This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with red strikethrough and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.
Successive Administrations have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran's behavior. U.S. sanctions on Iran, which are primarily "secondary sanctions" on firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran, have adversely affected Iran's economy. The sanctions arguably have not, to date, altered Iran's pursuit of core strategic objectives including its support for regional armed factions and its development of missiles. Arguably, sanctions did contribute to Iran's decision to enter into a 2015 agreement that put limits on its nuclear program.
During 2011-2015, the global community pressured Iran economically, and Iran's economy shrank as its crude oil exports fell by more than 50%, and Iran was rendered unable to access its foreign exchange assets abroad. Iran accepted the 2015 multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) in part because the agreement brought broad sanctions relief. The Obama Administration waived relevant sanctions and revoked relevant executive orders (E.O.s). United Nations and European Union sanctions were lifted as well. Remaining in place were U.S. sanctions on: U.S. trade with Iran, Iran's support for regional armed factions, its human rights abuses, its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, provided for a non-binding restriction on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and kept in place an existing ban on its importation or exportation of arms. The latter ban expires on October 18, 2020. The sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly pre-sanctions levels, regain access to its foreign exchange funds, and order some new passenger aircraft.
On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA. All U.S. secondary sanctions were re-imposed as of November 6, 2018. Sanctions have since been at the core of Trump Administration policy to apply "maximum pressure" on Iran, with the stated purpose of compelling Iran to negotiate a revised JCPOA that takes into account U.S. concerns beyond Iran's nuclear program. The policy has caused major companies to exit the Iran market, and Iran's economy fell into severe recession. Iran's oil exports decreased dramatically, particularly after the Administration in May 2019 ended sanctions exceptions for the purchase of Iranian oil. The Administration has also sanctioned several senior Iranian officials. Iran has continued to develop its missile force and to provide arms and support to a broad array of armed factions operating throughout the region, while refusing, to date, to begin talks with the United States on a revised JCPOA.
The European Union and other countries have sought to keep the economic benefits of the JCPOA flowing to Iran in order to persuade Iran to remain in the nuclear accord. In early 2019, the European countries created a mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran but the vehicle only completed one transaction in its first year of operations. Since mid-2019, Iran has responded to the increasing sanctions by decreasing its compliance with some of the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and by conducting provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq.
The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted international criticism that U.S. sanctions on Iran might be hindering Iran's response to the outbreak. Iran has reported more cases and more deaths from the illness than any other country in the region. Numerous accounts indicate that sanctions have hindered Iran's ability to finance the purchase of medical equipment, even though U.S. sanctions do not apply to humanitarian transactions. In March 2020, the Administration revised public sanctions guidance to prompt foreign companies to proceed with sales of humanitarian items to Iran. The Administration has also offered assistance to help Iran deal with COVID-19, but Iran has refused the U.S. aid. Iran has applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $5 billion loan.
See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Sanctions have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, a U.S. ally. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran's strategic power in the Middle East more generally. After the mid-2000s, U.S. and international sanctions focused largely on trying to persuade Iran to agree to limits to its nuclear program. Still, sanctions have had multiple objectives and sought to address multiple threats from Iran simultaneously.
This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. CRS cannot independently corroborate whether any individual or other entity might be in violation of U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The report tracks implementation of the various U.S. laws and executive orders, some of which require the blocking of U.S.-based property of sanctioned entities. No information has been released from the executive branch indicating the extent, if any, to which any such property is currently blocked.
The sections below are grouped by function, in the chronological order in which these themes have emerged.
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, in the
form of executive orders issued by President Jimmy Carter blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the United States. These included E.O. 12170 of November 14, 1979, blocking all Iranian government property in the United States, and E.O 12205 (April 7, 1980) and E.O. 12211 (April 17, 1980) banning virtually all U.S. trade with Iran. The latter two orders were issued just prior to the failed April 24-25, 1980, U.S. effort to rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages held by Iran. President Jimmy Carter also broke diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. The trade-related orders (12205 and 12211) were revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981, following the "Algiers Accords" (hereafter: "Accords") that resolved the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis.
The Accords established a "U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal"
in the United States.1
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal
The Algiers Accords that resolved the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis established a “U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal” at the Hague that continues to arbitrate government-to-government cases resulting from
the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran'’s assets. All of the 4,700 private U.S.
claims against Iran were resolved in the first 20 years of the Tribunal, resulting in $2.5 billion in
awards to U.S. nationals and firms.
The major government-to-government cases involve Iranian
claims for compensation for hundreds of foreign military sales (FMS) cases that were halted in
concert with the rift in U.S.-Iran relations when the Shah's government fell in 1979. In 1991, the George H. W. Bush Administration paid $278 million from the Treasury Department Judgment Fund to settle FMS cases involving weapons Iran had received but which were in the United States undergoing repair when the Shah fell and were then impounded.
’s government fell in 1979.
On January 17, 2016 (the day after the JCPOA took effect), the United States announced it had
settled with Iran on additional FMS cases that were frozen when the Shah'’s government fell. Iran
had been depositing its FMS payments into a DoD-managed "“Iran FMS Trust Fund,"” and, after
1990, the Fund had a balance of about $400 million. In 1990, $200 million was paid from the Fund to Iran to settle some FMS cases. Under the 2016 settlement, the United States sent Iran the $400 million balance in the Fund, plus $1.3 billion in accrued interest, paid from the Department of the Treasury's "Judgment Fund." In order not to violate U.S. regulations barring direct U.S. dollar transfers to Iranian banks, the funds were remitted to Iran by early February 2016 in foreign hard currency from the central banks of the Netherlands and of Switzerland. Some remaining claims involving the FMS program with Iran remain under arbitration.
Iranian assets in the United States remain blocked under several provisions, including Executive Order 13599 of February 2010. The JCPOA did not commit the United States to release any of these assets.
Terrorism4
Nearly $50 billion in court awards have been made to victims of Iranian terrorism. These include
the families of the 241 U.S. soldiers killed in the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut. U.S. funds equivalent to the $400 million balance in the DOD account (see
above) have been used to pay a small portion of these judgments. The Algiers Accords apparently
precluded compensation for the 52 U.S. diplomats held hostage by Iran from November 1979
until January 1981. The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (Section 404 of P.L. 114-113) set up
a mechanism for paying damages to the U.S. embassy hostages and other victims of Iranian terrorism using settlement paymentsusing settlements paid by various
banks for concealing Iran-related transactions, and proceeds from other Iranian frozen assets.
Other past financial disputes include the errant U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian
Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States paid Iran $61.8 million in
compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248
Iranians killed. The United States did not compensate Iran for the airplane itself, although
3
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tar2010.pdf.
For details on these issues, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism
Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of
Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10104, It Belongs in a Museum: Sovereign Immunity Shields
Iranian Antiquities Even When It Does Not Protect Iran, by Stephen P. Mulligan; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10140,
Iran’s Central Bank Asks Supreme Court to Consider Whether the Bank’s Assets Abroad are Immune from Attachment
to Satisfy Terror Judgments, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
4
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officials involved in the negotiations told CRS in November 2012 that the United States later
arranged to provide a substitute used aircraft to Iran.
Executive Order 13599, issued by President Obama on February 5, 2012, directs the blocking of
Executive Order 13599 (February 5, 2012) blocks U.S.-based assets of entities determined to be "
“owned or controlled by the Iranian government."” The order was issued to implement Section
1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) that imposed secondary
U.S. sanctions on Iran'’s Central Bank. The order requires that U.S. banks block any U.S.-based assets
of the Central Bank of Iran, or of any Iranian government-controlled entity. The order goes beyond
the regulations issued pursuant to the 1995 imposition of the U.S. trade ban with Iran, in which
U.S. banks are required to refuse such transactions but to return funds to Iran. Even before the issuance of the order, and in order to implement the ban on U.S. trade with Iran (see below)
successive Administrations had designated many entities as "“owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran."
”
Numerous designations have been made under Executive Order 13599, including the June 4,
2013, naming of 38 entities (mostly oil, petrochemical, and investment companies) that are
components of an Iranian entity called the "“Execution of Imam Khomeini'’s Order"” (EIKO).35 The
Department of the Treasury characterizes EIKO as an Iranian leadership entity that controls "
“massive off-the-books investments."
”
Implementation of the JCPOA and U.S. Withdrawal from the JCPOA.of the JCPOA. To implement the JCPOA, many 13599-designated entities (in
JCPOA "“Attachment 3"”) were "delisted"“delisted” from U.S. secondary sanctions (no longer considered "
“Specially Designated Nationals,"” SDNs), and in early 2016 and instead referred to as "designees “designees
blocked solely pursuant to E.O 13599."4 That characterization permitted,” a characterization that permits foreign entities to conduct
transactions with the listed entities without U.S. sanctions penalty but continued to bar U.S. persons (or foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person)but bars U.S. persons from conducting transactions with these entities. them.
In concert with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, virtually all of the 13599-designated entities that were delisted as SDNs13599designated entities were relisted as SDNs on November 5, 2018.5
6
Civilian Nuclear Entity Exception. When the Trump Administration reinstated sanctions, . Among those entities “relisted” as Iranian owned entities were
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and 23 of its subsidiaries, were relisted under E.O. 13599. However, the
Administration did not relist these entities as subject to secondary sanctions (SDNs) under E.O.
13382, in order to facilitate continued IAEA and international involvementwork with Iran's ’s permitted civilian nuclear
program.7 The subsequent ending of most sanctionscivilian nuclear program permitted under the JCPOA.6 The May 2019 ending of some waivers for nuclear technical assistance to
Iran prohibits work with somealmost all work with AEOI entities.
Militant Groups
After about five years during which no U.S. sanctions were imposed on Iran, the United States
imposed sanctions for Iran'’s support for regional groups committing acts of terrorism. The
Secretary of State designated Iran a "“state sponsor of terrorism"” on January 23, 1984, following
the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later
established Lebanese Hezbollah. ThisThe designation triggers substantial sanctions. None of the laws
or executive orders in this section were waived or revoked to implement the JCPOA, and no
entities discussed in this section were "delisted"“delisted” from sanctions.
The U.S. naming of Iran as a "“state sponsor of terrorism"”—commonly referred to as Iran's ’s
inclusion on the U.S. "“terrorism list"”—triggers several sanctions. The designation iswas made
under the authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as
amended), sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of
international terrorism. The sanctions triggered by the designation are as follows:
The terrorism list designation, and other U.S. sanctions laws barring assistance to Iran, do not bar
U.S. disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of
two earthquakes in Iran in 1997; $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June 2002, earthquake;
and $5.7 million in assistance for victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, which
killed 40,000. The U.S. military flew 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam. The Trump
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Administration has offered Iran assistance, via the World Health Organization, to help it battle the
COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020, but, as of mid-April 2020, Iran has refused the aid.
Requirements for Removal from Terrorism List
Terminating the sanctions triggered by Iran
If the country
If the |
Section 40A to the Arms Export Control Act (added by Section 330 of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132)) prohibits the sale or licensing of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country designated (by each May 15) as "“not cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorismantiterrorism efforts."” The President can waive the provision upon determining that a defense sale is "
“important to the national interests"” of the United States.
Every year since enactmentthis was enacted, Iran has been designated as a country that is "“not fully cooperating"
cooperating” with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. However, the provision is largely redundant with
other laws that prohibit U.S. defense sales to Iran.
Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001)8 mandates the freezing of the U.S.-based assets of,
and a ban on U.S. transactions with, entities determined by the Administration to be supporting
international terrorism. The order wasE.O. 13224, issued two weeks after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code, initially targeting Al Qaeda. On
the United States, targeted Al Qaeda, but it has subsequently been used to also target Iran. On
September 10, 2019, the Administration amended E.O. 13224 to authorize barring from the U.S.
financial system any foreign bank determined to have "“conducted or facilitated any significant transaction"
transaction” with any person or entity designated under the order.7
Corps (IRGC)
Section 105 of the Countering America'’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-4411544, August 2, 2017), mandates the imposition of E.O. 13324 penalties on the IRGC and its
officials, agents, and affiliates by October 30, 2017 (90 days after enactment). The Treasury
Department made the designation of the IRGC as a terrorism-supporting entity under E.O. 13224
on October 13, 2017.
8
The Order was issued under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N. Participation Act of
1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code.
9 For text of the amendments to the Order, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-ordermodernizing-sanctions-combat-terrorism/
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Implementation of E.O. 13224
Successive Administrations have used the Order extensively to sanction Iran-related entities,
on October 13, 2017.
E.O. 13224 is not specific to Iran. Successive Administrations have used the Order extensively to sanction persons or entities that are involved in Iranian weapons shipments. Numerous Iran-related entities, including members of Iran-allied organizations, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and entities
involved in financing or facilitating Iran’s regional operations. The Iran-related entities
and several Iraqi Shia militias, have been designated under E.O. 13224, as are shown in the tables later in the report. Some persons and entities that have been sanctioned for such activity have been cited for supporting groups which are not named as terrorist groups by the United States, such as the Afghan Taliban organization and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Trump The Trump
Administration has used the Order to sanction Iranian economic entities that furnish funds for the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its regional activities. No entities designated
under E.O. 13224 were delisted to implement the JCPOA.
Sanctions similar to those of E.O. 13224 are imposed on Iranian and Iran-linked entities through the
The State Department has authority under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8.U.S.C. 1189) to designate an entity as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In addition to the sanctions of E.O. 13224,The designation
carries penalties similar to those of E.O. 13224, but also subjects any U.S. person (or person
under U.S. jurisdiction) who "“knowingly provides material support or resources to an FTO, or
attempts or conspires to do so" is subject to to “fine or up to 20 years in prison.” A bank that commits such a
violation is subject to fines.
Implementation: The following organizations have been designated as FTOs for acts of terrorism
on behalf of Iran or are organizations assessed as funded and supported by Iran:
Some sanctions have been imposed to try to curtail Iran'’s destabilizing influence in the region.
In 1995, the Clinton Administration expanded U.S. sanctions against Iran by issuing
In 1995, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) banning U.S.
trade with and investment in Iran. 11 The order The order was issued primarily under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),9 which gives the President wide powers to regulate commerce with a foreign country when a "state of emergency" is declared in relations with that country. E.O. 12959 superseded and broadened Executive Order 12957,
which was issued two months earlier (March 15, 1995) and, which barred U.S. investment in Iran's ’s
energy sector. The March 1995 order accompanied President Clinton'’s declaration of a "“state of emergency"
emergency” with respect to Iran. Subsequently, E.O 13059 (August 19, 1997) added a prohibition on U.S. companies'
companies’ knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined
for Iran. Each March since 1995, the Administration in power has renewed the "“state of emergency" with respect to Iran. IEEPA gives the President the authority to alter regulations to license transactions with Iran—regulations enumerated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian Transactions Regulations, ITRs).
emergency” with respect to Iran.
Section 103 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195) codified the trade ban and reinstated the full ban on imports that had
earlier been relaxed by April 2000 regulations. That relaxation allowed importation into the
United States of Iranian nuts, fruit products (such as pomegranate juice), carpets, and caviar. U.S. imports from Iran after that time were negligible.10
12
11
The executive order was issued not only under the authority of International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.(IEEPA) but also the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and §301 of Title 3, United
States Code. IEEPA gives the President wide powers to regulate commerce with a foreign country when a ”state of
emergency” is declared in relations with that country, and to alter regulations to license transactions with Iran—
regulations enumerated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian Transactions Regulations, ITRs).
12 Imports were mainly of artwork for exhibitions around the United States, which are counted as imports even though
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Iran Sanctions
Section 101 of the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293) separately ) codified the ban on U.S. investment
in Iran, but givesgave the President the authority to terminate this sanction with presidential notification to Congress of such a decision 15 days in advance (or 3 days in advance if there are "exigent circumstances").
In accordance with U.S. commitments under
the JCPOA, the ITRs were relaxed to allow U.S. importation of the Iranian luxury goods
discussed above (carpets, caviar, nuts, etc.), but not to permit general U.S.-Iran trade. U.S.
regulations were also altered to permit the sale of commercial aircraft to non-sanctioned Iranian
airlines.1113 In concert with the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the easing of the regulations to
allow for importation of Iranian carpets and other luxury goods was reversed on August 6, 2018.
The following provisions apply to the U.S. trade ban on Iran as specified in regulations (Iran
Transaction Regulations, ITRs) formulated pursuant to the executive orders and laws discussed above. The regulations
are administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury.
The ITRsregulations do not ban foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as
the subsidiary is not "controlled"“controlled” by the parent company. Most foreign subsidiaries are legally
considered foreign persons subject to the laws of the country in which the subsidiaries are
incorporated. Section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act
(ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158) holds "controlled"“controlled” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to the same
standards as U.S. parent firms, defining a controlled subsidiary as (1) one that is more than 50%
owned by the U.S. parent; (2) one in which the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of
Directors of the subsidiary; or (3) one in which the parent firm directs the operations of the
subsidiary. There is no waiver provision.
JCPOA Regulations and Reversal. To implement
During the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, the United States licensed "controlled"“controlled” foreign
subsidiaries to conduct transactions with Iran that are permissible under JCPOA (almost all forms of civilian trade). The implementation was accomplished in the Treasury Department's issuance of "through “General License H: Authorizing Certain
Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person."17 The Obama Administration asserted that the ”18 The
President has authority under IEEPA to license transactions with Iran, the ITRSHRA
notwithstanding. The Trump Administration revoked that general license and restore the pre-JCPOAGeneral License H and restored the preJCPOA licensing policy ("“Statement of Licensing Policy,"” SLP) on November 6, 2018.
Waiver Authority |
In 1996, Congress and the executive branch began a long process of pressuring Iran's vitalto pressure Iran’s energy sector, with the stated
aim of denying Iran the financial resources to support terrorist organizations and other armed
factions or to further its nuclear and WMD programs. Iran'’s oil sector is as old as the petroleum
industry itself (early 20th20th century), and Iran'’s onshore oil fields are in need of substantial investment. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest after Saudi Arabia and Canada, and in November 2019 it announced discovery of the Namavaran oilfield with an estimated 53 billion barrels of crude oil. Iran has large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet), exceeded only by Russia. However, Iran's gas export sector is still rudimentary and most of Iran's gas is injected into its oil fields to boost their production. Iran has, since 2011, reduced its dependence on oil and gas sales, but, prior to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, the energy sector was still generating about 20% of Iran's GDP and as much as 30% of government revenue.
investment.20 Since 2011, Iran has been reducing its dependence on oil and gas revenues, to the
point where Iran’s 2020-2021 budget assumes minimal revenue from oil sales.21
The Iran Sanctions Act
This sections includes sanctions triggers under the Act that were added by subsequent laws.
laws.
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) has been a pivotal component of U.S. sanctions against Iran's ’s
energy sector. Since its enactment in 1996, ISA'’s provisions have been expanded and extended to
other Iranian industries. ISA sought to thwart Iran'’s 1995 opening of the sector to foreign
investment in late 1995 through a "“buy-back"” program in which foreign firms gradually recoup
their investments as oil and gas is produced. It was first enacted as the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act (ILSA, P.L. 104-172, signed on August 5, 1996) but was later retitled the Iran Sanctions Act
after it terminated with respect to Libya in 2006. ISA was the first major "“extra-territorial sanction"
sanction” on Iran—a sanction that authorizes U.S. penalties against third country firms.
ISA consists of a number of "triggers"“triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered
violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA'’s provisions. (All
triggers were waived during JCPOA implementation and reinstated in 2018, unless specified
below.)
The core trigger of ISA when it was first enacted was a requirement that the President sanction
companies (entities, persons) that make an "investment"19“investment” of more than $20 million20 in one year in Iran's energy sector.21 The definition of "investment" in ISA (§14 [9]) includes not only equity and royalty arrangements but any contract that includes "responsibility for the development of petroleum resources" of Iran. The definition includes additions to existing investment (added by P.L. 107-24) and pipelines to or through Iran and contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects (added by CISADA).
This provision of ISA was not waived under the JCPOA.
The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed , September 30, 2006) added Section 5(b)(1) of ISA,
subjecting to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to have sold to Iran (1) "“chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies"” or (2) "“destabilizing numbers and types" ”
of advanced conventional weapons. Sanctions can be applied if the exporter knew (or had cause
to know) that the end-user of the item was Iran. The definitions do not specifically include
ballistic or cruise missiles, but those weapons could be considered "“related technologies" or a "destabilizing type" of advanced conventional weapon.
.”
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158, signed August
10, 2012) created Section 5(b)(2) of ISA subjecting to sanctions entities determined by the
Administration to participate in a joint venture with Iran relating to the mining, production, or
transportation of uranium.
Implementation:
Implementation: This provision of ISA was not waived under the JCPOA. No ISA sanctions have
been imposed on any entities under this provision.
Section 102(a) of the CISADA (mentioned aboveSection 102(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195, signed July 1, 2010) amended Section 5 of ISA to exploit Iran's dependency on imported gasoline (40% dependency at that time). Itsanction Iran’s
importation of gasoline Its enactment followed legislation, such as P.L. 111-85, that prohibited the
use of U.S. funds to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with products from firms that sell
gasoline to Iran; and P.L. 111-117 that denied Ex-Im Bank credits to any firm that sold gasoline or
related equipment to Iran. The section sanctions:
Petrochemicals Production
Section 201 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHA, P.L.
112-158, signed , August 10, 2012) codified an Executive Order, 13590 (November 21, 2011), by adding
Section 5(a)(5 and 6) to ISA sanctioning firms that:
Section 201 of the ITRSHRA amends ISA by sanctioning entities the Administration determines to have
Separate provisions of the ITRSHR Act—which do not amend and were not formally
incorporated into ISA——require the application of ISA sanctions (five out of the 12 sanctions on
the ISA menu) on any entity that
Implementation.
A definition of chemicals and products considered “petrochemical products” is found in a Policy Guidance
statement. See Federal Register, November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/201227642.pdf.
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Section 312 of ITRSHRA required an Administration determination, within 45
days of enactment (by September 24, 2012) whether NIOC and NITC are IRGC
agents or affiliates. The determination would subject financial transactions with NIOC and NITC to sanctions under CISADA (prohibition on opening U.S.-based accounts)
NIOC and NITC to CISADA sanctions (see below).
Implementation. On September 24, 2012, the Department of the Treasury determined that NIOC
and NITC are affiliates of the IRGC. On November 8, 2012, the Department of the Treasury
named NIOC as a proliferation entity under Executive Order 13382—a designation that, in
accordance with Section 104 of CISADA, bars any foreign bank determined to have dealt directly
with NIOC (including with a NIOC bank account in a foreign country) from opening or
maintaining a U.S.-based account. NIOC and NITC were delisted under the JCPOA, but they
were “relisted” on November 5, 2018.
maintaining a U.S.-based account.
Sanctions on dealings with NIOC and NITC were waived in accordance with the interim nuclear agreement of late 2013. Their designations under Executive Order 13382 were rescinded in accordance with the JCPOA, but they were "relisted" on November 5, 2018.
Status: 13622 (July 30, 2012) revokedrevoked (by E.O. 13716, January 2016) but waswas put back into effect
by E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018
Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012) imposed specified sanctions on the ISA sanctions menu,
and bars banks from the U.S. financial system, for the following activities:
E.O. 13622 also blocked U.S.-based property of entities determined to have
E.O. 13622 sanctions do not apply if the parent country of the entity has received an oil importation importation
exception under Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81, discussed below. An exception also is provided for
pre-existing projects that bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey, if such project was initiated prior to the issuance of the order.
In the original version of ISA, there was no firm requirement, and no time limit, for the
Administration to investigate potential violations and determine that a firm has violated ISA's ’s
provisions. The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added a
provision recommending, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination.24 25
CISADA (Section 102[g][5]) mandated that the Administration begin an investigation of potential ISA violations when there is "credible information" about a potential violation, and made mandatory the 180-day time limit for a determination of violation.
ITRSHRA defines "credible information" needed to begin an investigation of a violation to
A definition of what chemicals and products are considered “petroleum products” for the purposes of the order are in
the policy guidance issued November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf.
25 Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that
supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb moneylaundering for use to further WMD programs.
24
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14
Iran Sanctions
ISA violations when there is “credible information” about a potential violation, and made
mandatory the 180-day time limit for a determination of violation.
ITRSHRA defines “credible information” needed to begin an investigation of a violation to
include a corporate announcement or corporate filing to its shareholders that it has undertaken
transactions with Iran that are potentially sanctionable under ISA. It also says the President maymay use as credible information reports from the
Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service. In addition, Section 219 of
ITRSHRA requires that an investigation of an ISA violation begin if a company reports in its filings to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that it has knowingly engaged in activities that would violate ISA (or Section
104 of CISADA or transactions with entities designated under E.O 13224 or 13382, see below).
Oversight
ITRSHRA added several mechanisms for Congress to oversee whether the Administration is
investigating ISA violations. Section 223 of that law required a Government Accountability
Office report, within 120 days of enactment, and another such report a year later, on companies
that have undertaken specified activities with Iran that might constitute violations of ISA. Section
224 amended a reporting requirement in Section 110(b) of CISADA by requiring an
Administration report to Congress every 180 days on investment in Iran'’s energy sector, joint
ventures with Iran, and estimates of Iran'’s imports and exports of petroleum products.
Congressional Research Service 15 Iran Sanctions ISA Sanctions Menu
For companies that the President determines violated ISA, the original version of ISA required the imposition of
1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity 2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity (original ISA) 3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity (original ISA)
4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds;
5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity (original ISA) 6. prohibition on transactions in foreign exchange by the entity (added by CISADA) 7. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution (added by CISADA)
8. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-based property which the
9. restriction on imports from the sanctioned entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic
10. a ban on a U.S. person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a
11. exclusion from the United States of corporate officers or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned firm (added
12. imposition of any of the ISA sanctions on principal offices of a sanctioned firm (added by ITRSHRA).
Mandatory Sanction: Prohibition on Contracts with the U.S. Government CISADA (§102[b]) added a requirement
Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011 and E.O. 13628 of October 9, 2012 |
The sections below provide information on how some key ISA provisions have been interpreted and implemented.
ISA's definition of "investment" that is subject to sanctionsapplied.
Application to Energy Pipelines
As noted above, ISA’s definition of “investment” has been consistently interpreted by successive
Administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran. Such pipelines are deemed to because pipelines
help Iran develop its petroleum (oil and natural gas) sector. Amendments to ISA in CISADA specifically included in the definition of petroleum resources "products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied natural gas." In March 2012, then-Secretary of In March 2012, then-Secretary of
State Clinton clarified that the Obama Administration interpreted the provision to be applicable
from the beginning of pipeline construction.25
ISA does not sanction purchasing crude oil from Iran, but other laws, such as the Iran Freedom
and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA, discussed below) and executive orders, do. No U.S. sanction
requires any country or person to actually seize, intercept, inspect on the high seas, or impound
any Iranian ship suspected of carrying oil or other cargo subject to sanctions.
However, as
discussed further below, in August 2019, the Trump Administration began using various
terrorism-related provisions to sanction some Iranian oil shipments and persons involved in
shipping Iranian oil. The Administration has argued that the shipments were organized by and for
the benefit of Iran'’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On September 4, 2019, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
OFAC updated its sanctions guidance to state that "“bunkering services"” (port operational support)
for Iranian oil shipments could subject firms and individuals involved in such support to U.S. sanctions.
ISA and other laws, such as IFCA, exclude from sanction purchases of natural gas from Iran or
natural gas transactions with Iran. However, construction of gas pipelinespipelines involving Iran is
subject to ISA sanctions. MoreoverAnd, sanctions on financial transactions with Iran (see throughout) can impede impede
implementation of purchase agreements for Iranian gas.
The effective dates of U.S. sanctions laws and orders exclude long-standing joint natural gas
projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and
related pipelines in the Caspian Sea. Iran's Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO)’s NICO holds a passive 10% share in Shah Deniz,
which also includes BP, Azerbaijan'’s natural gas firm SOCAR, Russia'’s Lukoil, and other firms.
NICO is a sanctioned entity under ISA and other provisions, but an OFAC factsheet of November
28, 2012, stated that the Shah Deniz consortium, as a whole, is not determined to be "“a person
owned or controlled by"” the government of Iran and transactions with the consortium are
permissible.
The original version of ISA did not apply to the development by Iran of a liquefied natural gas
(LNG) export capability. Iran has not developed an LNG export capability to date. CISADA
specifically included LNG in the ISA definition of petroleum resources and therefore made
subject to sanctions LNG investment in Iran and supply of LNG tankers to Iran.
The definitions of investment and other activity that can be sanctioned under ISA include
The ISA definition of investment includes financing for investment in Iran'’s energy sector, or for
sales of gasoline and refinery-related equipment and services. However, the definitions of
financial institutions are interpreted not to apply to official credit guarantee agencies, such as France'
France’s COFACE and Germany'’s Hermes. These credit guarantee agencies are arms of their
parent governments, and ISA does not provide for sanctioning governments or their agencies.
Entities sanctioned under the executive orders or laws cited in this section are listed in the tables
at the end of this report. As noted, some of the orders cited provide for blocking U.S.-based assets
of the entities designated for sanctions. OFAC has not announced the blocking of any U.S.-based property of the sanctioned entities, likely indicating that those entities sanctioned do not have a presence in the United States.
publicly reported on the accounts, if any, that have been blocked under the orders or laws discussed in this section, and the entities sanctioned likely do not have a financial presence in the United States. Congressional Research Service 17 Iran Sanctions ISA Waiver, Exemptions, and Sunset Provisions
The President can waive ISA sanctions in several ways—general, country-specific, or company-specific.
General Waiver. Under Section 4(c)(1)(a), the President can waive (for six months at a time) the requirement to
Country-Specific Waiver. Under Section 4(c)(1)(B), the President can waive ISA sanctions (for 12 months at a time)
Company-Specific Waiver. Under Section 9(c), the President can waive ISA sanctions (for one year at a time) on any
ISA (§5[f]) also contains several exceptions such as that the President is not required to impose sanctions that
Under a provision added by CISADA (§102[g][5]), ISA provides a means—a so-called Administration Termination Process and Requirements
The Administration can immediately terminate all ISA provisions if it certifies that Iran:
(1) has ceased its efforts to acquire WMD; (2) has been removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; 27
This termination provision, like the sunset provision discussed below
Sunset and Other Expiration Provisions
ISA was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2016, as provided for by CISADA. This followed prior sunset
P.L. 107-24 also required an Administration report on ISA |
Oil Export Sanctions: FY2012 NDAA Sanctioning the Central Bank
In 2011, Congress sought to reduce Iran'’s exportation of oil by imposing sanctions on financial
transactions with Iran'’s Central Bank, which receives Iran'’s oil payments worldwide. President
Obama, in his signing statement on the bill, indicated he would implement the provision so as not
to damage U.S. relations with U.S. partner countries, many of whom were purchasers of Iranian
oil. Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 112-81, signed on ,
December 31, 2011):
The Obama Administration used the FY2012 NDAA to pressure Iran without causing economic
difficulty to U.S. allies, other Iran policy partners, or the global oil market. The table below on major Iranian oil customers
indicates cuts made by major customers compared to 2011.
The January 2016 waivers issued to implement the JCPOA suspended the requirement for a
country to cut oil purchases from Iran in order to maintain their exceptionsSREs, and Iran's historic ’s oil customers
quickly resumed buying Iranian oil. The provision went back into effect on November 5, 2018.29
The law provides for the President to waive the sanctions for 120 days, renewable for successive
120-day periods, if the President determines that doing so is in the national security interest. Outright repeal or amendment of this law would require congressional action.
This provision was waived to implement the JPoA (to allow Iran'This
provision was waived to implement both the interim nuclear accord (January 2014 – January
2016), which allowed Iran’s oil customers to maintain purchases level at 1.1 million barrels per day) and again (Section 1245(d)(5)) on January 18, 2017, just before the Obama Administration left office. The Trump Administration renewed the waiver on May 18, 2017, on September 14, 2017, and on January 12, 2018. The law went back into effect on November 5, 2018 (180-day wind-down period).
The ability of
day) and to implement the JCPOA. The Trump Administration renewed the waiver for the last
time, on January 12, 2018. The law went back into effect on November 5, 2018.
Iran Foreign Account “Restriction” Provision
Section 504 of the ITRSHRA, which went into effect in February 2013, impedes the ability of
Iran to repatriate hard currency to its Central Bank, including U.S. dollars that are the primary
form of payment for oil, was impeded by Section 504 of the ITRSHRA which went into effect on February 6, 2013. The provision amended Section 1245 of the FY2012 NDAA (adding "
“clause ii"” to Paragraph D[1]) to require that any funds paid to Iran as a result of exempted
transactions (oil purchases, for example) be credited to an account located in the country with
primary jurisdiction over the foreign bank making the transaction.
Most of Iran's funds held abroad are in banks located in Iran's main oil customers, and the provision largely compels Iran to buy the products of the oil customer countries. Because of theIran can therefore only use the
funds to buy the products of the countries where the funds are held.
The September 25, 2019, designation of the Central Bank as a terrorist entity under E.O. 13224,
restricted Iran’ Iran's ability to draw downuse its Central Bank accounts abroad to pay for imports of humanitarian items was been impeded
items because the 13224terrorism designation does not carry a humanitarian exception. The
Administration sought to counteracteased that effectrestriction with the February 27, 2020 General License that Iran's ’s
Central Bank accounts could be used for humanitarian transactions, as discussed above.
The waiver provision that applies to the sanctions imposed (see above).
Waiver
The waiver under the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) applies to this Iranthe foreign bank account restriction provision. A waiver period of six months is permitted.
provision, in six month periods. To implement the JPoAJCPOA, a waiver was issued under P.L. 112-81
Department of State. Background Briefing on President Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from the JCPOA. May 8,
2018.
32 See CRS Insight IN11108, Iran Oil Sanctions Exceptions Ended, by Kenneth Katzman.
33 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil, April 22, 2019.
34 “U.S. to warn shippers against storing Iranian oil.” State Department official. Reuters, March 9, 2020.
31
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20
Iran Sanctions
(Section 212 and 213) to allow Iran to receive some hard currency from ongoing oil sales in eight installments during the JPA period. Iran remained unable under the JPA to remove hard currency from existing
installments, but Iran remained unable to repatriate funds from its accounts abroad. During U.S.
implementation of the JCPOA the JPOA, Sections 212(d)(10 and 2134(b)(1) of ITRSHRA were waived - enabling Iran to gain access to hard currency from ongoing purchases of its oiland
Iran was able to access the hard currency it received from oil sales. The waiver was last renewed
on January 12, 2018. Its provisions, and the restriction went back into effect on November 5, 2018.
(average daily volumes, in barrels per day)
Country/Bloc
2011
JPA period
average
(2014-2016)
European Union
(particularly
Italy, Spain,
Greece)
600,000
negligible
520,000 +
100,000
0
China
550,000
410,000
700,000
838,000
130,000
Japan
325,000
190,000
133,000
0
0
India
320,000
190,000
620,000
354,000
0
South Korea
230,000
130,000
100,000
0
0
Turkey
200,000
120,000
200,000
161,000
0
South Africa
80,000
negligible
negligible
0
0
Other Asia
(Malaysia, Sri
Lanka,
Indonesia)
90,000
negligible
negligible
Taiwan
35,000
10,000
67,000
0
0
Singapore
20,000
negligible
negligible
33,000
0
0
negligible
33,000
96.000
0
55,000
negligible
100,000
21,000
97,000
2.5
1.06
2.45
1.60
0.227
Syria
Other/Unknown
(Iraq and UAE
swaps, other)
Total (mbd)
At U.S.
JCPOA Exit
(May ‘18)
At SRE
Determination
(Oct. ‘18)
May 2020
(post-SRE
termination)
0
Sources: Bloomberg News, Reuters, and other press articles. Information on actual Iranian exports is often
preliminary and incomplete, and might not reflect activities by Iran and various oil customers to conceal
purchases or avoid tracking of oil tankers. Figures do not include purchases of condensates, which are light
petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas production. South Korea was a large customer for
Iranian condensates and, as of August 2018, it ended its purchases of that product from Iran to zero.
Note: mbd = million barrels per day.
Sanctions on Arms and Weapons-Related
Technology Transfers
Several laws and executive orders seek to prevent Iran from obtaining arms and weapons-related
technology. Sanctions on Iran’s exportation of arms are discussed in the sections above on
sanctions for Iran’(average daily volumes, in barrels per day)
Country/Bloc |
2011 |
JPA period average (2014-2016) |
|
|
March 2020 (post-SRE termination) |
European Union (particularly Italy, Spain, Greece) |
600,000 |
negligible |
520,000 + |
100,000 |
0 |
China |
550,000 |
410,000 |
700,000 |
838,000 |
64,000 |
Japan |
325,000 |
190,000 |
133,000 |
0 |
0 |
India |
320,000 |
190,000 |
620,000 |
354,000 |
0 |
South Korea |
230,000 |
130,000 |
100,000 |
0 |
0 |
Turkey |
200,000 |
120,000 |
200,000 |
161,000 |
0 |
South Africa |
80,000 |
negligible |
negligible |
0 |
0 |
Other Asia (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia) |
90,000 |
negligible |
negligible |
0 |
|
Taiwan |
35,000 |
10,000 |
67,000 |
0 |
0 |
Singapore |
20,000 |
negligible |
negligible |
33,000 |
0 |
Syria |
0 |
negligible |
33,000 |
96.000 |
150,000 |
Other/Unknown (Iraq and UAE swaps, other) |
55,000 |
negligible |
100,000 |
21,000 |
129,000 |
Total (mbd) |
2.5 |
1.06 |
2.45 |
1.60 |
0.343 |
Sources: Bloomberg News, Reuters, and other press articles. Information on actual Iranian exports is often preliminary, incomplete, and inaccurate, and this table therefore contains figures from at least one month prior. Figures might not reflect actual deliveries due to reported activities by Iran and various oil customers to conceal purchases or avoid tracking of oil tankers. Figures do not include purchases of condensates, which are light petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas production. South Korea was a large customer for Iranian condensates and, as of August 2018, it ended its purchases of that product from Iran to zero.
Note: mbd = million barrels per day.
Several laws and executive orders seek to bar Iran from obtaining U.S. or other technology that can be used for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions on Iran's exportation of arms are discussed in the sections above on sanctions for Iran's support for terrorist groups.
The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Title XIV of the FY1993 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 102-484, signed in October 1992) imposes a number of sanctions on
foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or "“destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons."32
”35
Advanced conventional weapons are defined as:
(1) such long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low
observability aircraft, other radar evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites,
electromagnetic weapons, and laser weapons as the President determines destabilize the military
balance or enhance the offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways;
. The definition is generally
understood to include technology used to develop ballistic missiles.
(2) such advanced command, control, and communications systems, electronic warfare systems,
or intelligence collections systems as the President determines destabilize the military balance or
enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways; and
(3) such other items or systems as the President may, by regulation, determine necessary for the
purposes of this title.
purposes of this title.
The definition is generally understood to include technology used to develop ballistic missiles.
Sanctions to be imposedSanctions to be imposed: Sanctions imposed on violating entities include: (1)
If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are: (1)
Section 1603 of the act amended an earlier law, the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586G(a)
of P.L. 101-513), to provide for a "“presumption of denial"” for all dual use exports to Iran.
Waiver. for all dual use exports to Iran.
A number of entities were sanctioned under the act in the 1990s, as shown in the tables at the end of this paper. None of the designations remain active, because the sanctions have limited duration.
Section 1606 of the act provides a presidential waiver for its provisions, and for sanctions
imposed pursuant to the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, if the President determines that it is "
“essential to the national interest."
Another law reinforces the authority of the President to sanction governments that provide aid or
sell arms to Iran (and other terrorism list countries). Under Sections 620G and 620H of the
Foreign Assistance Act, as added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold foreign aid from any
35
The act originally only applied to advanced conventional weapons. The extension to WMD, defined as chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons-related technology was added by the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
104-106).
Congressional Research Service
22
Iran Sanctions
country that provides to a terrorism list country financial assistance or arms. Waiver authority is
provided.
Section 321 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act also makes it a criminal
offense for U.S. persons to conduct financial transactions with terrorism list governments.
No foreign assistance cuts or other penalties under this law have been announced.
As noted above, Section 5(b)(1) of ISA subjects to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to
have sold to Iran (1) technology useful for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or (2) "
“destabilizing numbers and types"” of advanced conventional weapons. ThisThis section, and Section
5(b)(2) pertaining to joint ventures to mine uranium, are the only provisions of ISA that were not
waived to implement the JCPOA.
Implementation. As noted earlier, no sanctions under this sectionthese sections have been
imposed.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, signed in March 2000) became the Iran-North
Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) after the enactment of laws expanding its
provisions to North Korea and to Syria. INKSNA authorizes sanctions—for two years unless
renewed—on foreign personspersons (individuals or companies, not governments) that are determined in
a report by the Administration to have assisted Iran'’s WMD programs. Sanctions imposed include
(1) a prohibition on U.S. exportation of arms and dual use items to the sanctioned entity; and (2) a
ban on U.S. government procurement and of imports to the United States from the sanctioned
entity under Executive Order 12938 (of November 14, 1994). INKSNA also banned U.S.
extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the
international space station unless the President certified that the agency had not transferred any
WMD or missile technology to Iran within the year prior.33
36
Entities that have been sanctioned under this law are listed in the tables at the end of the report.
Designations more than two years old are no longer active. The JCPOA required the United States
to suspend INKSNA sanctions against "“the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and
services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA," but no.” No INKSNA sanctions were waived during that time.
. Section 4 gives the President the authority to not impose sanctions if the
President justifies that decision to Congress. Section 5 provides for exemptions from sanctions if
certain conditions are met, particularlyincluding that the government with jurisdiction over the entity cooperating
cooperates to stop future such transfers to Iran. Termination of this law would require congressional action; thereThere is no automatic sunset or expiration, or
stipulated conditions under which an Administration could terminate its application.
Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code.
The . The
36
The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit
U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for
transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision
to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
Congressional Research Service
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Iran Sanctions
numerous Iranian or Iran-related entities sanctioned under the order for are listed in the tables at the
end of this report. Entities delisted and which were to be delisted in accordance with the JCPOA
(in October 2023) are in italics and boldface type, respectively. Virtually all entities delisted to
implement the JCPOA were relisted on November 5, 2018.
)
CAATSA (August 2, 2017) mandates sanctions on arms sales to Iran and on entities that "
“materially contribute"” to Iran'’s ballistic missile program.
Implementation. The CAATSA provisions have been implemented through additional
designations for sanctions (SDNs) under the executive orders referenced in CAATSA, primarily
E.O. 13382.
Some past foreign aid appropriations have withheld U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation
unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran'’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. The
provision applied to the fiscal year for which foreign aid is appropriated. Because U.S. aid to
Russia generally has not gone to the Russian government, little or no funding was withheld as a result of the provision. The JCPOA makes no reference to any U.S. commitments to waive this sanction or to request that Congress not enact such a provision.
Title III of CISADA established authorities to sanction countries that allow U.S. technology that Iran could use in its nuclear and WMD programs to be reexported or diverted to Iran. Section 303 of CISADA authorizes the President to designate a country as a "as a “Destination of Diversion Concern" if that
Concern” a country allows substantial diversion of goods, services, or technologies characterized
in Section 302 of that law to Iranian end-users or Iranian intermediaries. The technologies specified include any
goods that could contribute to Iran'’s nuclear or WMD programs, as well as goods listed on various U.S. controlled-technology lists such as the the
Commerce Control List or Munitions List. For any country designated as a country of diversion
concern, there would be prohibition of denial for licenses offor U.S. exports to that country of the
goods that were being reexported or diverted to Iran.
To date, no country has been designated a "
“Country of Diversion Concern."” Some countries, for example,such as the UAE, have adopted or enforced
anti-proliferation laws apparently to avoid designation.
Waiver:
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Iran Sanctions
Waiver and Termination. The President may waive sanctions on countries designated as of
Diversion Concern for 12 months, and additional 12-month periods, pursuant to certification that
the country is taking steps to prevent diversions and reexports.
Termination:re-exports. The designation terminates on the
date the President certifies to Congress that the country has adequately strengthened its export
controls to prevent such diversion and reexportsre-exports to Iran in the future. The JCPOA makes no
reference to this sanction.
reference to waiving or terminating this sanction.
Summary of Sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Numerous sanctions target Iran
|
U.S. efforts to shut Iran out of the international banking system were a key component of the
2010-2016 international sanctions regime.
During 2006-2016, the Department of the Treasury conducted a campaign to persuade foreign banks to cease dealing with Iran by briefing them on Iran's use of the international - which it termed
“targeted financial measures” - to persuade foreign banks to cease dealing with Iran. During the
outreach campaign, Treasury officials briefed bank officials on Iran’s use of the international
financial system to fund terrorist groups and acquire weapons-related technology. According to a
GAO report of February 2013, the Department of the Treasury made overtures to 145 banks in 60 countries, including several visits to banks and officials in the UAE,
countries, and convinced at least 80 foreign banks toof them cease handling financial transactions with Iranian
banks. During the period of U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, the Treasury Department instead
sought to encourage foreign banks to conduct normal transactions with Iran.
There is no blanket ban on foreign banks or persons paying Iran for goods using U.S. dollars. But,
U.S. regulations (ITRs, C.F.R. Section 560.516) ban Iran from direct access to the U.S. financial
system. The regulations allow U.S. banks to send funds (including U.S. dollars) to Iran for
allowed (licensed) transactions, but U.S. dollars cannot be directly transferred to an Iranian bank, but must instead be channeled through an intermediary financial institution
and instead must be paid through a third country bank. Section 560.510 specifically of the Iran regulations
allows for U.S. payments to Iran to settle or pay judgments to Iran, such as those reached in connection with the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, discussed above, but the prohibition on dealing
directly with Iranian banks applies.
On November 6, 2008, the Department of the Treasury broadened restrictions on Iran's access to the U.S. financial system by barring U.S. banks from handling any transactions with foreign banks that are handling transactionsbarred U.S. banks from any transaction
with a foreign banks on behalf of an Iranian bank ("“U-turn transactions").34 This means ”).37 Under that regulation,
a foreign bank or person that pays Iran for goods in U.S. dollars cannot access the U.S. financial
system (through a U.S. correspondent account, which most foreign banks have) to acquire dollars for anythat transaction involving Iran. This ban
remained in effect during JCPOA implementation, and Iran argued that these U.S.the restrictions deterred
European and other banks from reentering the Iran market.
because of the difficulty in paying Iran
with U.S. dollars. In 2016, the Obama Administration reportedly considered licensing
transactions by foreign (non-Iranian) clearinghouses to acquire dollars that might facilitate transactions with Iran, without providing Iran with dollars directly.35 However, the Administration did not take that step. The Trump Administration's reimposition of U.S. sanctions has further reduced the willingness and ability of foreign firms to use dollars in transactions with Iran.
The Department of the Treasury and other U.S. authorities have announced financial settlements
with various banks that violated U.S. regulations in transactions related to Iran (and other
countries such as Sudan, Syria, and Cuba). The amounts were reportedly determined, at least in
part, by the value, number, and duration of illicit transactions conducted, and the strength of the
evidence collected by U.S. regulators.3639 (As noted above, the FY2016 Consolidated
37
For text of the OFAC ruling barring U-Turn transactions, see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Documents/fr73_66541.pdf.
38 Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Potential U.S. Clarification of Financial Sanctions Regulations,” by
Katharine Bauer. April 5, 2016.
39 Analyst conversations with U.S. banking and sanctions experts, 2010-2015.
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Iran Sanctions
Appropriation, P.L. 114-113, provided for use of the proceeds of the settlements above to pay
compensation to victims of Iranian terrorism.)
Bank |
Date |
Amount Paid |
Violation |
UBS (Switzerland) |
2004 |
$100 million |
Bank
Date
Amount
Paid
Violation
UBS (Switzerland)
2004
$100 million
Unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to |
ABN Amro (Netherlands) |
December 2005 |
$80 million |
Failing to fully report financial transactions |
Credit Suisse (Switzerland) |
December 2009 |
$536 million |
Illicitly processing Iranian transactions with |
ING (Netherlands) |
June 2012 |
$619 million |
Concealing movement of billions of dollars |
Standard Chartered (UK) |
August 2012 |
$340 million |
Settlement paid to New York State for processing transactions on behalf of Iran |
Clearstream (Luxembourg) |
January 2014 |
$152 million |
Helping Iran evade U.S. banking restrictions |
Bank of Moscow (Russia) |
January 2014 |
$9.5 million |
processing transactions on behalf of Iran
Clearstream (Luxembourg)
January 2014
$152 million
Helping Iran evade U.S. banking restrictions
Bank of Moscow (Russia)
January 2014
$9.5 million
Illicitly allowing Bank Melli to access the U.S. |
BNP Paribas |
June 2014 |
$9 billion |
Amount forfeited for helping Iran (and |
Standard Chartered (UK) |
April 2019 |
$639 million |
Standard Chartered (UK)
April 2019
$639 million
Dubai branch of Standard Chartered |
Unicredit AG (Germany, |
April 2019 |
$1.3 billion |
For illicitly processing transactions through |
Halkbank |
October 2019 |
N/A |
Halkbank
October 2019
N/A
Justice Department filed charges against |
Source: Various press reports.
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was a key piece of legislation intendedenacted
to try to limit Iran'’s access to the international financial system and to reduce the ability of Iran's ’s
import-export community (referred to in Iran as the "“bazaar merchants"” or “bazaaris”) from
or "bazaaris") from obtaining "“letters of credit"” (trade financing) to buy or sell goods. The Department of the Treasury determines what is a "significant" financial transaction.
CISADA's key provision—Section 104—Section 104 of CISADA
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid U.S. banks from opening new "correspondent accounts" or "“correspondent
accounts” or “payable-through accounts"” (or force the cancellation of existing such accounts) for37
In addition, Section 1244(d) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act, IFCA, applies the CISADA sanctions to any foreign bank that does business with Iran's energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL. The provision was not an amendment to CISADA itself. The IFCA provision was waived to implement the JCPOA, but was reinstated as of November 5, 2018.
Some sanctions have been imposed under Section 104 of CISADA. On July 31, 2012, the United States sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq under Section 104 of CISADA. On May 17, 2013, the Department of the Treasury lifted sanctions on Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq, asserting that the bank had reduced its exposure to the Iranian financial sector and stopped providing services to the Export Development Bank of Iran.
Section 104 was not waived to implement the JCPOA, but many entities with which transactions would have triggered sanctions under Section 104 were "delisted" as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), in accordance with the JCPOA. These entities were relisted and therefore again made subject to secondary sanctions
for:40
40
Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish correspondent accounts or payablethrough accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system. The Department of the Treasury
determines the amount money that constitutes a “significant” financial transaction.
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Iran Sanctions
Any foreign bank that conducts a significant financial transaction with an entity
that is sanctioned by Executive Order 13224 or 13382 (see above). No
humanitarian exception is provided for. A full list of sanctioned entities is at the
end of this report, and entities “delisted” are in italics.
Any foreign bank determined to have facilitated Iran’s efforts to acquire WMD
or delivery systems or provide support to groups named as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) by the State Department.
Any foreign bank that facilitates “the activities of” an entity sanctioned under a
U.N. Security Council resolution.
Any foreign bank that transacts business with the IRGC or any of its affiliates
designated under any executive order.
Section 1244(d) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act, IFCA, applies the CISADA
sanctions to any foreign bank that does business with Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding
sectors, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL. The provision was not an amendment to
CISADA itself. The IFCA provision was waived to implement the JCPOA, but was reinstated as
of November 5, 2018.
Implementation
Some sanctions have been imposed under Section 104 of CISADA. On July 31, 2012, the United
States sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq under Section
104 of CISADA. On May 17, 2013, the Department of the Treasury lifted sanctions on Elaf
Islamic Bank in Iraq, asserting that the bank had reduced its exposure to the Iranian financial
sector and stopped providing services to the Export Development Bank of Iran.
Section 104 was not waived to implement the JCPOA, but many entities with which transactions
would have triggered sanctions under Section 104 were “delisted” as Specially Designated
Nationals (SDNs), as provided by the JCPOA. The entities were relisted on November 5, 2018.
on November 5, 2018.
Under Section 401(a) of CISADA, the Section 104 sanctions provisions would terminate 30 days
after the President certifies to Congress that Iran (1) has met the requirements for removal from
the terrorism list, ANDand (2) has ceased pursuit, acquisition, or development of, and verifiably
dismantled its nuclear weapons and other WMD programs.
The Secretary of the Treasury may waive sanctions under Section 104, with the waiver taking
effect 30 days after the Secretary determines that a waiver is necessary to the national interest and
submits a report to Congress describing the reason for that determination.
On November 21, 2011, the Obama Administration identified Iran as a "“jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern"38”41 under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A), based
on a determination that Iran'’s financial system, including the Central Bank, constitutes a threat to governments or financial
institutions that do business with Iran'’s banks. The designation imposed additional requirements
41
Federal Register. Finding That the Islamic Republic of Iran Is a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern.
November 25, 2011.
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Iran Sanctions
on U.S. banks to ensure against improper Iranian access to the U.S. financial system. On October
25, 2019, the Treasury Department'’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a
final rule barring the U.S. financial system from any transactions with Iranian banks or foreign
banks acting on behalf of Iranian banks.39
42
In October 2018, the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN)
issued a warning to U.S. banks to guard against likely Iranian efforts to evade U.S. financial
sanctions. Earlier, in January 1, 2013, OFAC issued an Advisory to highlight Iran'’s use of hawalas
hawalas (traditional informal banking and money exchanges) in the Middle East and South Asia region to circumvent U.S. financial sanctions. Because the involvement of an Iranian client is often opaque, banks have sometimes inadvertently processed hawala transactions for Iranians.
In 2016, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named Iran a "High Risk Jurisdiction" for anti-money laundering and combating
financial sanctions.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
In 2016, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multilateral body that shares best practices to
combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). On June 24,, named Iran a “High Risk
Jurisdiction.” In June 2016, the FATF welcomed an "“Action Plan"” filed by Iran to address its
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and suspended "countermeasures"“countermeasures”—mostly voluntary
recommendations of increased due diligence with respect to Iran transactions—pending an
assessment of Iran'’s implementation of its Action Plan. The FATF continued the suspension of
countermeasures until 2020.
countermeasures in 2017 and February 2018.
On October 19, 2018, the FATF stated that Iran had not completed legislation to adopt international standards. In June 2019, the FATF stated that Iran still had not adequately criminalizedcriminalized terrorist financing,
including by removing the exemption for designated groups "“attempting to end foreign
occupation, colonialism and racism;" identified and frozen;” identified and frozen terrorist assets in line with the relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions; or ensured; or ensured an adequate and enforceable customer
due diligence regime. The FATF continuedcontinued the suspension of countermeasures, countermeasures, but called on
but called on members to require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial
institutions based in Iran.43 institutions based in Iran, in line with a February 2019 ultimatum to do so.40 In October 2019, the FATF said that Iran would fully impose countermeasures if, by February 2020, Iran does not enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions.41 On February 21, 2020, the FATF stated that: "“given Iran'’s failure to
enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the
FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all
jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19"” – a
determination that subjects Iran'’s financial system to increased scrutiny by banks around the world.
worldwide.44
“SWIFT” Electronic Payments System
Section 220 of the ITRSHRA required reports on electronic payments systems, such as the
Brussels-based SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), that do business with Iran. That law also authorizes—but neither it nor any other U.S. law or executive order mandates—sanctions against SWIFT or against electronic payments systems. Still, many transactions with Iran are subject to U.S. sanctions, no matter the payment mechanism.
Successive Administrations and Congresses have expanded sanctions on several significant non-oilnonoil industries and sectors of Iran'’s economy. The targeted sectors include Iran'’s automotive production sector, which is Iran'
42
Treasury and State Announce New Humanitarian Mechanism to Increase Transparency of Permissible Trade
Supporting the Iranian People. October 25, 2019.
43 Statement by the Financial Action Task Force, June 19, 2019.
44 Statement by the Financial Action Task Force, February 21, 2020.
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Iran Sanctions
production sector, which is Iran’s second-largest industry (after energy), its mineral exports,
which account for about 10% of Iran'’s export earnings, and various light manufacturing sectors.
The Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act began a trend in U.S. Iran sanctions policy in which several economic sectors were sanctioned simultaneously. The National Defense
The Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA, Subtitle D of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239, January 2, 2013)—Subtitle D, The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), sanctions several different sectors of Iran's economy. Its provisions on Iran', January 2, 2013) sanctioned several Iranian
economic sectors simultaneously. IFCA’s provisions on Iran’s human rights practices are
discussed below. Most IFCA sections were waived during JCPOA implementation (2016-18).
discussed in the section on "Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses/Promote Civil Society."
Several sections of IFCA impose ISA sanctions on entities determined to have engaged in
specified transactions below. (The provisions The provisions apply ISA sanctions but do not amend ISA.)
Implementation
The entities designated for sanctions under E.O. 13224, 13382, and other Ordersorders – which are
listed in the tables at the end of the report - trigger additional sanctions under IFCA for any entity that conducts transactions with those entities. In addition, the IFCA sanctions discussed above. Some
sanctions have been imposed on entities that conductfor transactions with the Iranian sectors stipulated in IFCA: for example, in August 29, 2014, the State Department sanctioned UAE-based Goldentex FZE providing support to Iran's shipping sector.
Sections 1244 and 1245 of IFCA provide for a waiver of sanctions for 180 days, renewable for 180-day periods, if such a waiver
is determined to be vital to U.S. national security. These sections were waived in order to implement the JPA. In addition, Section 5(a)(7) of ISA was waived to allow for certain transactions with NIOC and NITC. Sections 1244(i), 1245(g), 1246(e), and 1247(f)
of IFCA were waived to implement the JCPOA on January 18, 2017, and that waiver was last
renewed on January 12, 2018. All sections of IFCA went back into effect as specified above.
JCPOA Status: Revoked (by E.O 13716) but most provisions below went back into effect under E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018.
Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013, as superseded by 13846 of August 6, 2018:
On May 8, 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13871 sanctioning transactions
involving Iran'’s minerals and industrial commodities. The announcement stated that Iran earns
10% of its total export revenues from sales of the minerals and metals sanctioned under the order.42 The order does the following:
On January 10, 2020, as a stated response to the Iranian missile strikes on an Iraqi air base used
by U.S. forces several days earlier (Iran'’s response to the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF commander
Qasem Soleimani), President Trump issued Executive Order 13902 expanding the Iranian economic
industrial sectors subject to specific U.S. sanctions. The order
The order appears to build on E.O. 13871 in sanctioned specific non-oil sectors of Iran's economy. Sanctioning the textile sector would appear to affect Iran's vibrant carpet industry. However, the sectors sanctioned in the 2020 order generally serve markets in Iran's immediate neighborhood and transactions in the goods manufactured are likely not conducted in hard currency, and the Order might have marginal further effect on Iran's economy.
The Order
Related State and Treasury Determination: E.O. 13902 followed an October 31, 2019,
determination by the State and Treasury Departments that the construction sector of Iran is
controlled by the IRGC and that, therefore, the supply of raw or semi-finished metals, graphite,
coal, and industrial software to Iran are sanctionable under Section 1245 of IFCA (see above).
The two agencies also determined that the sale to Iran of the following are sanctionable as useful
to Iran'’s nuclear, missile, and military programs: stainless steel 304L tubes; MN40 manganese
brazing foil; and stainless steel CrNi60WTI ESR + VAR (chromium, nickel, 60% tungsten, titanium, electro-slag remelting,
and vacuum remelting).43
Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012, gives the Department of the Treasury the ability to
identify and sanction (cutting them off from the U.S. market) foreign persons who help Iran (or
Syria) evade U.S. and multilateral sanctions.
Several persons and entities have been designated for sanctions, as shown in the tables at the end.
The Trump Administration appears to be making increasing use of
46
Dept. of State. Findings Pursuant to the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) of 2012. October 31,
2019.
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Iran Sanctions
Sanctions on Cyber and Criminal Activities
The Trump Administration has used executive orders issued during the Obama Administration to
sanction Iranian entities determined to be engaged in malicious cyberactivities or in transnational crime. Iranian entities have attacked, or attempted to attack, using cyberactivity, infrastructure in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere
crime. Separately, the Justice Department has prosecuted some Iranian entities for such activity.
Entities sanctioned under the two orders below are listed in the tables at the end of the report.
Executive Order 13581
Iranian entities for such activity.
Executive Order 13694 (April 1, 2015) blocks U.S.-based property of foreign entities determined to have engaged in cyber-enabled activities that (1) harm or compromise the provision of services by computers or computer networks supporting in the critical infrastructure sector; (2) compromise critical infrastructure; (3) disrupt computers or computer networks; or (4) cause misappropriation of funds, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for financial advantage or gain.
Executive Order 13581 (July 25, 2011) blocks the U.S.-based property of entities determined (1)
to be a foreign person that constitutes a significant transnational criminal organization; (2) to have
materially assisted any person sanctioned under this order; or (3) to be owned or controlled by or
to have acted on behalf of a person sanctioned under the order.
Iran-related entities sanctioned under the orders are listed in the tables at the end of this report.
Executive Order 13694
Executive Order 13694 (April 1, 2015) blocks U.S.-based property of foreign entities determined
to have engaged in cyber-enabled activities that (1) harm or compromise the provision of services
by computers or computer networks supporting in the critical infrastructure sector; (2)
compromise critical infrastructure; (3) disrupt computers or computer networks; or (4) cause
misappropriation of funds, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for financial
advantage or gain.
U.S. State-Level Sanctions
Some U.S. laws require or call for divestment of shares of firms that conduct certain transactions
with Iran. A divestment-promotion provision was contained in CISADA, providing a "safe harbor"“safe
harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran'’s energy sector at
levels that would trigger U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act. As noted above, Section 219 of the
ITRSHRA of 2012 requires companies to reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission
whether they or any corporate affiliate has engaged in any transactions with Iran that could trigger
sanctions under ISA, CISADA, and E.O 13382 and 13224.
Numerous states have adopted laws,
regulations, and policies to divest from—or avoid state government business with—foreign
companies that conduct certain transactions with Iran. The JCPOA required the United States to work with state and local governments to ensure that state-level sanctions did not conflict with JCPOA sanctions relief provided by the federal government.
A trend in
Sanctions Supporting Democracy/Human Rights
U.S. policy and legislation since the June 12, 2009, election-related uprising in Iran has been to sought to
support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to communicate and to sanction Iranian officials that commit human rights abuses or corruption. Sanctions on the IRGC represent one facet of that trend because the IRGC is a key suppressive instrument
officials and institutions, such as the IRGC, that commit human rights abuses or engage in
corruption. Individuals and entities designated under the executive orders and provisions
discussed below are listed in the tables at the end of this report. For those provisions that ban
visas to enter the United States, the State Department interprets the provisions to apply to all
members of the designated entity.44
Some laws and Administration action focus on expanding Internet freedom in Iran or preventing the Iranian government
from using the Internet to identify opponents.
Subtitle D of the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the "VOICE"
“VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act, contained several provisions to
increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify to Congress companies that are
selling Iran technology equipment that it can use to suppress or monitor thecontrol Internet usage by Iranians. The Act authorized funds to document Iranian human rights abuses since the June 2009 Iranian presidential election. Section 1241 required an Administration report on U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Iran and the effect of those sanctions on Iran.
Some Iran-specific legislation and administrative action has sought to sanction regime officials
involved in suppressing the domestic opposition in Iran or in human rights abuses more generally. Much of this legislation centers on amendments to Section 105 of CISADA.
The Trump Administration has utilized global human rights related laws to sanction Iranian violators.
The Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on some members of Iran's civilian leadership. The Administration has named some Iranian officials as SDNs under various executive orders, as shown in the table at the end of the report. As noted throughout, anyH.R.1865)
51
Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Senior Officials of the Government
of Iran. September 25, 2019.
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Sanctions on Iran’s Leadership
The Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on some members of Iran’s civilian leadership.
Any Iranian official that is named an SDN is subject to a freezing of their U.S.-based property
and there are secondary sanctions (noted throughout) on third parties that deal with those entities.
Section 103(b)(3) of CISADA also provides for the freezing of assets of any "“family member or
associate acting for on behalf of the person"” that is named as an SDN.
On June 24, 2019, in the context of heightened U.S.-Iran tensions, President Trump issued
Executive Order 13876, imposing sanctions on the assets of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'’i and his top associates. Still, the degree to which Khamene'i's or his associates' assets intersect with the global financial or commercial community is likely modest, making the effect of the order probably limited. The order
Implementation: Supreme Leader Khamene'’i and his office are sanctioned by the order itself.
Subsequently, Iran'’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and other senior Iranian officials
and commanders were designated under the order, as shown in the tables at the end of the report.
U.N. sanctions on Iran, enacted by the Security Council under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter,4952 applied to all U.N. member states. During 2006-2008, three U.N. Security
Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803—imposed sanctions on Iran'’s nuclear program and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010) asserted that
major sectors of the Iranian economy support Iran'’s nuclear program and authorized U.N.
member states to sanction civilian sectors of Iran'’s economy. It also imposed binding limitations
on Iran'’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and imports and exports of arms.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015 contained the provisions below. The U.S.
withdrawal from the JCPOA did not change the status of Resolution 2231. The resolution
Until August 2019, U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency reports after the JCPOA began implementation stated that Iran was complying with its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA. That assessment was corroborated by U.S. intelligence leaders in January 29, 2019, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.50 Since mid-2019, Iran has begun to decrease its compliance with the nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA on the grounds that the U.S. pullout from the JCPOA has caused U.S. secondary sanctions to be reimposed.
U.N. reports on Iranian compliance with Resolution 223151 have noted assertions by several U.N. Security Council members, including the United States, that Iranian missile tests have been inconsistent with the resolution. U.S. officials have called some of Iran's space and medium-range missile launches as violations of the resolution. Iran's compliance with the arms transfer restrictions are analyzed in CRS Insight IN11429, cited above.
Under Paragraph 6(c) of Annex B of Resolution 2231, entities sanctioned under Resolutions 1737 (and subsequent resolutions) and named in an attachment to the Annex were immediately "delisted" on Implementation Day. These were—mostly persons and entities connected to permitted aspects of Iran's nuclear program and its civilian economy. Those not listed on the attachment would continue to be sanctioned until Transition Day (October 2023—eight years from Adoption Day). One notable person for whom U.N. sanctions was to end on Transition Day is IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani. Soleimani's death at the hands of a U.S. strike in January 2020 renders this listing moot. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International PLC, also were delisted on Implementation Day by separate Security Council action.52 Paragraph 6(c) provides for the Security Council to be able to delist or list any entity at any time.
Table 3. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231)
Resolution 2231 superseded all the previous Iran resolutions
Resolution 1737 required Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, to suspend construction of the heavy-water |
Assets frozen of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the resolutions, and countries required to ban |
Transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran prohibited, except for use in light-water reactors |
Resolution 1747 prohibited Iran from exporting arms. Resolution 2231 requires Iran to obtain Security Council |
Resolution 1929 prohibited Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear |
1929 mandated that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, but did not bar sales of missiles that are |
1929 called for restraint on transactions with Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. |
Resolution called for |
Resolution 1929 called on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran |
Prior to JCPOA implementation, a Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, |
Source: Text of U.N. Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231. http://www.un.org.
The following sections discuss sanctions relief provided under the November 2013 interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPoA) and the JCPOA.
U.S. officials said that the JPoA provided "limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible" easing of .
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Iran Sanctions
Iran Compliance Status
Until August 2019, U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency reports after the JCPOA began
implementation stated that Iran was complying with its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA.
Since mid-2019, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA on
the grounds that the United States has reimposed secondary sanctions on Iran.
U.N. reports on Iranian compliance with Resolution 223153 have noted assertions by several U.N.
Security Council members, including the United States, that Iranian missile tests have been
inconsistent with the resolution. U.S. officials have called some of Iran’s space and mediumrange missile launches as violations of the resolution. Iran has repeatedly violated the U.N. ban
on exportation of arms, as analyzed in CRS Insight IN11429, Capital Markets, COVID-19, and
Federal Government Emergency Facilities, cited above.
Sanctions Application under Nuclear Agreements
The following sections discuss sanctions relief provided under the November 2013 interim
nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPoA) and the JCPOA.
Sanctions Eased by the JPoA
U.S. officials said that the JPoA provided “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible” easing of
international sanctions. Under the JPoA (in effect January 20, 2014-January 16, 2016):54
Iran’international sanctions. Under the JPoA (in effect January 20, 2014-January 16, 2016):53
In accordance with the JCPOA, international sanctions relief occurred at Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), following IAEA certification that Iran had completed stipulated core nuclear tasks
(January 16, 2016). U.S. secondary sanctions were waived or terminated, but most sanctions on
direct U.S.-Iran trade remained. The secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation included56
included (1) sanctions that limited Iran'’s exportation of oil and sanction foreign sales to Iran of
gasoline and energy sector equipment, and which limit foreign investment in Iran'’s energy sector; (2) financial sector sanctions; and (3) sanctions on Iran'
53
The report is reprinted in, Iran Watch, at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/united-nations/
un-secretary-general/third-report-secretary-general-implementation-security-council-resolution-2231.
54 The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm.
55 Daniel Fineren, “Iran Nuclear Deal Shipping Insurance Element May Help Oil Sales,” Reuters, November 24, 2013.
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Iran Sanctions
(2) financial sector sanctions; and (3) sanctions on Iran’s auto sector and trading in the rial. The
s auto sector and trading in the rial. The EU lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; and Iranian banks were readmitted to the
SWIFT electronic payments system. All U.N. sanctions were lifted.
All of the U.S. sanctions that
were eased went back into effect by November 5, 2018, in accordance with the Trump
Administration’s withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA.
The laws below were waived to implement the JCPOA:
• were eased went back into effect by November 5, 2018, in accordance with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. The Administration stated that the purpose of reimposing the sanctions is to deny Iran the revenue with which to conduct regional malign activities and advance its missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons programs.
The sanctions that went back into effect on August 7, 2018 (90-day wind-down period), were on
The sanctions that went back into effect on November 5, 2018, were on
The laws below were waived to implement the JCPOA. All provisions that were waived during the JCPOA implementation were revoked by the Trump Administration by November 5, 2018, and all entities and individuals "de-listed" from U.S. sanctions were re-listed (with some exceptions noted below).
Even though it has reimposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran, the Trump Administration has issued
• The JCPOA required the U.S. Administration, by “Transition Day,” (October 2023, eight
years after Adoption Day) to request that Congress lift virtually all of the sanctions that were
suspended under the JCPOA. No outcome is mandated.
• The JCPOA terminates U.N. sanctions on persons and entities still designated for U.N.
sanctions on Transition Day. All U.N. sanctions are to terminate by “Termination Day” (October
2025, ten years after Adoption Day).
In implementing its decision to exit the JCPOA and apply “maximum pressure” on Iran’s
economy, sanctions were reimposed. The sanctions that went back into effect on August 7, 2018
(90-day wind-down period), were on:
The purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes by Iran; Iran’s trade in gold and
other precious metals; transactions in the Iranian rial; activities relating to Iran’s
issuing of sovereign debt; and transactions with Iran in graphite, aluminum, steel,
coal, and industrial software.
Importation of Iranian luxury goods to the United States.
The sale to Iran of passenger aircraft (and aircraft with substantial U.S. content).
The sanctions that went back into effect on November 5, 2018, were on:
Petroleum-related transactions with Iran; and port operators and energy, shipping,
and shipbuilding sectors; and
Transactions by foreign banks with Iran’s Central Banks (including the provision
that restricts Iran’s access to hard currency held in banks abroad).
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Iran Sanctions
Entities that were delisted from sanctions were all relisted, with selected
exceptions (such as the AEOI and 23 subsidiaries), The continued de-listing of
the nuclear entities was in order to allow European and other U.S. partners to
continue providing civilian nuclear assistance to Iran as permitted under the
JCPOA.
Even though it has reimposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran, the Trump Administration has issued
some exceptions that are provided for under the various U.S. sanctions laws:
As noted abovesome exceptions that are provided for under the various U.S. sanctions laws:
The JCPOA did not commit the United States to suspend U.S. sanctions related to terrorism,
proliferation, arms transfer, or human rights abuses, or suspend the ban on U.S.-Iran direct trade
(with the selected exceptions discussed above). The sanctions below remained in place during
JCPOA implementation:
Sanctions might have been reimposed by congressional action in accordance with President Trump'
Trump’s withholding of certification of Iranian compliance with the JCPOA, under the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17). Certification was withheld in October
2017 and January and April of 2018, but Congress did not reimpose sanctions.60
57
The JCPOA (paragraph 36 and 37) and Resolution 2231 (paragraphs 10-13) contain a mechanism
for the "“snap back"” of U.N. sanctions if Iran does not satisfactorily resolve a compliance dispute.
According to the JCPOA (and Resolution 2231), the United States (or any veto-wielding member
of the U.N. Security Council) would have been able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution
that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran'’s refusal to resolve the dispute. In
that case "“... the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be reimposed,
unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise."
The snap-back mechanisms of the JCPOA can be formally initiated by current participants through the Joint Commission, on which the United States no longer sits. The State Department reportedly has determined that, for purposes of”
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserts that Resolution 2231, allows the United States can alsoto trigger
the snap-back because it remains legally a “participant,” and that it will take that step unless the
Annex B ban on arms transfers to and from Iran is extended. The other JCPOA parties dispute
that the United States has the right to trigger the snap back because it withdrew from the
JCPOA.58
the snap-back because it remains legally a participant.61 The Security Council never enacted an amendment to 2231 removing the United States from the nuclear agreement. Still, a U.S. triggering of the snap-back without agreement from the other participants might be difficult. The European parties to the JCPOA triggered the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) in January 2020 but they stated that the move was intended to try to bring Iran back into full JCPOA compliance, and not to snap back sanctions.
International Implementation and Compliance
During 2010-2016, converging international views on Iran'’s expanding nuclear program
produced global consensus to pressure Iran through sanctions. Some countries asserted that imposing global sanctions would head off unwanted U.S. or other military action against Iran, whereas others cooperated with sanctions primarily in order to preserve their close relationships with the United States. All the JCPOA parties publicly All the JCPOA parties publicly
opposed the U.S. decision to exit the JCPOA in 2018 and have sought to continue to provide its
economic benefits to Iran. A comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions is contained in
the Appendix. 59
European Union (EU)
the Appendix. For issues of Iran's foreign policy, see CRS Report R44017, Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
After the passage of Resolution 1929 in 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran became
nearly as extensive as those of the United States. This contrasted with the 1990searlier periods, when the
EU countries refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade ban on Iran and they agreed to reschedule $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally. In July 2002, Iran's Islamic regime tapped international capital markets for the first time, selling $500 million in bonds to European banks and, during 2002-2005, there were negotiations between the EU and Iran on a "Trade and Cooperation Agreement" (TCA) that would have benefitted Iranian exports to the EU countries.63
Under the JCPOA, EU sanctions that were imposed in 2012 were lifted, including:
The following EU sanctions remained in place:
Even though the EU countries have not reimposeddid not reimpose sanctions on Iran, in order to avoid risk to their positions in the large U.S. market, many large after the U.S. withdrawal from
the JCPOA, many European firms have ceased Iran-related transactions or exited the Iran market entirely as the Trump Administration reimposed all U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran, as discussed below.64
services to the field.63
European Special Purpose Vehicle/INSTEX
The EU countries continue to try to preserve the JCPOA in the face of the Trump Administration'
Administration’s maximum pressure policy on Iran, while at the same time criticizing and Iran's reduced compliance with the terms of the deal. ’s violations of the JCPOA’s terms.
On August 6, 2018, a 1996 EU "“blocking statute"” that seeks to protect EU firms from reimposed
U.S. sanctions took effect. In September 2018, EU countries announced a small amount ($20 million) of development assistance to Iran.
In September 2018, Germany, France, and Britain, joined by Russia and China, as well as Iran,
endorsed the creation of a "“special purpose vehicle"” (SPV) that would facilitate trade with Iran by
avoiding dollar-denominated transactions or other exposure to the U.S. market. In a January 31,
2019, joint statement, France, Britain, and Germany announced the registration of the SPV,
named the "“Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges" (INSTEX). It is based in France, with German governance, and financial support from the three governments. Its initial” (INSTEX). Its stated focus has been on
transactions in goods not subject to sanctions, including medicines, medical devices, and food,
but it might eventually expand to oil and other products.67 U.S. officials have insisted that INSTEX remain contained to humanitarian transactions.6864 In April 2019, Iran set up the required
counterparty—the "“Special Trade and Finance Instrument"” (STFI). Six additional countries in
Europe joined the INSTEX system in December 2019 and the mechanism subsequently sought to
speed up processing of medical transactions to help Iran deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020. On March 31, 2020, INSTEX completed its first transaction – —for about $540,000 worth of
medical equipment.69
As a major incentive discussed publicly at65
At the August 2019 G-7 summit in Biarritz, France, French President Emmanuel Macron
proposed to provide a $15 billion credit line for Iran to purchase goods through INSTEX, with the
credit line to be secured by future Iranian oil deliveries—in exchange for Iran's returning to full compliance with the JCPOA. The proposal apparently is subject to U.S. concurrence in the form of waivers of sanctions on transactions with Iran's energy sector. Although President Trump appeared open to the plan at the G-7 summit,. U.S. officials later signaled opposition to
the credit line proposal and it has not advanced.70
66
While attempting to preserve civilian economic engagement with Iran, the European countries
have sought to support U.S. efforts to counter Iran'’s terrorism and proliferation activities.
The management of the Brussels-based Swift electronic payments system has sought to balance
financial risks with the policies of the EU governments. In March 2012, SWIFT acceded to an EU
request to expel 14 EU-sanctioned Iranian banks.7167 Some Iranian banks were still able to conduct
electronic transactions with the European Central Bank via the "“Target II"” system. Even though
“U.S. Grants BP, Serica License to Run Iran-Owned North Sea Field.” Reuters, October 9, 2018.
Joint Statement on the New Mechanism to Facilitate Trade with Iran. January 31, 2019.
65 “EU Ramps up Trade System with Iran Despite U.S. Threats.” Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2020.
66 “Trump Administration cool to French plan for $15 billion Iranian credit line: officials.” Reuters, September 4, 2019;
Press briefing by Ambasador Brian Hook, September 4, 2019.
67 Avi Jorish, “Despite Sanctions, Iran’s Money Flow Continues,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2013.
63
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the EU has not reimposed sanctions on Iran in concert with the Trump Administration, SWIFT's ’s
board is independent and, in order to avoid risk of U.S. penalties, in late 2018, the system again
disconnected the Iranian banks that were "relisted"“relisted” for U.S. sanctions.
Russia and China, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and parties to the
JCPOA, historically have imposed only those sanctions required by Security Council resolutions.
Increasingly aligned on regional issues, Iran and Russia have agreed to expand energy and more
general trade, but there is little evident implementation of any agreements. The two countries reportedly agreed on $30 billion in energy development deals during President Putin's visit to Tehran in October 2017. In December 2018, . In December 2018,
Iran signed a free trade deal with the Russia-led "“Eurasian Economic Union,"” suggesting Russian
intent to potentially circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran.
intent to potentially circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran.
In April 2015, Russia lifted its own restriction on delivering the S-300 air defense system that it sold Iran in 2007 but refused to deliver after Resolution 1929 was adopted—even though that resolution technically did not bar supply of that defensive system. In April 2016, Russia began delivering the five S-300 batteries. Iran's Defense Minister visited Russia in February 2016 to discuss possible future purchases of major combat systems, presumably to be consummated after the U.N. arms import ban on Iran expires in October 2020.
China is a major factor in the effectiveness of any sanctions regime on Iran because China
remains Iran'’s largest oil customer. During 2012-2016, China was instrumental in reducing Iran's ’s
total oil exports because it cut its buys from Iran to about 435,000 barrels per day from its 2011 average of 600,000 barrels per day. The State Department asserted that, because China was the largest buyer of Iranian oil, percentage cuts by China had a large impact in reducing Iran's oil sales by volume and China merited an SRE. After sanctions were lifted in 2016, China increased its purchases of Iranian oil beyond 2011 levels. After
average of 600,000 barrels per day. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, China reduced has reduced
its oil imports from Iran (see Table 1), and the Administration gave China a SRE sanctions exception on November 5, 2018.), but China has continued to import at least some Iranian oil
despite the ending of the SRE as of May 2, 2019, although at much lower volumes than any time in the recent past. Iran'. Iran’s automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China, including from China-based Geelran and Chery companies. The degree to which Iran appears economically dependent on China is perhaps evident in the fact that Iran-China air travel has not diminished significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic.72
As of
proportion of its parts from China. In November 2018, China’s Kunlun Bank—a CNPC affiliate
that was sanctioned under CISADA in 2012—reportedly stopped accepting Euro and then China
currency-denominated payments from Iran.68 A state-owned China firm (CNPC) withdrew from a
major phase of Iran’s South Pars gas field, perhaps to avoid U.S. sanctions.
In mid-2019, the Administration has begun to more frequently sanction Chinese economic entities
for transactions with Iran.69 On July 23, 2019, the Administration sanctioned (under IFCA) a
small Chinese firm, Zhuhai Zhenrong Company Ltd., for buying oil from Iran.7370 Prior to the
expiration of the SREs, China had stockpiled 20 million barrels of Iranian oil at its Dalian port,74 71
and importation of that oil apparently is not counted until it clears customs checkpoints. On September 25, 2019, the Administration designated for sanctions (under E.O. 13846) several subsidiaries and partners of China's COSCO Shipping Corporation Ltd. For involvement in shipping Iranian oil, although some of those designations were subsequently withdrawn.
China also remains a large investor in Iran. Several Chinese energy firms that invested in Iran's energy sector put those projects on hold in 2012, but resumed work after sanctions were eased in 2016 and continued that work despite the reimposition of U.S. sanctions. China'
Yet, China continues to invest in Iran. China’s President Xi Jinping visited Iran and other Middle
East countries in the immediate aftermath of the JCPOA, and he stated that Iran is a vital link in an
effort to extend its economic influence westward through its "“One Belt, One Road"” initiative. In
concert, Chinese firms and entrepreneurs are integrating Iran into this vision byhave been modernizing Iran's rail and other infrastructure, particularly where that infrastructure links to that of neighboring countries, including the Sultanate of Oman, funded by loans from China.75 In August’s rail and other
infrastructure.72 Since 2019, Iran and China expanded their 2016have discussed a 25-year deal for China investments
in Iran to total $280 billion to be invested in Iran'’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors, and $120
billion in upgrading Iran'’s transport and manufacturing infrastructure.73 China and Iran were
reported in July 2020 to be negotiating finalizing the agreement, which might include arms sales
“As U.S. Sanctions Loom, China’s Bank of Kunlun to Stop Receiving Iran Payments—Sources.” Reuters, October
23, 2018.
69 s transport and manufacturing infrastructure.76 On the other hand, perhaps calling into question that agreement, a state-owned China firm (CNPC) shortly thereafter withdrew from an investment in a major phase of Iran's South Pars gas field.
Regarding banking, China's Kunlun Bank—an affiliate of China's energy company CNPC and which was sanctioned under CISADA in 2012—reportedly stopped accepting Euro and then China currency-denominated payments from Iran in November 2018.77 Existing Iranian accounts at the bank presumably can still be used to pay for Iranian imports from China. Iran and China also maintain a hard currency escrow account, with several billion dollars of assets, that is used to pay for China's infrastructure projects in Iran, such as the long Niayesh Tunnel.
In April 2018, the Commerce Department (Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS, which administers Export
Administration Regulations) issued a denial of export privileges action against China-based ZTE Corporation and its
affiliates. The action was taken on the grounds that ZTE did not uphold the terms of a March 2017 settlement agreement with BIS over ZTE's shipment of prohibited U.S. telecommunications technology to Iran (and North Korea). On March 27, 2019, OFAC announced a $1.9 million settlement with a Chinese subsidiary of the U.S. Black and Decker tool company for unauthorized exports of tools and parts to Iran.78
agreement with BIS.
70 “The United States to Impose Sanctions on Chinese Firm Zhuhai Zhenrong Company Limited for Purchasing Oil
from Iran. Department of State, July 22, 2019.
71 “Boxed In: $1 billion of Iranian Crude Sits at China’s Dalian Port.” Reuters, May 1, 2019.
72 Thomas Erdbrink. “China’s Push to Link East and West Puts Iran at ‘Center of Everything.’” New York Times, July
25, 2017.
73 “China and Iran Flesh out Strategic Partnership.” Petroleum Economist, September 3, 2019.
68
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to Iran and other strategic ties, and including China’s purchases of Iranian oil at discounted
prices.74
Japan/Korean Peninsula/Other East Asian Countries
During 2010-2016, Japan and South Korea enforced sanctions on Iran similar to those imposed
by the United States and the EU. Both countries cut imports of Iranian oil sharply and banks in
the two countries restricted Iran'’s foreign exchange assets Iran held in their banks. From 2016-2018,
when U.S. sanctions were suspended, both countries increased importation of Iranian oil, and
eased restrictions on Iran'’s accounts.
Both countries—and their companies—have historically been unwilling to undertake transactions
with Iran that could violate U.S. sanctions. They reduced their Iranian oil purchases and received
SRE sanctions exceptions on November 5, 2018. In early 2019, Japan imported some Iranian oil,
and South Korea purchased about 200,000 barrels per day of Iranian condensates. Upon expiration of their SREs in May 2019, both countries stopped energy transactions with Iran. , butboth
countries stopped energy transactions with Iran upon expiration of their SREs in May 2019.
South Korea sought, but was denied, Administration concurrence to continue to import Iranian
condensates (a very light oil) on which South Korea'’s petrochemical sector depends. Among
banks, South Korea’s Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea, and Nomura Holdings of Japan,
are reportedly restricting Iran’s petrochemical sector depends. South Korea is instead importing condensates from Qatar and Australia.
Japan exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer electronics. South Korean firms have been active in energy infrastructure construction in Iran, and its exports to Iran are mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances—meaning that South Korea could be affected significantly by the May 2019 executive order sanctioning transactions with Iran's minerals and metals sector.
The following firms have announced their postures following the U.S. exit from the JCPOA:
s use of its Central Bank accounts held in both countries.75
Other East Asian Countries
North Korea, like Iran, has been subject to significant international sanctions. North Korea has
never pledged to abide by international sanctions against Iran, and it reportedly cooperates with
Iran on a wide range of WMD-relatedstrategic ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missiles. A
portion of the oil that China buys from Iran (and from other suppliers) is reportedly sent to might be transshipped to
North Korea, but it is not known if North Korea buys any Iranian oil directly. The potential for North Korea to try to buy Iranian oil illicitly increased in the wake of the adoption in September 2017 of U.N. Security Council sanctions that limit North Korea's importation of oil, but there are no publicly known indications that it is doing so. While serving as Iran's president in 1989, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, visited North Korea. North Korea's then-titular head of state attended President Rouhani's second inauguration in August 2017.
76
Taiwan and Singapore have generally been small buyers of Iranian oil. TaiwantTaiwan resumed imports
of Iranian oil after sanctions were eased in 2016 and received an SRE in November 5, 2018, but
has bought no Iranian oil since late 2018. Singapore has been a small buyer of Iranian oil and has
not bought any Iranian oil since U.S. sanctions went back into effect in 2018.
Iran'
India and Pakistan
Iran’s economy is highly integrated into those of its immediate neighbors in South Asia.
India India
cites U.N. Security Council resolutions as its guideline for policy toward Iran. During 2011-2016, with
when U.N. sanctions were in force on Iran, India’ in force on Iran, India's private sector assessed Iran as a "controversial market"—a term describing reputational and financial risk. India's central bank ceased using a Tehran-based
regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran, and the two countries
agreed to settle half of India'’s oil buys from Iran in India'’s currency, the rupee. India reduced its
imports of Iranian oil substantially after 2011, in the process incurring significant costs to retrofit refineries that were handling Iranian crude. Howeverbut, after sanctions were eased in 2016, India'’s oil
imports from Iran increased to as much as 800,000 bpd in July 2018—well above 2011 levels.
Indian firms resumed work that had been ended or slowed during 2012-2016. India also paid Iran
the $6.5 billion it owed for oil purchased during 2012-2016.80
In June 2018, after the Trump Administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran and India again agreed to use rupee accounts for their bilateral trade, indicating that India might implement its insistence that it could still buy Iranian oil. Yet, India's SRE, last granted in November 2018, expired in May 2019, and India has not imported Iranian oil since that time,
In 2015, India and Iran agreed that India would help develop Iran's Chahbahar port that would enable India to trade with Afghanistan unimpeded by Pakistan. In 77 In June 2018, after the Trump
“Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership.” New York Times, July 11, 2020.
Author conversations with South Korean officials, January – December 2019.
76 “The Military Relationship Between Iran and North Korea.” Inside Sources, January 27, 2020.
77 “India Seeks to Pay $6.5 Billion to Iran for Oil Imports.” Economic Times of India. May 16, 2016.
74
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Administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, India received an SRE until May 2019, and India
has not imported Iranian oil since that time,
In 2015, India and Iran agreed that India would help develop Iran’s Chahbahar port and an
associated railway that would enable India to trade with Afghanistan unimpeded by Pakistan. In
May 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Iran and signed an agreement to invest
$500 million to develop the port and related infrastructure. As noted above, theThe Trump Administration has utilized the "given
India the “Afghanistan reconstruction"” exception under Section 1244(f) of IFCA to allow for firms to continue developing it. Construction at the port is proceeding, but India reportedly has reduced the pace and scope of that work because of banks' reluctance to finance any work in Iran.
One test of Pakistan'. However, in
July 2020, Iran cited India’s non-performance of contracts to exclude the country from further
work on the railway at the port.78
Iran’s economic relations with Pakistan are less extensive than are its economic ties to India. One
test of Pakistan’s compliance with sanctions was a pipeline project that would carry Iranian gas to
Pakistan—a $7 billion project that U.S. officials on several occasions stated would be subject to ISA sanctions. Despite that threat, agreement on the $7 billion project was finalized on June 12, 2010, and construction was formally inaugurated in a ceremony attended by the Presidents of both countries on March 11, 2013. Iran reportedly completed the pipeline on its side of the border. China's announcement in April 2015 of a $3 billion investment in the project seemed to remove financial hurdles to the line's completion, and the JCPOA presumably removed sanctions impediments to the project. However, during
ISA sanctions. Iran reportedly completed the pipeline on its side of the border but, during
President Hassan Rouhani'’s visit to Pakistan in March 2016, Pakistan still did not commit to complete
the line. In 2009, India dissociated itself from the project over concerns about the security of the pipeline and financial arrangements for the gas purchases.
Iran has substantial economic relations with Turkey and the countries of the South Caucasus.
During periods when U.S. sanctions did not apply.
Turkey
Turkey is a large neighbor whose relations with Iran have been uneven. Prior to the Trump
Administration’s ending of all SREs in 2019, Turkey bought about 40% of its oil from Iran.
Turkey reduced purchases of Iranian oil during 2012-2016, but its buys returned to 2011 levels after sanctions on Iran were eased in 2016. Turkey received an SRE sanctions exemption on November 5, 2018, and its officials strongly indicated in April 2019 that Turkey expected to receive another SRE as of the May 2, 2019, expiration. Turkey's insistence on being allowed to buy Iranian oil without fear of U.S. penalty—as well as its overall dependence on Iranian oil—underpinned statements by Turkey's leaders that the country would continue buying at least some Iranian oil despite the SRE expiration. However, Turkey has bought no Iranian oil in recent months, according to Bloomberg Tanker Tracker data sources.
Turkey buys about 6% of its total gas imports
after sanctions on Iran were eased in 2016. Turkey’s SRE to buy Iranian oil expired in May 2019
and Turkey has not been a buyer of Iranian oil since, according to Bloomberg oil transactions
data.
Turkey also buys natural gas from Iran via a pipeline built in 1997, which at first was used for a
swap arrangement under which gas from Turkmenistan was exported to Turkey. Direct Iranian
gas exports to Turkey through the line began in 2001,79 but no ISA sanctions were imposed on the
grounds that the gas supplies were crucial to Turkey's energy security. Prior to the October 2012 EU ban on gas purchases from Iran, this pipeline was a conduit for Iranian gas exports to Europe, primarily Bulgaria and Greece.
’s energy security.
Pre-JCPOA, in response to press reports that Turkey'’s Halkbank was settling Turkey'’s payments
to Iran for energy with gold, U.S. officials testified on May 15, 2013, that the gold going from
Turkey to Iran consists mainly of Iranian private citizens'’ purchases of Turkish gold. U.S.
prosecutions have occurred since, against Halkbank and various individuals, for alleged
violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran.80
violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran.81 On January 6, 2014, the Commerce Department blocked a Turkey-based firm (3K Aviation Consulting and Logistics) from reexporting two U.S.-made jet engines to Iran's Pouya Airline.82
The rich energy reserves of the Caspian Sea createhave created challenges for U.S. efforts to deny Iran
financial resources. The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations cited potential ISA
sanctions to deter oil pipeline routes involving Iran—thereby successfully promoting an the
alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005.
Iraq and Persian Gulf States
The Arab monarchy states of the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—are oil exporters and close allies of the United States. Still, they
maintain relatively normal trade with Iran. One Gulf state in particular, UAE, has sometimes
“Iran drops India from Chabahar rail project, cites funding delay.” The Hindu, July 14, 2020
“Iran Clears 40% of Gas Fine to Turkey.” Financial Tribune, June 13, 2017.
80 Department of Justice. Turkish Bank Charged In Manhattan Federal Court For Its Participation In A MultibillionDollar Iranian Sanctions Evasion Scheme. October 15, 2019.
78
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attracted U.S. scrutiny because of the large presence of Iranian firms there. Several UAE-based
firms have been sanctioned by the United States, as noted in the tables at the end of the report.
Iran and several of the Gulf states, including Kuwait and Bahrain, have had discussions on
various energy and related projects. However, their projects have not materialized because of
broad Iran-Gulf disputes. Qatar and Iran share the large gas field in the Gulf waters between
them, and their economic relations have become closer in light of the isolation of Qatar by three
alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005. Section 6 of Executive Order 13622 exempts from sanctions any pipelines that bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey. Agreements reached in 2018 between Russia and the Caspian Sea states on the legal division of the sea might spawn new energy development in the Caspian. Iran's energy firms will undoubtedly become partners in eventual joint ventures to develop the Caspian's resources.
Iran and Azerbaijan have in recent years tried to downplay political differences for joint economic benefit, and they have been discussing joint energy and infrastructure projects among themselves and with other powers, including Russia. Iran and Armenia—Azerbaijan's adversary—have long enjoyed extensive economic relations: Armenia is Iran's largest gas customer, after Turkey. In May 2009, Iran and Armenia inaugurated a natural gas pipeline between the two, built by Gazprom of Russia. No ISA sanctions have been imposed.
The Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman) are oil exporters and close allies of the United States, and they have generally supplied the global oil market with additional oil to compensate for sanctions-impinged Iranian exports. Still, the Gulf countries maintain relatively normal trade with Iran.
The UAE has attracted U.S. scrutiny because of the large presence of Iranian firms there, and several UAE-based firms have been sanctioned, as noted in the tables at the end of the report. U.S. officials praised the UAE's March 1, 2012, ban on transactions with Iran by Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank, which Iran reportedly used to process oil payments. Some Iranian gas condensates (120,000 barrels per day) were imported by Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) and refined mostly into jet fuel. However, in March 2020, the United States sanctioned several UAE firms for trading Iranian oil, suggesting that there is significant illicit Iran-UAE trade in key goods, as listed in the tables at the end of the report.
Iran and several of the Gulf states, including Kuwait and Bahrain, have had discussions on various energy and related projects. However, their projects have not materialized because of broad Iran-Gulf disputes. Qatar and Iran share the large gas field in the Gulf waters between them, and their economic relations have become closer in light of the isolation of Qatar by three of its GCC neighbors, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain.
of its GCC neighbors, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain. Iran and Oman have active economic relations. Iran and Oman have an active
relations, including a joint venture to expand Oman'’s Al Duqm port, which is envisioned as a
major hub for regional trade. Omani banks, some of which operate in Iran, were used to
implement some of the financial arrangements of the JPoA and JCPOA.81
Iraq has sought to remain engaged economically with Iran while avoiding running afoul of U.S.
sanctions on Iran. In 2013, Iraq signed an agreement with Iran to buy natural gas through a joint
pipeline that would supply several Iraqi power plants. The Trump Administration has
accommodated Iraq’s need for Iranian electricity supplies by giving Iraq waiver permission—
under Section 1247 of IFCA—to pay Iran for electricity and the Iranian natural gas that runs
Iraq’s power plants. That section provides for waivers of up to 180 days, but the Administration
has limited the waiver to shorter increments, and requires that the funds due to Iran are held in
escrow at Iraq’s Trade Bank.82
Syria and Lebanon
Iran has extensive economic relations with both Syria and Lebanon, countries where Iran asserts
that core interests are at stake. Iran has sought to use banks in Lebanon to provide financial
assistance to Hezbollah as well as to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Asad. To try to
curb this activity, the Trump Administration has sanctioned some Lebanese banks for facilitating
Iranian aid to Hezbollah, although in the process perhaps weakening the Lebanese banking
system and aggravating Lebanon’s economic downturn. In July 2020, U.S. officials threatened to
impose sanctions on Lebanon if the government moves forward with a Hezbollah suggestion that
the country ease its financial difficulties by buying oil from Iran.83
In January 2017, Iran and Syria signed a series of economic agreements giving Iranian firms
increased access to Syria’s mining, agriculture, and telecommunications sectors, as well as
management of a Syrian port.84 In July 2019, Gibraltar diverted an Iranian tanker delivering oil to
Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in
accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For
text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.” A total of
$5.7 billion in Iranian funds had built up in Oman’s Bank Muscat by the time of implementation of the JCPOA in
January 2016. In its efforts to easily access these funds, Iran obtained from the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) of the Treasury Department a February 2016 special license to convert the funds (held as Omani rials) to
dollars as a means of easily converting the funds into Euros. Iran ultimately used a different mechanism to access the
funds as hard currency, but the special license issuance resulted in a May 2018 review by the majority of the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation to assess whether that license was consistent with U.S. regulations “Obama
Misled Congress, Tried and Failed to Give Iran Secret Access to US Banks Before the Deal.” Business Insider, June 6,
2018; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. “Review of U.S. Treasury Department’s License
to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System.” Majority Report. May 2018.
82 Department of State. Waiver Transmittal Letter, April 27, 2020.
83 “Pompeo: We are trying to prevent Iran from selling crude oil to Hezbollah.” Arab News, July 9, 2020.
84 Iran Signs Phone, Gas Deals with Syria. Agence France Presse, January 17, 2017.
81
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Syria, a transaction that violated EU sanctions on Syria. The ship delivered the oil to Syria after
its release by Gibraltar in August 2019.
Venezuela
During 2020, Iran has expanded its economic relations with the regime of Nicolas Maduro in
Venezuela which, like Iran, is heavily targeted by U.S. sanctions. In May 2020, five Iranian
tankers shipped gasoline to Venezuela, reportedly in exchange for gold (which is a form of hard
currency). U.S. officials threatened sanctions on those as well as four other tankers bound for
Venezuela and successfully deterred the latter four from completing their deliveries.85 The United
States subsequently took legal action to impound those four shipments. Iran-Venezuela relations
had fluctuated prior to the 2020 Iranian shipments, and earlier agreements between the two
received little, if any, implementation.
International Financial Institutions/World Bank/IMF and WTO
The United States representatives to international financial institutions are required to vote
against international lending to Iran, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block
international lending. Asserting that it needs additional funds to cope with the costs of the
COVID-19 pandemic, Iran applied for a $5 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in
March 2020. Administration officials have opposed the loan on the grounds that Iran has
sufficient funds to manage its response to the pandemic, and no loan decision has been announced
by the IMF as of July 2020.86
Iran has received no international financial loans since 2005. In 1993, the United States voted its
16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and
irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. During FY1994-FY1996, foreign aid
appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the
U.S. contribution to the bank because of its loans to Iran, contributing to a temporary halt in new
bank lending to Iran. In May 2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to approve
$232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of
$725 million in loans were approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and
sanitation projects, and land management projects, plus $400 millionimplement some of the financial arrangements of the JPoA and JCPOA.84 As a consequence, a total of $5.7 billion in Iranian funds had built up in Oman's Bank Muscat by the time of implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016. In its efforts to easily access these funds, Iran obtained from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department a February 2016 special license to convert the funds (held as Omani rials) to dollars as a means of easily converting the funds into Euros. Iran ultimately used a different mechanism to access the funds as hard currency, but the special license issuance resulted in a May 2018 review by the majority of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation to assess whether that license was consistent with U.S. regulations.85 The new Sultan of Oman, Sayyid Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, who was named leader upon the death of Sultan Qaboos in early January 2020, appears to be continuing all of Qaboos' foreign policies.
Iraq's attempts to remain close to its influential neighbor, Iran, have complicated Iraq's efforts to rebuild its economy yet avoid running afoul of the United States and U.S. sanctions on Iran. As noted above, in 2012, the United States sanctioned an Iraqi bank that was a key channel for Iraqi payments to Iran, but lifted those sanctions when the bank reduced that business. Iraq presented the United States with a sanctions-related dilemma in July 2013, when it signed an agreement with Iran to buy 850 million cubic feet per day of natural gas through a joint pipeline that would supply several power plants. No sanctions were imposed on the arrangement, which was agreed while applicable sanctions were in effect.
The Trump Administration reportedly is seeking to accommodate Iraq's need for Iranian electricity supplies and other economic interactions, in part by giving Iraq waiver permission—under Section 1247 of IFCA—to buy the Iranian natural gas that runs Iraq's power plants. That section provides for waivers of up to 180 days, but press reports indicate that the Administration has limited the waiver to shorter increments, the latest of which (March 2020) was reportedly only 30 days.86 As of October 2018, Iraq reportedly has discontinued crude oil swaps with Iran—about 50,000 barrels per day—in which Iranian oil flowed to the Kirkuk refinery and Iran supplied oil to Iraq's terminals in the Persian Gulf. Iranian arms exports to Shia militias in Iraq remain prohibited by Resolution 2231, but no U.N. sanctions on that activity have been imposed.
Iran has extensive economic relations with both Syria and Lebanon, countries where Iran asserts that core interests are at stake. The compliance of Syrian or Lebanese banks and other institutions with international sanctions against Iran has always been limited, and Iran has sought to use banks in Lebanon to provide financial assistance to Hezbollah as well as to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. To try to curb this activity, the Trump Administration has increasingly sought to sanction Lebanese banks for facilitating Iranian aid to Hezbollah, although in the process perhaps weakening the Lebanese banking system and aggravating Lebanon's economic downturn in 2019.
In January 2017, Iran and Syria signed a series of economic agreements giving Iranian firms increased access to Syria's mining, agriculture, and telecommunications sectors, as well as management of a Syrian port.87 In July 2019, Gibraltar diverted an Iranian tanker delivering oil to Syria, a transaction that violated EU sanctions on Syria. The ship reportedly delivered the oil to Syria after its release by Gibraltar in August 2019.
The United States representative to international financial institutions is required to vote against international lending, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block international lending. No new international financial institution loans have been approved to Iran since 2005, including under the World Bank's "Global Environmental Facility" (GEF) that had slated more than $7.5 million in loans for Iran to dispose of harmful chemicals.88 However, in an effort to cope with the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic that has affected Iran significantly, in March 2020 Iran applied for a $5 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. Because of the humanitarian circumstances of the loan application, the Administration has discretion to support, or to refrain from opposing, the loan.
Earlier, in 1993, the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. To block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank by the amount of those loans, contributing to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. But, in May 2000, the United States' allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land management projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief.
for earthquake relief.
WTO Accession
Iran has sought to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Iran began accession talks in 2006
after the George W. Bush Administration dropped its objection to Iran'’s application as part of an
effort to incentivizepersuade Iran to reach an interim nuclear agreement. The lifting of sanctions presumably paves the way for talks to accelerate, but the accession process generally takes many years. Accession generally takes place by consensus of existing WTO members. Iran's accession might be complicated by the requirement that existing members trade with other members; as noted above, the U.S. ban on trade with Iran remains in force. The Trump Administration does not advocate Iran's admission to that convention.
The claim in 2019 and 2020 by Trump Administration officials that "sanctions on Iran are working" can be analyzed based on an analysis of the goals of the sanctions. The following sections assess the effectiveness of Iran sanctions according to a number of criteria.
The international sanctions regime of 2011-2015 is widely credited with increasing Iran's willingness to accept the JCPOA as well the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran in June 2013. Rouhani campaigned on a stated commitment to achieving an easing of sanctions and ending Iran's international isolation. Still, the U.S. intelligence community assesses that it "does not know" whether Iran plans to eventually develop a nuclear weapon.89
The Trump Administration asserts that its campaign of "maximum pressure" on Iran, implemented mainly through sanctions, is intended to cause Iran to negotiate a revised JCPOA that would limit not only Iran's nuclear program but also its missile program and its regional malign activities. However, Iran has refused such negotiations with the United States, to date, insisting that the United States provide JCPOA sanctions relief before any talks can begin.
Sanctions during 2011-2015 did not prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. And, even though U.S. and EU sanctions remained on Iran's missile programs after the JCPOA was implemented, U.S. intelligence officials have testified that Iran continues to expand the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal. Iran also has advanced its cruise missile and drone capabilities. These capabilities were crucial to the success of Iran's September 14, 2019, strike on critical Saudi energy infrastructure, as well as to Iran's retaliation for the killing of Qasem Soleimani in the form of a missile attack on the Ayn al-Asad base in Iraq that is used by U.S. military personnel. U.S. intelligence directors testified in January 2019 that Iran also continues to develop its own increasingly more advanced naval mines, small submarines, and attack craft.90 Still, Iran's nuclear a nuclear agreement. The accession process generally takes many
years, and generally requires consensus of existing WTO members. The Trump Administration
opposes Iran’s admission, and Iran’s efforts to join the WTO have not advanced.
Effectiveness of Sanctions
Trump Administration officials assert that U.S. sanctions on Iran are “working.”87 The following
sections assess the effectiveness of Iran sanctions according to a number of criteria.
85
Comments by Ambassador Brian Hook at Hudson Institute Seminar on Iran-Venezuela relations. July 10, 2020.
“Pompeo Reiterates US Opposition To IMF Loan For Iran.” Radio Farda, April 15, 2020.
87 “U.S. envoy says Iran sanctions working, warns against nuclear breaches.” Reuters, June 27, 2019.
86
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Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Strategic Capabilities
The international sanctions regime of 2011-2015 is widely credited with increasing Iran’s
willingness to accept the JCPOA. The Trump Administration asserts that its campaign of
“maximum pressure” on Iran, implemented mainly through sanctions, is intended to cause Iran to
negotiate a revised JCPOA that would limit not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its missile
program and its regional malign activities. Iran has refused such negotiations with the United
States, insisting that the United States provide JCPOA sanctions relief as a precondition to talks.88
Sanctions during 2011-2015 did not prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. And, even
though U.S. and EU sanctions remained on Iran’s missile programs after the JCPOA was
implemented, Iran has been able to expand the scale and sophistication of its missile capabilities,
as demonstrated by Iran’s September 14, 2019, strike on critical Saudi energy infrastructure and
Iran’s retaliatory attack for the killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Still, Iran’s nuclear
and missile programs might have advanced faster were sanctions not imposed.
Sanctions—and missile programs might have advanced faster were sanctions not imposed.
Sanctions – as well as Resolution 2231 - —have prevented Iran from buying significant amounts of
major combat systems since the early 1990s. The U.N. ban on Iran'’s importation and exportation
of weaponry is expires on October 18, 2020.
In explaining its decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the Trump Administration asserted that the easing of sanctions during 2016-18 caused Iran to expand its regional activities. However, neither the imposition, lifting, nor reimposition of strict sanctions - nor the ban on Iran's transfer of arms stipulated in Resolution 2231 - has appeared to affect Iran'expires on October 18, 2020. U.S. intelligence directors testified in 2019 that Iran
continues to develop its own increasingly advanced naval mines, submarines, and attack craft.89
Effects on Iran’s Regional Influence
The imposition, lifting, or reimposition of strict sanctions have arguably had minimal effect on
Iran’s regional behavior. Iran intervened extensively in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen during the 2011-201520112015 period when sanctions had a significant adverse effect on Iran'’s economy. Iran has remained
engaged in these regional conflicts after sanctions were eased in early 2016, and since U.S. sanctions were reimposed in late 2018. It can be argued that Iran's regional activities have varied not according to the imposition of lifting of sanctions but according to the opportunities to expand its influence that are provided by the region's conflicts.
Administration officials assert that Hezbollah's financial difficulties are evidence that its "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran is working.91 The assertion cites recent reports that the party has had to appeal for donations, cut
were reimposed in late 2018. Iran’s regional activities are assessed in: CRS Report R44017,
Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman
Administration officials have cited Hezbollah’s financial difficulties as evidence that its
“maximum pressure” campaign on Iran is harming Iran’s abilities to project power in the region.90
The claim references reports since early 2019 that the party has had to appeal for donations, cut
expenses, request donations, and delay or reduce payments to its fighters.92 An alternate91 In 2020, the
Administration has also attributed the apparent drawdown of pro-Iranian fighters in Syria to the
effect of U.S. sanctions. An alternative explanation is that Iran is adjusting its expenditures to the
reduced activity on the Syria battlefield, where Hezbollah has and other Iran-backed militias have
been fighting on behalf of the Asad regime.
The Administration also has sought to highlight the effect of its policy on Iran's ability to project power citing fluctuations in Iran'’s defense budget.
President Trump has stated that Iran'’s defense budget had increased 40% during the 2016-2018 time
frame of JCPOA implementation.9392 On October 16, 2019, the State Department Special
“Iran says pandemic will not force talks with the US.” Al Monitor, April 20, 2020.
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
90 Testimony of Ambassador Brian Hook before the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 19, 2019.
91 “Sanctions on Iran are Hitting Hezbollah,” Washington Post, May 19, 2019.
92 Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran, August 6, 2018.
88
89
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Representative on Iran, Ambassador Brian Hook, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that
However, from 2017 to 2018, when our pressure went into effect we saw a reduction in
[Iran'’s] military spending of nearly 10 percent. Iran'’s 2019 budget, which was released in
March, called for even steeper cuts, including a 28 percent cut to their defense budget and
a 17 percent cut for IRGC funding.94
Oversight 93
Oversight. A provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17) requires that a
semiannual report on Iran'’s compliance with the JCPOA include information on any Iranian use
of funds to support acts of terrorism. However, because the United States has ceased
implementing the JCPOA, the semi-annual reports apparently are not prepared any more.
No
Domestic Political Effects
Although no U.S. Administration has publicly asserted that the goal of U.S. sanctions on Iran is to
bring about the change of Iran's regime. Some assert that the sanctions are fostering the periodic unrest that has erupted in Iran since late 2017’s regime, a key question is whether U.S. sanctions might produce
political change in Iran. In late 2017- early 2018 and in November 2019, unrest has brokenbroke out over
economic conditions and government repression, although not at a level that appears to threaten the regime. Still, U.S. sanctions were suspended at the time
of the unrest in late 2017 and there were few secondary sanctions during the large Green
Movement uprising of 2009-2010, suggesting that anythe connection between sanctions and unrest is tenuous. Other protests occurred over flooding in the southwest in March-April 2019Iran
unrest might be tenuous. Still, some Iranian protesters complain that the country'’s money is being
spent on regional interventions rather than on the domestic economy.
Nor have U.S. sanctions necessarily always achieved favorable gradual political change. U.S. sanctions imposed by the Obama Administration might have contributed to Rouhani's election, as discussed above. However, the The
Trump Administration'’s maximum pressure campaign has arguably undermined Rouhani – and bolstered the confidence of Iranian hardliners - President Hassan
Rouhani—and bolstered Iranian hardliners—by illustrating that negotiations with the United
States do not produce better relations with the United States. Hardliners overwhelmingly won Iran'
Iran’s February 2020 parliamentary elections, in part because the hardline-dominated election screening bodies were able to disqualify many moderates and reformists from running for seats.
.94
Economic Effects
U.S. sanctions during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a substantial toll on Iran'’s economy.
Iran had taken a series of steps
Iran has sought to try to mitigate the economic effect of sanctions.
![]() |
has improved collections of taxes.104
102
Testimony of Patrick Clawson before the Senate Banking Committee. January 21, 2015.
“How Trump’s terrorist designation of Iran’s revolutionary guard impacts its economy.” CNBC, April 12, 2019.
104 Patrick Clawson testimony, January 21, 2015, op. cit.
103
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Figure 1. Economic Indicators
Sources: |
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) was enacted in large part to reduce Iran's oil and gas production capacity over the longer term by denying Iran the outside technology and investment to maintain or increase production. U.S. officials estimated in 2011 that Iran had lost $60 billion in investment in the sector as numerous major firms pulled out of Iran. Since international sanctions increased inIMF 2019, U.S. Energy Information Administration, OPEC.
Effect on Energy Sector Development
Since 2011, there has been little development activity at Iran'’s various oil and gas development
sites, and many foreign investors resold their equity stakes to Iranian companies that are less
technically capable than international firms. The lifting of sanctions in 2016 prompted Iran to try
to lure foreign investors back into the sector with more generous investment terms under a
concept called the "“Iran Petroleum Contract"” that gives investing companies the rights to a set
percentage of Iran'’s oil reserves for 20-25 years.104105 Iran signed a number of new agreements with
international energy firms after 2016 but, as noted above, major energy firms again divested in again in
response to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA. Appendix B at the end of this report discusses various
Iranian oil and gas fields and the fate of post-1999 investments in them.
Sanctions relief also opened opportunities for Iran to resume developing its gas sector. Iran has been using its gas development primarily to reinject into its oil fields rather than to export, although Iran exports about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas,
Iran’s development of its gas export sector has been slow. Iran still uses its gas mostly to reinject
into aging oil fields. However, Iran is exporting natural gas primarily to Turkey and Armenia.
Sanctions have rendered Iran unable to develop a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export business.
With respect to gasoline, the enactment of the CISADA law targeting sales of gasoline to Iran had a measurable effect. Several suppliers stopped selling gasoline to Iran once enactment appeared likely, and others ceased supplying Iran after enactment. Gasoline deliveries to Iran fell from about 120,000 barrels per day before CISADA to about 30,000 barrels per day thereafter, although imports later increased to about 50,000 barrels per day.
105
Thomas Erdbrink.“New Iran Battle Brews over Foreign Oil Titans.” New York Times, February 1, 2016.
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With respect to gasoline, several suppliers stopped selling gasoline to Iran after CISADA (see
above) was enacted. In response, Iran expanded several of its refineries and, in 2017, Iranian
officials said Iran had become self-sufficient in gasoline.
It is difficult to draw any direct relationship between sanctions and Iran'’s human rights practices. Recent human
Human rights reports by the State Department and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights practices assess that there has been only modest
improvement in Iran's practices in recent years, particularly relaxation of enforcement of the public dress code for women. The altered policies cannot necessarily be attributed to any alterations of sanctions.
’s practices in recent years, but the altered policies are not attributed by these
reports to any changes in sanctions.106
Since 2012, foreign firms have generally refrained from selling the Iranian government
equipment to monitor or censor social media use. Such firms include German firm Siemens, Chinese internet infrastructure firm Huawei, and South African firm MTN Group. However, the regime retains the ability to
monitor and censor social media use, and it is also developing a progressively more advanced
cyber capability using indigenously-upgraded technology.
Humanitarian Effects
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has put a spotlight on the extent to which sanctions - might be affecting
Iran’s response to the disease—despite the fact that humanitarian items are exempt from U.S. sanctions - might be affecting Iran's response to the disease, which has expanded in Iran to a much greater degree than in any other regional country
sanctions. For further analysis, see CRS Insight IN11279, COVID-19 and U.S. Iran Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman
.
During 2012-2016, and since 2018, sanctions reportedly have limited Iran'’s ability to import
expensive Western-made medicines, such as chemotherapy drugs and medicines for multiple
sclerosis. 105 107 Other reports in 2019 indicated that Cargill, Bunge, and other global food traders halted supplying Iran because
of the absence of trade financing,106or108or, alternately, their shipments have been held at Iranian docks until payments clear. Iranian officials and some international relief groups have complained that U.S. sanctions inhibited the ability to provide relief to flooding victims in southwestern Iran in March-April 2019.
until payments clear. Some of the scarcity of medicines is caused by banks'’ refusal to finance
such sales, even though doing so is not subject to sanctions. The State Department has issued
statements that the Iranian government exaggerates reports of the effects of U.S. sanctions on its medical imports in order to generate opposition to the sanctions and to justify its application for a $5 billion IMF loan.107 Other
medical imports,109 whereas other accounts say that Iranians, particularly those with connections
to the government, take advantage of medicine shortages by cornering the import market for key medicines.
Other reports say that pollution in Tehran and other big cities is made worse by sanctions because Iran produces gasoline itself with methods that cause more impurities than imported gasoline. As noted above, Iran's efforts to deal with environmental hazards and problems might be hindered by denial of World Bank lending for that purpose.
In the aviation sector, some Iranian pilots complained publicly that U.S. sanctions caused Iran's passenger airline fleet to deteriorate to the point of jeopardizing safety. Since the U.S. trade ban was imposed in 1995, 1,700 passengers and crew of Iranian aircraft have been killed in air accidents, although it is not clear how many of the crashes, if any, were due to difficultly in acquiring U.S. spare parts.108
The Trump Administration has undertaken several steps to assist Iran'’s response to the COVID-19COVID19 pandemic and, in the process, perhaps parry calls in the international community to broadly ease sanctions on Iran.
Sanctions relief ameliorated at least some of the humanitarian difficulties discussed above. In the aviation sector, several sales of passenger aircraft have been announced, and licensed by the Department of the Treasury, after Implementation Day. However, as noted, the licenses were revoked as of November 2018.
JCPOA oversight and implications, and broader issues of Iran'’s behavior have been the subject of
legislation.
110
Senator Robert Menendez: Menendez & Engel Propose Policies for Addressing COVID-19 in Iran. Press release,
April 3, 2020; Feinstein urges Trump to reverse plan to block Iran request for $5B in IMF aid, claims it is in ‘our
national interest’ Fox News, April 11, 2020.
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114th Congress
The JCPOA statedlegislation. Legislation considered in the 114th and 115th Congress is provided as examples of additional sanctions provisions that have been considered.
The JCPOA states that as long as Iran complies with the JCPOA, the sanctions that were
suspended or lifted shall not be reimposed on other bases. The Obama Administration asserted
that some new sanctions that seek to limit Iran'’s military power, its human rights abuses, or its
support for militant groups would not violate the JCPOA.
)
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA, P.L. 114-17) provided for a
congressional review period after which Congress could pass legislation to disapprove of the
JCPOA. No such legislation of disapproval was enacted.
There are several certification and
reporting requirements under INARA, although most of them no longer apply as a result of the
Trump Administration withdrawal:
The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 114-113) contained a provision amending the Visa
Waiver Program to require a visa to visit the United States for any person who has visited Iraq,
Syria, or any terrorism list country (Iran and Sudan are the two aside from Syria still listed) in the previous five years. Iran argued that the provision represented a violation of at least the spirit of the JCPOA by potentially deterring European businessmen from visiting Iran.
previous five years. The Obama Administration issued a letter to Iran stating it would implement
the provision in such a way as not to not impinge on sanctions relief, and allowances for Iranian
students studying in the United States were made in the implementing regulations. Another
provision of that law requiresrequired an Administration report to Congress on how Iran has used the
benefits of sanctions relief.
Iran Sanctions Act Extension
The 114thbenefits of sanctions relief.
President Trump has issued and amended executive orders that, in general, prohibit Iranian citizens (as well as citizens from several other countries) and high-ranking Iranian officials from entering the United States.
The 114th Congress acted to extend ISA before its scheduled expiration on December 31, 2016.
The Iran Sanctions Extension Act (H.R. 6297), which extended ISA until December 31, 2026,
without any other changes, passed the House on November 15 by a vote of 419-1 and then passed
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the Senate by 99-0. President Obama allowed the bill to become law without signing it (P.L. 114-277114277), even though the Administration considered it unnecessary because the President retains authority to reimpose sanctions on Iran.
The conference report on the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-328, Section
1226) required quarterly reports to Congress on Iran'’s missile launches the imposition of U.S.
sanctions with respect to Iran'’s ballistic missile launches, until December 31, 2019. The
conference report on the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91) extended the requirement until December
31, 2022. The report is to include efforts to sanction entities that assist those missile launches.
Even before the Trump Administration withdrew the United States out of the JCPOA, Congress
acted on or considered additional Iran sanctions legislation. The following Iran sanctions
legislation was enacted or considered in the 115th Congress.
)
S. 722, which initially contained only Iran-related sanctions, was reported out by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on May 25, 2017. Afterafter incorporating sanctions on Russia, the bill was passed byand it passed the Senate on
June 15, 2017, by a vote of 98-2. A companion measure, H.R. 3203, was introduced in the House. Subsequently, H.R. 3364, containing additional sanctions provisions related to North Korea, passed both chambers and was signed on August 2, 2017 (P.L. 115-44).
Overall, CAATSA did not appear to conflict with the JCPOA insofar as it did not reimpose U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran's civilian economic sectors, and the JCPOA did not require the United States to refrain from imposing additional sanctions on Iranian proliferation, human rights abuses, terrorism, or the IRGC. Section 108 of CAATSA , containing not only S.722 provisions
but also sanctions on North Korea, passed both chambers (P.L. 115-44, August 2, 2017). The
main provisions of CAATSA are discussed in the sections above, and Section 108 of the law
requires an Administration review of all designated entities to assess whether such entities are
contributing to Iran'’s ballistic missile program or contributing to Iranian support for international terrorism.
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116th Congress
Legislation introduced subsequent to the May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA appeared to
try to support implementation of the Administration'’s maximum pressure campaign to compel Iran to change its behavior. The following, which. The
following pertain to sanctions and not the broader issue of U.S.-Iran military confrontation or
other Iran issues, represents a sampling, but not a comprehensive list, of legislation that has been introduced to increase sanctions on Iran:
Sanctions112
There are a number of other possible sanctions that might receive consideration—either in a
global or multilateral framework. These possibilities are analyzed in CRS In Focus IF10801,
Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
112
See CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
Appendix A.
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Appendix A. U.S., U.N., EU and Allied Country
Sanctions
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
EU and Other Allied
Countries
U.S., U.N., EU and Allied Country Sanctions
U.S. Sanctions |
U.N. Sanctions |
EU and Other Allied Countries |
General Observation: Most |
As of 2010, U.N. sanctions were
Post-JCPOA: Resolution 2231 is the |
EU closely aligned its sanctions Japan and South Korea sanctions |
Ban on U.S. Trade with |
U.N. sanctions did not |
No comprehensive EU ban on
Japan and South Korea did not ban |
Sanctions on |
No U.N. equivalent existed. However, Resolution 1929 "not[es] the potential connection between Iran's revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities." This wording was interpreted as providing U.N. support for countries to ban their companies from dealing with Iran's energy sector. |
With certain exceptions, the EU banned almost all dealings with Iran's energy sector after 2011. These sanctions now lifted, but no oil imports from Iran since 2018. Japanese and South Korean measures banned new energy projects in Iran and called for restraint on ongoing projects. Both cut oil purchases from Iran sharply. These sanctions now lifted, but no oil being imported by either. |
Ban on Foreign Assistance: Ban on Foreign Assistance:
U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—
other than purely humanitarian | . No U.N. equivalent |
EU measures of July
Japan and South Korea did not |
ban aid or lending to Iran. Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:
Iran is ineligible for U.S. arms |
As per Resolution 1929 (paragraph | EU sanctions include a postJCPOA.
No similar Japan and South Korean |
Restriction on Exports to Iran ”:
Primarily under §6(j) of the Export |
U.N. resolutions on Iran banned the |
EU banned the sales of dual use
Japan and S. Korea have announced |
Sanctions Against Lending to Under §1621 of the International |
Resolution 1747 ( |
Japan and South Korea banned |
These lifted post-JCPOA.
Sanctions Against
Several laws and regulations provide |
Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph |
The EU measures imposed July 27,
Japan and South Korea froze assets |
Ban on Transactions
| No direct equivalent, but Resolution |
No direct equivalent, but many of
Japan and S. Korea did not impose |
Human Rights Sanctions:
CISADA and other laws provide for | No U.N. sanctions were imposed on | The EU retains a ban on providing
Japan and South Korea have |
Restrictions on Iranian Shipping: Under Executive Order 13382, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has named Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and several affiliated entities as entities whose U.S.-based property is to be frozen. |
Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any ships in national or international waters—if there is an indication that the shipments include goods whose export to Iran is banned. These resolutions no longer apply. |
The EU measures announced July 27, 2010, banned Iran Air Cargo from access to EU airports and froze the EU-based assets of IRISL and its affiliates. Insurance and reinsurance for Iranian firms are banned. These sanctions now lifted. Japan and South Korean measures took similar action against IRISL and Iran Air. Sanctions now lifted. |
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No longer applicable
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Iran Sanctions
EU and Other Allied
Countries
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
Restrictions on Iranian
Shipping:
Under Executive Order 13382, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury
has named Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines and several affiliated
entities as entities whose U.S.-based
property is to be frozen.
Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize
countries to inspect cargoes carried
by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any
ships in national or international
waters—if there is an indication that
the shipments include goods whose
export to Iran is banned.
These resolutions no longer apply.
The July 2010 EU measures banned
Iran Air Cargo from access to EU
airports and froze the EU-based
assets of IRISL and its affiliates.
Insurance and reinsurance for
Iranian firms are banned. These
sanctions now lifted.
Japan and South Korean measures
took similar action against IRISL
and Iran Air. Sanctions now lifted.
Banking Sanctions:
During 2006-2011, several Iranian FY2012 Defense Authorization (P.L. | No direct equivalent
However, two Iranian banks were |
The EU froze Iran Central Bank
Brussels-based SWIFT expelled
Japan and South Korea took similar |
Ballistic Missiles: U.S. |
Resolution 1929 (paragraph 9) |
EU measures |
Appendix B.
Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran's Energy Sector
Date |
Field/Project |
|
Value |
|
Feb. 1999 |
Doroud (oil) Doroud (oil)
Total and ENI received |
Total (France)/ENI |
$1 billion |
205,000 bpd |
Apr. 1999 Dec./May 2016 |
Balal (oil) Balal (oil) Initial development completed in 2004
Dec. 2016: Thailand PTTEP signed agreement with |
Total/ Bow Valley Thailand PTTEP |
$300 million |
40,000 bpd |
Nov. 1999 |
Soroush and Nowruz (oil) Soroush and Nowruz (oil)
Royal Dutch received special rule ISA exemption |
Royal Dutch Shell |
$800 million |
190,000 bpd |
Apr. 2000 |
Anaran bloc (oil) Anaran bloc (oil)
Lukoil and Statoil invested in 2000 but abandoned |
Lukoil (Russia) and |
$105 million |
65,000 |
Jul. 2000 |
South Pars Phases 4 and 5 (gas) 4 and 5 (gas)
On stream in 2005. ENI given special rule exemption |
ENI |
$1.9 billion |
ENI
$1.9 billion
2 billion cu. |
Mar. 2001 |
Caspian Sea oil exploration—construction of |
GVA Consultants |
$225 million |
NA |
Jun. 2001 |
Darkhovin (oil) Darkhovin (oil)
ENI exited in 2013 and doing so enabled the firm to |
ENI Field in production |
$1 billion |
100,000 bpd |
May 2002 |
Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil) |
Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil)
Sheer Energy |
$80 million |
25,000 bpd |
Sept. 2002 |
South Pars Phases 9 and 10 (gas) On stream as of early 2009 |
On stream as of early 2009
GS Engineering and |
$1.6 billion |
2 billion cfd |
Oct. 2002 |
South Pars Phases 6, 7, and 8 Field began producing late 2008; operational control |
Statoil (Norway) |
$750 million |
3 billion cfd |
Statoil (Norway)
$750 million
3 billion cfd
Jan. 2004
Dec. 2016 | Dec. 2016
Azadegan (oil)—South and North
CNPC (China)—N. Azadegan operator (vice Inpex)
Royal Dutch Shell/Petronas (Malaysia)—MoU to | CNPC—N. Azadegan |
$200 million (Inpex stake); China $2.5 billion |
260,000 bpd, of which 80,000 is from N. Azadegan. |
Jan. 2004 |
Tusan Block Oil found in block in Feb. 2009, but not in commercial quantity, according to the firm. |
Petrobras (Brazil) |
$178 million |
|
Oct. 2004 |
Yadavaran (oil) |
Sinopec (China), deal finalized Dec. 9, 2007 |
$2 billion |
300,000 bpd |
2005 |
finalized Dec. 9, 2007
$2 billion
Congressional Research Service
300,000 bpd
64
Iran Sanctions
Date
Field/Project
Company(ies)/Stat
us (If Known)
Value
Output/
Goal
2005
Saveh bloc (oil)
GAO report, cited below |
PTT (Thailand) |
||
Jun. 2006 |
GAO report, cited below PTT (Thailand) Jun. 2006 Garmsar bloc (oil)
Deal finalized in June 2009
Sinopec (China)
$20 million
Jul. 2006
Arak Refinery expansion
Sinopec (China); JGC
(Japan). Work
continued by Hyundai
Heavy Industries (S.
Korea)
$959 million
(major initial
|
Sinopec (China) |
$20 million |
|
Jul. 2006 |
Arak Refinery expansion
|
Sinopec (China); JGC (Japan). Work continued by Hyundai Heavy Industries (S. Korea) |
$959 million (major initial expansion) |
Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd |
Sept. 2006 |
expansion) Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd Sept. 2006 Khorramabad block (oil)
Seismic data gathered, but no production is planned. |
Norsk Hydro and |
$49 million |
no estimates |
Dec. 2006 |
North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas). Includes gas |
China National |
$16 billion |
3.6 billion cfd |
Feb. 2007 |
LNG Tanks at Tombak Port LNG Tanks at Tombak Port
Contract to build three LNG tanks at Tombak, 30 |
Daelim (S. Korea) |
$320 million |
200,000 ton capacity |
Feb. 2007 |
South Pars Phases 13 and 14 Deadline to finalize (May 2009) not met; firms submitted revised proposals to Iran in June 2009. State Department said in September 2010, that Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol would not pursue the project. |
Dutch Shell and Repsol would not pursue the project.
Royal Dutch Shell, |
$4.3 billion |
|
Mar. 2007 |
Esfahan refinery upgrade |
Daelim (S. Korea) |
NA |
|
Jul. 2007 |
and 24
Pipeline to transport Iranian gas to Turkey, and on to |
Turkish Petroleum |
$12. billion |
2 billion cfd |
Dec. 2007 |
Contract modified but reaffirmed December 2008 |
Petrofield Subsidiary |
$15 billion |
3.4 billion cfd of gas/250,000 bpd of oil |
2007 |
bpd of oil
Belarusneft (Belarus)
under contract to
Naftiran.
No production to
date
$500 million
40,000 bpd
2007
Jofeir Field (oil)
GAO report cited below. Belarusneft, a subsidiary of |
Belarusneft (Belarus) under contract to Naftiran. No production to date |
$500 million |
40,000 bpd |
2008 |
Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil) Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)
GAO reports.
Edison (Italy)
$44 million
Feb. 2008
|
Edison (Italy) |
$44 million |
|
Feb. 2008 |
Lavan field (offshore natural gas) |
Lavan field (offshore natural gas)
PGNiG (Polish Oil |
$2 billion |
|
Mar. 2008 |
Danan Field (on-shore oil)
|
Petro Vietnam | ||
Apr. 2008 |
Iran's Kish Gas Field Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman. |
Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman.
Oman (cofinancing of |
$7 billion |
1 billion cfd |
Apr. 2008 |
Moghan 2 (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil | INA (Croatia), but |
$40-$140 million |
|
2008 |
Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new construction) construction)
GAO reports.
Uhde (Germany)
Jun. 2008
Resalat Oilfield
|
Uhde (Germany) |
300,000 metric tons/yr |
|
Jun. 2008 |
Resalat Oilfield Status of work unclear. |
Status of work unclear.
Amona (Malaysia). |
$1.5 billion |
47,000 bpd |
Jan. 2009 |
Bushehr Polymer Plants Bushehr Polymer Plants
Production of polyethelene at two polymer plants in |
Sasol (South Africa), |
Capacity is 1 million tons per year. |
|
Mar. 2009 |
Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—Incl. LNG terminal |
Indian firms: Oil and |
$8 billion |
20 million tonnes of LNG annually by 2012 |
Aug. 2009 |
Abadan refinery Upgrade and expansion; building a new refinery at |
Sinopec |
Sinopec
Up to $6 | |
Oct. 2009 |
South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas Contract signed but abrogated by S. Korean firm. |
G and S Engineering |
$1.4 billion |
|
Nov. 2009 |
South Pars Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3 |
South Pars Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3
Daelim (S. Korea)—
Part 2; Tecnimont |
$4 billion ($2 | |
Feb. 2010/July 2017 |
South Pars Phase 11 South Pars Phase 11
Awarded to CNPC in 2010, but in July 2017, Total |
CNPC (China), with |
$4.7 billion |
1.8 billion cu ft/day |
2011 |
ft/day 2011 Azar Gas Field
Iran later cancelled Gazprom |
Gazprom (Russia) |
||
Dec. 2011 |
Zagheh Oil Field Zagheh Oil Field
Preliminary deal signed December 2011 |
Tatneft (Russia) |
$1 billion |
55,000 barrels per day |
Jul. 2016 |
Tatneft (Russia)
$1 billion
55,000
barrels per
day
Jul. 2016
Aban Oil Field
Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field. |
Zarubezhneft (Russia) |
||
Jul. 2016 |
Paydar Garb Oil Field Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field. |
Zarubezhneft (Russia) |
||
Nov. 2016 |
Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field.
Zarubezhneft (Russia)
Jul. 2016
Paydar Garb Oil Field
Zarubezhneft (Russia)
Congressional Research Service
1 billion cfd
300,000
metric
tons/yr
$1.5 billion
47,000 bpd
Capacity is 1
million tons
per year.
20 million
tonnes of
LNG annually
by 2012
66
Iran Sanctions
Date
Field/Project
Company(ies)/Stat
us (If Known)
Value
Output/
Goal
Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field.
Nov. 2016
Parsi and Rag E-Sefid
Schlumberger signed a MoU to assess the fields. |
Schlumberger (France) |
||
Nov. 2016 |
Schlumberger (France) Nov. 2016 Sumar Oil Field PGNiG signed MoU to assess the field for six months. |
PGNiG (Poland) |
||
Nov. 2016 |
Karanj
PGNiG (Poland)
Nov. 2016
Karanj
International Pergas Consortium signed a MoU to |
Pergas (consortium of | ||
Dec. 2016 |
Changuleh Oil Field Changuleh Oil Field
Companies signed MoU |
Gazprom (Russia), | ||
Dec. 2016 |
Kish Gas Field Kish Gas Field Royal Dutch Shell signed MoU to assess the field |
Royal Dutch Shell |
||
Dec. 2016 |
Royal Dutch Shell Dec. 2016 Chesmekosh Gas Field Gazprom signed MoU to assess the field |
Gazprom (Russia) and | ||
Mar. 2017 |
Shadegan Oil Field Shadegan Oil Field
Khuzestan province, producing about 65,000 bpd. |
Tatneft (Russia) |
Tatneft (Russia)
500,000 bpd |
Sources: Various oil and gas journals, as well as CRS conversations with some U.S. and company officials. Some
information comes from various GAO reports, the latest of which was January 13, 2015 (GAO-15-258R).
Notes:
Notes: CRS has no mandate, authority, or means to determine violations of the Iran Sanctions Act, and no way
to confirm the status of any of the reported investments. The investments are private agreements between Iran
and the firms involved, which are not required to reveal the terms of their arrangements. Responsibility for a
project to develop Iran'’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.
Appendix C.
Congressional Research Service
67
Iran Sanctions
Appendix C. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N.
Resolutions and EU Decisions
U.N. Security Council Resolutions
| ||||||
| ||||||
| ||||||
Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747 (resolution no longer active) | ||||||
| ||||||
Congressional Research Service 68 Iran Sanctions Entities Added by Resolution 1803 (resolution no longer active) | ||||||
Requires that countries report when the following persons enter or transit their territories:
Travel banned for five Iranians sanctioned under Resolutions 1737 and 1747.
Adds entities to the sanctions list:
| ||||||
Entities Added by Resolution 1929 (resolution no longer active) | ||||||
Makes mandatory a previously nonbinding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions. Adds one individual
The following IRGC-affiliated firms (several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction affiliate):
- Sepanir
The following entities determined to be owned or controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL): Irano Hind | ||||||
European Union | ||||||
Terrorism-related |
||||||
Hamid Abdollahi |
||||||
Iran Designations
Terrorism-related
Hamid Abdollahi
Mansoor Arbabsiar—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi | ||||||
| ||||||
Hashemi Moghadam—for alleged terrorist plot in Europe | ||||||
Abdul Reza Shahlai—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi | ||||||
Gholam Ali Shakuri—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi | ||||||
Qasem Soleimani—IRGC-QF commander |
||||||
Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security |
||||||
Hamas |
||||||
Hezbollah Military Wing |
||||||
Palestinian Islamic Jihad |
||||||
Human-Rights Related |
||||||
87 persons, mostly IRGC, Basij, Law Enforcement Forces commanders, as well as security militia chiefs such as Hossein
The full list is at |
Appendix D.
from=EN
Congressional Research Service
70
Iran Sanctions
Appendix D. Entities Sanctioned under U.S. Laws
and Executive Orders
For every table below, names in italicsitalics are entities and individuals that were delisted to
implement the JCPOA. Under the JCPOA, entities in boldfaceboldface were to be delisted on Transition
Day (October 2023), had the United States remained in the JCPOA. Because of the U.S.
withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, all delisted entities were relisted on November 5, 2018, and no entities are currently planned to be delisted.
. Table D-1. Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382 (Proliferation)
(many designations coincide with EU and UN designations)
Entity
Date Named
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran); Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran); Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI). AEOI and 23 subsidiaries remained delisted for secondary sanctions
under E.O. 13382 but still designated as Iran-owned or controlled entities.
June 2005,
(many designations coincide with EU and UN designations)
Entity |
Date Named |
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran) |
June 2005, September 2007 |
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran) |
June 2005, February 2009 |
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). AEOI and 23 subsidiaries remain delisted for secondary sanctions under E.O. 13382 but are still designated as Iran-owned or controlled entities. |
June 2005 |
Novin Energy Company (Iran) and Mesbah Energy Company |
January 2006 |
(Iran)
January 2006
Four Chinese entities: Beijing Alite Technologies, LIMMT Economic and Trading Company, China |
June 2006 |
June 2006
Sanam Industrial Group (Iran) and Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)
July 2006
Bank Sepah (Iran)
January 2007
Kalaye Electic Company
February 2007
Defense Industries Organization (Iran)
March 2007
|
July 2006 |
Bank Sepah (Iran) |
January 2007 |
Kalaye Electic Company |
February 2007 |
Defense Industries Organization (Iran) |
March 2007 |
Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program), Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program), Fajr Industries |
June 2007 |
June 2007 Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran); Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea). |
September 2007 |
September 2007
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; |
October 21, 2007 |
Individuals: Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official |
October 21, 2007 |
October 21, 2007 Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli) |
March 12, 2008 |
March 12, 2008
Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief); Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior |
July 8, 2008 |
chemicals for ballistic missile programs)
July 8, 2008
Karaj Nuclear Research Center; Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC); |
August 12, 2008 |
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8 |
September 10, 2008 |
IRISL Malta
September 10,
2008
Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense |
September 17, 2008 |
September 17,
2008
Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). Provides financial services to Iran |
October 22, 2008 |
October 22, 2008 Assa Corporation (alleged front for Bank Melli in New York property management, see text) |
December 17, 2008 |
|
March 3, 2009 |
; BMIIC Intel General
Trading
March 3, 2009
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi |
February 10, 2010 |
.
27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated IRISL ships.
Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or controlled by Iran |
June 16, 2010 |
under E.O. 13599.
June 16, 2010
Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) for |
September 7, 2010 |
Sept. 7, 2010
Pearl Energy Company (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat, Pearl Energy |
November 30, 2010 |
Mohammad Haji Pajand.
November 30,
2010
Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC; Ansar Bank (for providing |
December 21, 2010 |
Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM) |
May 17, 2011 |
Tidewater Middle East Company; Iran Air; Mehr-e Eqtesad Iranian Investment Co. |
June 23, 2011 |
. By Treasury—Javad Rahiqi |
November 21, 2011 |
Iran Maritime Industrial Company SADRA (owned by |
March 28, 2012 |
(IRISL)
March 28, 2012
Electronic Components Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN); Advanced |
July 12, 2012 |
Iran missile assistance)
July 12, 2012
Congressional Research Service
72
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
National Iranian Oil Company; Tehran Gostaresh, company owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Imam |
November 8, 2012 |
(services to IRGC)
November 8,
2012
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Fereidoun Abbasi Davani |
December 13, 2012 |
|
December 21, 2012 |
December 21,
2012
Babak Morteza Zanjani—chairmen of Sorinet Group that finances Iran |
April 11, 2013 |
. (owned by NIOC).
April 11, 2013
Iranian-Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB), for activities on behalf of the Export Development Bank |
May 9, 2013 |
May 9, 2013
For supporting Iran Air, the IRGC, and NIOC: Aban Air |
May 23, 2013 |
May 23, 2013 Bukovnya AE (Ukraine) for leasing aircraft to Iran Air. |
May 31, 2013 |
May 31, 2013
Several Iranian firms and persons: Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company; The Exploration |
December 12, 2013 |
December 12,
2013
Ali Canko (Turkey) and Tiva Sanat Group, |
February 6, 2014 |
|
April 29, 2014 |
April 29, 2014
By State: Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (nuclear research); Nuclear
By Treasury: Mohammad Javad Imarad and Arman Imanirad |
April 29, 2014
(by both State |
11 ballistic missile-related entities: Mabrooka Trading Co LLC (UAE); Hossein | January 17, 2016 |
Two Iranian entities subordinate to SHIG: Shahid Nuri Industries and Shahid Movahed | |
17 ballistic missile-related Entities. Abdollah Asgharzadeh Network ( | February 3, 2017 |
February 3, 2017
Ballistic missile-related entities. Rahim Ahmadi (linked to Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group); | May 17, 2017 |
| July 18, 2017 |
July 18, 2017
Missile entities related to Iran Simorgh space launch | July 28, 2017 |
| October 13, 2017 |
October 13, 2017
Five ballistic missile entities (owned or controlled by Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, SBIG) : Shahid | January 4, 2018 |
January 4, 2018
Green Wave Telecommunications (Malaysia) and Morteza Razavi (for supporting Fanamoj, |
January 12, 2018 |
January 12, 2018
Sayyed Mohammad Ali Haddadnezhad Tehrani, for supporting the IRGC Research and |
May 22, 2018 |
Bank Tejarat (for providing servides to support Bank Sepah); Trade Capital Bank (Belarus); Morteza |
November 5, 2018 |
Nov. 5, 2018
31 individuals/entities connected to Iran |
March 22, 2019 |
Petrochemicals Network: Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), for |
June 7, 2019 |
June 7, 2019
Missile Proliferation Entities: Hamid Dehghan, Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra LLC (PKGB), |
August 28, 2019 |
August 28, 2019
Iranian Space Entities: Astronautics Research Institute, Iran Space Agency, Iran Space Research |
September 3, 2019 |
Table D-2. Iran-Related Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224
(Terrorism Entities)
Entity
Date Named
Martyr’(Terrorism Entities)
Entity |
Date Named |
|
July 25, 2007 |
).
July 25, 2007
IRGC-Qods Force and Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbollah, Hamas, |
October 21, 2007 |
|
January 16, 2009 |
Qods Force senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi,Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad |
August 3, 2010 |
supporting Hezbollah. Liner Transport Kish (for providing shipping services to transport weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah) |
December 21, 2010 |
December 21, 2010
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander); Hamid Abdollahi (Qods force); Abdul Reza Shahlai |
October 11, 2011 |
Mahan Air (for transportation services to Qods Force) |
October 12, 2011 |
Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS) |
February 16, 2012 |
October 11, 2011
Mahan Air (for transportation services to Qods Force)
October 12, 2011
Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)
February 16, 2012
Five entities/persons for weapons shipments to Syria and an October 2011 shipment to Gambia, |
March 27, 2012 |
March 27, 2012
Mohammad Minai, senior Qods Force member involved in Iraq; Karim Muhsin al-Ghanimi, leader of |
November 8, 2012 |
November 8, 2012
Ukraine-Mediterranean Airlines (Um Air, Ukraine) for helping Mahan Air and Iran Air conduct illicit |
May 31, 2013 |
, front for Mahan Air;
Hamid Arabnejad, managing director of Mahan Air.
May 31, 2013
Several persons/entities in UAE aiding Mahan Air (see above): Blue Sky Aviation FZE; Avia Trust
Several IRGC-Qods Force offices
|
February 6, 2014 |
February 6, 2014
Meraj Air (for delivering weapons to Syria |
August 29, 2014 |
). Pouya Air
August 29, 2014
Al Naser Airlines (Iraq) for transferring nine aircraft to Mahan Air, which is a 13224 designee: Issam |
May 21, 2015 |
May 21, 2015
Four U.K.-based and two UAE-based entities for supporting Mahan Air. U.K.: Jeffrey John James |
March 24, 2016 |
March 24, 2016
Eight IRGC-QF and Hezbollah-related entities. Lebanon-Based IRGC-QF Network: Hasan |
February 3, 2017 |
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) |
October 13, 2017 |
Six entities involved in IRGC-QF counterfeiting: Reza Heidari; Pardazesh Tasvir Rayan Co. (Rayan |
November 20, 2017 |
November 20, 2017
Nine individuals and entities, disrupted by U.S.-UAE joint action, attempting to acquire |
May 10, 2018 |
’i.
May 10, 2018
Persons and entities providing IRGC-QF funds to Hezbollah |
May 15, 2018 |
May 15, 2018
Congressional Research Service
76
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Four persons for helping the Houthi missile program through the IRGC Aerospace |
May 22, 2018 |
|
October 16,2018 |
|
October 23, 2018 |
|
November 5, 2018 |
Four Hezbollah and IRGC-QF-related individuals who operate in Iraq : Shibl Mushin |
November 13, 2018 |
Individuals involved in a network through which Iran provides oil to Syria
Also designated under E.O. 13582 as part of the network: Promsyrioimport; Andrey Dogaev; Mir |
November 20, 2018 |
|
January 24, 2019 |
January 24, 2019
Iraq-related entities: Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN), Iraqi Shia militia; and HAN leader Akram Abbas |
March 5, 2019 |
25 individuals and entities that illicitly moved |
March 26, 2019 |
March 26, 2019
Iraq-based |
June 12, 2019 |
Congressional Research Service
June 12, 2019
77
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Eight IRGC Commanders: IRGC Navy Commander Ali Reza Tangsiri; IRGC Aerospace |
June 24, 2019 |
Hezbollah Parliamentarians: Two Hezbollah parliamentarians for using their parliamentary |
July 9, 2019 |
|
August 29, 2019 |
August 29, 2019
Financial Facilitators Moving Funds from IRGC-QF to Hamas: Muahmmad Sarur; Kamal |
August 29, 2019 |
August 29, 2019
Oil Tanker Seized and Released by Gibraltar: Adrian Darya 1 and Akhilesh Kumar (ship and |
August 30, 2019 |
August 30, 2019
Iran Oil Shipping Network: 16 entities and 10 persons, including: Rostam Qasemi (former Oil |
September 4, 2019 |
|
September 10, 2019 |
September 10, 2019
Central Bank. Central Bank of Iran, National Development Fund of Iran, and Etemad Tejarate Pars |
September 20, 2019 |
September 20, 2019
IRGC-QF Shipping Network to Yemen: Abdolhossein Khedri; Khedri Jahan Darya Co; |
December 11, 2019 |
December 11, 2019
Hezbollah Individuals and Entities |
February 26, 2020 |
Iran and Iraq-based front companies controlled or supporting the IRGC-QF |
March 26, 2020 |
Entity |
Date Named |
Total SA (France); Gazprom (Russia); and Petronas (Malaysia)—$2 billion project to develop South Pars gas |
May 18, 1998 |
Violation determined but
sanctions waived.
Congressional Research Service
Date Named
May 18, 1998
78
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO), Iran and Switzerland. Sanctioned for activities to develop Iran |
Sept. 30, 2010 |
Total (France); Statoil (Norway); ENI (Italy); and Royal Dutch Shell.
Exempted under ISA |
Sept. 30, 2010 |
Sept. 30, 2010
Inpex (Japan)
Exempted under the Special rule for divesting its remaining 10% stake in Azadegan oil field |
Nov. 17, 2010 |
.
Nov. 17, 2010
Belarusneft (Belarus, subsidiary of Belneftekhim) Sanctioned for $500 million contract with NICO (see |
March 29, 2011 |
Petrochemical Commercial Company International (PCCI) of Bailiwick of Jersey and Iran; Royal Oyster
Sanctioned under CISADA amendment to ISA imposing sanctions for selling gasoline to Iran or helping Iran |
May 24, 2011 |
May 24, 2011
Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. (China); Kuo Oil Pte Ltd. (Singapore); FAL Oil Co. (UAE)
Sanctioned for brokering sales or making sales to Iran of gasoline. |
January 12, 2012 |
Sytrol (Syria), for sales of gasoline to Iran. Sanctions remain. |
August 12, 2012 |
January 12, 2012
Sytrol (Syria), for sales of gasoline to Iran.
August 12, 2012
Dr. Dimitris Cambis; Impire Shipping; Kish Protection and Indemnity (Iran); and Bimeh Markasi-Central . Sanctioned under ISA provision on owning vessels that transport Iranian oil or |
March 14, 2013 |
Tanker Pacific; SAMAMA; and Allvale Maritime Tanker Pacific; SAMAMA; and Allvale Maritime
Sanctions lifted. Special rule applied after |
April 12, 2013 |
April 12, 2013
Ferland Co. Ltd. (Cyprus and Ukraine)
Sanctioned for cooperating with National Iranian Tanker Co. to illicitly sell Iranian crude oil. |
May 31, 2013 |
|
August 29, 2014 |
Table D-4. Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Nonproliferation
Act or Executive Order Order 12938 for Iran-Specific Violations
These designations expireexpired after two years, unless redesignated. The designations included in this table
are those that were applied specifically for proliferation activity involving Iran.
Entity |
Date Named |
Entity Date Named Baltic State Technical University and Glavkosmos, both of Russia. (both designations revoked in 2010) |
July 30, 1998 |
July 30, 1998
D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute ( |
January 8, 1999 |
Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea) |
January 2, 2001 |
Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea) and Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import-Export |
June 14, 2001 |
Three entities from China for proliferation to Iran |
January 16, 2002 |
Armen Sargsian and Lizen Open Joint Stock Co. (Armenia); Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov |
May 9, 2002 |
Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran. |
May 2003 |
Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan) |
July 4, 2003 |
May 9, 2002
Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.
May 2003
Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)
July 4, 2003
Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artillery shells to Iran. (Also |
September 17, 2003 |
September 17,
2003
13 entities from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan. |
April 1, 2004 |
April 1, 2004
14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. |
September 23, 2004 |
September 23,
2004
14 entities, mostly from China, for supplying of Iran |
December 2004 |
Nine entities, including from China (Norinco, Hondu Aviation, Dalian Sunny Industries, Zibo Chemet |
December 23, 2005 |
December 23,
2005
Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms |
July 28, 2006 |
Abu Hamadi (Iraq); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); Al Zargaa Optical and Electronics (Sudan); |
December 28, 2006 |
December 28,
2006
Rosobornexport, Tula Design, and Komna Design Office of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov (Russia); |
January 2007 (see below for Tula and Rosoboronexport removal) |
January 2007
14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. |
April 17, 2007 |
April 17, 2007
China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China); IRGC; |
October 23, 2008 |
BelTechExport (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl Lee; |
July 14, 2010 |
16 entities: Belarus: Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association; Beltech Export; China: Karl Lee; Dalian |
May 23, 2011 |
May 23, 2011
Belvneshpromservice (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl |
December 20, 2011 |
December 20,
2011
Congressional Research Service
80
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Al Zargaa Engineering Complex (Sudan); BST Technology and Trade Co. (China); China Precision Machinery |
February 5, 2013 (these designations, and prior designations above, have expired) |
February 5, 2013
Al Zargaa Engineering Complex (Sudan); Belvneshpromservice (Belarus); HSC Mic NPO Mashinostroyenia |
December 19, |
2014.
BST Technology and Trade Co. (China); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Li Fang Wei (China); Tianjin |
August 28, 2015 |
August 28, 2015
Asaib Ahl Haq (Iraqi Shiite militia); Katai |
June 28, 2016 Sanctions still active. |
June 28, 2016
11 entities sanctions for transfers of sensitive items to Iran |
March 21, 2017 |
Table D-5. Entities Designated under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992
of 1992
(all designations have expired or were lifted)
Entity
Date Named
Mohammad al-Khatib (Jordan); Protech Consultants Private (India)
December 13,
2003
(all designations have expired or were lifted)
Entity |
Date Named |
Mohammad al-Khatib (Jordan); Protech Consultants Private (India) |
December 13, 2003 |
China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Corp. (China); China Machinery and Equipment |
July 9, 2002 |
July 9, 2002
Table D-6. Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order
13438 (July 17, 2007)
Entity
Date Named
13438 (July 17, 2007)
Entity |
Date Named |
Ahmad Forouzandeh. Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, accused of |
January 8, 2008 |
Mahdi Army; Al Zawra Television Station and its owner, Mishan al-Jabburi.
January 8, 2008
Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander of the Qods Force; Akram Abbas Al Kabi, leader |
September 16, 2008 |
|
July 2, 2009 |
July 2, 2009
Table D-7. Iranians Designated Under Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights
Abusers (September 29, 2010)
These persons are named in a semiannual report to Congress, required under CISADA. Virtually all of the
persons on this list, and those listed under Executive order 13628 (below) are designated as human rights
abusers by the European Union, whose list contains 87 individuals, including several province-level prosecutors
Entity |
Date Named |
prosecutors
Entity
Date Named
Eight persons: IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari; Minister of Interior at time of June |
September 29, 2010 |
Two persons: Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Dowlatabadi (appointed August 2009), for |
February 23, 2011 |
February 23, 2011
Four entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Basij Resistance Force; Law |
June 9, 2011 |
June 9, 2011
Two persons: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hassan Firouzabadi; Deputy IRGC |
December 13, 2011 |
One entity: Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS) |
February 16, 2012 |
One person: Ashgar Mir-Hejazi for human rights abuses on/after June 12, 2009, and for |
May 30, 2013 |
May 30, 2013
One entity: Abyssec, for training the IRGC in cyber tradecraft and supporting its |
December 30, 2014 |
December 30, 2014
One entity and One person: Tehran Prisons Organization. For severe beating of prisoners |
April 13, 2017 |
Persons and entities designated following repression of December 2017-January 2018 |
January 12, 2018 |
January 12, 2018
Ansar-e Hezbollah internal security militia designations: Ansar-e Hezbollah; Ansar leaders |
May 30, 3018 |
May 30, 3018
Ghavamin Bank (for assisting Iran |
November 5, 2018 |
Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade |
January 24, 2019 |
Table D-8. Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13572 for Repression
of the Syrian People
(April 29, 2011)
Entity
Date Named
Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
April 29, 2011
(April 29, 2011)
Entity |
Date Named |
Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force (IRGC-QF) |
April 29, 2011 |
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force Commander); Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Qods Force |
May 18, 2011 |
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) |
February 16, 2012 |
Table D-9. Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13606 (GHRAVITY,
April 23, 2012))
Entity
Date Named
April 23, 2012))
Entity |
Date Named |
|
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); IRGC (Guard Cyber Defense Command); Law |
April 23, 2012 |
|
IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization |
January 12, 2018 |
|
Hanista Programming Group. For operating technology that monitors or tracks computers |
May 30, 2018 |
Table D-10. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13608 Targeting Sanctions
Evaders (May 1, 2012)
Entity
Date Named
Evaders (May 1, 2012)
Entity |
Date Named |
Ferland Company Ltd. for helping NITC deceptively sell Iranian crude oil |
May 31, 2013 |
May 31, 2013
Three persons based in the Republic of Georgia: Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and
|
February 6, 2014 |
February 6, 2014
Evren Kayakiran (Turkey) for directing employees to provide U.S. products and services to |
February 7, 2019 |
Iran
February 7, 2019
Table D-11. Entities Named as Iranian Government Entities Under Executive Order
13599 (February 5, 2012)
Hundreds of entities—many of which are names and numbers of individual ships and aircraft—were
designated under this order to implement the JCPOA, and removed from the list of SDNs, in order that
secondary sanctions not apply. Those entities are in italics. Others were designated as owned or
controlled by the government of Iran before the JCPOA. As of November 5, 2018, all the entities
designated under E.O. 13599 are subject to secondary sanctions.
Entity |
Date Named |
Entity
Two insurance companies: Bimeh Iran Insurance Company (U.K.) Ltd
Company.
Congressional Research Service
Date Named
June 16, 2010
83
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
20 Petroleum and Petrochemical Entities: MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran |
June 16, 2010 |
Central Bank of Iran |
February 12, 2012 |
(aka Bank Markazi)
February 12, 2012
Shipping Companies: Arash Shipping Enterprises Ltd.; Arta Shipping Enterprises Ltd.; Asan
Energy Firms )
58 vessels of National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC)
Banks: Ansar Bank; Future Bank B.S.C |
July 12, 2012 |
Development
July 12, 2012
Entities and persons helping Iran evade oil shipping sanctions: Dimitris Cambis |
March 14, 2013 |
.
March 14, 2013
Sambouk Shipping FZC, which is tied to Dr. Dimitris Cambis and his network of front |
May 9, 2013 |
Eight petrochemicals companies: Bandar Imam; Bou Ali Sina; Mobin; Nouri; Pars; Shahid |
May 31, 2013 |
Tabriz.
May 31, 2013
Six individuals including Seyed Nasser Mohammad Seyyedi, director of Sima General Trading
Four businesses used by Seyyedi to assist NIOC and NICO front companies: AA Energy |
September 6, 2013 |
Swiss Management Services
Sarl.
September 6, 2013
Execution of Imam |
January 4, 2013 |
.
Five Iranian banks: Khavarmianeh Bank, |
August 29, 2014 |
|
November 5, 2018 |
sanctions.
November 5, 2018
Five unnamed Iranian ship captains for delivering gasoline to Venezuela
June 24, 2020
Table D-12. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13622 for Oil and
Petrochemical Purchases from Iran and Precious Metal Transactions with Iran (July (July 30, 2012)
Entity
Date Named
30, 2012)
Entity |
Date Named |
Jam Petrochemical Company (for purchasing petrochemical products from Iran); Niksima Food |
May 31, 2013 |
May 31, 2013
Asia Bank (for delivering from Moscow to Tehran of $13 million in U.S. bank notes paid to |
August 29, 2014 |
August 29, 2014
Five individuals and one company for helping Iran acquire U.S. banknotes: Hossein Zeidi, Trading. Anahita Nasirbeik—Asia Bank official (see above). |
December 30, 2014 |
December 30, 2014
Table D-13. Entities Sanctioned under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation
Act (IFCA, P.L. 112-239)
Entity
Date Named
Goldentex FZE (UAE)
August 29, 2014
Zhuhai Zhenrong (China) for purchasing oil from Iran
July 22, 2019
Global Industrial and Engineering Supply Ltd. (China and Hong Kong) For transferring
graphite to IRISL
June 25, 2020
Table D-14. Entities Designated as Human Rights Abusers under Executive Order
13628 (October 9, 2012, pursuant to ITRSHRA)
Entity
Ali Fazli, deputy commander of the Basij; Reza Taghipour, Minister of Communications and
Information Technology; LEF Commander Moghaddam (see above); Center to Investigate
Organized Crime (established by the IRGC to protect the government from cyberattacks;
Press Supervisory Board, established in 1986 to issue licenses to publications and oversee
news agencies; Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Rasool Jalili, active in assisting the
government’s internet censorship activities; Anm Afzar Goster-e-Sharif, (censorship
equipment); PekyAsa, another company owned by Jalili, to develop telecom software.
Congressional Research Service
Date Named
November 8, 2012
85
Iran Sanctions
Entity
Date Named
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and Ezzatollah Zarghami (director and head of
IRIB); Iranian Cyber Police (hacks email accounts of political activists); Iranian
Communications Regulatory Authority (filters Internet content); Iran Electronics Industries
Act (IFCA, P.L. 112-239)
Entity |
Date Named |
Goldentex FZE (UAE) |
August 29, 2014 |
Zhuhai Zhenrong (China) for purchasing oil from Iran |
July 22, 2019 |
Table D-14. Entities Designated as Human Rights Abusers or Limiting Free Expression under Executive Order 13628 (October 9, 2012, E.O pursuant to Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act)
Entity |
Date Named |
Ali Fazli, deputy commander of the Basij; Reza Taghipour, Minister of Communications and Information Technology; LEF Commander Moghaddam (see above); Center to Investigate Organized Crime (established by the IRGC to protect the government from cyberattacks; Press Supervisory Board, established in 1986 to issue licenses to publications and oversee news agencies; Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Rasool Jalili, active in assisting the government's internet censorship activities; Anm Afzar Goster-e-Sharif, company owned by Jalili, above, to provide web monitoring and censorship gear; PekyAsa, another company owned by Jalili, to develop telecom software. |
November 8, 2012 |
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and Ezzatollah Zarghami (director and head of IRIB); Iranian Cyber Police (filters websites and hacks email accounts of political activists); Iranian Communications Regulatory Authority (filters internet content); Iran Electronics Industries (producer of electronic systems and products including those for jamming, eavesdropping |
February 6, 2013 |
(producer of electronic systems and products including those for jamming, eavesdropping
February 6, 2013
Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content for engaging in censorship |
May 30, 2013 |
|
May 23, 2014 |
May 23, 2014
Douran Software Technologies, for acting on behalf of the Committee to Determine |
December 30, 2014 |
December 30, 2014
Two entities that blocked social media sites and websites: Supreme Council for Cyberspace, |
January 12, 2018 |
January 12, 2018
IRIB Director General Abdulali Ali-Asgari (see above); Abolhassan Firouzabadi (Secretary of |
May 30, 3018 |
Table D-15. Entities Designated under E.O. I3645 on Auto production, Rial Trading,
Precious Stones, and Support to NITC (June 3, 3, 2013)
Entity
Date Named
2013)
Entity |
Date Named |
Five entities/persons supporting NITC: Mid Oil Asia (Singapore); Singa Tankers (Singapore); |
December 12, 2012 |
December 12, 2012
Three entities/persons for deceptive Iran oil dealings: Saeed Al Aqili (co-owner of Al Aqili |
April 29, 2014 |
April 29, 2014
Faylaca Petroleum (for obscuring the origin of Iranian sales of gas condensates); |
August 29, 2014 |
August 29, 2014
Table D-16. Entities Designated under Executive Order 13581 on Transnational
Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011)
Entity |
Date Named |
|
Entity
Four individuals/entities: Ajily Software Procurement Group, Andisheh Vesal Middle East |
July 18, 2017 |
Table D-17. Entities Designated under Executive Order 13694 on Malicious Cyber
Activities (April 1, 2015)
Entity
Date Named
Activities (April 1, 2015)
Entity |
Date Named |
Eight individuals/entities: ITSec Team, for 2011-12 distributed denial of services attacks on |
September 14, 2017 |
September 14,
2017
Ten individuals and one entity, for theft of data from U.S. and third-country universities: |
March 23, 2018 |
March 23, 2018
Ali Khorashadizadeh and Mohammad Ghorbaniyan. For helping exchange bitcoin digital |
November 28, 2018 |
“SamSam”
ransomware scheme.
November 28,
2018
Table D-18. Entities Designated under Executive Order E.O.13846 Reimposing Sanctions
(August 6, 2018)
Entity
Date Named
Ayandeh Bank (for materially assisting IRIB).
November 5, 2018
Subsidiaries of China’(August 6, 2018)
Entity |
Date Named |
Ayandeh Bank (for materially assisting IRIB). |
November 5, 2018 |
|
September 25, 2019 |
September 25,
2019
Under Section 7 of the E.O. (Human Rights related provision sanctioning persons who limit |
December 19, 2019 |
Several petrochemical companies for brokering sales of Iranian oil and other |
January 23, 2020 |
January 23, 2020
Entities involved in petrochemical transactions with Iran |
March 18, 2020 |
March 18, 2020
UAE Companies facilitating Iran petrochemical and oil sales |
March 19, 2020 |
For facilitating Iran petrochemical transactions: Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd |
January 23, 2020 |
Entity |
Date Named |
Pamchel Trading Beijing Ltd; Power Anchor Ltd (Seychelles); Hongyuan Marine Co.; |
January 10. 2020 |
January 10. 2020
Affiliates of Iran’s Mobarakeh Steel Company: Iran – Metil Steel; South Aluminum
Company; Sirjan Jahan Steel Complex; and Iran Central Iron Ore Company. Others: Tara
Steel GmbH (Germany); UAE - Pacific Steel FZE; Better Future General Trading Co LLC;
and Tuka Metal Trading DMCC.
June 25, 2020
Table D-20. Entities Designated as Gross Human Rights Violators under Section
7031(c) of Foreign Aid Appropriations
Entity
Date Named
Two Iranian prisons: Great Tehran Penitentiary; Qarchak Prison
December 5, 2019
Hassan Shahvarpour - IRGC commander of Vali Asr unit
January 18, 2020
Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli (Interior Minister), and Ali Fallahian (Intelligence head during 19891997)
May 20, 2020
7031(c) of Foreign Aid Appropriations
Entity |
Date Named |
Two Iranian prisons: Great Tehran Penitentiary; Qarchak Prison |
December 5, 2019 |
Hassan Shahvarpour - IRGC commander of Vali Asr unit |
January 18, 2020 |
Table D-21. Entities Designated under E.O. 13876 on the Supreme Leader and his
Office (June 24, 2019)
Entity
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
Date Named
July 31, 2019
Office (June 24, 2019)
Entity |
Date Named |
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif |
July 31, 2019 |
Ten High-Ranking Officials/Personalities and One Major Entity: Ebrahim Raisi (head of the |
November 4, 2019 |
November 4, 2019
Ali Shamkhani—Secretary General of Iran Supreme National Security Council; |
January 10, 2020 |
January 10, 2020
Congressional Research Service
88
Iran Sanctions
Members of Council of Guardians and Elections Supervision Committee (for |
February 20, 2020 |
February 20, 2020
Table D-22. Executive Order 13818 Implementing the Global Magnitsky Act
(December 20, 2017)
Entity
Date Named
(December 20, 2017)
Entity |
Date Named |
Iran-backed Iraqi militia figures: Qais al-Khazali (head of |
December 6, 2019 |
Author Contact Information
1. |
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tar2010.pdf. |
2. |
For details on these issues, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10104, It Belongs in a Museum: Sovereign Immunity Shields Iranian Antiquities Even When It Does Not Protect Iran, by Stephen P. Mulligan; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10140, Iran's Central Bank Asks Supreme Court to Consider Whether the Bank's Assets Abroad are Immune from Attachment to Satisfy Terror Judgments, by Jennifer K. Elsea. |
3. |
Department of Treasury. Treasury Targets Assets of Iranian Leadership. June 4, 2013. |
4. |
See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20181105_names.aspx. |
5. |
For a full list of entities designated under E.O. 13599, go to the following link: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/13599/13599list.pdf. |
6. |
U.S. diplomatic "non-paper" provided to CRS. |
7. |
For text of the amendments to the Order, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-modernizing-sanctions-combat-terrorism/ |
8. |
"Exclusive: U.S. Carves out Exceptions for Foreigners Dealing with Revolutionary Guards." Reuters, April 21, 2019. |
9. |
The executive order was issued not only under the authority of IEEPA but also the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and §301 of Title 3, United States Code. |
10. |
Imports were mainly of artwork for exhibitions around the United States, which are counted as imports even though the works return to Iran after the exhibitions conclude. |
11. |
The text of the guidance is at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf. |
12. |
Shipping insurers granted the waiver included Assuranceforeningen Skuld, Skuld Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Ltd. (Bermuda), Gard P and I Ltd. (Bermuda), Assuranceforeningen Gard, the Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, The North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association Ltd., the Shipowners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg), the Standard Club Ltd., the Standard Club Europe Ltd., The Standard Club Asia, the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Bermuda), the Swedish Club, United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association Ltd. (Bermuda), United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Association Ltd. (Europe), and the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (Luxembourg). |
13. |
Reuters, February 21, 2014; "Exclusive: Boeing Says Gets U.S. License to Sell Spare Parts to Iran," Reuters, April 4, 2014. |
14. |
Tasnim news agency. August 14, 2019. |
15. | |
16. |
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/gl_food_exports.pdf. |
17. |
The text of General License H can be found at Treasury Department: Archive of Revoked and Expired General Licenses. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/general_license_archive.aspx#iran |
18. |
The Federal Register (Volume 77, Number 219) "Policy Guidance" defines what products and chemicals constitute "petroleum," "petroleum products," and "petrochemical products" that are used in the laws and executive orders discussed throughout the report. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf. |
19. |
As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195), these definitions include pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects. CISADA also changes the definition of investment to eliminate the exemption from sanctions for sales of energy-related equipment to Iran, if such sales are structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures. |
20. |
Under §4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. P.L. 111-195 explicitly sets the threshold investment level at $20 million. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and transactions subject to sanctions included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993). |
21. |
The original ISA definition of energy sector included oil and natural gas, and CISADA added to that definition liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG. |
22. |
A definition of chemicals and products considered "petrochemical products" is found in a Policy Guidance statement. See Federal Register, November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf. |
23. |
A definition of what chemicals and products are considered "petroleum products" for the purposes of the order are in the policy guidance issued November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf. |
24. |
Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-laundering for use to further WMD programs. |
25. |
Tough US warning on Iran gas pipeline. Dawn, March 1, 2012. |
26. |
This termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293 formally removed Libya from the act. Application of the act to Libya terminated on April 23, 2004, with a determination that Libya had fulfilled U.N. requirements. |
27. |
Text of letter from Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez to Secretary Geithner, January 19, 2012. |
28. |
Treasury Issues General License No. 8 Regarding Certain Permitted Humanitarian Trade Transactions Involving the Central Bank of Iran. JDSupra. March 12, 2020. |
29. |
Department of State. Background Briefing on President Trump's Decision to Withdraw from the JCPOA. May 8, 2018. |
30. |
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil. April 22, 2019. |
31. |
U.S. to warn shippers against storing Iranian oil: State Department official. Reuters, March 9, 2020. |
32. |
The act originally only applied to advanced conventional weapons. The extension to WMD, defined as chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons-related technology was added by the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106). |
33. |
The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria. |
34. |
For text of the OFAC ruling barring U-Turn transactions, see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/fr73_66541.pdf. |
35. |
See Katherine Bauer. "Potential U.S. Clarification of Financial Sanctions Regulations." April 5, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/potential-u.s.-clarification-of-financial-sanctions-regulations. |
36. |
Analyst conversations with U.S. banking and sanctions experts. 2010-2015. |
37. |
Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system. |
38. |
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1367.aspx. |
39. |
Treasury and State Announce New Humanitarian Mechanism to Increase Transparency of Permissible Trade Supporting the Iranian People. October 25, 2019. |
40. |
June 2019 FATF statement is at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/iran/documents/public-statement-june-2019.html. |
41. |
FATF Public Statement. October 2019. |
42. | |
43. |
Dept. of State. Findings Pursuant to the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) of 2012. October 31, 2019. |
44. |
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Sanctions Iranian Security Forces for Human Rights Abuses, June 9, 2011. |
45. |
Christopher Rhoads, "Iran's Web Spying Aided by Western Technology," Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2009. |
46. |
Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran, March 20, 2012. |
47. | |
48. |
Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Senior Officials of the Government of Iran. September 25, 2019. |
49. |
Security Council resolutions that reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter represent actions taken with respect to threats to international peace and acts of aggression. Article 41 of that Chapter, in general, provides for enforcement of the resolution in question through economic and diplomatic sanctions, but not through military action. |
50. | |
51. |
The report is reprinted in, Iran Watch, at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/united-nations/un-secretary-general/third-report-secretary-general-implementation-security-council-resolution-2231. |
52. | |
53. |
The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm. |
54. |
Daniel Fineren, "Iran Nuclear Deal Shipping Insurance Element May Help Oil Sales," Reuters, November 24, 2013. |
55. |
White House Office of the Press Secretary. "Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program," November 23, 2013. |
56. |
http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/blog/translation-iranian-factsheet-nuclear-negotiations; and author conversations with a wide range of Administration officials, think tank, and other experts, in Washington, DC, 2015. |
57. |
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/full-text-iran-deal-120080.html. |
58. |
For more information on these Executive Orders and their provisions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack. |
59. |
The JCPOA did commit the United States to terminate sanctions with respect to some entities designated for sanctions under INKSNA. |
60. |
For more information on this option, see CRS Report R44942, U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen. |
61. |
US to release legal opinion it can demand resumption of UN sanctions on Iran. Times of Israel, December 15, 2019. |
62. |
Note: CRS has no mandate or capability to "judge" compliance of any country with U.S. or other sanctions against Iran. This section is intended to analyze some major trends in third country cooperation with U.S. sanctions. |
63. |
During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran's human rights record, Iran's efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counternarcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI. |
64. |
"Iran Nuclear Deal: The EU's Billion-Dollar Deals at Risk," BBC News, May 11, 2018. |
65. |
Germany's Central Bank Imposes Rule to Stop Cash Delivery to Tehran. Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2018. |
66. |
"U.S. Grants BP, Serica License to Run Iran-Owned North Sea Field." Reuters, October 9, 2018. |
67. |
Joint Statement on the New Mechanism to Facilitate Trade with Iran. January 31, 2019. |
68. |
Pompeo Comes to Europe With a Tough Iran Message. Real Clear Politics, June 1, 2019. |
69. |
EU Ramps Up Trade System With Iran Despite U.S. Threats. Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2020. |
70. |
Trump Administration cool to French plan for $15 billion Iranian credit line: officials. Reuters, September 4, 2019; Press briefing by Ambassador Brian Hook. September 4, 2019. |
71. |
Avi Jorish, "Despite Sanctions, Iran's Money Flow Continues," Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2013. |
72. |
What Spurs Iran's Mahan Air To Continue Flights To China Despite Public Outrage? Radio Farda, March 13, 2020. |
73. |
"The United States to Impose Sanctions on Chinese Firm Zhuhai Zhenrong Company Limited for Purchasing Oil from Iran. Department of State. July 22, 2019. |
74. |
"Boxed In: $1 billion of Iranian Crude Sits at China's Dalian Port. Reuters. May 1, 2019. |
75. |
Thomas Erdbrink. "China's Push to Link East and West Puts Iran at 'Center of Everything.'" New York Times, July 25, 2017. |
76. |
China and Iran Flesh out Strategic Partnership. Petroleum Economist, September 3, 2019. |
77. |
"As U.S. Sanctions Loom, China's Bank of Kunlun to Stop Receiving Iran Payments—Sources." Reuters, October 23, 2018. |
78. |
OFAC Crystallizes Expectations for Sanctions Compliance. April 1, 2019. |
79. |
Author conversations with South Korean officials. 2019. |
80. |
"India Seeks to Pay $6.5 Billion to Iran for Oil Imports." Economic Times of India. May 16, 2016. |
81. |
Department of Justice. Turkish Bank Charged In Manhattan Federal Court For Its Participation In A Multibillion-Dollar Iranian Sanctions Evasion Scheme. October 15, 2019. |
82. |
"US Acts to Block Turkish Firm from Sending GE Engines to Iran," Reuters, January 6, 2014. |
83. |
The CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman, discusses the relations between Iran and other Middle Eastern states. |
84. |
Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran's Central Bank, in accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the "determination of waiver." |
85. |
"Obama Misled Congress, Tried and Failed to Give Iran Secret Access to US Banks Before the Deal." Business Insider, June 6, 2018; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report. "Review of U.S. Treasury Department's License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System." May 2018. |
86. |
Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2020. |
87. |
Iran Signs Phone, Gas Deals with Syria. Agence France Presse, January 17, 2017. |
88. |
Barbara Slavin, "Obama Administration Holds Up Environmental Grants to Iran," Al Monitor, June 23, 2014. |
89. |
"Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. May 11, 2017. This language was not contained in the 2018 version of the testimony. |
90. |
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019. |
91. |
Testimony of Ambassador Brian Hook before the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. June 19, 2019. |
92. |
"Sanctions on Iran are Hitting Hezbollah," Washington Post, May 19, 2019. |
93. |
Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran. August 6, 2018. |
94. |
Testimony of Special Representative Brian Hook. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 16, 2019. |
95. |
"Foreign Investors Flock to Iran as U.S. Firms Watch on the Sidelines." Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2017. |
96. |
Forecast Says Sharp Drop in Iran's Economic Growth Rate. Radio Farda, September 2, 2018. World Bank: Iran Likely to Suffer Worse Recession Than Previously Thought. VOA News, June 2, 2019; IMF, October 2016. |
97. |
CRS conversation with Department of the Treasury officials. July 2015. |
98. |
Iran, Cut Off From Vital Cash Reserves, Faces Deeper Economic Peril, U.S. Says. Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2019. |
99. |
Al Monitor. October 21, 2019. |
100. |
Ibid. |
101. |
Testimony of Patrick Clawson before the Senate Banking Committee. January 21, 2015. |
102. |
How Trump's terrorist designation of Iran's revolutionary guard impacts its economy. CNBC, April 12, 2019. |
103. |
Patrick Clawson testimony, January 21, 2015, op. cit. |
104. |
Thomas Erdbrink. "New Iran Battle Brews over Foreign Oil Titans." New York Times, February 1, 2016. |
105. |
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fresh-sanctions-on-iran-are-already-choking-off-medicine-imports-economists-say/2018/11/17/c94ce574-e763-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/trump-s-sanctions-are-proving-a-bitter-pill-for-iran-s-sick; https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1029/In-Iran-US-sanctions-are-being-felt-with-harsher-measures-to-come. |
106. |
"Global Traders Halt New Iran Food Deals as U.S. Sanctions Bite." Reuters, December 21, 2018. |
107. |
State Department. Iran's Sanctions Relief Scam. April 6, 2020. |
108. |
Thomas Erdbink, "Iran's Aging Airliner Fleet Seen As Faltering Under U.S. Sanctions," July 14, 2012. |
109. |
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/iran-sanctions-us-european-humanitarian-supplies. |
110. |
Press release from Senator Robert Menendez: Menendez & Engel Propose Policies for Addressing COVID-19 in Iran. April 3, 2020; Feinstein urges Trump to reverse plan to block Iran request for $5B in IMF aid, claims it is in 'our national interest' Fox News, April 11, 2020. |
111. |
For more information on the issue of judgments for victims of Iranian terrorism, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea. |
112. |
See CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. |