Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key IssuesOverview and U.S.
February 17, 2021July 14, 2023
Engagement
Tomas F. Husted,
The 117th Congress may review U.S. engagement inCongress regularly addresses issues pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) as it
Coordinator
establishes budgetary and policy priorities and responds to developments in the region. Issues for
Analyst in African Affairs
Congress include the authorization and appropriation of funding for U.S. foreign aid programs

and U.S. military activities in the region, and oversight of U.S. programs and policies. Major
Alexis Arieff
topics for congressional consideration may include:
Specialist in African Affairs

Economic and Development Issues. Economic shocks linked to the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic have had a severe impact across Africa, triggering the first region-wide
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
recession in decades. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted a regional
contraction of 3.0% in 2020, Africa’s sharpest annual decline on record, amid a drop i

n global
demand for key natural resource exports, trade and tourism disruptions, and the domestic impacts
Nicolas Cook
of lockdowns. Oil producers such as Nigeria and Angola have faced acute economic downturns,
Specialist in African Affairs
as has South Africa—home to the most confirmed COVID-19 cases in Africa by far. Economic

downturns are likely to heighten significant development challenges across Africa, which ranks
among the world’s poorest and least developed regions on a range of measures.
Brock R. Williams

Specialist in International
Trade and Finance
Governance and Human Rights. While some African countries have held multiple peaceful

electoral transfers of power and recorded positive or improving human rights records since a
wave of democratization in the 1990s, autocracies have become entrenched in others, using a

variety of means to curtail civil society and opposition activity. Analysts also warn of
“democratic backsliding,” or a deterioration of various dimensions of democratic governance, in some countries. Recent
political transitions, some prompted by large-scale protests, have raised hopes for reform in several countries, but prospects
for lasting governance gains remain fragile. The development of effective, accountable institutions remains limited in much
of the region.
Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Issues. Security crises have emerged or intensified in several African countries over the
past decade, triggering massive population displacements and humanitarian needs. Islamist armed groups, some linked to Al
Qaeda or the Islamic State, have proliferated and expanded their presence in parts of the region, particularly in Somalia, the
Lake Chad Basin, West Africa's Sahel region, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Porous borders, corruption, and weak justice
sectors have enabled transnational crime such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, poaching, and maritime piracy.
U.S.-Africa Policy and Engagement. U.S. engagement with Africa has long focused on responding to health challenges and
humanitarian crises, advancing peace and security, strengthening democracy and good governance, and fostering economic
growth, development, and U.S.-Africa commercial engagement. While maintaining many longstanding priorities of U.S.-
Africa policy, the Trump Administration placed a heightened emphasis on countering Chinese, Russian, and other foreign
influence in the region, increasing two-way U.S.-Africa trade and investment, and cutting U.S. foreign assistance to Africa.
The Trump Administration also reviewed U.S. military engagement in Africa, resulting in the drawdown of some U.S.
military personnel from the region and a reorientation of certain deployments. Analysts continue to debate the degree to
which the Trump Administration’s approach toward Africa meaningfully departed from those of its predecessors.
The 116th Congress consistently appropriated foreign aid funding above levels requested by the Trump Administration and
maintained a focus on areas of enduring congressional interest, including humanitarian crises and responses, human rights
and governance issues, and U.S. military activities in the region. As the Biden Administration sets forth its own approach
toward Africa, the 117th Congress may continue to consider similar issues as it weighs the appropriate balance between U.S.
diplomacy, development, and defense priorities in Africa and draws on a number of tools to shape U.S.-Africa policy.

Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 27 link to page 28 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 6 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 23 link to page 25 link to page 36 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Economic and Development Conditions ......................................................................................... 2
Key Development Challenges in Africa .................................................................................... 4
Economic Issues ................................................................................................................. 4
Human Development Issues ............................................................................................... 5
Governance and Human Rights Conditions .................................................................................... 6
Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Issues ....................................................................................... 9
West Africa .............................................................................................................................. 10
East Africa ............................................................................................................................... 12
Central and Southern Africa .................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Policy and Engagement ......................................................................................................... 14
U.S. Assistance to Africa ......................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Support for Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights .............................................. 15
U.S. Military Engagement in Africa........................................................................................ 16
Activities and Operations .................................................................................................. 17
U.S.-Africa Trade, Investment, and Economic Cooperation ................................................... 19
Programs and Legislation Supporting U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment ........................ 21
U.S.-Africa Policy during the Trump Administration: A Wrap-Up ......................................... 24
Global Power Competition in Africa ................................................................................ 25
U.S. Assistance to Africa .................................................................................................. 27
DOD Posture Reviews and Drawdowns ........................................................................... 28
Trade Policy ...................................................................................................................... 30
Immigration Policy ........................................................................................................... 31
The 116th Congress ................................................................................................................. 32
Issues for the 117th Congress ................................................................................................... 32

Figures
Figure 1. Estimated GDP Growth in 2020....................................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Rankings, 2020 ............................................... 8
Figure 3. State Fragility and Population Displacement in Africa .................................................. 10
Figure 4. U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa..................................................... 20
Figure 5. U.S. AGOA Imports, FY2019 ........................................................................................ 22

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33

Congressional Research Service

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

This report provides an overview of select issues related to sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”
hereafter) and U.S. policy toward the region.1 It includes information on regional economic and
development trends, governance and human rights conditions, and security concerns. It also
discusses U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military engagement in Africa. This report does not
extensively address U.S. foreign aid to Africa; for more on that topic, see CRS Report R46368,
U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview. Other CRS products address in greater
depth many of the topics considered in this report, as referenced in the text and footnotes below.
Introduction
With 49 countries and an estimated 1.17 billion people, Africa encompasses a vast diversity of
social, ecological, economic, political, and security conditions.2 Such diversity complicates and
casts doubt on generalizations about Africa or African countries—such as narratives that portray
Africa’s socioeconomic trajectory as unambiguously positive or negative.3 Moreover, many of the
conditions discussed in this report are changing rapidly as countries in the region reckon with
significant demographic, societal, and other shifts. Africa is the world’s youngest region—as of
2019, an estimated 62% of its population was under 25 years of age—and is rapidly urbanizing.4
Access to smartphones, mobile broadband, and social media is expanding across the region,
revolutionizing the ways Africans engage with each other and with the world and bringing new
opportunities for industry, public service delivery, political engagement, and social mobilization.
A number of African countries are beset by conflicts; Islamist insurgencies, some with ties to Al
Qaeda or the Islamic State, have proliferated and expanded their reach in the region. Some
countries face humanitarian crises, and nearly all are contending with stark development
challenges. Yet several have ranked among the fastest growing economies globally over the past
decade, and African markets have attracted growing foreign interest. Despite enduring state
capacity shortfalls, many African governments responded rapidly to the COVID-19 pandemic,
drawing on public health expertise developed in confronting HIV/AIDS, malaria, Ebola, and
other disease outbreaks (with substantial donor support). Governments across Africa face
demands for accountable governance, effective service delivery, free and fair elections, and
personal safety, fueling a “tug of war between leaders and their publics,” according to a 2018 U.S.
intelligence assessment.5 These dynamics, and African governments’ responses to them, are likely
to continue to shape U.S.-Africa policy and congressional engagement with the region.

1 In this report, unless otherwise noted, “Africa” refers to the 49 countries comprised within the jurisdiction of the State
Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. This includes all Member States of the United Nations’ African Group except
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, which fall within the remit of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
2 CRS calculation, using 2021 estimates from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, accessed January 22, 2021.
3 For a critique of these discourses—commonly known as “Afro-optimism” and “Afro-pessimism”—see, e.g., Pius
in the exercise of Coordinator its legislative and oversight functions. Legislation, hearings, and Member statements in the 118th Analyst in African Affairs Congress have dealt with a range of topics relating to Africa and U.S.-Africa policy, including armed conflict in Sudan, the influence and activities of China and Russia in the region, and the Alexis Arieff possible reauthorization of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Specialist in African Affairs largest facet of U.S. aid for Africa. Funding and oversight of U.S. aid and diplomatic and military activity in Africa are of enduring interest to Congress. Issues that have garnered attention among Members and may continue to present opportunities for congressional consideration include: Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs Governance and Human Rights. Democratic backsliding in Africa over the past decade, and a series of military seizures of power since 2020, have sparked concern in Congress and impeded Nicolas Cook U.S. cooperation with some governments in the region. Some Members also have demonstrated Specialist in African Affairs interest in various human rights issues in Africa, including wartime abuses, religious freedom concerns, restrictions on sexual minorities, and threats to press freedom. Congress has sought to support democracy in Africa through the appropriation of foreign aid, oversight of U.S. policy, and authorization of sanctions or restriction of aid on governance and human rights grounds. Peace and Security. Security crises have intensified in several African countries over the past decade. Islamist armed groups, some linked to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, have proliferated and expanded in parts of the region, while conflicts in Ethiopia (2020-2022) and Sudan (2023-) have attracted attention from some Members. Congress has shaped U.S. approaches to peace and security issues in Africa through legislation authorizing, directing, and funding efforts to mitigate and resolve conflicts and strengthen state security forces in the region. Congress also has imposed restrictions on security assistance in selected cases, typically citing concerns over poor governance or security force abuses. Oversight of U.S. military activities, and the use of military force, in Africa has been another facet of Member engagement. Economic Affairs. Promoting economic development in Africa and expanding U.S.-Africa trade and investment have been areas of sustained congressional interest and U.S. assistance. Economic shocks linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war slowed economic growth and have aggravated food insecurity and debt distress in many African countries. A pending issue for Congress is whether, and with what possible changes, to reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended), a cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy that is due to sunset in 2025. Global Health. Public health challenges in Africa have been an enduring focus of U.S. attention and assistance: health aid regularly constitutes around three-quarters of annual U.S. assistance for Africa, much of it for HIV/AIDS programs under PEPFAR. African countries, to varying degrees, have made strides in healthcare provision over the past three decades, yet as a whole, Africa lags behind other regions in life expectancy, maternal and child morality, and HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria incidence, among other measures. The COVID-19 pandemic illuminated and aggravated health system weaknesses in Africa. Geopolitical Issues. Congress has expressed mounting concern over the activities of China and Russia in Africa. Among other issues, the implications of China’s commercial influence for governance, debt levels, and U.S. commercial access, supply chains, and national security interests in the region have attracted growing scrutiny. Some Members have also voiced alarm over China’s reported military basing aspirations in Africa. Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war has increased congressional attention on Russian defense cooperation with African countries, the involvement of Russian state-linked military contractors in the region, sometimes in exchange for gold and other natural resource concessions, and disinformation efforts. The impact of the Wagner Group’s June 2023 abortive mutiny in Russia on Wagner’s operations in Africa is not yet clear. African countries’ high abstention rates (relative to other regions) on U.S.-backed U.N. resolutions regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have drawn scrutiny from U.S. policymakers. U.S. messaging on the Russia-Ukraine war has seemed to inflame sensitivities among some African governments to U.S. pressure regarding their choice of external partners. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 33 link to page 35 link to page 36 link to page 5 link to page 11 link to page 23 link to page 25 link to page 38 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 U.S.-Africa Policy and the Biden Administration ........................................................................... 2 The 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit ..................................................................................... 4 U.S. Assistance for Africa ......................................................................................................... 6 Governance and Human Rights ....................................................................................................... 7 Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................................. 8 Selected Congressional Engagement ...................................................................................... 10 Peace and Security Issues .............................................................................................................. 12 U.S. Military Engagement in Africa........................................................................................ 14 Selected Congressional Engagement ...................................................................................... 16 Economic Affairs and U.S. Trade and Investment ........................................................................ 18 U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment........................................................................................... 19 Selected Congressional Engagement ...................................................................................... 23 Global Health ................................................................................................................................ 24 Selected Congressional Engagement ...................................................................................... 26 Global Power Competition in Africa ............................................................................................. 27 The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) ................................................................... 27 Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 30 Selected Congressional Engagement ...................................................................................... 32 Outlook and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 33 Figures Figure 1. Political Map of Africa ..................................................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Freedom House Freedom in the World Rankings for 2023 .............................................. 8 Figure 3. U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment ................................................................................. 20 Figure 4. AGOA Trade Statistics, 2021 ......................................................................................... 22 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 35 Congressional Research Service Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Introduction This report surveys selected issues related to sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) and U.S.-Africa policy.1 It addresses governance and human rights trends, security challenges, economic affairs, public health issues, and strategic competition in Africa, as well as U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic involvement in the region. U.S. aid for Africa is more fully addressed in a separate product, CRS Report R46368, U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview. With 49 countries and an estimated 1.2 billion people, Africa encompasses a vast array of social, ecological, economic, political, and security environments.2 This diversity undermines narratives that cast the region’s trajectory as manifestly positive or negative, and may complicate U.S. efforts to construct a single policy approach or strategy toward the region.3 Many countries are expected to double in population by 2050, promising new challenges as well as opportunities for regional development.4 Observers have identified climate change, urbanization, and growing access to digital technology as other “megatrends” whose full implications for economies, public services, and political and social organization in Africa remain to be seen.5 Congressional attention on Africa has often focused on major crises (e.g., armed conflicts and humanitarian emergencies), governance and human rights issues, and development challenges (notably, HIV/AIDS)—but also on the potential for expanding U.S.-Africa trade and investment. Congress has additionally demonstrated growing interest in the activities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), Russia, and other global competitors in Africa, and the implications for such activity for Africa’s outlook and for U.S. policy, national security, and commercial interests. Congress has shaped U.S.-Africa policy through legislation authorizing or directing the executive branch to pursue certain activities in the region; funding and oversight of U.S. foreign assistance, military engagement, and diplomatic activities; and resolutions, public statements, and private correspondence setting out views and recommendations on particular issues in African affairs. Engagement with African leaders and publics, such as through regular Member and staff travel to the region, has been another major avenue of congressional involvement in African affairs. 1 In this report, unless otherwise noted, “Africa” refers to the 49 countries within the jurisdiction of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. 2 CRS calculation using 2022 estimates in U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, accessed November 17, 2022. 3 For one critique of these discourses, see Pius Adesanmi, “For Whom is Africa Rising?” in Adesanmi, “For Whom is Africa Rising?” in Who Owns the Problem? Africa and the Struggle for Agency (East (East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2020). Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2020).
4 U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 4 U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2019: Data Booklet, 2019. On
urbanization and associated challenges and opportunities in the region, see Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography, 2020.
5 U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Pitched Contests for Democratization Through 2022,”
February 2018.
Congressional Research Service

1

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Economic and Development Conditions
Starting in the early 1990s, many African countries witnessed rapid economic growth, buoyed by
high global prices for key raw commodity exports (such as crude oil, natural gas, minerals, and
some agricultural goods) and increasing domestic demand.6 Across Africa, many countries
experienced a growth of their middle class,7 expanded access to digital technologies, improved
health conditions, and made other progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).8 National outcomes varied widely, however, and poverty rates remained high compared
to other developing regions. Following an economic downturn linked to the 2008 global financial
crisis, a collapse in the prices of several export commodities (including oil and key minerals)
caused regional growth rates to decelerate again in the mid-2010s, leading to recessions in some
countries—though several non-resource-intensive economies, including Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Rwanda, and Senegal, averaged annual growth above 5.5% between 2015 and 2019.9
Economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) have triggered downturns or
recessions across Africa. As of October 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected a
regional contraction of 3.0% in 2020, Africa’s sharpest annual decline on record, amid a drop in
global demand for key African commodity exports, global trade and tourism disruptions, and the
consequences of domestic lockdowns.10 Small, tourism-reliant economies (e.g., Botswana, Cabo
Verde, and Seychelles) have faced acute downturns, as have Africa’s leading oil producers
(including Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria, along with Angola and the Republic of Congo).11
Southern Africa also has been hard-hit, as a severe contraction in South Africa—Africa’s second-
largest economy, which has confirmed by far the most COVID-19 cases in the region—has
dimmed sub-regional growth prospects. The IMF expects growth to slow but remain positive in
some more diversified economies (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya).
In response to COVID-19-related shocks, African governments have reallocated budget resources
and instituted economic stimulus measures (e.g., tax relief); some have initiated targeted aid for
their most vulnerable citizens.12 The World Bank and other international financial institutions,
U.N. agencies, and private firms have supported such efforts. Many central banks have acted to
increase liquidity. Yet most African governments lack sufficient domestic resources to cushion
local economies and spur recoveries. The IMF forecasts a regional rebound to 3.1% growth in
2021, “a smaller expansion than expected in much of the rest of the world, partly reflecting
limited policy space to sustain a more expansionary fiscal stance in most countries.”13

6 See, e.g., Steven Radelet, “Africa’s Rise—Interrupted?” in International Monetary Fund (IMF), Finance and
Development, June 2016.
7 On the concept of the middle class in Africa, see Claire Mercer and Charlotte Lemanski, “The Lived Experiences of
the African Middle Classes: Introduction,” in Africa (90:3), 2020, a special issue centered on Africa’s middle classes.
8 The MDGs were a series of broad development goals agreed to by 189 U.N. member states in 2000. In 2015, the
MDGs were replaced with the sustainable development goals, a non-binding list of 17 development and social equity
objectives. See CRS In Focus IF10249, The Post-2015 Global Development Agenda.
9 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2020, accessed January 25, 2021.
10 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: A Difficult Road to Recovery, October 2020. This regional
growth rate does not account for Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, or Sudan, which the IMF includes in its Middle East
and Central Asia grouping.
11 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2020.
12 IMF, “Policy Responses to COVID-19,” accessed January 25, 2021.
13 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa. As above (see Footnote 11), this regional growth rate does
not account for Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, or Sudan.
Congressional Research Service

2

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues2022: Summary of Results, 2022. 5 See Patrick Dupoux et al., “Six Megatrends That Are Changing Africa—and How to Navigate Them,” BCG, August 29, 2022; and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs “Megatrends Afrika” series of publications. See also discussion of Africa in National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Figure 1. Political Map of Africa Source: CRS graphic created using basemap from the Department of State. U.S.-Africa Policy and the Biden Administration Successive Administrations have set out generally consistent aims for U.S.-Africa policy: promoting economic growth and development; expanding U.S.-Africa trade and investment; responding to health challenges and humanitarian crises; strengthening democracy and good governance; and enhancing security. Congress has broadly endorsed and supported the pursuit of these goals on a bipartisan basis, albeit with some divergences in emphasis and prioritization. In August 2022, the Joe Biden Administration released its U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which articulates its approach to U.S.-Africa relations. In a broad sense, the strategy pledges to recognize Africa’s importance to U.S. national security interests and “include and Congressional Research Service 2 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement elevate African voices” in multilateral policy settings.6 The document lays out four objectives intended to “further embed Africa’s position in shaping our shared future”: 1. Foster Openness and Open Societies, entailing efforts to increase transparency and accountability, expose corruption, support the rule of law and independent judiciaries, improve natural resource governance, and enhance food production and food security; 2. Deliver Democratic and Security Dividends, with a focus on curbing authoritarianism and military seizures of power, addressing public dissatisfaction with poor governance, supporting civil society and credible elections, investing in peacebuilding, and building counterterrorism and other security sector capacities; 3. Advance Pandemic Recovery and Economic Opportunity, by supporting COVID-19 surveillance and vaccine uptake, bolstering infectious disease prevention and response, and providing financing to support economic growth, supply-chain diversification, and improved access to internet and other information and communication technologies; and 4. Support Conservation, Climate Adaptation, and Just Energy Transition, centering on efforts to help conserve, manage, and restore natural ecosystems, strengthen climate change adaptation and mitigation, support transitions away from fossil fuels while addressing energy and development needs, and expand critical mineral supply chains. The strategy commits to “surging assistance” to support democratic openings; bolstering civil society; and deepening engagement with multilateral bodies, African diaspora communities, the private sector, and sub-national governments and entities (e.g., state and municipal authorities). It also pledges to modernize U.S. diplomacy to “empower our ambassadors and officials to engage with African publics...in more accessible and creative ways,” refine U.S. security cooperation programs in the region, and provide increased support for urban planning and service delivery in African cities, as part of a “rebalance toward urban hubs.”7 Various Members of Congress and commentators have examined the framing and content of the strategy and debated its merits relative to approaches put forth by past Administrations.8 Issues include how the strategy will be pursued in practice and the level of financial and personnel resources available for implementation (see Text Box). Staffing U.S. Embassies in Africa9 As of June 29, 2023, 39 of 49 countries (80%) under the jurisdiction of the State Department’s African Affairs Bureau had U.S. ambassadors in place.10 Ambassadorial nominees for 8 of the 10 remaining countries were awaiting Senate confirmation. The State Department does not publicly disclose lower-level embassy staffing 6 Quotes and other information in this section are from White House, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022. 7 The Africa Strategy resembles Africa-related material of other Biden Administration strategies and policy documents. These include the 2022 National Security Strategy, which similarly stresses the need to “adapt” U.S.-Africa partnerships in light of African countries’ “important geopolitical role” and sets out commitments to “engage African countries as equal partners”; promote democracy, human rights, and good governance; enhance Africa’s peace and prosperity, including by countering extremism; and support conservation and climate adaptation, among other aims. 8 For a range of Member views on the strategy, see House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), Assessing the Biden Administration’s U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., November 17, 2022. 9 CRS Analyst in Foreign Affairs Cory R. Gill contributed to this text box. 10 Ambassador positions were vacant in Djibouti, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, and Zimbabwe, as well as Eritrea, with which the United States does not currently exchange ambassadors. There were 40 country ambassadorship vacancies globally. State Department, “Ambassadorial Assignments Overseas,” June 29, 2023. Congressional Research Service 3 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement vacancies, but a 2022 Foreign Policy report assessed that U.S. embassies in Africa were “chronically short-staffed,” with one-third to one-half of diplomatic posts vacant in surveyed embassies in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.11 Beyond the chief of mission level, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leadership and other Members of Congress have voiced concern over personnel shortages at U.S. embassies in Africa.12 In addition to impeding embassy operations and programming, such shortages could disadvantage the United States vis-à-vis strategic competitors such as China, according to U.S. diplomats and some Members of Congress.13 Past audits of U.S. assistance programs and embassies in the region have identified position vacancies and other staffing gaps as impediments to the implementation and oversight of U.S. aid for Africa, including security assistance, and U.S. military officials have described insufficient personnel as a challenge for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) engagement in the region.14 In March 2023 testimony to Congress, Secretary of State Antony Blinken attributed U.S. staff shortages in Africa partly to low bids from Foreign Service Officers, noting ongoing efforts to study the challenge and “see what we can do to incentivize people” to serve in the region.15 The 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit In December 2022, President Biden hosted senior delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union (AU) for a three-day U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS).16 The 2022 Summit marked the second-ever ALS; the first, convened by President Barack Obama, took place in 2014. Members of both parties expressed support for the 2022 ALS and emphasized the importance of congressional engagement in the Summit.17 The Biden Administration announced a number of commitments and planned aid initiatives during the 2022 Summit, and some Members of both parties have expressed interest in monitoring ALS deliverables.18 Major pledges include:19 11 Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon, “U.S. Embassies in Africa Are Chronically Short-Staffed,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2022. 12 Ibid; see also remarks by Senator Tim Scott in SFRC, American Diplomacy and Global Leadership: Review of the FY24 State Department Budget Request, hearing, 118th Cong., March 22, 2023; and remarks and questions related to U.S. embassy staffing shortages in the Sahel by Senators Bob Menendez, James Risch, and Mike Rounds in SFRC, Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response, hearing, 117th Cong., July 12, 2022. 13 Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon, “U.S. Embassies in Africa Are Chronically Short-Staffed.” 14 State Department Office Inspector General (OIG), Audit of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs Monitoring and Coordination of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program, 2020; and testimony by AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley in Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2024 and the Future Years Defense Program, 118th Cong., March 16, 2023. 15 Secretary of State Blinken in SFRC, American Diplomacy and Global Leadership: Review of the FY24 State Department Budget Request, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 2023. 16 The 49 country invitees to the 2022 ALS included all countries in good standing with the AU with which the United States maintains full diplomatic relations, including five North African countries. Four countries—Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan—suspended by the AU following military seizures of power were excluded. Also excluded were Eritrea, with which the United States does not exchange ambassadors, and the AU-recognized Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the self-declared government in exile of the disputed territory of Western Sahara, which the United States does not recognize as a sovereign country. For a list of heads of delegation, see AllAfrica, “Africa: Heads of Delegation for U.S-Africa Leaders Summit - White House,” December 13, 2022. 17 In May 2022, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 538, expressing support for the ALS and urging congressional participation in the event, among other provisions. 18 See, among others, letter from then-HFAC Chair Representative Gregory Meeks to President Biden, December 21, 2022; and remarks by SFRC Ranking Member James Risch and Senator Tim Scott in SFRC, Review of the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of State, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 2023. 19 ALS fact sheets and remarks by Administration officials set out a range of additional commitments related to health, food security, trade and investment, youth and diaspora engagement, security, and democracy, human rights, and governance. An overview of Summit commitments is available at White House, “U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: Strengthening Partnerships to Meet Shared Priorities,” December 15, 2022. A State Department ALS landing page provides links to view recorded Summit events and press releases; see https://www.state.gov/africasummit/. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 21 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement • High-level travel. President Biden announced his intention to visit Africa. This would be the first presidential visit to the region since 2015. The White House also announced plans for travel by Vice President Harris, First Lady Jill Biden, and cabinet members and other top officials.20 Several high-level officials have visited Africa since the Summit.21 • African representation in the G20 and U.N. Security Council. President Biden called for a permanent seat for the AU at the Group of 20 (G20), an initiative for which some Members have expressed support; in the 118th Congress, H.Res. 525 would express the sense of the House that the AU should be a permanent G20 member.22 Biden also reiterated support for a permanent seat for an African country at the U.N. Security Council, which he first voiced in September 2022.23 • Food security and health workforce aid. Among the largest financial pledges made during the ALS were President Biden’s commitments of “an additional $2 billion” to address food insecurity in Africa,24 and to invest $4 billion in Africa’s health workforce by 2025 under the Global Health Worker Initiative.25 • Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA). During a U.S.-Africa Business Forum event, President Biden formally announced DTA, an initiative to “expand digital access and literacy and strengthen digital enabling environments across the continent.”26 He stated his intention to work with Congress to “invest over $350 million and facilitate over $450 million in financing” for the program. • Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) Expansion. Vice President Harris announced plans for a “next phase” of YALI—which offers training, mentorship, and exchange-based fellowships to emerging business, science, and civic leaders in Africa—entailing “a new investment of $100 million [...to] expand networking for alumni and connect them with social impact and business investors.”27 • Support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on U.S. cooperation with the AfCFTA, a pan-African free trade area (on the AfCFTA, see “Economic Affairs and U.S. Trade and Investment,” below).28 20 White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Summit Leaders Session on Partnering on the African Union’s Agenda 2063,” December 15, 2022. 21 Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited Zambia, Senegal, and South Africa in January 2023; First Lady Biden traveled to Namibia and Kenya in February 2023; and in March 2023, Vice President Harris visited Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia, and Secretary Blinken made his third trip to Africa, visiting Ethiopia and Niger. 22 Ibid. On other congressional support, see, for instance, Senator Chris Van Hollen, “Van Hollen Applauds Biden Administration Decision to Support African Union Membership in G-20,” December 9, 2022. On the G20, see CRS Report R40977, International Economic Policy Coordination at the G-7 and the G-20. 23 Ibid; and White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2022. 24 White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Closing Session on Promoting Food Security and Food Systems Resilience,” December 15, 2022. An accompanying White House fact sheet set out a pledge of “$2.5 billion in emergency aid and medium to long-term food security assistance”; White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.- Africa Partnership to Promote Food Security and Resilient Food Systems,” December 15, 2022. 25 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Health Cooperation,” December 13, 2022. 26 White House, “Fact Sheet: New Initiative on Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA),” December 14, 2022. 27 White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit African and Diaspora Young Leaders Forum,” December 13, 2022. See also the YALI website at https://yali.state.gov/. 28 USTR, “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation for Trade and Investment Between the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat and the Government of the United States of America,” December 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement • Diaspora Engagement. In line with the Africa strategy’s emphasis on diaspora engagement, President Biden issued an executive order (E.O.) establishing the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States,29 and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) signed a $500 million MOU with the African Export-Import Bank to expand diaspora engagement in Africa.30 Funding Commitments. Overall, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan asserted that the Administration would work with Congress to “commit $55 billion to Africa over the course of the next three years.”31 The Administration has released few details publicly on how it derived the $55 billion figure and on the breakdown between past funding and resources that it anticipates Congress will make available in the future. During the U.S.-Africa Business Forum, U.S. and African firms announced ongoing or planned investments and partnerships worth $15.7 billion.32 The Administration’s FY2024 budget request proposes new or increased funding for several U.S. assistance initiatives in Africa, in line with ALS announcements, without indicating how this funding relates to the Administration’s $55 billion pledge.33 Congress is considering the FY2024 request as it debates FY2024 appropriations. The Administration has appointed retired Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation to coordinate and oversee ALS outcomes.34 Debates Over Scope and Emphasis. As with the 2014 Summit, the 2022 ALS generated debate over the relative emphasis of the event’s agenda and the Administration’s Africa strategy, the merits of including or excluding certain African leaders, and policy dilemmas in U.S. relations with African countries. Some commentators praised the ALS as a valuable signal of U.S. interest in Africa, an opportunity to marshal high-level attention to U.S. interests in the region, and a welcome—if overdue—recognition of Africa’s importance.35 Other, more critical observers alleged that the Summit de-emphasized governance and human rights issues in favor of less contentious topics, and criticized the attendance of autocratic leaders at the event.36 U.S. Assistance for Africa37 The overall level of State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered aid for Africa remained fairly constant in the past decade, averaging roughly $8.0 29 White House, Executive Order 14089, “Establishing the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States,” December 13, 2022 (87 FR 77459). 30 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.- Africa Partnership in Elevating Diaspora Engagement,” December 13, 2022. 31 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” December 12, 2022. 32 Prosper Africa, U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Business Forum Commitments, 2022, available at https://www.prosperafrica.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Final-USALSBF-Commitment-Book-16-Dec_V3.pdf. 33 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year FY2024, 2023 (hereafter, “CBJ for FY2024”). Congressional consideration of the FY2024 request was ongoing as of June 2023. 34 White House, “Statement: Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation,” December 15, 2022. 35 See, e.g., Zainab Usman, Juliette Ovadia, and Aline Abayo, “The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Marks a Seismic Shift in Relations with the Continent,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 22, 2022; Joe Davidson, “Africa summit boasted progress, though differences with U.S. remain,” Washington Post, December 16, 2022. 36 See, e.g., Robbie Gramer, “A Narrow Escape, a Massacre, an Invite to Washington,” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2022; Jeffrey Smith, “Biden's Africa Summit Legitimizes Strongmen Like Kagame,” Time, December 13, 2022. 37 A separate product, CRS Report R46368, U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview, provides a detailed analysis of U.S. aid for the region. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 15 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement billion in annual inflation-adjusted dollars between FY2012 and FY2022, excluding humanitarian aid. U.S. assistance for Africa spiked to $8.85 billion in FY2021, underpinned by supplemental COVID-19 aid and emergency funding for Sudan.38 Health aid—primarily aimed at eradicating HIV/AIDS—regularly constitutes around three-quarters of State Department- and USAID-administered assistance for Africa. Other U.S. aid programs seek to foster economic growth and agricultural development; address insecurity, including by building the capacity of African security forces; improve education access and social service delivery; bolster democracy, human rights, and good governance; support natural resource management; and address humanitarian needs. Sections below provide additional information on specific areas of U.S. assistance. Governance and Human Rights In the 1990s, many African countries transitioned from military or single-party rule to multiparty political systems with regular elections. Regional governance trends have since varied. In a handful of stronger democracies, elections are competitive and opposition politicians and civil society activists tend to operate without harassment or impediment. Some (e.g., Cabo Verde, Ghana, and Mauritius) have held multiple electoral transfers of power between parties, while in others (e.g., Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa), political parties borne out of former independence movements have retained executive power for decades. Meanwhile, the majority of African countries generally have continued to receive middling to poor marks in independent global measures of democracy and civic freedoms (see Figure 2 below). Predominant among them are flawed democracies that blend elements of democratic governance (e.g., regular elections) with some (official or de facto) constraints on political and civic activity. In other countries, semi-authoritarian or entrenched autocrats tilt state institutions and election systems in their own favor, restrict media freedoms, and repress protests. The leaders of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini,39 and Uganda have held power since the 1980s. Trends or issues that have spurred particular attention and activity from Congress include: Military Takeovers. Since 2020, military officers have overthrown governments or engineered extra-constitutional transfers of power in Mali (twice), Chad, Guinea, Sudan, and Burkina Faso (twice).40 Intra-military tensions, alleged government corruption, state counterinsurgency failures, and economic pressures have fueled this trend.41 Military coups have complicated U.S. engagement, including security cooperation, amid legislative restrictions on U.S. assistance to military juntas (see “Peace and Security Issues,” below). Democratic Backsliding. Some heads of state in the region have abolished or evaded constitutional term limits to remain in power. In Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, leaders used the ratification of new constitutions as a pretext to evade term limits, arguing that this had effectively reset the clock on their mandates. (Guinea’s president was later overthrown in a military coup.) 38 CRS calculations based on FY2012-FY2022 allocations (drawn from State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024), adjusted to constant FY2022 dollars with deflators from Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables. FY2021 figures specifically include $367 million in COVID-19 related Economic Support Fund (ESF) funding provided in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2) and $700 million in ESF for Sudan provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Title IX, P.L. 116-260). 39 Eswatini, formerly Swaziland, is the only absolute monarchy in Africa. 40 In addition, authorities in Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Principe, and Gambia each claimed to have prevented coup attempts in 2022, though details surrounding each event remain unclear. 41 CRS Insight IN11854, “An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service 7 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Some leaders have cited security threats, health crises (including COVID-19), or protests and other social unrest as justifications for crackdowns or restrictions on opposition and civil society. Figure 2. Freedom House Freedom in the World Rankings for 2023 Source: CRS graphic; basemap from State Department and ESRI; rankings from Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2023. Corruption. While state effectiveness and bureaucratic capacity vary widely across Africa, the development of strong and accountable institutions remains limited in many countries. Corruption has been a major challenge in the region. State Department Investment Climate Statement reports routinely cite corruption as a major business challenge in many African countries. In consecutive years, on regional average, Africa has ranked last in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of perceived graft. Surveys indicate particularly high levels of public distrust of police, legislators, and other civil servants.42 Human Rights Issues Human rights conditions vary widely in Africa.43 The region’s leading democracies have maintained generally positive records in recent years, although state security forces in some of these countries (e.g., Senegal and South Africa) have been implicated in excessive force and other abuses, including during periods of social unrest. Arbitrary arrest, torture, and restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly occur with general impunity in many of Africa’s semi-authoritarian and authoritarian states. Civilians in countries afflicted by conflict may face threats from non-state armed groups as well as state security forces and state-backed militias. Abuses in Conflict. Atrocities and crimes against humanity in conflict-affected countries have been among the leading human rights concerns for some Members. These include extrajudicial 42 See, among others, Afrobarometer, “Perceptions are bad, reality is worse: Citizens report widespread predation by African police,” Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 512, March 18, 2022. 43 Information in this section is drawn from annual State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 13 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement killings by state security forces; sexual- and gender-based violence in conflict; ethnically- and religiously-targeted violence; and attacks or restrictions on humanitarian activity. As discussed below (see “Selected Congressional Engagement”), the 2020-2022 war in Ethiopia generated substantial activity in the 117th Congress, amid reports of extensive abuses in that conflict. Congress has also focused on the recruitment and use of child soldiers: in 2022 (latest available), the State Department designated the governments of the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA, Title IV, P.L. 110-457, as amended). Designation under the CSPA can carry restrictions on certain U.S. security assistance, subject to a presidential waiver; President Biden partially waived restrictions on FY2023 assistance for CAR, DRC, and Somalia.44 Restrictions on Freedoms of Assembly, Expression, and Religion. Human rights organizations have accused state security forces in some countries of mass killings of protesters (e.g., in Nigeria in 2020 and Chad in 2022). In a number of African countries, governments restrict freedoms of expression and the press, and journalists may self-censor to avoid harassment or arrest. Many African governments also restrict the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) citizens, and anti-LGBTQI sentiment and discrimination is reportedly widespread in the region.45 In Uganda, where same-sex relations were already punishable by life imprisonment, President Yoweri Museveni signed legislation in May 2023 prescribing the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality,” making Uganda the fourth African country with a death penalty for same-sex relations, alongside Mauritania, Nigeria, and Somalia.46 As of July 2023, Ghana’s parliament was considering legislation that would dramatically increase prison sentences for same-sex relations and for providing healthcare and other services to LGBTQI individuals. In some countries, citizens face restrictions on freedom of worship or threats of violence along religious lines. In 2022, the State Department named Eritrea a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) and placed CAR on the Special Watch List for religious freedom violations under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended). The State Department also named Russia’s Wagner Group as an entity of particular concern, citing actions in CAR (see “Global Power Competition in Africa”). As noted below, some Members have criticized the Administration’s decision to not designate Nigeria a CPC in successive years. Designation as a CPC can prompt a range of sanctions, subject to a waiver or referral to existing sanctions already in place for the country; the Administration referred Eritrea to preexisting sanctions in 2022.47 Labor Abuses and Trafficking in Persons. Labor abuses in Africa, especially child labor, have been a longstanding emphasis of congressional attention. Engagement has centered on the use of child labor in West Africa’s cocoa industry (with a focus on Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, the leading cocoa producers globally) and in the mining sector, particularly in DRC. Amid U.S. concern related to China’s influence over global mineral supply chains (see “Global Power Competition in Africa”), some in Congress have expressed increased interest in allegations of child labor and other human rights abuses in the cobalt sector in DRC, where PRC firms play a prominent role.48 44 CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions. 45 Afrobarometer, “‘All in this together’: Africans tolerant on ethnic, religious, national, but not sexual differences,” Dispatch No. 362, May 19, 2020. 46 Aditi Bhandari, “Uganda’s anti-gay bill is the latest and worst to target LGBTQ Africans,” Reuters, updated May 29, 2023. In Nigeria, the death penalty for same-sex conduct is in effect in the 12 northern states that observe Sharia law. 47 CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy. 48 See, e.g., Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (TLHRC), Child Labor and Human Rights Violations in the Mining Industry of the Democratic Republic of Congo, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Human trafficking has been an enduring challenge in the region. The State Department, in its 2023 Trafficking in Persons report (mandated under Division A of P.L. 106-386, as amended), ranked Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan as Tier 3 (worst-performing), which carries restrictions on “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to the government” for the following fiscal year and on certain other engagement, subject to a presidential waiver.49 Waiver determinations for 2023 (related to FY2024 aid) are pending. Selected Congressional Engagement Hearings. Congress has held hearings on governance and human rights issues in Africa generally, and on developments in specific countries.50 Hearings on global trends in democracy and human rights, and on particular issues (e.g., China’s support for authoritarianism abroad, global threats to religious freedom, and attacks on LGBTQI people worldwide) also have featured discussion of African countries.51 Some Members have additionally used annual State Department and USAID budget hearings to express views on governance and human rights conditions in certain countries and request information from Administration officials on U.S. responses. Resolutions. Members regularly introduce and consider resolutions pertaining to political and governance issues in Africa and expressing views on U.S. responses. Resolutions are often tied to elections; the 117th and 118th (to date) Congresses have considered measures to call for free and credible polls in Angola (S.Res. 736), Gambia (S.Res. 456), and Nigeria (S.Res. 36; H.Res. 143). Human rights trends or developments in particular countries also have spurred resolutions and Member remarks. Atrocities in the war in Ethiopia drew particular concern in the 117th Congress (including S.Res. 97, agreed to in the Senate, as well as H.Res. 445 and H.Res. 842), as did Rwanda’s imprisonment of exiled dissident and U.S. legal permanent resident Paul Rusesabagina (H.Res. 892). Regarding religious freedom, as noted above, some Members have criticized the Biden Administration’s decision to de-list Nigeria as a CPC under the IRFA; in the 118th Congress, H.Res. 82 would call for Nigeria to be re-designated, among other provisions. Foreign Assistance. Congress appropriates democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) aid in Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bills. Such funding comprised roughly 4% of State Department and USAID-administered assistance for Africa in 2022, although additional DRG aid is provided via programs that are global in scope (as opposed to allocated on a region- or country-specific basis).52 Among other activities, U.S. DRG programs in Africa aim to support electoral bodies and political processes; build capacity of justice sectors, parliaments, political parties, civil society, and journalists; enhance service delivery; and counter corruption. Congress has included provisos in SFOPS appropriations bills that DRG funding be made available for certain countries, with Benin, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, 49 Tier classifications are set out in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386, as amended). See CRS In Focus IF10587, Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction and CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology. 50 See, for instance, HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, Elections in Africa, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 2021; SFRC, Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 1, 2022; and HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Democratic Backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., September 30, 2020. 51 See, among others, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), Techno-Authoritarianism: Platform for Repression in China and Abroad, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2021; TLHRC, The State of Religious Freedom Around the Globe, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 2021; and HFAC, Advancing and Protecting LGBTQI+ Rights Abroad, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2021. 52 CRS estimates based on data provided by USAID, March 2023. Congressional Research Service 10 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Ethiopia, Gambia, South Sudan, and Sudan, among others, specified in the most recent bill (Division K of P.L. 117-328) and accompanying report language. Sanctions and Other Restrictions. As of June 2023, the United States maintained country-specific sanctions programs pertaining to CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Sudan,53 South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.54 Successive Administrations also have imposed human rights- or corruption-related sanctions on Africa-based individuals and entities under non-Africa-specific programs. These include “Global Magnitsky” sanctions, pertaining to global human rights and corruption, along with Russia-related sanctions programs.55 Designation under these sanctions programs freezes any assets under U.S. jurisdiction, blocks transactions with U.S. persons, and imposes visa and entry restrictions. The State Department has also publicly designated Africa-based individuals for visa bans under “Section 7031(c)” of annual SFOPS appropriations (most recently, Division K of P.L. 117-328), pertaining to human rights abuses and corruption.56 The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, provides the executive branch with additional, broad authority to deny visas or entry on various grounds, generally without public designation. Other provisions in SFOPS appropriations measures restrict or condition aid for certain countries on governance or human rights grounds. Certain forms of assistance for the governments of countries in the Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda), along with South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, are subject to some restrictions in the most recent SFOPS appropriations bill. Recurring language in annual SFOPS appropriations measures additionally has directed the executive branch to use its position in international financial institutions to vote against proposed loans or grants to the Government of Zimbabwe, except to meet basic needs or promote democracy. (The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 [P.L. 107-99, as amended by P.L. 115-231] frames U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe more broadly, prohibiting U.S. support for multilateral debt relief and credit for Zimbabwe’s government pending progress toward various governance benchmarks and other U.S. policy goals.) Additionally, Congress has imposed restrictions on certain kinds of U.S. aid following coups d’état or in connection with poor records on human trafficking, child soldiers, and religious freedom. Reporting and Consultation Requirements. Congress has enacted executive branch reporting, briefing, or consultation requirements related to a range of governance and human rights issues in Africa. Most recently, language in the FY2023 SFOPS appropriations measure (Division K of P.L. 117-328) and the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 (NDAA, P.L. 117-263) and accompanying explanatory statements require the executive branch to report to or brief Congress on governance or human rights issues in DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, the Sahel, South Sudan, and Sudan. Congress also has directed the executive branch to consult with Congress on the use of funds to be made available for certain countries whose governments have been implicated in abuses; the FY2023 SFOPS bill and House report require consultation on funding for Cameroon, South Sudan, and Sudan, and subject aid for Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. 53 Two sanctions authorities are in effect with respect to Sudan. The most recent, E.O. 14098, was issued in May 2023, in response to an outbreak of fighting between wings of Sudan’s military. See Treasury Department, “Sudan and Darfur Sanctions,” at https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/sudan-and-darfur-sanctions. 54 For a full list of sanctions programs, see Treasury Department, “Sanctions Programs and Country Information,” at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information. 55 See CRS Report R46981, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act: Scope, Implementation, and Considerations for Congress. 56 CRS In Focus IF10905, FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Targeting Foreign Corruption and Human Rights Violations. Congressional Research Service 11 link to page 30 link to page 17 link to page 30 link to page 30 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Peace and Security Issues After proliferating in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, armed conflicts diminished in number in much of Africa in the 2000s, with the end of devastating wars in Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and southern Sudan. Over the past decade, however, civil wars and violent political crises have broken out or intensified in multiple African countries (e.g., Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan), while some long-running conflicts have eluded resolution (e.g., in eastern DRC and Somalia). Islamist armed groups affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) are active in parts of East, West, and Central Africa. Injecting a new element of insecurity and predation, Russia’s Wagner Group, a nominally private military company, has expanded its footprint in several African countries (see “Global Power Competition in Africa”).57 Trends have not been uniformly negative, however. Some countries have weathered political uncertainty or unrest without tipping into conflict, and African-led interventions have made progress in stabilizing parts of Somalia and Mozambique. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)’s 2023 Posture Statement, presented to Congress in March 2023, stresses Africa’s importance to U.S. strategic interests and to global stability and prosperity. Describing Africa as “the epicenter of global terrorism,” it asserts that extremist violence is “the most immediate threat to both American lives and our partners in Africa.”58 The presence of Russia and China—the former “overwhelmingly harmful,” the latter offering an “uneven mix of much-needed infrastructure, equipment, and trade alongside depleted natural resources, polluted ecosystems, corruption and deficient military hardware”—as well as climate shocks are other top emphases of the 2023 statement. Issues that have garnered congressional attention include: Islamist Extremism. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) characterizes Somalia’s Al Shabaab as Al Qaeda’s “biggest and richest franchise” and a potential threat to the U.S. homeland.59 A U.N.-backed African Union stabilization force has made some counterinsurgency gains, with U.S. and European support, but Al Shabaab continues to control territory and resources.60 The group has killed thousands of civilians since the mid-2000s and staged large attacks in the broader region, especially Kenya. A small IS faction also is active in Somalia’s north. The U.S. military has supported counterinsurgency efforts in the country, including through a long-running airstrike campaign (see “U.S. Military Engagement in Africa,” below). The second-largest Al Qaeda affiliate in Africa, the Malian-led Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), is primarily active in West Africa’s Sahel region, centering on Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Conflicts involving JNIM and other armed actors, including a rival IS affiliate, ethnic militias, and criminal actors, have displaced millions and deepened development, humanitarian, and governance challenges.61 Russian contractors have been involved in Mali and engaged in outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso (see “Global Power Competition in Africa”). Since 2020, violence has moved south into previously stable coastal West African countries, particularly Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo.62 57 See CRS In Focus IF12389, Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress. 58 AFRICOM, 2023 Posture Statement to Congress, submitted as written testimony by AFRICOM Commander General Michael E. Langley to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2023. 59 Testimony by AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley in SASC, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command. 60 See CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia, and CRS In Focus IF10170, Al Shabaab. 61 See CRS In Focus IF10434, Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule, CRS In Focus IF10116, Crisis in Mali, and CRS Testimony TE10044, U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa. 62 See CRS Insight IN11938, Responding to State “Fragility” in Coastal West Africa. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 30 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement In Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, an Islamist insurgency in the country’s northeast has displaced millions and destabilized surrounding border areas of neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, known as the Lake Chad Basin region. Boko Haram, an extremist group that emerged in 2009 and gained global notoriety for its abduction of over 250 schoolgirls in 2014, later split; since 2016, an Islamic State affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (IS-WA), has established itself as the leading Islamist armed group threat in the country. Since 2017, an IS-affiliated insurgency in northern Mozambique has targeted state facilities and personnel, civilians, and natural gas operations partly financed by U.S. loan commitments, killing thousands.63 The group also has staged attacks in neighboring Tanzania. The Islamic State also claims an affiliate in eastern DRC.64 At Mozambique’s request, Rwanda and several southern African countries have separately deployed forces to Mozambique to combat the insurgency. As discussed below (see “Global Power Competition in Africa”), Mozambique was also the site of Russian military contractor the Wagner Group’s most significant defeat in Africa to date, as Wagner withdrew personnel from the country after sustaining heavy casualties. Other Internal Conflicts: Ethiopia, Sudan, and DRC. Congress demonstrated extensive interest in the 2020-2022 conflict in northern Ethiopia, which pitted Ethiopian federal forces, allied militia, and troops from neighboring Eritrea against an ethnic insurgency spearheaded by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. A peace deal signed in late 2022 has quelled the violence, though prospects for its sustainability—and accountability for abuses that the State Department found to constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—are uncertain.65 In Sudan, fighting between rival state security services—the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Force—erupted in April 2023 and has killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands to date. The U.S. government evacuated personnel from the capital, Khartoum, and helped facilitate the departure of over 1,000 U.S. citizens from the country. Some Members of Congress have raised questions about U.S. anticipation of and response to the crisis, including the evacuation process for U.S. citizens, and have made recommendations or sought information from the executive branch on the path forward for U.S. engagement.66 U.S. and other foreign diplomats have sought to broker a lasting ceasefire, as observers warn that the situation could descend into a broader civil war in an already unstable country. Insecurity has persisted in DRC since the 1990s, involving dozens of armed groups, some with roots in or support from neighboring countries.67 Recent congressional concern has centered on the resurgence, since 2021, of the M23 armed group, which has reportedly received substantial support from neighboring Rwanda.68 Regional leaders have sought to facilitate peace talks between the DRC government and armed groups. The Islamic State has separately recognized the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a DRC-based armed group of Ugandan origin, as an affiliate. Intercommunal Violence. Intercommunal conflicts, often spurred by disputes over land and other resources, citizenship rights, and political power struggles, are a major challenge in parts of Africa. Such disputes often coincide with and aggravate ethnic or religious cleavages, presenting 63 CRS In Focus IF11864, Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Nature and Responses. 64 CRS In Focus IF12206, The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State Affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 65 State Department, “War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia,” March 20, 2023. 66 See SFRC, “Conflict in Sudan: Options for an Effective Policy Response,” hearing 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 10, 2023. In the 118th Congress, H.Res. 585 would call on the Administration to take various actions with regard to Sudan. 67 See CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations. 68 See U.N. Security Council, Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. doc. S/2022/967, December 2022; State Department, “Statement on Report by UN Group of Experts,” January 4, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement opportunities for extremist groups to gain support by exploiting perceptions of marginalization or state predation.69 In West Africa, for instance, Islamist armed groups have made use of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists to position themselves as “defenders of pastoralist interests.”70 U.N. Peacekeeping. Almost 85% of all U.N. peacekeeping personnel are in Africa.71 As of July 2023, U.N. peacekeeping operations were under way in CAR, DRC, Mali, South Sudan, and the Abyei region of Sudan, while a U.N. logistical operation was deployed to Somalia to support the aforementioned AU-led stabilization force. U.N. peacekeepers are expected to withdraw from Mali by late 2023 after Mali’s government called for their departure. With its veto power at the U.N. Security Council, the United States plays a lead role in establishing and renewing U.N. peacekeeping missions.72 Rwanda, Ghana, and Senegal ranked in the top 10 contributors to U.N. peacekeeping as of April 2023, and several other African countries regularly rank in the top 20.73 U.S. Military Engagement in Africa AFRICOM’s area of responsibility covers all of Africa (including North Africa) except Egypt.74 In 2021, AFRICOM’s then-Commander put AFRICOM’s manpower at “just under 6,000 service members, civilians and contractors.”75 Of these, several thousand are located at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the lone enduring U.S. military base in Africa. As of June 2023, about 1,000 U.S. personnel were deployed to Niger to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and support regional counterterrorism efforts.76 Since 2022, roughly 500 U.S. troops have redeployed to Somalia to support counterterrorism operations, following President Donald Trump’s decision in 2020 to withdraw and redeploy forces to neighboring countries.77 The U.S. military conducts a range of activities in Africa, including: Direct Strikes. The U.S. military has acknowledged conducting strikes against terrorist targets in two African countries: Somalia and Libya. (On Libya, see CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy.) The U.S. military commenced airstrikes in Somalia in 2007, targeting members of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab. In 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al Shabaab as an “associated force” of Al Qaeda under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, 69 For one study of extremist recruitment in Africa, see U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, 2017. 70 Leif Brottem, “The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), July 12, 2021. 71 CRS calculation based on May 2023 (latest) data in U.N. Peacekeeping, Uniformed Personnel Contributing Countries by Ranking, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors. 72 CRS In Focus IF10597, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping. 73 U.N. Peacekeeping, Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Country and Personnel Type, March 31, 2023. 74 Before AFRICOM became a stand-alone command in 2008, responsibility for U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided among European, Central, and Pacific Commands. 75 SASC, United States Central Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 22, 2021. In 2020 testimony to Congress, then-Commander General Stephen Townsend stated that “about 5,100 U.S. service members and about 1,000 DOD civilians and contractors” were active in Africa; SASC, United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., January 30, 2020. 76 White House, “Letter to the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate on War Powers Report,” June 8, 2023. 77 Testimony by AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley in SASC, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 30 link to page 30 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note).78 The tempo of U.S. strikes rose under Presidents Obama and Trump, and strikes have continued under President Biden; AFRICOM reported 15 strikes in Somalia in 2022, describing most as “collective self-defense strikes” in support of the Somali army.79 Several Members of Congress have expressed concern over reported harm to civilians from U.S. strikes in Somalia.80 AFRICOM has acknowledged that some airstrikes in Somalia have killed or harmed civilians, while rejecting such allegations in other cases.81 More broadly, some Members have questioned whether the executive branch assertion of authority under the AUMF to target Al Shabaab is appropriate.82 Congress has authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to support “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations” by U.S. special operations forces to combat terrorism (codified in 10 U.S.C. §127[e]). DOD does not publicly disclose the locations or scope of such activities; media have reported programs in several African countries. Some Members have sought to gain a better understanding of the legal authorization under which U.S. military personnel have deployed to Africa, along with human rights-related safeguards governing U.S. partnered operations in the region.83 Building Partner Capacity. DOD seeks to build the capacity of African forces under a “by, with, and through” approach that emphasizes a supporting role for the United States.84 The majority of DOD-administered security assistance for African partner forces has been provided under DOD’s “global train and equip” authority, which Congress expanded and codified under 10 U.S.C. 333 (“Section 333”) in the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328). DOD also implements some State Department-administered security assistance programs. Logistical Support. France withdrew military forces from Mali and Burkina Faso in 2022-2023 amid diplomatic tensions linked in part to Russia’s involvement in the Sahel (see “Global Power Competition in Africa”). French President Emmanuel Macron has pledged to reorient operations in the region toward support for willing partner militaries, as opposed to direct strikes on targets in Mali.85 The United States has supported French counterterrorism operations in the Sahel through intelligence sharing and aerial refueling and resupply.86 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The U.S. military conducts ISR activities in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, operating primarily out of Niger, via facilities in the 78 Obama White House, Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations, 2016. See also CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application. 79 AFRICOM regularly issues press releases on such strikes, at https://www.africom.mil/media-gallery/press-releases. 80 See, e.g., letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Sara Jacobs to Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, December 19, 2022. 81 In response to allegations of civilian casualties, AFRICOM conducted a review in 2019, which led to the first official confirmation of civilian killings in its Somalia strike campaign. AFRICOM civilian casualty reports are available at https://www.africom.mil/civilian-casualty-report. 82 See April 27, 2023, House floor debate on H.Con.Res. 30, which would have directed the removal of U.S. forces from Somalia for lack of specific authorization. The resolution failed in the House, 102-321. 83 Remarks by Representative Ilhan Omar in HFAC, The 2001 AUMF and War Powers: The Path Forward, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 2, 2021; and remarks by Representative Sara Jacobs in House Armed Services Committee (HASC), National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2022. See also Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Rules for Pentagon Use of Proxy Forces Shed Light on a Shadowy War Power,” New York Times, May 14, 2023. 84 Department of Defense (DOD), 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2022. 85 Constantin Gouvy and Andrew Lebovich, “France Shifts Gears in the Sahel as Russia’s Influence Grows,” World Politics Review, April 18, 2023. 86 DOD has provided logistical support under 10 U.S.C. 331, enacted as part of the FY2017 NDAA. Congressional Research Service 15 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement capital, Niamey, and the northern city of Agadez.87 Media outlets have reported additional U.S. ISR activities that have not been confirmed by U.S. officials. Other Engagements. The U.S. military conducts regular exercises and other engagements with African militaries. These include Flintlock, the flagship U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa-led exercise focused on West Africa; African Lion, which was jointly hosted by Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, and Senegal in 2022; and Obangame Express, a maritime exercise in the Gulf of Guinea. The State Partnership Program, which pairs state National Guards with security forces and disaster response agencies in partner countries for training and other engagements, had partnerships in 16 African countries as of July 2023, with National Guard assignments pending for two others (Gabon and Malawi/Zambia).88 Most U.S. embassies in Africa also host U.S. military personnel, such as Defense Attachés or Office of Security Cooperation staff. A small number of U.S. military personnel (28 as of March 2023) serve as staff officers in U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region.89 Selected Congressional Engagement Hearings. Congress has held multiple hearings on conflict in Africa generally, and on conflicts or crises in specific African countries.90 The war in Ethiopia spurred extensive Member engagement in the 117th Congress.91 In the 118th Congress, SFRC held a hearing on the unfolding conflict in Sudan in May 2023.92 State Department and USAID budget hearings, along with annual AFRICOM posture hearings, have been additional venues for Members to express views or concerns on conflicts in Africa and probe U.S. responses and military activity. War Powers. The 118th Congress has debated and considered legislation pertaining to war powers and the use of military force, both worldwide and specifically in Africa. Notably, bills that would repeal, sunset, and/or replace the 2001 AUMF, which authorized the use of military force against those who perpetrated or provided support for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, could have implications for some military operations in Africa (see “Direct Strikes,” above).93 Separately, the House considered, and voted to table, H.Con.Res. 30, which would have directed the President to remove all U.S. forces, other than those assigned to protect the U.S. embassy, from Somalia. Foreign Assistance. Congress appropriates State Department- and USAID-administered peace and security assistance for Africa in annual SFOPS appropriations measures. State Department-administered security assistance programs, codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code, include activities to strengthen and professionalize African security forces, strengthen counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, border security, maritime, and other security capacities, and enhance policing and law enforcement. The United States also provides support to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict in Africa, and to train and equip African peacekeeping personnel. The House report accompanying 87 The U.S. military began ISR flights from Air Base 201 in 2019. Congress explicitly authorized funds for construction of the Agadez facility. See DOD Inspector General, Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction, 2020. 88 DOD, “Building Partnerships Around the Globe: State Partnership Program,” accessed July 14, 2023. 89 U.N. Peacekeeping, “Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Country, and Personnel Type,” March 31, 2023. 90 In the 117th Congress, the HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights held two hearings on conflict in Africa: Understanding Conflict in Africa, (1st sess; September 28, 2021), and Examining U.S. Foreign Assistance to Address the Root Causes of Instability and Conflict in Africa, (2nd sess.; November 15, 2022). 91 The 117th Congress held two hearings on Ethiopia: SFRC, Ethiopia in Crisis: U.S. Strategy and Policy Response, 117th Cong., 1st sess., May 27th, 2021, and HFAC, The Conflict in Ethiopia, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 29, 2021. 92 SFRC, “Conflict in Sudan: Options for an Effective Policy Response.” 93 For example, H.R. 2501, H.J.Res. 52, and S. 1061, along with several proposed amendments. Congressional Research Service 16 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement the most recent SFOPS appropriations measure (Division K of P.L. 117-328) directs the State Department to allocate funds for the U.N. support operation in Somalia, national park security in DRC, and surplus weapons destruction in Angola and Zimbabwe. DOD also conducts security cooperation activities with foreign militaries and internal security entities from its own funds; comprehensive information on country allocations and activities is not publicly available. Congress also has enacted legislation authorizing security assistance activities in Africa. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program (TSCTP) Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103) provided statutory authority for TSCTP, a preexisting State Department-led interagency program focused on North and West Africa. Congress sought to encourage a more coordinated interagency approach to U.S. peace and security assistance via the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (GFA, Title V of Div. J, P.L. 116-94), which required the executive branch to select five priority countries or regions for stabilization or prevention programming over a 10-year period. The Administration subsequently designated Mozambique and “Coastal West Africa” (a grouping of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo) as GFA partners.94 Sanctions and Other Restrictions. A provision in regular SFOPS appropriations measures (most recently, Section 7008 of Division K, P.L. 117-328) restricts most U.S. foreign assistance after a coup d’état, with exemptions for democracy assistance, funds implemented by nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian aid, and other funds authorized to be provided “notwithstanding” any other provision of law.95 In practice, military aid is often affected most directly. As of May 2023, “Section 7008” restrictions were in effect for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and (since 1989) Sudan. Some Members have urged the executive branch to restrict security assistance for other governments after other military seizures of power, notably in Chad.96 AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley, for his part, has criticized Section 7008 as restrictive and misguided.97 Some Members have pushed for reviews or reductions of security cooperation with certain African governments following reports of state security force abuses. In 2021, SFRC leaders reportedly placed a pre-notification hold on a proposed sale of attack helicopters to Nigeria, citing human rights concerns.98 (The proposal later advanced.) In 2022, some Members reportedly requested reviews of security aid for Nigeria (after Reuters alleged that Nigeria’s military had conducted forced abortions) and Rwanda (over Rwanda’s reported support for the M23 in DRC).99 The so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict most State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance to foreign security force units that have been credibly implicated in a “gross violation 94 The Administration has released summaries of its strategic plans for Mozambique and Coastal West Africa; see State Department, The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Mozambique, and The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Coastal West Africa, 2023. See also CRS Insight IN11938, Responding to State “Fragility” in Coastal West Africa. 95 See CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations. 96 In the 117th Congress, S.Res. 701 would have expressed the view that events in Chad constituted a coup d’état. 97 In AFRICOM’s 2023 Posture Statement, for instance, General Langley asserted that “although well intended, U.S. coup restrictions can inadvertently incentivize the most at-risk African countries to dig themselves deeper into the mire of militancy and corruption.” AFRICOM, 2023 Posture Statement to Congress. 98 Robbie Gramer, “U.S. Lawmakers Hold Up Major Proposed Arms Sale to Nigeria,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2021. 99 David Lewis and Daphne Psaledakis, “Senator wants review of U.S. security assistance to Nigeria following abortion report,” Reuters, December 20, 2022; and Hereward Holland, “U.S. senator questions aid to Rwanda over human rights, role in Congo,” Reuters, July 26, 2022. Congressional Research Service 17 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement of human rights,” subject to certain exceptions.100 The executive branch generally does not make public which units have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws. Reporting Requirements. Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa. Among other efforts, in the 117th Congress, Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) expanded notification and reporting requirements associated with the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance for Africa.101 The TSCTP Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-103), in addition to authorizing TSCTP, established congressional notification requirements on funding allocations, required interagency strategies for TSCTP and regional policy objectives, and mandated regular reporting on progress in meeting TSCTP objectives and resolving past management deficiencies. Economic Affairs and U.S. Trade and Investment By several measures, Africa ranks among the world’s least developed regions. According to the U.N. Development Program’s Multidimensional Poverty Index, half of all poor people globally— an estimated 534 million, out of 1.1 billion—live in sub-Saharan Africa.102 Extractive industries that have underpinned periods of high gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the region have often created limited employment and social welfare gains. Many countries reduced poverty rates between 1990 and 2020, but population growth meant that the total number of Africans living in extreme poverty rose during the period.103 Most of Africa’s poor reside in a handful of states, led by Nigeria, the region’s most populous country.104 Africa also surpasses other regions in many non-monetary measures of deprivation, such as deficits in electricity and clean water access. In 2021, 17 of the 20 countries with the largest energy deficits were in Africa; Nigeria (86 million), DRC (76 million), and Ethiopia (55 million) had the largest populations without power.105 The economic shocks of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war have roiled African economies, heightening poverty and food insecurity. According to the World Bank, the pandemic pushed some 23 million more Africans into “extreme poverty” between 2020 and 2022, albeit fewer than initially projected.106 More recently, trade disruptions resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reduced supplies of some goods (e.g., wheat and fertilizers) in global markets, pushing up food and other prices and eroding local purchasing power in Africa. Of the 19 countries and regional clusters identified as “hunger hotspots” in a joint Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)-World Food Program (WFP) study of global food insecurity in late 2022, 12 are in Africa, including four—Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Somalia—facing or at risk of starvation.107 100 CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”). 101 The FY2023 NDAA amended the reporting requirement (Section 5594 of P.L. 117-263). 102 UNDP, Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2023, 2023. 103 Marta Schoch and Christoph Lakner, “The number of poor people continues to rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite a slow decline in the poverty rate,” World Bank Data Blog, December 16, 2020. 104 “Nigeria accounts for about one-quarter of Africa’s poor (85.2 million); the next four (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Madagascar) for another quarter; and the next five (Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi, Kenya, and Zambia) for the following 25 percent.” Luc Christiaensen and Ruth Hill, “Poverty in Africa,” in Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa, ed. Kathleen Beegle and Luc Christiaensen (The World Bank, 2019), p. 46. 105 World Bank et al., Tracking SDG7: The Energy Progress Report 2023, 2023. 106 World Bank Blog, “Africa might have dodged a bullet, but systemic warnings abound for poverty reduction efforts on the continent,” September 28, 2022. 107 FAO and WFP, Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP Early Warnings on Acute Food Insecurity: October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook, September 2022. Congressional Research Service 18 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Public debt levels have risen sharply in many African countries since 2019, amid increased spending on public health and stimulus efforts alongside a collapse in revenue generation during the pandemic.108 As of April 2023, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessed that at least 19 African countries were in (or at high risk of) debt distress, or unable to service their debts.109 Two African countries, Ghana and Zambia, have defaulted on sovereign debts since 2020, and some analysts warn of a looming debt crisis in the region.110 U.S. officials have criticized China, a top lender for many African countries, for delaying debt relief for both Ghana and Zambia.111 Business Climate Challenges. The U.S. government has identified a number of impediments to doing business in Africa. According to public reporting by the State Department, investors cite poor infrastructure, expensive and unreliable electricity, and currency shortages and foreign exchange volatility as major challenges, even in some of the region’s more advanced economies (e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa).112 In many countries, low access to banking and credit have constrained commercial activity and hamstrung businesses’ ability to respond to shocks, though access to financial services has expanded with the widespread adoption of mobile money technologies.113 Uncertain political and legal environments also may constrain business activity in parts of the region, as may armed conflicts or other insecurity. Many governments have struggled to adequately enforce contracts or property rights, partly due to poor property registration and record-keeping.114 Intellectual property rights protection also is generally weak in the region.115 African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA).116 Efforts to deepen regional integration are ongoing under the AfCFTA, a pan-African free trade zone intended to eventually create a single regional market for goods, services, and capital. Fifty-four of 55 AU member states have signed a framework accord establishing the AfCFTA. AfCFTA's initial implementation phase, centering on trade in goods, began in 2021, though negotiations persist on certain issues, including rules of origin. Realization of the AfCFTA’s full benefits also will require the parties to overcome substantial non-tariff barriers and other impediments. Several Members have expressed support for the AfCFTA.117 During the 2022 Africa Leaders Summit, the United States and the AU’s AfCFTA Secretariat signed an MOU on U.S. support for the AfCFTA. U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment Africa accounts for a small share of overall U.S. trade and investment activity, making up roughly 1-2% of U.S. international trade and of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions, on 108 See CRS In Focus IF11880, Sovereign Debt Concerns in Developing Countries. 109 Ibid. IMF data on debt distress cover the 35 low-income African countries included (as of April 2023) under the Joint World Bank–IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries. 110 Charles Albinet and Martin Kessler, The Coming Debt Crisis: Monitoring Liquidity and Solvency Risks, Finance for Development Lab, Working Paper 1, November 2022; The Economist, “Debt repayment costs are rising fast for many African countries,” April 30, 2022. 111 Department of the Treasury, "Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen at Press Conference as Part of 2023 IMF-World Bank Annual Spring Meetings," April 11, 2023. 112 State Department, 2022 Investment Climate Statements, 2022. 113 An estimated 33% of adults in Africa have mobile money accounts, the highest rate of any region. World Bank, The Global Findex Database 2021: Financial Inclusion, Digital Payments, and Resilience in the Age of COVID-19, 2022. 114 The Economist, “The quest for secure property rights in Africa,” September 12, 2020. 115 U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments, 2020, pp. 167-206. 116 CRS Report R47197, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress. 117 In the 118th Congress, H.Res. 261 would express "strong support" for the AfCFTA. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 23 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement average, in the past decade.118 U.S. goods exports to Africa totaled $18.6 billion in value in 2022, led by mineral fuels, vehicles and parts, machinery, aircraft, and cereals (see Figure 3). South Africa and Nigeria were the top U.S. export markets in Africa in 2022, accounting for more than half of the value of U.S. exports to the region. African exports to the United States totaled $31.3 billion in 2022, led by metals, mineral fuels, apparel, and cocoa. South Africa, consistently the leading African exporter to the United States, accounted for almost half the value of such imports. Figure 3. U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment Source: CRS graphic, based on data from U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) Dataweb; BEA, U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on a Historical-Cost Basis: Country Detail by Industry, 2021; and BEA, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Position by Detailed Country, 2020-2021. Notes: U.S. export figures reflect total Free Alongside Ship (FAS) value of total exports. U.S. import figures reflect general customs value of general imports. FDI outflow and inflow data include North Africa, due to data 118 CRS calculation based on trade and investment data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ “International Data” interactive tables, at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?ReqID=62&step=1. BEA data for Africa include North Africa. Congressional Research Service 20 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement availability issues. Mineral fuel import data represent general customs value of general imports for HTS Code 27 (Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils and Products of their Distil ation; Bituminous Substances; Mineral Waxes). There is limited public information on the distribution of U.S. FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. According to U.S. Department of Commerce data, U.S. FDI stock in Africa has hovered at around $35 billion since 2010.119 South Africa, Mauritius, and Nigeria are the top destinations of U.S. FDI in the region. Mining, including oil and gas extraction, is the top target industry of U.S. FDI in Africa, followed by manufacturing, holding companies, finance, and wholesale trade.120 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). A cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy, AGOA (P.L. 106-200, as amended), established a nonreciprocal U.S. trade preference program that provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for most exports from eligible sub-Saharan African countries.121 U.S. imports under AGOA totaled $10.2 billion in value in 2022 (see Figure 4). Crude oil (primarily from Nigeria) is consistently the leading import under the program. South Africa exports the broadest range of products under the program, including motor vehicles, minerals, chemicals, and agricultural products. Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Ethiopia are other top beneficiaries. Congress extended AGOA’s authorization through September 2025 in the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-27). Looking ahead, Members may consider whether, and with what (if any) possible changes, to reauthorize the program beyond 2025. As of June 2023, 35 countries were eligible for AGOA.122 President Biden has terminated AGOA preferences for four countries: Ethiopia (in 2022) for gross human rights violations, and Mali (2022), Guinea (2022), and Burkina Faso (2023) after military coups. Some Members have debated the Administration’s termination of Ethiopia’s AGOA benefits.123 Some have separately called for other countries to be suspended from the program, for various reasons.124 119 USTR, 2022 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2022; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), “Direct Investment Position on a Historical-Cost Basis by Detailed Country.” 120 BEA, “Direct Investment by Country and Industry, 2021,” July 21, 2022. 121 CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 122 A list of AGOA-eligible countries is available at https://agoa.info/about-agoa/country-eligibility.html. 123 Senator Risch and Representative McCaul, “Risch, McCaul Urge Government of Ethiopia to Take Action to Retain AGOA Benefits,” October 26, 2021; letter from Senator Van Hollen and Representative Bass to President Biden, December 21, 2021; and letter from Representative Beyer to the U.S. Trade Representative, November 18, 2022. 124 See, e.g., Senate Finance Committee, “Wyden Statement on Uganda Anti-LGBTQI+ Law,” May 30, 2023. Congressional Research Service 21 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Figure 4. AGOA Trade Statistics, 2021 Source: CRS graphic based on data from USITC, U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade Data Tables, available at https://dataweb.usitc.gov/trade-data-reports/sub-saharan-africa/trade-data, accessed May 8, 2023. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Negotiations and Other Frameworks. The United States does not have an FTA with any country in sub-Saharan Africa. The Trump Administration made reciprocal trade negotiations a priority of its trade policy with Africa and, in 2020, launched FTA negotiations with Kenya.125 The Biden Administration undertook a review of the proposal, and later announced a U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP), a platform for “enhanced cooperation” toward “high standard commitments,” in lieu of pursuing a free trade agreement that would address market access.126 In 2022, USTR reported that Mauritius had stated interest in an FTA with the United States, and that USTR was reviewing the proposal.127 Congress would have to approve any comprehensive trade agreements through implementing legislation. Past U.S. FTA negotiations with African countries have faced hurdles, including concerns on the part of African governments over the extensive nature of U.S. FTAs—such as with respect to the scope of tariff liberalization or level of protections for intellectual property rights—and over how a bilateral FTA may affect efforts toward regional integration.128 According to USTR, “most African countries have focused on advocating for an additional renewal of AGOA, as opposed to seeking other high standard reciprocal trade agreements.”129 The United States also has completed or made efforts toward negotiating several other types of trade and investment agreements with countries in the region, including 16 Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) and nine bilateral investment treaties (BITs). TIFAs aim to provide a forum for high-level engagement on trade and investment issues with the goal of 125 See CRS In Focus IF11526, U.S.-Kenya FTA Negotiations. AGOA directs the executive branch to pursue “reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agreements,” possibly including FTAs, with African countries. 126 USTR, “United States and Kenya Announce the Launch of the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership,” July 14, 2022. 127 2022 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, p. 82. 128 For a thorough discussion, see the Obama Administration report, USTR, Beyond AGOA, September 2016. 129 2022 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, p. 82. Congressional Research Service 22 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement reducing barriers and expanding market opportunities. BITs aim to protect U.S. FDI and promote economic growth by advancing nondiscriminatory rules and other market-oriented policies. Selected Congressional Engagement Hearings. Congress has held numerous hearings examining economic and development issues in Africa and exploring opportunities to strengthen U.S.-Africa trade and investment.130 Congress also has examined broader trends or challenges facing African economies and publics, covering such issues as climate change and the region’s rapidly growing youth population.131 Resolutions. Congress also addresses topics related to economic and development conditions in Africa and U.S.-Africa trade and investment through resolutions. In the 118th Congress, for instance, S. 158 would seek to increase U.S. exports to Africa, while H.Res. 261 would express support for implementation of the AfCFTA, among other provisions. Foreign Assistance. The State Department and USAID administer most U.S. economic and development assistance for Africa. Agriculture and food security aid is often the largest sub-sector of such assistance, channeled primarily via Feed the Future (FTF), a global food security effort.132 Prosper Africa, a USAID-led initiative launched in 2019, is the primary vehicle for U.S. trade and investment aid for Africa. It seeks to facilitate commercial deals, promote market opportunities, and coordinate the services of 17 U.S. federal departments and agencies with development and trade and investment promotion mandates. Trade capacity-building is another emphasis of U.S. trade and investment aid for Africa, with activities to increase use of AGOA; foster intra-regional trade, notably in staple foods; reduce trade barriers; enhance business climates; and promote regional integration.133 The United States has committed to support the development of the AfCFTA under an MOU signed between the USTR and the AfCFTA Secretariat.134 U.S. economic assistance for Africa also includes support for climate change adaptation, natural resource management, and energy generation—the latter under Power Africa, an electrification effort. Other agencies that support economic growth or trade and investment in Africa include the Commerce and Treasury Departments, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF), and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation.135 Annual SFOPS appropriations measures generally stipulate funding for the USADF and for U.S. contributions to the African Development Bank (AfDB), a multilateral financial institution. Otherwise, SFOPS bills generally provide economic and development assistance funds on a global (versus region- or country-specific) basis, though they may include provisos and directives 130 See, for instance, HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, Understanding the African Continental Free Trade Area and How the U.S. Can Promote Its Success, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., April 27, 2022; SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, U.S. Trade and Investment in Africa, 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 28, 2021; and House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, Strengthening the U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment Relationship, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2021. 131 HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, The Effects of Climate Change in Africa, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 27, 2021; and HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, The Youth Bulge in Africa: Considerations for U.S. Policy, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., February 13, 2020. 132 Of 20 FTF priority countries globally, 16 are in Africa: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 133 For much of the two past decades, USAID-administered trade hubs in Southern, East, and West Africa pursued such activities, but only the latter remains in operation. Such activity is now pursued, in part, under Prosper Africa, the regional USAID Africa Trade and Investment (ATI) program, and other programs. 134 See CRS Report R47197, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress. 135 CRS In Focus IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?. Congressional Research Service 23 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement pertaining to development assistance for Africa. For instance, the FY2023 SFOPS appropriations act (Division K of P.L. 117-328) directs “not less than” $260 million for clean energy programs, “including in support of… implementing the Power Africa initiative.” Authorization bills that have shaped U.S. economic aid for Africa include the Electrify Africa Act (P.L. 114-121), which established a framework for Power Africa, and the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act, P.L. 115-254), which established the U.S. Development Finance Corporation. The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195) reauthorized through 2028 as part of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263, Sec. 5588 of Title LV, Subtitle G) endorsed an approach to U.S. food security aid similar to FTF. In the 117th Congress, H.R. 6455 would have codified Prosper Africa. Reporting Requests and Requirements. Congress has requested or required that the executive branch submit reports on development and economic issues in Africa and U.S.-Africa trade and investment relations. AGOA’s 2015 reauthorization required USTR to report biennially on U.S.-Africa trade and investment relations; the most recent report was submitted in 2022.136 In 2022, the House Committee on Ways and Means requested that the Administration report on the AGOA program and specific industries in AGOA beneficiary countries.137 The FY2023 SFOPS appropriations act (Division K of P.L. 117-328) subjects funds allocated for Prosper Africa and Power Africa to “the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.” Global Health Albeit to varying degrees, African countries have made strides in public health provision over the past three decades. According to World Bank data, between 1990 and 2020, on average, the region’s neonatal mortality rate fell by nearly 40% and under-five mortality rate fell by half, while its average maternal mortality rate fell by one-third between 2000 and 2020.138 On the whole, however, African countries continue to have the lowest life expectancy at birth, highest infant and maternal mortality rates, and largest cumulative malaria burden, accounting for 95% of global malaria cases.139 Many of the countries with the highest rates of HIV infection and prevalence are in Africa.140 Tuberculosis (TB) detection and treatment has increased in Africa since 2000, leading to a decline in TB deaths, but TB incidence remains high in the region, which is on par with Southeast Asia as the region with the highest TB incidence.141 Among public health issues in Africa, Congress has been especially concerned with: HIV/AIDS. With U.S. and other donor support, African countries have recorded large declines in new HIV infections in the past two decades. Nonetheless, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region most heavily affected by HIV/AIDS. In 2021, the region accounted for almost 60% of new global HIV infections, 82% of girls and young women newly infected with HIV, and almost 85% of new mother-to-child transmissions.142 East and Southern Africa have the highest sub-regional burden, 136 USTR. 2022 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2022. In 2022, the House Committee on Ways and Means requested that the Administration report on the AGOA program and specific industries in AGOA beneficiary countries; see USITC, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Program Usage, Trends, and Sectoral Highlights, March 2023. 137 USITC, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Program Usage, Trends, and Sectoral Highlights, 2023. 138 CRS calculations based on World Bank Databank, available at https://data.worldbank.org/. 139 World Health Organization (WHO), World Health Statistics 2023: Monitoring Health for the SDGs, 2023. 140 Ibid. 141 WHO, Global Tuberculosis Report 2022, 2022. 142 UNAIDS, In Danger: UNAIDS Global AIDS Update 2022, 2022, p. 32 and p. 54. Congressional Research Service 24 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement with an estimated 21 million people living with HIV.143 HIV/AIDS assistance is consistently the largest category of U.S. aid for Africa, provided under the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the George W. Bush Administration launched in 2003 with bipartisan congressional support. PEPFAR reports that its programming has saved 25 million lives and helped 5.5 million babies to be born HIV-free worldwide.144 Ebola and other Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. In the past decade, there have been major outbreaks of Ebola, an often-fatal viral hemorrhagic fever, in West Africa (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 2014-2016) and DRC (2018-2020), with smaller outbreaks identified and contained in DRC and Uganda.145 More limited outbreaks of Marburg virus, another viral hemorrhagic fever that is similar to Ebola, have been recorded in several African countries, including in Ghana (2022), Equatorial Guinea (2023), and Tanzania (2023).146 Malaria. Malaria, a life-threatening but usually curable disease caused by parasites transmitted through bites by infected mosquitoes, is a leading cause of death in Africa, particularly among children. In 2021, Africa accounted for around 95% of the estimated 247 million malaria cases worldwide, and for approximately 96% of global malaria deaths; almost 45% of all global malaria deaths in 2021 occurred in Nigeria and DRC alone. 147 The U.S. President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), launched in 2005, is the primary channel for U.S. malaria-related bilateral assistance for Africa. In April 2023, the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator announced the expansion of PMI to three new countries—Burundi, Gambia, and Togo—which will bring the total number of African PMI focus countries to 27, out of 30 focus countries globally.148 According to USAID, more than 700 million people benefit from PMI programming each year.149 Maternal and Child Health. Africa countries’ average maternal and child health indicators rank among the worst globally. As a region, Africa accounted for around 70% of global maternal deaths—deaths that occur during pregnancy, at delivery, or soon after delivery—in 2020 (latest comprehensive estimates).150 Obstetric hemorrhage, hypertension, infection, and indirect causes (e.g., linked to preexisting conditions) are primary causes of such deaths. South Sudan had the world’s highest maternal mortality rate as of 2020, followed by Chad and Nigeria.151 Africa also has the highest neonatal mortality rates (often linked to preterm birth, birthing complications, infections, and birth defects) and under-five mortality rates (with pneumonia, malaria, and diarrhea among the lead causes).152 According to WHO, “children in sub-Saharan Africa are more than 14 times more likely to die before the age of 5 than children in developed regions.”153 143 Ibid. 144 PEPFAR, “Latest Global Program Results, December 2022,” 2022. 145 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “History of Ebola Outbreaks,” accessed June 16, 2023. 146 CDC, “Marburg Virus Disease Outbreaks,” accessed June 16, 2023. 147 WHO, World Health Statistics 2023: Monitoring Health for the SDGs. On causes of death in Africa, see WHO, “Cause-specific mortality, 2000–2019,” database, accessed June 16, 2023. 148 PMI, “U.S. President’s Malaria Initiative Announces Plans to Expand to New Partner Countries,” April 25, 2023. President Trump extended PMI to include Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Sierra Leone. 149 USAID, “U.S. President's Malaria Initiative,” accessed July 14, 2023. 150 WHO, Trends in maternal mortality 2000 to 2020: estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and UNDESA/Population Division, 2023. 151 Ibid. 152 WHO, “Children in Africa: Key statistics on child survival and population,” (January 9, 2019) and “Newborn Mortality,” (January 28, 2022). 153 WHO, “Child health,” accessed June 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 25 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement COVID-19 and Health System Capacity.154 Overall, Africa has confirmed far fewer COVID-19 cases and deaths per capita than other regions, though studies suggest that cases, and to a lesser extent mortality, have been undercounted in the region.155 Reported cases have been concentrated in a few countries, led by South Africa, where testing rates have also been higher. Demographic and other factors may have limited the virus’s toll in Africa. Still, COVID-19 exposed and aggravated healthcare system capacity gaps in the region, which has the lowest density of health workers globally and among the world’s lowest rates of public health spending per capita.156 Inadequate cold storage (owing to electricity deficits) and poor infrastructure have impeded vaccine administration in Africa. COVID-19 also underscored inequities in global access to vaccines. Despite efforts to spur local production, African countries generally lack vaccine manufacturing capacity and were unable to compete with wealthier countries to procure doses during initial vaccine rollouts—which some African leaders decried as “vaccine apartheid.”157 Selected Congressional Engagement Hearings. Congress has held numerous hearings on public health challenges in Africa and U.S. responses. Recent Congresses have considered such issues as the 2018-2020 Ebola outbreak in DRC, COVID-19 in Africa, vaccine production capacity, and the global HIV/AIDS epidemic.158 State Department and USAID budget hearings also have provided Members with opportunities to examine and express views on health challenges in Africa and U.S. responses. Resolutions. Members regularly introduce resolutions on global health issues that pertain to Africa, often recognizing or expressing support for efforts to address particular diseases or other health challenges. In the 118th Congress, for instance, Members have considered resolutions related to HIV/AIDS and PEPFAR (S.Res. 139) and malaria (S.Res. 170). Foreign Assistance. Congress first authorized appropriations in support of PEPFAR in the “Leadership Act” of 2003 (P.L. 108-25) and has since enacted several bills reauthorizing or reshaping global HIV/AIDS assistance—most recently including the PEPFAR Extension Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-305), which extended several provisions through 2023.159 As Congress continues to consider PEPFAR’s potential reauthorization, it may consider what changes, if any, to make to the program.160 Separately, bills under consideration in the 118th Congress (S. 288 and H.R. 1776) would authorize activities to combat tuberculosis, with possible implications for aid for Africa. Health assistance is consistently the largest sector of State Department- and USAID-administered aid for Africa, regularly comprising 70-75% of annual allocations for the region. In FY2022, U.S. bilateral health assistance for Africa totaled approximately $5.84 billion. HIV/AIDS assistance under PEPFAR often comprises approximately half of all U.S. aid allocated for Africa in a given 154 CRS In Focus IF11532, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Impact in Africa. 155 WHO, “COVID-19 Dashboard: Situation by Region, Country, Territory & Area,” accessed June 16, 2023. 156 WHO, The State of the Health Workforce in the WHO African Region, 2021; World Bank, “Current health expenditure per capita (current US$),” data as of 2020, accessed June 16, 2023. 157 Pia Sarkar, “‘Vaccine apartheid’: Africans tell UN they need vaccines,” Associated Press, September 23, 2021. 158 Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, Confronting Ebola: Addressing a 21st Century Global Health Crisis, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 24, 2019; HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, Update on COVID–19 in Africa, 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 17, 2021; SFRC, PEPFAR at 20: Achieving and Sustaining Epidemic Control, 118th Cong., 1st sess., April 19, 2023. 159 See CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities and CRS In Focus IF11758, U.S. Global Health Funding: FY2020-FY2023 Appropriations. 160 In an April 2023 hearing on PEPFAR, SFRC leadership and other Members voiced support for PEPFAR’s reauthorization. See SFRC, PEPFAR at 20: Achieving and Sustaining Epidemic Control. Congressional Research Service 26 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement fiscal year. Other U.S. health assistance for Africa aims to combat malaria, address maternal, child, and reproductive health issues, strengthen infectious-disease preparedness and response capacities, and improve water and sanitations service, among other activities. Congress also has appropriated emergency assistance in response to disease outbreaks in the region. Reporting and Consultation Requirements. Congress has required the executive branch to report or consult with Congress on global health issues and U.S. responses, including in Africa. For example, bills authorizing U.S. assistance for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs have included reporting requirements to enable congressional oversight of such programming.161 Congress also has requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate U.S. health aid, including programs in Africa.162 Global Power Competition in Africa The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) Since the creation of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, the PRC has dramatically expanded its trade, investment, and financial ties with African countries, including through the export of PRC services, notably in the construction sector. Such activity is often financed with credit from PRC state lenders and tied to procurements of PRC goods and services. China also has expanded its political, military, and development cooperation with the region, including through cultural, educational, and training exchanges with African countries. China overtook the United States as Africa’s top trade partner in 2009; as of 2020/2021, two-way trade between the PRC and Africa was roughly quadruple the value of U.S.-Africa trade.163 In 2021, South Africa, Angola, and DRC were Africa’s top exporters to China; Nigeria and South Africa were the top importers of PRC-origin products.164 Fuels, minerals, metals, and precious stones have ranked among Africa’s top exports to the PRC in the past decade, while machinery, textiles and apparel, and metals have been Africa’s top imports from China.165 Nearly all African countries have signed cooperation memoranda under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to develop China-centered and -controlled global infrastructure, transport, trade, and production networks.166 Some aspects of PRC economic engagement in Africa, such as infrastructure construction and investment, may contribute to meeting development needs in the region. U.S. officials have raised concerns over the governance, environmental, and human-rights implications of PRC engagement in some countries, however. The PRC’s pursuit of its goals in Africa may also pose strategic challenges for the United States. Issues that have attracted attention in Congress include: 161 See reporting requirements in P.L. 108-25, P.L. 110-293, P.L. 113-56, and P.L. 115-305. 162 See, among others, GAO, Global Health Assistance: USAID Has Faced Implementation Challenges Related to U.S. Policy and COVID-19, 2022; and GAO, Global Health Assistance: Awardees’ Declinations of U.S. Planned Funding Due to Abortion-Related Restrictions, 2020. 163 CRS calculation based on data from World Bank WITS Database, accessed July 14, 2023; see also Reuters, “Biden says U.S. is 'all in' on Africa's future,” December 15, 2022. For a historical overview of U.S. and PRC trade with Africa, see GAO, Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S., and Chinse Economic Engagement, 2013. 164 Economist Intelligence Unit, A New Horizon for Africa-China Relations: Why Co-Operation will be Essential¸ 2022. 165 Data from the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, accessed June 14, 2023. 166 See CRS In Focus IF11735, China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues. Congressional Research Service 27 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement Military Engagement and Basing. China has been a top supplier of arms to Africa, alongside Russia (on the latter, see below).167 The PRC has been involved in multilateral counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa since 2008, China is among the top ten troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations, most of which are in Africa.168 China has provided training for African military and police personnel in some countries, and opened a military training school in Tanzania in 2018.169 China also engages in military diplomacy, including military exercises, naval port calls, and senior level meetings. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base, in Djibouti, several miles from Camp Lemonnier. AFRICOM reported to Congress in 2021 that China had expanded the facility to support aircraft carriers.170 DOD has reported that China may be seeking to establish additional military facilities in Africa, possibly along the western Atlantic coast.171 In 2023, AFRICOM Commander Langley stated that a PRC military base on Africa’s western coast “would change the whole calculus of the geostrategic global campaign plans of protecting the homeland” and “geostrategically put [the PRC] at an advantage.”172 U.S. military officials indicated as of early 2022 that PRC outreach had had “the most traction” in Equatorial Guinea, although few developments have been publicly reported since then.173 Critical Minerals. Successive Administrations have identified PRC influence over global “critical mineral” supply chains as a U.S. national security and economic challenge.174 China is a top destination for Africa’s raw mineral exports and hosts mineral processing facilities that are crucial to global market supplies. China’s “dominant position” in DRC’s cobalt industry, which accounted for around 70% of global cobalt mined production as of 2022, has spurred particular alarm among U.S. policymakers.175 (Cobalt is a key ingredient in electric car batteries, among other industrial applications. The Biden Administration designated cobalt as one of a number of “critical minerals” in 2022.176) DRC also holds reserves of lithium (another designated critical mineral) and, along with Zambia, is a top global producer of copper—not a designated critical mineral, but vital to some clean energy technologies. PRC firms hold mining concessions and exploration rights in other African countries, notably Guinea, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and “Digital Authoritarianism.” PRC firms such as Huawei and ZTE have played lead roles in financing and building many African countries’ ICT infrastructure, including 5G wireless, internet backbone, and government cloud 167 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, China was sub-Saharan Africa’s second-largest arms supplier from 2018-2022, after Russia. SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022, 2023. 168 U.N. Peacekeeping, “Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Country, and Personnel Type,” March 31, 2023. 169 Paul Nantulya, “China’s Policing Models Make Inroads in Africa,” ACCSS, May 22, 2023; China Military [a People’s Liberation Army news outlet], “Chinese-built military training centre opens in Tanzania,” February 14, 2018. 170 U.S. Naval Institute, “AFRICOM: Chinese Naval Base in Africa Set to Support Aircraft Carriers,” April 20, 2021. 171 See, e.g., DOD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021 and 2022. 172 Testimony by AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley in SASC, “To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command.” 173 Former AFRICOM Commander Townsend in HASC, “National Security Challenges And U.S. Military Activities In The Greater Middle East And Africa,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2022. See also Michael Phillips, “China seeks first military base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. intelligence finds,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021. 174 White House, “FACT SHEET: Securing a Made in America Supply Chain for Critical Minerals,” February 22, 2022. 175 White House, Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth,” June 2021. 176 U.S. Geological Survey, “U.S. Geological Survey Releases 2022 List of Critical Minerals,” February 22, 2022. Congressional Research Service 28 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement infrastructure systems.177 PRC firms dominate African cell phone markets, and also are the main implementers of “smart city” projects—which ostensibly aim to leverage technology to improve state services but are sometimes associated, in practice, with artificial intelligence-enabled state surveillance systems.178 This activity has spurred concerns over data protection and privacy, and over the potential for PRC ICT exports to aid authoritarian practices in Africa.179 Such activities may also pose espionage risks to U.S. commercial firms and government assets in the region. Debt Issues. PRC lending to Africa is often opaque: both PRC lenders and African governments reportedly often underreport debt, loan terms, and other information.180 This opacity can restrict the ability of other lenders—including U.S.-funded international financial institutions—to assess outstanding debt, and African countries’ ability to repay it, in deciding to lend or restructure debt. Some Members and other U.S. officials have at times accused China of predatory lending and “debt trap diplomacy,” a framing that independent analysts have debated.181 China has in some cases canceled debts owed by African governments, and in 2020 joined the Group of 20 (G20) Debt Service Suspension Initiative, a U.S.-backed suspension of debt repayments amid COVID-19. More recently, African, U.S., and international financial institution officials have appeared to accuse China of delaying debt relief for debt distressed countries, such as Zambia and Ghana.182 Corruption, Environmental Crime, and Labor Abuses. Local news reports have documented multiple individual cases of corruption linked to PRC commercial activity in the region, but comprehensive studies are limited. Researchers also have accused PRC firms of labor abuses and environmental crime in several African countries. Some human rights activists have accused PRC firms operating or exploiting mines in DRC that use child labor.183 Advocates also have alleged a range of ecologically exploitative practices by PRC actors in Africa, including illicit, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, especially in West Africa; illegal and unsustainable logging and timber trafficking; wildlife crime; and polluting mining activities in a number of countries.184 Public Perceptions of PRC Engagement in Africa Pol ing by Afrobarometer, a regional nongovernmental survey institution that receives U.S. support, indicates that public perceptions of China are broadly comparable to those of the United States in the region, notwithstanding 177 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, “Huawei’s Global Cloud Strategy: Economic and Strategic Implications,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 17, 2021. 178 See, e.g., Alice Ekman, “Smart Cities: The new geopolitical battleground,” French Institute of International Relations, December 2019. 179 Voice of America, “China’s Reach Into Africa’s Digital Sector Worries Experts,” October 22, 2021. 180 On PRC lending patterns and practices, see Anna Gelpern et al., How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Center for Global Development, and AidData at William & Mary, 2021; and Oyintarelado Moses et al., Demystifying Chinese Overseas Lending and Development Finance, Boston University Global China Initiative, 2023. 181 See HFAC, “China Regional Snapshot: Exposing the CCP’s Global Malign Influence,” 2022; and remarks by General Michael Langley in SASC, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2024. For one criticism of such framing, see Chatham House, Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’: How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 2020. 182 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen at Press Conference as Part of 2023 IMF-World Bank Annual Spring Meetings,” April 11, 2023; Christian Akorlie and Cooper Inveen, “China must join Ghana debt restructuring effort soon, Germany's Lindner says,” Reuters, February 4, 2023; Andrea Shalal, “Georgieva says she told China to 'speed up' work on debt restructuring,” Reuters, April 6, 2023 183 TLHRC, “Child Labor and Human Rights Violations in the Mining Industry of the Democratic Republic of Congo.” 184 CRS In Focus IF11923, Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Africa: An Overview; CRS Report R47065, China’s Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service 29 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement (in some cases significant) differences within particular countries—as in Cameroon, where public opinion heavily favors China, and Ghana, where public opinion favors the United States.185 Preliminary results of Afrobarometer’s most recent survey, released in April 2023, suggest that positive perceptions of both the United States and China declined between 2019 and 2022 in many countries.186 Pol ing does not indicate a direct link between alleged il icit or exploitative economic practices by PRC-based actors and public sentiment. For instance, despite the reported involvement of PRC-based firms in IUU fishing and il icit mining in Ghana, Freedom House reports that “most Ghanaians are not overly critical toward the Chinese government and instead hold the Ghanaian government primarily responsible for poor judgment regarding investments that have come at a high cost to the country.”187 Russia Following a period of relative disengagement after the end of the Cold War, Russia has cultivated military, political, and economic partnerships in Africa, building in part on legacies of Soviet-era ties. Russia’s engagement still remains limited compared to that of China. Russia’s defense and security relations in the region include military cooperation agreements, arms sales, and the deployment of nominally “private” military companies (PMCs), notably the Wagner Group, that U.S. officials assert have close ties to the Russian government. The implications of the Wagner Group’s June 2023 abortive mutiny in Russia on Wagner’s operations in Africa are not yet clear. Russia also exports fuel, cereals, equipment, and fertilizer to African countries, and Russian firms are active in the region’s mining and energy sectors. U.S. officials have characterized Russia’s approach to Africa as destabilizing, exploitative, and abusive, expressing particular concern over the Wagner Group’s activities.188 Key areas of Russia-Africa engagement include: Official Military Cooperation and Arms Sales. According to publicly available data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia was Africa’s top arms supplier in 2018-2022, supplying roughly a quarter of the region’s arms imports; Angola, Mali, and Nigeria were the top regional importers of Russian arms during the period.189 In the past decade, Russia has signed numerous military cooperation agreements with governments in Africa, some of which preceded the arrival of Russian military advisors or increased military sales. PMCs: The Wagner Group.190 The Wagner Group, founded by state-connected businessperson and U.S. sanctions designee Yevgeny Prigozhin, has expanded its presence in Africa over the past six years. As of May 2023, Wagner was active in CAR, Mali, and Sudan (as well as Libya), and had engaged in outreach to Burkina Faso and reportedly sought to destabilize pro-Western leaders elsewhere in Africa.191 It had previously also been present in Mozambique, prior to suffering 185 Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Edem Selormey (Afrobarometer), “Africans welcome China’s influence but maintain democratic aspirations,” Dispatch No. 489, November 15, 2021. See also preliminary results of the most recent round of Afrobarometer polling, shared via the organization’s official Twitter page (@afrobarometer), at https://twitter.com/afrobarometer/status/1650859906193555456, April 25, 2023. 186 Ibid. 187 Freedom House, Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022: Ghana, 2022. 188 See, e.g., Testimony by AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley in SASC, “To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central Command and United States Africa Command”; Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” January 26, 2023; and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Financing of Armed Groups and Terrorists Through the Illicit Trafficking of Natural Resources,” U.S. Mission to the United Nations, October 6, 2022. 189 CRS calculations, based on importer/exporter TIV tables in SIPRI Arms Transfers database, accessed May 3, 2023. 190 CRS In Focus IF12389, Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress; CRS In Focus IF12344, Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC). 191 Wagner previously deployed personnel to Mozambique in 2019 to aid the government’s counterinsurgency against the Islamist State affiliate there, but withdrew after heavy casualties. Congressional Research Service 30 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement significant casualties at the hands of insurgents. The firm has been implicated in human rights abuses in Africa, including massacres and torture in CAR and Mali. In early 2023, the United States designated Wagner a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO), citing, in part, its activities in Africa, and sanctioned several Africa-based individuals and entities linked to Wagner operations.192 Wagner affiliates are reportedly active in mining and other commercial sectors. In January 2023, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland testified to Congress that Wagner’s access to gold mines in Mali and CAR “directly funds” operations in Ukraine.193 Extractive Industries. Russian state-owned or -linked firms are active in the oil, natural gas, and mining sectors of multiple African countries. Some of these firms are subject to U.S. sanctions; examples include oil and gas corporation Lukoil (reportedly active in Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ghana, and Nigeria) and diamond company Alrosa (active in Angola and Zimbabwe).194 In Guinea, which holds the world’s largest reserves of bauxite (aluminum ore), aluminum giant Rusal operates several bauxite mines and the country’s only bauxite refinery. Russian involvement in gold mining in African countries—including Sudan, CAR, and Mali—has been of U.S. concern in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and sanctions enforcement. Diplomacy. Russia has announced plans for a high-level Russia-Africa summit in July 2023, after a similar summit in 2019. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has visited multiple African countries in 2023, including South Africa (which hosted joint naval exercises with Russia in February 2023), Sudan (where Russia seeks military basing rights), Mali, and Eritrea. Multiple African leaders have visited Moscow, including then-AU Chairperson Macky Sall, President of Senegal, in 2022. In June 2023, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine each hosted a delegation of African leaders seeking to facilitate Russia-Ukraine peace talks, seemingly to little effect. Russia has sought to cultivate support among African countries in the United Nations, in which African states account for around one-quarter of total votes and hold three non-permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on a rotating basis. Relative to other regions, African countries have abstained from U.S.-backed U.N. resolutions regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at comparatively high rates (see Text Box). Russia has also sought to influence African regional institutions, notably the African Union, amid concerns over the negative impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine on African economies and food security.195 African Votes on U.N. Resolutions Related to the Russia-Ukraine War In 2022, the UNSC voted on five resolutions concerning Ukraine. Of Africa’s three non-permanent UNSC members in 2022, two—Ghana and Kenya—voted with the United States on four motions196 and abstained from one.197 The third member, Gabon, voted with the United States on three resolutions, and abstained from two.198 Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique are the three African non-permanent UNSC members in 2023. As of June 2023, the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) had voted on six U.S.-backed resolutions in emergency special sessions to examine the Russia-Ukraine war. As a region, sub-Saharan Africa has accounted for an outsize share of abstentions and no-votes on each measure (see Table 1). For example, fewer than 20% of African 192 Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” January 26, 2023. 193 SFRC, Countering Russian Aggression: Ukraine and Beyond, 118th Cong., 1st sess., January 26, 2023. 194 S&P Global, “Russia's Lukoil keen to expand upstream presence in Africa: official,” October 6, 2022. 195 See, e.g., France24, “African Union head Sall 'reassured' after talks with Putin on food shortages,” June 3, 2022. 196 These were Resolution S/Res/2623 (adopted) and S/2022/155, S/2022/231, and S/2022/720 (not adopted). 197 This was S/2022/821, a Russia-backed resolution related to debunked claims of U.S.-supported biological weapons labs in Ukraine. 198 These were S/2022/821 (see footnote above) as well as S/2022/720, a resolution to condemn referenda on annexation in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine. Congressional Research Service 31 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement governments voted in favor of suspending Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2022 (Resolution ES-11/3), compared to 48% globally, and 53% of African states (compared to 73% globally) voted in early 2023 in favor of calling for a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace” in Ukraine in line with the principles of the U.N. Charter, and demanding that Russia withdraw its military forces from Ukraine (ES-11/6). Regional abstentions and absenteeism on U.S.-backed U.N. resolutions related to Ukraine may partly reflect a common principle of nonalignment that dates to the Cold War. Russia’s veto power on the UNSC also makes it a potentially powerful ally for some governments (e.g., Eritrea) opposed to foreign intervention in their countries. Table 1. African Countries’ Voting Record on U.S.-Backed UNGA Resolutions Related to Ukraine199 UNGA Resolution ES-11/1 ES-11/2 ES-11/3 ES-11/4 ES/11-5 ES/11-6 In Favor 25 24 9 26 15 26 Against 1 1 8 0 5 2 Abstain 16 19 22 18 23 14 Absent 7 5 10 5 6 7 Source: U.N. Digital Library at https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en. Disinformation. Russian entities such as the Prigozhin-financed Internet Research Agency (IRA) reportedly engage in disinformation campaigns in Africa and have been active in the context of several elections in the region. The State Department has sought to raise awareness of Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns in Africa, including IRA support for pro-Russian social media activists in the region.200 Selected Congressional Engagement Hearings. Congress has held numerous hearings on PRC engagement in Africa and implications for U.S. interests.201 China’s involvement in Africa also has been examined in hearings on global U.S.-China relations, including as it relates to access to critical minerals, China’s BRI, and human rights abuses attributed to the PRC government or PRC firms.202 Congressional activity related to Russia’s involvement in Africa has centered on the Wagner Group’s expanding presence and the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war on food insecurity and price inflation in the region.203 Legislation. Congress has considered legislation pertaining to strategic competition with China and Russia, including in Africa. Among other measures, the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act (H.R. 7311), which passed the House in the 117th Congress but did not advance in 199 These resolutions were: ES/11-1 (Aggression against Ukraine); ES/11-2 (Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine); ES/11-3 (Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council); ES/11-4 (Territorial integrity of Ukraine : defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations); ES/11-5 (Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine); and ES/11-6 (Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine). 200 State Department, “Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and Russia’s Disinformation in Africa,” May 24, 2022, and “Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s Africa-Wide Disinformation Campaign,” November 4, 2022. 201 These include, in the 118th Congress, an April 2023 HFAC Subcommittee on Africa hearing entitled “Great Power Competition Implications in Africa: The Chinese Communist Party.” See also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., May 8, 2020. 202 See, in the 118th Congress, House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Dependence on Foreign Adversaries: America’s Critical Minerals Crisis,” 118th Cong., 1st sess., February 9, 2023. 203 HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, “Examining the Realities of Russian Activities and Influence in Africa and Its Effects on the Continent,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 14, 2022; SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, “Classified Briefing on Russian Activity Across Africa,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., December 15, 2022; and SFRC, “Global Food Security Crisis and the U.S. Response,” 117th Congress, 2nd sess., July 20, 2022. Congressional Research Service 32 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement the Senate, would have required the State Department to create and report to Congress on a strategy outlining U.S. efforts to counter Russia’s malign influence in the region. Some African commentators criticized the bill, and similar U.S. diplomatic messaging related to Russia, as condescending and punitive, and as an encroachment on African autonomy; several southern African leaders, notably including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and other South African officials, publicly condemned the measure.204 Supporters of the bill have stated that the measure was intended to curb Russia’s illicit activity in the region.205 In the 118th Congress, companion measures S. 416 and H.R. 506 would urge the Secretary of State to designate the Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), citing (in part) the group’s activities in Africa. Separately, H.Res. 145 would express opposition to South Africa’s hosting of military exercises with China and Russia in February 2023, among other purposes. Foreign Assistance. Supplemental appropriations measures enacted by Congress in response to the Russia-Ukraine war have provided hundreds of millions of dollars in food security assistance for countries affected by the war. In early 2023, the Administration reported that it had allocated $337 million to African countries in supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid provided under the FY2022 Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-128).206 Reporting Requirements. Congress has strengthened oversight of PRC and Russian activity in Africa and U.S. responses through reporting and consultation requirements. Among other efforts, in the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263), Sec. 1076 required the Administration report to Congress on the potential impacts of China or Russia establishing a naval facility in Africa, while Sec. 9718 required a report on countering “malign actors” in Africa, with case studies on Mali, Sudan, CAR, DRC, Burkina Faso, and South Sudan. Report language accompanying the most recent SFOPS appropriations measure (Division K of P.L. 117-328) required the Secretary of State to submit a report on PRC predominance in global rare earth minerals supply chains, and on efforts to work with countries in Africa (and other global regions) to develop such minerals. Outlook and Issues for Congress A range of issues related to governance, security, economic and development trends, and global geopolitics in Africa have attracted sustained interest from Congress and may continue to shape policy, budgetary, and oversight priorities in the 118th Congress. In the governance realm, a trend of democratic backsliding and military seizures of power has frustrated U.S. democracy promotion aims in Africa and complicated U.S. security cooperation with several governments. Members may consider whether U.S. responses to such challenges are adequate and effective, and weigh the benefits and risks of engagement or disengagement with undemocratic or military-led governments in Africa. Congress also may continue to oversee and debate the scope, effectiveness, and application of targeted sanctions or restrictions on U.S. engagement with particular countries related to poor governance and human rights abuses. Regarding geopolitics, the involvement of China and Russia in Africa, and the threats that such engagement may pose for U.S. national security and commercial interests, are likely to attract sustained congressional attention. China’s and Russia’s military basing aspirations have been a 204 Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s International Relations and Cooperation Minister, called H.R. 7311 “unfortunate” and “offensive.” State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor at a Joint Press Availability,” August 8, 2022. 205 Peter Fabricius, “US debates bill to counter ‘malign’ Russian activities in Africa,” Institute for Security Studies, May 20, 2022. 206 State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Supplementary Tables, pp. 12-13. Congressional Research Service 33 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement central concern for U.S. policymakers, as has the involvement of Russian state-connected military contractors in several African countries. How the United States might counter these activities without inflaming sensitivities on the part of African leaders who have expressed reluctance to choose one foreign partner over another is a central dilemma. In the security realm, Members may continue to monitor armed Islamist violence in parts of Africa, the status of conflicts or peace efforts in particular African countries (including DRC, Ethiopia, and Sudan), and the shifting footprint of foreign partners, notably France. Debate may persist over how to approach security cooperation with military juntas in the region, and with key partners that have been credibly implicated in security force abuses. Oversight of U.S. military activities in Africa may also remain a priority for the 118th Congress, amid Member scrutiny of the legal authorization for U.S. military action in Africa, the human rights safeguards in place for U.S. partner forces, and civilian harm from U.S. strikes in Somalia. Interest in Global Fragility Act implementation in coastal West Africa and Mozambique is also likely to continue. In the health domain, Congress is considering the potential reauthorization of PEPFAR, the global HIV/AIDS program that reshaped U.S.-Africa engagement in the 2000s and continues to account for the majority of U.S. aid to Africa. The COVID-19 pandemic and other public health emergencies in the region (e.g., outbreaks of Ebola and Marburg) have drawn increased U.S. attention to health system capacity deficits and pandemic preparedness in the region. In economic and development affairs, inflationary pressures, food insecurity, and fiscal crises have shaken economies across Africa, with possible implications for U.S. development, foreign policy, and two-way trade and investment objectives. Among other issues, Members may assess whether U.S. engagement is adequately targeted and resourced to address enduring barriers to development in Africa, and to bolster historically limited U.S.-Africa commercial ties. The 118th Congress also may help determine the future of AGOA—which is to expire in September 2025—and shape U.S. commercial engagement with Africa through other means, such as oversight of U.S. support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Particular country- and issue-specific developments also may continue to spur engagement in the 118th Congress. Sudan may remain high on the congressional agenda amid the country’s ongoing internecine conflict, as is Ethiopia, as Members scrutinize the implementation of a peace agreement that quieted hostilities in the country’s north in 2022. Events in DRC also may garner attention, amid ongoing peace talks and regional military interventions intended to stabilize the country’s east. Elections in Zimbabwe (slated for August 2023) and DRC (December) may offer opportunities for Members to assess governance trends in two countries that have garnered extensive U.S. interest in the past two decades, and to articulate their views on U.S. approaches toward incoming governments. South Africa, both because of its economic and political influence in Africa and its engagement with China and Russia, may also attract continued attention. More broadly, Members may assess the Biden Administration’s policy approach and engagement in Africa, including its pursuit of Africa Leaders Summit commitments. Congress could shape implementation of such deliverables through its appropriation of foreign assistance funding, and may seek additional information on the status of announced initiatives and other outcomes, including through hearings, reporting requirements, and other forms of oversight. In considering these and other developments, Congress may weigh various options, including: • Conducting hearings, briefings, or (Member or staff) travel to examine particular issues, observe and assess U.S. engagement in the region, and state views and make recommendations related to U.S.-Africa policy; • Regularly monitoring U.S.-Africa policy and relations, and possibly bolstering oversight by enacting additional legislation requiring the executive branch to Congressional Research Service 34 Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement • submit reports to Congress on topics of interest, or directing agency inspectors general or the Government Accountability Office to investigate specific concerns; • Demonstrating interest or concern or exercising oversight via public statements, resolutions, or correspondence with executive branch or African officials; • Engaging with outside experts to assess challenges or develop recommendations related to U.S. engagement in Africa; and • Considering changes to the level or scope of foreign assistance and defense authorizations or appropriations for African countries. Author Information Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator Lauren Ploch Blanchard Analyst in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs Alexis Arieff Nicolas Cook Specialist in African Affairs Specialist in African Affairs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Congressional Research Service R45428 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED 35 and U.S. Engagement

Figure 1. Estimated GDP Growth in 2020

Source: CRS graphic created using basemap from the Department of State; growth estimates from IMF, World
Economic Outlook database, October 2020.
Notes: CAR=Central African Republic; DRC=Democratic Republic of Congo; Eq. Guinea=Equatorial Guinea.
As of January 2021, the IMF had approved nearly $17.0 billion in COVID-19-related financial
assistance for 38 African countries, alongside roughly $408.4 million in relief for service on debts
due to the IMF through April 2021.14 The G20 has approved a moratorium on sovereign debt
service for 73 low-income countries, including 38 in Africa; as of mid-January, 31 African
countries had enrolled in the program, obtaining roughly $5.3 billion in debt service deferments
through June 2021.15 International financial institutions have urged private creditors to restructure
African debt service schedules. Coordinated private sector debt relief has not materialized to date,
however, and some experts have expressed concern about the possible impact of such measures
on African sovereign credit ratings.16 Debt relief deliberations also have drawn U.S. and other
donor attention to Africa’s debt owed to Chinese official and private creditors, which China does
not publicly report. China has rescheduled some official debt servicing under the G20 framework,
yet the deferment reportedly does not cover a large share of Africa’s debt to Chinese lenders.17

14 CRS calculation based on IMF, “COVID-19 Financial Assistance and Debt Service Relief,” accessed January 29,
2021. See CRS Report R46342, COVID-19: Role of the International Financial Institutions.
15 CRS calculation based on World Bank, “COVID 19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative,” accessed January 29, 2021.
16 Andrea Shalal, “IMF Chief Says Ratings Worries Dampen Interest in G20 Debt Relief,” Reuters, May 18, 2020.
17 Scope SE & Co., “Africa’s Solvency Crisis: China’s Participation in G20 Debt Relief a Sign of Multilateralism, but a
“DSSI+” Framework is Required,” November 16, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

3

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Key Development Challenges in Africa
Economic Issues
Africa ranks among the poorest regions on a per-capita basis and by other measures. Poverty rates
vary widely among countries and between urban and rural zones; some 80% of the region’s poor
live in rural areas, where roughly three in five Africans reside.18 The World Bank classifies two
African countries (Mauritius and Seychelles) as high-income. Five more (Botswana, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Namibia, and South Africa) qualify as upper-middle-income; the rest are either
lower-middle- or low-income.19 Several countries with comparatively higher per capita incomes
exhibit high income inequality, including Namibia and South Africa—which share a history of
racially based apartheid rule that has had lasting consequences for land and wealth inequality.20
Other historical factors, including the transatlantic and other slave trades and colonial rule, also
have had enduring legacies for Africa’s economic and political development.21
Despite progress since the early 1990s, the region continues to face significant socioeconomic
development challenges. Extractive industries that have helped to fuel high aggregate growth
rates in many economies have created limited employment and relatively small gains in well-
being.22 The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that as of 2016, roughly 89% of
African workers and 96% of African workers aged 24 or younger were employed informally
(including in smallholder agriculture), with few formal benefits or worker protections.23
Inadequate access to electricity is a key impediment to industry: according to the World Bank,
only 43% of Africa’s population had access to electricity in 2016 (latest available), far below
other developing regions.24 Low per capita incomes and undiversified economies limit growth
prospects across much of Africa. Efforts are under way to deepen regional integration, notably
through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a pan-African free trade zone that
formally took effect in January 2021.25 Negotiations continue on critical commitments under the
AfCFTA—the agreement will be implemented in phases—and full realization of the AfCFTA’s
possible benefits will require overcoming substantial non-tariff barriers and other impediments.
Several other factors hamper Africa’s economic potential (see Text Box).

18 Luc Christiaensen and Ruth Hill, “Poverty in Africa,” in Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa, ed. Kathleen
Beegle and Luc Christiaensen (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2019); U.N. Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision, 2019.
19 For FY2021, the World Bank defined high-income economies as having a gross national income (GNI) per capita of
$12,056 or more; upper-middle income a GNI per capita of between $4,046 and $12,535; lower-middle income a GNI
per capita of between $1,036 and $4,045; and low income a GNI per capita of $1,035 or less.
20 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2019, 2020.
21 For a review of the literature on these topics, see Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, Historical Legacies
and African Development, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 25278, November 2018.
22 U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union, African Development Bank, and UNDP, MDG
Report 2015: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals, 2015.
23 Economic informality generally refers to work or production that occurs in small-scale enterprises and commercial
settings, and is non-compliant (in whole or in part) with state regulatory or taxation requirements. ILO, Women and
Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture (Third Edition), 2018.
24 Moussa P. Blimpo and Malcolm Cosgrove-Davies, Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa: Uptake, Reliability,
and Complementary Factors for Economic Impact, World Bank, 2019.
25 See CRS In Focus IF11423, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
Congressional Research Service

4

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

What Factors Hinder Economic Potential in Africa?

Infrastructure. Much of Africa has limited, unreliable, and often poorly maintained infrastructure. These
problems impose high production and transportation costs and delay shipments, and may be the largest
impediment to the region’s trade flows. The IMF estimated in 2016 that improving the region’s infrastructure
to average global levels could boost Africa’s international trade by up to 42%.26

Labor and Productivity. Much of Africa suffers from a scarcity of skil ed labor due to underinvestment in
education, outmigration of educated workers, and the predominance of low-skil informal and agricultural
sectors in many countries. By some estimates, smallholder farming provides 60% of all jobs in Africa.27

Value Chains. Many African countries depend heavily on exports of cash crops and other raw commodities,
especial y in the energy, mining, and agricultural sectors. Many countries in the region lack the technical
expertise and capital investment needed to pursue value-added processing and production.

Economic Complexity. Lack of diversification, demand, and economies of scale mean that African markets
for finance, services, and goods used in production are limited compared to other regions. Such factors
increase production costs and inhibit the growth of cross-sectoral linkages and industrial and manufacturing
capacities. The ability to meet production quality standards demanded by global markets is often limited.

Regulatory and Legal Environments. Governments often have provided inadequate enabling
environments for private sector activity, including by failing to adequately enforce contracts or protect
property rights. Corruption also remains a challenge. Inefficient cross-border trade procedures and a lack of
trade regulation and tariff harmonization also impose trade costs, both within Africa and with other regions.

Political Instability and Uncertainty. Political instability and conflict—as well as other sources of risk,
such as foreign exchange volatility—undermine business climates and deter investment in some countries.
Human Development Issues
Africa has the highest fertility rates of any region, as well as the highest maternal mortality rates,
accounting for roughly two-thirds of all maternal deaths worldwide in 2017.28 The region’s child
mortality and stunted child growth prevalence rates also are the highest globally, as are rates of
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. The WHO reported that as of 2016, Africa accounted for
over half of all global deaths attributable to inadequate access to safe drinking water, sanitation,
and hygiene services.29 Ensuring access to quality schooling has been an enduring challenge, as
has closing gender gaps in educational access and outcomes. Despite many countries’ efforts to
make access to basic education universal, nearly one-third of African children aged six to
seventeen reportedly do not attend school.30 According to U.N. estimates, some 60% of African
men and 70% of African women aged 25 and older have had no secondary education.31 Armed
conflict impedes learning in parts of the region; as of mid-2019, some 9,200 schools had closed
due to insurgent threats in West and Central Africa, affecting more than 1.9 million learners.32

26 IMF, Trade Integration and Global Value Chains in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2016.
27 Lutz Goedde, Amandla Ooko-Ombaka, and Gillian Pais, “Winning in Africa’s Agricultural Market,” McKinsey &
Company, February 15, 2019.
28 World Health Organization (WHO), U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA), World Bank
Group, and the U.N. Population Division, Trends in Maternal Mortality 2000 to 2017, 2019.
29 WHO, Safer Water, Better Health, 2019 update.
30 Proportions of out-of-school youth are generally lower at the primary school level than at the middle and secondary
school levels. See U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “One in Five Children,
Adolescents and Youth is Out of School,” February 2018.
31 UNDP, Human Development Report 2019.
32 UNICEF, “Education under threat in West and Central Africa,” August 2019.
Congressional Research Service

5

---

link to page 12 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Food insecurity varies widely between and within countries. In parts of the region, armed conflict
and population displacements (see “Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Issues”) have created
acute food insecurity while impeding or rolling back development gains. The World Bank
projected in June 2020 that 26 to 40 million more Africans could fall into extreme poverty due to
economic shocks linked to COVID-19, in addition to the virus’ health effects (see Text Box).33
Impacts may be particularly severe in countries already affected by conflict or weather extremes,
such as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and South Sudan.34
COVID-19: Health Impacts in Africa
As of January 2021, confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths per capita in Africa were far below those in other
regions, though Africa’s case counts were surging amid a second wave of infections that began in late 2020.35
Recorded cases remained concentrated in a handful of countries, led by South Africa—which had conducted the
most COVID-19 tests by far, and is the reported origin of a more rapidly transmissible variant of the COVID-19
virus.36 Some experts have attributed Africa’s relatively low confirmed caseloads to the early implementation of
robust containment measures by many African governments, some of which had recent experience in containing
Ebola and other epidemics.37 Social and environmental factors, including poor transportation infrastructure limiting
domestic travel, also may serve to slow disease transmission in the region.
At the same time, low testing capacity and limited death registration rates across the region have raised concerns
that official statistics may significantly understate the extent of the pandemic in the region, complicating appraisals
of African countries’ efforts to combat the pandemic.38 In several countries, testing for COVID-19 antibodies, an
indication of past infection, has suggested higher rates of transmission than officially recorded.39 Health experts
also warn that the virus’ second wave could overwhelm some public health systems at a time when governments
in the region are reluctant to re-impose economically costly containment measures.40 Limited financial resources,
infrastructure gaps, and logistical deficits, such as electricity and refrigeration shortfalls, pose significant challenges
for mass COVID-19 vaccination efforts in the region. For more comprehensive discussion of COVID-19 and
regional responses in Africa, see CRS In Focus IF11532, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Impact in Africa.
Governance and Human Rights Conditions
Since the early 1990s, many African countries have transitioned from military or single-party rule
to multiparty political systems under which elections are held regularly. The consolidation of
democratic institutions has been uneven, however. According to Freedom House, a U.S.-based
nongovernmental organization, countries in West and Southern Africa generally saw major
improvements in political rights and civil liberties between 1990 and 2017 (notwithstanding more
recent backsliding, discussed below), while East and Central Africa saw stagnation or decline.41

33 World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune, 2020.
34 FAO and WFT, FAO-WFP Early Warning Analysis of Acute Food Insecurity Hotspots, October 2020.
35 WHO, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Dashboard,” at https://covid19.who.int/.
36 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Emerging SARS-CoV-2 Variants,” updated January 28, 2021.
37 David Pilling, “How Africa Fought the Pandemic — And What Coronavirus Has Taught the World,” Financial
Times, October 23, 2020.
38 Ruth Maclean, “A Continent Where the Dead Are Not Counted,” New York Times, January 2, 2021. In response,
some commentators have criticized the suggestion that large-scale COVID-19 outbreaks could escape notice by African
governments and publics despite low official death registration rates in many countries. See, e.g., Mamka Anyona,
“Africans don’t just live to die. A response to the New York Times.” African Arguments, January 8, 2021.
39 Linda Nordling, “The Pandemic Appears to Have Spared Africa So Far. Scientists Are Struggling to Explain Why,”
Science, August 11, 2020.
40 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Analyzing Africa’s Second Wave of COVID-19,” January 5, 2021.
41 Jon Temin, “Democratic Governance in Africa: Three Key Trends,” Freedom House Blog, May 10, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

6

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

The region’s more robust democracies (e.g., Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal,
and South Africa) have experienced multiple peaceful electoral transfers of power; journalists,
civil society organizations, and opposition politicians in these countries generally operate free
from legal restraint and state harassment. By contrast, governments in Africa’s entrenched
autocracies (e.g., Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo,
and Rwanda) curtail political freedoms and civil liberties, including by imposing legal and
regulatory constraints on civil society and opposition activity, using security forces to disrupt
political gatherings, and arresting critics and journalists. Activists and media personnel in some
countries (e.g., Ethiopia and Cameroon) have faced arguably spurious criminal charges under
expansive anti-terrorism laws. Recent political transitions have raised hopes for reform in several
countries (e.g., Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Ethiopia, The Gambia, and
Sudan), but prospects for enduring governance gains remain fragile.
Selected Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Africa
“Presidents for Life,” “Third Termism,” and Entrenched Ruling Parties. In multiple African countries,
heads of state have abolished, altered, or evaded constitutional term limits to remain in power.42 Authoritarian
leaders in some countries (e.g., Cameroon, Chad, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and
Uganda), have held power for decades, tilting electoral processes in their favor and stifling opponents. In several
countries (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea), leaders recently secured third terms after circumventing or
amending constitutional term limits, sparking unrest that provoked state security crackdowns. In others—Burkina
Faso (2014), DRC (2018), and Sudan (2019)—protests against long-serving incumbents’ efforts to cling to power
ultimately forced leaders to step down, notably after the military or regional leaders intervened in protesters’
favor. In some countries where longtime leaders recently have stepped down (e.g., Angola and Zimbabwe), politics
and governing apparatuses remain control ed by the same parties that have exercised power for decades.
Military Intervention. An August 2020 military coup d’état in Mali—which came amid rising armed conflict and
Islamist violence, military casualties, ethnic tensions, flawed elections, and corruption scandals—has intensified
concerns over democratic backsliding in West Africa. Some observers posit that events in Mali may be a warning
sign for other countries facing similar challenges in the sub-region, such as Burkina Faso.43 West Africa saw a wave
of military coups or coup attempts in the late 2000s/early 2010s (in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger). In Sudan, many citizens initially celebrated the military’s 2019 ouster of long-serving leader Omar al Bashir
fol owing months of anti-government protests, but longer-term prospects for civilian rule remain uncertain, as the
military retains a role in politics under a transitional power-sharing arrangement until elections slated for 2023.
Insecurity. Armed groups threaten civic participation in multiple African countries. In several recent elections
(e.g., in Burkina Faso, Central African Republic [CAR], Cameroon, Mali, and Niger), insurgents have used threats
and attacks to impede administrative or voting processes. Islamist insurgents in the Sahel and East Africa and
separatist fighters in Cameroon also have violently limited freedom of expression in areas in which they operate,
even as governments have restricted human rights and civil liberties in the course of counterinsurgency efforts.
COVID-19.44 Several African heads of state have invoked emergency executive powers in response to the public
health crisis, with varying degrees of legislative consultation.45 Some containment efforts have involved restrictions
on political and civil society activity, and state security forces in some countries have been accused of human rights
abuses in the course of lockdown enforcement.46 COVID-19 also has hindered the conduct of elections: some

42 Joseph Siegle and Candace Cook, “Circumvention of Term Limits Weakens Governance in Africa,” Africa Center
for Strategic Studies (ACSS), September 14, 2020.
43 See, e.g., The Economist, “Burkina Faso Says its Poll Will be Valid, Whatever the Turnout,” September 3, 2020.
44 See CRS Report R46430, Global Democracy and Human Rights Impacts of COVID-19: In Brief.
45 ISS Africa, “The Dangers of States of Emergency to Combat COVID-19 in Africa,” May 26, 2020.
46 Nic Cheeseman and Jeffrey Smith, “The Pandemic is Being Used to Erode Democratic Freedoms. Civil Society Must
Fight Back,” Mail & Guardian, April 17, 2020; Katherine Jacobsen, “Amid COVID-19, the Prognosis for Press
Freedom is Dim. Here are 10 Symptoms to Track,” Committee to Protect Journalists, June 2020.
Congressional Research Service

7

---

link to page 11
Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

governments have postponed pol s, raising tensions in some cases.47 In some countries (e.g., Cameroon and
Uganda), the government has cited COVID-19-related restrictions to arrest or harass the political opposition.
Recent analyses have warned that some countries in Africa may be experiencing “democratic
backsliding,” signifying a deterioration of various dimensions of democratic governance, such as
political competition, electoral credibility, respect for freedoms of expression and association, and
the rule of law.48 Freedom House downgraded 23 African countries’ rankings in its 2020 Freedom
in the World survey of political rights and civil liberties (see Figure 2). These included Benin and
Tanzania—two countries once considered regional pillars of democracy that have seen vibrant
civic spaces curtailed by authoritarian leaders—along with several countries, such as
Mozambique, that face growing Islamist insurgencies. West Africa saw major setbacks in 2020:
Mali’s elected president was overthrown in a military coup, armed conflicts threatened
participation in elections in Burkina Faso and Niger, and the presidents of Côte d’Ivoire and
Guinea effectively evaded constitutional term limits to secure contested third terms in office.
Figure 2. Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Rankings, 2020

Source: CRS graphic created using basemap from the Department of State; freedom rankings from Freedom
House, Freedom in the World index, 2020.
In much of Africa, the development of accountable, functional institutions remains limited. Even
some governments that regularly hold democratic elections exhibit few effective internal checks

47 ISS Africa, “COVID-19 Further Complicates Holding Free and Fair Elections in Africa,” July 24, 2020.
48 CRS Report R45344, Global Trends in Democracy: Background, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress.
Congressional Research Service

8

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

and balances. In most African countries, the executive branch wields far more power than other
branches of government, which often remain institutionally weak. Justice systems in many
countries lack capacity or are blighted by corruption, which may corrode trust in courts and law
enforcement. Security force abuses and a perceived lack of access to justice and protection may
drive recruitment into extremist organizations and other armed groups (see Text Box).
Islamist Recruitment in Africa: Study of Key Drivers
A 2017 UNDP study based on interviews with former members of Islamist armed groups in Africa identified
several risk factors for recruitment into such organizations.49 These include residence in underdeveloped and
political y marginalized areas, vulnerable family circumstances, religious motivations (including a fear of religious
persecution), economic frustrations, and grievances toward the government. Seventy-one percent of voluntary
recruits identified an adverse state action, such as the kil ing or arrest of a relative or friend, as the “tipping point”
precipitating their decision to join an extremist group. According to the study’s authors, the role of state abuses
as “an accelerator of recruitment” calls for scrutiny “of how counter-terrorism and wider security functions of
governments in at-risk environments conduct themselves with regard to human rights and due process.”
According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), an annual index of government
performance in Africa, African governance generally improved between 2010 and 2020, but gains
slowed beginning around 2015.50 The 2020 IIAG also documented a “divergence in different
areas of governance” across Africa, characterized by improving economic management and social
service delivery alongside a deterioration in civil liberties, political participation, human security,
and the rule of law. Africa ranked worst among all regions in the 2019 Corruption Perceptions
Index, a survey of perceived public sector corruption by the independent organization
Transparency International—though performance and trends varied across the region.
Human rights conditions vary widely across Africa.51 Some countries have maintained generally
positive records in recent years but face enduring challenges such as high rates of gender-based
violence, discrimination against sexual minorities and other vulnerable groups, labor abuses, or
human trafficking. In Africa’s authoritarian countries, citizens may face arbitrary arrest, torture
and other maltreatment in detention, and restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and
information. Abuses by African police forces came under intense scrutiny in 2020, amid massive
nationwide protests against police brutality in Nigeria that drew global attention and support—
with observers drawing parallels to protests in the United States against the use of excessive force
by police against People of Color.52 Populations in conflict-affected countries may face severe
human rights threats from armed groups as well as state security forces and state-backed militias.
Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Issues
Violent political crises, civil wars, and intercommunal conflicts have broken out or intensified in
several African countries in the past decade. Islamist armed groups, some linked to Al Qaeda or
the Islamic State, have proliferated and expanded their presence in some countries, particularly in
Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, West Africa’s Sahel region, and Mozambique and Tanzania. In
parts of Africa, porous borders, corruption, and weak justice and law enforcement systems have
enabled transnational crime networks to operate with relative impunity. U.S. policymakers have
shown an enduring interest in curtailing such activities, which include human trafficking, drug

49 UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment, 2017.
50 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2020.
51 See, e.g., annual State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
52 See CRS Insight IN11525, Nigeria: #EndSARS Protests Against Police Brutality.
Congressional Research Service

9

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

smuggling, oil theft, and poaching and other wildlife and natural resource crime.53 Maritime
insecurity, such as piracy, is another focus of U.S. engagement. U.S.-backed antipiracy efforts
have helped reduce attacks off the Somali coast since 2013, but reported attacks have surged in
the Gulf of Guinea, which now ranks among the world’s most insecure maritime zones.54
Selected security challenges are discussed below.
Figure 3. State Fragility and Population Displacement in Africa

Sources: CRS graphic created using basemap from the Department of State. State fragility rankings from Fund
for Peace, Fragile States Index, 2020. Displacement figures reflect estimates by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) as of August-November 2020. The absence of displacement data on this
graphic does not necessarily indicate an absence of displaced populations.
Note: Population displacement is one dimension of state fragility, which is complex and multifaceted. On links
between displacement and fragility, see Yonatan Araya, “State fragility, displacement and development
interventions,” in Forced Migration Review, vol. 43 (May 2013), pp. 63-65.
West Africa
The Sahel. In North-West Africa’s Sahel region, roughly spanning Mauritania to Chad, conflicts
involving Islamist armed groups, ethnic separatists, communal defense militias, and criminal

53 See CRS In Focus IF10601, Transnational Crime Issues: Global Trends Overview.
54 See CRS In Focus IF11117, Gulf of Guinea: Recent Trends in Piracy and Armed Robbery.
Congressional Research Service

10

---

link to page 19 link to page 19 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

actors have outpaced responses by governments while deepening local development, human
security, and governance challenges. Mali has been mired in crises since 2012, when the state
nearly collapsed in the face of a northern separatist rebellion, a military coup, an Islamist
insurgent advance, and a regional drought.55 Islamist insurgents and other armed groups hold
sway over much of the country’s territory, and a 2015 peace accord with northern separatists has
not been fully implemented. In August 2020, as noted above, the military overthrew Mali’s
president, giving rise to a transitional administration that has pledged to hold elections in 2022.
Burkina Faso has seen increasing violence since 2016, as Islamist groups—some with ties to the
conflict in Mali, and to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS)—have asserted control over parts of the
country and carried out attacks in the capital.56 Human rights groups have accused state security
forces and state-backed militias of committing abuses during counterinsurgency efforts.57 Islamist
groups also are active in adjacent regions of Niger, a key Western security partner in the region,
and have staged attacks in previously unaffected coastal West African countries.
The U.N. Security Council established a peacekeeping operation in Mali in 2013. Separately,
France has deployed about 5,000 troops to the region under Operation Barkhane, a
counterterrorism mission headquartered in Chad that receives U.S. logistical support (see “U.S.
Military Engagement in Africa”). In 2017, the G5 Sahel—comprising Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Burkina Faso, and Chad—launched a “joint force” to coordinate military operations in border
regions. The United States and other donors have provided support for the force, but regional
militaries have struggled to coordinate and sustain operations.
The Lake Chad Basin.58 The Lake Chad Basin region adjoining Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and
Chad has faced a years-long insurgency by Boko Haram and an IS-affiliated splinter faction, the
Islamic State West Africa Province (IS-WA, or ISWAP). The conflict has killed nearly 40,000
people in Nigeria since 2010, along with thousands more in neighboring countries.59 U.S.-backed
regional counterinsurgency efforts have episodically weakened the groups’ strength and territorial
control, yet both remain capable of staging attacks in northeast Nigeria and adjacent border
regions. The violence has featured extensive human rights abuses by armed extremists as well as
state security forces, and has given rise to a spiraling humanitarian emergency.60
Central and Northwest Nigeria.61 Violence between farmers and livestock herders in Nigeria’s
central “Middle Belt” has surged in frequency and intensity over the past decade, claiming
several thousand lives. In the northwest, such clashes have mounted in a context of escalating
armed banditry, kidnapping, and ethnic vigilantism. Islamist extremist groups also reportedly
have sought to establish themselves in the northwest, building ties with local communities and

55 See CRS In Focus IF10116, Crisis in Mali.
56 See CRS In Focus IF10434, Burkina Faso.
57 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “We Found Their Bodies Later That Day”: Atrocities by Armed Islamists and
Security Forces in Burkina Faso’s Sahel Region, March 22, 2019.
58 See CRS In Focus IF10173, Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province.
59 Council on Foreign Relations, “Nigeria Security Tracker,” accessed February 3, 2021.
60 See, e.g., Amnesty International (AI), Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands: War Crimes Committed by
the Nigerian Military, 2015; AI, Cameroon's Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in
the Fight Against Boko Haram, 2017; and Human Rights Watch, They Didn’t Know if I was Alive or Dead, 2019.
61 See CRS Report RL33964, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.
Congressional Research Service

11

---

link to page 19 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

armed groups.62 In August 2020, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa
stated that “we’re seeing al-Qaida starting to make some inroads” in Nigeria’s northwest.63
East Africa
Somalia.64 Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda affiliate, continues to wage an asymmetric campaign against
the Somali government, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, and international
targets. The group has killed thousands of Somali civilians since the mid-2000s and demonstrated
its ability to stage attacks in the broader East Africa region—most notably in Kenya, which Al
Shabaab has targeted in what it describes as retaliation for Kenya’s participation in AMISOM. In
January 2020, an Al Shabaab raid on a Kenyan military base used by the U.S. military killed one
U.S. service member and two Defense Department contractors.65 Somalia also faces a threat from
a small IS faction in the north. The United States has provided extensive counterterrorism support
to Somalia’s government and AMISOM, and the U.S. military conducts airstrikes and other
operations against Islamist militants in the country (see “U.S. Military Engagement in Africa”).
Tensions between Somalia’s federal government and its member states have fueled local
instability, undermining both the fight against Al Shabaab and the process of nation-building.
Ethiopia.66 An armed conflict in the northeastern region of Tigray that began in November 2020
has displaced more than two million people and created a major humanitarian crisis, with roughly
4.5 million people in Tigray in need of emergency food aid as of January 2021.67 Violence pits
federal forces supported by militias from the neighboring Amhara region against forces loyal to
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which dominated Ethiopia’s ruling coalition for
almost three decades. The conflict threatens to evolve into a protracted insurgency, amid reports
of serious abuses against civilians.68 The government has restricted access to Tigray by aid
agencies, journalists, and human rights monitors. Neighboring Eritrea’s reported involvement in
the conflict and rising tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan have prompted concerns of a regional
conflict. The conflict in Tigray, alongside ethnic violence elsewhere in the country, threatens
Ethiopia’s political transition that began in 2018 with the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
Sudan.69 Sudan’s transitional government, which assumed power in 2019 after the military’s
ouster of longtime leader Omar al Bashir, has pursued peace negotiations with insurgent groups in
the western Darfur region and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, but instability continues
to plague the country’s periphery. In August 2020, the government signed a peace deal with some
rebel groups, but it has yet to reach agreement with two major factions. Continued violence
underscores concerns about the government’s capacity to protect civilians after the departure of
the U.N. peacekeeping mission from Darfur: under pressure from the Sudanese government, the

62 ICG, Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem, May 18, 2020.
63 State Department, “Digital Briefing on U.S. Efforts to Combat Terrorism in Africa during COVID,” August 4, 2020.
64 See CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia.
65 AFRICOM, “UPDATE: U.S. Statement on Manda Bay Terrorist Attack,” January 5, 2020.
66 See Testimony of CRS Specialist Lauren Ploch Blanchard, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Subcommittee
on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, The Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia,
hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 1, 2020; see also CRS In Focus IF10185, Ethiopia.
67 OCHA, “Ethiopia Humanitarian Bulletin Issue #1 25 Dec – 10 Jan. 2021,” January 10, 2021.
68 See, e.g., U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, “U.N.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, Urges All Parties
to Prohibit the Use of Sexual Violence and Cease Hostilities in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia,” January 21, 2021.
69 See CRS In Focus IF10182, Sudan.
Congressional Research Service

12

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

U.N. Security Council ended the mission’s mandate in December 2020. More than seven million
people in Sudan were severely food insecure as of December 2020, according to U.N. estimates.70
South Sudan.71 South Sudan’s civil war has featured widespread sexual violence, mass killings,
and other atrocities since erupting in 2013, just two years after the country’s separation from
Sudan. A study estimated in 2018 that nearly 400,000 South Sudanese had died as a result of the
conflict, which has displaced at least a third of the country’s population.72 A 2018 power-sharing
deal between the government and some rebel groups has quieted some areas, but security gains
are fragile, parts of the agreement remain unimplemented, and some factions have refused to sign
the accord. Intercommunal conflicts also persist, spurred by political elites. Almost six million
South Sudanese may face severe food insecurity, with tens of thousands at risk of famine.73
Central and Southern Africa
Cameroon.74 A separatist insurgency by Anglophone rebels in this majority Francophone country
has drawn attention from U.S. policymakers since the onset of conflict in 2017. Government
forces and Anglophone rebel groups have committed widespread violence against civilians, as
attempts to negotiate a settlement have foundered. The Anglophone crisis has overstretched a
Cameroonian military already contending with Boko Haram and IS-WA insurgencies in the
country’s north, where attacks on civilians reportedly surged in 2019-2020.75
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).76 Instability has endured in DRC since the mid-1990s
despite extensive foreign assistance and international stabilization efforts, including one of the
world’s largest and longest-running U.N. peacekeeping operations. Tensions over access to land
and citizenship rights, local disputes, criminal activity, and regional geopolitics, have driven
conflicts—notably in the densely inhabited, mineral-rich east. In 2019, IS media outlets began to
claim some attacks locally attributed to a Ugandan-origin armed group long active eastern DRC.
Some 21.8 million people are acutely food insecure, including 5.7 million facing emergency-level
food insecurity, and DRC has one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations.77
Central African Republic (CAR).78 CAR has struggled to emerge from conflict and state
collapse since 2013, when rebels overthrew the government. Armed groups control much of the
country and continue to perpetuate widespread violence against civilians, much of it along ethnic
and religious lines. In recent years, U.S. officials have expressed particular concern over a surge

70 OCHA, “Sudan: Situation Report,” December 17, 2020.
71 See CRS In Focus IF10218, South Sudan. See also Jon Temin, From Independence to Civil War: Atrocity Prevention
and U.S. Policy Toward South Sudan, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, July 2018.
72 This figure refers to “excess deaths” beyond what would have likely occurred absent war. See Cecchi et. al., South
Sudan: Estimates of Crisis-Attributable Mortality in South Sudan, December 2013-April 2018: A Statistical Analysis,
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), September 2018.
73 OCHA, South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (December 2020), January 12, 2021; IPC Famine Review:
Conclusions and Recommendations for Pibor County – South Sudan – IPC Analysis – November 2020.
74 See CRS In Focus IF10279, Cameroon.
75 ACSS, “Boko Haram Violence against Civilians Spiking in Northern Cameroon,” November 13, 2020.
76 See CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations.
77 IPC, “Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Acute Food Insecurity Situation July - December 2020 and
Projection for January - June 2021,” accessed November 30, 2020.
78 See CRS In Focus IF11171, Crisis in the Central African Republic.
Congressional Research Service

13

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

in Russian military, private contractor, and mining firm support for the government. Nearly three
million Central Africans, roughly half the population, may require humanitarian aid in 2021.79
Mozambique.80 Since 2017, Mozambique has faced a mounting Islamist insurgency based in
Cabo Delgado province, along its northern border with Tanzania. The group is known locally as
Al Shabaab (no known ties to the Somali extremist group of the same name) or Al Sunnah wa
Jama’ah (ASWJ, “Adherents of the Sunnah”). Islamic State media outlets have recognized the
faction as part of its IS-Central Africa affiliate, under whose banner it has also claimed attacks in
DRC (see above). ASWJ has targeted government facilities and personnel, local civilians, and
workers engaged in natural gas operations partially financed by the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
ASWJ also has staged attacks in neighboring Tanzania. Human rights groups have accused
Mozambican security forces of extensive abuses during counterinsurgency operations.81
Peacekeeping in Africa
As of January 2021, five U.N. peacekeeping operations were under way in Africa.82 Under the U.N. system of
assessed contributions, the United States is the top source of funding for U.N. peacekeeping globally.83 The United
States provides training and equipment to peacekeeping contributors through bilateral foreign assistance
programs. The United States has also provided support to AMISOM, which the U.N. Security Council authorized
but is not U.N.-conducted. AMISOM conducts stabilization and counterterrorism operations, primarily against Al
Shabaab, an Al Qaeda affiliate. African countries play a key role in global peacekeeping: Rwanda and Ethiopia were
the second- and third- largest troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping as of December 2020; several other
African countries consistently rank in the top 20.84
U.S. Policy and Engagement
Successive Administrations and Congresses have pursued broadly consistent objectives in Africa:
enhancing peace and security; strengthening democracy and good governance; promoting
economic growth and development; expanding U.S.-Africa trade and investment; and responding
to health challenges and humanitarian crises. Certain African countries have drawn consistent
attention from Members of Congress and other policymakers, notably those afflicted by conflict
and instability (including terrorist threats), humanitarian crises, severe human rights violations, or
poor or deteriorating governance conditions. These include DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,
and Zimbabwe, among others. U.S. policymakers have sought to deepen relations with regional
economic powerhouses Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola, notwithstanding challenges and policy
concerns in each case. Successive Administrations also have invested substantial diplomatic
engagement and foreign aid in countries seen as regional leaders in security and development,
such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tanzania. The extent to which the United
States should partner with and provide assistance to authoritarian governments in Africa to
advance shared development and security objectives has been a frequent topic of debate.

79 OCHA, “Central African Republic Situation Report, 30 Nov 2020,” November 30, 2020.
80 See CRS Report R45817, Mozambique: Politics, Economy, and U.S. Relations.
81 Human Rights Watch, Mozambique: Security Forces Abusing Suspected Insurgents, December 4, 2018; Amnesty
International, Mozambique: Torture by Security Forces in Gruesome Videos Must be Investigated, September 9, 2020.
82 These operate in the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan (Abyei region). Another
operation, in Darfur, Sudan, ended its mandate on December 31, 2020, and was replaced by a new U.N. political mission.
83 See CRS Report R45206, U.S. Funding to the United Nations System: Overview and Selected Policy Issues.
84 U.N. Peacekeeping, “Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post,” December 31, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

14

---

link to page 24 link to page 19 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

U.S. Assistance to Africa
A separate CRS product, CRS Report R46368, U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Overview, provides more comprehensive information on U.S. aid to Africa, including funding
trends, key policy debates, and selected considerations for Congress.
U.S. assistance to Africa primarily focuses on addressing health challenges, notably relating to
HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal and child health, and nutrition; in FY2020, 74% of nonemergency
U.S. assistance for Africa went toward health programming.85 Other U.S. aid programs seek to
foster agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security, including
through activities to build the capacity of African security forces; improve education access and
social service delivery; bolster democracy, human rights, and good governance; support
sustainable natural resource management; and address humanitarian needs.
The overall scale of State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-
administered aid for Africa has remained relatively constant since the latter years of the Obama
Administration, hovering around $7.0-7.5 billion annually, excluding humanitarian aid and other
funding allocated from global accounts and programs. Other federal departments and agencies
administer additional aid funds for Africa. These include the U.S. Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), an independent agency that provides large, multi-year grants to developing
countries through a competitive selection process; the U.S. Africa Development Foundation
(USADF), which provides small-scale development assistance; the U.S. Development Finance
Corporation (see “Programs and Legislation Supporting U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment”) and
the Department of Defense (DOD, see “U.S. Military Engagement in Africa”).86
U.S. Support for Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights
Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance (DRG) has long been a stated priority
of U.S. Africa policy and focus of U.S. assistance to the region—though annual funding for such
programs has been smaller than funds allocated in support of other U.S. goals in the region (e.g.,
promoting health outcomes). Key tools in the promotion of DRG include:
Foreign Aid. State Department- and USAID-administered DRG programs seek to enhance
democratic institutions, improve government accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen
the rule of law. Activities include supporting African electoral institutions and political processes;
training political parties, civil society organizations, parliaments, and journalists; promoting
effective and accountable service delivery; bolstering anti-corruption efforts; and strengthening
justice sectors. U.S. assistance also provides legal aid to human rights defenders and funds
programs to address particular human rights issues, enable human rights monitoring and
reporting, and support election observation. For more on U.S. DRG assistance, including funding
levels, see CRS Report R46368, U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview.
Diplomacy and Reporting. U.S. diplomats often publicly criticize or condemn undemocratic
actions and human rights violations in Africa, and raise concerns in private meetings with African
leaders. Some Members of Congress likewise raise concerns directly with African leaders, with
U.S. executive branch officials, or through legislation. The State Department publishes annual
congressionally mandated reports on human rights conditions globally, and on other issues of

85 CRS calculation based on FY2020 653(a) data.
86 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues.
Congressional Research Service

15

---

link to page 27 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

concern, such as religious freedom and trafficking in persons.87 Such reports document violations
and, in some cases, provide the basis for U.S. policy actions, such as restrictions on assistance.
The State Department and USAID also finance international and domestic election observer
missions in Africa that produce reports on the credibility of electoral contests.
Sanctions. As of January 2021, Executive Orders (EOs) permitted the President to impose
financial sanctions and/or travel restrictions on persons implicated in violating human rights or
undermining democratic transitions or peace processes in several countries, including Burundi,
CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.88 As discussed below (see
“U.S.-Africa Policy during the Trump Administration: A Wrap-Up”), the Trump Administration
permanently lifted certain sanctions on Sudan that the Obama Administration previously had
eased, and in 2020 removed Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list—a designation
accompanied by a range of sanctions, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance.89 Other
EOs are global in scope but have relevance for Africa, such as the 2017 “Global Magnitsky” EO
pertaining to global human rights abuses and corruption, which the Trump Administration
invoked to impose targeted financial sanctions on a number of individuals and business entities in
Africa.90 The executive branch also has imposed U.S. visa restrictions on certain African nationals
implicated in corruption or gross human rights violations pursuant to authority granted by
Congress in annual State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures.91
Prosecutions. The United States has helped fund special tribunals to investigate and prosecute
human rights violations in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Chad. The United States is not a state party
to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which in practice has prioritized human rights cases in
Africa, though U.S. law permits the federal government to assist ICC efforts on a case-by-case
basis. U.S. prosecutors also have brought charges against or convicted alleged perpetrators of
human rights abuses in African countries, notably Rwanda and Liberia, often for fraud or perjury
linked to nondisclosure of involvement in wartime abuses in U.S. immigration applications.
U.S. Military Engagement in Africa
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has a stated mission to work with African partner states to
counter transnational threats and malign actors, strengthen local security forces, and respond to
crises in order to “advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability and
prosperity.”92 Its area of responsibility (AOR) comprises 53 countries, or all of Africa (including
North Africa) aside from Egypt, which lies within Central Command’s AOR.93 In the FY2021
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-283), Congress authorized $277.9 million
for AFRICOM operations and maintenance, exceeding a funding request of $239.4 million.
In January 2020 testimony to Congress, AFRICOM Commander General Stephen J. Townsend
stated that “about 5,100 U.S. service members and about 1,000 DOD civilians and contractors”

87 See CRS In Focus IF10795, Global Human Rights: The Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices.
88 EOs are available on the Federal Register at https://www.federalregister.gov/.
89 See CRS Insight IN11531, Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
90 See CRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
91 See CRS In Focus IF10905, FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Targeting Foreign Corruption and Human
Rights Violations.
92 AFRICOM, “About the Command,” at https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command.
93 Before AFRICOM became a stand-alone command in 2008, responsibility for U.S. military involvement in Africa
was divided among European, Central, and Pacific Commands.
Congressional Research Service

16

---

link to page 31 link to page 31 link to page 27 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

were active in Africa.”94 A majority are stationed in Djibouti, which hosts Camp Lemonnier, the
only enduring U.S. military base in Africa. Between 650 and 800 troops were in Somalia prior to
President Trump’s December 2020 directive to relocate most of these personnel outside of the
country, including to neighboring Djibouti and Kenya (see “DOD Posture Reviews and
Drawdowns,” below); whether the Biden Administration will review that directive remains to be
seen. As of September 2020, some 760 U.S. military personnel were deployed to West Africa—
most of them to Niger, where they conduct a range of activities, including intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance flights from a new U.S. Air Force facility (discussed below).95
Activities and Operations
Consistent with the Trump Administration’s orientation toward global power competition (see
“U.S.-Africa Policy during the Trump Administration: A Wrap-Up”), AFRICOM’s 2020 Posture
Statement placed a high priority on countering malign Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.96
It also reiterated several enduring Command priorities, such as protecting U.S. personnel and
facilities and countering “violent extremist organizations” (VEOs)—generally understood to refer
to Islamist armed groups. The 2020 Posture Statement asserted that efforts to counter VEOs and
build the capacity of partner militaries in Africa, two traditional focuses of DOD engagement,
were now considered components of AFRICOM’s strategy to counter China and Russia.
Building Partner Capacity. The U.S. military generally seeks to build the capacity of African
partner forces under a “by, with, and through” framework, which “emphasizes U.S. military
capabilities employed in a supporting role, not as principal participants.”97 DOD’s 2018 National
Defense Strategy prioritized efforts to support “local partners and the European Union to degrade
terrorists” in Africa, while “build[ing] the capability required to counter violent extremism,
human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal arms trade with limited outside
assistance.”98 In addition to implementing some State Department-administered security
assistance for African security forces, DOD also is authorized to engage in security cooperation
under its own Title 10 authorities. The majority of DOD-administered security assistance for
African partner forces has been provided under DOD’s “global train and equip” authority, which
Congress expanded and codified under 10 U.S.C. 333 (“Section 333”) in the FY2017 NDAA
(P.L. 114-328). DOD also conducts exercises, naval cooperation, threat-reduction, and other
military-to-military cooperation with African counterparts under various statutory authorities,
along with civil-military engagement in areas where U.S. forces are deployed.
The U.S. military has provided logistical support to French counterterrorism operations in the
Sahel since 2013, when France deployed its military to Mali to halt an Islamist insurgent advance.

94 Testimony of AFRICOM Commander General Stephen J. Townsend, Senate Armed Services Committee, United
States Africa Command and United States Southern Command, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 30, 2020. A
November 2020 report by the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) for East Africa and North and West Africa
Counterterrorism Operations, covering July – September 2020, similarly stated that AFRICOM “had approximately
5,100 personnel in Africa” during the quarter, without providing detail on the number of DOD contractors active in the
region. Lead Inspector General for East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, Quarterly
Report to the United States Congress: July 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020, November 25, 2020.
95 Lead IG for East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, Quarterly Report.
96 AFRICOM 2020 Posture Statement to Congress, submitted as written testimony by AFRICOM Commander General
Stephen J. Townsend to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
97 AFRICOM 2018 Posture Statement to Congress, submitted as written testimony by then-AFRICOM Commander
General Thomas D. Waldhauser to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
98 DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.
Congressional Research Service

17

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Such assistance has included aerial refueling, aerial resupply, and intelligence sharing.99 DOD
currently provides logistical support under 10 U.S.C. 331, enacted as part of the FY2017 NDAA.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). In recent years, DOD has deployed
personnel to conduct ISR activities in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. In November 2019, the
U.S. military commenced ISR flights out of Air Base 201 in the northern Niger town of Agadez,
after multiple delays.100 (The U.S. military also maintains a presence at a separate facility near the
capital, Niamey.101) Congress explicitly authorized funds for construction of the Agadez facility,
which was led by U.S. active duty military personnel.102 Media outlets have reported other U.S.
ISR activities in the Sahel, but these have not been confirmed by U.S. officials.103 In February
2020, under the Trump Administration’s “force optimization” effort (see below), AFRICOM
ended a U.S. ISR operation based in Cameroon that involved up to 300 U.S. military personnel.104
Direct Action. In the past two decades, the U.S. military has taken direct action, including
airstrikes, against terrorist threats in two African countries: Somalia and Libya. (On Libya, which
is beyond the scope of this report, see CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Conflict, Transition, and
U.S. Policy.) In 2019 testimony to Congress, AFRICOM’s then-Commander stated that the
Command had not been granted “offensive strike capabilities or [executive] authorities” outside
Libya and Somalia, while asserting that any U.S. forces accompanying local forces on
counterterrorism missions would have an “inherent right of self-defense and collective self-
defense,” were they to be attacked.105
Beginning in the George W. Bush Administration, DOD has conducted airstrikes in Somalia
against members of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab; in 2017, AFRICOM publicly stated that U.S.
strikes also have targeted an Islamic State faction in the country’s north.106 The tempo of U.S.
strikes rose beginning in 2015, when President Obama broadened the justification for military
action in Somalia, and rose again after President Trump further expanded the authority for such
strikes in 2017. U.S. officials have described some strikes as having been conducted in “self-
defense” of U.S., Somali, or AMISOM forces.107 In response to allegations from human rights
groups that U.S. strikes had killed civilians in Somalia, AFRICOM conducted a review in 2019,
subsequently acknowledging that strikes had killed two civilians in 2018 (fewer than alleged by
some human rights groups).108 In April 2020, AFRICOM began publicly issuing quarterly civilian

99 Murielle Delaporte, “US Military Support in Sahel: Allies At Work,” Breaking Defense, May 14, 2020.
100 DOD Inspector General, Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction, March 31, 2020
101 Lead IG for East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, Quarterly Report.
102 FY2016 NDAA (P.L. 114-92), Title XXIII--Air Force Military Construction, §2301 (b).
103 Joe Penney, Eric Schmitt, Rukmini Callimachi, and Christoph Koettl, “C.I.A. Drone Mission, Curtailed by Obama,
Is Expanded in Africa Under Trump,” New York Times, September 9, 2018; and Nick Turse, “U.S. Military Says It has
A “Light Footprint” in Africa. These Documents Show a Vast Network of Bases,” The Intercept, December 1, 2018.
104 CRS communication with AFRICOM, February 2021; White House, “Letter From The President-- War Powers
Resolution Regarding Cameroon,” October 14, 2015.
105 Testimony of AFRICOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser, Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Africa Command and Southern Command, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., February 7, 2019.
106 Jim Garamone, “Aircraft Attack Al Qaeda Haven in Somalia,” American Forces Press Service, January 9, 2007;
AFRICOM, “Why the U.S. Military is in Somalia,” November 29, 2017.
107 See, e.g., AFRICOM, “Update: U.S. Self-Defense Strikes in Somalia,” September 29, 2016.
108 AFRICOM, “U.S. Africa Command commander-directed review reveals civilian casualties,” April 5, 2019. For
human rights groups’ allegations concerning U.S. strikes in Somalia, see, e.g., Amnesty International, “Somalia: Zero
accountability as civilian deaths mount from US air strikes,” April 1, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

18

---

link to page 23 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

casualty reports.109 Several Members of Congress have expressed concern over civilian casualties
from U.S. strikes in Somalia and over the transparency of AFRICOM’s resultant inquiries.110
Congress also has authorized DOD to provide support to “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups,
or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations” by U.S. special
operations forces to combat terrorism under 10 U.S.C. §127(e).111 DOD generally does not
publicly disclose the locations or scope of activities conducted pursuant to this authority.
Other Engagements. The U.S. military also conducts exercises with African military personnel
and shares skills related to disaster and humanitarian response. Major exercises include Flintlock,
a Special Operations Command Africa-led exercise focused on West Africa, and Obangame
Express, a maritime exercise in the Gulf of Guinea. A small number of U.S. military personnel
(25 as of December 2020) serve as staff officers in U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region.112
Nearly every U.S. Embassy in Africa also hosts some U.S. military personnel, for example as part
of a Defense Attaché Office, Office of Security Cooperation, or Marine Security Detachment. In
2020, the Trump Administration reportedly withdrew defense attachés from several embassies in
Africa, as part of its stated effort to reorient resources toward global power competition.113
U.S.-Africa Trade, Investment, and Economic Cooperation
Africa accounts for a small share of overall U.S. trade and investment activity, making up roughly
1% of such U.S. global transactions in 2019.114 As it has over the past several years, the United
States ran a goods trade deficit with the region in 2019 (totaling $5.2 billion), importing $21.0
billion and exporting $15.8 billion (see Figure 4). U.S. exports are diverse, while imports are
mostly primary products; crude oil alone accounts for one-third of imports, but the total value of
U.S. crude oil imports from Africa has substantially declined as U.S. domestic oil production has
increased. Apparel, a key product benefitting from preferential U.S. tariff treatment under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, see below), is the region’s most significant
manufactured export to the United States. Over half of U.S. trade with Africa is with the region’s
two largest economies, Nigeria and South Africa. U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) is also
concentrated in a few countries, including South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania.
South Africa accounts for a large share of African FDI in the United States ($4.1 billion in 2019).

109 AFRICOM, “Civilian Casualty Report and Allegations,” at https://www.africom.mil/civilian-casualty-report-and-
allegations.
110 Letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Adam Smith, Adam Schiff, Eliot Engel, André Carson, James Langevin,
Terri Sewell, and Karen Bass to AFRICOM Commander General Stephen J. Townsend, May 6, 2020.
111 Currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. 127e.
112 U.N. Peacekeeping, Summary of Contribution to UN Peacekeeping by Mission, Country and Post: Police, UN
Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troops, data as of December 31, 2020.
113 Warren P. Strobel and Gordon Lubold, “Pentagon Draw-Down at U.S. Embassies Prompts Concern About Ceding
Field to Global Rivals,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2020.
114 Trade data include only sub-Saharan Africa and are sourced from Trade Data Monitor. Foreign direct investment
data cover sub-Saharan and North Africa and are sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Direct Investment
interactive tables at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm.
Congressional Research Service

19

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Figure 4. U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: CRS with trade data from Global Trade Atlas and foreign direct investment data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ Direct Investment interactive tables at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm.
Notes: FDI data are stock values based on historical cost and include North Africa.
U.S. trade and investment policy toward Africa is focused on encouraging economic growth and
development through trade within the region, with the United States, and internationally. The U.S.
government also seeks to facilitate U.S. firms’ access to opportunities for trade with and
investment in Africa. A major increase in African trade and investment ties with other countries,
particularly China, has been a growing concern for U.S. policymakers due to questions about lost
U.S. export opportunities as well as potential policy implications associated with such ties. At
$174 billion, China-Africa trade was nearly five times as large as U.S.-Africa trade in 2019.115
Improving economic and political climates in some African countries over the past decade have
led to increasing U.S. commercial interest in the region as a destination for U.S. goods, services,
and investment. Many U.S. businesses may remain skeptical of the region’s investment and trade

115 China- and U.S.-Africa trade data from Trade Data Monitor.
Congressional Research Service

20

---

link to page 25 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

potential, however, and may focus their investments in other regions thought to offer more
opportunity and less risk. Economic governance challenges, the relative difficulty of doing
business, and, in some instances, instability also may limit U.S. commercial interest in Africa.116
Programs and Legislation Supporting U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).117 AGOA (Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended)
is a nonreciprocal U.S. trade preference program that provides duty-free tariff treatment on
certain imports from eligible African countries (38 were eligible in 2020). Congress first passed
AGOA in 2000 in an effort to promote African development, deepen economic integration within
the region, and enhance U.S.-African trade and investment ties. AGOA builds on the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP), which when authorized provides similar duty-free treatment on
U.S. imports from developing countries worldwide.118 AGOA covers a wider range of products
and has typically been authorized over longer periods than GSP. The Trade Preferences Extension
Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-27) amended aspects of the program and extended AGOA’s authorization
for an unprecedented 10 years, to September 2025. AGOA also directs the executive branch to
pursue reciprocal trade agreements, where feasible, with African countries, but such efforts have
been unsuccessful to date (U.S. negotiations with Kenya remain ongoing, as discussed below).
U.S. imports under AGOA totaled $8.4 billion in 2019; energy products, mostly crude oil, are the
top imports under the program (see Figure 5).119 U.S. imports of non-energy products under
AGOA grew threefold between 2001 and 2019, but remain concentrated among a few countries
and products. In 2019, over half of the $3.8 billion in non-energy imports under AGOA were
from South Africa, which exports the broadest range of products, including motor vehicles, under
the program. Kenya, Lesotho, Ethiopia, and Madagascar are other top AGOA beneficiaries and
primarily export apparel products—the top non-energy export to the United States under AGOA.

116 A majority of sub-Saharan African countries rank in the bottom tiers of the World Bank’s annual Doing Business
report, which examines countries’ performance trends relating to the relative ease of doing business.
117 See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
118 GSP expired at the end of 2020; as of this writing Congress had not passed legislation to reauthorize the program.
See CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Overview and Issues for Congress.
119 Data on U.S. AGOA imports are from the U.S. International Trade Commission at https://dataweb.usitc.gov/trade-
data-reports/sub-saharan-africa/trade-data.
Congressional Research Service

21

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Figure 5. U.S. AGOA Imports, FY2019

Source: CRS with data from the U.S. International Trade Commission. Energy products defined as Harmonized
Tariff Schedule chapter 27. Non-energy includes all other products.
Prosper Africa.120 U.S.-Africa policy and engagement has increasingly focused on advancing
U.S. business opportunities in the region, including with the goal of boosting U.S. commercial
competiveness vis-à-vis China.121 In 2019, the Trump Administration launched the Prosper Africa
initiative, which aims to substantially increase U.S.-African trade and investment ties—including
by establishing “deal teams” in each U.S. embassy in Africa to help facilitate private sector
business transactions. Key goals under Prosper Africa include linking U.S. firms to trade and
investment opportunities in Africa, enabling African firms to access similar prospects in the
United States, facilitating access to U.S. trade assistance and other services, and fostering market-
oriented regulatory and policy reforms. Trump Administration officials also described Prosper
Africa as intended to counter China and Russia by “encourag[ing] African leaders to choose high-
quality, transparent, inclusive and sustainable foreign investment projects.”122

120 See CRS In Focus IF11384, The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative, by Nicolas Cook and Brock R.
Williams.
121 For more on U.S. trade and investment initiatives in Africa, see USTR, 2020 Biennial Report on the Implementation
of AGOA, June 2020.
122 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa
Strategy,” December 13, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

22

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Prosper Africa is not a new foreign aid program, per se; rather, it seeks to harmonize the existing
programs and capabilities of 17 U.S. agencies and departments involved in trade and investment
assistance, financing, credit insurance, and economic development activities. Congress has given
its implicit endorsement of Prosper Africa by requiring the Administration submit to Congress a
spending plan for Prosper Africa activity in FY2021. President Biden has pledged to promote
U.S.-Africa trade and investment, but as of early February 2021, his Administration had not stated
whether it would maintain, amend, or discontinue Prosper Africa.123
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).124 Congress, with support from
the Trump Administration, created the DFC in 2018 in the Better Utilization of Investments
Leading to Development Act (BUILD Act, P.L. 115-254), which merged and amended the
mandates of the former Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and USAID’s
Development Credit Authority to create a new agency. The DFC provides financing, direct equity
investments, technical assistance, and political risk insurance for U.S. private investment in
emerging markets. In its FY2020 report, DFC reported that 27% of its commitments ($8 billion)
were in Africa, the second-largest regional share.125
Some Members of Congress have described the DFC as a tool for countering China’s growing
economic influence in Africa and other developing regions.126 The DFC, by statute, has expanded
authority and an exposure cap of $60 billion (larger than that of the former OPIC), but its
footprint in Africa may nevertheless be limited relative to Chinese development financing.127 At
the most recent China-Africa summit, in 2018, President Xi Jinping of China pledged $50 billion
in state-backed aid, loans, and trade credit for Africa alone over three years, and urged Chinese
firms to make an additional $10 billion or more of investments in Africa over the same period.128
Trade Capacity Building (TCB) and Other Support. The United States provides TCB
assistance (see Text Box) to help countries better engage in international trade, take advantage of
the benefits of U.S. trade preferences, and encourage trade-led growth. Historically, three African
trade hubs, established during the George W. Bush Administration, were a pillar of U.S. TCB
efforts in Africa. While each pursued separate mandates, they all worked to increase regional
export competitiveness, intraregional trade, and AGOA use. Two of those hubs, one in South
Africa and one in Nigeria, are currently operational. The Trump Administration had planned to
replace an East Africa trade hub with Prosper Africa-related support, and to establish a new hub
in North Africa; whether the Biden Administration pursues these plans remains to be seen. The
Trump Administration also continued its predecessor’s effort to turn the trade hubs into two-way
U.S.-Africa trade and investment centers aimed at boosting U.S. business activity in Africa.
Trade Capacity Building

123 President Biden, “President Biden’s Message to African Union Summit Participants,” February 5, 2021.
124 See CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), by Shayerah I. Akhtar
and Nick M. Brown.
125 DFC, Annual Management Report for Fiscal Year 2020, December 8, 2020, at https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/
files/media/documents/DFC%20Annual%20Management%20Report%20FY%202020.pdf.
126 See, e.g., remarks by Representative Ted Yoho at the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, Members’ Day Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., March 6, 2019.
127 According to World Bank data, China was the largest bilateral lender to 32 of 40 low-income African countries as of
2020, with a total of $64 billion in disbursed loans outpacing the World Bank ($62 billion). Yufan Huang and Deborah
Brautigam, "Putting a Dollar Amount on China's Loans to the Developing World," The Diplomat, June 24, 2020.
128 Xinhua, “Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's Speech at Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing
Summit,” September 3, 2018; and Deborah Brautigam, “China's FOCAC Financial Package for Africa 2018: Four
Facts,” China in Africa Research Initiative Blog, September 3, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

23

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Trade capacity building (TCB) refers to a broad range of activities designed to promote and expand countries’ and
regions’ participation in international trade. Core TCB activities help build or strengthen physical, human, and
institutional capacities to help recipient countries facilitate the flow of goods and services across borders. Among
other ends, they also seek to help countries participate in trade negotiations; implement trade agreements; comply
with food safety, manufacturing, and other standards; join and comply with World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements; and increase economic responsiveness to trade opportunities through business and trade training.
Such aid often is linked to other types of economic growth aid, but is generally accounted for separately, and often
comprises a relatively small portion of overall economic growth assistance. Some aspects of MCC programs,
including infrastructure development, are also considered TCB. Agency TCB funding allocations vary by year, but
USAID and MCC are generally the lead funding agencies. Other agencies providing TCB include the Departments
of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Justice, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
Note: TCB may incorporate a wide range of additional types of assistance. For background on TCB and the roles
of U.S. agencies and current TCB assistance flows, see USAID’s TCB database, at https://tcb.usaid.gov/.
Other U.S. agencies support U.S. exports to Africa, including the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank
and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA).129 Ex-Im Bank provides loans, loan
guarantees, and export credit insurance to help finance U.S. exports that support U.S. jobs, and
includes a statutory requirement to promote increased Ex-Im Bank support for U.S. exports to
Africa. USTDA seeks to advance economic growth by promoting development-related exports by
U.S. businesses in overseas infrastructure projects. It funds feasibility studies and other project
preparation activities, as well as other trade-expanding efforts. As a region, Africa typically
accounts for the largest share of annual USTDA funding.130
Other U.S. trade and investment policy tools in place with African countries include commercial
dialogues; Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), or intergovernmental forums
for dialogue on trade and investment issues; and bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which
advance reciprocal commitments to facilitate and protect foreign investment.131
U.S.-Africa Policy during the Trump Administration: A Wrap-Up
In a late 2018 speech unveiling the Administration’s policy approach toward Africa, then-
National Security Advisor John Bolton identified three core objectives: expanding U.S.-Africa
commercial ties, including through the pursuit of bilateral trade agreements; countering
extremism and other forms of violent conflict; and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S.
foreign aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions.132 In line with a general orientation toward “great
power competition,” Bolton’s remarks—as well as other Trump Administration statements and
policy documents—also placed a strong emphasis on countering Chinese and Russian influence
in Africa.133 Officials stressed their intention to pursue regional policy aims largely through
bilateral engagement with African countries, as opposed to acting through multilateral bodies,
such as the United Nations and African Union (AU).134

129 See CRS In Focus IF10017, Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank).
130 USTDA annual reports; see also CRS In Focus IF10673, U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA).
131 See CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. International Investment Agreements (IIAs).
132 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor John R. Bolton.”
133 See, among others, White House, 2017 National Security Strategy, December 2017; White House, “Remarks by
National Security Advisor John R. Bolton”; DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States
of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, 2018; and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Posture Statements to the Armed Services committees for 2019 and 2020.
134 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor John R. Bolton.”
Congressional Research Service

24

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Analysts debate the degree to which the Trump Administration’s approach toward Africa
meaningfully departed from those of its predecessors. In some respects—such as its emphasis on
countering China—the Administration appeared to reshape or reorder the priorities guiding U.S.-
Africa policy and relations, though practical implications may be disputed (see below). At the
same time, the Administration pursued other objectives for Africa broadly similar to those
prioritized by its predecessors, including boosting economic growth, trade, and investment,
enhancing peace and security, promoting economic development, and improving health
outcomes. This continuity partly reflected congressional action. For instance, despite the
Administration’s repeated proposals to cut foreign assistance to the region, Congress appropriated
global foreign aid funds above requested levels, and allocations of U.S. foreign aid for Africa
remained similar to levels reached in the latter years of the Obama Administration.
Political transitions in Sudan and Ethiopia drew particular U.S. diplomatic attention during the
Trump Administration. Following the April 2019 military ouster of President Omar al Bashir in
Sudan, the State Department established a Special Envoy for Sudan to support political reforms.
Bashir’s ouster came at a time of improving U.S.-Sudanese ties, long strained due to the Sudanese
government’s links to international terrorism and pervasive human rights violations.135 In late
2020, citing reforms under Sudan’s transitional authorities, the Administration rescinded Sudan’s
designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (SST), which had carried restrictions on
certain kinds of U.S. foreign aid, among other sanctions.136 In Ethiopia, a key U.S. development
partner notwithstanding U.S. governance concerns, political reforms under Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed presented an opportunity to deepen ties. U.S. concerns over the Tigray conflict, however,
as well as the Abiy government’s push to begin operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam over opposition from neighboring Egypt, have strained prospects for improved relations.137
The Administration also established a new Special Envoy for the Sahel focused on overseeing
U.S. engagement on violent extremism and other challenges in that sub-region. Other countries
afflicted by insecurity or human rights challenges (e.g., DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and
Zimbabwe) remained focuses of U.S. diplomatic attention, as did countries that play key roles in
U.S.-backed development or security efforts (e.g., Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda).
Global Power Competition in Africa
In his 2018 Africa policy roll-out, then-National Security Advisor Bolton accused China and
Russia of “targeting their investments in [Africa] to gain a competitive advantage over the United
States” and engaging in predatory business practices in the region, citing opaque deal-making,
exploitative lending, and self-interested extractive industry activity.138 The Administration’s
National Security Strategy portrayed Chinese influence as undermining Africa’s development “by
corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and
opaque debts and commitments.”139 In the political sphere, officials accused Chinese authorities
of promoting authoritarianism in Africa—echoing fears among some observers that China seeks
to export a model of authoritarian-led development to countries in the region (see Text Box).140

135 For background on Sudan’s transition and U.S.-Sudan ties, see CRS Report R45794, Sudan’s Uncertain Transition.
136 See CRS Insight IN11531, Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
137 See CRS In Focus IF10185, Ethiopia, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard; and CRS Insight IN11471, The Nile Dam
Dispute: Issues for Congress.
138 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor John R. Bolton.”
139 White House, 2017 National Security Strategy.
140 In a 2020 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) hearing, USAID’s Acting Assistant
Congressional Research Service

25

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

Analysts debate the extent to which the Administration’s engagement with Africa advanced its
stated goal of countering China and other global competitors. Some observers have argued that
derogatory statements about African countries attributed to President Trump, as well as the
Administration’s comparatively limited senior-level engagement with African leaders, proposed
cuts to U.S. aid for Africa, and moves to reduce the U.S. military presence in the region (see
below), served to undermine U.S. influence in Africa vis-à-vis other powers.141 Others qualified
accusations of disdain or indifference toward Africa on the part of the Trump Administration,
stressing continuities in U.S. engagement with Africa.142 More generally, many analysts and
African leaders have criticized any zero-sum approach to U.S.-Chinese competition in Africa as
misguided or counterproductive, arguing that African governments are capable of engaging with
China without being exploited and disinclined to choose one foreign partner over another.143
Chinese and Russian Engagement in Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Concerns
China’s economic influence in Africa has spurred debate among U.S. policymakers over its potential impact on U.S.
economic and foreign policy goals in the region. China overtook the United States as Africa’s largest trading
partner in 2009. Chinese firms have built infrastructure projects across Africa, often financed by Chinese state-
backed credit and tied to the use of Chinese goods or services and, in some cases, access to natural resources.
Such activities have expanded since 2013 under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and with a series of large-
scale Chinese grant and loan commitments for African countries.144 Chinese engagement in Africa has helped to fil
infrastructure gaps and enable the rapid spread of digital communications in Africa, but it also has raised concerns
regarding U.S. commercial access and competitiveness.145 U.S. officials also have expressed concern that African
sovereign debt owed to China may give the latter leverage over African governments, though analysts debate
whether high levels of debt owed to China by some African states reflect a deliberate “debt-trap diplomacy.”146
Some observers also have raised alarm over Chinese political and ideological influence in Africa. According to one
expert, “China has begun to actively promote . . its own development model, which combines political
authoritarianism and economic capitalism, to prove to some African countries that economic development and
political stability could exist without a democratic system.”147 These efforts have involved training for African
political parties, engagement with African journalists to “promote media narratives favorable to Beijing and its
model of state-directed journalism,” and sales of surveil ance technology to African governments.148

Administrator in the Bureau for Africa Christopher Maloney stated that China “views Africa as a proving ground for its
model of authoritarian governance [which] promotes corruption, a lack of human rights and environmental and social
safeguards, increased authoritarianism and a lack of mobility for much of the population.” Written statement by Acting
Administrator Maloney in USCC, China’s Strategic Aims in Africa, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 8, 2020.
141 See, among others, Judd Devermont, “A New U.S. Policy Framework for the African Century,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), August 7, 2020.
142 See, e.g., Herman Cohen, “What Analysts are Missing about Trump's Africa Policy,” The Hill, April 17, 2020 and
John Campbell, “Trump’s Africa Policy Is Better Than It Looks,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2020.
143 See remarks by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in Darlene Superville, Tom Odula, and Cara Anna, “Trump
Administration to Open Free-Trade Talks with Kenya,” Associated Press, February 6, 2020. See also Adva Saldinger,
“African Leaders Question US Position on China at Investment Event,” Devex, October 19, 2020.
144 On the BRI, see CRS In Focus IF11735, China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues.
145 Joshua Meservey, “Chinese Corruption in Africa Undermines Beijing’s Rhetoric About Friendship with the
Continent,” Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2018.
146 USCC, 2020 Annual Report to Congress, December 2020. For a critique of the “debt-trap diplomacy” narrative, see
Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri, Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’: How Recipient Countries Shape
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Chatham House, 2020.
147 Testimony of Yun Sen, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Implications of China’s Presence and Investment in
Africa, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 12, 2018.
148 Will Green, Leyton Nelson, and Brittney Washington, China’s Engagement with Africa: Foundations for an
Alternative Governance Regime, USCC Staff Research Report, May 1, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

26

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

U.S. military officials, for their part, have expressed concerns about the strategic implications of China’s evolving
presence in Africa.149 In 2019 testimony to Congress, AFRICOM’s then-Commander stated that BRI participants in
Africa “receive promises of development, defense, and cultural investments in their countries, further enhancing
China’s influence while challenging our own partnerships.”150 In 2017, China established its first overseas military
base, in Djibouti—the site of the only U.S. military base in Africa, located on a key maritime chokepoint between
the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.151 China's engagement in Djibouti is part of a broader expansion of its military
engagement in Africa. The Chinese government has pledged at least $180 mil ion in peacekeeping assistance for
the African Union, and Chinese weapons sales to African governments have increased over the past decade.152
Russia also has expanded its presence in Africa. Russian engagement generally has centered on arms sales, military
training, intelligence exchanges, and access to minerals, notably uranium and platinum. It has signed military
cooperation deals with a number of African governments over the past decade, although the terms and practical
impacts of such deals reportedly vary.153 In late 2020, Russia reportedly concluded a naval logistics basing
agreement with Sudan; if established, it would be Russia’s first naval base in Africa since the Cold War.154 CAR,
where more than 200 Russian military personnel and private military contractors (PMCs) have deployed since
2017, has been a focus of Russian attention.155 Since 2018, Russian PMCs also reportedly have deployed to Sudan
and Mozambique.156 Several African countries have been targeted by disinformation campaigns by Russian agents,
including some with reported ties to President Vladimir Putin.157 The U.S. Treasury has sanctioned several entities
in CAR and Sudan associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin—a U.S.-sanctioned Russian tycoon and Putin associate
alleged to be a lead backer of PMCs in Ukraine, Syria, and various African countries.158
U.S. Assistance to Africa
The Trump Administration expressed skepticism of U.S. foreign aid in general, and of U.S. aid to
certain African countries. Officials described past U.S. aid to Africa as broadly ineffective and
subject to diversion by corrupt elites.159 In line with proposed cuts to foreign aid globally, the
Administration repeatedly proposed dramatic cuts to the overall level of U.S. aid to Africa—in
particular, to development and humanitarian aid. As a region, Africa regularly would have seen
the largest absolute reductions in State Department- and USAID-administered assistance as

149 Testimony of AFRICOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser, Senate Committee on Armed Services, United
States Central Command and United States Africa Command, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 13, 2018.
150 AFRICOM, 2019 Posture Statement to Congress, submitted as written testimony by AFRICOM Commander Gen.
Thomas D. Waldhauser to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
151 On Chinese activities in Djibouti and U.S. concerns, see CRS In Focus IF11304, China’s Engagement in Djibouti.
152 Hong Xiao, “China boosts its peacekeeping role,” China Daily, May 8, 2019. On Chinese weapons sales to Africa,
see CSIS, “How Dominant is China in the Global Arms Trade?” August 25, 2020.
153 Reuters, “Russian Military Cooperation Deals with African Countries,” October 17, 2018; Paul Stronski, Late to the
Party: Russia’s Return to Africa, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2019.
154 Alexander Bratersky, “Sudan to Host Russian Military Base,” Defense One, November 13, 2020.
155 These personnel are reportedly training government forces to use weaponry that Russia has donated to CAR.
Russian personnel also have reportedly been assigned to the CAR president’s security detail, while others have
established a presence in rebel-held areas. The unsolved August 2018 killing, in CAR, of three Russian journalists
probing the activities of Russian PMCs raised new concerns about Russia’s involvement.
156 See CRS In Focus IF11650, Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs), by Andrew S. Bowen.
157 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Russian Disinformation Campaigns Target Africa: An Interview with Dr.
Shelby Grossman,” February 18, 2020; Nathaniel Gleicher and David Agranovich, “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic
Behavior from France and Russia,” Facebook, December 15, 2020.
158 Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Financier’s Illicit Sanctions Evasion Activity,” July 15, 2020, and
“Treasury Increases Pressure on Russian Financier,” September 23, 2020.
159 See, e.g., White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor John R. Bolton”; State Department, “Press Briefing
on U.S. Policy in Africa with Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs, Tibor P. Nagy, Jr.,”
October 23, 2018. On the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid, see CRS Report R42827, Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts
to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance.
Congressional Research Service

27

---

link to page 19 Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

compared to past-year allocations.160 Congress, however, appropriated foreign aid funding above
levels requested by the Trump Administration each year, and in many cases did not accept the
Administration’s proposed aid account reorganizations and policy changes.161
Trump Administration officials also pledged to reorient and rebalance U.S. aid to Africa, in part to
address global power competition.162 In practice, however, the Administration maintained many
of its predecessors’ assistance initiatives focused wholly or largely on Africa, including the global
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Feed the Future (FTF) initiatives, and
the Africa-specific Power Africa and the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). The
Administration also launched new initiatives and aid programs with implications for U.S. aid to
Africa. These included Prosper Africa, the DFC, and the Women’s Global Development and
Prosperity (W-GDP) initiative, a women’s economic empowerment program. As under its
predecessors, both the Trump Administration’s annual budget requests and congressional
appropriations of U.S. assistance for Africa remained overwhelmingly weighted toward health
programs, with the balance largely dedicated to traditional development and security activities.
Notwithstanding its stated skepticism of development aid, the Trump Administration also
expanded USAID’s footprint in Africa, with bipartisan congressional support. Notably, USAID
upgraded its presence in Niger to a full Mission, opened a new office in Cameroon, added five
African countries to the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), and launched a new development
initiative for West Africa’s Sahel region, the Sahel Development Partnership.163 The MCC also
awarded new multi-year development aid Compacts to Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire.
DOD Posture Reviews and Drawdowns
The Trump Administration’s National Defense Strategy asserted that “inter-state strategic
competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”164 In 2018,
news outlets reported that then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis was planning to curtail
counterterrorism missions in Africa in which U.S. personnel were deployed alongside local
forces. The planned drawdown reportedly would center on U.S. deployments in Niger, where four
U.S. soldiers were killed by Islamist militants in 2017.165 In late 2018, DOD announced “force
optimization” plans, to be implemented over several years, entailing “a reduction of about 10
percent of the 7,200 military forces serving in Africa Command” and a reorientation of certain
deployments.166 DOD’s announcement suggested that counterterrorism would be de-emphasized
overall, though activities in Somalia, Djibouti, and Libya would “largely remain the same.” As
noted above (see “U.S. Military Engagement in Africa”), Djibouti hosts the sole U.S. military

160 Calculations account for humanitarian assistance. See CRS Report R45763, Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs: FY2020 Budget and Appropriations and similar reports for past years.
161 See CRS Report R46656, Selected Trump Administration Foreign Aid Priorities: A Wrap-Up, coordinated by Emily
M. Morgenstern.
162 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor John R. Bolton.”
163 Written testimony of USAID Administrator Mark Green, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, Review of the Fragility in the Sahel, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 10,
2020.
164 DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.
165 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “After Deadly Raid, Pentagon Weighs Withdrawing Almost All
Commandos from Niger,” New York Times, September 2, 2018. See also CRS Report R44995, Niger: Frequently
Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers.
166 DOD, “Pentagon Announces Force Optimization,” November 15, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

28

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

base in Africa and largest U.S. military presence on the continent, while Somalia and Libya are
the only African countries in which the United States has active airstrike campaigns.
Officials initially indicated that cuts would largely affect U.S. forces in West Africa, but that
DOD support for France’s counterterrorism operation in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, would
continue; construction also advanced on the new U.S. Air Force facility in Agadez, Niger.167 In
March 2019, then-AFRICOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser testified to Congress that
the Command had been directed to implement a first tranche of cuts, in which “300 or so” U.S.
personnel would be recalled by June 2020.168 The withdrawal centered on U.S. personnel in
Cameroon and, to a lesser extent, Niger; General Waldhauser reiterated that cuts would not affect
activities in Somalia and Libya. He also cast doubt on prospects for further cuts, noting that it
remained to be seen whether AFRICOM would “ever be directed to execute the second half” of
troop withdrawals and pledging to “push back” on drawdowns that were not in “our best interest.”
In early 2020, a new Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, initiated a fresh review of AFRICOM’s
footprint and missions while also announcing the deployment of a new Security Force Assistance
Brigade (SFAB), based outside of Africa, specializing in “train, advise, and assist missions” in the
region.169 DOD described the SFAB deployment as a reorientation toward global power
competition in Africa, and said that the SFAB would enable the Army “to return elements of an
infantry brigade from the 101st Airborne Division back to its home base ... to train and prepare for
high intensity conflict operations.”170 In contrast to statements by former Defense Secretary
Mattis, Secretary Esper stated in early 2020 that “no decisions yet have been made” to maintain
support for Operation Barkhane or the Agadez facility.171 Several Members of Congress
expressed opposition to the possible drawdown of U.S. military forces from Africa and concern
over the implications for French and other counterterrorism operations in the region.172
Ultimately, DOD did not issue a final decision by the end of the Trump Administration regarding
support to Operation Barkhane or the DOD operations out of Agadez, and both continued.
In December 2020, DOD announced that President Trump had directed the withdrawal of “the
majority of personnel and assets out of Somalia by early 2021.”173 As noted above, between 650
and 800 U.S. military personnel were operating in Somalia as of September 2020.174 DOD stated
that some forces would relocate to neighboring countries, where they would retain the ability to
mount “cross-border operations.” The directive came as part of a series of decisions to withdraw
U.S. combat troops from long-running conflicts worldwide. Some analysts and Somali security

167 DOD, “Joint Press Conference with Secretary Mattis and Minister Parly in Paris, France,” October 2, 2018.
168 Testimony of then-AFRICOM Commander General Thomas Waldhauser, House Armed Services Committee,
National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa, hearing, 116th Cong.,
1st sess., March 7, 2019.
169 DOD, “Statement on the Deployment of Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade to Africa,” February 12,
2020.
170 Ibid; see also Testimony of Defense Secretary Mark Esper, House Armed Services Committee, The Fiscal Year
2021 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 26, 2020.
171 DOD, “Joint Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense Esper and French Minister of Armed Forces Parly,” January 27,
2020.
172 Letter from Representatives Anthony Brown, Jimmy Panetta, Austin Scott, Richard Hudson, Chrissy Houlahan, Gil
Cisneros, Jason Crow, Veronica Escobar, Elaine Luria, Xochitl Torres Small, and Michael Waltz to Secretary Esper,
January 14, 2020; Letter from Senators Lindsey Graham and Chris Coons to Secretary Esper, January 15, 2020.
173 DOD, “Somalia Force Posture Announcement,” December 4, 2020.
174 Lead IG for East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, Quarterly Report.
Congressional Research Service

29

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

officials expressed concern over the implications of the pullout for the effectiveness and oversight
of Somali partner forces.175 DOD airstrikes in Somalia have continued since the relocation.176
Trade Policy
Given the small magnitude and narrow composition of U.S.-Africa trade, the region was not the
main target of the Trump Administration’s major trade policy actions. Nonetheless, certain policy
shifts and initiatives affected U.S. trade with African countries:
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Negotiations. The Trump Administration made reciprocal trade
negotiations a top priority of its trade policy with Africa. In 2019, for instance, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) C.J. Mahoney expressed the Administration’s support for a reciprocal
FTA in Africa—while also pledging U.S. support for African regional economic integration under
the AfCFTA.177 In July 2020, the Administration formally launched bilateral FTA talks with
Kenya, adhering to Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures.178 The Administration hoped to
establish an agreement that could serve as a model for future negotiations with other African
countries, but as of February 2021 talks remained in early stages; the Biden Administration may
consider whether and how to pursue the negotiations. Future talks are likely to face the same
challenges that have dogged previous U.S. pursuit of an FTA in Africa, including concerns among
African countries over the extensive nature of U.S. FTA commitments (e.g., the scope of tariff
liberalization or level of protections for intellectual property rights) and over how a bilateral trade
agreement may affect efforts toward regional integration.179 Congress would have to approve any
comprehensive trade agreements through implementing legislation, but the Biden Administration
also could pursue smaller-scale agreements that would not require congressional approval.
Tariff Actions. Increased tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) imposed under Section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were of particular concern for South Africa, which was the
25th ($186 million) and 11th ($387 million) largest supplier of affected U.S. steel and aluminum
imports, respectively, in 2019. Products subject to Section 232 tariffs are ineligible for
preferential tariff treatment under AGOA or GSP; the Administration granted product exclusions
for a limited number of steel and aluminum imports from South Africa.180 Withdrawing the tariff
increases would require action by the President.
Eligibility for U.S. Preference Programs. Statutes authorizing U.S. preference programs give
the President broad discretion in determining country eligibility. As part of its focus on unfair
trade practices, the Trump Administration initiated a review of South Africa’s GSP eligibility due

175 Declan Walsh, “In Somalia, U.S. Troop Withdrawal Is Seen as Badly Timed,” New York Times, December 5, 2020;
Max Bearak, “As U.S. Forces Leave, Somalia’s Elite Fighting Unit Fears Becoming a Political Pawn,” New York
Times, December 29, 2020.
176 Stars and Stripes, “AFRICOM Launches Airstrike in Somalia Shortly after Troop Pullout,” January 19, 2021.
177 USTR, “Remarks of Ambassador C.J. Mahoney at the 2019 AGOA Forum in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire,” August 5,
2019.
178 See CRS In Focus IF11526, U.S.-Kenya FTA Negotiations. TPA is a time-limited authority that Congress uses to
establish trade negotiating objectives, notification and consultation requirements, and procedures to consider
implementing legislation for reciprocal trade agreements provided that they meet certain statutory requirements. See
CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).
179 For a thorough discussion, see the Obama Administration report, USTR, Beyond AGOA, September 2016.
180 CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Administration granted exclusions for
some steel and aluminum imports from South Africa. South Africa Department of Trade and Industry, “South Africa
Welcomes Product Exclusion for Some Steel and Aluminum Products from Section 232 Duties,” October 24, 2018; see
also CRS Report R45687, South Africa: Current Issues, Economy, and U.S. Relations.
Congressional Research Service

30

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

to concerns over its protection of intellectual property rights; the review remained pending as of
January 2021.181 The Administration removed AGOA eligibility for Cameroon and Mauritania,
citing human rights concerns, and restricted Rwanda’s AGOA eligibility due to its restrictions on
imports of used clothing. Previous Administrations similarly revoked AGOA eligibility for a
variety of reasons, including concerns over governance and labor rights.
Immigration Policy182
In 2017, citing terrorism concerns, the Administration issued a series of presidential directives
prohibiting nationals from Chad, Somalia, and Sudan from entering the United States, subject to
waivers and exceptions—although amid criticism and legal challenges, only Somali nationals
remained subject to such blanket prohibitions after late 2018.183 A separate directive issued in
January 2020 imposed entry restrictions (subject to waivers and exceptions) on immigrants from
Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania, among others, citing “deficiencies in sharing terrorist,
criminal, or identity information” on the part of these countries’ governments.184 President Biden
revoked both directives upon taking office in January 2021, lifting such restrictions.185
Implementing a decision initiated by the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration ended
temporary protected status (TPS, a form of deportation relief on humanitarian grounds) for
nationals of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the countries hit hardest by the 2014-2016 West
Africa Ebola outbreak.186 Separately, President Trump ordered a wind-down of deferred enforced
departure (DED, a form of administrative relief from deportation) for certain Liberian nationals,
but delayed the effective date of its expiration pending congressional consideration of “remedial
legislation” for those affected.187 The Administration terminated TPS for Sudan in 2017, citing
improved conditions in that country, though the decision has not yet taken effect due to a legal
challenge.188 Meanwhile, it extended TPS for Somalia and South Sudan, citing ongoing armed
conflicts and extraordinary and temporary conditions in both countries.189
As authorized by Congress, the Administration restricted visas, or threatened to do so, for certain
nationals of African countries considered “recalcitrant,” meaning their governments do not

181 AGOA builds on GSP and requires that beneficiary countries satisfy both programs’ eligibility criteria. For more on
GSP, see CRS In Focus IF11232, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and CRS Report R45687, South Africa:
Current Issues, Economy, and U.S. Relations.
182 CRS Analyst in Immigration Policy Jill H. Wilson contributed to this section.
183 White House, “Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” September 24, 2017; State Department,
“Presidential Proclamation Lifts Travel Restrictions for Chad,” April 10, 2018. See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10458,
Presidential Actions to Exclude Aliens Under INA § 212(f).
184 White House, “Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry,” January 31, 2020.
185 White House, “Proclamation on Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry to The United States,” January 20, 2021.
186 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues.
187 White House, “Memorandum on Extension of Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians,” March 28, 2019. In
December 2019, Congress enacted Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness (LRIF) as part of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L.
116-92); LRIF enables certain Liberians in the United States to obtain LPR status, subject to conditions and exceptions.
See CRS Report R46487, Applications for Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness (LRIF): Fact Sheet.
188 USCIS, “Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for El
Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and Nepal,” 85 Federal Register 79208, December 9, 2020.
189 USCIS, “Extension of the Designation of Somalia for Temporary Protected Status,” 85 Federal Register 14229,
March, 11 2020; USCIS, “Extension of the Designation of South Sudan for Temporary Protected Status,” 85 Federal
Register 69344, November 2, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

31

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

cooperate with U.S. court-ordered immigration removals.190 In late 2020, it launched a pilot
program authorizing consular officers to require bond payments from certain nonimmigrant visa
applicants from countries whose citizens overstay nonimmigrant U.S. visas at a rate above 10%;
nationals of fourteen African countries are potentially subject to such fees, based on FY2019
overstay rates.191 Several Members of Congress expressed alarm over the Trump Administration’s
treatment of asylum-seekers from certain African countries, notably Cameroon, amid allegations
of abuses against African asylum-seekers by U.S. immigration authorities as well as concerns
over potential threats to the safety of asylum-seekers ordered removed from the United States.192
The 116th Congress
The 116th Congress, like other past Congresses, shaped U.S. ties with Africa through its
appropriations, authorization, and oversight roles. It enacted several pieces of legislation that
influenced U.S.-Africa policy, including:
 The Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act
of 2020 (Title XII, Subtitle G of the FY2021 NDAA [P.L. 116-283]), requiring
the Department of State to submit a strategy concerning U.S. support for a
transition to civilian rule in Sudan and authorizing or directing certain assistance
for such aims, among other provisions.
 The Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title V of the Further Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2020 [P.L. 116-94]), requiring the executive branch to
develop a strategy for helping to stabilize conflict-affected zones and identifying
the roles and needs of U.S. agencies involved in implementing such activities.
Congress also passed several Resolutions in response to developments in the region, including the
Anglophone conflict in Cameroon (H.Res. 358 and S.Res. 684), violence against civilians in the
Central African Republic (H.Res. 387), and violence against protesters in Sudan (H.Res. 432). It
additionally influenced U.S.-Africa policy through communications with U.S. and African
policymakers to urge attention to or action on a range of issues, such as human rights abuses.
Issues for the 117th Congress
As it considers budgetary, policy, and oversight priorities—as well as potential shifts in U.S.-
Africa policy during the Biden Administration—the 117th Congress may consider such issues as:
 The scale and programmatic focus of U.S. foreign assistance to African countries.
 The footprint and objectives of U.S. military deployments in Africa, in the wake
of the Trump Administration’s drawdown of U.S. military forces from the region
and AFRICOM’s reorientation toward global power competition in Africa.
 Progress toward a free trade agreement with Kenya and other U.S. trade policy
goals, as well as the impact of U.S. tariff actions on U.S. trade with the region.

190 See CRS In Focus IF11025, Immigration: “Recalcitrant” Countries and the Use of Visa Sanctions to Encourage
Cooperation with Alien Removals.
191 State Department, “Visas: Visa Bond Pilot Program,” 85 Federal Register 74875, November 24, 2020.
192 Letter from Representatives Bennie Thompson and Karen Bass to Tony Pham, Senior Official Performing the
Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, October 13, 2020; Letter from Senators Chris Van
Hollen, Edward Markey, Christopher Coons, and Benjamin Cardin to Acting Department of Homeland Security
Secretary Chad Wolf, October 28, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

32

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement

 The implementation of U.S. trade, investment, and development finance
programming in Africa, including Prosper Africa and DFC activities.
 The implications, for U.S. interests and U.S.-Africa policy, of involvement by
other global powers and contenders such as China and Russia.
 Progress toward civilian-led government and a cessation of armed conflicts in
Sudan following the 2019 ouster of long-serving leader Omar al Bashir.
 Armed conflict and other unrest in Ethiopia, where the government of Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed has facilitated some reforms since 2018 but has drawn
growing criticism for suppressing dissent and failing to quell ethnic tensions.
 The extent to which the United States should prioritize counterterrorism in
Africa, including in Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and West Africa's Sahel
region, and what tools are best suited for U.S. counterterrorism objectives.
 The appropriate scale of U.S. responses to humanitarian crises in Cameroon,
CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique, the Sahel, Somalia,
South Sudan, and Sudan, among others.
 Prospects for improved governance in Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and The Gambia following recent political transitions in each country.
 Democratic backsliding and “third-termism” in parts of Africa alongside
enduring authoritarianism in countries that play key roles in U.S. security or
development efforts (such as Cameroon, Chad, Rwanda, and Uganda).

Author Information

Tomas F. Husted, Coordinator
Nicolas Cook
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs


Alexis Arieff
Brock R. Williams
Specialist in African Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance


Lauren Ploch Blanchard

Specialist in African Affairs

Congressional Research Service

33

---

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement



Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R45428 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED
34

---