U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues January January 612, 2021 , 2021
for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S.
Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of

the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context
or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the

success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign
countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it
can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of
the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention
of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what implications this might The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what implications this might
have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound
effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations
with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance,
and human rights. and human rights.
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, the Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, the
United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world. Other observers, particularly supporters of the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world. Other observers, particularly supporters of the
Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a
number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, there has been less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. Administration, there has been less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has substantially changed the Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has substantially changed the
U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump Administration, and also some who were critical of the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump Administration, and also some who were critical of the
Obama Administration—view the implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an Obama Administration—view the implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an
unnecessary retreat from U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it unnecessary retreat from U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it
to be an unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something of great to be an unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something of great
value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 years. value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 years.
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent years—particularly Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent years—particularly
supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were arguing even prior to the Trump supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were arguing even prior to the Trump
Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least
certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S.
values and interests, particularly in terms of adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the values and interests, particularly in terms of adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the
United States can accomplish, enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S. United States can accomplish, enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S.
actions less predictable to potential adversaries, reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for actions less predictable to potential adversaries, reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for
U.S. foreign policy and for organizing international affairs, and encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in U.S. foreign policy and for organizing international affairs, and encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in
Eurasia to do more to defend themselves. Eurasia to do more to defend themselves.
Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous
policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S.
foreign policymaking. foreign policymaking.
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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in
the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in
international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in
the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers
for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific
international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and
understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of more than 70 years Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of more than 70 years
(i.e., since the end of World War II in 1945), the U.S. role in the world under the Trump (i.e., since the end of World War II in 1945), the U.S. role in the world under the Trump
Administration has undergone a substantial change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could Administration has undergone a substantial change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could
have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could
significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense
plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights. plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. Congress’s decisions regarding implications this might have for the United States and the world. Congress’s decisions regarding
the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans,
programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in
U.S. foreign policymaking. U.S. foreign policymaking.
A variety of other CRS reports address in greater depth specific international issues mentioned in A variety of other CRS reports address in greater depth specific international issues mentioned in
this reportthis report. Appendix A provides a glossary of some key terms used in this report, such as provides a glossary of some key terms used in this report, such as
international order or or regional hegemon. For convenience, this report uses the term . For convenience, this report uses the term U.S. role as a as a
shorthand for referring to the U.S. role in the world. shorthand for referring to the U.S. role in the world.
Background
Overview of Traditional U.S. Role: Four Key Elements
While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in
their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements:
 global leadership;  global leadership;
 defense and promotion of the liberal international order;  defense and promotion of the liberal international order;
 defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and  defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and
 prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.  prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.
The following sections provide brief discussions of these four key elements. The following sections provide brief discussions of these four key elements.
Global Leadership
The traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II is generally described, first The traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II is generally described, first
and foremost, as one of global leadership, meaning that the United States tends to be the first or and foremost, as one of global leadership, meaning that the United States tends to be the first or
most important country for identifying or framing international issues, taking actions to address most important country for identifying or framing international issues, taking actions to address
those issues, setting an example for other countries to follow, organizing and implementing those issues, setting an example for other countries to follow, organizing and implementing
multilateral efforts to address international issues, and enforcing international rules and norms. multilateral efforts to address international issues, and enforcing international rules and norms.
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Observers over the years have referred to U.S. global leadership using various terms, some of Observers over the years have referred to U.S. global leadership using various terms, some of
which reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of this aspect of the U.S. role. Examples which reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of this aspect of the U.S. role. Examples
of such terms (other than global leader itself) include leader of the free world, superpower, of such terms (other than global leader itself) include leader of the free world, superpower,
indispensable power, system administrator, hyperpower, world policeman, or world hegemon. indispensable power, system administrator, hyperpower, world policeman, or world hegemon.
The U.S. role of global leadership has resulted in extensive U.S. involvement in international The U.S. role of global leadership has resulted in extensive U.S. involvement in international
affairs, and this, too, has been described with various phrases. The United States has been affairs, and this, too, has been described with various phrases. The United States has been
described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy; a foreign policy of global engagement or described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy; a foreign policy of global engagement or
deep engagement; a foreign policy that provides global public goods; a foreign policy of liberal deep engagement; a foreign policy that provides global public goods; a foreign policy of liberal
order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony; an interventionist foreign policy; or order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony; an interventionist foreign policy; or
a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony. a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony.
Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order
A second key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that can A second key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that can
be viewed as inherently related to the first key element above—has been to defend and promote be viewed as inherently related to the first key element above—has been to defend and promote
the liberal international order1 that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the the liberal international order1 that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the
years after World War II. Although definitions of the liberal international order vary, key elements years after World War II. Although definitions of the liberal international order vary, key elements
of it are generally said to include the following: of it are generally said to include the following:
 respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of  respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of
changing international borders by force or coercion; changing international borders by force or coercion;
 a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use  a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use
or threat of use of force or coercion, and in a manner consistent with international or threat of use of force or coercion, and in a manner consistent with international
law; law;
 respect for international law, global rules and norms, and universal values,  respect for international law, global rules and norms, and universal values,
including human rights; including human rights;
 strong international institutions for supporting and implementing international  strong international institutions for supporting and implementing international
law, global rules and norms, and universal values; law, global rules and norms, and universal values;
 the use of liberal (i.e., rules-based) international trading and investment systems  the use of liberal (i.e., rules-based) international trading and investment systems
to advance open, rules-based economic engagement, development, growth, and to advance open, rules-based economic engagement, development, growth, and
prosperity; and prosperity; and
 the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and  the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and
(more recently) cyberspace as international commons rather than domains subject (more recently) cyberspace as international commons rather than domains subject
to national sovereignty. to national sovereignty.
Most of the key elements above (arguably, all but the final one) can be viewed collectively as Most of the key elements above (arguably, all but the final one) can be viewed collectively as
forming what is commonly referred to as a rules-based international order. A traditional antithesis forming what is commonly referred to as a rules-based international order. A traditional antithesis
of a rules-based order is a might-makes-right order (sometimes colloquially referred to as the law of a rules-based order is a might-makes-right order (sometimes colloquially referred to as the law
of the jungle), which is an international order (or a situation lacking in order) in which more of the jungle), which is an international order (or a situation lacking in order) in which more
powerful countries routinely impose their will arbitrarily on less-powerful countries, powerful countries routinely impose their will arbitrarily on less-powerful countries,
organizations, and individuals, with little or no regard to rules. organizations, and individuals, with little or no regard to rules.

1 Other terms used to refer to the liberal international order include 1 Other terms used to refer to the liberal international order include U.S.-led international order, , postwar international
order, , rules-based international order, and , and open international order. Observers sometimes substitute . Observers sometimes substitute world for for
international, or, or omit omit international or or world and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the
terms terms liberal international order and and liberal order, the word , the word liberal does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct
often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the
term that refers to an order based on the rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary term that refers to an order based on the rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary
monarchs. monarchs.
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Though often referred to as if it is a fully developed or universally established situation, the Though often referred to as if it is a fully developed or universally established situation, the
liberal international order, like other international orders that preceded it, is liberal international order, like other international orders that preceded it, is
 incomplete in geographic reach and in other ways;  incomplete in geographic reach and in other ways;
 partly aspirational;  partly aspirational;
 not fixed in stone, but rather subject to evolution over time;  not fixed in stone, but rather subject to evolution over time;
 sometimes violated by its supporters;  sometimes violated by its supporters;
 not entirely free of might-makes-right behavior;  not entirely free of might-makes-right behavior;
 resisted or rejected by certain states and nonstate actors; and  resisted or rejected by certain states and nonstate actors; and
 subject to various stresses and challenges.  subject to various stresses and challenges.
Some observers, emphasizing points like those above, argue that the liberal international order is Some observers, emphasizing points like those above, argue that the liberal international order is
more of a myth than a reality. Other observers, particularly supporters of the order, while more of a myth than a reality. Other observers, particularly supporters of the order, while
acknowledging the limitations of the order, reject characterizations of it as a myth and emphasize acknowledging the limitations of the order, reject characterizations of it as a myth and emphasize
its differences from international orders that preceded it. its differences from international orders that preceded it.
As mentioned above, the liberal international order was created by the United States with the As mentioned above, the liberal international order was created by the United States with the
support of its allies in the years immediately after World War II. At that time, the United States support of its allies in the years immediately after World War II. At that time, the United States
was the only country with both the capacity and willingness to establish a new international order. was the only country with both the capacity and willingness to establish a new international order.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is generally viewed as reflecting a desire by U.S. policymakers to avoid repeating the deadly is generally viewed as reflecting a desire by U.S. policymakers to avoid repeating the deadly
major wars and widespread economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th major wars and widespread economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th
century—a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and century—a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and
fascism, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, and World War II. fascism, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, and World War II.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is also generally viewed as an act of national self-interest, reflecting a belief among U.S. is also generally viewed as an act of national self-interest, reflecting a belief among U.S.
policymakers that it would strongly serve U.S. security, political, and economic objectives. policymakers that it would strongly serve U.S. security, political, and economic objectives.
Supporters of the liberal international order generally argue that in return for bearing the costs of Supporters of the liberal international order generally argue that in return for bearing the costs of
creating and sustaining the liberal international order, the United States receives significant creating and sustaining the liberal international order, the United States receives significant
security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of
power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing and power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing and
operating global institutions and rules for international finance and trade. Indeed, some critics of operating global institutions and rules for international finance and trade. Indeed, some critics of
the liberal international order argue that it is primarily a construct for serving U.S. interests and the liberal international order argue that it is primarily a construct for serving U.S. interests and
promoting U.S. world primacy or hegemony. The costs and benefits for the United States of promoting U.S. world primacy or hegemony. The costs and benefits for the United States of
defending and promoting the liberal international order, however, are a matter of debate. defending and promoting the liberal international order, however, are a matter of debate.
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights
A third key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend A third key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend
and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and
resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible. This element of the U.S. resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible. This element of the U.S.
role is viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political values but also with a theory role is viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political values but also with a theory
advanced by some observers (sometimes called the democratic peace theory) that democratic advanced by some observers (sometimes called the democratic peace theory) that democratic
countries are more responsive to the desires of their populations and consequently are less likely countries are more responsive to the desires of their populations and consequently are less likely
to wage wars of aggression or go to war with one another. to wage wars of aggression or go to war with one another.
Defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights is additionally viewed as a key Defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights is additionally viewed as a key
component of U.S. soft power, because it can encourage like-minded governments, as well as component of U.S. soft power, because it can encourage like-minded governments, as well as
organizations and individuals in other countries, to work with the United States, and because it organizations and individuals in other countries, to work with the United States, and because it
has the potential to shape the behavior of authoritarian and illiberal governments that are acting has the potential to shape the behavior of authoritarian and illiberal governments that are acting
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against U.S. interests by shaming those governments and inspiring prodemocracy organizations against U.S. interests by shaming those governments and inspiring prodemocracy organizations
and individuals within those countries. and individuals within those countries.
Prevention of Emergence of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia
A fourth element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that U.S. A fourth element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that U.S.
policymakers do not often state explicitly in public—has been to oppose the emergence of policymakers do not often state explicitly in public—has been to oppose the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia. This objective reflects a U.S. perspective on geopolitics and grand regional hegemons in Eurasia. This objective reflects a U.S. perspective on geopolitics and grand
strategy developed by U.S. strategists and policymakers during and in the years immediately after strategy developed by U.S. strategists and policymakers during and in the years immediately after
World War II that incorporates two key judgments: World War II that incorporates two key judgments:
 that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a  that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a
regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large
enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and
 that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the  that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the
emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot
be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of
regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside
Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.2 Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.2
Preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is sometimes also referred to as Preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is sometimes also referred to as
preserving a division of power in Eurasia, or as preventing key regions in Eurasia from coming preserving a division of power in Eurasia, or as preventing key regions in Eurasia from coming
under the domination of a single power, or as preventing the emergence of a spheres-of-influence under the domination of a single power, or as preventing the emergence of a spheres-of-influence
world, which could be a consequence of the emergence of one or more regional hegemons in world, which could be a consequence of the emergence of one or more regional hegemons in
Eurasia. Eurasia.
U.S. actions that can be viewed as expressions of the U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of U.S. actions that can be viewed as expressions of the U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia include but are not necessarily limited to the following: regional hegemons in Eurasia include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
 U.S. participation in World War I,3 World War II, the Korean War, and the  U.S. participation in World War I,3 World War II, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War;4 Vietnam War;4
 U.S. alliances and security partnerships, including  U.S. alliances and security partnerships, including
 the NATO alliance, which was established in large part to deter and counter  the NATO alliance, which was established in large part to deter and counter
attempts by the Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in attempts by the Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in
Europe; Europe;

2 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, 2 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, ,
by Ronald O'Rourke. by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 Although the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons was not articulated in explicit terms (at least not 3 Although the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons was not articulated in explicit terms (at least not
widely) by U.S. strategists until World War II and the years immediately thereafter, U.S. participation in World War I widely) by U.S. strategists until World War II and the years immediately thereafter, U.S. participation in World War I
against Germany can in retrospect be viewed as an earlier U.S. action reflecting this goal. against Germany can in retrospect be viewed as an earlier U.S. action reflecting this goal.
4 U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was justified in part by the so-called domino theory, which argued that a 4 U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was justified in part by the so-called domino theory, which argued that a
victory by communist-ruled North Vietnam over South Vietnam could be followed by other countries in the region victory by communist-ruled North Vietnam over South Vietnam could be followed by other countries in the region
falling, like dominos in a row, under communist control. Opponents of the domino theory challenged its validity and falling, like dominos in a row, under communist control. Opponents of the domino theory challenged its validity and
argue that it was disproven when North Vietnam’s defeat of South Vietnam was not followed by other countries in the argue that it was disproven when North Vietnam’s defeat of South Vietnam was not followed by other countries in the
region falling under communist control. The theory’s supporters argue that the theory was not disproven, because the region falling under communist control. The theory’s supporters argue that the theory was not disproven, because the
years-long U.S. effort to defend South Vietnam, though ultimately unsuccessful in preventing victory by North years-long U.S. effort to defend South Vietnam, though ultimately unsuccessful in preventing victory by North
Vietnam, gave other countries in the region time and space to develop their political institutions and economies enough Vietnam, gave other countries in the region time and space to develop their political institutions and economies enough
to deter or resist communist movements in their own countries. Valid or not, the domino theory’s use as a justification to deter or resist communist movements in their own countries. Valid or not, the domino theory’s use as a justification
links U.S. participation in the war to the goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon (in this case, a links U.S. participation in the war to the goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon (in this case, a
communist hegemon of China and/or the Soviet Union). communist hegemon of China and/or the Soviet Union).
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 U.S. alliances with countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which were  U.S. alliances with countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which were
established in large part to deter and counter attempts by the Soviet Union or established in large part to deter and counter attempts by the Soviet Union or
China to become a regional hegemon in East Asia; and China to become a regional hegemon in East Asia; and
 U.S. security partnerships with countries in the Persian Gulf region, which  U.S. security partnerships with countries in the Persian Gulf region, which
were established in large part to deter or counter attempts by Iran or the were established in large part to deter or counter attempts by Iran or the
Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in that region; and Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in that region; and
 additional U.S. political, diplomatic, and economic actions to contain and oppose  additional U.S. political, diplomatic, and economic actions to contain and oppose
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, including the Marshall Plan and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, including the Marshall Plan and
subsequent U.S. foreign assistance programs. subsequent U.S. foreign assistance programs.
In pursuing the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S. In pursuing the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S.
policymakers have sometimes decided to work with or support nondemocratic regimes that for policymakers have sometimes decided to work with or support nondemocratic regimes that for
their own reasons view Russia, China, or Iran as competitors or adversaries. As a consequence, their own reasons view Russia, China, or Iran as competitors or adversaries. As a consequence,
the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Asia has sometimes been in tension the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Asia has sometimes been in tension
with defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights. with defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Changes over Time
Although the traditional U.S. role in the world was generally stable over the past 70 years, the Although the traditional U.S. role in the world was generally stable over the past 70 years, the
specifics of U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various specifics of U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various
reasons, including changes in administrations and changes in the international security reasons, including changes in administrations and changes in the international security
environment. Definitions of the U.S. role have room within them to accommodate some variation environment. Definitions of the U.S. role have room within them to accommodate some variation
in the specifics of U.S. foreign policy. in the specifics of U.S. foreign policy.
Long-Standing Debate over Its Merits
The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not
necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right
one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of
World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter
of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the
public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world. public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world.
The most prominent dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to The most prominent dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to
continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead
adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of
the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a
more restrained U.S. role. (For additional discussion, seemore restrained U.S. role. (For additional discussion, see Appendix B.)
A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or
combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and
promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third major promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third major
dimension concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft dimension concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft
power. Observers debating these two dimensions of the future U.S. role in the world stake out power. Observers debating these two dimensions of the future U.S. role in the world stake out
varying positions on these questions. varying positions on these questions.
Issues for Congress
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. The sections below provide implications this might have for the United States and the world. The sections below provide
some discussion of this issue. some discussion of this issue.
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Has the United States Changed Its Role?
There currently are multiple views on the question of whether the United States under the Trump There currently are multiple views on the question of whether the United States under the Trump
Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world, some of which are outlined briefly below. Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world, some of which are outlined briefly below.
Some Observers Believe the United States Has Changed Its Role
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world by altering Administration, the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world by altering
some or all of the four key elements of the U.S. role described earlier. Although views among some or all of the four key elements of the U.S. role described earlier. Although views among
these observers vary in their specifics, a number of these observers argue that the these observers vary in their specifics, a number of these observers argue that the
Administration’s America First construct, its emphasis on national sovereignty as a primary Administration’s America First construct, its emphasis on national sovereignty as a primary
guidepost for U.S. foreign policy, and other Administration actions and statements form a new guidepost for U.S. foreign policy, and other Administration actions and statements form a new
U.S. role characterized by U.S. role characterized by
 a voluntary retreat from or abdication of global leadership,  a voluntary retreat from or abdication of global leadership,
 a greater reliance on unilateralism,  a greater reliance on unilateralism,
 a reduced willingness to work through international or multilateral institutions  a reduced willingness to work through international or multilateral institutions
and agreements, and agreements,
 an acceptance of U.S. isolation or near-isolation on certain international issues,  an acceptance of U.S. isolation or near-isolation on certain international issues,
 a more skeptical view of the value of alliances to the United States,  a more skeptical view of the value of alliances to the United States,
 a less-critical view of certain authoritarian or illiberal governments,  a less-critical view of certain authoritarian or illiberal governments,
 a reduced or more selective approach to promoting and defending certain  a reduced or more selective approach to promoting and defending certain
universal values, universal values,
 the elevation of bilateral trade balances, commercial considerations, monetary  the elevation of bilateral trade balances, commercial considerations, monetary
transactions, and ownership of assets such as oil above other foreign policy transactions, and ownership of assets such as oil above other foreign policy
considerations, and considerations, and
 an implicit tolerance of the reemergence of aspects of a might-makes-right  an implicit tolerance of the reemergence of aspects of a might-makes-right
international order. international order.
In support of this view, these observers cite various Administration actions and statements, In support of this view, these observers cite various Administration actions and statements,
including, among other things including, among other things
 the Administration’s decisions to withdraw from certain international  the Administration’s decisions to withdraw from certain international
agreements—including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade agreements—including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade
agreement, the multilateral Paris climate agreement, and the Iran nuclear agreement, the multilateral Paris climate agreement, and the Iran nuclear
agreement—and from the World Health Organization (WHO); agreement—and from the World Health Organization (WHO);
 its earlier proposals for reducing State Department funding and foreign assistance  its earlier proposals for reducing State Department funding and foreign assistance
funding, and delays in filling senior State Department positions; funding, and delays in filling senior State Department positions;
 the President’s skeptical statements regarding the value to the United States of  the President’s skeptical statements regarding the value to the United States of
certain U.S. alliances (particularly with European countries and South Korea) and certain U.S. alliances (particularly with European countries and South Korea) and
more generally his apparent transactional and monetary-focused approach to more generally his apparent transactional and monetary-focused approach to
understanding and managing alliance relationships; understanding and managing alliance relationships;
 what these observers view as the President’s affinity for certain authoritarian or  what these observers view as the President’s affinity for certain authoritarian or
illiberal leaders, as well as his apparent reluctance to criticize Russia and his illiberal leaders, as well as his apparent reluctance to criticize Russia and his
apparent continued desire to seek improved relations with Russia, despite apparent continued desire to seek improved relations with Russia, despite
Russian actions judged by U.S. intelligence agencies and other observers to have Russian actions judged by U.S. intelligence agencies and other observers to have
been directed against the United States and overseas U.S. interests; been directed against the United States and overseas U.S. interests;
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 the President’s decision, announced by the Administration on October 6, 2019, to  the President’s decision, announced by the Administration on October 6, 2019, to
withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria, and the Administration’s initiatives to withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria, and the Administration’s initiatives to
reduce the U.S. military presence in Germany, Afghanistan, and Iraq; reduce the U.S. military presence in Germany, Afghanistan, and Iraq;
 the Administration’s focus on pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with various  the Administration’s focus on pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with various
countries (as opposed to regional or multilateral trade negotiations); and countries (as opposed to regional or multilateral trade negotiations); and
 the Administration’s infrequent or inconsistent statements in support of  the Administration’s infrequent or inconsistent statements in support of
democracy and human rights, including the Administration’s reaction to the democracy and human rights, including the Administration’s reaction to the
killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and some of the President’s statements killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and some of the President’s statements
regarding the prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong. regarding the prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong.
Other Observers Disagree
Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, disagree with some or all of Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, disagree with some or all of
the perspective above. While acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S. the perspective above. While acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S.
foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration, foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration,
these observers argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more these observers argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more
continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. In support of this view, these observers cite, continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. In support of this view, these observers cite,
among other things among other things
 the Administration’s December 2017 national security strategy (NSS) document  the Administration’s December 2017 national security strategy (NSS) document
and its January 2018 unclassified summary of its supporting national defense and its January 2018 unclassified summary of its supporting national defense
strategy (NDS) document—large portions of which refer to U.S. leadership, a strategy (NDS) document—large portions of which refer to U.S. leadership, a
general emphasis on great power competition with China and Russia, and strong general emphasis on great power competition with China and Russia, and strong
support for U.S. alliances; support for U.S. alliances;
 Administration statements reaffirming U.S. support for NATO, as well as  Administration statements reaffirming U.S. support for NATO, as well as
Administration actions to improve U.S. military capabilities in Europe for Administration actions to improve U.S. military capabilities in Europe for
deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe; deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe;
 the Administration’s willingness to impose and maintain a variety of sanctions on  the Administration’s willingness to impose and maintain a variety of sanctions on
Russia; Russia;
 the Administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) construct for guiding  the Administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) construct for guiding
U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region; U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region;
 the Administration’s more confrontational policy toward China, including its plan  the Administration’s more confrontational policy toward China, including its plan
to increase funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs to compete against to increase funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs to compete against
China for influence in Africa, Asia, and the Americas; China for influence in Africa, Asia, and the Americas;
 U.S. trade actions that, in the view of these observers, are intended to make free  U.S. trade actions that, in the view of these observers, are intended to make free
trade more sustainable over the long run by ensuring that it is fair to all parties, trade more sustainable over the long run by ensuring that it is fair to all parties,
including the United States; and including the United States; and
 the Administration’s (admittedly belated) support of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy  the Administration’s (admittedly belated) support of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy
protestors, its criticism of China’s human rights practices toward its Muslim protestors, its criticism of China’s human rights practices toward its Muslim
Uyghur population, and its emphasis on religious freedom as a major component Uyghur population, and its emphasis on religious freedom as a major component
of human rights. of human rights.
Still Other Observers See a Mixed or Confusing Situation
Still other observers, viewing points made by both of the above sets of observers, see a mixed or Still other observers, viewing points made by both of the above sets of observers, see a mixed or
confusing situation regarding whether the United States under the Trump Administration has confusing situation regarding whether the United States under the Trump Administration has
changed the U.S. role in the world. For these observers, whether the U.S. role has changed is changed the U.S. role in the world. For these observers, whether the U.S. role has changed is
difficult to discern, in part because of what they view as incoherence or contradictions in the difficult to discern, in part because of what they view as incoherence or contradictions in the
Administration’s foreign policies and in part because the President’s apparent views on certain Administration’s foreign policies and in part because the President’s apparent views on certain
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issues—such as the value of U.S. alliances, the acceptability of certain actions by Russia or North issues—such as the value of U.S. alliances, the acceptability of certain actions by Russia or North
Korea, and the importance of democracy and human rights as universal values—have frequently Korea, and the importance of democracy and human rights as universal values—have frequently
been in tension with or contradicted by statements and actions of senior Administration officials been in tension with or contradicted by statements and actions of senior Administration officials
(particularly those who served during the first two years or so of the Administration), with the (particularly those who served during the first two years or so of the Administration), with the
President’s views being more consistent with the change in the U.S. role outlined by the first set President’s views being more consistent with the change in the U.S. role outlined by the first set
of observers above, and statements and actions of senior Administration officials frequently being of observers above, and statements and actions of senior Administration officials frequently being
more consistent with a continuation of the U.S. role of the past 70 years outlined by the second more consistent with a continuation of the U.S. role of the past 70 years outlined by the second
set of observers above. set of observers above.
Some Observers Argue That Change Began Earlier
Some observers argue that if the U.S. role has changed, that change started not under the Trump Some observers argue that if the U.S. role has changed, that change started not under the Trump
Administration, but under the Obama Administration, particularly regarding the question of Administration, but under the Obama Administration, particularly regarding the question of
whether the United States has reduced or withdrawn from global leadership. In support of this whether the United States has reduced or withdrawn from global leadership. In support of this
view, these observers cite what they views as the Obama Administration’s view, these observers cite what they views as the Obama Administration’s
 focus on reducing the U.S. military presence and ending U.S. combat operations  focus on reducing the U.S. military presence and ending U.S. combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of focusing more on domestic U.S. rebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of focusing more on domestic U.S. rebuilding
initiatives, initiatives,
 decision to announce but not enforce a “red line” regarding the behavior of the  decision to announce but not enforce a “red line” regarding the behavior of the
Syrian government, and Syrian government, and
 restrained response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and more  restrained response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and more
generally, its reluctance, for a time at least, to fully acknowledge and adapt to generally, its reluctance, for a time at least, to fully acknowledge and adapt to
less cooperative and more confrontational relationships with Russia and China. less cooperative and more confrontational relationships with Russia and China.
Still others view the start of a change in the U.S. role as occurring even sooner, under the George Still others view the start of a change in the U.S. role as occurring even sooner, under the George
W. Bush Administration—when that Administration did not respond more strongly to Russia’s W. Bush Administration—when that Administration did not respond more strongly to Russia’s
2008 invasion and occupation of part of Georgia—or under the Clinton Administration. 2008 invasion and occupation of part of Georgia—or under the Clinton Administration.
For these observers, a change in the U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration may For these observers, a change in the U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration may
represent not so much a shift in the U.S. role as a continuation or deepening of a change that represent not so much a shift in the U.S. role as a continuation or deepening of a change that
began in a prior U.S. administration. began in a prior U.S. administration.
Potential Combined Perspectives
The perspectives outlined in the preceding sections are not necessarily mutually exclusive— The perspectives outlined in the preceding sections are not necessarily mutually exclusive—
assessments combining aspects of more than one of these perspectives are possible. assessments combining aspects of more than one of these perspectives are possible.
Implications of a Changed U.S. Role
Among observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent Among observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years, there are multiple views regarding the potential implications of that change. years, there are multiple views regarding the potential implications of that change.
Some Observers View Implications as Undesirable
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has
substantially changed the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump substantially changed the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump
Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the
implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from
U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an
unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something
of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70
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years. More specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is years. More specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is
doing some or all of the following: doing some or all of the following:
 reducing U.S. power and foreign-policy capacity, particularly by weakening or  reducing U.S. power and foreign-policy capacity, particularly by weakening or
hollowing out the State Department and reducing or devaluing elements of U.S. hollowing out the State Department and reducing or devaluing elements of U.S.
soft power; soft power;
 weakening the U.S. ability to leverage its power and foreign-policy capacity in  weakening the U.S. ability to leverage its power and foreign-policy capacity in
international affairs—and isolating the United States on certain international international affairs—and isolating the United States on certain international
issues, effectively turning the concept of America First into “America Alone”—issues, effectively turning the concept of America First into “America Alone”—
by by
 damaging long-standing and valuable U.S. alliance relationships,  damaging long-standing and valuable U.S. alliance relationships,
 reducing U.S. participation in multilateral political and trade negotiations and  reducing U.S. participation in multilateral political and trade negotiations and
agreements, and agreements, and
 making the United States look more erratic and impulsive as an international  making the United States look more erratic and impulsive as an international
actor, and less reliable as an ally and negotiating partner; actor, and less reliable as an ally and negotiating partner;
 weakening the U.S.-led international order and encouraging a reemergence of  weakening the U.S.-led international order and encouraging a reemergence of
aspects of a might-makes-right international order; aspects of a might-makes-right international order;
 slowing the spread of democracy and human rights, encouraging a moral  slowing the spread of democracy and human rights, encouraging a moral
equivalency between the United States and authoritarian and illiberal countries, equivalency between the United States and authoritarian and illiberal countries,
and tacitly facilitating a reemergence of authoritarian and illiberal forms of and tacitly facilitating a reemergence of authoritarian and illiberal forms of
government; government;
 disregarding the costly lessons of the first half of the 20th century, and how the  disregarding the costly lessons of the first half of the 20th century, and how the
U.S. role in the world of the last 70 years has been motivated at bottom by a U.S. role in the world of the last 70 years has been motivated at bottom by a
desire to prevent a repetition of the horrific events of that period; and desire to prevent a repetition of the horrific events of that period; and
 creating vacuums in global leadership in establishing and maintaining global  creating vacuums in global leadership in establishing and maintaining global
rules and norms, on the disposition of specific disputes and other issues, and in rules and norms, on the disposition of specific disputes and other issues, and in
regional power balances that China and Russia as well as France, Turkey, Syria, regional power balances that China and Russia as well as France, Turkey, Syria,
Iran, and other countries are moving to fill, often at the expense of U.S. interests Iran, and other countries are moving to fill, often at the expense of U.S. interests
and values. and values.
Other Observers View Implications as Helpful
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more-restrained U.S. role in the arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more-restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests. More to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests. More
specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is doing some specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is doing some
or all of the following: or all of the following:
 winding down U.S. participation in so-called endless wars (aka forever wars) in  winding down U.S. participation in so-called endless wars (aka forever wars) in
places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and also not starting new wars; places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and also not starting new wars;
 emphasizing religious freedom—a core U.S. value—as a central tenet in U.S.  emphasizing religious freedom—a core U.S. value—as a central tenet in U.S.
foreign policy; foreign policy;
 adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the United  adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the United
States can accomplish in the world today and in the future, particularly given States can accomplish in the world today and in the future, particularly given
limits on U.S. resources and the reduction in U.S. economic and military limits on U.S. resources and the reduction in U.S. economic and military
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preponderance in recent decades as other countries have grown economically and preponderance in recent decades as other countries have grown economically and
developed their militaries; developed their militaries;
 enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S.  enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S.
actions less predictable to potential adversaries; actions less predictable to potential adversaries;
 reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign  reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign
policy and for organizing international affairs; policy and for organizing international affairs;
 encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend  encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend
themselves, thereby reducing U.S. costs and developing Eurasia’s potential to themselves, thereby reducing U.S. costs and developing Eurasia’s potential to
become more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional become more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional
hegemons; hegemons;
 placing an emphasis on countering and competing with China, which poses a  placing an emphasis on countering and competing with China, which poses a
uniquely strong and multidimensional challenge to U.S. security and prosperity; uniquely strong and multidimensional challenge to U.S. security and prosperity;
 working to strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region under  working to strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region under
the FOIP construct; the FOIP construct;
 helping to broker breakthrough improvements in Israel’s relations with other  helping to broker breakthrough improvements in Israel’s relations with other
countries in the Middle East; countries in the Middle East;
 exploring possibilities for improving relations where possible with countries such  exploring possibilities for improving relations where possible with countries such
as Russia and North Korea; and as Russia and North Korea; and
 making trade agreements more fair to the United States.  making trade agreements more fair to the United States.
Some Related or Additional Issues
The following sections provide brief discussions of some related or additional issues for Congress The following sections provide brief discussions of some related or additional issues for Congress
regarding the U.S. role in the world. regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Potential Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic
A new (i.e., since about March 2020) issue is the question of whether and how the global A new (i.e., since about March 2020) issue is the question of whether and how the global
COVID-19 pandemic might lead to profoundly transformative and long-lasting changes in the COVID-19 pandemic might lead to profoundly transformative and long-lasting changes in the
U.S. role in the world in areas such as U.S. global leadership, China’s potential for acting as a U.S. role in the world in areas such as U.S. global leadership, China’s potential for acting as a
global leader, U.S. strategic competition with China, U.S. relations with allies, and U.S. global leader, U.S. strategic competition with China, U.S. relations with allies, and U.S.
definitions of U.S. national security. Some observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is the definitions of U.S. national security. Some observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is the
first major international crisis since World War II for which the United States has not served as first major international crisis since World War II for which the United States has not served as
the global leader for spearheading, organizing, or implementing an international response. the global leader for spearheading, organizing, or implementing an international response.
Another CRS report provides an overview of the potential implications of the COVID-19 Another CRS report provides an overview of the potential implications of the COVID-19
pandemic for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, as well as a pandemic for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, as well as a
list of CRS reports addressing various aspects of this issue and examples of other writings list of CRS reports addressing various aspects of this issue and examples of other writings
addressing this issue from various perspectives,5 See also some of the more recent writings cited addressing this issue from various perspectives,5 See also some of the more recent writings cited
iin Appendix C of this CRS report. of this CRS report.
Costs and Benefits of Allies
Within the overall debate over the U.S. role in the world, one long-standing specific question Within the overall debate over the U.S. role in the world, one long-standing specific question
relates to the costs and benefits of allies. As noted earlier, some observers believe that under the relates to the costs and benefits of allies. As noted earlier, some observers believe that under the

5 CRS Report R46336, 5 CRS Report R46336, COVID-19: Potential Implications for International Security Environment—Overview of Issues
and Further Reading for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Michael Moodie. , by Ronald O'Rourke, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Michael Moodie.
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Trump Administration, the United States has become more skeptical of the value of allies, Trump Administration, the United States has become more skeptical of the value of allies,
particularly those in Europe, and more transactional in managing U.S. alliance relationships. particularly those in Europe, and more transactional in managing U.S. alliance relationships.
Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated; Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated;
that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help; that U.S. allies frequently act as that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help; that U.S. allies frequently act as
free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting security costs to the free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting security costs to the
United States; that in the absence of U.S. help, these allies would do more on their own to balance United States; that in the absence of U.S. help, these allies would do more on their own to balance
against potential regional hegemons; and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States against potential regional hegemons; and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States
into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States. into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States.
Supporters of the U.S. approach to allies and alliances of the past 70 years, while acknowledging Supporters of the U.S. approach to allies and alliances of the past 70 years, while acknowledging
the free-rider issue as something that needs to be managed, generally argue that alliances are the free-rider issue as something that needs to be managed, generally argue that alliances are
needed and valuable for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia and for needed and valuable for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia and for
otherwise deterring potential regional aggression; that alliances form a significant advantage for otherwise deterring potential regional aggression; that alliances form a significant advantage for
the United States in its dealings with other major powers, such as Russia and China (both of the United States in its dealings with other major powers, such as Russia and China (both of
which largely lack similar alliance networks); that although allies might be capable of defending which largely lack similar alliance networks); that although allies might be capable of defending
themselves without U.S. help, they might also choose, in the absence of U.S. help, to bandwagon themselves without U.S. help, they might also choose, in the absence of U.S. help, to bandwagon
with would-be regional hegemons (rather than contribute to efforts to balance against them); that with would-be regional hegemons (rather than contribute to efforts to balance against them); that
in addition to mutual defense benefits, alliances offer other benefits, particularly in peacetime, in addition to mutual defense benefits, alliances offer other benefits, particularly in peacetime,
including sharing of intelligence, information, and technology and the cultivation of soft-power including sharing of intelligence, information, and technology and the cultivation of soft-power
forms of cooperation; and that a transactional approach to alliances, which encourages the merits forms of cooperation; and that a transactional approach to alliances, which encourages the merits
of each bilateral alliance relationship to be measured in isolation, overlooks the collective benefits of each bilateral alliance relationship to be measured in isolation, overlooks the collective benefits
of maintaining alliances with multiple countries in a region. of maintaining alliances with multiple countries in a region.
U.S. Public Opinion
U.S. public opinion can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world. U.S. public opinion can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world.
Among other things, public opinion can Among other things, public opinion can
 shape the political context (and provide the impulse) for negotiating the terms of,  shape the political context (and provide the impulse) for negotiating the terms of,
and for considering whether to become party to, international agreements; and for considering whether to become party to, international agreements;
 influence debates on whether and how to employ U.S. military force; and  influence debates on whether and how to employ U.S. military force; and
 influence policymaker decisions on funding levels for defense, international  influence policymaker decisions on funding levels for defense, international
affairs activities, and foreign assistance. affairs activities, and foreign assistance.
Foreign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion Foreign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion
poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that
observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders
have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public, and particularly the middle class, have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public, and particularly the middle class,
has supported the costs of U.S. global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain has supported the costs of U.S. global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain
benefits, particularly steady increases in real incomes and the standard of living. benefits, particularly steady increases in real incomes and the standard of living.
Operation of U.S. Democracy
Another potential issue for Congress is how the operation of democracy in the United States Another potential issue for Congress is how the operation of democracy in the United States
might affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting might affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting
democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government. democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government.
During the Cold War, the effective operation of U.S. democracy at the federal level and lower During the Cold War, the effective operation of U.S. democracy at the federal level and lower
levels was viewed as helpful for arguing on the world stage that Western-style democracy was levels was viewed as helpful for arguing on the world stage that Western-style democracy was
superior, for encouraging other countries to adopt that model, and for inspiring people in the superior, for encouraging other countries to adopt that model, and for inspiring people in the
Soviet Union and other authoritarian countries to resist authoritarianism and seek change in the Soviet Union and other authoritarian countries to resist authoritarianism and seek change in the
direction of more democratic forms of government. The ability of the United State to demonstrate direction of more democratic forms of government. The ability of the United State to demonstrate
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the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government was something that in today’s parlance the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government was something that in today’s parlance
would be termed an element of U.S. soft power. would be termed an element of U.S. soft power.
The end of the Cold War led to a diminution in the ideological debate about the relative merits of The end of the Cold War led to a diminution in the ideological debate about the relative merits of
democracy versus authoritarianism as forms of government. As a possible consequence, there democracy versus authoritarianism as forms of government. As a possible consequence, there
may have been less of a perceived need during this period for focusing on the question of whether may have been less of a perceived need during this period for focusing on the question of whether
the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other
countries. countries.
The shift in the international environment over the past few years from the post-Cold War era to The shift in the international environment over the past few years from the post-Cold War era to
an era of renewed great power competition6 has led to a renewed ideological debate about the an era of renewed great power competition6 has led to a renewed ideological debate about the
relative merits of Western-style democracy versus 21st-century forms of authoritarian and illiberal relative merits of Western-style democracy versus 21st-century forms of authoritarian and illiberal
government. Articles in China’s state-controlled media, for example, sometimes criticize the government. Articles in China’s state-controlled media, for example, sometimes criticize the
operation of U.S. democracy and argue that China’s form of governance is more advantageous.operation of U.S. democracy and argue that China’s form of governance is more advantageous.
The potential issue for Congress is whether, in a period of renewed ideological competition, there The potential issue for Congress is whether, in a period of renewed ideological competition, there
is now once again a need for focusing more on the question of whether the operation of U.S. is now once again a need for focusing more on the question of whether the operation of U.S.
democracy is being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other countriesdemocracy is being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other countries, and what implications, if any, this might have for the future U.S. role in the world. Discussion of this issue intensified following the assault on the Capitol building on January 6, 2021, with some observers arguing that this event substantially damaged the image of the United States as an exemplar of democracy and the ability of the United States going forward to defend and promote democracy. .
Potential Implications for Congress as an Institution
Another issue for Congress is what implications a changed U.S. role in the world might have for Another issue for Congress is what implications a changed U.S. role in the world might have for
Congress as an institution, particularly regarding the preservation and use of congressional Congress as an institution, particularly regarding the preservation and use of congressional
powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic
policy, and more generally the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. policy, and more generally the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S.
foreign policymaking. Specific matters here include, among other things, the question of war foreign policymaking. Specific matters here include, among other things, the question of war
powers, the delegation of authority for imposing tariffs, and whether a change in the U.S. role powers, the delegation of authority for imposing tariffs, and whether a change in the U.S. role
would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations.7 would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations.7
Reversibility of a Change in U.S. Role
Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would at Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would at
some point in the future be reversible, should U.S. policymakers in the future desire to return to a some point in the future be reversible, should U.S. policymakers in the future desire to return to a
U.S. role in the world more like that of the past 70 years. Potential questions for Congress include U.S. role in the world more like that of the past 70 years. Potential questions for Congress include
the following: the following:
 What elements of a change in the U.S. role in the world should be reversed, and  What elements of a change in the U.S. role in the world should be reversed, and
what elements should be maintained? what elements should be maintained?
 What elements of change in the U.S. role might be more reversible, less  What elements of change in the U.S. role might be more reversible, less
reversible, or irreversible? What elements might be less reversible due to reversible, or irreversible? What elements might be less reversible due to
technological developments, changes in international power dynamics, or technological developments, changes in international power dynamics, or
changes in U.S. public opinion? changes in U.S. public opinion?
~~ How much time and effort would be required to implement a return to a U.S. role~~
~~like that of the past 70 years?~~
~~ How might the issue of reversibility be affected by the amount of time that a~~
~~change in the U.S. role remains in place before an attempt might be made to~~
~~reverse it?~~

6 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, 6 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For additional discussion, see Kevin Kosar, ed., 7 For additional discussion, see Kevin Kosar, ed., Congress and Foreign Affairs: Reasserting the Power of the First
Branch, R Street Institute, 2020, 64 pp. , R Street Institute, 2020, 64 pp.
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 How  How much time and effort would be required to implement a return to a U.S. role like that of the past 70 years?  How might the issue of reversibility be affected by the amount of time that a change in the U.S. role remains in place before an attempt might be made to reverse it?  How might decisions that Congress and the executive branch make in the near might decisions that Congress and the executive branch make in the near
term affect the question of potential downstream reversibility? What actions, if term affect the question of potential downstream reversibility? What actions, if
any, should be taken now with an eye toward preserving an option for reversing any, should be taken now with an eye toward preserving an option for reversing
nearer-term changes in the U.S. role? nearer-term changes in the U.S. role?
 What are the views of other countries regarding the potential reversibility of a  What are the views of other countries regarding the potential reversibility of a
change in the U.S. role, and how might those views affect the foreign policies of change in the U.S. role, and how might those views affect the foreign policies of
those countries? those countries?
Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional readingAs potential sources of additional reading, Appendix C presents a list of recent writings presents a list of recent writings
reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump Administration has reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump Administration has
changed the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change might be. changed the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change might be.

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Appendix A. Glossary of Selected Terms
Some key terms used in this report include the following: Some key terms used in this report include the following:
Role in the world
The term The term role in the world generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the overall character, generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the overall character,
purpose, or direction of a country’s participation in international affairs or the country’s overall purpose, or direction of a country’s participation in international affairs or the country’s overall
relationship to the rest of the world. A country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible relationship to the rest of the world. A country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible
expression of its grand strategy (see next item). In this report, the term expression of its grand strategy (see next item). In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is is
often shortened for convenience to often shortened for convenience to U.S. role. .
Grand strategy
The term The term grand strategy generally refers in foreign policy discussions to a country’s overall generally refers in foreign policy discussions to a country’s overall
approach for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national approach for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national
instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools
(sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). A country’s leaders might deem (sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). A country’s leaders might deem
elements of a country’s grand strategy to be secret, so that assessments, assumptions, or risks elements of a country’s grand strategy to be secret, so that assessments, assumptions, or risks
included in the strategy are not revealed to potential adversaries. Consequently, a country’s included in the strategy are not revealed to potential adversaries. Consequently, a country’s
leaders might say relatively little in public about the country’s grand strategy. As mentioned leaders might say relatively little in public about the country’s grand strategy. As mentioned
above, however, a country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand above, however, a country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand
strategy. For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or strategy. For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or
interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues. interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues.
International order/world order
The term The term international order or or world order generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the
collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to
organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period. organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period.
International orders tend to be established by major world powers, particularly in the years International orders tend to be established by major world powers, particularly in the years
following wars between major powers, though they can also emerge at other times. Though often following wars between major powers, though they can also emerge at other times. Though often
referred to as if they are fully developed or firmly established situations, international orders are referred to as if they are fully developed or firmly established situations, international orders are
usually incomplete, partly aspirational, sometimes violated by their supporters, rejected (or at usually incomplete, partly aspirational, sometimes violated by their supporters, rejected (or at
least not supported) by certain states and nonstate actors, and subject to various stresses and least not supported) by certain states and nonstate actors, and subject to various stresses and
challenges. challenges.
Unipolar/bipolar/tripolar/multipolar
In foreign policy discussions, terms like In foreign policy discussions, terms like unipolar, , bipolar, , tripolar, and , and multipolar are sometimes are sometimes
used to refer to the number of top-tier world powers whose actions tend to characterize or give used to refer to the number of top-tier world powers whose actions tend to characterize or give
structure to a given historical period’s international security situation. The Cold War that lasted structure to a given historical period’s international security situation. The Cold War that lasted
from the late 1940s to the late 1980s or early 1990s is usually described as a bipolar situation from the late 1940s to the late 1980s or early 1990s is usually described as a bipolar situation
featuring a competition between two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and featuring a competition between two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and
their allies. The post-Cold War era, which followed the Cold War, is sometimes described as the their allies. The post-Cold War era, which followed the Cold War, is sometimes described as the
unipolar moment, with the United States being the unipolar power, meaning the world’s sole unipolar moment, with the United States being the unipolar power, meaning the world’s sole
superpower. superpower.
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As discussed in another CRS report,8 observers have concluded that in recent years, there has As discussed in another CRS report,8 observers have concluded that in recent years, there has
been a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new international security situation characterized by been a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new international security situation characterized by
renewed great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, leading renewed great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, leading
observers to refer to the new situation as a tripolar or multipolar world. Observers who might list observers to refer to the new situation as a tripolar or multipolar world. Observers who might list
additional countries (or groups of countries, such as the European Union) as additional top-tier additional countries (or groups of countries, such as the European Union) as additional top-tier
world powers, along with the United States, China, and Russia, might also use the term world powers, along with the United States, China, and Russia, might also use the term
multipolar. multipolar.
Eurasia
The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both
Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to
Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia’s Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia’s Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its
southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of
Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia’s fringing islands include, Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia’s fringing islands include,
among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, the among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, the
archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia, and Japan. There are also other definitions of Eurasia, archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia, and Japan. There are also other definitions of Eurasia,
some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above. some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above.
Regional hegemon
The term The term regional hegemon generally refers to a country so powerful relative to the other generally refers to a country so powerful relative to the other
countries in its region that it can dominate the affairs of that region and compel other countries in countries in its region that it can dominate the affairs of that region and compel other countries in
that region to support (or at least not oppose) the hegemon’s key policy goals. The United States that region to support (or at least not oppose) the hegemon’s key policy goals. The United States
is generally considered to have established itself in the 19th century as the hegemon of the is generally considered to have established itself in the 19th century as the hegemon of the
Western Hemisphere. Western Hemisphere.
Spheres-of-influence world
The term The term spheres-of-influence world generally refers to a world that, in terms of its structure of generally refers to a world that, in terms of its structure of
international relations, is divided into multiple regions (i.e., spheres), each with its own hegemon. international relations, is divided into multiple regions (i.e., spheres), each with its own hegemon.
A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple top-tier A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple top-tier
powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those top-tier powers have powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those top-tier powers have
achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major
world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere) world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere)
have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world, have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world,
international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar
world. world.
Geopolitics
The term The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or for strategy relating is often used as a synonym for international politics or for strategy relating
to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features
on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that
places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features
involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of
countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers

8 CRS Report R43838, 8 CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald , by Ronald
O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
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such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads, such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads,
railways, and waterways. railways, and waterways.
Hard power and soft power
In foreign policy discussions, the term In foreign policy discussions, the term hard power generally refers to coercive power, particularly generally refers to coercive power, particularly
military and economic power, while the term military and economic power, while the term soft power generally refers to the ability to persuade generally refers to the ability to persuade
or attract support, particularly through diplomacy, development assistance, support for or attract support, particularly through diplomacy, development assistance, support for
international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of
cultural elements such as music, movies, television shows, and literature. cultural elements such as music, movies, television shows, and literature.
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Appendix B. Past U.S. Role vs. More
Restrained Role
This appendix provides additional discussion on the debate over whether the United States should This appendix provides additional discussion on the debate over whether the United States should
attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years,
or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs.
Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role
include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Ted Galen Carpenter, John include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Ted Galen Carpenter, John
Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, William Ruger, and Stephen Walt. These and Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, William Ruger, and Stephen Walt. These and
other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role. Terms other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role. Terms
such as such as offshore balancing, , offshore control, , realism, , strategy of restraint, or , or retrenchment have have
been used to describe some of these variations.9 These variations on the idea of a more restrained been used to describe some of these variations.9 These variations on the idea of a more restrained
U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued
by the Trump Administration.10 by the Trump Administration.10
Arguments in Favor of a More Restrained U.S. Role
Observers advocating a more restrained U.S. role in the world make various arguments regarding Observers advocating a more restrained U.S. role in the world make various arguments regarding
the United States and other countries. Arguments that they make relating to the United States the United States and other countries. Arguments that they make relating to the United States
include the following: include the following:
  Costs and benefits. In terms of human casualties, financial and economic In terms of human casualties, financial and economic
impacts, diplomatic impacts, and impacts on domestic U.S. values, politics, and impacts, diplomatic impacts, and impacts on domestic U.S. values, politics, and
society, the costs to the United States of defending and promoting the liberal society, the costs to the United States of defending and promoting the liberal
international order have been underestimated and the benefits have been international order have been underestimated and the benefits have been
overestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia have overestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia have
frequently been more costly and/or less successful than anticipated, making a frequently been more costly and/or less successful than anticipated, making a
strategy of intervening less cost-effective in practice than in theory. U.S. strategy of intervening less cost-effective in practice than in theory. U.S.
interventions can also draw the United States into conflicts involving other interventions can also draw the United States into conflicts involving other
countries over issues that are not vital or important U.S. interests. countries over issues that are not vital or important U.S. interests.
  Capacity. Given projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt, the Given projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt, the
United States in coming years will no longer be able to afford to play as United States in coming years will no longer be able to afford to play as
expansive a role in the world as it has played for the past 70 years. expansive a role in the world as it has played for the past 70 years.
Overextending U.S. participation in international affairs could lead to excessive Overextending U.S. participation in international affairs could lead to excessive

9 The terms 9 The terms offshore balancing and and offshore control refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect, refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect,
stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less
expansively. The term expansively. The term retrenchment is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches. is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches.
10 Debate about this dimension of the U.S. role in the world is not limited to one between those who favor continued 10 Debate about this dimension of the U.S. role in the world is not limited to one between those who favor continued
extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—
other options are also being promoted. For example, one analyst and former White House aide advocates an approach other options are also being promoted. For example, one analyst and former White House aide advocates an approach
that differs from both retrenchment and reassertion, an approach he labels “re-calibration” to the “geopolitical, that differs from both retrenchment and reassertion, an approach he labels “re-calibration” to the “geopolitical,
economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world.” Such an approach, he argues, would entail economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world.” Such an approach, he argues, would entail
a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (See Bruce a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (See Bruce
Jentleson, “Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World,” Jentleson, “Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World,” War on the Rocks, January 2017.) January 2017.)
As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on “a better nationalism”—what he As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on “a better nationalism”—what he
describes as a more benign and constructive form that “would not dismantle the post-war order and America’s post war describes as a more benign and constructive form that “would not dismantle the post-war order and America’s post war
project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests.” (Hal Brands, “U.S. project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests.” (Hal Brands, “U.S.
Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives,” Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017: , Spring 2017:
73-93.) 73-93.)
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amounts of federal debt and inadequately addressed domestic problems, leaving amounts of federal debt and inadequately addressed domestic problems, leaving
the United States poorly positioned for sustaining any future desired level of the United States poorly positioned for sustaining any future desired level of
international engagement. international engagement.
  Past 70 years as a historical aberration. The U.S. role of the past 70 years is an The U.S. role of the past 70 years is an
aberration when viewed against the U.S. historical record dating back to 1776, aberration when viewed against the U.S. historical record dating back to 1776,
which is a history characterized more by periods of restraint than by periods of which is a history characterized more by periods of restraint than by periods of
high levels of international engagement. Returning to a more restrained U.S. role high levels of international engagement. Returning to a more restrained U.S. role
would thus return U.S. policy to what is, historically, a more traditional policy for would thus return U.S. policy to what is, historically, a more traditional policy for
the United States. the United States.
  Moral standing. The United States has not always lived up to its own ideals, and The United States has not always lived up to its own ideals, and
consequently lacks sufficient moral standing to pursue a role that involves consequently lacks sufficient moral standing to pursue a role that involves
imposing its values and will on other countries. Attempting to do that through an imposing its values and will on other countries. Attempting to do that through an
interventionist policy can also lead to an erosion of those values at home. interventionist policy can also lead to an erosion of those values at home.
  Public opinion. It is not clear that U.S. public opinion supports the idea of It is not clear that U.S. public opinion supports the idea of
attempting to maintain a U.S. role in the world as expansive as that of the past 70 attempting to maintain a U.S. role in the world as expansive as that of the past 70
years, particularly if it means making trade-offs against devoting resources to years, particularly if it means making trade-offs against devoting resources to
domestic U.S. priorities. In public opinion polls, Americans often express support domestic U.S. priorities. In public opinion polls, Americans often express support
for a more restrained U.S. role, particularly on issues such as whether the United for a more restrained U.S. role, particularly on issues such as whether the United
States should act as the world’s police force, funding levels for U.S. foreign States should act as the world’s police force, funding levels for U.S. foreign
assistance programs, U.S. participation in (and financial support for) international assistance programs, U.S. participation in (and financial support for) international
organizations, and U.S. defense expenditures for defending allies. organizations, and U.S. defense expenditures for defending allies.
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following: Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
  Growing wealth and power. Given the rapid growth in wealth and power in Given the rapid growth in wealth and power in
recent years of China and other countries, the United States is no longer as recent years of China and other countries, the United States is no longer as
dominant globally as it once was, and is becoming less dominant over time, dominant globally as it once was, and is becoming less dominant over time,
which will make it increasingly difficult or expensive and/or less appropriate for which will make it increasingly difficult or expensive and/or less appropriate for
the United States to attempt to continue playing a role of global leadership. the United States to attempt to continue playing a role of global leadership.
  Ideas about international order. Other world powers, such as China, have their Other world powers, such as China, have their
own ideas about international order, and these ideas do not match all aspects of own ideas about international order, and these ideas do not match all aspects of
the current liberal international order. The United States should acknowledge the the current liberal international order. The United States should acknowledge the
changing global distribution of power and work with China and other countries to changing global distribution of power and work with China and other countries to
define a new international order that incorporates ideas from these other define a new international order that incorporates ideas from these other
countries. countries.
  Eurasia as self-regulating. Given the growth in the economies of U.S. allies and Given the growth in the economies of U.S. allies and
partners in Europe and Asia since World War II, these allies and partners are now partners in Europe and Asia since World War II, these allies and partners are now
more capable of looking after their own security needs, and Eurasia can now be more capable of looking after their own security needs, and Eurasia can now be
more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons
in Eurasia. Consequently, the level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia in Eurasia. Consequently, the level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
can be reduced without incurring undue risk that regional hegemons will emerge can be reduced without incurring undue risk that regional hegemons will emerge
there. The current substantial level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia there. The current substantial level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
discourages countries in Eurasia from acting more fully on their own to prevent discourages countries in Eurasia from acting more fully on their own to prevent
the emergence of regional hegemons. the emergence of regional hegemons.
  Hegemons and spheres of influence. Even if one or more regional hegemons Even if one or more regional hegemons
were to emerge in Eurasia, this would not pose an unacceptable situation for the were to emerge in Eurasia, this would not pose an unacceptable situation for the
United States—vital U.S. interests could still be defended. Similarly, the United States—vital U.S. interests could still be defended. Similarly, the
emergence of a spheres-of-influence world need not be unacceptable for the emergence of a spheres-of-influence world need not be unacceptable for the
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United States, because such a world would again not necessarily be incompatible United States, because such a world would again not necessarily be incompatible
with vital U.S. interests. with vital U.S. interests.
Arguments in Favor of Continuing U.S. Role of the Past 70 Years
Observers who support a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years generally Observers who support a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years generally
reject the above arguments and argue the opposite. Arguments that these observers make relating reject the above arguments and argue the opposite. Arguments that these observers make relating
to the United States include the following: to the United States include the following:
  Costs and benefits. Although the costs to the United States of its role in the Although the costs to the United States of its role in the
world over the past 70 years have been substantial, the benefits have been world over the past 70 years have been substantial, the benefits have been
greater. The benefits are so long-standing that they can easily be taken for greater. The benefits are so long-standing that they can easily be taken for
granted or underestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia, granted or underestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia,
though not without significant costs and errors, have been successful in though not without significant costs and errors, have been successful in
preventing wars between major powers and defending and promoting vital U.S. preventing wars between major powers and defending and promoting vital U.S.
interests and values. A more restrained U.S. role in the world might be less interests and values. A more restrained U.S. role in the world might be less
expensive for the United States in the short run, but would create a risk of expensive for the United States in the short run, but would create a risk of
damaging U.S. security, liberty, and prosperity over the longer run by risking the damaging U.S. security, liberty, and prosperity over the longer run by risking the
emergence of regional hegemons or a spheres-of-influence world. emergence of regional hegemons or a spheres-of-influence world.
  Capacity. Projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt need to be Projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt need to be
taken into account, but even in a context of limits on U.S. resources, the United taken into account, but even in a context of limits on U.S. resources, the United
States is a wealthy country that can choose to play an expansive role in States is a wealthy country that can choose to play an expansive role in
international affairs, and the costs to the United States of playing a more international affairs, and the costs to the United States of playing a more
restrained role in world affairs may in the long run be much greater than the costs restrained role in world affairs may in the long run be much greater than the costs
of playing a more expansive role. Projections regarding future U.S. budget of playing a more expansive role. Projections regarding future U.S. budget
deficits and debt are driven primarily by decisions on revenues and domestic deficits and debt are driven primarily by decisions on revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures rather than by decisions on defense and foreign-policy-mandatory expenditures rather than by decisions on defense and foreign-policy-
related expenditures. Consequently, these projections are an argument for getting related expenditures. Consequently, these projections are an argument for getting
the country’s fiscal house in order primarily in terms of revenues and domestic the country’s fiscal house in order primarily in terms of revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures, rather than an argument for a more restrained U.S. role mandatory expenditures, rather than an argument for a more restrained U.S. role
in the world. in the world.
  Past 70 years as a historical aberration. Although a restrained U.S. foreign Although a restrained U.S. foreign
policy may have been appropriate for the United States in the 18th and 19th policy may have been appropriate for the United States in the 18th and 19th
centuries, the world of the 18th and 19th centuries was quite different. For centuries, the world of the 18th and 19th centuries was quite different. For
example, given changes in communication, transportation, and military example, given changes in communication, transportation, and military
technologies since the 18th and 19th centuries, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are technologies since the 18th and 19th centuries, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are
much less effective as geographic buffers between the United States and Eurasia much less effective as geographic buffers between the United States and Eurasia
today than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. Experiences in more recent today than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. Experiences in more recent
decades (including World Wars I and II and the Cold War) show that a more decades (including World Wars I and II and the Cold War) show that a more
restrained U.S. foreign policy would now be riskier or more costly over the long restrained U.S. foreign policy would now be riskier or more costly over the long
run than an engaged U.S. foreign policy. run than an engaged U.S. foreign policy.
  Moral standing. The United States, though not perfect, retains ample moral The United States, though not perfect, retains ample moral
authority—and responsibility—to act as a world leader, particularly in authority—and responsibility—to act as a world leader, particularly in
comparison to authoritarian countries such as China or Russia. comparison to authoritarian countries such as China or Russia.
  Public opinion. Other public opinion poll results show that Americans support a Other public opinion poll results show that Americans support a
U.S. global leadership role. U.S. global leadership role.
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Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following: Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
  Growing wealth and power. Although the wealth and power of countries such Although the wealth and power of countries such
as China have grown considerably in recent years, future rates of growth for as China have grown considerably in recent years, future rates of growth for
those countries are open to question. China faces the prospect of declining rates those countries are open to question. China faces the prospect of declining rates
of economic growth and the aging and eventual shrinkage of its population, while of economic growth and the aging and eventual shrinkage of its population, while
Russia has a relatively small economy and is experiencing demographic decline. Russia has a relatively small economy and is experiencing demographic decline.
The United States has one of the most favorable demographic situations of any The United States has one of the most favorable demographic situations of any
major power, and retains numerous advantages in terms of economic and major power, and retains numerous advantages in terms of economic and
financial strength, military power, technology, and capacity for innovation. financial strength, military power, technology, and capacity for innovation.
Although the United States is no longer as dominant globally as it once was, it Although the United States is no longer as dominant globally as it once was, it
remains the world’s most powerful country, particularly when all dimensions of remains the world’s most powerful country, particularly when all dimensions of
power are taken into consideration. power are taken into consideration.
  Ideas about international order. The liberal international order reflects U.S. The liberal international order reflects U.S.
interests and values; a renegotiated international order incorporating ideas from interests and values; a renegotiated international order incorporating ideas from
authoritarian countries such as China would produce a world less conducive to authoritarian countries such as China would produce a world less conducive to
defending and promoting U.S. interests and values. Americans have long lived in defending and promoting U.S. interests and values. Americans have long lived in
a world reflecting U.S. interests and values and would not welcome a world a world reflecting U.S. interests and values and would not welcome a world
incorporating Chinese values on issues such as the rule of law; the scope of civil incorporating Chinese values on issues such as the rule of law; the scope of civil
society; political and human rights; freedom of speech, the press, and society; political and human rights; freedom of speech, the press, and
information; and privacy and surveillance. information; and privacy and surveillance.
  Eurasia as self-regulating. Eurasia historically has not been self-regulating in Eurasia historically has not been self-regulating in
terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, and the idea that it will terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, and the idea that it will
become self-regulating in the future is a risky and untested proposition. become self-regulating in the future is a risky and untested proposition.
  Hegemons and spheres of influence. A regional hegemon in Eurasia would have A regional hegemon in Eurasia would have
enough economic and other power to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests. In enough economic and other power to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests. In
addition to threatening U.S. access to the economies of Eurasia, a spheres-of-addition to threatening U.S. access to the economies of Eurasia, a spheres-of-
influence world would be prone to war because regional hegemons historically influence world would be prone to war because regional hegemons historically
are never satisfied with the extent of their hegemonic domains and eventually are never satisfied with the extent of their hegemonic domains and eventually
seek to expand them, coming into conflict with other hegemons. Leaders of seek to expand them, coming into conflict with other hegemons. Leaders of
regional hegemons are also prone to misjudgment and miscalculation regarding regional hegemons are also prone to misjudgment and miscalculation regarding
where their spheres collide. where their spheres collide.
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Appendix C. Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, this appendix presents a list of writings over the past As potential sources of additional reading, this appendix presents a list of writings over the past
six months reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump six months reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump
Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change
might be, listed in chronological order, with the most recent on top. Writings from more than six might be, listed in chronological order, with the most recent on top. Writings from more than six
months ago can be found in earlier versions of this report. months ago can be found in earlier versions of this report.
Michael Rubin, “Xi Jinping Is Wrong: Time Is on America’s Side, Not China’s, The Benefit Of Democracy—Despite the Hiccups on Display in Washington, DC—Is That It Provides a Pressure Relief Valve and Enables Correction. When a Society Such as China Does Not Allow Dissent, Then the Only Recourse Is Violence. The Absence of Freedom and Liberty Only Catalyzes That Downward Cycle,” National Interest, January 12, 2021. Jon B. Alterman, “Enemies—and Partners—Will Get a Vote in the Middle East,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 11, 2021. Kelly Bjorklund, “‘We’re in a Worse Place Today Than We Were Before He Came In,’ Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on the Mess Donald Trump Is Leaving Behind,” Foreign Policy, January 11, 2021. Christopher England, “Do U.S. Allies Think the Capitol Siege was an Attempted Coup? Worries about American Democracy Will Be Used to Justify a Series of Policies That Washington Views as Geopolitically Risky, But Which Allies See as Granting Them Strategic Flexibility or Economic Benefits,” National Interest, January 11, 2021. Kate Abnett, “U.S. Capitol Siege a ‘Wake-up call’ for Democracies, Top EU Diplomat Says,” Reuters, January 10, 2021. Olivia Enos, “No, Beijing, Hong Kong Protests Were Nothing Like What Happened on Capitol Hill,” Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2021. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “American Soft Power Will Survive Donald Trump, January 6, 2021, May Prove to be a Day of Infamy Like December 7, 1941, But It Could Also Go Down in History as a Turning Point in Which Trumpism Peaked and Some Politicians Began to Take Responsibility for the Consequences of Their Rhetoric,” National Interest, January 9, 2021. Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Will the World Take the United States Seriously After the Capitol Invasion? After a Pro-Trump Mob Stormed Congress, Americans Might Have a Harder Time Accomplishing Their Diplomatic Goals from Europe to China,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2021. Leonid Bershidsky, “The U.S. Capitol Riot Wasn’t a Gift to Putin, Whether for Propaganda or Geopolitics, the Value to Russia of Current U.S. Domestic Turmoil Is Vastly Overrated,” Bloomberg, January 8, 2021. Jude Blanchette and Michael J. Green, “The Enduring Damage of This Insurrection to U.S. Diplomacy, Adversaries Are Already Leveraging Wednesday’s Indelible Images of Chaos for Propaganda Purposes,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2021. Editorial Board, “Awe and Shock, How the World Reacted to the Trumpist Mob that Sacked the Heart of American Democracy,” New York Times, January 8, 2021. Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Diplomats Draft Dissent Cable Following Storming of Capitol by Pro-Trump Mob, State Department Officials Expressed Anger at the Department’s Gag Order on Messaging as Violence Wracked Washington, Saying the Incident Has Caused Congressional Research Service 21 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Untold Damage to U.S. Efforts to Promote Democratic Values Abroad,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2021. Tracy Wen Liu, “Chinese Media Calls Capitol Riot ‘World Masterpiece,’ Instructions Sent to Reporters Emphasized Attacking Democracy and Promoting Censorship,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2021. Robin Wright, “The World Shook as America Raged,” New Yorker, January 8, 2021. Agence France-Presse, “‘Democracy Under Siege’: International Press Condemn Trump,” Yahoo News, January 7, 2021. Anne Applebaum, “What Trump and His Mob Taught the World About America, The Allure of Democracy Was the Nation’s Best Asset Abroad, But the President Squandered It by Inciting Political Violence,” Atlantic, January 7, 2021. Emma Ashford, “America Can’t Promote Democracy Abroad. It Can’t Even Protect It at Home. Wednesday’s Failed Insurrection Shows How the Global Ambitions of Foreign-Policy Elites Are Divorced from Reality—and Undermined by Domestic Dysfunction,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2021. Doug Bandow, “No Forever-Guarantee To Europe: Refuting NATO’s Latest Dumb Ideas, Thanks to Joe Biden's Election, the Eurocrats and Establishment Are Breathing a Sigh of Relief,” American Conservative, January 7, 2021. Bloomberg News, “China Compares U.S. Mob Attack on Capitol to Hong Kong Protests,” Bloomberg, January 7, 2021. Roger Cohen, “A Shattering Blow to America’s Troubled Democratic Image, The Mob in Washington Attempting to Disrupt the Peaceful Transition of American Power Also Posed a Threat to All Democracies,” New York Times, January 7, 2021. Eva Dou, “China Is Having a Field Day with U.S. Capitol Chaos,” Washington Post, January 7, 2021. James Griffiths, “China Is Thriving in the Chaos of the US Presidential Transition,” CNN, January 7, 2021. Lori Hinnant, “World Watches US Chaos with Shock, Dismay and Some Mockery,” Associated Press, January 7, 2021. Elsa B. Kania, “The United States Can’t Stay a Great Power Without Beating Threats at Home, Before Taking on Challengers Like China, Washington Must Put Its Own House in Order,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2021. Joshua Keating, “Is America Seriously Going to Lecture Other Countries About Democracy Now?” Slate, January 7, 2021. Matthew Levitt, “Trump's Aiding Capitol Violence as World Watches Shows U.S. Is Now Exporting Extremism, The U.S. Has Increasingly Been A Haven For Far-Right Extremism Over The President's Tenure, Frustrating Our Allies And Encouraging Our Enemies,” NBC News, January 7, 2021. Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “State Department Office Sees Last-Minute Surge of New Evangelical Appointees, Graduates of a Christian College Swell the Ranks of State’s Global Criminal Justice Office, Shifting the Focus from War Crimes to Religious Persecution,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2021. Congressional Research Service 22 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Tom McTague, “Is This How Greatness Ends? Some of the American Mystique Has Gone, Even If the Raw Power Remains. That Is What Makes the Scenes in Washington Not Simply Pathetic, but Important Too,” Atlantic, January 7, 2021. Valentina Pop and James Marson, “Capitol Riots Hurt Image of U.S. Democracy, Allies Fear, as Rivals Gloat, Europeans Look Ahead to More Globalist Biden Administration while China, Russia and Others Accuse U.S. of Hypocrisy,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2021. Ronald W. Pruessen, “The U.S. Capitol Raid Exposes the Myth and Pathology of American Exceptionalism,” The Conversation, January 7, 2021. Adam Taylor, “Trump’s ‘Stop the Steal’ Message Finds an International Audience among Conspiracy Theorists and Suspected Cults,” Washington Post, January 7, 2021. Ishaan Tharoor, “The End of the Road for American Exceptionalism,” Washington Post, January 7, 2021. Patrick Tucker, “China, Russia, Iran Spin Capitol Insurrection, As Allies Lamented the ‘Disgraceful’ Scene, Adversaries Used Wednesday’s Riot to Attack U.S. Democracy,” Defense One, January 7, 2021. Emma Anderson, “‘This Is Not America’: Europe Reacts as Trump Supporters Riot in US Capital, National and EU Leaders Call for Democracy to be Respected,” Politico, January 6, 2021. Jariel Arvin, “How the World Is Reacting to the Storming of the US Capitol, World Leaders Express Shock, Condemnation, and Schadenfreude about the Insurrection at the US Capitol,” Vox, January 6, 2021. Katrin Bennhold and Steven Lee Myers, “America’s Friends and Foes Express Horror as Capitol Attack ‘Shakes the World,’ Global Leaders Watched Live as a Mob Stormed the U.S. Capitol, and Many Saw It as a Warning to Global Democracies, Placing the Blame Squarely on President Trump,” New York Times, January 6, 2021. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Dream Team Is Disappointing, Surveying the Views of the Biden Foreign Policy Team, One Is Struck by the Extent of Utterly Conventional Thinking,” National Interest, January 6, 2021. Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Grace Hwang, The Biden Transition and U.S. Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need to Change U.S. Strategy, Cener for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 6, 2021, 211 pp. Robbie Gramer, Chloe Hadavas, and Allison Meakem, “U.S. Allies Abroad Condemn Pro-Trump Mob Storming U.S. Capitol, European Leaders Urge Trump to Finally Concede the Election for the Sake of American Democracy,” Foreign Policy, January 6, 2021. Daniel Benjamin, “Biden Wants to Boost Democracy. He Should Shelve the Summit and Look to Daniel Benjamin, “Biden Wants to Boost Democracy. He Should Shelve the Summit and Look to
Europe, It’s Time to Focus on the Authoritarianism Festering in the Democratic Heartland of Europe, It’s Time to Focus on the Authoritarianism Festering in the Democratic Heartland of
Europe,” Europe,” Politico, January 5, 2021. , January 5, 2021.
Anthony Musa, “For LGBTQ+ People Around the World, Here’s What Biden Can Do to Build Anthony Musa, “For LGBTQ+ People Around the World, Here’s What Biden Can Do to Build
Back Better, Divided Government or Not, the Incoming Administration Has Several Options for Back Better, Divided Government or Not, the Incoming Administration Has Several Options for
Fixing the United States’ Human Rights Record,” Fixing the United States’ Human Rights Record,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2021. , January 5, 2021.
Josh Rogin, “Meet Biden’s New Foreign Policy Team—Same as Obama’s Old Foreign Policy Josh Rogin, “Meet Biden’s New Foreign Policy Team—Same as Obama’s Old Foreign Policy
Team,” Team,” Washington Post, January 5, 2021. , January 5, 2021.
Harlan Ullman, “Another End to History? I think Not,” The Hill, January 5, 2021. Congressional Research Service 23 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Stephen M. Walt, “Trump’s Final Foreign-Policy Report Card, A Look Back at Four Years of Big Stephen M. Walt, “Trump’s Final Foreign-Policy Report Card, A Look Back at Four Years of Big
Ambitions, a Handful of Successes—and Many More Failures,” Ambitions, a Handful of Successes—and Many More Failures,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2021. cy, January 5, 2021.
Erica D. Borghard, “A Grand Strategy Based on Resilience,” Erica D. Borghard, “A Grand Strategy Based on Resilience,” War on the Rocks, January 4, 2021. , January 4, 2021.
Tom Bowman, “Trump And The Military: What An Erratic Commander In Chief Leaves Behind,” Tom Bowman, “Trump And The Military: What An Erratic Commander In Chief Leaves Behind,”
NPR, January 4, 2021. , January 4, 2021.
Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Stalin and Hitler, Putin and Xi: How to Deal with Bad Guys? No Global Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Stalin and Hitler, Putin and Xi: How to Deal with Bad Guys? No Global
Problem—Climate, Disease, Pollution—Can Be Solved Without Global Cooperation. But Being Problem—Climate, Disease, Pollution—Can Be Solved Without Global Cooperation. But Being
Nice to Others Without Reciprocity Can Bring Martyrdom,” Nice to Others Without Reciprocity Can Bring Martyrdom,” National Interest, January 4, 2021. , January 4, 2021.
Steven Erlanger, “Trump’s Call Leaves Allies Fearful for American Democracy, Many Now Take Steven Erlanger, “Trump’s Call Leaves Allies Fearful for American Democracy, Many Now Take
the President’s Disregard for Democratic and Ethical Norms for Granted, but Also Fear Its Effect the President’s Disregard for Democratic and Ethical Norms for Granted, but Also Fear Its Effect
on America’s Standing in the World,” on America’s Standing in the World,” New York Times, January 4, 2021. , January 4, 2021.
Nick Wadhams, “Pompeo Cites China, North Korea as Trump’s Unfinished Business,” Nick Wadhams, “Pompeo Cites China, North Korea as Trump’s Unfinished Business,”
Bloomberg, January 4, 2021. , January 4, 2021.
Paul Heer, “How Joe Biden Can Restore America’s Standing Abroad, Before the United States Paul Heer, “How Joe Biden Can Restore America’s Standing Abroad, Before the United States
Can Reliably Rebuild its International Power and Influence, it Must Heal Itself by Getting Can Reliably Rebuild its International Power and Influence, it Must Heal Itself by Getting
COVID Under Control, Reviving Economic Prosperity, and Moving Beyond the Bitterly Divided COVID Under Control, Reviving Economic Prosperity, and Moving Beyond the Bitterly Divided
Politics of The Trump Presidency,” Politics of The Trump Presidency,” National Interest, January 3, 2021. , January 3, 2021.
Robert D. Kaplan, “Three Things Joe Biden Must Do to Restore American Foreign Policy, Robert D. Kaplan, “Three Things Joe Biden Must Do to Restore American Foreign Policy,
America Is the world’s Leading Democracy, and Thus We Must Return to Promoting Liberal America Is the world’s Leading Democracy, and Thus We Must Return to Promoting Liberal
Societies and Human Rights, but Do So with Limits in Mind,” Societies and Human Rights, but Do So with Limits in Mind,” National Interest, January 3, 2021. , January 3, 2021.
Walter Russell Mead, “The End of the Wilsonian Era, Why Liberal Internationalism Failed,” Walter Russell Mead, “The End of the Wilsonian Era, Why Liberal Internationalism Failed,”
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2021. , January/February 2021.
Samantha Power, “The Can-Do Power, America’s Advantage and Biden’s Chance,” Samantha Power, “The Can-Do Power, America’s Advantage and Biden’s Chance,” Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2021. , January/February 2021.
William R. Hawkins, “NATO and Beyond: President Trump Revitalized Our Alliances,” William R. Hawkins, “NATO and Beyond: President Trump Revitalized Our Alliances,” Journal
of Political Risk, January 2021. , January 2021.
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Ted Galen Carpenter, “Biden Needs To Repudiate Obama’s Policy Legacy: The Case of Libya,” Ted Galen Carpenter, “Biden Needs To Repudiate Obama’s Policy Legacy: The Case of Libya,”
Antiwar.com, December 31, 2020. , December 31, 2020.
David Wainer, “Trump Administration Votes Against UN Budget, Citing Israel, Iran Disputes,” David Wainer, “Trump Administration Votes Against UN Budget, Citing Israel, Iran Disputes,”
Bloomberg, December 31, 2020. , December 31, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “A Smoldering Cauldron of Foreign Policy Challenges Awaits Joe Biden,” Daniel L. Davis, “A Smoldering Cauldron of Foreign Policy Challenges Awaits Joe Biden,”
Washington Times, December 30, 2020. , December 30, 2020.
Thomas Spoehr, “Honoring How Our Deployed Troops Keep Us Safe,” Thomas Spoehr, “Honoring How Our Deployed Troops Keep Us Safe,” Heritage Foundation, ,
December 30, 2020. December 30, 2020.
William Inboden, “The World That COVID Made: What Should American Foreign Policy Do? William Inboden, “The World That COVID Made: What Should American Foreign Policy Do?
The Pandemic Reminds Us That ‘American Leadership’ Is Not a Trite Euphemism. It is Arguably The Pandemic Reminds Us That ‘American Leadership’ Is Not a Trite Euphemism. It is Arguably
the Single Most Important Factor in Whether the Arc of History Bends Toward Something Better the Single Most Important Factor in Whether the Arc of History Bends Toward Something Better
or Something Worse,” or Something Worse,” Government Executive, December 29, 2020. , December 29, 2020.
John J. Mearsheimer, “Joe Biden Must Embrace Liberal Nationalism to Lead America Forward,” John J. Mearsheimer, “Joe Biden Must Embrace Liberal Nationalism to Lead America Forward,”
National Interest, December 29, 2020. , December 29, 2020.
Doug Palmer, “Turn It Up to 11: Trump’s Trade Carnage Went Beyond Tariff Wars,” Doug Palmer, “Turn It Up to 11: Trump’s Trade Carnage Went Beyond Tariff Wars,” Politico Pro, ,
December 29, 2020. December 29, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 24 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Jennifer Rubin, “Biden Sounds Like He Has Made a Choice on China,” Jennifer Rubin, “Biden Sounds Like He Has Made a Choice on China,” Washington Post, t,
December 29, 2020. December 29, 2020.
Alex Ward, “How Military Superiority Made America Less Safe, America’s Dominance Wasn’t Alex Ward, “How Military Superiority Made America Less Safe, America’s Dominance Wasn’t
by Happenstance. It Was a Choice,” by Happenstance. It Was a Choice,” Vox, December 29, 2020. , December 29, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “When To Fold ‘Em: What Biden Should Do About Trump’s Lesser Known Ted Galen Carpenter, “When To Fold ‘Em: What Biden Should Do About Trump’s Lesser Known
Foreign Policies, He’ll Be Facing Tough Decisions on Cuba Sanctions, the International Criminal Foreign Policies, He’ll Be Facing Tough Decisions on Cuba Sanctions, the International Criminal
Court, and More,” Court, and More,” American Conservative, December 28, 2020. , December 28, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “How Trump’s Assault on International Organizations Benefits Beijing, The Colum Lynch, “How Trump’s Assault on International Organizations Benefits Beijing, The
United States Was Already Fighting with China for Influence at Global Organizations, But the United States Was Already Fighting with China for Influence at Global Organizations, But the
Pandemic Made Everything Worse,” Pandemic Made Everything Worse,” National Interest, December 28, 2020. , December 28, 2020.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Does the International Liberal Order Have a Future? The Difficult Question Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Does the International Liberal Order Have a Future? The Difficult Question
for Biden Will be Whether the United States and China Can Cooperate in Producing Global for Biden Will be Whether the United States and China Can Cooperate in Producing Global
Public Goods While Competing in the Traditional Areas of Great Power Rivalry,” Public Goods While Competing in the Traditional Areas of Great Power Rivalry,” National
Interest, December 28, 2020. , December 28, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “Joe Biden’s Biggest Foreign Policy Challenge: Irredentism, The United States Michael Rubin, “Joe Biden’s Biggest Foreign Policy Challenge: Irredentism, The United States
Was Never the Catalyst for Conflict but Rather Was the Lid on the Pressure Cooker. America’s Was Never the Catalyst for Conflict but Rather Was the Lid on the Pressure Cooker. America’s
Retreat Opens the Door to Dictators and Despots to Pursue Their Own Revanchist Ideologies,” Retreat Opens the Door to Dictators and Despots to Pursue Their Own Revanchist Ideologies,”
National Interest, December 28, 2020. , December 28, 2020.
Patrick Mendis and Antonina Luszczykiewicz, “To Balance China, Joe Biden Should Build upon Patrick Mendis and Antonina Luszczykiewicz, “To Balance China, Joe Biden Should Build upon
Trump’s India Strategy,” Trump’s India Strategy,” National Interest, December 27, 2020. , December 27, 2020.
Robert W. Merry, “Can Joe Biden Really Overcome America’s Divisions? Can Biden Craft a Robert W. Merry, “Can Joe Biden Really Overcome America’s Divisions? Can Biden Craft a
Trade Policy that Keeps Overseas Markets Open to U.S. Goods While Protecting the Interests of Trade Policy that Keeps Overseas Markets Open to U.S. Goods While Protecting the Interests of
Working-Class Americans Devastated by Past Unfair Practices by American Trading Partners, Working-Class Americans Devastated by Past Unfair Practices by American Trading Partners,
Particularly China?” Particularly China?” National Interest, December 27, 2020. , December 27, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “A Restart for U.S.-China Relations? There Presently is Little Trust or Rapport Doug Bandow, “A Restart for U.S.-China Relations? There Presently is Little Trust or Rapport
between the U.S. and China. That is Unlikely to Change; The Two Governments Nevertheless between the U.S. and China. That is Unlikely to Change; The Two Governments Nevertheless
Must Find a Way Forward,” Cato Institute, December 26, 2020. Must Find a Way Forward,” Cato Institute, December 26, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Ted Galen Carpenter, “Between Biden and Beijing, A Biden Administration Has Important Ted Galen Carpenter, “Between Biden and Beijing, A Biden Administration Has Important
Incentives and Justifications for Trying to Restore the More Cooperative Status Quo that Existed Incentives and Justifications for Trying to Restore the More Cooperative Status Quo that Existed
Before Donald Trump Became President,” Cato Institute, December 26, 2020. Before Donald Trump Became President,” Cato Institute, December 26, 2020.
John O’Sullivan, “Biden Should Pursue a Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy, On a Range Of Issues— John O’Sullivan, “Biden Should Pursue a Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy, On a Range Of Issues—
Trade Negotiations, Relations with China, Balancing between Iran and the Sunni Arab States in Trade Negotiations, Relations with China, Balancing between Iran and the Sunni Arab States in
the Middle East—Biden Should Be Thinking of Pursuing a Better-Managed Version of Trump’s the Middle East—Biden Should Be Thinking of Pursuing a Better-Managed Version of Trump’s
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy,” National Interest, December 26, 2020. , December 26, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Why There Won’t be a Biden Doctrine, Biden’s Legacy Will Rest on How Well Paul R. Pillar, “Why There Won’t be a Biden Doctrine, Biden’s Legacy Will Rest on How Well
He Performs the Repair Job, More than on Any Programs to Move the Country Ahead from He Performs the Repair Job, More than on Any Programs to Move the Country Ahead from
Where It Stood as of 2016,” Where It Stood as of 2016,” National Interest, December 25, 2020. , December 25, 2020.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Why Americans Are Turning Inwards, The New Administration Has an Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Why Americans Are Turning Inwards, The New Administration Has an
Opportunity to Define an Affirmative Vision for the 2020s that Can Both Advance America’s Opportunity to Define an Affirmative Vision for the 2020s that Can Both Advance America’s
Geopolitical Position on the World Stage, but Also Be Linked to Concrete Benefits that Geopolitical Position on the World Stage, but Also Be Linked to Concrete Benefits that
Americans Will Receive,” Americans Will Receive,” National Interest, December 24, 2020. , December 24, 2020.
Melinda Haring, “How to Reinvent Democracy Promotion, The United States Cannot Credibly Melinda Haring, “How to Reinvent Democracy Promotion, The United States Cannot Credibly
Promote Democracy Abroad Any Longer, and the Biden Administration Must Act Swiftly to Promote Democracy Abroad Any Longer, and the Biden Administration Must Act Swiftly to
Remedy Our Own Deficiencies,” Remedy Our Own Deficiencies,” National Interest, December 24, 2020. , December 24, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 25 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Pranshu Verma and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Biden Is Expected to Expand U.S.-India Relations While Pranshu Verma and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Biden Is Expected to Expand U.S.-India Relations While
Stressing Human Rights,” Stressing Human Rights,” New York Times, December 24, 2020. , December 24, 2020.
James Jay Carafano et al., James Jay Carafano et al., Why the United States Needs an Atlantic Strategy, Heritage , Heritage
Foundation, December 23, 2020, 24 pp. Foundation, December 23, 2020, 24 pp.
Jack Detsch, “Forever’s Gonna Stop Tonight, Trump Pledged to End America’s ‘Forever Wars.’ Jack Detsch, “Forever’s Gonna Stop Tonight, Trump Pledged to End America’s ‘Forever Wars.’
He Almost Managed To—But Left Carnage Behind,” He Almost Managed To—But Left Carnage Behind,” National Defense, December 23, 2020. , December 23, 2020.
Barry Gewen, “Why Joe Biden Will Confront the Limits of American Power, We Are No Longer Barry Gewen, “Why Joe Biden Will Confront the Limits of American Power, We Are No Longer
the ‘Exceptional Nation,’ Whatever that Means. Who These Days Believes that the United States the ‘Exceptional Nation,’ Whatever that Means. Who These Days Believes that the United States
Is an Ethical Paragon for the Rest of the World to Emulate, or that American Ideals Are Universal Is an Ethical Paragon for the Rest of the World to Emulate, or that American Ideals Are Universal
Aspirations?” Aspirations?” National Interest, December 23, 2020. , December 23, 2020.
Jared Keller, “Do Americans Really Care About War Crimes? Trump’s Pardoning of Four Jared Keller, “Do Americans Really Care About War Crimes? Trump’s Pardoning of Four
Blackwater Contractors Underscores America’s Apathy towards War Crimes Committed Blackwater Contractors Underscores America’s Apathy towards War Crimes Committed
Abroad,” Abroad,” Task and Purpose, December 23, 2020. , December 23, 2020.
Jeremy Page, “How the U.S. Misread China’s Xi: Hoping for a Globalist, It Got an Autocrat,” Jeremy Page, “How the U.S. Misread China’s Xi: Hoping for a Globalist, It Got an Autocrat,”
Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2020. , December 23, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “America’s History of Luck Is Running Out, The Country’s Rise Was Fueled Stephen M. Walt, “America’s History of Luck Is Running Out, The Country’s Rise Was Fueled
by Fortunate Circumstances that Seem Unlikely to Last Much Longer,” by Fortunate Circumstances that Seem Unlikely to Last Much Longer,” Foreign Policy, ,
December 23, 2020. December 23, 2020.
Austin Bay, “On Point: The Enemy Is Fragility: Pompeo’s New Strategy,” Austin Bay, “On Point: The Enemy Is Fragility: Pompeo’s New Strategy,” Strategy Page, ,
December 22, 2020. December 22, 2020.
Zack Cooper and Laura Rosenberger, “Democratic Values Are a Competitive Advantage, The Zack Cooper and Laura Rosenberger, “Democratic Values Are a Competitive Advantage, The
Contest with Authoritarianism Requires the United States to Understand Its Strengths,” Contest with Authoritarianism Requires the United States to Understand Its Strengths,” Foreign
Affairs, December 22, 2020. , December 22, 2020.
Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Meeting the Challenge in Asia, To Succeed in Asia, President-Elect Joe Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Meeting the Challenge in Asia, To Succeed in Asia, President-Elect Joe
Biden Will Need an Administration that Whines Less, Competes More, and Leverages American Biden Will Need an Administration that Whines Less, Competes More, and Leverages American
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Strengths in the Asia that Actually Exists, Not the One of Its Wishes, Dreams, and Fantasies,” Strengths in the Asia that Actually Exists, Not the One of Its Wishes, Dreams, and Fantasies,”
National Interest, December 22, 2020. , December 22, 2020.
Yoichi Funabashi, “Three Challenges Biden Must Confront, Maintaining the Liberal International Yoichi Funabashi, “Three Challenges Biden Must Confront, Maintaining the Liberal International
Order Requires Addressing Covid-19, Foreign Policy with a Focus on China, and International Order Requires Addressing Covid-19, Foreign Policy with a Focus on China, and International
Trade,” Trade,” National Interest, December 22, 2020. , December 22, 2020.
Jeff M. Smith, “Avoiding an Early Blunder: Why the U.S. Must Not Abandon the Indo-Pacific,” Jeff M. Smith, “Avoiding an Early Blunder: Why the U.S. Must Not Abandon the Indo-Pacific,”
Heritage Foundation, December 22, 2020. Heritage Foundation, December 22, 2020.
Tony Walker, “Joe Biden’s Approach to the Middle East Could be a 180 from Trump, Especially Tony Walker, “Joe Biden’s Approach to the Middle East Could be a 180 from Trump, Especially
on Iran,” on Iran,” National Interest, December 22, 2020. , December 22, 2020.
Ahmed Charai, “Don’t Underestimate American Resilience, For an Outside Observer Who Ahmed Charai, “Don’t Underestimate American Resilience, For an Outside Observer Who
Believes in the ‘American Dream,’ the Problems of Today Look Like Just Another Catalyst for Believes in the ‘American Dream,’ the Problems of Today Look Like Just Another Catalyst for
America’s Relentless National Spirit to Innovate Solutions that Will Make The Country America’s Relentless National Spirit to Innovate Solutions that Will Make The Country
Stronger,” Stronger,” National Interest, December 21, 2020. , December 21, 2020.
Paula J. Dobriansky, “Time for a New American Century, The President‐Elect Advance a Strategy Paula J. Dobriansky, “Time for a New American Century, The President‐Elect Advance a Strategy
Clearly Elaborating the Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy and Why the Protection of Vital Clearly Elaborating the Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy and Why the Protection of Vital
National Interests Require American Global Leadership,” National Interests Require American Global Leadership,” National Interest, December 21, 2020. , December 21, 2020.
Emma M. Ashford, “Why Joe Biden Can’t Restore the Foreign Policy Status Quo, Donald Emma M. Ashford, “Why Joe Biden Can’t Restore the Foreign Policy Status Quo, Donald
Trump, Though Not a Good President, Created a Window of Opportunity for Reform in U.S. Trump, Though Not a Good President, Created a Window of Opportunity for Reform in U.S.
Congressional Research Service 26 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Foreign Ppolicy. Biden Would Be Wise to Seize that Opportunity,” Foreign Ppolicy. Biden Would Be Wise to Seize that Opportunity,” National Interest, December , December
20, 2020. 20, 2020.
David Bromwich, “The Demise of American Exceptionalism, The Best Thing the Policy Elite David Bromwich, “The Demise of American Exceptionalism, The Best Thing the Policy Elite
Could Do, for the United States and the World, Would Be to Put Themselves Out of Business,” Could Do, for the United States and the World, Would Be to Put Themselves Out of Business,”
National Interest, December 20, 2020. , December 20, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump Has Pressed Hostile Regimes to Release American Prisoners. His Favorite Jackson Diehl, “Trump Has Pressed Hostile Regimes to Release American Prisoners. His Favorite
Dictators, Not So Much.” Dictators, Not So Much.” Washington Post, December 20, 2020. , December 20, 2020.
Jacob Heilbrunn, “What Is the Purpose of American Foreign Policy? Several Experts Debated Jacob Heilbrunn, “What Is the Purpose of American Foreign Policy? Several Experts Debated
What Is the Purpose of America and U.S. Power,” What Is the Purpose of America and U.S. Power,” National Interest, December 20, 2020. , December 20, 2020.
Dimitri K. Simes, “Why America Needs a Foreign Policy Reset, We Must Recognize that World Dimitri K. Simes, “Why America Needs a Foreign Policy Reset, We Must Recognize that World
Affairs are Rarely Black and White, that Alliances Should Serve as Instruments of U.S. Policy Affairs are Rarely Black and White, that Alliances Should Serve as Instruments of U.S. Policy
Rather than as Ends in Themselves, and that—Like It or Not—History as We Always Knew It Rather than as Ends in Themselves, and that—Like It or Not—History as We Always Knew It
Has Returned,” Has Returned,” National Interest, December 20, 2020. , December 20, 2020.
Dan Balz, “America’s Image Has Tumbled During Trump’s Presidency. Can Biden Turn It Dan Balz, “America’s Image Has Tumbled During Trump’s Presidency. Can Biden Turn It
Around?” Around?” Washington Post, December 19, 2020. , December 19, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Joe Biden Needs a Pivot to a Humbler Foreign Policy, The Past 20 Years Have Doug Bandow, “Joe Biden Needs a Pivot to a Humbler Foreign Policy, The Past 20 Years Have
Brought Little Except Failure and Destruction. Rather than Listen to Antony Blinken, Biden Brought Little Except Failure and Destruction. Rather than Listen to Antony Blinken, Biden
Should Change,” Cato Institute, December 18, 2020. Should Change,” Cato Institute, December 18, 2020.
David Frum, “13 Things Trump Got Right, Nobody Does Nothing As President, Not Even David Frum, “13 Things Trump Got Right, Nobody Does Nothing As President, Not Even
Someone Who Watches Television For Five Or Six Hours A Day,” Someone Who Watches Television For Five Or Six Hours A Day,” Atlantic, December 18, 2020. , December 18, 2020.
Robert M. Gates, “The World Is Full of Challenges. Here’s How Biden Can Meet Them. The Robert M. Gates, “The World Is Full of Challenges. Here’s How Biden Can Meet Them. The
Incoming Administration Needs to Update American Policy to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Incoming Administration Needs to Update American Policy to Meet the Challenges of the 21st
Century,” Century,” New York Times, December 18, 2020. , December 18, 2020.
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David A. Graham, “Trump Failed to Protect America, The President’s Decision Not to Push Back David A. Graham, “Trump Failed to Protect America, The President’s Decision Not to Push Back
Aggressively Against Putin’s Meddling Seems Only to Have Encouraged It,” Aggressively Against Putin’s Meddling Seems Only to Have Encouraged It,” Atlantic, December , December
18, 2020. 18, 2020.
Frank Hoffman, “Regaining the Initiative: Can the US Lead Again?” Frank Hoffman, “Regaining the Initiative: Can the US Lead Again?” Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI), December 18, 2020. , December 18, 2020.
James M. Lindsay, “Transition 2021: How Much Foreign Policy Leverage Is Trump Leaving James M. Lindsay, “Transition 2021: How Much Foreign Policy Leverage Is Trump Leaving
Biden?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 18, 2020. Biden?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 18, 2020.
Jacob Heilbrunn, “Can Joe Biden Take America Back to the Future? For All Biden’s Promises to Jacob Heilbrunn, “Can Joe Biden Take America Back to the Future? For All Biden’s Promises to
Restore American Leadership—a Decorous Word for Predominance—the Era of Liberal Restore American Leadership—a Decorous Word for Predominance—the Era of Liberal
Interventionism is Likely Over. Trump Tried to Bury It; Biden May Sign the Death Certificate,” Interventionism is Likely Over. Trump Tried to Bury It; Biden May Sign the Death Certificate,”
National Interest, December 17, 2020. , December 17, 2020.
Daniel F. Runde, “A New Approach to Foreign Aid,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 17, 2020. Mai Truong, “How Trump and the 2020 US Election Are Helping Authoritarians’ Domestic Mai Truong, “How Trump and the 2020 US Election Are Helping Authoritarians’ Domestic
Causes, The Trump Administration Has Gifted Autocrats with Three Key Tools for Consolidating Causes, The Trump Administration Has Gifted Autocrats with Three Key Tools for Consolidating
Their Strength at Home,” Their Strength at Home,” Diplomat, December 17, 2020. , December 17, 2020.
Helle C. Dale, “New Leadership Is Exactly What Voice of America Needs,” Heritage Foundation, Helle C. Dale, “New Leadership Is Exactly What Voice of America Needs,” Heritage Foundation,
December 16, 2020. December 16, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 27 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Nikki Haley, “Nikki Haley: Biden Shouldn’t Reject All of Trump’s Foreign Policies. Here Are Nikki Haley, “Nikki Haley: Biden Shouldn’t Reject All of Trump’s Foreign Policies. Here Are
Three He Should Keep,” Three He Should Keep,” Washington Post, December 16, 2020. , December 16, 2020.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “A New Way to Lead the Free World, The Authoritarian Tide Has Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “A New Way to Lead the Free World, The Authoritarian Tide Has
Risen, but a Global Alliance of Democracies Would Help Turn It Back,” Risen, but a Global Alliance of Democracies Would Help Turn It Back,” Wall Street Journal, ,
December 15, 2020. December 15, 2020.
Luis Simon, “Biden and Europe’s Dilemmas,” Luis Simon, “Biden and Europe’s Dilemmas,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2020. , December 15, 2020.
Jennifer Steinhauer and Michael Crowley, “Biden to Face a Confrontational Russia in a World Jennifer Steinhauer and Michael Crowley, “Biden to Face a Confrontational Russia in a World
Changed From His Time in Office,” Changed From His Time in Office,” New York Times, December 15, 2020. , December 15, 2020.
Loren Thompson, “Love Him Or Hate Him, President Trump’s Defense Legacy Is Profound,” Loren Thompson, “Love Him Or Hate Him, President Trump’s Defense Legacy Is Profound,”
Forbes, December 15, 2020. , December 15, 2020.
James Goldgeier and Bruce W. Jentleson, “A Democracy Summit Is Not What the Doctor James Goldgeier and Bruce W. Jentleson, “A Democracy Summit Is Not What the Doctor
Ordered, America, Heal Thyself,” Ordered, America, Heal Thyself,” Foreign Affairs, December 14, 2020. , December 14, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “Can Biden Find Clarity on China and Russia? Shared Interests Help Shape Walter Russell Mead, “Can Biden Find Clarity on China and Russia? Shared Interests Help Shape
Geopolitical Rivalries, but They Can’t Erase Them,” Geopolitical Rivalries, but They Can’t Erase Them,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2020. , December 14, 2020.
Alex Ward, “The Single Biggest Foreign Policy Decision Joe Biden Faces, Will Biden’s Foreign Alex Ward, “The Single Biggest Foreign Policy Decision Joe Biden Faces, Will Biden’s Foreign
Policy Be One Of Restoration, Reformation, Or Revolution?” Policy Be One Of Restoration, Reformation, Or Revolution?” Vox, December 14, 2020. , December 14, 2020.
Andrew A. Michta, “America’s Fin de Siècle: How Unbound Liberalism Has Brought the Andrew A. Michta, “America’s Fin de Siècle: How Unbound Liberalism Has Brought the
Country to Its Knees,” Country to Its Knees,” National Interest, December 13, 2020. , December 13, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Joe Biden Might Have Good Instincts, But His Foreign Policy Team Ted Galen Carpenter, “Joe Biden Might Have Good Instincts, But His Foreign Policy Team
Doesn’t,” Doesn’t,” American Conservative, December 11, 2020. , December 11, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Biden Sees the A-Team. I See the Blob,” Stephen M. Walt, “Biden Sees the A-Team. I See the Blob,” Foreign Policy, December 11, 2020. , December 11, 2020.
Dan DePetris, “Milley Is Right—the U.S. Should Reevaluate Its Military Commitments,” Dan DePetris, “Milley Is Right—the U.S. Should Reevaluate Its Military Commitments,”
Defense News, December 10, 2020. , December 10, 2020.
Mary Harris, “Maybe the U.S. Shouldn’t Be the World’s Leader,” Mary Harris, “Maybe the U.S. Shouldn’t Be the World’s Leader,” Slate, December 10, 2020. , December 10, 2020.
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Emilie Kao and Brett D. Schaefer, “Can Human Rights Be Rescued From Human Rights Emilie Kao and Brett D. Schaefer, “Can Human Rights Be Rescued From Human Rights
Activists’ Overreach?” Heritage Foundation, December 10, 2020. Activists’ Overreach?” Heritage Foundation, December 10, 2020.
Reuters staff, “U.S. Blacklists People in Russia, Haiti, Yemen for Rights Abuses,” Reuters staff, “U.S. Blacklists People in Russia, Haiti, Yemen for Rights Abuses,” Reuters, ,
December 10, 2020. December 10, 2020.
Ian Talley, “U.S. Sanctions Accused Human Rights Abusers in Several Countries,” Ian Talley, “U.S. Sanctions Accused Human Rights Abusers in Several Countries,” Wall Street
Journal, December 10, 2020. , December 10, 2020.
Isaac Chotiner, “The Next Stage of the Ideological Struggle Between the U.S. and China,” Isaac Chotiner, “The Next Stage of the Ideological Struggle Between the U.S. and China,” New
Yorker, December 9, 2020. , December 9, 2020.
Dan Lamothe, “Like Trump, Biden has promised to end the ‘forever wars.’ The landscape Dan Lamothe, “Like Trump, Biden has promised to end the ‘forever wars.’ The landscape
remains complicated,” remains complicated,” Washington Post, December 9, 2020. , December 9, 2020.
Paul Sonne, “To Counter China and Russia, Biden Has Said He Will Strengthen Alliances,” Paul Sonne, “To Counter China and Russia, Biden Has Said He Will Strengthen Alliances,”
Washington Post, December 9, 2020. , December 9, 2020.
Nick Wadhams and Saleha Mohsin, “Trump Set Record Sanctions Use That Biden Is Likely to Nick Wadhams and Saleha Mohsin, “Trump Set Record Sanctions Use That Biden Is Likely to
Keep,” Keep,” Bloomberg, December 9, 2020. , December 9, 2020.
Michael T. Klare, “Trump Is Leaving Us With a New Cold War,” Michael T. Klare, “Trump Is Leaving Us With a New Cold War,” Nation, December 8, 2020. , December 8, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 28 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Simon Lester, “President Biden Must Restore American Trade Leadership,” Cato Institute, Simon Lester, “President Biden Must Restore American Trade Leadership,” Cato Institute,
December 8, 2020. December 8, 2020.
Danielle Pletka, “On Foreign Policy, Trump Created Opportunities for Biden, Will the President- Danielle Pletka, “On Foreign Policy, Trump Created Opportunities for Biden, Will the President-
Elect Build on Them or Rush to Repudiate Trump’s Legacy?” Elect Build on Them or Rush to Repudiate Trump’s Legacy?” Dispatch, December 8, 2020. , December 8, 2020.
Alex Ward, “The Revenge of the Blob, Presidents Obama and Trump Kept the Nation’s Foreign Alex Ward, “The Revenge of the Blob, Presidents Obama and Trump Kept the Nation’s Foreign
Policy Establishment at Arm’s Length. President-Elect Biden Has Warmly Embraced It,” Policy Establishment at Arm’s Length. President-Elect Biden Has Warmly Embraced It,” Vox, ,
December 8, 2020. December 8, 2020.
Edward Alden, “Report Sheds Light on How Biden’s Future NSC Chief Wants to Reshape U.S. Edward Alden, “Report Sheds Light on How Biden’s Future NSC Chief Wants to Reshape U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, December 7, 2020. , December 7, 2020.
Ryan P. Burke, “The Hidden Dangers in Biden’s Foreign Policy, The President-Elect’s Stated Ryan P. Burke, “The Hidden Dangers in Biden’s Foreign Policy, The President-Elect’s Stated
Agenda Will Antagonize China and Lead to Conflict,” Agenda Will Antagonize China and Lead to Conflict,” Defense One, December 7, 2020. , December 7, 2020.
Austin Doehler, “Great Power Competition Is Too Narrow a Frame, The United States Cannot Austin Doehler, “Great Power Competition Is Too Narrow a Frame, The United States Cannot
Hope to Prevail and Prosper Unless It Broadens Its Conception of the Global Struggle,” Hope to Prevail and Prosper Unless It Broadens Its Conception of the Global Struggle,” Defense
One, December 6, 2020. , December 6, 2020.
Michael Hirsh, “Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable,” Michael Hirsh, “Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable,” Foreign
Policy, December 5, 2020. , December 5, 2020.
Evan Sankey, “Damage Done: Why Joe Biden Needs to Leave Trump’s Policies Alone,” Evan Sankey, “Damage Done: Why Joe Biden Needs to Leave Trump’s Policies Alone,” National
Interest, December 5, 2020. , December 5, 2020.
Zachary Shore, “Divided We Fall: Why the ‘America First’ Policy Has Created New Problems,” Zachary Shore, “Divided We Fall: Why the ‘America First’ Policy Has Created New Problems,”
National Interest, December 4, 2020. , December 4, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Blob Is Back And It’s Ready For War,” Doug Bandow, “The Blob Is Back And It’s Ready For War,” American Conservative, December , December
3, 2020. 3, 2020.
Samuel Barnett, Natalie Thompson, and Sandy Alkoutami, “How Gen Z Will Shake Up Foreign Samuel Barnett, Natalie Thompson, and Sandy Alkoutami, “How Gen Z Will Shake Up Foreign
Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 3, 2020. Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 3, 2020.
Niall Ferguson, “Cold War II,” Niall Ferguson, “Cold War II,” National Review, December 3, 2020. , December 3, 2020.
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Thomas Joscelyn, “Trump’s Wish to End the ‘Endless Wars’ Denies Reality, ISIS Isn’t Dead, al-Thomas Joscelyn, “Trump’s Wish to End the ‘Endless Wars’ Denies Reality, ISIS Isn’t Dead, al-
Qaeda Is Not a ‘Shadow of Its Former Self,’ and the Taliban Is Not Our Counterterrorism Qaeda Is Not a ‘Shadow of Its Former Self,’ and the Taliban Is Not Our Counterterrorism
Partner,” Partner,” Dispatch, December 3, 2020. , December 3, 2020.
Amy Mackinnon, “Biden Expected to Put the World’s Kleptocrats on Notice, The U.S. President- Amy Mackinnon, “Biden Expected to Put the World’s Kleptocrats on Notice, The U.S. President-
Elect and His Top Advisors Have Made the Fight Against Dirty Money One of Their Early Elect and His Top Advisors Have Made the Fight Against Dirty Money One of Their Early
Priorities,” Priorities,” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2020. , December 3, 2020.
Peter Beinart, “Biden Wants America to Lead the World. It Shouldn’t. U.S. ‘Leadership’ Is a Peter Beinart, “Biden Wants America to Lead the World. It Shouldn’t. U.S. ‘Leadership’ Is a
Favorite Trope of the Foreign Policy Establishment. It’s Outdated and Dangerous,” Favorite Trope of the Foreign Policy Establishment. It’s Outdated and Dangerous,” New York
Times, December 2, 2020. , December 2, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Can’t Europe Defend Itself?” Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Can’t Europe Defend Itself?” National Interest, December 1, 2020. , December 1, 2020.
Scott Cullinane, “Biden, the Transatlantic Relationship and a Changing America,” Scott Cullinane, “Biden, the Transatlantic Relationship and a Changing America,” The Hill, ,
December 1, 2020. December 1, 2020.
Ash Jain and Alex Pascal, “Alliances First: Joe Biden’s Historic Opportunity to Reshape Global Ash Jain and Alex Pascal, “Alliances First: Joe Biden’s Historic Opportunity to Reshape Global
Order,” Order,” National Interest, December 1, 2020. , December 1, 2020.
Jonathan Stearns, “EU Leaders Plan Appeal to Biden to Rebuild Transatlantic Ties,” Jonathan Stearns, “EU Leaders Plan Appeal to Biden to Rebuild Transatlantic Ties,” Bloomberg, ,
December 1, 2020. December 1, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 29 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Hannah Beech, “‘Trump Is Better’: In Asia, Pro-Democracy Forces Worry About Biden,” Hannah Beech, “‘Trump Is Better’: In Asia, Pro-Democracy Forces Worry About Biden,” New
York Times, November 230 (updated December 1), 2020. , November 230 (updated December 1), 2020.
Dolf Gielen and Morgan Bazilian, “How John Kerry Will Restore America’s Climate Dolf Gielen and Morgan Bazilian, “How John Kerry Will Restore America’s Climate
Leadership,” Leadership,” National Interest, November 29, 2020. , November 29, 2020.
James Marson, “Biden’s NATO Amity Sparks Debate Among European Allies,” James Marson, “Biden’s NATO Amity Sparks Debate Among European Allies,” Wall Street
Journal, November 28, 2020. , November 28, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Team Trump Determined to Drop Foreign Policy Bombs on the Way Out,” Cato Doug Bandow, “Team Trump Determined to Drop Foreign Policy Bombs on the Way Out,” Cato
Institute, November 27, 2020. Institute, November 27, 2020.
David von Drehle, “Joe Biden Says America Is Back. Back to What?” David von Drehle, “Joe Biden Says America Is Back. Back to What?” Washington Post, ,
November 27, 2020. November 27, 2020.
Benjamin H. Friedman and Stephen Wertheim, “Say No, Joe, On U.S. Foreign Policy, There’s No Benjamin H. Friedman and Stephen Wertheim, “Say No, Joe, On U.S. Foreign Policy, There’s No
Going Back to the Status Quo,” Going Back to the Status Quo,” Foreign Policy, November 25, 2020. , November 25, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “Biden Likely to Lift Sanctions on ICC Chief Prosecutor,” Colum Lynch, “Biden Likely to Lift Sanctions on ICC Chief Prosecutor,” Foreign Policy, ,
November 25, 2020. November 25, 2020.
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Alexandra Stark, “Crafting a Diplomacy-First US Foreign Policy,” Anne-Marie Slaughter and Alexandra Stark, “Crafting a Diplomacy-First US Foreign Policy,”
Strategist, November 25, 2020. , November 25, 2020.
Dolf Gielen and Morgan Bazilian, “How Biden and Kerry Could Rebuild America’s Global Dolf Gielen and Morgan Bazilian, “How Biden and Kerry Could Rebuild America’s Global
Climate Leadership,” Climate Leadership,” The Conversation, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
Michael R. Gordon, “National-Security Picks Combine Diverse Backgrounds, Singular Aims,” Michael R. Gordon, “National-Security Picks Combine Diverse Backgrounds, Singular Aims,”
Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
Kim Hjelmgaard and Deirdre Shesgreen, “Even Trump’s Fiercest Critics Say He May Have Kim Hjelmgaard and Deirdre Shesgreen, “Even Trump’s Fiercest Critics Say He May Have
Gotten Some World Affairs Right,” Gotten Some World Affairs Right,” USA Today, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
Trevor Hunnicutt and Humeyra Pamuk, “Rejecting Trump’s Foreign Policy Approach, Biden Trevor Hunnicutt and Humeyra Pamuk, “Rejecting Trump’s Foreign Policy Approach, Biden
Says ‘America Is Back,’” Says ‘America Is Back,’” Reuters, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Annie Karni and David E. Sanger, “Biden’s National Security Team Offers a Sharp Turn. But in Annie Karni and David E. Sanger, “Biden’s National Security Team Offers a Sharp Turn. But in
Which Direction?” Which Direction?” New York Times, November 24, (updated December 8), 2020. , November 24, (updated December 8), 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “Aspects of Trump’s Foreign Policy Were Good for the U.S., Biden Should Charles A. Kupchan, “Aspects of Trump’s Foreign Policy Were Good for the U.S., Biden Should
Keep Them,” Keep Them,” Washington Post, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
Carol Morello, “Foreign Observers Shocked by Chaos over U.S. Election,” Carol Morello, “Foreign Observers Shocked by Chaos over U.S. Election,” Washington Post, ,
November 24, 2020. November 24, 2020.
David Rothkopf, “Biden’s National Security Team Reveals He Has Learned from the Mistakes of David Rothkopf, “Biden’s National Security Team Reveals He Has Learned from the Mistakes of
Past Presidents,” Past Presidents,” USA Today, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
Frederic Wehrey, “How Joe Biden Can Rein in Donald Trump’s Reckless Middle East Policy,” Frederic Wehrey, “How Joe Biden Can Rein in Donald Trump’s Reckless Middle East Policy,”
Politico, November 24, 2020. , November 24, 2020.
Jorge G. Castañeda, “Biden Can Inspire Latin America, A Domestic Transformation of the United Jorge G. Castañeda, “Biden Can Inspire Latin America, A Domestic Transformation of the United
States Would Have a Tremendous Impact in the Region,” States Would Have a Tremendous Impact in the Region,” New York Times, November 23, 2020. , November 23, 2020.
Gregory D. Foster, “We Have Met the Enemy, and It Is Us: Restoring American Power, Getting Gregory D. Foster, “We Have Met the Enemy, and It Is Us: Restoring American Power, Getting
the Nation’s House in Order—Restoring Our Integrity and Dignity—is a Precondition for the Nation’s House in Order—Restoring Our Integrity and Dignity—is a Precondition for
Reestablishing Our Standing in the World,” Reestablishing Our Standing in the World,” Defense One, November 23, 2020. , November 23, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Amy Mackinnon, “In Break From Trump, Biden Opts for Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Amy Mackinnon, “In Break From Trump, Biden Opts for
Experience, Expertise for Top National Security Jobs,” Experience, Expertise for Top National Security Jobs,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2020. , November 23, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 30 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Eli Lake, “Progressives May Not Like Biden’s Foreign Policy, The President-Elect’s National Eli Lake, “Progressives May Not Like Biden’s Foreign Policy, The President-Elect’s National
Security Cabinet Will be Too Centrist for the Left Flank of His Party,” Security Cabinet Will be Too Centrist for the Left Flank of His Party,” Bloomberg, November 23, g, November 23,
2020. 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Biden’s Choice for UN Envoy Signals Return to US Engagement,” Matthew Lee, “Biden’s Choice for UN Envoy Signals Return to US Engagement,” Associated
Press, November 23, 2020. , November 23, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Trump Aims to Box in Biden Abroad, but It May Not Work,” Matthew Lee, “Trump Aims to Box in Biden Abroad, but It May Not Work,” Associated Press, ,
November 23, 2020. November 23, 2020.
Charles V. Peña, “Why Joe Biden Should Lead a Reboot of NATO,” Charles V. Peña, “Why Joe Biden Should Lead a Reboot of NATO,” National Interest, November , November
23, 2020. 23, 2020.
Kori Schake, Jim Mattis, Jim Ellis, and Joe Felter, “Defense In Depth, Why U.S. Security Kori Schake, Jim Mattis, Jim Ellis, and Joe Felter, “Defense In Depth, Why U.S. Security
Depends on Alliances—Now More Than Ever,” Depends on Alliances—Now More Than Ever,” Foreign Affairs, November 23, 2020. , November 23, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Overarching Middle East Strategy Reaches a Disastrous Dead End,” Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Overarching Middle East Strategy Reaches a Disastrous Dead End,”
Washington Post, November 22, 2020. , November 22, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “The Fraught Politics Facing Biden’s Foreign Policy, His Presidency May be the Thomas Wright, “The Fraught Politics Facing Biden’s Foreign Policy, His Presidency May be the
Establishment’s Last Best Chance to Demonstrate that Liberal Internationalism is a Superior Establishment’s Last Best Chance to Demonstrate that Liberal Internationalism is a Superior
Strategy to Populist Nationalism,” Strategy to Populist Nationalism,” Atlantic, November 22, 2020. , November 22, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “President Joe Biden Confronts A Radically Different World Than When He Was Doug Bandow, “President Joe Biden Confronts A Radically Different World Than When He Was
Veep, America’s Foreign Entanglements Are Unnecessary. Joe Biden Has a Chance to End Veep, America’s Foreign Entanglements Are Unnecessary. Joe Biden Has a Chance to End
Them,” Them,” American Conservative, November 20, 2020. , November 20, 2020.
Jason Blazakis, “Trump Abused U.S. Sanctions and Failed to Get Results. Biden Can Do Better,” Jason Blazakis, “Trump Abused U.S. Sanctions and Failed to Get Results. Biden Can Do Better,”
Foreign Policy, November 19, 2020. , November 19, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will Biden Jettison the Anti-Russia Hysteria?” Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will Biden Jettison the Anti-Russia Hysteria?” Antiwar.com, November , November
19, 2020. 19, 2020.
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Daniel Fried and Benjamin Haddad, “Biden Knows Europe, and Europe Knows Biden. That’s Daniel Fried and Benjamin Haddad, “Biden Knows Europe, and Europe Knows Biden. That’s
Not Enough. How to Start a New—and Overdue—Chapter of Trans-Atlantic relations,” Not Enough. How to Start a New—and Overdue—Chapter of Trans-Atlantic relations,” Foreign
Policy, November 19, 2020. , November 19, 2020.
Sushma Raman, “Getting Human Rights Right, Before Biden Can Lead in the World, He’ll Have Sushma Raman, “Getting Human Rights Right, Before Biden Can Lead in the World, He’ll Have
to Lead at Home,” to Lead at Home,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2020. , November 19, 2020.
Jonathan Tepperman, “Can Biden End America’s Forever Wars? Delivering on His Promise Will Jonathan Tepperman, “Can Biden End America’s Forever Wars? Delivering on His Promise Will
Prove Extremely Difficult—but So May the Consequences of Not Doing So,” Prove Extremely Difficult—but So May the Consequences of Not Doing So,” Foreign Policy, ,
November 19, 2020. November 19, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “The World Is Never Going Back to Normal, Other Countries Are Learning to Anne Applebaum, “The World Is Never Going Back to Normal, Other Countries Are Learning to
Live without America. Biden Can’t Restore the Pre-Trump Status Quo,” Live without America. Biden Can’t Restore the Pre-Trump Status Quo,” Atlantic, November 18, , November 18,
2020. 2020.
Walden Bello, “What Will a Biden Presidency Bring to the Asia Pacific?” Foreign Policy in Walden Bello, “What Will a Biden Presidency Bring to the Asia Pacific?” Foreign Policy in
Focus, November 18, 2020. Focus, November 18, 2020.
Giselle Donnelly, “Can Joe Biden Save the World America Made? He May be the Last Man in Giselle Donnelly, “Can Joe Biden Save the World America Made? He May be the Last Man in
Position to Reverse the Wreck of US Post-Cold War Foreign Policy and Preserve What Remains Position to Reverse the Wreck of US Post-Cold War Foreign Policy and Preserve What Remains
of the Liberal International Order,” of the Liberal International Order,” National Interest, November 18, 2020. , November 18, 2020.
Daniel Immerwahr, “Should America Still Police the World? On the Problem—and Potential—of Daniel Immerwahr, “Should America Still Police the World? On the Problem—and Potential—of
a Seventy-Year-Old Superpower,” a Seventy-Year-Old Superpower,” New Yorker, November 18, 2020. , November 18, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 31 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Corina Rebegea, “Inbox: Reviving the Transatlantic Democratic Agenda,” Center for European Corina Rebegea, “Inbox: Reviving the Transatlantic Democratic Agenda,” Center for European
Policy Analysis, November 18, 2020. Policy Analysis, November 18, 2020.
Andrew J. Bacevich and Adam Weinstein, “Trump Demands Afghan Withdrawal and Washington Andrew J. Bacevich and Adam Weinstein, “Trump Demands Afghan Withdrawal and Washington
Panics. But It’s Time to Leave, Now,” Panics. But It’s Time to Leave, Now,” Responsible Statecraft, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Robin Emmott and John Irish, “After Trump, Europe Aims to Show Biden It Can Fight for Itself,” Robin Emmott and John Irish, “After Trump, Europe Aims to Show Biden It Can Fight for Itself,”
Reuters, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Najim Rahim and Fatima Faizi, “U.S. Troops Are Packing Up, Ready or Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Najim Rahim and Fatima Faizi, “U.S. Troops Are Packing Up, Ready or
Not,” Not,” New York Times, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Robert A. Manning, “A Gaping Hole in US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Robert A. Manning, “A Gaping Hole in US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Hill, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Tom McTague, “Joe Biden Has a Barack Obama Problem, Many Leaders in Asia, in Particular, Tom McTague, “Joe Biden Has a Barack Obama Problem, Many Leaders in Asia, in Particular,
Remain Unhappy with the Former President’s Foreign Policy,” Remain Unhappy with the Former President’s Foreign Policy,” Defense One, November 17, , November 17,
2020. 2020.
William Ruger and Rajon Menan, “It’s Time to Withdraw from Afghanistan,” William Ruger and Rajon Menan, “It’s Time to Withdraw from Afghanistan,” Washington Post, ,
November 17, 2020. November 17, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “Trump’s Latest Summit No-shows Are His Final Insult to America’s Asian Allies,” Josh Rogin, “Trump’s Latest Summit No-shows Are His Final Insult to America’s Asian Allies,”
Washington Post, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Trump Is in Denial—and America Is Unsafe, A House Divided against Itself Stephen M. Walt, “Trump Is in Denial—and America Is Unsafe, A House Divided against Itself
Can’t Compete on the World Stage,” Can’t Compete on the World Stage,” Foreign Policy, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Alex Ward, “The 3 Elements of Trump’s Foreign Policy Biden Should Keep, Trump’s Foreign Alex Ward, “The 3 Elements of Trump’s Foreign Policy Biden Should Keep, Trump’s Foreign
Policy Was Terrible. But Biden should still follow parts of it,” Policy Was Terrible. But Biden should still follow parts of it,” Vox, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Katie Bo Williams, “Trump Orders Hasty Afghanistan, Iraq Drawdowns to Beat Biden Katie Bo Williams, “Trump Orders Hasty Afghanistan, Iraq Drawdowns to Beat Biden
Inauguration,” Inauguration,” Defense One, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
Jordan Fabian and Jennifer Epstein, “Biden Vows to Rebuild U.S. Ties With World: ‘America Is Jordan Fabian and Jennifer Epstein, “Biden Vows to Rebuild U.S. Ties With World: ‘America Is
Back,’” Back,’” Bloomberg, November 16, 2020. g, November 16, 2020.
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Charles A. Kupchan, “For the West, There Is No Road Back to a Time Before Trump, Europeans Charles A. Kupchan, “For the West, There Is No Road Back to a Time Before Trump, Europeans
Are Relieved by Biden’s Victory But Will Be Very Disappointed If They Don’t Heed the Lessons Are Relieved by Biden’s Victory But Will Be Very Disappointed If They Don’t Heed the Lessons
of the Past Four Years,” of the Past Four Years,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2020. , November 16, 2020.
Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas, “French and German Foreign Ministers: Joe Biden Can Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas, “French and German Foreign Ministers: Joe Biden Can
Make Transatlantic Unity Possible,” Make Transatlantic Unity Possible,” Washington Post, November 16, 2020. , November 16, 2020.
Ania Nussbaum, “Macron Says EU Can’t Go Back to Relying on U.S. Under Biden,” Ania Nussbaum, “Macron Says EU Can’t Go Back to Relying on U.S. Under Biden,” Bloomberg, ,
November 16, 2020. November 16, 2020.
Eric Schmitt, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage, and Helene Cooper, “Trump Is Said to Be Eric Schmitt, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage, and Helene Cooper, “Trump Is Said to Be
Preparing to Withdraw Troops From Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia,” Preparing to Withdraw Troops From Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia,” New York Times, November , November
16, 2020. 16, 2020.
Ray Takeyh, “Trump’s Parting Gift to Biden: A More Stable Middle East, He Was Successful Ray Takeyh, “Trump’s Parting Gift to Biden: A More Stable Middle East, He Was Successful
Because Only an Iconoclastic President Could Have Rejected False Assumptions and Failed Because Only an Iconoclastic President Could Have Rejected False Assumptions and Failed
Strategies,” Strategies,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2020. , November 16, 2020.
Jeanne Whalen, “Biden Likely to Remain Tough on Chinese Tech Like Huawei, But with More Jeanne Whalen, “Biden Likely to Remain Tough on Chinese Tech Like Huawei, But with More
Help from Allies,” Help from Allies,” Washington Post, November 16, 2020. , November 16, 2020.
Paola Tamma, “Europe’s Biden bind: Stick with US or go it alone? Continent Split Between Paola Tamma, “Europe’s Biden bind: Stick with US or go it alone? Continent Split Between
Wanting Close Ties to Washington and Desire to Develop Its Own Power,” Wanting Close Ties to Washington and Desire to Develop Its Own Power,” Politico, November , November
15, 2020. 15, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 32 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Luke McGee, “Joe Biden’s Victory Isn’t Enough on Its Own to Heal the Wounds Trump Inflicted Luke McGee, “Joe Biden’s Victory Isn’t Enough on Its Own to Heal the Wounds Trump Inflicted
on Europe,” on Europe,” CNN, November 14, 2020. , November 14, 2020.
Brandon Valeriano and Eric Gomez, “A Biden Foreign Policy: Restraint By Circumstance, Not Brandon Valeriano and Eric Gomez, “A Biden Foreign Policy: Restraint By Circumstance, Not
Design,” Design,” American Conservative, November 14, 2020. , November 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Joe Biden Should Break Ranks and Stop the New Cold War With Russia,” Cato Doug Bandow, “Joe Biden Should Break Ranks and Stop the New Cold War With Russia,” Cato
Institute, November 13, 2020. Institute, November 13, 2020.
Tom McTague, “Europe Can’t Blame Donald Trump Anymore, The Question for the Continent’s Tom McTague, “Europe Can’t Blame Donald Trump Anymore, The Question for the Continent’s
Leaders Now is Whether They Can Agree on What They Are Collectively For, Not Just What Leaders Now is Whether They Can Agree on What They Are Collectively For, Not Just What
They Are Against,” They Are Against,” Defense One, November 13, 2020. , November 13, 2020.
Tara Varma and Jeremy Shapiro, “The European Offers America Cannot Refuse,” Tara Varma and Jeremy Shapiro, “The European Offers America Cannot Refuse,” War on the
Rocks, November 13, 2020. , November 13, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will the Democrats and Biden Continue to Treat Russia as the Enemy?” Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will the Democrats and Biden Continue to Treat Russia as the Enemy?”
Cato Institute, November 12, 2020. Cato Institute, November 12, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “What Will Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Look Like? The President-Elect’s Emphasis Fred Kaplan, “What Will Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Look Like? The President-Elect’s Emphasis
Will Be on Restoring U.S. Alliances. But is it Too Late for That?” Will Be on Restoring U.S. Alliances. But is it Too Late for That?” Slate, November 12, 2020. , November 12, 2020.
Suzanne Nossel, “Biden Must Restore America’s Reputation as a Beacon of Press Freedom, After Suzanne Nossel, “Biden Must Restore America’s Reputation as a Beacon of Press Freedom, After
Four Years of Hostility to Journalists and a Free Press, the United States Must Repair the Damage Four Years of Hostility to Journalists and a Free Press, the United States Must Repair the Damage
Trump Has Done at Home and Abroad,” Trump Has Done at Home and Abroad,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2020. , November 12, 2020.
Matthieu Vallières, “Joe Biden’s Empathy May Result in a ‘Therapeutic’ Foreign Policy,” Matthieu Vallières, “Joe Biden’s Empathy May Result in a ‘Therapeutic’ Foreign Policy,” The
Conversation, November 12, 2020. , November 12, 2020.
Paul D. Shinkman, “How President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Actually Help President-Elect Paul D. Shinkman, “How President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Actually Help President-Elect
Biden, The Incoming Administration is Poised to Try to Undo Four Years of Trump’s Foreign Biden, The Incoming Administration is Poised to Try to Undo Four Years of Trump’s Foreign
Policies. In Some Cases, Biden Would be Unwise to Even Try, Analysts Say,” Policies. In Some Cases, Biden Would be Unwise to Even Try, Analysts Say,” U.S. News & World
Report, November 11, 2020. , November 11, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Robin Wright, “The Seven Pillars of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” Robin Wright, “The Seven Pillars of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” New Yorker, November 11, 2020. , November 11, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “When America’s Election Is Over, Americans Will Have to Address China,” Cato Doug Bandow, “When America’s Election Is Over, Americans Will Have to Address China,” Cato
Institute, November 10, 2020. Institute, November 10, 2020.
Theodore R. Bromund, “The U.S. Must Promote Democratic Leadership in Interpol,” Heritage Theodore R. Bromund, “The U.S. Must Promote Democratic Leadership in Interpol,” Heritage
Foundation, November 10, 2020. Foundation, November 10, 2020.
Michael Crowley, “An Obama Restoration on Foreign Policy? Familiar Faces Could Fill Biden’s Michael Crowley, “An Obama Restoration on Foreign Policy? Familiar Faces Could Fill Biden’s
Team,” Team,” New York Times, November 9, 2020. , November 9, 2020.
Richard Haass, “Repairing the World, The Imperative—and Limits—of a Post-Trump Foreign Richard Haass, “Repairing the World, The Imperative—and Limits—of a Post-Trump Foreign
Policy,” Policy,” Foreign Affairs, November 9, 2020. , November 9, 2020.
Sara Khorshid, “What Trump’s Loss Means for Authoritarian Leaders, From Cairo to Riyadh, Sara Khorshid, “What Trump’s Loss Means for Authoritarian Leaders, From Cairo to Riyadh,
Autocrats Are Nervous about What a Biden Administration Might Mean for Their Relationship Autocrats Are Nervous about What a Biden Administration Might Mean for Their Relationship
with Washington,” with Washington,” Foreign Policy, November 9, 2020. , November 9, 2020.
Charles V. Peña, “Biden Shouldn’t Toss All of Trump’s Foreign Policies, From Ending Forever Charles V. Peña, “Biden Shouldn’t Toss All of Trump’s Foreign Policies, From Ending Forever
Wars to Pressing Allies to Shoulder More of Their Defense Loads, the Next President Should Wars to Pressing Allies to Shoulder More of Their Defense Loads, the Next President Should
Pursue at Least Some of His Predecessor’s Goals,” Pursue at Least Some of His Predecessor’s Goals,” Defense One, November 9, 2020. , November 9, 2020.
David E. Sanger, “The End of ‘America First’: How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the David E. Sanger, “The End of ‘America First’: How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the
World, Those Who Have Known President-Elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. for Decades Say They World, Those Who Have Known President-Elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. for Decades Say They
Congressional Research Service 33 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Expect Him to Move Carefully, Providing Reassurance with a Few Big Symbolic Acts,” Expect Him to Move Carefully, Providing Reassurance with a Few Big Symbolic Acts,” New
York Times, November 9 (updated November 12), 2020. , November 9 (updated November 12), 2020.
Matthew Karnitschnig, “What Biden Means for Europe, On Key Issues from Climate Change to Matthew Karnitschnig, “What Biden Means for Europe, On Key Issues from Climate Change to
China, How the Next US President Will Revamp Transatlantic Ties,” China, How the Next US President Will Revamp Transatlantic Ties,” Politico, November 8, 2020. , November 8, 2020.
Tom McTague, “Joe Biden Won’t Fix America’s Relationships, Serious Questions about Tom McTague, “Joe Biden Won’t Fix America’s Relationships, Serious Questions about
America’s Role in the World Will Not Go Away Just Because Donald Trump Was Defeated,” America’s Role in the World Will Not Go Away Just Because Donald Trump Was Defeated,”
Atlantic, November 8, 2020. , November 8, 2020.
James Stavridis, “A Preview of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” James Stavridis, “A Preview of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” Bloomberg, November 8, 2020. , November 8, 2020.
Rick Gladstone, “Biden to Face Long List of Foreign Challenges, With China No. 1,” Rick Gladstone, “Biden to Face Long List of Foreign Challenges, With China No. 1,” New York
Times, November 7 (updated November 15), 2020. , November 7 (updated November 15), 2020.
Barry Pavel et al., “Joe Biden Just Won the Presidency: What Does that Mean for America’s Role Barry Pavel et al., “Joe Biden Just Won the Presidency: What Does that Mean for America’s Role
in the World?” Atlantic Council, November 7, 2020. in the World?” Atlantic Council, November 7, 2020.
James Palmer, “Don’t Expect a Biden Win to Boost U.S. Favorability, Obama Won Hearts All James Palmer, “Don’t Expect a Biden Win to Boost U.S. Favorability, Obama Won Hearts All
over the World, but People Have Been Burned Twice Now,” over the World, but People Have Been Burned Twice Now,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2020. , November 6, 2020.
Anchal Vohra, “Trump Promised to End America’s Wars. Biden Might Actually Do It. The Anchal Vohra, “Trump Promised to End America’s Wars. Biden Might Actually Do It. The
Former Vice President Contributed to a Legacy of Failed Wars in the Middle East. Can He Fix Former Vice President Contributed to a Legacy of Failed Wars in the Middle East. Can He Fix
It?” It?” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2020. , November 6, 2020.
Peter Feaver, “What Trump’s Near-Victory Means for Republican Foreign Policy,” Peter Feaver, “What Trump’s Near-Victory Means for Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Policy, November 5, 2020. , November 5, 2020.
Jessica T. Mathews, “Time for a New Approach to Foreign Affairs,” Jessica T. Mathews, “Time for a New Approach to Foreign Affairs,” New York Review of Books, ,
November 5, 2020. November 5, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “The Election Has Already Changed the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Josh Rogin, “The Election Has Already Changed the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Washington
Post, November 5, 2020. , November 5, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Valerie Volcovici and Kate Abnett, “U.S. Formally Exits Global Climate Pact amid Election Valerie Volcovici and Kate Abnett, “U.S. Formally Exits Global Climate Pact amid Election
Uncertainty,” Uncertainty,” Reuters, November 4, 2020. , November 4, 2020.
Liam Kennedy, “Has Donald Trump Tarnished America for Good?” Liam Kennedy, “Has Donald Trump Tarnished America for Good?” National Interest, November , November
3, 2020. 3, 2020.
Daniel Kochis, “NATO Allies Now Spend $50 Billion More on Defense Than in 2016,” Heritage Daniel Kochis, “NATO Allies Now Spend $50 Billion More on Defense Than in 2016,” Heritage
Foundation, November 3, 2020. Foundation, November 3, 2020.
James M. Roberts, “Changing International Aid,” Heritage Foundation, November 3, 2020. James M. Roberts, “Changing International Aid,” Heritage Foundation, November 3, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Another Alliance Trump Didn’t Break, U.S. and India Will Share Intelligence as Editorial Board, “Another Alliance Trump Didn’t Break, U.S. and India Will Share Intelligence as
the China Threat Looms,” the China Threat Looms,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2020. , November 2, 2020.
Edith M. Lederer, “Over 70 ICC Nations Support Court and Oppose US Sanctions,” Edith M. Lederer, “Over 70 ICC Nations Support Court and Oppose US Sanctions,” Associated
Press, November 2, 2020. , November 2, 2020.
National Security Council, “President Trump on China: Putting America First,” White House, National Security Council, “President Trump on China: Putting America First,” White House,
November 2, 2020. November 2, 2020.
Ishaan Tharoor, “When America Decided to Rule the World,” Ishaan Tharoor, “When America Decided to Rule the World,” Washington Post, November 2, , November 2,
2020. 2020.
Kurt Volker, “US Foreign Policy After November 3: More Continuity than Change,” Center for Kurt Volker, “US Foreign Policy After November 3: More Continuity than Change,” Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), November 2, 2020. European Policy Analysis (CEPA), November 2, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 34 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Ryan Crocker, “The World Won’t Organize Itself, Biden Understands What Career Diplomats Ryan Crocker, “The World Won’t Organize Itself, Biden Understands What Career Diplomats
Know: America’s Relationships Overseas Require Hands-on Management, and Conditions in the Know: America’s Relationships Overseas Require Hands-on Management, and Conditions in the
Field Are Messier Than They Appear,” Field Are Messier Than They Appear,” Atlantic, November 1, 2020. , November 1, 2020.
Sumantra Maitra, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Legacy Is His Ability to Balance Chaos in Asia, Sumantra Maitra, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Legacy Is His Ability to Balance Chaos in Asia,
Trump’s Facilitating an Alliance with India and Arming Taiwan as a Frontier State Against a Trump’s Facilitating an Alliance with India and Arming Taiwan as a Frontier State Against a
Rising China Will Be His Defining Legacy, a Strategy That Will Likely Continue Even if Joe Rising China Will Be His Defining Legacy, a Strategy That Will Likely Continue Even if Joe
Biden Wins the Presidency,” Biden Wins the Presidency,” National Interest, November 1, 2020. , November 1, 2020.
Patrick Mendis Joey Wang, “Can the United States Leave Behind the Partisan Politics of Patrick Mendis Joey Wang, “Can the United States Leave Behind the Partisan Politics of
‘America First’ in Foreign Relations?” ‘America First’ in Foreign Relations?” National Interest, November 1, 2020. , November 1, 2020.
Christopher Mott, “The Death of Exceptionalism and the Birth of a New Foreign Policy,” Christopher Mott, “The Death of Exceptionalism and the Birth of a New Foreign Policy,”
National Interest, November 1, 2020. , November 1, 2020.
Hillary Clinton, “A National Security Reckoning, How Washington Should Think About Power,” Hillary Clinton, “A National Security Reckoning, How Washington Should Think About Power,”
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020. , November/December 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “How China Outsmarted the Trump Administration, While the U.S. Is Anne Applebaum, “How China Outsmarted the Trump Administration, While the U.S. Is
Distracted, China Is Rewriting the Rules of the Global Order,” Distracted, China Is Rewriting the Rules of the Global Order,” Atlantic, November 2020. , November 2020.
“End the War in Afghanistan and Unwind Post-9/11 Mistakes,” “End the War in Afghanistan and Unwind Post-9/11 Mistakes,” Defense Priorities, November , November
2020. 2020.
Peter Baker, “George Shultz Speaks Out for Renewing U.S. Leadership Overseas, At a Moment Peter Baker, “George Shultz Speaks Out for Renewing U.S. Leadership Overseas, At a Moment
When the United States Has Pulled Back from Its Allies, the Former Secretary of State Lamented When the United States Has Pulled Back from Its Allies, the Former Secretary of State Lamented
the Trump Administration’s Allergy to International Accords,” the Trump Administration’s Allergy to International Accords,” New York Times, October 31, , October 31,
(updated November 2), 2020. (updated November 2), 2020.
Michael Birnbaum and Loveday Morris, “Whether Trump or Biden Wins, Europe Doesn’t Think Michael Birnbaum and Loveday Morris, “Whether Trump or Biden Wins, Europe Doesn’t Think
It Can Depend on U.S.,” It Can Depend on U.S.,” Washington Post, October 31, 2020. , October 31, 2020.
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Zack Brown, “The Myth of American Primacy, Does Global Armed Dominance Still Pay?” Zack Brown, “The Myth of American Primacy, Does Global Armed Dominance Still Pay?”
National Interest, October 31, 2020. , October 31, 2020.
Karen DeYoung and Steve Hendrix, “Trump Critics Hail Accords between Israel and Arab Karen DeYoung and Steve Hendrix, “Trump Critics Hail Accords between Israel and Arab
Countries Even as Original Goal of Palestinian Peace Remains Unmet,” Countries Even as Original Goal of Palestinian Peace Remains Unmet,” Washington Post, ,
October 31, 2020. October 31, 2020.
Farah N. Jan Kolby Kaller, “Trump’s Big Mistake: America Is Making China Great Again, Farah N. Jan Kolby Kaller, “Trump’s Big Mistake: America Is Making China Great Again,
Beijing is Quietly Taking Advantage of American Isolationist Policies and is Advancing its Image Beijing is Quietly Taking Advantage of American Isolationist Policies and is Advancing its Image
as the Next Global Leader,” as the Next Global Leader,” National Interest, October 31, 2020. , October 31, 2020.
Timothy McLaughlin, “Trump Is a ‘Necessary Evil’ for Some, Despite His Own Assault on Timothy McLaughlin, “Trump Is a ‘Necessary Evil’ for Some, Despite His Own Assault on
Democratic Norms, the President Is Lauded in Parts of Asia for His Hawkishness Toward China,” Democratic Norms, the President Is Lauded in Parts of Asia for His Hawkishness Toward China,”
Atlantic, October 31, 2020. , October 31, 2020.
Dakota Wood, “The Myth of Endless Wars,” Dakota Wood, “The Myth of Endless Wars,” National Interest, October 31, 2020. , October 31, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Nation Building Overseas? America’s Own Neighborhood Is Becoming Ted Galen Carpenter, “Nation Building Overseas? America’s Own Neighborhood Is Becoming
More Violent, Mexico Is Descending Even Further into Carnage and Dysfunction. So Why Are More Violent, Mexico Is Descending Even Further into Carnage and Dysfunction. So Why Are
We So Focused on the Middle East?” We So Focused on the Middle East?” American Conservative, October 30, 2020. , October 30, 2020.
Thomas L. Friedman, “Trump Has Made the Whole World Darker,” Thomas L. Friedman, “Trump Has Made the Whole World Darker,” New York Times, October 30, , October 30,
2020. 2020.
Congressional Research Service 35 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Shalom Lipner, “Donald Trump’s Fire-Sale of International Peace Agreements, With Polls Shalom Lipner, “Donald Trump’s Fire-Sale of International Peace Agreements, With Polls
Indicating a Likely Biden Win, International Leaders Are Lining up to Cut Last-Second Bargains Indicating a Likely Biden Win, International Leaders Are Lining up to Cut Last-Second Bargains
with a Highly Transactional President Trump,” with a Highly Transactional President Trump,” National Interest, October 30, 2020. , October 30, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The ‘Adults In The Room’ With Trump Weren’t Adults At All, A New Book Tour Doug Bandow, “The ‘Adults In The Room’ With Trump Weren’t Adults At All, A New Book Tour
by H.R. McMaster Shows How Little the Foreign Policy Professionals Have Learned from Two by H.R. McMaster Shows How Little the Foreign Policy Professionals Have Learned from Two
Decades of Endless War,” Decades of Endless War,” American Conservative, October 29, 2020. , October 29, 2020.
Roger Cohen, “How Trump Lowered America’s Standing in the World,” Roger Cohen, “How Trump Lowered America’s Standing in the World,” New York Times, ,
October 29, 2020. October 29, 2020.
Tom McTague and Peter Nicholas, “How ‘America First’ Became America Alone, In His Tom McTague and Peter Nicholas, “How ‘America First’ Became America Alone, In His
Desperation to Restore and Showcase American Strength, Donald Trump Has Made the Country Desperation to Restore and Showcase American Strength, Donald Trump Has Made the Country
Weaker,” Weaker,” Atlantic, October 29, 2020. , October 29, 2020.
Kori Schake, “Threats and Border Walls Are Destroying the United States’ Biggest Strategic Kori Schake, “Threats and Border Walls Are Destroying the United States’ Biggest Strategic
Advantage, Restoring a Common Purpose with Canada and Mexico is the Lowest-Hanging Fruit Advantage, Restoring a Common Purpose with Canada and Mexico is the Lowest-Hanging Fruit
in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, October 29, 2020. , October 29, 2020.
Riley Walters, “How to Use the World Trade Organization to Deal with China,” Heritage Riley Walters, “How to Use the World Trade Organization to Deal with China,” Heritage
Foundation, October 29, 2020. Foundation, October 29, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “The Fight Over the World Trade Organization Has Begun,” Heritage James Jay Carafano, “The Fight Over the World Trade Organization Has Begun,” Heritage
Foundation, October 28, 2020. Foundation, October 28, 2020.
Steven A. Cook, “Trump’s Middle East Legacy Is Failure, The President Has Had a Handful of Steven A. Cook, “Trump’s Middle East Legacy Is Failure, The President Has Had a Handful of
Successes—But Never Anything Approaching a Strategy,” Successes—But Never Anything Approaching a Strategy,” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2020. , October 28, 2020.
Melanie Israel and Grace Melton, “The Trump Administration Won’t Accept Abortion as a Melanie Israel and Grace Melton, “The Trump Administration Won’t Accept Abortion as a
Human Right,” Heritage Foundation, October 28, 2020. Human Right,” Heritage Foundation, October 28, 2020.
Edward P. Joseph, “How Trump Lost the Balkans, The Administration’s See-No-Evil Diplomacy Edward P. Joseph, “How Trump Lost the Balkans, The Administration’s See-No-Evil Diplomacy
Has Produced a Dangerous Unraveling Across the Region,” Has Produced a Dangerous Unraveling Across the Region,” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2020. , October 28, 2020.
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Bonnie Kristian, “All U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Should Come Home by Christmas,” Bonnie Kristian, “All U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Should Come Home by Christmas,” National
Interest, October 28, 2020. , October 28, 2020.
Willis Krumholz, “America Enforcing a Core NATO Pledge Does Not Mean It’s Abandoning Willis Krumholz, “America Enforcing a Core NATO Pledge Does Not Mean It’s Abandoning
Allies,” Allies,” Defense News, October 28, 2020. , October 28, 2020.
Inu Manak, “WTO Director-General’s Race Shows the United States is Not Interested in Inu Manak, “WTO Director-General’s Race Shows the United States is Not Interested in
Reform,” Cato Institute, October 28, 2020. Reform,” Cato Institute, October 28, 2020.
James A. Winnefeld, Michael J. Morell, and Graham Allison, “Why American Strategy Fails, James A. Winnefeld, Michael J. Morell, and Graham Allison, “Why American Strategy Fails,
Ending the Chronic Imbalance Between Ends and Means,” Ending the Chronic Imbalance Between Ends and Means,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2020. , October 28, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Trump Team Reinforces a Fundamental Reality: China Must Change,” Joseph Bosco, “Trump Team Reinforces a Fundamental Reality: China Must Change,” The Hill, ,
October 27, 2020. October 27, 2020.
Colum Lynch, Amy Mackinnon, Robbie Gramer, “Trump Appointee Seeks to Turn U.S. Media Colum Lynch, Amy Mackinnon, Robbie Gramer, “Trump Appointee Seeks to Turn U.S. Media
Agency Into a Political Cheerleader,” Agency Into a Political Cheerleader,” Foreign Policy, October 27, 2020. , October 27, 2020.
Will Moreland, “To Compete with China and Russia, America Needs a New Era of Will Moreland, “To Compete with China and Russia, America Needs a New Era of
Mmultilateralism, Progressives Want to Revive Global Cooperation. But the US Must Compete, Mmultilateralism, Progressives Want to Revive Global Cooperation. But the US Must Compete,
Not Just Cooperate,” Not Just Cooperate,” Vox, October 27, 2020. , October 27, 2020.
Rebecca Ray, “Donald Trump’s Trade Wars Did More Harm Than Good,” Rebecca Ray, “Donald Trump’s Trade Wars Did More Harm Than Good,” National Interest, t,
October 27, 2020. October 27, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 36 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Charles A. Kupchan, “What Americans Can Learn From Their Isolationist Past,” Charles A. Kupchan, “What Americans Can Learn From Their Isolationist Past,” National
Interest, October 26, 2020. , October 26, 2020.
Michael Lind, “Why America First Is Here To Stay, Even if Donald Trump Is Defeated,” Michael Lind, “Why America First Is Here To Stay, Even if Donald Trump Is Defeated,” National
Interest, October 26, 2020. , October 26, 2020.
Philip Zelikow, “The U.S. Foreign Service Isn’t Suited for the 21st Century, Created for Another Philip Zelikow, “The U.S. Foreign Service Isn’t Suited for the 21st Century, Created for Another
Age, Washington’s Foreign-Policy Institutions Have Atrophied. The Next Administration Should Age, Washington’s Foreign-Policy Institutions Have Atrophied. The Next Administration Should
Rebuild and Reshape Them,” Rebuild and Reshape Them,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2020. , October 26, 2020.
Philip Rucker and Shane Harris, “Tumult at Home, Ailing Alliances Abroad: Why Trump’s Philip Rucker and Shane Harris, “Tumult at Home, Ailing Alliances Abroad: Why Trump’s
America Has Been a ‘Gift’ to Putin,” America Has Been a ‘Gift’ to Putin,” Washington Post, October 25, 2020. , October 25, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Trump and Biden Are Both Touting Foreign-Policy Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Trump and Biden Are Both Touting Foreign-Policy
Failures as Achievements,” Failures as Achievements,” Foreign Policy, October 23, 2020. , October 23, 2020.
Daniel Davis, “Risk to America of Maintaining Forever-War Status Quo Dangerously High,” Daniel Davis, “Risk to America of Maintaining Forever-War Status Quo Dangerously High,”
Military Times, October 23, 2020. , October 23, 2020.
Editorial Board, “The Arab-Israeli Peace Cascade,” Editorial Board, “The Arab-Israeli Peace Cascade,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2020. , October 23, 2020.
Van Jackson and Hunter Marston, “Trump, Not Biden, Wrecked American Power in the Pacific, Van Jackson and Hunter Marston, “Trump, Not Biden, Wrecked American Power in the Pacific,
The Damage Done to U.S. Standing in Asia Will Take Decades to Repair,” The Damage Done to U.S. Standing in Asia Will Take Decades to Repair,” Foreign Policy, ,
October 23, 2020. October 23, 2020.
Jeffrey A. Stacey, “The Era of Full-Spectrum War Is Here, China Won Round One, and Round Jeffrey A. Stacey, “The Era of Full-Spectrum War Is Here, China Won Round One, and Round
Two Went to Russia. Can the United States and Its Allies Take the Third?” Two Went to Russia. Can the United States and Its Allies Take the Third?” Foreign Policy, ,
October 23, 2020. October 23, 2020.
Katie Bo Williams and Patrick Tucker, “What Would a Second Trump Term Mean For Foreign Katie Bo Williams and Patrick Tucker, “What Would a Second Trump Term Mean For Foreign
Policy?” Policy?” Defense One, October 23, 2020. , October 23, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “America’s Language of Mass Destruction Convinces Nobody,” Doug Bandow, “America’s Language of Mass Destruction Convinces Nobody,” Foreign Policy, ,
October 22, 2020. October 22, 2020.
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Matthew Duss, “U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror, Only a Matthew Duss, “U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror, Only a
Reckoning With the Disastrous Legacy of 9/11 Can Heal the United States,” Reckoning With the Disastrous Legacy of 9/11 Can Heal the United States,” Foreign Affairs, ,
October 22, 2020. October 22, 2020.
Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes, Alexandra Murphy, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes, Alexandra Murphy, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J.
Tierney, “Poll: How Biden and Trump Differ on Foreign Policy, A Survey of Academics Tierney, “Poll: How Biden and Trump Differ on Foreign Policy, A Survey of Academics
Underscores Sharp Divergences on Key Issues but Expects Bipartisan Alignment Next Year on Underscores Sharp Divergences on Key Issues but Expects Bipartisan Alignment Next Year on
China, Cybersecurity, and counterterrorism,” China, Cybersecurity, and counterterrorism,” Foreign Policy, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
Steven Erlanger, “Europe Wonders if It Can Rely on U.S. Again, Whoever Wins, America’s Steven Erlanger, “Europe Wonders if It Can Rely on U.S. Again, Whoever Wins, America’s
Deeply Polarized Politics Have Marked Foreign Policy, Too, Undermining Washington’s Deeply Polarized Politics Have Marked Foreign Policy, Too, Undermining Washington’s
Authority and Reputation for Reliability,” Authority and Reputation for Reliability,” New York Times, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
Jamie McIntyre, “Trump’s Four-Year National Security Report Card: As, Bs, Cs, and Several Jamie McIntyre, “Trump’s Four-Year National Security Report Card: As, Bs, Cs, and Several
Incompletes,” Incompletes,” Washington Examiner, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
Rodger A. Payne and Kurt Mills, “Does Donald Trump’s America First Strategy Mean Human Rodger A. Payne and Kurt Mills, “Does Donald Trump’s America First Strategy Mean Human
Rights Last?” Rights Last?” National Interest, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “Trump Or Biden Can Still Fix America’s Failing Foreign Policy,” Daniel L. Davis, “Trump Or Biden Can Still Fix America’s Failing Foreign Policy,” National
Interest, October 21, 2020. , October 21, 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President, For All Charles A. Kupchan, “America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President, For All
the Talk of a New Administration Boldly Reengaging With the World After Four Years of the Talk of a New Administration Boldly Reengaging With the World After Four Years of
Congressional Research Service 37 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress ‘America First,’ Trump’s Strategic Retrenchment Can Only Be the Start,” ‘America First,’ Trump’s Strategic Retrenchment Can Only Be the Start,” Foreign Policy, ,
October 21, 2020. October 21, 2020.
Tom McTague and Peter Nicholas, “The World Order That Donald Trump Revealed, When It Tom McTague and Peter Nicholas, “The World Order That Donald Trump Revealed, When It
Comes to Foreign Policy, the President’s Most Important Characteristic Is Not Amorality or a Comes to Foreign Policy, the President’s Most Important Characteristic Is Not Amorality or a
Lack of Curiosity; It Is Naïveté,” Lack of Curiosity; It Is Naïveté,” Atlantic, October 20, 2020. , October 20, 2020.
Loren Thompson, “Get Ready For President Biden To Throw U.S. Security Policies Into Loren Thompson, “Get Ready For President Biden To Throw U.S. Security Policies Into
Reverse,” Reverse,” Forbes, October 20, 2020. , October 20, 2020.
Dan Caldwell, “The Politics of Restraint,” Dan Caldwell, “The Politics of Restraint,” Real Clear World, October 19, 2020. , October 19, 2020.
CAP National Security and International Policy Team, “The First 100 Days: Toward a More CAP National Security and International Policy Team, “The First 100 Days: Toward a More
Sustainable and Values-Based National Security Approach,” Center for American Progress Sustainable and Values-Based National Security Approach,” Center for American Progress
(CAP), October 19, 2020. (CAP), October 19, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “It’s Not NATO, but Quad Group Can Get Results in Asia,” Heritage James Jay Carafano, “It’s Not NATO, but Quad Group Can Get Results in Asia,” Heritage
Foundation, October 19, 2020. Foundation, October 19, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “What Americans Want in Foreign Policy (No Matter if Biden or Trump Wins),” Daniel L. Davis, “What Americans Want in Foreign Policy (No Matter if Biden or Trump Wins),”
National Interest, October 19, 2020. , October 19, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “The Dangerous Decline of U.S. Diplomacy,” Michael Rubin, “The Dangerous Decline of U.S. Diplomacy,” National Interest, October 19, , October 19,
2020. 2020.
Michelle Fitzpatrick, “EU-US Alliance ‘On Life Support’ After Four Years of Trump,” Michelle Fitzpatrick, “EU-US Alliance ‘On Life Support’ After Four Years of Trump,” Agence
France-Presse, October 18, 2020. , October 18, 2020.
Pranshu Verma, “Trump’s Sanctions on International Court May Do Little Beyond Alienating Pranshu Verma, “Trump’s Sanctions on International Court May Do Little Beyond Alienating
Allies,” Allies,” New York Times, October 18, 2020. , October 18, 2020.
George Beebe, “Balancing Great Power Politics in 2021 and Beyond, The Distance Between U.S. George Beebe, “Balancing Great Power Politics in 2021 and Beyond, The Distance Between U.S.
Aspirations for Dealing with Great Power Rivals and Its Capacity for Reaching Its Goals Has Aspirations for Dealing with Great Power Rivals and Its Capacity for Reaching Its Goals Has
Never Been Greater,” Never Been Greater,” National Interest, October 17, 2020. , October 17, 2020.
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Hans Binnendijk, America Is Clearly in Decline. But It Can Be Reversed,” Hans Binnendijk, America Is Clearly in Decline. But It Can Be Reversed,” National Interest, ,
October 17, 2020. October 17, 2020.
Serge Schmemann, “The Foreign Policy That Wasn’t,” Serge Schmemann, “The Foreign Policy That Wasn’t,” New York Times, October 16, 2020. , October 16, 2020.
Eric Schmitt, “Trump’s Tweets on Troop Withdrawals Unnerve Pentagon, The President’s Eric Schmitt, “Trump’s Tweets on Troop Withdrawals Unnerve Pentagon, The President’s
Demands to Draw Down Forces in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria Seek to Fulfill a Campaign Demands to Draw Down Forces in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria Seek to Fulfill a Campaign
Promise. But Officials Warn Rapid Troop Reductions Could Bolster Adversaries,” Promise. But Officials Warn Rapid Troop Reductions Could Bolster Adversaries,” New York
Times, October 15 (updated October 21), 2020. , October 15 (updated October 21), 2020.
Stephen Wertheim, “America Has No Reason to Be So Powerful, Eighty Years Ago, the United Stephen Wertheim, “America Has No Reason to Be So Powerful, Eighty Years Ago, the United
States Made a Tragic Decision to Pursue Global Supremacy. The Project Has Outlived Its States Made a Tragic Decision to Pursue Global Supremacy. The Project Has Outlived Its
Purpose,” Purpose,” New York Times, October 15, 2020. , October 15, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, Luke Coffey, and Daniel Kochis, “A Golden Opportunity for the U.S. to James Jay Carafano, Luke Coffey, and Daniel Kochis, “A Golden Opportunity for the U.S. to
Lead NATO Into the Future,” Heritage Foundation, October 14, 2020. Lead NATO Into the Future,” Heritage Foundation, October 14, 2020.
Olivia Enos and Emilie Kao, “Religious Persecution in China Must Be Called Out,” Heritage Olivia Enos and Emilie Kao, “Religious Persecution in China Must Be Called Out,” Heritage
Foundation, October 14, 2020. Foundation, October 14, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, “Trump’s Foreign-Policy Adventures Haven’t All Flopped, For All the Chaos, Robbie Gramer, “Trump’s Foreign-Policy Adventures Haven’t All Flopped, For All the Chaos,
the Trump Administration Has Notched Some Notable Victories Abroad. The Question Is the Trump Administration Has Notched Some Notable Victories Abroad. The Question Is
Whether They Outweigh Everything Else Trump Brought to Washington—and the World,” Whether They Outweigh Everything Else Trump Brought to Washington—and the World,”
Foreign Policy, October 14, 2020. , October 14, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 38 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Ezra Klein, “The Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy, The President Has Shifted How Both Parties Ezra Klein, “The Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy, The President Has Shifted How Both Parties
Think About Trade, Alliances, Russia, and China. Is That a Good Thing?” Think About Trade, Alliances, Russia, and China. Is That a Good Thing?” Vox, October 14, 2020. , October 14, 2020.
Scott Lincicome, “Calculating the True Cost of Trump’s ‘Trade Wars,’” Cato Institute, October Scott Lincicome, “Calculating the True Cost of Trump’s ‘Trade Wars,’” Cato Institute, October
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
Jamie McIntyre, “Trump Pledge to ‘End Endless Wars’ Reportedly Targets Somalia for Next US Jamie McIntyre, “Trump Pledge to ‘End Endless Wars’ Reportedly Targets Somalia for Next US
Troop Withdrawal,” Troop Withdrawal,” Washington Examiner, October 14, 2020. , October 14, 2020.
James Jay Carafano and Ana Rosa Quintana, “U.S. Empowering Women to Bolster Peace and James Jay Carafano and Ana Rosa Quintana, “U.S. Empowering Women to Bolster Peace and
Security,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2020. Security,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2020.
Luke Coffey, “Managing America’s Alliance System,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2020. Luke Coffey, “Managing America’s Alliance System,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2020.
Richard Fontaine, “America Must Promote Democracy, Despite Trump’s Disdain for It, Even If Richard Fontaine, “America Must Promote Democracy, Despite Trump’s Disdain for It, Even If
2020 Marks a Low Point of U.S. Democratic Practice, Supporting Liberalism Abroad Must 2020 Marks a Low Point of U.S. Democratic Practice, Supporting Liberalism Abroad Must
Remain a Vital Element of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Remain a Vital Element of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2020. , October 13, 2020.
Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Demands a Plan to Withdraw U.S. Troops From Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Demands a Plan to Withdraw U.S. Troops From
Somalia,” Somalia,” Bloomberg, October 13, 2020. , October 13, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “A World of Geopolitical Opportunity, America’s Global Position Is Walter Russell Mead, “A World of Geopolitical Opportunity, America’s Global Position Is
Stronger Today Than in 2016 in Some Important Ways,” Stronger Today Than in 2016 in Some Important Ways,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2020. , October 12, 2020.
Michael Crowley, “Trump’s Campaign Talk of Troop Withdrawals Doesn’t Match Military Michael Crowley, “Trump’s Campaign Talk of Troop Withdrawals Doesn’t Match Military
Reality,” Reality,” New York Times, October 11 (updated October 22), 2020. , October 11 (updated October 22), 2020.
David M. Halbfinger, Ben Hubbard, and Farnaz Fassihi, “For Trump, Defying Mideast Truisms David M. Halbfinger, Ben Hubbard, and Farnaz Fassihi, “For Trump, Defying Mideast Truisms
Produced Breakthroughs and Backfires, Disregarding Norms and Accepted Wisdom, President Produced Breakthroughs and Backfires, Disregarding Norms and Accepted Wisdom, President
Trump Went His Own Way in the Middle East and, in Some Cases, Got What He Wanted,” Trump Went His Own Way in the Middle East and, in Some Cases, Got What He Wanted,” New
York Times, October 11 (updated October 22), 2020. , October 11 (updated October 22), 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Continuing Vandalism of the Voice of America,” Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Continuing Vandalism of the Voice of America,” Washington Post, ,
October 11, 2020. October 11, 2020.
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Editorial Board, “Trump’s Latest Rantings Will Please the Taliban, If No One Else,” Editorial Board, “Trump’s Latest Rantings Will Please the Taliban, If No One Else,” Washington
Post, October 9, 2020. , October 9, 2020.
Ravi Agrawal, “Why the Quad Is the One Alliance Trump Cares About, The United States May Ravi Agrawal, “Why the Quad Is the One Alliance Trump Cares About, The United States May
Shun Multilateralism, But It Is Successfully Uniting Australia, India, and Japan against China,” Shun Multilateralism, But It Is Successfully Uniting Australia, India, and Japan against China,”
Foreign Policy, October 8, 2020. , October 8, 2020.
Lolita C. Baldor and Kathy Gannon, “Military Blindsided by Trump’s New Afghan Troop Lolita C. Baldor and Kathy Gannon, “Military Blindsided by Trump’s New Afghan Troop
Withdrawal,” Withdrawal,” Associated Press, October 8, 2020. , October 8, 2020.
Joshua Keating, “Mike Pence and Donald Trump Have Two Different Foreign Policies, They Joshua Keating, “Mike Pence and Donald Trump Have Two Different Foreign Policies, They
Only Occasionally Overlap,” Only Occasionally Overlap,” Slate, October 8, 2020. , October 8, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “U.S. Foreign Policy Might Be Too Broken for Biden to Fix,” Josh Rogin, “U.S. Foreign Policy Might Be Too Broken for Biden to Fix,” Washington Post, ,
October 8, 2020. October 8, 2020.
Missy Ryan, Karen DeYoung, and Susannah George, “After Trump Promises a Swift Troop Exit Missy Ryan, Karen DeYoung, and Susannah George, “After Trump Promises a Swift Troop Exit
from Afghanistan, Confusion Grows About U.S. Stance,” from Afghanistan, Confusion Grows About U.S. Stance,” Washington Post, October 8, 2020. , October 8, 2020.
Lara Seligman and Connor O’Brien, “Trump Undercuts His National Security Adviser on Troop Lara Seligman and Connor O’Brien, “Trump Undercuts His National Security Adviser on Troop
Withdrawal,” Withdrawal,” Politico, October 8, 2020. , October 8, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “Prioritizing Global Freedom and Prosperity at the United Nations and Brett D. Schaefer, “Prioritizing Global Freedom and Prosperity at the United Nations and
International Organizations,” Heritage Foundation, October 8, 2020. International Organizations,” Heritage Foundation, October 8, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 39 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Philip Stephens, “Democracy Faces Bigger Threats Than Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, Western Philip Stephens, “Democracy Faces Bigger Threats Than Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, Western
Governments Must Counter Autocrat Aggression, But Saving Democracy Starts at Home,” Governments Must Counter Autocrat Aggression, But Saving Democracy Starts at Home,”
Financial Times, October 8, 2020. , October 8, 2020.
Mike Gonzalez and Helle Dale, “The Axis of Disruption,” Heritage Foundation, October 7, 2020. Mike Gonzalez and Helle Dale, “The Axis of Disruption,” Heritage Foundation, October 7, 2020.
David Ignatius, “The Rest of the World Is Taking Advantage of a Distracted America,” David Ignatius, “The Rest of the World Is Taking Advantage of a Distracted America,”
Washington Post, October 6, 2020. , October 6, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “South Korea Doesn’t Need U.S. Military Babysitting,” Doug Bandow, “South Korea Doesn’t Need U.S. Military Babysitting,” Foreign Policy, October , October
2, 2020. 2, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “How Our Pointless Wars Made Life Hell For Religious Minorities,” Doug Bandow, “How Our Pointless Wars Made Life Hell For Religious Minorities,” American
Conservative, October 1, 2020. , October 1, 2020.
Eric Brewer, “Why Trump’s Retreat from US Allies Could Have Nuclear Consequences, For Eric Brewer, “Why Trump’s Retreat from US Allies Could Have Nuclear Consequences, For
Decades, America Gave Allies and Partners Good Reason to Shelve Their Nuclear-Weapons Decades, America Gave Allies and Partners Good Reason to Shelve Their Nuclear-Weapons
Efforts,” Efforts,” Defense One, October 1, 2020. , October 1, 2020.
Lewis Libby and Hillel Fradkin, “The UAE/Bahrain–Israel Deal: A Time for Celebration and Lewis Libby and Hillel Fradkin, “The UAE/Bahrain–Israel Deal: A Time for Celebration and
Critical Self-Reflection,” Critical Self-Reflection,” National Review, October 1, 2020. , October 1, 2020.
Grace Melton, “U.N. Should Recommit to Pro-Woman Agenda by Dropping Push for Abortion,” Grace Melton, “U.N. Should Recommit to Pro-Woman Agenda by Dropping Push for Abortion,”
Heritage Foundation, October 1, 2020. Heritage Foundation, October 1, 2020.
Charles Ray and Kevin Green, “Needed: American Diplomacy, Defense, Democracy, In the Past Charles Ray and Kevin Green, “Needed: American Diplomacy, Defense, Democracy, In the Past
Century the World Has Seen What Happens When the United States Leads and When It Does Century the World Has Seen What Happens When the United States Leads and When It Does
Not. We’re All Better Off When It Does,” Not. We’re All Better Off When It Does,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2020. , October 2020.
Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “Trump Officials Seek to Push Social Conservative Values in Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “Trump Officials Seek to Push Social Conservative Values in
International Agreements,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2020. International Agreements,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2020.
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Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “A Foreign Policy for the Day After Trump, Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “A Foreign Policy for the Day After Trump,
Reimagining—not Restoring—the Liberal International Order,” Reimagining—not Restoring—the Liberal International Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 30, , September 30,
2020. 2020.
Wesley J. Smith, “Does Pompeo Care More about Chinese Catholics than the Pope Does?” Wesley J. Smith, “Does Pompeo Care More about Chinese Catholics than the Pope Does?”
National Review, September 30, 2020. ew, September 30, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “What a Second Trump Term Would Mean for the World,” Thomas Wright, “What a Second Trump Term Would Mean for the World,” Atlantic, September , September
30, 2020. 30, 2020.
Jonathan Alter, “How the United States Learned to Love Human Rights,” Jonathan Alter, “How the United States Learned to Love Human Rights,” Foreign Policy, ,
September 29, 2020. September 29, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Mike Pompeo’s South America Trip Demonstrates Need for Sustained James Jay Carafano, “Mike Pompeo’s South America Trip Demonstrates Need for Sustained
Commitment,” Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2020. Commitment,” Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2020.
Amitai Etzioni, “America Has a Shameful Double Standard on Human Rights,” Amitai Etzioni, “America Has a Shameful Double Standard on Human Rights,” National Interest, ,
September 29, 2020. September 29, 2020.
Augusta Saraiva, “Washington’s ‘Blind Eye’ Toward Human Rights Abuses in Latin America,” Augusta Saraiva, “Washington’s ‘Blind Eye’ Toward Human Rights Abuses in Latin America,”
Foreign Policy, September 29, 2020. , September 29, 2020.
Brett Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “The Human Rights Council Must Reform to Earn U.S. Re- Brett Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “The Human Rights Council Must Reform to Earn U.S. Re-
Engagement,” Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2020. Engagement,” Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2020.
Alexander Vindman and John Gans, “Trump Has Sold Off America’s Credibility for His Personal Alexander Vindman and John Gans, “Trump Has Sold Off America’s Credibility for His Personal
Gain,” Gain,” New York Times, September 29, 2020. , September 29, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 40 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Joschka Fischer, “The Transatlantic Tragedy,” Joschka Fischer, “The Transatlantic Tragedy,” Project Syndicate, September 28, 2020. , September 28, 2020.
Seth J. Frantzman, “Can Trump’s ‘Transactional’ Diplomacy Get More Wins in the Middle East? Seth J. Frantzman, “Can Trump’s ‘Transactional’ Diplomacy Get More Wins in the Middle East?
In One Sense This Transactional Diplomacy Is Not Entirely Foreign to the Nature of US Foreign In One Sense This Transactional Diplomacy Is Not Entirely Foreign to the Nature of US Foreign
Policy Over the Last Two Hundred Years,” Policy Over the Last Two Hundred Years,” Jerusalem Post, September 28, 2020. , September 28, 2020.
Susan B. Glasser, “Biden Will Restore America’s Moral Leadership,” Susan B. Glasser, “Biden Will Restore America’s Moral Leadership,” New Yorker, September 28, , September 28,
2020. 2020.
Donna Rachel Edmunds, “Pompeo: The Chinese Communist Party is re-writing the Bible, Donna Rachel Edmunds, “Pompeo: The Chinese Communist Party is re-writing the Bible,
Speaking at a Recent Summit, State Secretary Mike Pompeo Said That America Was Standing Up Speaking at a Recent Summit, State Secretary Mike Pompeo Said That America Was Standing Up
for Religious Freedom Worldwide, As Where It Fails, Totalitarism [sic] Soon Follows,” for Religious Freedom Worldwide, As Where It Fails, Totalitarism [sic] Soon Follows,”
Jerusalem Post, September 27, 2020. , September 27, 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “ Charles A. Kupchan, “Isolationism Is Not a Dirty Word, Americans Have Lost Touch With a Is Not a Dirty Word, Americans Have Lost Touch With a
Crucial Strain of Their Foreign-Policy Tradition,” Crucial Strain of Their Foreign-Policy Tradition,” Atlantic, September 27, 2020. , September 27, 2020.
James Goldgeier and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The United States Is Not Entitled to Lead the World, James Goldgeier and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The United States Is Not Entitled to Lead the World,
Washington Should Take A Seat at the Table—But Not Always at Its Head,” Washington Should Take A Seat at the Table—But Not Always at Its Head,” Foreign Affairs, ,
September 25, 2020. September 25, 2020.
Evan Osnos, “The TikTok Fiasco Reflects the Bankruptcy of Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Evan Osnos, “The TikTok Fiasco Reflects the Bankruptcy of Trump’s Foreign Policy,” New
Yorker, September 25, 2020. , September 25, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “Europe Makes Its Choice,” Jimmy Quinn, “Europe Makes Its Choice,” National Review, September 25, 2020. , September 25, 2020.
William J. Burns, “The Blob Meets the Heartland, Foreign Policy Should Work Better for William J. Burns, “The Blob Meets the Heartland, Foreign Policy Should Work Better for
America’s Middle Class,” America’s Middle Class,” Atlantic, September 24, 2020. , September 24, 2020.
Kristine Lee, “The United States Can’t Quit on the UN, When America Withdraws, China Wins,” Kristine Lee, “The United States Can’t Quit on the UN, When America Withdraws, China Wins,”
Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2020. , September 24, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Armstrong Williams, “How Donald Trump Is Shaping History, At the End of the Day, There Is Armstrong Williams, “How Donald Trump Is Shaping History, At the End of the Day, There Is
Only One Person in Charge, One Person to Whom We Can Credit This Deal That So Many Only One Person in Charge, One Person to Whom We Can Credit This Deal That So Many
Doubters Thought Would Never Come. That Person is Donald Trump,” Doubters Thought Would Never Come. That Person is Donald Trump,” National Interest, ,
September 24, 2020. September 24, 2020.
William J. Burns and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “The Transformation of Diplomacy, How to William J. Burns and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “The Transformation of Diplomacy, How to
Save the State Department,” Save the State Department,” Foreign Affairs, September 23, 2020. , September 23, 2020.
Zachary Cohen, “Trump Says He Likes Putin. US Intelligence Says Russia Is Attacking American Zachary Cohen, “Trump Says He Likes Putin. US Intelligence Says Russia Is Attacking American
Democracy,” Democracy,” CNN, September 22, 2020. , September 22, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Contempt for Truth Leaves a Toxic Legacy Around the World,” Editorial Board, “Trump’s Contempt for Truth Leaves a Toxic Legacy Around the World,”
Washington Post, September 22, 2020. , September 22, 2020.
Jen Kirby, “At the UN, China’s Xi Showed He Understands the System Better Than Trump, The Jen Kirby, “At the UN, China’s Xi Showed He Understands the System Better Than Trump, The
US Is Ceding Leverage, Which Is Giving China the Influence It Craves,” US Is Ceding Leverage, Which Is Giving China the Influence It Craves,” Vox, September 22, , September 22,
2020. 2020.
Grant Newsham, “Did Trump Really Spoil America’s Asia Alliances? In Reality, Trump Has Grant Newsham, “Did Trump Really Spoil America’s Asia Alliances? In Reality, Trump Has
Moved US Closer to India, Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian Allies Than His Predecessor Moved US Closer to India, Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian Allies Than His Predecessor
Ever Did,” Ever Did,” Asia Times, September 22, 2020. , September 22, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “In U.N. Speech, Trump Highlights U.S. Response to COVID-19, Faults Brett D. Schaefer, “In U.N. Speech, Trump Highlights U.S. Response to COVID-19, Faults
China,” Heritage Foundation, September 22, 2020. China,” Heritage Foundation, September 22, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 41 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress F. Cartwright Weiland, “Pompeo’s Critics Misrepresent the Commission on Unalienable Rights, F. Cartwright Weiland, “Pompeo’s Critics Misrepresent the Commission on Unalienable Rights,
The NGOs and Activists Criticizing the Commission’s Inaugural Report Are Distorting Its The NGOs and Activists Criticizing the Commission’s Inaugural Report Are Distorting Its
Contents,” Contents,” Foreign Policy, September 22, 2020. , September 22, 2020.
WSJ Staff, “Where Trump and Biden Stand on China, Hard Line on Beijing Likely to Continue WSJ Staff, “Where Trump and Biden Stand on China, Hard Line on Beijing Likely to Continue
Regardless of U.S. Election Outcome,” Regardless of U.S. Election Outcome,” Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2020. , September 22, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Isolated at U.N. as Push to Ramp Up Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Isolated at U.N. as Push to Ramp Up
Pressure on Iran Fails,” Pressure on Iran Fails,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2020. , September 21, 2020.
Nahal Toosi, “The Trump Foreign Policies Biden Might Keep,” Nahal Toosi, “The Trump Foreign Policies Biden Might Keep,” Politico, September 21, 2020. , September 21, 2020.
Nick Wadhams and David Wainer, “U.S. Issues New Iran Sanctions, But Most Nations Reject Nick Wadhams and David Wainer, “U.S. Issues New Iran Sanctions, But Most Nations Reject
Move at UN,” Move at UN,” Bloomberg, September 21, 2020. , September 21, 2020.
Douglas Bulloch, “A Method in the Madness? Donald Trump Restores ‘Interests’ to the Center of Douglas Bulloch, “A Method in the Madness? Donald Trump Restores ‘Interests’ to the Center of
U.S. Foreign Policy,” U.S. Foreign Policy,” National Interest, September 20, 2020. , September 20, 2020.
Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Where Trump and Biden Stand on Foreign Policy, Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Where Trump and Biden Stand on Foreign Policy,
President Has Questioned U.S. Alliances, While Democratic Challenger Wants to Rebuild President Has Questioned U.S. Alliances, While Democratic Challenger Wants to Rebuild
Relationships After the Election; Both Are Wary of Troop Deployments,” Relationships After the Election; Both Are Wary of Troop Deployments,” Wall Street Journal, ,
September 19, 2020. September 19, 2020.
Andrew Bacevich, “The Endless Fantasy of American Power, Neither Trump Nor Biden Aims to Andrew Bacevich, “The Endless Fantasy of American Power, Neither Trump Nor Biden Aims to
Demilitarize Foreign Policy,” Demilitarize Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2020. , September 18, 2020.
Matthew Continetti, “How Trump Changed the World, Column: By Defying Conventional Matthew Continetti, “How Trump Changed the World, Column: By Defying Conventional
Wisdom on the Middle East and China, He Reshaped Both Political Parties,” Wisdom on the Middle East and China, He Reshaped Both Political Parties,” Washington Free
Beacon, September 18, 2020. , September 18, 2020.
Rich Lowry, “Jared Kushner Was Right,” Rich Lowry, “Jared Kushner Was Right,” National Review, September 18, 2020. , September 18, 2020.
Yuki Tatsumi, “Needed: Restoration of U.S. Credibility in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Stimson Yuki Tatsumi, “Needed: Restoration of U.S. Credibility in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Stimson
Center, September 18, 2020. Center, September 18, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Dan Balz and Scott Clement, “Poll: Sharp Partisan Differences Now Exist on Foreign Policy, Dan Balz and Scott Clement, “Poll: Sharp Partisan Differences Now Exist on Foreign Policy,
Views of American Exceptionalism,” Views of American Exceptionalism,” Washington Post, September 17, 2020. , September 17, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Trump Challenges Pro-War Foreign Policy Elite,” Doug Bandow, “Trump Challenges Pro-War Foreign Policy Elite,” American Conservative, ,
September 17, 2020. September 17, 2020.
Kevin Baron, “Nobody Wants America to Rule the World, Foreign Confidence in the U.S. Is Kevin Baron, “Nobody Wants America to Rule the World, Foreign Confidence in the U.S. Is
Sinking Even Faster Than the Share of Americans Who See the Benefits of Engagement Beyond Sinking Even Faster Than the Share of Americans Who See the Benefits of Engagement Beyond
Our Borders,” Our Borders,” Defense One, September 17, 2020. , September 17, 2020.
David Harsanyi, “Why Trump’s Mideast Peace Deals Matter,” David Harsanyi, “Why Trump’s Mideast Peace Deals Matter,” National Review, September 17, , September 17,
2020. 2020.
David Ignatius, “The Middle East’s Winners and Losers After Trump’s First Term Are Telling,” David Ignatius, “The Middle East’s Winners and Losers After Trump’s First Term Are Telling,”
Washington Post, September 17, 2020. , September 17, 2020.
Eli Lake, “The Kurds Have Paid Dearly for Trump’s Recklessness, A New Report Details the Eli Lake, “The Kurds Have Paid Dearly for Trump’s Recklessness, A New Report Details the
Horrific Consequences of the U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Last Year,” Horrific Consequences of the U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Last Year,” Bloomberg, September 17, , September 17,
2020. 2020.
David McKean and Bart M. J. Szewczyk, “The World Still Needs a United West, How Europe David McKean and Bart M. J. Szewczyk, “The World Still Needs a United West, How Europe
and the United States Can Renew Their Alliance,” and the United States Can Renew Their Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, September 17, 2020. , September 17, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 42 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm, Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm, Divided We Stand,
Democrats and Republicans Diverge on US Foreign Policy, Results of the 2020 Chicago Council
Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, , Chicago Council on Global Affairs,
undated, released September 17, 2020, 47 pp. undated, released September 17, 2020, 47 pp.
Sylvie Kauffmann, “Can Biden Fix What Trump Broke? E.U. Leaders Are Still Learning to Sylvie Kauffmann, “Can Biden Fix What Trump Broke? E.U. Leaders Are Still Learning to
Navigate a World Ever More Dangerous for Them, While Relations with the United States Grow Navigate a World Ever More Dangerous for Them, While Relations with the United States Grow
More and More Awkward,” More and More Awkward,” New York Times, September 16, 2020. , September 16, 2020.
Kevin D. Willioamson, “The World Sours on Washington, Our Credibility Is Waning, and We Kevin D. Willioamson, “The World Sours on Washington, Our Credibility Is Waning, and We
Should Care,” Should Care,” National Review, September 16, 2020. , September 16, 2020.
Jon B. Alterman, “Stumbling Out of the Middle East is No Better Than Stumbling In,” Jon B. Alterman, “Stumbling Out of the Middle East is No Better Than Stumbling In,” Defense
One, September 15, 2020. , September 15, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Successes Confound His Detractors,” Joseph Bosco, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Successes Confound His Detractors,” The Hill, ,
September 15, 2020. September 15, 2020.
Alison Durkee, “U.S. Popularity Plummets Worldwide Amid Widely Criticized Coronavirus Alison Durkee, “U.S. Popularity Plummets Worldwide Amid Widely Criticized Coronavirus
Response, Poll Finds,” Response, Poll Finds,” Forbes, September 15, 2020. , September 15, 2020.
Rich Lowry, “How Trump Defied the Experts and Forged a Breakthrough in the Middle East,” Rich Lowry, “How Trump Defied the Experts and Forged a Breakthrough in the Middle East,”
National Review, September 15, 2020. , September 15, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “When the United States Stands Alone,” Jimmy Quinn, “When the United States Stands Alone,” National Review, September 15, 2020. , September 15, 2020.
Oma Seddiq, “Trump Is Less Trusted Than Putin and Xi and the US Is Hitting Historic Lows of Oma Seddiq, “Trump Is Less Trusted Than Putin and Xi and the US Is Hitting Historic Lows of
Approval from Its Closest Allies,” Approval from Its Closest Allies,” Business Insider, September 15, 2020. , September 15, 2020.
Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Faced with Russia Crises, Trump and Top Aides Strike Different Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Faced with Russia Crises, Trump and Top Aides Strike Different
Tones,” Tones,” Washington Post, September 15, 2020. st, September 15, 2020.
Adam Taylor, “Global Views of U.S. Plunge to New Lows Amid Pandemic, Poll Finds,” Adam Taylor, “Global Views of U.S. Plunge to New Lows Amid Pandemic, Poll Finds,”
Washington Post, September 15, 2020. st, September 15, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as
Most Say Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2020. Most Say Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2020.
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Alexander Vindman: Trump Is Putin’s ‘Useful Idiot,’” Jeffrey Goldberg, “Alexander Vindman: Trump Is Putin’s ‘Useful Idiot,’” Atlantic, September 14, , September 14,
2020. 2020.
Joseph Krauss, “Trump’s Mideast Deals Tout ‘Peace’ Where There Was Never War,” Joseph Krauss, “Trump’s Mideast Deals Tout ‘Peace’ Where There Was Never War,” Associated
Press, September 14, 2020. , September 14, 2020.
Bret Stephens, “A Rare Middle East Triumph, And—Yes—A Triumph for Trump, Too,” Bret Stephens, “A Rare Middle East Triumph, And—Yes—A Triumph for Trump, Too,” New York
Times, September 14, 2020. , September 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Trump Is Right To Be Antiwar,” Doug Bandow, “Trump Is Right To Be Antiwar,” American Spectator, September 12, 2020. , September 12, 2020.
Samuel Ramani, “France and the United States Are Making West Africa’s Security Situation Samuel Ramani, “France and the United States Are Making West Africa’s Security Situation
Worse,” Worse,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2020. y, September 12, 2020.
Michael Brendan Dougherty, “Bring Them Home, If We Want to End These Wars, We Can Look Michael Brendan Dougherty, “Bring Them Home, If We Want to End These Wars, We Can Look
to Trump and Say: ‘Do It, or We’ll Find Someone Who Will,’” to Trump and Say: ‘Do It, or We’ll Find Someone Who Will,’” National Review, September 11, , September 11,
2020. 2020.
Christopher A. Preble and Mathew Burrows, “Foreign Policy Elites Ignore Public Sentiment at Christopher A. Preble and Mathew Burrows, “Foreign Policy Elites Ignore Public Sentiment at
Their Peril,” Their Peril,” National Interest, September 11, 2020. , September 11, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 43 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Paul R. Pillar, “Donald Trump Is Putting America on the Wrong Side of War Crimes,” Paul R. Pillar, “Donald Trump Is Putting America on the Wrong Side of War Crimes,” National
Interest, September 10, 2020. , September 10, 2020.
Russell A. Berman, “The Kosovo-Serbia Agreement: Another Step Forward for Trump Foreign Russell A. Berman, “The Kosovo-Serbia Agreement: Another Step Forward for Trump Foreign
Policy,” Policy,” National Interest, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
Robert Burns and Zeke Miller, “US Withdrawing Thousands of Troops from Iraq and Robert Burns and Zeke Miller, “US Withdrawing Thousands of Troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan,” Afghanistan,” Associated Press, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “James Carafano: US Troop Withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan Show James Jay Carafano, “James Carafano: US Troop Withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan Show
Progress in Resolving ‘Endless Wars,’” Progress in Resolving ‘Endless Wars,’” Fox News, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
Joseph J. Collins, “Assessing Trump’s National Security Record, How Has He Done Against Joseph J. Collins, “Assessing Trump’s National Security Record, How Has He Done Against
Four Main Threats Our Nation Faces?” Four Main Threats Our Nation Faces?” Defense One, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “America’s Alliance with NATO Needs to Change,” Daniel L. Davis, “America’s Alliance with NATO Needs to Change,” National Interest, ,
September 9, 2020. September 9, 2020.
Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Allison Meakem, “Trump Administration Orders U.S. Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Allison Meakem, “Trump Administration Orders U.S.
Diplomats to Curtail Contact With WHO,” Diplomats to Curtail Contact With WHO,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
Lara Seligman, “General Announces Iraq, Afghanistan Troop Drawdowns as Trump Looks to Lara Seligman, “General Announces Iraq, Afghanistan Troop Drawdowns as Trump Looks to
Fulfill Campaign Pledge,” Fulfill Campaign Pledge,” Politico, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “New Book Accuses Trump of Blasting Top Military Generals as ‘P******’ for Leo Shane III, “New Book Accuses Trump of Blasting Top Military Generals as ‘P******’ for
Defending Foreign Alliances,” Defending Foreign Alliances,” Military Times, September 9, 2020. , September 9, 2020.
Jamil Aderlini, “China’s Middle East Strategy Comes at a Cost to the US, Beijing Gains in Oil Jamil Aderlini, “China’s Middle East Strategy Comes at a Cost to the US, Beijing Gains in Oil
and Influence as Successive Presidents in Washington Withdraw,” and Influence as Successive Presidents in Washington Withdraw,” Financial Times, September 8, , September 8,
2020. 2020.
Sebastian Sprenger, “German Defense Leaders Place a Somber Bet on the US Election,” Sebastian Sprenger, “German Defense Leaders Place a Somber Bet on the US Election,” Defense
News, September 8, 2020. , September 8, 2020.
Matthew Choi, “Trump Says Pentagon Chiefs Are Accommodating Weapons Makers,” Matthew Choi, “Trump Says Pentagon Chiefs Are Accommodating Weapons Makers,” Politico, ,
September 7, 2020. September 7, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Brittany Bernstein, “Trump Oversees ‘Breakthrough’ Serbia-Kosovo Agreement to Normalize Brittany Bernstein, “Trump Oversees ‘Breakthrough’ Serbia-Kosovo Agreement to Normalize
Economic Relations,” Economic Relations,” National Review, September 4, 2020. , September 4, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “The Surprisingly Pragmatic Plan for WHO Withdrawal, The Trump Jimmy Quinn, “The Surprisingly Pragmatic Plan for WHO Withdrawal, The Trump
Administration Is Walking a Tightrope on the WHO,” Administration Is Walking a Tightrope on the WHO,” National Review, September 4, 2020. , September 4, 2020.
Michael Crowley, “Allies and Former U.S. Officials Fear Trump Could Seek NATO Exit in a Michael Crowley, “Allies and Former U.S. Officials Fear Trump Could Seek NATO Exit in a
Second Term,” Second Term,” New York Times, September 3, 2020. , September 3, 2020.
Michael Crowley and Maggie Haberman, “As Others Condemn Putin Critic’s Poisoning, Trump Michael Crowley and Maggie Haberman, “As Others Condemn Putin Critic’s Poisoning, Trump
Just Wants to ‘Get Along,’” Just Wants to ‘Get Along,’” New York Times, September 3, 2020. , September 3, 2020.
Anne Gearan and Paul Sonne, “Trump Administration Denounces Attack on Russian Dissident, Anne Gearan and Paul Sonne, “Trump Administration Denounces Attack on Russian Dissident,
Hints at Sanctions,” Hints at Sanctions,” Washington Post, September 3, 2020. , September 3, 2020.
Katie Bo Williams, “As Russia Provokes, Trump Remains Silent,” Katie Bo Williams, “As Russia Provokes, Trump Remains Silent,” Defense One, September 3, , September 3,
2020. 2020.
Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Jack Detsch, “Trump Appointee Takes ‘Slash and Burn’ Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Jack Detsch, “Trump Appointee Takes ‘Slash and Burn’
Approach to Key USAID Bureau,” Approach to Key USAID Bureau,” Foreign Policy, September 2, 2020. , September 2, 2020.
Katrina vanden Heuvel, “Trump Hasn’t Ended Endless Wars. Congress Must Use the War Powers Katrina vanden Heuvel, “Trump Hasn’t Ended Endless Wars. Congress Must Use the War Powers
Resolution,” Resolution,” Washington Post, September 1, 2020. , September 1, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 44 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Richard Haass, “Present at the Disruption, How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy,” Richard Haass, “Present at the Disruption, How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Affairs, September/October 2020. , September/October 2020.
Margaret MacMillan, “Which Past Is Prologue? Heeding the Right Warnings From History,” Margaret MacMillan, “Which Past Is Prologue? Heeding the Right Warnings From History,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020. , September/October 2020.
Shivshankar Menon, “League of Nationalists, How Trump and Modi Refashioned the U.S.-Indian Shivshankar Menon, “League of Nationalists, How Trump and Modi Refashioned the U.S.-Indian
Relationship,” Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020. , September/October 2020.
Ben Rhodes, “The Democratic Renewal, What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Ben Rhodes, “The Democratic Renewal, What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Affairs, September/October 2020. , September/October 2020.
Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion, Trump and the World as It Is,” Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion, Trump and the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs, ,
September/October 2020. September/October 2020.
Ganesh Sitaraman, “A Grand Strategy of Resilience, American Power in the Age of Fragility, Ganesh Sitaraman, “A Grand Strategy of Resilience, American Power in the Age of Fragility,
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020. airs, September/October 2020.
Doug Bandow, “When Will Donald Trump Stop Even One Endless War? Time To Halt America’s Doug Bandow, “When Will Donald Trump Stop Even One Endless War? Time To Halt America’s
Illegal Occupation of Syria,” Illegal Occupation of Syria,” Antiwar.com, August 31, 2020. , August 31, 2020.
William J. Burns, “‘America First’ Enters Its Most Combustible Moment, If the Next 150 Days William J. Burns, “‘America First’ Enters Its Most Combustible Moment, If the Next 150 Days
Turn Out to Be Trump’s Final Days in Office, He Could Still Wreak a Lot of Havoc on American Turn Out to Be Trump’s Final Days in Office, He Could Still Wreak a Lot of Havoc on American
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy,” Atlantic, August 29, 2020. , August 29, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Is Trump Touting His Diplomatic Achievements to Get Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Is Trump Touting His Diplomatic Achievements to Get
Reelected?” Reelected?” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
James Jay Carafano and Kiron K. Skinner, “Why Donald Trump Needs a Supportive State James Jay Carafano and Kiron K. Skinner, “Why Donald Trump Needs a Supportive State
Department,” Department,” National Interest, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
Chuck DeVore, “Biden Majors in the Minors. Trump Focuses on Existential Threats | Opinion,” Chuck DeVore, “Biden Majors in the Minors. Trump Focuses on Existential Threats | Opinion,”
Newsweek, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
Richard Grenell, “How to Remake the Foreign Service and Embassies for Today’s World,” Richard Grenell, “How to Remake the Foreign Service and Embassies for Today’s World,” The
Hill, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Eli Lake, “Trump Doctrine: End Wars But Keep Threatening Enemies, The RNC Tried to Sell Eli Lake, “Trump Doctrine: End Wars But Keep Threatening Enemies, The RNC Tried to Sell
Voters on a Foreign Policy of Strength without Entanglements,” Voters on a Foreign Policy of Strength without Entanglements,” Bloomberg, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “Will Trumpism Change Republican Foreign Policy Permanently?” Thomas Wright, “Will Trumpism Change Republican Foreign Policy Permanently?” Defense
One, August 28, 2020. , August 28, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Despite Military Resistance, Our Footprint In Iraq Is Finally Shrinking,” Doug Bandow, “Despite Military Resistance, Our Footprint In Iraq Is Finally Shrinking,”
American Conservative, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
Philip H. Gordon, “What the Republican National Convention Tells Us About Trump’s Foreign Philip H. Gordon, “What the Republican National Convention Tells Us About Trump’s Foreign
Policy,” Policy,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
Klaus W. Larres, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Is Still ‘America First’—What Does That Mean, Klaus W. Larres, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Is Still ‘America First’—What Does That Mean,
Exactly?” Exactly?” The Conversation, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
Kenneth Roth, “Pompeo’s Commission on Unalienable Rights Will Endanger Everyone’s Human Kenneth Roth, “Pompeo’s Commission on Unalienable Rights Will Endanger Everyone’s Human
Rights,” Rights,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Trump Vows to Continue Military Rebuild, Halt Endless Wars in Convention Leo Shane III, “Trump Vows to Continue Military Rebuild, Halt Endless Wars in Convention
Finale,” Finale,” Military Times, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
Richard Sisk, “At Conventions, Both Parties Endorse Military Pay Raises and Decry ‘Endless Richard Sisk, “At Conventions, Both Parties Endorse Military Pay Raises and Decry ‘Endless
Wars,’” Wars,’” Military.com, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 45 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress James Traub, “Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism, The Potential Next Democratic James Traub, “Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism, The Potential Next Democratic
Administration Is Preparing to Upend Decades of Dogma on Globalization,” Administration Is Preparing to Upend Decades of Dogma on Globalization,” Foreign Policy, ,
August 27, 2020. August 27, 2020.
Mark Cancian, “The Fuzzy Outlines Of Biden’s National Security Policies,” Mark Cancian, “The Fuzzy Outlines Of Biden’s National Security Policies,” Breaking Defense, ,
August 26, 2020. August 26, 2020.
Alex Ward, “‘America First, But on Steroids’: What Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy Might Alex Ward, “‘America First, But on Steroids’: What Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy Might
Look Like,” Look Like,” Vox, August 26, 2020. x, August 26, 2020.
Emma Ashford, “Biden Wants to Return to a ‘Normal’ Foreign Policy. That’s the Problem. Emma Ashford, “Biden Wants to Return to a ‘Normal’ Foreign Policy. That’s the Problem.
America Can’t Go Back to Being Everywhere and Solving Every Problem,” America Can’t Go Back to Being Everywhere and Solving Every Problem,” New York Times, ,
August 25, 2020. August 25, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Pompeo Praises Trump, But Doesn’t Have Much to Point to,” David Ignatius, “Pompeo Praises Trump, But Doesn’t Have Much to Point to,” Washington Post, ,
August 25, 2020. August 25, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “Pompeo’s Sudan Visit Shows the Way to Handle Rogue Regimes,” Michael Rubin, “Pompeo’s Sudan Visit Shows the Way to Handle Rogue Regimes,” Washington
Examiner, August 25, 2020. , August 25, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “GOP Leaders Promote Trump as a Wartime Commander Focused on Security and Leo Shane III, “GOP Leaders Promote Trump as a Wartime Commander Focused on Security and
Peace,” Peace,” Military Times, August 25, 2020. , August 25, 2020.
Nahal Toosi and Jacqueline Feldscher, “Pompeo Defends ‘America First’ Policies in Nahal Toosi and Jacqueline Feldscher, “Pompeo Defends ‘America First’ Policies in
Controversial Convention Appearance,” Controversial Convention Appearance,” Politico, August 25, 2020. , August 25, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Second-Term Plan Includes Stopping ‘Endless’ Wars, Boosting Military Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Second-Term Plan Includes Stopping ‘Endless’ Wars, Boosting Military
Support,” Support,” Military Times, August 24, 2020. , August 24, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “All Great-Power Politics Is Local, When It Comes to Building International Stephen M. Walt, “All Great-Power Politics Is Local, When It Comes to Building International
Power, There’s Growing Reason to Think That Foreign Policy Barely Matters,” Power, There’s Growing Reason to Think That Foreign Policy Barely Matters,” Foreign Policy, ,
August 24, 2020. August 24, 2020.
Francis J. Gavin, “Blame It on the Blob? How to Evaluate American Grand Strategy,” Francis J. Gavin, “Blame It on the Blob? How to Evaluate American Grand Strategy,” War on the
Rocks, August 21, 2020. , August 21, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Lanhee Chen, “Lead from the Front,” Lanhee Chen, “Lead from the Front,” Washington Examiner, August 20, 2020. , August 20, 2020.
Victor David Hanson, “Goodbye—Sort of—to Germany? Why Should America Anchor Victor David Hanson, “Goodbye—Sort of—to Germany? Why Should America Anchor
Germany’s Defense? It Cuts Deals with Russia, Has Never Met Its NATO Commitment, and Is Germany’s Defense? It Cuts Deals with Russia, Has Never Met Its NATO Commitment, and Is
the Most Anti-American Nation in Europe,” the Most Anti-American Nation in Europe,” National Review, August 20, 2020. , August 20, 2020.
Thomas Joscelyn, “Endless Jihad, The Problem with Pledging to End Our ‘Endless Wars,’” Thomas Joscelyn, “Endless Jihad, The Problem with Pledging to End Our ‘Endless Wars,’”
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 20, 2020. Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 20, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Biden Vows to Restore Global Respect, Military Integrity in Acceptance Speech,” Leo Shane III, “Biden Vows to Restore Global Respect, Military Integrity in Acceptance Speech,”
Military Times, August 20, 2020. , August 20, 2020.
James Traub, “The Biden Doctrine Exists Already. Here’s an Inside Preview,” James Traub, “The Biden Doctrine Exists Already. Here’s an Inside Preview,” Foreign Policy, ,
August 20, 2020. August 20, 2020.
Aaron David Miller, “Opinion: Israel And UAE’s Accord Is A Big Win, But Don't Overplay It,” Aaron David Miller, “Opinion: Israel And UAE’s Accord Is A Big Win, But Don't Overplay It,”
NPR, August 19, 2020. , August 19, 2020.
Klaus W. Larres, “Biden’s Long Foreign-Policy Record Signals How He’ll Reverse Trump, Klaus W. Larres, “Biden’s Long Foreign-Policy Record Signals How He’ll Reverse Trump,
Rebuild Old Alliances and Lead the Pandemic Response,” Rebuild Old Alliances and Lead the Pandemic Response,” The Conversation, August 18 (updated , August 18 (updated
August 19), 2020. August 19), 2020.
Congressional Research Service 46 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Dubowitz, “The Dangerous Illusion of Restraining U.S. Power, Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Dubowitz, “The Dangerous Illusion of Restraining U.S. Power,
Isolationists Among Both Democrats and Republicans Want to Withdraw from Foreign Isolationists Among Both Democrats and Republicans Want to Withdraw from Foreign
Entanglements. That Would Make the World Much Less Safe,” Entanglements. That Would Make the World Much Less Safe,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020. , August 18, 2020.
Alex Ward, “Joe Biden’s Plan to Fix the World, ‘He’s Looking at an Across-the-Board Alex Ward, “Joe Biden’s Plan to Fix the World, ‘He’s Looking at an Across-the-Board
Restoration Project,’ Said a former Obama Administration Official,” Restoration Project,’ Said a former Obama Administration Official,” Vox, August 18, 2020. , August 18, 2020.
Micah Zenko and Rebecca Lissner, “This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy, Micah Zenko and Rebecca Lissner, “This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy,
The Verdict Is In: Donald Trump’s Shallow Approach to Foreign Policy Has Damaged the United The Verdict Is In: Donald Trump’s Shallow Approach to Foreign Policy Has Damaged the United
States,” States,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020. , August 18, 2020.
Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “What Happens When America Is No Longer the Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “What Happens When America Is No Longer the
Undisputed Super Power? Chief Among the Flawed Assumptions Undergirding American Undisputed Super Power? Chief Among the Flawed Assumptions Undergirding American
Foreign Policy Is the Belief That Perpetual U.S. Primacy is Both Desirable and Possible, the Foreign Policy Is the Belief That Perpetual U.S. Primacy is Both Desirable and Possible, the
‘indispensable nation’—a Cliché Well Past Its Sell-by Date,” ‘indispensable nation’—a Cliché Well Past Its Sell-by Date,” National Interest, August 17, 2020. , August 17, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Israel-UAE Agreement Shows Trump’s Middle East Policy Succeeding,” James Jay Carafano, “Israel-UAE Agreement Shows Trump’s Middle East Policy Succeeding,”
Heritage Foundation, August 17, 2020. Heritage Foundation, August 17, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Alone Against the World, Pompeo’s Regime Change Obsession Has Left America Fred Kaplan, “Alone Against the World, Pompeo’s Regime Change Obsession Has Left America
More Isolated Than Ever,” More Isolated Than Ever,” Slate, August 17, 2020. , August 17, 2020.
William Ruger, “Why Americans Want a President Who Ends Endless Wars,” William Ruger, “Why Americans Want a President Who Ends Endless Wars,” National Interest, ,
August 17, 2020. August 17, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “How the WHO Can Earn Back U.S. Support,” Heritage Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “How the WHO Can Earn Back U.S. Support,” Heritage
Foundation, August 17, 2020. Foundation, August 17, 2020.
Jeremy Shapiro and Philip H. Gordon, “Trump and the Rise of Sadistic Diplomacy, His Jeremy Shapiro and Philip H. Gordon, “Trump and the Rise of Sadistic Diplomacy, His
Administration Spent Four Years Mostly Failing to Reach Diplomatic Agreements. What It Did Administration Spent Four Years Mostly Failing to Reach Diplomatic Agreements. What It Did
Instead Was Far More Disturbing,” Instead Was Far More Disturbing,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2020. , August 17, 2020.
Anthony B. Kim and Terry Miller, “Secretary Mike Pompeo’s Ringing Call to Secure Human Anthony B. Kim and Terry Miller, “Secretary Mike Pompeo’s Ringing Call to Secure Human
Rights and Liberty,” Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2020. Rights and Liberty,” Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2020.
Tiana Lowe, “Middle East Consolidates Against Iran, Disproving the Obama Doctrine,” Tiana Lowe, “Middle East Consolidates Against Iran, Disproving the Obama Doctrine,”
Washington Examiner, August 16, 2020. , August 16, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Jared Kushner, “Jared Kushner: The Historic Deal Between Israel and the UAE Shows Trump’s Jared Kushner, “Jared Kushner: The Historic Deal Between Israel and the UAE Shows Trump’s
Strategy Is Paying Off,” Strategy Is Paying Off,” Washington Post, August 15, 2020. , August 15, 2020.
Olivia Enos, “3 Reasons the U.S. Should Prioritize Human Rights With China,” Heritage Olivia Enos, “3 Reasons the U.S. Should Prioritize Human Rights With China,” Heritage
Foundation, August 14, 2020. Foundation, August 14, 2020.
John Hannah, “The Israel-UAE Deal Is Trump’s First Unambiguous Diplomatic Success, It’s a John Hannah, “The Israel-UAE Deal Is Trump’s First Unambiguous Diplomatic Success, It’s a
Historic Achievement That Eluded Other Presidents. Trump Will Try to Make the Most of It,” Historic Achievement That Eluded Other Presidents. Trump Will Try to Make the Most of It,”
Foreign Policy, August 14, 2020. , August 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The United States Can’t Handle China Alone, A Coordinated Strategy Is Doug Bandow, “The United States Can’t Handle China Alone, A Coordinated Strategy Is
Emerging Among Allies, Despite Trump’s Best Efforts,” Emerging Among Allies, Despite Trump’s Best Efforts,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Economist, “The Dereliction of American Diplomacy, Donald Trump Dismisses It as the ‘Deep Economist, “The Dereliction of American Diplomacy, Donald Trump Dismisses It as the ‘Deep
State Department’. Yet America Needs It More Than Ever,” State Department’. Yet America Needs It More Than Ever,” Economist, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Mideast Breakthrough, The Israel-UAE Accord Discredits Obama’s Editorial Board, “Trump’s Mideast Breakthrough, The Israel-UAE Accord Discredits Obama’s
Regional Vision,” Regional Vision,” Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Richard Grenell, “Israel-UAE Breakthrough Proves Trump’s Critics Wrong—Again,” Richard Grenell, “Israel-UAE Breakthrough Proves Trump’s Critics Wrong—Again,” The Hill, ,
August 13, 2020. August 13, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 47 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress David Ignatius, “Trump Is Right. The Israel-UAE Agreement Is a Huge Achievement,” David Ignatius, “Trump Is Right. The Israel-UAE Agreement Is a Huge Achievement,”
Washington Post, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Dimitri K. Simes, “The Case For Trump, Donald Trump Isn’t the Better Choice to Secure Dimitri K. Simes, “The Case For Trump, Donald Trump Isn’t the Better Choice to Secure
America’s Future. He Is the Only Choice,” America’s Future. He Is the Only Choice,” National Interest, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Edward Wong, “Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles With an Asia in Crisis,” Edward Wong, “Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles With an Asia in Crisis,” New York
Times, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Dov S. Zakheim, “The Case Against Trump, By the Time Trump’s Term Reaches Its Unhappy Dov S. Zakheim, “The Case Against Trump, By the Time Trump’s Term Reaches Its Unhappy
Conclusion, He May Well Have Overtaken Andrew Johnson as the Most Dangerous Chief Conclusion, He May Well Have Overtaken Andrew Johnson as the Most Dangerous Chief
Executive Ever to Occupy the Executive Mansion,” Executive Ever to Occupy the Executive Mansion,” National Interest, August 13, 2020. , August 13, 2020.
Jacob Helberg, “In the New Cold War, Deindustrialization Means Disarmament, Chinese Security Jacob Helberg, “In the New Cold War, Deindustrialization Means Disarmament, Chinese Security
Threats Offer the Chance to Rethink the U.S. Economy,” Threats Offer the Chance to Rethink the U.S. Economy,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2020. , August 12, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Pompeo Urges Europe’s Young Democracies to Embrace Freedoms,” Matthew Lee, “Pompeo Urges Europe’s Young Democracies to Embrace Freedoms,” Associated
Press, August 12, 2020. , August 12, 2020.
Scott Lincicome, “We Can Finally Stop Pretending Trump Isn’t a Protectionist,” Cato Institute, Scott Lincicome, “We Can Finally Stop Pretending Trump Isn’t a Protectionist,” Cato Institute,
August 12, 2020. August 12, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “In Europe, Pompeo Warns of China, Russia Authoritarianism,” Matthew Lee, “In Europe, Pompeo Warns of China, Russia Authoritarianism,” Associated Press, ,
August 11, 2020. August 11, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Putin Is Reckless Because We Allow Him to Be,” David Ignatius, “Putin Is Reckless Because We Allow Him to Be,” Washington Post, August 11, , August 11,
2020. 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump’s Latest Move in Europe Is a Betrayal of Foreign Policy Realism,” Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump’s Latest Move in Europe Is a Betrayal of Foreign Policy Realism,”
National Interest, August 10, 2020. , August 10, 2020.
Birgit Jennen and William Horobin, “Germany, France Balk at U.S. Bid to Overhaul WHO While Birgit Jennen and William Horobin, “Germany, France Balk at U.S. Bid to Overhaul WHO While
Leaving,” Leaving,” Bloomberg, August 10, 2020. , August 10, 2020.
David Nakamura, “Once Reluctant to Hit China on Human Rights, Trump Moves to Use the Issue David Nakamura, “Once Reluctant to Hit China on Human Rights, Trump Moves to Use the Issue
as a Cudgel Amid Growing Tensions,” as a Cudgel Amid Growing Tensions,” Washington Post, August 9, 2020. , August 9, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Ashley Parker, “A President Ignored: Trump’s Outlandish Claims Increasingly Met with a Ashley Parker, “A President Ignored: Trump’s Outlandish Claims Increasingly Met with a
Collective Shrug,” Collective Shrug,” Washington Post, August 9, 2020. , August 9, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Problem with Allies: It’s Time to Unfriend a Few Countries,” Doug Bandow, “The Problem with Allies: It’s Time to Unfriend a Few Countries,” American
Spectator, August 8, 2020. , August 8, 2020.
Max Bergmann and James Lamond, “Why Trump’s Troop Withdrawal from Germany Is Only the Max Bergmann and James Lamond, “Why Trump’s Troop Withdrawal from Germany Is Only the
Beginning, There Has Been a Clear and Consistent Pattern of Hostility from Donald Trump Beginning, There Has Been a Clear and Consistent Pattern of Hostility from Donald Trump
Toward NATO and America’s Closest Democratic Allies in Europe,” Toward NATO and America’s Closest Democratic Allies in Europe,” National Interest, August 8, , August 8,
2020. 2020.
Saeid Jafari, “Trump Has Pushed Iran Into China’s Arms,” Saeid Jafari, “Trump Has Pushed Iran Into China’s Arms,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2020. , August 8, 2020.
Andrew Roberts, “It’s Time to Revive the Anglosphere, The U.K. Should Form a New Union Andrew Roberts, “It’s Time to Revive the Anglosphere, The U.K. Should Form a New Union
with Canada, Australia and New Zealand to Work as a Global Partner of the U.S.,” with Canada, Australia and New Zealand to Work as a Global Partner of the U.S.,” Wall Street
Journal, August 8, 2020. , August 8, 2020.
Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Needs a Better Plan for Competing With China,” Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Needs a Better Plan for Competing With China,” Foreign Policy, ,
August 7, 2020. August 7, 2020.
Salvatore Babones, “Trump Has Alienated Allies—but Has Them Acting in America’s Interest Salvatore Babones, “Trump Has Alienated Allies—but Has Them Acting in America’s Interest
(and Their Own),” (and Their Own),” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2020. , August 6, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 48 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Jim Sciutto, “Trump Advisers Hesitated to Give Military Options and Warned Adversaries over Jim Sciutto, “Trump Advisers Hesitated to Give Military Options and Warned Adversaries over
Fears He Might Start a War,” Fears He Might Start a War,” CNN, August 6, 2020. , August 6, 2020.
Daniel Dammann and Price Floyd, “To Rebuild America’s Weakened Alliances, Heal Its Daniel Dammann and Price Floyd, “To Rebuild America’s Weakened Alliances, Heal Its
Diplomatic Corps,” Diplomatic Corps,” Defense One, August 5, 2020. , August 5, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Trump Administration Commission Caters to the Anti-Government Political Paul R. Pillar, “Trump Administration Commission Caters to the Anti-Government Political
Right,” Right,” National Interest, August 4, 2020. , August 4, 2020.
Riley Walters, “China: Trump Administration Needs to Align Trade Policies with Priorities,” Riley Walters, “China: Trump Administration Needs to Align Trade Policies with Priorities,”
Heritage Foundation, August 4, 2020. Heritage Foundation, August 4, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump Has Wasted His Chance to Rally U.S. Allies Against China,” Jackson Diehl, “Trump Has Wasted His Chance to Rally U.S. Allies Against China,” Washington
Post, August 2, 2020. , August 2, 2020.
Robert C. O’Brien, “President Trump Is Committed to Defending the U.S., and Russia Knows It,” Robert C. O’Brien, “President Trump Is Committed to Defending the U.S., and Russia Knows It,”
Washington Post, August 2, 2020. , August 2, 2020.
Anthony Vinci, “How to Stop China From Imposing Its Values, America’s Alliances Were Built Anthony Vinci, “How to Stop China From Imposing Its Values, America’s Alliances Were Built
to Address a Soviet Military Threat. The Economic Bullying That Beijing Uses Requires a to Address a Soviet Military Threat. The Economic Bullying That Beijing Uses Requires a
Different Kind of Collective Self-Defense,” Different Kind of Collective Self-Defense,” Atlantic, August 2, 2020. , August 2, 2020.
Karen DeYoung, “Dissonance Between Trump and Administration Officials over Russia Karen DeYoung, “Dissonance Between Trump and Administration Officials over Russia
Disguises Lack of Strategic Approach to Moscow,” Disguises Lack of Strategic Approach to Moscow,” Washington Post, August 1, 2020. , August 1, 2020.
Ahmed Charai, “America Must Become a World Model Again, In Recent Years, America Has Ahmed Charai, “America Must Become a World Model Again, In Recent Years, America Has
Become a Country Engulfed in Turmoil, Withdrawn from the World, Wanting for Leadership,” Become a Country Engulfed in Turmoil, Withdrawn from the World, Wanting for Leadership,”
National Interest, July 31, 2020. , July 31, 2020.
Conor Murray, “Is pulling US troops from Germany really a ‘gift to Russia’?” Conor Murray, “Is pulling US troops from Germany really a ‘gift to Russia’?” Vox, July 31, 2020. , July 31, 2020.
David Shambaugh, “As the U.S. and China Wage a New Cold War, They Should Learn From the David Shambaugh, “As the U.S. and China Wage a New Cold War, They Should Learn From the
Last One,” Last One,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2020. , July 31, 2020.
Wendy R. Sherman, “The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump,” Wendy R. Sherman, “The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump,” Foreign
Policy, July 31, 2020. , July 31, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Max Boot, “In a New Interview, Trump Again Shows That He’s Putin’s Puppet,” Max Boot, “In a New Interview, Trump Again Shows That He’s Putin’s Puppet,” Washington
Post, July 29, 2020. , July 29, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Spite-Germany Plan,” Editorial Board, “Trump’s Spite-Germany Plan,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2020. , July 29, 2020.
Philip H. Gordon and James Steinberg, “Trump’s Flip-Flops on China Are a Danger to National Philip H. Gordon and James Steinberg, “Trump’s Flip-Flops on China Are a Danger to National
Security,” Security,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2020. , July 29, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Trump’s Troop Tantrum, There’s No Strategy Behind the Decision to Withdraw Fred Kaplan, “Trump’s Troop Tantrum, There’s No Strategy Behind the Decision to Withdraw
U.S. Troops from Germany. It’s About the President’s Anger and Ego,” U.S. Troops from Germany. It’s About the President’s Anger and Ego,” Slate, July 29, 2020. , July 29, 2020.
William Saletan, “Trump’s Dismissal of Russian Bounties Adds to His Record of Treachery,” William Saletan, “Trump’s Dismissal of Russian Bounties Adds to His Record of Treachery,”
Slate, July 29, 2020. , July 29, 2020.
Robin Wright, “Why Trump Will Never Win His New Cold War with China,” Robin Wright, “Why Trump Will Never Win His New Cold War with China,” New Yorker, July , July
29, 2020. 29, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “America Can’t Contain China, but Maybe Proliferation Can,” Cato Institute, July Doug Bandow, “America Can’t Contain China, but Maybe Proliferation Can,” Cato Institute, July
28, 2020. 28, 2020.
Daniel Schwammenthal, “To America, From a Worried European Friend, A Country Convinced Daniel Schwammenthal, “To America, From a Worried European Friend, A Country Convinced
That It Is Irredeemably Racist Can’t Lead the World as the ‘Indispensable Nation,’” That It Is Irredeemably Racist Can’t Lead the World as the ‘Indispensable Nation,’” Wall Street
Journal, July 28, 2020. , July 28, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 49 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Christopher Smart, “To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression, the U.S. Can’t Afford to Alienate the Christopher Smart, “To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression, the U.S. Can’t Afford to Alienate the
World,” World,” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2020. , July 28, 2020.
Dan Balz, “America’s global standing is at a low point. The pandemic made it worse. Under Dan Balz, “America’s global standing is at a low point. The pandemic made it worse. Under
Trump, the United States Retreats from Collaborative Leadership at a Time of Global Crisis,” Trump, the United States Retreats from Collaborative Leadership at a Time of Global Crisis,”
Washington Post, July 26, 2020. , July 26, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Pompeo’s Clarion Call on Communist China: ‘We Can't Ignore It Any Longer,’” Joseph Bosco, “Pompeo’s Clarion Call on Communist China: ‘We Can't Ignore It Any Longer,’”
The Hill, July 25, 2020. , July 25, 2020.
Richard Haass, “What Mike Pompeo Doesn’t Understand About China, Richard Nixon and U.S. Richard Haass, “What Mike Pompeo Doesn’t Understand About China, Richard Nixon and U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, July 25, 2020. , July 25, 2020.
By Roger Pilon and Aaron Rhodes, “A Missed Opportunity In the Struggle for Human Rights,” By Roger Pilon and Aaron Rhodes, “A Missed Opportunity In the Struggle for Human Rights,”
Real Clear Markets, July 25, 2020. , July 25, 2020.
Gary Schmitt, “Pompeo’s China Speech at Odds with Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy,” Gary Schmitt, “Pompeo’s China Speech at Odds with Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy,”
The Hill, July 25, 2020. , July 25, 2020.
Edward Wong and Steven Lee Myers, “Officials Push U.S.-China Relations Toward Point of No Edward Wong and Steven Lee Myers, “Officials Push U.S.-China Relations Toward Point of No
Return,” Return,” New York Times, July 25 (updated July 31), 2020. , July 25 (updated July 31), 2020.
Thomas Wright, “Pompeo’s Surreal Speech on China, An Ideological Struggle Is Under Way Thomas Wright, “Pompeo’s Surreal Speech on China, An Ideological Struggle Is Under Way
Between Beijing and Free Societies, and the Trump Administration Is on the Wrong Side,” Between Beijing and Free Societies, and the Trump Administration Is on the Wrong Side,”
Atlantic, July 25, 2020. , July 25, 2020.
Editorial Board, “The New China Reality, The Tougher U.S. Policy Is More Than an Election- Editorial Board, “The New China Reality, The Tougher U.S. Policy Is More Than an Election-
Year Gambit,” Year Gambit,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2020. , July 24, 2020.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, “The Sad Story of Superpower America’s Foreign Policy Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, “The Sad Story of Superpower America’s Foreign Policy
Failures,” Failures,” National Interest, July 24, 2020. , July 24, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Don’t Pick a Cold War You Can’t Win,” Fred Kaplan, “Don’t Pick a Cold War You Can’t Win,” Slate, July 24, 2020. , July 24, 2020.
James Palmer, “Pompeo’s Strategy Depends on Beijing’s Own Paranoia,” James Palmer, “Pompeo’s Strategy Depends on Beijing’s Own Paranoia,” Foreign Policy, July , July
24, 2020. 24, 2020.
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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Tom Rogan, “Mike Pompeo and the Threat of Xi Jinping’s Dream,” Tom Rogan, “Mike Pompeo and the Threat of Xi Jinping’s Dream,” Washington Examiner, July , July
24, 2020. 24, 2020.
Bret Stephens, “The Two China Fires, Is America prepared for a Cold War with China?” Bret Stephens, “The Two China Fires, Is America prepared for a Cold War with China?” New
York Times, July 24, 2020. , July 24, 2020.
Cameron Stewart, “US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Calls on Free World to Unite Against Cameron Stewart, “US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Calls on Free World to Unite Against
Chinese ‘Tyranny,’” Chinese ‘Tyranny,’” Australian, July 24, 2020. , July 24, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Should Not Lead The World,” Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Should Not Lead The World,” American Conservative, July 23, 2020. , July 23, 2020.
Daniel DePetris, “Trump’s All-Stick, No-Carrot Approach Has Brought Two US Adversaries Daniel DePetris, “Trump’s All-Stick, No-Carrot Approach Has Brought Two US Adversaries
Together, The Blooming China-Iran Bilateral Relationship Serve[s] as a Warning to U.S. Together, The Blooming China-Iran Bilateral Relationship Serve[s] as a Warning to U.S.
Policymakers,” Policymakers,” Defense One, July 23, 2020. , July 23, 2020.
Michael H. Fuchs, “A Foreign Policy for the Post-Pandemic World, How to Prepare for the Next Michael H. Fuchs, “A Foreign Policy for the Post-Pandemic World, How to Prepare for the Next
Crisis,” Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, July 23, 2020. , July 23, 2020.
Seth Kaplan, “Human Rights Are in Recession. Can That Be Reversed?” Seth Kaplan, “Human Rights Are in Recession. Can That Be Reversed?” Foreign Policy, July 23, , July 23,
2020. 2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” Speech, Yorba Linda, Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” Speech, Yorba Linda,
California, The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, July 23, 2020. California, The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, July 23, 2020.
Congressional Research Service 50 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Stephen M. Walt, “How to Ruin a Superpower, Washington’s Status as a Superpower Has Been Stephen M. Walt, “How to Ruin a Superpower, Washington’s Status as a Superpower Has Been
Declining for Years. Trump’s Handling of the Pandemic Is Killing It Off,” Declining for Years. Trump’s Handling of the Pandemic Is Killing It Off,” Foreign Policy, July , July
23, 2020. 23, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump Threatens a New Troop Withdrawal. It Would Endanger Yet Another Editorial Board, “Trump Threatens a New Troop Withdrawal. It Would Endanger Yet Another
U.S. Relationship,” U.S. Relationship,” Washington Post, July 22, 2020. , July 22, 2020.
Max Boot, “No One Does More to Hurt America and Help China than Trump,” Max Boot, “No One Does More to Hurt America and Help China than Trump,” Washington Post, ,
July 21, 2020. July 21, 2020.
Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “Trump Is Determined to Bring Home U.S. Military Forces Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “Trump Is Determined to Bring Home U.S. Military Forces
from Somewhere,” from Somewhere,” Washington Post, July 21, 2020. , July 21, 2020.
Clifford D. May, “Mike Pompeo’s Fight for Unalienable Rights, The Human Rights Clifford D. May, “Mike Pompeo’s Fight for Unalienable Rights, The Human Rights
Establishment Wants Him Out of the Marketplace of Ideas,” Establishment Wants Him Out of the Marketplace of Ideas,” Washington Times, July 21, 2020. , July 21, 2020.
Ian Bremmer, “Trump’s Biggest Foreign Policy Win So Far,” Ian Bremmer, “Trump’s Biggest Foreign Policy Win So Far,” Time, July 20, 2020. , July 20, 2020.
Gene Park and Mieczysław Boduszynski, “Trump Has Damaged the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Gene Park and Mieczysław Boduszynski, “Trump Has Damaged the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
Alliance—And China Loves It,” Alliance—And China Loves It,” National Interest, July 20, 2020. , July 20, 2020.
Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Remains on the Sidelines in Libya’s Conflict as Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Remains on the Sidelines in Libya’s Conflict as
Russia Extends Its Reach,” Russia Extends Its Reach,” Washington Post, July 20, 2020. , July 20, 2020.
Ramon Marks, “America’s Days of International Policing are Over, The United States Can No Ramon Marks, “America’s Days of International Policing are Over, The United States Can No
Longer Act as the Lone, Dominant Military Power Around the Globe,” Longer Act as the Lone, Dominant Military Power Around the Globe,” National Interest, July 19, , July 19,
2020. 2020.
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2020. 2020.
Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders, “America Has Created a ‘China-Iran Collaboration’ Monster, Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders, “America Has Created a ‘China-Iran Collaboration’ Monster,
Beijing and Tehran Could Use the Prospects of Deeper Bilateral Cooperation to Generate Beijing and Tehran Could Use the Prospects of Deeper Bilateral Cooperation to Generate
Leverage with Foreign Leaders—Leaving Washington Out in the Cold,” Leverage with Foreign Leaders—Leaving Washington Out in the Cold,” National Interest, July , July
18, 2020. 18, 2020.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

48

~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

Hunter Marston and Ali Wyne, “America’s Post-Coronavirus Diplomacy Needs Middle-Powers Hunter Marston and Ali Wyne, “America’s Post-Coronavirus Diplomacy Needs Middle-Powers
Alliances, Focusing on China Alone Would Be Counterproductive,” Alliances, Focusing on China Alone Would Be Counterproductive,” Foreign Policy, July 17, , July 17,
2020. 2020.
Jeremi Suri, “What American Century? Those Who Worry About—or Cheer—Its Demise Don’t Jeremi Suri, “What American Century? Those Who Worry About—or Cheer—Its Demise Don’t
Realize That There Never Was One,” Realize That There Never Was One,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2020. , July 17, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Countries Should Mind Their Own Business, Two Cheers for a Classic Idea Stephen M. Walt, “Countries Should Mind Their Own Business, Two Cheers for a Classic Idea
That’s Been Out of Fashion for Too Long: State Sovereignty,” That’s Been Out of Fashion for Too Long: State Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2020. , July 17, 2020.
Rori Kramer, “Mike Pompeo Wants to Nationalize Human Rights,” Rori Kramer, “Mike Pompeo Wants to Nationalize Human Rights,” Washington Post, July 16, , July 16,
2020. 2020.
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PA, National Constitution Center, July 16, 2020. PA, National Constitution Center, July 16, 2020.
Ralph Reed, “Ralph Reed: Trump, Pompeo Human Rights Agenda Strong in Face of Abuses Ralph Reed, “Ralph Reed: Trump, Pompeo Human Rights Agenda Strong in Face of Abuses
Across the Globe,” Across the Globe,” Fox News, July 16, 2020. , July 16, 2020.
Pranshu Verma, “Pompeo Says Human Rights Policy Must Prioritize Property Rights and Pranshu Verma, “Pompeo Says Human Rights Policy Must Prioritize Property Rights and
Religion,” Religion,” New, York Times, July 16 (updated July 21), 2020. , July 16 (updated July 21), 2020.
Congressional Research Service 51 U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress Doug Bandow, “Allies Are Supposed to Help the US, but Americans Always Do the Paying,” Doug Bandow, “Allies Are Supposed to Help the US, but Americans Always Do the Paying,”
Antiwar.com, July 15, 2020. , July 15, 2020.
William J. Burns, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy, The Global Order Is William J. Burns, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy, The Global Order Is
Crumbling, Domestic Renewal Is Urgent, and America Must Reinvent Its Role in the World,” Crumbling, Domestic Renewal Is Urgent, and America Must Reinvent Its Role in the World,”
Atlantic, July 14, 2020. , July 14, 2020.
Pete Buttigieg and Philip H. Gordon, “Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence,” Pete Buttigieg and Philip H. Gordon, “Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence,”
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Will Replace It May Be Just What the World—and the United States—Needs,” Will Replace It May Be Just What the World—and the United States—Needs,” Foreign Policy, ,
July 13, 2020. July 13, 2020.
~~Ben Smith, “While America Looks Away, Autocrats Crack Down on Digital News Sites,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, July 12 (updated July 14), 2020.~~
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National Interest, July 11, 2020.
~~Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Ghost of Donald Trump Will Haunt Us For Years, Visions of Trump~~
~~Will Haunt All Interaction with the United States as Long as There Are People Alive Who~~
~~Remember Him,” National Interest, July 10, 2020.~~
~~Micah Zenko, “The Foreign-Policy Blob Is Structurally Racist,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2020.~~
~~Luke Baker, Andreas Rinke, Philip Blenkinsop, “Post-Trump Era a Possibility, Europeans See No~~
~~Quick Fix to U.S. Ties,” Reuters, July 9, 2020.~~
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~~Strategy, and It Is Based on Reciprocity,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress~~

~~Hal Brands, “The Upside of a New Cold War With China, Competition with the Soviet Union~~
~~Brought Out the Best in American Democracy,” Bloomberg, July 7, 2020.~~
~~Matthew Karnitschnig, “Merkel Looks East as Ties Fray Between Germany and U.S., Berlin~~
~~Aims to Reenergize Commercial Links with Beijing Amid the Coronavirus Crisis,” Politico, July~~
~~7 (updated July 8), 2020.~~
~~Matthew M. Kavanagh, Mara Pillinger, “Leaving the WHO Will Hurt Americans’ Health,”~~
Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020.
~~Jeremy Shapiro, “Ask Not What Your Country Can Do for Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks,~~
~~July 7, 2020.~~
~~Michael Schuman, “Why China Wants Trump to Win, Four More Years Might Present Tantalizing~~
~~Opportunities for Beijing to Expand Its Influence Around East Asia and the World,” Foreign~~
~~Policy, July 7, 2020.~~
~~James Jay Carafano, “Despite the Media’s Efforts, Trump Taking a Measured Approach to~~
~~Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation, July 6, 2020.~~
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National Interest, July 6, 2020.

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs

Acknowledgments
The other original co-author of this report was Michael Moodie, who was Assistant Director of the Foreign The other original co-author of this report was Michael Moodie, who was Assistant Director of the Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS and a Senior Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS and a Senior Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade
until his retirement from CRS in December 2020. until his retirement from CRS in December 2020.

Disclaimer
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