and concerns about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as
a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to “America First” policies by a future Administration. a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to “America First” policies by a future Administration.
Although many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burden- Although many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-
sharing, for example—Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent support for NATO. During the Trump sharing, for example—Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent support for NATO. During the Trump
Administration, congressional support at times was viewed by some as an effort to reassure Administration, congressional support at times was viewed by some as an effort to reassure al iesallies troubled by troubled by
President Trump’s criticisms of President Trump’s criticisms of the alliancethe al iance. Over the past several years, both chambers of Congress have passed . Over the past several years, both chambers of Congress have passed
legislation legislation reaffirming U.S. support for NATO (e.g., H.Res. 397, H.R. 676, H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232, and H.Res. reaffirming U.S. support for NATO (e.g., H.Res. 397, H.R. 676, H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232, and H.Res.
256 in the 115th Congress; S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 and H.R. 6395/P.256 in the 115th Congress; S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 and H.R. 6395/P.SL. 116-283 in the 116th Congress) and in some . 116-283 in the 116th Congress) and in some
cases sought to limit the President’s ability to withdraw from cases sought to limit the President’s ability to withdraw from NATO unilaterallyNATO unilateral y (H.R. 676 in the 115th; S. (H.R. 676 in the 115th; S.
1790/P.L. 116-92 in the 116th Congress). At the same time, Congress continues to assess NATO’s utility and value 1790/P.L. 116-92 in the 116th Congress). At the same time, Congress continues to assess NATO’s utility and value
to the United States, and some Members are concerned about key to the United States, and some Members are concerned about key chal engeschallenges facing NATO, including burden- facing NATO, including burden-
sharing, managing relations with Russia and China, and divergent threat perceptions within the sharing, managing relations with Russia and China, and divergent threat perceptions within the al iancealliance. .
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Key Defense and Security Chal enges Challenges ............................................................................................ 2
Deterring Russia ........................................................................................................................ 3
Transition in Afghanistan .......................................................................................................... 4
Expanding NATO Engagement in Iraq and Addressing Broader Instability in the
Middle East and North Africa ......................................................................................... 5....... 4
Assessing China’s Impact on NATO and Transatlantic Security .............................................. 5 5
Enhancing Resilience ................................................................................................................ 6 7
Defense Spending and Burden-Sharing ........................................................................................... 7
Enhancing Political Cohesion.......................................................................................................... 9 10
Concerns Regarding the U.S. Commitment to NATO ............................................................ 10 11
Tensions with Turkey .............................................................................................................. 12
Commitment to Democratic Values ........................................................................................ 14
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15

Figures
Figure 1. NATO Members and Dates of Accession ......................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Defense Spending by NATO Members, 2013-2020 ......................................................... 8 9

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 16 17


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Introduction
The United States was the driving proponent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) The United States was the driving proponent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
creation in 1949 and has been the unrivaled leader of the creation in 1949 and has been the unrivaled leader of the al iancealliance as it has evolved from a as it has evolved from a
collective defense organization of 12 members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a collective defense organization of 12 members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a
global y globally engaged security organization of 30 members (seengaged security organization of 30 members (see Figure 1)). Historically. Historical y, U.S. , U.S.
Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy that brings benefits ranging from peace and stability in Europe to the political and military policy that brings benefits ranging from peace and stability in Europe to the political and military
support of important support of important al iesallies, including many of the world’s most advanced militaries. During his , including many of the world’s most advanced militaries. During his
term in office, former President Donald Trump openly term in office, former President Donald Trump openly chal engedchallenged long-standing U.S. support for long-standing U.S. support for
NATO, however, arguing, among other things, that NATO was a “bad deal” for the United States.1NATO, however, arguing, among other things, that NATO was a “bad deal” for the United States.1
Although past U.S. presidents criticized burden-sharing dynamics within NATO, none did so as Although past U.S. presidents criticized burden-sharing dynamics within NATO, none did so as
stridently and publicly as Trump. Trump’s criticisms contributed to heightened political tensions stridently and publicly as Trump. Trump’s criticisms contributed to heightened political tensions
between the United States and Europe, prompting some between the United States and Europe, prompting some al iesallies to question his Administration’s to question his Administration’s
commitment to NATO and to criticize its perceived unilateralcommitment to NATO and to criticize its perceived unilateral approach to foreign policy issues. approach to foreign policy issues.
Trump Administration officials maintained that the United States remained committed to NATO, Trump Administration officials maintained that the United States remained committed to NATO,
highlightinghighlighting the Administration’s requests in 2017 and 2018 to increase funding for the U.S. force the Administration’s requests in 2017 and 2018 to increase funding for the U.S. force
presence in Europe and its efforts to secure defense-spending increases across the presence in Europe and its efforts to secure defense-spending increases across the al iance in
alliance in recent years. recent years.
Many Many al iesallies have welcomed President Joe Biden’s pledge to renew U.S. support for NATO and to have welcomed President Joe Biden’s pledge to renew U.S. support for NATO and to
prioritize consultation and cooperation with prioritize consultation and cooperation with al iesallies. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has . NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has
said the said the new U.Scurrentne U.S. Administration Administration presents “a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in presents “a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in
relations between Europe and North America.”2 relations between Europe and North America.”2 Al ied Allied heads of state and government are heads of state and government are
expected to meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, to meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, in May or June 2021on June 14, 2021, to set to set
NATO’s agenda for the coming year. Key NATO’s agenda for the coming year. Key al ied allied priorities include the following: priorities include the following:
 Deterring  Deterring Russian aggression in Europe, including Russia’s use of cyber and , including Russia’s use of cyber and
hybrid warfare tactics; hybrid warfare tactics;
 Deciding on  Deciding on NATO’s future in Afghanistan, especial y in light of recent
agreements between the United States, the Taliban, and the government of
Afghanistan in light of the April 2021 announcements that NATO and the United States would be ending military and training operations in the country by September of this year; ;
 Confronting  Confronting instability in the Middle East and North Africa, including , including
through an expanded mission in Iraq; through an expanded mission in Iraq;
 Responding to potential  Responding to potential security challenges posed by China and growing and growing
Chinese investment in Europe; Chinese investment in Europe;
 Enhancing the  Enhancing the resilience of member states to respond to nonmilitary security of member states to respond to nonmilitary security
threats and crises including hybrid and cyber threats, pandemics, and climate threats and crises including hybrid and cyber threats, pandemics, and climate
change; and change; and
 Enhancing  Enhancing political cohesion and consultation within the and consultation within the al iancealliance—Stoltenberg —Stoltenberg
plans to present proposals to reinforce unity within NATO, broaden the plans to present proposals to reinforce unity within NATO, broaden the al iancealliance’s ’s
approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order of which approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order of which
NATO has been a part since the end of the Second World War. NATO has been a part since the end of the Second World War.

1 T essa 1 Tessa Berenson, “Europe Worries as President Berenson, “Europe Worries as President T rumpTrump Heads to Heads to NAT ONATO Summit,” Summit,” Time, July 10, 2018. , July 10, 2018.
2 2 NAT ONATO, “Online Press Conference by , “Online Press Conference by NAT ONATO Secretary General Stoltenberg Following Secretary General Stoltenberg Following t he the First Day of the Meetings First Day of the Meetings
of of NAT ONATO Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181560.htm. Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181560.htm.
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NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress

Congress has consistently supported NATO and U.S. leadership of the Congress has consistently supported NATO and U.S. leadership of the al iancealliance, including as , including as al iedallied
concerns about the U.S. commitment to NATO increased during the Trump Administration. concerns about the U.S. commitment to NATO increased during the Trump Administration.
Nevertheless, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its Nevertheless, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its al iesallies could could
persist in several key areas, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-persist in several key areas, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-
standing concerns about defense spending and burden-sharing. Furthermore, some standing concerns about defense spending and burden-sharing. Furthermore, some al iesallies may may
continue to question U.S. credibility as a leader and continue to question U.S. credibility as a leader and al yally in light of the policy reversals in light of the policy reversals
experienced during the Trump Administration, ongoing U.S. politicalexperienced during the Trump Administration, ongoing U.S. political fragmentation, and concerns fragmentation, and concerns
about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a
return to “America First” policies by a future Administration. return to “America First” policies by a future Administration.
Figure 1. NATO Members and Dates of Accession

Source: CongressionalCongressional Research Service. Research Service.
Key Defense and Security Challenges
When NATO heads of state and government last met in London in 2019, the When NATO heads of state and government last met in London in 2019, the al ies allies stressed their stressed their
commitment to advancing existing readiness and deterrence initiatives and to confronting commitment to advancing existing readiness and deterrence initiatives and to confronting
emerging security emerging security chal engeschallenges, including by declaring space as an operational domain for NATO. , including by declaring space as an operational domain for NATO.
The The al iesallies also reinforced their support of NATO’s ongoing mission in Afghanistan and other also reinforced their support of NATO’s ongoing mission in Afghanistan and other
counterterrorism efforts and discussed the implications for NATO of China’s efforts to deepen counterterrorism efforts and discussed the implications for NATO of China’s efforts to deepen
economic and political ties with Europe (see text box below for more on the London Leaders’ economic and political ties with Europe (see text box below for more on the London Leaders’
Meeting). In 2021, NATO leaders are expected to continue to address these issues while also Meeting). In 2021, NATO leaders are expected to continue to address these issues while also
advancing initiativesadvancing initiatives to enhance societal resilience to nonmilitary threats, including pandemics, to enhance societal resilience to nonmilitary threats, including pandemics,
building on lessons learned during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.building on lessons learned during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
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Outcomes of the 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting
Heads of state and government from NATO’s Heads of state and government from NATO’s 30 member30 member states last met in London,states last met in London, United Kingdom (UK), in United Kingdom (UK), in
DecemberDecember 2019. NATO and U.S. officials2019. NATO and U.S. officials highlighted the fol owing key deliverableshighlighted the fol owing key deliverables from from the London Leaders’ the London Leaders’
Meeting: Meeting:
 
Completion of a new Readiness Initiative, under which the Completion of a new Readiness Initiative, under which the al iancealliance would have at its disposal 30 mechanized would have at its disposal 30 mechanized
battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vesselsbattalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days. ready to use within 30 days.
 
Declaration of space as a new operational domain for NATO and advances in combatting cyber and hybrid Declaration of space as a new operational domain for NATO and advances in combatting cyber and hybrid
threats, including establishing new baseline requirementsthreats, including establishing new baseline requirements for telecommunicationsfor telecommunications infrastructure. infrastructure.
 
Increased defense spending by European Increased defense spending by European al ies allies and Canada. and Canada.
 
Renewed commitment Renewed commitment to NATO’sto NATO’s mission mission in Afghanistan and counterterrorismin Afghanistan and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and efforts in the Middle East and
North Africa. North Africa.
 
Agreement Agreement to assessto assess China’s impact on NATOChina’s impact on NATO and transatlantic security. and transatlantic security.
 
Initiation of a new “forward-looking Initiation of a new “forward-looking reflection processreflection process … to further strengthen NATO’s political… to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension dimension
including consultation.” including consultation.”
Source: NATO, NATO, London Declaration,, December December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_171584.htm. official_texts_171584.htm.
Deterring Russia
Since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has renewed its Since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has renewed its
focus on territorial defense and deterring Russian aggression. Among other measures, NATO focus on territorial defense and deterring Russian aggression. Among other measures, NATO
member states have deployed an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) totaling about 4,500 troops member states have deployed an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) totaling about 4,500 troops
to the three Balticto the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland; established a “Tailored States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland; established a “Tailored
Forward Presence” in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Black Sea; increased military exercises and Forward Presence” in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Black Sea; increased military exercises and
training activities in Central and Eastern Europe; and established new NATO command structures training activities in Central and Eastern Europe; and established new NATO command structures
in six Central and Eastern European countries.3in six Central and Eastern European countries.3
In 2019, the In 2019, the al iesallies announced progress on several new initiatives intended to enhance NATO’s announced progress on several new initiatives intended to enhance NATO’s
readiness to respond swiftly to an attack on a NATO member, including by reinforcing the EFP readiness to respond swiftly to an attack on a NATO member, including by reinforcing the EFP
battlegroups. A cornerstone of these efforts is the so-battlegroups. A cornerstone of these efforts is the so-cal edcalled Four-Thirties Readiness Initiative, Four-Thirties Readiness Initiative,
proposed by the United States in 2018, under which NATO should have 30 mechanized proposed by the United States in 2018, under which NATO should have 30 mechanized
battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days. battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.
Although the Although the al iesallies have continued to support and contribute to NATO deterrence initiatives, have continued to support and contribute to NATO deterrence initiatives,
some analysts question the effectiveness and sustainability of these efforts. Several studies have some analysts question the effectiveness and sustainability of these efforts. Several studies have
concluded that as currently postured, NATO forces would struggle to defend NATO’s most concluded that as currently postured, NATO forces would struggle to defend NATO’s most
vulnerable vulnerable al iesallies, for example the Baltic States, from a Russian attack. Some , for example the Baltic States, from a Russian attack. Some al iesallies, including , including
Poland and the Baltic States, have urged other NATO members to deploy more forces to the Poland and the Baltic States, have urged other NATO members to deploy more forces to the
region to reinforce the region to reinforce the al iancealliance’s deterrence posture. Others stress the importance of enhancing ’s deterrence posture. Others stress the importance of enhancing
military mobility to respond quickly to an attack in the eastern part of the military mobility to respond quickly to an attack in the eastern part of the al iancealliance. Critics also . Critics also
highlight the importance of broadening NATO’s deterrence concept to include countering cyber highlight the importance of broadening NATO’s deterrence concept to include countering cyber
and hybrid attacks, including disinformation campaigns.4 and hybrid attacks, including disinformation campaigns.4

3 NAT O 3 NATO, , Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast, updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/, updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_136388.htm. natohq/topics_136388.htm.
4 See, 4 See, for example, David A. Shlapak andfor example, David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, RAND , RAND
Corporation, February 2016; and Melanie W. Sisson,Corporation, February 2016; and Melanie W. Sisson, “It’s “It’s T imeTime to Rethink to Rethink NAT ONATO’s Deterrent Strategy,” War on the ’s Deterrent Strategy,” War on the
Rocks, December 6, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/wantRocks, December 6, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/want -to-deter-russia-think-mobility-not-presence/. -to-deter-russia-think-mobility-not-presence/.
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Other Other al ies, allies, including leaders in Western European countries such as Germany, Italy, and France, including leaders in Western European countries such as Germany, Italy, and France,
have stressed the importance of a dual-track approach to Russia that complements deterrence with have stressed the importance of a dual-track approach to Russia that complements deterrence with
dialogue. These dialogue. These al iesallies contend that efforts to rebuild cooperative relations with Moscow should contend that efforts to rebuild cooperative relations with Moscow should
receive as much attention as efforts to deter Russia. Accordingly, these receive as much attention as efforts to deter Russia. Accordingly, these al iesallies are reluctant to are reluctant to
endorse permanently deploying troops in countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the endorse permanently deploying troops in countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the
Soviet Union due to concerns that this would violate the terms of the 1997 NATO-Russia Soviet Union due to concerns that this would violate the terms of the 1997 NATO-Russia
Founding Act; in consideration of these terms, NATO’s EFP has been referred to as “continuous” Founding Act; in consideration of these terms, NATO’s EFP has been referred to as “continuous”
but rotational rather than “permanent.”5but rotational rather than “permanent.”5
Transition in Afghanistan In April 2021, NATO announced that it would end its mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces in conjunction with U.S. plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by September 2021. The allies began withdrawing forces from the country in May 2021 and plan to complete the withdrawal by the end of summer. Secretary General Stoltenberg has stressed that although the alliance is ending its military operations in the country, NATO will continue to support the Afghan government, including by providing funding and capacity-building advice to Afghan security forces and through possible out-of-country training of Afghan security personnel.6 Some observers and political leaders in NATO member states have raised concerns, however, about the longer-term implications for NATO of a potentially deteriorating security environment and increased political instability after NATO’s ongoing withdrawal.7 Transition in Afghanistan
NATO al ies have expressed continued support for the ongoing NATO training mission in
Afghanistan, but NATO’s future presence could be determined largely by the February 2020
agreement between the United States and the Taliban, in which the United States c ommitted to
withdraw al al ied and partner forces by May 1, 2021.6 In January 2015, following the end of its
In January 2015, following the end of its 11-year-long combat mission in Afghanistan, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission 11-year-long combat mission in Afghanistan, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission
(RSM) to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Between 2015 and late 2018, NATO (RSM) to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Between 2015 and late 2018, NATO
al iesallies and partners steadily matched U.S. increases in troop levels to RSM. Over the past year, and partners steadily matched U.S. increases in troop levels to RSM. Over the past year,
however, the mission’s force strength has dropped from about 16,500 troops in February 2020 to however, the mission’s force strength has dropped from about 16,500 troops in February 2020 to
about 9,500 troops. As of February 2021, about 7,100 of the 9,592 troops contributing to RSM about 9,500 troops. As of February 2021, about 7,100 of the 9,592 troops contributing to RSM
were from NATO members and partner countries other than the United States. After the United were from NATO members and partner countries other than the United States. After the United
States (2,500 troops), the top contributors to the mission were Germany (1,300), Italy (895), non-States (2,500 troops), the top contributors to the mission were Germany (1,300), Italy (895), non-
NATO-member Georgia (860), and the United Kingdom (750).NATO-member Georgia (860), and the United Kingdom (750).7
NATO leaders welcomed the February 29, 2020, joint declaration between the United States and
Afghanistan and agreement between the United States and the Taliban in pursuit of a peaceful
settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Secretary General Stoltenberg said NATO would
implement adjustments, including troop reductions, to its mission as outlined in the agreements;
he stressed, however, that such actions would be “conditions-based.” Some European al ies
expressed concern that the Trump Administration did not consult them on possible drawdown
plans and cal ed for any such plans be carried out in close coordination with the al ies.8
At a February 2021 meeting of NATO defense ministers, the al ies agreed to a U.S. request to
postpone decisions on additional troop withdrawals until the Biden Administration completes a
review of U.S. force posture8 Expanding NATO Engagement in Iraq and Addressing Broader Instability in the Middle East and North Africa Over the past several years, some NATO members, including the United States, have called on the alliance to do more to counter terrorist and other security threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). NATO has launched new initiatives to address instability in the MENA region, but progress has been limited, due in part to challenging political and security and security conditions on the ground and a lack of consensus within NATO on the appropriate role for the alliance. New NATO initiatives launched since 2018 include a training mission in Iraq; the 5 In the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the allies agreed conditions in Afghanistan. European al ies and Canada
uniformly welcomed U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s commitment to consult closely
with them on any additional force posture decisions.9 Most analysts question the likelihood of a
sustained NATO military presence in Afghanistan without continued U.S. participation. Not only
do the al ies rely on U.S. force protection capabilities, but many have viewed their participation in

5 In the NAT O-Russia Founding Act, the allies agreed not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” in not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” in
countries that joined countries that joined NAT ONATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 6 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers’ Session,” June 1, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_184463.htm?selectedLocale=en. 7 Lorne Cook, “AP Interview: NATO Chief Says Afghan Forces Can Cope Alone,” Associated Press, May 27, 2021. 8 NATO, Resolute Support Mission: Key Facts and Figures, February 2021, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2021-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf. Congressional Research Service 4 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
6 For more on the military drawdown, see CRS Report R46670, U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently
Asked Questions, coordinated by Clayton T homas.
7 NAT O, Resolute Support Mission: Key Facts and Figures, February 2021, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/
assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2021-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf.
8 See, for example, “Germany Worried at Possible U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” DeutscheWelle, December 28,
2018; Ben Farmer, “Britain Left in Dark over U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Telegraph, December 21, 2018.
9 NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the Second Day of the
Meetings of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181561.htm.
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the mission largely as an act of solidarity with the United States and implicitly contingent on U.S.
participation.
Expanding NATO Engagement in Iraq and Addressing Broader
Instability in the Middle East and North Africa
Over the past several years, some NATO members, including the United States, have cal ed on
the al iance to do more to counter terrorist and other security threats emanating from the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA). NATO has launched new initiatives to address instability in the
MENA region, but progress has been limited, due in part to chal enging political and security
conditions on the ground and a lack of consensus within NATO on the appropriate role for the
al iance. New NATO initiatives launched since 2018 include a training mission in Iraq; the
“Package on the South,” a range of programs aiming to assist crisis management operations and “Package on the South,” a range of programs aiming to assist crisis management operations and
partner with governments to build security capacity; and establishment of a NATO Regional Hub partner with governments to build security capacity; and establishment of a NATO Regional Hub
for the South in Naples, Italy, to coordinate NATO responses to crises emanating from the MENA for the South in Naples, Italy, to coordinate NATO responses to crises emanating from the MENA
region.region.109 NATO also has deployed aerial NATO also has deployed aerial surveil ancesurveillance aircraft (Airborne Warning and Control aircraft (Airborne Warning and Control
System, or AWACS) to assist the global coalition fighting the Islamic State terrorist organization. System, or AWACS) to assist the global coalition fighting the Islamic State terrorist organization.
In February 2021, NATO defense ministers announced plans for a significant but gradual In February 2021, NATO defense ministers announced plans for a significant but gradual
expansion of the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), a noncombat advisory and training mission expansion of the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), a noncombat advisory and training mission
established in Baghdad in 2018.established in Baghdad in 2018.1110 According to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, the mission According to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, the mission
could increase from 500 to up to 4,000 personnel.could increase from 500 to up to 4,000 personnel.1211 NMI was launched at the request of the Iraqi NMI was launched at the request of the Iraqi
government and is focused on helping to strengthen Iraqi security institutions and armed forces to government and is focused on helping to strengthen Iraqi security institutions and armed forces to
assist their fight against terrorism. NATO forces do not deploy with their Iraqi counterparts, and assist their fight against terrorism. NATO forces do not deploy with their Iraqi counterparts, and
al all NMI activities are approved by the Iraqi government. NATO officials say the enhanced NMI activities are approved by the Iraqi government. NATO officials say the enhanced
mission mission wil will partner with more Iraqi security institutions and expand activities beyond Baghdad. partner with more Iraqi security institutions and expand activities beyond Baghdad.
Political instability, changing security conditions, and the COVID-19 pandemic have at various Political instability, changing security conditions, and the COVID-19 pandemic have at various
times caused NATO to curb or suspend operations, and Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasizes times caused NATO to curb or suspend operations, and Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasizes
that the mission’s expansion that the mission’s expansion wil will be conditions-based.be conditions-based.
Several factors have limited enhanced NATO engagement in the MENA region. These factors Several factors have limited enhanced NATO engagement in the MENA region. These factors
include a belief among some include a belief among some al iesallies that the EU is the appropriate institution to lead Europe’s that the EU is the appropriate institution to lead Europe’s
response to terrorism and migration issues and a related reluctance to cede leadership on these response to terrorism and migration issues and a related reluctance to cede leadership on these
issues to NATO. France, for example, has advocated strong European responses to terrorism and issues to NATO. France, for example, has advocated strong European responses to terrorism and
conflict in the Middle East but has conflict in the Middle East but has general ygenerally opposed a larger role for NATO. Some opposed a larger role for NATO. Some al iesallies also also
disagree on what the appropriate response should be to some of the security disagree on what the appropriate response should be to some of the security chal engeschallenges in the in the
MENA region, with some appearing hesitant to involve NATO in a way that could be seen as MENA region, with some appearing hesitant to involve NATO in a way that could be seen as
endorsing military action. endorsing military action.
Assessing China’s Impact on NATO and Transatlantic Security
In a February 2021 speech at the Munich Security Conference, President Biden In a February 2021 speech at the Munich Security Conference, President Biden cal edcalled on the on the
United States and Europe to “prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with United States and Europe to “prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with

10 NAT O, “Fact Sheet: Brussels Summit Key Decisions, 11-12 July 2018,” July 2018.
11 NAT O Fact Sheet, “NAT O Mission Iraq,” updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/144032.htm.
12 NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the Second Day of the
Meetings of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
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China.”13 Biden Administration officials have indicated they share the concerns of the Trump
Administration and some Members of Congress who have urged NATO to assess the security
implications of growing Chinese investment in Europe and to work more proactively to counter
potential negative impacts on transatlantic security.14 U.S. officials and some Members of
Congress have expressed particular concern about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure
and telecommunications systems, such as 5G networks.
At their 2019 meeting in London, NATO leaders formal y acknowledged for the first time in a
high-level NATO declaration that China’s “growing influence and international policies” pose
potential “chal enges” to NATO.15 Since then, the al iance has taken steps to address some
specific concerns, and Secretary General Stoltenberg has increasingly singled out potential
chal enges posed by China. In February 2021, Stoltenberg identified the rise of China as a
“defining issue for the transatlantic community” and cal ed on the al ies to enhance cooperation
with like-minded democracies around the world, “so we can protect the rules-based order, which
is undermined by countries that do not share our values, like Russia and China.”16
In 2019, NATO agreed to update its baseline requirements for civilian telecommunications to
reflect emerging concerns about 5G technology.17 The al ies agreed to assess the risks to
China.”12 Biden Administration officials have indicated they share the concerns of the Trump Administration and some Members of Congress who have urged NATO to assess the security implications of growing Chinese investment in Europe and to work more proactively to counter potential negative impacts on transatlantic security.13 U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed particular concern about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure and telecommunications systems, such as 5G networks. At their 2019 meeting in London, NATO leaders formally acknowledged for the first time in a high-level NATO declaration that China’s “growing influence and international policies” pose 9 NATO, “Fact Sheet: Brussels Summit Key Decisions, 11-12 July 2018,” July 2018. 10 NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO Mission Iraq,” updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/144032.htm. 11 NATO, “Online Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the Second Day of the Meetings of NATO Defense Ministers,” February 19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181561.htm. 12 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021. 13 The Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy expressed concern that, “China is gaining a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure.” White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 47. Congressional Research Service 5 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress potential “challenges” to NATO.14 Since then, the alliance has taken steps to address some specific concerns, and Secretary General Stoltenberg has increasingly singled out potential challenges posed by China. In February 2021, Stoltenberg identified the rise of China as a “defining issue for the transatlantic community” and called on the allies to enhance cooperation with like-minded democracies around the world, “so we can protect the rules-based order, which is undermined by countries that do not share our values, like Russia and China.”15 In 2019, NATO agreed to update its baseline requirements for civilian telecommunications to reflect emerging concerns about 5G technology.16 The allies agreed to assess the risks to communications systems associated with cyber threats, and the consequences of foreign communications systems associated with cyber threats, and the consequences of foreign
ownership, control, or direct investment. Although the EU is attempting to develop common ownership, control, or direct investment. Although the EU is attempting to develop common
guidelines to govern contracting decisions on 5G networks, these decisions would remain the guidelines to govern contracting decisions on 5G networks, these decisions would remain the
prerogative of individualprerogative of individual national governments.national governments.
U.S. officials have warned European U.S. officials have warned European al iesallies and partners that using Huawei or other Chinese 5G and partners that using Huawei or other Chinese 5G
equipment could impede equipment could impede intel igence intelligence sharing with the United States due to fears of compromised sharing with the United States due to fears of compromised
network security. Although some network security. Although some al iesallies, such as Germany and Italy, have said they would not , such as Germany and Italy, have said they would not
prevent Chinese companies from bidding on 5G contracts, these prevent Chinese companies from bidding on 5G contracts, these al iesallies have stressed that they have stressed that they
would not contract with any companies that do not meet their national security requirements.would not contract with any companies that do not meet their national security requirements.1817 In In
2020, the United Kingdom announced it was banning Huawei from participating in its 5G 2020, the United Kingdom announced it was banning Huawei from participating in its 5G
network; other network; other al iesallies, such as Poland and Romania, have announced stringent security , such as Poland and Romania, have announced stringent security
requirements that would prevent Huawei’s participation. requirements that would prevent Huawei’s participation.
Despite U.S. concerns about China’s growing footprint in Europe, Biden Administration officials Despite U.S. concerns about China’s growing footprint in Europe, Biden Administration officials
have expressed optimism that the United States and Europe can work together to meet the various have expressed optimism that the United States and Europe can work together to meet the various
security and economic issues posed by a rising China. Analysts, too, cite numerous concerns security and economic issues posed by a rising China. Analysts, too, cite numerous concerns

13 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19,
2021.
14 T he T rump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy expressed concern that, “China is gaining a stra tegic
foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and
infrastructure.” White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 47.
15 NAT Oshared on both sides of the Atlantic and contend that joint U.S.-European pressure on China would be more effective than either partner’s individual dealings with China. Enhancing Resilience Whereas NATO has long focused on fostering strong militaries, allied leaders increasingly stress the importance of broader societal and economic resilience.18 In the coming year, NATO is expected to refine its baseline requirements for national resilience to reflect lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and concerns about the potential security impacts of an array of 14 NATO’s 2019 ’s 2019 London Declaration states, “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies states, “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies
present both opportunities and challenges that we need to addresspresent both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.” together as an alliance.” NAT ONATO, , London Declaration, ,
December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm. December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
16 NAT O15 NATO, “Remarks by , “Remarks by NAT ONATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021; and 19, 2021; and NAT ONATO, “Online Press Conference by , “Online Press Conference by NAT ONATO Secretary General Secretary General Stoltenberg FollowingStoltenberg Following the First Day of the First Day of
the Meetings of the Meetings of NAT ONATO Defense Ministers,” February Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181560.htm. opinions_181560.htm.
17 NAT O16 NATO, “Press Conference by , “Press Conference by NAT ONATO Secretary General Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg FollowingJens Stoltenberg Following the Meetings of the Meetings of NAT ONATO Defense Defense
Ministers,” October 25, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169945.htm?selectedLocale=en. Ministers,” October 25, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169945.htm?selectedLocale=en.
1817 Guy Guy Chazan and Nic Fildes,Chazan and Nic Fildes, “Germany Crackdown Set to Exclude“Germany Crackdown Set to Exclude Huawei Huawei from 5Gfrom 5G Rollout,” Rollout,” Financial Times, ,
September 30, 2020; GiuseppeSeptember 30, 2020; Giuseppe Fonte, “Italy Vetoes 5G Deal Between FastwebFonte, “Italy Vetoes 5G Deal Between Fastweb and China’s Huawei:and China’s Huawei: Sources,”Sources,” Reuters, October 23, 2020. 18 In the words of NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, “Increasingly, our security does not just rely on strong militaries. We need strong, resilient societies and economies too.” NATO, “Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on NATO 2030 and the Importance of Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond in the Next Decade and Beyond,” February 4, 2021. Congressional Research Service 6 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress nonmilitary threats, including disinformation campaigns and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.19 Secretary General Stoltenberg has specificallyReuters,
October 23, 2020.
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shared on both sides of the Atlantic and contend that joint U.S.-European pressure on China
would be more effective than either partner’s individual dealings with China.
Enhancing Resilience
Whereas NATO has long focused on fostering strong militaries, al ied leaders increasingly stress
the importance of broader societal and economic resilience.19 In the coming year, NATO is
expected to refine its baseline requirements for national resilience to reflect lessons learned from
the COVID-19 pandemic and concerns about the potential security impacts of an array of
nonmilitary threats, including disinformation campaigns and vulnerabilities in critical
infrastructure.20 Secretary General Stoltenberg has specifical y identified the need for more identified the need for more
resilient transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, including 5G and undersea cables, resilient transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, including 5G and undersea cables,
and for safer and more diverse supply lines, and for safer and more diverse supply lines, especial yespecially for fuel, food, and medical supplies. for fuel, food, and medical supplies.2120
NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
NATO has assisted NATO has assisted its memberits member states as they confront the COVID-19 pandemic. Although NATO states as they confront the COVID-19 pandemic. Although NATO traditional ytraditionally
focuses on responding to militaryfocuses on responding to military threats, the threats, the al iance possesses alliance possesses command-and-control and logisticscommand-and-control and logistics capabilities capabilities to to
coordinate multilateralcoordinate multilateral responses responses to a range of security to a range of security chal engeschallenges, including natural disasters, including natural disasters and pandemics. and pandemics.
NATO’s primaryNATO’s primary disaster responsedisaster response mechanism,mechanism, the Euro-Atlantic Disasterthe Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre Response Coordination Centre
(EADRCC), has coordinated NATO’s(EADRCC), has coordinated NATO’s pandemic response.pandemic response. Among other measures,Among other measures, NATO’s responseNATO’s response has has
included the fol owing: included the fol owing:
 
Arranging the acquisition and transportation of critical Arranging the acquisition and transportation of critical medical supplies and equipment to NATO members medical supplies and equipment to NATO members
and partner countries in need;and partner countries in need;
 
Coordinating military Coordinating military assistance to national civilian efforts to build hospitals,assistance to national civilian efforts to build hospitals, increase testing, transport increase testing, transport
patients and medicalpatients and medical personnel, and distribute medicalpersonnel, and distribute medical equipment; and equipment; and
 
Establishing the NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund to stockpile Establishing the NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund to stockpile medical equipment and supplies and to medical equipment and supplies and to
provide immediateprovide immediate relief to al ies relief to allies or partners in need.or partners in need.
Some observers Some observers argue that NATO’s pandemic response efforts may have boosted argue that NATO’s pandemic response efforts may have boosted al iedallied unity and cohesion during unity and cohesion during
a period when individual membera period when individual member states were taking divergent approaches to the crisisstates were taking divergent approaches to the crisis and accepting assistance and accepting assistance
from potential NATO adversaries,from potential NATO adversaries, including Russia and China. Other analysts warn that economicincluding Russia and China. Other analysts warn that economic fal out fallout from the from the
pandemic could negatively affect pandemic could negatively affect al iedallied defense budgets and that restrictions defense budgets and that restrictions on multilateralon multilateral military exercises military exercises and and
other NATO operations could reduce other NATO operations could reduce al iedallied readiness. readiness.
Sources: NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” February 2021, at NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” February 2021, at
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2102-factsheet-COVID-19_en.pdf;https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2102-factsheet-COVID-19_en.pdf; Elisabeth Elisabeth
Braw, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Should be NATO’s Moment,”Braw, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Should be NATO’s Moment,” Defense One,, March 31, 2020.March 31, 2020.
Defense Spending and Burden-Sharing
Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have long urged NATO Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have long urged NATO al ies allies to increase national to increase national
defense budgets to ensure more equitable distribution of defense responsibilities within the defense budgets to ensure more equitable distribution of defense responsibilities within the
al iancealliance. A primary focus of the Trump Administration’s NATO policy was to secure increased . A primary focus of the Trump Administration’s NATO policy was to secure increased

19 In the words of NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg, “Increasingly, our security does not just rely on strong
militaries. We need strong, resilient societies and economies too.” NAT O, “Opening Remarks by NAT O Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg on NAT O 2030 and the Importance of Strengthening the T ransatlantic Bond in the Next
Decade and Beyond,” February 4, 2021.
20 For background on NAT O’s baseline resilience requirements, see NAT Odefense spending in line with NATO targets. Although Secretary General Stoltenberg credited then-President Trump with playing a role in spurring recent allied defense spending increases, many of Trump’s critics, including European leaders, warned that his strong criticism of European allies was damaging NATO cohesion and credibility.21 The Biden Administration has signaled it will continue to prioritize calls for higher defense spending and more equitable burden-sharing arrangements, but officials have stressed that they will pursue a more consultative and collaborative approach with allies.22 In February 2021, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said he would seek allied approval to increase common funding for ongoing deterrence efforts in Eastern Europe in an effort to increase solidarity and enhance 19 For background on NATO’s baseline resilience requirements, see NATO, “Resilience and Article 3,” updated , “Resilience and Article 3,” updated
regularly, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm. regularly, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.
21 NAT O20 NATO, “Opening Remarks by , “Opening Remarks by NAT ONATO Secretary General Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Jens Stoltenberg on NAT ONATO 2030 and the Importance of 2030 and the Importance of
Strengthening Strengthening t he T ransatlanticthe Transatlantic Bond in the Next Decade and Beyond,” February Bond in the Next Decade and Beyond,” February 4, 2021. 21 David Wemer, “NATO’s Stoltenberg Credits Trump as Allies Increase Defense Spending,” Atlantic Council, July 11, 2018. 22 See, for example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “The U.S. Can’t Meet its Responsibilities Alone. That’s Why We Believe in NATO,” Washington Post, February 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 11 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress burden-sharing. Stoltenberg also has called for4, 2021.
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defense spending in line with NATO targets. Although Secretary General Stoltenberg credited
then-President Trump with playing a role in spurring recent al ied defense spending increases,
many of Trump’s critics, including European leaders, warned that his strong criticism of
European al ies was damaging NATO cohesion and credibility.22
The Biden Administration has signaled it wil continue to prioritize cal s for higher defense
spending and more equitable burden-sharing arrangements, but officials have stressed that they
wil pursue a more consultative and collaborative approach with al ies.23 In February 2021, NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg said he would seek al ied approval to increase common funding for
ongoing deterrence efforts in Eastern Europe in an effort to increase solidarity and enhance
burden-sharing. Stoltenberg also cal ed for the creation of a new NATO defense innovation
initiative to a new NATO defense innovation initiative to increase interoperability and increase interoperability and promoteaccelerate transatlantic cooperation on defense transatlantic cooperation on defense
innovation.innovation.2423
In 2006, NATO members In 2006, NATO members informal yinformally agreed to aim to agreed to aim to al ocateallocate at least 2% of gross domestic at least 2% of gross domestic
product (GDP) to their national defense budgets product (GDP) to their national defense budgets annual yannually and to devote at least 20% of national and to devote at least 20% of national
defense expenditure to procurement and related research and development. These targets were defense expenditure to procurement and related research and development. These targets were
formalized at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, when the formalized at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, when the al iesallies pledged to halt declines in defense pledged to halt declines in defense
expenditures and “move towards the 2% guideline within a decade.”expenditures and “move towards the 2% guideline within a decade.”2524
U.S. and NATO officials say they are encouraged that defense spending by European U.S. and NATO officials say they are encouraged that defense spending by European al iesallies and and
Canada has grown for seven consecutive years (seCanada has grown for seven consecutive years (see Figure 2). According to Secretary General ). According to Secretary General
Stoltenberg, European Stoltenberg, European al iesallies and Canada have added $190 and Canada have added $190 bil ion billion in defense spending since 2014; in defense spending since 2014;
the figure is expected to rise to $400 the figure is expected to rise to $400 bil ion billion by the end of 2024.by the end of 2024.2625 In 2014, 3 In 2014, 3 al iesallies met the 2% met the 2%
guideline; in 2021, 9 guideline; in 2021, 9 al iesallies are expected to have met the 2% guideline and 24 are expected to have met the 2% guideline and 24 al iesallies are expected are expected
to have met the 20% benchmark for spending on major equipment.to have met the 20% benchmark for spending on major equipment.27

22 David Wemer, “NAT O’s Stoltenberg Credits T rump as Allies Increase Defense Spending,” Atlantic Council, July
11, 2018.
23 See, for example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “T he U.S. Can’t Meet its Responsibilities Alone. T hat’s Why
We Believe in NAT O,” Washington Post, February 16, 2021.
24 NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NAT O Defense
Ministers on 17 and 18 February at NAT O Headquarters,” 26 Figure 2. Defense Spending by NATO Members, 2013-2020 Source: Created by CRS. Data from NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries, October 21, 2020. 23 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NATO Defense Ministers on 17 and 18 February at NATO Headquarters,” February 15, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/February 15, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181427.htm. opinions_181427.htm.
25 NAT O 24 NATO, , Wales Summit Declaration, September 5, 2014, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/, September 5, 2014, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm. official_texts_112964.htm.
26 NAT O25 NATO, “Online Press Conference by , “Online Press Conference by NAT ONATO Secretary General Stoltenberg Following Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the First Day of the Meetings the First Day of the Meetings
of of NAT ONATO Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181560.htm; Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181560.htm; NAT O,
NAT ONATO, NATO, “Press Conference by , “Press Conference by NAT ONATO Secretary General Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg FollowingJens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of the North the Meeting of the North A tlanticAtlantic
Council at the Level of Heads andCouncil at the Level of Heads and State and/or Government,” December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/State and/or Government,” December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/opinions_171554.htm. natohq/opinions_171554.htm.
27 NAT O26 NATO, “Press Conference by , “Press Conference by NAT ONATO Secretary General Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg FollowingJens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of the North the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council at the Level of HeadsAtlantic Council at the Level of Heads and State and/or Government,” December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/and State and/or Government,” December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/opinions_171554.htm; the nine allies expected to meet the 2% benchmark in 2021 are Estonia, France, en/natohq/opinions_171554.htm; the nine allies expected to meet the 2% benchmark in 2021 are Estonia, France,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States. NAT ONATO, , Defence Expenditure
of NATO Countries (2013-2020), October 21, 2020. , October 21, 2020.
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Figure 2. Defense Spending by NATO Members, 2013-2020

Source: Created by CRS. Data from NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries, October 21, 2020.
Although al al ied Although all allied governments agreed to the Wales commitments, many, including Germany and governments agreed to the Wales commitments, many, including Germany and
Italy, emphasize that Italy, emphasize that al ied allied contributions to ongoing NATO missions and the effectiveness of contributions to ongoing NATO missions and the effectiveness of
al ied allied military capabilities should be considered as important as total defense spending levels. For military capabilities should be considered as important as total defense spending levels. For
example, an example, an al yally spending less than 2% of GDP on defense could have more modern, effective spending less than 2% of GDP on defense could have more modern, effective
military capabilities than an military capabilities than an al yally that meets the 2% target but that meets the 2% target but al ocatesallocates most of that funding to most of that funding to
personnel costs and relatively littlepersonnel costs and relatively little to ongoing missions and modernization. to ongoing missions and modernization.
Analysts on both sides of the Atlantic also have argued that a relatively narrow focus on defense Analysts on both sides of the Atlantic also have argued that a relatively narrow focus on defense
inputs (i.e., the size of defense budgets) should be accompanied by an equal, if not greater, focus inputs (i.e., the size of defense budgets) should be accompanied by an equal, if not greater, focus
on defense outputs (i.e., military capabilities and the effectiveness of contributions to NATO on defense outputs (i.e., military capabilities and the effectiveness of contributions to NATO
missions and activities). The missions and activities). The al iancealliance’s target to devote at least 20% of each member’s national ’s target to devote at least 20% of each member’s national
defense expenditure to new equipment and related research and development reflects this goal. defense expenditure to new equipment and related research and development reflects this goal.
Secretary General Stoltenberg likewise has emphasized a broad approach to measuring Secretary General Stoltenberg likewise has emphasized a broad approach to measuring
contributions to the contributions to the al iancealliance, using a metric of “cash, capabilities, and contributions.”, using a metric of “cash, capabilities, and contributions.”28
27 Proponents of the broad approach Proponents of the broad approach additional yadditionally argue that an assessment of argue that an assessment of al iedallied contributions contributions
that takes into account factors beyond the 2% of GDP defense spending metric would be more that takes into account factors beyond the 2% of GDP defense spending metric would be more
appropriate given NATO’s wide-ranging strategic objectives, some of which may require appropriate given NATO’s wide-ranging strategic objectives, some of which may require
capabilities beyond the military sphere. capabilities beyond the military sphere.
In 2019, In 2019, al iedallied leaders approved a U.S. proposal to reduce assessed U.S. contributions, and to leaders approved a U.S. proposal to reduce assessed U.S. contributions, and to
increase German contributions, to NATO’s relatively increase German contributions, to NATO’s relatively smal small pot of pot of common funds. National . National
contributions to NATO’s common funds—about $3.1 contributions to NATO’s common funds—about $3.1 bil ionbillion total in 2021—pay for the day-to- total in 2021—pay for the day-to-
day operations of NATO headquarters, as day operations of NATO headquarters, as wel well as some collective NATO military assets and as some collective NATO military assets and
infrastructure. For the budget period from 2021 to 2024, the U.S. share of NATO’s common infrastructure. For the budget period from 2021 to 2024, the U.S. share of NATO’s common
funded budget is slated to decrease from 22% to about 16%, or about $500 mil ion.29

28 NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NAT O Defense
Ministers,” October 23, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169891.htm.
29 Percentage shares of the common funds are negotiated among the allies based on per capita income and other factors.
U.S. shares for the three funds have fallen over the past three decades. NAT O, Funding NATO, at https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.
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funded budget is slated to decrease from 22% to about 16%, or about $500 million.28
Enhancing Political Cohesion
Many NATO leaders have warned that heightened political tensions within the Many NATO leaders have warned that heightened political tensions within the al iance alliance over the over the
past several years could have lasting negative repercussions. Divergent views have emerged on a past several years could have lasting negative repercussions. Divergent views have emerged on a
range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, Turkey’s standing as a member range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, Turkey’s standing as a member
of the of the al iancealliance, EU security and defense policy, NATO’s relations with Russia, and , EU security and defense policy, NATO’s relations with Russia, and al iesallies’ ’
commitment to democratic values.commitment to democratic values.3029 Doubts about the Trump Administration’s support for NATO Doubts about the Trump Administration’s support for NATO
and disputes within the and disputes within the al iancealliance on whether and how to respond to policy disagreements have on whether and how to respond to policy disagreements have
prompted some to question NATO’s strategic direction and future.prompted some to question NATO’s strategic direction and future.3130 Although European Although European al iesallies
have welcomed President Biden’s pledge to enhance U.S. engagement in NATO, and with Europe have welcomed President Biden’s pledge to enhance U.S. engagement in NATO, and with Europe
more broadly, some analysts caution that lingering European concerns about U.S. credibility more broadly, some analysts caution that lingering European concerns about U.S. credibility
could hamper U.S.-European relations.
could hamper U.S.-European relations. 27 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NATO Defense Ministers,” October 23, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169891.htm. 28 Percentage shares of the common funds are negotiated among the allies based on per capita income and other factors. U.S. shares for the three funds have fallen over the past three decades. NATO, Funding NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm. 29 For a more detailed account of broader tensions in the transatlantic relationship, see CRS Report R45745, Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues, coordinated by Kristin Archick; for more on NATO’s relations with Russia, see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin. 30 See, for example, Joe Gould, “U.S., European Lawmakers Swipe Trump and Turkey in New Syria Joint Statement,” Defense News, October 21, 2019. Congressional Research Service 9 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress Throughout the course of the Trump Administration, Secretary General Stoltenberg stressed that Throughout the course of the Trump Administration, Secretary General Stoltenberg stressed that
disagreement among disagreement among al iesallies is not a new phenomenon and is not a new phenomenon and arguedunderscored that “Europe and North that “Europe and North
American are doing more together in NATO today than we have for decades.”American are doing more together in NATO today than we have for decades.”3231 More recently, More recently,
however, Stoltenberg has acknowledged that differences between Europe and the United States however, Stoltenberg has acknowledged that differences between Europe and the United States
have raised “serious questions about the strength of our have raised “serious questions about the strength of our al iancealliance on both sides of the Atlantic” and on both sides of the Atlantic” and
has pointed to the coming years as a “historic opportunity to build a stronger has pointed to the coming years as a “historic opportunity to build a stronger al iancealliance. To regain . To regain
trust, and reinforce our unity. Europe and North America working together in NATO, in strategic trust, and reinforce our unity. Europe and North America working together in NATO, in strategic
solidarity.”solidarity.”3332
When When al ied allied leaders met in London in 2019, they agreed to initiate a “forward-looking reflection leaders met in London in 2019, they agreed to initiate a “forward-looking reflection
process … to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.”process … to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.”3433 Secretary Secretary
General Stoltenberg has since launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to develop proposals to make General Stoltenberg has since launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to develop proposals to make
sure “NATO remains strong militarily, becomes even stronger sure “NATO remains strong militarily, becomes even stronger political ypolitically and takes a more global and takes a more global
approach.”approach.”3534 Stoltenberg Stoltenberg aimsplans to present his proposals to to present his proposals to al iedallied heads of state and government at heads of state and government at a
summit in Brussels during the first half of 2021the June 2021 NATO summit. He says his recommendations . He says his recommendations wil will focus on the focus on the
following three areas: following three areas:
  Reinforcing unity by increasing common funding for deterrence and the defense by increasing common funding for deterrence and the defense
of NATO territory, agreeing to political of NATO territory, agreeing to political consultations on consultations on al all issues affecting issues affecting
member states’ security, and updating NATO’s Strategic Concept—last updated member states’ security, and updating NATO’s Strategic Concept—last updated
in 2010—to “chart a common course going forward;” in 2010—to “chart a common course going forward;”
  Broadening NATO’s approach to security beyond the military sphere to beyond the military sphere to
include societal resilience, increasing collective investments to maintain NATO’s include societal resilience, increasing collective investments to maintain NATO’s
technological edge and interoperability, and addressing the security impact of technological edge and interoperability, and addressing the security impact of
climate change; and climate change; and

30 For a more detailed account of broader tensions in the transatlantic relationship, see CRS Report R45745,
Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues, coordinated by Kristin Archick; for more on NAT O’s relations
with Russia, see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin.
31 See, for example, Joe Gould, “U.S., European Lawmakers Swipe T rump and T urkey in New Syria Joint Statement,”
Defense News, October 21, 2019.
32 NAT O, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NAT O Foreign Affairs Ministers”; “T ranscript: Emmanuel Macron
in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.
33 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021.
34 NAT O, London Declaration, December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
35 NAT O, “NAT O 2030: Making a Strong Alliance Even Stronger,” at https://www.nato.int/nato2030/.
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 Defending the rules-based international order, and countering China’s and
Russia’s chal enges to this order, by strengthening NATO’s commitment to
democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-minded partners
across the globe.36
Concerns Regarding the U.S. Commitment to NATO
As noted, many analysts and al ied leaders questioned the Trump Administration’s commitment
to NATO and expressed concern that Trump’s criticisms of the al iance could cause lasting
damage to NATO cohesion and credibility. In addition to admonishing European al ies for failing
to meet agreed NATO defense spending targets, Trump repeatedly questioned NATO’s value to
the United States.37 Although he was not the first U.S. President to press the al ies to increase
defense spending, none did so as stridently and none cal ed into question the U.S. commitment to
NATO as openly or to the same extent as Trump.
Some NATO members contend that divergence between the United States and many European
al ies  Defending the rules-based international order, and countering China’s and Russia’s challenges to this order, by strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-minded partners across the globe.35 Concerns Regarding the U.S. Commitment to NATO As noted, many analysts and allied leaders questioned the Trump Administration’s commitment to NATO and expressed concern that Trump’s criticisms of the alliance could cause lasting damage to NATO cohesion and credibility. In addition to admonishing European allies for failing to meet agreed NATO defense spending targets, Trump repeatedly questioned NATO’s value to the United States.36 Although he was not the first U.S. President to press the allies to increase 31 NATO, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers”; “Transcript: Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019. 32 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February 19, 2021. 33 NATO, London Declaration, December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm. 34 NATO, “NATO 2030: Making a Strong Alliance Even Stronger,” at https://www.nato.int/nato2030/. 35 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February 19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181696.htm. 36 Atlantic Council, “Trump Again Questions U.S. Commitment to Defend NATO Allies,” December 12, 2017; Tessa Berenson, “Europe Worries as President Trump Heads to NATO Summit,” Time, July 10, 2018. Congressional Research Service 10 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress defense spending, none did so as stridently and none called into question the U.S. commitment to NATO as openly or to the same extent as Trump. Some NATO members contend that divergence between the United States and many European allies on a range of key foreign and security policy issues, from Iran’s nuclear program to fighting on a range of key foreign and security policy issues, from Iran’s nuclear program to fighting
the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria, impeded cooperation in NATO and exposed the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria, impeded cooperation in NATO and exposed
strategic rifts within the strategic rifts within the al iance.38alliance.37 In a widely reported November 2019 interview, French In a widely reported November 2019 interview, French
President Emmanuel Macron cited these divergences when he proclaimed that, “we are currently President Emmanuel Macron cited these divergences when he proclaimed that, “we are currently
experiencing the brain death of NATO.” Referring to concerns about the drawdown of U.S. forces experiencing the brain death of NATO.” Referring to concerns about the drawdown of U.S. forces
from Syria in October 2019 and subsequent military operations by Turkey, he lamented, “You from Syria in October 2019 and subsequent military operations by Turkey, he lamented, “You
have partners together in the same part of the world, and you have no coordination whatsoever of have partners together in the same part of the world, and you have no coordination whatsoever of
strategic strategic decision-makingdecisionmaking between the United States and its NATO between the United States and its NATO al iesallies. None. You have an . None. You have an
uncoordinated aggressive action by another NATO uncoordinated aggressive action by another NATO al yally, Turkey, in an area where our interests are , Turkey, in an area where our interests are
at stake. There has been no NATO planning, nor any coordination.”at stake. There has been no NATO planning, nor any coordination.”39
38 President Macron has joined other European President Macron has joined other European al ies allies in welcoming President Biden’s pledge to in welcoming President Biden’s pledge to
“reengage with Europe, to consult with [Europe and NATO], to earn back our position of trusted “reengage with Europe, to consult with [Europe and NATO], to earn back our position of trusted
leadership.”leadership.”4039 President Biden President Biden has stressed that the transatlantic has stressed that the transatlantic al iancealliance is the foundation for is the foundation for
North American and European security and shared prosperity, and he has emphasized that his North American and European security and shared prosperity, and he has emphasized that his
Administration appreciates Administration appreciates al iedallied contributions to NATO and contributions to NATO and wil will consult closely with consult closely with al ies on
al allies on all aspects of foreign and security policy. European aspects of foreign and security policy. European al iesallies, including Germany, have reacted , including Germany, have reacted
positivelypositively to the Biden Administration’s decision to halt a planned troop withdrawal from to the Biden Administration’s decision to halt a planned troop withdrawal from
Germany and have welcomed the Administration’s initialGermany and have welcomed the Administration’s initial moves to reengage with multilateral moves to reengage with multilateral
agreements and organizations, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, the World agreements and organizations, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, the World
Health Organization, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START Treaty) with Russia, and Health Organization, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START Treaty) with Russia, and
the Iran nuclear agreement.41

36 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181696.htm.
37 Atlantic Council, “T rump Again Questions U.S. Commitment to Defend NAT O Allies,” December 12, 2017; T essa
Berenson, “Europe Worries as President T rump Heads to NAT O Summit,” Time, July 10, 2018.
38 See, for example, James McAuley and Rick Noack, “Withdrawal of U.S. T roops from Northern Syria Angers,
Worries Europeans,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019.
39 “T ranscript: Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.
40 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19,
2021.
41 See, for example, Federal Government of Germany, “Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel During the
Munich Security Conference Special Edition,” February 19, 2012.
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the Iran nuclear agreement.40 Analysts caution that the United States and its NATO Analysts caution that the United States and its NATO al ies allies may continue to disagree on how to may continue to disagree on how to
address some major address some major chal engeschallenges facing the facing the al iancealliance. Chiefly, some European . Chiefly, some European al iesallies may be may be
reluctant to endorse a strategic framework of great power competition between the United States reluctant to endorse a strategic framework of great power competition between the United States
and China and Russia that continues to be a key driver of U.S. foreign policy doctrine. President and China and Russia that continues to be a key driver of U.S. foreign policy doctrine. President
Biden has Biden has cal edcalled on NATO on NATO al ies allies to work with the United States to counter China’s and Russia’s to work with the United States to counter China’s and Russia’s
perceived efforts to undermine transatlantic and European unity and the democratic systems of perceived efforts to undermine transatlantic and European unity and the democratic systems of
governance that undergird NATO and the European Union. Although many governance that undergird NATO and the European Union. Although many al iesallies have have
condemned Chinese and Russian policies, many also have been wary of jeopardizing strong condemned Chinese and Russian policies, many also have been wary of jeopardizing strong
economic and in some cases, political, relations with one or both countries. economic and in some cases, political, relations with one or both countries.
U.S. U.S. al iesallies also could continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals experienced also could continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals experienced
during the Trump Administration; ongoing U.S. political fragmentation; and concerns about during the Trump Administration; ongoing U.S. political fragmentation; and concerns about
longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to
“America First” policies by a future Administration. Questions about the U.S. commitment to “America First” policies by a future Administration. Questions about the U.S. commitment to
NATO and European security during the Trump Administration led to heightened NATO and European security during the Trump Administration led to heightened cal scalls in Europe in Europe
for European for European al iesallies to reduce dependency on the United States and pursue a more autonomous to reduce dependency on the United States and pursue a more autonomous
European foreign and security policy. Proponents of increased European “strategic autonomy,” European foreign and security policy. Proponents of increased European “strategic autonomy,”
37 See, for example, James McAuley and Rick Noack, “Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Northern Syria Angers, Worries Europeans,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019. 38 “Transcript: Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019. 39 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021. 40 See, for example, Federal Government of Germany, “Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel During the Munich Security Conference Special Edition,” February 19, 2012. Congressional Research Service 11 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress including French President Macron, have said a more independent and militarily including French President Macron, have said a more independent and militarily capable Europe capable Europe
would benefit both Europe and the United States by ensuring more equitable burden-sharing (see would benefit both Europe and the United States by ensuring more equitable burden-sharing (see
text box below). Others in Europe, including Poland and the Baltic States, have been more text box below). Others in Europe, including Poland and the Baltic States, have been more
reluctant to endorse policies that might be viewed as undermining strong U.S. leadership of reluctant to endorse policies that might be viewed as undermining strong U.S. leadership of
NATO. NATO.
EU Security and Defense Policy
Some Some European leaders,European leaders, including French President Macron, have argued that uncertainty about the future U.S. including French President Macron, have argued that uncertainty about the future U.S.
rolerole in European security should add urgency to long-standing efforts to develop coordinated European defense in European security should add urgency to long-standing efforts to develop coordinated European defense
capabilities and policies,capabilities and policies, independent of but complementaryindependent of but complementary to NATO. For two decades, the EU has sought to to NATO. For two decades, the EU has sought to
develop its Common Security and Defensedevelop its Common Security and Defense Policy to bolster its common foreign policy, strengthen the EU’s ability Policy to bolster its common foreign policy, strengthen the EU’s ability
to respond to security crises,to respond to security crises, and enhance European militaryand enhance European military capabilities. Improving European militarycapabilities. Improving European military capabilities capabilities
has been difficult, however, has been difficult, however, especial y especially given many years of flat or declining European defense budgets. In recent given many years of flat or declining European defense budgets. In recent
years, the EU has announced severalyears, the EU has announced several new defense initiatives,new defense initiatives, including a European Defense Fund (EDF) to support including a European Defense Fund (EDF) to support
joint defense researchjoint defense research and developmentand development activities and a new EU defense pact (known as Permanent Structured activities and a new EU defense pact (known as Permanent Structured
Cooperation, or PESCO) aimed at spending defense funds moreCooperation, or PESCO) aimed at spending defense funds more efficiently. efficiently.
Secretary GeneralSecretary General Stoltenberg has expressed support for further EU defense integration and cooperation but Stoltenberg has expressed support for further EU defense integration and cooperation but
emphasizes that these efforts should strengthen the European pil aremphasizes that these efforts should strengthen the European pil ar within NATO—21 NATO memberswithin NATO—21 NATO members are also are also
membersmembers of the EU—rather than replace or supplant NATO. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has echoed of the EU—rather than replace or supplant NATO. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has echoed
Stoltenberg’sStoltenberg’s cal s calls for EU defense initiatives to complement for EU defense initiatives to complement rather than duplicate existing NATO initiatives and rather than duplicate existing NATO initiatives and
capacities. The Trump Administrationcapacities. The Trump Administration joined somejoined some Members Members of Congress in expressingof Congress in expressing concern that the EDF and concern that the EDF and
PESCO could restrictPESCO could restrict U.S. defense companies from participating in the development of panU.S. defense companies from participating in the development of pan -European military -European military
projects.projects. Supporters of EU defense integration highlight that PESCO’s initial prioritySupporters of EU defense integration highlight that PESCO’s initial priority projects were identified in projects were identified in
consultation with NATO and that severalconsultation with NATO and that several of these projectsof these projects focus on enhancing militaryfocus on enhancing military mobility acrossmobility across Europe, a Europe, a
key NATO priority.key NATO priority.
Tensions with Turkey
Over the past several years, heightened tensions between some Over the past several years, heightened tensions between some al iesallies and NATO member Turkey and NATO member Turkey
have prompted some policymakers to have prompted some policymakers to cal call into question Turkey’s qualification for continued into question Turkey’s qualification for continued
NATO membership and raised broader questions about standards for NATO membership and NATO membership and raised broader questions about standards for NATO membership and
mechanisms to ensure adherence to these standards.mechanisms to ensure adherence to these standards.4241 Turkey has faced sharp criticism and sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, from some fellow Turkey has faced sharp criticism and

42 T he only explicit mechanism for leaving NAT O in the North Atlantic T reaty is Article 13, which allows parties to
leave one year after giving a notice of denunciation to the United States. Article 2 of the treaty states that its parties
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sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, from some fel ow NATO members (including the United NATO members (including the United
States) for a number of issues, including its acquisition and planned operation of a Russian S-400 States) for a number of issues, including its acquisition and planned operation of a Russian S-400
air defense system; its October 2019 military operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria; air defense system; its October 2019 military operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria;
and its actions toward Greece and some other countries in an ongoing dispute in the Eastern and its actions toward Greece and some other countries in an ongoing dispute in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea.Mediterranean Sea.43
42 Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and has participated in numerous NATO missions, Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and has participated in numerous NATO missions,
including ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Western Balkans. NATO, in turn, has including ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Western Balkans. NATO, in turn, has
invested invested substantial ysubstantially in military facilities in Turkey, including naval bases and radar sites. Since in military facilities in Turkey, including naval bases and radar sites. Since
2013, NATO members have provided Turkey with air defense support through the deployment of 2013, NATO members have provided Turkey with air defense support through the deployment of
defensive missile systems along its southern border.defensive missile systems along its southern border.4443 41 The only explicit mechanism for leaving NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 13, which allows parties to leave one year after giving a notice of denunciation to the United States. Article 2 of the treaty states that its parties “will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.” 42 For more on these incidents and Turkish policy more broadly, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; and CRS Insight IN11185, Turkey Sanctions in Pending Legislation: Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 43 In spring 2018, the Italian parliament voted to end its deployment of one of two missile defense systems currently Congressional Research Service 12 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress
Secretary General Stoltenberg criticized Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system, Secretary General Stoltenberg criticized Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system,
underscoring that it “can pose a risk to underscoring that it “can pose a risk to Al ied Allied aircraft” and “cannot be integrated into NATO’s air aircraft” and “cannot be integrated into NATO’s air
and missile defense system.”and missile defense system.”4544 Stoltenberg also suggested, however, that Turkey could continue to Stoltenberg also suggested, however, that Turkey could continue to
participate in NATO’s air and missile defense systems if the S-400 were excluded from these participate in NATO’s air and missile defense systems if the S-400 were excluded from these
systems. Some systems. Some al iedallied leaders have argued that NATO should uniformly exclude Turkey from leaders have argued that NATO should uniformly exclude Turkey from
NATO’s defense systems if it deploys the S-400.NATO’s defense systems if it deploys the S-400.4645 In December 2020, the Trump Administration In December 2020, the Trump Administration
enacted sanctions curbing U.S. exports to Turkey’s defense procurement agency as a consequence enacted sanctions curbing U.S. exports to Turkey’s defense procurement agency as a consequence
of its S-400 acquisitionof its S-400 acquisition.; this move followed a 2019 decision to suspend Turkey’s participation in ; this move followed a 2019 decision to suspend Turkey’s participation in
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program due to concerns about S-400s in Turkey compromising the the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program due to concerns about S-400s in Turkey compromising the
security of F-35 technology and some congressional leaders’ placement of informal holds on security of F-35 technology and some congressional leaders’ placement of informal holds on
other U.S.-Turkey arms sales.other U.S.-Turkey arms sales.47
46 Since 2012, Turkey has invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty to prompt high-level NATO Since 2012, Turkey has invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty to prompt high-level NATO
consultations on a perceived threat from Syria to Turkey’s territorial integrity or security on three consultations on a perceived threat from Syria to Turkey’s territorial integrity or security on three
separate occasions. Nevertheless, many separate occasions. Nevertheless, many al iesallies strongly condemned Turkey’s 2019 military strongly condemned Turkey’s 2019 military
operations against Kurdish forces in Syria that had been cooperating with other NATO members operations against Kurdish forces in Syria that had been cooperating with other NATO members
in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist organization. Although NATO Secretary General in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist organization. Although NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg acknowledged Turkey’s “legitimate” security concerns in Syria, he urged Turkey to Stoltenberg acknowledged Turkey’s “legitimate” security concerns in Syria, he urged Turkey to

“will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration
between any or all of them.”
43 For more on these incidents and T urkish policy more broadly, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and
U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas; and CRS Insight IN11185, Turkey Sanctions in Pending
Legislation: Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas.
44 In spring 2018, the Italian parliament voted to end its deployment of one of two missile defense systems currently
under NAT O command in southern T urkey by the end of 2019; the other system is under Spanish command. NAT O,
“NAT O Patriot Mission in T urkey,” at https://shape.nato.int/ongoingoperations/nato-patriot-mission-in-turkey-; Emre
Peker, “NAT O Chastises T urkey over Syria, But Fears Driving It T oward Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, October
11, 2019.
45 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Joint Press Conference with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of T urkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,” October 5, 2020, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_178528.htm.
46 Nick Wadhams, “NAT O Chief Says T urkey Remains Important Ally Despite S-400 Deal,” Bloomberg, July 17,
2019.
47 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to T urkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,
August 12, 2020; T he Biden Administration has not expressed openness to changing U.S. positions on the se issues,
despite T urkish leaders’ hopes of reaching some arrangement that would allay U.S. security concerns about S-400s on
T urkish soil. T he future of U.S. sanctions on T urkey and the long-term impact of the S-400 issue on T urkish defense
procurement are unclear.

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“act with restraint” and do everything possible to preserve the gains that had been made against
the Islamic State.48
Long-standing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea between Greece and Turkey escalated in
the second half of 2020, within a broader context involving a number of other regional
countries.49 Greece and non-NATO member Cyprus have strenuously objected to Turkish naval
vessels exploring for natural gas in what they consider to be their exclusive economic zones
(EEZs). Turkey disputes some of the Greek and Cypriot EEZ claims.
Although the EU and most NATO member states have condemned Turkey’s incursions into
international y recognized Greek and Cypriot waters, al ied governments have done so with
varying degrees of severity, reflecting differences in their views on how to manage relations with
Turkey. Within NATO, France has joined Greece in advocating a relatively hard-line approach to
Turkey. In August 2020, France deployed naval vessels and fighter jets for exercises with the
Greek military following the arrival of a Turkish seismic research ship in Greek waters, and
French President Emmanuel Macron has advocated EU sanctions on Turkey. Most analysts view
France’s approach as an outgrowth of its broader disputes with Turkey, including in Libya, where
the two countries have supported opposing sides in the civil conflict.
Tensions within NATO on how best to address Turkey’s actions and grievances have chal enged
al iance cohesion. Secretary General Stoltenberg has focused on de-escalating tensions by
encouraging dialogue and negotiation. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain provisions
explicitly authorizing NATO al ies to take action against another NATO member. However, the
United States and other NATO members could take measures to affect the character of al ied
cooperation with Turkey—for example, by changing their contributions of equipment or
personnel to specific activities in Turkey.
Commitment to Democratic Values
Over the past several years, policymakers in some NATO member states have cal ed on NATO to
more proactively promote democratic norms and values. Proponents have expressed concern
about perceived democratic “backsliding” within the al iance, including possibly weakening
public support for democracy and democratic values, the rise of authoritarian-leaning nationalist
and populist leaders, and anti-establishment sentiment and deepening polarization in some NATO
member states.50 Some observers have cautioned these trends could have a lasting negative
impact on political cohesion within NATO and ultimately could erode NATO’s capacity to carry
out its core task of ensuring the collective security of its members. They add that these trends
could embolden potential adversaries, including China and Russia, that may seek to undermine
al ies’ commitments to these values by promoting alternative systems of governance.
Secretary General Stoltenberg and President Biden have argued that bolstering democratic
resilience within the al iance should be a component of any effort to counter potential threats

48 NAT O, “Joint Press Conference with NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of T urkey,” October 11, 2019.
49 For background, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and
Clayton T homas.
50 Experts warn against overgeneralizing nationalist and populist movements and note that not every such movement is
necessarily threatening to democracy. However, in some cases political leaders associated with these movements have
altered institutions considered central to democratic checks and balances and to genuinely free and fair democratic
political participation, such as independent judiciaries and protections for freedom of speech, assembly, and other
individual and civil rights.
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from China and Russia.51 Other NATO stakeholders have augmented these cal s, including the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly and a group of independent experts appointed by Secretary
General Stoltenberg to inform the NATO 2030 initiative, both of which have cal ed for NATO to
establish a center for democratic resilience within the al iance.52
In the preamble to NATO’s founding North Atlantic Treaty, the parties to the treaty express
determination to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”53 NATO continues
to promote these principles, and adherence to democratic values is a stated requirement for NATO
membership. Many analysts point out, however, that throughout NATO’s history, al ies have at
times been reluctant to act against other member state governments for breaching democratic
principles; NATO governments have included military dictatorships and unelected leaders who
seized power through force, for example.54 Some analysts caution that NATO’s commitment to
consensus decisionmaking could complicate efforts to enhance democratic accountability, as
some member state governments could be reluctant to endorse additional scrutiny of their
domestic political affairs.55
Issues for Congress
Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949 and has played a critical role in shaping
U.S. policy toward the al iance ever since. Although many Members of Congress have criticized
specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-sharing, for example—Congress as a
whole has consistently demonstrated strong support for active U.S. leadership of and support for
NATO and its cornerstone Article 5 mutual defense commitment.
Congressional support for NATO traditional y has buttressed broader U.S. policy toward the
al iance. During the Trump Administration, however, demonstrations of congressional support for
NATO were at times viewed primarily as an effort to reassure al ies about the U.S. commitment
to NATO after President Trump’s criticisms of the al iance. During the Trump Administration,
both chambers of Congress passed legislation expressly reaffirming U.S. support for NATO.56
Congressional hearings on NATO in the 115th and 116th Congresses reflected a mixed assessment
of President Trump’s impact on the al iance.57 Some in Congress argue that President Trump’s

51 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021; “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021.
52 Rep. Gerry Connolly, NAT O Parliamentary Assembly Political Committee report, NATO@70: Why the Alliance
Rem ains Indispensable, paragraph 44, October 12, 2019; NATO 2030: United for a New Era – Analysis and
Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NAT O Secretary General, pg. 52, November 25, 2020.
53 NAT O, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
54 Ulla Schmidt, NAT O Parliamentary Assembly Committee on th e Civil Dimension of Security, NATO @ 70:
Reaffirming the Alliance’s Values, October 12, 2019.
55 Judy Dempsey, “NAT O’s Bad Apples,” Carnegie Europe, April 3, 2018; Jonathan Katz and T orrey T aussig, “An
Inconvenient Truth: Addressing Democratic Backsliding within NAT O,” Brookings, July 10, 2018.
56 T his includes legislation passed by the House in January 2019 (H.R. 676), the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92)—both of which seek to limit the President’s ability to unilaterally withdraw
from NAT O—and the FY2021 William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 6395/P.S.
116-283). Some analysts also portrayed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and then -Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell’s joint invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress in April 2019, in
commemoration of NAT O’s 70th anniversary as an additional demonstration of NAT O’s importance to Congress.
57 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance,
hearing, March 13, 2019, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/3/nato-at-70-an-indispensable-alliance; U.S.
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NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress

criticism of al ied defense spending levels spurred defense spending increases by NATO members
that were not forthcoming under prior Administrations, despite long-standing U.S. concern.
Other Members of Congress countered that President Trump’s admonition of U.S. al ies and his
questioning of NATO’s utility damaged essential relationships and undermined NATO’s
credibility and cohesion. They contended that doubts about the U.S. commitment to the al iance
could embolden adversaries, including Russia, and ultimately may weaken other al ies’
commitment to NATO. Critics also lamented the Administration’s reported lack of coordination
with its al ies on policies that have significant security ramifications for Europe, such as
countering the Islamic State in Syria.
Most Members of Congress continue to express support for robust U.S. leadership of NATO, in
particular to address potential threats posed by Russia. Many have cal ed for enhanced NATO and
U.S. responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and others have advocated stronger European
contributions to collective defense measures in Europe. Increasingly, some Members of Congress
have raised the possibility of taking formal action against an al y, such as Turkey, which pursues
foreign and defense policies they believe could threaten al iance security. Other Members,
including the current president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Representative Gerald
Connolly, have advocated that NATO do more to monitor and promote NATO members’
adherence to democratic values.
In light of these considerations, Members of the 117th Congress could address a number of key
issues central to NATO’s future, including the following:
 assessing the strategic value of NATO to the United States and the United States’
leadership role within NATO;
 engaging in NATO’s ongoing NATO 2030 Initiative to strengthen the al iance
militarily and political y, including by updating NATO’s strategic concept
(NATO’s current strategic concept was adopted in 2010) and considering ways to
reinforce NATO’s commitment to political consultation and democratic values;
 examining NATO’s capacity and wil ingness to address other security threats to
the Euro-Atlantic region, including from the MENA region, posed by chal enges
such as terrorism and migration;
 examining the possible consequences of member states’ failure to meet agreed
defense spending targets;
 assessing U.S. force posture in Europe and the wil ingness of European al ies to
contribute to NATO deterrence efforts and U.S. defense initiatives in Europe,
such as the bal istic missile defense program and the European Deterrence
Initiative;
 examining options to sanction al ies that act in ways that could jeopardize al ied
security;
 revisiting the al ies’ commitment to NATO’s stated “open door” policy on
enlargement, especial y with respect to the membership aspirations of Georgia
and Ukraine; and
 developing a more comprehensive NATO strategy toward China, particularly
given U.S. and other al ies’ concerns about the security ramifications of increased
Chinese investment in Europe.

Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance, hearing, September 5,
2018, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-value-of-the-nato-alliance-090518.
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NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress



Author Information

Paul Belkin

Analyst in European Affairs


Acknowledgments
CRS Visual Information Specialists Jamie Hutchinson and Amber Wilhelm created the graphics in this
report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46066 · VERSION 11“act with restraint” and do everything possible to preserve the gains that had been made against the Islamic State.47 Long-standing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea between Greece and Turkey escalated in the second half of 2020, within a broader context involving a number of other regional countries.48 Greece and non-NATO member Cyprus have strenuously objected to Turkish naval vessels exploring for natural gas in what they consider to be their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Turkey disputes some of the Greek and Cypriot EEZ claims. Although the EU and most NATO member states have condemned Turkey’s incursions into internationally recognized Greek and Cypriot waters, allied governments have done so with varying degrees of severity, reflecting differences in their views on how to manage relations with Turkey. Within NATO, France has joined Greece in advocating a relatively hard-line approach to Turkey. In August 2020, France deployed naval vessels and fighter jets for exercises with the Greek military following the arrival of a Turkish seismic research ship in Greek waters, and French President Emmanuel Macron has advocated EU sanctions on Turkey. Most analysts view under NATO command in southern Turkey by the end of 2019; the other system is under Spanish command. NATO, “NATO Patriot Mission in Turkey,” at https://shape.nato.int/ongoingoperations/nato-patriot-mission-in-turkey-; Emre Peker, “NATO Chastises Turkey over Syria, But Fears Driving It Toward Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2019. 44 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Joint Press Conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,” October 5, 2020, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178528.htm. 45 Nick Wadhams, “NATO Chief Says Turkey Remains Important Ally Despite S-400 Deal,” Bloomberg, July 17, 2019. 46 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020; The Biden Administration has not expressed openness to changing U.S. positions on these issues, despite Turkish leaders’ hopes of reaching some arrangement that would allay U.S. security concerns about S-400s on Turkish soil. The future of U.S. sanctions on Turkey and the long-term impact of the S-400 issue on Turkish defense procurement are unclear. 47 NATO, “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey,” October 11, 2019. 48 For background, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Congressional Research Service 13 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress France’s approach as an outgrowth of its broader disputes with Turkey, including in Libya, where the two countries have supported opposing sides in the civil conflict. Tensions within NATO on how best to address Turkey’s actions and grievances have challenged alliance cohesion. Secretary General Stoltenberg has focused on de-escalating tensions by encouraging dialogue and negotiation. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain provisions explicitly authorizing NATO allies to take action against another NATO member. However, the United States and other NATO members could take measures to affect the character of allied cooperation with Turkey—for example, by changing their contributions of equipment or personnel to specific activities in Turkey. Commitment to Democratic Values Over the past several years, policymakers in some NATO member states have called on NATO to more proactively promote democratic norms and values. Proponents have expressed concern about perceived democratic “backsliding” within the alliance, including possibly weakening public support for democracy and democratic values, the rise of authoritarian-leaning nationalist and populist leaders, and anti-establishment sentiment and deepening polarization in some NATO member states.49 Some observers have cautioned these trends could have a lasting negative impact on political cohesion within NATO and ultimately could erode NATO’s capacity to carry out its core task of ensuring the collective security of its members. They add that these trends could embolden potential adversaries, including China and Russia, that may seek to undermine allies’ commitments to these values by promoting alternative systems of governance. Secretary General Stoltenberg and President Biden have argued that bolstering democratic resilience within the alliance should be a component of any effort to counter potential threats from China and Russia.50 Other NATO stakeholders have augmented these calls, including the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and a group of independent experts appointed by Secretary General Stoltenberg to inform the NATO 2030 initiative, both of which have called for NATO to establish a center for democratic resilience within the alliance.51 In the preamble to NATO’s founding North Atlantic Treaty, the parties to the treaty express determination to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”52 NATO continues to promote these principles, and adherence to democratic values is a stated requirement for NATO membership. Many analysts point out, however, that throughout NATO’s history, allies have at times been reluctant to act against other member state governments for breaching democratic principles; NATO governments have included military dictatorships and unelected leaders who seized power through force, for example.53 Some analysts caution that NATO’s commitment to 49 Experts warn against overgeneralizing nationalist and populist movements and note that not every such movement is necessarily threatening to democracy. However, in some cases political leaders associated with these movements have altered institutions considered central to democratic checks and balances and to genuinely free and fair democratic political participation, such as independent judiciaries and protections for freedom of speech, assembly, and other individual and civil rights. 50 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February 19, 2021; “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021. 51 Rep. Gerry Connolly, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Political Committee report, NATO@70: Why the Alliance Remains Indispensable, paragraph 44, October 12, 2019; NATO 2030: United for a New Era – Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, pg. 52, November 25, 2020. 52 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 53 Ulla Schmidt, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, NATO @ 70: Congressional Research Service 14 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress consensus decisionmaking could complicate efforts to enhance democratic accountability, as some member state governments could be reluctant to endorse additional scrutiny of their domestic political affairs.54 Issues for Congress Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949 and has played a critical role in shaping U.S. policy toward the alliance ever since. Although many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-sharing, for example—Congress as a whole has consistently demonstrated strong support for active U.S. leadership of and support for NATO and its cornerstone Article 5 mutual defense commitment. Congressional support for NATO traditionally has buttressed broader U.S. policy toward the alliance. During the Trump Administration, however, demonstrations of congressional support for NATO were at times viewed primarily as an effort to reassure allies about the U.S. commitment to NATO after President Trump’s criticisms of the alliance. During the Trump Administration, both chambers of Congress passed legislation expressly reaffirming U.S. support for NATO.55 Congressional hearings on NATO in the 115th and 116th Congresses reflected a mixed assessment of President Trump’s impact on the alliance.56 Some in Congress argue that President Trump’s criticism of allied defense spending levels spurred defense spending increases by NATO members that were not forthcoming under prior Administrations, despite long-standing U.S. concern. Other Members of Congress countered that President Trump’s admonition of U.S. allies and his questioning of NATO’s utility damaged essential relationships and undermined NATO’s credibility and cohesion. They contended that doubts about the U.S. commitment to the alliance could embolden adversaries, including Russia, and ultimately may weaken other allies’ commitment to NATO. Critics also lamented the Administration’s reported lack of coordination with its allies on policies that have significant security ramifications for Europe, such as countering the Islamic State in Syria. Most Members of Congress continue to express support for robust U.S. leadership of NATO, in particular to address potential threats posed by Russia. Many have called for enhanced NATO and U.S. responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and others have advocated stronger European contributions to collective defense measures in Europe. Increasingly, some Members of Congress have raised the possibility of taking formal action against an ally, such as Turkey, which pursues foreign and defense policies they believe could threaten alliance security. Other Members, including the current president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Representative Gerry Reaffirming the Alliance’s Values, October 12, 2019. 54 Judy Dempsey, “NATO’s Bad Apples,” Carnegie Europe, April 3, 2018; Jonathan Katz and Torrey Taussig, “An Inconvenient Truth: Addressing Democratic Backsliding within NATO,” Brookings, July 10, 2018. 55 This includes legislation passed by the House in January 2019 (H.R. 676), the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92)—both of which seek to limit the President’s ability to unilaterally withdraw from NATO—and the FY2021 William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283). Some analysts also portrayed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s joint invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress in April 2019, in commemoration of NATO’s 70th anniversary as an additional demonstration of NATO’s importance to Congress. 56 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance, hearing, March 13, 2019, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/3/nato-at-70-an-indispensable-alliance; U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance, hearing, September 5, 2018, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-value-of-the-nato-alliance-090518. Congressional Research Service 15 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress Connolly, have advocated that NATO do more to monitor and promote NATO members’ adherence to democratic values. In light of these considerations, Members of the 117th Congress could address a number of key issues central to NATO’s future, including the following:  assessing the strategic value of NATO to the United States and the United States’ leadership role within NATO;  engaging in NATO’s ongoing NATO 2030 Initiative to strengthen the alliance militarily and politically, including by updating NATO’s strategic concept (NATO’s current strategic concept was adopted in 2010) and considering ways to reinforce NATO’s commitment to political consultation and democratic values;  examining NATO’s capacity and willingness to address other security threats to the Euro-Atlantic region, including from the MENA region, posed by challenges such as terrorism and migration;  examining the possible consequences of member states’ failure to meet agreed defense spending targets;  assessing U.S. force posture in Europe and the willingness of European allies to contribute to NATO deterrence efforts and U.S. defense initiatives in Europe, such as the ballistic missile defense program and the European Deterrence Initiative;  examining options to sanction allies that act in ways that could jeopardize allied security;  revisiting the allies’ commitment to NATO’s stated “open door” policy on enlargement, especially with respect to the membership aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine; and  developing a more comprehensive NATO strategy toward China, particularly given U.S. and other allies’ concerns about the security ramifications of increased Chinese investment in Europe. Author Information Paul Belkin Analyst in European Affairs Acknowledgments CRS Visual Information Specialists Jamie Hutchinson and Amber Wilhelm created the graphics in this report. Congressional Research Service 16 NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Congressional Research Service R46066 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED
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